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# Integrated Deterrence as a Defense Planning Concept

The primary U.S. national security documents issued in 2022—the *National Security Strategy* and unclassified *National Defense Strategy (NDS)* of the Biden administration—have outlined a new core concept for achieving key U.S. national goals: *integrated deterrence*, which the 2022 *National Security Strategy* defines as “the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits.”<sup>1</sup> As our essay details, this is a proposal to better integrate U.S. investments, instruments of power, and activities across multiple combinations of categories: the whole of its government, domains, theaters, and allies and partners. Integrated deterrence is not intended to be a new theory of deterrence per se, but rather an assessment of what DoD must do to meet well-understood deterrence requirements. The 2022 *NDS* states that integrating capabilities and efforts to directly improve combat credibility represents the most plausible route to enhanced deterrent effects. The notion is timely and needed: At a time when U.S. military predominance is ebbing and the international system is more volatile, the need for and potential value of more-integrated campaigns of statecraft are greater than at any time in the last 30 years.

While this specific phrase and elements of the concept are associated with one set of national security strategies, integrated deterrence’s essential emphasis—

deterrence of major conventional aggression, nuclear use, and high-end gray zone coercion—will continue in U.S. strategy for decades. U.S. policy might emphasize other tools than integration to enhance deterrence, but improved coordination of instruments, achieving effects across domains and theaters, and better coordination with allies and partners will likely remain points of emphasis for some time. Understanding how U.S. investments and activities can enhance deterrence through this and related approaches is therefore an important analytical challenge.

Integrated deterrence thus represents a particular approach to the age-old problem of how to prevent various forms of state aggression using instruments of statecraft.

In attempting to better understand this new concept, this Perspective begins by returning to first principles—classic theories of deterrence—both to understand the general requirements for deterring aggression and to highlight two specific types of deterrence which mirror some aspects of the newer concept—cross-domain and tailored deterrence. We then define and evaluate integrated deterrence using publicly available U.S. government documents, official speeches, and background conversations with officials involved in its development. Finally, we outline a set of proposed criteria for judging whether a given investment, policy, or activity will contribute to integrated deterrence.

## Summary

This Perspective seeks to define, evaluate, and derive key requirements for defense programs from the concept of integrated deterrence, which was introduced in the *2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS)*. It begins by discussing classic theories of deterrence and then examines integrated deterrence using public U.S. government documents, official speeches, and conversations with officials involved in its development. Finally, the Perspective offers several guidelines for defense activities and investments to judge their contribution to integrated deterrence.

### Basic Principles of Deterrence

The essay first reviews several fundamental aspects of deterrence theory. It outlines distinctions among various types of deterrence—denial versus punishment, immediate versus general, and central versus extended—as well as between the insights from two discrete subtypes, cross-domain and

tailored deterrence. The essay summarizes the lessons of previous RAND analysis on the factors that determine whether deterrent policies will work. The essential categories are:

- the aggressor’s degree of motivation
- the clarity and communication of the defender’s threats
- the credibility and potency of those threats.

Other RAND work identifies related requirements for deterring aggression below the threshold of armed conflict: effective attribution, alignment with allies and partners, availability of proportionate response tools, and international backing.

Classic deterrence theory offers two other insights that are important to setting the context for an assessment of integrated deterrence. First, nations practicing deterrence can—and often do—go too far in their posturing, threats, and deployment of military forces, which has the effect of provocation rather than prevention. Second, deterrence is a perceptual challenge—an effort to shape the views of a potential

aggressor—and thus is not easily reducible to measurable indicators. It can be difficult to identify effects of specific actions on potential aggressor motivations or mindset.

### Understanding Integrated Deterrence

We examine the concept of integrated deterrence as specified in recent U.S. national security strategy documents and public statements by defense officials. *Integrated deterrence* represents the notion that, at a time of growing revisionist intent by potential aggressors and in an era when warfighting success is more and more dependent on networks of information and command and control, the United States can best reinforce deterrence by better aligning its various instruments of power and through closer integration with allies and partners. The objective is to generate synergies that offer added potential for the deterrent (and ultimately warfighting) effect. This essay notes several important aspects of this concept:

- Importantly, the 2022 unclassified *NDS* offers analysis and guidance separate from integrated deterrence. It describes general gaps in U.S. capabilities and the investments needed to close them. Defense programs must be judged against the *NDS* in its totality.
- Integrated deterrence reflects one multipart causal claim: The United States is entering a period of heightened military threat from potential aggressors in which the character of war relies on effective networked capabilities. At the time of this writing, enhancing deterrence of major aggression (and secondarily, coercion and belligerence below the threshold of war) is the dominant defense priority. The route to enhanced deterrence is building more effective capabilities through integration and synergy among warfighting elements as well as between them and other capabilities.

- Integrated deterrence aims to improve deterrence of both major interstate conflict and hostile actions below the threshold of war. However, the general emphasis of the *NDS* and current U.S. defense policy is on building combat-credible forces.
- U.S. strategy documents list five specific types of integration across: domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, the whole of the U.S. government, and with allies and partners. Many statements highlight the last of these—enhanced integration with allies and partners—as the most critical.
- The concept of integrated deterrence represents a form of tailored deterrence. Every deterrence situation is unique, and integrated deterrence campaigns will be designed for specific situations.
- The concept of integrated deterrence also stresses the importance of feedback loops designed to assess the effect U.S. policies have on deterrence over time.
- Integrated deterrence can embrace *reassurance*—steps to reduce an aggressor’s perceived need to engage in aggression—and threats of consequences if it does so.

We find the basic claim of integrated deterrence to be persuasive—that the United States can gain significant deterrent and warfighting value from improved integration, especially coordination across services, throughout the wider U.S. government, and with allies and partners. Our analysis also finds several challenges in achieving the goals of the concept:

- Official documents are somewhat unclear on precisely what sort of aggressor activities integrated deterrence is designed to prevent.
- The concept must better specify the ways in which integration per se enhances deterrence apart from measurable improvements in U.S. operational capabilities that it

generates. No official documents or statements published so far give any specific examples of discrete packages of initiatives that are expected to enhance deterrence.

- The concept leaves a significant degree of uncertainty around the most critical aspect of deterrence—the effect of one’s actions on the perceptions of the potential aggressor. It is not clear that rivals will notice efforts to enhance coordination or be persuaded that those actions decisively shift the potential for a successful aggressor.
- Most allies and partners—with whom coordination is described as the *center of gravity* for the larger drive toward integration—remain unclear about their roles in the concept and might be unwilling to play some of those roles.
- Integration and synergy represent institutionally and bureaucratically challenging goals, and it is not clear the U.S. government is prepared to take the necessary steps to bring them to fruition. The U.S. government outside the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has not yet embraced an ongoing process to integrate efforts to effect deterrence.

### **Criteria for Assessing U.S. Defense Policies**

Finally, we offer the following guideposts for U.S. defense planners aiming to align their priorities to the *NDS*, and specifically to its core idea of integrated deterrence:

- The core elements of integrated deterrence do not represent a radical departure from current defense planning. They reflect classic principles of the deterrent effect. Investments and actions to enhance U.S. capabilities are already underway throughout DoD to support these goals, as are steps to enhance coordination among services, across the U.S. government, and between the United States and other countries.

- Integrated deterrence begins with basic warfighting effectiveness. Continuing to work to solve current operational problems strongly serves the goals of the *NDS* overall and integrated deterrence in particular. The *NDS* provides many points of guidance separate from its statement on integrated deterrence; in such areas as force planning and allies and partners, the document identifies priorities that can be used to shape and align actions.
- Any DoD component can fulfill the spirit of the concept by identifying areas of integration that would enhance its effectiveness and efficiency—types of integration that might be feasible to implement and would make important operational differences.
- Identifying a small number of the highest-priority issue areas in which to pursue such integration would serve DoD well. Obvious potential candidates are networked sensing and targeting architectures as well as battle management systems capable of integrating U.S. offensive and defensive fires in the most efficient manner possible.
- Defense planners should continue to emphasize the space below the threshold of war. Integrated deterrence and the unclassified *NDS* more broadly speak to how the United States will employ its military capabilities across the spectrum of competition. Pursuing capabilities and forms of integration to better engage in what the *NDS* calls “campaigning” is a critical priority.
- Defense components at various levels can pursue initiatives that encourage long-term shifts in mindset required by the new approach. Movement toward greater integration necessarily confronts institutional, bureaucratic, and cultural issues, and will only emerge gradually. But services, commands, and other DoD components can constantly search for ideas and changes that will make integration and synergy more habitual over time.

## Theories of Deterrence

The concept *integrated deterrence* could be perhaps best understood as the intention to achieve deterrent effects using the comprehensive and strategically designed integration of national instruments of power. The central operative process is deterrence; the concept speaks to the nature of the tools employed. Getting a deeper understanding of integrated deterrence—and its requirements for success—can therefore begin by reviewing the essential nature and demands of deterrence in more comprehensive terms. This section reviews the subsidiary notions of cross-domain and tailored deterrence and provides insights and possible criteria for success that can help flesh out the concept of integrated deterrence.

