Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe

Horst Mendershausen

A Report prepared for

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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PREFACE

This report is concerned with pressures working on the defense structures of European NATO countries, particularly those of the Federal Republic of Germany, which tend to favor transforming these structures into latent conscript forces oriented toward territorial defense on the one hand, standing volunteer armies on the other hand. The study deals with the political, financial, and military potentialities of a combination of such forces and examines in detail the territorial defense component; drawing on experiences of NATO and non-NATO countries. It leads up to recommendations of ways in which the United States could encourage a desirable evolution of European force structures, and better European provisions for civil defense.

The study does not deal with the development of the structure of U.S. forces. An earlier Rand study of the U.S. force posture in Central Europe considered possible changes on the U.S. side that could be complementary to the European evolution. But that evolution, as contemplated here, does not depend on changes in the U.S. force posture.

The study draws on unclassified documentation of European defense systems and on interviews which the author conducted with military and civil defense specialists in West Germany, Norway, Switzerland, and France. The description of the Yugoslav system in Section V was contributed by the author's colleague, A. Ross Johnson, and is based on Johnson's study of Yugoslav defense.

This report is addressed to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (European and NATO Affairs) in ISA.

SUMMARY

The relatively large, conscription-based, standing armies of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and some other European NATO countries are not likely to withstand for long the financial, political, and social pressures to which they are currently exposed. Unless such armies are allowed to lose much of their military effectiveness, they are likely to be replaced by smaller professional/volunteer standing forces, or by territorial defense forces with a large mobilization potential, or most likely, by a combination of the two types of forces. The combination may also feature a hybrid form such as cadre-reservist main force units. The present study deals chiefly with the potentialities of territorial defense forces, and with some aspects of the combination. It explores difficulties that will have to be overcome in order to advance desirable developments in these directions and in the related field of civil defense.

Section I discusses various pressures on present defense structures, particularly in the FRG:

1. In an international environment marked by détente and by expectations of mutual force reductions and other arms control agreements, defense budgets appear too high and are increasingly vulnerable to criticism because of rising personnel costs and other increased operating costs of standing armies, and the resulting reduction of funds available for new equipment.

2. The FRG and smaller NATO countries are in search of inoffensive national contributions to the Western deterrent posture, i.e., military forces that do not threaten an aggressor’s homeland but that would make aggression a thankless task for his forces. This interest bears on various aspects of the present force structure.

3. The comprehensiveness or rationality of the present German defense effort and outlook is increasingly questioned in that country; gaps and ambiguities are undermining the government’s defense policies.

4. The necessity for greater national self-responsibility within alliance also calls for bringing defense responsibility closer to the citizen, but difficulties with the present conscription system, discipline problems in the standing army, and resistance to a public recognition of defense in the schools reveal a bent toward "limited liability" thinking in matters of defense, particularly in the FRG.

The question of Section II is whether some shift in the defense structure from standing strike forces to territorial defense forces is likely to alleviate these pressures. In this report, territorial defense forces are defined as latent (mobilization dependent), relatively lightly armed, locally assigned forces. While this definition
marks the principal focus of our study, it does not draw sharp boundaries. In some contexts, the study also deals with more heavily armed latent forces, and with standing forces with a local mission. Organization, concepts, and terminologies vary considerably from country to country.

Comparison of the peacetime defense expenditures per to-be-mobilized soldier in West Germany with those in Switzerland indicates a ratio of 7 to 1. Among other things, this ratio expresses the financial allure of a latent, largely territorial-defense oriented force over a standing force with a weak mobilization potential. Leaving aside the many qualifications which such a comparison requires, it is fair to assume that some shift toward territorial defense forces offers possibilities of budget relief. Calculation of the budgetary advantages depends, of course, on numerous specific assumptions and requires comprehensive studies by national Ministries of Defense (MODs). By reorienting the conscription system from the requirements of a standing army to those of a militia of reservists, with a short initial term of duty and substantial reserve training, it also seems possible to alleviate some of the difficulties of conscription, and thus to pay homage to the idea of "popular deterrence," which is the desire of most continental European governments. But changes in conscription methods alone cannot be expected to overcome the lack of patriotism and civic feeling that tends to devalue such a system today in many countries. In the event of reorientation, combat-ready strike forces and certain technologically complex units would have to be staffed largely with volunteers and professionals.

A shift toward territorial defense forces and other latent forces could well enhance the inoffensive character of a country's contribution to deterrence, and thus be of particular interest in the context of MBFR. But for major West European countries, and for NATO as a whole, it will remain important to balance the territorial and strike components within the total deterrent force. In some countries, whether in or out of NATO, reliance on a predominantly "inoffensive national deterrent" will also continue to accompany reliance on the relatively more "offensive deterrent" of other powers.

Greater emphasis on territorial defense and other latent forces is likely to go hand in hand with a higher degree of national self-responsibility for defense, and to enhance comprehensive thinking about military and civil defense in allied countries. The territorial forces are essentially "national forces," and the integrity of national territory is their proper mission. Similarly, the civil defense system is concerned with protecting the national population. In a sense, territorial defense stands between the main battle forces and the civilian defense system, and its resources and functions are linked to both. However, the development of both territorial and civil defense faces doctrinal and institutional opposition, particularly where it accompanies—as it can be expected to do nowadays—some reduction of the standing strike forces.

While a shift to territorial forces can be a good response to budgetary, social, and some political pressures, other political and, above all, military considerations call for a shift to professional/volunteer forces. Section III deals with the combination of the two types of forces, developing side by side and aiming at joint operations. The views of a German Defense Minister, a British Air Marshal, a French military expert, a retired U.S. Army General, and a German defense planner are presented. They discuss the strategic/tactical and the personnel-political aspects of the combination, taking as their point of departure a relative underdevelopment of territorial
forces in the actual defense structures. In the opinion of these experts, the combination of the two types of forces can be politically and militarily viable. A glance at the Swiss situation provides an approach to the combination from a radically different point of departure, a nearly pure territorial defense system which is in search of a minimal professional strike force component.

Section IV examines the territorial defense forces of the FRG, their present state and prospective development. It notes the peculiar alliance-political definition of the German Territorial Army (TA) and the related constraints on its resources, training, and missions. Although these forces are growing in size, the scope of their missions is constrained in both a geographic and a functional sense, omitting notably the forward defense area, static defense, city defense, and "stay-behind" (partisan-type) missions. On the other hand, the TA does not maximize the personnel-political advantages of a militia force, and it carries ambitious training and logistic responsibilities for the Field Army (FA), which detract further from the TA's distinct development as a contributor of tactical forces on the local plane. Its weakness in this regard is related to the unsatisfactory state of civil defense in the FRG, which is surveyed with the help of a recently published Civil Defense White Paper.

The structure and the responsibilities of the TA are likely to change in the course of a major reform of the entire German Army, which may be undertaken during the tenure of the second Brandt government. The recent final report of the Commission on Defense Structure declared the present army structure untenable and proposed a partial shift from standing forces, or peacetime forces alleged to be combat-ready, to latent forces frankly recognized as such and correspondingly organized. The proposed change concerns chiefly the brigades of the FA. It affects the TA only by shifting TA training functions to the proposed new cadre-reservist brigades of the FA. But although the Commission rejected a volunteer/militia combination for the army—at least in the form of a rather ambitious version—it kept alive the idea of a short-term militia with static defense functions and advocated some practical experimentation with units of this kind. This could portend further changes in the TA. Although the government is not bound by the Commission's recommendations, it can be expected to adopt the Commission's preference for some substitution of standing forces by latent ground forces and to express this preference both in the NATO and the MBFR contexts.

Section V deals with contrasting territorial defense concepts and forces in four European countries, two of which do not participate in NATO's military integration (Switzerland and Yugoslavia) and two which do so to a much lesser extent than the FRG (Norway and France). For quite different sets of reasons, these countries have developed, shifted to, or maintained territorial defense organizations which comprise a greater part of their total defense effort than does that of the FRG. This finds expression either in a greater proportion of territorials in total ground force mobilization strength, or in a greater latency factor (increase under mobilization) of these forces. In Switzerland, latent forces ranging from territorial forces under our definition to more heavily armed militia units make up the virtual entirety of the armed forces in peace and war; there, as well as in Norway and Yugoslavia, the territorial force system is also directly embedded in civil society (citizen-army). Norway, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia—but not France—also have developed substantial civil defense systems and given considerable attention to "comprehensive defense," allowing for little "business as usual" in an envisaged mobilization. In France, one
Does not find the conceptual barriers to comprehensive defense thinking that exist in the FRG, but a conspicuous weakness of material and organizational provisions. This reflects France's ambiguous relationship to NATO, theoretically distant but practically dependent. In all these countries, the tactical missions of the territorial forces are far less constrained in terms of geography and combat modes than they are in the FRG.

In these four less integrated or nonintegrated defense systems, except France's, the total peacetime defense budget per mobilized man is notably smaller than in the FRG: about one-fourth of the FRG's in Norway, one-seventh in Switzerland, one-ninth in Yugoslavia. (In France, it is higher, partly because the overall French mobilization potential is so small.) This comparison reflects, of course, a great variety of factors outside the sphere of peacetime personnel structure, but it probably also reflects some of the potential for savings in peacetime manpower expenditures which greater emphasis on territorial defense forces offers. It should be noted in this connection that the cheapness of such forces tends to be exaggerated by the fact that they are usually equipped, as in the FRG, chiefly with weapons phased out of the field armies, instead of with weapons specially developed and peculiarly suited to territorial defense missions. (The West German Territorial Army is probably more heavily equipped than the other territorial forces, with the exception of Switzerland's militia.) None of the countries can be said to have exploited the technology available for forces of this type.

One cannot explain the contrasts between the FRG and the four other countries, which are developed in Section VI, solely by terrain, social, and political differences. These differences are not simply cumulative, making it nonsensical for one country to do what seems good sense for the other. In part at least, they are mutually offsetting and would not, stand in the FRG's way to imitate or assimilate some features of the foreign models, if it so desired. To an important degree, the contrasts reflect the influence of the NATO system of military integration, which is nowhere as pervasive as in the FRG. NATO separates military from civil defense, defense by (integrated) main battle forces from defense by (national) territorial defense forces, and to a degree, defense by peacetime standing forces from defense by latent or mobilization forces. NATO military authorities tend to measure the alliance's capacity to deter and to defend very largely in terms of standing strike forces, and therefore disparage substituting latent territorial or civil defense forces, regardless of their quality.

One cannot say that NATO has shown no interest in territorial defense and civil defense, but what interest it has shown has been somewhat less than positive in the first, and quite remote in the second regard. A survey of the NATO literature shows that NATO has never set standards or demanded commitments regarding civil defense. With the exception of the December 1971 ministerial communique (regarding the flank countries), it has never had an encouraging official word for the development of national territorial defense forces. At best, such forces have been accepted as providers of administrative, logistical, and otherwise subordinate support to the strike forces. In effect, NATO has acted as a funnel concentrating defense thinking, planning, and spending on the standing integrated forces and has diverted attention from other elements of a total defense system.

A more determined exploration of, and a movement toward, the professional force/militia combination in Europe requires removal of these blind spots in NATO.
As long as the Germans and some others in NATO believe that a shift toward more latent forces, however well-organized, endangers the alliance, and are confirmed in this belief by U.S. attitudes in NATO, the change-resisting forces are likely to continue to prevent basic reform. This puts the spotlight on U.S. attitudes in these matters. Section VII recommends that the United States take the following positions in NATO:

1. Give fuller recognition to the pressures working on the present European defense structures.
2. Encourage studies in NATO, the EURO-Group, and allied MODs of a combination of standing volunteer forces, smaller than the present conscription-based forces, with larger conscription-based latent forces, both of the main force and the territorial-defense force type.
3. Counteract the antiterritorial bias in NATO, i.e., the tendency to treat national territorials, notably in Central Europe, as appendages, subordinates, or inferior substitutes of standing strike forces.
4. Seek greater respect in NATO for the concepts of comprehensive defense and total force.
5. Propose a more active role of NATO in civil defense, relating organizational measures and shelter programs to the flexible response strategy and seeking specific country commitments.
6. Perhaps present to NATO, at the proper time, a new concept of total force, consonant with a transition to a combination of strike and home defense forces.

Bilateral relations with allied countries and preparations for MBFR negotiations offer important contexts in which the United States could express more positive views on territorial forces than heretofore. Not only would a greater weight of territorial defense in some European force postures satisfy arms control objectives, it would also be a way to make these force postures more viable in peace and war.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author expresses his thanks to his colleagues A. Ross Johnson, for contribution of the section on Yugoslavia, and Herbert Goldhamer and Robert W. Komer, for useful critical comments on a draft of the study. He is also grateful to the numerous European specialists on military and civil defense affairs whom he consulted during 1971-1972 and who conveyed many useful insights on the subject matter of this report. Margaret Krahenbuhl provided valuable research assistance.
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I. THE INTEREST IN TERRITORIAL DEFENSE

In the defense planning of European NATO countries, territorial defense forces play a minor role. Defense of the country by a dense network of latent (mobilization-dependent), relatively lightly armed, locally assigned forces has been almost completely overshadowed by provisions for standing forces and their conventional equipment, and for the deterrent function of nuclear armament. Likewise, civil defense, the preparations for protecting the population against enemy action, has suffered from neglect and ineffective measures. By emphasizing internationally shared over national defense responsibilities, deterrence by standing forces over deterrence by well-trained latent forces—and to some extent also by emphasizing deterrence over preparations to fight and survive an actual armed conflict—NATO has acted as a funnel concentrating defense thinking, planning, and spending on the standing conventional and nuclear strike forces and has diverted attention from other elements of a total defense system. Perhaps this reflected the best choice of priorities in the past, but the degree to which the priorities have been exercised has entailed an underdevelopment of territorial and civil defense capacities, a neglect of total defense thinking, and consequently a weak underpinning of the principal defense forces. This underdevelopment can be observed directly in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and by comparison with European non-NATO-integrated defense systems, notably those of France, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, and with the relatively less-integrated system of a NATO country, namely Norway.

Various pressures on the defense structures of European NATO countries, notably those of the FRG, today call into question the use of past priorities as guides for future policy, and more or less directly point to a need for greater emphasis on territorial and civil defense. Whether such a shift in emphasis is possible in the political and social climate of these countries is a question that must be addressed after the pressures have been identified. The answer depends not only on national factors but also on the complexities of the NATO system which inhibit systematic innovation. The least one can say, however, is that awareness of the pressures continues to rise, and that opportunities may now exist for national authorities and for NATO to reallocate some priorities and take effective action.

In assessing these opportunities, this study concentrates on territorial defense, the neglected military element. Territorial defense forces are armed forces under the command of military authorities, although by the nature of their tasks these forces must be more closely coordinated with civilian authorities on various levels than is the case for mobile strike forces. Civil defense is under the control of civil
authorities. Their disposition for the protection of the population, sheltering, evacuation, or immobilization significantly affect the possibilities for territorial defense. In a sense, territorial defense stands between the main battle forces and the civilian defense system, and its resources and functions are linked to both. Therefore, our study must touch on these two as well. For reasons that will become apparent as we proceed, a relative strengthening of territorial defense is likely to entail, and also to be induced by, innovations concerning battle forces and civil defense.

Territorial defense forces are sometimes called militias. This would be correct if we dealt with a force of volunteers. Our study, however, is focused on a force based principally on conscription, in which volunteers and professionals play a numerically small—although functionally, i.e., in leadership and technical positions, often important—role. We shall, therefore, not use the term militia for the forces under discussion here, except occasionally with the qualifier "conscripted," or in discussing the Swiss militia which is based on conscription.

PRESSURES ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE STRUCTURES

The defense structures of Western European countries today are subject to a variety of steady pressures. The region is at peace, and the expectation is widespread that peace will be maintained by a combination of defenses deterring aggression and accommodating foreign policies that dry up possible sources of armed conflict. It is generally understood that this setting does not permit a drastic reduction of defense efforts; this would remove one of the pillars on which the peace rests. Even leading détente politicians can be heard, therefore, from time to time inveighing against détente euphoria. But it is also clear that the relatively benign state of international affairs in Europe induces changes in existing defense structures. These structures—expressed in budgets, concepts, investments, alliance relationships, and domestic political factors—bear the stamp of past decades in which things were done or left undone under the impact of recurrent East/West confrontations and according to then prevailing judgments. Newer financial, political, and military requirements, however, often conflict with these existing structures. Therefore, the search is on for modifications of defense efforts—for changes in their national and international composition, quite apart from the search for some scaling down of the efforts, or at least for a freezing of their claims on resources—to accompany the foreign policy successes in reducing tensions.

Western Europe is not a political and military unit. Defense structures differ from country to country, and so do the pressures bearing on them. Instead of making an encyclopedic survey of the British, German, Dutch, Italian, etc., situations, this study gives a more compact and realistic description. It focuses on the situation in the hub country of NATO Europe, the FRG, and brings in only marginally the situations of most other NATO countries. Different as these are for geographic, political, and other reasons, they show some similarities to, and in any event are influenced by, what goes on in Germany, because Germany is a big factor in Europe and is the centerpiece both of NATO and of recent European détente efforts. But there is also a specific reason for focusing on the FRG: The NATO principle of
international military integration is nowhere as pervasive as in the military structure there. With a deployment of stationed allied forces about equal to the country's own in peacetime, the problem of national self-responsibility for defense is obviously most acute in the FRG. Although the Germans are freer today to chart their own course than they were ten or twenty years ago, they carefully seek to make their defense policies compatible with those of their principal allies.

BUDGET PRESSURES IN DÉTENTE ENVIRONMENT

Politically most evident among the pressures on present defense structures is the concern with their high and rising costs. Defense budgets always have to compete with other budgets for resources, but they are today more vulnerable to the criticism that they are a waste of public monies. For one thing, they are relatively more burdensome than in the last period of European peace, preceding Hitler's assumption of power in Germany. In 1928, the share of British, French, and German military spending in net national product¹ was much smaller than in 1970, by about one-sixth in France, more than one-half in Britain, and about four-fifths in Germany (see Table 1). This comparison is rarely made today, perhaps for the good reason that in retrospect international security in the 1920s does not appear exemplary. The fact remains that the economic burden of security by armament was relatively less at that time.

The comparison of active military manpower in the two periods, which Table 1 also shows, reveals a rather different, but partly complementary, picture. Only in the FRG is military manpower today much larger than in its prewar counterpart, the disarmed Weimar Germany of the 1920s. In Britain, it is somewhat larger in absolute numbers, but smaller in percent of population. In France, it is nearly 30 percent smaller in absolute numbers, and 46 percent smaller in percent of population. In terms of men under arms, a given financial defense effort, expressed as a certain percentage of national product, buys much less today than in the 1920s. This reflects, of course, the fact that modern forces are more heavily and more expensively equipped than those of the 1920s, i.e., that the volume, complexity, obsolescence rate, and other cost factors of armaments have increased as much as, or even more than, those of economic equipment. But it also reflects greatly increased costs of manpower. These facts enter into contemporary criticism of defense spending, which we shall discuss mainly in its German setting.

Critics there hold (1) that defense spending at its present level is a wasteful way to buy external security in a time when security is being enhanced by a string of treaties with the presumptive opponents; (2) that it is self-perpetuating, and that when it goes into new weapon systems it is provocative, self-accelerating, and "economically exhausting"; (3) that the country is indefensible anyway against a determined, powerful opponent; and (4) that public expenditures on the management and improvement of civil society, as well as a lightening of the tax burden, are far more urgent. These criticisms, which have powerful spokesmen in public opinion, impinge directly and indirectly on the battle over the budget—directly by

¹ Net national product at factor cost. A lack of suitable data made it necessary to base the comparison on this measure rather than on the customary gross national product.
Table 1

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND MANPOWER IN GERMANY, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1928/29 AND 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Units of Monetary Data</th>
<th>Military Expenditures (National Monetary Units)</th>
<th>National Income (National Monetary Units)</th>
<th>Military Expenditures in % of National Income</th>
<th>Active Military Strength (Reg. Forces) (thousands)</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Active Military Strength in % of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reich, 1928 (RM million)</td>
<td>585&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>75,400&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>117&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>64.4&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG, 1970 (excl Berlin) (DM million)</td>
<td>19,780&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>504,000&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>467&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>60.0&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1928 (F billion)</td>
<td>10.5&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>227&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>712&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>41.0&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 (F billion)</td>
<td>32.6&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>615&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>302&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>51.2&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928/29 (£ million)</td>
<td>113&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4,166&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>339&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>45.4&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970 (£ million)</td>
<td>2,380&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>38,400&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>381&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>56.0&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Expenditures by Defense Ministry, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1928, p. 519.
<sup>c</sup>*Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, 1928, p. 577.
<sup>d</sup>*Statistisches Handbuch der Weltwirtschaft*, 1936, p. 11.
<sup>e</sup>*Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1971, pp. 25, 504, 513.
<sup>g</sup>World Almanac, 1930, pp. 231, 602, 657.
<sup>i</sup>National Income at Factor Cost, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* 1971, p. 130, (estimate based on 1969).
causing pressure for reduction, and indirectly by causing certain cost increases that make a "unit of defense" more expensive and thus more criticizable.

The latter is obvious in the realm of military personnel expenditures. To lessen public distaste for military service and to induce men to enlist and stay in the service, soldiers' pay, pensions, provisions for amenities, education, and advancement in civilian society must be constantly improved. This has been one of the main policies of the German Minister of Defense in recent years. Consequently, personnel expenditures for the German Bundeswehr, of about constant size, have shown a particularly high rate of increase (see Table 2). When the MOD recently succeeded, nonetheless, in augmenting the absolute size of the German defense budget (maintaining its share in total federal expenditures at slightly above 22 percent, and in German GNP at above 4 percent),\(^1\) it was partly because he emphasized making the Bundeswehr socially more attractive, and partly because the government was concerned with securing its bargaining position in the alliance during a crucial phase of détente policy. But this success may prove ephemeral in the continuing battle over the budget.

Table 2 shows a drop in the level of military procurement and other capital expenditures over the years 1966 to 1972, despite the considerable price increases for military equipment.\(^2\) Capital expenditures could decline because older equipment was replaced by new equipment in smaller numbers and because reequipment programs were stretched out. In the opinion of the MOD, "it is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile the funds available for procurement with actual requirements."\(^3\)

The downward pressure on the total defense budget, the upward pressure of personnel costs and equipment unit costs, and the resulting reduction of procurement and other investment efforts, put into question the structure of the German defense effort. But the questioning does not come from the general public, which usually argues over more or less Bundeswehr rather than over what kind of Bundeswehr it wants. It comes from military specialists, notably civilian defense planners, including recent Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt and the shadow Defense Minister of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Manfred Woerner, and focuses on the size of the standing strike force, notably army divisions, which the country is maintaining. Raising, equipping, and maintaining this standing force has been and continues to be the principal NATO objective for Germany's defense contribution. German critics hold American and other allied pressures responsible for having induced the FRG to pursue this objective to excess. Within a total Bundeswehr of about 470,000 men (effective peacetime strength) and a total army of about 320,000, so the argument runs, the requirement of maintaining in combat-readiness 33 brigades and 3 regimental combat teams imposes too heavy a burden.

Indeed these standing strike forces entail specific costs. While the operating costs of, say, an armored infantry brigade do not appear to have increased more in recent years than Bundeswehr-wide operating costs (both advanced by about 30 percent from 1968 to 1971),\(^4\) the need to maintain standing forces of this type

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\(^1\) German way of calculating, including aid to West Berlin in defense expenditure.


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 154, 158.
Table 2
RATES OF CHANGE IN GERMAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1966-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>Actual Percentage Changes</th>
<th>Planned Percentage Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct personnel</td>
<td>+8.6</td>
<td>+2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military pensions</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All operating expenditures (incl. personnel)</td>
<td>+3.1</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel procurement</td>
<td>+17.9</td>
<td>-24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All investment expenditures (incl. procurement)</td>
<td>+17.0</td>
<td>-12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total defense expenditures</td>
<td>+9.1</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Imposes costly requirements on the total defense structure. It increases the need for enlistees to serve two or more years, and since the army has much difficulty in attracting them, it increases the need to provide strong financial and occupational incentives for such men. Because the term of the draft must be long enough to train draftees for service on sophisticated equipment, it is more difficult to shorten the draft term and to provide at least basic training for all the available manpower in the relevant age groups. Training requirements conflict with combat-readiness requirements in the brigades, thus overloading officers and noncoms (increasing the need for incentives) and causing men to be paid for marking time (with morale and, again, incentive consequences). Materiel maintenance is made more costly by soldiers training with—and therefore wearing out—equipment which is also supposed to be combat-ready. More barracks space is needed than would be for a smaller battle force, more short-term draftees in basic training, and more reservists in refresher courses. Finally, the requirements of the strike forces in tanks and other kinds of combat vehicles are much higher than those of lighter, more terrain-bound, perhaps fortification-reliant, mobilization forces, of which the FRG is said to have too few.

The Germans have made two minor corrections to this situation. They have converted three armored infantry into motorized infantry (Jäger) brigades, and they have shortened the term of the draft from 18 to 15 months. More substantial corrections are under study in the Commission on Defense Structure and will be considered later in this report.4 Under continued budget pressures in a détente environ-

4 See pp. 80ff. below.
ment, structural changes may become unavoidable, and one possible course lies in
the direction of more territorial defense.

Before leaving the subject of budget pressures, it may be pointed out that the
problem of a relative excess of standing strike forces appears in a somewhat different
light for Germany's western neighbors. The standing nuclear strike forces of Britain
and France are ornaments of major power status for which their governments seem
determined to pay the necessary price and which can hardly be reduced in size
without losing their political visibility. British, Dutch, Belgian, and French conven-
tional maneuver forces are largely stationed in Germany. Insofar as they are meant
to deny an eastern invader access to the home country by operating on its forward
glacis, they must of necessity be standing and mobile strike forces. Substituting
more terrain-bound and latent (mobilization) forces would for these countries be
tantamount to reducing their military presence in Germany. This offers them a
special reason to maintain present structures. But these defense establishments are
also under budget and other pressures which may entail some conversions. For
example, although a high-level Commission in the Netherlands has recommended
unanimously that Dutch Army stationing in Germany be maintained and even
augmented, an important minority, including the chairman, has also recommended
(1) that two of the present six M-day brigades of the total Dutch Army be converted
to so-called RIM brigades, i.e., reservist units under carefully planned rapid mobiliz-
ation procedures; (2) that earlier plans to expand the standing army forces be
scrapped; and (3) that serious consideration be given to relinquishing the air force
as a national service—all this to maintain defense as a constant proportion (4
percent) of national income. In Belgium, a contemplated further conversion of stand-
ing forces into latent forces may entail removal of some units from Germany.
Denmark, which maintains no troops in Germany, has a defense structure reform
pending in parliament that provides for converting one-third of its present standing
army strength to a "supplementary" force of rapidly mobilizable reservists.

SEARCH FOR AN INOFFENSIVE DETERRENT

One of the principal features of Western détente policies in Europe has been to
cease questioning Soviet security interests east of the inner-German dividing line,
in particular to recognize the territorial-political status of the Soviet-affiliated states
in that area, and to seek in return Soviet assurances of the territorial-political status
west of that line and in the area of Berlin. When the German Social-Democrats took
over West German foreign policy, first as junior partners (in 1967) and then as the
dominant party (in 1969), the FRG became a leader in this approach to détente, after
having been a laggard for a number of years. At the end of 1972, the FRG capped
the treaties of force renunciation and frontier recognition, which it had concluded
with the USSR and Poland, with a treaty in which it accepted the sovereignty and

7 Commission of Civilian and Military Experts, The Future of the Netherlands Defence Effort, The
Hague, March 1972, p. 68. The Commission noted that the existing M-day brigades already include some
RIM battalions.
territorial integrity of the East German state. Chancellor Brandt declared that the cold war in Germany had ended.²

Accompanying a variety of U.S.-Soviet and Four-Power agreements on general and specifically European security matters, this turn in German foreign policy was bound to open the way to a new weighing of the policy of deterrence. Because of important cautions regarding the Western alliance, the protection of which German leaders do not wish to forego, and because of Soviet foreign and military policy, which they cannot predict, this reorientation of German defense thinking is proceeding slowly and guarded. But there are good reasons to believe that it goes in the direction of making the West German contribution to military deterrence increasingly defensive, or less capable of threatening Soviet territory and other assets in the Soviet security sphere. The FRG leadership appears to be searching for an inoffensive deterrent, as part of its efforts to base European peace on mutual accommodation rather than military confrontation.

In contrast to the leading articulator of defense policy in the old Bonn regime, Franz-Josef Strauss, who used to emphasize the FRG’s need to contribute in one way or another to the West’s capacity to threaten the Soviet area (offensive deterrent), the leading articulator of Social-Democratic defense policy, Helmut Schmidt, has stressed what he calls “the defensive principle.” In setting forth the principles of his party’s defense policy, he wrote in 1969:

Our détente policy requires that our defense measures are recognizable, also from abroad, as clearly defensive. The defensive principle calls for a defensive basic structure of the Bundeswehr with respect to its military organization and its size. Equipment and armament must correspond to the defensive role of the Bundeswehr in the frame of the Atlantic Alliance. The defensive principle also requires modesty [Zurückhaltung] in all defense-political utterances.⁹

In Schmidt’s list of five principles, this defensive principle ranked second only to the principle of “balance of forces acting in and on Europe.” The principle of alliance maintenance ranked third; proportionality of tasks and means, fourth. In fifth place was “continual adaptation of the FRG’s political and military role within the alliances and their organization to the changing conditions and requirements of our national security interest.”¹⁰

This view, which may be considered characteristic of the present government, does not repudiate the traditional core of West German military security thinking, namely, that deterrence of Soviet aggression, as much as it is needed, must consist principally of a threat of destruction to Soviet territory and society, which must, of course, be exercised by an offense-capable deterrent force. This basic thought has always been accompanied by another one, namely, that the presentation of this principal threat is the business of the FRG’s allies, chiefly the United States, and not the business of the FRG. Far from rejecting the value of an offensive deterrent aimed at the USSR on its behalf, the German Social-Democratic leadership only goes one step further in distinguishing between its own military business and that of the


¹⁰ Ibid., p. 253.
United States. The Germans are not saying that an inoffensive deterrent deters better than an offensive one, but they prefer to keep the former posture for themselves in the given international constellation, and to leave the latter to their allies.\textsuperscript{11}

Up to the present, the FRG's contribution to the Western deterrent has been a peculiar mixture of offensive and inoffensive elements. On the one hand, the FRG's own air, missile, and naval forces are largely incapable of striking Soviet territory, quite apart from being subject to alliance constraints. But these forces, as well as the German armored ground forces, can strike at least the forefield of Soviet military deployment: East Germany, Czechoslovakia, etc. So, of course, can allied forces stationed on West German soil. In addition to these offensive capabilities against the Soviet glacis, the FRG forces have capabilities to defend German ground and airspace. But these elements of an inoffensive deterrent (directed at invading forces rather than the invader's home territory) are relatively weak for lack of fortifications and territorial defense provisions and for insufficient emphasis on latent forces as against standing forces. Thus the FRG contribution of offensive-deterrent elements is notable—however secondary to the primary allied (American) deterrent it is judged to be—and its contribution of inoffensive-deterrent elements leaves something to be desired. In pursuing its détente policy, the present German leadership will probably seek to shift weight from offensive-deterrent elements to inoffensive-deterrent elements, i.e., to move toward a more clearly inoffensive-deterrent posture "recognizable also from abroad."\textsuperscript{12}

Before examining the possibilities and endeavors in this direction in greater detail—which is the business of the following section—let us briefly note two restraining factors, both of which are quite evident in the German approach to MBFR. Undoubtedly, the FRG, like the United States and unlike France and Britain, hopes that some East-West agreement on force deployment in Central Europe will entail a modification and reduction of its standing forces. But the FRG fears that reductions in U.S. stationed forces may somehow be the most prominent outcome of an MBFR agreement or of a protracted delay of such an agreement and unilateral U.S. action. Preventing such an outcome appears to be almost as imperative as the avoidance of greater imbalance of NATO and Warsaw Pact standing force deployments, perhaps even more so. Up to now, the Germans have looked at the deployment of American troops on their soil chiefly as a means of assuring themselves of the engagement of the American offensive deterrent on their behalf, and at the maintenance of a large standing German army as a means of persuading the United States of the earnestness of their own defense effort and thus the worthwhileness of the American engagement. To prevent a weakening of the presumptive link to U.S. strategic force, German defense policy has tied itself to the notion that "only standing forces deter" and has shied away from a greater emphasis on, and some conversion to, latent forces. But with the progress of the policy of reconciliation with the East, and its endorsement both by the Eastern partners and the West German

\textsuperscript{11} To cite Schmidt again: "It is the business of the United States and its nuclear power to attempt to maintain the balance of forces world-wide. . . . [Furthermore] the attempt to maintain the balance in Europe in particular can only succeed if the engagements of the two superpowers in Europe can be maintained. Beyond that, one should endeavor to get down from the high levels of armament and deployment to lower levels, on both sides." Ibid., p. 246.

