A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, VOL. II: THE ROLE OF THE PRINCIPAL

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PREFACE

This report is the second volume of a series documenting a study of alternative schools in American education, sponsored by the National Institute of Education under Contract B2C-5326. There are five other volumes in the series, all forthcoming under the general title, *A Study of Alternatives in American Education:*


Vol. III: *Teachers' Responses to Alternatives*, by R. Rasmussen, R-2170/3-NIE.

Vol. IV: *Family Choice in Schooling*, by G. Bridge and J. Blackman, R-2170/4-NIE.

Vol. V: *Diversity in the Classroom*, by P. Barker, T. K. Bikson, and J. Kimbrough, R-2170/5-NIE.

Vol. VI: *Summary and Policy Implications*, by D. Weiler, R-2170/6-NIE.

Study Background

This study had its origins in 1972. In April of that year, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) funded an education voucher demonstration in Alum Rock, California, and awarded a study and evaluation contract to The Rand Corporation. Voucher systems require that funds for education be distributed directly to families in the form of certificates, which families can then use to purchase education at schools of their choice.¹ The government wished to test a voucher model that included competing public and private schools, with complex regulations designed to protect and advance the interests

¹Findings for the first year of the voucher demonstration (1972-73) are reported in Daniel Weiler et al., *A Public School Voucher Demonstration: The First Year at Alum Rock*, The Rand Corporation, R-1495-NIE, June 1974, 4 vols. Alum Rock is an independent elementary school district in San Jose, California.
of disadvantaged families.\textsuperscript{1} But the OEO agreement with Alum Rock did not require immediate implementation of this model. In lieu of private schools participating in the demonstration, Alum Rock was to encourage parent choice and stimulate competition between schools--two key objectives of the voucher plan--by creating multiple programs within the public schools. Parents would be informed about their options and encouraged to select the programs they preferred for their children. Alum Rock and OEO agreed that this "public schools only" model was to be a "transition" toward a more complete voucher demonstration, and OEO continued to seek additional demonstration sites for a more extensive test of the voucher idea. The demonstration began in September 1972 with six schools, organized as twenty-two "mini-schools" offering a variety of educational approaches.

By the end of the second year of the demonstration--spring 1974--sponsorship of the voucher program had been assumed by the National Institute of Education. The transition to a full-scale model in Alum Rock had not taken place, and no new sites had joined the demonstration. Rand and NIE agreed, however, that while a more complete voucher test might still be arranged in Alum Rock or elsewhere, the existing demonstration was of interest in its own right: Thirteen public schools were offering forty-five program options to parents.\textsuperscript{2} In effect, Alum Rock was testing a variant of an innovation that a number of observers had argued could improve the quality of public education--alternative schools.

It was agreed that while the main study would continue to concentrate on Alum Rock in 1974-75, a small side study would be undertaken to explore the nature of the alternative schools movement in

\textsuperscript{1}The "regulated compensatory" voucher model was originally proposed in a 1970 study commissioned by OEO. See Center for the Study of Public Policy, \textit{Education Vouchers: A Report on Financing Elementary Education by Grants to Parents}, Cambridge, Mass., December 1970.

\textsuperscript{2}There were at one time more than fifty mini-schools available to participating parents, in fourteen demonstration schools. Ten Alum Rock schools never joined the demonstration.
other districts. This study identified a number of areas where further analysis might yield a better understanding of the issues associated with implementing alternative schools. Many of these issues had already surfaced in Alum Rock.

By the fourth year of the demonstration (1975-76), prospects for creating a more comprehensive test of the voucher model had diminished appreciably, while the work that had already been accomplished in Alum Rock constituted a useful base for a modest comparative study of alternative schools. Accordingly, some project resources were shifted in that year toward the study of three new sites where alternative schools were being tried: Cincinnati, Ohio; Eugene, Oregon; and Minneapolis, Minnesota.¹ Data collection from these sites and Alum Rock was completed in 1976-77.

**Alternative Schools**

Alternative schools or educational programs--variously defined--can now be found in perhaps one out of every four school districts in the country.² These schools and programs serve a number of different client groups, offering some form of teaching style and method or curriculum content differing in important respects from the mainstream of educational programs in those districts. They have been created in response to a variety of social and political pressures, and are usually designed to meet some or all of the following objectives:

- **Social Equity.** Extending to all parents the right to choose among educational alternatives that they consider best suited for their children, and reinforcing area- or district-wide desegregation plans by providing "magnet" programs.


Accountability. Creating schools that are more directly responsive to parent and student desires and needs, and more visible and open regarding their educational operations.

Incentives To Innovate. Providing expanded opportunities for teachers and administrators to offer new and different educational programs, where rewards for successful innovation are tied in part to extrinsic evaluations of success (parent and student demand) rather than (exclusively) to intrinsic criteria (administrator and colleague approval).

Diversity. Introducing program variety on the assumption that a uniform approach to education may be inefficient where the student clientele is socially and ethnically diverse, with a range of skills and interests that should be matched to appropriately varied educational opportunities.

Constituency Satisfaction. Increasing student, parent, teacher, and community satisfaction with the educational system, both as a desirable social goal in itself and as the means to other desirable objectives: increased social stability in the schools, greater parent support of school activities, and more community willingness to provide financial support for education.

Improved Student Outcomes. Improving student cognitive and noncognitive growth through better matching of students to programs, through improved teacher and administrator incentives to innovate, and through greater system accountability.

For the purposes of this study, an alternative school or program is defined as having at least three essential characteristics:

It is an educational program that is distinctly different in some way from the majority of programs in that district.
It is available to students on a voluntary basis.
It is a full-time educational program.

The study is confined to alternatives that meet this definition.\textsuperscript{1}

Study Goals and Constraints

As noted, this study had its origins in Rand's evaluation of the voucher demonstration in Alum Rock. In that district, rapid and complex changes in organization and procedure raised many questions about the problems that a district might encounter in attempting to implement a system of alternative schools. These questions became the main focal points of the research, as hypotheses generated on the basis of Rand's study of Alum Rock were tested against the experiences of other districts that have tried some version of an alternative schools program. We asked: What district strategies are most likely to lead to the successful implementation of alternatives under different circumstances? What are the effects of alternative programs on teacher behavior, and how do teachers influence the outcomes of such programs? What role does—or should—the school principal play? How do parents react—do they understand their choices? If so, how do they exercise their options? Is real diversity possible within the public schools, with the many internal and external pressures to conform to a common program?

The six reports in this study address these and related questions. The study is aimed at practitioners and community groups who may be contemplating the initiation of alternative schools, and at state and federal policymakers who may be asked to support alternatives and

\textsuperscript{1}In practice, we were obliged to select districts for the study on the basis of claimed and apparent program distinctiveness; the extent of actual distinctiveness was then treated as an issue to be explored in the course of the analyses. A discussion of the recent history of the alternatives movement will be found in Chapter I of Vol. I of this series.
would like to be aware of the obstacles and opportunities that this innovation can create.

The study draws no conclusions about the relative desirability of alternatives; this is a value judgment that citizens and professionals must make on the basis of what they want from their schools. Thus, although individual authors have tried to make their own normative positions clear, nothing in these reports should be interpreted as representing a Rand position on alternatives as an innovation in public education. Nor is this an evaluation: We have studied four districts to gain insight into common (and uncommon) problems; nothing in these reports should be construed as presenting evaluative judgments about the advisability or wisdom of any district policy. Finally, this study is not an assessment of the educational impact of alternatives on students. With the exception of Alum Rock—a unique case—the study did not have access to the longitudinal student outcome data that would have to be analyzed to make such an assessment.

The study utilizes a small purposive sample that was designed to select sites where an important effort had been made to implement alternatives. For reasons explained in a number of the reports, we believe that it is legitimate to assume that many of the study's findings will have wide applicability. Nevertheless, the reader should bear in mind the limited and selective nature of this sample when considering the generalizability of study results.

Organization of the Study

The study findings are organized as a series of reports on the issues of implementing alternatives from the perspectives of major participants: district administrators, principals, teachers, and parents. A fifth report focuses on the extent of program diversity achieved in the Alum Rock mini-school system, and a sixth report presents a summary overview of the entire study. The reports are related, but each is also designed to be read as an independent study. The reader who completes the entire series will therefore notice some
redundancy: Each report begins with a similar discussion of study methods and study site settings. There is also some inevitable overlap in the discussion of key issues, since a report that deals with any part of the educational system must to some extent discuss other aspects of the system as well. Thus, for example, the report that focuses on the role of the principal can hardly avoid discussing the views of teachers, and vice versa. In the interest of writing reports that are independent research documents as well as part of a general study topic, we have made no attempt to eliminate these redundancies.

Since 1972, this study has produced 41 informal Working Notes for client (OEO and NIE) use, mostly on selected aspects of the Alum Rock demonstration. These documents, together with project Administrative Reports and original materials (documentary materials, surveys, and field notes) form an extensive primary and secondary data base, which has been drawn on as needed by the authors of study reports, largely without specific citation. Where it is appropriate to call the reader's attention to a particular source of evidence in the informal secondary materials, the latter are cited as unpublished papers. These and related unpublished materials are available from the National Institute of Education.

The introductory chapter of each report in the series provides further details about the particular focus, methods, and limitations of that report.

Daniel Weiler
Study Director
SUMMARY

This report is the second of a series documenting a study of alternative schools in American education. It focuses on the role of school principals in managing diverse educational programs in their schools. Its purpose is to provide helpful information to school districts considering the implementation of alternatives and to assist state and federal policymakers who may be interested in this innovation.

This study addresses three main issues: (1) how alternative school principals are selected, and the relationship of these selections to the districts' systems of alternatives; (2) principal leadership styles and the distinctiveness of alternative programs; and (3) principal leadership and conflict between competing alternative programs. For the purpose of analysis, school principals in four districts—Alum Rock, California; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Cincinnati, Ohio; Eugene, Oregon—were classified according to three broadly different approaches to decisionmaking: authoritarian, functional, and collegial/democratic. Three behavioral types, as composites of principal management styles, were developed which closely parallel these three approaches: The Director, the Administrator, and the Facilitator. Briefly, the directive principal makes the decisions in the school, both procedural and substantive. The administrative principal gives teachers a large measure of influence over substantive decisions such as curriculum and classroom practices, but continues to make the procedural decisions. The facilitative principal follows a participatory decisionmaking model, involving teachers in all types of school decisions. Interview data with principals, as well as teacher descriptions of their principal's behavior, were used to classify principals according to their modal decisionmaking styles. In addition, alternative programs were classified into two types, based on their method of organization: those that are located with other programs in one school building and those that are organized as separate-site programs.
In each of the districts, the purpose for which a system of alternatives was implemented largely determined the type of system adopted and the principals who were to participate in the system. In Alum Rock, the superintendent was in favor of implementing alternatives through the federally sponsored voucher demonstration, because they were a way to achieve several of the other goals he held for the district: administrative decentralization, increased parent participation, and a stronger financial position. The type of alternative system implemented at Alum Rock was largely shaped by the concerns of the school staff and the community. For example, more than one alternative program was located in each participating school because parents wanted to be able to send their children to a program of their choice within the neighborhood school. To entice school staffs to participate in the demonstration, the superintendent offered the schools increased autonomy, responsibility, and financial resources. Although these incentives were frequently not sufficient to persuade school staffs to participate, they were strong enough to persuade a handful of school principals to participate, and to enlist the support of their staffs. The Alum Rock principals willing to participate in alternatives were those who were anxious to take on increased responsibilities.

In Eugene, alternative programs originated in response to demands from the community for more "humanistic" and "open" education. The administration created the mechanisms for establishing alternatives, and school staffs and parents interested in experimenting with new forms of education designed the programs. The Eugene school principals had little to do with the initiation of alternative programs. They became alternative program managers either when members of their staff designed a program that was accepted by the school board or when the administration selected them for the position.

In both Minneapolis and Cincinnati, the development of alternative programs was linked to school desegregation, as well as to other district goals. Accordingly, a primary factor was the strategic selection of schools to house programs designed to attract students of different races. In Minneapolis, the central administration
made the decisions about how to pair or cluster schools in order to best achieve desegregation. The new school communities that resulted would then decide the types of alternative programs to offer. Thus, district management selected Minneapolis principals to head alternative schools, at the same time allowing them to influence the type of program they would manage. In Cincinnati, principals had little opportunity to determine whether or not they would manage alternative schools, or what kinds of programs their schools would have. The central administration made decisions as to what types of alternatives to offer and where they were to be located in keeping with the goal of desegregation. They gave little consideration in these decisions to the abilities and preferences of the staff and the principal.

Some alternative programs were implemented more easily than others. In some multiprogram schools, tension among the program staffs was a problem. In other multiprogram schools, the programs did not appear all that distinct from each other. In separate-site alternative programs, some programs were more successful than others at creating and sustaining distinctiveness. Although many factors affected implementation, the leadership of the principal appeared to be one of the most important factors in the success or demise of an alternative program. Furthermore, it seemed that leadership styles called for in managing multiprogram schools were different from those needed in separate-site alternative programs. In the multiprogram schools, we found that those principals who tried to retain decision-making authority for themselves were more frequently located in schools where there was less diversity and more tension. In separate-site alternative programs, the principals' willingness to share decisionmaking authority was not a decisive factor in creating and sustaining distinctive programs. Rather, in this setting strong leadership was important, whether provided by the principal, a member of his staff, or a committee comprising teacher representatives and the principal. Where strong leadership was lacking, separate-site alternatives tended to drift toward offering something different from that originally intended, and teachers within the program tended to
follow disparate classroom practices. In general, when top administrators in these four districts made decisions on where to place alternative programs, they did not appear to explicitly consider certain critical issues related to the management of alternative schools. As a result, some principals were following less effective management styles than others, given the settings in which they found themselves.

These findings lead to a number of suggestions for policymakers who may be interested in implementing or supporting alternative educational programs. We suggest that policymakers consider placing alternative programs in separate sites rather than in multiprogram schools, since separate-site alternatives were more likely than multiprogram alternatives to offer distinctive educational programs. Should a district find it necessary to place more than one program in a school, we suggest that district management assign principals who are willing to share decisionmaking authority with their teachers, and if possible provide principals with training to enable them to cope with this new form of school organization. We also suggest that district management consider in advance how receptive the host school is to an alternative program. Our findings showed that conflict was more apt to occur over the placement of an alternative program when the host school staff and community felt the program had been forced upon them.

For separate-site alternative programs, we suggest that district management make certain that they provide for substantive program leadership, since program distinctiveness was strongly associated with such leadership. This leadership can be provided either by the school principal or by a teacher or group of teachers with decisionmaking authority for the program. Compatible programmatic aims of parents and the school staff were also vital for separate-site alternative programs. When a school offered a certain type of program because parents, but not staff, wanted it, and when no one took leadership responsibility for insuring that the staff adhered to the program's philosophy, the program began to drift away from its objectives.
We also suggest that district management carefully consider in advance its objectives for a system of alternatives. Failure to do so may result in offering school principals inappropriate incentives to participate. We found that in most cases district management gave scant attention to the characteristics of the principals selected to manage alternative programs. Yet, we found that certain types of principals were more successful than others at implementing certain kinds of programs. For example, directive principals were more successful at managing separate-site alternative programs than they were at managing multiprogram buildings. Incentives that appealed primarily to directive principals, such as an opportunity for principals to increase their decisionmaking responsibility, would be inappropriate for a district that planned to implement alternatives in multiprogram settings.

Although the limited number of districts and schools studied suggests caution in generalizing from this work, we believe that these suggestions merit consideration by policymakers interested in developing alternative programs. These measures will not automatically lead to the successful implementation of such programs, but we believe they will enhance the probability of success.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of a number of people in this research. In particular, Daniel Weiler, the director of the overall research effort, ably guided the study, and by his unfailing support provided the impetus needed to see it to fruition. Gail Bass and Roger Rasmussen collaborated on all phases of the study, and their advice and support were invaluable. Lonna Oliver facilitated the fielding and processing of the teacher survey. Henry Acland, Paul Berman, and John Pincus offered perceptive and useful suggestions, which have greatly improved the report. David Mandel of the National Institute of Education also offered many helpful suggestions during the course of the research. Bernice Jacobs performed the tedious job of draft preparation with extraordinary skill and speed.

Finally, the author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of the superintendents, principals, teachers, other district personnel, and community members in Alum Rock, California, Eugene, Oregon, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Cincinnati, Ohio, who virtually without exception contributed generously of their time. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

All of these contributors have facilitated and improved this report; responsibility for any errors that remain rests solely with the author.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This report explores some of the issues involved in the school-level management of alternative programs. It describes the process of implementing alternatives in four school districts—Alum Rock, California; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Eugene, Oregon—and examines the link between district objectives and the school-level leadership that emerged, as well as the link between this leadership and the changes effected by the alternative programs. The study is grounded in the assumption that important changes in school management practices are required for an alternative school system to be implemented successfully. The purpose of the study is to present findings that will be of use to policymakers who may be interested in developing alternatives in other districts, and to suggest directions for future research.

School Principals: Gatekeepers of Change?

We begin with the principal because any kind of system change [in school or not] puts him in the role of implementing the change in his school. I have yet to see any proposal for system change that did not assume the presence of a principal in a school. I have yet to see in any of these proposals the slightest recognition of the possibility that the principal, by virtue of role, preparation and tradition, may not be a good implementor of change. [Sarason, 1971, pp. 111, 112]

The literature suggests that a principal's potential impact on change or innovation within a school is multifaceted. He serves as an important source of new ideas (Brickell, 1961). He can reduce the risk to teachers participating in an innovation by running interference for them with the district administration, the community, and their colleagues (Kimbrough, 1968; Gracey, 1972). He can increase the incentive of teachers to innovate by securing special resources for
them (Lortie, 1975). He is responsible for establishing a climate in his school in which innovative practices will be tried (Kimbrough, 1968; Thayer, 1971). Clearly, there are many things a principal can do to promote innovation or change at the school level. The more relevant question is whether or not the support of the principal is necessary to create and sustain innovation in the school: Do principals serve as the gatekeepers of change?

On this point the findings are mixed. Evans (1973, p. 5) writes: "Any change to which the principal is opposed has little chance of unqualified success." The literature contains many examples in which the principal was considered to be a key agent for change, either by his opposition to or support of an innovation. Others, however, disagree. Most dissenters argue that the many forces impinging on the principal—the community, the educational bureaucracy, the resistance of teachers to change, and the principal's own values and lack of relevant training—limit the degree to which the principal can assert leadership (Spodeck, 1974; Myers, 1974; Licata, 1975).