### Deterrence: The Basics

Any effort to understand the challenges associated with achieving deterrence can begin with two essential insights. First, the focus of any deterrent policy—the choice of whether to initiate aggression—is a calculation in the mind of the potential aggressor (their dominant leader or leadership group). Leaders and governments calculate the risks and opportunities of going to war in often highly idiosyncratic ways under the influence of powerful beliefs and perceptions. Second, deterrence is a primarily political, rather than technical, enterprise that “depends on interests, power, information, and resolve,”<sup>2</sup> just as the decision to go to war is a political judgment, not an abstract, rationalistic calculation of local balances of power. Both insights complicate deterrence: While deterrence theory was developed in response to “the technological problem of nuclear weapons,”<sup>3</sup> in practice, deterrence

is not a linear scale of objectively measurable factors amenable to mechanistic adjustment, but a complex effort to shape subjective perceptions and influence highly unpredictable political judgments.

The practice of deterrence is the effort to stop another party—in the case of national security, typically a nation or subnational group—from taking an unwanted action. It is distinct in this sense from the related notion of *compellence*, which refers to a coercive effort to force another party to take action. Nations can seek to deter others from doing a wide variety of things. But the term has become somewhat devalued in recent U.S. national security discourse because it has been applied as a sort of generic policy response to any behavior or potential event that threatens U.S. interests.

Yet, as we will argue, deterrence demands (in part) credible threats of retaliation that impose costs significant enough to change an opponent’s risk calculus. For many rival efforts below the threshold of armed conflict, it is extremely difficult to threaten in advance to impose such costs. The aggressor’s actions are not belligerent or inappropriate enough to warrant credible threats: They are neither illegal nor aggressive, the United States uses the same tactics, or the risks of escalatory cycles are too great. Taken together, this means that U.S. threats to severely punish actions below the threshold of war are difficult to make credible and effective.<sup>4</sup> For many activities in day-to-day competition, the United States will have to focus on mitigating the effects of this gray zone activity or competing with them rather than deterring them.<sup>5</sup>

When defining any deterrent challenge or policy, it is essential to consider five key distinctions that define the nature of deterrent efforts. First, any deterrent policy is

first and foremost characterized by the hostile action it aims to prevent. The concept of deterrence is often applied to a relatively narrow category of potential actions: large-scale aggressive warfare. Most empirical studies of deterrence use such cases as the data foundation for their analysis.<sup>6</sup> Given the prominence of relatively aggressive gray zone actions below the threshold of war (such as cyber attacks and maritime coercion), U.S. national security policy has increasingly referred to the need to deter a select set of high-profile, especially bellicose gray zone actions.<sup>7</sup> We do not mean to imply that the concept of deterrence should be radically broadened to include such things as port visits, economic investment, or the opening of Chinese language institutes. Rather, it suggests that U.S. deterrence policy can apply to a small set of actions below the threshold of war that nonetheless involve a significant degree of military or quasi-military effect and belligerent intent.

A second way of conceptualizing forms of deterrence is by considering differences in the scope of the tools and statecraft employed to achieve deterrence goals. Some theorists have focused on a narrow definition of the deterrence toolbox, arguing that the term is properly understood as the use of military threats to prevent military action.<sup>8</sup> A second approach extends the concept to encompass nonmilitary tools used to threaten retaliation for military aggression, such as economic sanctions and political isolation. A third and still broader conception of deterrence incorporates a more comprehensive mechanism of effect that involves both threat and reassurance. This approach holds that a potential aggressor's most essential concerns must be addressed to avoid aggression, through such means as limitations on one's own activities, direct nego-

tiation and compromise, or formal public assurances. A threat alone might not be enough to prevent aggression. In fact, some threats or actions taken in the hope of reinforcing deterrence might cause it to fail because they exacerbate the security concerns of another party.

A third distinction in forms of deterrence is whether U.S. threats and actions are designed to prevent an action by rendering it infeasible by denying an aggressor potential success, by making it too costly, or by threatening consequences for the act. This is the well-known distinction between deterrence by *denial* and deterrence by *punishment*. In its most basic form, deterrence by denial is essentially the same thing as planning for the defense of territory or a domain: By successfully providing for defense and making its degree of readiness known, a nation can achieve a deterrent effect.<sup>9</sup> Deterrence by punishment threatens wider and perhaps indirect consequences for aggression that might or might not succeed—for example, economic sanctions, cyber attacks, or a nuclear strike—something that hurts the aggressor in ways beyond defeating their local aggression. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive: A defender could pursue both at the same time, as the United States did in Europe during the Cold War, both bolstering local defensive capabilities and creating a risk of nuclear escalation as a form of deterrence by punishment.<sup>10</sup>

The 2022 *NDS* adds a third category: Deterrence by *resilience*, which it defines as “the ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption.”<sup>11</sup> The argument appears to be that because aggressors today plan to use various forms of disruption to paralyze a defender's response, building resilience contributes directly to deterrence.

It is commonly argued that deterrence by denial is more credible and effective than deterrence by punishment. Leaders bent on aggression could convince themselves that they might somehow avoid punishment, but, in theory, denial capabilities stand directly in the way of their objectives. In practice, however, the relative strength of the two depends on several factors, many of which rely on the perceptions of the potential aggressor and are thus subject to wishful thinking, motivated reasoning, and a host of other biases. One thing that is clear is that deterrence by denial is not a simple scale of effects that can be adjusted with linear precision; there is no clear threshold at which success can be said to have been reached. The prospect of potential defeat alone has failed to deter many nations throughout history.

A fourth distinction that clarifies the character of deterrence has to do with time and scope. *Immediate deterrence* refers to the best known, short term, and aggression-specific form—deterrence focused on an imminent threat of attack. This would be the case if, for example, the United States received warning of a looming Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Measures taken by the United States to reinforce various threats would represent policies of immediate deterrence. *General deterrence*, on the other hand, is a more steady-state and contextual consideration. It involves creating a persistent cost-benefit calculus in the minds of one or more actors that helps to discourage aggression.

Fifth, deterrence varies depending on whether it aims to prevent an attack on a third party or the deterrer itself. *Central deterrence* involves efforts by a nation to deter attacks on itself; *extended deterrence* is the practice of deterring attacks on others.

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These five distinctions make clear how challenging it is to identify simple, measurable causal pathways from the outcomes of any one set of activities—whether military investments, added force structure, security cooperation activities, or other steps—in relation to deterrent efforts. A given U.S. activity or system might have different implications for deterrence by denial or punishment, for immediate or general deterrence, or for one potential aggressor versus another. If integrated deterrence is merely the use of integrated strategies and tools to achieve deterrence, then it can generate different requirements depending on the type and character of deterrence being attempted.

Patrick Morgan has observed a related problem in recent U.S. national security discourse, which is that “the concept of deterrence is being stretched to cover a great variety of situations.”<sup>12</sup> It has become a catch-all phrase for U.S. statecraft directed at stopping, reducing the incidence of, or mitigating actions that threaten U.S. interests. If integrated deterrence joined this trend, it would become synonymous for the integrated use of U.S. instruments of power to achieve U.S. goals—that is, national security strat-

egy broadly defined. For the purposes of focused analysis, it is helpful to limit the goal of deterrent strategies to preventing the large-scale use of force, primarily nuclear or conventional aggression but also possibly including very aggressive, high-end gray zone actions involving significant military force.

## Requirements for Success

Previous RAND research reviewed the existing literature on deterrence and conducted new case studies to derive criteria for deterrence success—the factors that determine which deterrent policies will work most effectively.<sup>13</sup> (A report by Mazarr et al. focused on the extended deterrence of attacks on U.S. allies and partners rather than central deterrence.<sup>14</sup> As of the time of this writing, much

of U.S. national security policy focuses on the challenge of extended deterrence as well.) The following box lays out the resulting variables, which are grouped into three categories: the motivation of the aggressor, the clarity and communication of threats, and their credibility and potency. Presumably, any effort to pursue integrated deterrence would have to meet these same criteria, which are general to the conduct of deterrence.