\textsuperscript{12} The concepts of "offensive" and "inoffensive" deterrence and their relations to weaponry, force organization, and other military dispositions will be explored in a separate study.
electorate in the 1972 elections, the FRG government will probably find this kind of logic less and less compelling. Following the elections, the Commission on Defense Structure published its report recommending a revision of the German military posture in a latent-force direction.13 Fear of losing the American offensive deterrent no longer seems to keep the lid shut on ideas to restructure the German deterrent.

The second restraining factor is the continued heavy preponderance of offensive elements in the Soviet military posture. As long as Soviet missiles are pointed at the FRG, Soviet armored divisions and other offense-capable weapon systems deployed near the West German Border and exercised there from time to time in a threatening fashion, the FRG is under no inducement to reduce the countoffensive capabilities of its armed forces. To do so would mean to assure the presumptive invader's territory of greater immunity than heretofore. Now, the prospect of MBFR negotiations and of continued benevolent attitudes toward the FRG in Moscow kindle German hopes that military deployment on the Soviet side may take on a somewhat less offensive face. A West German shift toward a purely defensive military posture would then appear more justifiable. However, it might even be begun in advance as a means to encourage the hoped-for Soviet move—a kind of bargaining practice which the FRG has followed on other subjects of Ostpolitik. One should expect that any actual reduction of forward-deployed Soviet forces would release in the FRG some move toward a more predominantly inoffensive deterrent, touching on armament, standing-force levels, presence of certain kinds of allied forces, or other relevant aspects.

But the West German approach to MBFR has been such as to allow for force posture changes that might take place even in the absence of a U.S. force reduction (which the FRG prefers to avoid) and a Soviet force reduction (which the Soviets may want to avoid). Accordingly, the Germans have stressed the priority of qualitative aspects of force posture or force modalities, and focused their search for less offensive mutual postures on these aspects. They proposed a "phasing" of MBFR negotiations in about the following fashion, as listed in an article by Uwe Nerlich.14

1. Agreement on principles that should underlie European security arrangements.
2. Reduction of the possibilities of military dispositions (military movements, e.g., maneuvers).
3. Agreement on force limitation.
4. Creation of a modest yet adequate system of verification.
5. Reduction of forces.

This suggested agenda for a phased approach, which reflected the official German line during the preparations for MBFR, dealt most prominently (in items 1

13 See below, pp. 60ff. The shift in the official position was already prepared by an article by Dr. Hans-Georg Wieck, chief of the MOD's planning staff and of the Commission's staff, "Wehstruktur und internationale Politik" (Defense Structure and International Politics), Europa Archiv, July 10, 1972, p. 463. After asserting that "NATO maintains the military balance through standing forces," and that "pure training armies are worthless for deterrence as long as the opponent maintains standing forces," Wieck allowed that a mixture of standing and training (reservist) forces might do and acknowledged that the degree of availability and preparedness of the reservist forces is of critical importance for their contribution to deterrence.

through 4) with a modus vivendi under the existing force deployments, and placed a reduction of deployments in fifth place. The desired modus vivendi was designed above all to reduce the reasons for (item 1), and the general capacity to conduct (items 2 through 4), offensive actions. In his brief comment on the fifth item, force reduction, Nerlich noted the desirability "to reduce in the first place weapons that have a relatively unambiguous offensive character and are accessible to verification, i.e., especially armor."\

Whichever course the MBFR negotiations may follow, we are likely to hear more of the German idea to make deterrent postures less offensive on both sides, and in particular of the idea to make the German contribution to the Western deterrent less offensive, either in exchange for, or in anticipation of, less threatening Soviet and Soviet-satellite postures vis-à-vis the FRG. The Germans may count on some diplomatic cooperation from some Eastern and Western countries. Relevant actions may occur long before an MBFR agreement materializes.\

It is not our task here to assess the problems that such an approach may pose to NATO, the United States, the USSR, etc., but only to indicate that in the MBFR context, and possibly also in other contexts (NPG, Franco-German defense relations, etc.), one should reckon with an inclination of the FRG to make its part of the Western deterrent less offense-capable. Latent (including territorial) defense forces, among other things, offer a way to pursue this inclination.

In its search for a less offensive deterrent, the FRG stands alone among the principal states of Western Europe. Not only do its western neighbors share the German desire to keep the long-range U.S. nuclear deterrent offense-capable and committed to strike the Soviet Union if the Soviets threaten to strike Western Europe; they have no qualms about American forces presenting this threat from German soil, a matter on which German views are ambivalent. Like the Germans, the French, the British, and other West European governments clamor for large American ground forces in Germany to enhance the credibility of the American threat. Only the Danes and Norwegians clearly share the German concern with an emplacement on their soil of nuclear deterrent capabilities; in fact, they have pushed it much further in their policy of ruling out the presence of nuclear weapons. For the British, there is little question that they would like to remain able to offer a direct counterthreat to the Soviet Union. Their problem is only how to make this possible with the small and obsolescing bomber and submarine force which they are willing to finance. For the French, the further development of the offensive capacity of the force de dissuasion (nuclear submarines and land-based missiles in the Provence) obviously remains a matter of high priority. To bolster its cherished claim to great-power rank, France not only lets this force absorb a large share of its defense budget, but has also incurred, at least until recently, a fair

16 Ibid., p. 168. The Western, in particular the German, demand for blunting the offensive edges of the Soviet force posture in Europe not only seeks to lessen the Soviet threat to Western states but to Eastern European states under the "Brezhnev doctrine" as well.

18 As a small example related to the fourth item on the Nerlich list, the FRG and the USSR agreed in October 1972 to establish military attachés at their respective embassies. As a result, the Soviets now have a fourth military attaché's office in the FRG, in addition to the three they maintain at the military headquarters of the three Western powers in that country.

17 It is interesting that nuclear abstinence in Norway goes hand in hand with quite thoroughgoing preparations for civil defense and a strong home guard, two kinds of inoffensive deterrents. See Section V.
amount of diplomatic trouble with Pacific Ocean states by pursuing its nuclear tests in Polynesia, as well as trouble with the FRG by suggesting a forward deployment of (nationally controlled) French Pluton missiles. In neither Britain nor France under their present governments can one detect a tendency to make their national contribution to deterrence less offense-capable so as to facilitate relations with the Soviets. When they contemplate possibilities of Franco-British nuclear cooperation, as they do from time to time, they seek to preserve or to enhance their capacity to offer a counterthreat to Soviet territory.

As much as the British and French are opposed to any independent nuclear role of the FRG, they may well prefer that the Germans maintain their contributions to offense-capable NATO forces in the present frame rather than shift toward a less offense-capable contribution. Such a shift seems politically more attractive to the Germans than to their western neighbors for whom the territory of the FRG is a defense glacis. Therefore, whatever reasons these countries may have to strengthen territorial and civil defenses, the search for a less offensive national deterrent is not one of them.

SHOULD DEFENSE BE "TOTAL"?

This question is a very uncomfortable one for German defense thinkers and policymakers. It asks whether German society and government policy should be prepared comprehensively and consistently to deal with a war on German soil. This touches on fundamental German ambiguities regarding defense matters. These ambiguities appear in the following six pairs of views or policies:16

1. Expectation of being battlefield; but fixation on "forward defense."

It is clear to all Germans that in a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact group, the territory of the FRG would be the crucial battlefield. It would seem to follow that this territory and the social and industrial structure on it should be prepared in depth, i.e., totally, for the events of war. But it is an imperative of German defense thinking that defense strategy must be "forward," not only in the obvious sense that an invader must be resisted at the frontier, but also that military resources must be concentrated on front-line battles. This concentration implies a neglect of provisions for warfare deep in the German hinterland, which an invading enemy could easily reach with armored and airborne thrusts.

The need for more total defense in the territorial respect encounters the argument that warfare on the territory of the FRG is likely to be so destructive that no national interest could possibly be served by it. War would essentially be a conflict between foreign superpowers, into which the FRG would merely be drawn. The industrial and social system of the country would be destroyed by exposure to warfare, and therefore all national values would be destroyed. This argument has been strongly made in the influential work of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker.17 His

16 Another ambiguity will be discussed in Section II.
studies have argued that the FRG is indefensible in both nuclear and conventional war, that deterrence leads to an arms race and thus enhances the risk of war, and that neither NATO's regular forces nor guerrillas and "civilians defense" can safeguard essential values. A policy of war avoidance, Weizsäcker holds, is the only acceptable course for Germany.

While this doctrine has been mildly criticized by government spokesmen—mainly for too radical conclusions drawn from accepted premises—its theses represent widespread German thinking. Unable to offer a fundamental rejection of the Weizsäcker view, say, on the Swiss or Yugoslav theme of "the enemy must not prevail!", yet caught in the institutionalized international and domestic system of deterrence by force, German policymakers tend to let defense fall short of being total by pushing it conceptually to the front line, and by living with rather than (under evident political risks) grappling with the widespread aversion to war preparation in depth. But they also find it politically unavoidable to proclaim a need for defense of the country in all its parts and feel compelled to do more about it here and there. The usual rationale is that country-wide defense preparedness is needed to make forward defense work. The persuasive power of such urgings, in fact the conviction of many of those who make them, is of course weakened by the hold which the ideas we characterized above as the Weizsäcker doctrine have on all German minds. If national defense efforts can at best contribute to deterrence but never defend, then forward defense cannot work, anyway, and country-wide defense preparations are merely a disturbing amplification of a futile endeavor. How can this be squared with the expectation that Germany would be a battlefield?

2. Front-line defense; but no fortifications.

Unable to root defense of the country firmly in national will and loyalty to the state, German defense policy thinkers have focused on defense as forward as possible and have influenced NATO strategy and national disposition accordingly. Yet they have rejected fortifications which could make the front line more defensible, i.e., forts and mine belts, as well as defense-oriented features of public works. Most pervasive among the numerous arguments against such aspects of total defense is that they would make the prospect of war impinge on the German countryside and manifest its direct and unequivocal involvement in military deterrence. Yet, the tradeoffs for such static defenses are mobile and offense-capable defenses; and the tradeoffs for fortifications manned largely by light infantry and reservists are sophisticated strike forces in being. The political and financial implications of such forces do not let the fortification issue come to rest and tend to reopen it from time to time. The military counterargument, summed up in the cry, "Maginot Line," cannot keep it safely dormant because it remains a historical fact that the French defense line by that name, manned by poilus, was not proven useless by assault but by the failure to extend the fortifications to the northern area most in need of fortification.

3. Deployment field for NATO armies; but unclear modus vivendi of wartime forces.

The FRG is the principal field of peacetime deployment of NATO armies, and the Germans wish it to be so. Yet the modus vivendi of these forces in wartime is
far from being clearly prepared. The logistics support of the national contingents has been, and continues to be, the responsibility of their national governments and relies on national supply and maintenance systems; it partly has to do so because the contingents use different equipments and supply rules. For them to draw on German supplies and services remains an international process. Even in tactical matters, their relation to local German authorities is distant and complex. The resulting problems are expected to be mitigated by liaison personnel. At present the principal mission of the German Territorial Army (see Section IV) is to guarantee the ability of the NATO armies to operate. But it remains quite doubtful that liaison and territorial assistance as conceived today could cope with the complex problems of military-civilian relations if the country were under attack.

In part, this means that it is difficult to combine international military integration with comprehensive national defense, a point to which we shall return. But the difficulty is enhanced by the relegation of the German Territorial Army to the hinterland, away from the frontier-near areas in which the NATO forces are meant to operate. A closer approach to total defense would require a much greater meshing of allied forces with German political and economic structures throughout the territory of the FRG, or else the assumption by the West German government of more direct responsibility for the defense of its territory.

4. Prospect of deep invasion; but doctrine that complex society rules out city defenses, partisan warfare, scorched earth policy.

Unfortunately, the doctrinal preference for forward defense does not rule out deep invasion. German defense thinkers are well aware of the possibility of enemy breakthroughs and airborne operations, notably into the urban areas. But German defense planning has been unwilling to provide for and to plan the defense of cities in the cities or at their periphery, or to contemplate recapturing them from an enemy who has taken shelter in them and uses them as strong points, or to prepare for combat operations behind advanced enemy lines, or to allow for a scorched earth policy to deny civilian structures and assets to an invader, or even for passive resistance under occupation. The idea that war on German soil should consist of fighting in the green countryside and along a (forward) front—because anything else would destroy too much or make too great demands on civilian society—seems to preclude such preoccupations; but awareness of the possibility of deep invasion keeps drawing the attention of some defense thinkers to total defense measures that could deal with it.

5. Large pool of reservists; but weakness of their organization and training.

The large reservoir of reservists, which the general conscription system furnishes the FRG, would permit theoretically the mobilization of large forces in a nation of over 60 million people. But the effective mobilization of this potential force is limited by the lack of an efficient training and recall system, the relatively small projected wartime augmentation of the Field Army, and the principle that reservists must only flesh out or replenish standing units of the Field Army rather than constitute new units. The Territorial Army may offer ways of escaping from these constraints if the Field Army cannot be freed from them; but either course would require that the military duties of reservists be made more tangible, and mobiliza-
tion planning more consistent with a rapid production of combat-ready forces from an inactive (reservist) base.


Nonviolent resistance to an invader, also called "civilian defense" in Germany, finds a good deal of interest on the left or pacifist wing of German defense thinking. The historic precedents abroad, the advantages and disadvantages of combining a German reliance on this approach with military resistance by allies, and scenarios and prospects of such a departure from armed defense, are discussed in some circles.20 An interesting feature of this thinking is that it combines emphasis on nonviolent resistance with a clear recognition of its need for universality, comprehensive organization, and total devotion of the citizen. It calls for total defense, even militancy, without arms. Interestingly also, a leading German military and disarmament specialist, Helmut Roth, who participated in such discussions, contested the relevance of French World War II résistance experience for the FRG today with the argument that patriotism and solidarity of population and government are unquestionable historical facts in France (sic!) but that "a similarly grown patriotism does not exist in the FRG." An attempt to create the necessary identification of the people with their nation, he said, would lead to totalitarianism. The FRG must, therefore, prefer military defense, "although it is rationally hopeless."21

The pacifists' call for a system of nonviolent defense involving everybody's heart and mind stands in stark contrast to the weak provisions for German civil defense, i.e., the protection of the population against enemy action. The spottiness of these provisions and the widespread unresponsiveness of the population to government efforts, however modest, are revealed in a recently published *White Paper on Civil Defense.*22 The apparent intent of this publication was to draw attention to how much remains to be done if in war the civilian population is to be preserved from utter vulnerability to enemy action and also to be kept from hamstringing military defense by predictable panic and flight. Here again, responsible thought leads to the quest for greater totality in defense.

**GREATER NATIONAL SELF-RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN ALLIANCE**

For all of the NATO countries, the peacetime processes of NATO and its provisions for war have become crucially important facts of national defense, but in no country have they become a substitute for national defense to the same degree as

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20 *Civilian Defense, Nonviolent Resistance as a Form of Defense Policy* (Bertelsmann, Bielefeld, 1989) reports on a conference held in 1987 by the Association of German Scientists. See also Adam Roberts, *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense,* Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1967. A leading German protagonist of passive resistance praised the force and resourcefulness of the Norwegian passive resistance movement against the German occupation in World War II and noted properly, although in partial contradiction of his thesis, that it would have crumbled had it not been sustained by the hopes for a military victory of the Allied forces, including the fighting Norwegians. Theodor Ebert, "Wehrpolitik ohne Waffen" (Defense Policy Without Arms), *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung,* 1972, No. 2.

21 "French Territorial Defense, Model or Warning Example for the German Discussion of Social Defense," in *Civilian Defence,* pp. 70-72.

22 Federal Ministry of the Interior, *White Paper on Civil Defense in the FRG,* Bonn, April 1972 (hereafter cited as *German Civil Defense White Paper*). For further discussion, see Section IV.
in the FRG. The Germans do not see allies contributing to the defense of their country. They see "the Alliance" defending the country, and the FRG contributing to the alliance. This special point of view is only vaguely expressed in the frequent official statements to the effect that "the Western Alliance is indispensable to our security." One can also hear this in other countries. But it is plainly expressed in the formal statement that "the Bundeswehr is an alliance army," and in informal but no less official statements that substantive (as contrasted to legal) responsibility for the defense of the FRG rests with "the Alliance," that the FRG "contributes according to its means," and that the FRG cannot defend where the alliance fails to defend. Nowhere can one hear a clear assertion that the FRG would indeed fight for its territorial and political integrity if by some extreme misfortune "the Alliance," i.e., Germany's allies, chose not to fight for it. In this critical regard, the West Germans do not look at their state as a sovereign power (in contrast to nonallied Switzerland and Yugoslavia, nonintegrated France, and most of Germany's partners in NATO); but rather as a "sovereignty with limited liability."  

Yet, limited as the defense liability is in the eyes of government and population, forces are at work that induce the government to assert it somewhat more strongly. In 1968, under the Great Coalition government, the Bundestag at long last passed the state-of-emergency legislation that legalized and defined the powers of the state in domestic and international emergencies, including powers to employ the armed forces. This legislation had to overcome vociferous opposition on the Left. After its passage, the opposition to a genuine defense responsibility made itself felt in several other contexts, notably in increasingly frequent evasion of conscription, a tendency to treat such evasion as a citizen's right, opposition to mentioning anything pertaining to defense in the schools, and a notable increase of phenomena of open insubordination and antidefense agitation in the armed forces.

At first, the defense ministry sought to minimize this opposition and to defuse it by tolerance and bonhomie. Minister Schmidt, for one, reacted with nonchalance, at least in public, to the spreading insubordination and slovenliness among Bundeswehr soldiers, the sporting of shoulder-length hair and unruly beards, and the expressions of dismay, hopelessness, and disaffection among commissioned and noncommissioned officers. He asserted that "functional performance" alone counted.  

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22 Literal translation of the German text of the *German Defense White Paper 1971-72*, p. 24. The official English text is less expressive: "The federal armed forces are designed and organized as a force that forms part of the Alliance."  

23 A high official in the *Land* government of Lower Saxony expressed the contrast clearly: "In contrast to Switzerland, which by tradition relies on itself to defend its freedom, the fact of the co-responsibility of the NATO allies for the inviolability of FRG territory has brought about a limitation of self-responsibility and this has influenced the defense readiness of the population." Adolf Dedekind, "Gesamtverteidigung—Vergleichende Aspekte Schweiz-Bundesrepublik Deutschland" (Comprehensive Defense: Comparative Aspects of Switzerland and FRG), *Wehrkunde*, January 1972, pp. 20-21.  

24 The annual report of 1971 of the parliamentarian ombudsman of the armed forces (*Wehrbeauftragter*) commented extensively on discipline deterioration (pp. 98ff.), the "hair problem," and the attempts to cope with it through humor and regulations (pp. 22ff.). He noted that the standards of external appearance in the police and frontier police are higher than in the Bundeswehr (p. 76). He noted, on the other hand, a low incidence of drug consumption in the Bundeswehr (p. 135). His critical comments received much attention in the press. *Die Bundeswehr in Staat und Gesellschaft, Jahresbericht 1971 des Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages*, Bonn, 1972, hereafter cited as *Ombudsman 1971*. The discontent among officers was aired in a memorandum of 30 company commanders of the 7th Armored Infantry Division, published in the MOD's *Mitteilungen an die Presse*, April 15, 1971, and in numerous press interviews and articles. See also the minister's response to this memorandum, ibid., April 2, 1971. Contrary to the minister's view that the functional performance of soldiers was satisfactory, the shadow defense minister of the CDU, Manfred Woerner, spoke in the Bundestag of unsatisfactory physical efforts and frequent cases of negligent handling of equipment. *Die Welt*, April 15/16, 1972.
But the minister came to realize that these phenomena were not signs of easygoing soldiery but parts of a systematic opposition to soldiery, which expressed itself also in growing absenteeism and provocations of officers. He finally had to impose stricter rules of behavior and appearance and to suppress the remedial hairnets that had been issued to his hirsute army, which had earned it the nickname of "the German Hair Force." When the Inspector Generalship of the Bundeswehr passed from General de Maizière to Admiral Zimmerman, the speeches of the old and the new commander and of the minister himself dwelled on the need for greater discipline and genuine soldiery. After tolerating for a while the tendency of soldiers to refuse, and of superiors not to enforce, discipline in military service in the name of "democratization" and the abandonment of anachronistic "Prussian" formalities, the government is now trying to set limits.

Antidefense feelings also prevail in the general educational systems of the FRG. Not only in many of the universities but also in many of the schools (especially the high schools in larger cities), defense, national as well as NATO, is anathema. Left-wing students and teachers agitate against it as contrary to German interests and demand, and furnish instruction in service refusal and conscientious objection. Land governments, which are responsible for the school system, have until recently gone out of their way to downgrade and to sanitize (i.e., divest of direct relevance to the citizen) defense subjects in the instruction plans for social studies and modern history. They have declared optional any mention of the Bundeswehr in classes, and any contacts with Bundeswehr youth officers, and they avoid anything that anybody might call defense propaganda.

In November 1970, Chancellor Willy Brandt found it necessary to admonish the Land governments, as he put it, "to create understanding among the young for the necessity of an adequate defense as a precondition for any détente policy," and to avail themselves of the services of the youth officers of the Bundeswehr "who inform and do not appeal (werben)." In June 1971, Defense Minister Schmidt pleaded with a teachers' union to help mitigate the systematic opposition in the schools, partly fostered by its own members, to participation in defense.

Some, but not all, of the Land governments have since answered these admonitions with cautiously worded ordinances encouraging a modicum of positive defense information in the schools. But the response of governments, trade unions, Social-

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26 The subject proved to be an irrepressible one for Rhenish Carnival humor. Minister Schmidt was knighted for bravery in the battle "against deadly seriousness" (wider den tierrischen Ernst) and the Bundeswehr was praised for its new hair strategy: when the Russians saw the woolly heads and the hairnets protruding from under helmets, they would be paralyzed by irresistible mirth and could be easily captured.

27 For a discussion of conscientious objectors, see below, pp. 24ff.

28 A rather comprehensive survey of the treatment and nontreatment of defense matters, NATO, Bundeswehr, etc., in German high school texts concluded that it offered "an alarming picture." It noted among other things that the subject of civil defense was not treated at all in the textbooks, F. H. Hubert, "Bundeswehr und Verteidigungspolitik: ihre Darstellung in Schulbüchern für Gymnasien" (Bundeswehr and Defense Policy: Their Presentation in High School Textbooks), Wehrkunde, May 1972.


30 Letter to the President of the Education and Science Union in the German Trade Union Federation of June 9, 1971. Ibid. One of the occasions for the letter was the bestowal of a first prize in a public competition on a high school senior's paper which declared military service inhuman and demeaning.

31 For example, the CDU education minister of Württemberg-Baden announced coyly that "the Land government is of the opinion that some information about the necessity of an adequate defense is a precondition for any détente policy," and that "renouncing a minimum of defense measures would
Democratic organizations, and the general public was far from encouraging, and the authorities show little desire to press the issue. Commenting on the negative response, the parliamentarian ombudsman said: "I fear that also in the future many schools in the FRG will not provide adequate instruction in matters of security and defense policy." \footnote{Ombudsman 1971, p. 64.}

Given this attitude at the political base, it is not surprising that German policymakers still fail to infuse with blood the concept of "defense of the country" (the direct national defense responsibility) and that, if they talk about it at all, they give it second place behind "NATO defense," which signifies a German defense policy largely designed to maintain the engagement of allies, notably the United States, in the military protection of Germany. Nor is it surprising when a well-known German defense journalist, despairing of "industrial society's growing unreadiness to furnish soldiers," suggests that, like the late Roman empire, Germany may have to entrust its protection to foreign mercenaries\footnote{Interview with Adelbert Weinstein, Truppenpraxis, March 1972.}—one wonders, of what nationality. The overarching concept of total or "comprehensive defense" (\textit{Gesamverteidigung}) has virtually no political or administrative reality at all in Germany. On the domestic side, discounting some needling by the CDU opposition, only the need to provide protection against civil catastrophes (floods, extreme cold, civil disturbances) appears to give obvious justification and some organizational force to efforts classed under "defense of the country."

If it seems hard to kindle a will to self-defense within the FRG, there are international factors that keep the political leadership from settling back and confining defense policy to the contribution of a standing army, money, and real estate to NATO. As one should expect, this policy generates little criticism from Germany's NATO allies, notably the NATO agencies themselves, for it seems to express Germany's "faithfulness to the alliance." But the Germans observe American tendencies that make the subsummation of all German defense under NATO questionable. In the realm of strategic weapons, they observe the tendencies to decouple more openly American long-range air and missile power from interventions in a future European war, as well as a confinement of American capabilities under strategic arms limitation agreements that could make such interventions against a Soviet violation of West European territory less likely than before. The Germans also realize that some forward-based American weapon systems, capable of striking the Soviet Union, may be reduced in conjunction with SALT or MBFR efforts, or in other contexts. They also continue to anticipate reductions of American stationed troops, despite recurrent assurances to the contrary and their own efforts to forestall such reductions. The present political leadership is clearly reluctant to go along with any of these tendencies, although it may well find ways to live with the inevitable once it happens, and be sustained in this acquiescence by hopes that some lessening of the directness of American military involvement can be counterbalanced by increased Soviet goodwill and a less Soviet-threatening military posture.
on German soil. Nevertheless, the prospect of less weighty and less automatic outside protection drives German political and military leaders back to the politically unpalatable proposition of a more self-dependent defense system. Do not the provisions for a home-grown defense effort, which are now largely low-priority supplements to the principal NATO-required contribution, have to be reinforced in order to maintain at least the "minimum of defense" which the society feels obliged to have? Must there not be some shift of German defense priorities to a German base and frame, within alliance, and within the limits set by budget and détente pressures? Some of the German attempts to find answers to these questions will be discussed in Section II.
II. WHAT DOES TERRITORIAL DEFENSE HAVE TO OFFER?

Can territorial defense forces answer the pressures we have outlined in Section I? To begin with, let us recall our general definition of these forces and point to some problems with that definition. Territorial defense forces, we said, are latent (mobilization dependent), relatively lightly armed, locally assigned forces. This will suffice for most of our discussion, but the terms deserve further inspection.

A latent force can, of course, be a thing of many different hues and colors. The fact that it is not standing, i.e., not made up of men living permanently in barracks next to their equipment, may mean that it is no force at all. Its members may be reservists with some previous but largely forgotten military training, spread out over civilian society, unassigned to specific units or functions, practically unrecallable and, if recalled, not immediately (if ever) usable. Its units may be paper organizations; its equipment primitive, in bad condition, or nonexistent; its leaders, superannuated. "Forces" exist which have several if not all of these characteristics. Yet to assert that these are the necessary characteristics of a latent force, as some partisans of standing forces sometimes do, merely invites a similar caricature of standing forces as barracks full of time-serving, crime-prone, soldier-playing, and in time of real challenge, hapless ruffians. Latent forces can also be well-trained and retrained soldiers, familiar with their tasks and equipment, quickly recallable and smoothly assignable, capably officered, and well-equipped. They can, moreover, be intertwined with standing elements, permanent cadres or specialists in many, including highly efficient, ways. The following description of national systems will show examples of latent forces of different configuration and quality. Political attitudes and dispositions, as well as mission assignment, tradition, organization, and finance, make all the difference.

Similarly, "light armament" can signify very different things. The forces we are talking about are principally infantry in their tactical elements, as well as support forces. Since their purposes are to observe, delay, harass, ambush, or otherwise frustrate mobile enemy forces, they should be equipped with communication and fighting equipment that enables numerous small units to accomplish these tasks and that maximizes their advantages over the heavier equipment of the enemy. Such equipment is available or can be designed. Depending on the mission of the various territorial units (object security and defense, terrain holding, denial of airfields and landing sites, operations behind enemy lines, communications, and so forth), they
should be provided with easily portable armor-breaking and antiaircraft weapons, and either equipped or supported with light artillery weapons, both missile and tube, armor and aviation. How light or cheap the units' own equipment can be depends on various factors. One consideration may be that is should be suitable for a force of reservists, rugged rather than "temperamental," and that it should not be subject to too frequent technological innovation, or require steady peacetime operation and monitoring. But such requirements are hardly absolute. Much depends on the organization of the latent forces, their seeding with permanent cadres, or interaction with standing forces. As we shall see, some forces of this kind can also operate fairly complicated electronics and machinery. In nations that have large numbers of technically trained civilians, people familiar with motors, electronics, etc., a well-organized force of reservists can handle a great variety of technical equipment. Territorial forces should therefore not be thought of as rifle-bearing trench-sitters. Above all, they should not be considered the dumping ground for unsuitable equipment phased out of the strike forces (and therefore "cheaply" procurable).

Likewise, the term "local assignment" invites comment. It indicates an association of units with specific parts of the territory, as contrasted with units of high inter-area mobility and expeditionary-force capability. Local assignment does not rule out mobility, but it emphasizes the mission of denying an enemy conquest of the assigned territorial assets and of exploiting to the fullest extent the features of the terrain and a superior knowledge of them. It should comprise "stay behind" tasks to deal with enemy forces that have overrun or bypassed the assigned territory, as well as preparation for forms of covert and partisan warfare. But territorial forces must not simply be equated with partisans. Other desirable features of equipment and organization will be dealt with in the following discussion.

