The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971

J. A. Koch

A Report prepared for
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
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This documentation was prepared within a larger ARPA-sponsored project, whose focus is on the organization and management of counter-insurgency in the countries of Southeast Asia. It is an attempt to record the history of the Chieu Hoi (Vietnamese for "Open Arms") program in South Vietnam, the only institution that has sought to persuade enemy soldiers and civilians to rally to the GVN side and has established instrumentalities for neutralizing such defectors, obtaining intelligence through them, indoctrinating them with a view to winning and retaining their loyalty, and even, to some extent, training them for economic survival in a slowly urbanized society.

Begun in 1963 at the initiative of the United States, which recognized its potential usefulness as a counterinsurgency weapon, the Chieu Hoi program became a component of the overall pacification effort, resulting in the defection and neutralization of over 194,000 enemy adherents and personnel. Now entirely GVN-administered, it has made some strides as a framework for national reconciliation, and as such may prove a useful device and illuminating precedent for those concerned with the postwar rehabilitation of former enemies in South Vietnam or elsewhere.

The author was personally involved in the development of the program in the field, and thus intimately aware of how relatively little of the results and experiences gathered there has been assembled and made known. A study by Emmett J. O'Brien on "Defection [as] a Military Strategy for Wars of Liberation," which calls for an after-action report that would "concentrate on strength, weaknesses, and lessons learned from the Vietnam defection program," provided added incentive to the author to prepare some of the background for such a study. In the present work, therefore, she has (1) summed up the results of earlier research on the defection of VC/NVA personnel in South Vietnam; (2) described the organization and operation of the Chieu Hoi

* A research report prepared by O'Brien at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., February 6, 1971.
program from 1963 to 1971; (3) recorded views and recollections about the functioning of the program by some of those who helped launch it or were otherwise responsible for its successes and failures; (4) included in her bibliographic references numerous documents that constituted policy and operating guidelines for Chieu Hoi administrators, in the belief that they will prove valuable to future researchers; and (5) collected, in the form of appendices, those GVN and MACV documents that would be essential to anyone attempting an analysis and evaluation of the program.

The work does not attempt the critical assessment called for by Colonel O'Brien. Apart from certain remarks on strengths and weaknesses in the program which were apparent, the author has attempted to limit herself to a factual, objective account which, however, was necessarily based on data derived from sources directly concerned with and participating in the program.

This report is being made available to its ARPA sponsors and those in the U.S. Government whose concern is with psychological operations in counterinsurgency and with means of healing divisions caused by a civil war.
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SUMMARY

Through its Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") Program, the GVN has offered the Viet Cong opportunities for defection, an alternative to the hardships and deprivations of guerrilla life, political pardon, and in some measure, through vocational training, a means of earning a livelihood. The program has not only weakened the enemy's manpower by the defection of over 194,000 ralliers (Hoi Chanh) but it has also weakened his cause politically with the public rejection of the policies and objectives of the National Liberation Front by a substantial number of its former adherents.

The Vietnamese are not "joiners" by nature. Both the GVN and the VC must propagandize, cajole, entrap, and draft recruits. However, the VC have had good leadership, discipline, and a strong means of persuasion in their promise of personal advantage to uneducated and ambitious young men of humble origin who see little future in traditional Vietnamese society. When the more careful appeals for voluntary recruitment have been insufficient to support the demands of a changing military-political strategy, compulsion, violence, and terrorism have been employed (though coerced recruits initially lack commitment and are more apt to rally or desert). The Viet Cong have reacted vigorously against Chieu Hoi, thereby attesting to its effectiveness. Rallying is considered a crime punishable by death.

Motives for rallying are not, in the main, ideological but personal. With relatively few exceptions, both military and civilian ralliers have come from the lower levels of the enemy ranks. The growing pressure of GVN and U.S. military effectiveness, the hardships of life in the VC, war-weariness, uncertainty about the future, doubt as to the ability of the Viet Cong to "liberate" South Vietnam, disillusionment with Viet Cong policies and promises, revulsion at the terrorism against the people, and family concern all go to make up the decision to rally.

The Chieu Hoi Program originated with the GVN in 1963 as a result of two advisory efforts. On the U.S. side, Rufus Phillips and C. R. Bohannan drew on their familiarity with the "EDCOR" experience in the Philippines, in which President Ramon Magsaysay offered a successful
amnesty and resettlement program to the Hukbalahaps. Quite independently, having in mind the British experience in Malaya, Sir Robert Thompson (then with the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam) successfully pressed for a Vietnamese defector program at the highest levels of the Vietnamese government.

Despite misgivings about offering any kind of amnesty to the enemy, President Diem placed some of his most able, energetic administrators in charge of the new program. Initially it met with great success. During the first three months alone, almost 5,000 of the enemy rallied. Even in the midst of the political turmoil which followed the death of President Diem, in 1964, more than 10,000 of the enemy rallied. American advisers urged that a high priority be assigned to Chieu Hoi, but a year-and-a-half after its initiation it was still a relatively modest, underfunded effort, lacking adequately trained personnel and beset with internal weaknesses.

By 1965 the defector program had been endorsed at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, but this policy was not backed up by any appreciable increase in materiel or personnel support. Discerning a lack of concrete interest on the part of the Americans, the GVN gave the program low priority. It had, however, become apparent to American officials at the operating level that Chieu Hoi had the most favorable cost/benefit ratio of any counterinsurgency operation in Vietnam, and it was decided to give the program more clout, including the input of high-caliber American personnel. The GVN also upgraded the program. By 1966, with increasing coordination among the Chieu Hoi Section of the U.S. Office of Civilian Operations (OCO), the GVN Chieu Hoi Secretariat, and other GVN agencies whose activities were closely tied into those of Chieu Hoi, the number of ralliers doubled.

In 1967 Chieu Hoi, now a full GVN ministry, became, on the U.S. side, the executive responsibility of CORDS, the new, unique civil/military agency which was to coordinate all U.S. civilian programs supporting the counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam. USAID continued to provide financial, logistic, and personnel support, and the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) retained responsibility for the development and dissemination of psychological operations relating to Chieu Hoi. The U.S. contributed the major share of the 1967 funding.
The cost of processing, retraining, and resettling a rallier rose from $14.00 in 1963 to $250.00.

Beginning in April 1967 a new policy of "national reconciliation" ("Dai Doan Ket") provided that Ho Chi Minh would not only continue to be given amnesty and guaranteed their political and civil rights but would be helped by the GVN to find careers commensurate with their experience, ability, and loyalty. It was to be an inducement to the high-ranking Viet Cong to rally. As with the original Chieu Hoi idea, however, Dai Doan Ket was a U.S. initiative pressed on the GVN, and it has never been widely implemented. GVN officials were reluctant to reward their former enemies with jobs and political careers, lest such full economic and political participation result in a coalition government.

The impact of the 1968 Offensive on the Chieu Hoi rate was severe. Physical assets and personnel came through largely unscathed, but momentum was lost as the security situation remained tense. Eventually, however, the Offensive proved a watershed in GVN acceptance of the program. With few exceptions Ho Chi Minh, and particularly the Armed Propaganda Teams, had proved loyal to the GVN. By the end of the year, the inability of the enemy to hold territory and bring about a people's uprising, followed by an expansion of the GVN presence and control of the countryside, led to a rise in both numbers and quality of ralliers.

The program reached its peak in 1969 with a rallier return of 47,023. The three basic principles governing the Chieu Hoi rate were in operation: a good internal organization, a large group of potential ralliers which could be tapped as the GVN expanded its presence into former VC and contested areas, and increased security in controlled areas with a rising tide of economic development reaching down to the village level.

The per capita cost per rallier rose to $350. There were American Chieu Hoi advisers in the four military regions and in all 44 provinces. On the GVN side the Chieu Hoi apparatus was extended from district to village level. Efforts continued to eliminate inflation in Chieu Hoi statistics. More sophisticated interrogation procedures to forestall infiltration and to improve intelligence collection were implemented. Nevertheless, the GVN leaders' distrust of the program lingered, preventing it from achieving its full potential.
During 1970 the nature of the war changed from a struggle for control of territory to one for internal security and consolidation. The enemy's strategy of protracted guerrilla war, terrorism, and covert political penetration had failed to stall the GVN pacification drive but progress was not as great as in 1969. Chieu Hoi showed a declining rallier rate. There was some shift in the attitude of GVN leaders toward making Chieu Hoi a true national reconciliation program. Inducement was directed at high-ranking military and political VC/NVA cadres and emphasis was put on improved political rehabilitation and vocational training.

The 1971 Chieu Hoi rate, fluctuating wildly, continued to decline to its lowest monthly figure since the early years of the program, the political instability surrounding the Presidential elections undoubtedly being a major factor. Most of the Chieu Hoi resettlement hamlets were put under local government administration, the number of Armed Propaganda Teams and Kit Carson Scouts was decreased, and the U.S. advisory effort was phased down. U.S. financial support remained at about the 1970 level, and the GVN prepared for complete takeover of the program in 1972.

The reception accorded the rallier is of the utmost importance; the promises given by the psyops inducement appeal must be fulfilled if the credibility of the program is to be sustained. At the reception centers the returnee is screened to determine his bona fides as a rallier. He is interrogated to obtain any tactical intelligence he may have, and then attends mandatory political lectures, receives vocational training if he desires, and after 45-60 days is released, with a six-month military deferment.

A shortage of adequately trained and motivated personnel to operate the centers has plagued the program from its inception. Low salaries have led to corruption and inhibited recruitment of persons of the caliber needed to project the image of a truly "open arms" policy. The problem has been partially resolved with the hiring of ralliers to fill many of the permanent administrative jobs in the centers. In contrast with VC indoctrination methods, the political rehabilitation of the rallier has been generally inadequate. Here too, however, there has been considerable improvement with the hiring of the more politically aware Ho Chi Minh as instructors.
The primary purpose of the voluntary vocational training is to offer the Hoi Chanh a means of supporting himself and his family after he leaves the center. (Most of them do not return to farming.) Many Hoi Chanh doubt the need for the training or its practicality and do not volunteer for it. Because of the short stay at the centers and the lack of qualified instructors, the training has of necessity been limited to the simpler skills, though by 1970 advanced training was offered at some of the regional centers.

Resettlement and employment of Hoi Chanh in a manner that will assure them of a livelihood after leaving the centers has been of obvious importance. Many Hoi Chanh volunteer for the military and paramilitary forces -- the ARVN, the RF/PF, Armed Propaganda Teams, Kit Carson Scouts. The need for manpower in the GVN armed forces has relieved many of the unemployment pressures that would exist in peacetime. Ralliers also participate successfully in psychological planning and operations, and some have been integrated into government agencies, particularly the Chieu Hoi Ministry. Since 1968 Hoi Chanh have increasingly been used as interrogators in PHUNG HOANG (the program to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure).

Resettlement of those Hoi Chanh who do not join the military, or who are not among the few to be absorbed by government agencies, has been one of the most acute problems confronting the GVN. It has been compounded by a shortage of the personnel necessary to assist the Hoi Chanh after he leaves the center and the reluctance of private firms and individuals to employ Hoi Chanh. This prejudice appears to be dissipating. Resettlement of those Hoi Chanh with family roots in GVN-controlled territory has not been too difficult; others, however, have become floaters on the economy vying for a livelihood with other displaced persons, often unable to throw off the social and political stigma of being ex-VC. Up until 1970 one of the solutions to resettlement was the Chieu Hoi hamlet, in which Hoi Chanh and their families could live under the aegis of the central government. However, there were problems. The extended family base of the traditional hamlet was lacking, the hamlets were vulnerable to VC reprisals, and the Hoi Chanh families were isolated from the mainstream of Vietnamese life. By the end of 1971 all but three of these hamlets were under local government administration.
Lack of an effective system for determining the whereabouts and activities of the Hoi Chanh after they leave the centers has precluded an overall assessment of their economic, political, and social rehabilitation, the criterion for the ultimate success or failure of Chieu Hoi as a reconciliation program. By late 1971 an automated tracking system under the National Police had been set up, but definitive results were not yet available to the author.

* * * *

The program has much to offer as the GVN finds it necessary to come to some kind of accommodation with the other side, and there is the indication that the GVN intends to continue the program despite the phasing out of U.S. support. Chieu Hoi is probably the most convenient, already established channel through which the VC can attain legal status. Should a cease-fire be declared or hostilities otherwise cease, the Chieu Hoi, as a program of reconciliation and rehabilitation, could become the instrumentality by which members of the VC openly transfer their allegiance to the GVN.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge with deep appreciation the help received in preparing this study from R. W. Komer, former Deputy to COMUSMACV for Pacification, 1967-1968; Ogden Williams, who was Director of the Chieu Hoi Division, 1966-1968, and was instrumental in setting up the Program 1963-1964; Raymond G. Jones, who succeeded Williams as Director of Chieu Hoi, 1969-1970; and Eugene Bable, Director of the Chieu Hoi Directorate in Saigon until June 1972. All these men were deeply involved and contributed greatly to making Chieu Hoi a success; without their cooperation and their comments, based on actual experience in how the program evolved and actually worked, this study would not have been possible.
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Figure 1

MINISTRY OF OPEN ARMS
(Decree No. 098-SL/CH of August 26, 1970)

MINISTER

CENTRAL ORGANIZATIONS

ASSISTANT TO THE MINISTER
CABINET

ASSISTANT FOR PLANNING
FUNCTION, STUDY & EVALUATION GROUP

SECRETARY GENERAL
DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL

COORDINATION SERVICE

DIRECTORATE OF MANAGEMENT

OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

CENTRAL OPEN ARMS CENTER

CENTRAL VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CORPS AREAS REPRESENTATIVES

Corps Areas
Open Arms Centers

Provincial & City
Open Arms Centers

Provincial & City
Open Arms Services

Saigon Capital
Open Arms Service

District Branches

District Branches

THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

The original full name of the Program was "The Movement to Regroup Misled Members of the Resistance" (Phong-Trào Chìeu-Tập Kháng-Chiến Lâm Đường). It is referred to in English as the "Open Arms Plan" and shortened in Vietnamese to "Chieu Hoi." "Chieu" means "to appeal," and "Hoi" means "to return." "Hoi Chanh" (the rallier) translates literally as "returnee" with the connotation that the individual returned voluntarily to the "just cause." The rallier who defects under Chieu Hoi is here distinguished from those defectors who (1) desert to their homes or to hiding places; and (2) those who surrender or who are captured in battle.

The U.S. Military Command in Vietnam (MACV) defines returnees (Hoi Chanh or ralliers) as:

Individuals who actively participated, whether voluntarily or not, in military, paramilitary, political or administrative organizations or positions operating in the name of Communist North Vietnam and its front organizations in South Vietnam [including Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front], North Vietnam and abroad, and who voluntarily quit these organizations to give themselves up to the Government of Vietnam and to cooperate with it while they still possess the capability to fight or resist. Also to be regarded as returnees are those members of dissident nationalist forces who illegally oppose the Government of Vietnam, if they also voluntarily return to the government's cause and cooperate with it. The terms rallier, Hoi Chanh, returnee are synonymous.

- MACV Directive No. 381-50
  February 22, 1969
  (Appendix 3)
I. WHY DO THEY JOIN THE VIET CONG?

While the Viet Cong is a Communist revolutionary organization committed to a transformation of traditional Vietnamese culture if it ever comes to power, it operates within the context of that traditional culture and can only succeed by adapting to it.¹

The purpose of the 1966 Simulmatics Study quoted above was to make recommendations for the improvement of the Chieu Hoi Program. To find out why the Vietnamese peasant joined the enemy ranks, the investigators went quite deeply into sociological foundations of rural life -- the family, village tradition, religious loyalty.

The study reached the conclusion that the Vietnamese villagers are not "joiners" by nature. Both the GVN and VC must propagandaize, cajole, entrap, and draft recruits. But, while the government desires the allegiance and help of the villagers, the Viet Cong must have it to survive; it is his strongest asset and the base of his resources and manpower.² Indeed, it is Communist doctrine that no insurgency can succeed without the active support of a small part of the population and the passive support of a larger part.

Nor are the Vietnamese impelled by any great sense of patriotism or ideological conviction. The Vietnamese peasant has come to expect some form of external authority to harass him, and in the past he has not really seen much to choose between the various alternatives. The choice as to which side to serve is oftentimes a rather haphazard decision -- a matter of chance, of who drafts him first, or which side offers him a particular advantage important at the time. As the apparent successor to the Viet Minh, the National Liberation Front (NLF) was able to exercise considerable influence as a nationalist party, and in those areas controlled by the Front (and even in "non-liberated" areas) joining the Front became what was expected of the young people. Moreover, during the early phases of the insurgency, the Viet Cong had superior leadership, discipline, organization, and means of persuasion, with an appeal of personal advantage to uneducated but ambitious young men of humble origin who saw only a dead end to a future in traditional
Vietnamese society (see Fig. 2 for a listing of other reasons for joining the VC).

**VC RECRUITMENT -- STRATEGY AND TACTICS**

In 1957-1962, primary emphasis was on what Pike calls "the social movement propaganda phase." VC recruitment was by persuasion -- carefully planned propagandizing of single individuals -- and voluntary enlistment. ³ The recruit, even if captured or impressed, was treated in a "proper manner," so important to the Confucianist-oriented Vietnamese, during his period of indoctrination. In early 1962-1963 (roughly the period of the initiation of the Chieu Hoi Program), with the beginning of the "political struggle phase of the conflict," there were major strategic shifts in recruitment policies dictated by the military-political changes in the war. Tactics became harsher, involving more coercion and outright compulsory drafting. The more careful measures of the earlier period were dropped. "Cadres were instructed to recruit all except the hard-core enemy,"⁴ though "persuasion rather than compulsion [was still] considered the correct strategy for areas of weak control."⁵ (See Fig. 3.)

This harsh recruitment policy culminated by 1971 in a significant rise in terrorist attacks against the general population. Such tactics were directly attributable to the enemy's continuing need to recruit -- by violence and terror if necessary -- to replace his losses.⁶ Assassinations of ordinary civilians were up 37 percent and general abductions 12 percent, while targeted assassinations dropped 12 percent and selective abductions 57 percent.

While it can be shown that such coercive measures are oftentimes counter-productive, i.e., that the recruit defects at the first opportunity, Berman warns that the effects of such coercive recruitment techniques on defection must be placed in the context of Vietnamese peasant culture. He states that "Such individual perspectives and/or motivation can mitigate the coercive aspects of his recruitment; persuasion during captivity can be influenced by many subjective factors."⁷ Kellen found, for example, that psychological measures and control
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Figure 2

REASONS FOR ENTERING THE LAF
(Liberation Armed Forces) *

1. Force
   - captured, arrested
   - kidnapped, forcible conscription
   - threats against self, family, or property
   - drafted

2. Social pressures and circumstances
   - all his friends were joining
   - pressures from family and village
   - had to (in the sense of duty), everyone's duty
   - felt trapped, couldn't do anything else

3. Emotional appeals
   - "taken in" by propaganda
   - young and enthusiastic
   - hatred

4. Personal susceptibilities
   - personal problems (in family, conflict in village, debts)
   - dissatisfied with village life

5. Personal or family rewards/penalties
   a) rewards
      - social advancement, prestige
      - honor and glory, would be hero
      - promises of land, decreased taxes, special privileges
      - education in Front
      - could stay near home, easy life
      - adventure, entertainment
   b) penalties if not join
      - would be drafted by ARVN
      - would be arrested by GVN
      - would be harassed by NLF

6. Grievances and personal experiences
   - member of family, or friends, killed by French or ARVN
   - abuses to self, family, or village by GVN or ARVN
   - corruption, or injustices, of local officials
   - lost land
   - strategic hamlets

7. Political-social appeals
   - nationalistic sentiments
   - ideological goals

### FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF LENGTH OF SERVICE OF DEFECTORS, COMPARISON OF COERCION INVOLVED IN RECRUITMENT*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Service (in months)</th>
<th>Coerced %</th>
<th>Mixed %</th>
<th>Volunteered %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 or less</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 12</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - 24</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 48</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 48</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of Interviews
- 39
- Median 7.5 mo.


---

### HISTOGRAM OF LENGTH OF SERVICE OF DEFECTORS, COMPARISON OF COERCION INVOLVED IN RECRUITMENT*


**Relative Frequency**

- Coerced
- Mixed
-Volunteered

Length of Service in Months

- 6 or less
- 7 - 12
- 13 - 24
- 24 - 48
- over 48

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methods -- not force -- are used to bring and keep men in line. While
the combat leaders are very tough, the political cadres are "gentle,
affable, friendly, liked and respected; consoling and building morale." 8
Kellen also found a very effective control mechanism within the Viet
Cong for inducing the insurgents to work and fight, viz.

Essentially, there are three internal means of inducing the
men to work and fight at their best. The first is actual
direct supervision. This watching of all fighters at all
times encompasses a control over physical activity of
which, theoretically, desertion or malingering might be
included, and a watch for signs of low morale, "sadness,"
or other indications of reduced valor or enthusiasm. The
second is the method criticism and self-criticism, a form
of group control and group therapy. And the third is the
division of the entire fighting force into 3-man cells,
producing a virtual symbiosis of three soldiers (no cadre)
who live, work and fight together, encourage and supervise
each other, and are duty-bound to help each other in
combat. . . 9

\[\text{According to a 1970 report, the Viet Cong have announced that whomever succeeds in killing a returnee, or former Viet Cong who has rallied to the GVN cause, will be made a member of the Order of the Valiant Knights, an honor heretofore reserved for those who have killed at least ten Vietnamese and American soldiers. This highlights the importance attached by the National Liberation Front to the elimination of their former comrades who have rallied, and suggests the courage it must take an insurgent to leave the Front.}\]
II. WHY DO THEY RALLY?

MOTIVATION

A series of Rand interviews conducted in 1966 go a long way toward explaining not only motivational -- but also deterrent -- factors behind VC desertions and defections.[1] Many of these same factors appear to be relevant even five years later as the GVN attains increasing control of the countryside.[2]

In 1966 Carrier and Thomson found that the chief factors which favor rallying -- and in most cases it involved several -- were the military effectiveness of the GVN[3] and, after 1965, U.S. air attacks (though few of the ralliers interviewed cited VC defeats or losses among their reasons for rallying); the tempo of military operations which not only puts pressure on the potential rallier but also in many instances provides him with the only opportunity to escape control; the growing hardships of life in the VC movement (poor and inadequate food, the need to constantly move about, illness, unhealthy environment); restrictions on personal freedom (e.g., the inability to marry and found a family); the tight control exercised by the 3-man cell system and the constant and close supervision by political cadres, and the desire to avoid criticism and punishment; the potential rallier's war weariness and the uncertainty of the future; increased frequency of combat;[4] fear of death in combat without decent burial;[5] disappointment in VC policies, promises and actions -- and doubt of VC capability to "liberate" South Vietnam;[6] the increasingly ruthless recruiting methods of the VC;[7] revulsion at VC terrorism against the people; homesickness and an awareness of the Chieu Hoi Program as an "open door" for returning to one's family (ralliers are deferred from military duty for six months and are allowed to return to their home village if security permits);[8] a more favorable perception of the GVN and its promises in general.[9]

As can be seen, motives for defecting are hardly ideological. In the Carrier and Thomson interviews ralliers of all categories shared a general ignorance or unawareness of formal Marxism.[10] However, the act
of rallying does not necessarily imply a commitment to the GVN, though many ralliers volunteer for the GVN regular and paramilitary forces, the rural development program, and other services. Conversely, the political indoctrination received while in the insurgent ranks is apparently insufficient to overcome personal reasons for rallying (particularly in those cases where the rallier has been forced to join). Many ralliers, however, still approve at least some aspects of VC aims and behavior and expect a VC victory, though ultimate victory or defeat is viewed as a protracted struggle.

Here a word should be said about what appears -- to Western eyes -- as an all too easy transfer of loyalty in the case of defectors. Of course, where the rallier was forcibly impressed into the Communist movement, no commitment was ever involved and no change of loyalty is necessary, just the opportunity to escape. Other recruits apparently experience a certain psychological development, ranging from probable initial and partial acceptance of involvement to a full-scale commitment. However, at some point prior to a "clean break" with their former lives, there appears to be an area where defection does not involve a sense of treason or guilt at changing sides, an attitude probably attributable, in part, to the Vietnamese proclivity to be on the side on which the "Mandate of Heaven" falls. This is not treason or disloyalty or even typical Vietnamese pragmatism, but derives from a deeply religious sense, from what Berman calls "pragmatic fatalism," or an acceptance of a situation ordained by forces beyond the individual's control, which leaves him free to behave in a manner best suited to promote his own interests. Mus puts it very well, viz., "While the game is being played out, a person can easily withdraw his bet." In the case of the higher-ranking VC, Carrier and Thomson believe that at some point in this psychological experience they do make a "clean break" with their former lives and become fully committed to the Party and the Front. Rallying then becomes a matter of disloyalty and involves a reversal of this ideological commitment:

Such persons seem to be insensitive to communications or demands not compatible with the new allegiance. If captured they remain hard-core VC; if for some reason they rally, they are likely to retain much of their pro-VC orientation.
Berman believes also that such commitment on the part of the high-ranking VC is buttressed by an almost unshakable belief in ultimate victory -- a belief crucial indeed to his very self-identity.

(4) There is another facet to the actual act of rallying, one difficult for the Westerner to understand, i.e., the Vietnamese psychological penchant for "role playing," which is in effect a disassociation from real life. The Simulactics Study found a direct relation between the institutionalizing of attitudes, emotional reactions, and reactions to violence, and the assumption of a personality considered to be more socially acceptable than the real one. This is not a subconscious effort; it is a deliberate, conscious assigning of an identity and life history to oneself which blankets and obliterates the original individuality. To quote from an earlier publication of this author,

While the new role probably will contain some element of the truth, the real factual life events of the individual which do not fit this new, assumed identity are selectively disregarded or de-emphasized . . . nor, during a lifetime, is only one role assumed. There are certain exceptions -- the intellectuals tend to adopt one role and maintain it or occasionally do not adopt a totally blanketing role. One of the motivations underlying the assumption of differing roles undoubtedly relates to the changes occurring within Vietnamese society which made a certain role more tenable or beneficial than a previous one.14

The analogy to the psychological experience of the rallier is obvious.
III. WHO RALLIES?

Pike asserts that the NLF is a front organization composed of a conglomeration of disparate groups and organizations . . . [it] is not monolithic . . . neither is there any ideological cement holding it together . . . its members have little unanimity of view rather than opposition to the GVN and the desire for political power . . . What held them together in the past . . . was anticipation of victory, what holds it together now is northern discipline, exercised by 20,000 civilian cadres (out of a total NLF cadre strength of 40,000) . . .

The Chieu Hoi appeal has been toward what Pike calls the "outer rim" of the Front. This "outer rim" can be broken down into three categories -- those who remain firm in their theoretical commitment (Pike's "true believers") but who rally for personal reasons; those who continue to accept some of the ideology and are "dependable in wide areas of behavior" but who are wavering in their faith and commitment; and those who remain in the Front -- including those who have and those who have never accepted Communist ideology or objectives -- and have decided to rally or desert but have not yet had the opportunity to do so.

Sir Robert Thompson succinctly breaks down this "outer rim" into "the naturals, the converted, and the deceived":

The naturals consist of many elements, ranging from the idealist to the criminal. None of them see any future prospects for themselves in existing society . . . they are influenced . . . by a desire to change existing society . . . they have great confidence in their talents [to do so] . . . and Communism with its strength of purpose and discipline, with the chances of promotion . . . secrecy of organization . . . with its belief in inevitable victory and its sense of political power offers them their opportunity . . .

The converted are those who join the insurgency because of Government excesses or abuses of power, who have close friends in the insurgent ranks, and those who jump on the "bandwagon."

[As for the deceived] . . . in any Communist appeal there is always a degree of deception which simple minds are unable to detect . . . within this category . . . would be former resistance fighters, e.g., the Viet Minh who
found themselves gradually committed to the Communist cause; those who become persuaded after being abducted and exposed to political indoctrination. 

Based on various studies dating from 1966 (e.g., a JUSPAO survey to determine, from a random sample of 194, how and to what extent Hoi Chanh were able to reintegrate into Vietnamese society), the typical returnee at that time was between the ages of 15 and 25, was a Buddhist or practiced ancestor worship, had little or no education (i.e., up to two years), had been a farmer or a hired laborer before being conscripted for or voluntarily joining the Viet Cong (for adventure or from boredom), served as a village guerrilla or civilian cadre, had only a limited knowledge of the organization around him; remained in the VC for less than one year; and rallied because he was afraid, fatigued, or needed by his family at home. In effect, most were quite low-level, though to meet the criteria of Chieu Hoi, each had to have actively supported the VC, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in a political or military capacity.

Few high-ranking Viet Cong and fewer NVA have rallied. In connection with the high-ranking cadre who do rally, the 1966 Simulactics Study (unlike recommendations in previous studies which included the high-level Viet Cong and NVA with the vast majority of returnees who rallied for personal, not political, reasons) stated that

[While the] fervor of the VC leader must be shaken by personal deprivation . . . this alone will not take him across the bridge unless he can find some rationalization for changing his mind and his allegiance. Personal deprivation and political justification must go together.

Perhaps the classic example corroborating this view is the testimony of Lt. Colonel Le Xuan Chuyen, one of the highest-ranking Viet Cong to rally (he had been Deputy Chief of the 5th Viet Cong Division and later became Director of the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon).

Total cumulative rallier figures for 1963 and 1964 stood at 11,248 and 5,416, respectively. An actual breakdown by category of the Hoi Chanh for these years is not available. However, beginning with 1965 more meaningful data can be given as shown in Fig. 4.
**Figure 4**

**BREAKDOWN OF HOI CHANH BY CATEGORY: 1965–1971, AND PERCENTAGE OF VC MILITARY HOI CHANH TO ESTIMATED VC STRENGTH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CY</th>
<th>VC Number</th>
<th>% of Total H/C</th>
<th>VC NVA Total</th>
<th>% of Total Military</th>
<th>Political % of Total H/C</th>
<th>Pol. Number</th>
<th>% of Total H/C</th>
<th>Other % of Total H/C</th>
<th>Total % of Total H/C</th>
<th>GVN Goal</th>
<th>Est. VC/VNA Military Strength</th>
<th>Est. VC Military Strength</th>
<th>% VC Military H/C-VC Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,898</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11,123</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>221,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,897</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>6,303</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,042</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20,242</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>282,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>17,526</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>17,672</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7,877</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27,178</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>12,285</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>12,569</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3,825</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18,171</td>
<td>20,000–30,000</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>28,037</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>28,405</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12,648</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5,970</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47,023</td>
<td>20,000–33,500</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>16,847</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17,092</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11,361</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4,112</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32,556</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>10,849</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>10,914</td>
<td>less than 12</td>
<td>6,645</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20,357</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967–1971</td>
<td>85,544</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>86,652</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42,356</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16,286</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>145,296</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*a* Breakdown of VC and NVA not available for 1965 and 1966. From 1963 to February 1966 fewer than 100 NVA rallied.

*b* Includes dissidents, followers, draft dodgers, deserters, porters, etc. who have *actively* supported the VC.

*a* Total subsequently revised to 32,703 but breakdown by category not available.

*d* Total subsequently revised to 20,244.

*e* Lunar Year Goal (see fn. 52, p. 217).


*g* Includes VC Main, Local Guerrilla and Administrative Forces. Sanitized figures from DOD/PA. Breakdown VC/VNA for 1965 and 1966 not available.
The preceding table shows a high proportion of military cadres (VC Main and Local Forces and VC Guerrilla Forces) among the ralliers. This military category includes persons with relatively long service in the VC who have had heavy political indoctrination and who, it would be assumed, have a considerable stake in a VC victory. It would be interesting to know the ratio of ralliers from VC Main/Local Forces to those from the Guerrilla Forces (from which Main/Local Forces are drawn) as an indication of dissatisfaction of the rural population (the main recruitment base for the guerrillas) with VC policies. Such a breakdown appears to be unavailable. Reduced VC recruitment can also be attributed, of course, to the more limited area of operations open to the enemy as pacification spreads.7

Infiltration, recruitment, loss (e.g., by rallying), and strength figures are estimated separately and cannot be correlated. But there is an interesting trend discernible between force strengths and recruitment. While estimated VC guerrilla strength remained at about 100,000 for 1969 and 1970, VC recruitment for those two years dropped over 60 per cent. However, bearing out the statement above, there was also a decrease of 14,362 Hoi Chanh from 1969 to 1970, probably reflecting the enemy's growing dependence on NVA (who do not readily defect) because of reduced VC recruitment caused by the decreasing manpower pool. There was also a reduction in NVA Hoi Chanh from 368 to 245, reflecting diminished NVA presence in South Vietnam due to the 1970 Cambodian operations and reduced infiltration from North Vietnam.

**CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS**

Classifying returnees is difficult in a guerrilla warfare situation, where troops in a clear-and-hold operation are likely to take a variety of "civilian" captives, all of them -- including the enemy -- dressed alike, as for example in South Vietnam, in the traditional black pajamas of the Vietnamese peasant. Proper classification of Hoi Chanh has been a continuing problem in the Chieu Hoi Program.8

U.S. Forces in Vietnam -- in accordance with Article 5 of the 1949 Geneva Convention -- "have been ordered to accord prisoner of war treatment to all captives, irrespective of their suspected status, until such date as their actual status is determined by the interrogating
officer. . . .” A MACV Directive issued in 1969 (see Appendix 3) further established the procedures and responsibilities for U.S. handling of returnees. Under combat conditions, however, proper classification and adherence to the Chieu Hoi principle were not always possible (see Fig. 5).

In December 1968, in connection with the U.S. position at the Paris Peace Talks and as a means of demonstrating the GVN's determination to pursue a policy of national reconciliation, Williams in a memorandum to the Deputy for CORDS, raised the possibility (and the desirability) of converting South Vietnamese prisoners of war into Hoi Chanh.\textsuperscript{10, 11}

Williams recalls that during his tenure there were very few conversions of prisoners of war to Hoi Chanh; rather, the proposal for such a conversion was implemented slowly on an ad hoc basis. Even prior to December 1968, however, there had been a general recognition within the Chieu Hoi Program (and an actual procedure had been set up) that VC prisoners could be released into the Chieu Hoi Program if they elected to do so and met certain criteria.\textsuperscript{12} (No NVA soldier captured in battle, i.e., no NVA/POW, could be given Hoi Chanh status.)

It can be validly assumed, of course, that prisoners of war represent more of a hard-core attitude than the VC/NVA who rally. There is also the question whether prisoners can or are willing to "renounce force, abandon Communist ideology and atrocities, lay down their weapons, and abide by the Constitution of Vietnam."\textsuperscript{13} Just as with ralliers, however, there are mitigating circumstances and a wide spectrum of commitment among prisoners of war -- most of whom knew about the program but nevertheless feared hard treatment at the hands of the GVN if they rallied, or who were captured by the GVN before they had the opportunity to rally.

Much depends on the circumstances under which a VC/NVA is captured -- where and by whom, whether he has a Chieu Hoi leaflet on his person, whether he still has ammunition and his weapon; or whether he is out of ammunition, throws up his hands, and \textit{has} to surrender. The British
DEPUTY FOR CORDS TO COMUSMACV

TO:  C/S

The RVN and US
Chief of Staff people are
getting increasingly exercised
over the program being
ignored by ARVN and US,
military alike. They don't
want it搞乱 all ranking
defense matters but simply
to be involved as such. C4
program is entered. They
have a good case. Would you
have RVN/US for the above?

Dated: 7 JUL 1968

SJS Policy Branch

8 JUL 1968

Unclassifed
in Malaya recognized that even in such cases the man was indicating a certain susceptibility to inducement by the very decision not to fight to the death. The decision of how to classify the returnee is made during interrogation and in the final analysis comes down to what the man is willing to do to show his bona fides. While the British, during the Malayan Emergency, had no mass defector program strictly analogous to the GVN Chieu Hoi Program, they did conduct widespread psychological warfare operations. They had an ingenious system for separating prisoners or returnees into two categories -- Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs), who were helped to re-establish themselves in private life after they had proved cooperative, and Captured Enemy Personnel (CEPs), who were incarcerated and tried under British law. The SEPs were required to undertake specific tasks against the insurgents which would so severely damage the Communist cause as to compromise the agent and prevent or make difficult his redefection. The Kit Carson Scout and APT programs are analogous.

Danger of infiltration is, of course, endemic to any defector program, and at any given time a low-level infiltration of the GVN Chieu Hoi Program does occur. Evidence of "false" ralliers, i.e., VC cadre infiltrators, appeared first in 1967. Initial interrogation and subsequent political indoctrination are designed to identify these false ralliers. The increasing effectiveness of the ID Card Program is also proving a deterrent to infiltration. However, during late 1970 and early 1971 there was recurring evidence of a coordinated overall VC strategy for infiltration of the Chieu Hoi Centers. The VC agent would rally and upon release from the Center join a local paramilitary force (the PSDF or PF). Cumulative figures on the rate of infiltration are not available. Allegations have been made -- but not substantiated -- that among the reasons for a decline in security in MR 4 during the summer of 1971 was infiltration of the RF/PF outposts by "false ralliers."14 Probably one of the best sources for identifying false ralliers are the other Hoi Chanh in the Center, who do not wish a "Trojan Horse" in their midst.

Until Tet 1968 there was a school of thought which held that the Hoi Chanh would prove to be a Fifth Column for the enemy when he
initiated Phase III of the Revolution, the general uprising of the people. When Phase III was initiated by the Tet '68 Offensive, no Hoi Chanh (of record) went over to the other side. Instead, many of them fought with tenacity to defend the Centers (which were a particular target of attack) and, if released during the fighting, willingly returned after the offensive diminished. APTs in provinces like Sa Dec, Ba Xuyen, and Long An fought so well that, after the emergency, they tended to be given security assignments by the Province Chiefs alongside other GVN forces.
IV. FACTORS DETERRING THE RALLIER

Political instability, military search-and-destroy operations, fear of reprisal, and the actual difficulty of rallying are the main factors deterring the potential rallier. Fluctuations in the Chieu Hoi rate caused by political instability in the post-Diem period are graphically shown in Fig. 6, though according to Carrier and Thomson "the military or civilian character of the regime ... had little to do with the act of rallying." In 1966 they found considerable evidence of apathy and even ignorance concerning Saigon politics. Presumably by 1969 this apathy and ignorance had been dissipated by the national, and more particularly by village and hamlet elections, which forced the rural population into some semblance of political partisanship.

There can be little doubt that stability and continuity of a regime tend toward a favorable rallying figure, and any change in regime or a period of political uncertainty has sharply and adversely affected Chieu Hoi statistics. For example, in May 1963, at the outset of the Buddhist crisis, the rallier rate was 1700 per month; by November 1963, at the time of the coup which brought about the fall of Diem, the rate was less than 100. The 1967 election of Thieu buttressed the sagging Chieu Hoi rate, which had been declining since 1966, the year of elections for a Constituent Assembly. The rate plunged again in 1968, the year of the all-out Communist Tet Offensive, when only 18,171 rallied. By 1969, with the failure of the 1968 Tet Offensive and the Communist "big unit war," and with the Thieu regime proving fairly stable, the rate jumped to 47,023, the highest in the history of the program. It dropped again in 1970 and went into a steep decline by the summer of 1971, with the approaching national elections for the Lower House and the Presidency, though other factors naturally contributed to the declining rate.

There has been increasing evidence that the VC regard Chieu Hoi as a serious threat to their organization, and their retaliation and reprisals have been swift and severe. A captured enemy document gives an assessment of the Program by the headquarters of the Viet Cong 5th Military Region as of April 1971:
From 1969 to date, the enemy "psywar" Chieu Hoi and intelligence activities were intensified, aimed at deteriorating or paralyzing friendly (VC) infrastructures and armed elements.

During the past year these efforts were very successful and should be credited with the serious casualties and losses suffered by friendly (VC) forces. Troops and guerrillas were demoralized, disorganized and unable to resist the enemy encroachment tactics.

Cadres at village levels usually shirked their duties, abandoned their posts or defected to enemy-controlled areas. Most of them were . . . attracted by the secure life (in the government-pacified areas). . . . Others were afraid to suppress reactionaries or even to carry weapons. . . . Friendly (VC) troops were confused to the point where they could hardly distinguish friends from foes. Many read enemy leaflets, listened to enemy radio broadcasts, kept enemy Chieu Hoi letters and even supported enemy propaganda themes.

The trend of defection continued to increase. . . . The defections among the local force and guerrilla elements were critical. . . . In some districts, half of the local guerrillas joined the enemy. . . . Mass defections were also recorded among troop units and included battalion and company political cadres.  

Not only does rallying deprive the Viet Cong of much needed manpower at less cost to the GVN than having to kill the Viet Cong, but the rallier also represents an important source of propaganda and intelligence to the GVN. Therefore, defection is viewed as a "tremendous crime" by the VC, and ralliers, Chieu Hoi Centers, and resettlement villages have been targets for terrorist attacks. A classic example of VC retaliation against a Hoi Chanh occurred near Can Tho in late 1968, when VC infiltrated a village in the middle of the night and killed the entire family of a rallier who had lived there. The rallier had guided allied forces to enemy installations in the area despite threatening letters from the local VC (see Appendix 4).

While certain trends are discernible between the rise and fall of such terrorist activities, particularly those involving the selective assassination and abduction of targeted Hoi Chanh (or their families), any precise interrelationship would be difficult to establish because of the psychological factors involved.
Though by 1969 most ralliers indicated they had some knowledge of the GVN rallier program, every effort has been made by the VC to prevent such knowledge from reaching the rank-and-file soldier. When GVN propaganda leaflets or safe-conduct passes are dropped, they are quickly gathered up and burned. Vigorous efforts are made to interfere with or drown out broadcasts from aircraft. Fear of maltreatment by the GVN and disbelief in the program are instilled by VC propaganda and apparently do serve as significant deterring factors. Severe disciplinary measures are taken to prevent or discourage villagers and soldiers from listening to forbidden radio stations. After the defection of any high-ranking cadre (though these are few), political cadres subject their men to prompt, methodical, and severe reindoctrination. However, these strict controls imposed on the freedom of the VC soldier to prevent rallying in turn produce increased resentment and disaffection among those brought under suspicion. Thus the very presence of a functioning defector program puts a strain on the VC control apparatus.
The origin of the Chieu Hoi Program establishes it clearly as a foreign-inspired initiative, though one carried out by the GVN. The analogies, as in so many other instances (e.g., the Strategic Hamlet Program) are found in the British experience in Malaya and Magsaysay's counterinsurgent movement against the Huks in the Philippines. Probably the greatest impact of the Philippine and Malayan experiences on the Vietnam Chieu Hoi Program came through the men who had been involved.