Other RAND research has focused on overlapping but distinct requirements for deterrence of aggression below the threshold of armed conflict.<sup>15</sup> While most gray zone actions will demand general competitive strategies and cannot be deterred, a handful of high-end or especially aggressive moves below the threshold of conflict have become a part of the U.S. portfolio of extended deterrence challenges. A leading example of such a high-end gray zone

### Variables Governing the Success of Deterrence

#### Category One: How Motivated Is the Potential Aggressor?

- General level of dissatisfaction with the status quo and determination to create a new strategic situation
- Degree of fear that the strategic situation is about to turn against them in decisive ways
- Level of national interest involved in a specific territory of concern
- Urgent sense of desperation to act

#### Category Two: Clarity and Communication of the Defender's Threats

- Precision and consistency in the type of aggression the defender seeks to prevent
- Clarity and consistency in the threatened actions that will be taken in the event of aggression
- Forceful communication of those messages to outside audiences, especially potential aggressors
- Timely response to warning with clarification of interests, threats

#### Category Three: Credibility and Potency of Defender's Threats

- Actual and perceived strength of the local military capability to deny an aggressor's aims
- Degree of automaticity in defender's response, including escalation to higher levels of violence
- Actual and perceived credibility of the political commitment to fulfill the threat
- Degree of national interests involved in the country being protected

SOURCE: Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression*.



provocation at the boundary line with conflict is potential Chinese maritime harassment of Japanese operations near the disputed Senkaku Islands. In addition to the basic principles outlined previously, Mazarr et al. highlights several principles of effective deterrence in the gray zone:

- *Effective attribution*: Some agents of gray zone actions aim at escaping responsibility. Deterrent threats will be ineffective if the United States cannot promise to credibly identify the perpetrators.
- *Alignment with allies and partners*: Almost all gray zone actions—and effectively all the high-end cases—are not aimed at the United States but at its allies and partners. If they are not on board with the design of a deterrent regime or threat, it will lose credibility in the eye of a potential aggressor.
- *Availability of proportionate response tools*: It may not be credible to threaten dangerously escalatory answers to limited moves below the threshold of war. Deterrent threats will be more effective if they can make use of a wide range of options including some proportionate in scale and scope to the aggression.
- *International backing*: Gray zone actions take place as part of a larger competition for international influence short of war. The prospect of broad-based global condemnation for an action can be an important component of deterrent strategies.<sup>16</sup>

Nations practicing deterrence can go too far in their posturing, threats, and deployment of military forces, which can have the effect of provocation rather than prevention. Provocation can be a function of the type or degree of military activity used, or the explicitness of the

threat: “Sometimes, the more explicit the deterrence threat, the more it antagonizes the opponent, stiffening its determination, particularly if it is certain it is in the right and thus entitled to attack.”<sup>17</sup> In some cases the provocation could be very direct and urgent, such as the unintentional creation of a belief that the United States (or other deterring party) is preparing a preemptive or preventive strike. Indeed, *assurance*—that is, demonstrating to the potential aggressor ways to achieve its most essential interests short of the use of force—is a critical component of preventing war.<sup>18</sup> Dissuading an aggressor from attacking thus almost always involves a balance between threat and assurance.

The concept of integrated deterrence does not represent a new overall national security approach but rather points to means and ways for meeting a well-established requirement. The main question for the approach is how integration—in all the ways proposed by the concept—can help meet the criteria for deterrence success. We will return to this question in our concluding section, but two related concepts of deterrence provide some insight: cross-domain and tailored deterrence.

## Cross-Domain Deterrence

*Cross-domain deterrence* is the use of capabilities in one domain to counter threats or a combination of threats in a different domain, especially when a nation has a comparative disadvantage in one domain. The concept emerged in the mid-2000s in response to the growing importance of space and cyber in military operations, which were joining the traditional operational domains of sea, land, and air.<sup>19</sup> The concept is therefore somewhat narrower than integrated deterrence, at least in its initial conception: It refers

primarily (but not solely) to the interaction of war-fighting domains in a deterrence dynamic.<sup>20</sup> However, the main analytical question is arguably the same: In what ways does crossing domains or integrating instruments of statecraft provide additional deterrent effect?<sup>21</sup> This concept differs from the newer idea of integrated deterrence: Cross-domain deterrence refers specifically to the use of capabilities in one domain to achieve a deterrent effect in another; it does not need to involve any particular integration of those various capabilities, but only the discrete use of action in one domain to affect another. In some ways, though, the spirit of cross-domain applications hints at the integrated effects that the newer concept seeks to achieve.

While the United States has traditionally found its coercive advantage in its ability to integrate air, sea, and space operations, adversaries such as China, Iran, and Russia have increasingly sought to exploit new technologies to gain strategic advantage where their conventional military capabilities fall short. The United States, in turn, seeks to develop a suite of nonmilitary strategies that can

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counter infringements in the gray zone to maintain a competitive advantage and safeguard national interests. However, complex linkages between actions and effects across domains harbor the potential for escalation and interpretation of signals. Some initial versions of the theory focused more on the threat than the opportunity of cross-domain linkages—i.e., the way U.S. rivals would use cross-domain strategies to undermine U.S. deterrent effects.<sup>22</sup>

The potential for cross-domain deterrence and conflict also raises important questions of escalation control. Jumping from one domain to another can create new fears in the adversary of a widening conflict, leading to escalatory moves.<sup>23</sup> Actions in some of the domains that are subject to cross-domain deterrent employment, such as space and cyber, could be misread as signals of a much wider attack.<sup>24</sup> At least one study suggests that the mosaic of connections across actors and domains could have a stabilizing effect, partly because it reduces the decisive risk inherent in any one escalatory move within a single domain.<sup>25</sup>

For both cross-domain and integrated deterrence, an obvious question is what these concepts offer that is particularly new. Some versions of the strategy go back to the Peloponnesian War and were common in various Cold War crises. One study concluded that “[c]ross-domain interactions are so prevalent in military history, in fact, that we conjecture that [cross-domain deterrence] is a more general rather than specific form of deterrence.”<sup>26</sup> In writing about cross-domain deterrence, another observer has stated that “[c]rises have always been cross-domain . . . [C]ontrary to the convictions of many observers, the empirical record suggests that cross-domainness has been both common and constant over the past century.”<sup>27</sup> The emphasis of the new concepts is to discover additional

deterrent power in improved synergies among U.S. and partner and allied actions. The idea is not new but offers real promise to improve actual and perceived capabilities, will, and commitment to deterrent goals.

## Tailored Deterrence

Tailored deterrence is an approach that places increased emphasis on customizing deterrence policies to specific contexts and issues,<sup>28</sup> which includes tailoring deterrent threats and the mix of tools used to achieve the greatest effect on a specific decisionmaker or decisionmaking group. It would create a natural opportunity to use integrated deterrence in context-specific ways: Integrated deterrence would define the spectrum of deterrent tools available, and tailored deterrence would invite country-specific designs of those strategies. Indeed, the 2022 *NDS* specifically suggests that integrated deterrence strategies will be “tailored to specific competitors and challenges.”<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, it includes an entire section on tailored deterrence, which argues that “[c]oordinating and applying deterrence logics to maximum effect requires tailoring for specific problems, competitors, and settings.”<sup>30</sup>

Tailored deterrence calls for a particular focus on the “fundamental differences in the perceptions and resulting decision calculus of specific adversaries in specific circumstances.”<sup>31</sup> It recommends identifying political leaders, elites, and individuals in the government and military of the potential aggressor who are the most likely to receive and act on a threat or incentive messages as well as design case-specific deterrence strategies to affect their perceptions. Tailored deterrence also involves an evaluation of strategic culture, which can be influenced by a strong

national cultural identity, elite allegiance to tradition, and a strong military organizational culture. Because deterrence is an interactive process that relies in part on the communication of the deterrence message for its success, the target state’s strategic culture and understanding of deterrence should be evaluated vis-à-vis any U.S. strategy, which is, in this case, integrated deterrence. For example, Chinese thinking about the concept of deterrence appears to have some overlap with the way that integrated deterrence has been discussed in the U.S. policy community by speaking to the ways in which different instruments of power reinforce one another in a synergistic whole.

Critics of tailored deterrence worry that it might be overambitious and excessively deterministic in assuming that the United States can identify specific centers of gravity for potential aggressor perceptions.<sup>32</sup> U.S. officials may often lack detailed information on aggressors’ perceptions to conduct such strategies reliably.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, a formalized strategy of tailoring deterrence to precisely calibrated perceptions could encourage false confidence, leading the United States to believe that its deterrent strategies are more effective than they are. At least in theory, however, all deterrent efforts do need to be designed in a manner that is likely to achieve results in specific situations, against individual aggressors, and with the best available intelligence on that aggressor’s motives, mindset, and plans.

## Russian and Chinese Concepts

While they do not mention the U.S. concept of cross-domain deterrence explicitly, China and Russia have evolved holistic concepts of deterrence that seek to gain deterrent and compellent leveraging by spanning domains,

at least theoretically.<sup>34</sup> Chinese concepts of deterrence have tended to be more holistic and comprehensive, and include leveraging military, economic, and diplomatic elements of national power into a broad concept of Comprehensive National Power.<sup>35</sup> Since roughly 2001, Chinese sources have discussed a specific approach that they called *integrated strategic deterrence*, which closely matches some of the goals of the new U.S. concept. As one RAND study notes,

Chinese security analysts have concluded that China needs a comprehensive, integrated set of strategic deterrence capabilities. Indeed, Chinese military publications indicate that China has a broad concept of strategic deterrence, in which a multidimensional set of military and nonmilitary capabilities combine to constitute the “integrated strategic deterrence” posture—a Chinese military concept that calls for a comprehensive and coordinated set of strategic-deterrence capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, space, and cyber forces—required to protect Chinese interests.<sup>36</sup>

Russian concepts of deterrence and coercion reflect a similar effort to draw together multiple instruments of power into a holistic approach. In general, Russian strategy conceives of a broad range of threats to Russian interests—from military power to political warfare and terrorism—and calls for “an integrated response to this integrated threat.”<sup>37</sup> In fact, the Russian term commonly used as an analogue to deterrence—*sderzhivanie*—has broader connotations: By drawing on aspects of coercion, compellence, and general campaigns of statecraft, it implies the sort of whole of government integration suggested by the current U.S. term.<sup>38</sup> Such integration provides Russia with opportunities in efforts to pursue more

aggressive Russian goals, such as destabilizing Western democracies in gray zone campaigns.