Many others perceive the principal's authority, prestige, and leadership to be diminishing (see, for example, Hills, 1977; Benson, 1970; McCleary, 1971; Perry and Wildman, 1970). This erosion is attributed largely to the emergence of collective bargaining and increased levels of teacher competence. If the principal's influence is diminishing, what does this imply about his position with respect to innovation in the schools? Can we still expect principals to function as "gatekeepers of change" in their schools, or to serve as facilitators of change desired by others? We hope to shed some light on these issues by studying the role of school principals in four school districts that are implementing one particular type of innovation: educational alternatives.

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1See Wayson (1971); Chesler, Schmuck, and Lippitt (1963); Sinclair (1975); Lieberman and Shiman (1973); Berman and McLaughlin (1976, 1977); Owens (1970); Heisel, Aurbach, and Willower (1969); Wall (1970); and Sarason (1974).
Educational Alternatives and School Principals

There are many ways in which alternative programs can vary from conventional programs: They may employ a special method or structure (e.g., open, continuous progress, or Montessori schools); offer a specialized curriculum or content (e.g., bilingual, creative and performing arts, math-science, or environmental education schools); or serve a special clientele (e.g., continuation schools, pregnancy-maternity centers). Alternatives may also be organized in a number of different ways: mini-schools (several distinct programs sharing a building), schools-within-schools (a specialized program sharing a building with a larger host school), schools-without-walls (where students do most of their learning in cultural and community institutions outside the confines of a school building), or independent schools in separate buildings. Thus, alternative programs can run the gamut from those that are very similar to conventional programs (for example, a program that uses a particular technique to teach reading but in every other way is similar to a conventional school), to those that are significantly different (for example, a completely unstructured open program). Under what conditions, then, might we expect different types of programs to be implemented?

For the most part, the literature treats innovation in general terms, without any attempt to categorize different types of innovations or to examine whether different types of innovations are best nurtured in certain types of school climates. One exception to this is a paper written by Abbott (1969), in which he theorizes that a school's climate influences the type of innovation adopted: Schools with a highly elaborated set of rules will adopt few proposals; schools in which rules tend to emphasize hierarchical lines of authority will tend to adopt innovations that affect classroom practices but do not alter the relationship between teachers and administrators; and schools that are "open" are more apt to adopt innovations that

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1 For a brief history of the alternatives movement, see Bass (1978).
relate to the organization of teachers and students for instructional purposes, as well as those that alter the school administrative and supervisory structure. This research suggests that the climate of a school will influence the characteristics of an alternative program developed by its staff, and extrapolating further, an alternative program may be modified to make it compatible with the climate of the school in which it is placed.

Other factors that we consider important in our study of educational alternatives are not even addressed in the literature. First, most studies deal only with the conventionally structured school (i.e., one program per school building rather than the mini-schools or school-within-school structures commonly used in a system of educational alternatives). Thus, they do not address the possible changes in principals' behavior that may be required for effective leadership in a multiprogram school. Second, most studies fail to consider the district context in which the innovation is occurring. Yet innovations are neither conceived nor implemented in isolation, but rather are introduced in response in identifiable district needs. Also, school principals do not work in isolation but are themselves subject to all kinds of outside pressures from parents, teachers, and the district's central administration. This study will attempt to unweave some of the complexities that surround the principal faced with implementing an alternative program, in an effort to derive lessons about the school-level management of these programs.

Issues To Be Addressed

We center our discussion around four issues that we believe to be critical factors affecting the management of alternative programs: district-level influences, program diversity, tension between programs, and the organization of alternatives.

District-Level Influences

Although most of the literature fails to consider the district context when examining the behavior of school personnel, the district
and its policies toward alternatives will have a pervasive effect on principals, and will strongly influence the actions they take with respect to alternatives.¹ School principals are middle managers between district administrators and their school faculty. It is the principals who will deal with district management, represent their schools' concerns to the administration, and receive feedback concerning the behavior expected of school personnel. Thus, principals occupy a strategic position in terms of district/school interaction. We will examine how district management influences the selection of alternative school principals, and the appropriateness of their selection given the district's system of alternatives.

Program Diversity

Alternative school systems are created in part to give parents and students a choice among diverse program offerings. If, in fact, the programs are not perceived as very different from each other, this choice is meaningless. At the same time, for parents and students to have real choices, the teachers in the program they choose should be consistent in their classroom practices. In other words, even if program Y is different from the usual district program, if the teachers in program Y are engaging in widely dissimilar classroom practices, the parents and students choosing program Y have no guarantee of what they are actually getting. Thus, a critical issue in the management of alternative programs is the extent to which principals are able to create and maintain program diversity.

Tension Between Programs

Alternative school systems frequently embody characteristics that precipitate conflict between alternative program staffs—conflict that teachers feel can impair the functioning of the program and that, if not managed properly, can lead to a reduction in program diversity or even the demise of the program itself. Various kinds of conflicts

¹See, also, Berman and McLaughlin (1975, 1976) and Sarason (1971).
can occur in an alternative school system: Teachers within a multi-
program school may compete with other programs within their school
for students, resources, or recognition. Teachers in single-program
alternative schools may feel in competition with other programs in
the district. Although the organizational behavior literature
suggests that conflict can often serve to energize people and can lead
to innovation and change (see, for example, Litterer, 1966), our data
from Alum Rock suggest that teachers consider conflict based on feelings
of competitiveness to be harmful.\textsuperscript{1} Furthermore, tension between pro-
gress was considered by teachers in Alum Rock to be more serious than
a number of other problems, including fairness in allocating district
funds among programs and the instability of class enrollments.\textsuperscript{2} In
this report we examine ways in which school principals were able to
alleviate feelings of tension among their staffs. We will focus in
particular on the tension that exists within multiprogram schools,
since our impression is that it is in these schools that tension is
most apt to occur and be harmful.\textsuperscript{3}

Organizational Arrangements

Multiprogram schools are an important and distinguishing feature
of alternative school systems. While it is fairly rare in a typical

\textsuperscript{1}In all of our surveyed districts, competition for students is
significantly correlated with teacher reports of tension between pro-
gress (R = .39, significant at the .001 level). In Alum Rock at the
height of the demonstration (1974-75), 85 percent of the voucher
teachers perceived at least some degree of competition among mini-
schools for students, and nearly a third perceived that there had
been "a great deal" of competition. In turn, most of the voucher
teachers considered this competition to be harmful in some respects;
only 15 percent evaluated competition for students as useful without
harmful side effects. (Source: Spring 1975 Alum Rock Teacher Survey,
Questions 11a and 11b; Spring 1977 Alum Rock Teacher Survey, Questions
22A-C, and 23.)

\textsuperscript{2}Spring 1975 Alum Rock Teacher Survey, Questions 8a-e.

\textsuperscript{3}There is also some support for this in the general literature
on organizations. For example, March and Simon (1958) suggest that
there will be more conflict between units sharing a common service
unit (for example, a school principal) than there will be between
units that do not, and that the conflict will center on the resource
provided by the service unit (pp. 122, 123).
school district to find two or more programs in one school competing for the same students, it is common in an alternative school system.\footnote{We exclude from our definition of multiprogram schools those schools that offer an accelerated and/or remedial program in addition to the regular program. In these instances students are generally selected by the district to participate on the basis of an eligibility requirement, rather than the students themselves choosing to participate on the basis of interest.} In both Alum Rock and Eugene, all of the elementary alternative programs were in multiprogram schools; in Cincinnati, 81 percent; and in Minneapolis, 21 percent. Multiprogram schools are a logical organizational arrangement in an alternative school system for several reasons. First, alternative programs often do not attract a sufficient number of students initially to fill an entire school to capacity; therefore, they are frequently housed with another alternative program in one school building or are housed in a school that is underenrolled. Second, districts generally do not have the financial ability to build new facilities or to rent facilities that may be uniquely suited to an alternative program. In fact, many districts are finding it financially difficult to continue operating existing school buildings that are not fully utilized. These constraints suggest that multiprogram schools will continue to be used by school districts interested in implementing alternative programs. At the same time, multiprogram schools are in many ways more difficult to administer than single-program schools. Certain job functions, such as budgeting and teacher hiring, become more complex. There is a greater need to coordinate the use of common areas, such as the cafeteria and gymnasium. Several different curricula or classroom organizations are followed and often several student discipline standards are adhered to. The number of meetings that a principal must attend is multiplied. Yet, to date few studies have looked at the management of multiprogram schools. One of the few such studies has looked at the interaction patterns in three schools that were organized into multiunits and three schools that were not (Pellegrin, 1975). This study found that principals were no longer the focal point in multiunit schools. They not only
shared their influence with the unit leaders, the unit leaders emerged as the most influential professionals in the schools. In contrast, Pellegrin found the influence hierarchy in the control schools to be dominated by the principals. These findings suggest that principals will find the management of multiprogram schools different from managing typical school plants, and that one important difference will be the extent to which they will need to share their influence with others. Some principals will be better able than others to manage multiprogram schools, and the extent to which such alternative programs are implemented as intended will depend, in part, on the ability of principals to adapt to these settings. This report explores the pitfalls associated with administering a multiprogram school, and presents an assessment of principal behaviors that are best suited to either multiprogram or single-program alternative sites.

Study Design

As noted in the preface, this study had its origins in April 1972, when Rand first began evaluating an education voucher demonstration in Alum Rock, California. As it turned out, Alum Rock implemented an alternative school system rather than a voucher model. As a result, the focus of Rand's analysis changed in two major ways. First, it became a study of an alternative school system, rather than an evaluation of education vouchers. Second, since an alternative school system was not unique to Alum Rock, the study was expanded to include three additional districts that were also implementing alternative schools: Minneapolis, Minnesota; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Eugene, Oregon. ¹

In Alum Rock, detailed information on the implementation of their alternative school system was collected over a five-year period. A minimum of six person-weeks each were spent collecting data in Minneapolis, Eugene, and Cincinnati over an 18-month period. In all four

¹See the appendix for further details concerning the selection of sites.
districts, the data collection methods used included personal inter-
views, mail questionnaires, observation, and the study of pertinent
documentary materials.

Data Sources

For this study of the role of the principal, personal interviews
and teacher survey responses were the primary data sources. In Alum
Rock, 32 personal interviews were conducted with principals, 16 in-
terviews with principals in Cincinnati, 31 interviews with principals
in Eugene, and 40 with principals in Minneapolis.\(^1\)

In addition to the personal interviews with school principals,
we conducted a mail survey of teachers in Alum Rock, Eugene, and
Minneapolis.\(^2\) Table 1 shows the rate of response to this survey.\(^3\)
A number of the questions dealt specifically with teachers' percep-
tions of the role of their principals, both generally and with respect
to implementing alternative programs. Areas covered in the survey
include: the extent of the principal's influence over certain decision
areas in the school, both at the time of the survey and prior to the
initiation of an alternative school system in the district; the role
of the principal in the school generally; the extent to which the
principal was involved in the implementation of the alternative pro-
gram and the helpfulness of this involvement; and the extent to
which the principal was involved in the planning of the alternative
program.

\(^{1}\) Includes interviews with elementary, middle, and junior high
school alternative school principals; interviews with regular school
principals; and repeat interviews with the same principals.

\(^{2}\) No teacher survey was administered in Cincinnati. The district
administers its own annual teacher survey and did not wish to burden
teachers with an additional questionnaire.

\(^{3}\) For a more complete discussion of the surveys, see Rasmussen
(1978).
Table 1
TEACHER QUESTIONNAIRE RETURN RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School District</th>
<th>Number Sent</th>
<th>Number Returned</th>
<th>Percent Responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alum Rock: Alternative</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonalternative</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis: Alternative</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene: Alternative</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonalternative (in buildings</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with alternatives)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonalternative (in buildings</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>without alternatives)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Includes only those schools that agreed to participate in the survey. One Eugene school and four Minneapolis schools declined to participate.

Using data from these two sources in tandem allows us to assess the validity of both, and throughout the report we have given the greatest weight to findings that are supported by both types of data. Thus, the analysis is based primarily on those alternative schools from which we have both survey data and principal interview data, as shown in Table 2.

Analytic Framework

There is little research to guide us in assessing the role of school principals in implementing alternative programs; what little research has been conducted on the role of the school principal in

\[1\] For further details see the appendix.
Table 2

PRIMARY ANALYSIS FILE FOR FOUR SCHOOL DISTRICTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data File</th>
<th>Alum Rock</th>
<th>Eugene</th>
<th>Minneapolis</th>
<th>Cincinnati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-program alternative schools:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of schools</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of principals interviewed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of schools responding to survey</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-program alternative schools:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of schools</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of principals interviewed</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of schools responding to survey</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of alternative schools</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of alternative principals interviewed</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of alternative schools responding to survey</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

School innovations generally is of marginal use to this topic. Therefore, we had to conduct an exploratory study that would enable us to understand the process of carrying out educational alternatives in a school district and how a principal's role interacts with alternative programs at the school level. Accordingly, we undertook a comparative case study of four districts and their experiences with implementing educational alternatives.

To compare the influences of principal behavior on the implementation of educational alternatives across several sites, we developed a classification scheme for principal behavior around which data collection and analysis could be organized. For several reasons, we selected a scheme that reflects the different approaches of school principals to decisionmaking. First, the literature suggests that in general, teachers' involvement in school decisionmaking is important. 1

1For example, teacher satisfaction is greater when teachers are allowed to participate in decisions that affect their classrooms (Lortie, 1975; Bridges, 1967).
Second, an examination of school decisionmaking seemed of particular importance for a study of alternatives, since such programs are often designed to foster a change in a school’s decisionmaking process. For example, open programs often follow a more participatory form of decisionmaking than is typically followed in other schools. Thus, we will examine the extent to which a school principal’s decision-making behavior is congruent with that called for by the alternative program being managed.

Our classification scheme reflects three different approaches to decisionmaking by principals: authoritarian, functional, and collegial. Three behavioral archetypes,\(^1\) as composites of principal behavior, were developed that closely parallel these three approaches:\(^2\)

1. **The Director.** This principal makes the decisions in his school, both procedural and substantive. He will take a great interest in things affecting the classroom, such as curriculum, teaching techniques, and staff development and training, as well as those things affecting the school as a whole, such as scheduling and budgeting.

\(^1\)Although the archetypes were initially conceptualized following our first wave of principal interviews, the variables were subsequently refined and measured by constructing scales from questionnaire items that asked teachers to indicate the behavior of their principals under different circumstances. For details concerning the construction of these scales, see the appendix.

\(^2\)Further support for the relevance of these archetypes can be found in a study of school principals by Ann Lieberman in which she rated principals in terms of three orientations that have meanings similar to our three classifications: (1) authority orientation—the amount of decisionmaking power kept by the principal or delegated and shared with the teachers; (2) task orientation—the extent to which the principal organizes resources and activities that promote ideas and stimulation for teachers about changing school needs; (3) expressive orientation—the extent to which the principal fosters a warm atmosphere in the school by taking into consideration the needs and interests of the teachers (Lieberman, 1973, p. 39). Also, parallels can be drawn between these three archetypes and the dimensions used by McClelland (1971) in assessing human motivation, with McClelland’s power, achievement, and affiliation dimensions corresponding, respectively, to our three archetypes.
Teachers in a school with this type of principal contribute to decisions affecting the classroom, but the principal retains final decisionmaking authority.

2. The Administrator. This principal tends to separate procedural decisions from substantive decisions. He will give teachers a large measure of autonomy in their own classrooms—over what they teach and how they teach—but will tend to make the decisions in areas that affect the school as a whole. He will perceive his functions as distinct from those of his faculty, and will tend to identify with district management rather than with his staff.

3. Facilitator. This principal perceives his role as one of support; his primary function will be to assist teachers in the performance of their duties. Unlike the administrator, however, this principal will be more concerned with process than with procedures. Principals who exhibit this type of behavior often perceive themselves as colleagues of their faculty, and are most apt to involve their teachers in the decisionmaking process.¹

¹These three approaches show some similarity to the philosophies of leadership represented in White and Lippitt's (1968) experiments in social climates: autocracy, laissez-faire, and democracy. However, there are also important distinctions between their classification and the one used in this report: Their authoritarian leader adheres to an authoritative hierarchy and makes all determination of policy; ours is also apt to follow a hierarchical approach but may seek inputs from teachers before making a final decision. Their laissez-faire leader either does not participate or shows minimal participation in decisionmaking, whereas our functional leader continues to make or participate in decisions in some areas but gives teachers a great deal of decisionmaking discretion in other areas. Their democratic and our collegial leader are very similar in that both follow a group decisionmaking approach.
To clarify the distinctions among these three behavioral archetypes, in Table 3 we show how principals following each of our three modes of behavior might typically perform the same job function. Of course, although these archetypes have been described as though they are separate and distinct, in reality most school principals will to some extent evidence all three types of behavior. Furthermore, we believe it likely that some principals will be able to move freely between these different behavioral approaches depending upon the situation. In fact an adaptive leadership style is apt to become more prevalent as an ever-growing number of school districts undertake training programs for their administrators, aimed at helping them to learn to organize themselves in a variety of ways to cope with the changing demands of a changing environment.

Table 3

DIFFERENT PRINCIPAL APPROACHES TO VARIOUS JOB FUNCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal Job Function</th>
<th>Principal Behavioral Type</th>
<th>Principal Behavioral Type</th>
<th>Facilitator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Select curriculum</td>
<td>Selects with teacher input</td>
<td>Approves teachers' selections</td>
<td>Member of committee that makes selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure resources</td>
<td>Writes proposals to secure the resources he feels are needed</td>
<td>Writes proposal to secure the resources requested by teachers</td>
<td>Encourages and assists teachers in writing proposals to secure resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocate budget</td>
<td>Makes allocation and tells teachers</td>
<td>Allocates budget on formula basis and allows teachers to decide how to spend dollars</td>
<td>Seeks teachers input into school budget decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire staff</td>
<td>Makes selection himself</td>
<td>Seeks teacher inputs on desirable staff characteristics before making selection</td>
<td>Member of selection committee that hires staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise teachers</td>
<td>Gives advice freely to teachers concerning classroom practices</td>
<td>Gives advice when asked: serves as resource to staff</td>
<td>Sees teachers as experts in classroom practice; encourages them to visit each other's classrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign teachers</td>
<td>Makes assignments himself</td>
<td>Makes assignments when schedules conflict, or when there is a need to do so</td>
<td>Handles by committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Few would argue that one leadership style is appropriate to all situations. Nevertheless, we believe that many principals will settle on one managerial style with which they are most comfortable and will tend to follow that style.\(^1\) In their study of principal-staff relations, Williams and Hoy advocate the matching of leadership style to situations but point out that since "leadership style is primarily a function of personality, modification of a principal's style seems somewhat unlikely and limited" (1971, p. 71). This variation will enable us to examine the effects of different principal leadership styles on the implementation of alternative programs. We use these behavioral archetypes as an analytical tool with which to examine the issues delineated above.