**PROGRAM INITIATION -- 1963**

There were two more or less parallel initiatives to set up a defector program in Vietnam. One was by Sir Robert Thompson, who headed the British Advisory Mission (BAM). Thompson with U.S. Ambassador Nolting's blessing sold it as a policy to President Ngo Dinh Diem, merely enunciating the "ground rules under which the insurgents could return to the government side."¹ On the American side, in late 1962, Rufus Phillips, then head of the Rural Affairs Office of USOM, together with Lt. Col. Charles Bohannan (Ret.) and GVN Colonel Hoang Van Lac, sold the idea to Ngo Dinh Nhu (Diem's brother).² Both Diem and Nhu never intended it to be an amnesty program, and the Proclamation issued by Diem on April 17, 1963, merely called upon the insurgents to stop fighting and return to the government:

The Chieu Hoi Campaign provides for appropriate measures in favor of all those men and women who -- deceived, exploited or enrolled by force by the Communists -- have a new awareness and decide from today to return to the side of the National Government.

Those having families and means of subsistence will be authorized to rejoin their families, or to reside in the hamlet or strategic quarter of their choice, subject only to the approval of the Administrative Committee.

Those having no means of subsistence or family support can be assured of the assistance of the Government.

Those having skills and ability -- after a period where they become conscious of the requirements of the National Cause, during which they will have proven by concrete acts their total detachment from Communism -- will see their services accepted.
Those who have trespassed against the law and who have already been sentenced, or who are subject to court trial, will have the opportunity to amend and to redeem themselves by meritorious patriotic acts which will justify the extension of clemency to them.

All of our compatriots in the country or abroad who have been victims of Communist propaganda and exploitation, I urge to return and uphold the just cause of the Fatherland and to contribute their efforts, along with those of all our people in order to build, in a militant spirit, the new society and civilization where every citizen will be able to develop totally and in full freedom.

GVN administrative responsibility for the program was split among several agencies but came under the general direction of a Commissariat in the President's office. Budget support (for salaries and allowances of GVN Chieu Hoi staffs at national, regional, provincial, and district levels and for general administrative costs) was small and even funds authorized were not spent.\(^3\)

On the U.S. side, direct responsibility for advising and funding the program lay in the Rural Affairs Office of USOM/AID, with Lt. Col. Bohannan in charge of the returnee program. Since the program was to be a Vietnamese operation, there were no American personnel at operating levels. (As late as 1965 there was only one full-time American committed to the program, and he operated without any U.S. staff.) American input was limited almost entirely to a training program and to providing building materials for the Chieu Hoi Centers.

Initially, the program met with great success. Diem placed some of his most able, energetic administrators in charge and the effort paid off. During the first three months of the program, 4,656 of the enemy rallied or "returned." A reservoir of persons ready to rally and only awaiting some assurance of good treatment by the government had undoubtedly been tapped.

However, with the onset of the Buddhist crisis in June 1963 and throughout the remainder of 1963 there was a precipitous drop in the monthly rate, though the total for the year was a sizable 11,248. Mis-trust of the Diem government, uncertainty as to its stability and very continuity, increasing Communist military success, a tightening of VC control over their troops, together with a typical Vietnamese attentisme
to wait out the political and military storm (which was to follow in 1964) played a part in this decreasing rallier rate.

KEEPING THE PROGRAM GOING — 1964

A glance at the graph at Fig. 6 will suffice to indicate the adverse impact on the Chieu Hoi Program of the political chaos which followed the fall of Diem in November 1963. The decline in ralliers continued throughout 1964; in that year there were only 5,417. Ogden Williams, who took over the operation of Rural Affairs in January 1964, discussed the overall situation:

Our principal problem was to maintain some sort of momentum as the Vietnamese Government was floundering under the impact not only of the overthrow of Diem, but the subsequent overthrow of Duong Van Minh by General Nguyen Khanh. . . . Naturally all the Ministries were changing, and many government officials had grave doubts about the legitimacy and longevity of the regime, particularly when it came to preparing budgets or authorizing expenditures of funds, whether these funds were of Vietnamese or American origins. . . . My principal function . . . was to assure the continued function of the only elements of the GVN which remained operational in the field. The ministries were for all practical purposes paralyzed during the period of February to July. . . .

U.S. advisers in South Vietnam -- familiar with similar programs employed in other Southeast Asian counterinsurgencies -- were urging that a high priority be assigned to publicizing and carrying out the Vietnamese defector program. While in their opinion probably only about 8 to 10,000 of the 16,000 ralliers who had come in since the inception of the program were bona fide Hoi Chanh, nevertheless, given the very small amount of money (roughly about $400,000) spent on the program and the fact that there were few benefits offered (or honored), even this number was significant.

Advisers were also experimenting with the use of armed psychological warfare teams, each made up of about ten persons, men and women, who spent three to five days in a hamlet and, through speeches and dramatic skits, sought to demonstrate government interest, explain government policies, and find out local grievances.
CORRELATION OF MONTHLY DEFECTORS, 1963-1967,
WITH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

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As a result of these rather successful innovations, USAID initiated the Armed Propaganda Unit Program. The basic unit was a thirty-five-man platoon composed of ex-Viet Cong who had rallied under the Chieu Hoi Program. Knowledgeable because of their experience with the Viet Cong, trained (to a degree) in psychological warfare, the unit went into contested or VC-controlled areas to spread the word among the people about the aims and policies of the government and to disseminate Chieu Hoi propaganda, particularly to families with members in the enemy ranks. (These units were later called Armed Propaganda Teams.)

But the Chieu Hoi Program in general still was a relatively modest and underfunded effort, lacking adequately trained personnel and beset with other weaknesses. A year-and-a-half after its initiation there was little or no coordination between the U.S. and GVN agencies involved in the program and between Saigon and the operating level at province. Nor was there any degree of coordination between Chieu Hoi and military operations. When, during the last week in November 1964, some 4,000 VC surrendered in a IV Corps province, there was no one to receive them nor were food, housing, medical care, and other facilities made available to them. Certainly there was no such thing as a planned rehabilitation program for them. No one in the province had even known of the psychological operations campaign which had led to this mass surrender; the entire campaign had been initiated and carried out above the province level and outside IV Corps by the Ministry of Information. Most of the returnees decamped within a week when they realized that none of the promises which had induced them to surrender was going to be fulfilled -- the VC had won a potent psychological victory.

SELLING AN EXPANDED PROGRAM -- 1965

By 1965 the idea of a defector program had been strongly endorsed at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. The Gosho-Jacobson Report had also recommended increased U.S. assistance to the program, particularly in advisory support. It further urged that the GVN view Chieu Hoi as an essential element of their counterinsurgency program. However, U.S. policy was not backed up by any appreciable increase in material or personnel support -- despite an increase in the rallier rate from 5,417
in 1964 to more than 11,000 in 1965. Uneasiness within the GVN concerning the program also persisted. Discerning an apparent lack of concrete interest on the part of the Americans, GVN officials faced with problems of limited resources, lack of qualified personnel, and increasing confrontation with the enemy -- were reluctant to accord Chieu Hoi any higher priority or to support its expansion. Though it proved to be a temporary measure (U.S. officials forced a reconsideration of the move), Chieu Hoi (an Under Secretariat in the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi) was downgraded to a Directorate in the Ministry of Psychological Warfare, headed by a young ARVN captain whose very youth and rank were an indication of the low status given the program by the GVN.

(1) The low priority accorded the program by the Saigon government was also reflected in indifferent performance at the province level. By mid-1965 some 40 Chieu Hoi Province Centers (there were at that time 42 provinces) were operating with only limited effectiveness, although well-functioning provincial centers were conceded to be of vital importance in the success of the program. Here the lack of dedicated and trained personnel was a great inhibiting factor. Local cadres were paid at the near-subsistence level of VN$1000 a month. Even if higher-calibre people had been available, their recruitment at such salaries would have been impossible. Difficulties impeding good performance at the Centers ran the gamut from the negative attitude of the Province Chief (a military man, he was not apt to be enthusiastic about receiving a former enemy) to Viet Cong terrorist attacks on the Centers.

(2) Budget support during 1963-1965 continued to be small, though there was some increase in both authorized and obligated categories. However, even the amounts allocated were not spent because of delays in construction programs and difficulties encountered by provincial authorities in obtaining the release of the authorized funds from Saigon.

(3) In sum, the program by 1965 had proved its potential but had fallen far short of its "promise and design." Pye saw a "failure of the GVN to create a philosophical and long-range political foundation on which a program for the rehabilitation of the former enemy could be geared to
the social and economic reconstruction of the nation after the war" and urged that the program be developed into a "constructive political and psychological warfare program and not merely a device for drawing manpower away from the Viet Cong." Pye further recommended that an American official with an American staff be assigned to the program who would have the backing of the Ambassador and would be able to communicate directly with the Prime Minister's office, "in order that the Chieu Hoi Program could be put at the very center of the Vietnamese political effort."

It had also become apparent to American officials that the program had the most favorable cost/benefit ratio of any operation in Vietnam. Ralliers from 1963-1965 now totaled 27,789 at a per capita cost of $14.00. Since it had become apparent that, if the program was to be operationally more effective, consistent American support -- including input of American personnel -- was necessary, the Americans decided to give the program higher priority.

THE PROGRAM TAKES OFF -- 1966

The new policy was reflected in the assignment of high-calibre U.S. personnel. In July 1966 Ogden Williams (called the "father of the advanced Chieu Hoi Program") arrived in South Vietnam for his third tour, "with marching orders . . . to increase the effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi Program calling upon such financial, personnel and logistical resources as might be required and reporting directly to the Deputy Ambassador, William Porter. . . ." He was joined by Monta Osborne, an experienced USIA officer who had extensive previous experience in Korea; by Paul Neilson, a senior USIA officer; and later by Colonel Raymond G. Jones (ret.), who had already served with distinction in Vietnam. Williams recalls:

During this initial six months we were able to redefine Chieu Hoi Doctrine and sell this doctrine to the GVN Chieu Hoi organization, and establish in the minds of all concerned the program elements which have never since required revision; recruit and field an entire advisory staff in all major provinces, starting from scratch; lay the foundations for the present Kit Carson Scout program; commence the reorganization and revitalization of the Chieu Hoi Ministry; and establish adequate budget levels for 1967. During this brief period, all the advantages of flexibility, direct control of field advisory personnel, and the substantial absence of red tape made it possible to achieve radical improvements in the program at a pace no longer feasible today.
Still a GVN program (though the U.S. paid three-fourths of the cost), Chieu Hoi was now directed by a Secretariat in the Ministry of Information and was headed by Colonel Pham Anh. Within the U.S. Mission, USAID retained executive responsibility, working closely with the GVN in preparing programs and coordinating policy and operations with other U.S. agencies. It also provided full-time advisers at the national and regional levels. In October, 45 handpicked officers were brought from the Philippines to assist the USAID Provincial Representatives by taking over direct advisory supervision of the Province Chieu Hoi Centers. The beneficial effect was immediate and dramatic. Grinker believed that the assignment of these Filipino advisers -- who spoke English and in a few cases Vietnamese, with a background of civic action and development experience, and who were Asians themselves was one of the most effective innovations sponsored by the U.S. 8

The Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) established in 1965 furnished Chieu Hoi advisers at the national level to assist GVN psychological warfare efforts, and JUSPAO field representatives exploited the coordinated psychological operations programs at region and province. MACV provided technical advice and assistance to the program on "psywar" operations and the exploitation of intelligence received from the interrogation of Hoi Chanh.

Policies, programs, guidelines, and close supervision emanated from the GVN Chieu Hoi "Central" in Saigon. There was good coordination with other GVN agencies, whose activities were closely tied into those of Chieu Hoi -- in psychological warfare, social welfare, resettlement, employment of the Hoi Chanh, and vocational training.

A National Chieu Hoi Center was established near Saigon (at Thi Nghe) with a capacity for receiving, interrogating, and training 500 Hoi Chanh. Centers -- with facilities for housing, feeding, interrogation, classifying, and training -- were also set up at province and later at region. There was a significant expansion of Chieu Hoi resettlement villages in many provinces. By December 1965 modest GVN Chieu Hoi "Services" were also available at district (subsector).
During the latter part of 1966 important changes were being made in the U.S. civilian organization in South Vietnam in an attempt to coordinate and integrate all U.S. civilian programs and personnel concerned with the "other war" -- land reform, agricultural training, medical assistance, education, and development of the country's economic and political infrastructure. In December the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was set up under which a single U.S. senior adviser was to be responsible for all civilian operations in each province and region, providing "streamlined command and communication channels, a common program philosophy and direction and single point of coordination with the Vietnamese Government and the U.S. Military." Working directly under Deputy Ambassador William Porter, a senior Foreign Service Officer in the USAID Mission, Wade Latham, was put in charge of OCO.

By the end of 1966 -- with total ralliers having risen to 20,242 from the 10,018 in 1965 -- it was apparent that Chieu Hoi had the potential of becoming a significant part of the counterinsurgency program.

CHIEU HOI AND PACIFICATION -- 1967

In May 1967 U.S. support of the reviving GVN pacification program (which someone has defined as short-term nationbuilding) was put under COMUSMACV (General Westmoreland) with the formation of CORDS, an acronym for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (Fig. 7). R. W. Komor, then Special Assistant to the President for the "other war" in South Vietnam, was appointed as Deputy to COMUSMACV for Pacification.

As Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker stated:

Support of revolutionary development has seemed ... to be neither exclusively a civilian nor exclusively a military function, but to be essentially civil/military in character. It involves both the provision of continuous local security in the countryside -- necessarily a primarily military task -- and the constructive programs conducted by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development. ... I have concluded that the U.S. advisory and supporting role in revolutionary development can be made more effective by unifying its civil and military aspects under a single management concept. Unified management, a single chain of command, and a more closely dovetailed advisory effort will ... greatly improve U.S. support of the vital revolutionary development program. ... Therefore, I am giving General Westmoreland the responsibility for the
performance of our U.S. Mission field programs in support of revolutionary development. . . . I have directed that a single chain of responsibility for advice and support of the Vietnamese RD program be instituted from Saigon down to district level. . . .

Chieu Hoi support now became, on the U.S. side, the executive responsibility of a new, unique civil/military agency, though USAID continued to provide financial, logistical, and personnel support. JUSPAO together with MACV/POD also retained responsibility for the development and dissemination of psychological operations relating to Chieu Hoi. The new CORDS Chieu Hoi Division under Ogden Williams was given actual direction of the Chieu Hoi support effort (see Fig. 8). The staff of the Division (with gradually increasing numbers of direct-hire U.S. personnel) continued its close liaison with the GVN Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi in the preparation and execution of plans and programs, assisted in the development of the budget, and advised on all phases of the program, coordinating commodity and technical service support. However, Williams had decided doubts as to how the new organization might affect the Chieu Hoi Program. Writing to Komer in 1970, he says:

You will recall that . . . you gave me carte blanche, and in the six months prior to the organization of OCO and later CORDS, the carte blanche really operated. . . . The formation of OCO and the later formation of CORDS no doubt served many U.S. purposes, but they were not of particular advantage to someone running a single project such as myself. . . . My own background in Vietnam is such, and particularly as regards dealing with Vietnamese officials at any level, that all I needed or wanted was the freedom to operate and the over-all bureaucratic support which you provided at the outset in 1966.12

By 1967 the money invested in the processing, retraining, and resettling of a single Hoi Chanh had risen from $14.00 in 1963 to over $350.00.13 This in itself was an indication of the priority now accorded the program. The Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS wrote to Komer:

President Johnson and others have repeatedly urged that no effort be spared to expand and intensify the Chieu Hoi Program. . . . Washington repeatedly has stated money is no object. Thus any responsible expenditures should be supported, if not with GVN funds, with U.S. funds.14
Figure 7
ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT
(as of November 1, 1967)

COMUSMACV
Deputy For Revolutionary Development

CHIEF OF STAFF

Spec
Asst

Asst CofS CORDS
Dep Asst CofS

Exec
Secy

Mgmt Support

Plans & Programs

Reports & Evaluation

Research & Analysis

Chieu Hoi

NLD
(New Life Development)

RDW
(Revolutionary Development Workers)

Refugee

PsyOps

Public Safety
Figure 8
THE CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE 1970-1971

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

(2) Secretaries
(US)

MILITARY LIAISON
SECTION

Interrogation
Intelligence Exploitation
Kit Carson Scouts

PROGRAM PLANNING AND
REPORTS SECTION

Coordination of Policy Planning
Liaison with PP&P and USAID/PROG
Reports Analysis

ADMINISTRATIVE AND
FISCAL DIVISION*

Personnel
Administrative Support
Budget

FIELD OPERATIONS
DIVISION

APT
PSYOPS
Training
Resettlement
Follow-up
Special Projects

PROGRAM SUPPORT
DIVISION

Resettlement Support
Construction
Logistics
Rewards/Awards

*In 1971 this Division was abolished and Personnel, Administrative Support, and Budget was put under Program Support.
And the U.S. did contribute the major part of the 1967 funding (over $8.0 million), with the GVN contributing roughly $1.7 million, for a total budget of $9.9 million. A glance at the breakdown of expenditures in the Chieu Hoi budget gives a good insight into operation of the program and the expansion of benefits now offered under it.

Piastre funds were spent for such purposes as salaries and allowances of the Chieu Hoi cadre, the Armed Propaganda Teams, and political orientation teachers; for food, clothing, and allowances of the Hoi Chanh; for weapons, special missions, transportation and per diem expenses for Hoi Chanh on duty; for psychological operations, political orientation and vocational training, special "allowances" for high-ranking returnees, furniture allowances for families settling in Chieu Hoi hamlets, reinstatement (separation) allowances for Hoi Chanh, survivor allowances to relatives of Hoi Chanh and APT members killed or wounded in action; for the expansion and improvement of Chieu Hoi Centers, construction and improvement of Chieu Hoi hamlets, and equipment for Centers; and for construction of the National Chieu Hoi Vocational Training Center.

Dollar funds were spent for roofing, cement, reinforcing bars, salaries of Americans and Third Country nationals functioning as Chieu Hoi Advisers, and vehicles and other equipment which had to be purchased outside South Vietnam. A similar budget breakdown continued in subsequent years, though the amounts varied.

CORDS found this budget adequate to support the target for the year of 45,000 returnees (2.2 times the actual 1966 rate), with this caveat:

It has been demonstrated repeatedly that GVN funding and administrative procedures do not admit of adequate flexibility or rapidity of response to permit the Chieu Hoi Program to go forward at the pace the priority demands.\(^{15}\)

To hurdle this obstacle, a contingency fund (something Williams had been urging for sometime) of VN$10 million was set up which could be "drawn down" at the request of the Chieu Hoi Program Manager. Some VN$55 million (approximately six times the amount available in 1966) was allocated in 1967 for the construction of new Centers and the expansion or improvement of existing ones.
One of the targets of the new CORDS team was inept and ineffective performance of some of the Chieu Hoi service chiefs at province. In addition to negotiating directly with GVN Chieu Hoi officials, Williams periodically supplied Komer with lists of those who should be removed, and some of these men were indeed removed as a result of Komer's interventions with the GVN at higher levels. It was necessary in many cases to resort to a "Vietnamese solution." There were many factors bearing on the appointment of a Chieu Hoi Chief, none of them necessarily related to the effective running of the program. In one instance, when the Chieu Hoi Minister attempted to remove four Chieu Hoi service chiefs in MR 4 who were Hoa Hao, leaders of that sect accused the GVN of a systematic policy of removing their brethren from government posts and informed the Prime Minister that the "Hoa Hao would be obliged to draw the necessary conclusions." When the Minister explained the men were being removed because of ineptitude and not because they were Hoa Hao, "this line of reasoning was so novel as to leave the Hoa Hao without comment -- but still skeptical." The solution was to play musical chairs with the recalcitrant Chieu Hoi chiefs to prove the principle that, despite local politics, government appointees could be removed to break up local accommodations, and, in the words of a CORDS Adviser, to "stimulate the tired blood of these officeholders."

By April 1967 it had become apparent that an organized, sustained effort had to be made on a nationwide basis to find jobs for Hoi Chanh if the credibility of the program was to be maintained in the eyes of potential returnees. The problem had been intensified by the influx of returnees into the Centers, which were filled to capacity and over. Failure to place returnees in jobs where they could earn a decent living was having an adverse effect. Through interviews with Hoi Chanh it was learned that many Viet Cong ready to rally were reluctant to do so because they were unsure as to how they would be able to support themselves and their families. In April, regional directors and provincial representatives were directed to establish an organized employment program or system for bringing Hoi Chanh into contact with prospective employers and generating interest on the part of potential employers in the Hoi Chanh as prospective employees.
Primary to any successful employment program for Hoi Chanh was the matter of the vital ID card. A long, involved security check was required by the National Police before it would grant one, necessitating clearance by the police of the village where the Hoi Chanh had been born or was inscribed -- a procedure which was oftentimes impossible or at the very least time-consuming -- all the way up to Saigon, where the Hoi Chanh was checked against the so-called "black list" of Viet Cong criminals. This process sometimes took six to eight months. Between 1966 and 1969 the time delay was gradually overcome, and reduced to two months (i.e., approximately by the time the Hoi Chanh were ready to leave the Center). By 1969, issuance of an ID card to Hoi Chanh as a means of identification and not necessarily as proof of security clearance, did much to alleviate the problem.

Wade Lathram, writing to Komar in mid-1967, saw the GVN as a whole "grudgingly supporting the Chieu Hoi Program although a slow improvement is discernible." Finally, in December 1967, the GVN upgraded Chieu Hoi to a Ministry with a corresponding change in personnel at the top -- "with one of the bright and influential 'inner circle' groups as the new Minister" (Nguyen Xuan Phong). Recruiting able personnel for the operating level, however, was still very much a problem. The GVN staffed the program either through appointment of army officers (Lathram had recommended to Komar that he take up with Prime Minister Ky the "transfer of at least 50 good quality ARVN officers to MCH as a matter of high priority") or by selection from civil service ranks. The GVN was generally not cooperative. Caliber and numbers continued to be inadequate.

The early 1967 rate followed a pattern similar to that for 1965 and 1966, i.e., high in the first quarter (almost one-half the annual returnee rate is achieved during the first quarter of the year because of Tet). There was also an expansion of GVN and allied presence into "virgin territory" in II and III Corps through clear-and-hold operations (e.g., IRVING in Binh Dinh and CEDAR FALLS in Binh Duong), which created a potential "defector pool." Later in the year there was a steady decline in the rate, as political activity surrounding the fall national elections (September and November) intensified. The program became paralyzed while cadres, administrators, and potential ralliers speculated
on the future of the Thieu government and the possibility of a coalition government after Tet as predicted by Communist propaganda.

Overcrowded centers (though total capacity had been increased 112.9 percent during the year, i.e., from 3,105 in December 1966 to 6,610 by December 1967); mistreatment of returnees; corruption (e.g., GVN officials sometimes took a "cut" from returnee allowances); failure of the GVN to provide opportunities for employment without prejudice -- shortcomings known to the Viet Cong via the jungle grapevine and subsequently propagandized -- were other serious deterrent factors explaining the declining rallier rate.

More important, however, than these factors, in the fall of 1967 the enemy was preparing for the 1968 Tet Offensive, tightly controlling his troops, promising a coalition government after Tet and the end of the war in 1968. In retrospect, there were ample indications of a forthcoming major effort by the enemy, but its precise nature and timing were not clear. Under these circumstances the enemy seized the psychological initiative and the number of returnees fell off severely -- from 2,100 in August to only 889 in December.

Data by corps area show that in 1967 I Corps consistently provided less than 10 percent of the total returnees, not surprising in view of its proximity to North Vietnam and the larger number of NVA troops in the area. The distribution from other corps areas was fairly even, though II Corps was able to produce more than 30 percent of the total number of returnees in every quarter from October 1965 through June 1967, primarily because of aggressive allied military clear-and-hold operations in provinces such as Binh Dinh.

The total number of ralliers in 1967 -- 27,178 -- fell far short of the estimated 1967 goal of 45,000, but still represented a 34 percent increase over 1966. The VC military forces neutralized through Chieu Hoi (17,671) were equal to about one-fifth of the total of all enemy forces killed or captured by military action (91,595). Had it been necessary to eliminate these armed VC on the battlefield, it would have meant the loss of more than 3,000 Free World forces.17

Impressive as these statistics are, there is reliable evidence of somewhat less substantial, long-range effectiveness. Kellen believed
that the number of surrenders was never actually big enough seriously to affect the enemy, that wars are not won through defectors, and that the defectors left their forces in body only but not in spirit, and tended to retain a good deal of their faith in VC leadership and faith in their cause.  

Berman agrees somewhat with this latter contention, viz.

... they quit because the hardships had become too much for them, but more frequently they gave up the struggle for reasons of personal grievances due to lack of promotion, or for family reasons. ... This would indicate ... that support for the cause might return in most of these defectors under more favorable conditions.

CORDS in a blunt May 1967 assessment of the program saw insufficient GVN participation in the psychological aspects, a lack of quality and quantity in the GVN staffing of the program; inadequate and ineffective political orientation of the Hoi Chanh while in the Centers; no adequate system for "follow-up" on the Hoi Chanh after he left the Center; insufficient tactical and intelligence exploitation of the Hoi Chanh; and an absence of flexible funding procedures to permit rapid response to problems and "targets of opportunity."

Further evidence of a lack of optimum imaginative approach in the GVN exploitation of the program is contained in an analysis done by the Chieu Hoi Division of CORDS and the Simulactics Corporation. Nor had the new GVN (elected in September) developed an image of demonstrable, aggressive forward action which could replace that of the Viet Cong "revolution."

DAI DOAN KET

Probably the most important innovation in the Chieu Hoi Program since its inception was the Proclamation in April 1967 by Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of a Policy of National Reconciliation (Dai Doan Ket).

Williams recalls that "the U.S. side had dreamed up national reconciliation in the fall of 1966 and that it had been negotiated with the highest levels of the Vietnamese government at the Manila Conference in October 1966." The Proclamation provided that Hoi Chanh who returned
to the GVN would not only be given amnesty and guaranteed their political and civil rights as before under the earlier Chieu Hoi Program, but would also be helped by the government to find careers commensurate with their experience, ability, and loyalty. In the words of the Proclamation,

... all citizens who abandon the Communist ranks will enjoy all the rights set forth in the Constitution, including the right of freedom, the right to have life, property and honor protected by law, the right to take part in elections, the right to rejoin families, the right to choose the place to settle and the right to enjoy national assistance toward improving the standard of living.

(It should be noted that the "rights set forth under the Constitution" and the promise of amnesty did not include amnesty from punishment for major crimes committed prior to joining the Viet Cong.)

President Thieu reaffirmed this policy of national reconciliation in a Joint Communiqué (with President Johnson) issued July 20, 1968, after the second Honolulu Conference. Noting that the Vietnamese government had rejected "the principles of retaliation and revenge," he offered full participation in political activities, including the right to vote and to be elected, to all individuals and members of groups who agreed to renounce force, abandon Communist ideology and atrocities, lay down their weapons, and abide by the Constitution of Vietnam."

Here again, however, was a U.S. initiative pressed on the GVN at the highest levels. The Vietnamese Cabinet was very much against the new proposal. Moreover, because the NRP offered full political participation to the rallier, the Vietnamese thought it would eventually lead to a coalition government. While the GVN went ahead and issued the Proclamation, the Vietnamese never really accepted -- or implemented -- this "American program."

The NRP -- as the name implies -- sought to use the concepts and the structure of the older and less ambitious Chieu Hoi Program as a nation-building device. Indeed, Pike actually saw Dai Doan Ket as a means of ending the war:

... whereas Chieu Hoi seeks to bring the insurgents back into society, the NRP seeks to bring them back into the decisionmaking arena. Dai Doan Ket concerns itself
not only with integration into society but with political participation, political rights, and political opportunities.\textsuperscript{23}

Specifically, the NRP was a campaign to induce hard-core, high-ranking Viet Cong to surrender with a guarantee of "job equivalency." While over 50,000 former Viet Cong had rallied to the government since 1963, it had become evident that the incentives offered had not been sufficient to attract high military and civilian cadres in the enemy ranks. Indeed, there was a rather widespread misconception that the GVN policy of amnesty applied only to those joining the Front recently (and therefore of lesser rank); that the government viewed with suspicion any defectors who had been in the Front for any length of time; or that Viet Cong leaders would meet with severe retribution.

Another deterrent to defection by the higher level cadres was the matter of status. The potential for upward social mobility is greater in the Viet Cong organization than in the traditional Vietnamese social structure and is cited in many cases as a reason for joining the insurgency. Thus, status once achieved in the Communist organization would not easily be given up to return to the GVN and an uncertain future. Most of the officers and high-ranking civilian cadres of the Front had worked their way up from peasant status to their present position. The Simulmatics Study makes an interesting point in this connection:

The careerists who constitute this cadre, while they are professional revolutionists who use the tools of conspiracy and violence without compunction, also have many bureaucratic civil service characteristics. They operate to a remarkable degree by the rule books. They fill out or demand forms in great detail. They concern themselves with promotions. . . . That is why . . . the offer of good jobs to the Ho Chi Minh is not just a matter of assuring them of the wherewithal to feed themselves and their families well. . . . Viet Cong leaders must be offered the chance to continue in their chosen profession with the same kind of status and opportunity for advancement that the Viet Cong offered. . . . Nowhere else in Vietnam can one find as extensive a . . . group with administrative skills and relatively high standards of honesty and performance as in the Viet Cong.\textsuperscript{24}

In the past numerous GVN officials had regarded with mixed feelings any policy that would give amnesty to former enemies responsible, in
many cases, for the death of relatives and friends. To welcome them into
government service and reward them with jobs was even more unacceptable.

Since the GVN recognized that a prerequisite to the success of the
proclaimed reconciliation policy was the unqualified acceptance of it
by GVN civil and military officials, some attempt was made at an informa-
tion and education program directed toward all government employees. As
late as June 1968, however, only the Ministry of Chieu Hoi, within the
government, had demonstrated any interest or capability in following
through on the NRP. High-level jobs were found for several prominent
returnees within the Chieu Hoi Ministry, but except in one or two out-
standing instances neither the Defense Ministry nor other civil ministries
demonstrated any initiative or desire to make national reconciliation a
reality.25

The government has offered Viet Cong medics and doctors who rally
an opportunity to resume their medical practice, but requires them to
take additional examinations and internship. By the end of 1971, six
ex-VC and 15 medical technicians had been approved officially by the GVN
and were working in province hospitals.

For Viet Cong army officers "the same kind of status," etc. means
equivalent rank in the ARVN but even should the natural disinclination
of ARVN officers to accept their erstwhile enemies be overcome, the like-
lihood for the same "opportunity for advancement" would appear even
dimmer. ARVN did agree to give examinations to ex-VC officers and NCOs,
allowing them to join the military at the rank achieved during the
examination. However, even by the end of 1971 no Ho Chi Minh had volun-
teered to take the examination.

In discussing Dai Doan Ket, Ambassador Komor stated in an inter-
view in May 1971:

... we found the Vietnamese a pillow on it. They accepted
it in principle. Ky and Thieu said a few of the right words.
BUT they never executed it in practice. The rationale was
to try to offer something more than just amnesty for ralliers.
We were trying to get some of the bigwig politicians on the
other side if there were any. The reaction of the GVN was
tepid. The results were almost nil. Here was an example
of our pushing a program that the GVN just did not want,
indeed most of the nationalist Vietnamese, not just the
government itself. The politicians in Parliament (sic) were
even more vigorously opposed.26
TWO STEPS FORWARD ONE STEP BACK -- 1968

In 1968 U.S. funding of the program was taken over by the Department of Defense as an AID/DOD "realignment activity" with all U.S. inputs funded by DOD on a reimbursable basis and administered by CORDS (except for U.S. commodities furnished directly from U.S. military stocks). Total cost of the program for 1968 was $22.9 million, of which the GVN contributed $0.38 million.27

Provision was made in the 1968 budget for additional advisory personnel. The following breakdown shows an interesting shift in emphasis, in an effort to "Vietnamize" the advisory effort via an increase of 44 Vietnamese personnel.

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<th>On Hand as</th>
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<th>Increase</th>
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CORDS believed the above personnel increases would permit adequate staffing of the advisory program. American, Australian, or Filipino Chieu Hoi advisers were assigned to the Regional MACORDS staffs in the four military regions and to the CORDS senior advisers in each province to work directly with the Vietnamese Chieu Hoi Service. However, by December 1968 Williams complained he was still trying to operate the program with "the leanest operating staff in CORDS . . . at the field level we are severely anemic in terms of advisory personnel."28 Eight provinces were still without Chieu Hoi advisers and in three provinces the Chieu Hoi adviser had other primary functions and took care of Chieu Hoi when he had time.

On the GVN side, there were now 1,615 Vietnamese employees on MICH rolls (not counting APT members). There was to be a substantial recruiting campaign with emphasis on improving the quality of Chieu Hoi cadres as well as numbers. Representatives of MICH at region were to provide technical supervision over the program. At province there was

* Third-country nationals.
a representative of the Chieu Hoi Service who supervised all province Chieu Hoi activities, including the province Chieu Hoi Center. A three-man Chieu Hoi team (one of whom was the District Chieu Hoi Chief) was authorized for each district, but many districts were, in fact, uncovered.

In early 1968 the program was taken out of MICH and a Ministry of Chieu Hoi (MCH) was created. The resignation of Minister Nguyen Xuan Phong six months later was, in Williams' words, "a tragic loss." Phong, resigning to become an "éminence grise" in the presidency, had only just managed to get the new ministry going. Phong recommended that as an "acceptable new status for Chieu Hoi a Special Commissariat be set up in the President's office" on the assumption that from such a position a Special Commissioner (possibly Phong) would have more influence on the military (e.g., on G-2 in the matter of interrogating high-ranking Hoi Chanh), though admittedly under such an arrangement the Commissioner's liaison with other ministries would have to go through the Prime Minister's office, which would "hinder his mobility." Komer backed the proposal for such a reorganization. However, upon Phong's resignation the program once again was put under a Minister for Information and Chieu Hoi (Nguyen Ngoc An) with an Under Secretariat for Chieu Hoi.

Program goals remained substantially the same and, despite a decrease in total number of returnees for the year, showed continued improvement in implementation. Specific goals outlined in the 1968 Pacification Guidelines were to

1) Recruit, train, arm, equip, and operate 75 APT companies (an increase from 69);
2) Press for increased use of returnees in tactical and intelligence operations in U.S./GVN forces (goal set for a total of 1,800 Kit Carson Scouts by end CY 1968);
3) Continue to support use of returnees in Revolutionary Development and other GVN civil programs;
4) Improve vocational training in Chieu Hoi centers and on-the-job sites;
5) Help find jobs for returnees (with a goal of 9,000 placements);
6) Construct reception/holding facilities in 118 districts;
7) Improve political training in Chieu Hoi centers (number of instructors was to be increased to 100);
8) Continue improvement in normal elements of the program, i.e., inducement, reception, and interrogation, training, tactical use, resettlement, and follow-up.
The GVN also sought to improve the program by setting up a Third Party Inducement Program, in which an individual was to be paid to bring in defectors (see pp. 71-72 for further description). There was increased emphasis on a "turn-around program" (in which a selected returnee was briefed and sent back to his former unit to induce other VC to defect), and on monetary awards for weapons brought in by ralliers. Total amount paid out during 1968 for this weapons award program came to about VN$20 million, an amount greatly in excess of previous annual expenditures.

The returnee goal for 1968 was put at a "conservative" figure of 30,000, with funds provided in the budget for an additional 30,000. This, however, was admittedly a planning and budgetary figure based on an arbitrary assumption that, if the military situation continued to improve, there could be mass desertions from VC ranks:

It had become clear in 1967 that massive returnee rates could be expected only when new areas and new "populations" were opened up and transferred suddenly from VC to GVN control. As an area is pacified the Chieu Hoi rate inevitably declines.³¹

A more realistic figure was around 20,000, based on a continued low level of VC recruitment, the expected shift of allied military operations to the sparsely populated border areas, and the "inefficiencies of the program."

THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE

The basic change in VC/NVA strategy which began in the second half of 1967 culminated in the celebrated 1968 Tet Offensive. 1968 was to be "the year of decision." P. J. Honey, a noted British expert on North Vietnam, believed that the drain on enemy manpower and intelligence caused by the Chieu Hoi Program was one of the major reasons why the enemy was forced to press for an earlier solution to the war than his previous protracted war strategy had contemplated.³²

The impact of the new strategy on the Chieu Hoi returnee rate was severe (though Williams believed it did not substantially affect the
structure or doctrine of the program). Whereas in the first quarter of 1967, primarily because of a stepped-up Tet campaign, some 10,603 Viet Cong had rallied, in the corresponding 1968 period (during the Tet Offensive and its immediate aftermath), there were only 2,541 -- the lowest quarterly total since 1965. Not only the heightened political uncertainty of that period but also the increase in allied search-and-destroy operations undoubtedly inhibited large-scale rallying. A comparison of the January and February 1968 rates with those in January 1967 amply illustrates the sensitivity of the returnee rate to military-political activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>February 1968</th>
<th>January 1968</th>
<th>January 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>2,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paul Neilson, Acting Chief of the Chieu Hoi Division in Saigon during the 1968 Tet attacks, wrote to the field in February 1968:

Most of you know at this writing that with few exceptions the Chieu Hoi Program has come through the past few weeks largely unscathed as far as its physical assets are concerned. The expected popular uprising which the VC expected did not materialize ... even in the form of defecting Hoi Chanh. ... Until such time as the current relatively high intensity of combat subsides, we cannot really expect much reaction in the form of increased returnee rates ... engaged forces are often reluctant to recognize even POWs let alone ralliers ... important activities such as vocational, political training, resettlement activities have remained at a standstill since the inception of the Offensive ... experience has shown that once momentum is lost, a very trying, time-consuming process must ensued before the loose ends can be picked up again. ... 33

The GVN Chieu Hoi Ministry "weathered the storm" with apparently few ill effects. The Minister and his staff continued to visit critical provinces as security permitted, presented meritorious service awards to deserving individuals, and continued to exert pressure for improvement in management and performance. Personnel losses had not
been severe, though a substantial number of ex-Hoi Chanh were engulfed by the Viet Cong along with the rest of the population as the GVN pulled back from the countryside to protect the cities.

Damage to facilities was not as heavy as had been feared except in six provinces: Quang Tri (which suffered the heaviest damage), Thua Thien (with 60 percent of its facilities damaged), Kontum, Pleiku, and Vinh Long (with major damage), and Kien Hoa (with minor damage to the Center but with total destruction of the Chieu Hoi office). Construction goals for 1968 suffered a substantial setback. Political and vocational training programs also were slow to recover momentum. The most serious impact was at district, where most ralliers are received and which therefore forms a vital link in the Chieu Hoi structure. The security situation continued tense and inhibited effective operations of the centers.

On the other hand the Tet Offensive was a "watershed" in the GVN's attitude toward the program. Hoi Chanh with few exceptions had remained loyal to the GVN, the APTs had proved worthy of confidence, and the inability of the enemy to hold territory and to fulfill the promised uprising of the people, created a new and even larger group of potential Hoi Chanh.

An upturn in the Chieu Hoi returnee rate began in April and continued for the rest of the year. The Accelerated Pacification Program -- set in motion by President Thieu in November 1968 -- set a goal of 5,000 Hoi Chanh for the following three-month period. Of the year's total (18,171), 42 percent (7,631) came in during the fourth quarter of the year, with 33 percent attributed to IV Corps as the result of the Third Party Inducement Program.34

New patterns were discernible. The percentage of military ralliers rose from 65 percent in 1967 to 69 percent, while the percentage of political ralliers dropped from 29 percent in 1967 to 21 percent. (It is interesting to note, however, that in 1969 the percentage of military ralliers dropped to 60 percent and the percentage of political ralliers rose to 27 percent. This trend continued through 1970. See Fig. 4, p. 11.)
While Kellen stated that "Tet which had been both a great success and a great failure in different ways for the enemy had not shaken his morale and the cadres had been able to redress the fighters' morale," the trend of increased military Ho Chi Minh continued throughout the year. One reason was perhaps the rallying of recruits impressed into military service for the Tet Offensive (estimated VC recruitment rose from approximately 3,500 a month in 1967 to 7,000 a month during corresponding months in the first quarter of 1968), who were now taking the Chieu Hoi route home. MACV also reported "a distinct rise in the rank of ralliers," but there are no figures on numbers or percentages considered statistically reliable. There was also some sporadic mass defection of Viet Cong military units and of dissident Hoa Hao and Cambodian KKK but no nationwide trend.

Williams saw 1968 as a year of testing for the program, with many factors operating against it:

... the Paris negotiations, the U.S. Presidential elections, the cessation of bombardment of the North, the greater presence of NVA in the South, the nature of the military confrontation, and better enemy control measures. ... The fact that Chieu Hoi was able to make a credible showing against all these obstacles is in a large measure due to the dedicated efforts of field advisors throughout Vietnam.

One of these advisers saw the situation through a different prism. William Lenderking, a USIA PsyOps adviser at district, writing in early 1968 and admittedly discouraged by the 1968 Tet Offensive, says:

The Chieu Hoi Program was indeed significant and imaginative but the sophistication required to administer it properly which would have involved detailed recordkeeping and efficient follow-up on Ho Chi Minh after they left the Chieu Hoi Centers, was simply beyond the capabilities of the GVN at that time. Further, the requirement that the program be made really appealing and credible by offering ralliers meaningful positions in society was not lived up to at all. The result was another program that was moving erratically, propped up by figures which were not inaccurate as to total numbers, but which actually concealed the most important elements of the story.

Notwithstanding the obvious flaws in the program, the influx of returnees during the last half of 1968 (an influx which was to continue in 1969) led Jones, then head of the Chieu Hoi Directorate, to state:
These returnees are not only out of action in a negative sense; they are beginning to make the significant positive contribution to the national effort which characterizes the bonus aspects of the Chieu Hoi Program, the most important of which involves their becoming GVN supporters at least in some form. . . .

OVER THE TOP -- 1969

By 1969 Williams believed that Chieu Hoi was "now a major political plank of the GVN, regarded as partial proof that the people of South Vietnam support the GVN more than the Viet Cong."39

The influx of returnees in the last quarter of 1968 (under the Accelerated Pacification Program) came to full flood in 1969. A goal of 20,000 had originally been set, but because of the great numbers rallying during the first half of the year (by the end of May, 12,383 VC had already rallied), the figure was revised upward to 33,500. In July 5,091 rallied, the highest monthly rate since 1963. By the end of the year there had been 47,023 returnees with pronounced increases in all regions. IV Corps was setting records, accounting for 70 percent of the year's total. (Later some of these returnees were reclassified as refugees or impressed laborers -- i.e., not actually VC -- or were found to have been party to false inducement practices under the Third Party Inducement Plan, described on pp. 72-73.) Countrywide, 28,405 VC in the military category rallied (the highest since inception of the program). Political cadres totaled 12,648 and the "other" category came to 5,970. There were about 368 NVA, up from 284 in 1968.

Jones summed it up:

... in the entire history of the Program there have been only five occasions when the monthly rate exceeded 3,000; four of them occurred during the first half of 1969 (only February with its pre-Tet depression dropped below this 3,000 mark).40

VC reaction was violent. In a document defining and analyzing the problem and setting forth countermeasures to be taken, the VC admitted that they "rarely discover a potential desertion. It usually
occurs before we know about it. The reason for this is that we lack vigilance and neglect to take preventive measures in a serious manner. . . . [41]

In June Jones instructed all field personnel to evaluate their situation in view of VC retaliation against the program. Particular attention was to be given by the Chieu Hoi advisers to uncovering in the interrogation process the countermeasures being employed by the VC in their area. To this end there was to be close coordination with local intelligence and PsyOps people. Earlier in February MACV issued a directive setting out military intelligence procedures for the handling and utilization of Hoi Chanh (see Appendix 3).