Latent forces, of course, must not be relatively lightly armed infantry, nor must they be locally assigned. They may be cadre-reservist units of the main forces, organized for any imaginable military function and prepared for their wartime role by reserve training, materiel readiness, and periodic activation. Such forces would not be territorial defense forces in the strict sense of our threefold definition, although they share with the latter the characteristic of having no significant peacetime presence (no standing force), which is of first-rate international and domestic political importance. We shall treat such types of forces somewhat eclectically in this study, as an extension of the main force (notably in tactical respect), or as an extension of the territorial forces (notably in the personnel respect), or separately, where they are being emphasized (as in the report of the German Defense Structure Commission).¹

Territorial defense forces can go under all kinds of names. Forces of this type are called Home Guard in Norway, Territorial Army in the FRG, Militia in Switzerland. Moreover, the forces called "territorial" in the several countries have peculiar characteristics and orientations. Like the territorial defense forces of other NATO countries, the German Territorial Army has the characteristic of not being assigned to NATO, i.e., it remains under national command when the field army and the entire air force and navy pass under NATO command, at least until further notice; its missions, however, are largely subordinated to NATO missions. In France, the défense opérationnelle du territoire comprises some of the standing and most of the

¹ See pp. 60ff. below.
reserve army forces that are neither stationed in Germany nor earmarked for deployment overseas. In Yugoslavia, the territorial defense forces are under the authority of the several republics and smaller political units, in contrast to the regular army which comes under the federal government. In Switzerland, the term "territorial service" is applied selectively to particular units with static defense and support missions, although in terms of our definition almost the entire defense establishment may qualify as a territorial defense force.

In accordance with these national peculiarities, the term "territorial force" is used to cover wider or narrower ground than our general definition. In Norway and Yugoslavia it frankly comprises partisan functions; in France and Switzerland less clearly so; in the FRG not at all. In all countries, it links up in some fashion with main battle or field forces on the one hand, with internal security and civil defense on the other hand, and it also shades off into these categories (e.g., into the light infantry of the field forces on one hand, protection of civil transport on the other). But these connections vary in degree and in kind. No country's territorial defense force is exactly defined and organized like the next country's, and none of these forces represents fully the ideal type of our general definition. Naturally, this means that no country's actual system can simply be regarded as a blueprint for the next country's endeavor to create a (better) territorial defense force.

It will become clear that greater reliance on territorial and other latent defense forces can offer some answers to the pressures on European defense structures, particularly the German, as outlined in Section I. What is at issue is not the complete substitution of such forces for standing strike forces, but a shift in emphasis from the first to the second. Territorial defense forces, of course, are not costless, either by themselves or in terms of possible tradeoffs with other forces. In the following discussion we shall at first postpone consideration of the tradeoff aspect by focusing simply on the vague proposition of *some shift in defense structure from standing strike forces to territorial forces*, and then consider a combination of the two. We shall leave open the question of the magnitude of the shift, which can only be resolved in specific circumstances.

**TERRITORIAL FORCES AS BUDGET RELIEF**

Territorial forces recommend themselves in the first place as cheap forces. The peacetime budgetary cost of a short-term draftee with obligations for subsequent supplementary and refresher training periods is in all likelihood lower than that of a longer-term draftee with roughly similar obligations, or that of a fixed-period volunteer or professional soldier with civilian readaptation and pension requirements (incentives). The peacetime budgetary cost of relatively light, predominantly infantry-type armament per military unit (battalion, etc.) is certainly lower than that of the heavy armament for, say, an armored unit. The peacetime budgetary cost of the largely latent logistics support of a mobilization force is lower than that of the operating or combat-ready logistics support of a standing force of the same wartime strength.

It is difficult to prove these propositions singly or jointly. Relevant figures are almost impossible to obtain as long as the national authorities or NATO do not
initiate specific studies. The following comparison is only vaguely suggestive of the overall peacetime cost relationship between a force that is largely of the territorial type and one that is largely of the standing field army type. Switzerland supports a wartime force of about 600,000, to be mobilized in little more than 48 hours, with an annual peacetime budget of about $460 million. The FRG supports a wartime force of about 1,300,000 (on a slower mobilization schedule) with an annual budget of about $7.2 billion. That comes to $765/year per wartime Swiss soldier, $5500/year per wartime FRG soldier. A small book could be written about the military and organizational qualifications to be attached to such a comparison. But something remains in this 1 to 7 proportion that expresses the financial allure of a latent, largely territorial-defense oriented force for budget-worried people in NATO Europe.\(^2\)

The principal problems with budget-relief along such lines are political-military and organizational. What kind of deterrence or defense does a territorial-defense oriented budget buy? The answer would depend, among other things, on the quality of the latent forces, their ability to spring into action, and their composition (lightly armed territorials, more heavily armed cadre-reservist units, etc.). The answer would also depend on the weight one puts on the imminence of the opponent's turn to an aggressive policy and on one's own capacity to augment the latent force's readiness if such a turn can be observed. These judgments would influence what kind of deterrent force one feels prudent to buy, and the judgment of the sufficiency of what one does buy. The military inferiority of a latent force is neither certain nor politically relevant in all circumstances.

With regard to organization, important social and domestic political factors would have to be weighed. Could military service be adapted to the training and readiness requirements of a latent force? In terms of our comparison, could the FRG manage to match, or come closer to matching, Switzerland's ability to create a credible wartime force of 20 men for every peacetime man in active service, instead of 3 for 1 as the FRG does today? Or could the FRG raise its mobilization potential from 1 wartime soldier per 50 population to some ratio closer to Switzerland's 1 wartime soldier per 10 population? It would certainly not be an easy matter.

The risk of deficient military capacity and difficulties of organization are bound to give pause to anyone about to succumb to the financial allure of a conscripted militia, not to mention vested military and industrial interests in a standing and large resources-consuming army. But those who long for some shift toward "militias" in Western Europe do have a financial argument, an argument which they could develop with more appropriate studies (and data) than have emerged so far.

**TERRITORIAL FORCES AND THE CONSCRIPTION SYSTEM**

If there is a longing for "militias" in Europe, in good part for financial reasons, there is also a longing for conscription-free volunteer or professional forces, for political-military reasons and because of the social difficulties of the conscription

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\(^2\) Note in passing that the ratio of capital to operating expenditures of the Swiss military establishment, despite the well-known parsimony of Swiss procurement, is still a good deal higher than that of the Bundeswehr: 1 to 1.6 as against 1 to 2 (1970 data for both). In preceding years, the Swiss ratio was even higher; see *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*; February 11, 1972. See below, Table 9, p. 93.
These difficulties are patent in the FRG. While the German MOD has opinion research to prove that the Bundeswehr as a whole is accepted today by the German population, the parliamentarian ombudsman writes:

The young generation does not regard the legally prescribed basic military service as a citizen’s duty. Opinion polls have shown that the majority of young citizens oppose the institution of general conscription.

And more specifically, referring to polls conducted on behalf of the MOD:

The disinclination to general conscription is on the increase. Most of the young wish for a different way of organizing the armed forces. A considerable number want to serve one year at the most.

The increasing number of conscientious objectors in Germany, largely for political reasons, receives much comment. MOD data show that the number of applicants rose steadily from a level of 3000 to 4000 in the early 1960s to almost 28,000 in 1971. In the first seven months of 1972 alone there were 24,000. The increase is alarming, although said to be still less than 4 percent of the most recent induction age group. By our calculations, however, in 1971 the applicants represented almost 9 percent of the relevant age group (class of 1951). No wonder, then, that some military experts consider the future of conscription a hopeless one.

The present government wants to uphold the general conscription system, partly in the belief that it furnishes a “more democratic army” (a volunteer or professional army is suspected of becoming a “state within the state”), partly to demonstrate to the allies a national will to defense. While trying hard—but with little success—to raise the proportion of longer-serving volunteer soldiers, the MOD has sought to make the conscription system “more equitable” by shortening its term from 18 to 15 months and inducting a larger proportion of conscription-age young men. But it seems that this policy raises more difficulties than it solves. The standing army.\(^5\)

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5 The case for a combination of conscripted militia with volunteer/professional forces will be dealt with in Section III.

6 Opinion polls have indicated that a majority of the population consider the Bundeswehr “important” and wish to keep it; that a large minority believe that it could, together with the allies, withstand an attack from the east; but also, that a large majority consider it inferior to the Wehrmacht of World War II, the Russian Army, and the American Army (in that order), chiefly on account of poorer training, organization, armament, and discipline. Bernard Fleckenstein, *Bundeswehr und Industriesgesellschaft* (Bundeswehr and Industrial Society), Boldt Verlag, Boppard, 1971, pp. 114ff.

7 *Ombudsman* 1971, pp. 20, 75.

8 German Defense White Paper 1971/72, p. 87; *Ombudsman* 1971, p. 30. The increase, since 1968, is entirely due to applications of new draftees, the number of applicants among active soldiers having stabilized at about 3000 per year.


10 The number of conscientious objector applicants not already in military service was about 24,000 in 1971. Presumably they belonged to the class of 1961 legally obliged to serve in 1971. This class has been estimated at 372,000. Only 74 percent of these, or about 275,000, were considered inducible as draftees or as military and paramilitary volunteers, according to estimates of the Commission of Defense Structure Report of 1971 (*Wehrberechtigung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Bonn, 1971, pp. 52-53). The objectors formed almost 9 percent of that number, and not 3.64 percent as shown in *German Defense White Paper* 1971/72, p. 86.

11 Adelberg Weinstein has said that a German conscription army on the present lines can hardly be imagined to exist by 1980. Interview in *Truppenpraxis*, March 1972.

12 The ideological tradition of the German Social-Democratic party shows considerable vacillation between this view and a preference for a small professional army.
forces are "enriched" with personnel of limited suitability; the training burdens falling on the Field Army are increased without enhancing its military worth; the young men find the term still too long, and agitation for a further reduction by six months has begun; and the "civilian substitute service" for recognized objectors, first 18 months long and now 16 to 17 months, which tries to place objectors in hospitals and a few other employments acceptable to the trade unions, cannot keep up with the rising number of objectors. At present, the substitute service manages to provide workplaces for about one-half of the recognized objectors.\textsuperscript{13}

It is possible that transition to a conscription system geared to the requirements of a territorial defense force, rather than the standing strike force, would alleviate some of the social difficulties. Such a force could live with a considerably shorter draft term (thus disturbing early civilian career pursuits less), but it would require more frequent and more systematic reserve callups for training (thus disturbing more men in mid-career).\textsuperscript{14} Short periods of intensive training would probably reduce the AWOL problem which plagues the present German conscription system.\textsuperscript{15} Such a conscription system might also meet more easily the preference of German draftees for military service near their homes, but like any military system relying on reservists, it would have to cope with the increased mobility of the civilian population, the frequent change of residence of young people.\textsuperscript{16} If conscription came to be reformed in this way, the standing strike forces and some of the technologically complex units might have to be staffed with volunteers only, although Swiss experience gives reasons to believe that many of the functions requiring high technical competence can also be entrusted to well-trained reservists.

How much the short draft term would alleviate the objector problem is hard to say. The Swiss with their initial basic training of four months, followed by at least nineteen recalls to service lasting from one to three weeks each during the following years, also have conscientious objectors, although the number appears quite small.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{11} Ombudsman 1971 (p. 59) reports difficulties with conscripts who have physical defects and with married conscripts who bring their babies into the barracks.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 41.

\textsuperscript{13} There is a good deal of public quarreling about the "civilian substitute service." Its insufficiency and looseness are such that thousands of objectors have escaped service altogether. The left-wing opposition attacks the idea that this service should be longer, by one month or two, than the initial term of military service and demands "equality of treatment." The CDU attacks the present government's policy of placing political objectors into functions (youth hostels, hospitals, etc.) in which they can engage in political agitation, and of not restricting such activities. The trade unions oppose any intrusion of the service into jobs of interest to their membership. In 1972, the federal government established a special office for the substitute service, but parliament failed to pass legislation enlarging the employment opportunities for objectors.

\textsuperscript{14} The ombudsman refers to the very generous German practice of excusing called reservists for occupational reasons—contrasting with the very strict Swiss practice—which leads to the routine of calling close to 50 percent more reservists to exercises than are actually expected to report for duty. On the other hand, he notes that serving reservists generate fewer complaints to him than draftees in basic training. Ombudsman 1971, pp. 68, 69.

Under present regulations, noncommissioned German reservists must expect to be reactivated two to three times during the six years following their active service, for a maximum of seven weeks in all. German Defense White Paper 1971/72, p. 51. Comparable Swiss reservists regularly spend a total of 32 weeks in training, spread out over 18 years.

\textsuperscript{15} Some German officers say that conscripts do not go AWOL more frequently than workers do in industry; but they also say that it happens most frequently during extended periods of military inactivity in the barracks.

\textsuperscript{16} Ombudsman 1971, pp. 67, 101.

\textsuperscript{17} Conscientious objectors' applications are not published in Switzerland, but the number of those penalized for evading military service is. It amounted to 133 in 1969, 175 in 1970, and 227 in 1971. Accompanying agitation for abolition of the army received a fair amount of press comment. Le Monde,
One cannot simply assume that a shorter initial conscription term in the FRG would, by itself, restore a sense of civic responsibility, for lack of which the present German conscription system malfunctions. Indeed, if other policies and developments do not strengthen that sense of responsibility, a militia based on short-term conscription may be equally handicapped. But then a militia may also offer a congenial framework for the enhancement of civic responsibility, as Swiss and Norwegian experience tends to show. In particular, by shifting part of the military service obligation from the initial-conscription age groups (18- to 20-year-olds) to the older age groups of reservists, the militia tends to benefit from the greater sense of civic responsibility characteristic for these age groups. On balance, the really short initial term of service characteristic of a territorial defense force, accompanied by more thoroughgoing reserve training and sharper penalization of service-dodging, could well make conscription more viable than it appears in the FRG today. Perhaps transition to such a system could save conscription from the crisis into which the current policy of drawing a maximum number of conscripts into the standing army—for a somewhat shortened but still long continuous term—is likely to lead.

Both in the United States and in Germany, leading military specialists have adopted this view. In a comprehensive article on U.S. and NATO manpower problems, Morris Janowitz asked that the United States and NATO encourage new European manpower systems: "For Europe, and especially for West Germany, militia systems, including six-month conscript service, must be developed." In Germany, an important book by Rudolf Woller elaborates on the idea. For political-military reasons, not unlike those that will be discussed in Section III of this study, and for peacetime personnel reasons, Woller recommends a strong territorial defense force.

The FRG, Woller argues, is wasting a large defense potential which it created at great expense by its poor exploitation of reserves. The size of this potential is bound to increase with the shortening of conscription. It may amount to well over 3 million men by 1980. Woller proposes to divert a large part of conscription to a nonmilitary service (civilian emergency service), to maintain only 60,000 conscripts in a total standing Bundeswehr of no more than 300,000; and to create conscript-militia units consisting of reservists with short basic training, capable of furnishing about 1 million men in wartime and organized around the FRG's present Home Defense Forces.

Woller acknowledges that reserve training is not costless. (In the FRG, the 1971 estimate ran to DM40 per man and exercise day.) But these costs should be related to the financial, political, and military benefits resulting from abandonment of the present structure. They should not be used as a pretext to favor cuts in reserve training when budgetary economies have to be worked out. Woller also draws atten-

November 4, 1971. In France, there is even less numerical information, but recognized objectors have to make alternative unarm ed service of twice the length of military service, and those who propagandize objection face jail sentences. Erwin Häckel, Military Manpower and Political Purpose, Adelphi Papers, No. 72, London, 1970, p. 25. One German press article reported that in 1971 there were 1450 applications of French objectors in relation to 220,000 draftees (Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 1, 2, 3, 1972); another one, that 350 refused to serve (Spiegel, May 22, 1972).

16 "Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose," Foreign Affairs, April 1972, p. 441.

18 Der unwahrscheinliche Krieg (The Improbable War), Seewald, Stuttgart, 1971. Woller is currently the President of the German Bundeswehr Reservists Association. The book is not available in English translation and therefore has found too little attention outside the FRG.
tion to ways of ensuring a smoother callup and integration of reservists in crisis situations. All in all, he assigns an important role to latent territorial defense forces in alleviating the incongruities of the conscripted army which the FRG now offers NATO.

PROS AND CONS OF THE INOFFENSIVE DETERRENT

To demonstrate its purely defensive intentions, a European country may well be attracted to emphasizing a territorial defense force in its invasion-deterrent structure. The force is latent, not strike-ready; it is bound to the geography of its own country and unsuitable for intervention abroad; it is weak in so-called offensive armament. These are advantages from the arms controllers' point of view and may well permit the country to exempt a significant military force from international force reduction agreements, such as MBFR.

On the other hand, as we have noted above, one must question how much deterrence such a force offers to an invasion-prone neighbor, and whether in his eyes it is really so inoffensive. No doubt one can think of a splendid territorial defense force that could transform the country into a veritable hornets' nest for enemy forces. What that would take and how far present provisions fall short of it will occupy us in the following sections dealing with the FRG on the one hand, and Norway, France, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia on the other hand. But such a force can neither strike at the enemy's homeland, nor by itself destroy the invading force. It must rely for successful counterattack on other forces—national, allied, or otherwise countervailing. This raises interesting questions in NATO, as well as for countries in NATO's neighborhood.

While it would be unrealistic to assume a drastic change in the FRG's defense posture in the near future, it is conceivable that the country will increasingly emphasize Schmidt's "defensive principle" in the structuring of its own forces, emphasizing static defense, territorial and other latent forces, and short-range arms, while leaving to allied forces both the role of the long-range offensive deterrent, and the role of providing a large part of the local counteroffensive force. The FRG would only be involved in their posture through alliance and through granting its territory to their mobile strike forces. These might, of course, be precisely the "offenses" for which an opponent threatening invasion might hold the FRG accountable, i.e., he might demand some day that the Germans renounce such commitments as the price of peace. Their deterrent effect, on the other hand, might serve a steadfast FRG as a diplomatic counter, to which it might attach its own territorial force deterrent. This is not an entirely unfamiliar, and not necessarily a hopeless, scenario. The strength of this posture would, of course, rest on the combination of these different deterrent capacities. Germany's inoffensive deterrent would be a supplement to, not a substitute for, the allies' offensive and counteroffensive deterrent, and its own weight would depend on the FRG's capacity and readiness to mobilize in times of crisis. In the past, the latter has been questionable.

In NATO's neighborhood, things are already working somewhat in this fashion. Neutral Switzerland and nonaligned Yugoslavia are strongly influenced in their defense thinking by the presence of NATO's forces and offensive deterrent. Defense
planners in both countries make the assumption that an aggressor on their territory will have to reckon with NATO, and they therefore feel free to emphasize territorial defense forces of their own. In Switzerland this assumption is anchored in the belief that an invasion of the country by Soviet forces could only happen in the course of a war with NATO and would only have the purpose of hurting NATO. In Yugoslavia this belief is replaced by the weaker one that the invader would have to guard against intervention by NATO. Thus in these countries, reliance on an inoffensive deterrent by way of territorial defense goes hand in hand with reliance on the offensive deterrent of others.

The interlocking of offensive and inoffensive deterrent postures of different allies will require much attention and adaptation in the future if the allies wish to pursue military security jointly, yet in the different fashions that their national situations dictate. If these differences make the interlock impossible, if the offensive or inoffensive components offered are too weak and thus judged unreliable by friend or foe, the combined deterrent offered by the alliance may well prove unsatisfactory, and the alliance may lose value in comparison with other security arrangements of the individual partners.

TERRITORIAL DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SELF-RESPONSIBILITY

Rejection of national self-responsibility in defense has been a persistent policy of past FRG governments, under CDU as well as SPD leadership. The twin of this policy has been the steady German insistence on keeping the number of American forces stationed in Germany undiminished. But current American, European, and East-West trends make it very likely that a substantial reduction of American troops will occur before the end of the 1970s. Even if such a reduction were accompanied by a reaffirmation of American strategic protection, a lesser forward deployment of Soviet forces, and continued smooth West German relations with the Soviet Union, the assurance of the country's security by military force would rest on the FRG's own forces to a greater extent than before. This applies particularly to the direct, immediate coverage of FRG territory against possible incursions from the East. The Western alliance might still furnish essential strategic and backup support, but less forward support. One may also doubt that the troops of other West European countries, stationed in Germany, would be fully maintained, let alone augmented significantly.

In the past the Germans have taken pains to point out that they could not and would not replace withdrawn American troops with German troops, and they have "threatened" their Western allies with the prospect of the country's defenselessness and an unravelling of the Western alliance under such circumstances. There is indeed little reason to believe that the FRG would augment its standing army, but it is interesting to observe that German thoughts about another kind of substitution are beginning to be expressed. A recent article by Jürgen Schilling in the semiofficial magazine, Deutschland Archiv, points to the attractiveness of German territorial

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20 "Die unvermeidbare Sicherheit vierten Klasse" (Unavoidable Fourth-class Security), Deutschland Archiv, September 1972, pp. 908-912.
defense forces and enhanced mobilization capacity under precisely the political conditions we have sketched above. The article appears to reflect views of leading policymakers.

Schilling is not the first German defense writer to advocate massive territorial defense by militia forces;[21] but he is the first to recommend it in public as a German response to an American troop reduction. He also distinguishes himself by not equating such a reduction with an "unravelling of the Western alliance," and by attacking the conventional German resistance to a restructuring of national defense policy, i.e., the "mockery of Maginot thinking," the facile rejection of Scandinavian and Yugoslav examples as "irrelevant to Germany," the alleged unsuitability of the North German plain for antiaircraft barriers manned by militiamen, and so forth. Finally, the article is noteworthy for stressing the value of a more self-dependent German defense policy. On the one hand, he declares it to be "a central task of domestic policy to strengthen the will to defense and the confidence in our own possibilities," and believes that this could be accomplished "without militarization of public opinion." On the other hand, he argues that such a defense policy could be fitted easily into MBFR, into a reduction of bloc-against-bloc confrontation on German soil, and into a harmonization of Western alliance and East-West détente, and that these foreign-policy considerations would help make the increase in German defense self-responsibility politically acceptable in the country. Thus the article presents greater defense self-responsibility as a consequence of Ostpolitik and as a contribution to NATO's moving from standing-force confrontation to "engagement" backed by latent national forces. Its argumentation might prove to be a useful pointer to the defense policy which the recently reelected socialist-liberal government will develop.

If the FRG were to seek more national self-responsibility in its defense effort, a strengthening of its territorial defense forces might well be a useful way. As these forces are now constituted in the Territorial Army they are to a lesser extent an "alliance army" and more of a national army than the rest of the Bundeswehr. Their missions could be extended forward, especially east of the Rhine, made to include the urban areas, even the hinterland of a broken-through invader, and they could encompass combat missions more fully than is the case today. As a result of their reliance on reserve training, local defense missions, and greater intertwining with local government, territorial defense forces could help bring home to the population that defense is above all its own job, not that of outsiders, or of taxes paid, or of "the neighbor's son." Lastly, by its linkage to civil defense, and by a concomitant strengthening of civil defense, a territorial defense effort could play an important role in making the objects, or "consumers," of defense (territory, population, social and political structure), producers of defensive strength. This is very much the spirit which imbues the Swiss "comprehensive defense" effort and which has given rise to the excellent handbook on civil defense distributed by the Swiss government to all households in the country.[22] The approach is not inconsistent with military alliance.

[22] Albert Bachmann and Georges Grosjean. Zivilverteidigung (Civil Defense), issued by the Federal Departments of Justice and Police on behalf of the Federal Government, Miles, Aarau, 1969. We shall comment below (p. 82) on this book, which goes well beyond civil defense in the narrow sense of air raid protection.
only with a wholesale delegation of defense responsibility to a supranational body, called "Alliance." It seems absurd to berate such an approach to defense as "insufficiently masculine," as some protagonists of pure strike armies reportedly do.23

Budget pressures in a détente environment, search for an inoffensive deterrent, endeavors to preserve a conscription system, and tendencies to make the American contribution to the FRG's defense less immediate and comprehensive, can be expected to drive FRG defense policy toward greater national self-responsibility. But it is not clear at this point what form this shift will take. We shall discuss below some of the alternative courses German defense planners are considering so far, and how domestic and external resistances will be overcome. Within the country, a shift from standing forces to latent forces, and particularly the appropriate provisions for the development of territorial defense forces face resistances that should not be underrated. Some of these will be described presently under Tradeoffs and Prejudices. Foreign examples still meet strong objections that "it cannot be done here." These resistances are reinforced by NATO's emphasis on integrated standing forces, and its discouragement of territorial force developments that amount to more than logistics support for the integrated forces and rear area policing. (At present, the development of the German Territorial Army is largely shaped and constrained by these NATO attitudes.) Much will depend, therefore, on the attitudes of allied governments, which may either strengthen these obstacles in the NATO establishment or help remove them. It may well be in the interests of Germany's allies, notably the United States, not to discourage stronger German territorial and civil defense efforts, even if they limit or reduce traditional priority contributions to the strike forces through competition for resources.

Let us note in passing that acceptance of greater national self-responsibility for the security of the territory need not work exclusively through the MOD channel. Territorial defense shades off into internal security. The FRG is strengthening its police forces, in particular the Federal Frontier Guard (BGS) which shares some military features of a territorial defense force with the Territorial Army, although it is a standing force (with expanding peacetime tasks) and is, of course, under the Ministry of the Interior. In 1970, the BGS for the first time in its history reached its statutory strength of 20,000. By 1973, it is to exceed 22,000.24 Wartime considerations play no role in this expansion, but increased peacetime security requirements (e.g., for air travel protection and the suppression of terrorism) do. But this force is augmentable in wartime, too—it produces a fair number of well-trained reserves—and it might well play a considerable role in wartime, especially in the frontier-near areas which at present are almost devoid of tactical units of the Territorial Army. Likewise, as we shall see, measures of territorial and civil defense are advancing in the FRG under the head of "protection against catastrophes," again under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior. In view of the difficulty of converting the military bureaucracy to territorial defense, it is possible that a part of the job will be open to, and be filled by, the internal security effort.

TRADEOFFS AND PREJUDICES

From a recognition of the pressures on the current defense structure to a policy of greater reliance on territorial defense forces, policymakers face thorny tradeoff problems on the political as well as the military level. For those primarily concerned with an alleviation of the financial, social, and international-confrontation problems of the present German defense system, disarmament competes with territorial and civil defense. Disarmament can also save money, reduce social frictions attending conscription, and appease unfriendly neighbors. Here we meet the antimilitary prejudice, which will undoubtedly exact its price in terms of neglect of territorial and civil defense actions. This prejudice will influence politicians who are concerned with reelection. But the political tradeoff, as we have seen, is not only between security and nonsecurity efforts; it is also between "external" and "internal" security efforts. The antimilitary prejudice may work against both, but it may also favor the second over the first, because it is not formally military. Thus this prejudice may permit some territorial defense functions to take roots in the Ministry of the Interior while it denies them to the MOD.

For those primarily concerned with military defense, latent territorial defense forces compete with standing strike forces. Such people would hardly oppose adding more of the former to a splendid supply of the latter, but that would be utopia. Military planners will have to contemplate reductions in the standing strike forces, although they already believe that the given supply is insufficient to meet a theoretically conceivable sudden attack. A shift from standing forces to latent forces tends to reduce professional military career opportunities, full-time command jobs as well as "overhead" jobs. To the extent that the shift does indeed yield budgetary savings, it will signify reductions in some parts of the service budget, say, Army personnel funds, and therefore arouse bureaucratic opposition. A shift from strike forces to territorial defense forces also impinges on doctrinal preferences for armor, heavily equipped maneuver forces, depersonalized combat, etc., which have been rooted in parts of the Bundeswehr officers' corps, thanks in no small measure to indoctrination by allied officers who have served as mentors for the Germans. Antiterritorial prejudice based on these factors has done much to make the territorial defense forces the "Cinderella of the Bundeswehr" (see Section IV). It tends to bias native and allied military advice against an expansion of their resources, military capacities, missions, and policy influence.

But the crucial problem is what might happen to the military worth of the German forces, by themselves and in the (variable) alliance frame, if some substitution were made. For fairly obvious reasons, there can be no general answers to this problem, and perhaps not even sufficiently objective specific ones. The answer depends on what is substituted for what, what kind of organizational and doctrinal adjustments are made to accompany the substitution, and how military worth is measured. Even when the case is well-defined, opinions are likely to differ. For example, the recent substitution in the German Field Army of three motorized infantry (Jäger) brigades for three armored infantry brigades is still being argued about. Is the loss of fire power compensated by greater terrain suitability? Is the operating mode of the new units more suitable to the mission? Has the concept of the mission been adapted to the new kind of resource? How are the new light units fitted together with German and allied heavier units? Is it just a cost-saving meas-
ure, regardless of military worth? From the standpoint of military worth, there can be too much and too little substitution, too drastic and too little change in organization and tactics. We therefore cannot answer the broad question that we posed by any kind of tradeoff calculus or curve.

We can, however, point to a consensus among military thinkers who are concerned with greater reliance on territorial defense forces in Germany, that total defense should include two principal components, a highly professional strike force and a broadly based territorial force, or, with regard to peacetime force status, a relatively small standing force and a spectrum of latent forces ranging from heavily armed cadre-reservist units to more lightly armed territorials in the strict sense of our definition. As we shall see, few military thinkers have attempted to specify desirable quantities of these components and thus the composition of the whole, but they all agree that one is needed to support the other and that the combination is valuable. The value of the combination of the two types of forces offers some of the best counters to the parochial and doctrinal oppositions to territorial forces; for some of the military values that appear to be jeopardized by greater emphasis on territorial forces can be enhanced by the simultaneous emphasis on professionalization of the strike forces.
III. THE PROFESSIONAL FORCE-CONSCRIPTED MILITIA COMBINATION

A combination of professional forces and a conscripted militia should be sharply distinguished from a mixture of professional and militia elements in a single military organization. The main criteria of the two types of forces are so different—ready striking power for the first, potential force for the second—that a mixture of the two risks being deficient on both counts and, due to the confusion of objectives, vulnerable to criticism on military, financial, and political grounds. This, and not the absence of either all professional or all conscript-militia features in the existing mix, is a critical weakness of the FRG and some other NATO-integrated defense structures.

In building a professional force besides a territorial defense force, a country can apply different principles of recruiting, training, equipment, and tactics to the two components and thus obtain from a given defense budget a total force that meets both criteria better. Instead of compromising the principles in each decision on conscription, procurement, mission definition, and so forth, it can create force components adequate to their different tasks, and then combine these components in overall defense policy, strategy, maneuvers, and so forth.

The aim of the following discussion is therefore to disaggregate the mixture and to combine functionally specialized components, i.e., (1) to bring out the different contributions which forces of the professional type and of the territorial-defense type can make to the resolution of the structural problems and (2) to examine some of the potentialities of combining differently structured forces.