**Limitations of This Study**

As we stated earlier, this is an exploratory study aimed at identifying how school principals affect and are affected by the implementation of alternative programs. By analyzing the factors that are important in implementing alternatives, we hope to achieve two objectives: to present findings that will be of use to policymakers who may be interested in developing alternatives in other districts; and to suggest directions for future research.

The limited number of districts and schools studied means that we must be careful about generalizing from this work. The number of principals in our sample is too small to permit rigorous statistical analyses.\(^2\) Thus, this report identifies relationships that are

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\(^1\) Thus, it is possible for organizational theorists to identify different behavioral types among officials occupying similar positions in an organization's hierarchy. See, for example, Downs (1967).

\(^2\) For example, to measure even a small effect or difference of association in a 3 x 2 contingency table, using a significance level of .05 and with the power of the test being .8, we would need a sample size of 157 (Cohen, 1969, p. 256).
plausible (given the literature, our knowledge of school district processes, and the knowledge of other practitioners with whom we have talked), and then tests whether these relationships are consistent with our data. While we are confident that additional research would largely confirm our own findings, our conclusions must be regarded as tentative.

We also stress that this study has a very specific focus: It is a study of the relationship of school principals to the implementation of alternative programs. It is not intended to answer more general questions such as "Are educational alternatives a wise policy?" or "Should the functions of principals be changed?" Rather, we start from the premise that both school principals and educational alternative programs are "givens," and attempt to focus our research so as to provide the policymaker with information about how to make the best use of school principals given the features inherent in an alternative program. We take this narrow approach for two reasons: First, there are several features inherent in alternatives that may make them more difficult for school principals to manage, and yet, as our findings show, it is not uncommon for district administrations to assume that principals are capable of managing any type of school regardless of the type of program or organization required. Thus, there was a need for a study that was focused at the level of the school principal and on the interaction that takes place between district management and the schools. Second, this report is only one in a series of reports that consider the process of implementing educational alternatives. Its companion reports examine the process from the perspectives of other actors in the system: district management, teachers, and parents. Collectively, these reports provide a more complete description and analysis of the implementation process.

Organization of This Report

In Chapter II of this report we describe the context in which these districts are undertaking their systems of alternatives—their
reasons for implementing an alternative school system, and a
description of the type of system implemented. This chapter also
examines how school principals became principals of alternative
programs, and explores how this process was consistent with each
district's objectives. In Chapter III we focus on issues related
to the management of alternative schools: principal leadership
style, program distinctiveness, organizational arrangements, and
tension between programs. In Chapter IV we synthesize our findings
and discuss the implications of the study for state, federal, and
local policymakers. Following this, we propose areas in which
further research needs to be undertaken.
II. FOUR SYSTEMS OF ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR SCHOOL-LEVEL MANAGEMENT

School district management may view a system of alternative programs as desirable for a number of different reasons: They may be seen as a form of responsiveness to the wishes of some parents and/or staff for different kinds of educational experiences; as a way of improving educational services in the district; or as a way of enhancing other district goals. For example, some districts may undertake alternatives to acquire a reputation as a "progressive" or innovative district. The district management's role in implementing alternatives may vary substantially, depending on the reasons for which the programs are initiated. For example, where schools are already asking for alternatives, district management may only need to legitimize the idea of diversity for programs to develop. On the other hand, if there is no demand for alternatives, management may have to take a far more active role in their promotion. Management might promote alternatives by offering incentives, such as additional monies or staff, to personnel willing to undertake an alternative program; by initially selecting program themes that have universal appeal as a way of generating support for the concept of diversity; and/or by selecting principals and staff for these programs who are known to be sympathetic to alternatives.

The district context for a system of alternative programs has implications for school principals as well. In a school in which the faculty wishes to carry out an alternative program, the principal may need to run interference against those who might oppose such a program (for example, parents and/or district management). On the other hand, if district management has mandated alternative programs regardless of staff desires, the principal may need to take a more active role—

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1For an analysis of the role of district management in the implementation of alternative systems, see Bass (1978).
acting as a resource person, or planning in-service training for his teachers. Thus, if we understand the contexts in which these four systems of alternatives originated, we will be in a better position to understand school principals' roles in each district.¹

Alum Rock

For Alum Rock, undertaking a system of alternatives was an expedient way to achieve several of the superintendent's goals for the district: administrative decentralization, increased parent participation, and a stronger financial position.

At the inception of the voucher demonstration in 1972, the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District, on the east side of San Jose, California, enrolled 15,428 students in grades K-8, 51 percent of whom were Spanish-surnamed and 12 percent of whom were black. The district was one of the poorest in California in terms of taxable property values. When Dr. William Jeffers became superintendent in 1968, the district was highly centralized and too poor to make improvements needed for its highly mobile and growing minority student population. Believing that school staff could improve the district's education without much centralized direction, Jeffers sought ways to give the schools greater discretion over their own programs. At the same time, he sought to increase the participation of Alum Rock parents in the schools. The voucher model proposed by the Office of Economic Opportunity interested him, for it appeared to offer the means to accomplish many of his goals for the district. Parent participation in the schools should increase, since the demonstration was to test the idea of parent choice, and the demonstration would bring a large federal grant that could be used in part to shift the district to a decentralized mode of operation. In short, the voucher demonstration provided Alum Rock with an unprecedented opportunity to experiment with new ways of doing things.

¹For additional information on the setting and context in each district, see Bass (1978) and Rasmussen (1978).
Alternative programs were a by-product of this experimentation. They were a means whereby Alum Rock could qualify as a site for the voucher demonstration, because they enabled the district to provide educational choices to parents and students without involving private and parochial schools. They were a means for federal policymakers to test the responsiveness of the educational system to market incentives even in a "public-schools-only" demonstration, since enrollments in the alternative programs would theoretically rise and fall with consumer (parent and student) demand. They were also a means of enlisting the support of parents for the demonstration, since by dividing individual schools into a number of alternative programs, or mini-schools, parents could choose educational programs for their children without sacrificing the essential concept of the neighborhood school.

Before the formation of alternative programs in Alum Rock, there was no demand for such programs from school staffs or parents. Thus in Alum Rock, alternative programs were considered an expedient means to other ends and not desirable ends in themselves. There had been no prior discussion of the potential advantages of a diversity of learning styles. Given these origins, we would expect the district to have to sell school staffs on the advantages of the innovation. In Alum Rock the advantages of alternatives to teachers were greater control over their curriculum, budget, and staffing, and an increase in funding. As we shall see shortly, these advantages were frequently not sufficient.

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1 Proponents of the voucher idea argued that the monopolistic position of the public schools made them slow to respond to their clientele and that parents needed a market mechanism to express their support or disapproval of what the schools were doing. Specifically, voucher advocates argued that parents should be able to use public funds to send their children either to public or private schools. At the time the demonstration was to be initiated, however, California had not passed legislation to allow private school participation. In the interim the district and OEO worked out a system of rules for a "transitional" model. This model provided that each school would offer at least two alternative, distinct educational programs called "mini-schools."

2 See Bridge and Blackman (1978).
to persuade school staffs to participate. However, the promise of increased autonomy and responsibility was sufficient to persuade a handful of school principals to participate in the demonstration, and they, in turn, were able to enlist the support of their staffs.

In the 1972-73 school year, 6 schools participated in the demonstration, offering the parents and students of these schools a choice among 22 different mini-schools. In years two and three, the demonstration's "expansion" years, an additional 7 schools and 1 school, respectively, voted to join. At the height of the demonstration (1974-75), 14 of the district's 25 schools participated, offering parents and students a choice among 51 different mini-school programs. Although most of these mini-schools advertised their differences from the district's standard educational offerings in terms of program content (e.g., fine arts, bilingual) and method (e.g., individualized) rather than in terms of program structure (e.g., open), it turned out that program differences were for the most part along an "open-structured" dimension.¹

By the 1976-77 school year, only 7 of the 14 voucher schools chose to continue the mini-school form of organization, although 2 nonvoucher schools elected to offer mini-schools. By 1977-78, only 2 Alum Rock schools were still offering more than one educational program.

Principals' Role in Program Initiation

In Alum Rock the school principals were an important force behind the decision of the schools to join the voucher demonstration. Each of the school faculties that first joined the demonstration experienced some pressure from their principal to join. One school joined entirely on the basis of the principal's decision; no faculty vote was ever taken. Most of the remaining 14 schools that ultimately joined the demonstration did so only after a vote of the faculty, usually requiring

¹See Barker, Bikson, and Kimbrough (1978).
more than a simple majority. A device often used by principals to influence their schools to join was to call for repeated votes until a favorable consensus was reached. Another common tactic was to require that the voting process be open so that the principal could identify how each teacher voted. Some principals tried to influence their faculties by enlisting the support of parents. Whatever the method used, it is certain that the principals in the original 6 voucher schools were heavily responsible for their schools' decisions to join the demonstration. Typical teacher comments were:

[The principal] was a real dictator; he wanted it so bad he was going to get it one way or another.

If the principal is gung ho for vouchers, then the school will go vouchers.

By the second and third years, fewer principals were taking such a forceful stand on the issue of joining the demonstration. In part, a less forceful stand may have been appropriate because by this time, what it meant to become a voucher school was less of an unknown quantity. One of the expansion schools had considered joining the demonstration in the first year but had postponed its decision to see what would happen. Three others had actually wanted to join in year one but had been discouraged from doing so by the district because they were receiving Title I funds. These schools subsequently joined in year two. In one case, a middle-school staff was pressured to join by parents of several elementary voucher feeder schools who wanted their children to be able to attend a voucher middle school.

In contrast, we know of only one case in which a nonvoucher principal attempted to influence a staff decision to join the demonstration. This principal allowed his staff to vote in secret but attempted to influence them through parents. In most cases, what clearly distinguished the behavior of the nonvoucher principals from that of the voucher principals was the refusal of the nonvoucher principals to take a public stand in favor of the demonstration. They
wanted their staffs to make that decision. One of the nonvoucher principals indicated that he thought the "nonjoiners" were being judged unfavorably by management simply because they "couldn't manipulate their staffs to join." As for their staffs, the two main deterrents to the nonvoucher teachers' voting to join the demonstration were their fear of having to undertake training with the Center for Human Resources and Organizational Development (HRC),¹ and their concern about having to divide the staff into separate groups. Most of the original six voucher principals indicated that they wanted to join the demonstration at least in part because they were bored. One of them indicated that he liked the opportunity it represented, especially the possibility of crossing the line into the private sector. On the other hand, the expansion principals indicated that they liked the idea of joining the "principals' club,"² in addition to being interested in trying something new.

What kinds of Alum Rock principals chose to become voucher (i.e., alternative) school principals? As the data in Table 4 illustrate, the original and expansion voucher principals were much more likely to be directors in their schools than were the nonvoucher principals. This is not surprising, given the major role played by the voucher principals in persuading their staffs to join the demonstration. The

¹In late 1970, Superintendent Jeffers invited HRC, a private organizational development consulting firm, to work with the central office staff to help them prepare for decentralization. Jeffers subsequently made HRC training a requirement for school staffs intending to join the demonstration, on the grounds that such training would be beneficial in preparing them to take on additional responsibility. This training was designed to promote open communication and effective decisionmaking within groups, to which a frequent precursor was an exchange of people's feelings toward each other. All six original voucher school staffs underwent HRC training with mixed reactions. Some found the training useful, while others found it harmful and degrading. All found it a painful experience. When it became evident that the requirement to undertake HRC training was acting as a deterrent to other schools considering joining, Jeffers dropped the requirement for the expansion schools. A number of the expansion schools elected to receive HRC training but their participation was voluntary.

²During the first year of the demonstration, the original six voucher principals had become an elite and powerful group within the district.
Table 4
DOMINANT BEHAVIOR OF ALUM ROCK PRINCIPALS
UNDER WHOM DECISION WAS MADE TO JOIN OR
NOT JOIN VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Principal Behavioral Type</th>
<th>Voucher</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Nonvoucher&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup>Four of the nonvoucher principals left the district before they could be interviewed; therefore, we were unable to determine their dominant mode of behavior and they have been excluded from this table.

differences in behavior evidenced by these various types of principals can best be illustrated by quoting several of the Alum Rock principals on their perceptions of their job. From the directors we received the following kinds of comments:

Sequoia<sup>1</sup> is not going to make policy in my school. EVAC<sup>2</sup> is not either—I am making policy in my school.

Since [it is] the administration [that] gets blamed, I should be involved in everything.

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<sup>1</sup>The Sequoia Institute was a nonprofit corporation organized specifically to house the voucher staff. Thus, Superintendent Jeffers was able to contract with Sequoia rather than make the voucher staff part of the district administration. In this way, Jeffers hoped to emphasize the temporary nature of the voucher staff and allay the concerns of principals and other staff opposed to the creation of a powerful new central staff.

<sup>2</sup>The Education Voucher Advisory Committee (EVAC), composed of equal numbers of parents and school staff, was designed to oversee the demonstration and advise the school board about it.
You make changes by just getting in there and doing it. It is difficult to change schools because people don't like to change, especially teachers, who as a group are pretty conservative.

These statements can be contrasted with statements made by other voucher principals who did not take a directive position with their faculty:

Teachers need ownership in the program; [a principal] can't just go in and say "do it." [Comment from an administrator.]

I like the consensus role of decisionmaking that is required under the mini-school structure. With four programs, it is horrendous to try to keep a handle on all aspects of the curriculum, so I let the staff make most of the instructional decisions. [Comment made by a facilitator.]

These comments clearly illustrate one of the major differences between "directors" and other kinds of principals. Directive principals want to be involved in all aspects of their schools' decisionmaking, and are less willing to delegate responsibility. In Alum Rock it was mostly these principals who elected to join the demonstration. We suggest that this occurred because the incentives to join the demonstration were stronger for principals than for teachers. In view of the additional work and the uncertainties of such an endeavor, the promise of increased responsibility and discretionary funding was not enough to persuade a majority of Alum Rock teachers to be a part of the voucher demonstration. Therefore, most schools in which the decision was left solely up to the teachers elected not to join the demonstration. On the other hand, the incentives for principals to join were apparently much stronger. For principals, the demonstration represented an increase in responsibilities and a new challenge. Even most of the nonvoucher principals said they favored the demonstration, although they were unwilling to take a hard line with their faculties. The big difference between voucher and nonvoucher principals, then, was not their attitude toward the demonstration itself,
but rather their willingness to influence their staffs' decisions about whether or not to join. Thus, it is not surprising that more voucher than nonvoucher principals were directors.¹

Relationship to District Objectives

Alternative programs in Alum Rock were a means to other district ends: decentralization, parent participation, and a stronger financial position. Superintendent William Jefferds saw in the voucher demonstration an opportunity to meet these district goals; first, however, he needed to sell others on the merits of the opportunity.² He had been preparing for decentralization even before the district considered becoming the site for the voucher demonstration. The central office staff were receptive to these attempts because their relations with the school principals had become somewhat strained.³ School principals were receptive because they had much to gain from a decentralized system. If they could not look forward to new positions within the district, new responsibilities in their present positions were the next best thing. Most of these principals had been appointed by the former superintendent. Under his administration, curriculum received a strong emphasis but decisionmaking in general was heavily centralized. Therefore, when Jefferds promoted the voucher demonstration as a means of decentralizing decisionmaking to the school level, those principals anxious to take on additional responsibilities became strong supporters of the demonstration. Recognizing that it was one thing to want additional responsibilities, and another to have the necessary skills with which to manage such responsibilities, Jefferds persuaded OEO to sponsor HRC training for the principals and

¹$p = .02$, using Fisher's Exact Probability Test.
²For a discussion of the initiation of the voucher demonstration in Alum Rock, see Bass (1978).
³During an expansionary period in the district, a large number of young teachers were appointed to principalships. When the district's enrollment began declining, further career promotions were limited for these principals and they were beginning to grow impatient in a system that was highly centralized.
staffs of the schools expressing an interest in joining the demonstration. Thus, he recognized the importance of enlisting the support of the schools; what he did not anticipate, however, was the extent to which this alliance was to shape the future of the demonstration.

The six principals who were eventually able to persuade their faculties to join the demonstration in 1972-73 became a cohesive and powerful group, partly as a result of their HRC training. During the first year of the demonstration, they focused on securing decisions that would benefit themselves and their schools. The superintendent and other major actors were interested in ensuring the survival of the demonstration and in having it expand during the second year. To achieve those aims, they considered it essential to maintain the commitment of the six original voucher principals, and were therefore willing to compromise with them. Throughout the first year the principals tested the limits of their new power, seeking a role in all decisions concerning the demonstration. Their strategy was to hammer out their official position among themselves and then to present a united front to district-level decisionmakers. They lobbied for policies that had the effect of limiting parent control and increasing the control of school personnel. For example, they obtained a postponement until the end of the second year of the distribution of mini-school evaluations to parents (teachers found these evaluations threatening), and secured decisions to allow mini-schools to limit their enrollments and to fix school enrollments at the size of the school, to make the management of the voucher schools less complicated and to reduce competition. As one principal stated, "We have been the guardians of the education system for so many years, we aren't willing to sacrifice that right on the altar of community choice."

However, by year two a number of changes occurred that significantly affected the cohesiveness and power of the principals' group. The first and most important change was the expansion of their group from 6 to 13 voucher principals. Even though the expansion school principals had been accepted into their group and were, with HRC's help, emulating their behavior, the voucher principals did not remain
the cohesive force they once were. For one thing, it was more difficult for 13 to reach agreement on a given issue than it had been for 6. Also, district-level voucher administrators had learned to use their access to the superintendent as an effective lobbying strategy to counter the influence of the voucher principals.