Integrating instruments of power in pursuit of deterrent or coercive effect is not unique to the United States. U.S. rivals will employ their own integrated campaigns to defeat deterrence or deter the United States from intervening in some circumstances. The complex task for the United States is therefore to plan for the interrelationship of two competing integrated campaigns to ensure that its own approach gains more traction than those of its rivals.

## The Essence of Deterring Conflict

This discussion leads us to an initial set of findings that are critical to understanding the potential requirements of integrated deterrence.

- *Integrated deterrence can be thought of as classic deterrence practiced with thoroughly and consistently integrated means.* The essential requirements for effective deterrence do not change merely because of the means used.
- *Deterrence is a perceptual challenge that is not easily reducible to measurable indicators.* It is very difficult to identify the effects of specific actions on potential aggressor motivations or mindset. Patrick Morgan explains that this can be “problematic” for assessing cross-domain or integrated forms of deterrence because “the associated analyses of them cannot be guaranteed to fully comprehend and convey, especially in advance, all the results of added domains, their components, and their activities.”<sup>39</sup>
- *Deterrence is a fundamentally political rather than military-technical endeavor.* This is true of

integrated or cross-domain forms as well: As two scholars conclude, cross-domain deterrence “is politics by many other means.”<sup>40</sup> Understanding the demands of deterrence is far more complex than a linear calculation of capabilities or imposed costs.

- *The role of integration in enhancing deterrence must be clearly specified.* Integration is only one of many possible avenues to enhanced deterrence; massively increased capabilities alone could achieve the desired effect regardless of the degree of integration. At the same time, the precise ways in which integration affects a potential aggressor’s views must be defined and proved. For example, integration might increase flexibility by providing more options to deny or punish potential aggression and more tailorable options for specific deterrent situations. However, it could also reduce the clarity of its deterrent threats by encouraging the United States to rely on nonmilitary approaches to deterrence that might not offer the same signals of resolve.<sup>41</sup>

Deterrence of hostile actions remains a major focus of U.S. national security strategy. An approach built around the better integration of tools of statecraft is one way of wringing the most deterrent effect out of U.S. capabilities, activities, and investments.

## **From Deterrence to Integrated Deterrence**

In early 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) transmitted the classified 2022 *NDS* to Congress. At the core of the new *NDS* is a concept of integrated deterrence.

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Integrated deterrence implies working across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, and other instruments of U.S. power.

Broadly defined, integrated deterrence aims to work seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, and other instruments of U.S. national power in lockstep with U.S. allies and partners, and it is further backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.<sup>42</sup> In Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s words, integrated deterrence “is about using existing capabilities, and building new ones, and deploying them all in new and networked ways . . . all tailored to a region’s security landscape, and in growing partnership with our friends.”<sup>43</sup>

This concept has now been discussed in various official sources and forums, including the 2022 *National Security Strategy* and 2022 *NDS*, public speeches by DoD senior officials, and interviews with those officials. For this research, we supplemented those sources with roughly a dozen informal discussions of the concept with officials and others who played a role in its formulation to develop the best possible unclassified portrait of the concept.<sup>44</sup> These sources show that the concept is a statement of nec-

essary and essential ways by which the United States can achieve deterrence. It is not a distinct theory of how deterrence works but rather an approach that allows the United States to increase the effectiveness of its tools to achieve deterrence as traditionally understood.

In its essence, integrated deterrence represents the notion that, at a time of growing revisionist intent by potential aggressors, the United States can best reinforce deterrence of various forms of conventional military aggression and high-end gray zone activities by better aligning its various instruments of power and through closer integration with allies and partners. The basis for integrated deterrence is the core insight that regional military trends, especially in the Indo-Pacific, have been working against the United States for more than two decades and that defense policies must now seek to reestablish the credibility and potency of U.S. warfighting commitments. This concept of enhanced integration is designed to generate synergies that add potential for deterrent effect.<sup>45</sup> Achieving this goal calls for two overlapping forms of integration: *internal* (across elements of the U.S. government and Joint force) and *external* (better cooperation and interoperability with other countries).

This essential causal relationship between better integration and improved deterrence is the core theme of the 2022 *NDS*. Changes in rivals' military capabilities and ambitions have placed U.S. allies and partners and broader U.S. interests at significant added risk; as a result, many basic assumptions of U.S. post-Cold War defense planning are no longer valid. The most important response to this trend is to improve the U.S. forces' combat capability to achieve essential military missions even without prior levels of dominance. A more combat-

capable military is the primary goal of the 2022 *NDS* and the concept of integrated deterrence. The core argument of the 2022 *NDS* is that the most viable route to such enhanced combat capability is to maximize available combat power by tightly linking all its elements.

Some officials involved with the 2022 *NDS* suggest that the emphasis on strengthening and sustaining deterrence as a primary goal is new in the 2022 *NDS*. Whereas prior National Security and National Defense Strategies included a broad range of goals, the newer document is focused on deterrence in the context of major power rivalry and ebbing U.S. predominance. Conventional deterrence has featured prominently in U.S. strategic documents and public statements by U.S. defense officials going back decades and is not new as a defense priority. But the need to address shortfalls in conventional deterrence was very much on the minds of those involved with this *NDS*.

Integrated deterrence does appear to reflect a theory of deterrence that is more about implementation than pure capabilities: In other words, it reflects the ways in which coordinated statecraft can maximize the effect of existing and planned capabilities. Given ebbing U.S. military predominance, limits to building and deploying new U.S. capacity and capabilities in the short-term as well as the rising threat of aggression and gray zone coercion from increasingly belligerent rivals, advocates of integrated deterrence would suggest that using synergies to wring more effect from current and planned U.S. capabilities—and to produce more allied and partner capability to aid U.S. efforts—is the most promising avenue to bolster deterrence.

Although the approach was not fully deployed in advance of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. strat-

egy for halting, reversing, and punishing that aggression might provide the most tangible real-world example of the idea behind integrated deterrence. The United States has combined efforts from many domains and parts of the government—military assistance and training, intelligence sharing, diplomacy, economic coercion and assistance, multilateral efforts to organize the efforts of allies and partners and more—to achieve its goals. Having demonstrated that model of a truly comprehensive national effort to punish aggression, the United States could institutionalize it and deploy it in advance of future conflicts to promise an ability to deny a hostile state’s objectives, impose costs on that aggressor, and enhance the resilience of the victim of the aggression.

As revealed by the Ukraine case, integrated deterrence could be conceptualized at two somewhat different levels: a narrower tactical and operational focus on synergies between effects, and a broader geostrategic emphasis on whole-of-government approaches to deterrence and conflict. The narrower approach to the concept would focus on initiatives to enhance integration within DoD, such as Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), and operational-level initiatives with allies and partners, such as interoperability. The broader way of thinking about integrated deterrence would be in geostrategic terms about military, economic, political, and informational tools and how they can threaten and, if necessary, punish aggressors in more comprehensive and synergistic ways, such as in the response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. DoD is likely to focus primarily on the narrower and more operational aspects of integrated deterrence, if only because that is where it can make the most tangible contributions.

The unclassified version of the 2022 *NDS*, as well as dozens of public statements by senior Defense officials, speak to defense policies and requirements other than integrated deterrence, including gaps in U.S. capabilities and the investments needed to close them.<sup>46</sup> Such capability enhancements are presumably one pillar of integrated deterrence, strengthening the U.S. capacity for effective warfighting as part of the larger, multi-pronged deterrent approach. This is a critical piece of the overall effort and is consistently stressed by U.S. officials as a centerpiece of their effort to enhance deterrence. However, the core message of the 2022 *NDS* is that individual capability enhancements are necessary but not sufficient to achieve key U.S. deterrent objectives. They must be matched with an effort to integrate U.S. capabilities and activities in ways that provide new forms of synergy and thus enhance the combat credibility of U.S. operational plans.

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Given ebbing U.S. military predominance, advocates for integrated deterrence suggest that synergies are the most promising way to bolster deterrence.

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More capable competitors and new strategies of threatening behavior mean we cannot rely solely on conventional forces and nuclear deterrence.

### What Are U.S. Efforts Trying to Deter?

The 2022 *NDS* identifies four priorities for U.S. defense policy and, by extension, its deterrent strategy: (1) defending the homeland, (2) deterring “strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners,” (3) deterring aggression and being ready to prevail in war “prioritizing the PRC [People’s Republic of China] challenge in the Indo-Pacific region, then the Russia challenge in Europe,” and (4) “[b]uilding a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.”<sup>47</sup> In this sense, what the strategy as a whole aims to deter is clearly defined.

