

**PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: AN AMERICAN VIEW**

**Marten van Heuven**

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## PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: AN AMERICAN VIEW

My task is to give you some views on the "Partnership for Peace" proposal advanced by Secretary of Defense Aspin at the recent meeting of NATO Defense Ministers at Travemuende. These views are, of course, personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of the United States government, nor of RAND.<sup>1</sup>

The subject warrants a number of comments. I shall mention five:

- The proposal is only one of the issues that will shape the future of NATO.
- NATO enlargement is an unavoidable issue.
- Timing of the NATO Summit is not without problems.
- All approaches to enlargement have drawbacks.
- The enlargement issue poses the question of Western policy with respect to Russia.

The agenda of the NATO Summit will include two major themes. One is how to adapt NATO to a changed world and to new threats. The other deals with the relationship between NATO and the members of the former Warsaw Pact. There are other issues, to be sure, including:

- How to strengthen the European component of NATO
- How to bring the French closer to NATO planning
- How to deal with burden sharing
- How to promote democracy and economic reforms in Eastern Europe

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<sup>1</sup>Presentation at an open meeting at the Ministry of Defense Information Center in The Hague, Netherlands, on November 4, 1993, organized by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission and chaired by Ambassador Charles Rutten, Vice Chairman of the Board of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission. The Russian view, not reproduced here, was presented by Dr. Pavel Baev, Head of Section for Military-Political Studies, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow).

- How to handle peacekeeping.

"Partnership for Peace" is the Clinton Administration's answer to the question of NATO enlargement. Though its contours are vague at present--they will no doubt be sharpened during the consultations leading up to the Summit--the concept includes the following elements:

- Within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), individual arrangements between NATO and individual nonmember countries providing for
- Joint exercises, training, and operational cooperation in peacekeeping and other crisis management activities, contingent on
- Democratic government, civilian control of the military, and open budget processes in the nonmember country, with
- Participation open to members of the NACC and former neutrals.

The enlargement of NATO is driven by the security vacuum in which the Eastern Europeans find themselves. The Soviet Union is gone. The Russians have mostly left Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact has disappeared. Eastern Europeans are reasserting their Europeanness and looking westward. For them, in the words of Yogi Berra, the future ain't what it used to be.

Eastern Europe also faces new dangers. Though the vital threat of massive pressure or invasion from the Soviet Union has disappeared, there is a residual Russian threat arising from political instability and difficult economic reform in Russia, and from the large stockpile of nuclear weapons under possibly uncertain control. Moreover, old disputes about borders and minority rights are reemerging. Some hark back a long way, as does the Serb view of the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 as a defining moment of the Serb nation. In Czechoslovakia, old disputes led to a velvet separation. In the former Yugoslavia, the breakup has been violent. Eastern Europeans do not feel ready to cope with these uncertainties.

Eastern European governments are putting their hopes on the organizations that have served Western Europe--the European Community for prosperity and NATO for security. NATO membership is now the declared objective of all Eastern European countries, including Albania. The NACC provides a welcome roof for cooperation with members of NATO. However, it is felt not to be enough.

The timing of the Summit is good. This will be the first visit of the new U.S. president to Europe. It affords him the opportunity personally to define and explain America's role in the new Europe. This will also be an opportunity for the Alliance to reorient and redefine itself, to deal with new issues and to achieve closer cooperation with France. But most importantly, it will lay the groundwork for new cooperative relationships with the Eastern Europeans.

Nonetheless, the timing of the Summit presents problems. With everything in Europe in flux and the process of change accelerating, the Summit will not find it easy to capture the moment. When asked once by a journalist what had been his greatest problem when in office, former British Prime Minister Macmillan ruefully remarked: "Events, young man, events."

Furthermore, neither the United States nor the other participants may be ready to deal effectively with such difficult issues as peacekeeping, burden sharing, and relations with Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. These factors could affect negatively Summit results.

Broadly speaking, there are three options on how to deal with the issue of enlargement at the Summit.

The first is to do nothing, to leave NATO membership as it is, and to focus on the broader agenda of the NACC as the best way to bring nonmembers into the NATO orbit. This approach would leave a security vacuum and fall way below the expectations of the Eastern European countries. It would suggest that NATO was unconcerned about the security problems faced by the Eastern Europeans. It would add, furthermore, to the impression that NATO is not relevant to today's issues of European security.

A second option advocated by three of my colleagues at RAND would be to tackle head-on the issue of enlargement by starting a process explicitly aimed at bringing the Visegrad countries--the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia--into the Alliance as members.<sup>2</sup> The objective would be to support democracy in those countries, help reform, and provide a much-needed sense of security. The process would parallel the enlargement process of the European Community; these countries would in due course also join the Community and become members of the Western European Union.

This option would respond to the desire of the Visegrad countries to join NATO. It could help preclude possible revival of anti-Western nationalism. It would facilitate processes for reform. It would contribute strongly to the Atlantic orientation of these countries. Germany would be relieved of the burden of being a border state. Security guarantees for the new members would be spelled out through NATO rather than derivatively, through the Community and the Western European Union. The approach would be responsive to NATO Secretary General Woerner's repeated plea that now is the time for the Alliance to open a new perspective "to those countries of Central and Eastern Europe which want to join NATO and which we may consider eligible for future membership."<sup>3</sup> The logical result of this approach would be to extend so-called Article V guarantees--to regard an attack against any one of them as an attack on all NATO countries--to the new members of NATO.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4 (September-October 1993), pp. 28-40.

<sup>3</sup>See speech by Secretary General of NATO Manfred Woerner to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Brussels, September 10, 1993, NATO Press Service.