By December 1973, the 13 voucher principals had decided to align themselves with nonvoucher principals. The reason given by the group for this alignment was that the issues of concern to them were issues of concern to all school administrators in a decentralized system—primarily, concern over alleged attempts of the central office to recentralize certain functions. In part, this shift in alignment was an indication that the voucher schools had been able to neutralize policies they opposed. By fixing school size and allowing mini-schools to limit enrollment, they had minimized the competition between schools and ensured each school and mini-school of a fairly stable enrollment. Also, it was clear by the second year that their initial anxiety about possible parent control over school operations had been misplaced. Thus, many of the problems that had motivated the original six voucher principals to unite had either been resolved in their favor by year two or had failed to materialize. In addition, the principals were left with a lot of uncertainty surrounding their roles within their own schools. They had expected decentralization to mean that they would have greater authority over the operation of their schools, but instead found decisionmaking authority extended down to the mini-school level—to teachers. Therefore, the most pressing concern of the voucher principals became the consolidation of the responsibility and authority they had gained, and an attempt to regain from the mini-schools some authority they had lost.

In part, the voucher principals shifted their alignment to a district-wide school administrators' group because it became politically advantageous for them to do so. In the second year of the demonstration, the superintendent refused to meet separately with the 13 voucher principals on the grounds that all principals had needs in common. This loss of status with the superintendent was further
underscored by the fact that he vetoed the principals on a number of different occasions on the issue of evaluating the mini-schools. Sensing the need to broaden their base of support, in December 1973 the voucher principals first attempted to organize voucher teachers to become a unified political influence in the forthcoming NIE/district negotiations (for year three of the demonstration). However, they failed in this attempt when the president of the teachers' bargaining agent—the Certified Employees Council (CEC)—refused to support the alliance on the grounds that the CEC already had strong review powers over voucher policy. To have sided with the principals on this attempt would have meant weakening the power of the teacher organization. Failing in this attempt, the voucher principals then chose to align themselves with other district principals.

Thus, beginning in year three (1974-75), the concerns of the voucher principals had shifted from voucher issues to issues of decentralization. As we shall see, this shift in orientation led them to attempt to decrease the decisionmaking authority of mini-schools and to reinstate this authority to the school level and, thus, to themselves.

In the fifth and final year of the voucher demonstration in Alum Rock, district policies were reviewed by all district administrators, working as task forces to recommend policies to the superintendent. Thus, the voucher principals had gone from being a separate and influential bloc to being members of the district-wide administrative group. Their influence has been diluted, but they, together with other administrators, probably participate more directly in district decisions than any of them did in 1972. That they were able to play such a significant role in the earlier stages of the demonstration is in large measure attributable to the leadership style of the superintendent.

In undertaking administrative decentralization, Jefferds deliberately avoided defining the ground rules; instead, he hoped that each school would shape decentralization to meet its own needs, and that eventually a consensus would emerge among the schools as to
reasonable decentralization guidelines. He saw his own role as that of adjudicating the disputes that arose in the process. This laissez-faire approach on his part might have worked much differently had the voucher principals not received HRC training. In HRC's own assessment, they helped the principals to "identify the necessity of maintaining internal group integrity and examine the potential alternatives available in order to facilitate the shifting of power, influence, and authority from the central staff to the principals" (Williams, 1972). During the initial phases of decentralization, then, the six original voucher principals—in part as a result of their HRC training—operated from a position of strength: They were effective in small group meetings, and the superintendent depended on them to support the demonstration. It was not until seven new schools joined the demonstration that this dependence lessened and other groups were able to balance the strength of the voucher principals.

Eugene

School District 4J encompasses the city of Eugene and several adjacent unincorporated areas. The district enrolls about 20,000 students in 31 elementary schools, 8 junior high schools, and 4 comprehensive high schools. Unlike Alum Rock, District 4J has almost no minority students (less than 4 percent) and its population is predominantly middle class. During the early 1960s, under its previous superintendent, School District 4J participated in a number of innovative projects. However, when the superintendent retired in 1973 after 14 years of service, some people felt that the schools had become too static.

Alternative programs originated in Eugene in response to parent demands for more "humanistic" and "open" education. These demands surfaced during a number of meetings convened by the board of education in preparation for selecting a new superintendent for the district. The purpose of the meetings was to obtain community views on the direction Eugene's schools should take in the future. As a result of
these meetings, and in keeping with their own educational philosophy, the board sought a superintendent capable of injecting new life into the system. They found Dr. Thomas Payzant, a 32-year-old graduate of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, who was then serving as superintendent in a small suburban district near Philadelphia. Payzant had achieved a reputation for innovativeness and had helped start a number of educational alternatives in his district.

Under Superintendent Payzant, the mechanisms for implementing alternative programs have been put in place. The district currently has seven elementary and three high school alternative programs, which together enroll approximately 5 percent of the student population. Unlike the case in Alum Rock, there was already community and staff demand for these programs. Therefore, the district did not need to offer inducements to teachers and principals to participate, but only needed to make sure that new programs could form if there was sufficient local initiative on the part of parents and teachers. The district formalized a procedure to develop, review, and process alternative school proposals; provided the services of a special project administrator to assist parents and faculty interested in forming an alternative program; undertook surveys to assess the demand for proposed programs within the district; and provided information to parents about the alternative programs. The central office decides on the location for an alternative program after the board approves the proposal. All of Eugene's elementary-level alternatives are housed in schools along with a regular educational program (i.e., they follow a school-within-school model). Most of the alternatives are oriented in varying degrees toward "open classroom" concepts. One of these programs is also focused on a specific content area, fine arts. The most recent elementary alternative developed in Eugene is a traditional program. Four of Eugene's seven elementary alternatives serve as magnet programs, drawing students from all areas of the district, and the remaining three programs enroll students from within their school's own attendance boundaries. In all cases, once the alternative program is started,
it is expected to operate within the same guidelines and with the same resources per student as the regular school programs.

**Principals' Role in Program Initiation**

In Alum Rock, principals initiated discussions of alternatives and actively sought to become alternative school principals; in Eugene, the alternative programs were initiated by teachers, and in one case by parents. Therefore, alternative school principals in Eugene did not select themselves for those positions; they acquired their responsibilities by being principals of schools in which teachers designed an alternative program that was accepted by district management, or by having their schools selected to house an alternative program.

All seven of the elementary-level alternative programs currently operating in Eugene, and one that has since disbanded, are housed in schools along with nonalternative programs. Four of these eight alternative programs are school-within-school models; that is, teachers within the building wrote a proposal for an alternative program that was to operate within that school and draw students from that attendance area. In these cases, the principals of these schools were retained as the principals of the multiprogram buildings. On the basis of this information, what can we infer about the principals of these four schools? First, we know that in these schools the staff were given the flexibility and autonomy to pursue their own interests. Second, we know that these principals must have been fairly comfortable with the idea of a multiprogram building. Two of these four principals were seen by their faculty primarily as administrators, and two primarily as facilitators. What appeared to distinguish the two "administrative" principals from the two "facilitative" principals was their method of decisionmaking. The two facilitators followed a consensus model of decisionmaking, with the alternative program and the regular program each having proportional representation in the decisionmaking group. The two administrators followed a more functional decisionmaking model. In one case the teachers in both the alternative and the regular programs were involved in decisions such
as curriculum and teacher hiring, but the principal made all of the budgeting decisions. In another case the principal gave the alternative program complete discretion over its decisions, including budgeting, but continued to make most of the decisions for the regular school and also played a coordinating role between the two programs.

The remaining four elementary alternative programs in Eugene began somewhat differently. In these instances interested teachers, and in one case parents, wrote proposals for alternative programs that were to serve as magnet schools, attracting students from the entire school district. These proposals were then approved by the district before any decisions were made as to where the new programs would be located. In two cases the alternative programs were placed at schools that were underenrolled, and the principals at these buildings were retained as the principals of both the regular schools and the alternative programs. Both of these principals were rated by their teachers as being primarily administrators. In the remaining two cases the alternatives were also placed in schools that were underenrolled, but the principals of these schools were replaced with new principals specifically brought in for the position. One of these principals was personally approved by the superintendent. He is seen as an administrator by his staff. The second principal was essentially selected by the teachers in the alternative program. This program had existed as a special program at another school for three years before becoming a designated alternative. The teachers there were given the opportunity to select a new principal several years before becoming a designated alternative, which they did on the basis of their candidate's support for the program. Subsequently, when they wrote a formal proposal to be accepted as a designated alternative, one of its terms was that this principal be appointed to run the school at which the program would be located. He is seen as a facilitator by his staff.

Thus, as we see from the data in Table 5, none of the alternative school principals in Eugene behave primarily as directors, whereas 2 of the 11 nonalternative principals are so rated by their staffs.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}This difference is statistically significant ($p = .04$, using Fisher's Exact Probability Test).
Table 5
DOMINANT BEHAVIOR OF EUGENE PRINCIPALS IN
ALTERNATIVE/NONALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Principal Behavioral Type</th>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Nonalternative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The selection of certain types of principals for the alternative programs in Eugene was particularly important because all of the alternative programs there were designed by teachers and parents to function with a shared decisionmaking style. Had these principals been unwilling to give up some of their authority and to include teachers in decisionmaking, it is unlikely that the programs could have been implemented as intended.

Relationship to District Objectives

In Eugene, alternatives were implemented in response to community and staff interest; the district merely had to institute the mechanisms whereby alternatives became legitimate. Unlike Alum Rock, where the teachers expressed no prior interest in alternatives and needed to be sold on the idea, the Eugene teachers simply needed to be given the opportunity. This difference had implications not only for the district strategies needed to implement alternatives but also for the type of principal who would be best suited to run an alternative school. In Alum Rock the voucher teachers could be described initially as reluctant participants; a directive principal willing to make decisions might be most appropriate in these circumstances. However, in Eugene
the appropriate principal response was to allow teachers' discretion to initiate and develop the programs. Thus, a highly directive principal would have been antithetical to the purpose for which alternatives originated in Eugene. It was therefore consistent with Eugene's objectives to select principals who behaved primarily as administrators or facilitators.

Minneapolis

Minneapolis is in a metropolitan area of nearly a million people. Most of the population is middle class and of North European descent, with a relatively small minority population (4.3 percent black and 1.3 percent Native American). The enrollment in the Minneapolis Public Schools has declined from 65,000 in 1971 to 53,000 in 1976. During that period the percentage of minority students went from just under 15 percent to slightly over 20 percent. After a number of school closings and consolidations, the district now operates 82 schools (10 high schools, 12 junior high schools, and 60 elementary schools). Before the mid-1960s the district was plagued by a number of familiar problems—declining test scores, inadequate finances, old and inadequate buildings. The superintendent of nearly twenty years presided over a central staff that was relatively isolated from the schools. Some teachers and principals felt that the system provided few opportunities for them to grow professionally, and there were also signs of mounting community dissatisfaction with the schools. In the mid-1960s, a reform-minded majority gained control of the school board. In 1967 they hired a new superintendent, Dr. John Davis, then superintendent in Worcester, Massachusetts, who served in Minneapolis from 1967 to 1975, and initiated efforts to carry out the board's mandate for change.

Davis initiated a multifaceted program of reform and improvement, beginning with a major effort to reverse the district's financial position. Over the course of the next ten years, state aid to the district tripled and the legislature authorized the sale of special bonds to finance a major school building program. A major effort was
also made to increase the sense of professionalism and responsibility among the staff, from the central office to the classroom. One mechanism for achieving this goal was decentralization. In 1973 the district was divided into three administrative areas, and decisions about budget, personnel, and curriculum that used to reside in the central office began to be delegated to area superintendents and in turn to principals.

The district also began to place greater value on innovativeness and risk-taking. It encouraged school staffs to submit proposals for federal ESEA Title III funding; numerous grants were obtained to support local projects. In 1971, Minneapolis received an Experimental Schools Program grant from the U.S. Office of Education. The purpose of the Minneapolis experiment was to bring about "comprehensive change" in the schools by creating educational choices. The Southeast Alternatives (SEA) program began in one area of the district, enrolling approximately 2,500 students in the local high school and four elementary alternative school programs: a contemporary, or traditional school; an ungraded continuous progress school; an "open" school in which students had considerably more choice over their learning activities; and a K-12 free school.

In March 1973 the board passed a resolution to implement elementary-level alternatives city-wide by September 1976. A major impetus for this resolution was a 1971 court decision ordering Minneapolis to desegregate its schools. Although the board mandated the development of alternative schools district-wide, decisions about the kinds of alternative programs to be adopted were generally left up to the schools themselves. Typically, the process worked as follows: Central administration would make decisions about how to pair or cluster schools to best achieve desegregation. The new school communities that resulted from these clusterings would then

\[1\] The Experimental Schools Program was subsequently moved from USOE to NIE.
decide which programs to offer within their own cluster. Generally, parents and teachers would be surveyed as to their preferences and the final decisions concerning program location were made by the cluster school principals and their area superintendent. Although schools and communities were free to implement any types of themes they desired, in practice only the contemporary, continuous progress, and open program themes were chosen. The main deviation that occurred from this pattern was that a number of the new open program alternatives chose to impose more structure than did the model previously implemented under the Experimental Schools Program, and referred to themselves as "modified open" programs.\(^1\)

Within each cluster, teachers were allowed to transfer to the program of their choice on the basis of seniority. The district gave school staffs funds to plan their programs and conduct in-service training. Generally, the schools were given one full year to plan and to prepare the community before the implementation of their programs. During the 1976-77 school year, 57 percent of the district's 60 elementary schools were alternative schools: 9 contemporary, 11 continuous progress, 6 open or modified open, and 1 free school.\(^2\) Seven schools were offering more than one educational program within their school. Additionally, three new school complexes have been built that house students previously attending a number of the district's older, underenrolled and usually racially imbalanced schools.

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1 In recent years, parents and teachers have begun to demand that the district provide additional program themes. A Montessori program has been implemented in one area of the district, and fundamental programs are likely to be implemented in two of the four areas.

2 Semantically, the remaining 26 Minneapolis elementary alternative schools are also alternatives, bearing the label of a contemporary program, since the board designated all schools in Minneapolis as alternative schools. However, it is our contention and the contention of a number of people in the district that these "outer-ring" schools are not truly alternatives. They have not been included in the district's desegregation plan, nor are they clustered with the other types of programs. Thus, they have not been affected very much by the alternatives effort. (Their students may voluntary transfer to open or continuous progress programs within their administrative area, but relatively few do so.) For further details, see the appendix and Rasmussen (1978).
Two complexes contain three alternative schools; the third complex is a K-3, 4-6 continuous progress school.

**Principals' Roles in Program Initiation**

Although the decision as to whether or not a Minneapolis principal would manage an alternative school was made by the central administration, the alternative school principals themselves largely determined the types of programs they would administer. Within a limited range of choices (i.e., those choices for which parents and teachers had indicated a preference), the principals were able to select the programs they chose to lead. Did certain types of principals tend to select certain kinds of programs? From the data in Table 6, it would appear not. From our interviews with a number of these principals, we know that in some cases the principals had a definite preference for one program over another, either because of some specific training they had received or because of their personal interest in that type of program. For example, one of the principals with whom we spoke had taught in an open classroom, and therefore preferred to manage an open program as a principal. Another of our respondents had been recently trained in methods directly applicable to a continuous progress program, and had therefore requested that kind of placement. In other cases, it appeared that principals had no strong preferences for the kinds of programs in which they would be located. Some of the Minneapolis principals had received management training that better prepared them to deal with the various needs of an organization undergoing change. For these principals, selecting a particular program theme to manage may not have been important.

Principals of multiprogram buildings were expected to manage several programs. For the most part, multiprogram school organization was avoided in Minneapolis except in cases where it was deemed

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1Recall we have eliminated 26 Minneapolis schools from our list of alternative schools.
Table 6
DOMINANT MODE OF MINNEAPOLIS PRINCIPALS' BEHAVIOR
BY TYPE OF ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Principal Behavioral Type</th>
<th>Single Program</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contemporary</td>
<td>Continuous Progress</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Multiprogram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: These differences are not statistically significant.

necessary for desegregation purposes. In fact, Minneapolis is the only one of our four districts to follow primarily a separate-school form of organization for its alternative programs. Not only was Minneapolis committed in principle to the single-program-per-school organizational arrangement piloted in the SEA model, in practice it was willing to commit the funds required to bring the idea to fruition. As one observer wrote, "If possible, everyone preferred that people more or less like-minded should have a whole building to themselves" (Morley, 1976, p. 20).

Relationship to District Objectives
In Minneapolis, alternatives were first introduced in response to community interest in alternative styles of instruction to meet

1 The three multiprogram schools in our sample became multiprogram schools because it was feared that parents in these communities would continue to send their children to the neighborhood school regardless of the programs offered, thus defeating desegregation. Therefore, these schools became either an intermediate or a primary school offering parents their choice of two or three programs within one building.
varied student learning styles, and were later implemented district-wide as it became apparent that they were consistent with a number of other district objectives—decentralization, desegregation, and modernization. Older, underutilized, racially segregated schools were closed and their students sent to new educational complexes, each enrolling 1,200 to 1,800 students from three to four obsolete schools. Several of these complexes each contain three types of alternatives. Other district schools were paired, or clustered in groups of three or four, as a means of desegregating previously racially isolated schools. Again, school clusters offer more than one alternative program. For the most part, parent and student selection of program themes resulted in racially desegregated schools. Thus, alternatives helped serve the objective of voluntarily desegregating the Minneapolis schools.

To support the objective of desegregation, a number of the decisions pertaining to alternatives had to be centrally mandated, such as identifying which schools to close and which to pair or cluster. Recall, however, that decentralization was another of the district's objectives, and the district did not therefore want to centrally mandate all of the decisions related to alternatives. As noted above, once schools were selected to be alternative schools, the school staffs and communities were given the responsibility for choosing and designing the program themes they would offer. The administration supported them with time to plan,¹ and once the alternative programs were in place, the district continued to support them with funds for staff development and additional teacher allocations.² As one principal stated,

¹Generally one year, with an early release day for students every Tuesday, so that teachers and interested parents could have time to plan or to attend human relations training sessions to prepare them for desegregation.

²The allocation of these additional teaching positions and funds was left up to the discretion of each area superintendent and was not necessarily consistent from area to area. For example, in one of the areas two additional teacher positions were allocated to both the continuous progress and open alternative programs, whereas in another of the areas continuous progress programs were not allocated any additional staff positions.
the central office "rewards those schools who move in the direction they want them to go with dollars and with recognition."

Cincinnati

Enrollment in the Cincinnati School District has declined in recent years. Its student population went from 87,500 in the 1964-65 school year to 66,000 in 1976-77, whereas its proportion of black students rose from 45 percent in 1970-71 to 51 percent in 1976-77. The district operates 97 schools: 7 senior high schools, 16 junior high schools, and 74 elementary schools. Until the fall of 1973, with the advent of the first alternative schools and an open-enrollment plan, all but one of Cincinnati's schools were geographically districted. The one exception was a special college preparatory school for students in grades 7 to 12 who pass a special admissions test.