By early March the program on both the U.S. and the GVN side had attained full momentum. The budget had now reached a figure of $28.5 million, with a cost per rallier of $350 (up from $150 in 1966). [42]

There was a three-to-five-man Chieu Hoi Advisory Team in each region, there were American or Filipino Chieu Hoi advisers in all 44 provinces (though none at district). In an effort to arouse greater local interest and effort in support of the program in each village there was to be for the first time a newly created position for a "Chieu Hoi Cadre." The U.S. agreed to support this new plan for 1970 (e.g., pay the cadre) with the GVN budgeting for it thereafter.

Until September MICH was headed by Nguyen Ngoc An, a dynamic, able man with a good Deputy Minister for Chieu Hoi, Colonel Hien. Together they made tours of the provinces and the Chieu Hoi Centers to assess progress. An actively supported other GVN programs bearing on Chieu Hoi activities, e.g., PHUNG HOANG. Notwithstanding An's efforts, however, coordination and execution of government policies among the various ministries and between the Saigon ministries and the field continued to be a pressing problem. Jones believed that An never really got to the point where he placed much trust in Hoi Chanh and, capable though he was, "this showed through." [43] Lack of coordination and cooperation was particularly evident in psychological operations. In fact, Jones felt that the relationship between the Ministries of Information and Chieu Hoi was never sufficiently close to bring about maximum impact on the returnee rate:
The two just didn't work together. It was apparently difficult for the MOI to see the importance of working closely with Chieu Hoi. There was a very difficult problem in achieving a balance between having a well-managed operating Chieu Hoi Program and the kind of inducement which should go into it. It was difficult to get these people to understand that Chieu Hoi was more than just an inducement process and the necessity for good Centers, training programs, and other incentives to substantiate the credibility of the Program.  

Planning became an integral part of implementing the program. In March Jones sent a memorandum to the field with instructions that every province was to have some kind of a Chieu Hoi plan which would

(a) force the operator to develop realistic goals imposed from higher echelons into an appropriate local proportion;

(b) set forth procedures and processes in proper priority by which goals are to be achieved;

(c) inform all concerned as to what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done;

(d) enable resource requirements to be anticipated and properly budgeted for;

(e) serve as a check list for the necessary recurrent measurement of the program.*

In regard to (a) Jones stated bluntly that "provinces are not to be assigned returnee goals from higher authority." Past experience has clearly established this as entirely counterproductive in a Chieu Hoi sense," though provinces themselves could establish such goals.

Long a problem, particularly when contrasted with the sophisticated techniques practiced by the Communists in what they considered one of their most important tasks, the quality of political indoctrination given the Hoi Chanh at the Chieu Hoi Centers began to improve. By 1969, as a result of a greater display of interest and comprehension of this vital element of the reconciliation process on the part of GVN leaders, personnel at the all-important district level were more carefully selected and trained, with emphasis on instruction by VC political cadres who had rallied and were experienced in such indoctrination. Greater

*See Appendix 7 for the outlines of the plan.
effort was made to explain government policies and objectives and the need by the government to win the allegiance and support of the Hoi Chanh and the Vietnamese people. The content of the lectures became more substantive and was geared to the different educational levels of the Hoi Chanh.

Though under the National Identity Registration Program (NIRP) all Hoi Chanh were required to be fingerprinted, lack of follow-up on the ralliers after they left the centers led to duplication and inflation of Chieu Hoi statistics, e.g., ralliers who returned to their villages could very likely again be impressed by the VC and thus become once more eligible for Hoi Chanh status.

There was also growing fear that the program was being infiltrated by the enemy on a major scale. In 1968 and continuing into 1969, in conjunction with MACV/J-2, a program of intense surveillance and interrogation was undertaken to assure the bona fides of the Hoi Chanh, particularly in the Delta, and to discover any countrywide strategy by the enemy for subverting the program. The program came off "clean" with little evidence of widespread infiltration. Actually, by 1969 the interrogation process had reached a rather high level of refinement and there was good coordination and collaboration among the various agencies involved (the Province S-2, the National Police Adviser, Special Branch, etc.). On the U.S. side, senior military intelligence officers kept in close contact with the interrogation procedures at region and province, and MACV/J-2 stated that his organization gained some of its most valuable intelligence from the interrogations conducted at the Chieu Hoi Centers. There were also at each region Returnee Liaison Officers directly responsible to Jones who made regular inspection trips to the centers and reported on intelligence procedures there.

Even given all the problems and allowing for possible inflationary figures, the influx of ralliers (47,023) during 1969 was phenomenal. One of the main reasons was the new momentum of pacification and the expansion of the GVN presence in theretofore Viet Cong-controlled or contested areas. The revival and improved effectiveness of the RF/PF was of particular significance to the Chieu Hoi Program. These were the paramilitary forces which brought security to the villages and hamlets; HES security scores for rural population showed an increase
to 90.5 percent in relatively secure areas (ABC). The people now had to accommodate their lives to the GVN presence, and could do so without fear of enemy retribution. For example, their young men, now subject to the draft, could "Chieu Hoi" and become members of the local Popular Forces.

Also, studies had consistently shown that concern for the safety and economic livelihood of their families was a primary motivation for Viet Cong to rally. When their families moved into GVN-controlled areas and away from their own land, which exacerbated their economic plight, or when an area came under GVN control, thus relieving the fear of VC retaliation (by holding the family hostage or confiscating ancestral land), this could mean the climax of an oftentimes long-delayed decision to rally. It also, of course, offered an opportunity to do so.

Increased ARVN/U.S. pressure increased the hardship of the rank-and-file VC soldier, creating intense physical danger and fear, disrupting supply lines, and causing food and medicine shortages. Such deprivations, coupled with a loss of morale by the now-evident failure of the 1968 Tet Offensive and the prospects of a long protracted struggle envisaged in COSVN Resolution 9, also were inducements if not compelling reasons to rally.

In September President Thieu appointed Dr. Ho Van Cham as Minister of Chieu Hoi. From the outset, this young medical doctor (with a Master's Degree from Columbia University) demonstrated leadership and an understanding of the true meaning of national reconciliation and greater national unity. The revitalization of the ministry and the program began in earnest. But in assessing the 1969 program Jones still saw an innate distrust of the program by GVN leaders which resulted in certain brakes being put on any expansion of its concepts. The GVN never quite came through on the reintegration of Hoi Chanh (particularly the higher-level cadres) into the economic and political life of South Vietnam. Jones could see that as the GVN found it necessary to provide for some solidarity within Vietnamese society, to find some form of accommodation with the members of that society involved in the insurgency, the Chieu Hoi process could become the instrumentality by
which members of the Viet Cong transferred their allegiance to the GVN. But by 1969 the reconciliation aspects of the program were far from being fully developed.

MAINTAINING MOMENTUM -- 1970

During 1970 the nature of the war changed from a struggle for control of territory to one for internal security and consolidation. The enemy’s strategy of protracted guerrilla war, terrorism, and covert political penetration failed to stall the GVN pacification drive, although progress was not as great as in 1969. The 1970 Cambodian operations brought about significant increases in the rallier rate in MR 3 and MR 4, as VC crossed the border to rally in Vietnam. There was an interesting increase in MR 4 in the number of ralliers from Kien Hoa (the "seat" of the National Liberation Front) which accounted for 62 percent of the 4,443 fourth-quarter 1970 ralliers, the result of the opening up of VC strongholds and erection of permanent outposts to maintain the GVN presence. There was also a significant increase in the quality of ralliers, as 640 ranking VC came in from MR 4 alone.

The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan (see Appendix 8) was in general an improved version of the 1969 Plan, providing for continuity and completion of the 1969 program, with emphasis on strengthening internal security. There was a need to regain momentum in pacification (and in Chieu Hoi), particularly in MR 2, where security was bad. However, overall terrorism and sabotage was down and was concentrated in less than a dozen provinces. Komar found that

... by 1970 the war had become largely localized. Analysis of the 1970 incident rate and HES statistics show clearly that both the military war and terrorism now impact on a few key areas. Insurgency-type activity is largely concentrated in three provinces of southern I Corps (Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai); Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Pleiku, and Kontum in northern II Corps; and Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, An Xuyen, and Kien Giang in IV Corps. In most populated areas of the other 33 provinces the intensity of the conflict and even terrorism has radically declined in many cases only to sporadic harassment.
The total number of Hoi Chanh decreased from 47,023 in 1969 to 32,565 in 1970 (the goal had been 40,000). Sixty percent of the total (or 19,587) came from MR 4. One analyst estimates it would have cost Free World Forces about 1,400 lives to neutralize the 10,925 military included in this 19,587 if they had not rallied. The largest drop countrywide was in the "military category" which decreased from 28,405 in 1969 to 17,092 (or from 60 to 52 percent), reflecting the enemy's growing dependence on NVA. Estimated VC recruitment had dropped from approximately 57,000 in 1969 to 33,000 in 1970 with the expansion and consolidation of the GVN presence in previous Viet Cong-controlled or contested areas. The number of "political" Hoi Chanh also decreased from 12,648 to 11,361, though the latter figure was actually 35 percent of the total number of Hoi Chanh for the year -- an increase from the 29 percent of 1969. Vann, operating in MR 4, attributed this increased percentage to greater emphasis on pacification rather than military operations. NVA ralliers were also down from 368 to 245, probably because of reduced enemy presence in RVN due to combat in Cambodia, reduced infiltration from North Vietnam, and anticipation of an imminent ceasefire.

By 1970 the objectives of the program had not much changed, but emphasis had shifted to reflect an attitudinal change on the part of the GVN, i.e., the apparent intent to make Chieu Hoi a "true national reconciliation program." The number of inducement cadres was decreased and those in the political rehabilitation-vocational training fields increased to implement this change in emphasis.

Poor, unimaginative, unfocused, and inept political indoctrination -- by untrained, indifferent personnel -- had been a problem ever since the program developed into something more than an amnesty program (around 1967). As Jones puts it,

... when a guy rallies he is like a body count; what you do with him in the Center is the crucial point because it is there he really makes up his mind as to whether he made the right decision. ... This is where the really important aspect of the program as far as nation-building is concerned comes in. We either build bridges or we merely neutralize these people.
Ralliers wise in VC training and indoctrination techniques had viewed with alarm and astonishment the lack of time, effort, and emphasis placed on political rehabilitation of Hoi Chanh. Some improvement was apparent by 1969 (though only about 60 percent of the Hoi Chanh were provided political indoctrination because of a lack of facilities and qualified instructors); by 1970 budgetary support for improved political indoctrination was firmly established. Instructors were to be trained at the National Training Center at Vung Tau and efforts made to enlist the support and personnel of other GVN agencies and ministries. By the end of 1971 MCH was to have 100 Hoi Chanh trained political instructors.

Another vital element of the nation-building process, preparing the Hoi Chanh to reenter the economic life of the country by giving him thorough vocational training, a means of making a living, had been an integral part of the Chieu Hoi Program ever since 1964. But given the lack of skilled instructors and length of time most Hoi Chanh were in the centers, it had been minimal. However, as a result of a visit in early 1970 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, impetus was given the vocational training program for Hoi Chanh (and for veterans and refugees). With the assistance of USAID-sponsored contract personnel, vocational training in agriculture, animal husbandry, building trades, and engine mechanics was to be provided. Initially, the program was to be a joint activity of MCH, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Labor. Eventually the Ministry of Labor would take over all vocational training.

Fundamental to the successful employment of Hoi Chanh was the all-important identification card. According to the 1970 Project Status and Accomplishment Report issued by the Chieu Hoi Directorate, the identification card problem had been largely solved. The goal of 70 percent of all Hoi Chanh processed for identification cards had been met; only a shortage of National Police personnel to process the large backlog of cards precluded 100 percent achievement. By the end of 1971, 95 percent of all Hoi Chanh rallying in 1971 were processed for ID cards.

Another means of social and political reintegration of the enemy was the conversion of VC/POWs to Hoi Chanh. While such conversion was
possible and had been implemented on a limited ad hoc basis in previous years, in March 1970 in Danang in the first public ceremony of its kind 74 VC/POWs were given Hoi Chanh status. By the end of 1970 Hoi Chanh status had been granted 313 VC/POWs. This process was to be accelerated in 1971.

Yet another significant 1970 development was an attempt to rectify a long-standing problem connected with resettlement of Hoi Chanh and their protection from Viet Cong retaliation -- a follow-up procedure to determine where they went after release from the Chieu Hoi Centers. Did they return to their village or remain in urban areas? What, if any, was the impact of the vocational training received in the Center on their ability to find employment and support their family? There was also a need to know just how many Hoi Chanh returned to the Viet Cong.

Buried in the 1970 budget was funding for the activation of an automated tracking system (to be combined with the Ministry of Chieu Hoi Management and Information System) under the Director General of National Police. Each time a Hoi Chanh moved from one province to another, he was to be finger-printed and the data were to be forwarded to the National Police Command to be automated for quick accessibility to determine his status. In addition Ministry of Chieu Hoi village cadres were to maintain regular personal contact with the Hoi Chanh.

While, particularly in the interrogation of Hoi Chanh, Chieu Hoi had been geared into PHUNG HOANG (the program to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure) as early as 1968, when PHUNG HOANG was set up, coordination steadily improved and by 1970 was successfully accelerated. Armed Propaganda Teams were assigned to each operational PHUNG HOANG DIOCC (District Intelligence Operations Control Center), through contacts with their families to induce VC to rally. By the end of 1971, this means of neutralizing a VCI had become a very important part of the PHUNG HOANG Program.

In 1970 the GVN contributed about $.44 million to the total U.S./GVN expenditures for 1970 of $12.9 million, a substantial decrease from the high 1969 figure of $28.5 million, ballooned by the influx of returnees and increased salary expenditures for U.S. employees. The original
Chieu Hoi budget for 1970 had called for VN$460 million of counterpart funds for all Chieu Hoi operations except the Armed Propaganda Teams (which was estimated at about half of total program costs). The GVN was to fund the remainder but was unable to do so because of a shortage of piastres. Without U.S. assistance it was feared the GVN would reduce the program, severely impairing its operations and effectiveness. Hence DOD undertook funding of 1970 operational costs. Chieu Hoi continued to be an AID/DOD "realignment activity," with U.S. assistance "inputs" funded by DOD. Except for U.S. commodities furnished directly from U.S. military stocks, all U.S. support was administered by USAID/CORDS on a reimbursable basis.

U.S. advisory assistance was to be maintained at the level of 26 direct-hire personnel (as of September 1970, 19 positions were filled) with a reduction to 21 in FY 1971. By November 1970 U.S. advisers were no longer being recruited into the Chieu Hoi Program because of the planned U.S. "phase-out." Of the 39 Third-Country Nationals (38 of whom were Filipinos), it was contemplated that 32 would be phased out by the end of FY 1971, when, presumably through improved management, MCH would be able to take over advisory functions.

In November a Special Pacification and Development Campaign was undertaken to complete the 1970 Plan and to effect a smooth transition to the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan, which was to begin in March 1971. Emphasis was to be put on inducement of high-ranking military and political VC/NVA cadre to rally.

(1) The satisfactory result of the security and pacification and the large-scale operations conducted by the RVN and Allied Forces to attack and destroy the VC sanctuaries across the borders have created a favorable environment for the expansion of our Chieu Hoi campaign.

Thus, every effort should be made to propagandize and appeal to high ranking Communists, youth, and the enemy units that have infiltrated into either provinces or border areas. Especially in III and IV CTZs we must aim for their logistical areas and the Communist command now being destroyed in Cambodia.

(2) There should be separate appeals for cadres and soldiers infiltrated from the North, and cadres and soldiers of COSVN. Use to the fullest all information and psychological warfare means, as well as armed propaganda teams for more effective action.
Organize teams of high-ranking ralliers to talk to organizations of people, college students, and other associations in order to motivate those families with relatives following the Communists to call them back to the Nationalist cause.

(3) The training program to create cadres and retrain ralliers who are capable of effective participation in the Pacification and Development program should be continued.

(4) Officials must follow up and assist ralliers in order to create favorable circumstances for their participation in the self-development program. 50

A goal of 12,000 ralliers was set for the Special Campaign, but during the four months of the campaign only 9,560 Viet Cong rallied (4,761 in November/December). The overall 1970 Chieu Hoi results (32,661), while not as spectacular as in 1969, continued to be a contribution to the overall pacification effort. There was a noticeable improvement not only in planning but also in the general operation and administration of the program, which had now been "injected with a sense of discipline, responsibility and urgency although there are still cases of mismanagement and inefficiency. . . ." 51 As Richard Riddle, an Australian Chieu Hoi adviser and an old hand in the program put it at the end of 1970,

The present Ministry is the best in my experience and they, from the Minister down, would certainly continue the program even if the Americans left. They have replaced more incompetent chiefs in twelve months than all other ministries put together and generally speaking the quality of the replacements are quite superior. . . .

PHASING DOWN -- 1971

52 In 1971, as in 1970, the number of ralliers fell short of the official goal; only 20,244 rallied during the Calendar Year, with the monthly rate fluctuating wildly from a high in February of 3,070 (probably attributable to a diminution of enemy military activity and terrorism until after Tet) to a low of 754 in September, the month preceding the Presidential elections. A comparison by month with the 1970 influx also indicates that with the expansion of the GVN control and "presence," the "soft-core" VC areas had been cleaned out, leaving the "hard-core" areas which produce fewer Hoi Chanh.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>CY 1970</th>
<th>CY 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,347</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>3,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3,239</td>
<td>2,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3,656</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>1,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2,844</td>
<td>1,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3,330</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2,801</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>1,889*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>3,090**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Total:</td>
<td>32,37953</td>
<td>20,24454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The spectre of enemy infiltration again reared its head in spring 1971. Thirty-one RF/PF outposts were overrun by the enemy (compared to nine for the same period in 1970), with indications of collusion between some of the RF/PF and the VC, i.e., VC agents defecting to the GVN as "false ralliers," joining the paramilitary forces, and then helping their VC comrades overrun the posts. This is probably the first time in the history of the program that any countrywide strategy of infiltration had been discernible.

Given the fluid situation in the country -- the decrease in the level of hostilities, the political atmosphere surrounding the 1971 National Elections -- the GVN funding for the program remained minimal for FY 1971 (at about the $0.3 million level). The DOD-projected budget figure for 1972 was set at about $13.3 million. GVN allocation of manpower to the program appeared acceptable. A reorganization of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi was approved by the Prime Minister's office giving more authority and flexibility at the local level in the utilization of manpower. The Minister of Chieu Hoi (Dr. Ho Van Cham) continued the coordinated management and leadership largely lacking prior to his takeover in 1969. He constantly pressed all GVN (and U.S.) agencies and ministries to take full advantage of Chieu Hoi resources and sought to awaken every segment of the GVN and the general public to the true meaning of "greater national unity." Ho Chi Minh began

* Includes 444 POWs granted Chieu Hoi status.
** Includes 2,297 POWs granted Chieu Hoi status.
to hold more of the key positions in the Ministry, especially in the propaganda and exploitation areas. TV and radio programs, leaflets, etc. were written and managed by Hoi Chanh.

But there was a phasing down of certain elements of the program. Chieu Hoi resettlement hamlets were put under local administration. There was a reduction in the number of Armed Propaganda Teams -- though an increased emphasis on training and effectiveness. By the end of the year the number of Kit Carson Scouts was down to around 400 (from a high of over 2,500 in 1970). The American advisory effort was also phasing down; by June 1972 the Chieu Hoi Division was to be reduced to a staff of three advisers to the Ministry. Chieu Hoi had, in fact, become a Vietnamese program.
VI. KEY PROGRAM ELEMENTS


duction*

Psychological Operations

The importance and priority that the Communists put on psychological warfare (PsyWar) and psychological operations (PsyOps) is well known, as in the slogans "Political activities are more important than military activities," and "Fighting is less important than propaganda."\(^1\) Vo Nguyen Giap in his *People's War, People's Army* quotes as one of Ho Chi Minh's cardinal principles of political warfare, "Do not attempt to overthrow the enemy but try to win over and make use of him."\(^2\) This quotation could also well be one of the cardinal principles underlying the key element of the Chieu Hoi Program -- inducement.

Many believe that the Vietnamese paid a high price for paying too little attention to countering the Communist psychological offensive even (after 1963) in connection with Chieu Hoi. U.S. agencies in Vietnam between 1955 and 1960 made the same errors as the Vietnamese: they discounted the power of Communist agitation and armed propaganda, and they gave no priority to encouraging the Vietnamese to counter the Communist psychological warfare campaign in the rural areas of the country.

Had the U.S. given a higher priority to finding out precisely what the Communists were doing psychologically in remote areas of South Vietnam between 1955 and 1959, and then urging the GVN to develop and use a counter-psychological operations strategy . . . the VC would have been less able to exploit peasant resentments and to get them organized to support a guerrilla war the people did not want.\(^3\)

Not until 1959, when the VC guerrilla warfare increased in intensity, did the U.S. turn to psychological warfare and operations as a weapon to use against the insurgents. And even in 1959 it was apparent that

*For discussion of the Armed Propaganda Team, probably one of the most effective single inducement tools available to the Chieu Hoi Program, see Section VII, Exploitation and Utilization of Hoi Chanh.
the Americans little understood the nature and significance of psychological operations and political warfare. Not only was there a lack of American expertise in the field but little knowledge of the Vietnamese language, the people, and culture necessary to initiate and design in-depth policy and message content to wage such a war. Nor was there adequate coordination among the agencies in Vietnam involved (MAAG, USIA, USOM/AID), concentrated for the most part in the Saigon area with little contact with the rural population.

In 1965, as a result of a National Security Council decision, a Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was established to coordinate the U.S. policies and personnel involved in psychological operations (Defense, USIA, AID, CIA, etc.). A major portion of the new U.S. psyops effort was to be devoted to the Chieu Hoi Program.

Barry Zorthian, the first Director of JUSPAO, was assigned the responsibility of establishing U.S. Mission psyops policy and implementing it. Military psyops remained under COMUSMACV but was subject to JUSPAO guidance and general supervision (see Figs. 9, 10, and 11). Johnston writes:

This centralization of U.S. psychological operations policy in a threatened country was a milestone. Even more important, for the first time a psychological operations expert was on the first team where he could have a say in strategic decisions before they were made and not left with the job of supporting them after the decision was taken. Equally important was the boost given to military psychological operations. At MACV a Psychological Operations Directorate was formed and authority was provided to deploy into Vietnam a Psychological Operations battalion and an Air Commando squadron to support U.S. Free World and Vietnamese combat operations. At the same time, about 120 U.S. PsyOps Advisors were authorized to provide advice and assistance to the Vietnamese PolWar organization at Corps, Division, Province training camps and schools. This new JUSPAO concept and correlation of effort brought great progress in PsyOps in 1965-1966 even though the money budgeted was minute in comparison with overall costs of the war and in spite of the great lack of PsyWar experts.

The new unified concept for management of psychological warfare and operations not only proved cost-effective but brought cohesion and coordination to Chieu Hoi inducement efforts. General Westmoreland
Figure 9
JOINT UNITED STATES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (JUSPAO)

MISSION PSYOPS COMMITTEE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR

ASST. DIRECTOR
PROGRAM LIASON OFFICE

ASST. DIRECTOR
POLICY PLANNING RESEARCH OFFICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE
BRANCHES
ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING
BUDGET & MANAGEMENT
ENFORCEMENT SERVICES
COMMUNICATION
SECURITY
HOUSING
PRODUCTION
PRINTING
PHOTO
GRAPHICS
AUDIO-VIDEO FACILITIES

VOICE RELAY
HUE

INFORMATION DIVISION
BRANCHES
LOCAL PRESS
RADIO
TELEVISION
MOTION PICTURES
PUBLICATIONS
EXHIBITS

CULTURAL DIVISION
BRANCHES
EXCHANGES
AMERICAN CULTURAL COUNCIL
VIETNAMESE-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION (BAMC)
ENGLISH TEACHING
BOOK TRANSLATIONS
CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

NORTH VIETNAM AFFAIRS DIVISION
BRANCHES
NVN PSYOPS PROGRAM
DOCUMENTATION
ARCHIVES
MISSIONWIDE LIASON
MACP4 NVN PSYOPS LIASON

FIELD DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
BRANCHES
PSYOP MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT
NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS
SUPPORT TO FIELD OPERATIONS
MACP4 NVN PSYOPS LIASON
VAN TAC WU TEAMS
SPECIAL PROJECTS

LEGEND
COMMAND LINE
TECHNICAL SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTION SUPERVISION SUPPORT
Figure 10

U.S. MISSION

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STRUCTURE

THE AMBASSADOR

DEPUTY AMBASSADOR

MISSION COUNCIL

DIRECTOR JUSPAO

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

ASS'T, DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVE & TECHNICAL SERVICES

ANSE, DIRECTOR
PROGRAM LIASON OFFICE

POLICY, PLANNING,
RESEARCH OFFICE

MACV

CORDS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

I Corps

II Corps

III Corps

IV Corps

INFORMATION DIVISION

CULTURAL DIVISION

NORTH VIETNAM AFFAIRS DIVISION

FIELD DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

FIELD & COMPONENT COMMAND PSYOPS OFFICERS

SUBORDINATE UNIT PSYOPS OFFICERS

MACV PSYCHOLOGICAL APPLICATION ELECTROLYTE

POLWAR ADVISOR TO CORDS

POLWAR ADVISOR TO DCS POLWAR CORDE

LEGEND

COMMAND LINE

TECHNICAL SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTION, SUPERVISION, SUPPORT, COORDINATION

STAFF SUPERVISION
in his "Guidance for Commanders in Vietnam" dated July 22, 1966, directed them to "capitalize on psywar opportunities." A "National Psychological Operations Plan" was issued. JUSPAO Regional Directors were to be responsible for preparation, coordination, submission, and execution of regional plans. JUSPAO Field Representatives were to generate indigenous local interest and support of Chieu Hoi campaigns, including development of local plans and materials. There was to be optimum coordination and integration of both U.S. and CVN operations at all levels, with overall supervision from JUSPAO and the GVN Ministry of Information (MOI) through the Vietnam Information Service, vested in a Combined U.S./GVN Coordinating Committee at the national level with representation from MACV, JUSPAO, GPWD, and MOI.

"Guidelines to Chieu Hoi Psychological Operations: The Chieu Hoi Inducement Program" were prepared in April 1966 by the JUSPAO Field Development Division, which centralized policy planning, with decentralized operational planning and execution at the local level. Development and mass production of psyops materials was to be done by JUSPAO in accordance with tactical needs and conditions determined by the field. In addition to JUSPAO, MACV (the 6th PsyOps Battalion) operated an extensive psywar program, much of which was devoted to the inducement operation. On the CVN military side, the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) supervised the psywar program of the RVNAF.

The Audience. While it is difficult to prove any close and direct relationship between content and dissemination of Chieu Hoi psywar material and the returnee rate, there is little doubt of its impact, e.g., many ralliers cite the "Safe Conduct Pass" as being a prime incentive to their rallying.

Information about the program reaches the population and potential rallier through different channels: leaflets dropped from aircraft or distributed by hand, newspapers, aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, radio, TV, movies, family influence, contact with ex-VC who have rallied (e.g., the Armed Propaganda Teams, etc.)

Sir Robert Thompson in his Defeating Communist Insurgency sees any inducement program as having two target audiences: (1) the
population -- that under GVN control (which must be educated to accept
the rallier back into society) and that in VC-controlled areas, spe-
cifically the families of insurgents; and (2) the insurgents --
military and civilian. In addition, in Vietnam, as the program de-
veloped, it soon became apparent that the RVNAF and Free World Forces also
had to be made aware of its concept, implementation, and relative worth.

Content. Zorthian early in the program initiated a series of
structured surveys to measure the "who, what, and why" of VC defection
as a means of designing more effective Chieu Hoi appeals and targeted
dissemination. There was a crying need to devise and coordinate rele-
vant inducement material and pre-test it to measure its effectiveness.
Much of the material in the early days was incongruous and tainted with
what Griner calls "the operational environment and culture orientation
of the American psywarrior." For example, the Viet Cong would be cast
in the role of villain, or a Vietnamese peasant might be shown sitting
(the Vietnamese peasant squats -- a traditional posture -- he does not
sit). Griner found too that to introduce a nationalist appeal into
the material was counterproductive. There should be no hint of implied
disloyalty in the appeal of the message. The themes devised were many
and sought a delicate balance between inducing the insurgent to rally
and antagonizing him. Fall in The Two Vietnamese states the basic
attitudinal approach:

One of the essential elements of counterinsurgency is . . .
that the counterinsurgent must assume that the insurgent is
basically amenable to certain normal human motivations --
fairness, justice, kindness, love for his family -- and,
therefore, remains "winnable." 9

Content of psychological war material, targeted on the potential
rallier, had to be focussed on his grievances, emotions, and aspira-
tions, not -- except in the case of hard-core VCI or NVA -- on ideo-
logical commitment. The insurgent must be encouraged to surrender by
the creation of trust in the government as just and generous. His
vulnerabilities must be thoroughly analyzed. Here close coordination
with intelligence operations -- in the interrogation of ralliers and
POWs -- was to play a most important role. Former insurgents were
used in preparation of the material to the maximum extent possible --
they, rather than the "American psywarrior," knew the modus operandi
of the enemy, their erstwhile comrades, and were themselves a part of
the indigenous culture and social and political environment. Until
1967 the GVN would probably have been hard put to present itself as a
revolutionary government committed to the welfare of the people. Indeed,
Johnston and others have pointed out that the basic source of Viet
Cong power "... did not lie in their Communist ideology, but rather
in the slumbering needs, grievances, emotions and hatred of the people.
..."\(^{10}\) In the Chieu Hoi psyops program which emerged, this was a
real problem. As Ogden Williams put it,

The Chieu Hoi program could only sell the GVN image that
existed. The Vietnamese ruling establishment was domi-
nated by the more educated elite, the new urban rich, and
the bourgeoisie left behind by the French. There was
still inadequate concern for the peasant and worker. In
this respect the Viet Cong had a more revolutionary image
whatever their ultimate intentions. Unless the GVN's
revolution was as sincere and authentic as that of the
enemy, little appeal could be made to the Viet Cong on an
ideological or political level. Psychological warfare,
for the most part therefore, had largely to concentrate on
the fears and hardships. This is also why the more motivated
Viet Cong rarely defected under Chieu Hoi.\(^{11}\)

**Dissemination.** The leaflet -- distributed from aircraft by the
5th Air Commandos of the USAF, by the VNAF, and by hand -- proved to
be the most effective means of disseminating the Chieu Hoi message.
The ubiquitous, multilingual "Safe Conduct Pass" which had literally
blanketed South Vietnam has been the most effective of all (see Fig. 12).
Though there are thousands of other leaflets stressing other themes,
the pass is most often described by ralliers during interrogation as
the one most seen, the one most conducive to rallying. After one
battle during OPERATION PAUL REVERE 90 percent of the VC who could be
searched -- the dead, wounded, and captured -- had the leaflets.

During a typical month (March 1969), according to the Vietnam
Information Service, 713.4 million leaflets were dropped from planes
and 3.3 million distributed by hand.\(^{12}\) By the spring of 1971 it is
Figure 12

THE CHIEU HOI SAFE CONDUCT PASS

GIÂY THÔNG-HÀNH

SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

UNCLASSIFIED
estimated that JUSPAO had distributed nearly four billion leaflets in
the campaign to persuade "men to rally to the GVN under its amnesty
program."  

The Tet Campaigns. Each year during the Vietnamese New Year (Tet)
an intensive psyops campaign has been mounted, requiring immense effort
and coordination of all U.S./GVN military and civilian agencies involved
in the Chieu Hoi Program. Statistics show that each year a large num-
ber of VC -- two to three times the normal rate -- rally during Tet
(which usually occurs in January or February of the Lunar New Year).  

The Tet holiday is the most important of all Vietnamese holidays;
it has been celebrated for centuries and is by custom more sacred and
sentimental even than the marriage day. It is the traditional time of
family reunion and provides a unique opportunity to convince families
of the safety and good treatment which will be accorded the rallier by
the government. The Tet psyops campaign is thus focused on the family
and on the homeward-bound VC, emphasizing not only sentimental family
ties but also the concrete opportunities presented by the holiday to
rally. Indeed, most ralliers report to their village and hamlet councils.

Grinker states that on January 19–20, 1966, 132 million leaflets
were dropped "signaling the beginning of the homecoming campaign" and
that in the following three weeks 2,336 Hoï Chanh rallied.  

(There appears to be an interesting correlation between the level of education
of the potential rallier and the rate of rallying. In a survey conducted
by JUSPAO in 1967, over half of the higher educated ralliers stated that
their reasons for rallying were associated with Tet; only one out of
three of the uneducated gave this as reason.) Most of the big returns of
1967 were associated with Tet, and with the operations of late 1966 and
eyeartly 1967 which established a U.S./GVN presence in untapped areas of
traditional VC control.

In December 1966 the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was formed,
and JUSPAO field personnel were placed under its operational control.
In May 1967 they came under CORDS, the new U.S. pacification agency
which combined OCO and the Revolutionary Development Directorate of
MACV. On a national level the inducement or psychological operations
phase of the Chieu Hoi Program was carried out primarily by MACCORDS/POD and JUSPAO in coordination with MACPD. In the field at province and district, CORDS psyops personnel were assigned responsibility for support of all U.S.-sponsored civilian programs assisted by the G-5 (Civil Affairs) and S-5 elements of the sector and subsector military commands. Priority was given the Chieu Hoi but lack of sufficient personnel precluded exploitation of rallier potential. Lathram wanted "every Hoi Chanh...tapped for some psyops purpose."16 But as late as 1967 there were provinces without a full-time information and psyops adviser. The GVN information service at province and district was almost nonexistent -- all this in the light of what Johnston calls "the long-term psychological complexity of the Vietnam war."

Johnston believes that the effectiveness of the psyops people under OCO and CORDS suffered because their performance was dependent to a large extent on whether the U.S. advisers at province and district had an appreciation of psychological operations as a primary weapon in the conduct of the war -- and unfortunately, in many cases, these men were not psyops-oriented.

The problem came more than once to the fore. In January 1968, Zorthian in a memorandum to Komor deplored what he saw as a lack of responsiveness on the part of CORDS personnel in connection with keeping monthly records on psychological operations in a province.17 Zorthian had found that part of the problem of mounting an effective psyops program was not only in the targeted dissemination of psyops material but in "feedback" to determine what factors actually were conducive to rallying. The Viet Cong propaganda expounded by VC agitprop cadres was geared to the economic and social grievances of the rural community. GVN psyops operations should similarly be based on such detailed investigation and analysis. Zorthian felt we could, for example, achieve "more mileage" from our leaflet program by being more selective in content and dissemination. To this end he had requested field reports on psychological operations in the field -- only to find that statistics as to the number of ralliers, the number of Viet Cong families contacted, APT operation, number of leaflets dropped, aerial loudspeaker sorties flown, etc. were practically nonexistent.

UNCLASSIFIED
Komer replied to Zorthian on January 6, 1968:

The record of non-responsive ness by MACCORS and its field organization described in your 1/4 memo is shocking. My only retort is why didn't you let me know sooner? . . . Now we are developing action programs for 1968 is the time to crank in results of the study and your thoughts on the matter. . . . We will hit the points in our Chieu Hoi and PsyOps action programs.

He followed up with a memorandum to the Chief of Staff: "Please have the staff prepare necessary guidance to the field. . . ."

Actually, however, Komer was diffident about imposing more reporting requirements on his CORDS people, feeling they were already laboring under the burden of the new reporting systems (e.g., the Hamlet Evaluation System) he had initiated as management tools. Nor did he consider that psychological operations per se contributed much to achieving pacification objectives, except in the Chieu Hoi Program. However, a communications revolution was sweeping Vietnam and much of the "word" about Chieu Hoi was now getting to the people and the potential rallier over radio and TV. Thus, in mid-1968 Komer agreed to relinquish operational control of psyops personnel to JUSPAO except for a small liaison group which remained in CORDS.

In July 1971, MCH took over from JUSPAO the full responsibility for the development and implementation of its own psyops program. Hoi Chanh had been trained by JUSPAO to develop themes and messages for leaflets and conduct tests of the leaflets. Printing, which had been funded by JUSPAO, was now included in the MCH budget. All psyops materials and activities (such as the Long Me magazine, weekly newsletters, TV programs, two radio programs, and general leaflet and poster production) were supervised by MCH personnel with some support (such as distribution) being received from the General Political Warfare Department of ARVN and the Vietnamese Air Force.

The Chieu Hoi Weapons Reward Program

No discussion of the factors motivating defection is complete without mention of the carefully structured program of rewards proffered to those who rally and indeed even to those who influence a Viet Cong to rally.
Sir Robert Thompson advocates such a program as one of the most important aspects of a defector program:

If there is a well-publicized standard rate of rewards for information leading to the killing or capture of terrorists, and the recovery of weapons, the natural cupidity of many members of the population soon involves them in the hunt, particularly if they know that their identity will not be revealed and that they will be paid on the nail in cash in accordance with results.\textsuperscript{18}

It is of course crucial that rewards be paid promptly, be equitable, and in line with those previously paid.\textsuperscript{19} One "snag" developed in the Chieu Hoi reward system: Allied units to whom the VC rallied were prone to keep the weapons brought in (as trophies), refusing to issue the necessary receipt to the returnee. In order to ensure the credibility of the reward program, such practices should be forbidden and made subject to severe penalties.

The Chieu Hoi Weapons Reward Program "pays a returnee for weapons he turns in or for weapons to which he leads units after he has rallied. This program has been most successful and the finding of large weapons caches which are widely publicized are usually the result of this program."\textsuperscript{20}

The weapons reward system was established by Decree No. 0144 of September 18, 1964, issued by Nghiem Xuan Hong, then Special Commissioner for Chieu Hoi. The system and rates for weapons brought in (from VN$800 for a pistol to VN$20,000 for a 75mm recoilless rifle) were reaffirmed in 1967 by the basic decree covering the organization and functioning of the Chieu Hoi Program (see Appendix 5). CORDS kept pressing for higher rewards, partly to increase inducement and partly to keep pace with inflation. In July 1967 (by Decree No. 148), rates for weapons turned in by ralliers were again increased, and by March 1970 the rate ranged from VN$1,200 (approximately U.S.$10) for a hand weapon to as much as VN$1 million for leading allied troops to large enemy caches.
Funds for payment of the awards were calculated in the 1967 Chieu Hoi budget on the basis of a possible 2,000 cases and an average award of VN$3,500 per case. Awards were paid according to an official table of prices (see Appendix 5). From 1967 through 1970, some 25,129 weapons were turned in. Yet the cost of the program was miniscule in proportion to the gain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>VN$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>17,838,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24,698,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (1st quarter)</td>
<td>1,777,196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Third-Party Inducement Program

A basic principle underlying Chieu Hoi was that a man's loyalty cannot really be bought. However, it is possible -- without dragging a defector program down to a monetary exchange for a man's loyalty -- to pay a third party for rendering a service, i.e., inducing a potential rallier to defect and having the rallier attest to his sponsor's bona fides in getting him to do so.

Such a program was inaugurated in the summer of 1967 in Vinh Binh and Vinh Long Provinces in MR 4. It proved quite successful. The November 1968, Accelerated Pacification Campaign extended the program to the whole country. An intensive effort was undertaken to pay rewards to any Vietnamese citizen or Hoi Chanh instrumental in getting a VC/NVA to rally. Eligibility for reward was determined by a special committee at province, and amounts -- based on the rank of the rallier -- varied from VN$250,000 for a commander of a Military Region to VN$3,000 for a member of the guerrilla force.

Initially, particularly in MR 4, there was a significant increase in the number of ralliers (in the first six months of 1969, three-fourths of those rallying were attributed to this program). It went more slowly in MR 1 and MR 3; it never really "got off the ground" in MR 2 because of poor psyops and organization.

The program, however, contained the seeds of its own destruction. It can be assumed, of course, that there are "third parties" involved in any rallying situation -- families, friends, other government contacts. Certainly over the period of time, sometimes months, before the rallier actually crosses the line he has often made contact to
determine the best point at which to rally, etc. Indeed, Pike believes
that 50 percent of the rallyings take place in this manner, by "nego-
tiation" rather than by "simply walking out of the jungle, hands in the
air, waving a safe conduct pass." But it soon became apparent that
under the "Third Party Inducement Program," too many ralliers turned
out to have a "third party inducer" — sometimes a GVN official — who
in fact had done nothing to induce the rallier. Chieu Hoi cadres at
the centers were also found to be in collusion with ralliers coming into
the centers with whom they would offer to split the "third party" reward.

The program was finally terminated in the summer of 1969. The
general consensus was that there had been a considerable expenditure of
piastre funds without any substantial increase in the number of ralliers
whose defection could actually be attributed to official inducement.
There was also damage to the image of the Chieu Hoi Program as a whole,
because oftentimes bona fide claims were paid only after much delay and
red tape if they were paid at all. U.S. advisers were prone to withhold
support of the program not only because of the corruption connected with
it but also because the rewards were paid out of AIK funds on a priority
basis, leaving no money for other pacification projects they considered
more worthwhile.

In the spring of 1971, a proposal from the Central Pacification
and Development Council for a Third Party Inducement Campaign aimed at
high-ranking VCI was under consideration. The campaign was to be direc-
ted at the families of the VCI, and rewards were contemplated for fami-
lies who succeeded in persuading VCI members to rally. Similar rewards
were to be paid to Hoi Chanh successful in inducing a member of the VCI
to rally or in providing information leading to his neutralization. How-
ever, the proposal was never implemented.

RECEPTION

With the steady rise in the number of Hoi Chanh from 1966 on, it
became apparent that the initial reception accorded the rallier was of
the utmost importance. Promises given by the psyops appeals had to be
fulfilled if credibility of the program was to be sustained. The first
reception accorded the rallier has a direct bearing on whether and how
much he will contribute to the GVN or, conversely, whether he will be
an easy target for enemy reindoctrination and redefection. Stressing
that politeness, respect, and even deferential treatment have an importance in Vietnamese culture which Americans have underestimated, and that lack of consideration produces a subtle resistance on the part of the rallier difficult to counteract, Simulmatics recommended that "every effort be made to ensure that the psychological as well as the material needs of the Hoi Chanh are looked after."

Thus it became essential that every soldier and every adviser in the field know about Chieu Hoi and how to receive and handle the returnee -- "a brave man who has not only decided to break from a close Communist organization but has risked his life to do so." Anyone, with or without a Chieu Hoi Safe Conduct Pass, who voluntarily turned himself in under any circumstances was to be given Chieu Hoi status, his exact classification to be made later by proper authorities (see Appendix 3).