A question does arise about the balance between major warfare and the activities below the threshold of conflict. Some comments in the 2022 *NDS* and in public speeches of U.S. officials suggest that integrated deterrence includes efforts to forestall both large-scale

aggression—and especially dangerous, high-end gray zone coercive actions—but also lower-intensity hostile actions. The unclassified 2022 *NDS* itself offers a mixed endorsement regarding the role of military capabilities below the threshold of conflict. It states that “[t]he Department will be judicious in its use of defense resources and efforts to counter competitors’ coercive behaviors in gray zone operations, as traditional military tools may not always be the most appropriate response.” But it then continues, “[n]evertheless, there can be an important role for campaigning to disrupt competitors’ efforts to advance their objectives through gray zone tactics.”<sup>48</sup>

Several official documents support an interpretation that integrated deterrence is ultimately focused primarily on higher-order aggression and major contingencies. The 2022 *NDS* defines integrated deterrence as “using every tool at the Department’s disposal, in close collaboration with our counterparts across the U.S. Government and with Allies and partners, to ensure that potential foes understand the folly of aggression,”<sup>49</sup> which traditionally implies major conventional aggression of some kind. Other 2022 *NDS* references and statements in official speeches appear to confirm the idea that the focus is large-scale aggression (especially in relation to sudden, fait accompli-style aggression against targets adjacent to the aggressor’s territory) and more intensive gray zone activities.<sup>50</sup> Arguably the primary focus of the 2022 *NDS*, and the main goal of integrated deterrence, is to serve the goal of deterrence through creating a more combat credible military, an objective clearly focused on high-end conflict. Our discussions with officials involved in the development of the 2022 *NDS* confirmed this view—though even here we found some range of opinions and admitted lack of clarity.



Yet multiple statements in official documents and public reports suggest a wider focus, on rival actions below the threshold of war or even major crisis. The *National Security Strategy* lays out the concept by stating that “More capable competitors and new strategies of threatening behavior below and above the traditional threshold of conflict mean we cannot afford to rely solely on conventional forces and nuclear deterrence”; its definition of integrated deterrence includes stopping “hostile activities” rather than major aggression. It also refers to the challenge of rivals “pressing for advantage,” a more inclusive notion than large-scale aggression. All of that would seem to imply a focus well down into gray zone activities, and the examples that follow in Part II give the same indication. Yet that section also begins with the statement, “The United States has a vital interest in deterring aggression.”<sup>51</sup> Other official statements lean more in the direction of deterring a wide range of gray zone actions,<sup>52</sup> though some statements in the unclassified 2022 *NDS* suggest a focus on the most significant or dangerous of the gray zone actions.

Secretary of Defense Austin testified to such a broader goal, noting that integrated deterrence “aims to bring to bear the right mix of capabilities to demonstrate beyond doubt that the United States can respond across domains *and the spectrum of conflict*, working closely across the U.S. Government and with our global allies and partners—all in the manner, time, and place of our choosing.”<sup>53</sup>

In this sense integrated deterrence is linked to another core concept in the new *NDS*—*campaigning*. The unclassified 2022 *NDS* defines it as “the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military activities to achieve strategy-aligned objectives over time.” Campaigning activities are designed to “change the environment to the benefit of the

United States and our Allies and partners, while limiting, frustrating, and disrupting competitor activities that seriously impinge on our interests, especially those carried out in the gray zone.” The document then lists a range of efforts that fall under this rubric, including shaping perceptions of likelihood of success in aggression and disrupting rivals’ warfighting advantages—which all could be part of deterrence strategies. The document further blurs the distinction between campaigning and integrated deterrence by explaining that the United States “will conduct campaigning activities . . . against a clear set of objectives, to include deterring adversary attacks” and other objectives.<sup>54</sup> This concept thus reflects a more focused version of the broader notion of *competition*, which includes just about any national activity designed to generate competitive advantage. This phrase would suggest that deterrence is a subset of campaigning—one strategy for achieving campaigning’s goal of deterring adversary attacks. Discussions with DoD officials and our reading of the documents and speeches, however, suggest that the two concepts can best be viewed as complementary if overlapping ideas. Campaigning refers to day-to-day activities, deployments, exercises, operations, posture enhancements, information campaigns, and other activities to shape the environment and contest the space below armed conflict. Integrated deterrence refers to efforts specifically designed to prevent dangerous behavior, whether large-scale aggression or something less severe. Some actions could fit into both categories—in fact, many peacetime actions will support both concepts.

## How Integration Deters

The essential implicit claim of the concept of integrated deterrence is that stronger integration of U.S. tools of statecraft, linked to ally and partner efforts, is the most-promising available means to bolster deterrence. However, its core argument goes beyond that: It suggests that changes in the character of warfare toward networked technological operations demand more comprehensive integration, without which the United States will not measurably enhance its forces' combat credibility. The *National Security Strategy* defines integrated deterrence as “the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits.” It adds:

Integrated deterrence requires us to more effectively coordinate, network, and innovate so that any competitor thinking about pressing for advantage in one domain understands that we can respond in many others as well. This augments the traditional backstop of combat-credible conventional and strategic

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Changes in the character of warfare toward networked technology operations demand more comprehensive integration.

capabilities, allowing us to better shape adversary perceptions of risks and costs of action against core U.S. interests, at any time and across any domain.<sup>55</sup>

The 2022 *NDS* states that “the core of integrated deterrence” is to “develop, combine, and coordinate our strengths to maximum effect.”<sup>56</sup> Here again, the concept differs from the older idea of cross-domain deterrence: The 2022 *NDS*'s core idea is that, in the current technological and geopolitical context, the effectiveness of U.S. military operations increasingly requires a more comprehensive synergy among various capabilities. These can stretch across domains, but the idea is not limited to taking a separate and distinct action in one domain to achieve goals in another.

Although it is unstated, the basis for this approach appears to be a sense that the United States is leaving substantial national capabilities and power untapped because of a lack of interagency coordination, linkage of regions and domains, and perhaps especially closer integration with allies and partners. In a strictly military operational sense, in an era of networked warfare and a growing role for information and automation at the core of military operations, various forms of integration become essential to operational effectiveness. Improved synergies, including with allies and partners, and the reinforcement of military power with other instruments of national power, are required to make a more immediate and, in some ways, lasting difference.<sup>57</sup>

The unclassified 2022 *NDS* also offers a more general theory of deterrence independent of the idea of integration. Grounded in classic ideas about deterrence summarized previously, the theory holds that deterrence is a function of three basic elements: *denial* (being able to

threaten an aggressor with the failure of their aggressive intent), *resilience* (the “ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption” as a critical signal to aggressors), and *cost imposition* (punishing an aggressor in ways beyond denying its local objectives).<sup>58</sup> Presumably, integrated deterrence can be measured by the degree to which synergies enhance any of these three components of effective deterrence. It is possible to imagine investments or initiatives outside the scope of integration that could serve these three forms of deterrence. However, the core argument of the 2022 *NDS* is that, to achieve combat credibility in the emerging era of highly technological networked warfare, integration is the necessary route to success.

Of the three basic elements, the emphasis on resilience is arguably the most significant because it represents a factor not always highlighted by classic deterrence theory. Multiple U.S. officials’ statements as well as comments in several of our interviews pointed to the significance of this component of the theory.<sup>59</sup> Various U.S. officials and military officers have specifically called out the importance of resilience in the defense industrial base, U.S. space operations, and forward basing.<sup>60</sup>

Even though some aspects of deterrence effects might be achievable before large-scale force enhancements or other capability-based augmentations to deterrence are implemented, sources familiar with the concept stress that the new deterrent effect of these revised approaches would only be felt in piecemeal terms and gradually over a decade or more. Incremental improvements in coordination and integrated efforts with allies would enhance deterrence over time with growing synergistic effects. This implies the need for ongoing tracking and assessment to evaluate the effect on deterrent strength over time.

As noted previously, the unclassified 2022 *NDS* clearly embraces a parallel and more direct approach to deterrence. It notes that the United States

will bolster deterrence by leveraging existing and emergent force capabilities, posture, and activities to enhance denial, and by enhancing the resilience of U.S. systems the PRC may seek to target. We will develop new operational concepts and enhanced future warfighting capabilities against potential PRC aggression.<sup>61</sup>

The document lists several specific areas of investment to fulfill these goals, including cyber, command and control, detection and targeting, and long-range strike.<sup>62</sup> In other words, the 2022 *NDS* articulates a clear avenue to deterrence apart from integration.

Although it is not made explicit, an implicit claim of the 2022 *NDS*—one clarified in comments with several officials—is that the route to deterrence success is through improved combat capability and credibility. Many factors can influence an aggressor’s decision to go to war, and the 2022 *NDS* accounts for other factors besides capabilities—for example, it refers to the importance of assurances to avoid provocation as well as deterrent threats. However, the strategy relies primarily on the effects of direct improvements in credible combat power to enhance deterrence—by denial, cost imposition, and resilience—rather than more abstract approaches to shaping the psychology of potential aggressors.

## Forms of Integration

*Integrated deterrence embodies several different conceptions of integration and synergistic effect. As the 2022 NDS puts*

it, “*Integrated deterrence* entails working seamlessly across warfighting demands, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of U.S. national power, and our network of Alliances and partnerships.”<sup>63</sup> The National Security Strategy elaborates further on this point, highlighting no less than five distinct categories of integration:

- Integration across domains, recognizing that our competitors’ strategies operate across military (land, air, maritime, cyber, and space) and non-military (economic, technological, and information) domains—and we must too.
- Integration across regions, understanding that our competitors combine expansive ambitions with growing capabilities to threaten U.S. interests in key regions and in the homeland.
- Integration across the spectrum of conflict to prevent competitors from altering the status quo in ways that harm our vital interests while hovering below the threshold of armed conflict.
- Integration across the U.S. Government to leverage the full array of American advantages, from diplomacy, intelligence, and economic tools to security assistance and force posture decisions.
- Integration with allies and partners through investments in interoperability and joint capability development, cooperative posture planning, and coordinated diplomatic and economic approaches.<sup>64</sup>

Each of these forms of integration has appeared in other public statements by DoD officials,<sup>65</sup> though most of the details have not been worked out. Many DoD officials have stressed the importance of effective coordination across the U.S. government as a critical component of integration,<sup>66</sup> for example. The role of cross-domain deterrence in the overall concept is relatively clear from an oper-

ational military standpoint—Secretary of Defense Austin has stressed the importance of this form of integration<sup>67</sup>—but this would appear to apply largely to the improvement of Joint combined arms operations. If there are broader assumptions about the ways in which operations in some domains can fundamentally alter deterrence outcomes in others, the 2022 *NDS* has not yet made them explicit.