THE PROFESSIONAL FORCE

A study of territorial defense is not the place to study in depth the potential and the problems of a professional military force in Europe, and in our focal country, the FRG, in particular. Nevertheless, since it is quite likely that defense structure reforms will aim at developing both types of forces and at making them mutually supporting, a brief discussion of the professional force is in order.

Several of the pressures bearing on present European defense structures, which we have noted above, cannot be relieved by a professionalization of the forces.
Professional forces consist of highly trained, long-serving military specialists in peacetime active service who live with combat-ready equipment. They do not easily satisfy the search for an inoffensive deterrent, although their mission may be defined as "defensive," their equipment may be more or less inoffensive, and their number may be so small as to look inoffensive in comparison to present mixed professional/conscript armies. Professional forces are also particularly useful for purposes of intervention ("limited war") in places away from home. They can be trained and equipped for such purposes, and actually be deployed and engaged in combat for raisons d’État, i.e., without the strong reliance on popular support and public opinion that is essential for maintenance and engagement of conscript armies. But it should be evident to any observer of German and, except for France, continental European politics that this kind of potential holds no interest today in these countries.

Likewise, professional forces as such do not help to make defense more "total." By their very nature they consist of specialists set aside in the social structure. Finally, professional forces have no specific merit in increasing national self-responsibility for defense.

But two important kinds of pressure on present European defense structures are answerable for professionalization. Budget pressure in the détente environment can work for professionalization because it concentrates on training a smaller number of men, reducing the size of the forces, and therefore reducing personnel expenditures. A reduction of the German Bundeswehr to the number of professionals and volunteers presently in it, i.e., from about 470,000 (including conscripts) to about 250,000,¹ would be a drastic step. However, higher military qualification of such a reduced force could undoubtedly compensate for much of the reduction in numbers, and perhaps the reduction would not need to be so drastic if enlistment incentives were raised further. A smaller professional force would probably also bring some savings in materiel costs, i.e., a reduction in the consumption (maintenance) of materiel presently used in training large numbers of conscripts.

Then there is the relief from the troubles of conscription. We have noted them for Germany, but they appear in other places as well, and they are not entirely tractable by a widening or a narrowing of a uniform conscription system. A volunteer system holds out the promise of bringing into the force only those who for one reason or another have decided that they want to be in it, and that may burden and improve the force in some, if not necessarily all, respects.

For these reasons, there is no lack of voices in Europe that advocate or predict an end of conscription and a turn toward professional armies, notably smaller ones than the present conscript armies.² These predictions and advocacies gain momentum at present from the U.S. policy to end the draft, although some of the factors leading to the adoption of this policy here are not relevant for Europe.³

¹ For the German Army alone, the corresponding figures would be 316,000 and 144,000, all as of September 7, 1971. German Defense White Paper 1971/72, p. 55.
² The following opinion of The Economist is characteristic: "Long before another quarter century of peace has passed—if it does—sentiment in Europe will doubtless have softened to the point that only the tightest little professional European armies will exist." "Overture for Europe—a Survey," The Economist, January 17, 1971, p. 53.
³ "The end of the draft in the United States will also push NATO nations toward all-volunteer systems or toward new forms of militia systems," writes Janowitz in "Volunteer Armed Forces," Foreign Affairs, April 1972, p. 427.
Kingdom has already taken this course and apparently finds the complete abandonment of conscription compatible with the country’s domestic and international political situation, at least for the time being. But most of the continental countries resist such a drastic step, and can be expected to avoid it in the future. The reasons for this resistance are not only found in tradition and in alliance politics; they also lie in the incompatibility of a purely professional force with some of the tendencies we have noted above, notably the search for an inoffensive deterrent and for a measure of "total defense"—both requiring more mobilization capacity than a purely professional force can offer—and the disinterest in expeditionary warfare. The continentals can be expected to seek the benefits of professionalization chiefly by strengthening the professional element in the more highly mechanized military branches (air force, air defense, navy), and as far as the ground forces are concerned, in command and technical positions where it is most needed. If the Germans were to try to make their Field Army a professional force throughout, they certainly would find it impossible to keep it at its present numerical level. So they can be expected to continue wrestling with the conscription system, a task that will not be eased by Britain’s (and the United States’s) abandonment of conscription.

There are also specifically strategic considerations that point toward professional forces. In a Rand analysis of NATO’s lack of preparedness to meet with conventional armament a Soviet blitzkrieg thrust in a short and violent contest, Steven Canby concluded that with all its emphasis on combat-readiness, NATO is not providing the necessary kind of quick reaction defense force. It provides instead an ill-focused, unevenly equipped, high-peacetime-activity force of dubious "surge" capacity. In looking for remedies to this defect, Canby does not distinguish between the roles that militia forces and professional forces, local and allied forces, can play. In our view, all have distinct roles in an interlocking whole. But much of his argumentation points specifically toward a need for lean and hard peacetime forces as providers of ready armor and heavy antitank armament, a need which standing professional forces, both allied and local, would be well suited to meet.

In the FRG, and in continental Western Europe generally, a central military issue will be how best to combine professional and conscripted component forces. Thus thoughts about the combination are very relevant. In what follows, we examine such thoughts that have been focused on the FRG, particularly ideas of military men who have also sought a positive development of territorial defense forces.

VIEWS ON THE COMBINATION

In view of the political circumstances of the FRG, it is not surprising that the most sanguine and ambitious views about German territorial defense have not come from German sources. A British Air Marshal, a French military expert, and a

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4 The mixture of reasons is not the same in the FRG, France, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.

6 Regulars and volunteers enlisted for 3 to 15 years presently make up only 29 percent of German Army strength. For the German Air Force, the corresponding percentage is 65 and for the Navy, 70. German Defense White Paper 1971/72, p. 55.

retired U.S. Army General have seen more promise in a strong German TD than have most West German military thinkers—at least those officially connected with the FRG's military buildup in the NATO frame. In recent times, however, the idea of German "militia type" forces has found a prominent spokesman in the Social-Democratic leader Helmut Schmidt, who was defense minister from October 1969 to July 1972. In an extensive press interview in 1971, Schmidt said that in the course of this decade, the West German military might come to be made up of two components: (1) a quasi-professional standing force, encompassing navy, air force, and parts of the army, and (2) a conscript-reservist force (chiefly army) of more latent combat capacity. The latter would be sustained by a relatively short term of conscription and be expected to "accomplish, with relatively simple weapons, regional or local combat tasks."

The relevant passages of the interview, published in Die Welt of June 2, 1971, read as follows:

I suppose that in the course of this decade, we shall tend toward a defense structure consisting of two components: (1) fully combat-ready and manned units made up mostly of longer-serving troops and longer-serving or professional commissioned and noncommissioned officers ... primarily for the Air Force and the Navy but also for a limited number of ready Army units; and besides these, (2) units that will, in case of need, be made combat-ready by the call-up of reservists. These reservists will be enabled by service under general conscription, during a relatively short period of basic training, to carry out regional or local combat tasks with relatively simple equipment. These units will be differently endowed from those mentioned under (1).

I imagine that we shall arrive at a defense structure of which one component roughly resembles the British example, professional army, and the other, the Swiss or Swedish example, militia army. But I emphasize that this evolution will take a long time, that no decisions have been taken, and that the evolution can only proceed step by step ... Foreign-policy considerations keep plans ... in the direction of this kind of structure from being timely today.

It is evident today, however, that Schmidt advanced this view as a "trial balloon" and did not translate it into a vigorous line of policy during his term as defense minister. The foreign policy considerations which, as he pointed out in the interview (last sentence cited), stood in the way of such a policy may meanwhile have lost some of their strength because the treaty negotiations with the USSR and the GDR have been completed and the strengthened Brandt government may now be somewhat less reluctant to tackle NATO orthodoxy.

Marshall Slessor's Ideas

Writing in 1954, before the issue of German rearmament had been resolved—the European Defense Community had not yet been shelved, German NATO mem-

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Footnote: In the early phases of FRG rearmament, several German military authors, including Colonel Von Bonin and General Heusinger, and some politicians in and out of government showed interest in strong home or territorial defense forces and in strategies of static defense appropriate to such forces. Their initiatives were stifled by the Adenauer government's preoccupation with alliance-political considerations and its small interest in autonomous national defense. See Hans Speier, German Rerarmament and Atomic War, Row, Peterson, Evanston, Ill., 1957, pp. 75ff., 194, 223, 243.
bership not yet been decided—British Air Marshal Sir John Slessor developed this vision of German defense forces:

Twelve German armoured divisions should contribute to an Atlantic Alliance army of highly mobile armoured forces, covered and supported by tactical air forces and atomic artillery.

But twelve divisions by themselves are not going to assure the defence of Germany against invasion, and they should be supplemented . . . by a highly trained, semistatic Home Guard armed primarily with antitank guns and with light automatics as the personal weapon. The Federal Republic . . . should be covered with a network of these units composed of local men, knowing every inch of the ground, every coppice and stream, lane and side street, responsible for the defence of their own Kreis and town or village and inspired by the knowledge that they are protecting their own homes and their own kith and kin. They should be responsible for the storage and protection of land mines in peace and for laying the mine fields when so directed, using locally requisitioned civilian transport. They should also, where appropriate, be in charge of strategic demolition in their zone . . . The personnel would be young and middle-aged men who had received their initial training . . . as conscripts in the regular divisions . . .

Their job would be to block every road and destroy every tank moving across country in their zone—and when they could do no more, then pull out and blow up their guns, and cut and run for the next belt of posts in their rear. Against a defence system of this kind, covered by adequate air . . . and supported by really mobile, hard-hitting regular armoured reserves, I should be surprised if General Guderian would welcome the job of conducting an armoured invasion of his own country.*

Slessor's proposal of a German home guard and a strategy relying on a network of semi-static defenses fell on deaf ears in the NATO capitals. NATO cared mostly about the buildup of German armored and armored infantry divisions. And during the first decade of its arms buildup, the FRG had its hands full meeting this requirement.

The Miksche Plan

In 1967, a small book by the French military expert Ferdinand Otto Miksche appeared in Germany on The Future of the Bundeswehr.† Miksche criticized the "fiction of forward defense," the excessive reliance on expensive armor, and the lack of comprehensive defense concepts, all of which he attributed to a combination of German defense unwillingness, American military concepts, and the sales pressure of equipment suppliers. Expecting a limitation of American defense commitments in Europe to develop in the course of time, and European conventional and nuclear armament to become increasingly important as a counterweight to the Soviet Un-

† Die Zukunft der Bundeswehr, Gedanken über den Umbau der Westdeutschen Verteidigung, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart, 1967. Born in Austria, Miksche was an officer in the Austrian Army in World War I, has lived in France since before World War II, is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the French Army, Legion of Honor, and has been a frequent contributor to French, German, and American journals since the 1950s.
ion, Miksche prescribed for the forces of the FRG a more self-dependent, conventionally armed, mobilization-reliant and invasion-resistant role than the one for which they had been built up. His book reflected French pessimism about NATO and also his own reservations about French national defense policy: "Undoubtedly, Paris will have to recognize some day that an autonomous strategy requires not only nuclear armament but also strong conventional forces. If only for financial reasons, this goal can only be realized within a politically integrated European Defense Community." 10

Miksche recommended an early reorganization of FRG forces "while the protection of NATO lasts." It should permit them to defend their territory against armored and airborne attack, using conventional arms and even, if NATO should disintegrate, to make a German position of armed neutrality on the Swedish or Swiss models possible. The envisaged force structure allowed for a smaller standing army, relied on mobilization of well-trained reserves, and focused on defense in depth against attacking tank and airborne forces. 11 Its critical new elements were various territorial defense forces and a civil defense force. The strike force of the army was to consist of 7 divisions (2 armored, 4 armored infantry, 1 airborne), the territorial force of 6 frontier commands, 72 militia brigades (light and armored infantry), and internal security battalions.

Table 3 offers an overview of the composition of FRG forces which Miksche advocated, and, for purposes of comparison, their actual composition, taken largely from the German Defense White Paper 1971/72. Miksche's proposed peacetime forces had 110,000 fewer men in the Field Army than the Bundeswehr has today. They contained territorial cadre/training units, under the heading of "frontier commands"; militia brigades (Landwehrschützenbrigaden); and home defense units (Heimwehr). Altogether they totaled about 80,000 men in peacetime, in place of about 31,000 men of the present forces assigned to "territorial defense and basis organization."

Miksche's total peacetime ground (including civil defense) force was about 40,000 men smaller than the recent (1971) total of army and frontier police; his total FRG peacetime force, 60,000 smaller than the present total Bundeswehr and frontier police.

The wartime buildup of the ground forces (excluding civil defense) foreseen by Miksche (to a total force of 878,000) provided for the call-up of reserves chiefly for the frontier units, the militia and the home defense units (531,000 out of 605,000), and an augmentation of the Field Army by only 75,000 men. By contrast, the present Bundeswehr plans to incorporate more ground-force reservists in the Field Army, and a correspondingly lesser proportion, only about 220,000, in the territorial defense forces. Miksche believed that well-trained reserves and organizational preparation could be relied on to furnish a powerful force within a span of 10 days (obviating some of the emphasis on standing forces), and that an attack "out of the blue" was an unrealistic scenario, one on which the defense system should not be based.

Miksche's concept stressed heavily the allocation of manpower to Landwehr and home defense units. His general approach was one of comprehensive defense of

10 Ibid., p. 32.
11 Miksche referred approvingly to the proposals of Colonel Von Bonin, which were submitted to and discarded by German defense authorities in 1954. Ibid., p. 27.
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<th>Type of Service</th>
<th>Bundeswehr and Frontier Police, 1971</th>
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<tr>
<td>Home defense (Heimwehr)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3,600&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>120,000&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier police (BGS)</td>
<td>20,000&lt;sup&gt;j&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18,000&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18,000&lt;sup&gt;k&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ground forces</td>
<td>336,000&lt;sup&gt;b, l&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>272,600</td>
<td>878,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil defense force</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ground forces plus civil defense</td>
<td>336,000&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>294,600</td>
<td>1,078,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air force</td>
<td>326,000&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>294,600</td>
<td>1,078,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>104,000&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>90,200</td>
<td>160,000&lt;sup&gt;m&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35,000&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>50,000&lt;sup&gt;m&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces, including frontier and civil defense units</td>
<td>475,000&lt;sup&gt;b, o&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>414,800</td>
<td>1,288,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Miksche, *Die Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, pp. 61-62.
<sup>c</sup>Field Army of 12 divisions (33 brigades) and divisional and corps support battalions; excludes Territorial Defense troops which are shown under "Militia brigades," but includes about 40,000 men who do not seem to be actually assigned to Field Army units. Three motorized infantry brigades (Panzergrenadier) included in Field Army, correspond to brigades included in Miksche's militia brigades and frontier units.
<sup>d</sup>Seven divisions, plus corps and army troops.
<sup>e</sup>Six frontier commands of light infantry, communications, engineer and transport units, consisting of professionals and draftees.
<sup>f</sup>Manpower planned for "territorial defense and basis organization."
<sup>g</sup>Eighteen training and equipment brigades, including 45,000 draftees in training.
<sup>h</sup>Commissioned and noncommissioned officers as cadres for mobilization, materiel administration, and training.
<sup>i</sup>Battalions and companies for territorial defense, mostly in the hinterland.
<sup>j</sup>Bundesgrenzschutz, a light-infantry type police force under the Ministry of the Interior, which Miksche proposes to put under military command in wartime. Effective strength appears to be close to 20,000 in 1972.
<sup>k</sup>Six brigades.
<sup>l</sup>Including frontier police.
<sup>m</sup>Including six air defense brigades and security battalions for radar installations, airfields, depots of the air force.
<sup>n</sup>Including security battalions for port and radar installations and navy depots.
<sup>o</sup>Organizational strength of Bundeswehr (454,000) including overhead headquarters personnel (10,000), plus BGS. Figure excludes "variable component" consisting of reservists in training and servicemen in vocational advancement courses.
the territory (front and hinterland) against invading tank and airborne armies: "Defense against armor is the chief task of defense."12 Therefore, the Landwehr must be armed with antiaarmor weapons; tanks, armored infantry vehicles, artillery, missiles, personal weapons, etc. He believed that current weapons development favors unarmored infantry in a contest with tanks. Regarding the home defense units, he expressed satisfaction with the currently (1967) planned development of the Territorial Army in Germany.13 Finally, he provided for a considerable civil defense force with rescue, evacuation, radiation control, and other tasks that transcend civil defense in the limited sense of protection against air raids.

**General Bonesteel's View**

In 1970, a distinguished U.S. Army officer, Gen. C. H. Bonesteel, III, Ret., returned to Marshal Slessor's theme of a diversified force for NATO with a strong militia element.14 Taking Frederick Stern's book *The Citizen Army*15 as his point of departure, General Bonesteel held that a greater reliance on citizen-soldier reserve units in the armies, and possibly in naval and air forces as well, would offer large financial advantages to European states and meet some of the political problems of their defense systems. Like Miksche, he was skeptical of the emphasis on "forward defense," stressed "defense in depth" instead, and proposed to use European reserve manpower mainly for the constitution of militia units, rather than as fillers for units of the standing forces as prevalent NATO doctrine provides.

General Bonesteel envisaged a new NATO ground defense structure consisting of three different elements:16

1. "Full-time, active duty professional units with advanced weaponry and equipment to make them highly mobile, with high firepower and strong antiaarmor capabilities, but not containing significant infantry, light artillery, and some logistical units." He also described these units as small, "pocket-battleship" divisions, which suggests much leaner units than present NATO divisions.

2. A large number of "citizen army reserve units, whose combat elements would be organized primarily as light infantry, light artillery, and combat engineer battalions especially equipped with a high quantity of low-cost ... antipersonnel and antitank weapons."

3. "Numerous small units of paramilitary, unconventional forces with a variety of irregular 'partisan' capabilities," which would operate "in areas stretching

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12 Ibid., p. 42.
13 *Landwehr* militia and home defense overlap in Miksche's presentation, which makes comparison with the current FRG force structure difficult. Taken by themselves, the "home defense" units in his plan have less manpower, both in peace and in war, than the current TF. But the latter contains units of a kind that Miksche has in his *Landwehr*, i.e., the Home Defense Forces. It also includes units of a kind that Miksche has in his "civil defense force."
14 General Bonesteel's views were presented in an unpublished paper by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) Strategic Studies Center, entitled "The Use of Territorial Reserve Units in the Future Defense of NATO," November 1970. Citations are from the manuscript. Bonesteel's ideas have been developed further in a study by Jon L. Leilenberg, *Overview of the Citizen-Army Concept*, Stanford Research Institute, October 1972. See, in particular, Section V, "The Citizen-Army Concept in Western Europe."
some several hundred kilometers in depth from the boundaries between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries." One of their important missions would be "when overrun by the enemy . . . to provide battlefield surveillance and target acquisition to the friendly, high-firepower, professional units."

Without being specifically addressed to Germany, General Bonesteel's concept of a "Wasps' Nest" strategy, stressing "ubiquitous citizen battalions," offered an alternative to the forward defense strategy for that country, which is now being pursued more or less exclusively by means of large, standing, filler-replenished, mobile forces. In the logic of his thinking, the responsibility for providing the "citizen army units" and the "paramilitary forces" operating in the country would fall mainly on the country's government and population. Such forces are by their very nature bound to the specific territorial and sociopolitical environment. In Germany, they would have to consist of Germans mainly, if not exclusively. Bonesteel did not take up the general question of allied forces on German soil, but he put the stationed U.S. forces in the first of his three categories and thus suggested an international division of labor which might, perhaps to a lesser degree, also apply to British and other NATO forces.\(^7\) His territorial defense concept was particularly noteworthy for its provisions for a force operating behind enemy lines, in enemy-overrun territory. Such a "partisan force," with combat and intelligence missions, is neither mentioned by Slessor and Miksche, nor does it find favor with defense planners in the FRG today. It is, however, part of Swiss, Yugoslav, French, and Norwegian defense doctrine.

It should be noted that General Bonesteel did not propose to make lightly armed territorials and partisans the mainstay of NATO defense forces in Germany. His point was that the second and third of his three components had been neglected, and that the overemphasis on the first was objectionable on military, financial, and political grounds. He was aware, however, that his thoughts might at best jog some of the European defense planners, and that they would probably not overcome opposition based on well-entrenched dogma and interests. He hoped that some European defense planners would, more or less on their own, begin to look in this direction.

**Colonel Fernau's Model**

The foregoing three contributions of non-German defense thinkers focused on territorial defense as an element of combat power in war. Slessor and Bonesteel did not deal with the *peacetime structure* of forces at all; Miksche did, but in a fashion that subordinated consideration of peacetime structure to that of warfare. In West German thinking, however, concern with peacetime structure tends to dominate concern with fighting a war. This is particularly true for thoughts aired by MOD officials. The difference in viewpoint is not fortuitous. Allied defense thinkers are concerned with how West Germany can be defended, notably by Germans. German defense thinkers, particularly official ones, are primarily concerned with managing the German defense establishment in peacetime so as to make a contribution to a

\(^7\) His comment that the United States could provide in this framework "highly mobile, high-firepower divisions" in Europe, which "would be reconfigured to depend more on the European territorial infantry, light artillery and logistics units," is significant.
deterrent posture of NATO which is adequate by NATO, especially by U.S., standards, and to make this effort socially acceptable within the country. In their minds, fighting the war is primarily a matter for NATO, with Germans providing inputs, considerations, demands, and cautions.

The German ideas, which we are about to discuss, came up in the course of the MOD's effort under Helmut Schmidt to distribute the burden of military service more justly over the population, i.e., to enhance Wehrgerechtigkeit (literally, "defense justice"), or equitable conscription. The report of the Ministry's Commission on Personnel Structure, published in 1971, contained a "model of a new defense structure," devised by Lt. Col. Hans-Georg Fernau, a member of the Commission. 18 In presenting this model, Colonel Fernau spoke of a trend in Western defense structures, exemplified by France, toward a triad consisting of "strategic forces," a "corps de bataille," and a territorial defense force, the first two elements consisting mostly of volunteers serving over a number of years, and the third, mostly of conscripts. Since the territorial force would be equipped with relatively uncomplicated arms, it could be manned by conscripts serving a short term and receiving further training as reservists. Fernau noted that the present Bundeswehr suffers from the lack of distinction between the second and third elements and their different requirements. Standing and highly mechanized units are burdened with conscript training and are thus reduced in their effectiveness. The territorial units, on the other hand, receive reservists who have been trained for technical jobs in the Field Army and must then be retrained as infantrymen. 19

The Fernau model postulated a German Army consisting of two main components, the mobile battle force (MBF) and the territorial battle force (TBF). The MBF contains ready and cadre units. The ready units are made up largely of volunteers. They perform no basic training, only advanced training; and their peacetime strength equals wartime strength. Reservists will only serve as replacements in wartime. The cadre units of the MBF, defined functionally as mainly infantry, armored infantry, artillery, engineer, and antiaircraft units, have cadres of professional and long-term volunteer soldiers, partly active, partly reservists, who—besides training other cadres—give basic training to conscripts (9 months) and hold them in service for another 3 months. The cadre units are of variable combat-readiness. In wartime, they are subject to expansion by recalled reservists. Ready and cadre units of the MBF will be mixed in MBF divisions.

The territorial battle force has the same functions as those presently assigned
to the German Territorial Army. Its units are tied to area and object-defined tasks, and its men are to be residents of the area in which the units operate. In peacetime, the units have small permanent (long-serving) cadres and stores of equipment. They train conscripts under a divided term of service, 6 months of basic training and 6 months of follow-on training in courses to be absorbed between the ages of 21 and 32. This follows the Swiss example of a term in conscript school and subsequent training courses. Thanks to the training courses, which bring the men together periodically in the same units and with familiar equipment, Fernau expects the territorial force to be easily mobilizable. When mobilized, it will, of course, consist chiefly of reservists and conscripts in training.

Fernau’s model envisaged two principal components of the ground forces which resemble the first two of General Bonestee1’s three components, and omit the latter’s partisan force. Fernau’s presentation lacked any quantitative proposals for the several force components regarding manpower, equipment, or budget. It offered no innovation with regard to the mission of the territorial force. It dwelled mostly on peacetime personnel aspects of the army, leaving aside those of navy and air force. The model pursued Wehrgerechtigkeit via a radical shortening of the draft term and the consequent increase in the throughput of draftees and the output of reservists; and it looked for ways to utilize this conscript manpower in more or less peacetime-latent military units, while composing the ready units of the standing army largely of professionals and volunteers.

PROFESSIONAL SUPPLEMENT TO A MILITIA

The above four views on a combination of professional and territorial defense forces have one thing in common: they approach the combination via a development of latent forces, in particular territorial defense forces. The main concern of the four authors was to show what contribution latent, territorial-defense oriented forces could make to the whole. Therefore they dealt rather lightly with professional forces, which is not altogether surprising. Although the existing Bundeswehr is far from having the quality of a professional force, its emphasis on peacetime presence and combat-readiness—at least in the sense of men dwelling together with equipment—models it far more on the pattern of a standing professional force than a militia-type force. Innovators thus tend to take the considerations and requirements of a professional force for granted. No one in the FRG is approaching the combination from the other end, i.e., using as the point of departure a pure territorial or militia system and demonstrating that it must be complemented by a professional force.

The evolution of Swiss military thinking, however, offers an interesting contrast. Switzerland’s military organization has rested, and still rests principally, on a territorial defense system in which the country is treated as one large fortress—with the “redoubt” as its inner citadel. The large wartime effective consist of militiamen called up to man “positions.” Since World War II, an extensive discussion in Switzerland has dealt with the limitations of static defenses and the need for,

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20 See below, pp. 53ff.
and possibilities of, "mobile defense" using armor, tactical aircraft, and other mobile high-powered equipment. A group of military and political thinkers has stressed the development of mobile defenses, but the effect of their reform proposals was strongly constrained by the unwillingness of the government to face the equipment expenditures and other charges required to form a substantial strike force. Nevertheless, compromises in the direction of mobile defense have been made. Armored forces are being developed which are to serve as "reserves" for the static defense system, to be held back for engagement as the need develops, to operate in relatively small units, and to lean on the static defenses.

The Swiss are resolved not to plan their country's defense operations in the current NATO manner (forward, mobile, etc.), but they are looking for a small, mobile attack force to supplement their well-developed static and area defenses, realizing that the main weight of their military effort must lie outside the Alpine redoubt. Their advance in this direction is slow, much too slow in the eyes of critics, due in part to parsimony in investments in tactical aircraft and armor. In principle the Swiss are opposed to a professional force and will not abandon their compulsory militia system. But the evolution of operational concepts and equipment inventory entails a strengthening of the as yet very small professional element in the Swiss military organization, and thus entails an approach to the combination with emphasis on the professional element. It is not surprising that this evolution is proceeding faster in the Swiss Air Force than in the ground forces. But it must be noted that most of the professional personnel serving the Air Force are technically not in military service, but are civilian employees of the government who maintain aircraft and ground facilities. Of the military flying personnel, only about 100 are regulars; the remainder are militiamen usually employed in civilian aviation.

21 The Swiss discussion and the compromises, notably those contained in the "defense concept of 1966," are well described in the work of Col. (Oberst)kommandant) Alfred Ernst, Die Konzeption der Schweizerischen Landesverteidigung 1815 bis 1966 (The Swiss Defense Concept 1815 to 1966), Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld and Stuttgart, 1971. See, in particular, pp. 362ff. 22 See also below, pp. 79, 80, 83. 23 Ernst, The Swiss Defense Concept, pp. 352ff. 24 For example, Gustav Däniker and André Wicki, "Die Armee in Rahmen der Gesamtverteidigung" (The Army in the Framework of Total Defense), Studien zur Wehrbereitschaft der Eidgenossenschaft, VFWW, Zurich, 1969. 25 Ernst, The Swiss Defense Concept, pp. 420ff. 26 Defending the conscription system, a Swiss military expert writes: "The need for professional personnel will increase in the coming years, because high-performance aircraft and air defense weapons can only be serviced by specialists. But most of the weapons and equipment remain suitable for the militia..." Col. (Oberst)divisionär) Hans Senn, "Die Armee in Rahmen der Gesamtverteidigung" (The Army in the Framework of Total Defense), Schweizerische Gesamtverteidigung/Swiss Comprehensive Defense, published by Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1971, p. 23. 27 Swiss authorities consider misleading the data shown in the International Institute of Strategic Studies' The Military Balance 1972-1973, London, p. 27 (and earlier years). These credit the Swiss ground forces with "2500 regular cadres," and the Air Force with "3000 regulars." For Swiss data and further discussion, see below, p. 78.
IV. TERRITORIAL DEFENSE FORCES OF THE FRG

Returning to the territorial force component of the combination, we shall describe in this section the existing territorial defense system of the FRG, primarily what the Germans call the Territorial Army (TA), and then the civil defense system. The TA is officially defined today as "..."a component of the Army which will remain under national command even in wartime; its primary mission is to maintain the freedom of manoeuvre of NATO forces within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany."¹ This definition puts the TA beside the Field Army (FA), the other principal component of the ground forces, and it distinguishes between the two with regard to NATO assignment, i.e., on alliance-political, not military grounds. The peacetime strength of the FA (October 1971) is 248,000, its projected mobilization strength, about 500,000. The peacetime strength of the TA is about 35,000, its projected mobilization strength, about 220,000.² In numbers, the TA is only 12 percent of the combined peacetime strength of two Army components; but it is 30 percent of the total wartime Army. German budget data do not permit us to assess the budgetary cost of the TA and of the FA separately.³

Before discussing the Territorial Army further, we must note that it does not comprise all the FRG forces that correspond to our general definition of territorial defense forces. On the one hand, the Jäger (motorized infantry) brigades of the FA resemble well-developed territorial defense forces with regard to their armament, mission, and localized (hill country) assignment. Since they are standing units and assigned to NATO, the Germans do not count them as territorials under their alliance-political definition, but include them in the Field Army. But some German Army men are aware of the fact that the motorized infantry brigades of the FA are being prepared for a mission similar to that of the motorized infantry of the TA and are beginning to point out the military irrelevance of the distinction.⁴ With regard

¹ German Defense White Paper 1971/72, p. 211.
² The combined peacetime strength of the two components of the Army is about 285,000. German Defense White Paper 1971/72 shows the effective strength of the total FRG Army (September 1971) as 316,000. The difference of 30,000 men appears to represent active Army personnel assigned to neither component but to various overhead functions.
³ So-called planning cost figures are available. They show for 1971 estimates of Field Army costs of DM6.5 billion (4.5 billion operating costs, 2 billion investment costs) and of Territorial Army costs of DM1.4 billion (1.1 billion operating, 300 million investment). In view of the unrequired transfer of equipment and training services between the two branches, these figures do not permit one to estimate the net cost of either.
⁴ For example, Col. O. Wolters, "Jäger, Gedanken zur neuen Gliederung der Infanterie" (The Jäger, Thoughts about the New Infantry Organization), Truppenpraxis, August 1971, pp. 588ff.
to peacetime "presence," the two types of motorized infantry differ, of course; that of the FA is standing, that of the TA is latent, at least in large measure. But in this respect, too, the difference is not absolute; for as we shall see, the TA contains in peacetime some active motorized infantry battalions in the so-called Home Defense Brigades (Heimatschutzkommandos). It is understandable that German military leaders look forward to a more reasonable distinction.5

On the other hand, the light-infantry units of the Frontier Police (BGS) deployed along the East German border also qualify as territorials. But since they are "police officers," not soldiers, the Germans do not count them as territorials. In a bureaucratic and command-and-control sense, these territorial defense segments live in different worlds. The Germans have no concept of territorial defense that encompasses them all.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Being part of the German Army, the TA shares its conscription base and mix of conscripts, volunteers, and professionals. Length of conscription is the same as for the rest of the Army; but the mix is quite different. The small peacetime cadres of the TA comprise 5000 conscripts, about one-seventh of total peacetime strength. The rest are volunteers and professionals. For the Army as a whole, as we have seen, and for the FA in particular, conscripts make up well over half of the peacetime strength. It follows, of course, that the bulk of the reservists on whom the TA draws for exercises and wartime expansion have had their original training in the FA.