The Chieu Hoi Center

One of the primary objectives of the early Chieu Hoi Program was to establish a reception center in every province so that the potential rallier could rally close to his original home. The center, protected by APT units, provided relative security from VC reprisals (though, as one knowledgeable adviser put it, "it was sometimes unnerving to see an erstwhile VC walking around the Chieu Hoi compound armed with an M-16").

By 1965 Chieu Hoi Centers (under the direct control of the Province Chief) had been set up in the majority of provinces. In a 1966 JUSPAO survey (when a significant expansion of center facilities was contemplated with AID support), most Hoi Chanh stated they were satisfied with their stay at the centers, though living quarters were described as cramped (men, women, and children often having to share the same quarters) and not always clean, and the quality and quantity of food as less than adequate.

In the early years the facilities varied greatly -- from well-equipped, spacious, brick-and-mortar buildings with an office, mess hall, sleeping quarters, and exercise yard (long-range plans for the centers envisaged converting them to school buildings when the war was over) to open-air sheds. Grinner found that the ability of the center officials to operate a good program did not necessarily correspond to the cost of the quarters, however.
The year 1967 saw a major expansion of center facilities throughout the country and construction was largely completed. By 1968 Simulmatics reported that conditions at the centers, while primitive by American standards, were adequate and according to the Ho Chi Minh were better than what they had experienced with the Viet Cong.

The 1968 budget had funds to construct a standard two-room holding facility in 118 districts (where interrogation and intelligence exploitation first occurred) for the Ho Chi Minh until they could be moved up to province. In the wake of the Tet Offensive an interesting exchange of correspondence took place between Komer and the Chieu Hoi Minister, Nguyen Xuan Phong. Komer wrote:

While agreeing in the desirability of these facilities, I feel that the recent VC Tet Offensive has presented us with a number of reconstruction problems which demand our immediate attention and I am therefore recommending that the construction of the proposed district facilities be deferred until (1) the Chieu Hoi rate picks up to a point where district facilities are essential; (2) it is clear that construction assets, including commodities and funds, are adequate for higher priority programs; and (3) construction and repair work has been completed on all provincial centers. . . .

Naturally it is disappointing not to be able to go forward with all programs as rapidly as possible, particularly in the case of Chieu Hoi to which I have always assigned a high priority, but the recent emergency has required us to reprogram our assets which is why I have felt it necessary to make this recommendation.

Phong, however, replied on March 29:

While I am in agreement with you about the great pressure of our recovery efforts, I feel that in the present circumstances it is vitally essential for us to place Chieu Hoi among such high priorities as defense and pacification since it is directly aimed at disarming and reducing the enemy's ability to fight and create further destruction which would draw us into endless recovery programs. The Chieu Hoi Program . . . has been developed up to now horizontally and totally lacks in depth. Although we have developed our facilities at the provincial level where the burden is already great from many areas of activity, our failure to date to concentrate on the district level has resulted in the following:

(1) inability to get the Chieu Hoi message to the people at the district, village and hamlet levels. People at these levels are the best vehicles and the most effective medium to induce would-be returnees;
(2) most returnees prefer to rally through the civilian channel rather than to any military forces and we must therefore improve the capability of the civilian authorities to induce and receive these returnees;

(3) our only civilian Chieu Hoi representation is now at the provincial level and while I am not ambitious to have large facilities at the hamlet level, we must have a point of rally at the district level.

The above is the best course of action if we are to expect the returnee rate to pick up. If not our efforts will continue to be superficial. . . .

Phong then indicated that his two priorities for the program were the development of APTs and 118 "points to rally" at the district level.

By 1970 there were centers in Saigon, in the four military regions at Danang, near Qui Nhon, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho, in all 44 provinces, and in three autonomous cities (Danang, Cam Ranh, and Vung Tau); and Phong's district program was being expanded.

Hoi Chanh interviewed in the JUSPAO survey generally described the center cadres as fair and sympathetic. Indeed, Grinter states that in his sample the biggest surprise to the Hoi Chanh seemed to be the fair treatment accorded them. Simultaneously found, however, that all too often the cadres, the majority of whom were recruited from the "weaker elements" of the GVN civil service, adopted condescending and patronizing attitudes toward the Hoi Chanh and recommended training the cadres in human relations as an urgent matter. It was also recommended that returnees be hired to fill as many of the permanent administrative jobs in the centers as possible, since they knew the problems of the rallier and could be very effective in ways and means of successfully rehabilitating him. Both recommendations were to be followed in the next few years.

First aid and such limited pharmaceutical treatment as antimalaria injections and vitamins were introduced into the centers by late August 1966, though to forestall pilfering and illicit sale of the drugs they were kept under lock and key. The rallier is given what medical attention he needs.

The Interrogation Process

The intelligence community can play a vital role in psychological operations because, if feedback as to why insurgents have rallied is
timely and valid, it can be used in inducement appeals. As early as
1967 Simulmatics was stressing the value of such feedback and the value
of compiling biographic data from this intelligence interrogation to be
used in efforts targeted on the rallier's families and relatives.

O'Brien deals with this interrogation period in some detail and
points out that the "interview" should be initiated as soon as possible
and should be designed to produce initial perishable intelligence
(though in some instances there is hesitancy to use such intelligence)
and at the same time provide an answer to the question "Is the defector
bona fide or a questionable and potential infiltrator?" Many times
sheer numbers of ralliers reduce this interview to a mere screening,
which unfortunately leaves the program vulnerable to infiltration.

In early 1967, in an effort to exploit the intelligence value of
the ralliers (up to that time nobody was getting much out of them because
the GVN was not geared to do so), MACV assigned a major from military
intelligence to work at each region. His job was to move around from
province to province and ensure that the proper people were interrogating
the returnees. These interrogators were to be from all interested agen-
cies -- Special Branch (of the National Police), local RF/PF, Free World
Forces, ARVN, and (after 1968) PHUNG HOANG. The coordinated efforts paid
off. By fall of 1967 MACV/J-2 admitted "to all and sundry that the great
bulk of valuable intelligence received was coming from returnees." The
language barrier has been a principal roadblock to the successful
collection and the prompt and effective use of intelligence. Captured
personnel and documents which might have yielded valuable information
generally by-passed the American adviser because he was not equipped to
deal with them unless he happened to have an interpreter at his disposal
at the critical time.

During the interrogation period, if it is determined that the rall-
lier has knowledge of weapons or supply caches, he can be "borrowed"
from the center by the military to assist in locating and destroying the
caches. He must, however, volunteer for such duty, which not only makes
him eligible for the reward but also proves his good intent in rallying.

In his summing up of Chieu Hoi activities in 1969 Williams stated:

... the intelligence by-product of Chieu Hoi was nothing
short of spectacular. Tran Van Dac's revelation of the VC
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attack plans in April 1968 led to the total failure of the enemy's "Mini-Tet" Offensive in early May and alone more than justified the total investment in the Chieu Hoi Program in 1968. A majority of the weapons caches, including long-range rockets, discovered around Saigon before they could be launched were located as a result of the efforts of Hoi Chanh, APTs and Kit Carson Scouts.28

The National Police have the responsibility of verifying the curriculum vitae of the rallier (there are at least two police at each regional and provincial center and a larger, more experienced group conducting the interviews at the National Center). The Chieu Hoi Ministry is held responsible for fingerprinting all Hoi Chanh, and the prints are registered under the National Identity Registration Program (NIRP).29

After the interrogation interview the ralliers are sorted. Lower-level ralliers in terms of rank and education are retained at province for political orientation, vocational training, and possible participation in intelligence, tactical, and inducement operations. Regional centers receive those ralliers from province requiring more advanced political and vocational training than can be provided at province, and to relieve the overflow caused by seasonal influx of ralliers. "Elite" ralliers (those of cadre level and all NVA returnees) are sent to the National Center in Saigon for further intelligence processing, political instruction, national-level psychological operations, and vocational training appropriate to their capabilities.

The returnee's family may and often does live with him in the center. Each Hoi Chanh receives an allowance of 80 piastres per day for food, VN$2,500 (U.S.$13.00) for clothing, VN$500 (U.S.$2.50) a month spending allowance, and a VN$1,200 (U.S.$10.00) separation allowance upon leaving the center. The family is also given certain allowances.

Political Rehabilitation

This is supposed to begin at the center as soon as the rallier has been released from the interrogation process. Most ralliers are highly apprehensive of what to expect, entertaining doubts as to whether they made the right decision in rallying. Various techniques are used to deal with such fears. The new rallier is introduced to the other ralliers in the center, earlier ralliers talk to the new ones, possibly a
rallier who has been at the center for sometime is assigned as sponsor.
The rallier then proceeds through a 72-hour political indoctrination
course designed to counteract previous Viet Cong indoctrination, to
develop loyalty to the GVN by giving him some comprehension of the social
and political objectives of the government, and to acquire a sense of
citizenship.

In 1966, according to a JUSFAO survey, 78 percent of the Hoi Chanh
interviewed said the political indoctrination course had taught them
things they had not known before, mainly about GVN policies and objec-
tives, and about VC strategy, tactics, and organization (with only a few
learning anything about U.S./Allied objectives). Indeed, the survey
found that "political training is conducted in an effective manner."

In subsequent years, however, in contrast with what came to be
known about VC indoctrination methods and techniques, advisers found
the indoctrination of Hoi Chanh "pretty sad," dwelling more heavily on
the need to kill VC than on the GVN's goals of peace and prosperity.
The essence of VC indoctrination was the three "whats": sleeping,
eating, and working with new recruits. In contrast, GVN Chieu Hoi in-
structors were thought to be "undemocratic" and lacking enthusiasm for
what they were teaching, being unfriendly, condescending, and generally
aloof from the problems of the men they were instructing.

The lectures were pitched at the group without regard to educational
level or degree of political sophistication and with little regard as to
whether they were even understood much less accepted. Often they were
read from a prepared text with little or no audience participation.
Course content seems to have been a mixture of anticomunism and nation-
alism, with final emphasis on memorized rules of behavior calculated to
further the "just cause" of the GVN and "to keep the Hoi Chanh branch
pure." Grinter found that

the less intelligent or poorly motivated Hoi Chanh simply
bear the boredom with typical peasant passivity; the
cadres come away completely disappointed ... with a
sense of nostalgia ... a yearning for the emotional
ignition so many of them experienced at the hands of the
Front's agitation cadres.

He recommended that, since the ralliers are organized within the center
into cells (as in the Viet Cong organization), this grouping should be
extended to the political indoctrination course, with the cells based on age, education (in many cases literacy training was required), regionalism, and degree of political sophistication. Instructors should be the higher level, more politically experienced ex-Hoi Chanh who admittedly would have to be reindoctrinated by broadening their understanding and acceptance of GVN objectives.

The 1967 goals for the Chieu Hoi Program called for expansion and improvement of political orientation as a necessary prerequisite to Hoi Chanh taking their place in the political, social, and economic scene. One hundred specially trained motivational teachers with adequate remuneration were to be employed. The training was to be carried out at province, region, or Saigon, depending on the category of rallier.

Not all the improvements called for were undertaken, and political reindoctrination remains a weak point of the program. There has been considerable improvement over the last three years. Visual aids, group discussions, and role-playing are now integral components of the program. O'Brien noted in 1970 that political training was now based on the level of responsibility the rallier had held in the Viet Cong and was conducted with differing degrees of intensity. Returnees were divided into "hard-core and the politically naive" (about 70 percent of the ralliers fall into the latter group).

For the hard-core rallier emphasis is placed on the inadequacy of Communist government and on individual rights under democracy. With the "politically naive," an attempt is made to develop some kind of ideology through a recounting of Vietnamese history from the pre-Chinese period through the Viet Minh, the Viet Cong insurgency, and the current struggle against North Vietnamese aggression. Much class time is spent on Viet Cong organizational network, the part even the low-ranking rallier played in it, and how he was controlled and maneuvered to implement overall Communist strategy and objectives.

The target for fiscal years 1971-1973 is the political rehabilitation of all Hoi Chanh at an average of 30,000 a year. The Chieu Hoi Ministry projects the training of approximately 100 political instructors (many of them higher-level, more politically experienced Hoi Chanh) to be
assigned to provincial centers. Participation of other services and ministries will be emphasized.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Aside from the necessity of maintaining morale by keeping the Hoi Chanh occupied while in the centers, the primary objective for vocational training (a key element in the Chieu Hoi Program since its inception) has been to give the Hoi Chanh some means whereby to support himself and his family when he returns to society. As early as 1966 it was known that doubts as to future economic opportunities preoccupied the average Hoi Chanh and were the source of many of his apprehensions.

Most Hoi Chanh stay in the centers only for the required 60 days (which limits the amount of actual training possible), and few Hoi Chanh volunteer for training, preferring to rest (after combat) or considering the training as of little use to them. What training exists in the province centers has been for low-level skills (sewing, barbering, brickmaking, carpentry, and basic mechanics), which are taught to reinforce what may already be known (and can be done in 60 days) and which will provide some additional means of making a living in the villages and hamlets. However, this low-level training has proved of little incentive to many of the VC, who oftentimes joined the insurgency to escape the frustration of trying to achieve economic success and status in traditional Vietnamese society. A 1966 JUSPAO survey recommended that some kind of test be given to select those Hoi Chanh who could qualify for training in the higher skills even though their formal education was low. "Such a test would reveal and utilize talents necessary for the economic development of Vietnam and it would make rallying more attractive and meaningful to the VC." Simulmatics came up with similar recommendations and, to counteract the time limitations imposed by the 60-day rehabilitation period, wanted training programs linked to post-center activities. By 1970-1971 advanced training in automotive repair, electrical housewiring, plumbing, furniture-making, refrigeration, TV/radio repair, and other technical skills was being given at the regional centers. A few Hoi Chanh have been sent for post-center training to the Government Agricultural Development Center for instruction in the cultivation of the new "miracle rice," fish culture, and poultry and swine
raising. Some Hoi Chanh have received nurses training at the province hospitals.

The type of training offered varies from center to center, depending on the employment opportunities in the nearby community, budget considerations, and the availability of instructors. Funds for training were budgeted from 1967 on, with a U.S. input for equipment augmenting GVN funds. The program was to be technically supported by local GVN Technical Services, and training was also to be done at government and private trade and agricultural schools and by local firms. Instructors were contracted for through Education Consultants, Ltd. But in late 1967 CORDS still thought that the program was not moving fast enough (mainly because of a lack of training materials), though some VNS$37,482,000 (and U.S.$107,000) had been allocated to province centers for training, and VNS$20 million (and U.S.$23,000) to regional centers, at a cost per returnee of approximately VNS1,200. Most of the impetus in the training program has occurred since 1968, and of the 12,000 Hoi Chanh who completed some form of training during 1964-1969, about half were trained in 1969 alone.

Progress in the four corps areas has been uneven. I Corps did not get a program going until 1970; II Corps started, stopped, and never has had a real training program. Up until 1971, III Corps took second place to IV Corps, where the program has been outstanding. During 1970 27.7 percent of all ralliers (or 5,441) received training, an increase of 9.7 percent over 1969. By the end of 1971 the III Corps Vocational Training Center had become by far the most efficient and effective of the MCH training centers in the country.

By 1972 the MCH was totally self-sufficient in the operation of its vocational training program. All instructors were ex-Hoi Chanh (most of them trained under a USAID-sponsored contract with American Asian International, which was terminated in August 1971). Classes have been opened not only to Hoi Chanh but also to students of the Ministries of Labor and Education. All support requirements are programmed for in the budget. U.S. assistance will terminate in FY 1973, at which time MCH will take on full operational and support responsibility for any further vocational training of Hoi Chanh.
There is little information available at present as to how and to what degree the Hoï Chanh are able to employ the skills learned at the Chieu Hoi Centers. One knowledgeable Deputy Province Senior Adviser feels that the training is probably of little immediate benefit to the Hoï Chanh in the present war-torn economy. However, because of the sheer numbers involved (i.e., 12,000 Hoï Chanh trained in at least some skill), there has undoubtedly been some marginal technical upgrading of the economy. In postwar South Vietnam, as the present urban trend increases (the Lillenthal Report estimates that at least 25 percent of the Hoï Chanh will not go back to the farm, even though security conditions permit, and Snyder estimates 50 percent), the training will assume even greater significance in the economy.

RESETTLEMENT

The provision of civilian economic opportunities for the Hoï Chanh upon his release from the Chieu Hoi Center has always been an acute problem for the Chieu Hoi Program. Around 20 percent of these Hoï Chanh, subject to the draft after six months, volunteer for military service. As of June 1971 some 20,863 returnees were serving in the RVNAF, 3,695 were serving with allied forces as scout or reconnaissance elements, and 7,309 had enrolled in the APTs. But most Hoï Chanh, tired of the rigors of military life and wanting only to return to their families, find themselves confronted with the problems of reintegrating into the social and economic life of the country.

Not only has the problem of resettlement been hampered by the inability of the Vietnamese economy to assimilate the numbers of Hoï Chanh flooding the labor market, but it has been further hampered by a shortage of the government personnel necessary to assist the Hoï Chanh after he leaves the center, and by the natural hesitancy if not outright hostility toward the returnee on the part of private citizens and government officials. Fortunately, most Viet Cong have family roots in GVN-controlled territory, and reintegration in such cases has not been too difficult. The others -- and their families -- become "floaters" on the economy, encounter friction with other displaced persons also vying for a livelihood, and are unable to throw off the social stigma borne by the returnees. One of the solutions to the resettlement
of the Hoi Chanh whose homes are in VC-controlled territory has been the setting up of Chieu Hoi Hamlets, in which they and their families -- who often have had to flee their native villages in fear of VC reprisals -- can live.

The Chieu Hoi Hamlet

It was planned at one point to have at least one such hamlet connected with each Chieu Hoi Center. By 1966, 36 had been built and in 1967 funds were budgeted for 14 more, each hamlet to accommodate 100 families. The hamlets were initially administered by the Chieu Hoi Ministry, but by the end of 1971, 36 out of a total of 38 had been transferred to local administration. Total transfer of the remaining two hamlets is expected in 1972.

There were problems connected with the hamlets: they were vulnerable to VC reprisal attacks against the Hoi Chanh, and they inhibited the Hoi Chanh from actually entering the mainstream of Vietnamese life since the hamlets were in effect segregated communities (though there was some commercial intercourse). There were recriminations because the Hoi Chanh and their families were provided relatively comfortable houses, whereas soldiers' families are often required to live in hovels.

Each family living in a Chieu Hoi hamlet was given a plot of land suitable for gardening, and (in 1968) VNS$10,000 for the purchase of timber and other materials needed for building a house (the U.S. provides the cement and roofing). An allowance of VNS$2,000 was granted for the purchase of furniture and tools. Villagers were given a rice subsistence and fish sauce for six months while they were building their homes and clearing their land; after that they were expected to be able to earn their own living.

In some instances the already established Hoi Chanh families acted as sponsors for the new arrivals, helping them in different ways until they became self-sufficient. And in most hamlets there was a common interest in bettering their lot and proving themselves to be good citizens.
Hoi Chanh Employment

Chronic economic conditions throughout the country caused by the war have added to the difficulties of the Hoi Chanh finding employment. There has been an upward urban trend and a general uprooting of major elements of the entire population. Inflation has been rampant and the burgeoning American civilian and military complexes have caused a severe crisis in the economy -- GVN and private Vietnamese employers cannot compete with American salaries.

It has been impossible to resettle many of the large number of Hoi Chanh that came in during 1966-1967. By 1967 U.S. advisers recognized that assisting Hoi Chanh to find jobs was a top priority objective of the Chieu Hoi Program. While the GVN National Reconciliation Proclamation in April 1967 stated that the government would assist Hoi Chanh in finding jobs commensurate with their experience and loyalty, "the promises had not been honored to the extent necessary to sustain the credibility of the Chieu Hoi appeal."

Chieu Hoi regional directors and provincial representatives were instructed to establish an organized program or system to generate interest on the part of prospective employers in hiring Hoi Chanh. Qualifications were to be kept on file and employers were to be encouraged to register their requirements with the Chieu Hoi Service. In 1968 a letter issued by the Presidency authorized the setting up of high-level provincial committees to find jobs for Hoi Chanh. The committees were to include the Province Chief (or a high-ranking representative), the Chief of the Chieu Hoi Service, and representatives of the National Police, the Military Security Service, major U.S. and Free World and GVN military commands, American construction firms (e.g., RMK and Pacific Architects and Engineers), and major Vietnamese employers in the area. But the committees were manned by GVN officials having the same prejudices and inhibitions as those in Saigon. By the end of 1971 only five provinces had such a committee; all the other province committees were on paper.

... the prospects of obtaining an MSS clearance or a contractor pass for an ex-VC in a non-sensitive position as an employee of a U.S.G. contractor are favorable insofar as announced GVN policy is concerned. Local MSS practice may be entirely different, however.
Issuance of such clearance or pass may be contingent upon the possession of a valid GVN I.D. card and an up-to-date Residence Certificate. The attitude of local branches of the MSS should be determined, and any problems which cannot be resolved at the local level should be referred to the Chieu Hoi Division, OCO, Saigon.

(By 1968 the average time required for issuance of the permanent ID card had been reduced to two months after the Hoi Chanh left the Chieu Hoi Center.)

By 1968 prospects for employment of Hoi Chanh in the private sector looked brighter. American construction companies were hiring Hoi Chanh. Indeed, after general mobilization in June of 1968, they began hiring Vietnamese women as truck drivers, machine shovel operators, and general construction workers. The "Gentleman's Agreement" which had inhibited the employing of Hoi Chanh began to give way to a new look toward acceptance of Hoi Chanh into the competitive economy. By 1970 MR 4's year-end report was able to state that of the 19,587 Hoi Chanh that had rallied in MR 4 during the year, 20 percent had found immediate employment upon release from the Chieu Hoi Center, "though lack of feedback information from friendly agencies precludes an overall picture of the Hoi Chanh employment situation."

There were other serious problems, however, connected with the employment of Hoi Chanh in government ministries and agencies.

As early as 1966 Pye had recommended more extensive use of Hoi Chanh in the government, e.g., in the Rural Development (RD) Program then developing momentum under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Nguyen Be at the National Training Center at Vung Tau. Pye thought the Hoi Chanh should be integrated as regular RD personnel and then become fully established civil servants. During 1967 1,100 Hoi Chanh did enter the RD Program. CORDS noted that as a result of pressure exerted under the National Reconciliation Program, the Minister of Revolutionary Development (MORD) had

officially decided to use Chieu Hoi returnees as a source of manpower for RD teams . . . and planned to recruit and mount six 59-man teams entirely of Hoi Chanh as well as 1000 Hoi Chanh as filler personnel for teams already in existence.
Williams saw this "break-through," however, largely as the result of one man, the Minister of Revolutionary Development (General Nguyen Duc Thang), who was "big enough . . . to experiment with a new idea even though he initially had misgivings." One bottleneck was no less than the Prime Minister himself, Nguyen Van Loc (1967-1968), who had a "deep bourgeois timidity about it." Perhaps even more decisive was the lack of interest in Chieu Hoi and everything connected with it on the part of the powerful Director General of National Police, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, whose people held the ultimate trump card. If a Hoi Chanh was to receive a good job in government, sooner or later the Police or the Military Security Service had to give him a security clearance, and General Loan applied a policy of "intense conservatism" to the whole matter. 41

However, in assessing the intransigence -- bureaucratic or otherwise -- of SVN officials in providing employment opportunities to the Hoi Chanh, it should be borne in mind that the majority of Viet Cong rally for personal reasons, not because of any deep ideological commitment to the GVN. Once personal needs are assuaged, loyalty to the government may be found to be very thin indeed, particularly in the case of those Hoi Chanh who still profess that in many ways the objectives, if not the modus operandi, of the Front are superior to those of the GVN. And yet, as Grinter put it,

\[\text{The essence of amnesty . . . is an honorable pardon . . . without a corresponding utilization of the returning insurgents' talents, a political pardon is not enough. There must also be a productive utilization of their skills and meaningful employment. They must be given a productive stake in the future of South Vietnam.}^{42}\]

Many Hoi Chanh joined the Viet Cong in the first place because they were highly ambitious and did not want to remain peasants the rest of their lives. It has been important, therefore, that they not be faced with the prospect of not being able to support themselves and their family nor be given the opportunity to rise to positions of responsibility and status once their loyalty has been proved. Indeed, Viet Cong cadres are often better trained and motivated than low-level GVN civil servants, as has been found to be true when Hoi Chanh are hired to fill administrative and teaching positions in the Chieu Hoi centers.
However, while the Ministries of Refugees and Social Welfare have accepted a small number of Hoi Chanh, for the most part only the Ministry of Chieu Hoï has made any great effort to fulfill the Chieu Hoï pledge of economic opportunity.

There has been some encouraging development in the political field. A few Hoi Chanh have in fact been elected or appointed to responsible government positions at the village level; 75 of them are village or hamlet chiefs. One Hoi Chanh has even been elected to the Lower House in the GVN. About 400 Hoi Chanh now occupy GVN or local government positions.

FOLLOW-UP

Lenderking argues that only through some systematic method of keeping tabs on the Hoi Chanh after they leave the Chieu Hoï Center could the ultimate success or failure of Chieu Hoï be tested, though as of 1968 he found that "such a method was apparently beyond the capabilities of the Vietnamese and their foreign advisors."43

The need for a follow-up system was recognized almost from the inception of the program. Colonel Pham An certainly did, and wanted a system "effective enough to pinpoint where every ex-Hoi Chanh was located at all times"—not only to determine their success or failure in integrating back into Vietnamese society but also as a matter of security to determine how many redefected to the VC, though from spot analyses it had been determined that less than 2 percent of the Hoi Chanh went back to the VC, despite their coming into contact with the Front in some way or another after leaving the center. Captured VC documents also attest to the fact that "in general the Hoi Chanh remain very faithful to the enemy [GVN]."44

There was a system of follow-up, but implementation was a far cry from what Colonel An envisaged. When a Hoi Chanh left the center, the District Chief of the district to which he was sent received a notice. The Chieu Hoï staff at district was charged with keeping track of the Hoi Chanh, reporting monthly on his status and welfare. However, district staffs were usually undermanned (only three cadres at full strength), they had many other duties, and the system broke down because of the sheer numbers of Hoi Chanh involved.
Other problems also precluded a satisfactory follow-up system -- the mobility of the population, the geographic distribution of the Hoi Chanh, and the very desire of the Hoi Chanh to fade into society (though Simulmatics found that in most instances the ralliers did not mind being contacted when they knew it was for their welfare, police surveillance being another matter). However, there is in any follow-up system a tendency to devise a parole-type approach to the problem. Hoi Chanh after release from the centers should be free to become just like any other Vietnamese citizen; a continual requirement to contact police could lead to unfavorable accusations and prove counterproductive. The Chieu Hoi Directorate endeavored to see that the follow-up function was carried out in such a way as to reduce the surveillance aspects of the procedure.

In 1966 JUSPAO conducted a "random" survey of ex-Hoi Chanh, but results were admittedly inconclusive primarily because the sample was of necessity weighted toward Hoi Chanh in provinces where records were more complete. They did come up with some interesting data on employment before and after joining the VC, however, changes that seem to bear out the Lilienthal contention that most Hoi Chanh do not return to the farm:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Before VC</th>
<th>After VC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hired Labor</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Komer was not satisfied with follow-through on Hoi Chanh:

It was better than the follow-through on PHENIX, and remember we just kept them for three months, tried to retrain them, offered them a resettlement allowance. But I was not satisfied. Once again, we could have pushed for more elaborate schemes, but it was probably administratively infeasible to do a lot more. Remember, in all of these cases we had to ask ourselves what the traffic would bear. There's not a program in Vietnam that could not have been carried out much better if we had had the time, the money, the right kind of GVN leadership. And I might add, the right kind of advisors . . . if you want to criticize . . . you can criticize every single thing we did. . . . But
you've got to measure results and performance against inputs, environment, and lead time. Rome isn't built in a day.45

By 1970 a follow-up system finally got off the ground. By a Directive (No. 122) in June the GVN established a reporting requirement for all Chieu Hoi Service Chiefs on ex-Hoi Chanh in their area. The key innovation was the participation of village chiefs in contacting the Hoi Chanh. The numbers problem was resolved by limiting contact to a six-month period after the Hoi Chanh left the Chieu Hoi Center. After that time the Hoi Chanh was to be considered a citizen and follow-up no longer necessary. By the end of the year Chieu Hoi in MR 4 was able to account for 70-80 percent of all Hoi Chanh resettled in its area.

After CY 1970 follow-up activities were to be accomplished by an automated tracking system under the auspices of the Director General of National Police and with the assistance of the Ministry of Information's village cadres who were to make and maintain regular personal contact with Hoi Chanh.46 Under the new system all Hoi Chanh were to be fingerprinted before leaving the centers, and the prints submitted to the Identification Service of the National Police; each time a Hoi Chanh moved from one province to another he would be fingerprinted, etc., all data to be automated. A complete census of all Hoi Chanh was scheduled for 1972, to form the data base for the automated system. This census was to be taken by the APTs. By late 1971 the automated system had been set up, but definitive results were not readily available for purposes of this report.
VII. EXPLOITATION AND UTILIZATION

INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. Probably one of the greatest benefits of the Chieu Hoi Program has been derived from exploitation and utilization of Hoi Chanh for intelligence, propaganda, and tactical military purposes.

2. Thompson in discussing the use of surrendered enemy personnel breaks returnees down into two categories:

   ... those who are harmless, are of no further use to the government, and can safely be allowed to rejoin their families immediately.
   ... those who are of further use to the government, either in intelligence or in propaganda work and who can be given such employment with the government.

3. The whole matter of exploitation of Hoi Chanh for tactical and strategic intelligence, psychological operations, and press purposes -- particularly of the high-ranking rallier -- led to controversy between the Chieu Hoi people and other agencies, especially the military. Until late 1967 and 1968 there was no set procedure for coordinating the exploitation of returnees among either the U.S. or GVN agencies involved. Instead there were many competing interests and responsibilities. The underlying question was whether exploitation for intelligence or any other purpose was to be recognized as a bonus by-product of GVN Chieu Hoi policy or whether the Chieu Hoi policy was merely a pretext to serve "our only real interest in the matter, namely exploitation." The Chieu Hoi people argued that if the program was to have significance and continued appeal, its credibility had to be sustained by a recognition and reinforcement of the reconciliation theme, with a proper sense of proportion being maintained with respect to the important but secondary bonus effects of exploitation for intelligence and propaganda purposes.

4. In 1968 a joint U.S./GVN PsyOps Information Exploitation Committee was set up to prepare plans coordinating and assigning specific exploitation responsibilities commensurate with the various agencies represented on the Committee. Williams was against such a committee. He wanted responsibility for the exploitation of high-level ralliers to be fixed in the Prime Minister's office.
... with an absence of complicated and detailed procedures which would violate the well-established fact that nothing will work in Vietnam unless it is simple and clear ... there should be no joint U.S./GVN Committee as such ... nothing is more fruitless than to have a large U.S./GVN debating society in which complicated ideas are thrown at the heads of the Vietnamese by Americans who do not even agree with each other. ... 4

A MACV Directive, issued in March 1968, also sought to establish guidelines and procedures for the "exploitation of human sources" for both psyops and intelligence purposes (see Appendix 9). 5 Orchestration of competing interests in the Hoi Chanh was further resolved through the various PHUNG HOANG committees operating at district, province, region, and in Saigon (PHUNG HOANG was the GVN program designed to target and neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure).

Use of Hoi Chanh as PHUNG HOANG interrogators had been suggested by the U.S. Province Senior Adviser in Phu Yen (Daniel Leaty) in 1968. A similar recommendation had been made by a Special Assistant to the Ambassador (John Hart) earlier in the year when PHUNG HOANG was in the planning stage and had been concurred in by the Director of PHOENIX (the American advisory staff to PHUNG HOANG). However, the GVN Central PHUNG HOANG Committee was "very cool toward the idea" even if the Hoi Chanh were to be constrained by very close supervision. Williams, sensing another channel for employment of his Hoi Chanh, pointed out that the rallier had a kind of expertise invaluable to PHUNG HOANG and that such use of his talents would not only compromise him in the eyes of the VC but could go far in removing any prejudice against him on security grounds. 6

Improvements in the use of Hoi Chanh in PHUNG HOANG have largely been attributable to the determined efforts of American advisers to stimulate interest among their Vietnamese counterparts in recognizing the potential of Hoi Chanh as a primary source for eliciting information from ralliers. By 1970 information derived from Hoi Chanh sources accounted for 21.2 percent (or 22,341) of all VCI neutralized. 7

In October 1971 MCH and the Central PHUNG HOANG Committee issued a bilateral message to personnel of the two agencies requiring that a minimum of one squad of APT be assigned to each operational DIOCC. Their purpose was to induce VCI to rally through contacts with the
families of the VCI. This form of neutralization, by the end of 1971, had become a very important aspect of the PHUNG HOANG program.

MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY USE OF HOI CHANH

Many Hoï Chanh, tired of the rigors of military life, want only to return to their villages and their families upon release from the centers. Some, however, want the protection of belonging to an armed group; others need immediate employment. In any case, all able-bodied ralliers are subject to the GVN draft after a six-months' exemption, and some ralliers find it desirable to join a unit of their own choice first. Thus, many volunteer (about 20 percent) to join the ARVN military forces and such paramilitary units as the Armed Propaganda Teams, the RF/PF, the Kit Carson Scouts, etc. (which mostly serve near their home villages). Incorporation of units made up entirely of ralliers (e.g., as in the Armed Propaganda Teams) into ARVN has not been allowed by the Minister of Defense.

THE ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAM

Variations of the ex-insurgent psychological warfare team were employed in the Philippines, Malaya, and Algeria. In Vietnam, in 1964, it took the form of armed propaganda teams of ex-Viet Cong who rallied under the Chieu Hoï Program. These paramilitary units have become the primary "action arm" of the Ministry of Chieu Hoï for face-to-face inducement for enemy military and civilian personnel to rally to the government side. Particularly during the early years they were invaluable in establishing the credibility and bona fides of the government, i.e., they were living proof that the government did not kill or mistreat Viet Cong who rallied, despite Viet Cong rumors circulated by "Radio Catinat."

Development of the Program

In summer 1964 the Minister of Chieu Hoï decided the experience and knowledge of especially chosen Hoï Chanh could be more fully exploited. Men between the ages of 17 and 50 (later the upper age limit was reduced to 39), selected because of their leadership ability, demonstrated loyalty to the government, and ability to communicate with people, were to be organized as armed propaganda units (not unlike the small squads
of armed VC agitprop); they were to go back into Viet Cong-controlled or contested areas to present themselves to the people as ex-VC who had come to recognize the Communist cause as "unjust," to talk to the people, relate their experiences, explain policies and aims of the government, and tell the people about the Chieu Hoi Program. The U.S. Mission Council (concurring in the recommendations of the Gosho-Jacobson Report) endorsed the idea.

The first two APT companies were organized in October 1964. Their outstanding success during 1965, together with proof of their cost effectiveness, led to authorization for additional companies. Until 1968, however, use of the APT was still lacking in wide support by GVN officials, particularly the Province Chiefs, who exercise command over them (though operational control lies with the province Chieu Hoi Service Chief). By 1970 there were some 84 APT companies. 8

Utilization

Most U.S. advisers, particularly at province and district, were quick to recognize the propaganda and psychological operations potential of the APT. However, particularly after 1968 when the APT became more heavily armed, there was (and continues to be) considerable misuse of the teams. As late as 1970 Yabut reported about MR 4:

With few exceptions the APTs are generally inactive in terms of its primary mission or are improperly utilized in such activities as palace guards, static defense, air field security or as administrative personnel at sector and sub-sector levels. Onus for this rests with the Province Chiefs who exercise command and control of APTs though in some cases the U.S. Advisor has been able to produce meaningful effective APT operations. 9

As their numbers have grown, greater flexibility in operational command has had to be given to APT Company Commanders, which has alleviated the problem of improper utilization to some extent. Also MCH has directed that the Teams must be regularly committed to their psyops mission. While there is no direct causal relationship between the APTs and the rallier rate, by 1970 a knowledgeable Chieu Hoi adviser stated that the APTs "were the most effective single inducement tool available to the Chieu Hoi Program."
The primary mission of the APT has been to disseminate Chieu Hoi propaganda -- leaflets, banners, posters, film -- on a person-to-person basis, in the hamlets and villages of contested or VC-controlled areas. The teams were originally lightly armed to provide them with self-protection and the confidence needed to operate in these insecure areas.

The APTs are also assigned clerical duties in the Chieu Hoi centers, defense of the centers (though MCH directed that no more than one-third of the province complement can be used in this way and guard duty must be on a rotational basis), assistance in the recovery of enemy weapons and ammunition caches, etc.

Utilization of the APTs has gradually broadened. In October 1970 APTs were assigned to the PHUNG HOANG Program (e.g., to the DIOCCs -- District Intelligence Operations Control Center) to assist in the targeting and rallying of Viet Cong political cadre. In 1971 a pilot program was initiated to assign APTs (comprised of former NVA soldiers prepared to offer their NVA experience and psyops expertise) to GVN Political Warfare Companies of ARVN Infantry Divisions in order to improve inducement efforts against NVA units. The program proved successful and further implementation was approved.

By 1971 APTs were also being assigned to assist other counterinsurgency programs, e.g., the National Police, as interrogators and identifiers of VC travelers, the PSDF in their training to counter VC tactics and techniques. There are also now seven five-man lecture teams composed of the most highly intelligent Ho Chi Chanh, who systematically visit schools, colleges, business groups, and military camps and units and have proved highly successful. By the end of 1971 these assignments were holding priority over all other activities of the APT.

**Organization**

Though the APT has no combat function, the units are organized on military lines:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teams</th>
<th>Squads</th>
<th>Platoons</th>
<th>Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 men</td>
<td>2 (3-man) Teams</td>
<td>3 (7-man) Squads</td>
<td>3 (23-man) Platoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>Platoon Leader</td>
<td>Company Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asst. Squad Leader (optional)</td>
<td>Asst. Platoon Leader</td>
<td>Asst. Company Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3 men)</td>
<td>(7 men)</td>
<td>(23 men)</td>
<td>Administrative Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supply Clerk - Medic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(74 men)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The annual force structure for APTs is determined by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi in coordination with MACV and other GVN agencies. Allocation of a company to a province or region depends on (1) priority of the province in the overall, countrywide GVN Pacification Plan, (2) available enemy targets, (3) ability to recruit and manage. Prior to 1969 a few provinces only had a platoon, while very small inactive provinces were authorized only a squad. By 1969 all four regions and the 44 provinces were authorized a full APT company.

Regional APT companies are used to augment province companies. They are assigned, usually at platoon strength, to provinces for special operations, where they come under the operational control of the province Chieu Hoi Chief. The province company can be deployed by platoon down to district either for unilateral platoon operations or in conjunction with more complex military operations. However, the APTs are not equipped or trained for combat and their role in such instances is to remain as "psyops specialists." At the discretion of the Chieu Hoi Chief, companies can be broken up into designated "specialized" squads or platoons, e.g., as culture drama teams. These specialized squads are often made up of female Hoi Chanh employed previously by the VC as entertainment and propaganda personnel.

Logistical Support

Funds to support the APTs comprise approximately 60 percent of the Chieu Hoi annual budget. The APT member is paid a base salary in accordance with his position and grade level as follows:14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Base Salary</th>
<th>Induce-</th>
<th>Function Allowance</th>
<th>Rice Allowance</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Max. Per Diem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(VNS)</td>
<td>(VNS)</td>
<td>(VNS)</td>
<td>(VNS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(VNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company Commander</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,030</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Co Commander</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Leader</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>Base Salary (VNS)</td>
<td>Induced Indem (VNS)</td>
<td>Allowance (VNS)</td>
<td>Rice Allowance (VNS)</td>
<td>Total (VNS)</td>
<td>Max. Per Diem (VNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Platoon Leader</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,910</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,910</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Squad Leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,450</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3,450</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition each married member of the APT is authorized a monthly family allowance of VNS$525 for his wife and VNS$450 for each child. Family allowances in the event of the death of the APT member are also allocated.

MCH does not possess a logistical system through which to supply and support the APT with weapons, ammunition, psyops equipment, radios, transportation, etc. It does supply clothing and personal items, but field equipment is programmed by the Ministry of Defense and supplied by MACV/MAP, direct U.S./DOD and USAID funding and JGS/RVNAF through Chieu Hoi channels. Housing for the APTs has been provided by the Chieu Hoi budget. Each APT Company is expected to be self-sufficient, not dependent on the local Chieu Hoi Center.

**Training**

As former Viet Cong, APT cadres come to the GVN generally with good training and a strong sense of discipline. However, the men still need indoctrination in GVN policies and training in psychological operations.

... The problem is not failure to recruit more APTs ... but rather to assure more effective training and utilization of APTs. In other words quality not quantity is of the essence. Our approach to the Ministry is rather to pressure it to come up with better training guidelines, reiterate instructions to province teams, and on the US side, continued action to obtain US/APT advisors for whom we have been pressing for many months with only limited results.15
In 1967 CORDS found that training was handled on a hit or miss basis. The GVN did not have a uniform plan for training the APTs — some teams were being trained at RF/PF Centers, some at the Vung Tau National Training Center (though this was discontinued in 1967); many teams were given no training at all, or only informal local instruction by interested GVN or U.S. elements (e.g., in I CTZ the U.S. 244th PsyOps Company gave invaluable training, support, and guidance to the APTs in their area of operation). As late as August 1967, training of the APTs was considered by MCH as a province responsibility.

PROJECT TAKEOFF acted as a catalyst. Funds to support training for the APTs were included in the GVN/MCH annual budget, and MCH started to develop its own training program for the APTs. Responsibility for training was to be a joint U.S./GVN effort — MACPD/JUSPAO/MCH — with U.S. and ARVN psyops battalions actually doing the training, where feasible, at regional and province levels. In February 1968 training of the APTs was started at region, with the Regional Chieu Hoi Chief responsible for establishing and conducting a training course based on a Program of Instruction put out by MCH.

The POI for APT training provides for four weeks of training in psyops and basic military tactics in order to prepare each APT for his inducement functions. In addition to improving the APT's ability to speak and discuss various topics, the APT are given instruction on the use and maintenance of the equipment which they will use. In order to expand the APT's knowledge and better equip him for his future duties, the structure and functions of the RVN government, and major policies and programs of national importance are discussed during the training. Practical exercises are used to reinforce classroom instruction.

As summed up by Jones,

... in the 1968-1969 time frame, the problem [of advisers for the APT] occupied much of our attention... The Chieu Hoi Directorate at one time attempted to obtain a military allocation of qualified combat NCOs for use as advisers to the province APTs. These people would have been of the type the Marine Corps used in their combined action teams which operated in I Corps with the GVN regional forces. Failing to secure official authorization for such a category of adviser, lower echelons of CORDS
authorities were urged to find local solutions to the problem. In many cases this was done through the good graces of one of the local U.S. combat units or by utilizing the space held by a sergeant security adviser on the district advisory team, and finally through the good graces of the Army, a few highly qualified NCOs who had a number of months remaining in theatre prior to rotation were made available. It was almost a foregone conclusion that where an APT was able to have an adviser, it was much more effective than others. Some of the most significant accomplishments in the armed propaganda field were achieved by APTs who were under the tutelage of one of these informal advisers. It took a certain kind of individual who not only possessed the empathy, but also the desire, to accompany the APT while on operations in the field.  