All official documents and public statements have pointed to the United States’ improved ability to operate with and call upon the capabilities of allies and partners as crucial.<sup>68</sup> U.S. officials stressed that this component of integrated deterrence is the center of gravity of the whole concept because greater integration with allies is the essential foundation for U.S. operational success. Specifically, the unclassified 2022 *NDS* suggests that the United States will assist allies to:

- improve denial capability, including resilience, for those under immediate threat
- support their ability to respond to regional contingencies
- provide strategic indicators and warning
- reduce “competitors’ ability to hold key geographic and logistical chokepoints at risk”
- support ally and partner efforts to deal with “acute forms of gray zone coercion”
- strengthen role and capabilities for humanitarian missions.<sup>69</sup>

Other specific capabilities, domains, or issue areas that are frequently called out in discussions of integrated deterrence include space, cyber, and the U.S. nuclear deterrent.<sup>70</sup> DoD’s research and engineering function has also been nominated as one component of an integrated strategy;<sup>71</sup>

aspects of defense industrial base preparedness and resilience have been mentioned as well.

## Other Aspects of Integrated Deterrence

The concept of integrated deterrence has two other important aspects. First, *it relates to the concept of tailored deterrence*. Both public documents and officials to whom we spoke repeatedly maintained that every deterrence situation is unique and that the packages of integrated deterrence campaigns will be designed for specific situations. The 2022 *NDS* states that “[t]he Department will align policies, investments, and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence—*tailored to specific competitors and challenges* and coordinated and synchronized inside and outside the Department.”<sup>72</sup> Later the 2022 *NDS* emphasizes that integrated deterrence efforts will be “[t]ailored to specific circumstances,” and mentions several specific cases that demand “tailored deterrence approaches.”<sup>73</sup> Some U.S. officials stress that tailoring deterrence places particular emphasis on the role of intelligence, assessment, and analysis to understand the motives, mindset, strategies, and tactics of specific potential aggressors.

A closely related second aspect is that *integrated deterrence stresses the importance of feedback loops designed to assess the effect U.S. policies are having on deterrence*.<sup>74</sup> An effective deterrent strategy will incorporate all available evidence about rival leaders’ perceptions and how integrated deterrent strategies might affect them, whether from direct public statements, the behavior of rivals, or U.S. intelligence channels. The intent of the concept is to identify which approaches have more effect on perceptions and behavior over time and expand them, while noting

which U.S. actions generate few results. This theme of learning and feedback is also central to the parallel *NDS* concept of campaigning. Official discussions suggest that *campaigning*—which the 2022 *NDS* defines as “the conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military activities to achieve strategy-aligned objectives over time”<sup>75</sup>—implies more than a series of individual steps to counter rival competitive advantage short of war; it also embodies a spirit of constant reflection, watching the results of U.S. actions, and calibrating future steps based on evidence. In both of its leading concepts, the 2022 *NDS* urges a habit of learning and adaptation.

Third, at least in theory, *integrated deterrence can reduce an aggressor’s perceived need to engage in aggression and subsequent threats of consequences for doing so*. As noted previously, forestalling aggression is partly about convincing a potential attacker that it can satisfy its essential interests short of war. The 2022 *NDS* seems to include a wider conception of dissuasion when it describes inte-

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Campaigning embodies the spirit of constant reflection, watching the results of U.S. actions, and calibrating future steps based on evidence.

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Integrated deterrence addresses a critical U.S. national security objective, which is forestalling major aggression from rivals.

grated deterrence as applying “a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of *the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint*.”<sup>76</sup> By incorporating diplomatic tools into a deterrence strategy, initiatives can signal an assurance and willingness to meet a rival’s vital interests in ways that make aggression less necessary.

## Challenges with Integrated Deterrence

The concept of integrated deterrence speaks to a critical U.S. national security objective, which is forestalling major aggression or other especially dangerous actions by rivals. It highlights the critical importance of better synergy among U.S. instruments of power, actions across multiple domains and regions, and closer cooperation with allies and partners to achieve more deterrent power. However, any new concept will face practical challenges to being understood and implemented effectively. Our research

also highlighted several issues to be addressed over time as integrated deterrence becomes central to U.S. national security strategy.

First, *official documents are somewhat unclear on precisely what sort of aggressor activities integrated deterrence is designed to prevent*. Those documents suggest that integrated deterrence provides an approach for everything from major aggression to ongoing competitive activities. Emerging notions of strategic competition can lead to strategic overstretch if the United States tries to resist almost everything that a competitor does. While the 2022 *NDS* repeatedly emphasizes the importance of prioritization, a broad conceptualization of integrated deterrence could allow U.S. officials to frame almost any policy or investment as a step toward positional advantage or cost imposition. This is partly unavoidable: A broad strategy document will have difficulty spelling out rigid priorities for an uncertain future. However, U.S. defense policy must make choices that demand a sense of priorities, for example, between sustaining legacy systems and investing in transformative ones. While certain tendencies are apparent in defense budget decisions, integrated deterrence itself does not necessarily provide guidance for them.

Second, *it is not clear why integration per se enhances deterrence apart from the measurable improvements in U.S. operational capabilities that it generates*. There remains no clear idea of how or why more seamless integration produces stronger deterrence, apart from an assumption that better synergies would make the United States and its partners more effective. Integrated deterrence can be better defined when the advantages of synergy are made explicit, which would force U.S. officials to identify the combina-

tions, forms of integration, and resulting investments that will make the most difference.

A third challenge is that *no official documents or published statements give any specific examples of forms of integration—discrete packages of initiatives that create useful synergies—that are expected to enhance deterrence.* Some anecdotal examples have appeared in the defense press,<sup>77</sup> and some synergies are obvious candidates, such as various elements of long-range strike packages. Integrated deterrence presumably enables more ambitious and comprehensive synergies than components of a military operational system can. Nevertheless, how a more expansive set of independent tools would work together synergistically has yet to be spelled out.

Laying out specific synergistic approaches will be challenging because of the risks, costs, and sensitivities involved in many deterrent actions. For example, using potent offensive cyber operations as part of a peacetime integrated deterrence effort would have significant escalatory risks. Sometimes multiple actions can counteract rather than enhance one another. For example, opening a diplomatic channel that might signal an unwillingness to use threatened military force could come into conflict with other military actions. In other words, designing actual synergistic approaches might take a substantial amount of analysis and discussion.

Fourth, *the concept of integrated deterrence leaves a significant uncertainty around the most critical aspect of deterrence, which is the effect of one's actions on the perceptions of the potential aggressor.* Despite its potential value, improving synergy might simply go largely unnoticed by potential aggressors, in part because some of its practical manifestations will remain classified. The gradual char-

acter of integrated deterrence also complicates the challenge of affecting an aggressor's thinking: If the approach enhances U.S. deterrent capabilities only slowly, it might never promise a degree of threshold capability that would affect an aggressor's perception of their ability to succeed.<sup>78</sup>

Fifth, *partners and allies—coordination with whom is described as the center of gravity for the larger drive toward integration—remain unclear about their roles in the concept and are potentially hesitant to play those roles.* Documents that have been released so far do not specify clear roles, missions, or responsibilities for allies and partners in general or for specific countries. As one recent study concluded, “At present, America's allies and partners do not understand the integrated deterrence concept and what it would require of them, nor are Washington's own expectations clear.”<sup>79</sup> The same study noted that some allies have different conceptions of deterrence and concerns that U.S. barriers to collaboration will not ease even under the new approach.

There might be a bigger issue than lack of clarity in allied and partner roles in integrated deterrence: The strict constraints on their willingness to play the roles that U.S. strategy sets out for them.<sup>80</sup> Those constraints come from multiple sources. Three leading ones are stark differences in threat perceptions, especially in Asia;<sup>81</sup> deeply entrenched philosophies of nonalignment; and vulnerability to Chinese economic and political coercion. The role of allies and partners might be the gravitational center of integrated deterrence, but it must reflect the constraints on the roles and missions those countries will perform.

Sixth, *integration and synergy represent institutionally and bureaucratically challenging goals, and it is not clear the U.S. government is prepared to take the necessary steps*

to bring them to fruition. As one example, the 2022 NDS suggests that in pursuit of improved integration with allies and partners, the United States will “reduce institutional barriers, including those that inhibit collective research and development, planning, interoperability, intelligence and information sharing, and export of key capabilities.”<sup>82</sup> That is a significant agenda and some elements of it—such as information sharing with allies and streamlined arms transfer policies—have resisted policy solutions for decades. The barriers to movement are often political and bureaucratic rather than technical, which means that they will require strong high-level attention and a degree of risk tolerance to overcome.