Initially, Cincinnati's commitment to alternative programs was portrayed as a response to the idea of cultural pluralism, which was popular in the late sixties and early seventies. A speech by the superintendent in 1974 cited the "diversity of learning styles, modes of living, cultural aspirations, value systems and growth patterns" of urban educational systems and stated that "no single curriculum can possibly satisfy the abilities and aspirations of all students." The superintendent went on to state that the "alternative school approach differs from traditional concepts of educational systems primarily in that the school system is seen as responsible for suiting the program to the student's needs, rather than forcing the student to change in order to fit into the program" (Waldrip, 1974). However, regardless of Cincinnati's avowed reason for initiating alternatives, their growth has also become closely identified with another compelling district goal: voluntary desegregation of the schools.

In the early 1970s, a majority-liberal school board began to take steps to reduce the racial isolation of Cincinnati's schools. In 1972, it hired a new superintendent, Dr. Donald Waldrip, who had recently been involved in desegregating the schools in Wichita Falls,
Texas. Waldrip had a reputation for being both pro-integration and educationally innovative. In March 1973, the board adopted a policy

...that quality integrated education is the highest goal of the Cincinnati Public Schools. While this purpose shall remain clear, devices used to achieve this goal may vary with time and circumstances. Whenever a relevant decision is to be made, the potential for achieving integration shall be assigned a high priority.¹

That summer, Waldrip unveiled an open enrollment plan that would allow students to attend any district school with available space, providing the transfers would improve racial balance. He also initiated a plan for achieving staff racial balance by encouraging voluntary transfers and assigning new teachers on the basis of race. The city's first two alternative schools were opened in the fall of 1973, with the provision that admissions would be regulated to promote racial balance.

In the November 1973 school board election, four members of the liberal board were defeated by a slate of conservative candidates running on a "neighborhood schools" platform. In December the lame-duck board passed a resolution to abolish existing school attendance area lines and assign students to schools so that each one would reflect the 50 percent black, 50 percent white racial makeup of the district. When the four new board members took office in January, the more conservative board did not formally rescind the previous board's resolution, but did affirm its intention to develop "quality integrated education" within the framework of a "neighborhood schools policy" (Cincinnati Board of Education minutes, January 14, 1974). In May 1974 the NAACP initiated a lawsuit charging the board with racial and economic segregation. The case has been several years in pretrial judicial maneuverings, and a key element in the board's defense has

¹Cincinnati Board of Education Minutes, March 26, 1973.
been its pursuit of voluntary desegregation through alternative schools. Since the district implemented its first alternative school in 1973, it has gradually expanded its system of alternatives to 17 programs at 43 sites, with an enrollment of approximately 9,000 students in alternatives for the 1977-78 school year. In contrast to both Alum Rock and Eugene, Cincinnati deliberately employed a strategy of gradual growth for its alternative programs: They would begin with one or a few grade levels and then "grow" one grade level per year. The majority of Cincinnati's alternative programs follow a school-within-school model, with the rest functioning as separate-site programs.

Using alternatives to help achieve desegregation has required a centralized approach to determine what kinds of program/location combinations would do the most to improve racial balance. Using these programs to advance desegregation has also allowed the board to make a significant financial commitment to alternatives. For some school principals, staffs, and communities, having an alternative program placed at their school represents a means of providing integrated education within the neighborhood school setting.¹ Some feel that if these steps are taken now, their schools will be exempt from more drastic measures in the future, such as mandatory busing and school closing. For these, as well as for more reluctant participants, the district offers further inducements in the form of more money and more staff for alternative programs.

Principals' Roles in Program Initiation

Principals in Cincinnati had little opportunity to determine whether or not they would manage alternative schools, or what kinds of programs their schools would have. Decisions as to what types of

¹Students were admitted to the alternatives after a consideration of racial balance criteria. The district's student population is approximately 50 percent black and 50 percent white, and alternative school enrollments have been allowed to range between ratios of 70/30 either way.
alternatives to offer and where they were to be located were made by the central administration regardless of the abilities or preferences of the staff at these locations. Unlike Minneapolis, however, most of the elementary and junior high alternative programs in Cincinnati did not involve a change in school processes. Of the 13 different program types offered at 35 different school sites during the 1967-77 school year, 6 program types involved new processes and 7 involved new content orientations.  

Another way in which Cincinnati's system of alternatives differed from that of Minneapolis was in Cincinnati's provision of an identifiable program leader for most of their programs. Program leaders were responsible for the substantive development and implementation of their programs; they had no teaching duties. Of the 13 types of alternative programs operating in Cincinnati during the 1976-77 school year, 7 had program leaders and 6 did not. Principals of alternative programs that had program leaders were not expected to be the substantive leaders of those programs. Therefore, for some principals of separate school alternative programs, perhaps the most significant change in their jobs was having to share responsibility for their school's program with another person. For principals of multiprogram alternatives with program leaders, major changes in their functions were also administrative in nature—keeping two separate budgets, processing additional purchase orders, and coordinating the two programs, for example. Multiprogram school principals would also need to be willing to share some of their authority with the alternatives' program leaders.

We predict that highly directive principals would experience difficulty working with a substantive program leader. We see from the data in Table 7 that two of the alternative programs with substantive leaders do have principals who behave primarily as directors.

\[1\] During the 1976-77 school year, Cincinnati officially listed 14 different program types. The excluded program is a tracked, remedial reading program that did not meet our definition of an alternative. By the 1977-78 school year, Cincinnati also discontinued referring to their reading program as an alternative program.
Table 7

DOMINANT BEHAVIOR OF CINCINNATI PRINCIPALS IN ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS WITH AND WITHOUT A PROGRAM LEADER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Principal Behavioral Type</th>
<th>Has Program Leader</th>
<th>Does Not Have Program Leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single Program</td>
<td>Multiple Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Montessori program was located separately at one site and shared a neighborhood school at another site. The principal of the separate-site Montessori program is also the principal of the Montessori program at the regular site but is not the principal of the regular program located there. To avoid double counting the Montessori principal, we treat this program as a single-program alternative. This decision is also supported by the fact that the regular program and the Montessori program are attempting to keep completely separated at the multiprogram site.

However, in both of these cases the design of the program called for the school principal to take a strong leadership role. These two principals both run the same type of alternative program—one that requires a great many changes both in classroom practices and in the organization of the school. This particular program is complex, requiring five years to implement fully. At the beginning of the conversion process the principals were put through an extensive training session. They then continued to receive the assistance of a program "facilitator," usually from a nearby university, who provided in-service training to the principal and the teachers in
this program, and counseled them during the implementation process. Thus, in these cases the principals were in a training role in addition to managing their schools. As time wore on, they absorbed more of the functions of the university consultant and served more as the leaders of their programs.

It would seem imperative for Cincinnati to provide such program leaders, given their method of developing alternative program themes. After all, could principals and teachers be expected to be the substantive leaders of programs that were conceived and developed at the district level? When a program leader was not provided, the district used various strategies to provide equivalent leadership. For example, in one case the principal was recruited specifically for an alternative program on the basis of his prior experience in that program's substantive area. In still other cases the district was to provide alternative school teachers with free periods for planning and developing their programs. Thus, it appears that in Cincinnati, with one or two exceptions, the alternative program principals were not expected to play a strong substantive role. This responsibility was either handled by, or shared with, the program leader or the program teachers.

Relationship to District Objectives

In contrast to the other three districts, Cincinnati operates as a more centralized system with less discretionary authority given to the schools. The board and superintendent still make operational and policy decisions, and other district personnel are expected to carry out these decisions. Although Cincinnati has an area structure apparently like those in Minneapolis and Eugene, this clearly has not led to more responsibility at the school level. In an annual survey of school personnel in 1976, Cincinnati principals rated their decisionmaking power as low (Cincinnati Public Schools, 1976). Similar views were expressed by a number of the principals with whom we spoke. It was not uncommon, in fact, for Cincinnati principals to remark on their isolation from the board and downtown: "The
Board of Education does not care about us"; "They don't even know what we are doing here."

These relationships also colored the district's policies on alternatives. For the most part, alternative programs in Cincinnati were designed by the superintendent or members of his staff. The locations of alternative programs were selected primarily to achieve racial balance, followed by space considerations. Little consideration was given to the qualifications or interests of the principals and staffs. We know of several cases where the principals were very displeased at having alternative programs placed in their schools, and asked to have the programs removed.

From Waldrip's perspective, it was unnecessary to take the qualifications or interests of existing staff or community into consideration when deciding on locations for alternative programs. From his viewpoint, alternatives were linked to desegregation, and communities would accept them because alternatives that helped to desegregate their schools might also help to exempt them from court-ordered busing. School staffs were expected to accept the placement of alternatives at their schools because it was better than having their schools closed—a real threat to schools with empty classrooms. And principals were expected to accept them because it was their job; in Waldrip's view, principals were not educational or program leaders and would therefore not be seriously affected by the placement of alternative programs in their buildings. To ensure their acceptance, Waldrip "sweetened the pot" by providing additional resources for alternative programs: They were given additional money, and frequently additional staff positions as well. For example to entice

\[\text{It is difficult to give precise cost figures for Cincinnati's alternative programs. Excess costs vary greatly from program to program, depending on facilities, student/teacher ratio, and specialized staffs. The district's figures for 1975-76, when 5,300 students were enrolled in alternatives, show excess costs for alternatives to be approximately } \$1.26 \text{ million, or an average of } \$236 \text{ per student. In March 1976, the board voted to hold the 1976-77 excess per pupil cost of an alternative program to } \$100.\]
several junior high principals to take on alternative programs, the district promised them two additional staff positions per grade level during the first year of the program's existence. As one area superintendent stated, "No principal is going to say no to additional teachers." In addition, alternative school principals reported considerably more discretion in hiring staff than did principals of nonalternative schools. One alternative program principal with whom we spoke said he had never had the ability to select staff before, and regarded this new authority as the single greatest advantage of working with an alternative program. Thus, although the administration did not believe it necessary to attempt to match principal expertise or interest to the nature of alternative programs, they clearly felt they should provide the schools with some positive incentives and not just the threat of mandatory busing or school closings.

Like Minneapolis, Cincinnati was attempting to deal with tight budgets. As principals retired, they were not replaced; instead, existing principals were assigned to cover two schools. When area superintendents and curriculum coordinators retired, they too were not replaced. This has had several implications for school principals: First, their contact person at the central office has had less time to devote to each school, which has added to the principals' administrative duties. Second, with fewer curriculum coordinators serving the schools, principals found themselves having increasingly to serve in the role of curriculum or instructional leaders. Finally, if senior positions are phased out entirely there will be fewer paths for promotion open to principals. If these changes do in fact occur, the district administration may have to make some adjustments to its alternatives policies. For example, if Cincinnati principals do come increasingly to function in the role of educational leaders, the district may need to take their qualifications and interests more into account when selecting locations for alternative programs. On the other hand, principals responsible for more than one school may have difficulty functioning as curriculum leaders also, making it
necessary for the district to make other provisions. Also, if the Cincinnati principals perceive relatively few opportunities for promotion within the district, they may become impatient, as the principals did in Alum Rock, unless they are provided with greater decisionmaking opportunities.¹

Summary

We have seen that the incentives offered to school staffs differed markedly in these four districts, depending on their basic reasons for implementing alternatives. When programs were initiated in response to consumer demand, as was the case in Eugene, few incentives had to be provided for alternatives to form. In this situation the district had only to legitimize the process by instituting formal procedures whereby programs became recognized as alternatives to the regular school offerings. When alternatives were implemented as a means of meeting other district goals (such as desegregation and decentralization) as well as consumer demand, as was the case in Minneapolis, the district administration took a more active role in the formation of alternative programs. In the case of Minneapolis the decision to offer alternatives district-wide was centrally mandated, and inducements were offered to the schools in the form of additional in-service monies and additional staff allocations. The actual planning and implementation of alternatives was left up to the discretion of the school staffs and local communities.

In our remaining two cases, consumer demand for alternative programs was noticeably absent, and in both cases the districts operated

¹There were already some signs that this may be happening in Cincinnati. The principals' association has considered unionization, and has initiated discussions about this with the teachers' union. However, in our view, it would take some time before the Cincinnati principals acted as a collective group. Currently, they have separate elementary and secondary principal associations, and relations between these two groups have not always been harmonious. Also, a relatively large number of principals with whom we spoke did not appear to be interested, or active, in the existing principal associations, thought they might become so if they perceived it to be to their advantage.
in accordance with their particular objectives. In Cincinnati, alternatives were primarily a means of desegregating the schools. There, the district administration made all the decisions regarding the design and location of alternatives, in keeping with the need to racially balance the schools, and encouraged school staffs to cooperate by providing them with additional resources. In Alum Rock, alternatives were implemented as a means of meeting several district goals, one of which was administrative decentralization. A centralized approach to implementing alternatives would not have been congruent with attempts to decentralize decision-making to the school level. Accordingly, one major inducement to school staffs to implement alternatives was the promise of additional decision-making responsibility. Additional inducements in the form of extra resources were also provided by the federal voucher demonstration grant.

The contexts in which the alternative programs were initiated and implemented in these four districts often influenced the kinds of principals who became the managers of these programs. In Alum Rock, the principals, who largely selected themselves for the positions, were judged by us to be directors significantly more often than were the principals who allowed their staffs to make the decision whether or not to join the demonstration. In Eugene, school staffs primarily initiated alternative programs; principals were selected to become alternative school principals because their staffs initiated an alternative, because their school had the space to accommodate an alternative, or because the district administration appointed them to that position. The Eugene alternative school principals were judged by their staffs as directors significantly less often than were the Eugene nonalternative school principals.

Although we are unable to make an alternative/nonalternative comparison in Minneapolis and Cincinnati, we do know that in both of these districts there was no differentiation of principal type by program type (open, continuous progress, and contemporary; and multi-program and single program). Furthermore, in both of these districts, key decisions concerning alternatives, such as location, were made
by central administration in keeping with one of their objectives for alternatives—desegregation. In both cases, the districts' desegregation goals superseded school principals' choices to become alternative school principals although the Minneapolis principals did have considerable flexibility in selecting the kind of program themes they would manage. In the next chapter we will examine how these and other district policies affected principals' management of the alternative schools.
III. MANAGING ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS

We have examined the process by which principals came to be alternative school principals in four districts. In this chapter, we examine how these principals managed their schools: We investigate the relationships among principal behavior, program distinctiveness, organizational arrangements, and staff tension.

Program Distinctiveness

An alternative program is not really an alternative unless it is in some way distinctive. A major rationale for alternative schools is that they enable parents, students, and teachers to choose educational programs that best suit their needs and interests, with the assumption that these programs are different in some discernible way from other programs in the district. In some cases, such as in Cincinnati or Minneapolis, alternatives were initiated as a means of bringing about or supporting school desegregation. The rationale behind this approach is that student interest in different types of educational approaches will transcend neighborhood school boundaries and will thereby facilitate the student movement required to create ethnically mixed schools throughout the district. Here too, presumably, programs that are being used to attract students out of their neighborhoods will need to offer them something other than what they are already receiving in their local schools.

As noted above, alternative programs can vary from conventional programs in many ways; they may employ a special method or structure, or they may offer a specialized curriculum or content. Furthermore, we have seen that three of our districts—Alum Rock, Minneapolis, and Eugene—tended to specialize in alternative programs that offered a different structure, and Cincinnati's alternatives tended to vary by both structure and content. From our perspective, for an alternative program to be distinct, it must vary from conventional programs in
the district (between-program diversity), but the teachers within the alternative should be following uniform classroom practices (within-program uniformity). In this study, teacher reports of classroom practices are used as the basis for determining an alternative program’s distinctiveness. The data illustrated in the following figure show the distribution of classroom practices in the schools and programs in our sample, by district. In this report we are most interested in schools and programs at the two extremes of these distributions—the highly structured, or fundamental schools, and the child-centered, or open schools. We consider these programs to be diverse from the typical programs offered in their districts.

Diversity in Multiprogram Buildings

In Alum Rock the decision was made to offer more than one alternative within a building because parents wanted a choice of programs within their own neighborhood schools. Valid choices depended upon

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1 Question 46 of the spring 1977 Teacher Questionnaire asked teachers to describe their classrooms along thirteen dimensions. These dimensions were analyzed to determine whether or not certain combinations were explaining the same phenomena. One statistically significant factor emerged from this analysis, on which all of the alternative programs could be categorized. (See the appendix for details.) Essentially, this factor represents a continuum of classroom practices: Programs that ranked at one end of this continuum were following open classroom practices, whereas programs that ranked at the opposite end were following traditional or structured classroom practices. Programs that fell in the middle of this continuum tended to follow an individualized approach. This factor measures the extent to which classrooms were organized differently from the typical classroom in that district. Without a systematic observation of classrooms in these districts, we were unable to determine whether alternative programs were different in terms of content. Thus, our measure of distinctiveness is sensitive to operational differences only. For an analysis of the distinctiveness of the Alum Rock alternatives based on classroom observation data, see Barker, Bikson, and Kimbrough (1978).

2 The Cincinnati alternative programs are excluded from this analysis because we lacked the survey data necessary to construct a valid and reliable measure of their distinctiveness.

3 See Bridge and Blackman (1978).
In the case of Alum Rock and Eugene, these means are a weighted average for the district as a whole, with data from each of our sampled nonalternative schools representing all of the nonalternative schools in the district from which they were randomly selected. In the case of Minneapolis, however, this mean is a weighted average for the alternative programs only. At the time we selected our Minneapolis sample, we were unaware that the 26 schools surrounding the outer fringes of the district are not (by our standards) alternative schools. Only 2 of these 26 schools fell into our sample by chance, since we sampled disproportionately by program strata (i.e., contemporary, continuous progress, and open) to obtain a similar number of programs in each strata. Since we cannot justify letting 2 schools represent 26, we have excluded them from our analyses and present data here from the Minneapolis alternative schools only (see the appendix).

In each district, a score was computed for each school or program in our sample that reflected the classroom practices followed by those teachers. These scores were then weighted to reflect an average score for each district, and this weighted district average was used to calculate the extent to which programs differed from that typically provided in the district. Those programs that differed by plus or minus one standard deviation (σ), as marked, are considered to be diverse from the typical district program.