The present TA took the place of the Territorial Reserve, a true militia of 50,000 which the FRG attempted to organize in 1963, but failed to develop because of lack of volunteers. After 1965, it was put on a conscription base, renamed Home Protection Force (Heimatschutztruppe), and aimed for the same peacetime strength.6 In 1969, this force was made a component of the Army and renamed Territorial Army. One important and, from the point of view of the territorial forces, undesirable side effect of the "unification" was that the TA became subject to the same NATO-oriented conscription term as the FA. But it must also be acknowledged that in this framework the TA developed considerably and became a military reality.

The Territorial Army is organized in geographic subdivisions of the FRG under 6 Area Commands (Wehrbereichskommandos; see Fig. 1), subdivided into 29 District Commands (Verteidigungsbezirkskommandos), and into local units. Its organizations have their mission areas largely behind the forward areas assigned to NATO units, and they are at present far from uniformly distributed over the territory of the FRG. Among the critical northern areas, Schleswig-Holstein (Area I) has a relatively large peacetime TA contingent (3000) and the most developed tactical units (Home Defense Brigade), parts of which seem to be incorporated in the 6th Division of the FA. The geographic division into NATO and TA territory is not

5 In a public statement on October 16, 1972, accompanying the completed organization of the Home Defense Forces in Baden-Württemberg, the Area Commander, Maj. Gen. Ferdinand von Senger, suggested that the present distinction between FA and TA be redefined as one between standing army and mobilization army (Press release.)

Fig. 1—FRG: Military Regions and Districts
followed there strictly; the TA commander in Area I also has the function of a NATO commander. Lower Saxony (Area II), which covers an important part of the northern plain from the Elbe to the Dutch frontier, has a small contingent (700) without as yet any major tactical unit of the TA. (If such a unit existed, its mission area would cover only the western third of this territory, inhabited by about 20 percent of its population.) Area IV (Hesse and the Palatinate) has another small peacetime contingent (600) and also lacks a major tactical unit at present. North Rhine-Westphalia (Area III) has 2700 men and a Home Defense Brigade. Both of two southern areas (V and VI) have such units, and a total peacetime contingent of 4500.\footnote{The contingents include Headquarters Units, Home Defense Brigades, Independent Infantry Battalions, and Security Companies. Approximate figures, which do not add up exactly to the national totals, are shown for these categories in Table 4.}

In functional terms, the TA is composed of five categories of units: (1) Headquarters Units, (2) Home Defense Forces, (3) Combat Support Troops, (4) Service Support Troops, and (5) Hospital Troops. The characteristics and assigned strength of these units in early 1972 are shown in Table 4.

The principal tactical units of the TA are contained in the Home Defense Forces. They have the following organizational characteristics, present and planned status:

Object Security Companies are units of a wartime strength of about 150 men who have the task of protecting specific objects, primarily key transportation, communications, and economic facilities. In peacetime these units are equipment units (Geräteinheiten), i.e., they consist of token personnel (1 to 3 men) and a store of equipment that is limited largely to basic infantry weapons. About 200 such companies have been organized; by 1975, 300 are supposed to exist (see Table 5).

Independent Infantry Battalions are units of a wartime strength of about 800 to 900 men who have the task of defending territorial areas. In peacetime these are also equipment units with 1 to 3 men. Their stored equipment contains or is to contain heavier weapons, in particular armored vehicles, and will, if completed, fall little short of that of a regular motorized infantry battalion. About 20 such battalions have been organized so far; by 1975, 28 are supposed to exist.

The Home Defense Brigades are large units with a wartime strength of about 6200 men, which are expected to function like motorized infantry brigades of the FA. Their organizational scheme provides for 2 armored infantry (antitank) companies, 2 mortar companies, 4 infantry battalions, and supplementary units. The assigned strength of these units is shown in Table 6. Four such brigades have been organized so far; by 1975, there are supposed to be six. These brigades are not pure equipment units. Each of them has in peacetime one standing armored infantry company, one mortar company, and one infantry battalion, and a total assigned strength of nearly 2000 men. The Home Defense Brigades thus are a hybrid between a standing and a latent force. Moreover, their organizational structure appears focused on large-unit rather than small-unit combat.

The Home Defense Forces are considered capable of being built up to full strength in about two days, the remainder of the TA over a longer span of time.

If the 1975 organizational frame is to be filled as now contemplated, the Home Defense Forces should then have a peacetime strength of about 12,000 men in 6 brigades instead of the 7500 at the beginning of 1972. They should have a mobilized
Table 4

FRG TERRITORIAL ARMY, 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Assigned Peacetime Strength</th>
<th>Mobilization Strength</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Headquarters Units</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>29,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Home Defense Forces (Home Defense Brigades, Infantry Battalions,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object Security Companies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Combat Support Troops (Communication Troops, Engineer Troops, M.P.</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>65,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions, ABC Protection Units, Psychological Defense Units)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Service Support Troops (Logistics Units, Depots)</td>
<td>15,200</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Hospital Troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38,600</td>
<td>218,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5

PROGRESS IN ORGANIZING INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BATTALIONS
AND SECURITY COMPANIES OF THE GERMAN TERRITORIAL ARMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Infantry Battalions Organized (Reserve Units)</th>
<th>Security Companies Organized (Reserve Units)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1971</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1972</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1972</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan (1975)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>300</td>
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### Table 6

**FRG HOME DEFENSE BRIGADES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subunits of a Home Defense Brigade</th>
<th>Assigned Peacetime Strength</th>
<th>Mobilization Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored infantry Company 1</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored infantry Company 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Company 1</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar Company 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC defense company</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff, infantry Regiment 1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry battalion 1a</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry battalion 1b</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff, infantry Regiment 2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry battalion 2a</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry battalion 2b</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer battalion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics battalion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Home Defense Brigade</strong></td>
<td><strong>1964</strong></td>
<td><strong>6154</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

strength of 109,000 (instead of 65,500 in 1972): 37,000 in 6 brigades, 50,000 in 300 security companies, and 22,000 in 28 infantry battalions.

### PEACETIME MISSION—AND PERFORMANCE

The principal peacetime mission of the Territorial Army is to prepare for its considerable expansion in wartime. This involves the acquisition and holding of materiel and the training of reservists. Eighty-two percent or more of its wartime strength is to consist of reservists recalled to service.

It is difficult to assess the quantitative and qualitative sufficiency of the materiel provisions for the TA. Substantial combat materiel—such as antitank guns and recoilless rifles, mortars, armored personnel carriers, logistics vehicles—are being made available to the Home Defense Forces, thanks in large measure to transfers of equipment from the FA; but there are as yet few guided missiles, no surface-to-air missiles, no helicopters. M-48 tanks are being introduced into some of the Home Defense Brigades as tank hunters. The materiel buildup for the larger units gives the impression of responding in large measure to the emergence of surplus equipment in the FA. It shows relatively little concern for equipment that meets specifically the combat requirements of small home defense units. But it is providing a substantial amount of antitank armament for the Home Defense Forces as a whole.

On the personnel side, a fair amount of information points to considerable deficiencies. In part these are deficiencies of the German Army-wide reserve training system, lack of experienced cadre personnel, laxity in the enforcement of reserve
duty, lack of training facilities and realistic training tasks. In part, they are peculiar deficiencies of the TA which result from the fact that it is still getting "poor relation" treatment in the Army. Despite authoritative statements about these deficiencies, it appears that at least some experiences with TA reserve training compare favorably with the FA.

The "reserve concept" introduced in 1971 limits obligatory reserve training to a total of 48 days for privates (previously the theoretical maximum was 9 months). Privates above the age of 35 and noncommissioned officers over 45 are now released from duty in peacetime. A large proportion of German reservists are assigned to the Home Defense Forces and train in their units when called up. The TA's reserve (equipment) units are to train four times in six years, i.e., every 18 months, for 12 days in a row. The individual reservist assigned to such units is obligated to attend four training exercises. Thereafter, the ordinary soldier is free of such obligation, but noncommissioned officers are not, largely because an insufficient number of soldiers reach that status and can replace the older noncoms. Reservists assigned to standing units are called up for theoretically the same total amount of time, in a less regular sequence, either for mobilization exercises of their units or for individual service, depending on budget and other factors. As a rule, the Home Defense Forces, in particular the Object Security Companies, draw their reservists from within a radius of 50 kilometers of the unit's assigned station. But their exercises are usually held in a few training centers and rarely in the specific locations they are to protect.

The Commission on Defense Structure reported in 1971:

The problem with the Territorial Army is that its reservists cannot train adequately. . . . Mobilization exercises are difficult because of lack of active cadre personnel and lack of housing during exercises. The more advanced training of leading personnel and specialists is particularly critical, because the particular exercises cannot be performed with equipment units.

The Commission pointed to an overburdening of the Home Defense Forces with training tasks:

The Home Defense Force trains the reservists for its equipment units during regular 12-day mobilization exercises in its own training centers. The Home Defense Brigades have the task in peacetime to train recruits for the Field Army, their own regular personnel, . . . their own reservists and reservists for other units.10

The Commission's flat statement that the reservists of the TA cannot train adequately is a severe indictment, since reserve training is the TA's principal peacetime mission. The Commission's own comments, as well as a number of articles in the official Truppenpraxis, supplemented by interviews with TA personnel, indicate some of the principal deficiencies:

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2 According to Woller, The Improbable War, p. 262, one-third of the 110,000 German reservists who trained in 1969 did so in Home Defense Force units.
4 See, for example, Maj. M. Luog, "Erahrungen mit Reservisten bei der Ausbildung der Heimat- schutztruppe in Mob-Uebungen" (Experiences with Reservists in Training and Exercises of the Home Defense Troops), Truppenpraxis, June 1972.
1. Lack of barracks space. This is responsible for the slow formation of tactical units as well as for the skipping or curtailment of exercises.

2. Lack of competent trainers. This difficulty is accentuated by the recently increased requirement for trainers in the FA, caused by the induction of more draftees.

3. Restrictions on permissible exercises (fire restrictions, unsuitable training locale, lack of enemy simulation, of individual combat training, of training in covert warfare, and of exercises for equipment-holding reserve units).\(^{12}\)

4. Laxity in the enforcement of reserve obligations, notably in the younger age groups in the cities.

5. Imbalance between the qualifications of available reservists and the requirements of the TA. The FA, where most of the reservists obtained their training, is a mechanized force which does not train infantrymen in the number the TA requires. Therefore, artillerymen, technical specialists, and other noninfantrymen are often assigned to training in Object Security Companies or other infantry-type units. It appears that the FA has first call on reservists who are trained infantrymen.

6. Assignment of FA draftees to training in the TA. Conscripts for the FA's corps and division troops are being sent to the Home Defense Brigades for training. Sixty percent of the training spots that the TA offers are thus being used by the FA. Given the shortage of trainers in the TA, this dilutes its capacity for training its own personnel.

7. Lack of training manuals. For various types of units of the TA, training instructions have not yet been published.

In the face of these deficiencies, it is interesting to note that an experienced observer made favorable comparisons between reservists of the TA and the Field Army, with respect to discipline, maturity, combat willingness, and performance.\(^{13}\) He was describing experiences with rural and small-town reservists, largely married men in their upper 20s or lower 30s. These factors appear to influence motivation positively. The ombudsman observed, on the other hand, that too many reservists, notably the better educated and skilled ones, find ways to avoid reserve exercises, and that the lack of leaders contributes to making exercises "Mickey Mouse affairs."\(^{14}\)

WARTIME MISSIONS AND NONMISSIONS

The most recent statement of the wartime missions of the TA can be found in an article by Lt. Gen. Albert Schnez, who was Inspector of the German Army until late 1971.\(^{15}\) He described these missions as follows:

\(^{12}\) For reasons (1) through (3), reservists rarely exercise and train in company strength. Vice Adm. F. Ruge, "Die Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik und die Reservisten." (The Defense of the FRG and the Reservists. Revue Militaire Générale, June 1969, p. 76.

\(^{13}\) Lueg, "Experiences with Reservists."

\(^{14}\) "Ombudsman 1971, pp. 67-68.

\(^{15}\) "Das Territorialheer," Truppenpraxis, September 1971, pp. 663ff. The following discussion is based on this article, other pertinent information released by the MOD, and the author's interviews with a number of senior staff officers and civilian MOD officials.
1. To maintain the operational freedom of action for NATO forces in the FRG, and thus to support forward defense.
2. To prevent or annihilate military action of the enemy in the rear combat area, particularly in the rear corps area.
3. To ward off, in cooperation with Civil Defense Forces, covert enemy action.
4. To safeguard the personnel and materiel requirements as well as the medical support of the German forces.
5. To support civil defense measures for the survival of the population.
6. To ensure cooperation between NATO forces and the German civil defense authorities and to coordinate their requirements or measures.
7. To represent the German interests in the NATO command authorities.

These seven missions can be grouped in three categories: tactical (1 and 2), logistics support and international linkage (4 and 7), and civil-defense related (3, 5, and 6). We shall examine German views of the missions and their gaps (nonmissions) under these three heads.

**Tactical Missions**

In terms of territorial geography, the tactical combat missions of the TA stay clear of "forward combat areas." These areas are assigned to the NATO units, German or allied. Only in exceptional cases shall the TA concern itself with combat actions in the rear area of a NATO corps, or as in Schleswig-Holstein, of a NATO division. Delaying enemy action in the forward area, even object security in it, thus falls outside the TA's responsibility. Before examining what the TA is to do in the so-defined hinterland, we must note two consequences of the geographic limitation.16

1. Since the "forward combat area" exists only in NATO planning and has no predictable relevance for the location of an actual conflict, TA planning is confused by uncertain responsibility. Should NATO forces stand and fight in the forward area, all might be well. If they should advance, it is not clear that the TA should move forward to the frontier. If they should fall back, official German opinion today is that the TA should fall back, too ("because it cannot fight main enemy forces"), but this would mean that it would default on its mission of defending the assigned hinterland.

It would seem that the geographic delimitation of responsibilities is dictated above all by a desire to avoid jurisdictional conflict between NATO and national authorities, and not by military considerations. If the latter were prominent, one might expect to find a screening mission among the wartime tasks of the TA, which is at present nonexistent.

2. As implied in the foregoing, the TA has no stay-behind mission in the case of an enemy advance into the FRG. Combat on ground overrun or left behind by enemy shock forces, or in territory occupied by the enemy, is definitely a nonmission. This signifies—and the point is emphasized by German MOD and Army authorities—the denial of any pocket-of-resistance or partisan mission to the TA Home Defense Forces, not only in the direct fighting sense but also in terms of communication and intelligence-gathering activity. It imposes a serious limitation on TA and probably also on FA training and preparation.

16 A third consequence will be noted below, p. 56, under civil defense related missions.
One encounters in the FRG a veritable abhorrence of partisan warfare, combined with a good deal of admiration for the partisan operations of others somewhere else in the world, including Europe during World War II. People explain the contrast between the two attitudes by "unsuitable German terrain," lack of defense willingness of the people, insufficient conspiratorial skills, overwhelming dominance by a totalitarian invader, and so forth. Their ambiguity in this regard is often highlighted by the assumption that hostile gangs and commandos operating in the FRG, notably in its cities, may cause considerable damage and losses to the defenders of the FRG. But the defenders are believed to be unable to turn this weapon against the enemy. This ambiguity is fully reflected in official opinion about partisan warfare in the FRG.

In the chosen hinterland, the two tactical tasks of the TA are area protection and object (or vulnerable-point) protection. The former is assigned to the Home Defense Brigades and infantry battalions, the latter to the Object Security Companies. The stated objectives of the brigades are to destroy hostile forces landed by air or amphibious means or broken through friendly defenses; the objectives of the battalions, to perform reconnaissance and "partial or temporary static defense" in their area. The Object Companies are concerned with the static defense of selected critical facilities. Leaving aside the personnel and materiel problems which we have noted, and granting a proper coverage of objects, one may assume that these forces are being prepared for the stated tasks; but here again two nonmissions must be noted: city defense and prepared static defenses.

City Defense. Cities and metropolitan areas (Ballungsräume) play a peculiar role in German defense thinking. It is well recognized that the urban areas in which most of the population and industry of the FRG are concentrated are strategic objectives of the first order and must be protected. However, German military authorities make it clear that they are only thinking of defending these agglomerations in the countryside surrounding them. Fighting the enemy out of and within the great cities is considered "too destructive," or requiring "unavailable forces." Therefore protecting the cities means to declare them "open" and to avoid making any military use of their facilities. This has important consequences for the wartime mission of German NATO-assigned and territorial defense forces.

The desire to spare the cities from combat is understandable. But it must be clear, in particular from World War II experience in Russia, that cities can be powerful defense bastions. An enemy attacking a defended city can be bogged down; an enemy bypassing such a city can be harassed from the city and deprived of communication lines. Moreover, an enemy occupying an undefended city may turn it into a fortress of its own and use it against the counterattacking defender. Short of surrounding cities with great fortifications, forces based in the cities and using the natural fortifications which buildings and public works offer could add importantly to defense capacity. The denial of the urban terrain to the fighting TA (and the FA as well) forces the Army to forego these opportunities and to accept great tactical handicaps when operating in more or less contiguous areas of urbanization.

18 There also appears to be little remembrance, at least in this context, of the amazing feats of Leitton-Vorbeck's black and white partisan-type army in the defense of German East Africa against superior British forces in World War I.
19 For a contrast, see Norwegian views on the defense of Oslo, below, pp. 66-67.
Indeed, these areas appear to German Army tacticians not as potential defense assets but as defense liabilities. Regarding the protection of vulnerable objects in particular, it is doubtful that the TA is preparing to defend them if they happen to lie within built-up urban areas.

**Prepared Static Defense.** The lack of prepared static defense positions in the FRG is a well-known fact. Authorities have refrained from creating such facilities to the point of avoiding certain defense-assisting features in public works construction (e.g., in canal building). The TA has no mission to prepare static defenses, mine fields, tank traps or the like; but some units have at least a responsibility to study the defense value of natural facilities and existing road structures, and to make structural preparations for the demolition of bridges and road sections.²⁰ It appears, however, that they are not always able to get the required permission of the civilian public works authorities, notably where an eventual demolition would jeopardize public utilities or normal civilian transport, and that they often lack the administrative backing or the funds to carry out their missions.

Besides these two kinds of tactical mission limitations, others may be noted in passing. The kind of hostile forces which the Home Defense Forces are trained to meet are usually assumed to be "armed gangs" or "sabotage commandos," and not substantial military units.²¹ These are proper targets, but hardly the only relevant ones for TA tactical troops in times of highly mobile warfare. Some TA documents also mention more substantial opponents ("any sort of enemy"), but one wonders whether the TA is being prepared at all to fight them. Another kind of nonmission appears to be the protection of the localized military assets of the NATO units, German or allied, including the German Air Force and Navy, from enemy attack. The protection of these assets is said to be the task of the "users"; but the TA is responsible for protecting the surrounding countryside.²²

**Large Logistics Missions and International Linkage**

The wartime logistics missions of the German TA are very broad and go well beyond the personnel and materiel support for its own tactical units. The TA is responsible for supplying the FA with personnel replacements in wartime. It is responsible for the wartime expansion of hospital facilities for all German military as well as civilian casualties, drawing on its own reserve hospital and civilian hospitals. It is finally responsible for the wartime provisioning of all German forces with general supplies, presumably including all not weapon-specific supplies, and repair facilities. These are vast administrative tasks of general wartime mobilization. They have ended up with the TA because they are national tasks and the TA is the only "national" force, and not because they are germane to area or object defense.

We have not studied the preparations for these missions, but note from General Schnez's article²³ that they seem to be largely in preliminary stages. He speaks of

²⁰ The tasks are outlined in Col. E. Bredenföhrer, "Das Pionierwesen des Territorialheeres" (The Engineer Troops of the Territorial Army), *Truppenpraxis*, September 1971, pp. 676ff.
²³ "Das Territorialheer."
"requirements," necessary "preconditions," and experimentation, rather than of organizational accomplishments. He is particularly vague on the requisitioning of civilian assets (facilities, supplies, vehicles, etc.) in wartime, which appears to be a touchy issue.24

As regards the international linkage mission, the commanders of the TA are to serve as rear area commanders for the NATO forces deployed in Germany. General Schnez noted that this arrangement, which extends into the civil defense field, is meant to unburden NATO commanders and to make "a more thorough representation of German interests" possible. Here again, the TA is the thread that shall close the seam between international integration of forces and German sovereignty.

Civil-Defense Related Missions

The missions of the TA in civil defense are nebulous. It is clear that the TA has no primary responsibility in this field. This responsibility lies with civilian authorities—the federal and Land ministries of the interior and local administrations—and it requires separate discussion later in this section. In General Schnez's description, the TA is to "assist" civil defense by helping repair war damage, rescue civilian casualties, and assure necessary supplies; it is also to "cooperate in the planning and directing of population movements." But the TA has no units earmarked, trained, and equipped for civil defense tasks proper, and no units of any kind in the heavily populated forward area. Its military police units are no doubt capable of playing a role in controlling civilian population movements, but General Schnez notes that as a rule they will only intervene to prevent refugee streams from interfering with military movements.25 The TA has presumably cooperated in the designation of separate military and civilian road networks for war, a plan designed to reduce the interference of military and civilian traffic; but the two networks naturally have numerous intersections.26 In the present state of military and civil defense planning for Germany, protection of the population in wartime poses completely baffling problems.

A division of labor between military and civil defense organization is quite logical. The tasks are different. But the coordination of the two activities is imperative in combat areas and presupposes a close linkage of the two in the regional and local administration. In the centralized French system, the offices of the regional and departmental prefects serve as the units to effect this linkage.27 In the federal German system there is no obvious counterpart. The Land governments, which carry the direct responsibility for civil defense, have no military function. The regional and local commanders of the TA are responsible to the federal MOD only, and the commanders of NATO-assigned units to higher NATO (or allied) authorities. The cooperation between the relevant authorities is not institutionalized and is said

24 In preparing the first mobilization exercise, planned for the fall of 1972, the MOD went out of its way to limit the simulation of private vehicle requisitioning, evidently for fear of civilian opposition. Only 160 trucks were ordered to be driven up for inspection; none were put to use in the exercise. MOD Press Release, September 29, 1972; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 7, 1972.
27 See p. 73 below.
to be "under study." In principle, all parties are undoubtedly willing to cooperate, but one may well wonder how the cooperation would work under the stress of war.

In sum, the German Territorial Army is a largely latent force, permitted to rely on mobilization because it is not part of the internationally integrated strike force, for the same reason (and for others) constrained in its territorial defense missions and diverted to nontactical missions, yet organized largely as if its units were parts of that strike force. These contradictions make it likely that its present configuration will prove to be a transitory form in the development of the FRG's defense structure, and that sooner or later its peacetime structure and wartime missions, as well as those of the Field Army, will be redefined in major reforms.

THE CIVIL DEFENSE SECTOR

The recent publication of the first German White Paper on Civil Defense offers a good occasion to review summarily the FRG's civil defense system, its problems and current tendencies.

The opening sentences of the White Paper describe the essence of the situation:

- The Federal Government is aware of the fact that the problems of civil defense, in the framework of overall defense, have not been solved sufficiently so far. In the course of events, the ranking of civil defense among political priorities has been lowered on several occasions, and subjected to modifications which were determined by psychological and political factors, as well as the financial situation of the FRG. The Federal Government maintains its belief that civil defense is an inseparable and inescapable part of overall defense. 28

The "insufficient solutions of civil defense problems" can be observed on four levels: (1) regarding accomplishments along chosen and proclaimed lines of government policy, (2) regarding the government's policy concepts, (3) regarding government efforts to convey a sense of urgency and to assume leadership, and (4) regarding the population's acceptance of and participation in civil defense. These four aspects are not independent of each other. Deficiencies in aspects 2 and 3 have produced failures in aspect 4; deficiencies in 4, failures in 1, 2, and 3. If there is any single key to malperformance, and thus to the improvement of German civil defense in the future, it is the government's failure to give substantial proof of its alleged determination to treat civil defense as "an inseparable and inescapable part of overall defense." Faced with the ostrich-like attitude of most people toward civil defense requirements, the government has taken refuge behind the notion of voluntary self-protection and provided only a patchwork of fair-weather arrangements and bureaucratic complexities in an attempt to bridge the wide gap between the requirements of peacetime and wartime civil emergencies. It has created neither satisfactory shelters nor an evacuation system, so that it is left with a policy of admonishing the unprotected civilians to stay put and, as a last resort, of forcing them into immobility. Some officials take comfort from the thought that in cities declared "open" the population will be safe.

28 German Civil Defense White Paper, p. 11.
Here we discuss each of the four aspects noted above.

1. One cannot begin to review civil defense accomplishments along proclaimed lines of government policy without pointing to the vacillations of governmental civil defense policy over time, legislation followed by suspension of the law, the nonappropriation of funds to implement laws, etc., which will occupy us under the second heading. These vacillations have meant belated and false starts in implementation, and they make it difficult to relate accomplishments to elapsed time.

A federally financed siren warning system is in existence. Ten warning centers in hardened facilities are operational. They serve 56,000 existing sirens and are to serve a total of 82,000 sirens spread over the territory of the FRG. A substantial part of the population can thus be warned of enemy (notably air) attacks.

The question is unresolved where people should go when the sirens sound. Public shelters now in existence are said to afford protection for about 85,000 people; shelters for 82,000 more are under construction, and for another 82,000, in the planning stage.29 This is not much for a population of 62 million. The federal government is only now beginning to include shelters in the construction of new federal buildings, "funds permitting." The brand-new building which houses the Federal Administration of Civil Defense in Bad Godesberg has no air raid shelter.

Shelters in private buildings are virtually nonexistent. Although the federal government has been offering shelter construction subsidies to private builders since 1969, few have availed themselves of the money, even after an increase in the amounts of the subsidy in 1970, and the funds authorized are not being fully used. No funds have as yet been authorized for shelters in hospitals.30

For an emergency food supply (one warm meal per person per day), the FRG is committed to maintaining a civil defense reserve of foodstuffs for 30 days. Present stocks are said to suffice for 14 days only, and they include food reserves for the armed forces. Owing to insufficient funding, the stocks will probably be reduced. The government has appealed to the population to stock food for 14 days. The effect is unknown.31

Regarding the personnel requirements of civil defense, since 1967 the FRG has enjoined selected local communities to form volunteer units of air raid helpers. In 1970, this civil defense service sought to fill 300,000 positions, but it had only 97,000 volunteers. In a recent innovation, the FRG made the air raid helpers part of a newly established Enlarged Civil Emergency Service (ECES, Erweiterter Katastrophenschutz) and undertook to finance the training and equipment of some 195,000 volunteers (especially in the rescue, ABC defense, and facilities repair categories), who are to supplement the peacetime force of 385,000 firemen, ambulance men, etc., available for nonwar emergencies, as well as to upgrade the equipment of the peacetime force.32 Organized in platoons and groups, the ECES will be destined to cope with

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29 The White Paper leads one to assume that these shelters are designed for protection against conventional bombardment, except direct hits, and that they also afford protection against direct radiation and air contamination. We have not studied their technical characteristics. The White Paper reports that additional "provisional" facilities for 600,000 people, adequate for "up to three hours occupancy" are now being readied under a crash program. More than half the shelters are in reconditioned bunkers of World War II vintage, the others in multipurpose facilities (subways, garages, etc.). Ibid., pp. 67, 76-78.

30 Ibid., pp 76-77.

31 Ibid., pp. 92. 112.

32 Ibid, pp. 69, 70. The peacetime force is organized by several agencies, such as local and industrial fire departments, the Red Cross, and the Technical Assistance Agency.
peace and wartime emergencies. Its buildup may take 5 to 10 years. Volunteers are expected to commit themselves for a period of 10 years and will be exempted from military service.\textsuperscript{33} This program holds out more promise for an effective organization, but it will take some years before the results, notably the solidity of the volunteer commitments, can be judged. Financial compensation is minimal for training during the volunteer’s free time; for training during worktime, employers are expected to pay regular wages and to be reimbursed out of public funds. Organization of the volunteer force is apparently progressing best in rural areas and small cities. To raise an adequate force in the most vulnerable urban centers a compulsory system will probably be found necessary.

In view of the present state of civil defense preparation, the present government policy of holding the population in their normal places of residence under war conditions is not convincing. As long as the material and organizational provisions for protection remain so deficient, war can be expected to produce widespread panic and flight movements which will render any military defense, mobile or static, very difficult. Civil defense officials generally expect this to happen, and for lack of better provisions believe that they may have to rely mainly on propaganda, describing the horrors awaiting fleeing citizens on clogged roads, to deter headlong flight as best they can. A working conference of responsible officials in the Land of Lower Saxony, to which the author was invited as a guest, faced this situation with utter pessimism.

The federal budget for civil defense, currently (1971) at a level of about $155 million/year, is allotted only in part (70 percent) to the tasks of the MOI (civil defense proper), with the remainder going to other ministries responsible for economic preparedness. The total amounts to about 2 percent of the combined outlays for military and civil defense, or to little over $2 per head of population. About $41 million were to be spent on the ECES, $17 million for shelter construction. While a little larger than in preceding years, the budget bears no relation to "the necessity of raising civil defense to the level of military defense," which the government has proclaimed.\textsuperscript{34}

2. The civil defense concepts of the government show a record of vacillation. A shelter construction law, passed in 1965, made the construction of private shelters compulsory. A law establishing a civil defense corps, passed in the same year, provided for the conscription of civilian defense personnel among young men available for the military draft; basic training during 4 months with subsequent refresher courses; and the formation of territorial units. Both laws were suspended shortly after passage "for financial reasons" and have never been reactivated. The recent White Paper declared that compulsory construction of private shelters is "out of the question."\textsuperscript{33} It remains to be seen whether the indirect linkage of the new ECES to the military draft will work for a stable civil defense force or simply open an avenue for escaping any form of service.

3. The government has failed conspicuously in conveying to the population a sense of urgency and practicality of civil defense measures. It has never approached the population directly with a popular handbook on civil defense on the model of the Swiss or Norwegian handbooks, which deal with concrete physical, political, and

\textsuperscript{33} The ECES is being organized under the state-of-emergency legislation of 1968 (see above, p. 16); Ibid., pp. 70, 71, 88.