Seventh, *it is not clear that the U.S. government outside DoD will join an ongoing process of integration of efforts for deterrent effect.* The 2022 NDS repeatedly emphasizes that integrated deterrence relies on leading roles from other parts of the U.S. government, especially for competition short of war. Yet there is little evidence that other departments and agencies have taken up the concept or are even coordinating intensively with DoD on its widespread implementation.<sup>83</sup> This might not turn out to be a fatal handicap: Integrated deterrence will always be applied in specific cases (its tailored aspect). If the U.S. government develops individual deterrent strategies for major aggression and specific high-end gray zone operations, it will be able to achieve the spirit of the concept even if it remains somewhat underdeveloped at a general, interagency level. At a minimum, it will be important to identify high-priority institutional barriers to address to make the concept work.

None of these challenges denies the potential utility of various forms of integration and coordination in enhanc-

ing U.S. deterrent policies. As the concept suggests, there is good reason to believe that the United States is forfeiting significant opportunities for operational military effectiveness and broader geopolitical deterrent effect because of imperfect integration. If the concept is to reach its potential, these and other related challenges must be addressed.

## **Conclusion: Criteria for Assessing Contributions to Deterrence, Integrated or Otherwise**

To apply integrated deterrence, DoD will need to continually assess the contributions made by its specific capabilities and activities to the concept.

The most important step forward would be to lay out tailored, country-specific integrated deterrence strategies, which include detailing the specific forms of aggression to be deterred, assessing the motivations and mindset of potential aggressors, and describing a theory of success for U.S. actions to effectively deter an aggressor. Articulating such a strategy and taking its recommended action could then set the stage for the assessment, learning, and NDS feedback in which the United States watches closely for reactions to its moves and adapts its strategy accordingly.

In the meantime, DoD components that are aiming to align their priorities to the 2022 NDS, and specifically to its core idea of integrated deterrence, could follow several simple guideposts.

1. *The core elements of integrated deterrence do not reflect a radical shift from existing defense policy, but instead reflect classic principles.* The concept aims to enhance deterrence; first and foremost from a



DoD perspective, that means investing in the U.S. capabilities that are already underway throughout the DoD. It also stresses well-known issues of coordination among services both across the U.S. government and between the United States and other countries. Services, theater commands, and other DoD components have well-planned efforts in all these areas; much of what they are already doing directly serves these goals.

2. *Integrated deterrence focuses on more-holistic combinations of capabilities to enhance warfighting effectiveness.* The foundational DoD contribution to integrated deterrence is a well-trained and equipped force capable of fighting and winning wars. Continuing to work to solve current operational problems strongly serves the goals of the 2022 NDS overall and integrated deterrence.
3. *The unclassified 2022 NDS provides many points of guidance separate from its statement of integrated deterrence.* In areas such as force planning and allies and partners, the document points to specific priorities that can be used to shape and align theater, service, and office actions.
4. *Any DoD component can identify areas of integration that would enhance its effectiveness and efficiency.* In all its forms, integration is a long-term aspirational goal. Senior leaders in any theater command, service, or other DoD component could readily identify several areas for potential reform and improvement, in other words, types of integration that might be feasible to implement and make important operational differences. This might be especially true for engaging allies and partners.

5. *DoD should identify a small number of the highest-priority issue areas in which to pursue integration.* Integration is less likely to generate meaningful effects as a blanket principle than in a handful of specific initiatives chosen for their deterrent effect. Within DoD, across the wider U.S. government, and with allies and partners, the United States should pick an initial set of priority efforts chosen for their high-value proposition for deterrent and warfighting effect. Some efforts are arguably already underway, such as the JADC2 project and the focus on improving defense integration with Japan.
6. *Defense planners should continue to emphasize the space below the threshold of war.* Integrated deterrence and the unclassified 2022 NDS more broadly address how the United States will employ its military capabilities across the spectrum of competition and conflict. Pursuing capabilities and forms of

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As the United States deals with the challenges of two major rivalries, it will need to apply its instruments of statecraft holistically and carefully.

integration to better engage in what the 2022 *NDS* calls campaigning is a critical priority.

7. *Any DoD component can pursue initiatives that encourage the long-term shifts in mindset required by the new approach.* Movement toward greater integration necessarily confronts institutional, bureaucratic, and cultural issues, and will only emerge gradually. However, services, commands, and other DoD components can constantly search for ideas and changes that will make integration and synergy more habitual over time.

As the United States deals with the challenges of two major rivalries—both in terms of the risk of a major conventional war and especially intense gray zone confrontations—it will need to master the art of applying its instruments of statecraft in holistic and carefully designed packages to achieved case-specific effects. The idea of integrated deterrence and the companion notion of campaigning highlight this critical requirement and indicate ways to improve deterrence effects. The challenge now is to continue developing these concepts and to build individual strategies that reflect their overall goals.

## Notes

- 1 The White House, *National Security Strategy*, p. 22.
- 2 Lindsay and Gartzke, “Introduction,” p. 14.
- 3 Lindsay and Gartzke, “Introduction,” p. 14.
- 4 See the analysis in Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression*.
- 5 This argument is made in Morris et al., *Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone*.
- 6 An example is Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict.”
- 7 Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression*.
- 8 This discussion relies on Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression*, pp. 3–5.
- 9 Morgan, *Deterrence*, p. 32.
- 10 The distinction is even more complex because the *NDS* refers to a third category, “deterrence by cost imposition.” In one sense, this might be taken to split the difference between denial and punishment as typically defined and refer to “direct cost imposition” in such forms as long-range fires, which implies that the actions are imposing costs in ways very similar to denial activities. The key distinction is between actions taken to defeat and roll back the actual aggression and those used to hurt the aggressor in other ways. However, officials involved with the *NDS* suggest that its use of cost imposition is designed to be functionally equivalent to the category of deterrence by punishment.
- 11 DoD, *2022 National Defense Strategy*, pp. 8.
- 12 Morgan, “The Past and Future of Deterrence Theory,” p. 53.
- 13 Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression*, p. 54.
- 14 Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression*, p. 54.
- 15 Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression*, pp. 14–16.
- 16 Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Applying a Framework to Assess Deterrence of Gray Zone Aggression*.
- 17 Morgan, “The Past and the Future of Deterrence Theory,” p. 59.
- 18 Whether the term deterrence encompasses such assurance is a semantic issue. The political and strategic actions necessary to prevent war typically demand reassurance as well as threats.
- 19 Lindsay and Gartzke, “Introduction,” p. 3. As they explain, the concept refers to states which “may use air strikes to retaliate for terrorism, cyber operations to disable an adversary’s command and control or to influence its electorate, targeted economic sanctions to punish a cyber intrusion, or even migration policy to coerce neighboring states” (p. 3). See also Gartzke, Lindsay, and Nacht, “Cross-Domain Deterrence.” Nacht, Schuster, and Uribe, “Cross-Domain Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,” provides multiple examples of the use of cross-domain actions for deterrent purposes.
- 20 Lindsay and Gartzke define cross-domain deterrence as almost equivalent to the current notion of integrated deterrence: “[W]e consider a *domain* to be any pathway or means for coercion that is different from other means in respect to its utility for political bargaining” (Lindsay and Gartzke, “Introduction,” p. 16).
- 21 Lindsay and Gartzke asked whether it “provides any additional analytical traction beyond classical notions of deterrence” (Lindsay and Gartzke, “Introduction,” p. 3).
- 22 Mallory, *New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deterrence*, p. 6.
- 23 Mallory, *New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deterrence*, pp. 7–8.
- 24 Chase and Chan, *China’s Evolving Approach to “Integrated Strategic Deterrence”*, pp. 51–52.
- 25 Gannon, “One if by Land, and Two if by Sea.”
- 26 Lindsay and Gartzke, “Conclusion,” p. 338.
- 27 Gannon, “One if by Land, and Two if by Sea,” p. 9.
- 28 Johnson and Kelly, “Tailored Deterrence,” pp. 22–29.
- 29 DoD, *2022 National Defense Strategy*, p. iv.
- 30 DoD, *2022 National Defense Strategy*, p. 9.
- 31 *Strategic Deterrence Joint Operation Concept, Version 1.0*, U.S. Strategic Command, February 2004. Quoted in Lantis, “Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence,” p. 470.
- 32 Larkin, “The Limits of Tailored Deterrence.”

<sup>33</sup> An example is the Russian invasion of Ukraine: Open-source reports suggest that, in the final days before the Russian invasion, U.S. and European intelligence services accurately predicted an invasion, but in the months and weeks before that, opinions about Vladimir Putin's intentions differed widely. See, for example, Abdalla et al., "Intelligence and the War in Ukraine."

<sup>34</sup> Scouras, Smyth, and Mahnken, "Cross-Domain Deterrence in U.S.-China Strategy," pp. 21–22.

<sup>35</sup> Peng and Yao, *The Science of Military Strategy*, p. 214; Cheng, "Chinese Views of Deterrence," p. 93.

<sup>36</sup> Chase and Chan, *China's Evolving Approach to "Integrated Strategic Deterrence"*, pp. 3, see also pp. 9–12.