Arming the APTs

Up until 1967 the APTs were not authorized to carry arms on their propaganda missions, though they were armed to defend the Chieu Hoi Centers and Hoi Chanh Resettlement Hamlets. But adequate self-protection (a decided morale factor) in insecure or VC-controlled areas has always been a problem, particularly since they become prime targets for enemy attack and retaliation.

Komer saw the problem early in his take-over of the pacification program in 1967:

Three . . . programs for utilizing Hoi Chanh were very effective . . . one was the development of 25-man APTs [sic] which would go and get more VC to defect. They were so effective that we set a target of 5000 [sic] more in the APTs . . . one of the big problems was getting these teams armed because many GVN officials feared arming ex-VC.  

PROJECT TAKEOFF of June 1967 laid out a three-pronged attack to achieve the adequate arming of the APTs:

1. Persuade the Chief of the Joint General Staff (General Cao Van Vien) to order Province Chiefs to arm APTs.
2. Request CINCPAC approval to include the arming of APTs in the Military Assistance Program.
3. Arrange for provinces to make interim issuance to APTs of Viet Cong weapons turned in by ralliers. (Such weapons had less stringent accountability requirements than regularly issued weapons.)
This approach to getting weapons for the APTs demonstrates clearly the methods Komer used to get the new pacification program going. The ACS/CORDS had written Komer that "It is imperative that these teams be armed, if they are to function properly -- their most important work lies in contested areas where they cannot work without defensive armament."\textsuperscript{22} In September 1967 Komer requested a status report on the arming of APTs. On October 4 Lathram replied that out of a total of 2,169 team members only 839 were armed. Immediately Komer wrote to the Chief of Staff:

It's hard to believe that 1330 captured weapons are not available to arm currently unarmed members of APTs. There may be a maldistribution problem among provinces; some PCs may be hoarding weapons; and other PCs may oppose arming APTs. However, there must be a solution. I would like to find one ... we have been living with this problem for years. I suggest we set a deadline of 1 December for arming all qualified members of APTs ... let's push this instead of giving me explanations only!\textsuperscript{23}

At CORDS' request, Westmoreland took up the cudgels with the GVN Chief of the General Staff, Gao Van Vien, indicating that MCH and MACV were most interested in assuring that all members of APTs were adequately armed -- that only a few were fully armed, that others were only partially armed, and that some were not armed at all. In many cases the weapons were of questionable reliability. COMUSMACV indicated that the teams could be armed from an excess in the MAP inventory and recommended that the Province Chiefs be directed to give the arming of these APTs earliest consideration.

By October Williams was able to report that arming of the APTs was "now in the final stages of completion. ... MOD [the Ministry of National Defense] had ordered the arming of the APTs in a directive dated 10/3/67, and ... implementation of this order was supplemented by a supporting letter from COMUSMACV to the MOD dated 10/6/67."\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, albeit still in many cases with weapons of questionable reliability, the APTs were armed by December 1967. When in February 1968 the Tet Offensive burst, Chieu Hoi Centers, defended by the now armed APTs, were generally well protected and the prestige of the APTs was greatly enhanced by their performance.\textsuperscript{25} As a result the APTs were given more favorable attention by the Province Chiefs. The numbers of Hoi Chanh volunteering for the team increased, which was significant
because of the decrease in the overall number of Hoi Chanh following Tet. Forty-six understrength APT companies were organized, though this was far under the goal of 75 set for the year.

By October 1968 Komer was agitating to get the APTs better arms. He queried the Chief of Staff:

Now that RF units are receiving M-16s, what are we doing with the M-2 carbines that have been turned in? Please give me a run-down on plans for utilization of these weapons. In particular, will APTs receive some? If not, why not?26

A glance at the 1969 APT Handbook shows that by mid-1969 the APTs were being issued the M-2 carbine.27

Authorized recruitment for APTs in 1969 was increased to over 5,500 and for 1970 to over 6,600. Actual strength figures for these years stood at approximately 4,250 and 5,400 respectively. Planning for 1971 called for recruitment of approximately eighty 74-man companies; actual strength was around 4,000. As of June 30, 1972, the U.S. will fund to support only 30 companies, although MCH will keep 60 companies. U.S. support to the APT (as well as the Chieu Hoi Program) will terminate on June 30, 1973. The MCH plans to maintain and support a 60-company force structure even though U.S. dollars support is withdrawn.

THE KIT CARSON SCOUT PROGRAM

"... even more important (than the number killed) is that Truong Kinh has the admiration and respect of every Marine in the company. In fact, many of these men wouldn’t be alive today if it weren’t for Kinh. And this is a debt a fighting Marine never forgets."28

In spring 1966 several Viet Cong guerrillas rallied under the Chieu Hoi Program in Quang Nam Province near Danang. One of the ralliers was a Ngo Van Bay who, the Viet Cong told the people of the village, had been tortured and killed by the Marines. To counter the VC propaganda, the USAID Chieu Hoi adviser for I Corps arranged for Bay and two of the other ralliers to be returned to the village from which they had rallied. The operation was successful, but to further promote any program using Hoi Chanh in military operations it was
necessary to sell the idea to the GVN Ministry of Open Arms. By August 1966 a pilot program had been set up and a first group of six "scouts," handpicked by the GVN Chieu Hoi Service Chief in Danang, was in the field (subsequently all but one of these men were killed in action). It was soon recognized that their knowledge of the VC modus operandi as well as their knowledge of the terrain and identity of their former associates was an invaluable aid in locating and combating the enemy.

The use of Hoi Chanh in (at first) psychological operations against the enemy but in conjunction with U.S. military units was initiated in late 1966 by the First Marine Division, operating in the northern provinces of South Vietnam (I Corps). In November 1966 the use of hand-picked Hoi Chanh as combatants, paid by the U.S. and under U.S. military command was officially adopted by the Commanding General of the First Marine Division. The Hoi Chanh were called "Kit Carson Scouts" after the famous guide in early American history.

Development of the Program

In April 1967 COMUSMACV extended the Kit Carson Scout program to all U.S. military units in South Vietnam, with MACV/J-2 given staff responsibility. By July 1967, as a result of the establishment of CORDS, staff responsibility was transferred from J-2 to the MACCORDS/Chieu Hoi Directorate, with funding by a J-2 Contingency Fund (until December 31, 1967, when AID funds were allocated to fund the program). In January 1968 COMUSMACV recommended that each U.S. Division Commander consider the use of a minimum of 100 Scouts, and the goal for the program for 1968 was set at 1,500 Scouts (actual strength by end 1968 was 1,517). In April 1968 USARV and III MAF were charged with the administration of the program. In September MACV laid down policy and procedures for extending the program countrywide (see Appendix 10).

By the end of 1968 a considerable increase and deployment of Kit Carson Scouts had taken place. The 1,517 Scouts were deployed to the 1st Cavalry Division; the 1st, 4th, 9th (where they were called Tiger Scouts), and 25th Infantry Divisions; the 10th Air Cavalry; the Americal Division; the 173rd Airborne, 199th Lt. Infantry, and 1/5 Mechanized Brigades; the 3/82nd Airborne Division; the 11th Armored
Cavalry Regiment; II FFV Headquarters; the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions; the 1st CAG NAVFORCE; and IV CTZ. Later, Scouts also were assigned to the Australian Task Force (January 1969), the Royal Thai Forces (August 1969), and ROK Forces (December 1970).

Why do Hoi Chanh volunteer for such hazardous duty? One reason, of course, is the pay and the chance to continue what has for many of them become a way of life in action-oriented combat. The pay ranges from VN$5,500 a month for a District (platoon) Scout Leader to VN$10,000 a month for a Corps (Division) Scout Leader; average salary is VN$9,000. There are other benefits -- clothing, equipment, living facilities, and rations are furnished by the unit to which the Scout is assigned. He is given complete medical and dental care for occupational injuries. There is a six-month deferment (dating from his release from the Chieu Hoi Center), with subsequent draft deferments through his last years of draft eligibility or until he is terminated as a Scout. Those physically incapacitated through war-related injuries are offered vocational training and resettlement in a Hoi Chanh village. If the Scout is killed in action, he is accorded a full military funeral (a new uniform is furnished for burial), his family is given one year's pay, and his body is transported to his home village for burial in the family ancestral burial ground.

Another motivating factor in volunteering to become a Kit Carson Scout may be the Vietnamese penchant for role-playing (see p.7 for a description of this psychological phenomenon), in which the Hoi Chanh sees himself as living up to the highest ideals of Vietnamese historical lore as a military hero. (The GVN allows the Scout to receive Vietnamese awards and decorations; he can also be accorded U.S. awards up to the Silver Star except for the Purple Heart.)

In South Vietnam it was found, as in the Malayan experience, that the Scouts operate best in territory familiar to them; hence potential Scouts (except for NVA returnees who are sent to the National Chieu Hoi Center and are recruited from there) are recruited from Chieu Hoi Centers in a Division's area of responsibility. Personnel are screened for physical stamina, motivation, family background (priority being given to those Hoi Chanh whose families live within a GVN-controlled area, to avoid susceptibility to blackmail or the danger of being held hostage).
The screening process (by Division NCOs having experience with Kit Carson Scout Teams, where possible) is long and tedious, cautious and careful as it must be to recruit the best possible candidates and to avoid possible infiltration. However, the Hoi Chanh must volunteer to become a Kit Carson Scout.

Those Hoi Chanh who volunteer and pass the screening process are sent to "boot camp" for a probationary training period of thirteen days. There they are issued an American uniform with appropriate insignia and a special MACV Identification Card, and are taught the English terms necessary to enable them to understand instructions. (Many American units maintain regular training schools for the Scouts, such as the 1st Air Cavalry Division's Kit Carson Scout Training Academy.) This probationary period is a critical point in the evaluation and acceptance of the potential Scout. A complete file containing his picture, fingerprints, short personal history statement, attitudes, reactions is maintained.

Upon completion of the probationary training the Scout is assigned to one of the U.S. units closest to his area of operation when he was with the Viet Cong. Assignment is made where possible on the "buddy system," i.e., the Vietnamese Scout is teamed up with an American soldier (or in some cases with an experienced Vietnamese Scout), which often establishes an intense mutual loyalty, a technique similar in many ways to the 3-man cell system of the Viet Cong.

The Scout is used for propaganda broadcasting, for tactical operations in the recovery of enemy equipment and the locating of mines, booby traps, and ammunition and weapons caches. He can be used for instructing American and Vietnamese military personnel (e.g., PF/MATs) in Viet Cong tactics and techniques. One very successful training program conducted by a Scout was in the tactics of the VC sapper. It became of increasing importance in the fall of 1969 as VC/NVA strategy concentrated on the use of sappers as an economy of force measure. The Scout may be used in any capacity required by his unit, but the MACV Directive states categorically that "Scouts are not to be expected to perform duties more hazardous or more often than regular members of the parent unit."

The Scout can be used for interrogation of known or suspected VC/NVA, and in the identification of Viet Cong at checkpoints and of
dead or wounded Viet Cong. In many instances of interrogation the very presence of the Scout applies a psychological pressure that causes the suspect to tell the truth. There is presently a program in MR 4 using Kit Carson Scout squads for such intelligence functions under the operational control of the District Intelligence Operations Center (DIOCC).

The Kit Carson Scout idea is at some variance with the basic Chieu Hoi concept in that, when he becomes a virtual member of a U.S. combat unit, the Scout is prone to give his allegiance to the U.S., not to the GVN. Also, his access to U.S. uniforms, weapons, and other material benefits often make him a privileged character in the eyes of ARVN military forces, who resent this. Jones writes:

It was always hoped that the GVN would create an office of contact within their Ministry of Defense which could assume overall cognizance of the program and at least give it a GVN flavor.

In June 1970, in order to promote a better understanding of the Kit Carson Scout Program by GVN officials and in line with possible "Vietnamization" of the program, the name "Kit Carson Scouts" was changed to "Luc Luong 66," Vietnamese for "Force 66" (66 being the year that the program -- with 6 scouts -- was started). The name Luc Luong 66 was chosen by the Minister of Chieu Hoi.

As American military units are withdrawn, U.S. use of Luc Luong 66 Scouts is being reduced sharply. In early 1971 there was an increase in the number of Scouts released for cause (theft, selling drugs, and being AWOL -- defined as being absent without leave for 15 days and guilty of generally unsatisfactory performance), which further depleted the ranks. While Scouts terminated without cause are technically offered enlistment with the ARVN, RF/PF, or paramilitary units of their choice, it is doubtful that full acceptance of these former Viet Cong, despite their often proven valor and loyalty, can be expected by GVN officials or, particularly in combat operations, by the regular Vietnamese soldier.

All in all, the Kit Carson Scout subprogram stands out as one of the most useful small-scale initiatives of the U.S. in the Vietnam conflict. At marginal cost, mostly in piastres, it provided invaluable eyes and ears which helped reduce one of the most critical U.S. handicaps in Vietnam: the great difficulty of finding the enemy and coping with his style of war.
Although actual costs of the program are hard to come by since they are embedded in the AIK funds allocated and disbursed by the U.S. user units, they have been almost miniscule. The program strength rose from 244 Scouts in 1967 to over 2,500 in June 1969, with a perceptible phasing down by June 1971 (by end 1971 there were still over 400 Scouts employed). Approved strength for 1972 was set at over 500.
Chieu Hoi has been one of the few GVN programs with continuity since 1963. Its administration by the GVN over the years has often been inefficient, ineffectual, indifferent, corrupt, and hamstrung by bureaucratic red tape and interests, but it has also been dynamic once the concept of the program was accepted and some degree of priority accorded it. Today it stands -- thanks in no small measure to a small group of dedicated American advisers who worked in it -- as a functioning integral part of the GVN counterinsurgency effort.

Chieu Hoi statistics are impressive (see Figs. 13 and 14). The program has denied to the enemy some 194,000 of his adherents -- voluntary or involuntary -- admittedly for the most part from the lower ranks. Still, the preponderance of military Hoi Chanh in the total rallier figure gives weight to statistical exercises which show the alternative heavy cost in human lives to allied forces if those men had had to be eliminated in combat. There are of course unexamined assumptions in such an exercise, but the results can be used to show order of magnitude. In terms of cost-effectiveness, it is much cheaper to get an insurgent to surrender than it is to kill him; it is also a more difficult operation, requiring a delicate balance of psychological and military roles at which, at least in the early years, neither the U.S. nor the GVN was particularly adept.

More important than the "body count" is the political implication of 194,000 of the enemy defecting. Though not necessarily implying commitment to the GVN, their defection in some degree reflects a loss of political faith, of confidence in victory, or of personal motivation. Rallying to the GVN need not connote the complete rejection of VC policies and programs, since it is prompted by fear, war-weariness, hunger, and the other motivations heretofore described; indeed, should a change in circumstances alleviate these personal reasons, some of the Hoi Chanh could be expected once again to change their allegiance. There is little evidence, however, that such redefection occurs on any large scale.
One of the greatest failures in the program has been its apparent inability to attract more than a small number of the high-ranking VC military and political cadres. To most of these, rallying would involve a reversal of a longstanding ideological commitment. Yet it is they whom the GVN must win to its side if the political war is to be won. Though Chieu Hoi in its inducement and interrogation phases had increasingly become coordinated with PHUNG HOANG, the GVN program designed to neutralize the VC infrastructure (VCI), more remains to be accomplished in getting the high-level enemy to rally.

Chieu Hoi returnee rates in the future, as in the past, will reflect three factors: the presence or absence of a sizable enemy target group, favorable external circumstances, and a good Chieu Hoi organization. The declining Chieu Hoi rate attests to the phasing down of the first factor. Fluid and not necessarily favorable social, political, and economic circumstances still are in the balance. But the internal structure of the program has stabilized; it is a good program.

One of the weaknesses which has plagued the program from its inception has been the lack of "follow-up" on the Hoi Chanh after they leave the centers. In 1971 such an automated tracking system was set up as part of the National Police Communications Information System (NPCIS). In the current political and military turmoil, this measurement of the vitality and long-term political and economic effectiveness of Chieu Hoi may have come too late. Nonetheless, it is an encouraging sign of GVN intent to continue and strengthen the program.

The success of any U.S. program in South Vietnam has always in the last analysis come down to the quality, competence, and motivation of the Vietnamese. This was never more true than in Chieu Hoi. The U.S. Chieu Hoi advisory effort has been phased out, the GVN Chieu Hoi people are on their own. They will have to achieve a dedication to Chieu Hoi as an instrument of national reconciliation, and to overcome their all-too-natural suspicion of the erstwhile enemy.

The crux of the matter lies in the reception accorded the rallier in the Chieu Hoi Center and his psychological reaction to it. It is at the center that a possible commitment to the GVN is made. Political indoctrination would appear the obvious answer here, but given the generally poor quality of its content and instruction (albeit greatly
improved), it is unlikely to evoke any strong ideological commitment to the GVN. Undoubtedly, if Chieu Hoi is to become an effective instrument for national reconciliation, political indoctrination must be given more emphasis in the rehabilitation of the rallier.

The vocational training offered the Hoi Chanh has been viewed as providing him not only a means of livelihood but also as a means of gaining commitment to the GVN. In the Vietnamese psyche, the fact that such training has been offered the Hoi Chanh (a testimony of the government's willingness and effort to help him) is probably as important to him as whether or not the training will benefit him economically in the future. Given the short time the Hoi Chanh is in the center (at most 60 days) and the lack of qualified instructors, training has had to be only in the simpler skills (though Chieu Hoi in MR 4 now operates one of the most comprehensive and professional vocational training schools in the country). The Lilienthal Report estimates that at least 24 percent of the Hoi Chanh will not go back to the village even when security conditions permit. Thus, an expanded vocational training program could be used as an incentive in the national reconciliation process, as Vietnam becomes increasingly urbanized.

Much remains to be done in the area of resettlement of the Hoi Chanh. The war and the drafting of Hoi Chanh into the military and paramilitary forces have largely averted or postponed any major resettlement problems. There is still too much of a tendency for the bureaucracy to "body-count" the returnee as he comes in the door of the center and then to lose interest in his further activities and welfare. The economic livelihood of the ex-enemy is far from assured, and together with other displaced persons -- war victims, refugees, demobilized military, and then newly educated elite -- the unemployed Hoi Chanh with no stake in the future of Vietnam adds to the danger of an incipient second-generation insurgency. The GVN must offer a real alternative to ex-Communists of every talent and background, and this may call for a degree of national identity, development, and maturity which the GVN has not yet achieved. Once large masses of Hoi Chanh and other displaced persons do gain a productive stake in the future of South Vietnam, the people will know it -- and so will the enemy.
Chieu Hoï has become an institution in Vietnam with Vietnamese roots. The initial reluctance on the part of most Vietnamese to accept this "American program" has gradually given way to some recognition that only through the ultimate reabsorption of the thousands of their fellow Vietnamese now on the enemy side can the political war be won. So far, however, this recognition has not shown itself to any great degree in the development of Chieu Hoï into a dynamic and effective national reconciliation movement, though the accelerated conversion of POWs to Hôi Chanh is a welcome sign in this direction.

The program will have much to offer as the GVN finds it necessary to come to some kind of accommodation with the other side, and there is every indication that the GVN intends to continue the program despite the phasing out of U.S. support. Chieu Hoï is probably the most convenient established channel through which the VC can attain legal status. Should a cease-fire be declared or hostilities cease on some other basis, Chieu Hoï, as a program of rehabilitation and reconciliation, could become the instrumentality by which members of the VC openly transfer their allegiance to the GVN.
### LOCAL SELF-DEFENSE

**CHIEU HOI PROGRAM**

[Graphical representation of regions/provinces]

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<td>74</td>
<td>197</td>
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<td>Quang Nam</td>
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<td>325</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>143</td>
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<td>386</td>
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<td>599</td>
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<td>179</td>
<td>143</td>
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<td>Quang Tri</td>
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<td>Thua Thien &amp; Hue</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>325</td>
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<td>144</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIONAL TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,226</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,734</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,515</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,469</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,596</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,594</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,242</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,360</strong></td>
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</table>

| M2               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |
| Regional Center  | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 77   | 256  | 333   |
| Quang Phu        | 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| Quang Tri        | 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| Thua Thien & Hue| 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| **REGIONAL TOTALS** | **1,169** | **1,734** | **2,349** | **3,469** | **4,596** | **4,594** | **1,242** | **20,360** |

| M3               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |
| Regional Center  | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 91   | 1,212| 1,403 |
| Phu Yen          | 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| Quang Tri        | 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| Thua Thien & Hue| 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| **REGIONAL TOTALS** | **7,368** | **9,036** | **7,168** | **9,174** | **11,376** | **11,376** | **11,376** | **28,427** |

| M4               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |
| Regional Center  | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 0    | 256  | 1,212| 1,403 |
| Phu Yen          | 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| Quang Tri        | 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| Thua Thien & Hue| 34   | 325  | 179  | 143  | 144  | 386  | 198  | 599   |
| **REGIONAL TOTALS** | **8,306** | **9,036** | **7,168** | **9,174** | **11,376** | **11,376** | **11,376** | **28,427** |

| GRAND TOTALS     | 11,171 | 12,429 | 6,792 | 9,137 | 20,025 | 20,025 | 19,937 | 35,577 |

*Includes 93 Hoi Chams who rallied in the former province of Phuoc Tho.*

**NOTE:** The number of Hoi Chams who rallied since the program began in Feb 63 through Dec 71 is: 34,244.

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*Final figure through LY 1971 is 194,424.*
Figure 14

GREATER NATIONAL UNITY
(Chieu Hoi-open arms)

MR
RESULTS Thousands
31 DEC 1971
CATEGORIES

MR 1
1,242

MR 2
2,328

MR 3
2,930

MR 4
13,857

RALLIERS

PROGRAM

TOTAL

193,421

TOTAL 1968
18,171

TOTAL 1969
47,023

TOTAL 1970
32,661

TOTAL 1971
20,357

POLITICAL
6,645

NVA 65

MILITARY
10,914

OTHER
2,798

UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix 1

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AB 143 - Combined Campaign Plans for e.g. CY 1968 and 1969 respectively.
AB 144 - AB 144 includes current-year pacification plans and definitions.
ACofS - Assistant Chief of Staff for --

AID - The Agency for International Development

AIK - Assistance-in-Kind Funds. The Province Team's contingency fund so called because generated through sale of commodities rather than exchange of currency.

AK - Communist light-infantry weapons system. The AK-47 and AK-50 assault rifles are the most frequent references.

APT - Armed Propaganda Team. Teams of Ho Chi Minh, working for the Chieu Hoi Ministry who try to recruit other ralliers by face-to-face propaganda and encouragement. Not to be confused with the APU or Armed Propaganda Unit which is a Viet Cong element assigned to terrorism.

ARVN - Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The Vietnamese Regular Army as distinguished from territorial forces and paramilitary elements.

CAP - (1) the AID Country Assistance Program; (2) Combined Action Platoon, a team of Vietnamese Popular Force troops and U.S. Marines employed for hamlet security in I Corps

Chieu Hoi - The "Open Arms" program for encouraging the Viet Cong to defect to the GVN side.

C-I - Counter-insurgency.

CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group. The local units, often of minority races, who are recruited and trained by U.S. Special Forces


CORDS - Civil Operations and Rural [Revolutionary] Development Support


CPDC - Central Pacification and Development Council; the GVN inter-agency group with review powers over pacification planning.

CTZ - Corps Tactical Zone. Equivalent to geographic "Corps" or Military Regions
DEPCORDS - Deputy for CORDS (to the Commanding General). Ambassadors Komer and Colby respectively in Saigon; in the Corps areas, the Regional Director

DGNP - Director(ate)-General of National Police

DIOCC - District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Center, the basepoint of the PHUNG HOANG anti-VC infrastructure program.

District - Political subdivision of a province, roughly equivalent to a U.S. county.

DPSA - Deputy Province Senior Advisor; the second man on the U.S. Province Team.

DSA - (1) District Senior Advisor (CORDS); (2) Division Senior Advisor (MACV).

FDD - Field Development Division, JUSPAO. The office which does actual composition of JUSPAO-composed material for Vietnam.

FFV - Field Force Vietnam (U.S.)

FWMAF - Free World Military Assistance Forces

GVN - Government of Vietnam

HES - Hamlet Evaluation System. The computerized system for assigning security and development ratings in each hamlet in Vietnam

Hoi Chanh - The returnee coming in under the Chieu Hoi Program.

IVS - International Voluntary Services

JGS - Joint General Staff, the Vietnamese military high command.


KKK - Khmer Kampuches Krom. Cambodians of Lower Cambodia, i.e. the part of the Mekong Delta now in South Vietnam. A bandit group operating in the border area of the Delta, ostensibly a Cambodian resistance group. KKK members occasionally appear as Hoi Chanh in the Central Delta provinces.

LOC - Lines of communications, roads, canals, railways

LAF - Liberation Armed Forces

MACCORDS - Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. Same thing as CORDS but with its subordination to MACV emphasized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAT, MATS</td>
<td>Mobile Advisory Team(s). Teams of MACV advisors working with the RF and PF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>Ministry of Chieu Ho i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICH</td>
<td>Ministry of Information and Chieu Ho i. Now two separate GVN Ministries. Responsibility for Chieu Ho i shifted alternately between MICH and MCH depending on the priority accorded the program by the GVN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Information, GVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORD</td>
<td>Ministry of Rural [Revolutionary] Development, GVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>Military Region. Viet Cong and GVN geographic area and administrative division, though not congruent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSS</td>
<td>Military Security Services (of the Vietnamese Armed Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Police, GVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFF</td>
<td>National Police Field Force. Combat-police type striking force of the Police Special Branch intended to target the Viet Cong Infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army. Either (1) designated units of the North Vietnamese Regular Army, as distinguished from Viet Cong units under COSVN control; or (2) personnel of the North Vietnamese Army attached as cadres or fillers in VC units, as distinguished from ethnic southerners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVN</td>
<td>North Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Office of Civil Operations (old title for CORDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSA</td>
<td>Office of the Special Assistant (to the Ambassador). Performs intelligence gathering and analysis and conducts various classified activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAT</td>
<td>People's Action Teams. One of the precursors of the present RD Cadre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAVN</td>
<td>&quot;People's Army of Vietnam&quot; The North Vietnamese Army (predecessor of CORDS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Province Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>FF</td>
<td>Popular Forces. Vietnamese local militia, one of the territorial security forces. Organized in smaller units than RF or ARVN, and more lightly armed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOENIX</td>
<td>The coordinated anti-VC infrastructure program. Involves civilian inter-agency and military inter-service cooperation in intelligence collection and police-military cooperation in targetting VCI. (Some provinces have loosely used PHOENIX to designate U.S. activities and PHUNG HOANG to mean Vietnamese. Proper designation is PHUNG HOANG.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHUNG HOANG</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PL-480 - The Food for Freedom Program. Used to mean the law, the program implementing the law, or the commodities the program provides.

PLAF - "People's Liberation Armed Forces." The Viet Cong military.

PM - Prime Minister, GVN

POD - Psychological Operations Division (of CORDS)

POLWAR - Political Warfare

PRC - People's Revolutionary Committee. Title of the VC shadow government organization at District and Province level.

PRDC - Province Rural Development Council

Province - Political subdivision equivalent to U.S. state, but more directly under central government control.

PREF - People's Revolutionary Party. The "real" (overt) Communist Party element of the National Liberation Front.

PRU - Province Reconnaissance Unit. A paramilitary strike force used for anti-VC infrastructure and other special missions.

PSA - Province Senior Adviser. The head of the U.S. Province Team

PSDF - People's Self-Defense Forces. Armed people's units raised, and sometimes armed.

RD - Rural Development. A program for pacifying the countryside and re-establishing GVN civil authority there.

RDC - RD Cadre, the worker teams implementing the RD Program.

Region - Political and military subdivision consisting of a number of provinces.

RF - Regional Forces. Provincial troops, more heavily armed than PF but not so well as ARVN, and used within a single province.

RF/PF - Regional Forces and/or Popular Forces. The Vietnamese Army below ARVN level. They are essentially territorial security forces for the pacification effort.

RVN - Republic of Vietnam. The nation of South Vietnam itself, sometimes used interchangeably with GVN when referring to the government, with SVN when referring to the land.

RVNAF - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

Sector - Military subdivision - province
Sub-sector - Military sub-division - district

SVN - South Vietnam

TET - The Vietnamese Lunar New Year


U.S. Mission - The entire U.S. country team, headed by the U.S. Ambassador and including all U.S. forces and agencies assigned to Vietnam to assist the South Vietnamese Government.


VC - Viet Cong. (1) the Communist revolutionary movement; (2) persons belonging to or associated with it; (3) military units subordinate to COSVN as distinguished from NVA units; (4) Communists of SVN background as distinguished from Northern cadres.

VCI - Viet Cong Infrastructure. Either (1) Viet Cong cadres with managerial or command responsibility or (2) the Viet Cong covert organization as a whole.

VIS - Vietnam Information Service

VN - Vietnam or Vietnamese

VN$ or $VN - Vietnamese dong or piastre

VNAF - Vietnamese Air Force

VNN - Vietnamese Navy

VNNMC - Vietnamese Marine Corps
Q. What was it that attracted you, personally, to rally to the Government side?

A. I had many reasons for rallying. These reasons came together and became meaningful little by little, and over a long time. The reasons grew up in my private life, and in my public life and in everything that I did. The first reason is that I do not like this kind of war and I don't like this kind of method of operation, which is designed to impose the yoke of Communism upon the Vietnamese people. The reason that I do not like this kind of war is that it is necessary to leave every person free to choose the life that he desires. One must not impose it on him. Everyone must be left free to choose which way he wants to go. In my opinion, all people should be free to choose what regime they want to live under and what religion they want to practice. And I think also that if you employ military force to win the victory, this is not a permanent victory. It is only an ephemeral victory and it will not last for a long time. By its nature, war is very destructive. As an old soldier and a participant in many campaigns, I have come to recognize that war is good for only one thing, and that is destruction, tearing the country apart. During the time of the French, the French took advantage of the war to begin a civil war among the Vietnamese. I also think that if there was no war, Viet Nam could organize a better life for itself because it has the natural richness, the talents, and the ability to do so. And I think further, that if the war continues the Vietnamese people will become beggars and will depend for their life on the assistance of foreigners.

The second reason I left is that I have been a member of the Party since 1946 and I have studied very many things -- the principles, doctrines, theories, and ideology of Communism. I have also studied the theories of capitalism and the way in which both sides choose to live. The thing I object to among the Communists is that under their regime, the people lack liberty. For example, the elections in North Viet Nam. I must emphasize that I have been thoroughly indoctrinated in Communist ideology, and you might compare me to a fervent Catholic in that regard. But among the Communists, there is no freedom. In the North there is only one Party and that is the Communist Party. There is no one who is allowed to be against them. Here, for example, there are three or four or five parties, each of which is free to be against the Government. I will give you an example. If there is a person who does not have the same opinion as the Government in Hanoi, he does not have the liberty to speak about it openly. And so, in sum, my reasons for leaving were that there was no liberty and no political democracy. We were not free. Also, from the economic point of view, in the North the Viet Minh have a program for economic production in order to raise the level of living of the country, but they have
not been successful in that. In the North, they have imposed a
Government plan for production on the people, but they do not
leave the people free to produce. The reason that they do not
encourage the people to produce is that everyone is organized
into associations and societies for production, but there is no
individual liberty given. The final reason that I left was
that I was not in agreement with the VC about the way in which
they employed the higher ranking cadres like myself. I have
been in the military ever since I was a child, and since that
time I have been designated for very high level functions, such
as regimental commander and Chief of Staff. But during that
time I was not well treated from a material or a spiritual point
of view in either political or military matters. For example, I
know some VC colonels in posts more important than I had, who
have never been under fire and who have never participated in
any military operations. Also, when I was in the North, I had
disagreements on various matters with my superiors and when I
came to the South they were willing to recognize that I had
abundant military experience, but they did not trust me for my
political morale. This is the reason why I was not given any
unit to command in the South. I know, for example, some friends
of mine who are now of the rank of colonel, commanding a division,
but these men do not merit their rank. Before I became a ra-
lieutenant, I had a dispute with several of these colonels. Also,
before I came to the South, when I was in the North, I had a
dispute with a corps commander in the arm. This occurred three
years ago. I suggested to that general that we have a public
debate, but he did not dare to do that. He also did not dare to
do anything to me. I had a disagreement with the general and
also with those colonels about the way in which one should treat
inferior officers and the way in which we should organize mil-
tary operations. The reason the others could not do anything to
me was that I was widely recognized as being a man of experience
and who had many many accomplishments. These people were my old
comrades, and they did not dare to do anything against me.
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222
MACV Dir 381-50

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 381-50

22 February 1969*
(MACCORDS)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING AND UTILIZATION OF RETURNEES (MACCORDS)
CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

1. PURPOSE. This directive establishes procedures and responsibilities for handling returnees (Hoi Chanhs) who rally to the Government of Vietnam under the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program.

2. APPLICABILITY. This directive is applicable to all MACV staff agencies and subordinate commands.

3. DEFINITIONS. For the purpose of this directive the following definitions apply:

   a. Returnees (Hoi Chanhs) (Ralliers). Individuals who actively participated, whether voluntarily or not, in military, para-military, political or administrative organizations or positions operating in the name of Communist North Vietnam and its front organizations (in South Vietnam [including Viet Cong and NLF], North Vietnam and abroad), and who voluntarily quit these organizations to give themselves up to the Government of Vietnam and to cooperate with it while they still possess the capability to fight or resist. Also to be regarded as returnees are those members of dissident nationalist forces who illegally oppose the Government of Vietnam, if they also voluntarily return to the government's cause and cooperate with it. The terms rallier, Hoi Chanh, returnee are synonymous.

   b. Provincial Chieu Hoi Centers. A Chieu Hoi facility located in each of the 44 provinces, with separate city centers in Vung Tau, Cam Ranh and Da Nang. The purpose of these centers is to receive, house and train returnees for a period of 45-60 days.

   c. Regional Chieu Hoi Centers. Regional Chieu Hoi Centers are designed to receive returnees sent from different provinces for more advanced political or vocational training than can be provided in provincial Chieu Hoi centers. They also may be used to relieve the overflow of provincial centers during periods when the returnee rate is high.

Change 2
*As revised 3/24/71
d. National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon. The National Chieu Hoi Center is designed to receive the "elite" among the returnees from all provinces. Generally all cadre-level and all NVA returnees are sent there for intelligence interviewing, political instruction, and vocational training. The National Chieu Hoi Center also receives returnees whose services are needed at the national level for psychological operation purposes.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. MACV, component commands, Field Force Commanders, CG, DMAC; and CG, III MAF, will ensure that all US Forces and agencies are aware of the proper handling and approved operational utilization of returnees.

5. PROCEDURES FOR ENTERING THE RETURNEE INTO THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.

a. Under combat conditions it may be virtually impossible to know with precision whether a detainee is to be considered a returnee or prisoner of war. Local judgment must be made, and no general directive can cover all possible circumstances. In general, units or agencies should be guided by these questions:

(1) Does the individual claim to be, or want to be a returnee?

(2) Does he voluntarily cooperate in support of his alleged desire so as to make it advantageous for us to consider him a returnee and give him returnee status under the Chieu Hoi Program?

b. It is the responsibility of the US unit or agency to which the returnee rallies to transfer him to the Province (Sector) S-2 within 48 hours of initial contact. During this 48-hour period units or agencies concerned are encouraged to exploit the returnee for local perishable intelligence which he may voluntarily offer.

c. A complete listing of weapons and equipment turned in will be maintained for each returnee. This listing, plus circumstances of rallying, will be kept with the returnee during his processing. Receipts must be given for any item taken from the returnee. Without these receipts he cannot claim weapons rewards provided for under the Chieu Hoi Program.

d. Brief operational interrogation may be conducted by units or agencies between the receiving unit/agency and Province S-2 Headquarters in the course of the evacuation of the returnee, but stopover should not extend the 48 hours total time limit for arrival at Province (Sector) S-2.

e. Commanders of military units or chiefs of combined civil-military US agencies that receive returnees will be held responsible for all complaints: violations of individual's welfare, or accidents that may occur to the returnee during the transferal period, if these are in violation of the above procedures and the 48-hour time period.
f. Returnees will not be transferred along with or in the same manner as PWs, or treated in such a manner that they, or anyone else, might mistake them for prisoners.

g. Returnees will not be transferred by receiving units out of the province in which they rallied.

h. It is the responsibility of the Province (Sector) S-2 to receive the returnee from the unit to which he originally rallied. Province (Sector) Headquarters will deliver the returnee to the nearest Chieu Hoi facility within 72 hours of the returnee's arrival at Province (Sector) Headquarters.

6. INTERROGATION OF A RETURNEE AFTER HE HAS ENTERED THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.

a. All interrogations of returnees by US units or agencies will take place at the national, regional, or provincial Chieu Hoi center.

b. Permission to interrogate will be received from appropriate Chieu Hoi Service Chief.

c. To take a returnee out of the center for interrogation, there must be an exact, concrete reason and explanation as to why it is not possible to undertake the interrogation at the center.

7. INSTRUCTIONS FOR BORROWING A RETURNEE FOR A TACTICAL OPERATION ONCE HE HAS ENTERED THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.

a. The returnee must voluntarily agree to his/her operational use.

b. The Provincial Chieu Hoi Service Chief has authority to authorize units to borrow returnees for particular operations. In the case of important returnees, the Province Chief's concurrence is needed.

c. At regional level, the GVN Regional Chieu Hoi Representative is authorized to grant permission to authorize units to borrow returnees.

d. Returnees located at the National Chieu Hoi Center, Saigon, may be borrowed by permission of the Director of the Operations Directorate, Chieu Hoi Ministry. In cases of important returnees, the approval of the Chieu Hoi Minister is required.

e. The following are the conditions under which agencies or units may borrow returnees:

(1) The returnee must be treated exactly as one of the borrowing agency's own personnel.
(2) The returnee is free and must not be guarded or imprisoned. He must have free access to all unrestricted areas.

(3) The borrowing unit is responsible for feeding the returnee at the set food rate of 30 piastres a day.

(4) The returnee must receive equivalent living facilities to the other personnel of the borrowing unit or agency.

(5) The returnee is not to be subjected to harsh interrogation.

(6) The returnee will be separated from and avoid contact with prisoners of war.

(7) The period for which a returnee is to be borrowed must be set in advance and adhered to. In no case may this period exceed one week except wherein expressed approval is received from the Chieu Hoi Ministry, Saigon.

(8) The borrowing unit or agency is responsible for the security of the returnee. If necessary, he may be armed.

(9) The returnee is not to be placed in the vanguard or front line of the unit unless he specifically volunteers.

(10) The borrowing unit will provide the results of the operation and the value of the information provided to the Chieu Hoi Service from which the returnee was borrowed.

(11) If the returnee is guilty of some misdeed during the period he is on loan, the unit will immediately inform the Chieu Hoi Service and then promptly return him to the Chieu Hoi Service.

(12) Authorized agents of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi will be permitted unrestricted and unaccompanied access to the returnee during any and all periods for which the returnee is borrowed.

8. REPORTS. This directive requires no report.

9. REFERENCES.
   b. MACV Directive 381-11, Military Intelligence Exploitation of Human Sources and Captured Documents, dated 5 August 1968.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(Official Seal)                           CHARLES A. CORCORAN
SIDNEY GRITZ                           Major General, USA
Colonel, USA                               -Chief of Staff
Adjutant General  

UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix 4

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, CORDS
APO San Francisco 96222

MACCORDS-CHD 10 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: CG DMAC IV CTZ: CG’s I and II FFC and III MAF

SUBJECT: Chieu Hoi Operational Memorandum 15/69: VC Counter (GVN)
Chieu Hoi Program

1. The Chieu Hoi Directorate/MACCORDS recently acquired information
on measures taken by the VC to counter the GVN Chieu Hoi Program.
The problems encountered by the VC as a result of the Chieu Hoi
Program are also discussed.

2. This memorandum provides information as an attachment concerning
measures taken by the VC to defeat the Chieu Hoi Program. It is
suggested that you evaluate your situation in view of the counter-
measures which it mentions. Particular attention should be given in
the interrogation process to uncovering counter-measures being em-
ployed in your local area. PSYOPS exploitation if based on such in-
formation could go far in nullifying the effectiveness of such mea-
sures. Coordination should be maintained with local intelligence
and psychological operations personnel on this subject.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, CORDS:

RAYMOND C. JONES
Director
CORDS-CH Directorate
I. Problems to be settled:

Deserters and traitors are those who break their vow to be loyal to the Army and country and defect from our revolutionary ranks to side with the enemy, betraying the Army, the people, and the country.

Desertion and defection occur both during times of war and peace. During wartime, desertion cases which betray the country (by working for the enemy) are relatively few as compared with those for other reasons. However, the former type of desertion is very dangerous. In this case, the deserters may give to enemy very valuable military information that the enemy cannot otherwise easily obtain. These deserters are those who have been indoctrinated and trained by our Army; they have worked in our ranks, received our missions and sometimes assumed a leading role. They can understand our secret military situation, especially our combat plans, our internal military situation, key units, and agencies.

This knowledge varies in importance with the situation, rank, and position of each deserter. In general, all deserters can provide the enemy with accurate information that may cause heavy damage to our Revolution.

Upon receiving a deserter, the enemy immediately exploits him to extract information, employs him as an informer or uses his henchman to sabotage our Revolution, or uses him as an anti-propaganda goal to slander us and entice more troops (among our ranks) into defecting to the (GVN).

So, the enemy always tries to cause dissatisfaction among our cadre and soldiers. Now, in the face of our temporary difficulties, the enemy is making great efforts to step up his "Open Arms" Campaign. His activities in this field have caused relatively serious losses to us. In short, the anti-desertion and defection mission is essential to ensure the security of our Army and Revolution.

II. Security missions against desertion, defection, and surrender.

The motives behind desertion and defection are:

- Pacifism, fear of death, war atrocities, and inability to sustain hardships and privations.

- Dissatisfaction with superiors, with the Party, and with military policies.

- Enticement by the enemy ("Open Arms" Campaign).
- The enemy has infiltrated agents into our internal organizations who now leave our ranks to rejoin their (GVN) unit. Thus, regardless of the reason, all deserters are the enemy of the Revolution and Army and the most dangerous objectives of our security mission.

So the whole Party and Army, including security agencies, are responsible for the struggle against desertion and defection.

Security missions consist of the following:

a. Regularly keep abreast of any manifestation that may lead to a desertion so that the leaders can take effective counter-measures.

b. If the desertion or defection occurs suddenly, try to help the Party Committee and Unit Commander take all measures to prevent or limit possible damages that the deserter may cause.

c. Continue to collect documents and records of the deserter or traitor in order to ensure security today and in the future.

The problem is that we better try to prevent the desertion from taking place rather than waiting until it occurs to take counter-measures. The reason is that when it occurs, it is difficult to prevent the damages it may cause. Although we can limit them, we cannot prevent it from harming the revolutionary reputation, prestige, and tradition of our Army.