Figure—Distribution of classroom practices by program/school and by district.
each voucher school being able to offer distinct programs within one school. In Minneapolis the district resorted to a multiprogram organization for their alternatives only when they felt that a separate form of organization would be insufficient to promote desegregation. Here, too, the ability of the schools to provide distinct programs within one school was important if parents were to be given a real choice. In Eugene a multiprogram form of organization was also followed. However, in Eugene an alternative program was always housed with a nonalternative school. In this case, parents could simply send their children to the neighborhood school unless they preferred to send them to another school or to an alternative program under the district's open-enrollment policy.

In our surveyed sample we found that programs differed from other programs in their building in 8 of our 18 multiprogram schools. Interestingly, the alternative programs in the three Eugene multiprogram schools that have within-school diversity are all physically separated from the regular program in either a separate wing or separate floor of their buildings. Also, all three of these programs have strong program leadership from their head teacher and strong parent support. Two of these alternatives were designed by teachers and parents as magnet programs and were placed at schools after approval was received from the board for their creation. In these cases the neighborhood schools also retained programs that were operationally different from the alternative programs in those buildings. However, we do know of one case in Eugene where this did not happen. In this instance, all but one of the regular teachers left when a magnet program was placed at their school. The principal brought in to manage this multiprogram building hired new personnel for the regular program—and thus began with essentially two new programs, both of which follow more or less the same classroom

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1 Programs that coexisted in one school and that differed from each other by at least one standard deviation in terms of classroom practices reported by teachers are considered to be diverse.
practices. The principal utilizes techniques similar to those used by the multiprogram principals whose programs have remained diverse: That is, the two programs are physically separated and each program has its own management structure. In this case, however, the programs may be operationally similar because the principal had an unusual opportunity to select new "like-minded" faculty for the "regular" program.

In Alum Rock four of the nine multiprogram schools in 1976-77 had diverse programs. Two of these schools elected to continue to offer more than one program in 1977-78, because they too perceive their programs as being uniquely different from each other. One of these two schools will continue to offer the same two mini-schools offered in 1973-74—the year they joined the demonstration. At that time the staff made a conscious decision to offer only two programs, since they had heard that having three or more programs in one school leads to staff dissent. They have also been able to keep the enrollment in these mini-schools fairly stable, which in turn cuts down on feelings of competition among staff. The principal of their school stated that he was definitely a curriculum leader before vouchers, but that he now functions as an advisor or facilitator to his staff. Teachers in this building are heavily involved in the decisionmaking process; decisions are made by a committee composed of the principal and two teacher representatives from each of the mini-schools.

The second of these two schools continued to offer three mini-schools during the 1977-78 school year despite the principal's desire to return to a single program. This school has had three different principals since first joining the demonstration in 1972-73 entirely on the principal's recommendation. When the process of forming mini-schools caused divisions and alienation between the staff members, the principal initially tried to bring them together. Later he decided unity was unimportant, as they were still able to function as a school. The mini-schools became strong, autonomous units under this principal, and the staff came to enjoy their independence and decision-making responsibility. As one of the teachers stated, "Now we demand
input into decisions [whereas] several years ago we didn't know what input meant." Consequently, they refused to go along with their principal's wishes to return to offering only a single program in 1977-78.

Although our analysis indicates that two additional Alum Rock schools were offering programs that were uniquely different from each other, these two schools elected to return to a single program for the 1977-78 school year. One of these schools had to return to a single program because it could not continue to offer a bilingual alternative without accredited bilingual teachers. Moreover, the staff no longer saw an advantage to having separate mini-schools since the voucher demonstration was ending (i.e., they would no longer receive any discretionary funds). The other school elected to return to a single program because the principal did not perceive that the programs were sufficiently different from one another. This school also experienced a turnover in principals. The principal in 1977-78 perceived a number of factions in the school and felt it was critical that school-wide directions be developed. At the same time, some aspects of the two programs were retained. For example, the two reading curricula currently used by these programs in 1977-78 will continue to be offered next year, and parents of children attending this school will be able to select both the reading program and the teachers they would like for their children.

In Minneapolis only one of the three multiprogram schools in our sample was able to maintain within-school diversity. This school's decisionmaking was done by a committee composed of the principal and the resource teachers from the alternative programs. The principal saw his role as one of support for his teachers; he managed those aspects of the school that were not directly related to the classroom, and ran interference for his teachers so they were free to concentrate on their jobs. The resource teachers had responsibility for program content and interprogram coordination. By dividing responsibility in this way, this school was able to offer two programs within one building that were more distinct than were the program combinations in any of our other 18 multiprogram schools. This suggests that
teachers were able to maintain program diversity as long as the principal provided them with the support and the flexibility to do so, and if the program itself had strong substantive leadership. Principals who were able to provide this necessary support tended to behave as either administrators or facilitators. We suggested above that it would be operationally difficult for a school principal to be all things to all people. In other words, if the school principal attempts to be highly directive of two or more programs, we would expect these programs to be operationally similar to one another. Although we have too few cases to generalize from, our data do appear to support this view.

At this point we should recall that the incentives operating in one of the districts—Alum Rock—were such that a disproportionate number of directive principals elected to become principals of multiprogram alternative schools. We have seen, however, that multiprogram schools in which the programs were distinct in terms of their classroom practices were managed by principals who were less directive. Programs in schools managed by directive principals tended to function more like one another. This is not to suggest that a principal who behaves primarily as a director is incapable of managing a distinct alternative program but rather that he will have difficulty managing a school in which more than one different program is to be offered. Indeed, we can imagine the case in which a highly directive principal is the main reason an alternative program adheres closely to a distinct educational philosophy. To test this relationship, we turn to an examination of the single-program alternatives offered in Minneapolis.¹

Diversity in Single-Program Alternatives

Recall that in Minneapolis the alternative programs were of three types—contemporary, continuous progress, or open. Recall also that

¹Minneapolis was the only district in our study that both offered single-program alternatives and responded to our teacher survey, thus enabling us to undertake an analysis of the diversity of these programs. Cincinnati also offered single-program alternatives but did not field our teacher survey; Eugene had only multiprogram alternatives and we considered only the Alum Rock multiprogram schools as alternative schools (see the appendix for further details).
our diversity scale measures the extent to which the teachers in a program followed practices in their classroom that were consistent with these program types. Therefore, in Minneapolis we have a unique opportunity to examine the extent to which program labels accurately reflect the educational programs being offered at each school. According to our analysis, most of the separate-site alternative programs are correctly labeled.\footnote{When the alternative programs at multiprogram buildings are entered into this calculation, the percentage of programs correctly labeled is reduced slightly.} In other words, in only a few cases will parents be misled by selecting an alternative school in Minneapolis on the basis of its label. Furthermore, the separate-site alternative principals who were perceived as behaving primarily either as directors or as facilitators were the managers of programs that were consistent with their labels. One of the directive principals was specifically recruited by the former superintendent to be the principal of an open alternative program. In making the assignment, he told the principal to "Get down those...walls!" The principal and five teachers received training at the district's Teacher Center and were responsible for planning and implementing a staff development course for the rest of the faculty. This principal was given free reign in selecting and training staff. The result was a program that was distinctly different from the continuous progress and contemporary alternative programs in Minneapolis.

The second of these directive principals took over an existing continuous progress alternative program. This principal saw himself as a leader in the curriculum area and felt that it was his job to make certain the school had excellent curriculum and instruction. When he first came to the school he did not feel that the continuous progress program was being implemented as intended. Accordingly, he tore down the walls to open up the physical space, and initiated a training program to help teachers utilize this space in a multi-aged, ungraded setting. These examples show that a principal
exercising strong leadership in curriculum and classroom practices can create a program that is more diverse than it might otherwise be. Principals who behave primarily as directors are "suitable" as principals of separate-site alternative schools.

Our data also show that facilitative principals managed separate-site alternative schools that were consistent with their program labels. One such principal described his style as "turning people loose within a basic framework which I set." This principal believed that decision-making must be broadly based, and he accordingly involved both the staff and the community in the decisionmaking process. Another of the facilitative principals described his approach as "personal versus authoritative." He saw his role as "protecting teachers from flak" so that they were free to do their jobs. Decisionmaking in this school was done by a committee of two teachers who functioned as team leaders, and the principal.

Assessing the extent to which teachers followed consistent classroom practices \(^1\) is another way to compare the Minneapolis separate-site alternative programs. Again, in programs that had "director" and "facilitator" principals, the teachers were following consistent practices. In fact, alternative schools in Minneapolis headed by directive and facilitative principals were both consistent in their classroom practices and distinct from other types of programs. That is, they were truly distinctive because they were providing students with different educational programs that were consistent in their approaches. The five schools where either a majority of the teachers did not follow the same classroom practices, or where the teachers were following classroom practices not consistent with their program label, were headed by principals who behaved primarily as administrators. In at least three of these schools there seemed to be tension between the educational programs desired by parents and the programs

\(^{1}\) Operationally defined as programs in which more than half of the teachers report following classroom practices consistent with their program's label.
desired by the teachers. In each of these cases the parents dictated the kind of programs to be offered, but a majority of the teachers in these schools reported following less-structured classroom practices than the parents desired. One teacher commented: "We are a traditional school because the parents wanted it, but we are not a standard one." One of these schools even had another alternative program operating there at one time, but had to convert to offering only a contemporary program because of parent desires. Our data suggest that in these three cases the majority of the teachers continued to teach in their preferred fashion despite their program label. Furthermore, we would have to conclude that the principals of these schools were also either predisposed to another type of educational program, or were reluctant to infringe on the domain of the teacher's classroom to see if consistent classroom practices were adhered to.

We did not observe this tension between parent interests and teacher preferences in the remaining two cases. In one of these schools, teachers from several schools that were closed were brought together when the new alternative school was formed. From the outset, these teachers were divided into separate school factions: One faction desired a less-structured approach and the other preferred more structure. Although the building principal worked with the teachers to resolve the overt conflicts they were having, he did not see his role as one of making curriculum decisions. Accordingly, our data suggest that while the teachers in this program may be getting along with less conflict, it is only because each faction has agreed to let the other go its own way. In other words, conflict was resolved in this case at the expense of program uniformity. Lack of direction by the principal also appeared to have been a factor in the second of these cases. In this situation, the principal was relatively new to the position and expressed uncertainty about his role. This principal indicated to us that it was difficult to know when to make a decision and when to let teachers decide. As a result, teachers in this alternative school were neither uniform in the classroom practices they followed nor did they tend to follow, on average, practices in keeping with the type of educational program they were supposed to be offering.
Summary

In summary, our analyses suggest that the type of principal behavior most conducive to achieving diversity in a separate-site program differs from that which is best suited to achieve diversity in a multiprogram school. We believe that there is a tendency for programs that share a single building to become similar, unless specific steps are taken to maintain their uniqueness. Our data suggest that principals who behaved primarily as either administrators or facilitators were better able to manage schools in which there were two or more separate programs than were principals who behaved primarily as directors. In contrast, our data suggest that when a separate-site alternative principal functioned as a programmatic leader, or facilitated his teachers' doing so, the program was apt to be both consistent in its direction and uniform in the classroom practices followed by teachers. With a separate-site form of organization, the schools that were not distinctive either lacked a principal who was willing or able to take responsibility for the program's direction, and/or the program preferences of parents and school staff differed.

Tension Within Multiprogram Buildings

We have elsewhere suggested that one serious drawback to a multiprogram school is the tension that can result among staff who have been divided into separate groups and who are competing for the same resources. A priori, it would seem that the school principal would be in a critical position to defuse this tension, and prior studies conducted with single-program schools suggest that the principal is critical in determining the school's climate (Tye, 1973; Lieberman, 1973; Sinclair, 1975; Keeler and Andrews, 1963; Wood, 1973). In a multiprogram school the principal should be in an even more critical position to affect school climate, since he would be the only person to have an overall picture of how two or more groups are functioning together. In this section we examine the causes of
school tension and the principal's role with respect to this tension in a multiprogram school.

Causes of Tension

We noted above that where tension is experienced by teachers in the four districts, it was related primarily to feelings of competition between programs. Teachers within a multiprogram building may compete with other programs within their building for students, resources, or recognition. When steps were taken by either the principal or the staff to minimize such competition, the conflict or tension between programs was substantially reduced. For example, in Eugene competition was minimal. In some cases it was minimized because the alternatives attracted too few students to pose a real threat to regular school teachers. In other cases the alternative programs were oversubscribed and had a waiting list, but the teachers decided not to have their programs expand. Some of the alternative programs went to great lengths to avoid competing with the regular programs at their schools. For example, one of the magnet programs deliberately discouraged student transfers from the host school to minimize competition. And in one of the school-within-school multiprogram buildings, a conscious decision was made to maintain a one-third to two-thirds proportion of students in the alternative and nonalternative programs. In contrast, the Alum Rock teachers were at first not allowed to control the size of their mini-schools, and thus the degree to which the mini-schools competed with each other for students. Instead, mini-schools were initially required to accommodate any student selecting their program. By the second year, the

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1 Teacher responses to Questions 22a-c on the spring 1977 Teacher Questionnaire were summed and then meaned to obtain an overall tension score that ranged from 1 (not a problem) to 3 (major problems). In 1976-77, the mean tension score for multiprogram schools in Eugene was 1.39; in Alum Rock, 1.46; and in Minneapolis, 2.02. During the peak year of the voucher demonstration, 1974-75, the mean tension score for the Alum Rock multiprogram schools was 1.96 (Spring 1975 Alum Rock Teacher Survey, Questions 8a, d, e).
voucher principals had successfully lobbied for more school control over enrollment. Mini-schools were still required to accept any students who had requested their program by a spring cutoff date, but following this application period, teachers could set enrollment limits based on their building capacities. Although this policy ensured teachers somewhat more stability in their program size, the enrollment of some of the mini-schools nevertheless changed markedly between the second and third years of the demonstration. This enrollment fluctuation continued to cause anxieties among teachers: Some—especially those in schools that previously had poor reputations in the district—were afraid of losing students. Others were comfortable in the mini-school group they were in and did not want to have to accommodate new teachers in the group. Still others were afraid that they lacked the control to hire new staff ideally suited for their program, and that to accept a new teacher who did not share their philosophy would erode the distinctive character of that program. Thus, it is not surprising that the Eugene multiprogram teachers reported considerably less tension in their schools than did the Alum Rock multiprogram teachers during the peak year of the voucher demonstration (1974-75). However, there was a significant decrease in the amount of tension experienced by the 9 Alum Rock multiprogram schools in 1976-77 from that experienced by the 14 multiprogram voucher schools during 1974-75. What led to a reduction in tension?

Of the 43 mini-schools that operated in both year two and year three, 9 increased their enrollments by more than 10 percent; 14 mini-schools lost more than 10 percent; and 20 mini-schools experienced an enrollment change of 10 percent or less. In some instances the changes were drastic: Two mini-schools, for example, lost over half their enrollment from year two to year three. Two other mini-schools closed from lack of enrollment. (Source: enrollment data collected by C. M. Leinwand Associates.)

1.39 and 1.96 respectively, p = .02, using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U Test.

From 1.96 in 1974-75, to 1.46 in 1976-77. These differences are significant at the .001 level, using a one-tailed Mann-Whitney U Test.
We believe that tension can be reduced between programs if steps are taken to ensure the receptivity of the staff and host schools to the placing of an alternative program or programs at their school, and if principals take certain actions to reduce the competition between the programs within their building.

Staff and Host School Receptivity

One of the important differences between the initiation of alternatives in Eugene and Alum Rock was the degree to which teacher participation was voluntary or involuntary. In Eugene, teachers initiated and developed their own programs, and their participation was strictly voluntary. In contrast, Alum Rock teachers had never expressed an interest in developing mini-schools, and although it was the teachers who subsequently designed the programs, they did so only after they had been persuaded by their principals to join the demonstration. One could therefore describe most original voucher teachers as somewhat reluctant participants. However, the Alum Rock teachers in the 1976-77 multiprogram buildings did volunteer, since it was they who decided whether or not their schools would offer more than one program. And there was significantly less tension in these 9 schools than there was in the 14 voucher schools at the peak of the demonstration. This suggests the importance of allowing teachers to decide whether or not they wish their school to offer alternative programs.

In Eugene the alternative school teachers all volunteered, and the regular school teachers were involved in varying degrees in the decision to place an alternative in their school. Generally, in the school-within-school model the teachers desiring to start an alternative program only formally secured their principal's approval; the rest of the staff were aware that other teachers were designing an alternative program, but that they would not necessarily be involved in the process. Instead, once the program received district approval and was implemented, the principal and staff would work to ensure open communication between the two programs—having regular teachers visit the alternative programs, and having the alternative program
students and the regular school students go to recess and eat lunch
together, for example. In one case, the principal insisted that the
alternative school teachers involve the regular school teachers in
the design of the program, thereby successfully promoting a sense of
ownership in the program among the regular school teachers as well.
This principal also went to great lengths to avoid showing any
partiality to the teachers in the alternative program: While he
was extremely supportive of their efforts, he would not meet with
them on school property to help them plan their program. He did,
however, meet with them in the evenings on his own time. As a result
of these efforts, when a secret vote was taken by the school faculty
to decide whether or not to submit their proposal for an alternative
program to the school board, all but one of the regular school staff
voted affirmatively.

Much of the tension that occurred in the Eugene multiprogram
schools was over the actual placement of the alternative magnet
programs in district schools. During the first year of alternatives
in Eugene, three magnet alternative school proposals were reviewed
and approved without regard to location considerations. Once decisions
had been made about which programs would be implemented, space had
to be found to house them. Most of the buildings in Eugene with
excess capacity were located in the district's South area, which was
also the area with the highest concentration of alternative school
supporters. Availability of space in a building, however, did not
mean that a school's staff, or those parents not interested in
alternatives, were anxious to welcome a new program, particularly
if it was perceived as radically different. A number of active,
influential parents at the affected South area schools felt they had
not been adequately consulted in the alternative school placement
process, creating at times a high level of dissension. Nor were the
anxieties of parents and staff at one school ameliorated when the
existing principal was replaced by another principal chosen specif-
ically for the assignment—without their having been consulted.
Conflict at this school arose over a number of different issues common to multiprogram buildings: different student discipline standards between the programs, perceived fairness in the allocation of space (for example, in dividing the programs between different floors, with the alternative program located on the bottom floor, the carpeted classrooms became alternative classrooms), and differences in the utilization of support personnel, such as physical education teachers. Tension between the two staffs was also not helped by the fact that with the advent of the alternative program, enrollment dropped in the regular program from 150 to 75. Thus, unlike the case with many of the school-within-school alternative models in Eugene, the alternative program here was perceived as a real threat by the regular school teachers. The tension between these two program staffs persisted through the program's first year, but greatly diminished as time passed. A real sign of change was the fact that in the third year of their coexistence, the two program staffs agreed to share a single faculty room and even to take joint field trips. In part, relations between the two programs were helped by the fact that the alternative program became more structured and is now less radically different than it once was. Partially, relations improved because the alternative program did not grow after its first year, although it initially had to use a lottery for selecting students, with a list of students waiting to enroll. And in part, tensions were relieved by the actions of the principal. He had been personally selected for this difficult assignment by the superintendent. The regular staff and parents were suspicious of him because he arrived at the school along with the alternative program and was therefore suspected of being partial to the alternative. On the other hand, the alternative parents and staff were suspicious of him because they had wanted no principal at all. The design of their program called for a steering committee, composed of an equal number of community and staff members, to perform the functions normally performed by a principal. In spite of the atmosphere in which this principal first took over, participants were later quick
to credit him for the more cordial relations that grew between the two programs.