\textsuperscript{34} German Civil Defense White Paper, p. 50; German Defense White Paper 1970, German text, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{35} German Civil Defense White Paper, p. 76.
psychological situations likely to confront the people in wartime, and show what people should and should not do about them. It has given civil defense no place whatever in civil instruction in the schools. The Civil Defense White Paper is a dry, bureaucratic account. It has been treated in the press largely as a documentation of failures and will not instruct or inspire anyone. Perhaps the best that can be said for it is that it does not present apocalyptic visions of massive nuclear bombardment, such as those in the cited Weiszäcker study and in much of the public discussion on civil defense in Germany during past years. For the Germans at least, these visions articulate the hopeless case in which no defense, military or civil, seems practical. Since military defense measures on the national territory have largely been adjusted to the prospect of conventional war, and nuclear capabilities have been assigned principally the role of deterring the enemy’s use of nuclear weapons, it is only logical that civil defense thinking be freed from the paralyzing thought that only the impractical is sufficient.

4. Having begun to outline what is practical, the government still has to overcome the widespread refusal of the population to be involved in civil defense. Every German newspaper article on civil defense speaks of its unpopularity. The White Paper quotes an opinion survey of 1969 in which only 20 percent of the respondents said they would follow a call for civil defense volunteers. Some individuals and semiofficial organizations, grouped around the Civil Defense Academy of Bad Godesberg, are working hard to improve the atmosphere and to create positive interest. But they have a long way to go.

The implications of the civil defense situation for military territorial defense are manifold. Civil defense weaknesses in the cities compound the noted weakness of the TA in the cities. They are also bound to complicate the tactical, logistic, and policing functions of the TA in wartime and to interfere with the execution of NATO tactical plans.

OUTLOOK UNCERTAIN

The outlook for the German territorial (and civil) defense forces is uncertain. During the next year or so, they are likely to continue in their present frame and to grow along the lines indicated above. But beyond that, these forces are bound to be affected by reforms in the FRG’s defense structure. Such reforms can be expected during the tenure of the second Brandt government.

At the end of 1972, the Defense Structure Commission, which had been appointed in July 1970 by the federal government to study the evolution of the German defense structure and possible options for change during the 1970s, turned in its

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34 See above, p. 17.
37 Consequences and Avoidance of War.
39 German Civil Defense White Paper, p. 87.
40 Note two magazines devoted to civil defense, the monthly ZS Magazine, and the quarterly Zivilverteidigung. See also articles by Adolf Dedekind, a high official in the MOI of Lower Saxony, Wehrkunde, January and May 1972.
final report. On the basis of the published summary and of several earlier conversations the author had with leading MOD staff members working for the Commission, one can assess the general trend of its thinking and the options it offered to the government, notably with regard to the matters covered in this report. A fuller analysis of the recommendations and subsequent policy developments may be undertaken at a later time.

The principal message of the Commission appears to be that the present FRG defense structure is untenable. In what is perhaps the most startling revelation, the Commission declares that the 33 brigades of the FRG Field Army, which were structured, and hitherto alleged to be, a combat-ready standing force, can “be considered as only 65 percent combat-ready on the average” at least in a personnel sense. This statement of fact, which is offered in the DSC Report without further definition or explanation, serves as a point of departure for the exposition of alternative structures. The Commission does not decry the revealed degree of latency of the German Army—as a NATO official might do. It rather says that a force that is latent to such a degree can be structured better, e.g., that NATO may get the 36 German Field Army brigades it has been asking for in the form of 24 brigades that are actually full-strength and 12 cadre-reservist brigades that can be promised to be at full strength on M+3 day. The acknowledgment of default helps the Commission avoid the ticklish task of justifying a transition to greater latency or lesser peacetime force “presence.”

The optimal structure in the Commission’s view envisages a major reorganization of the Army, but hardly any of the Navy and Air Force. The peacetime total of all military personnel is kept at 472,000, or about the present level (which is given as 479,000). The requirement of volunteers/professionals is slightly raised (from 247,000 to 259,000). The conscription term is left at 15 months; but close to one-half of the young men reaching conscription age in the 10 years ahead would no longer be called to military service. Those selected for service would receive a variety of financial benefits, and those not selected would be financially penalized. This would mark a radical departure from the hitherto favored concept of Wehrgerechtigkeit through universal military service.

The proposed subdivision of the Field Army into fully standing and cadre-training brigades resembles the organization of the mobile battle force in the Fernau model, which we discussed in Section III. The 24 fully standing Field Army brigades would comprise 40 percent volunteers, 60 percent conscripts who have completed basic training. The 12 cadre brigades would comprise 25 percent volunteers and 75 percent conscripts in basic training. These cadre brigades would conduct basic training for all conscripts of the Field Army and the Territorial Army.

The cadre brigades are supposed to be fully equipped units, and generally armed along the same lines as the full-strength brigades. They are to hold annual exercises during which they would be constituted as full-strength units by the call-up of reservists. (During the exercises, the cadres would presumably leave the new conscripts and join the reservists.) Two reservists are to be assigned to each position. Reservists are to train in units “at least two times for 14 days” during the three

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years following their basic training—and no more thereafter.\footnote{This seems to imply a further reduction of reserve exercise obligation. See above, p. 51.} The Commission notes that in time of crisis, reservists could be recalled to their cadre brigades without mobilization and notes "the political responsibility for timely full activation."\footnote{DSC Report, p. 22.}

The \textit{DSC Report} deals only marginally with the Territorial Army, but indicates some significant changes for it in the option outlined above. The TA would cease to act as a training agency for the Field Army and employ only a few conscripts in peacetime. This would relieve it of a large extraneous burden. On the other hand, the reservists assigned to the TA would be those who are "not needed for the completion of the cadre brigades." This suggests a rather haphazard assignment and promises no improvement over the present.

On its way to the preferred structure, the Commission considered and rejected several alternatives. A pure volunteer force was rejected because a force of this type, when equal in size to the present Bundeswehr (\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 20, 38-40. The Commissioners do not talk about the TA but about a militia, relatively lightly armed troops, local assignment, static and primarily antitank defense missions.}), would either cost too much (about 35 percent more than the present in 1972 terms) or at the given budget level would only permit one-quarter of the present, and for the future desired, share of investments in total defense expenditures (7.5 instead of 30 percent).

The Commission also considered a peculiarly ambitious version of a combined force of volunteers (24 heavily armed FA brigades) and short-term (6 months) conscripts serving in a lightly armed militia which it made large enough to take in all available conscripts. Thus constructed, the combination meant boosting the total personnel level of the Bundeswehr to 564,000 men (including twice as many volunteers as at present), and depressing investment resources available in a total defense budget of the present size to 14 percent of the total. Naturally, the Commission rejected this version, too. It failed, unfortunately, to consider a more moderate version of this combination, involving perhaps less than 100 percent conscription and a less inflated number of volunteers (either via a greater reduction in full-strength volunteer brigades or via the employment of reservists or conscripts as trainers), and thus did not do full justice to the kind of force posture favored in the present study.

In comments on the militia idea, the Commission supported its political value but cast doubt on its capability to produce combat-readiness on M-day, which may surprise observers of the Swiss, Norwegian, and other existing systems. Nevertheless, the Commission recommended some practical experimentation with militia units in the Bundeswehr and closer study of their tactical and financial possibilities. Three of the Commissioners, General Kielmansegg and State Secretaries Duckwitz and von Berghes, added their personal views to the report, arguing strongly for further consideration of the type of forces we have called territorial defense forces in this report.\footnote{In this connection we may note that the Commission was composed in large part of representatives of traditional military views, who might also have served under a CDU government, and not of social reformers and politicians close to the present government.} Their argumentation on tactical and political grounds makes points familiar to the reader of the present report.

The government is not bound by the recommendation of the Commission,\footnote{\textit{DSC Report}, p. 22.} and the course of its policy cannot yet be predicted, except for one general point: some
substitution of latent forces for standing (or allegedly standing) forces is likely to be made in the next few years. What kind of substitution that will be depends in part on the apparently continuing debate over militia-territorial defense type forces, in part on a new debate about the principles and the appropriate financial inducements and penalties relating to selective conscription, and in part on budget decisions, discussions in NATO, and developments in the MBFR context.46

With regard to discussions in NATO, the Commission gave the government a cue by raising the question whether “NATO demands” regarding German forces are not in need of revision.47 The government may well choose not to follow it literally in order to avoid an open clash of interests in the alliance. It is more likely to use the tactic which the Commission itself applied in its reasoning—and which has been used by many others in NATO before—i.e., to say, “NATO force requirements being what they are, let us make the best of an imperfect world and organize the partial fulfillment of these requirements in a better way.” Whichever approach the FRG government may use, it will pose the issue of NATO’s adaptation to an institutionalization of greater latency in the force posture, possibly also to a greater recognition of territorial-defense type forces. The German initiative is also likely to have a catalytic effect on changes in other European, and perhaps American, force dispositions. We shall return to the problem of NATO adaptation in Section VII.

46 The Commission calculated its various force posture options on three budget assumptions: (1) constant share of defense in total public expenditures through the 1970s, (2) slowly declining share (minus 0.3 percent annually), (3) more rapidly declining share (minus 0.6 percent annually). It applied traditional NATO demands for combat-ready main forces as a criterion of military sufficiency in the several options. With regard to MBFR, it attempted to keep its study “open” to force reduction possibilities, e.g., by considering alternatives to the preferred option in which 15, 18, or 21 brigades of the Army (instead of 12) are configured as cadre-reservist brigades—with corresponding budgetary savings.
47 DSC Report, p. 18.
V. TERRITORIAL DEFENSE IN NONINTEGRATED EUROPEAN SYSTEMS

This section deals with territorial defense concepts and forces developed in four European countries, two of which (Switzerland and Yugoslavia) do not participate in NATO's military integration, and two (Norway and France) which participate in it in a far more remote way than the FRG. These countries have been developing their armed forces entirely or mainly under national impulses, on the supposition that military defense of their values depends essentially on their own forces.

In terms of mission concepts, organization, and force provisions—but not necessarily in all respects—the four countries have put greater emphasis on latent forces and territorial defense than has the FRG. Their experiences could guide future FRG endeavors to do more along these lines, but this does not mean that they offer immediately imitable precepts. There are national peculiarities in each system which either militate against imitation abroad or require suitable adaptations. Moreover, the defense structures of these countries have their troubles, too. Some of these peculiarities and difficulties will emerge in the following discussion. We shall note, however, that they do not add up to the kind of "irrelevance of foreign experience" behind which standpatters in bureaucratic systems are wont to take refuge. Some of the international differences are not cumulative, but are mutually offsetting from the point of view of a territorial defense policy.

NORWAY'S HOME DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Norway has been outstanding among NATO countries in recognizing the value of a territorial defense organization, developing its peacetime structure, and preparing it for important tactical missions in wartime. In peacetime, the Norwegian Home Guard (HG) is a separate service—apart from regular army, air force, and navy—with its own budget. It is headed by an Inspector General who reports directly to the Defense Minister in administrative matters and is a coequal member of the Joint Defense Staff. The HG is a latent force, a reserve organization with a peacetime staff of only 300 full-time officers and NCOs and on the average about 1000 men who at any particular time are in training at HG centers or involved in exercises. The number in uniform varies considerably during the year, following the training routine of the various units. Under mobilization, the HG is said to be capable of
fielding about 80,000 men within one day. The HG command reckons the mobilization time of the various units in hours; and the Defense Staff considers the HG the most immediately available defense force, besides the air force, in time of emergency.

The Home Guard units, mostly of platoon (30 to 40 men) or smaller size, are under operational control of the local military commanders. The ground force units (80 percent of the total) are under the operational control of the army. Their missions include: to operate a network of signal communications for field intelligence and command purposes; to man and defend roadblocks, demolition points, and other strong points along the communication lines; to act as pathfinders to field army units; to prevent enemy acts of sabotage against critical defense objects; to carry out sabotage and guerrilla activities in enemy-occupied territory or no-man's-land; and to assist civil defense units. Each combined army regiment has HG units attached to it. The naval HG units consist of small armed fishing and whaling vessels, with crews of 10 to 12 men, for coastal and harbor control, reconnaissance and transportation missions, as well as a few coastal batteries. HG antiaircraft batteries (primarily for airfield defense) and visual air surveillance units are under control of the air force. Guard and defense duties at war headquarters, depots, radar installations, and military bases are common to all three types of units. In comparison with Germany's TA, it is interesting that greater administrative separateness of the HG in peacetime does not exclude greater integration with the regular forces in wartime. This contrast is also reflected in the fact that the Home Guard's tactical units are typically smaller than those of the TA, of sub-company size (except for Oslo) in place of the TA's companies, battalions, and even brigades.

The Home Guard had its origin in Norwegian planning (in England) during World War II and in the Resistance movement. (The lack of such an organization at the time of Hitler's invasion is still deplored among Norwegian military men.) Some of its senior officers today still are wartime Resistance leaders. The first Inspector General was appointed in 1946. In the years following the war, the rebuilding of Norwegian army strength began with the Home Guard. After the formation of a new regular army, the Home Guard settled down in about its present frame, outlined in the HG Law of 1953 and later amendments.

**Personnel, Training, and Equipment**

The bulk of the Home Guard's personnel is recruited under Norway's compulsory military service, which at present sets a term of active service of 12 months for the army, 15 months for navy and air force, plus obligation to attend reserve exercises. About 85 percent of the HG's mobilizable strength consists of active and reserve conscripts of military age (20 to 45 years), who have transferred to the HG after serving in the regular forces for some time (3 to 18 months). The remaining 15 percent consists of volunteers below or above regular military age, about 5 percent youths (ages 17 to 20), and 10 percent older men. There are also some women volunteers. The volunteer recruitment enables the HG to train youngsters, which it is doing to good effect in parts of the country (its snow camps and evening exercises appear to be popular), and to keep experienced older men in the forces. Apart from 3 months of basic training for men without previous military service, all members of the HG are obliged to spend at least 1 week per year in training courses and
exercises and to keep abreast of this obligation so as to accumulate a total service record of (presently) 19 months before the age of 45. Failure to keep abreast of the service obligation within a reasonable time span is a punishable offense.

Training is conducted in HG training centers or in the soldier's own locality. Courses cover general tactics, guerrilla and single fighter tactics, field intelligence, signal communications, demolitions, sniping, gunnery, etc. Home Guard officers, NCOs, and specialists, who are mostly in reserve status, are obligated to take additional advanced training. The basic training emphasizes infantry combat in all kinds of terrain, including built-up areas, and seeks to produce tenacious and imaginative fighters prepared for combat in small units or singly. ¹ To assure rapid mobilization, HG personnel keep personal arms, ammunition, and uniforms at home—larger weapons are kept in community houses—and practice a simple but apparently quite effective warning system. Each individual knows the rendezvous, which usually is a short distance from his residence or place of work.

The HG is lightly armed and equipped. Normal equipment consists of rifles, automatic personal weapons, machine guns, and explosives. Some units have mortars and antitank weapons, but many are deficient in arms of this kind. Artillery weapons are mainly at the disposal of the coastal and air defense units. The units are mobile within a local radius, largely with the help of requisitioned vehicles. The HG has no armor, with the exception of a few units which have armored cars.

Mission Concepts

The combat missions of HG units emphasize static defenses, barring enemy movements in woods, narrow defiles, and mountainous country. The units are taught to exploit the highly articulated terrain characteristic of the Norwegian countryside, and to use their knowledge of terrain, local population, and local conditions against the enemy. Where the objects to be defended lie in more open country, or in built-up areas, the missions include tasks that can often be accomplished only in cooperation with more heavily armed regular forces. Owing to the assignment of a large part of the regular forces to the defense of northern Norway, the Home Guard carries a relatively large responsibility in the defense of the southern, and not quite as sparsely populated, region of the country.

Oslo, communication and transportation hub of the country, with 12 percent of the total population, is the focus of an important tactical mission of the HG. The defense of Oslo is entrusted principally to an HG force of about 8000 men, organized in 8 light battalions of 500 to 600 men, upward of 10 independent companies, and antiaircraft units. The mission of the force is to stay in the city, which according to published plans is expected to be evacuated by the government and most of the population in wartime, and to defend it house by house, with or without the assistance of regular army units.² This important mission is plainly stated by the responsi-

¹ The basic infantry training manual *Soldaten i felt* (Soldier in the Field), published by the army in 1969, illustrates the blunt and forthright approach to the soldier's education which is characteristic of the Norwegian forces.

² This mission is in pursuit of the Royal Order of June 10, 1949, directing all officers, NCOs, and military chiefs throughout the country "to offer resistance against an armed attack with all resources at their disposal... even if they are left on their own and even if the situation looks difficult or hopeless without regard to enemy threat of reprisals (bombing of towns, etc.)."
ble authorities, and in the eyes of the HG command is far from hopeless, provided officers’ recruitment and the force’s equipment with suitable armament and training facilities (to simulate in-city fighting) are improved. As it is, the Oslo HG appears to be somewhat better equipped with mortars and antitank rockets than other HG forces, and considered capable of turning the city into a horror for armored enemy forces.

Financial and Social Aspects

The current (1972) budget of the Home Guard amounts to about $14 million, or less than 3 percent of Norway’s aggregate defense budget of about $480 million. Operating expenditures make up nearly $10 million and investments little over $4 million. Since some of the equipment (particularly the larger items) is supplied by the regular forces free of charge to the HG budget, the investment bill is understated. Nevertheless, as it is, the HG is a very cheap force, considering that for 3 percent of the budget it supplies about 30 percent of the country’s mobilized strength (either on a ground forces or total forces basis). Understandably, this cheapness makes the HG politically attractive, but unfortunately for its military worth, cheapness is exaggerated by failure of the political authorities to equip the force with suitable modern weapons and to provide the incentives necessary for a rejuvenation of its officer personnel. If these deficiencies were remedied, say, through a doubling or trebling of the HG budget, the Home Guard would still qualify as a relatively inexpensive defense force, and would promise, with given total manpower and organization, far more punch than it has today.

On the manpower side, the cheapness of the HG results in large part from the fact that the organization only pays the salaries of its small full-time staff and merely token compensation to the men in training and exercises. Municipalities and enterprises pay the normal salaries of their employees while they are in HG service, and other reservists face a loss of monetary income. (An equalization scheme is under discussion.) As a result, the manpower bill of this latent force in peacetime is borne to a high degree by civil society, not the defense budget. In view of the lack of financial incentives, it is remarkable that morale in the force is generally described as good, discipline outstanding, and the responsiveness of the reservists to their military obligations rather higher than that of many conscripts in the regular forces. U.S. military detachments involved in exercises with Home Guard units typically describe them as excellent soldiers, tough and spirited.

The political popularity of the HG is founded in part on the close integration of the force with civil society. HG members elect local trustee councils, which act as a body to hear appeals in disciplinary cases and send some of their members to district councils that arecomposed of military and civilian representatives. In addition to HG men, these mixed district councils include representatives of the area’s principal economic and social organizations, farmers, industrialists, Red Cross, women’s and youth organizations, etc., and are usually chaired by labor union representatives. The councils deal with various problems related to HG activity and seek

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3 Exemptions from reserve exercises are granted for economic and social reasons, and somewhat more liberally than in the regular forces. Therefore, typically 20 percent more HG reservists are being called up than are expected to participate. But those excused must make up time, and the rule seems to be strictly enforced.
to interest the communities in the HG. They presently meet once or twice a year. Built upon them, a national HG Council furthers HG interests countrywide, lobbies in Parliament, and communicates with national military authorities. The HG command finds this system of councils helpful in involving wide circles of citizens and their organizations in the affairs of the Home Guard.

Further Development

No significant new developments of the HG are expected to occur in the near future, but some Norwegian defense planners think that a latent force organization—either under the HG or under an adaptation of parts of the regular services to the HG principle—could be useful and economical for a variety of military tasks presently assigned to the standing forces. In radar stations, two or three full-time technicians could keep equipment "warm"; full manning within a couple of hours could be assured by reservists. Similarly, fast patrol boats could be manned with a permanent crew of two or three, while the rest of the crew would be reservists subject to immediate recall. Furthermore, in adaptation to the Home Guard principle, the regular services might come to conscript the men of some units for a shorter initial term and call them back for short periods of further training in following years. In Norway, as elsewhere in Europe, the progress of East-West détente and the pressures on the defense budget induce tendencies to reduce the financial and social requirements of the standing forces, and the Norwegian HG offers suggestions of how this might be accomplished without too great a loss of military capability and elasticity.

Civil Defense Organization

Norway's Civil Defense Program has been called the most advanced in a NATO country. It certainly reflects a thorough concern with the survival of the civilian population under war conditions and shows many achievements and interesting forms of organization that could be emulated elsewhere. It comprises a large public and private sheltering program, a civil defense manpower organization under compulsory service, and an extensive city evacuation program; and it is paralleled by an economic defense and stockpiling program. The civil defense program is administered by the Directorate for Civil Defense and Emergency Planning in the Ministry of Justice and Police.

The Norwegian shelter program comprises the building and maintaining of blast-resisting shelters, public and private. Its target is to provide public shelter space for 20 percent of the population in larger cities and towns. By January 1971, it had provided 166,000 shelter spaces, or 45 percent of the target. These substantial public installations, built in bedrock or in concrete constructions in central areas with few private shelters, are built by the municipalities under heavy government

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subsidy. They are to protect against conventional, nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons. The building of private shelters has been compulsory for years in all new residential, commercial, and industrial buildings above a certain size. The cost, according to law, is borne by the private owners and users, without the benefit of any subsidy. These private shelters, reserved for the people who normally use or frequent the buildings, provided about 1,100,000 spaces by January 1972. They are, of course, less elaborately equipped than the public shelters. Together, public and private shelters offer today about 1,300,000 spaces, which is equivalent to one-third of the country's total population (as compared with 2 to 3 percent for the FRG).

Expenditures for shelter construction, public and private, amounted to $13.5 million in 1971, the lion's share ($11 million) coming from private funds. National funds contributed only $1.7 million, which left the bulk of the national civil defense budget of $11 million (about $3 per capita) available for purposes other than shelter construction. Most of the budget is spent on the administration and training of the country's large civil defense service.

Civil defense service is compulsory for all men and women between the ages of 18 and 65 not otherwise deployed in wartime. It is based on local relief forces of about 55,000 (firemen, Red Cross units, etc.) who are under the direction of the heads of police districts, and 14 mobile columns of about 10,000 men total who are the crack troops of civil defense. A mobile column consists of 1 to 4 task groups (each including a fire-fighting company and a rescue company), an ambulance company, and a supply and maintenance group. These columns operate out of a number of camps which are spread over the country. In addition, 35,000 people are organized in the Industrial Defense System, 3000 in the Railway Civil Defense Force, and several thousand more as air raid wardens and public shelter caretakers.

Each person conscripted to CD service receives two weeks of intensive basic training in one of the mobile column camps, and is called up every fourth year for a 20-hour refresher course. Officers receive about 2 months of training. Civil defense personnel wear blue-grey uniforms. They are not part of the military. About 2000 men of military age are transferred to CD service every year and freed from military reserve service.6

The resources of the CD service double the materiel and triple the personnel resources of the ordinary (municipal) fire-fighting organization, and supply the special capacities needed for extraordinary emergencies. These resources can be called on to assist in peacetime disasters; but in contrast to the FRG, the Norwegian Civil Defense Service has no mission to coordinate peacetime disaster assistance. Unlike the German Katastrophen schutz, it is not a peacetime function with wartime capacities added, but a wartime function whose resources can be tapped in peacetime emergencies. For many practical purposes, the difference between the two concepts may be insignificant, but in some regards—e.g., closeness to the military services, in particular the Home Guard, joint exercises, etc.—the difference appears to matter. The Norwegian service grew to respectable proportions as a component of the country's external defenses, while the German service—organized after the failure

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6 Authorities encourage the peacetime use of private and public shelters for varied purposes and have published detailed suggestions and plans to this effect, as well as regulations to safeguard the civil defense function of the shelters.

6 Conscientious objectors, about 700 every year, are often assigned to civilian substitute service related to civil defense (hospitals).
of a direct approach to wartime civil defense—tries to furnish such a component as an add-on to peacetime emergency capacities.

The Norwegian policy regarding the wartime evacuation of cities by the population differs markedly from the stay-put policy, which is embraced wholeheartedly in Switzerland (and underpinned there by a comprehensive sheltering program), and which represents at least the preferred outlook (or hope) of the FRG authorities (but is not supported there by adequate shelters). The Norwegians have not only made plans to evacuate up to 1.2 million people—primarily mothers, children, aged, and infirm people—from cities over 10,000 population, but Norwegian telephone directories show maps and specific instructions regarding rallying points and destinations for people living in specific city sections, should the government order evacuation. Civil defense personnel have been detailed to evacuation functions (evacuation platoons), and municipalities have been instructed to prepare reception, registration, lodging, and supply plans for evacuees. The extensive sheltering program for the cities shows, of course, that evacuation is not thought of as a measure of first resort or as the sole road to survival. There is no thought of rushing into evacuation at the beginning of a war. But the contingency is faced seriously.

In this regard, Norway has clearly gone beyond the military (also NATO) preference for avoiding civilian population displacements that might encumber military movements. By preparing the evacuation option thoroughly, the Norwegians may indeed help minimize such encumbrances, but it cannot be overlooked that their defense geography—strategic objectives located at the periphery rather than deep inside their national territory—makes this somewhat easier for them than it is for the Germans or the Swiss, whose strategic assets lie in the center of the country. At any rate, the Norwegians frankly face the eventual allocation of organizational and transport resources to evacuation, for which there would also undoubtedly be direct military demand. Whatever use the Norwegian authorities may make of these preparations, their approach to home defense, in civil defense as well as in Home Guard preparations, shows an acceptance of total defense responsibilities and avoidance of limited-liability thinking.

FRANCE'S "DéFENSE OPÉRATIONNELLE DU TERRITOIRE"

The current concept of territorial defense originated in the early 1960s in conjunction with France's withdrawal from NATO, the liquidation of the Algerian war, and the reduction of French "classical maneuver forces" incidental to both developments. Under President de Gaulle, territorial defense was defined as one of the four components of the country's military system: (1) the strategic nuclear force, (2) the territorial and air defense force, (3) the maneuver forces on land, sea, and in the air, and (4) the intervention force for limited overseas actions. 7

7 This grouping follows the scheme presented by Gen. A. M. Fourquet, former Chief of the General Staff, in "Emploi des différents systèmes de force dans le cadre de la stratégie de dissuasion" (Employment of Different Force Systems in the Frame of Deterrence Strategy), Revue de Défense Nationale, May 1969, p. 736. The first French Defense White Paper, published in 1972 by the MOD in Paris, takes up this fourfold division: under the heads of nuclear capacity of dissuasion; defense of the territory, airspace, and coasts; the European maneuver force (for defense of the frontiers, their approaches, and for intervention in Europe); and action outside Europe (by ground, air, and naval forces). Pp. 11ff.
The role of territorial defense (défense opérationelle du territoire, or DOT) was defined in a decree of February 24, 1962:

The DOT, which is conducted in liaison with the operation of external defense, has the mission to confront enemy forces over the whole reach of the national territory, whether they are implanted, airdropped, landed, or filtered through. The DOT measures round out public order measures taken in the frame of civil defense. They assure notably the security of mobilization, transport, evacuation, and supply, of interest to the forces and the general life of the country.8

The missions of the DOT comprise the security of the essential infrastructure and direct combat against the enemy. In the order chosen by Colonel Lestien, which reflects current official thinking, these missions are notably:

1. Protection of the installations of the strategic nuclear force, of the government structure, and of national cohesion (couverture générale).
2. Support and combat assistance to the maneuver forces.
3. In case of invasion, combat, at first in all relevant zones and later in the most favorable zones of the territory, so as to manifest the national resistance and to maintain the state as long as possible (résistance militaire).9

These missions reflect the combination of two interests that occupy a high rank in the military thought of France's Gaullist leadership, in particular the current Defense Minister Michel Debré: (1) safeguarding the power of the government, notably its strategic nuclear force, and (2) engaging the people in the defense of the state, a Jacobin idea of milice populaire. While the first interest is fairly straightforward and readily translatable into force dispositions, the latter is not much more than a political ambition to recapture a spirit of spontaneous involvement of the people in the affairs of government, which has long been absent in French politics.10 While the White Paper invokes the ideal of "popular deterrence" (dissuasion populaire), the actual provisions for territorial defense take the form entirely of components of the centralized state apparatus, police, and army forces. Like the German TA, and unlike the Norwegian, Swiss, and Yugoslav territorials, the DOT is in no way built on popular voluntarism or on federalism, or embedded in social, as distinct from state-executive, bodies. Its forces are largely latent, but it is no citizen-army.

The French concept for the tactical mission of the DOT is considerably broader than the FRG's. First, it exempts no part of the national territory from the tactical mission of territorial forces, it includes the stay-behind mission (and encompasses training in commando operations),11 and it does not seem to exempt cities from combat operations; but French views on this matter have not been expressed

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9 Ibid., pp. 361, 366.
10 Minister Debré is said to have been particularly impressed with the performance of the territorials in the "Freedom-1971" maneuvers of the Yugoslav field and territorial armies, which he attended. The combination of the two kinds of forces is said to have produced considerable difficulties for the invader. See also below, p. 89.
clearly. Second, it includes the special mission, not relevant for the FRG, to defend the land, air, and sea approaches to the ballistic missile emplacements in the Provence and the nuclear submarine base at Brest. And third, it encompasses the air defense mission for the country as a whole and the mission of defending all coastal waters. On the other hand, it does not include the NATO liaison mission and the sweeping logistics mission that fall on the German TA.

DOT stands for a piece of military logic (defenses directly related to the national territory) rather than a distinct element of the French armed forces. When we look for the latter element, we find a certain part of the ground forces, the “territorial forces” (forces du territoire), and the national gendarmerie. The first is a fringe group of the army, and the second, a partly fixed, partly mobile police force under the MOD, in which conscripts may do their military service. These troops, which are comparable to the German TA and frontier police, are not organically unified with the air defense and coastal defense forces. In what follows, we shall deal only with the ground forces assigned to the DOT missions.

The French Defense White Paper 1972 and various press articles present the approximate picture shown in Table 7 of the current strength of French ground forces in peacetime and under mobilization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Forces</th>
<th>Peacetime Strength</th>
<th>Mobilized Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial forces</td>
<td>110,000 (40,000)</td>
<td>360,000 (200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>(70,000)</td>
<td>(160,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver and intervention forces</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (commands, infrastructure, training centers)</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ground forces</td>
<td>395,000</td>
<td>710,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The French territorial forces constitute a higher percentage of the total peacetime ground forces than do those of the FRG, 28 percent against 16 percent. Under mobilization, the territorials come to comprise 51 percent of the total French ground forces, as against 32 percent of the German. In contrast to the FRG, where more

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12 In 1940, only Paris was declared "open."
14 For both countries, numerator and denominator include the gendarmerie/BGS components.
reservists are due to join the Field Army than the Territorial Army, most of the
French ground force reservists will join the territorial forces. These are, therefore,
the only part of the French ground forces due for significant expansion in wartime.
The French maneuver and intervention forces show very little expansion from
reserve sources.