III. Characteristics and manifestations of potential desertions and defections and their effects.

To carry out the above mentioned mission, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the manifestations of potential desertions, defections, and to their occurrences; then work out effective counter-plans.

1. Characteristics:

a. An action usually comes after a duration of consideration and preparation. This duration varies with each situation (sic).

b. For traitors, their actions are usually very discreet. They anticipate a plan to cope with our disclosure and pursuit.

c. In general, they are men who display a great fear of death. Before surrendering to the enemy, they usually try to have the enemy's confidence in order to receive good treatment.

d. If the desertion or defection originates from internal dissenion, its evolution is very complex. Sometimes this evolution changes very quickly. In just a few seconds, the traitors have already sided with the enemy and fought the people, although in the past, some of them had scored many revolutionary achievements, participated in many battles, or were carefully trained and indoctrinated.
Sometimes, dissatisfaction has led these people to treacherous actions which cause inconceivable disaster.

2. Manifestations:

Before surrendering to the enemy, deserters or traitors usually:

- Listen curiously and attentively to secret information, steal or copy confidential documents not belonging to them in order to do some meritorious work for the enemy.

- Make false papers in order to pass through (our) control stations without arousing suspicion.

- Steal (our) weapons and equipment; keep enemy papers such as leaflets, safe conduct slips ... (sic) as proof that they intend to surrender.

- Study the enemy policy and treatment toward (our) defectors, the activities and the situation in enemy areas, the roads between our areas and the enemy's, so that they can determine their plan of action.

- Try to mislead us by working hard, volunteering to do "extra" work or missions in an area near the enemy. While doing these missions they can find favorable conditions for desertion. . . . (sic.

These manifestations vary with the social class, activity, role, and psychology of the deserters or traitors:

- For high-ranking cadre, their manifestations are much more discreet than those of soldiers.

- If the deserter operates deep in base areas, the duration of his consideration and preparation will be longer than that of those operating in areas near the enemy. The latter knows more about the enemy situation and roads in his areas.

- If the deserters assume missions deep in enemy areas or near enemy rear agencies such as an armed propaganda mission, their sections sometimes will be so quick that we can not take prompt action.

- If they are on an operational movement, they usually seek to leave their ranks or fall behind so that they can easily escape.
- In other cases, they use signals (white cloth to be put at the muzzle of their weapons) so that in a battle they can run to the enemy and the latter does not fire at them.

- Sometimes they volunteer to do vanguard or advance scout missions in order to have conditions to escape to the enemy and inform him of our combat and movement plans. In addition, they may take advantage of the engagement to kill their comrades, seize their weapons, then run to the enemy. Sometimes, after a battle, when we withdraw, they usually seek to stay behind.

- Those who commit shortcomings in a spontaneous phase and fear to be seriously punished and those who are seriously punished or show dissatisfaction, usually try to desert. These people usually leave letters behind to their friends and relatives.

- For those who infiltrate our organizations, they usually try to desert when their missions have been fulfilled or when the situation is disadvantageous for them. Before deserting, they usually try to desert when their missions have been fulfilled or when the situation is disadvantageous for them. Before deserting, they usually try to sabotage our ranks or entice other men to desert with them.

3. Situations favorable for desertion:
   a. When the living conditions are too low and difficult.
   b. When the Revolution encounters temporary difficulties caused by the enemy's intensified sweep activities or tight encirclement.
   c. In fierce battles when the enemy is stronger or when we suffer heavy losses.
   d. When dissension springs up among cadre and soldiers.

   Due to poor leadership or improper implementation of policies or when the enemy intensifies his psy-war activities.

IV. Counter-measures.

   A. Preventive and discovering measures.

   1. Additional ideological training should be given to all personnel and people to heighten their patriotism, loyalty, and revolutionary vigilance and to make positive efforts to counter the enemy psy-war.

   This is a necessary task that we should fulfill at all times in order to eliminate desertion and defection.
We should not only unmask the enemy enticement plan and his anti-propaganda themes, but also train all personnel and people to be loyal to the Army and country, to preserve the reputation and tradition of our revolutionary army. In addition we should strictly observe the ten oaths of our Army.

We should be careful when we disseminate information on the enemy "Open Arms" policy or on desertion (to our military personnel and people). Careless speeches may encourage others to desert.

A unit where a desertion has happened has to motivate the hatred of the people toward that deserter and improve their vigilance to prevent other cases. The Party Committees and Unit Commanders at every level, the cadre in charge, and political agencies should be responsible for and give due concern to this motivation, for our security agency, we have to make a study to keep abreast of the situation in order to help the Party Committees and Unit Commanders in their motivation methods.

In addition, the leading levels should give due concern to the control and prevention of bureaucracy and indifference toward soldiers' difficulties and hardships among the leading ranks and militarism among leading cadre.

Execute complete democracy in the critique and self-critique so internal dissensions can be promptly settled and prevented from turning into opposition and desertion.

2. Strict control in political and ideological field.

a. Regular control of internal political affairs:

- Never neglect small suspected manifestations, give particular attention to those which can lead to desertion and defection.

- In the course of control, attention should be paid to general and particular manifestations of desertion as well as to the following objectives:

  - Military personnel newly assigned often are discouraged when faced with difficulties and shortages.

  - Military personnel who defect from enemy ranks and surrender to us.

  - Men who display pacifism, confusion, fear of death, and want to live in enemy areas.

  - Those who like to get near to and seek friendship from the persons who are used to going to enemy areas, although the former are not assigned to the mission.
- Military personnel who ask to go on a mission in enemy areas while the organization does not require him to do so.

- Temperamental men who were hesitant and passive and then suddenly become voluntary and active. Also, their sadness or happiness may constantly vary.

- Finally, attention should also be paid to those who assumed their missions well before, but now commit an error and fear to be seriously punished. These men can be secretly dissatisfied after the punishment. . . . (sic).

b. Implementation of three-man cell organization:

This organization is used by the people to control one another with mutual assistance and affection. Thanks to this close relationship between the people, their secret confidences will be easily revealed and we can thus discover suspected changes and have counter-measures ready.

c. Intensively employ key forces:

Chapter Party Committees and Party cell leaders, cadre in charge of squads and platoons, the Youth Group Chapter Executive Committee. . . . (sic) so that they can help us in the control, detection, indoctrination and prevention (of potential manifestations).

d. Organize agent network in charge of the detection and prevention:

Organize agents to study and detect potential deserters and traitors. Indoctrinate them on the characteristics and manifestations of desertion in order to help them in their detection. Assign them specific missions and teach them to have quick reactions when a desertion case occurs.

e. Administrative measures brought out through the control and assessment of the situation.

Bring out regulations to relate to our military personnel between our area and enemy's for the movement between two areas, for the schedule of our internal activities, the control of our strength of our daily additional duties. . . . (sic) in order to prevent the laxity of organization that facilitates the action of the potential deserters and traitors.

Bring out regulations for patrol and guard duties; establish control stations at entry and exit points, and key communication points between our area and enemy's; control carefully the papers of travellers in order to discover fake papers.
- On discovering a potential deserter, immediately transfer him to the rear area (if he is on a mission in an area near the enemy) so we can investigate.

- Never send a potential deserter to an area far from his unit, nor permit him to participate in a battle; that means try to control him strictly in order to prevent him from deserting.

3. Inspection of suspected manifestations:

When suspected manifestations are found, immediately conduct an inspection to see if they are right or not in order to have counter-measures in due time. If they are right, assign agents to detect their motives and purpose. If the inspection meets with difficulties, seek to send (the potential deserter) to (another) place favorable for the inspection.

NOTE: The detection and inspection missions must be promptly carried out. If the situation is advantageous (for the deserter), immediately take counter-measures, simultaneously continue the detection. If we pay too much attention to the detection, sometimes the desertion occurs so quickly that we cannot prevent it.

B. Counter-measures taken after the occurrence of a desertion.

We rarely discover a potential desertion. It usually occurs before we know about it. The reason for this is that we lack vigilance and neglect to take preventative measures in a serious manner nor do we carefully control our detection procedures.

If a desertion case occurs, the following measures must be taken:

1. Investigate to demonstrate the action and assess its influence (on the troops).

   a. Know exactly who the deserter is, what damages he may cause, what the reason and situation of his action were. Know the time and place of the action, its plan, motives, and purpose. (To know all of this we should make a study on his past political and ideological background.)

   b. Make a study to discover his remaining accomplices, to know who his accomplice leader is and where the latter still hides himself in order to prepare counter-measures.

If the deserter is a military serviceman who deserted from enemy ranks and surrendered to us, we should make a study to know if he really is an intelligence agent whom the enemy infiltrated into our ranks to conduct sabotage, pick information, and to take away our weapons.
c. Assert if he has conducted any sabotage before deserting (sabotage procedures) so that we can have effective counter-measures.

2. Pursue and recapture the deserter:

This mission must be promptly done. It must be based on the real situation to implement effective pursuit measures. It must be based on the time, place of desertion, and the plan of the deserter.

Once the desertion case occurs and if we still have any hope of recapturing the deserter (even though the hope is little), try to pursue him at any cost.

In general, the following measures are necessary:

- Inform all agencies, military personnel, security agents, militias, guerrillas, and communication stations to organize the pursuit, control stations to check papers with care, guard stations to shut the entry and exit points, units near the communication lines to conduct patrols and ambushes with a view of recapturing the deserter.

- Check his relatives' houses on the way he probably travels, is suspected to stop at to pick up provisions, change clothes, or disguise himself.

- Anticipate the way he may take to pursue him by taking a short cut.

- Assign agents at key communication points from our area to the enemy's to follow day and night the deserter's footsteps.

Upon recapturing the deserter, immediately check him to see if he has weapons or documents on his body, then interrogate him on his motives, purpose, method, and accomplices. In addition, see if he manages to throw away anything while being pursued and try to search for it.

3. Assessment of the damages the deserter may cause and appropriate measures to be taken to prevent or limit the damages.

Right after the desertion case occurs we must do the following:

a. Study the motives, purpose, and qualifications, of the deserter. Assess his knowledge about our secrecy to see what he could disclose to the enemy. From there, bring out appropriate counter-measures.

b. Report immediately to the related agencies to procure security for our agents and forces working within the enemy area or to change our combat plan and the schedule of the transportation of equipment to agencies and workshops (which the deserter knows). The reason for this is that the enemy can, with the deserter's disclosure, conduct attacks on us. . . . (sic).
c. Cook up and spread out false news so as to create doubt between the enemy and the deserter, confuse the former, and force him to be hesitant in believing what the deserter discloses. The enemy can thus mistrust the deserter or even punish him, and we will have time to take counter-measures and procure our security.

Remember that this mission must be done with care and based on the current situation in order to preserve secrecy and deceive the enemy.

4. Continue to collect documents and records of the deserters or traitors in order to ensure security for the present time and the future.

a. Concerning the collection of documents and records of the deserters, we should pay attention to the following:

- Seize their origin and past activities (this mission must be done gradually and carefully).

- Seize the motives and purpose of their desertion, their activities in the past, during the desertion, and after the desertion.

NOTE: Record their names, date of birth, physical characteristics, and keep their photos (try to procure them).

b. The collection of document and records on the deserters provides us with immediate use:

- The enemy may employ these deserters, after having interrogated them, to penetrate back into our ranks or revolutionary agencies and group, under disguise, when the situation is in disorder.

- Or we will not make a mistake in killing local administrative personnel and eliminating traitors.

These deserters are generally eliminated after the war (sic) and the remaining number have to go abroad to earn their living or join foreign reactionary, factions, some of them continue to work for the enemy.
Appendix 5

OPEN ARMS: The 1967 program: Procedures for cadre and requirements and rewards for returnees:

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
MINISTRY GENERAL OF INFORMATION & OPEN ARMS
*******

No. 111/TDTTCH/CH/SQT/KT/TT

COMMUNIQUE

to

Open Arms Chiefs throughout the Country

Subject: Procedural Operation of Foreign Aid Program for 1967 Open Arms Activity.


- Resolution No. 023-TBTTCH/CH/SQT/KT dated January 21, 1967 from Central Open Arms Organization.

This communiqué aims at fixing and giving explanations to Open Arms Chiefs so that they can have a thorough knowledge of the procedural working-out of foreign aid for open arms activity in 1967.

A. Expenditure procedure

1. General Characteristics of 1967 Open Arms Budget

The Open Arms Budget for 1967 is listed in article 13, chapter 212, code 84. It is put under the direct management of the central open arms organization, and expended in accordance with the National Budget regulations as follows:

- Expenditures can be depending on needs and circumstances, cleared at central or local Open Arms by administrative cash vouchers to be charged to funds released to the provinces.

- Provinces cannot establish an imprest fund to be charged on expenditure release (the establishment of imprest fund for local use concerning emergency activity will be dealt with below).
- Expenditures should be charged on the article fixed in the budgeting project (the transfer of expenditure from one article to another should be approved by the Open Arms central office.

- Clearance and justification of expenditures for personnel and materials should be made according to National Budget regulations in force.

- Expenditure rate relating to the supply of materials and carrying out of activities is fixed as follows:

  - Up to $20,000  - Exempted from competitive pricing is obligated expenditure control procedures but purchase orders should be signed by the authorizing officer before the procurement of commodities.

  - From $20,001 to $200,000  - Competitive pricing is mandatory, purchasing regardless of price (bon de commande) should be controlled and approved before the receiving of commodities.

  - From $200,001 to $1,000,000  - Should obtain competitive bids or make a contract agreement after ample pricing.

  - Over $1,000,000  - Bidding is mandatory.

2. Budgeting Project of 1967 Open Arms Program

The aforesaid budgeting Project is composed of 4 categories of expenditures classified according to fixed articles of the National Budget:

**Article 1. Payment of Salary and Allowances**

- Salary and Per Diem for Open Arms Armed Propaganda cadres (no longer borne by the National Budget as it was in 1966).

- Salary and Per Diem for instructors.

**Article 3. Operational Expenditures**

- Feeding of returnees
- Tailoring and clothing
- Pocket money
- Transportation
- Rewards
- Propaganda Campaign
- Political training
- Vocational training
- Per diem for returnees
- Equipment for Open Arms Armed Propaganda cadres
Article 5. - Miscellaneous Allowances

- Special allowance for high-ranking returnees
- Domestic-use allowance for returnee families resettled in Chieu Roi villages
- Return-home allowance
- Allowance for dead members of returnee families
- 12-month salary allowance for Open Arms Armed Propaganda cadres killed in the course of their duties.

Article 7. - New Activities

- Open Arms Center construction, repair and equipment
- Establishment of Open Arms villages.

3. Expenditures

In principle, all expenditures concerning article 3 should be paid by central or local administrative cash vouchers (to be charged to fund released to the provinces).

However, in order to meet the necessary requirements of Open Arms activities requiring cash, ref. official letter No. 980-UBHP/NSNV/Ngv dated January 21, 1967, the Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid has agreed to allow the Open Arms organization set up an imprest fund in central (Saigon) and distribute money to provinces through the use of money-orders. The money sent to the province will be deposited at the treasury service concerned (or the nearest treasury service, if the province concerned has no treasury service) or a non-profit account in the name of the Province Chief or Mayor. In case the contact between the province and the treasury service is beset with difficulties, due to the security situation, the province headquarters can hold such fund at its province under the responsibility of the Mayor or Province Chief.

Mayors and Province Chiefs are deputy authorizing officers of the fund who will designate a liquidator and examine and sign on correct vouchers.

The Open Arms Chief acts as Cashier (and enjoys no allowance). Funds will be gradually advanced to Open Arms Services by the Province headquarters concerned for expense according to needs.

The following categories of expenditures are paid by the imprest fund:

- The nine types of expenditures recorded in article 3 (except expenditure for Open Arms Armed Propaganda cadres' equipment which is to be cleared by the central (Saigon). A money order will be sent to provinces indicating clearance):
- Food, clothing, pocket money, transportation, weapons, and exploitation rewards, propaganda campaign, political training, vocational training, and per diem.

Two types of expenditures recorded in article 5: return-home allowance and allowance for members of returnee families who are killed:

In order to facilitate the vouchering and expenditure control, two imprest funds have been established, and money-orders will be issued separately:

- Imprest fund No. ______ covering expenditures recorded in article 3.
- Imprest fund No. ______ covering expenditures recorded in article 5.

B. Allowances and Vouchering Procedures of Activities

Allowances of Permanent Open Arms Activities

a. Feeding

The feeding price provided for a returnee in the 1967 National Budgeting Project is $30.00 per day.

However, the new rate can only be applied after getting the approval of the Central Executive Chairman's Office. Pending approval, returnees will be fed according to the old tariff, e.g., during the 60 days of refuge in Open Arms Centers, the feeding fees per day for:

- 1 returnee. ......... $24.00
- His wife or child over 15 .... $24.00
- His children under 15 .... $12.00

Feeding fees should be given to the returnee representative committee daily for marketing cooking.

The provincial Open Arms Center is considered as a temporary shelter for returnees when they return to GVN territory. The center takes charge of the making of ID cards, classification and political training. The maximum dwelling period for carrying out of the aforesaid activities is fixed at two months. Beyond that deadline, the returnee who wishes to stay longer at the center, due to special reasons, should have the approval of the Central (Saigon).

b. Clothing

In principle clothing fee for a returnee who just returns to the GVN is $1,000.00 for the purchase of one pajama suit, one trousers and one shirt.
In reality, the returnee can request cash for clothing according to his liking. However, it would be advisable to maintain close control so as to avoid the case where they use the money for another expense in lieu of clothing. In cases where the returnee has a family, he can apply a part of this allowance for clothing for the family. He must have a pajama suit made for himself. Clothes are provided on a permanent basis and the returnee need not return them upon leaving the center.

c. Pocket money

During 60 days in the Open Arms Center, the monthly pocket money to be given to:

- 1 returnee is ............ $200.00
- His wife and children is .......... $100.00 each

If the one-month period has not expired when a returnee is transferred to another Open Arms Center, he then has no right to get additional pocket money.

After his return home, any returnee who is requested to come over to the center for training or for other reasons is allowed $100.00 of pocket money even though his dwelling period in the Center is only for a few days.

d. Return-home

Return-home allowance for a returnee family is $1,000. The center must issue a return-home certificate and is responsible for the granting of allowance. It is advisable to inform the province that received the concerned returnee in order to avoid duplication, as return-home allowance is granted only once.

e. Per diem

The returnee who participates in activities which are useful to Open Arms Program, such as intelligence, Open Arms propaganda campaigns, whether he works independently or in coordination with friendly agencies, is to get $80.00 per diem, but the feeding fees should be taken off his per diem if the concerned works at the center (re Resolution No. 10/PTT/PPU/18/QD dated January 2, 1965).

Per diem is granted during the period of field duty (no maximum amount of per diem is fixed) recorded in the mission order delivered by the Provincial Open Arms Services, and approved and signed by the Province headquarters authorities.

f. Transportation

Returnees' home travel authorization to carry out activities or move from one place to another is authorized to enjoy transportation means or get cash for bus fare or air ticket, if need be.
Transportation fees are to be borne by the province from which the returnee has departed.

g. Campaign

Permanent propaganda campaigns include the printing of leaflets, posters, slogans, mottos, movie slides, the exploitation and organization of cultural performances.

The local Open Arms Chief has authority to spend up to $5,000.00 per month for foreclosed propaganda activities without having requested approval from the central (Saigon) beforehand.

In case it is necessary to organize a special propaganda campaign having a wider scope central (Saigon) approval is mandatory. The projected program should be submitted to the central as well as the estimated cost list and drafts of leaflets, slogans, etc., for examination beforehand (so that they can be approved in due time).

The Directorate for Operations will issue a guided communique dealing with propaganda matters.

h. Political Training

The political training for returnees is carried out at three levels: provincial, Regional and Central levels depending on the returnee elements (temporarily, the communique No. 10-QP/PUBCH/KH/K dated February 20, 1964 is still applicable).

The political training method should be flexible and practical, and avoid idle theory. Therefore:

- It would be advisable to introduce visitations to cultural, social, economical, and military structures into the political training program so that returnees can see with their own eyes all the progress achieved by the government concerning the betterment of government machinery and people's living conditions.

- It would be advisable to audio-visualize all materials and focus attention on the organization of seminars (conversation, debate, comparison).

On an average, the political training cost is $500.00 for each returnee, including:

- Production of materials (including audio-visual materials)
- Office supplies for students
- Organizing observation visits (tours)
- Taking pictures of returnees to complete their training dossier, individual file, application form 7, return-home certificate, etc.
- Rewards granted to outstanding students, closing ceremony and party
- Organizing annual Returnee Nationwide Assemblies so as to give them refresher motivational training (expenditures concerning feeding, transportation, pocket money, etc... granted to congress returnee participants are to be charged to other articles).

1. Trade Training

1. Organize breeding and cultivation demonstration pilot centers at or near the center in order to teach returnees improved agricultural methods along with the political learning during a maximum period of two-month dwelling at the Open Arms centers. This should be technically supported by local technical services.

2. Organize trade training classes at the Open Arms center for returnees or those who have completed their political training course and who request to stay for vocational training.

3. Allow returnees cited in item 2 to be trained at government trade schools, private trade schools and local firms.

Vocational training for returnees is also carried out during the same period at three levels: province, region and central. Special adherence should be paid to the following points:

- Only common trades which can help returnees gain employment easily and whose training period is short (one month at maximum) are taught at the provincial level. For example: carpentry, masonry, brick making, bamboo weaving, haircutting, etc.

- Longer training courses (2 months at maximum) can be organized at regional level but should not overlap with those being organized at the provincial and central levels.

Expenditures for vocational training recorded in items 1, 2, 3 above-mentioned, depending on circumstances, include:

- Organizing cost: renting of land for demonstration pilot center, if need be, remuneration for trade teachers (this remuneration should be approved by the central).

- Tuition paid to private trade schools: according to the agreement concluded with the schools.

- Office supplies for students: $60.00

- Feeding fees:
- If taking meals at the Open Arms center, the tariff of feeding fees is fixed at $24.00 per day as it was applied for returnee dwellers at the center.

- In case the center has no available room for students, they must board outside the center and the feeding fee is fixed according to the local living standards, but meal should be similar (and reasonable) to that served at the center.

- Pocket money: as fixed at the concerned item.

Regional service chiefs and inspectors should draw up a trade-training project for 1967 and submit it to the central (Saigon) for study and fixing fund release for each place. However, it is feasible to rely (base) on the aforementioned principles so as to open trade-training courses immediately, if required.

k. Rewards

Reward for special activities

As for returnees who achieve meritorious and special deeds, including the bringing back of enemy's documents or supply of reliable and valuable information from the enemy, service chiefs can propose to the Mayor, Province Chief (Open Arms Committee Chairman) to fix appropriate rewards up to $10,000.00 depending on the case.

Rewards which are over $10,000.00 must be submitted to central Open Arms for approval.

Public servants and cadres who achieve meritorious activities are only allowed to get administrative rewards (reward certificate, encouragement certificate, proposal for promotion, etc., but no cash reward).

A third person who is not a meritorious public servant or service-man can receive a cash reward to be charged on the National Budget through the central Open Arms organization's resolution.

Weapons Reward

Returnees bringing weapons with him will be rewarded in accordance with the tariff fixed by Decree No. 0144-HC/18/ND dated September 18, 1964 as follows:

- Pistol $ 800.00
- Foreign rifle, Mas 36, British and Japanese rifle, etc. $ 1,000.00
- Garant MI rifle 1,200.00
- US and French carbine, German MAT 49 1,200.00
- Thompson machine pistol 2,000.00
- B.A.R. 24/29 3,500.00
- Machine gun 30 5,000.00
- Machine gun 12.7 - 13.2
- Mortar 60
- Mortar 81
- Bazooka
- Rocket, SKZ 57 (recoiless rifle)
- SKZ 75 (recoiless rifle)

There can be no substitutions in the above list. Vouchers should include the resolution of the Province Chief, chairman of Open Arms Committee, and a weapons receipt issued by ARVN and GVN agencies which received weapons from returnees reported at national bases.

As for returnees who reported to allied Forces Units (US, Korean, New Zealand) there were some cases that trespassed on returnees' rights because allied units have kept weapons as trophies and refused to issue receipts to the concerned. In order to protect the returnees' rights, Open Arms centers must (are requested to) give explanations to friendly units to issue proper weapons receipts so as to clear cash reward for the concerned as a means of warding off difficult-to-solve complaints.

Usually when the returnee brought weapons to any province rewards should be made by the province concerned. However, if for special reasons the returnee is dispatched to another place, say the central Open Arms center, reward procedures and payment can be made at the latter place. Dossier is composed of:

- Legal weapons-receipt issued by the agency receiving weapons
- Certificate delivered by the concerned province certifying that the concerned returnee has not received cash reward.

The central Open Arms center must inform the provincial Open Arms center concerned immediately after completing the weapons reward clearance.

Imprest Fund Vouching Procedures

The manager of the imprest fund should keep three accounting books:

- the cash book
- the receipt book
- the voucher book

The aforesaid books are supplied by printing shops to the government at the official price.

Open Arms services can request province H.Q. to supply them with these books (which are subject to payment) or request Central Open Arms to supply them directly.

a. Cash book (Appendix 1)*

The province chief or local representative, the Deputy Commissioner for Open Arms or central representative initial the first and

*Not attached.
last page of the book to certify the number of sheets (a 100-page copy book can be used provided that it is made out in accordance with the Appendix 1).

The manager (bookkeeper) is to record on the left page the date and amount of money (recorded on money orders) received.

On the right page, he has to record expenditures and money released (day, month, year) and date of submitting vouchers to the central. Each expense item has an order number.

b. Receipt book (Appendix 2)*

This E3-Form book has 100 duplicating numbering sheets.

In each payment, the bookkeeper has the money-receiver sign on the receipt E3-Form.

If many persons get pay on the same activity, a collective description list with the signature of each individual should be attached.

If the receiver submits an individual invoice or receipt, the bookkeeper will make a receipt E3-Form (the invoice requires a fiscal stamp).

E3-Forms are prepared and signed below by the bookkeeper and the province headquarters (chief?) will approve and sign as deputy authorizing officer.

c. Voucher book (Appendix 3)*

This E2-Form book has 100 quadruplicating numbering sheets for recording the following details of E3-Form receipts bearing the signature of creditors: date, receipt number, money receiver, expense item, amount of money, code, expenditure.

*Not attached.
Today on Hung Vung day when the entire nation is reminded of its origins, the Government solemnly announces its course of action and its policy concerning the National Reconciliation Program to be put into effect throughout the country.

With the Constitution as a base, the National Reconciliation Program is a part of a campaign for the attainment of our national objective. This objective is to accomplish reforms within the framework of historical continuity to liberate the nation and to free the people. The three guiding principles of the National Reconciliation Program are National Community, National Concord and National Progress.

The principle of National Community is based on the fact that our ties of blood demand us to have tolerance rather than hatred. This principle aims at bringing together all the Vietnamese spiritual heritage bequeathed on us by our forefathers, and at the same time to strive and keep us with the rate of progress of mankind in this second half of the twentieth century. This principle requires that we reject the communist proposed divorce with our traditions. For indeed this denial of the past will bring the nation and the individual into the pit of extermination and slavery.

The principle of National Concord, which aims at restoring the life of harmony that had been worked out by our ancestors after so much hardship, will establish the foundation of our democratic regime. In an atmosphere of peace and harmony, all disagreements and differences will be expressed, not through the use of steel and not at the cost of bloodshed, but rather through democratic procedures.

The principle of National Progress will guide our people to move forward in freedom and with greater expectations. Based on this principle, the social revolution which is being carried out by the Republic will bring about progress and social justice.

All citizens without discrimination will have equal opportunity to develop their capabilities and to enjoy the fruit of the progress the achievement of which everyone will have a chance to contribute his share.

The three principles of National Community, National Concord and National Progress will strengthen our unity of purpose and action within the national community and that will create the essential conditions for the Vietnamese people to be the masters of their own destiny.

In recent days, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has many times set forth proposals for the restoration of peace and has stated its readiness to meet North Vietnamese authorities either at the demilitarized zone or at any other place. Such initiatives on the part of the
Government have no other purpose than to safeguard the supreme interests of the Vietnam race.

In the field of Chieu Hoi Open Arms action, these three principles provide the Government and the people three ways to implement the National Reconciliation Program.

First, all those who decide to leave the ranks of the communists and reintegrate in the national community will be warmly welcomed as citizens with full rights of citizenship. All returnees will be protected by the Government which will also provide them facilities to build a new life. In other words, every citizen who abandons the communist ranks will enjoy the rights set forth in the Constitution, including the right to have the law protect his freedom, his life, his property, and his honor, the right to vote and to run for office, the right to go back and live within one's family, the right to choose his place of residence and the right to enjoy the national assistance on the pursuit of his profession.

Second, the citizens who rally to the national cause will be employed in accordance with their ability so that every Vietnamese, without distinction, will have the opportunity to contribute positively to the reconstruction and development of the country.

Third, the citizens who rally to the national cause, but who have violated the law under communist coercion or deception, whether they have been convicted or not, will enjoy all the guarantees set forth in the Constitution. The country will be tolerant to the utmost so they have the opportunity to put their ability and determination to serve and redeem themselves.

The Government hereby orders all cadres at all levels, civilian, military and administrative, and calls on the entire people to disseminate and carry out the National Reconciliation policy and program.

The realization of this policy will help shorten this destructive war initiated by the communists and will soon bring about the day which has been yearned for by the entire people for more than twenty years: the day of a lasting and genuine peace.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for CORDS, I, II, III, and IV CTZs
Attn: Chieu Hoi Advisors

SUBJECT: Chieu Hoi Operational Memorandum No. 6/69: Chieu Hoi Planning.

1. Every province should have some kind of a Chieu Hoi plan. Such a plan serves a number of useful purposes:

   a. Forces the operator to develop realistic goals imposed from higher echelon into an appropriate local proportion.

   b. Sets forth procedures and processes in proper priority by which goals are to be achieved.

   c. Informs all concerned as to what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done.

   d. Enables resource requirements to be anticipated and properly budgeted for.

   e. Serves as a check list for the necessary recurrent measurement of progress.

   As special note, be advised that provinces are not to be assigned returnee goals from higher authority. Past experience has clearly established this as entirely counterproductive in a Chieu Hoi sense. If provinces themselves desire to set forth their own targets for returnees, there would be no objection.

2. A province plan was received some time ago which could well be used as a general guide for the preparation of such plans. It is appended hereto for information and such use as is deemed appropriate.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, CORDS:

RAYMOND G. JONES
Director
MACCORDS/Chieu Hoi Directorate
Pacifications and Development Plan (Chieu Hoi) - Annex K

I. Province Goals

1. Induce move Hoi Chanh to rally. Improve and exceed previous rates.

2. Intensify inducement through increased use of the CH psyops fund, the Hoi Chanh, the APT and the CH Cadre.

3. Improve reception methods and facilities.

4. Improve vocational training and political reorientation; establish a regular literacy education program.

5. Expedite intelligence interrogation of the Hoi Chanh; facilitate wider dissemination of the information obtained therefrom and maximize the tactical utilization of the Hoi Chanh.

6. Improve after-release program.

II. Forces and Resources Available:

1. APT

2. Chieu Hoi Staff.

3. Chieu Hoi Advisory Team (1 CH Advisor, APT Advisor, CH Psyops Advisor).

4. Province MACCORDS Advisory Team

5. US Navy Seabees

6. US Navy PBR Sections

7. Civic Action Platoon

8. US Infantry Division

9. Psyops Battalion

10. Engineers Brigade (US)

11. Maintenance Battalion (US)

12. JU SPAO

13. Province Radio Station

14. VIS Monthly Newspaper
15. ARVN Inf. Div. Psywar Team
16. Province Sector Polwar Team
17. JUSPAO-VIS Drama Team
18. TV Station
19. CH Budgeted Funds
20. AIK and CH Division Special Funds
21. GVN Provincial Committees and Services
22. PA & E and RMK
23. ARVN Units in the province
24. RD Teams
25. Chieu Hoi Center and equipment (10 service vehicles, 1 polaroid camera, 1 mimeographing machine, 4 typewriters, 2 bullhorns, 1 electric tape-recorder, 1 battery-operated loudspeaker).

III. Plans for utilization of the resources to achieve goals:

1. Intensify inducement through increased use of CH psyops fund, the Hoi Chanh, the APT and the CH cadre:
   a. Publish a monthly Chieu Hoi newsletter, out of the CH psyops fund, to keep the people in both sides of the camps fully informed of the Chieu Hoi program.
   b. Print at least one leaflet out of the Chieu Hoi psyops fund every month. Quick reaction leaflets will be printed with the assistance of the Psyops Bn and/or the province JUSPAO multi-litho printing machine.
   c. Purchase one 35-mm camera and films for this and the polaroid cameras out of the CH psyops fund.
   d. Select reliable Hoi Chanh to go back to their respective villages and induce their comrades, who are still with the VC ranks, to rally.
   e. Encourage Hoi Chanh who could not go back to their native villages due to insecurity to write leaflet, messages mimeographed at the CH Center or at the districts or make taped messages.
f. Provide adequate training to the new APT recruits for a period of one month, and a refresher training for old APT cadre for a period of at least 2 weeks. The emphasis of the training is in making the individual a psywar man as well as a part of a psywar team.

g. Improve the weapons of the APT by replacing the M-1 with automatic weapons. Coordinate with the Province ADS & L Co.

h. Provide APT with a distinct uniform and proper identification patches.

i. Equip the APT with adequate psyops capability such as a polaroid camera with films, portable battery-operated tape-recorder and loudspeaker.

j. Coordinate with the RD team in the districts to enable the APT, CH Cadre and/or Hoi Chanh to participate in RD-organized hamlet meetings.

k. Coordinate with S-2 and S-3 sections to enable the APT to provide military operations with Chieu Hoi psyops support. They should be informed within 48 hours after the operation has been started.

l. Continue to coordinate with the US Navy PBR Sections in order to cover the areas, which are inaccessible from the highways, with Chieu Hoi psyops.

m. Request District Chiefs to plan out operations using the APT in their respective areas to support their local operations and/or programs.

n. Establish a roster of families with relatives known to be working with the VC. Utilize APT, CH Cadre and Hoi Chanh in contacting these families face-to-face or by letters.

o. Encourage families with VC relatives to visit the Chieu Hoi Center. Make follow-up visits to these families until their wayward relatives rally to the government.

p. Continue the third party reward program following the national reward schedule made by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi and funded by Provincial AIK funds.

q. Offer a monthly reward for the "200th Hoi Chanh of the Month" received at the Chieu Hoi Center.

2. Improve reception methods and facilities:
   a. Complete the construction of district reception centers.
b. Construct the Chieu Hoi office inside the Chieu Hoi Center to put the Chieu Hoi staff closer to the HoI Chanh.

c. Organize a reception committee composed of the Chieu Hoi Chief or his deputy, Chieu Hoi Center Manager, APT Company Commander and the Representative of the HoI Chanh.

d. Provide the HoI Chanh his authorized issues (blankets, mosquito net, mat, bowl and chopsticks and reception kits) within 24 hours after his arrival at the CH Center.

e. Accelerate the processing of HoI Chanh dossiers by employing more PSB interrogators at the Chieu Hoi Center during periods of high HoI Chanh influx, borrow additional typewriters from JUSPAO or USAID, and provide overtime pay, using AIK fund, to CH cadre when overtime work is necessary.

f. Put up a dispensary with 20-bed capacity, inside the Chieu Hoi Center using pre-fab house to be obtained through the assistance of the Civic Action Platoon. Vietnamese, American and/or Filipino doctors will be requested to visit the dispensary regularly and provide the HoI Chanh with a monthly medical check up.

g. Construct a two-compartment bathroom.

h. Invite ARVN and GVN officials to visit the CH Center during their leisure hours to further the loyalty of the HoI Chanh to the government.

3. Improve the vocational and political reorientation programs; establish a regular literacy education program:

   a. Continue to hold training on masonry, carpentry, tailoring, barbering and hollow-block making.

   b. Coordinate with the US Navy Seabees and the US and/or ARVN maintenance battalions to provide deserving and reliable HoI Chanh an on-the-job training.

   c. Send more HoI Chanh to the CH regional training center for advanced vocational trades.

   d. Provide the political reorientation training with adequate and interesting visual aids. If possible purchase a picture projector.

   e. Invite ARVN and GVN officials as resource speakers to political reorientation training.
f. Hire one Hoi Chanh as literacy education instructor paid out of AIK funds.

g. Show a regular JUSPAO movie to supplement the TV program. Invite ARVN and GVN entertainment/drama teams to perform at the Chieu Hoi Center.

4. Expedite intelligence interrogation of the Hoi Chanh and facilitate wider dissemination of information obtained therefrom; maximize the tactical utilization of the Hoi Chanh:

   a. Provide fast transportation to Hoi Chanh who rally in inaccessible areas. Remote outposts and villages should contact the nearest unit with airlift capability so that these Hoi Chanh are interrogated, utilized and received at the Chieu Hoi Center within 48 hours after his rally.

   b. Construct a Chieu Hoi interrogation building inside the Chieu Hoi Center adequate to accommodate interrogators from the NPS/PSB, S-2, Phuong Hoang/Phoenix, FWMAP Mil. Unit, Chieu Hoi Service and others.

   c. Set up a wall map indicating the location where each new Hoi Chanh came from and the number of Hoi Chanh from each area for reference use by the agencies mentioned in b.

   d. Recruit Kit Carson Scouts.

   e. Keep friendly units informed of the Hoi Chanh received both in the districts and at the Chieu Hoi Center for immediate operations.

5. Improve after-release program:

   a. Establish a province Chieu Hoi hamlet capable of accommodating 100 Hoi Chanh families who cannot return to their native villages due to insecurity.

   b. Establish district Chieu Hoi hamlets capable of accommodating 25 Hoi Chanh families who prefer to stay in the district but cannot return to their native villages because of insecurity. Since this program has not support from the Ministry of Chieu Hoi assistance from the Refugee and Social Services, the RD self-help program and the CORDS will be solicited.

   c. Revitalize the province employment committee to enable the government to assist Hoi Chanh needing employment.

   d. Assist released Hoi Chanh to obtain advanced vocational training by sending them to the regional and national Chieu Hoi Centers.
e. Assist reliable Hoi Chanh get employed with the Kit Carson Scouts, PRU, CIDG, RDC, RF/PF, and the ARVN.

f. Coordinate with ARVN and US units and GVN agencies, that are employing Hoi Chanh, to enable the Chieu Hoi Service to keep track of their performances and problems.

g. Hire reliable and married Hoi Chanh to assist the Chieu Hoi cadre in the districts carry out the follow-up of released Hoi Chanh. AIK fund will be used to pay for their salaries and per diem.

h. Organize a yearly ex-Hoi Chanh reunion in each district.
I. GENERAL

a. According to the tradition of national unity, the RVN Government promulgated the Chieu Hoi Policy to save lives of Vietnamese people, and to early end the aggressive war initiated by the Communists.

b. From early 1963 (when the Chieu Hoi policy was promulgated) up to this date (20 September 1969), the Chieu Hoi program has accepted 126,247 Hoi Chanh. Particularly, in the first nine months of 1969, there were 32,867 Hoi Chanh; this number is six times higher than the total number of Hoi Chanh in 1964, and nearly double the number in 1968.

c. The Chieu Hoi program has obtained many remarkable achievements in these recent months due to the following main factors:

1. Good results achieved by the Pacification and Development Operations, from the Special Pacification Plan through the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, Phases 1 and 2.

2. Pressure of the ARVN and allied military activities was permanently placed on Communist forces, particularly from the two phases of the Communist general offensive during Tet Mau Than (Monkey's New Year).

3. Good actions of all civilians, military, and government officials in welcoming Hoi Chanh.

4. Morale of Communist troops and cadres has been extremely lowered, particularly after heavy defeat of their Tet Mau Than general offensive, and the belief in their leaders also has been weakened.

5. Communist forces have encountered many difficulties in the strength replenishment, food and weapon supply.

6. Effectiveness of the popularization of the national unity policy and the psywar offensive conducted by the Chieu Hoi Ministry in coordination with all the Vietnamese psywar agencies, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and the Allied Forces.

7. Participation of more and more people in the propaganda campaign for the Chieu Hoi policy.

   d. If the situation is better and better to our side in comparing with the weakness day after day of the enemy, and if the Chieu Hoi activities are more and more effective and stronger, it is believed that the Chieu Hoi program will have more capabilities to contribute to the 1970 Pacification and Development Program for the following reasons:
1. Results of the Chieu Hoi Program will considerably increase effectiveness of the Pacification and Development Program, thus, reducing the burden of the latter program.

2. Results of the Pacification and Development Program will exercise basic pressure on the enemy, and provide more opportunities to the execution and development of the Chieu Hoi program in two fields: motivation and propaganda for the Chieu Hoi policy; and vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities.

II. OBJECTIVES

a. Based on the results obtained during the first nine months of 1969, the objectives of the Chieu Hoi Program in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan are to receive 40,000 Hoi Chanh and vitalize their activities.

b. In the first phase of the plan (1 January 1970 to 30 June 1970) the target to be achieved is to receive and revitalize 25,000 Hoi Chanh, apportioned among CTZs as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>Number of Hoi Chanh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>13,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The number of Hoi Chanh to be returned by each province and city will be jointly decided by the CTZ Chieu Hoi office (representative office) in coordination with the respective CTZ Pacification and Development Council.

III. DUTIES

a. The Chieu Hoi Program is simultaneously aimed at two objectives: decreasing the enemy potential while increasing our potential.

b. These objectives will only be achieved if the people are willing to participate directly in the implementation of the Chieu Hoi Program and the Chieu Hoi Ministry and other friendly agencies effectively perform the main tasks in the Chieu Hoi Program to include conducting propaganda and motivation, and receiving Hoi Chanh and vitalizing their activities.

1. Propaganda and motivation must be performed effectively in order to widely popularize the national unity policy as well as to induce hostile personnel to return to the national community.

2. Reception of Hoi Chanh must be made properly so as to prepare their psychology, particularly their attitude, to enable them to easily enter into the community life. In addition, the Hoi Chanh's knowledge of the enemy situation must be immediately exploited for military, security and psywar intelligence purposes.
3. Vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities must be conducted effectively so as to make maximum use of Hoi Chanh resources in the struggle against Communism in the building of the Nation.

IV. EXECUTION

A. Propaganda and motivation.

1. Orientation:

a. Widely publicize the national unity policy within the Chieu Hoi operational limit.

b. Motivate people, military personnel, civil servants, governmental cadres, Hoi Chanh, and particularly the persons whose relatives are joining the Communists and induce them to call their relatives to the national just cause.

c. Provide additional means and improve propaganda and motivation techniques in order to initiate the psychological offensive against the enemy, sow disunion among hostile people, and popularize the Chieu Hoi policy.

d. More effort will be made in the following areas of the Chieu Hoi campaign.