<sup>4</sup>"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.," Article V, North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat 2241, TIAS No. 1964.

The option would not provide instant membership. It would proceed in phases of expanding cooperation. It would, moreover, be conditional on commitment to democratic rule, to reform of civilian-military relations, to renunciation of territorial claims, to respect for the rights of minorities, and to willingness to participate in the full range of NATO activities.

A third option would be partnership for peace, the notion advanced in outline by Secretary of Defense Aspin at Travemuende. The goals of this concept are twofold: To advance the ability of the Alliance to act effectively in peacekeeping and other crisis management activities, and to demonstrate in concrete terms NATO's willingness to fashion new security relationships to the East and to establish a process for the evolution of defense cooperation.

This third option would involve individually negotiated arrangements with Eastern European countries to further defense cooperation. The arrangements or agreements would include the possibility of consultations, in the event of a threat to their security, like those provided for under Article IV of the NATO Treaty.<sup>5</sup> They would not constitute Article V guarantees. They would be implemented within the context of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Partnership for peace moves toward but does not fully meet the desires of the Eastern Europeans.<sup>6</sup> It does not extend Article V security guarantees but provides a sense of security under Article IV.<sup>7</sup> It leaves open for now the issue of membership.<sup>8</sup> It will acquire firmer

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<sup>5</sup>Article IV provides that "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."

<sup>6</sup>"We have a feeling that the leaders of the NATO countries don't understand the real situation in this region." Laszlo Kovacs, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, as quoted in FBIS-WEU-93.

<sup>7</sup>Extension of Article V guarantees eastward in Europe would almost certainly require formal Senate consent. Partnership for peace, however, can be pursued by the Executive Branch of the United States Government without formal recourse to the Congress. Congressional interest would, of course, be high, and a congressional role in approving Partnership for Peace is therefore likely.

shape during the process of consultations that will precede the Summit.<sup>9</sup> It leaves open who may eventually join from the ranks of the NACC or former neutral countries.<sup>10</sup>

Partnership for peace poses the question of Western policy with respect to Russia. Indeed, had it not been for the favorable comments made by Russian President Yeltsin during his August visit to Warsaw, the issue would not have acquired its current momentum. The latest signals from Moscow are far less forthcoming and now include the notion that NATO and Russia could jointly guarantee the security of Eastern Europe. The Russian military, meanwhile, have made clear their dislike of an eastward extension of NATO.

Under these circumstances, the West could bow to Russian sensitivities or it can do what it thinks best. The latter would be the right policy.

It is difficult for anyone who has grown up with the division of Europe to break out of the old pattern of thinking about the nature and the structures of Europe. If we want to get our policy right, however, we must do so.

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<sup>8</sup>"Partnership for Peace" is an apprenticeship going nowhere.... It finesses the question of America's future commitment to Europe." William Pfaff, *Baltimore Sun*, November 1, 1993.

<sup>9</sup>"Behind a misty wall of words one can see only the blurred contours of a clear [American] policy towards Eastern Europe," Stephen Kornelius, "NATO Orders Itself a Long Break to Think," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, October 23-24, 1993, p. 4, as quoted in FBIS-WEU-93-204, October 25, 1993.

<sup>10</sup>In response to a question on whether in the future Russia and the other former Warsaw Pact countries would be full members of NATO, Secretary of State Christopher responded: "It's an evolutionary process, but that certainly is not excluded. The 'Partnership for Peace' permits any country which is now a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the so-called NACC, to participate as a partner and to provide the possibility of training together with NATO forces, consulting together with NATO forces, seeing if we can work out a degree of interoperability on such problems as search and rescue, so that possibility is not excluded as we move forward in this process of the expansion of NATO.... I would say that we welcome the opportunity in an evolutionary way to consider an admission of all the countries that are now a part of the NACC." Secretary of State Warren Christopher during a joint press conference with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, Budapest, October 21, 1993, cited in United States Information Agency, European Wireless File, October 23, 1993.



First, we must realize that Europe is no longer divided--that it is one. The Eastern Europeans' claim to Europeanness is as valid as that made by the countries of the European Community. Power has moved from Moscow to the center of Europe. Eastern Europeans look to that center for help with their security and their reforms. The major task facing Western Europe today is to embrace the Eastern European countries that have come in from the cold. It would be ironic, now that Soviet power has retreated from Eastern Europe and Ukraine, not to recognize that the security of the new Europe is indivisible. It would be a miscalculation to leave the Eastern Europeans in a destabilizing security vacuum that Russia cannot fill. The West handled German unification with an eye first to its own interests, recognizing but not bowing to Soviet sensitivities. It should do so again.

This is not to say that the opening up of NATO to the east should be done in a manner that is in any way hostile. On the contrary, the reach of NATO to the east--gradual and careful--should be done and seen as way to construct bridges to Russia. Partnership for peace fits alongside a strategy of engagement with Russia in common tasks, recognizing Russian sensitivities, seeking to build on Russian capabilities, and acknowledging Russian interests.

If we think of NATO as an organization for the defense of the territory of its members, it is indeed hard to see how, in an era of reduced military forces, NATO could move its borders and extend a nuclear guarantee hundreds of miles to the east. If, however, we think of NATO instead as a tool for promoting a secure, free, democratic, and prosperous unified Europe seeking to overcome the legacies that create insecurity, enlargement is the right policy.

NATO enlargement, moreover, will be a natural complement to the enlargement of the European Community. While membership in each does not require any particular sequence or synchronization, there should be a pattern of rough parallelism. In the new Europe it is natural for neutrals and Eastern Europeans to join the European Community as a way to greater prosperity. It is also natural to enlarge NATO to enhance European security.