<sup>37</sup> Charap et al., *Russian Grand Strategy*, pp. 33, see also pp. 33–45.

<sup>38</sup> Charap, "Strategic Sderzhivanie."

<sup>39</sup> Morgan, "The Past and the Future of Deterrence Theory," p. 58.

<sup>40</sup> Lindsay and Gartzke, "Conclusion," p. 338.

<sup>41</sup> Morgan, "The Past and the Future of Deterrence Theory," pp. 59–60.

<sup>42</sup> DoD, "Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy."

<sup>43</sup> Austin, "Transcript: US Defense Secretary Austin's Speech in Singapore."

<sup>44</sup> We interviewed officials working for or with DoD in October and November of 2022 to gather key unclassified interpretations of integrated deterrence. The interviews were not for attribution, so no names are provided. Where appropriate, however, we include information on the interviewee's position or status.

<sup>45</sup> In this sense, integrated deterrence appears to be more about taking advantages of opportunities rather than identifying and solving problems in U.S. deterrent policies. It does not explicitly identify shortcomings that need to be resolved for deterrence to work. As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Mara Karlin stated, "Deterrence isn't new. But given the urgent need to sustain and strengthen it, given the complicated security environment . . . a new framework really was important. And that is integrated deterrence. And it's really trying to weave together our cutting-edge capabilities, technology, and operational concepts alongside the rest of the U.S. government and our allies and partners" (U.S. Department of Defense [@DeptofDe-

fense], "Want to know how we're implementing the National Defense Strategy?").

<sup>46</sup> For example, the section on force planning names several areas of emphasis, such as surveillance and command and control. See DoD, 2022 *NDS*, pp. 17–18. It is striking that in many public statements, DoD officials take pains to stress basic defense planning priorities. Potent capabilities are the centerpiece of DoD's contribution to integrated deterrence.

<sup>47</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 7.

<sup>48</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 12.

<sup>49</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. iv. The document later states that integrated deterrence "applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors' perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat credible forces prepared to fight and win, as needed, and backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent" (DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 1). These references imply a focus on major aggression.

<sup>50</sup> For example, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl, said that "[w]e need to think about deterrence differently given the existing security environment, and the potential scenarios for conflict that we're trying to deter. . . . We at [the] Department of Defense need to have the capabilities and the concepts to deny the type of rapid fait accompli scenarios that we know potential adversaries are contemplating, so they can't make a rapid lunge at our partners and allies before they believe the United States can show up" (Garamone, "Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says").

<sup>51</sup> The White House, "National Security Strategy," p. 22.

<sup>52</sup> Mara Karlin has suggested that integrated deterrence aims to force more rigor on DoD by considering "how, why, under what circumstances might one actually want to compete," implying a broader focus than just major aggression (Karlin, "The Next National Defense Strategy with Dr. Mara Karlin").

<sup>53</sup> Austin, "Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Prepared Remarks Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 7, 2022," p. 3.

<sup>54</sup> Austin, "Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Prepared Remarks Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 7, 2022," p. 2. Emphasis added.

<sup>55</sup> The White House, *National Security Strategy*, p. 22.

<sup>56</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. iv.

<sup>57</sup> Again, Ukraine might offer a useful example of how such integration—both between U.S. instruments of power and among allies and partners—can achieve significant synergistic effects.

<sup>58</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, pp. 8–9.

<sup>59</sup> See Karlin, “The Next National Defense Strategy with Dr. Mara Karlin”; Colin Kahl’s comments in Garamone, “Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says”; and DoD, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. Kathleen Hicks and Senior Defense Officials Discuss DoD’s Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request and the National Defense Strategy with Defense Industry Executives.” These comments and other discussions suggest that resilience is viewed as a contributing factor to both deterrence by denial (by enhancing the ability of U.S., partner, and allied militaries and societies to resist aggression) and deterrence by punishment or cost imposition (by making U.S., partner, and allied systems stronger in a mutual contest of cost imposition).

<sup>60</sup> Pope, “Raymond Praises Space Force Achievements & Purpose While Noting Ongoing Threats, Challenges”; and Theresa Hitchens, “New ‘Strategic Space Review’ to Shape Space Force Offensive-Defensive Capabilities Mix.”

<sup>61</sup> DoD 2022 *NDS*, p. 10.

<sup>62</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, pp. 17–21.

<sup>63</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 1.

<sup>64</sup> The bullet points in this display quote come directly from the White House, *National Security Strategy*, p. 22.

<sup>65</sup> In one major public statement, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl defined “integrated” as meaning “integrating across domains, not just land, air, sea, undersea, but also space, cyberspace, and the informational domains. . . You have to integrate across theaters [and] the spectrum of conflict because you have to think of everything from the gray zone to high intensity warfare.” Integration across theaters means that the United States “is more forward and more present alongside more allies and partners in more places around the world than any other global power to generate the limits,” so that adversaries can never be certain if acting in one place will lead to cost imposition elsewhere (Center for a New American Security, “Dr. Colin Kahl in

Conversation with Richard Fontaine, CNAS 2022 National Security Conference”).

<sup>66</sup> Karlin, “The Next National Defense Strategy with Dr. Mara Karlin.”

<sup>67</sup> Austin explained that the approach will help ensure “that capabilities like our Global Positioning System can continue even if adversaries attack it with missiles, cyber tools, or space-based weapons. Integrated deterrence could also mean employing cyber effects in one location to respond to a maritime security incident hundreds of miles away. [ . . . ] It means that capabilities must be shared across lines as a matter of course, not as an exception to the rule. And it means that coordination across commands and services needs to be a reflex, and not an afterthought” (DoD, “Secretary of Defense Remarks for the U.S. INDOPACOM Change of Command”).

<sup>68</sup> For example, the *NDS* is described as “a call to action for the defense enterprise to incorporate Allies and partners at every stage of defense planning” (DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 14). The document appears to refer to a form of integrated deterrence when it advocates for the use of “collective cost imposition,” which “increase the expectation that aggression will be met with a collective response” (DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 9). See also Karlin, “Engagement with Allies and Partners”; and Garamone, “Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says.”

<sup>69</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, pp. 14–15.

<sup>70</sup> Garamone, “Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says.”

<sup>71</sup> Vergun, “Modernization of Armed Forces a Collaborative Effort, Official Says.”

<sup>72</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. iv. Emphasis added.

<sup>73</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, pp. 1, 9–10.

<sup>74</sup> Vergun, “Indo-Pacific Exercise Offers Effective Deterrence.”

<sup>75</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 12.

<sup>76</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 5. Emphasis added.

<sup>77</sup> As one example, Colin Kahl also cites U.S. dominance in the global financial system as a tool that “can impose real costs and create real dilemmas for adversaries” (Center for a New American Security, “Center for a New American Security Holds Discussion with Colin Kahl at 2022

National Security Conference”). See also Kahl, “The 2022 National Defense Strategy.”

<sup>78</sup> This is not a new problem. Both at the national and theater level, U.S. activities are often undertaken based on assumptions about their effects on the perceptions of rivals or potential aggressors, sometimes without a strong evidentiary basis. To some degree, this is inevitable given limits to U.S. knowledge. However, implementing integrated deterrence demands progress in this area, because without a clear understanding of how potential aggressors view specific initiatives, their deterrent value cannot be known.

<sup>79</sup> Pettyjohn and Wasser, “No I in Team,” p. 9.

<sup>80</sup> Malley and Wirtz conclude that emerging U.S. deterrent strategies assume that allies and partners will be willing to do things “they have not done in the past and show few signs of being willing to do today,” including intervene in contingencies outside their home territory and allow the United States to conduct offensive operations from their land

(Malley and Wirtz, “Maritime Coalitions and Deterrence,” p. 108). RAND has conducted over a dozen studies in the last few years on ally and partner perspectives that universally support this same message: there are strict limits to what they will be willing to do in peace or war. See, for example, Hornung, *Ground-Based Intermediate-Range Missiles in the Indo-Pacific*; Wong et al., *New Directions for Projecting Land Power in the Indo-Pacific*, Appendix A; Mazarr et al., *Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition Through the Eyes of Others*; and Lin et al., *Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific*.

<sup>81</sup> Kang, “Still Getting Asia Wrong.”

<sup>82</sup> DoD, 2022 *NDS*, p. 14. See Pettyjohn and Wasser, “No I in Team,” pp. 6–9.

<sup>83</sup> As of this writing, for example, there is no National Security Council process related to the coordination of tools under integrated deterrence.

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## Abbreviations

NDS	<i>National Defense Strategy</i>
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
JADC2	Joint All-Domain Command and Control
PRC	People's Republic of China

## **Acknowledgments**

This Perspective represents the views of the authors and is partly informed by a wide range of RAND work on the future of the international order and strategic competition. The authors would like to thank Jim Mitre and James D. Fearon for their thoughtful peer review comments.

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## About This Perspective

This Perspective describes the new defense planning concept of integrated deterrence and places it into the context of existing theories of deterrence. In the process, the Perspective identifies several criteria to employ in assessing whether U.S. investments or actions might serve deterrence goals, both general and integrated.

### RAND National Security Research Division

This work was sponsored by U.S. Defense Department Office of Global Partnerships and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense intelligence enterprise.

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