   (1) Rallying of entire units.
   (2) Rallying of high ranking Communists.
   (3) Rallying of Montagnard Viet Cong.
   (4) Rallying of infiltrators from the North.
   (5) Rallying of former Southerners returned from the North.
   (6) Rallying of unmarried individuals between 15 and 29.

e. More propaganda and motivation efforts are made in all provinces in I, II, and III CTZ as well as in Saigon and its suburbs.

2. Planned Tasks:

a. Widely popularize the national unity policy both at home and abroad through the production and dissemination of movies, documents, magazines, etc.

b. Increase propaganda and motivation efforts of all radio broadcasting units aiming at the priority areas included in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. Main tasks of the radio broadcasting cadres are to reach and motivate the persons whose relatives are joining the Communists and induce them to call their relatives to the national cause.
c. Improve all overt propaganda and motivation activities: The Tieng Chim Goi Dan Program (calling VC personnel to return to the national community) broadcast on Radio and Television (particularly on local radio), leaflets, air-mounted loudspeakers. After completing exploitation of the enemy situation, expedite an appeal by the Hoi Chanh to their comrades-in-arms to return immediately to the nationalist cause.

d. After one or two weeks living at the Chieu Hoi Centers, Hoi Chanh will be encouraged to volunteer to return to their former areas of activities to popularize their experiences in the Chieu Hoi program and call other hostile persons to return to the nationalist just cause.

e. Hoi Chanh teams (composed of Hoi Chanh officers or cadres) will have to be formed and sent to every locality, people's associations, universities, high schools, military schools, etc., to talk about the real weaknesses and political plots of the Communists.

f. The program for awarding money in cash to civilians, Hoi Chanh, military personnel, and civil servants who take part in the motivation of Communists to return to the national just cause will have to be continued. However, it must insure that the merit done by the awarded person is of real value so as to maintain the value of this program.

g. Open the Spring Campaign for 1970.

h. Initiate a Chieu Hoi Campaign to call single Communists between 15 and 29 to return to the national just cause.

i. Organize exhibition of the achievements performed by the Chieu Hoi program.

j. Conduct press conference to introduce important Hoi Chanh to the public.

k. Support the Joint General Staff, ARVN (Department of Political Warfare) in the conduct of paywar and Chieu Hoi campaigns, such as the Nguyen Trai Campaign, against the enemy.

B. Reception of Hoi Chanh.

l. Orientation:

a. Clear up all complexes of guilt and suspicion in Hoi Chanh's minds immediately after their reception.

b. Place emphasis on the classification of Hoi Chanh.

c. Improve facilities and the administration of the Chieu Hoi Centers.

d. Improve the exploitation of information concerning the enemy situation, cross check, use and exchange this information with those of other government agencies.
e. Improve the system for the Hoi Chanh political training.

f. Select Hoi Chanh with instructor ability to act as political lecturers with pay. Training will be coordinated with National Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau.

g. Pay attention to the defense of all the Chieu Hoi Centers against Communist sabotage.

2. Planned Tasks

a. Strictly apply the Basic Instruction on Reception No. 222/HT/CH, 15 November 1968, issued by the Prime Minister (already disseminated to the Province, Sectors and Provincial Chieu Hoi Services) and follow up related military and civilian agencies as well as allied units in applying this document which covers the following areas:

   (1) Reception. Civilians, military personnel cadres, and allied troops should warmly welcome Hoi Chanh.

   (2) Award for weapons. The award for weapons must be made in the shortest possible time based on the rates fixed by the Chieu Hoi Ministry.

   (3) Transfer of Hoi Chanh. Strictly apply current regulations which prescribe that Hoi Chanh should be brought with all means available to the appropriate provincial Hoi Chanh Center in the shortest possible time.

   (4) Screening and determination of Hoi Chanh's personal records: the determination of personnel records and screening of Hoi Chanh elements must be done carefully in order to identify the elements who disguise as Hoi Chanh to perform their underground sabotaging actions or to be exempt from the draft.

   (5) Exploitation of information concerning enemy infrastructures in order to timely furnish this information to the local Phung Hoang Committee.

   (6) Hoi Chanh used as guides in military operations. Use of Hoi Chanh as guides in operations must be made on a voluntary basis, and other procedures for employing Hoi Chanh out of their centers must be respected.

b. All Hoi Chanh should attend a political training course at a Chieu Hoi center (province, regional, or central level according to their rank). A training program will be provided by the Chieu Hoi Ministry, and instructors will be cadres of this Ministry, or men of letters, experienced cadres of authorized associations, military personnel and civil servants (instructors will be paid).

c. Establish system of classifying Hoi Chanh in order to tailor their political training.

   (1) Youths. Could be drafted by the Communists again and therefore must have different political training than women and old persons.
(2) The two other types mentioned in (1) have a tendency to return to their old ways after leaving the Chieu Hoi Center and therefore need political training different from youths.

(3) Classification needs to be accomplished in detail in order to have data for research and estimates.

d. According to the budget situation, all Chieu Hoi Centers will be maintained and enlarged in order to improve their facilities and insure the defense.

e. Anti-Communist refugees, the persons whose relatives are joining the Communists, and other civilians will be encouraged to visit Chieu Hoi centers.

f. Detach personnel from the National Police General Directorate to all Chieu Hoi centers on the basis of at least two police personnel for one center in order to interrogate Hoi Chanh and prepare their personal dossiers and Identity Cards.

g. Issue Identity Cards to Hoi Chanh within two months from the date they arrive, and prior to their departure from the Chieu Hoi centers.

h. Improve the establishment of Hoi Chanh dossiers, especially the seven-colored cards. Hoi Chanh dossiers will have to be completed within one month, and the seven-colored cards within one week, beginning the date the Hoi Chanh entered the centers.

C. Vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities.

1. Purposes:

a. Help Hoi Chanh so that they can promptly join the national community. However, the treatment of Hoi Chanh will have to be legitimate so as to avoid any possible jealousy by members in nationalist ranks.

b. Majority of Hoi Chanh are farmers, therefore, their training will be aimed much as agriculture, fishery, and animal husbandry techniques in accordance with the national economy development policy, in addition to the handicraft and industry training. This training will be given only to those Hoi Chanh who want it.

c. The employment of Hoi Chanh in the Armed Forces and government agencies will have to be executed in compliance with the following criteria:

(1) The Hoi Chanh must be qualified in the assigned functions.

(2) The nationalist stand of the Hoi Chanh is reliable.

(3) In addition, after recruitment of Hoi Chanh, a guide plan will have to be made to help them to familiarize themselves with their newly-assigned functions as well as to avoid conflicts which often occur between them and their co-workers who are not Hoi Chanh.
d. Try to utilize Hoi Chanh in the Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

e. Attention will be paid to the updating of Hoi Chanh’s status when they are resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban wards and villages. This updating has two purposes:

(1) Understand clearly the status of Hoi Chanh in order to help them when necessary.

(2) Keep an eye on the political stand of the Hoi Chanh.

f. Pay attention to leading Hoi Chanh to return to a normal and peaceful life, participating in activities of groups such as PSDF, Youth Groups, Women’s Groups, or private organizations such as cooperatives and labor unions.

2. Planned tasks:

a. Vocational training.

(1) Provide training in cultivation and animal husbandry techniques to 40,000 Hoi Chanh while they are at Chieu hoi centers, and 4,000 resettled in Chieu Hoi villages.

(2) Give training in popular skills such as carpentry, masonry, tailoring, two and four stroke motor repair, typing, driving, etc.

b. Resettlement.

(1) Convert 30 Chieu Hoi villages to normal local communities.

(2) Completely maintain eight Chieu Hoi villages (buildings, wells, roads, etc.).

(3) Resettle an additional number of Hoi Chanh in existing villages.

(4) Issue land titles to Hoi Chanh resettled in Chieu Hoi villages located in governmental land.

(5) Organize agriculture and animal husbandry cooperatives at three Chieu Hoi villages which are suitable for agriculture development.

(6) Organize handicraft cooperatives at three Chieu Hoi villages.

(7) Push the 1969 program concerning the electrification of the 17 Chieu Hoi villages.

c. Employment.

(1) Recruit Hoi Chanh and organize them into 15 additional Chieu Hoi armed propaganda companies so as to bring the total strength of Chieu Hoi propaganda companies to 90.
(2) Recruit enough Hoi Chanh to act as village Chieu Hoi cadre (extend deadline for joining army).

(3) Recruit a maximum number of Hoi Chanh into the Popular Forces and Regional Forces and employ them in the protection of hamlets, villages, and mobile activities (subject of a separate plan of the Ministry of National Defense).

(4) Introduce Hoi Chanh to government and private factories for jobs.

(5) Establish a system to follow up results of the employment of Hoi Chanh at government and military agencies.

(6) Fix the manner and pursue achievement of organizing Chieu Hoi groups.

(7) Test Hoi Chanh's specialized qualifications previously learned from the Communists.

(8) Test military and cultural qualifications of Hoi Chanh who were commanders in the Communist forces in order to insure their interest when they perform military service.

d. Census and Liaison.

(1) Conduct the updating of status of Hoi Chanh, and make a census of Hoi Chanh resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban wards and villages through administrative channels therein (Ministries of Interior and Chieu Hoi will meet to settle details).

(2) Establish a liaison system between the Chieu Hoi infrastructure and Hoi Chanh who are leading a normal life as other citizens.

D. Support.

1. Personnel:

a. Recruit 1,130 village Chieu Hoi Cadres (recruit talented local inhabitants and Hoi Chanh with essential qualifications).

b. Recruit enough personnel and cadres as authorized (1,589 persons excluding 1,130 village cadres, and 6,660 armed propaganda cadres). Regarding 85 political instructors, they will be recruited among members introduced by anti-Communist parties and associations, and should have political qualifications and training.

c. Rationalize the assignment of personnel and cadres to local services based on local requirements.

d. Fifteen officers and NCOs from the Ministry of Defense will be detached to the Chieu Hoi Branch to perform security and intelligence tasks.
2. Training

a. The following personnel will be sent to the RD Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau for training:

   (1) 5,000 armed propaganda cadres (Hoi Chanh) for the following training:
       (a) People leadership.
       (b) Politics.
       (c) Operational techniques.
       (d) Military.

   (2) 1,500 Chieu hoi personnel and cadres: They will attend the aforementioned training. However the military training will be cancelled and replaced by the administrative, personnel, and financial training.

   (3) 1,130 village Chieu Hoi cadres: They will attend the aforementioned training. However, the military training will be cancelled and replaced by the Chieu Hoi technical training.

   (4) 200 Chieu Hoi Interrogator cadres. These cadres will be completely trained in techniques of interrogating and classifying Hoi Chanh, preparing their dossiers and laminated ID cards, and exploiting information concerning enemy situation.

   (5) 300 security and intelligence cadres. These cadres will be completely trained in security and intelligence techniques.

   (6) All the above-listed personnel and cadres (8,130) will attend one-month training course.

b. Training and refresher training to be conducted by the Chieu Hoi Ministry:

   (1) One Province Service Chief training course for Deputy Province Service Chiefs and outstanding District Section Chiefs.

   (2) One District Service Chief training course for outstanding personnel.

   (3) One refresher training course for Province Service Chiefs and Regional Center Managers.

   (4) One refresher training course for District Section Chiefs.

   (5) The appointment of Province Service Chiefs and District Section Chiefs will be made based on their classification after graduation.

3. Finance

The foreign aid fund in the Chieu Hoi Budget appropriated for the management of Chieu hoi programs at localities will be transferred through normal procedures to the Provinces for use through RD financial procedures.
V. PREPARATION OF PLANS

Based on the main points in this Annex and according to local situation, all Province Chieu Hoi Service are requested to compile their own Annex to be attached to the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. See Annex XVIII.

VI. COORDINATION

In order to achieve the objectives set forth for 1970 (Receive 40,000 Hoi Chanh, and vitalize their activities), the Chieu Hoi program will require coordination between the Chieu Hoi agencies, governmental and allied civilian agencies, ARVN and Allied Forces at Central and especially local levels through the command channel of all Pacification and Development Councils.

a. In order to promote propaganda and motivation (popularize government's policies), coordination of the following agencies will be required:


2. Joint General Staff, ARVN (Department of Political Warfare): Armed propaganda teams, printed propaganda materials, loudspeaker aircraft, radio, psywar units and cadres.

3. Ministry of Revolutionary Development and Ministry of Ethnic Minorities: Coordinate activities between RD Cadres or Son Thon Cadres and armed propaganda teams.

4. MACV-JUSPAO support propaganda operations, loudspeaker aircraft, leaflet drops, special activities in Chieu Hoi operations.

5. Psywar Operations Coordinating Centers: Support propaganda and aircraft operations in tactics applicable to various corps and provinces.

b. In the reception of Hoi Chanh (apply the procedures for reception, particularly the establishment of dossiers, classification, issuance of ID cards the entry of Hoi Chanh into Chieu Hoi Centers within two months, and exploitation of the enemy situation), coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. Ministry of Interior (General Directorate of National Police), J2/JGS.

c. In the political training of Hoi Chanh at the Chieu Hoi Centers, coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. Ministry of Information (Province Information Services).

2. Sector S-5s.

3. Anti-Communist national political parties.
d. In the vocational training and employment of Hoi Chanh, coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development. This Ministry will help in training 44,000 Hoi Chanh in cultivation and animal husbandry techniques, and issuing land titles to Hoi Chanh who are resettled in Chieu Hoi villages.

2. The Ministry of Health. This Ministry will assist in testing medical qualifications of Hoi Chanh who were nurses and physicians turned out by Communist regime.

3. The Ministries of Education and Defense. These Ministries will assist in testing cultural and military qualification of Hoi Chanh who were commanders in the Communist Forces.

4. The Ministry of Defense. This Ministry will help in recruiting a large number of Hoi Chanh into Regional and Popular Forces.

e. In the execution of the full range of Chieu Hoi tasks at the grass-root level (particularly the updating of status of Chieu Hoi and census of Hoi Chanh resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban villages and wards), coordination is required with the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Interior through the Administrative Committees of rural villages, and urban villages and wards.

2. The Ministries of Revolutionary Development and Information through the hamlet and village cadres.

f. In the training and refresher training of Chieu Hoi personnel and cadres, coordination is required with the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development in the training of 8,130 personnel and cadres at RD Cadre Training Center, Vung Tau.

2. The Ministry of Interior in the administration training of local Chieu Hoi personnel and cadres in provinces.

g. In the operational management, education, and mobilization of the morale of all Hoi Chanh Armed Propaganda Teams, coordination is required from the Ministry of Interior through the Province Chiefs who have direct responsibility for the employment and management of Chieu Hoi Armed Propaganda Teams.

h. In the provision of weapons to Hoi Chanh Armed Propaganda Teams, coordination is required from the Ministry of Defense.

i. In the detachment of personnel, coordination is required from the Ministry of Defense in the detachment of officers and non-commissioned officers from that Ministry to the Chieu Hoi Branch to perform security and intelligence operations for village Chieu Hoi Cadres.
VII. REPORTS

a. A monthly report form will be disseminated by the Chieu Hoi Ministry to all Provincial Services.

b. The monthly operational report of the previous month will have to be submitted to the Chieu Hoi Ministry prior to the fifth of the following month. Copies of this report will be sent to:

(1) Concerned province or city Pacification and Development Council.

(2) CTZ Chieu Hoi Office.
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Appendix 9

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 381-11

19 April 1969
(MACJ2)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

EXPLOITATION OF HUMAN SOURCES AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

1. PURPOSE. This directive announces policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the U.S. military intelligence exploitation of human sources and captured documents within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. APPLICABILITY. This directive is applicable to all U.S. personnel assigned to U.S. units, agencies, and headquarters operating in the RVN; and to all U.S. personnel assigned to advisory or liaison duties, at all levels of command, to the RVN or Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).

3. DEFINITIONS.

   a. Detainee. A person who has been apprehended by U.S., RVN, or other FWMAF but whose individual status has not yet been determined. Although such persons have not been categorized as a prisoner of war, they are entitled to the same protection afforded a prisoner of war under the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (CPW49).

   b. Very Important Source (VIS). A human source assessed by appropriate intelligence officers or personnel to be of significant intelligence value and warrants immediate exploitation because of his rank, level of access to information, area of knowledgeability, or particular unit of assignment.

   c. Documents. All written, printed, drawn, or engraved material, sound or voice recordings, photographs, exposed film, insignia, or reproductions of the foregoing.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

   a. The ACoS, J-2, MACV, is responsible for developing plans, policies, and procedures for the intelligence exploitation of human sources and captured documents.

   b. Commanders of subordinate commands, advisory, and liaison teams, as defined in MACV Directive 310-2, will insure compliance with the procedures contained herein.

*As revised 6/3/69 and 8/17/69

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5. GENERAL. The intelligence exploitation of human sources and captured documents is accomplished through a combined U.S., RVN, and other FWMAF exploitation system. The concept of combined interrogation of sources and exploitation of captured documents is practiced at all echelons. The priority for human source and captured document exploitation in this system is: first, combat intelligence; second, intelligence required by higher headquarters; third, psychological operations; and fourth, public information. This mutually supporting system provides for the exchange of information derived from captured documents and human sources. This system is designed to satisfy appropriate intelligence requirements of the U.S., RVN, and other FWMAF (see JGS Directive 170-1).

   a. The following facilities and teams comprise the combined exploitation system.

      (1) A Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) located in Saigon.

      (2) A Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) located in Saigon.

      (3) Corps Interrogation Centers (CIC) located at Da Nang, I CTZ; Pleiku, II CTZ; Bien Hoa, III CTZ; and Can Tho, IV CTZ.

      (4) U.S. interrogation/translation teams attached to the RVNAF elements.

      (5) RVNAF interrogation teams attached to U.S. and other FWMAF.

      (6) U.S. advisory, assistance, and liaison personnel assigned to the RVN and other Free World forces.

   b. Through liaison with national and local officials, additional interrogation and document exploitation support may be provided during specific operations by Government of Vietnam (GVN) agencies.

   c. Field interrogations and field document exploitation will be conducted by CMIC and CDEC field teams when subordinate units need special assistance in interrogation or document exploitation because of an unusually high number of detainees taken or documents captured, or when an especially difficult exploitation situation has arisen requiring assistance. Requests for field team assistance will be validated by ACoFS, J-2, MACV, Exploitation Division, and will be dispatched as personnel resources allow. Extraordinary circumstances may warrant the dispatch of a field team without prior request from the field commander.

6. HUMAN SOURCE INTERROGATION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES.

   a. General. Detainees will be screened expeditiously by the capturing unit to determine PW or non-PW status, to identify knowledgeable sources, and to establish interrogation priorities. All detainees will be processed in accordance with the provisions of MACV Directive 381-46. Doubtful cases will be processed as outlined in MACV Directive 20-5.
b. Exploitation of Sources.

(1) Interrogations may be conducted at all levels of command. However, interrogation will normally be limited to that information which is of immediate value to the commander of the unit having custody and his subordinate units or agencies.

(2) All interrogations will be conducted in accordance with pertinent provisions of the Geneva Conventions relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), 1949, with particular regard to the prohibitions which apply equally to all detainees incorporated within the definitions contained in Articles four and five. Detainee and PW interrogations at separate regiment, brigade, and division PW collecting points will be conducted so as to permit military police observation of interrogations. Military police will be positioned as to not to interfere with the interrogation procedures or environment. Interrogations at corps and force level will be conducted in accordance with CMIC agreement dated 14 August 1968 and signed jointly by JCS/MACV. When U.S. personnel have knowledge of a RVN or FWNAF violation of the Geneva Conventions, a report must be made through channels to the senior U.S. commander involved in the operation. The senior U.S. commander will then point out the violation to the RVNAF or FWNAF commander. A report identifying all parties involved and describing the violation in detail is to be forwarded to COMUSMACV, Attn: MACJA, by the senior U.S. commander. Reports of Geneva Convention violations will be transmitted electrically by priority precedence.

(3) Sources will be held at the CMIC and the CIC for a reasonable time mutually agreed on by the J-2/JCS, RVNAF, and the ACoF, J-2, MACV.

(4) Interrogation of PW and Hoi Chans in the CMIC is ordinarily based on the MACV Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP), and current MACV special collection plans. Requirements in addition to the ICP and special collection plans will be processed by way of the Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR) format (see MACV Dir 381-16 (C)).

(5) The CIC will collect intelligence information in response to requirements of the corps commander, U.S. senior advisor, and higher headquarters. Methods of tasking CIC by higher headquarters will be made by separate arrangements.

c. Evacuation of Prisoners of Intelligence Value.

(1) The normal evacuation of knowledgeable PW by U.S. and other FWNAF is from capturing unit to division or separate brigade, then to the RVNAF Corps PW camp as shown in Annex A. VIS may be released to the CIC, or directly to the CMIC in Saigon for detailed interrogation. The evacuation of PW and RVNAF division tactical areas or corps level PW camps is not to exceed 14 days from the date of capture.

(2) Units evacuating sources directly to the CMIC will notify the U.S. Director, CMIC, of the expected time of arrival so necessary arrangements may be made with the RVNAF detaining authorities at the center.
(3) When it is necessary to reinterview a PW after he has entered the ARVN PW camp, the PW may be retrieved from the PW camp by coordination with the ARVN corps G-1.

d. Hoi Chanhs of Intelligence Value. GVN authorities require that Hoi Chanh be delivered to the sector S-2 within 48 hours of the original contact with friendly elements. During this period he may be interrogated, if the Hoi Chanh agrees, for perishable information of immediate tactical value. Hoi Chanhs will be processed and handled in accordance with MACV Directive 381-50.

e. Innocent Civilians of Intelligence Value. The sector S-2, or the S-2 advisor will supervise the interrogation of innocent civilians who possess information satisfying military intelligence requirements. Detainees placed in the innocent civilian category will not be held by U.S. units; they will be turned over to ARVN sector officials for processing and return to their homes.

f. Reporting Procedures. All U.S. units (separate brigade and higher) will report on PW and Hoi Chanhs as indicated below; the unit having custody of the PW or Hoi Chanh is responsible for reporting. Advisory personnel and U.S. military liaison personnel with other PAVN/AF units will insure that reports are forwarded, as they are available, on all PW and Hoi Chanhs who meet the reporting criteria for each report required.

(1) Interrogation Spot Report. The first report on a PW or Hoi Chanh from VC LF battalions, VC MF units, all NVA units, or a member of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) at district level and above, will be transmitted electrically within 12 hours from time of capture or return. Interrogation Spot Reports should not be transmitted on PW or Hoi Chanhs from hamlet or village level units and organizations unless the PW or Hoi Chanh has valuable or potentially valuable information. The minimum amount of information required in the Interrogation Spot Report is found at Annex B. Format is to be followed exactly as prescribed. It is to be clearly indicated which of the four categories source belongs to: NVA/PW; NVA/Hoi Chanh (Returnee); VC/PW; or VC/Hoi Chanh (Returnee).

(2) Very Important Source Report (VISR). Very important sources will be identified through the VISR which will be transmitted electrically within 48 hours after the transmission of the Interrogation Spot Report. The format for the VISR is at Annex C.

g. Interrogation Reports.

(1) All reports submitted subsequent to the Interrogation Spot Report will fully identify the PW or Hoi Chanh by repeating his full name (the Vietnamese diacritical markings of the PW or Hoi Chanh's name will be indicated by use of the International Telegraphic Code (ITC), alias(es), rank, and date and place of capture or return (DTG and UTM coordinates).
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(2) A copy of all interrogation reports originated by the RVN and other FWNAF, and passed locally to U.S. units, U.S. advisors, and liaison personnel, will be forwarded through intelligence channels to the same addressees as listed on the Interrogation Spot Report.

(3) Interrogation reports will be classified in accordance with MACV Directive 380-5.

(4) Initial Interrogation Report. This report is to be transmitted electrically within 72 hours of the transmission of the Interrogation Spot Report. The criteria for transmitting an Initial Interrogation Report is the same as the Interrogation Spot Report. Every Interrogation Spot Report is to be followed up by an Initial Interrogation Report. A copy of this report will accompany the PW during evacuation. The Initial Interrogation Report format is found at Annex D. Format is to be followed exactly as prescribed. It is to be clearly indicated in this report which of the four categories source belongs to: NVA/PW; NVA/Hoi Chanh (Returnee); VC/PW; or VC/Hoi Chanh (Returnee).

(5) Additional Interrogation Report. Three copies of any interrogation reports in addition to those required by this directive will be forwarded to the ACoFS, J-2, MACV, Exploitation Division. The interrogation report format found in FM 30-15 is recommended for additional reports.

(6) Intelligence Information Report (IIR), DD Form 1396. The IIR will be prepared by the CMIC and the CIC in response to MACV SICR (see MACV Directive 381-26 (C).

h. Knowledgeability Brief (KB). A KB will be prepared on every PW and Hoi Chanh who is interrogated at the CMIC and CIC. Criteria for publication of the KB will be established by the CMIC and the CIC directors. As a general rule, KB should be published on PW and Hoi Chanhs of officer and NCO rank, PW or ralliers having significant information on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), and others who are in possession of valuable tactical or strategic information. The format for the KB is found in Annex E.

i. PW control. U.S. directors of the CMIC; the corps interrogation centers at Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho; and the Division Interrogation Center at Hue will report by the 10th of each month all U.S. captured PW who have been interrogated during the preceding month. The report will include the PW name, rank, organization, date of capture, and disposition. Report is to be forwarded to CG, USARV, Attn: AVHPS-PW.

j. Availability of Sources for Transfer to CMIC. The corps interrogation centers at Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho will forward or transmit to the ACoFS, J-2, MACV (MACJ213 and MACJ213-3), on the 15th and last day of each month, a report of all sources that are expected to be available for transfer in the forthcoming two weeks. Report will include name, status (PW or Hoi Chanh), rank, organization, date and place of capture, areas of knowledgeability, and degree of cooperativeness of source.
7. EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

a. General. Captured documents will be expeditiously processed, exploited, and evacuated to division or separate brigade level, with subsequent evacuation directly to CDEC, if feasible. The original document will be forwarded so as to reach CDEC within 10 days of the date of capture. Because of the complete facilities available at CDEC, the forwarding of documents within the first two days following capture will provide maximum exploitation results in most cases. Units will process all captured documents on an urgent basis, and follow-through on the final delivery of documents to CDEC, with view to improving evacuation procedures.

b. Document Reporting. Captured documents containing significant intelligence information (such as new order of battle findings, attack plans, location of mine fields or booby traps, or new weapons or equipment) will be reported electrically to COMUSMACV for the ACoFS, J-2, MACV (see Annex F). Other appropriate FWMAF/RVNAF units (to include ARVN corps) should be included as addressees of this spot report. The original copy of the significant captured document will be forwarded expeditiously to CDEC.

c. Document Reproduction. Within existing capabilities, captured documents containing important intelligence information will be reproduced for distribution to interested higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units, to the local ARVN corps, and other RVNAF/FWMAF units as appropriate. Translations which accompany captured documents should be in a format similar to that of the Translation Report at Annex G.

d. Detainees and Hoi Chanh with Documents. Documents taken along with a detainee or Hoi Chanh will be reproduced at the lowest echelon possible, the original copy forwarded to CDEC, and the duplicate copy evacuated with the individual to aid in interrogation.

e. Technical Documents. Documents concerning materiel will be tagged "Technical Documents" or appropriately identified to facilitate technical intelligence exploitation. Technical documents, when captured or acquired with materiel, will be annotated to describe the materiel from which the documents were separated and the documents will be forwarded to the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) in accordance with MACV Directive 381-24.

f. Signal or Cryptographic Documents. Signal or cryptographic documents containing codes or charts pertaining to enemy messages or message traffic will be delivered promptly to the Technical Research Unit (TRU) field team in each corps area. If contact cannot be made with the TRU field team, the documents will be forwarded to the ACoFS, J-2, MACV, Exploitation Division, Attn: TRU, by the most expeditious means.

g. Packaging and Tagging Documents. Captured documents will be packaged, tagged with document cards (a locally produced form similar to that shown at Annex H may be used), and delivered by the capturing or acquiring
unit to the next higher echelon (normally battalion or brigade) at which field exploitation may be accomplished. If document cards are not available, the protective wrapping placed around the documents will be annotated with the date, time, place, and circumstances of capture or acquisition (such as "taken from captive," "found on body," or "found in bunker"); the identity of the capturing or acquiring unit; and the name or numerical designation of the specific operation in which the document was captured. Captured documents will be handled as CONFIDENTIAL. However, no marking whatsoever will be made directly on any captured document.

h. Batch Slips. Transmittal of captured documents from one echelon of command to another will be under cover of a batch slip. A locally produced form similar to that shown in Annex I may be used.

i. Propaganda Documents. Propaganda materials will be forwarded to the CDEC as outlined in paragraph 6g, above, and MACV Directive 380-20. The acquiring unit will enter on the accompanying document card the information pertaining to the propaganda materials such as quantities of leaflets found, area of coverage in which leaflets were distributed, suspected target group, and methods of delivery.

j. Captured Film. Captured enemy film will be handled in the manner described for documents in paragraph 6g, above, except that all film will be forwarded without delay to the CDEC for initial processing and evaluation.

k. Captured Currency. Policies and procedures to be used in safeguarding and disposing of currency captured during field operations are prescribed by MACV Directive 37-20.

8. REPORTS

Reports required by this directive are assigned reports control symbols as indicated below:

b. Interrogation Spot Report (RCS: MACJ2-26)
d. Initial Interrogation Report (RCS: MACJ2-28)
e. Knowledgeability Brief (excluding those published on DD Form 1396)(RCS: MACJ2-29)
f. PW Control Report (RCS: MACJ2-19(RI))
g. Very Important Document Spot Report (RCS: MACJ2-31)
h. Translation Report, Document Identification and Document Transmittal tags and slips (RCS: MACJ2-32)
i. Availability of Sources for Transfer to CMIC (RCS: MACJ2-47).

9. REFERENCES

b. FM 19-40
c. FM 27-10
d. FM 30-5
e. FM 30-15
f. MACV Directive 20-5
g. MACV Directive 37-20
h. MACV Directive 190-3
i. MACV Directive 310-2
j. MACV Directive 380-5
k. MACV Directive 380-20
l. MACV Directive 381-16 (C)
m. MACV Directive 381-17 (S)
n. MACV Directive 381-24
o. MACV Directive 381-26 (C)
p. MACV Directive 381-46
q. MACV Directive 381-50
r. MACV Directive 335-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(Official Seal)  
ELIAS C. TOWNSEND  
Major General, USA  
Chief of Staff

SIDNEY GRITZ  
Colonel, USA  
Adjutant General

Annexes
A. Prisoners of War Intelligence Evacuation Channel
B. Interrogation Spot Report Format
C. Very Important Source Report (VISR) Format
D. Initial Interrogation Report Format
E. Knowledgeability Brief (KB) Format
F. Very Important Document Spot Report Format
G. Translation Report
H. Document Card (RGS: MACJ2-32)
I. Batch Slip

DISTRIBUTION:
B
Plus: 300 MACAG-AOP
120 MACJ213
25 MACJ2
2 MACAG-AOD
1. US/TVHAF Channel
2. ARVN Channel
3. After recovery, FW may be evacuated to FW Camp, CIC or CMIC. Interrogations will be conducted in accordance with MACV Dir 190-3.
   * FFORCEN/III MAF Headquarters are not in the evacuation chain, but will coordinate the evacuation of prisoners from subordinate units to the CTZ Headquarters, and may conduct interrogations as necessary.
   ** Navy and Air Force units are to turn FW over to the nearest US Army or USMC unit after initial exploitation.

   a. Name and alias(es).

   b. Rank or position (NVA or VC).

   c. Date and place of capture or return (in DTG and UTM coordinates).

   d. Capturing unit.

   e. PW or Hoi Chanh's unit designation, location, and mission.

   f. Present location and future disposition of PW or Hoi Chanh.

2. **GUIDANCE.** COMUSMACV will be an addressee of Interrogation Spot Reports.

   a. The following ACoS, J-2, MACV, offices will be listed on message "for" lines.

      (1) MACJ213 (Exploitation Division).

      (2) MACJ213-3 (CMIC).

      (3) MACJ232 (Current Intelligence, Indication, and Estimates Division).

      (4) MACJ241 (RVNAF Intelligence Affairs Division).

   b. This report is to be transmitted electrically within 12 hours of capture or return.

Annex B
   a. Name/alias(es).
   b. Rank/position (NVA or VC).
   c. Unit/organization (NVA or VC); complete subordination of his unit; e.g. company, battalion, regiment, division, or infiltration group.
   d. Date of capture/return.
   e. Place of capture/return (UTM coordinates).
   f. Capturing unit.
   g. Present location of source.
   h. Statement of substantive information obtained from source.
   i. Major areas and depth of source knowledgesability.
   j. Originator's comments (status of interrogation, planned disposition of source, recommended further evacuation, and exploitation).
   k. Statement of level of cooperation to be expected from PW or Hoi Chanh (see paragraph 15, FM 30-15).

2. **GUIDANCE.** COMUSMACV will be an addressee of VIS reports.
   a. The following ACoS, J-2, MACV, offices will be listed on message "for" lines:
      (1) MACJ213 (Exploitation Division).
      (2) MACJ213-3 (CMIC).
      (3) MACJ232 (Current Intelligence, Indication and Estimates Division).
      (4) MACJ241 (RVNAF Intelligence Affairs Division).
   b. This report is required 48 hours after the Interrogation Spot Report.
INITIAL INTERROGATION REPORT
(MESSAGE FORMAT)

   a. Report number.
   b. Name/alias(es).
   c. NVA/VC rank/function and serial number.
   d. Specific duty assignment.
   e. DOB.
   f. POB.
   g. Date, time, and place of capture/return (in UTM grid coordinates).
   h. Circumstances of capture or return.
   i. Type/quantity of weapons and documents in possession at time of capture.
   j. VC/NVA unit ID and Also-Known-As (AKA) designations of the unit.
   k. Infiltration data to include infiltration card number and destination.
   l. Last known location of unit and date.
   m. Mission of unit (be as specific as possible).
   n. Other information of immediate tactical value.
   o. Areas of knowledgeability.
   p. Interrogator’s comments (indicate level of cooperation, see paragraph 15, FM 30-15).
   q. Interrogator’s name, rank, and unit.
   r. SICR numbers or EEI this report answers.
   s. Present location and future disposition.

2. GUIDANCE. COMUSMACV will be an addressee of Initial Interrogation reports.

Annex D
UNCLASSIFIED

MACV Dir 381-1

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a. The following ACoS, J-2, MACV, office will be listed on message "for" lines:

(1) MACJ213 (Exploitation Division).
(2) MACJ213-3 (CMIC).
(3) MACJ232 (Current Intelligence, Indications and Estimates Division).
(4) MACJ241 (RVNAF Intelligence Affairs Division).

b. This report is required to be transmitted electrically within 72 hours of the interrogation Spot Report.
1. **SUBJECT.** Knowledgeability Brief (KB). Reference MACV Dir 381-11.
   a. Biographical data.
      (1) Name of PW or Hoi Chanh.
      (2) Alias(es).
      (3) Rank or position.
      d. Unit (VC/NVA).
   e. Family data: (parents' names, date and place of birth, home of residence, and marital status).
   f. Education: (years of education, name of college or university attended, if any).
   g. Political affiliation (length of affiliation).
   h. Total military service.
   i. Relatives working with RVNAF.
   j. Relatives working with NVA/VC.
   k. Religion.

2. **CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE OR RETURN.**
   a. Date and place of capture or return (give locations in UTM grid coordinates).
   b. Unit capturing PW or unit to which Hoi Chanh rallied.
   c. Weapons, equipment, or documents in possession at time of capture or return.
   d. Persons captured or returning with source.

3. **PAST ACTIVITIES.** (Include only those events in PW or Hoi Chanh's biography which will aid in exploitation.)

4. **KNOWLEDGEABILITY.** (List items in which PW or Hoi Chanh can be expected to have a good knowledgeable background and can be exploited regardless of tactical level or interest.)

Annex E
5. GUIDANCE. KB will be issued to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. Those KB addressed to HQ, MACV, will be marked for ACoS, J-2, MACV, ATTN: MACJ213; ACoS, J-2, MACV, ATTN: MACJ232; ACoS, J-2, MACV, ATTN: MACJ214; and Chief, Studies and Observations Group, MACV. KB published by CMIC will be dispatched to higher headquarters and other US agencies as required. KB published by CIC will not be transmitted out-of-country. In the event a PW or Ho Chi Minh is significant enough to inform higher headquarters, KB produced by CIC will be retransmitted from HQ, MACV.

1. Type of document.

2. Date, time, location, and circumstances of acquisition, to include name/number of operation.

3. Summary of significant information contained in the document.

4. Local coordination.

5. Status of evacuation of document to CDEC.

6. Other pertinent data.

Annex F
TRANSLATION REPORT

Control data:

1. Item no. __________
2. Description of document:
3. Capturing unit:
4. Name/number of operation:
5. Date received __________ in batch no. __________
6. Type of translation. (FULL) (EXTRACT) (SUMMARY)

Text of translation (use continuation sheets as needed).

(CLASSIFICATION)

Annex G

(Unclassified until filled in)
### DOCUMENT CARD

(RCS: MACJ2-32)

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Annex H
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PCC: MAC 72-32

Annex 1

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

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Appendix 10

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE  
NUMBER 525-6  

25 June 1970  
(MACCords)

MILITARY OPERATIONS

LUC LUONG 66 PROGRAM
(Kit Carson Scout Program)

1. PURPOSE. This directive establishes policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures in the employment and utilization of Chieu Hoi returnees in the Luc Luong 66 Program.

2. APPLICABILITY. This directive is applicable to all allied tactical forces and provincial advisory teams in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

3. GENERAL. A program of employing reliable and aggressive male Chieu Hoi returnees to accompany tactical forces on military operations was formally adopted within MACV and is designated as the Luc Luong 66 Program. Returnees to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) under the Chieu Hoi Program have been providing valuable assistance to allied forces in combat. Their services have resulted in more effective operations and in fewer friendly casualties.

4. POLICY.

   a. This directive governs the full-time employment of Chieu Hoi returnees by allied tactical forces and provincial advisory teams to support operational, intelligence, and psychological operation (PSYOP) activities in counterinsurgency operations. These instructions are not applicable to the employment of such individuals for general administrative or logistical functions; nor do they modify instructions relating to immediate intelligence exploitation of returnees as governed by MACV Directive 381-11.

   b. Allied tactical units and provincial advisory teams are authorized to hire selected Chieu Hoi returnees on a full-time basis to assist in military operations when such individuals, familiar with an area of operations and/or North Vietnamese Army (NVA)/Viet Cong (VC) activities, can contribute to the accomplishment of the counterinsurgency mission.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

   a. Chieu Hoi Directorate, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). Provides staff supervision of the Luc Luong 66 Program for COMUSMACV.

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 525-6, 23 September 1968.
b. Deputy Commanding General, USARV. Provides personnel management for the Luc Luong 66 Program in US Army tactical units, and for the province advisory teams.

c. Commanding General, III MAF. Provides personnel management for the Luc Luong 66 Program in the U.S. Marine Division.

d. Commander, NAVFORV. Provides personnel management for the Luc Luong 66 Program for all U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam.


g. Commander, Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam. Provides personnel management for the Luc Luong 66 Program for Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam.

h. Commander, Each Organization Employing Scouts. Provides a scout coordinator and administrative assistants. Such personnel are to be provided on a full-time basis at division and separate brigade to insure necessary recruiting, training of scouts, and administration of the Luc Luong 66 Program.

6. PROCEEDURES.

a. Selection and Hire of Returnees.

(1) Commanders/senior advisors may arrange with the GVN provincial Chieu Hoi officials and CORDS Chieu Hoi Advisor to assist in the selection of returnees who indicate usable knowledge of NVA/VC.

(2) Returnees may be hired only after having completed the prescribed indoctrination course at the Chieu Hoi Center and after formal release by appropriate GVN Chieu Hoi officials. All NVA returnees are sent to the National Chieu Hoi Center, Saigon, and can be recruited at that location.

(3) All personnel and administrative actions which are required in order to hire and supervise the scouts are to be performed in accordance with the Personnel Policy Manual (reference 8d, below).

b. Assignment and Utilization.

(1) COMUSMACV will establish authorized ceilings of scouts for commanders providing personnel management (see paragraph 5, above). Commanders providing personnel management will allocate scouts to their tactical units and/or provincial advisory teams.

(2) Allied tactical units and provincial advisory teams may hire scouts in accordance with their tactical requirements but are not to exceed the allocations established by the headquarters providing personnel management.
(3) Local area familiarity enhances the value of scouts on operations but is not to be an overriding consideration when deciding to keep or reassign scouts should the unit be committed to another area.

(4) General missions which can be accomplished by scouts are:

(a) Assist in tactical operations as guides or scouts.

(b) Assist in locating and identifying enemy units, assembly areas, and routes of movement.

(c) Assist in search operations for NVA/VC equipment and supplies.

(d) Assist in population control and concurrent PSYOP.

(e) Assist in interrogation of captives, suspects, or other returnees.

(f) Assist tactical and intelligence units and GVN police forces by identifying members of the NVA/VC through visual recognition.

(g) Assist in identification of dead or wounded NVA/VC.

(5) Scouts are not to be expected to perform duties more hazardous or more often than regular members of the parent unit.

(6) Scouts have been authorized a draft deferment by the GVN Ministry of Defense under the following conditions:

(a) The scouts are granted a six month draft deferment by virtue of their rallying to the Chieu Hoi Program. The effective date of the deferment is the date of official release from the Chieu Hoi Center. They are to be hired during the period that their Chieu Hoi Program deferment is still effective.

(b) Draft deferments for 12 month periods must be requested from the Mobilization Directorate, Ministry of National Defense, Saigon. The initial request must be forwarded through the headquarters providing personnel management within one week of the date of hire. Subsequent requests for deferment extensions must be forwarded through the same channels to arrive at the Mobilization Directorate at least 30 days prior to termination of the current deferment (see Annex A).

(c) The scouts are authorized annual draft deferment extensions as long as they are employed as scouts. A Certificate of Deferment, QD772 or QD772A, for each scout, will be forwarded through channels to the requesting unit upon approval by the Mobilization Directorate (see Appendix 2 to Annex A).
(d) Service as a scout does not provide constructive credit towards military service obligations.

(e) Upon termination of employment, regardless of cause, the Mobilization Directorate is to be promptly notified of the scout's draft availability and the draft deferment certificate returned to the Mobilization Directorate. Reason for termination must be specified, and, if the deferment certificate is not returned, a reason is to be given (see Appendix 3 to Annex A). One copy of the Letter of Notification is to be forwarded to this headquarters, Attn: MACCORDS-CHD, for information. In addition, the employing organization is to escort the terminated scout to the Chieu Hoi Center from which recruited, and furnish a written explanation of the reason for termination.

(f) In the event scouts are transferred from one major organization to another, the losing unit is to submit to the Mobilization Directorate, through proper channels, a roster using the format at Appendix 1 to Annex A, specifying the organization(s) to which the scout(s) has/have been transferred. The gaining unit is to confirm the transfer by submitting a similar roster. Rosters are to be submitted within one week of loss or gain.

c. Training.

(1) Each employing organization is to provide appropriate training for new scouts prior to utilization.