In another case, all but one of the regular program teachers chose to transfer, enabling the new principal to select virtually an entirely new staff for the school. In this case, the community not only saw a new program placed at their school and their principal displaced, they also saw virtually all of their teachers transferring. In the words of one parent, the decision to locate this program at their school "rent the school asunder," with the community still feeling the scars three years later. This community had been threatened for several years with the closing of their school because of continually declining enrollment. While on the one hand this should have led them to welcome an alternative program, the community was hostile because the decision had been made without their participation.

It is a fairly common perception in the district that the superintendent favors the school-within-school model of alternative programs for the future, because of the extent to which he was drawn into the arguments surrounding the placement of these two magnet programs. When a fourth magnet alternative was implemented in 1976-77, the superintendent was quick to involve in the decision the communities and staffs of the schools being considered as possible sites. The limits to which the community and staff of a "host" school would be allowed to influence a site decision were quickly tested when several influential parents at one school organized the community and staff to protest the proposed placement of the magnet program there. Although the superintendent preferred to have the program located at their school, he quickly backed off and it was located elsewhere.

This magnet program was somewhat unique for two reasons: It was Eugene's first foray into a "back to basics" alternative, and it was proposed and designed by a group of parents.\(^1\) A proposal to implement

\(^1\) A fundamental alternative proposal was actually first developed by a teacher at one of the district schools. Although his proposal was rejected by the board, the parents who were later to write the proposal that was adopted got started at the meetings that were convened to discuss this earlier proposal.
a "back to basics" alternative often generates a lot of hostility because others see it as an indictment of all schools for falling to do their job. Eugene was no exception. Surprisingly, then, the implementation of this program proceeded very smoothly. It was located at an elementary school that was also fairly traditional in approach. The school had a good reputation in the district, showing consistently high test scores, and thus its teachers were less threatened by a "back to basics" program than they might otherwise have been. The principal prepared his staff by pointing this fact out to them, and also pointed out that since they had excess space in the school, they would have to choose between this program or a magnet open structure alternative high school program, which was also in need of a "home" that year. Given that tradeoff, the choice was easy.

After the decision was made, its coordination with the regular program at the school took place almost without a hitch. Cognizant of the tensions that had existed between other regular and magnet alternatives, the alternative staff and community were careful to minimize conflict. For example, they discouraged student transfers from the regular program into theirs, to minimize competition. The principal's strategy was to try to blur the lines between the two programs. He insisted initially that the alternative school staff attend regular school staff meetings, even though they also held separate staff meetings, so that they would become more a part of the schools, and the regular program teachers could get to know them better. He also required that they "buy" some of the school's media specialist time to avoid any feelings on the part of the regular teachers that the alternative program was not carrying its fair share.\(^1\) As a result of these strategies, these two programs were able to coexist peacefully.

\(^1\)Under the district's "staffing parity" policy, the alternative could have chosen to spend its entire 18.4:1 full-time equivalent teacher allotment for classroom teacher salaries and not specialists, as many of the other alternative programs have done. However, while the regular program staff could make the same decisions, they perceived this option as largely one reserved for alternatives, and it therefore became a source of contention.
It appears from our Eugene data that less serious conflicts erupt in a school-within-school than in a magnet school mode. However, the only magnet alternative program begun after the first year was implemented very smoothly, largely because the district administration made sure that the proposed host school participated in the placement decision, thereby giving it a stake in the success of the program. We conclude, therefore, that a magnet program can be implemented as readily as a school-within-school program, if there is a receptive climate at the host school.

In Cincinnati the host or neighborhood school was generally given no choice as to whether or not it would receive an alternative program, and if so, what type of program. As a result, in some cases the neighborhood school teachers resented the "invasion" of their school by the alternative program, and in other cases the community resented and feared students of another race who were attending their schools. Given this potential that existed for tension, what distinguished the Cincinnati schools that were experiencing a high level of tension from those where tension was low? Basically, two factors seemed to distinguish these schools: The extent to which the alternative program was perceived as receiving additional resources, and the extent to which the host school desired an alternative program.

In both of the two schools reporting a high level of tension, the neighborhood school staffs were upset over the amount of resources given to the alternative programs. In both cases the neighborhood

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1In later years some schools did request that an alternative be placed at their school, but the district administration usually decided what program they would receive. In several cases strong parent groups were even successful in obtaining the program of their choice for their school.

2Although we do not have teacher survey data that would have enabled us to compute tension scores for the multiprogram alternatives in Cincinnati, from the interview data we determined that two of the seven schools were experiencing high levels of tension, two were experiencing medium levels of tension, and three were experiencing little tension between programs.
schools had been underenrolled when the decision was made to place alternative programs there. In both cases the decision was made to keep the alternative programs completely separated from the regular programs. However, both of these alternatives received additional resources that were very visible to the regular school staff in spite of the programs' physical separation. In one case the alternative received a lot of new equipment and its classrooms were renovated and repainted. In the second case the alternative had a lower student/teacher ratio than the regular school, and it took over newly redecorated classrooms in this school to make it more attractive to potential incoming students. To our knowledge, in neither case did the principals of the neighborhood schools take steps to alleviate this tension, partly, we suspect, because they had little control over the alternative programs. In the first case, the alternative's program coordinator handled all the substantive decisions, and another administrator handled student discipline. In the second case, the alternative program had its own principal. Therefore, in both instances the alternative programs could be thought of as sharing physical space within the school buildings, but not otherwise being part of the schools.

There is a third example of this type of arrangement in Cincinnati, only in this instance the tension between the two staffs appeared to be minimal. Again, the alternative program, which had its own principal, was located at a junior high school that also retained its own principal. Both schools were kept completely separated, administratively and operationally. What seems to have made the difference in this case was that the host school had experienced a serious drop in enrollment and might have been closed had not an alternative program been placed there. Furthermore, the neighborhood school was promised by the central office that it would not be closed even if the alternative program expanded further. Therefore, while space was available to accommodate the two programs, there was little interaction between the two staffs, and the alternative program posed no threat to the regular program. Should these conditions change, however, the regular school staff might also start becoming more sensitive about the additional resources being spent in the alternative program.
In our remaining four cases, the alternative programs were much more a part of the school than in these first three examples. In two of these four cases we were told that there was some rivalry and jealousy expressed by the neighborhood school teachers toward the alternative programs. In one case, the principal was also lobbying to have the alternative program removed from his school; he was not happy with the additional administrative work that was required. Additionally, the school became overcrowded when the alternative was placed there, adding to the resentment felt by the regular school teachers toward the alternative's smaller class sizes. In the second case, the parents resented having the alternative program placed at their school, and felt that it had siphoned off some of their best teachers. These feelings helped to create a sense of rivalry between the two programs, which the principal tried to counter by emphasizing school-wide factors (holding school-wide faculty meetings, for example).

In the remaining two cases, there has been very little tension between programs because the host schools had requested that alternative programs be placed there. In the first case, it was the parents who actually lobbied for the program. The regular school staff did not feel threatened because they had the space available, no teachers were forced to teach in the program—new teachers were hired—and the program received no additional resources. In the second case, the school had also requested that an alternative be placed there, because they were underenrolled. Although they did not receive the program they had requested (a college prep school), the alternative they did receive differed from a traditional program in content only, and thus was not too different from what this community had requested. Furthermore, this principal took steps to ensure good relations between the two staffs, making certain they had equivalent class sizes, insisting that they share equipment, and allocating supply money on an equal basis. Thus, although the alternative's program coordinator had additional resources to spend on specialized textbooks and materials for the program, the teachers perceived the principal to be completely fair and impartial.
In summary, we are left with several distinct impressions concerning tension within multiprogram schools: Host school and staff receptivity were critical factors in determining the extent of tensions over the initial placement and implementation of alternatives, and once tension existed, school principals played a major role in its amelioration. It is to this latter point that we now turn our attention, as we examine the relationship between principal styles and program tension.

**Principal Styles and Program Tension**

It appears that certain types of principals may be better able to deal with tension between programs in multiprogram buildings. There is some evidence that principals who find it difficult to share their decisionmaking responsibility with teachers (i.e., principals who tend to be rated as directors by their staffs) behave in ways that not only weaken their ability to reduce tension among the different programs, but often exacerbate this tension. We found no principals who could be the substantive leaders of distinctly different educational programs. For principals who tried to fill this role, prior familiarity with one type of educational program or personal preference for a certain educational philosophy often made it difficult to behave fairly and impartially in teachers' eyes.\(^1\) At the same time, the evidence suggests that unless teachers have voluntarily chosen to become involved with an alternative program, the principal may need to provide some direction at the start, or see to it that someone else, such as a resource teacher or a program coordinator, can provide this direction. In these cases, while the principal may need to make many of the initial decisions, he will eventually have to provide his

\(^1\)To be sure, we saw cases in which a principal who was rated as either an administrator or a facilitator was also considered to be giving preferential treatment to one program, but this was more likely to occur when the principal was rated as a director.
staff with the training or resources they need to assume decision-making responsibility themselves. Thus, our analysis indicates that the primary function of a multiprogram alternative school principal is to provide his staff with support, and to foster a climate in which the different programs can exist autonomously, side by side. It seems that this can be best accomplished by principals who are seen as behaving primarily as administrators or facilitators but not as directors.¹

Alum Rock data, in particular, substantiate this view. Much of the tension in Alum Rock appears to have occurred over allocating staff to mini-schools, or over differences in popularity among mini-schools. In several cases the tension was exacerbated when teachers thought that a principal favored one program over others at their school. Several teachers even charged that they suspected their principal of diverting funds from the other mini-schools to his favorite mini-school.

A clear indication that directive principals have difficulty managing a multiprogram building comes from the principals themselves. A number of them indicated to us that they were no longer able to function in a multiprogram school as they once did in a single-program school:

I was not able to be the educational leader that I once was because I also have to be a financial leader, personnel leader, and process leader. These new roles obviously take time away from other things. [Comment made by a voucher principal who changed his dominant mode of behavior from that of a director to that of an administrator.]

¹What appears to distinguish the administrators from the facilitators is a difference in focus. Facilitators, generally, will focus on promoting a school climate in which diverse opinions and practices can exist. The administrators, on the other hand, will tend to focus on providing their staffs with the support necessary to enable them to teach without being diverted by administrative or public relations issues. Both are willing to share their decision-making responsibilities with their staffs.
Before, I tried to do everything myself and to be on top of everything that went on. Now [I] lean toward setting up a management system and delegating more decisionmaking. [Comment made by a voucher principal whose dominant behavior was a director while principal of a multiprogram building.]

I was a curriculum leader before. Now I serve more as an advisor and resource person. [We] have collaborative decisionmaking. I spend a lot of time helping new teachers. [Comment from a principal who was a director and changed to behaving as a facilitator while principal of a multiprogram building.]

I used to be very structured; tried to insulate the staff from everything. Now I operate in a very unstructured fashion. I feel everyone ought to have their say and that I can do the best job by drawing upon the resources of others. [Comment from a principal who was a director and changed to behaving as a facilitator while principal of a multiprogram building.]

These comments suggest several things: First, "directors" do have difficulty in a multiprogram school, and second, principals can change their dominant mode of behavior as the situation changes. However, a question arises as to how likely principals are to change their behavior. In Alum Rock, only three of the eight principals who initially behaved as directors changed their behavior; five did not. And only one of the other voucher principals changed his dominant mode of behavior during the demonstration from that of an administrator to that of a facilitator. Thus, only 4 of 12 principals for whom we have longitudinal data, or 33 percent, substantially changed their behavior. Yet, the voucher principals in Alum Rock were exposed to training which few principals in other districts are routinely exposed to—organizational development training through HRC. Furthermore, the voucher principals attributed a great deal of their ability to deal with their new responsibilities to their HRC training. As one of the principals who changed his behavior put it, "Prior I was very structured in my approach with people, but now, as a result of HRC, I feel free to behave in a manner that's inconsistent with people's expectations." Even the voucher teachers frequently
attributed the actions of their principals to the HRC training they received. If, even with this training, only one-third of the Alum Rock voucher principals substantially changed their behavior, this suggests that an even smaller proportion of principals would substantially alter their behavior in districts in which such training is not provided. But if the Alum Rock voucher principals generally did not alter their behavior, how then did they resolve the difficulties many of them were having managing multiprogram buildings? It appears that just as the principals opted into multiprogram buildings, they also opted out.

During the fourth year of the demonstration, the district administration concluded that there were too many mini-schools in the district, and made this conclusion known to the schools. At the end of the third year, there were 51 mini-schools operating, and the administration felt that such a large number of programs made it difficult for parents to make informed choices. Many school personnel shared this point of view. Accordingly, in the fourth year the voucher principals and their staffs initiated discussions about disbanding some of the mini-schools. By 1976-77, the fifth year of the demonstration, only 9 of the 24 Alum Rock schools were offering more than one program at their schools. Two of these 9 multiprogram schools were previously nonvoucher schools.¹

From the data in Table 8, we see that only one of the multiprogram building principals in 1976-77 was perceived as operating as a director; the other seven principals who had operated as directors in multiprogram schools had either changed their behavior by this time or had left the demonstration. That it was in fact, the principals who decided to leave can be illustrated by the data in Table 9. Four out of five schools where the principal made the decision on his

¹One of these schools had been offering a separate bilingual program and elected to continue to do so. The other school absorbed a small voucher school that was underenrolled and subsequently closed, and elected to continue to offer the largest of their mini-schools—a bilingual program—along with their regular program.
Table 8

DOMINANT BEHAVIOR OF ALUM ROCK PRINCIPALS UNDER WHOM DECISION WAS MADE TO BECOME MULTIPROGRAM OR SINGLE-PROGRAM SCHOOL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Principal Behavioral Type</th>
<th>Multiple Program</th>
<th>Single Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9

ALUM ROCK SCHOOLS OFFERING MULTIPLE PROGRAMS IN 1976-77, BY DECISIONMAKER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Programs Offered</th>
<th>Decisionmaker</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Principal Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or more</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

own as to whether or not the school would return to offering only a single program elected that option. In contrast, in schools in which the decision was either shared with or made by the teachers, only two out of eight elected to return to a single program. A number of the principals were explicit about their dislike of multiprogram schools, as the following comments illustrate:

Most of the administrators wanted to return to single programs because they were tired of the paperwork and the hassles.

A lot of my work [in a multiprogram building] doesn't seem to be directly related to students anymore.

I haven't been the instructional leader I would like to be. That's what I'd like to be but I don't have the time. Next year we are returning to a single program and I hope to have the time.

We have seen, then, that many Alum Rock principals did not like managing a multiprogram building, and that this dissatisfaction was often felt most intensely by those principals whose dominant mode of behavior was perceived as that of a director. In 1977-78, only two Alum Rock schools retained their multiprogram structures. The perceived dominant mode of behavior of both of these schools' principals was not that of a director.

The Minneapolis multiprogram schools afford us another opportunity to examine how a directive principal functions in a multiprogram school setting. In one such school the principal did not feel that a multiprogram building has been difficult to administer, and felt in control of the staff despite the division of the school into separate programs. It was our observation that in practice there was little difference between the programs at this school. Yet the staff felt a great deal of tension over the different student noise levels among the programs and over differences in program philosophies.¹ These

¹These tensions were manifested by a tension score for this school of 2.4 on a scale from 1 to 3, with 3 representing tension as a major problem.
feelings were exacerbated because some teachers felt vulnerable and at risk professionally. They did not feel adequately supported by their principal and felt that the success and/or failure of their program rested squarely on their shoulders. Given that these results are consistent with those found in Alum Rock, these findings appear to further support our tentative conclusion that principals who behave primarily as directors are not ideally suited to be principals of multiprogram buildings.

Summary

During the course of our study, it became apparent that one of the drawbacks to multiprogram schools was the tension that frequently occurred between the staffs of the programs in a single building. This tension appeared to be caused by the programs competing for the same resources—students, staff, materials, and recognition. At the same time, we found a number of examples of steps that could be taken to relieve this tension. Some of these steps were taken by the program staffs themselves, such as explicitly attempting to share equally the building's facilities and resources, and refusing to recruit new students from the host school. We also saw district administration take steps to relieve this tension, most noticeably ensuring the receptivity of host schools before placing alternative programs there. Actions taken by school principals also resulted in a reduction of tension. Some principals encouraged their staffs to visit each other's programs and to share common periods, such as lunch and recess, as a means of promoting communication and understanding between the programs. One principal even insisted that the regular school teachers be involved in the design of the alternative program as a means of promoting a sense of ownership in the program. Fair and impartial treatment of the programs by the principal also minimized tension. Reports of tension were greater in schools where the program staffs perceived the principal as favoring one program over the others, or inequitably distributing resources or allocating staff. The strategies employed by principals differed: Some principals
attempted to minimize the differences between the programs, whereas others tried to keep the programs functionally separate. One danger with the first strategy is that the programs might in fact become similar over time unless, as noted earlier in this chapter, substantive program leadership is also provided. On the other hand, we also saw that when both the substantive and the operational leadership for programs sharing a building are separated (i.e., there are two principals), neither principal necessarily takes responsibility for trying to alleviate tension.