Organization of the Territorial Forces

The organizational design of the territorial army forces (i.e., other than gend-
armerie) appears to be fairly firm in concept, but still in flux as far as implementa-
tion is concerned. They include three active brigades of the army: the 17th Alpine
Brigade at Gap, the 27th Alpine Brigade at Grenoble, and the 9th Brigade at Saint-
Malo, all in locations relevant to the strategic nuclear force. In addition, they
include 24 territorial regiments: 21 territorial infantry regiments of 6 commando
companies each, distributed somewhat unevenly over the military divisions of
mainland France (see Fig. 2) and 2 armored cavalry regiments and 1 artillery regiment.
Some of the commando companies are in active status, but the majority are cadre
units to be filled with reservists during mobilization. At full wartime strength, a
territorial infantry regiment has about 1000 men. While the three active brigades
are presumably in a good state of training and equipment, the territorial regiments,
part from being largely inactive, are described as "often badly trained and lacking
modern materiel."

Finally, in time of mobilization, these active or partly active units of the territo-
rial army forces are to be supplemented by an as yet uncertain number of reserve
infantry regiments. In peacetime, the reserve infantry regiments are considered as
paired (jumeles) with active units of territorial and maneuver forces. The active
units are responsible for the mobilization and the stored equipment of the reserve
units, and for the training of conscripts who are to be assigned to the latter as
reservists.

In terms of administrative geography, the territorial forces are organized
within seven military regions, which in turn are subdivided into the 22 defense
military divisions of the country shown in Fig. 2. At the regional and divisional
levels, the forces are under military commanders who are coordinated with the zonal
and "divisional" prefects, the heads of civil government. Since both commanders
and prefects are agents of the central government, the responsibility for assuring
their cooperation and resolving conflicts rests with the ministries in Paris.

Like the rest of the armed forces, the territorial forces work with a conscrip-
tion term of 12 months, but an experiment with a shorter term of initial service (8
months), to be followed by 2 months of follow-on training two times within 5 years,
seems to be under way in two territorial regiments, possibly with an eye to its
introduction in the territorial forces. The French Defense White Paper 1972

15 A descriptive article on these forces, written by Jacques Ianard, appeared in Le Monde, March 8,
1972.
16 Military regions 1 and 5 have more such regiments than military divisions; regions 3 and 4 have
less.
18 In the civilian bureaucracy, the circonscription d'action régionale corresponds to the division
militaire. Pergent, French Concept of DOT, p. 516.
19 Soldat und Technik, June 1972, p. 302.
Fig. 2—France: Military Regions and Divisions
devotes a long section to justifying the general conscription system, which is also under pressure in France. It justifies the system by the propositions that "defense is a matter for the whole nation," and that universal conscription is an "element of domestic deterrence" and "an expression of civic responsibility." Even with its 12-month term, which is short by NATO standards, French conscription is being sharply criticized by responsible editorialists and some officers as an "education in sloth and grumbling, a kind of forced labor." Perhaps the situation could be improved by instituting a shorter initial term for the territorial forces and professionalizing the maneuver forces; but the White Paper rejects a purely professional army on financial and political grounds.

Regarding the utilization of reservists, efforts have been under way for some time to resolve the complex problems of appropriate assignment of reservists in terms of their age, location, qualification, and previous service experience, so as to be able to form combat-capable units in a reasonably short time. In March 1972, France conducted a mobilization exercise of the DOT in the Paris region ("Beauce 72"), in which 6000 men simulated combat against an airdropped and infiltrated opponent who sought to destroy 20 specified objects. The liaison between civil and military authorities was tested, and the accomplishments of the defenders were judged "rather mediocre," attributed in part to lack of cooperation by the local population.

Budget and Budget Pressures

In contrast to the FRG, where budget data for the Territorial Army appear to be nonexistent, the French defense budget permits at least an approximate computation of the budgetary slice of territorial defense. Data published in the French Defense White Paper 1972 refer to a category, "general security forces," which is defined as "DOT plus gendarmerie." Since the French include all air defense (radar stations, interceptors, etc.) and coastal defense in DOT, the budget category must be expected to cover these forces as well.

According to the data shown in Table 8, the DOT absorbs at present 10 percent of the total defense budget, 15 percent of the total "forces" budget. Its budget share is relatively high for personnel expenditures (33 percent of the "forces" budget) and low for equipment expenditures (6 percent). The former probably reflects relatively high pay rates in the large professional component of the gendarmerie; the latter, the combined effects of relatively inexpensive equipment and underequipment of the territorial forces. The mixture of standing and latent forces in the French DOT makes it impossible to assess the cost of the latter alone from these data.

In conclusion, it can be stated that territorial defense is more firmly rooted in the strategic concepts and the defense structure of France than in those of the FRG. In France, its tactical missions are broader and encompass a transition to guerrilla warfare in contingencies; its peacetime strength is greater; and its foreseen expan-

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20 Pp. 27, 28, 38.
21 See Le Mondeof June 10 and July 1, 1972. The earlier article, entitled "Service inutile," by Jean Planchais, argues that the French conscription system cannot be saved by reforms and should be abandoned.
23 P. 64.
### Table 8
**TERRITORIAL DEFENSE IN THE FRENCH MILITARY BUDGET, 1972**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Programs</th>
<th>Budget 1972 (billions of francs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic nuclear force</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver forces</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas intervention forces</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General security forces (DOT plus gendarmerie)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other general purpose forces</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total program &quot;forces&quot;</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total program &quot;support&quot;</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incl unallocated R&amp;D)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** *French Defense White Paper 1972*, p. 65. Detail does not always add up to totals because of rounding.

...ision under mobilization is at least as great as in the FRG. The President of the Defense Committee of the French National Assembly, Alexandre Sanguinetti, undoubtedly exaggerates when he criticizes the government's defense policy for leaving "no room for anything but the nuclear force and the popular militia." But his criticism, which is combined with a demand for larger resources for the maneuver forces, confirms that even in its present state of underequipment and incomplete organization, the territorial force appears as a priority element in the French defense structure, albeit far behind the nuclear force. This situation highlights the conceptual strength and the material weakness of that structure.

### Civil Defense

The French civil defense system is minimal. In the main, it is still limited to peacetime firefighting and civil emergency services, although a program has been under way for some time to provide a somewhat more adequate organization.

Since 1951 the Ministry of the Interior has had the responsibility for a National Civil Protection Service. Under its auspices some leaflets, a brochure, and other low-key propaganda efforts have appeared, and some studies have been made. It has worked out a bombing alert system in liaison with the Air Force and installed a network of radioactivity warning devices in police stations and other public facilities all over the country. Its efforts in sheltering have been limited to an inventory of...

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premises capable of protecting against radioactive fallout. No significant private or public shelter construction program is known to exist. Solid shelters against any kind of blast, conventional or nuclear, have been rejected as being too expensive.25

Fire-fighting is the responsibility of the roughly 230,000 municipal firemen, who are chiefly volunteers. The intermunicipal mutual assistance-plan (known as OR-SEC) for fire, medical, and rescue purposes is described as an "up-to-date inventory of men and equipment," which entails no recruiting of reinforcement personnel and no additional equipment.26

Since January 1959, an ordinance has been on the books calling for the organization of a Civil Protection Defense Corps, and since July 1970, a law providing for the detailing of "specialized military units" to perform its duties. At the end of 1971, it was reported that these measures were "already being implemented." The army was said to be detailing a number of conscripts (about 1500 men) to this corps, and with two additional (non-army?) units of 400 men each, these were to form the "active nucleus of the future Defense Corps."27 On the 14th of July 1972, according to press reports, the first unit of this kind participated in the military parade. It consisted of conscripts training with the Paris fire department.28 Eventually, 14 mobile assistance columns and a number of evacuation companies with a total emergency-time personnel of 12,000 are expected to exist. The evacuation companies are to be responsible for thinning out, within a radius of 20 to 50 kilometers, the population of densely inhabited areas, and preparing lodgings for those "thinned out."

For the present, French civil defense seems to be largely limited to provisions for peacetime civil emergencies plus some general administrative planning for expansion in wartime. The French government has not made a financial and organizational effort to protect the civil population remotely comparable to the Swiss or Norwegian, or even equivalent to the German. Total public expenditures for civil protection amounted to $35 million in the 1972 budget, or 70 cents per capita.

THE SWISS MODEL

The entire Swiss military establishment is built on the idea of a conscript militia. The Swiss Constitution forbids the federal government to maintain a standing army. Every fit male citizen between the ages of 20 and 50 is obligated to military service. Men reaching the age of 20 are obligated to 4 months of basic training, followed by reservist training of 3 weeks/year for 8 years, 2 weeks/year for 3 years, and 1 week/year for 2 years. Noncommissioned and commissioned officers, the great majority of whom are likewise nonprofessional citizen-soldiers, are subject to considerably more intensive, specialized, and time-absorbing training requirements, which


26 Ibid., p. 13. This source notes exceptions for combating sea pollution, forest fires, and snow emergencies, where navy, army, and some MOI resources are being made available.


increase, of course, with grade. Military service is preceded by voluntary paramilitary training in the schools.

The Swiss forces are a citizen-army to a much higher degree than those of any other country. They do not make the usual distinction between soldier and citizen, between actives and reservists. The Swiss do not have a category of reservists; they only have militiamen who at any particular time either are or are not engaged in training and exercises, and whose officers do a good deal of their military studies on their own time. Apart from numerically small exceptions (the fortress guard corps of about 2000 men), they have no standing military units. They have about 2000 full-time military professionals: about 20 corps and division commanders, 1300 military instructors (commissioned and noncommissioned officers), some 500 permanent barracks personnel, about 100 pilots of the air force reconnaissance units, etc. But these men are cadres of the militia and form no military units by themselves. Finally, there are about 15,000 permanent civilian workers, employed by military administration or civilian contractor firms, who run armories, operate military airfields and air defense installations, perform logistics functions, or work in government arsenals. Altogether, about 20,000 men, the majority of whom do not wear uniforms, are fully employed in peacetime by or on behalf of the military administration. Most of the military specialists, aviators, communications and radar men, and armor operators of the militia are normally not on the government’s payroll.

The operational units of the Swiss Army and Air Force are latent forces. At some time during the year, some 25,000 militiamen, officers and men, may be in uniform and training in units. Over half a million others are subject to call. The full mobilization strength of the forces is put at more than 600,000 men and capable of being attained in 3 to 4 days; in main-force formations within 48 hours. The Swiss parliament may empower the executive to call up all or only sections of the militia. In August 1939, Switzerland mobilized 150,000 men; in May 1940 (invasion of France), more than 800,000; at the time of the Stalingrad battle, 200,000; since World War II on one single occasion (fall of 1956), 10,000 men.

In terms of its personnel structure and to a high degree its mission assignments, virtually the entire Swiss military is a territorial defense force. In terms of troop organization and armament, however, large parts of this militia constitute latent main forces and go well beyond what we call territorial defense forces in this report. The Swiss militia is not a supplement to regular forces, but encompasses the whole range of military functions entrusted to the country’s armed forces.

Concepts and Forces

The central concept of the Swiss defense effort is dissuasion of a possible invader by inoffensive means. There are no strike forces, nuclear or otherwise, capable of or assigned to carrying a military threat to an aggressor’s homeland or even to his forces that may be deployed outside Swiss territory. The Study Commission for Strategic Questions, which under the leadership of Prof. Karl Schmid prepared a

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Switzerland has no nuclear armament, but the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons for tactical use continues to be an active subject of military and political debate. Switzerland has ratified the test-ban treaty but not the nonproliferation treaty, although the Swiss government has declared itself in favor of adhering to that treaty.
comprehensive review of Swiss strategy for the federal government, expressed the concept of the inoffensive deterrent in the following terms:

Our total military provisions must seek to attain such a high degree of defense readiness and defense power that a possible opponent will be made to understand that the costs of an attack on our country are too high in relation to the gain he can derive from such an enterprise. ... The determined display of military means for the protection of our neutrality must be regarded the most effective form of dissuasion. 30

This concept of "the high price of entry" rests on a long and honorable tradition of the Swiss Confederacy and is broadly supported in the country against a minority view, which is at times quite forcefully expressed, that military defense makes no sense for the country. A public opinion poll conducted in 1971 brought out that a majority (66 percent) believed in the deterrent value of a strong army, 75 percent in armed resistance in case of attack, about 70 percent in the combat effectiveness of the forces, 77 percent in the character-forming value of military service, and 55 percent in the necessity of all forms of resistance against an enemy who had succeeded in occupying the country. These findings were noteworthy in the light of the sober view expressed by a majority (60 percent) at the same time, viz., that in a modern war the Swiss Army would have "little chance to succeed." 31 But leading Swiss political and military circles have shown much uncertainty in recent years about the ways and means of implementing the defense concept. A continuing public debate about insufficiencies of the present military structure, alternatives to it, and technical, political, and financial constraints on policy choices shows that the Swiss look with pride on their defense structure, yet are deeply in doubt about the efficacy of some of its features.

Implementation of the Swiss defense concept revolves around three geographic elements: the frontier, the Alpine "redoubt," and the rest of the country. In past European wars, it has been an important mission for the Swiss Army to man positions along the frontier and to prepare for incursions by hostile ground forces from neighboring territory. This mission continues to exist, albeit with reduced emphasis. For technical and strategic reasons, it merges with missions regarding the "rest of the country."

The redoubt is a system of fortresses in the Alpine center of the country. These fortresses can deny to an invader the north/south passes and tunnels across the Alps and serve as a base for resistance in the rest of the country should a large part of it be overrun. But they do not bar enemy movements on an east/west axis, which can proceed through the lowlands and minor mountain regions of northern and western Switzerland. Since the lowlands harbor the principal cities and industrial centers, the redoubt mission is no longer of first importance. 32

31 Wie denkt das Schweizervolk über die Landesverteidigung? (How Do the Swiss Think about National Defense?), Studien zur Wehrbereitschaft der Eidgenossenschaft, No. 4, Zurich, 1971. In the French-speaking parts of the country and in the younger age groups, the attitudes to national defense were often less favorable than the countrywide figures indicate. Another opinion poll conducted among high school students in Zurich (1972) revealed a majority of positive attitudes toward Swiss national defense, but no enthusiasm for military service. Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärischhtschrift, October 1972, pp. 530-538.
32 "The center of gravity of our defense will lie outside the Alps." Ernst, Swiss Defense Concept 1815 to 1966, p. 352.
The most important missions are located in the northern and western parts of the country. They are to block enemy advances and landings, to make counterattacks, and to offer resistance in enemy-occupied territory. The principal problem of Swiss strategy appears to be how much of total resources should be allotted to these missions and how the allotment should be apportioned to the tasks of static defense, mobile defense, and resistance.

At present, 17 brigades of the army are frontier, fortress, and redoubt troops. One army corps of three mountain divisions is organized for the defense of the Alps, and three army corps, each consisting of one armored and two infantry divisions, are responsible for the rest of the country. As yet, the main emphasis is on static defense. The official defense doctrine (Truppenführung 1969) says that "a sufficient system of defensive positions is the prerequisite for an effective conduct of combat operations. The mobile forces can fulfill their mission only by leaning on such positions." According to the doctrine, the main emphasis is on static defense. "Accordingly, the doctrine emphasizes minefields, antitank obstacles, "reinforcements of topography," and prepared infantry positions. It also emphasizes the decisive role of the infantry, "which can go on fighting even if support weapons are unavailable and the vulnerable military infrastructure is destroyed," and it calls for strong antiarmor weapons.

The function of armored, mobile units in this concept is to provide reserves rather than "a mass of maneuver." Armored battalions or regiments, rather than divisions, are to make counterattacks when the situation warrants it, and typically refrain from independent tank battles and from preventive strikes, except perhaps against airborne invaders. The mobile units in existence have heavy, medium, and light tanks, and armored personnel carriers.

The Schmid Report round out this strategy with these words:

Static defense units and mobile counterattack forces shall cooperate to hold areas of operational or logistic importance for as long as possible. Forces are to deploy deeply, so that the aggressor will find himself, time and again, facing new centers of resistance. The tactics of defensive combat must be aggressive so as to exploit the specific weaknesses of mechanized attack forces. This presupposes a high degree of independence of small combat units capable of continuing the fight even in complete isolation.

The strategy of ubiquitous, invasion-arresting, and counterattacking combat shades off into one of small-scale war (Kleinkampf or Jagdkampf) and ultimately widespread resistance against an enemy occupying parts of the country. The Schmid Report calls these modes of combat both a complement to ongoing main-force battles and a sequel to them when major combat actions have ceased in the area. "Even the occupation of the entire country must not signify the end of resistance." Detailed strategic preparation for such warfare is said to be pointless, and much is left to spontaneous action of individuals and small groups. But the propagation of the idea, general preparations, and small-unit training are believed to contribute significantly to the strategy of dissuasion. The report also goes to some length to refute

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33 Cited in ibid., p. 362.
34 Ibid., p. 437.
36 Pp. 91-92
37 Pp. 31, 56-57.
the notions that partisan warfare is "too dangerous" and impractical for an urbanized population. 58

The defense of cities is under study. For most of the cities, the government holds open the option of defending them, and the army maintains city commands. Leading military officers consider combat in the cities a terrible necessity, and training manuals pay considerable attention to combat in urban areas. 59

Altogether, the structure and mission concepts of the entire Swiss Army bring out quite strongly the essential features of a territorial defense force as we have discussed them earlier in this report. 40 In that country, the territorial defense idea has been implemented in the most sweeping fashion. But it must be noted that the Swiss do not apply the term to their entire forces but only to a special segment of the army, called the Territorial Service (Territorialdienst, or TD).

The TD is described as a link between the military and the civilian population. It comprises military staffs organized on the cantonal, regional, and (for the principal cities) municipal levels, which have the following wartime functions: 41

1. An information and warning service for military and civilian authorities.
2. Object security for selected strategic objects. This is to be carried out by about 100 regional object security units.
3. Internal security, comprising the internment of prisoners of war and auxiliary police functions.
4. War economy officers, responsible for the mobilization of economic resources, the requisitioning of buildings for military and civil defense uses, and the destruction or removal of critical equipment in industrial enterprises in case of enemy occupation.
5. Air raid protection troops (Luftschutztruppen). The Swiss Army is unique in having organized approximately 30 battalions of air raid protection troops, or 30,000 men. About one-half of these lightly armed battalions are assigned to the principal cities—Geneva, Lausanne, Berne, Bâle, and Zurich—and the rest to smaller cities and communities.

Civil Defense

The Swiss Civil Defense Concept, as recast in 1971, aims at protecting the entire population against destructive hostile actions, in particular bombardment with nuclear weapons. Its principles are to provide adequate and livable shelter for every inhabitant, in residential areas as well as near war-essential enterprises; to avoid evacuation; and to organize a comprehensive civil protection service.

The Swiss Civil Defense Organization (CDO) is a large and thoroughly organized

58 Pp. 58-60.
40 The missions of the Swiss Air Force are correspondingly focused on defense of the air space and ground support.
41 Col. (Oberstdivisionär) Denis Borel, "Territorialdienst: Bindeglied zwischen Militär und Zivili" (The Territorial Service: Link Between Military and Civilians), Schweizerische Gesamtverteidigung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Verlag, Zürich, 1971, pp. 27ff.
body under civilian jurisdiction but with close working ties to the army. Its functions are to protect, rescue, and care for the population in case of war or natural disaster, to protect goods and property, and to educate the people in the physical, psychological, and political adversities of war, and in ways to cope with them.

The CDO structure parallels that of the militia. All male citizens from the ages of 21 to 61 not assigned to the armed forces are liable for civil defense duty. Volunteers, especially women, are accepted for periods of 5 years. Both recruits and volunteers undergo mandatory training and participate in exercises with the air raid protection troops of the militia. Recruitment and apportionment to various specific duties (fire-fighting, medical, rescue, etc.) are handled at the municipal level and supervised by the cantons under federal guidelines. The municipalities organize "civil defense units" for major tactical tasks, and "self-defense units" in groups of households and in business enterprises, which are structured in blocks, districts, and sectors. Municipalities and cantons have mutual aid agreements with neighboring areas.

This manpower organization is supplemented by stringent legal provisions for shelter construction. A federal law of 1964 requires all municipalities of 1000 or more inhabitants to enforce the provision of shelter facilities in all new buildings with cellars. The federal government, the cantons, and the municipalities subsidize the cost of these facilities up to 70 percent, and shelter construction in existing buildings to an even higher percentage. Shelter construction has proceeded to a point where about one-half of the total population—percentages vary from place to place—can be accommodated in shelters, compared to about one-third in Norway, the NATO country with the most progressive shelter construction program, and less than 1 percent in the FRG. Of the 3 million shelter spaces now in existence, over 2 million are said to satisfy the new, more stringent requirements of physical protection and habitability; about 300,000 new spaces are being added annually.

Annual public expenditures on civil defense in Switzerland are budgeted at $80 million for 1973 ($45 million federal, $35 million cantonal), or about $13 per capita, not including war-economic preparations. About one-half of the federal expenditures are for shelter construction.

The attitude of the Swiss population to civil defense is positive as well as critical. An aforementioned public opinion poll in 1971 showed 87 percent of respondents of the belief that the country needs civil defense in addition to the army, and almost 50 percent, of the opinion that present provisions are insufficient. The public education effort is extensive. We have already referred to the handbook, Civil Defense, which the Swiss government has distributed to about two million households. It is an excellent educational document, unmatched in any other country to our knowledge. The handbook has found considerable interest in Yugoslavia, Western Europe, Japan (in translation), and elsewhere. Swiss officials note with surprise, however, that NATO authorities have shown no interest, although Swiss policy seems to offer

43 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 7, 1971; Elise Nouël, "Total Defence in Norway," p. 7. For the FRG, see above, p. 58.

44 Calculated on the same basis, public civil defense expenditures in the FRG (1971) amounted to about $1.80 per capita, and in France (1972) to 70 cents per capita.


46 P. 29 above. Because of the color of its cover, it is also known as the "Swiss Little Red Book."
an effective answer to often expressed NATO concerns about civilian panic and streams of refugees.

In contrast to the FRG and most other European countries, the Swiss government has begun to put much emphasis on systematic consideration of interactions between the various spheres of national defense: the military and civil defense, foreign policy and defense, federal and divisional (cantonal) defense-related activities, etc. A federal law of 1969 established a Comprehensive Defense Organization within the federal government, and a planning office (Zentralstelle für Gesamtverteidigung) within it. Following the idea that there should be consistency between the several defense-related activities, this organization directs studies, issues guidance documents, and prepares exercises pertaining to specific problems affecting the various governmental bodies, such as crisis management, impact of an armament decision on the country's neutrality policy, and the like. This study is not the place to discuss the Swiss comprehensive defense effort more fully. But their effort is noteworthy for its emphasis on meeting the total responsibility of the government for defense, rather than a sum of separate departmental responsibilities.

Stresses and Criticisms

One cannot leave the remarkable conceptual and organizational accomplishments of the Swiss defense system without pointing to some of the stresses and difficulties to which it is subject.

One important problem consists of the virtual absence of a mobile strike force and the financial and organizational obstacles to its creation. Granting the principle of nonaggression, some Swiss military thinkers question the effectiveness of forces relying so heavily on static or area defense and demand a clearer separation of territorial (static) from strike (mobile) units, and greater forces and equipment for mobile warfare. The cost of such equipment, notably tanks and mobile artillery and high-performance aircraft for the air force, is a critical obstacle to the realization of this demand. It militates in particular against proposals to convert some of the redoubt and mountain division forces to armored units; but the horse cavalry, which has been maintained until now because of its popularity, will now be converted to armored units.

A second and somewhat related problem is posed by the absence of standing, immediately disposable reaction forces. Many believe that the short mobilization time of important militia units, which is calculated in hours rather than days, obviates this problem; but critics point out that even greater readiness may be required—assuming, of course, that standing forces can indeed provide it. This problem, and to some extent the first one as well, lead into the problem of the adequacy of the militia system.

The adequacy of the militia is largely debated with regard to the technical requirements of the use and maintenance of complex equipment. The argument appears to be between those who feel that good militia instruction can resolve the problems and those who say that even peacetime operation of, say, air defense technology, requires the steady presence of professional personnel, and is therefore

46 The aforementioned Study Commission under Karl Schmid served to launch the Zentralstelle and to define specific tasks for it.
incompatible with the universal militia principle. Both sides observe the gradual, modest increase of the number of professionals in the Swiss forces, which may to some extent resolve the problem. But the militia idea is strained, not only by encroachments on its universality (which tends to raise a constitutional problem), but also by difficulties to find a sufficient number of professional soldiers. The instructor corps, although expanded, appears to be continually under strength. To overcome this difficulty, better pay and facilities for professional officers' training appear to be needed, but these remedies, too, infringe on the universality of the militia system, besides requiring money.

Some observers say that the popular attitude toward defense, in particular among the young, presents the most serious problem for the kind of defense organization Switzerland maintains, and a great deal of public debate relates to this. While political agitation against, and noncooperation with, the defense system appear much weaker than in the FRG, popular preferences for other resource uses weigh even more heavily on the Swiss than the German defense budget. The government is hard pressed to maintain even the low present budget level. Swiss military expenditures amounted to 2.2 percent of GNP in 1972, less than in most Western European countries. Competent military critics argue that these expenditures should be nearly 40 percent higher to satisfy mobility and technological requirements, and that together with civil defense expenditures they should amount to little less than 4 percent of GNP. But in fact, the military department finds it already difficult to hold the line at 2 percent for military expenditures proper; and military and civil defense expenditures combined are currently about 2.5 percent of GNP. In addition to the intrinsic cheapness of the Swiss defense system, this level expresses a pronounced caution in committing large funds to purchases of complex new weapons, e.g., high-performance aircraft.

THE YUGOSLAV MODEL

Ever since the victory of Tito's Partisans in World War II, Yugoslav defense doctrine has included some "territorial" aspects, but these have been considerably reemphasized since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The innovation was dramatic and highly visible, culminating in the revival of mass military maneuvers in 1971, the first since 1953. Far-reaching organizational changes have occurred, accompanied by debates in military and political circles on the implications of the reemphasis on territorial defense. While some features of the Yugoslav "model" have yet to be elaborated, much of the system is already well established.

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48 A comprehensive estimate of Swiss military, civil, and economic defense expenditures by the director of the Zentralstelle arrives at 2.5 percent of GNP for 1972. It includes, besides the items included in the 2.5-percent figure, certain military defense expenditures of civil federal departments and cantons, wages paid to training militiamen (employers receive no compensation from public funds), voluntary activities of militiamen, obligatory (uncompensated) business inventories. H. Wanner, "Das Instrumentarium der schweizerischen Gesamverteidigung" (Instruments of Swiss Comprehensive Defense), text of a speech given in Vienna, November 1971.
"Total National Defense"

Defense preparations in Yugoslavia proceed from two premises: (a) small and medium-sized states must be self-reliant in defense if they are to maintain their sovereignty; (b) such states can successfully resist and thus quite likely prevent external attack, even by a superpower, provided that they have suitable military institutions and that the national will is mobilized. From these premises is derived a doctrine of noncapitulation.44 Article 254 of the Yugoslav Constitution and the National Defense Law of 1969 prohibit military capitulation or surrender of territory under any circumstances, and make such an act punishable as high treason.

"Self-reliance" is inevitably conditional. The Yugoslavs do not believe that a state of 21 million inhabitants could resist an unlimited attack by a superpower entirely on its own. But they assert that, if a country places primacy on self-defense efforts, it can benefit from a superpower standoff without the negative consequences of membership in a military alliance. Specifically, the existence of NATO and Sino-Soviet hostility are believed to limit the military forces Moscow could deploy to less than the two million which the Yugoslavs feel able to resist on their own. The Yugoslavs also believe that in the event of a protracted invasion they would receive outside (that is Western) military assistance, at least materiel.

The organizational premise of this contention is that the entire able-bodied citizenry must be mobilized to defend the country. This premise is embodied in the very name given to the Yugoslav defense doctrine, opšt enarodna odbrana, meaning "total national defense."

Although the doctrine postulates "defense in all directions," Yugoslavia adopted "total national defense" in response to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Brezhnev Doctrine, on the one hand, and the buildup of Soviet military power in the Mediterranean, on the other. Although the reciprocal visits of Brezhnev and Tito in 1971 and 1972 signified an improvement of bilateral relations, the Yugoslavs remain concerned about the long-run Soviet threat.

"Total national defense," with its strong territorial element, differs significantly from the defense preparations of the early 1950s. Then, fearing a Soviet invasion, Yugoslavia built up its standing army (the Yugoslav People's Army, or YPA) to nearly a half-million men, with YPA reservists providing a large reinforcement capacity. Twenty-two percent of national income was allocated for defense at the peak of the buildup, aside from U.S. military assistance of some three-quarter billion dollars. After 1955, Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved and the Tito leadership felt that defense capabilities could be reduced accordingly. On the eve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the YPA numbered some 200,000 men, and defense expenditures had fallen to less than 6 percent of national income.

Several considerations forbade repetition of the buildup of the early 1950s at the turn of the 1970s. The development of military technology has radically changed the capabilities of the Soviet and Soviet-allied forces. Yugoslavs now must plan to resist invasion by a highly mobile Soviet force with a strong airborne component which, launching a blitz invasion, could threaten the traditional Yugoslav "rear" simultaneously with the traditional front. This mobility of the opponent invalidates

a large capacity for mobilizing traditional reservists in the YPA. But the Yugoslav military planners also perceive a weakness in the newly structured Soviet forces; they may be less well prepared to control territory than a more traditional army.

Socioeconomic factors, too, have played a role in making "total national defense" the new Yugoslav response to the increased Soviet threat. With a more developed and more market-oriented economy than the country had in the 1950s, competition for economic resources is keener than at that time. The 1971 share of the regular military in national income (below 6 percent) now appears as the upper limit. Large foreign military aid is both unavailable and undesired. Domestic political considerations, too, have precluded the revival of a large standing army. Such a force at the command of Belgrade would be incompatible with the decentralization of the Yugoslav political system which took place in the 1960s, i.e., the considerable devolution of political power to the constituent republics.

The Territorial Defense Forces

Following these considerations, the Yugoslavs have turned to the organization of large-scale Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), consisting of citizen-soldiers organized and directly commanded by the republican authorities. This militia is financed at the local and republican, not the federal, levels. It offers a prospect of mobilizing the population for defense more effectively than a conventional standing army might be able to do.\textsuperscript{59}

Formed ad hoc in the fall of 1968, the TDF was given legal sanction by the National Defense Law of 1969. As presently organized, the TDF is a conscript militia,\textsuperscript{61} with a peacetime presence limited to full-time headquarters personnel of an estimated 3000 men and a body of part-time trainers.\textsuperscript{62} The TDF exists beside the YPA and largely replaces the former YPA reserve. It is composed in part of citizens who have fulfilled their 15-month tour of duty in the YPA (18 months in the Navy), and in part of citizens whose YPA obligation was deferred for one reason or another. Legally and doctrinally (although in many respects not \textit{de facto}), the TDF is coequal with the YPA; both organizations are components of the "Armed Forces of Yugoslavia" (a post-1968 term). The claimed strength of the TDF at mobilization is about 600,000 at present, not counting "youth units" estimated at 300,000. In future years the total is supposed to reach a force goal of 3 million (14 percent of the population).