(2) The training is to accomplish the following as a minimum:

(a) Emphasis is to be placed on the scout's knowledge of English terms to the degree necessary to enable the individual to understand instructions relating to command and control.

(b) Familiarization with tactics and standing operating procedures of the unit by which employed.

(c) Proper operation, care, and cleaning of clothing and equipment issued for their use.

(d) A full understanding of his position and mission within the unit of employment.

(e) An understanding of the GVN and U.S. Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) counterinsurgency goals in the RVN.


(1) The employment of Chieu Hoi returnees as scouts presents a personnel security problem. The past activities and associations of the returnees and the difficulty of performing complete background investigations to determine the motivation and loyalty of the scouts is recognized. Therefore, all possible sources of information must be made use of to reduce the security risk.
(2) The military intelligence units organic to, or in support of, employing organizations are encouraged to render all possible assistance to reduce the security risk.

(3) The employing organization is responsible for determining, within the degree of sources of information available, the motivation and loyalty of each scout employed.

(4) The priority for recruitment, as a matter of policy, should be for those Chieu Hoi returnees whose family ties are in areas controlled by the GVN.

(5) The process of recruitment should include:

(a) The completion of a History Statement (MACV Form 2 EV-R), or a similar personal history form.

(b) Extraction of pertinent background information from Chieu Hoi Center files.

(c) Interview of recruit by qualified debriefing personnel to assist in determining motivation and loyalty.

(6) There is no requirement for a military security service security clearance prior to employment (see MACV Directive 690-11).

(7) The employing organization will maintain a personal security file on each scout which will include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Copy of History Statement (MACV Form 2 EV-R), or a similar personal history form.

(b) Full length, front and side photographs.

(c) Complete set of fingerprints.

(d) All other available or developed information.

(8) Employing organizations will request MACJ2 (CI) to conduct a file check on each scout. The request will reflect full name, aliases, date and place of birth, family and VC/NVA history. The request and results will be filed in the scout's personal security file.

(9) Employing organizations will establish controls, within tactical limitations, to control movement of scouts within fire base areas and base camps.

(10) The employing organizations will require a report, at least every 60 days, from using units as to the scout's attitudes, abilities, shortcomings, questionable activities, achievements, and displayed loyalties. These reports will be filed in the scout's personal security files.

(11) Employing organizations may request, in accordance with MACV Directive 380-28, a polygraph examination for scouts suspected of subversive activities.
(12) Exposed or suspected false Chieu Hoi returnees who are scouts will be reported, prior to termination of employment, to employing organizations organic to or supporting Military Intelligence Units. The Military Intelligence Unit will prepare and forward a Summary of Information Report to MACJ2, Attn: J22.

e. Logistic Support.

Logistic support for scouts to include clothing, equipment, daily rations, and billeting is to be furnished by the employing unit. Issue of the clothing and equipment included at Annex E is optional, depending on the requirement for clothing and equipment for the scouts to properly perform their duties. Sundry pack items are authorized for issue to scouts.

f. Funding.

Scouts are to be paid monthly. Funds to support this requirement are to be provided from assistance in kind (ATK) funds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scouts Assigned In</th>
<th>Funding Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Marine Units</td>
<td>III MAF (AIK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Units and Province Advisory Teams</td>
<td>USARV (AIK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam (NAVFORV)</td>
<td>NAVFORV (AIK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFW)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam (RTFW)</td>
<td>RTFW (AIK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Medical.

(1) Prior to employment by allied forces, returnees are to undergo a physical examination to ascertain that they are free from communicable diseases or latent physical defects.

(2) Initial physical examination and complete medical and dental service for an occupational injury are authorized in allied military medical facilities. Once the scout's condition is stabilized sufficiently that further treatment in allied medical facilities is not required and available GVN medical facilities are capable of providing necessary sustained treatment, the expenses for sustained treatment are to be provided under the provision of the Bureau of Employees Compensation. The same provisions are to be used by AIK-funded programs.

h. Awards and Decorations.

(1) The scouts may receive U.S. valorous awards, Silver Star, and below. These awards are to be made based on the same criteria required for those recommended and approved for members of the Free World Forces; the provisions of MACV Directive 672-1 and appropriate component service regulations apply. Impact awards are limited to the Bronze Star with "V" device and the Army Commendation Medal with "V" device.
(2) The Ministry of Defense Awards and Decorations System allows scouts to receive GVN decorations and is to be used when acts of gallantry have been performed by scouts.

(3) At present, scouts are authorized to receive the following GVN awards and decorations:

(a) Gallantry Cross with Palm (highest award); Gold Star; Silver Star; and Bronze Star.

(b) Certificate of Achievement.

(c) Letter of Commendation.

(4) Citations for decorations are to be prepared by the employing unit, in the Vietnamese language, and forwarded to the appropriate Commander, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Regiment, Division/Corps, through the Commanding General, ARVN Corps Tactical Zone, for approval (see Annex B).

i. Records.

A complete personnel record of the scout is maintained at the servicing area civilian personnel office. The employing organization is to maintain adequate local records to: insure prompt identification of the scout in case of injury or death; locate the scout's next of kin; record the expiration date of the scout's draft deferment certificate; and keep a record of the scout's performance.

j. Identification.

(1) Identification tags. Each scout will be issued identification tags by the employing organization that will show name, unit, blood type, and the words "Luc Luong 66."

(2) Identification Cards.

(a) The employing organization upon employment of a scout is to issue a Luc Luong 66 (Kit Carson Scout) identification card, MACV Form 75 (see Annex C).

(b) The Adjutant General, MACV, is responsible for procuring, stocking, and distributing Luc Luong 66 identification cards in bulk to employing organizations.

(c) Employing organizations are responsible for appointing an officer or warrant officer as Luc Luong 66 Identification Card Control Officer (ICCO) on written orders. Orders will specify that the ICCO is authorized to issue Luc Luong 66 identification cards to employed scouts. One copy of each appointing order is to be forwarded to this headquarters, Attn: MACAG-AP.

(d) ICCO appointed by employing organizations will submit requirements for identification cards to this headquarters, Attn: MACAG-AP, utilizing DA Form 17.
(e) Identification cards are accountable forms and will be controlled in all phases of shipment, storage, and issue. All mail shipments of identification cards are to be registered.

(f) The Adjutant General, MACV, is to issue identification cards on DA Form 410, Receipt for Accountable Form (see Appendix 1 to Annex C) to sponsoring agencies. Receiving ICCO will check the serial number of each identification card in the shipment against numbers listed on DA Form 410. If the listing of numbers on the DA Form 410 varies in any way from the numbers on the identification cards received, an immediate report will be made to this headquarters, Attn: MACAG-AP. Under no circumstances will the recipient make any changes on the DA Form 410. If the forms received agree in all respects with the DA Form 410, the original copy is to be signed and returned to this headquarters, Attn: MACAG-AP. The duplicate will be retained by the ICCO to account for identification cards received and issued.

(g) Identification cards are to be issued by the ICCO to scouts on MACV Form 332-R, Ration Card Control Register (see Appendix 2 of Annex C). Cards will be issued in numerical sequence beginning with the lowest serial number. Each scout receiving an identification card is to personally verify all entries and sign for the card. MACV Forms 332-R are to be retained on file by the issuing agency for two years.

(h) Surrender of identification cards. Scouts will be required to surrender their identification cards upon termination of employment or upon demand of the issuing agency.

(i) Storage. Unissued identification cards will be provided the same degree of security as that prescribed for CONFIDENTIAL material in MACV Directive 380-5.

(j) Destruction. Obsolete or mutilated identification cards and identification cards turned in by terminated scouts are to be listed by serial number on DA Form 546, Destruction of Classified Records (see Appendix 3 of Annex C), or equivalent form prior to destruction by burning. A disinterested officer will witness the destruction and certify that the cards have been destroyed.

(k) Accountability upon change of ICCO. Upon change of ICCO or absence of ICCO in excess of 30 days, the ICCO will, prior to departure, account for all identification cards of which he is custodian. The following statement signed by both the old and new custodians is to be attached to the MACV Form 332-R indicating the date of transfer of custodianship: "Per joint inventory conducted (date), the undersigned new custodian hereby accepts responsibility for unused Luc Luong 66 identification cards:

MACV Form 75  Serial No.______ through Serial No.______

(Signed) Name  (Signed) Name
(Typed) Name  (Typed) Name
Rank, Branch  Rank, Branch
Old Custodian  New Custodian
(1) Lost identification cards. The loss or theft of a Luc Luong 66 identification card will be reported by the individual through channels to the ICCO of his organization. The ICCO is to report the loss or theft of the card to the Provost Marshal of his organization and to other agencies having a direct interest. Scouts are to receipt for the replacement identification card on MACV Form 332-R.

7. REPORTS.

USARV; III MAF; NAVFORV; AFV; ROKFV; and RTFV are to submit a monthly Scout Status Report (RCS: MACCORDS/06.4-68) to arrive at this headquarters, Attn: MACCORDS-CHD, by the eighth day of each calendar month (see Annex D).

8. REFERENCES.

a. MACV Directive 672-1.

b. MACJ14 Memorandum, 16 May 1969, Subject: Delegation of Authority to Award the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Gallantry Cross.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

(Official Seal) W. G. DOLVIN
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

W. A. RUTLEDGE
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

Annexes
A. Format for Draft Deferment Request and Notification of Termination
B. Citation Format for Vietnamese Decorations
C. Identification Card
D. Scout Status Report (RCS: MACCORDS/06.4-68)
E. List of Clothing and Equipment
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</table>
LETTERHEAD
OF
PREPARING UNIT

(Office Symbol) (Date)

SUBJECT:

THRU: (Headquarters providing personnel management)

TO: Headquarters
USMACV
ATTN: MACV14, MAB Advisor
38 Gia Long, Saigon
APO 96222

Request the attached Luc Luong 66 Scout Draft Deferment (Renewal*) be processed by the Mobilization Directorate, Ministry of Defense, Saigon.

1 Incl
as
(Signature block of
Authorized Official)

* Strike out if not applicable.

Annex A
### LUC LUCIC DRAFT DEFERMENT REQUEST

*(Kit Carson Scout)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Date/Place of Birth</th>
<th>Parents Full Name</th>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Date of Release CH Center</th>
<th>Date of Hire</th>
<th>Present Current Deferment Number *</th>
<th>Home Address</th>
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*Applicable If Request Is For Renewal*
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<th>MAU</th>
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<td>SỐ QUẢN</td>
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<td>NÅY VA NƠI SINH</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHÁ</td>
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<td>CỔ TÀI</td>
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<tr>
<td>VẠN LƯƠNG</td>
<td>TÀI PHỤ LỤ</td>
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TÌNH TRẠNG QUẢN DỊCH:

CHỨNG CHỈ NÀY CÓ HIỆU LỰC ĐẾN HẾT NGÀY

EXPIRATION DATE IF ANY

KBC: ____________________________________________

SỐ: ____________________________________________

KHÔNG XỬ DỤNG ĐƯỢC

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**BỘ QUỐC PHÒNG**

**NHA ĐỒNG VIÊN**

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SỐ: ____________________________________________

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**TÌNH TRẠNG QUẢN DỊCH**

CÓ HIỆU LỰC ĐẾN: ____________________________

KBC: ____________________________

SỐ: ____________________________________________

---

**BỘ QUỐC PHÒNG**

**NHA ĐỒNG VIÊN**

---

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Appendix 2 to Annex A
UNCLASSIFIED

THRU: Headquarters, III MAF
ATTN: PsyOps
APO 96602

HEADQUARTERS, USARV
ATTN: AVHCP
APO 96375

TO: Headquarters
USMACV
ATTN: MACJ14, MOB Advisor
38 Gia Long, Saigon
APO 96222

The following Luc Luong 66 Scout(s) have terminated employment with
(Unit Designation) and are hereby reported to the Mobilization
Directorate, Ministry of Defense, Saigon, for termination of draft
Deferment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Date/Place of Birth</th>
<th>Parents Name</th>
<th>Date Terminated/Termination Pay</th>
<th>Current Certificate</th>
<th>Home Address</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>28 Feb 70</td>
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</table>

(R None or SVN as applicable)

Reason for termination must be specified and, if the deferment certificate is not returned, a reason will be given.

(Signature Block of Authorized Official)

CY: Headquarters
USMACV
ATTN: MACCORS-GID
APO 96243

Appendix 3 to Annex A

UNCLASSIFIED
CITATION FORMAT FOR VIETNAMESE DECORATIONS

(DESIGNATION OF UNIT SUBMITTING CITATION)

(Office Symbol) (Date)

SUBJECT: Award of (Title of Medal)

Commanding General
ARVN Corps Tactical Zone
(Location)

The attached citation for (Name) Luc Luong 66 Scout,
(Unit), is forwarded for approval. (Name)

participated in Operation (Title), (Date)

for which this citation has been prepared.

(Signature Block of Authorized Official)

(The letter of transmittal and attached citations for decorations must be forwarded in two copies. More than one citation may be transmitted as long as the citations are for the same period of time.)

Annex B
UNCLASSIFIED

-199-      MACV Dir 525-6

(DESIGNATION OF SUBMITTING HEADQUARTERS)

BANG DE NGHI
TUYỂN-DUONG CONG-TRANG TRUOC:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>LY-DO DE-NGHI:</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO QUAN:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DON VI:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>THUONG-TICH CHIÊN-TRANH:</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGAY:</td>
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<tr>
<td>TINH CHAT CUA VET THUONG AY:</td>
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NHUNG BANG TUYỂN-DUONG CONG-TRANG DA DUOC: (ghi ro cac Quyet-Dinh cho
day du)

DUONG-SU DA DUOC AN-THUONG BAO-QUOC
HUAN-CHUONG HAY QUAN-CONG BOI-TINH
CHUA?

Y KIEN CUA CAP CHI HUY
(Thec he thong quan gial)

(SAMPLE FORMAT)

(Data)

(Signature Block of Authorizing Official)

Appendix 1 to Annex B

UNCLASSIFIED
**UNCLASSIFIED**

APPROVING AUTHORITY
VIETNAMESE AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

| Gallantry Cross w/Palm         | JGS |
| Gallantry Cross w/Gold Star   | CG, ARVN CTZ |
| Gallantry Cross w/Silver Star | CG, ARVN Div |
| Gallantry Cross w/Bronze Star | CG, ARVN Regt |
| Certificate of Achievement    | All Unit Levels |
| Letter of Commendation        | All Unit Levels |

*(All citations are to be forwarded to or through the Commanding General, ARVN Corps Tactical Zone.)*
IDENTIFICATION CARD

NAME
RANK
DATE OF BIRTH
VN. ID. NUMBER
UNIT COMMAND
SIGNATURE OF SCOUT

PHOTO

UNCLASSIFIED

Annex C
RECEIPT FOR ACCOUNTABLE FORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM NO.</th>
<th>FORM DESIGNATION, NUMBER, EDITION DATE AND TITLE</th>
</tr>
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<td>FROM (INCLUDING LETTER SYMBOL)</td>
<td>TO (INCLUDING LETTER SYMBOL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QTY</td>
<td>TITLE OR INSTALLATION MAKING SHIPMENT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RECEIPT IS ACKNOWLEDGED OF FORM IDENTIFIED ABOVE

DATE RECEIVED | NAME OF INSTALLATION OR INDIVIDUAL |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|

TYPED NAME, GRADE OR TITLE OF ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER | SIGNATURE |
|--------------------------------------------------|----------|

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE.

RECEIPT FOR ACCOUNTABLE FORM (AP 210-1)

DA FORM 15 410 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 JAN 54, AND DA FORM 410-4, 1 JAN 53, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

INSTRUCTIONS

ISSUING AGENCY - Prepare this form in triplicate. Original and one copy will be forwarded with the shipment to the consignee and suspend the third copy until the signed copy is returned by the consignee.

CONSIGNEE - Upon receipt of the shipment, return the signed copy to the issuing agency.

_APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C_
### RATION CARD CONTROL REGISTER
(MACV Directive 60-7)

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<th>CUSTODIAN</th>
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<td>NAME</td>
<td>SERVICE NO</td>
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MACV FORM 332-R Previous editions are obsolete
15 June 1969
SCOUT STATUS REPORT (RCS: MACCORDS/06.4-68)

(DESIGNATION OF SUBMITTING HEADQUARTERS)

(Office Symbol)  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Luc Luong 66 Status Report (RCS: MACCORDS-06.4-68)

Commander
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MACCORDS - Chieu Hoi Directorate
APG 96243

In accordance with MACV Directive 525-6, the status of Scouts during the period (date) to (date) is submitted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Recruited</th>
<th>KIA - WIA - MIA - Absent - Terminated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Items of Interest: (This section should contain a narrative description of noteworthy items concerning Scouts, i.e., number of Scouts cited for awards or decorations, types of missions assigned, school graduations, etc. It is designed to assist in documenting the program.)

Significant Accomplishments: (This section should contain a narrative description of significant events which concern the Scouts, i.e., outstanding acts of heroism, outstanding results of operations due to the Scouts efforts, etc.)

Significant Weaknesses: (This section should contain a narrative description of significant incidents in which Scouts failed to perform in accordance with accepted standards.) (This section may be omitted if there is nothing of interest to report.)

(Signature Block of Authorized Official)

Annex D
**LIST OF CLOTHING & EQUIPMENT**

**Clothing**
- Trousers, Utility 2 ea
- Shirt, Utility 2 ea
- Boots, Tropical combat 2 pr
- Socks, Wool 3 pr
- Undershirt, Cotton 3 ea
- Undershorts, Cotton 3 ea
- Cover, Utility 1 ea

**Equipment**
- Individual Weapon 1 ea
- Equipment, cleaning, weapon 1 set
- Pouch, Magazine 4 ea
- Bayonet, Knife 1 ea
- Scabbard, Bayonet, Knife 1 ea
- Pack, Field 1 ea
- Helmet, Steel 1 ea
- Liner, Helmet 1 ea
- Poncho, Nylon coated 1 ea
- Vest, Armor, protective 1 ea
- Belt, Cartridge 1 ea
- Canteen, complete 2 ea
- Suspenders, Field Pack 1 ea

 Annex E
I. WHY DO THEY JOIN THE VIET CONG?


2. The Viet Cong proselyting system is divided into civilian and military sections. Effective functioning of the system is considered equivalent in importance to military and political goals.


4. Ibid., p. 160.


6. See OASD/SA analysis of "Terrorism in South Vietnam," May 1971 (COO). There were other reasons, of course, for the switch in tactics, e.g., that of responding to military pressure by attacking civilians, hoping to draw ARVN forces back to protect the rural population. For further formulation of the three-pronged military, diplomatic, and political strategy, see COSVN Resolution No. 9, July 1969.


9. Ibid., p. 28.

II. WHY DO THEY RALLY?

2. Total Chieu Hoi figures for 1966 were 20,242. Except for 1968, when the yearly figure dropped to 18,171 as a result of the Tet Offensive, Chieu Hoi figures through 1969 steadily increased, with motivation factors for rallying remaining the same. 1970 (with 32,661) and 1971 (with 20,244) showed a declining rate.

3. Statistics show that the rallying pattern is influenced by the constancy of military pressure. In 1971, in An Xuyen, although the 21st ARVN Division per se had not been effective in generating ralliers, its presence lent support by creating an aura of GVN strength which has enabled the RF units to operate in pacified areas (and the majority of ralliers come from pacified areas). Conversely, the shifting of GVN troops outside the area has caused an imbalance in the rallying trend.

4. Kellen (op. cit., p. 8), in his attempt to estimate the reasons for enemy morale, resilience, and reliability, which he found extraordinarily high, particularly in view of the enormous disproportion in power and resources of the two contenders, states that average exposure to combat, "though well within the limits of what the soldiers seemed able to bear," had apparently become more frequent per month than in previous periods, presumably because of attrition. It should be noted that Kellen's last interview was in June 1969, thus covering any adverse reaction to the 1968 Tet Offensive. However, his sample consisted of only 22 interviewees.

5. Fear of death in combat without decent burial in the ancestral graveyard bears a deep religious connotation to the Vietnamese, who believe that the spirit will wander in limbo until such burial is effected.

6. After 1965, with the commencement of bombing of North Vietnam and increasing deployment of U.S. air and ground forces in South Vietnam, Carrier and Thomson (op. cit.) found that most ralliers rejected their previously accepted faith in Maoist doctrine, i.e., that in guerrilla war man is the decisive factor, not weapons, and that the side with superior morale will win. Berman, while admitting that pessimism as to the outcome of the war did not appear widespread, draws an interesting comparison as to pessimism among "Defectors, Potential Defecting Prisoners and Hard-Core Prisoners." (Berman, op. cit., p. 335.)

7. "The median length of service for coerced VC is only 7.5 months whereas for volunteers it is three years. Within the first year over 60 per cent of the coerced defectors had defected whereas after two years 60 per cent of the volunteers who eventually defected still had not." (See Berman, op. cit., p. 115.)

8. This pull-back to the family must be understood in the context of certain sociological values. The Vietnamese family, under strong pressures from modernization and the war, still holds together to an extraordinary degree. Religion and politics are subordinate to the family, and even families of mixed political sympathies remain intact, e.g., it is estimated that one-third of loyal GVN citizens have close relatives among the Viet Cong whom they will not "turn in." Countering the strong pull-back to the family has been disintegration of the
village community and the dislocation of the family. They have played an important role in the acceptance of the Front as a substitute social structure having the same group orientation as the extended family, i.e., the authority of the Party is substituted for that of the father (the head of the family and its spiritual leader), and VC camaraderie and loyalty are substituted for family unity.

9. In 1966-1967 the big psywar problem indeed was how to sell the GVN as the alternative to the enemy at a time when the government was foundering and when the ARVN reacted violently against the population in clearing areas held by the enemy. By 1969 the GVN became a more salable product after some attempt to make the ARVN "pacificateurs" and by initiating and implementing programs at the local level, e.g., Decree No. 045 of April 1969 which returned local autonomy to the village. Other programs which had great impact on the rural population were the Village Development and the Land-to-the-Tiller programs.


11. Berman, op. cit., p. 120. Grinter, however, while admitting that the men interviewed in his study [85] were not typical of the Hoi Chanh at large, found that "Eventually almost all of the Hoi Chanh interviewed demonstrated a sense of embarrassment, shame, or moral guilt over some aspect of their defection . . . often the sense of guilt was patterned around the 'mistake' of ever having fallen in with the Communists in the first place. They felt they had been duped." Lawrence E. Grinter, "Amnesty in South Vietnam: An Analysis of the Chieu Hou (Open Arms) Program in the Republic of Vietnam," University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1967 (M.A. thesis).


III. WHO RALLIES?

1. Pike, op. cit., p. 96.

2. Carrier and Thomson, op. cit., p. 31.


5. Chuyen was probably instrumental in getting the Dai Doan Ket program started. See Appendix 2 for text of his testimony.

6. See Carrier and Thomson (op. cit., pp. 15 and 17) for a breakdown by military and political categories.

7. Recruitment figures for 1968 are not considered reliable and are not used by official sources. Such a figure would be interesting as a criterion of the impact of the Tet Offensive on the manpower recruitment base. Total VC guerrilla strength was about 70,000-80,000. There was a substantial decrease in military and political Hoi Chanh in 1968.

8. Memorandum from O. Williams to Assistant Chief of Staff/CORDS, July 9, 1968, on "Significant Issues for Period 1-7 July 1968."


10. The subject of the Memorandum dated December 12, 1968, was "Major Problems in the Chieu Hoi Program."

11. Pye saw Chieu Hoi as eventually embracing not only defectors but also refugees and prisoners of war. Lucian Pye, Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program (U), The Rand Corporation, RM-4864-ISA/ARPA, January 1966 (Confidential), pp. 16-20. It is interesting to note that in the case of VC/POWs, during 1970 "rehabilitated" VC/POWs were increasingly converted to Chieu Hoi status. See Note 12 below.

12. In October 1971 the GVN, as a gesture marking President Thieu's Second Inaugural and in celebration of National Day, announced the conversion of 2,297 VC/POWs to Hoi Chanh status. Cumulative total of such conversions through December 31, 1971 was 3,084.

13. Joint Communiqué issued after the second Honolulu Conference, July 20, 1968, by Presidents Thieu and Johnson.


15. There are five Phases of the Revolution according to Maoist Doctrine -- organization, guerrilla or protracted warfare, the military offensive, the political offensive, and the economic offensive.

IV. FACTORS DETERRING THE RALLIER


2. As of December 31, 1969, 94 percent of the 2,151 villages (or 2,033) had elected village councils; out of 10,522 hamlets, 93.6 percent (or 9,850) had elected hamlet officials. See Koch, op. cit., p. 179.

V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROGRAM: 1963-1971

1. Pike states that notwithstanding Diem's (and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu's) refusal to accept any name for the program that implied forgiveness, exoneration, or amnesty (the name Chieu Hoi was a concession to their sensitivities in this respect), "... even from the start the program was in effect a 'hidden' amnesty program, because the officials who administered it in the rural areas, though Diem appointees, did not share Diem's views that all guerrillas were to be treated as heretics; rather they regarded them in more pragmatic terms, as dangerous nuisances who must be forced or persuaded to stop fighting." (See Douglas Pike, War, Peace, and the Viet Cong, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, p. 102.) Frederick A. Nolting was U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam from October 1961 to 1963. The military British Advisory Mission which served in South Vietnam from September 1961 to March 1965 was principally involved in setting up a Vietnamese unified National Police system.

2. Bohannan had served with Colonel Edward Lansdale in the Philippines and was instrumental in devising the EDCOR (Economic Development Corps) program under which in 1950 Magsaysay offered the Huks free land resettlement. Only a small number of ex-Huks (3-4%) took advantage of the resettlement offer under EDCOR but the psychological value of the program was substantial because Magsaysay ensured the government's credibility in the eyes of the people, and by promise of lenient treatment, gave the insurgents an alternative to the hardships suffered in the Huks, frequently the primary reason for defection. Once the credibility of the government was established, the intelligence potential of a successful defector program also became a powerful factor in defeating the Huks. Rufus Phillips served under Colonel Lansdale in Vietnam in 1954-1956 and was familiar with the EDCOR precedent.

3. The Gosho Report (Henry H. Gosho, Inter-Agency Task Force Report on the Chieu Hoi Program, August 1965) states that "no dependable information was available concerning the amount of money spent by the GVN in the years 1963-1965." However, Carrier and Thomson (op. cit., p. 12) cite some 1963-1965 figures from USOM/Saigon which can be used for purposes of comparison with costs of the program in later years.

4. From a communication from Ogden Williams to R. W. Komer, June 1, 1971. Williams was Chief of the Chieu Hoi Division of MACCORDER and its predecessor from 1966-1969; Komer was Deputy to COMUSMACV for Pacification from May 1967 to November 1968.


6. See Section VII, "Exploitation and Utilization," for a description of the development of the Kit Carson Scout program, which was started in 1966.

8. Grinter, op. cit., also notes that the Filipinos were wise to corruption techniques practiced by Chieu Hoí service chiefs in the greatly expanded construction program initiated in 1966 and were able, in many cases, to circumvent them.


10. "Long-range" nation-building remained a function of USAID.


13. This figure derives from dividing total 1967 obligations (VN$950,000,000) -- approximately $9.8 million -- by the total number of returnees (27,178) and includes total cost of inducement, rehabilitation, and resettlement operations. Of the total obligations VN$200,000,000 was provided from the GVN national budget; the balance from dollar-derived piastres and direct dollar input. These figures do not include the cost of the inducement (psyops) programs operated by JUSPAO, MACV, CORDS, and GVN/FWD. There was a supplementary amount of VN$80,876,500 granted by the U.S. in November 1966 but not spent, and hence available for 1967 expenditures. (See "Some Salient Facts About the Chieu Hoí Program 1966-67," unpublished study aid, Vietnam Training Center.) In September 1967, in an interview with Robert Considine ("Pacification Cadres") of the Philadelphia Inquirer, September 19, 1967, Komer gave a figure of $127.00, which approximates the 1966 figure of MACCORDS/CHD.

14. Memorandum from Wade Lathram to R. W. Komer, on "Chieu Hoí Action Program for July-December 1967." Lathram was Assistant Chief of Staff/CORDS 1967-1968 and had previously served as Director of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) under Deputy Ambassador William Porter.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


20. Lathram to Komer, op. cit.


22. See Appendix 6 for English text of the Proclamation (OCO Notice 67-102, May 9, 1967, "The GVN National Reconciliation Policy [Doan Ket]"). This Notice is an outline of JUSPAO (Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office) Guidance to all members of the U.S. Mission in South Vietnam, particularly psyops officers and American advisers, to give maximum support to the NRP.
23. Pike, op. cit., p. 106. Actually, political rights and privileges were available under the original Chieu Hoi program as it developed. Ralliers previously registered as voters could apply to the District Chief in order to vote. Any Ho Chanh who wanted to run for office was eligible if his name appeared on the voters' lists and he was able to get clearance from local police. In secure areas the Ho Chanh were separated by police into "real, occasional, and forced Communist supporters"; ralliers who were classified in the latter two categories could become candidates. In the 1967 village and hamlet elections seven Ho Chanh were elected — 1 village chief, 3 hamlet chiefs, and 3 village councilors. Political opportunities other than by election, given the South Vietnamese reluctance to accept Ho Chanh even in low-level positions, is another matter.

24. Simulmatics, op. cit., p. 46. There is no hard and fast definition of the word "cadre." Generally, the term applies to the rank of assistant squad leader or above in the military or its civilian equivalent.

25. See Ogden Williams, Memorandum for Record, June 12, 1968, subject "Handling of High Level Chieu Hoi Returnees." The head of the Chieu Hoi Psychological Operations Directorate in 1969 had been rank in the PLAF equivalent to a Brigadier General prior to rallying. Another high-ranking Viet Cong was appointed Director of the National Chieu Hoi Center in Saigon. Col. Tran Van Doc has been a consultant to the General Political Warfare Department since he rallied in April 1968.


27. This $22.9 million figure represents total cost of the program, including U.S. civilian, military, and GVN input, and should not be compared with the USAID/GVN figure for 1967 of $9.9 million. AID phased out of funding Chieu Hoi in FY 1968. Prior to FY 1969 USAID had assumed all U.S. costs of the program with the exception of U.S. military advisory costs and administrative support costs of MCH. In FY 1969 DOD assumed advisory personnel costs on a reimbursable basis and began providing direct commodity support. AID continued to furnish counterpart piastrs to MCH for operational costs. In FY 1970 DOD assumed responsibility for funding the entire U.S. support of the program, largely on a reimbursable basis with USAID. For this and other reasons it would be virtually impossible, within the constraints of this study, to do a complete budget analysis of the cost of the program.


29. Ibid.

30. Williams was to write Komer on May 5, 1970: "While you were there, it was still possible to shortcut the system when something really important arose, but the ability to operate efficiently, sensibly and freely in Vietnam was increasingly curtailed thereafter."


33. N. Paul Neilson to DepCORDS (I, II, III, IV Corps), Attention: Chieu Hoi Advisors, February 22, 1968, subject "Operational Memorandum No. 5/68: Regaining the Momentum."

34. This disparity between IV Corps returnee rates and the other three corps has grown wider over the years, especially in 1968. For example, in 1966 IV Corps reported 28 percent of the total Ho Chanh; in 1967 35 percent; and in 1968 57 percent. It is "apparent that IV Corps effectively meets the three major prerequisites for a healthy influx of returnees: (1) ample VC target; (2) absence of extensive NVA units (which exercise control and discipline over lower-level guerrilla ranks); (3) a fairly well-managed Chieu Hoi Program. VC recruiting problems in IV Corps also contribute to the rallier rate—lack of popular support reduced guerrilla pay; in addition guerrilla forces had to be transferred from their home areas to fill Main Force and NVA vacancies." (Williams, "1967 Year End Report."

35. Kellen, op. cit. It should be borne in mind that the respondents who were interviewed did not represent a random sample. Efforts to obtain random samples were unsuccessful. However, the internal consistency of the answers and the fact that much of the data ties in with information obtained from other sources indicate that most of the collected information is largely credible and usable for analysis. The project was terminated in 1968 but a special "Tet" series of interviews was run to gain data on Vietnamese civilian reactions to the Offensive and to obtain information from prisoners and defectors about VC activities during the Offensive.


38. R. G. Jones on "Current Chieu Hoi Appraisal," MACORDS/Chieu Hoi Directorate, Saigon, May 14, 1969. (Jones had become Director of MACORDS/Chieu Hoi Division in March 1969 replacing Williams.)


42. See Note 27 above.


44. Ibid.

45. Raymond G. Jones, "Chieu Hoi Operational Memorandum No. 6/69: Chieu Hoi Planning," MACORDS/Chieu Hoi, Saigon, March 1969. Actually, this had been a major Chieu Hoi policy since 1966 under Williams. By late 1969 it was no longer adhered to.


49. From an interview with Jones, March 1971.


51. Yabut, op. cit.

52. With the 1971 Community Defense and Development Plan, the reporting period changed from calendar to lunar year (LY), from March 1 through end-February, and the Chieu Hoi goal for 1971/1972 was set at $25,000.

53. This figure was subsequently revised upward to 32,661, but a revised monthly breakdown is not available.

54. The official LY figure is 16,730. Also, 1971 figures reflect changes made in method of computation (see DOD-OASD Comptroller Data Sheet, January 19, 1972).

VI. KEY PROGRAM ELEMENTS

1. "Psychological operations . . . these operations include psychological warfare and, in addition, encompass those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behaviour to support the achievement of national objectives."

2. "Psychological warfare . . . the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behaviour of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives." (Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage, p. 152.)


4. Ibid.


6. Ibid.


7. That same year Grinter had found excessive bureaucracy at the Saigon level. Field personnel often had to ignore directions from Saigon because they were "naive, based on preconceived, out-of-date data. . . . It was difficult for any province-conceived and province-oriented program to be implemented because of the layers of staff and paperwork necessary at the headquarters level."

8. Thompson, op. cit., p. 90.


14. Tết Nguyên Dàn, feast of the 1st day of the year, corresponds to the new moon and is placed half-way between the winter solstice and the spring equinox. It lasts from the first to the seventh day of the month. Each year it has its own particular designation corresponding to the Lunar Calendar. Thus the 1968 Têt Holiday is designated Mậu Thân Têt (Year of the Monkey). (See P. Huair and M. Durand, Connaissance du Vietnam, "The Lunar Calendar and Traditional Vietnamese Holidays," Journal of the Vietnamese-American Association, June 1964.)


16. Lathram, op. cit.


19. Official Letter No. 980-UBHP/NSNV/NGV, dated January 21, 1967, issued by the Director General of the Budget and Foreign Aid (DGBFA). In order to provide the funds for weapons award programs, a special imprest fund was set up, with the awards to be dispensed at province.


21. Bernard Fall (op. cit., p. 387) says that the 12,067 defectors who rallied between February 1963 and February 1964 brought in an average of about one or two weapons per hundred, indicating that "they could hardly have been hard-core VC." Fall notes that no weapon surrender rate was mentioned in the Komor Report for the 29,000 VC who surrendered 1965-1966. Figure given here does not include weapons captured or turned in during the Cambodian/Laos operations.
22. Vietnam is divided into four military regions (formerly called corps). See frontispiece for map of their territorial boundaries.


24. In 1970 two additional autonomous cities were created: Nha Trang and Rach Gia.


27. In 1967, as Special Assistant to the President, Komer was instrumental in having the Vietnam Training Center (VTC) set up to train military and civilian advisers assigned to the pacification program. An integral part of the training was in the Vietnamese language. Although the VTC drew support and personnel from all U.S. agencies, administratively it was a part of the Department of State Foreign Service Institute. By May 1972, when it closed, it had graduated 1,845 advisers.

28. Williams, "End of Tour Report."


31. In 1970 the Vietnam Feature Service reported that 65 percent of the ralliers had been farmers before joining the VC, 20 percent were laborers, and 10 percent small traders; one-fourth of these men had had no education at all and were illiterate. Literacy training became a component part of the Chieu Hoi training program.

32. Data may become available as a spin-off from the tracking system set up in 1971 to determine the location and activity of Hoi Chanh after they leave the Centers.

33. Jess Snyder, Deputy Province Senior Adviser in Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, and Lam Dong, 1966-1970. Snyder believes, however, that the vocational training is important as a psychological gambit for reconciling the Hoi Chanh to the government. In Vietnamese culture the things you do not necessarily have to have substance; they do have to have form, and the manner in which something is done is of more importance than the thing itself. Hence, while the Hoi Chanh may see little immediate benefit to him in the training, the fact that it is offered him may reconcile him to the GVN.

35. Eugene Bable (head of MACCORS/Chieu Hoi until June 1972) believes that by 1971 those Hoï Chanh who desired employment could find jobs, especially those who had vocational training. While self-employment seems to be more common for the Hoï Chanh, private enterprise has accepted them without undue prejudice. (From a letter dated March 14, 1972.)

36. Bable sees this problem as largely solved and states that even the NVA ex-Hoï Chanh are resettling themselves successfully, melting into the society without causing dissension among the regular GVN citizenry. (Ibid.)


38. Williams, ibid.


40. Latham, op. cit. Thang had authorized the recruitment of six pilot 59-man RD teams of Hoï Chanh as early as April 1967 in Bình Dinh, Phú Yên, Dinh Tuong, Bà Xuyên, and Chuong Thien. Requirements stated that the Hoï Chanh be a local returnee, be sponsored by the local Chieu Hoi Service, be able to read and write Vietnamese, meet required health standards, have no criminal record, and be within the age limit prescribed for RD cadres. He would be entitled to the same salary as normal RD cadres. (See MORD Message No. 0960/XD/422/CD, April 1967, to RD Councils in province.)

41. Actually, the problem existed not only in the GVN bureaucracy but also in U.S. military and civilian agencies, even the Embassy itself. Embassy security officers applied rigorous rules to prevent American agencies from hiring Hoï Chanh. JUSPAO on several occasions wanted to hire NVA Hoï Chanh to produce propaganda material targeted on the NVA in both South and North Vietnam — to no avail. Williams wanted USAID and other USG contractors to hire a certain percentage of the work force from among veterans, Hoï Chanh, and refugees, but nothing officially was ever done about it.

42. Grinter, op. cit., p. 65.

43. Lenderking, op. cit., p. 91.


45. Interview with Komor, May 1971.

VII. EXPLOITATION AND UTILIZATION

1. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, p. 93.

2. High-level ralliers are defined as VC/NVA military personnel of the rank of LTC and above, and VC civilian personnel with the rank of Political Cadre or above.

3. The Committee consisted, on the U.S. side, of representatives of MACV/PsyOps Directorate, the MACV Office of Information, JUSPAO, OSA/Embassy, CORDS/POD, and CORDS/Chieu Hoi; on the GVN side: Ministries of Information, Chieu Hoi, and the military General Political War Department.


5. See also MACV Directive No. 381-2 dated March 19, 1968, "Military Intelligence Volunteer Informant Program," designed to "encourage Vietnamese civilians to volunteer useful information on the VC/NVA for cash or material rewards."

6. O. Williams to Assistant Chief of Staff/CORDS, "Use of Hoi Chanh as Interrogators for PHENIX," November 13, 1968.

7. Members of the VCI are counted as neutralized only when they have been killed, have rallied, or have been sentenced to a meaningful jail term. Captured personnel awaiting processing are not considered neutralized.

8. Members of the APTs become civil servants of the GVN once employed by MCH and must meet Civil Service standards and requirements; in addition, they must of course be able to pass a full security clearance. Nor can they be guilty of prior criminal acts or military desertion, a negative factor in recruitment since many Hoi Chanh of draft age deserted the RVNAF to join the VC. APT members are draft-exempt.


10. A study on making more extended use of the APT has been conducted in Saigon.

11. In an attempt to increase the number of NVA ralliers 24-man teams were assigned to the Political Warfare Battalions at each Military Region Headquarters on a trial basis before assignment to ARVN units in contact with NVA units within the region. If successful, the program was to be expanded to allow 7-man teams to operate with other ARVN units (see TOAID A-1590, May 10, 1971, Unclassified). A meeting was held later in 1971 with all agencies concerned present, and further implementation of the program was approved. However, MCH had not begun recruitment by May 1972.


14. Ibid. Note that figures are for 1969. The pay scale has been slightly raised, and President Thieu in January 1972 authorized an increase of VNS$1200 per man in base salary.


17. In July 1970 MCH instituted a national training program for the APTs at the National Training Center at Vung Tau and training at regional centers was discontinued.


21. Project TAKEOFF.

22. Latham, op. cit.

23. From a Memorandum by Komer to Brig. General Walter Kerwin, Chief of Staff/MACV, dated October 3, 1967.


26. From a Memorandum by Komer to Chief of Staff, October 24, 1968.


28. Truong Kinh, a Kit Carson Scout serving with the Fifth Marines, had killed 55 VC/NVA in a single day's fighting.

29. No formal or even written request for GVN approval was made at this stage, in order to forestall possible questions of general policy until the Scout program had in fact been given a chance. (See document entitled "The Kit Carson Scout Program: 1966-1968," issued by the Chieu Hoi Division/MACCORDS, Saigon, January 18, 1968, p. 2.)

30. There had been certain precedents for similar use of defectors or returnees in the British experience in Malaya.

31. Major General Nickerson, CG, III MAF, is believed to have chosen the name. In June 1970 the name of the program was changed to Luc Luong 66 (see Appendix 10).

32. See letter from COMUSMACV (Westmoreland) to the field, dated April 29, 1967, "Chieu Hoi Returnees in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations."

33. See Message (Cite No. 00832), DTG 081210Z (January 1968), COMUSMACV to the field.

UNCLASSIFIED
34. See Message (Cite No. 12242), DTG 300745Z (April 1968), COMUSMACV to the field.

35. See Message (Cite No. 29643) DTG 061125Z (October 1968) COMUSMACV to the field for distribution of KCS by Division, Brigade, Advisory, and Naval units.

36. From August 1966 through March 1971, 369 KCS had been killed, and 1,119 wounded in action. Burial allowances were raised in June 1969 from VN$5,000 to VN$8,000. See note 5 to Section II for importance of ritual burial. Fear of improper burial in combat has been one of the major causes of rallying.

37. See MACV Directive No. 672-1 (Change 1) of May 29, 1969, which sets forth policy for U.S. awards to Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces, including KCS. Such awards and decorations, especially GVN, can earn a veteran certain credits and better enable him to reestablish himself as a citizen of the RVN once he returns to civilian life.

38. Chieu Hoi/MACCORDS in December 1967 Year End Report stated that "Based on Reports from all U.S. military units using KCS throughout Vietnam, up to December 1, 1967, there was not a single case of re-deection, desertion or treachery." However, R. W. Kemper, in an interview on May 7, 1971, recalled that "In most cases the Hoi Chanh proved invaluable, though there were some cases of treason."

39. It should be borne in mind that a Hoi Chanh may be taken from a Chieu Hoi Center and used in a combat operation to exploit perishable information, but he must be returned to the Center. See MACV Directive No. 381-11 of August 5, 1968.


41. MACV Directive No. 525-6, dated June 25, 1970, "Military Operations, Luc Luong 66 Program (Kit Carson Program)," p. 3 (see Appendix 10).