The TDF is composed of three major types of units. The main emphasis to date has been on establishing company-size units at the municipal level, organized by some 500 urban and rural local authorities according to regulations enacted by the respective republics. These companies are intended primarily for defense within the boundaries of the localities. Many are entrusted with the primary responsibility for defense against airborne assault. Second, "defense units" have been organized in some 2000 large factories and other enterprises, each of which is required by law to

\textsuperscript{59} The process has a suitable Marxist rationale. Yugoslav theorists maintain that they are implementing the "withering away of the state" in Yugoslavia. The resulting progressive socialization of state functions must, it is argued, in time encompass the armed forces as well. While a standing army of some kind will be required as long as international antagonisms persist, it is argued, some of its functions must even now be taken over by the "armed people."

\textsuperscript{61} The law also provides for volunteer service in the TDF.

\textsuperscript{62} Estimate assuming full-time headquarters personnel of 5 in each locality and 50 in each republic.
make contingency plans for defense. The factory units are charged with performing some civil defense functions and with defense of the plant in the event of direct assault by airborne or other enemy forces. (If the enterprise is captured, its "defense units" merge with the municipal TDF.) Third, some larger battalion-sized and more mobile TDF units have been formed at the republican level. Present indications are that the regional units will receive greater emphasis in the future.

The TDF units are not part of the Ministry of Defense-YPA chain of command. They are subordinated to defense commands, presently staffed by reserve YPA officers, at the local and republican levels. These commands have a dual responsibility: to the respective political authorities and to the higher national defense command. While informal liaison between the TDF and the YPA units is required, local TDF units formally come under YPA tactical command only when they are engaged in joint war operations with YPA units. On the other hand, Yugoslav military planning provides for the defense commands to direct TDF units "behind the lines." If an entire republic should be overrun by the enemy, the republican defense command would, as in World War II, assume command of all military units on its territory, regular YPA as well as TDF. The Yugoslavs have thus decentralized their command-and-control structure, reverting to elements of their Partisan experience.

Training of the TDF is carried out in local training centers by reserve YPA officers who are not "full-time" TDF personnel. Regular training activities are supplemented by full-dress maneuvers. Training requirements are at present about 100 hours yearly.

The TDF is armed with light antitank and antipersonnel weapons of indigenous manufacture; the battalion-size units at the republican level have some heavier, mobile, antitank and antiaircraft armaments as well. While Yugoslav military experts stress the value of sophisticated weapons (such as infrared and laser targeting devices and sensors) for the TDF, they believe that even obsolete weapons captured in World War II will be useful until more modern arms can be supplied in quantity. While personal equipment is kept at home, weapons are stored in TDF mobilization centers. Dispersal of light weapons on the Swiss pattern has been considered but has been apparently shelved for the present.

The TDF is designed for speedy mobilization. Yugoslav sources claim that half of the TDF can be mobilized in three to six hours—a claim apparently supported by recently conducted maneuvers—and the other half, in twenty-four hours. If correct, this assumption would point to a very remarkable organizational performance. The mobilization of the large number of Yugoslav workers in Germany and elsewhere, many of them highly skilled, presents, of course, special problems.

Most of the financing of the TDF is a supplement to the roughly 6 percent of national income allocated to the YPA through the federal budget. Local and republican authorities have established defense funds, financed by allocations from both the respective assembly and from enterprises directly. The current five-year economic projection assumes that an additional one-half to one percent of national income will be allocated for national defense through this channel. The TDF receives some equipment from cost-free YPA transfers. Local TDF units in backward

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53 Maj. Gen. D. Dzvet, *Komunist*, January 13, 1972, p. 4. For example, in 1972 the Kraljevac locality allocated 2 percent of its budget to the TDF, supplemented by substantial contributions from enterprises. Sixty percent of the total went for equipment costs; the remainder for training. *Narodna armija*, June 27, 1972, p. 11.
and border regions are apparently the beneficiaries of subsidies from the republican and federal levels.

A major effort has been made to involve the youth in "total national defense" prior to its YPA training and subsequent service in regular TDF units. Special TDF youth units have been organized in most of the country. Courses on "total national defense" are now obligatory in secondary schools.

A New Approach to Civil Defense

The concept of "total national defense" has led to a radical modification of civil defense. While the Yugoslavs earlier envisaged the mass evacuation of cities in the event of attack, such plans have now been abandoned, and only the infirm and other special categories of people are now to be evacuated. "Total national defense" postulates that since half the population now resides in cities and towns, they must be defended no less than the countryside. The TDF has taken over and greatly expanded some of the activities (e.g., intelligence) formerly entrusted to local civil defense authorities. Nevertheless, "total national defense" still envisages additional civil defense forces which are to incorporate the entire able-bodied population not in the YPA or the TDF. These forces presently number 1.3 million. Each locality must form a civil defense organization parallel to local TDF units and subordinate to the unified local defense command. Engineering, sanitation, radiation-chemical-biological warfare, fire-fighting, veterinary, evacuation, and security subunits comprise the local civil defense organization. Shelters have been constructed on a large scale.

Strategy and Tactics

The "Armed Forces of Yugoslavia" are designed to defend the country against two major variants of external attack—limited incursion and massive invasion. Should a Warsaw Pact neighbor invade with only indirect Soviet support, the YPA itself would engage the invading force in forward frontal warfare and seek to repulse it. In the affected border region, the TDF would assist the YPA; elsewhere in Yugoslavia, the TDF would be on alert.

Far more likely, as Yugoslav military planners recognize, would be a massive blitz attack by the USSR. In this eventuality, the invading forces would enjoy overwhelming military superiority in traditional terms. The Yugoslavs assume that the Soviets would try to seize Belgrade, Zagreb, and other key cities with armor and parachute and heliborne troops. In this scenario, the YPA's first task would be to delay enemy penetration for the hours needed to mobilize the TDF. Withdrawing from the border regions of the country, the YPA would wage active defense in depth throughout the country and would be joined by the then-mobilized TDF. The entire country would be transformed into a "hedgehog" in which front and rear would merge. The YPA and TDF units would employ a mixture of combined and partisan tactics in a protracted conflict, fighting in the cities as well as the countryside. On

enemy-occupied territory, urban as well as rural, TDF and paramilitary forces would wage guerrilla war. Only if an entire region of the country were occupied would the YPA and TDF revert exclusively to small-unit partisan tactics.

Altered Role for the YPA

Adoption of "total national defense" has signified far-reaching changes for the YPA. Some of these will be briefly noted.

The size of the YPA, which still stood at about 230,000 in 1972, is being further reduced. The term of conscription has already been shortened from 18 months to 15 months and may be shortened further. Modernization of the YPA will continue, but at a slower pace than envisaged prior to 1968. The emphasis will be on the development of a modern mobile infantry, well-armed with antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Presently 85 percent of weapons costs are covered by domestically produced armaments; this percentage will not be reduced. Political and military leaders alike maintain that it would be pointless to attempt to compete with the USSR in tanks or other heavy modern weaponry.

The air force (along with the navy, part of the unified YPA) may still aspire to an air defense role with ultra-modern fighters similar to that of the Swedish air force. But this is recognized to exceed the country's present economic possibilities. Its primary mission is now defined as ground support. The navy will concentrate on coastal and island defenses.

The YPA reserve has been drastically reduced, with most of the reservists assigned to TDF units. At present, 20 percent of YPA conscripts are assigned to the YPA active reserve after fulfilling their tours of duty. Most of these can be presumed to fulfill such specialized functions as air defense. The remaining 80 percent are assigned to TDF units. The inactive YPA reserve has been abolished.

The YPA has largely abandoned its earlier pattern of maneuvers, which simulated conventional defense by the YPA alone, combined with mass evacuations of noncombatants. Typically, Yugoslav military exercises now involve joint operations by YPA and TDF units against both massive armed invasion and airborne assault. The new variant of military maneuvers received its first large test in "Freedom-1971," which simulated an armored and airborne thrust from the northeast into the hilly region southeast of Zagreb, where 80,000 YPA regulars were joined by 400,000 territorials and other nonregulars in the exercise. In October 1972, territorials again outnumbered regulars in the Podgora 1972 maneuvers, which simulated a sea-based assault on Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast.

Support functions, formerly the exclusive responsibility of the YPA, are being transferred to the TDF or the "civilian sector." Medical care, food supply, and some engineering services are apparently among the affected functions.

These changes in the position of the YPA constitute a minor revolution in the Yugoslav military establishment. One would expect such changes to generate tensions within the professional military, and some evidence of this has come to light. The post-1968 professional discussions on total national defense revealed two lines of criticism. A "romantic Partisan" current advocated an even more radical return

** From 24 to 18 months for the navy.
to the decentralized organization and tactics of the Partisan War; its spokesmen were usually identified with republican and national self-assertion in Croatia and Slovenia; they sometimes advocated the formation of full-fledged republican armies. The other current has resisted the de-emphasizing of the YPA and the "territorialization" of defense on such a large scale. That the frictions have been limited is testimony to the flexibility of outlook of the YPA senior officer corps and the institutional subordination of the YPA to the League of Communists and Tito personally. Substantial consensus has apparently been achieved within the officer corps on "total national defense" with relatively few personnel changes.

Within the limits of that consensus, senior officers and military theorists have—in a series of consultations reported in Vojno Delo—taken different views on the roles of the various branches of the standing army and the TDF in the new system. Contentious issues have included antitank vs. antiairborne assault as the prime mode of defense; the balance between urban and rural warfare; and the relative emphasis to be placed on resistance in the mountainous interior ("redoubt") vs. "occupied" territory.

Relevance of the Yugoslav Model

Yugoslavia, a relatively poor Southeast European country ruled by an unorthodox Communist Party, is unique in many respects. Its defense preparations embody many features applicable only to the country. But the Yugoslav experience does seem to have some relevance to self-reliant variants of defense elsewhere in Europe and in the "Third World." In any case, the spirit of innovation displayed by the Yugoslavs in this area since 1968 is noteworthy.

One lesson suggested by Yugoslavia's experience is that territorial defense can play a significant role when harnessed to an appropriate doctrine of nationwide, protracted resistance which is accepted by the population and the military establishment. In Yugoslavia, these conditions are fulfilled to a high degree, thanks in part to the Partisan heritage and the nature of the political system, in which the officer corps has remained under the firm control of the League of Communists and Tito himself. In West European countries, notably the FRG, these conditions could only be approximated through a stronger emphasis on self-reliance, together with external encouragement. Even in that eventuality, these countries would probably not go as far as the Yugoslavs in substituting territorial forces for strike forces.

The Yugoslav defense organization is, of course, attuned to the country's status as a secondary theater (from the Soviet point of view) against which the USSR would be unlikely to commit a large part of its military resources. Yugoslav defense is also attuned to the topographical possibilities the country enjoys for conducting defense in depth. These factors differ in many parts of NATO Europe; but this does not make the Yugoslav example irrelevant. In the case of the FRG, for example, the necessity to reckon with a fuller measure of Soviet military resources is counterbalanced by the availability, through alliance, of substantial allied strike forces.

As we have noted, the immediate stimulus for revamping the Yugoslav defense

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organization has been the perception of a worsening of the international situation and a continuing, perhaps increasing, external threat. This development differs rather strikingly from that of the FRG's and other West European countries' threat perceptions in recent years. But this difference, too, does not necessarily invalidate the Yugoslav example for Western Europe. In those countries, the budget pressures in a détente environment, the search for an inoffensive deterrent, and other factors discussed in Sections I through III, may lead more directly to territorial defense policies than would a sharpening of the threat perception. Given the far greater economic resources of Western Europe, it might—at least, could—respond to a greater threat by a strengthening of strike forces. Thus the numerous contrasts between Yugoslavia and Western Europe should not be regarded as being simply cumulative, making it nonsensical for one to do what seems good sense for the other; the contrasts are in part mutually offsetting.
VI. LATENT FORCE SYSTEMS AND NATO

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS

The preceding discussion of territorial defense in four European countries, either outside of NATO or less integrated in it than the FRG, aimed at topical treatment, and not at a systematic review of their total defense systems.

For quite dissimilar sets of reasons, Norway, France, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia have developed, shifted to, or maintained territorial defense organizations which comprise a greater part of their total defense effort than does that of the FRG. This finds expression either in a greater proportion of territorials in total ground force mobilization strength (France, Switzerland, Yugoslavia—not Norway), or in a greater latency factor (mobilization increase) of these forces (Norway, Switzerland, Yugoslavia—not France), and even in the higher mobilization strength of all forces in percent of population, presently attainable in Norway, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia (but not France), which reflects above all the territorial element (see Table 9).

In Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Norway, mobilization of territorials is assisted further by legal facilities for the call-up of force sections short of general mobilization. In Switzerland, territorial defense forces, by our definition, and other more heavily armed latent forces make up the virtual entirety of the armed forces in peace and war; there, as well as in Norway and Yugoslavia, the territorial force system is also directly embedded in civil society (citizen-army). In all these countries, the tactical missions of the territorial forces are far less constrained in terms of geography and combat modes than they are in the FRG, including notably operations in forward areas, city defense, combat in small units, and stay-behind missions. Norway, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia—but not France—also have developed substantial civil defense systems and given considerable attention to "comprehensive defense," i.e., the coordination of all aspects of military and civil defense.

One of the important consequences of the thinking and planning about "comprehensive defense" is that the wartime mobilization envisaged in these countries contains much less "business as usual" than the mobilization envisaged in the FRG, or in France. In Switzerland and Yugoslavia, where the governments are fully conscious of their exclusive responsibility for the country's defense, the military and civil defense tasks have absolute priority over the functioning of the civilian economy and society in wartime, even to an extent that makes one wonder how these functions could be maintained during a war of some duration. In the FRG, on the other hand, where the government shares responsibility for the country's defense
Table 9
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRESENT TERRITORIAL ARMIES AND SOME GENERAL DEFENSE FEATURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace-time active strength of</td>
<td>55,000a</td>
<td>About 1000b</td>
<td>110,000c</td>
<td>30,000d</td>
<td>About 3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total peace-time army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envisaged mobilization strength of</td>
<td>240,000a</td>
<td>84,000b</td>
<td>360,000c</td>
<td>600,000e</td>
<td>600,000f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total wartime army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization strength, all armed</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forces, in percent of population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial term of compulsory</td>
<td>15 mo</td>
<td>12 mo</td>
<td>12 mo</td>
<td>4 mo</td>
<td>15 mo x2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget source of Territorial Army</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Republics +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>localities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National territory covered by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tactical missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>City defense mission</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay-behind mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special mission focus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Near area&quot;</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special mission focus</td>
<td>&quot;Near area&quot;</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil defense provisions</td>
<td>Limited organization &amp; sheltering</td>
<td>Comprehensive organization &amp; sheltering</td>
<td>Rudimentary</td>
<td>Comprehensive organization &amp; sheltering</td>
<td>Comprehensive organization &amp; sheltering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total peace-time defense budget</td>
<td>5,500h</td>
<td>1,200f</td>
<td>6,200f</td>
<td>765h</td>
<td>630f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per mobilized man ($)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of capital to operating</td>
<td>1:2</td>
<td>1:3</td>
<td>1:1.2</td>
<td>1:1.6</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenditures in total defense budget</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a80s included in TA and total army.
bFull-time staff of 300, about 1000 in training at any time in the total Home Guard. Ground force about 3000.
cGendarmerie included.
d2000 fortress corps, 2000 other military professionals, about 25,000 militiamen in training activities.
eAnother 16,000 of the Home Guard come under Navy and Air Force.

with NATO, limited-liability thinking imposes constraints on mobilization and warfighting concepts which sometimes go as far as to give the continued, undisturbed functioning of peace-time pursuits priority over defense activities. In France, there is no such barrier to comprehensive defense thinking, but a conspicuous weakness of material and organizational provisions. This dichotomy reflects France's ambiguous relationship to NATO, theoretically distant but practically dependent.

Table 9 offers a conspectus of the results of our inquiry into the FRG's defense system and the four more independent defense systems. This conspectus does not reveal, of course, the various institutional and political characteristics of the national systems which have been discussed. In addition to the differences in the countries' territorial army and civil defense characteristics, which have been noted above, the table brings out differences in two other aspects, which are shown in the last two rows. For the less or nonintegrated defense systems, except France's, the total peace-time defense budget per mobilized man is notably smaller than for the FRG. For France, it is higher, partly because the French mobilization potential is so small. The ratio of capital to operating defense expenditures is lower for the FRG.
than for the other countries, except Norway. Obviously, Norway has not chosen to devote resources “saved” by its cheap Home Guard to larger equipment expenditures. These comparisons suggest some of the potential of a greater emphasis on latent-force or territorial defense systems for savings on manpower costs and for relatively larger investment programs. As noted in the earlier sections, however, the territorial forces have benefited rather little from such programs up to now and have been equipped largely with weapons phased out of the field armies instead of weapons peculiarly suited to their actual or possible missions. In fact, the German TA is probably more expensively equipped than the other territorial armies, with the exception of Switzerland’s.

NATO BLIND SPOTS

One cannot explain the contrasts between the FRG and the four other countries solely by geographic, social, and internal-political peculiarities. To an important degree, the contrasts reflect effects of the NATO system of military integration, which is nowhere as pervasive as on the territory of the FRG. NATO separates military defense from home defense (in NATO parlance equated with civil defense). It assumes responsibility for the first and leaves the second to the national governments; but in effect, NATO assumes responsibility only for that part of military defense that the national systems allot to the main battle forces or strike forces. Consequently, the dividing line between NATO and national responsibility runs between these forces on the one hand, and territorial defense and civil defense forces on the other hand. This is not quite tantamount to a dividing line between standing and latent forces, for some of the main battle forces earmarked for NATO are latent, mobilization forces. Nevertheless, the bulk of the latent forces typically remain outside NATO’s domain, and NATO military authorities treat them as only remotely related to the alliance’s capability to deter and to defend. They measure that capability almost exclusively in terms of standing strike forces and therefore disparage their substitution by latent forces, regardless of the latter’s quality and activation potential.

One cannot say that NATO shows no interest at all in territorial and civil defense, but this interest is indirect, of incomparably lower intensity than the interest in military planning for the standing strike forces, or even the interest in detente diplomacy. It is in the latter two areas that NATO has tried seriously to coordinate national activities, and that countries have received strong urgings from NATO or passed such urgings on to others through the NATO machinery. As regards territorial and civil defense and other latent forces with low peacetime “presence,” the record shows that member countries can hardly expect to get much “NATO credit” for measures that emphasize and improve these functions, and must expect criticism if these measures cut into their contributions to standing strike

1 “The responsibility for home defense is essentially national. But the measures adopted by individual governments are reviewed each year by the Council, which can thus note progress and assess the general state of preparedness throughout the Alliance. This yearly review parallels that carried out on the military side, but civil defense commitments are not subject, as are military ones, to any time limit as regards implementation.” NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures, Brussels, 1969, p. 159. We are not aware of any specific national “civil defense commitments” to NATO.
forces. Thus the NATO system has conveyed an anti-latent force bias, and in particular, an anti-territorial and anti-civil defense bias, to member countries and has, in effect, discouraged comprehensive or total defense planning in the national framework.

This systematic institutional bias is quite evident from the NATO literature. A survey of the final communiqués of NATO ministerial meetings from 1952 to the present shows that civil defense was mentioned in the following five instances:

December 1952—referring to "constructive work of the Council's committee on Civil defense."

April 1953—referring to "progress made in ... technical studies ... in a number of widely different fields, such as civil defense and other aspects of civil organization in time of war."

December 1953—emphasizing the importance of coordinating national planning in civil defense and agreeing with "Lord Ismay's view that the preparations by member governments in these fields should parallel the progress already achieved in the military field."

December 1961— noting that "urgent questions, particularly that of civil defense ... constitute an essential element of the Allied defense effort."

December 1970—"encouraging further efforts in the field of civil preparedness and civil emergency planning."

Not one of the NATO ministerial communiqués mentioned territorial defense forces, except that of the December 1971 meeting, which identified as a field for early action "the strengthening and modernization of local and reinforcement forces on the Northern and South-Eastern Flanks." Even this oblique reference pointedly omitted the most important central area.

Other NATO publications show the same pattern of near-total neglect of national territorial defense efforts and occasional remote surveying of civil defense efforts, the latter notably with regard to large-scale thermonuclear bombardment. Over the years, a few articles in official sources have dealt with civil defense. Only one dealt, albeit very lightly, with a national territorial defense force, i.e., the Norwegian Home Guard. In civil defense, officials of NATO's international staff had occasion to note the futility of the surveys and admonitions. With regard to territorial defense, no such disappointments have been expressed in print, probably

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3 Ibid., p. 101.
6 Elise Nouéll, Total Defence in Norway, p. 5. Most of the article dealt with civil defense.
7 "NATO has not been very successful in persuading governments that those sectors of Civil Emergency Planning directly concerned with survival of populations should receive greater attention, nor of the fact that Civil Emergency Planning is, indeed, an inseparable complement to military defense in the nuclear age."
8 Cippico, "Civil Emergency Planning," p. 28. Cippico was for a time head of NATO's Civil Emergency Planning Bureau.
because there were no official NATO admonitions. It is true that the NATO parliamentarians have tried occasionally to focus the attention of the alliance bureaucracy on the capabilities of latent defense forces in the initial and follow-on phases of conventional war and asked for their encouragement. As recently as February 1972, the North Atlantic Assembly passed resolutions on reserve forces and home guard units which were published in a report following the Ottawa meeting of the Assembly. These efforts, however, have been usually sidetracked with the help of arguments that the situation is being "monitored" or that such matters come under "national responsibilities." It would take an effort of some of the leading governments to overcome the unresponsiveness of the alliance bureaucracy and its fear that an expression of strong, positive interest in latent forces would accelerate, rather than counterbalance, tendencies to diminish the standing forces, and therefore weaken the alliance.

Neglect could hardly have been more complete. NATO authorities have never set standards or demanded commitments regarding civil defense; with the exception of the December 1971 communiqué (for the flank countries), they have never had an official encouraging word for the development of national territorial defense forces. This does not signify that civilian and military NATO staffs have not taken cognizance of the existence of such forces and that no efforts have been made to make latent territorial forces take over some additional support functions for the main battle forces, especially logistics functions, and even to include them as auxiliaries in some NATO maneuvers (at least one instance of this kind is known to have occurred in Germany). But this kind of attention is very different from recognizing their economic and political worth, fostering their tactical capabilities and missions, and accepting the idea that militia-type forces—although, or perhaps because, they are nationally organized—are well suited to a wide range of tactical missions.

It has by now become a moot question whether these biases were useful for alliance purposes in an international setting that favored standing force confrontation in Europe as well as expectations to the effect that the United States would carry the essential responsibility, burden and risk, for safeguarding Western Europe's security. The present international setting favors both greater reliance on latent forces and greater self-responsibility of the West European states for the defense of their territories and values. In this setting, NATO's biases against latent forces, territorial and civil defense, rank high among the factors that tend to pit alliance priorities against European national priorities and thus to depreciate the alliance.

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9 North Atlantic Assembly, International Secretariat, Reserve Forces and Home Guard Units, Brussels, September 1971. The report proposed establishment of a NATO committee on home guard forces, the preparation of guidelines, and recognition that the forces should be under national command.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The relatively large, conscription-based standing armies of the FRG and some other NATO countries are not likely to withstand for long the financial, political, social, and military (effectiveness) pressures to which they are presently exposed. Unless such armies are permitted to become hollow facades, they are likely to be replaced by smaller standing forces of professionals and volunteers, or by conscripted militias, or by some combination of the two, which may also feature a hybrid form such as cadre-reservist main force units. The professional/volunteer and hybrid components are well suited to furnish heavily and expensively armed strike forces; the militias, to furnish more lightly armed and less mobile territorial defense forces. Such a replacement has been recommended for some time by a number of outstanding defense policy thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic. Current political and fiscal trends enhance the actuality of the idea.

To develop a combination of these two types of forces, organizationally viable, operationally effective, and in appropriate proportions, is a fundamental challenge for national defense establishments. Our analysis suggests that organizational viability and operational effectiveness are attainable, but decisions on these matters require detailed and clearly pointed studies in the national and NATO frameworks for which this study can be no more than a catalyst. The desirable proportions of the two types of forces are likely to differ from country to country, as do other features of defense structure. For NATO, the challenge will be to adapt its force posture, strategic planning, and criteria of performance to these changes, and to work for compatibility and complementarity, rather than uniformity, of the national defense structures. The transformation will present many difficulties both on the national and the alliance levels; but it also promises to renew NATO's relevance and vitality.

The European territorial defense forces with which this study has been mainly concerned deserve particular attention as (1) military structures compatible with conscription and with comprehensive national defense efforts; (2) contributions to an inoffensive deterrent; (3) an economical way to create a large latent defense force and to prepare for a country's defense in depth. Their potentialities in these directions have been insufficiently explored by national Ministries of Defense and NATO authorities and discounted a priori owing to conceptual and institutional rigidities. Territorial militias obviously do not furnish the large standing strike forces that NATO has sought to put up in the past. But in several European countries not subject to NATO integration, such militias furnish quite meaningful and viable
contributions to total defense structures. With due allowance for the national peculiarities of these examples, they are highly relevant for NATO countries faced with a growing need for self-dependence within alliance. Moreover, in countries where the need for strike forces remains large but the burden of standing forces has become too onerous, a shift toward latent main-force units is inviting. This too deserves greater receptiveness in NATO.

In order to overcome the conceptual and institutional obstacles, a transition from present defense structures to professional/militia combinations will require an interaction of ideas and political forces. In the FRG, where only defense budget and infrastructure fully "belong" to the national state, but the main military forces to "the Alliance," this interaction must have an international dimension. As long as the Germans believe that reforming their defense structure endangers the alliance, and are confirmed in that belief by the attitudes of the United States and others in NATO, the change-resisting forces in the FRG are likely to continue preventing the transition, however reasonable and desirable it appears in the eyes of the country's best defense thinkers. In some other countries, the same may hold true, albeit to a lesser degree.

This puts the spotlight on the U.S. attitudes toward developments in the European defense structures. The present study has not been concerned with the development of the United States's own military structure. This development is, of course, relevant to the evolution of the composite NATO structure, particularly through its implications for U.S. forces stationed in Germany. But whatever the changes in the American military structure may turn out to be, they obey many considerations distinctly different from those relevant to the European states, and it does not seem necessary to put the European evolution on ice pending the realization of a new U.S. military structure. It is also hard to see why it should be in the U.S. interest to obstruct structural reforms in Europe which could make the defense establishments of its allies more viable.

What is of prime concern here are the U.S. attitudes in NATO and in other contexts bearing directly on reforms in European defense structures. Regarding U.S. positions in NATO, the following recommendations flow from this study.

1. The United States should give fuller recognition to the pressures on European defense structures, notably the FRG's, which are weakening NATO's standing conscript armies. These pressures work partly toward a development of standing volunteer forces, numerically smaller than, but not necessarily militarily inferior to, the present standing forces, and partly toward the development of conscripted militias for territorial defense, with short basic training and thorough reserve training, and other types of cadre-reservist forces.

2. The United States should encourage studies of the combination of small standing volunteer forces with large latent territorial defense forces, with regard to strategy and tactics, equipment, personnel policy, mobilization, financial, and political aspects. In these studies the United States should favor an approach that looks toward development of the two types of forces side by side and, in conjunction, should question an approach that treats them as two mutually exclusive alternatives. The United States should encourage NATO, in particular the EURO-Group, and the allied Ministries of Defense to start and pursue such studies.

3. The United States should counteract the antiterritorial bias in NATO and urge better recognition of the potentialities and possible missions of territorial
defense forces, notably in Central Europe. It should resist tendencies to treat such forces merely as appendages and subordinates of standing strike forces. It should show greater flexibility than heretofore in evaluating the worth to the Alliance of "integrated" and "national" forces, and not treat assignment to NATO commands as a dominant criterion of a force's worth. It should rather favor the criterion of a force's contribution to the country's comprehensive defense. By urging on NATO a fuller recognition of the contributions that well-trained and organized reservists can make to defense, the United States should help NATO unburden the strike forces of certain tasks, e.g., in air defense, to enhance the factor of "popular deterrence," and to shift the balance of some European military commitments from standing forces to high-quality latent forces.

4. The United States should seek greater respect in NATO for the concepts of comprehensive defense and total force. It should recognize the essentiality of these concepts for the development of greater self-responsibility of the European states in defense matters. NATO cannot provide comprehensive defense for member countries, but for lack of comprehensive defense planning, countries may be ineffective Alliance members. Some European countries outside NATO offer valuable conceptual and organizational examples.

5. The United States should propose a more active role of NATO in civil defense, going beyond general philosophizing and inventoring. It should seek specific commitments of European countries to organizational measures and shelter programs consonant with the flexible response strategy and its emphasis on conventional war fighting, and recommend emulating the accomplishments of Switzerland and Norway. It should try to interest the EURO-Group in such an effort.

6. The United States should present to NATO a concept of total force that signifies not only that countries should "use all they have got," but that they should "get what they can from the available political and budgetary base." This concept should encompass (a) a potent but inoffensive deterrent on European soil, (b) a short-term conscription system producing well-organized, competent reservists for mobilization in territorial forces, (c) standing volunteer forces with strong counterattack capabilities, (d) a civil defense system that offers substantial protection against peacetime and wartime civil emergencies.

While the sixth recommendation spells out an essentially new U.S. view of a desirable and attainable European effort in NATO, the preceding five are piecemeal approaches to such a view. In following them, the United States would not break radically with earlier positions it has taken; it would take original positions on alliance matters that have up to now been permitted to linger or to suffer total neglect. To take such positions might be a good way to test the ground and to provide a rallying point for European reform tendencies which have been stifled in the past by alliance-political considerations. The sixth recommendation only caps the preceding ones and assumes a greater urgency and finality of the U.S. approach than the others do.

There are, of course, other contexts than meetings of the NATO council in which it would be appropriate for the United States to remove the NATO blind spots for latent forces, in particular territorial and civil defense. One consists of bilateral contacts, both formal and informal, with individual European partners. A great deal could undoubtedly be done in such contacts to assure that more or less unavoidable reductions in standing forces do not come alone but are accompanied by a real
strengthening of latent forces. As long as the latter are frowned upon or treated as irrelevant to deterrence anyway, defense reforms are likely to lessen defensibility.

In the context of MBFR, the implications of territorial defense forces for an inoffensive European deterrent could be of particular interest. There will be efforts in any event to put the spotlight in MBFR negotiations on standing strike forces and their deployment in Europe. This will automatically tend to keep the latent, territorially oriented forces from becoming objects of force reductions. But a fuller appreciation of the value of such forces, as this study has sought to convey, could strengthen this tendency. Not only would a greater weight of territorial defense in total force postures satisfy arms control objectives, it would also be a way to make these force postures more viable in peace and war.