It is our impression that certain types of principals are better able to deal with tension between programs. Principals of multiprogram schools will need to provide their staff with support and foster a climate in which different programs can exist autonomously side-by-side. Yet, if the principal tries to be the substantive leader of distinctly different educational programs, his prior familiarity or personal preference for one type of educational program may interfere with his ability to provide equal support to all programs. Therefore, a multiprogram program principal may need to turn over a large measure of the decisionmaking responsibility to teachers. Our data suggest that multiprogram schools headed by principals who wish to retain for themselves final decisionmaking authority, or directors, are more likely to experience tension than are other multiprogram schools. These principals are also more likely to opt out of a multiprogram building, should the opportunity arise and be sanctioned by district management, than to change their dominant mode of behavior to one better suited to a multiprogram environment.
IV. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Findings in Review

This report explored some of the issues involved in school-level management of alternative programs in four school districts: Alum Rock, California; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Eugene, Oregon. The premise upon which this study is based is a simple one: Change in schools is required for an alternative school system to be implemented, and the extent to which this change is successful will in large measure depend on the leadership at the school. With this premise in mind, we focused in particular on one aspect of school principal behavior—willingness to share decisionmaking authority with teachers—which we believe has important ramifications for the implementation of alternative programs. From our interview data with principals and from the responses of teachers in a mail survey describing their principals' behavior in a number of areas, we categorized principals according to their dominant mode of decisionmaking behavior. We roughly characterized three types of behavior: principals who retain the authority for all aspects of a school's decisionmaking authority (the "director"); principals who retain authority for certain aspects of the school's decisionmaking and give teachers primary decisionmaking authority for other aspects, such as curriculum and classroom practices (the "administrator"); and principals who operate on a shared or consensus model of decisionmaking in all areas (the "facilitator"). While we believe that some principals will be able to move freely between these different behavioral approaches depending upon the situation, in this study we used these approaches as discrete archetypes, which enabled us to explore the effects of utilizing different types of leadership behavior in similar situations.

Furthermore, we categorized alternative programs into two types, based on their method of organization: those that are located with
other programs in one school building, and those that are organized as separate-site programs. Within the multiprogram form of alternatives, we examined the relationship between principal behavior and program diversity, and we looked at the relationship between principal behavior and interprogram tension. In the case of separate-site alternative programs, we looked at the relationship between principal behavior and differences between the new program's classroom practices and those of other programs offered in the district, and at the extent to which teachers in the alternative programs were following uniform classroom practices. In addition to this school-level analysis, we described district-level influences on principals, and described how these influences affected who was to become the principal of an alternative school.

Briefly, we found that in a multiprogram setting a principal will need to share decisionmaking with teachers to some extent. Those principals who retained this authority for themselves were more frequently found in buildings where there was less diversity and more tension. Also, when given the opportunity, most of these principals decided to leave the multiprogram setting. In separate-site alternative programs, the degree to which principals were willing to share decisionmaking authority was not a decisive factor in whether or not the programs were distinctive. Rather in this setting strong leadership was important, whether provided by the principal, a member of his staff, or a committee composed of teacher representatives and the principal. Where strong leadership was lacking, separate-site alternatives tended to drift toward offering something other than what was intended, and the teachers within the program tended to follow disparate classroom practices.

In general, the management in these districts did not explicitly consider certain critical issues related to the management of alternative schools. In only one of the four districts was an attempt made specifically to select certain principals to manage multiprogram buildings. Interestingly, this district was also the most successful at minimizing the tension that frequently occurs in a multiprogram
setting. Also, decisions concerning the placement of alternative programs were frequently made without adequate attention being paid to the inclinations of the staffs affected by the decisions.

**Policy Implications**

Although the limited number of districts and schools studied lead us to regard our conclusions as tentative, we nevertheless are confident that our findings are generally applicable for three reasons: First, the findings were consistent across sites and between observers and data collection methods; second, we know from prior research that most districts are similar on dimensions of importance; and third, our findings are consistent with other research. This study's findings suggest the following policy implications for those planning to implement or support alternative education programs:

*District policymakers should carefully consider the tradeoffs between implementing separate-site alternative programs and placing the programs with other alternatives or with a non-alternative in a multiprogram setting.*

Our findings suggest that an alternative has a better chance of offering a distinctive educational program if it is organized as a separate site rather than as a multiprogram alternative. However, there may be forces that influence a school district in the direction of providing alternatives in a multiprogram school setting: Parent interests may prevent a district from closing a neighborhood school; limited demand for certain kinds of alternatives may make it hard to attract enough students to fill a school building; limited funding may prevent the district from being able to use new facilities. Should these forces require the formation of multiprogram schools despite their disadvantages, our findings suggest steps that could be taken to facilitate the implementation of these schools:
District management should either select their principals specifically for a multiprogram building assignment or provide multiprogram principals with training to enable them to cope with this new form of school organization.

Multiprogram buildings are difficult to administer. Some of the principals in our sample were quite candid about their dislike for managing a multiprogram school; others regarded it as a challenge. Some multiprogram principals found that they were less in control of their schools because various other aspects of their job had become more complex. As one of the principals stated, "A multiprogram principal has to be somewhat flexible, willing to gamble, take risks, willing to learn about himself, and not be afraid to lose the reins of decisionmaking" [emphasis added]. We found that when multiprogram buildings were managed by principals who were rated by their teachers as directors, their programs tended less often to be distinct from one another, and the teachers reported tension to be a bigger problem. As one alternative teacher stated, a multiprogram principal should be "willing to share power with the teachers." The principals whom we have labeled "administrators" and "facilitators" are willing to share at least some of the decisionmaking authority with their teachers, and their schools have less reported tension and more program diversity. Therefore, we would encourage district administrators to evaluate the ability or willingness of school principals to share the reins of decisionmaking before assigning them to multiprogram schools.

Even among those principals who were willing to share decisionmaking authority with their teachers, some appeared more skilled than others at handling the problems of a multiprogram school. For example, several of the Eugene principals were noticeably adept at maintaining good relations among teachers in the different programs at their schools. They attributed this ability to either behavioral modification and organizational development training through the local university's education school, or to their experience as a member
of the school district's communications group. A number of the Alum Rock multiprogram principals attributed their ability to be more flexible, and to change their behavior in accordance with the needs of a multiprogram school, to the training they received from a private human relations consulting firm. The multiprogram principals in Minneapolis and Cincinnati did not report receiving similar kinds of training and, in Minneapolis—where we have data on school tension—the multiprogram schools reported more tension on the average than did the Alum Rock and Eugene multiprogram schools. This suggests that it is possible to provide principals with supplementary training that can help them deal with a complex multiprogram organizational structure. Accordingly, this suggests that school districts planning to implement multiprogram alternative schools first provide such training for their principals. Where it is not possible to provide such training, the district might take other steps such as providing staff specialists or other kinds of support from the central office to help principals cope with administering multiprogram schools.

*District management should take steps to ensure the receptivity of the host school to an alternative program, before placing the program at that school.*

In some cases, conflict erupted over the placement of an alternative program when the staff and community of the host school felt that the program had been forced upon them. When this occurred, district and school management were forced to spend time resolving the conflict. In other cases, the placement went smoothly because the host school saw an advantage to having the alternative located there. In both Eugene and Cincinnati, the districts often selected under-utilized schools to house alternative programs, knowing that a school would rather have an alternative program than risk being closed for lack of enrollment. However, the threat of school closing was not always sufficient to ensure that schools with empty classrooms would welcome alternative programs. The host school also had to perceive
the alternative as philosophically compatible or nontreating before peaceful co-existence was possible. This suggests that when locating an alternative program, district management consider host school receptivity to the program in question, as well as relying on other administrative criteria such as available space.

When implementing separate-site alternative programs, district management should make certain that substantive program leadership is available. This leadership can be provided either by the school principal or by a teacher or group of teachers who are given decisionmaking authority for the program.

In the separate-site alternative programs, we found that program distinctiveness was strongly associated with program leadership. Where teachers were following classroom practices that were consistent with the type of program being offered, there was usually a discernible leader or leaders responsible for the program's design and implementation. In Minneapolis, separate-site alternative program principals and some of their staff frequently received training in the program's philosophy and design before or concurrent with implementation of the program. In this context we found that principals who behaved as directors were just as effective at achieving program distinctiveness as were the "facilitator" principals who involved their teachers in decisionmaking. In fact, what seemed to be critical in this situation was compatibility between the desires of parents and school staff for a certain kind of educational program, and the presence of someone on the staff in a position to guide the program in that direction. We found that when a school offered a certain type of program because it was desired by parents but not by staff, and where for this reason no one on the staff had the responsibility for seeing to it that teachers adhered to the program philosophy, it began to drift away from its objectives. Therefore, when a school district wishes to implement a separate-site alternative program,
district management should first determine whether there is sufficient leadership available to ensure the program's distinctiveness, and should offer supplementary training if the availability of this leadership is in doubt. This leadership can be provided in different ways: The school principal can provide it, if he is both willing to assume the responsibility and in agreement with the program's educational philosophy. Teachers can also provide leadership, if the principal of the school is willing to give them decisionmaking responsibility.

District management should carefully consider the characteristics of the alternative system they wish to implement before determining the incentives they will offer to school principals to participate, because certain incentives will be appropriate in some situations but inappropriate in others.

In Alum Rock, increased decisionmaking responsibility was an incentive provided by district management to encourage school principals to participate in the voucher demonstration. While this was an appropriate incentive to get the demonstration started, with hindsight we would argue that it was an inappropriate incentive in the long run, given the type of alternative system that was to be implemented. The promise of increased decisionmaking responsibility appealed to principals who behaved primarily as directors, but the alternatives in Alum Rock were implemented in a multiprogram organizational structure. The type of principal to whom the district administration was appealing was least able to reduce tension between program staffs in a multiprogram building, and to ensure that programs would remain distinct from one another. The eventual demise of the Alum Rock system of alternatives reflects the use of this inappropriate incentive structure for principals. Had Alum Rock been prepared to implement separate-site alternative programs, the use of an incentive that appealed to "director" principals would have been appropriate.
This incentive would have been equally inappropriate in Eugene, where alternatives were also placed in multiprogram settings. Furthermore, in Eugene the alternative programs were designed by teachers and parents; the school principals took a much less active role in program initiation than did the principals in Alum Rock. Principals of schools in which the teachers designed an alternative program (to be implemented at that school) were obviously willing to allocate a large measure of responsibility to their teachers. In cases where the proposed alternative was placed in another school, district management primarily considered two factors: space availability and school leadership. In one instance, an alternative was placed at a school with available space but a new principal was brought in to manage the alternative and the host school. In selecting this principal, the superintendent sought someone capable of handling a potentially difficult situation—the two programs had very different educational philosophies and the host school was not particularly receptive to the alternative being placed there. The principal selected by the superintendent for this assignment was not seen as directive by his teachers, nor were any of the other multiprogram principals in Eugene. Instead, the Eugene administration sought principals able to maintain good relations among the staffs in the different programs at their school and between the school and the community—an appropriate focus given their system of alternatives.

State and federal policymakers interested in fostering the development of educational alternatives in school districts should encourage districts to consider such issues as organizational form and suitability of available staff, to enhance the potential success of the programs.

State and federal policymakers are sometimes in a good position to influence districts through the use of "seed" monies.¹ We would

¹For example, it was under an NIE Experimental Schools Program grant that Minneapolis first experimented with its three alternative school program themes, before these themes were implemented district-
encourage policymakers interested in fostering educational alternative programs to require districts to develop long-range plans for their alternative systems, or to assist them in doing so. Included in these plans should be an indication that the districts have considered the administrative needs of the alternative programs and are taking steps to ensure that the necessary administrative leadership will be provided. These steps might include the use of appropriate incentive structures, supplementary staff development and training, and/or evidence of an attempt to select appropriate staff for the assignment on the basis of some established criteria. Such measures will not automatically lead to the successful implementation of alternative programs, but such an approach will enhance the probability of success.

Further Areas for Research

Not surprisingly, this study has raised more questions than it has answered. It has dealt with issues on which little prior research has been conducted. It has raised additional issues that were beyond the scope of this study. Yet, further research in a number of these areas could add immeasurably to our understanding of the management of alternative programs. In addition, the directions our educational system may take in the future suggest the importance of having a better understanding of some of the issues outlined below. For example, the extent to which school principals can learn to share the

wide. Federal monies for the voucher demonstration were also a major impetus behind Alum Rock's experimentation with alternatives. However, in Alum Rock, alternatives were not viewed by the district as a solution to its local problems and consequently, with the cessation of federal funds, they have been almost entirely discontinued. The differing experience of these two districts underscores a key finding of another recent study of federally sponsored change agent projects: Innovations undertaken opportunistically--because funds are available--are much less likely to be continued when outside funding ceases than innovations adopted as solutions to local problems (Berman and McLaughlin, 1977).
reins of decisionmaking with their teachers will affect not only their "suitability" as managers of alternative programs, but may also determine how well they adjust to role changes brought about by collective bargaining.¹

1. There are a number of reasons why school districts may choose to implement a multiprogram form of educational alternatives, despite their administrative complexity. Further research might help to determine how the role of a school principal is changed in a multiprogram school, and to find out from principals what aspects of this role they feel most comfortable with and in what areas they would like to have further training.

2. Although a number of the Alum Rock and Eugene principals indicated that the human relations and organizational development training they had received helped them to manage a multiprogram school, an assessment of the content and quality of this training was beyond the scope of this study. However, it is possible that other school districts will adopt such arrangements, and this kind of training may have broader applicability. Additional research in this area might try to assess both the quality and the relevance of school principals' in-service and pre-service training, in terms of the demands that are likely to be placed on principals in the future.

3. Teachers as well as principals seem able to provide the leadership necessary to enhance program distinctiveness. However, the scope of this study did not allow us to compare the effectiveness of the two groups. Some schools may have become so difficult to manage that a school principal cannot be both a procedural and a substantive leader. Further research could help school districts determine the proper management strategy for alternative programs, and could also contribute to more efficient school management.

In summary, an innovation is often attempted without adequate thought about what will be required of the various actors charged

¹See, for example, Perry and Wildman (1970); Hellweg (1973); Cooper (1976).
with its implementation. In this study we have looked specifically at school principals as the actors, and at educational alternatives as the innovation. Our findings suggest that school principal behavior can determine whether or not an alternative program is successfully implemented. Yet, in the majority of the districts studied, the importance of principals in this process was not clearly acknowledged. This suggests the need for a better understanding of the implementation process in general, and specifically of the role of school principals in this process. We hope that this study has served to improve this understanding.
Appendix

STUDY METHODS

The purpose of this appendix is to describe our overall research design in greater detail and to discuss the conceptual and measurement problems encountered in the study and our solutions to them.

Study Parameters

As it became apparent that Alum Rock was not a test of the voucher model but rather an alternative school system, we recommended that our study be expanded to include additional districts that were also experimenting with alternative programs. We proposed to undertake an in-depth study of a few districts so that we might better understand the processes by which different districts went about implementing alternatives, rather than study a large number of districts superficially. We considered four districts a feasible number to study given available study resources.

We were then faced with the problem of identifying and selecting three additional districts for study from among the many that are experimenting with alternatives. In choosing the additional sites for this study, we established certain minimal criteria. These helped us guarantee comparability with Alum Rock and allowed us to select districts that had made a major commitment to alternatives. We wanted to find districts that (1) had elementary school alternatives (because Alum Rock schools cover only grades K-8, we wanted to avoid districts that offered only secondary alternatives); 1 (2) offered at least three different options (i.e., two options besides the so-called "regular" program); (3) had at least 5 percent of their elementary

1 Although the three districts finally selected all offer some secondary alternatives in addition to their elementary alternatives, we have concentrated our attention on the elementary programs in each district.
students in alternative programs; and (4) had been operating alternatives for several years. Telephone contacts were made with 27 districts that we identified either through alternative school directories or from recommendations by expert informants as being likely to meet our criteria. Most of these failed to pass at least one of our four tests. Several districts that met these four criteria were eliminated because of their size. One otherwise likely prospect was so small (fewer than 5,000 students) that we decided its experiences would be atypical. At the other extreme, we avoided several potentially interesting districts because they were so large (over 200,000 students) we felt we could not fathom their alternative system within our limited budget for field visits.

From the remaining districts, we wanted to select three that would offer some variation in district size and demographic characteristics and represent different regions of the country. In our judgment, Cincinnati, Eugene, and Minneapolis satisfied these criteria better than any other combination of districts.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) A large number of districts that our informants thought might satisfy our screening criteria turned out, in fact, to offer only a few programs, involving a very small number of students. Such districts probably represent the modal case among districts offering any alternatives at all. Our search for districts with a large-scale commitment to alternatives thus assured us an unrepresentative sample, but this was a deliberate choice on our part. We reasoned that alternatives would be a more salient issue to district management where there were more of them, and more students were involved, and it would therefore be easier to study the dynamics of implementation at all levels of the system in such districts. We also felt that the findings from more ambitious alternative efforts would be relevant to districts attempting just a few programs, whereas the reverse was less likely to be true.

\(^2\) Another federal Experimental Schools site—Berkeley, California—satisfied our screening criteria, as did Minneapolis, but we did not wish to have two Experimental Schools sites in our limited sample. We selected Minneapolis because that district's attempt to disseminate alternatives district-wide represented a particularly interesting implementation problem for study.
Because our primary interest was in describing the process of implementation, we chose to devote most of our resources to on-site fieldwork. During the next 18 months, a minimum of six person-weeks were spent in these districts collecting data. Many data-collection methods were used: personal interviews were conducted with school board members, central office personnel, school personnel, parents, and community members; mail questionnaires were administered to teachers in three of the four districts;\(^1\) an unstructured observation of alternative programs was conducted;\(^2\) and documentary materials were collected from each of the districts.

An Issue of Definition

Having selected the districts we would study, a significant conceptual problem still remained: deciding which of the districts' programs should be considered "real" alternatives.\(^3\) Without a systematic observation of all programs, it was impossible for us to determine whether the alternatives were in fact significantly different from the educational program typically offered in each district. One solution would have been to accept as alternatives those programs that had been so labeled by each district. However, in two of the districts, Alum Rock and Minneapolis, all schools had been designated by the school boards as alternative schools. In Alum Rock, we knew that only 9 of the 24 schools were offering more than one program in 1976-77 and that the remainder had made little attempt to modify their existing programs when they became an officially designated alternative. Moreover, three-quarters of the teachers in the 13 schools surveyed did not consider themselves to be

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\(^1\) No teacher survey was administered in Cincinnati. The district administers its own annual teacher survey, and did not wish to burden teachers with an additional questionnaire.

\(^2\) In Alum Rock a systematic observation of classrooms was undertaken in the spring of 1976. Ninety-two classrooms were each observed twice by observers trained in using a structured classroom observation instrument. The results of this study can be found in Barker, Bikson, and Kimbrough (1978).

\(^3\) For further details, see the appendix in Rasmussen (1978).
teaching in an alternative school compared with over three-quarters of the teachers in the 9 multiprogram schools who did consider themselves to be teaching in an alternative school. Thus, in Alum Rock we treat the 9 multiprogram schools as alternative schools and the 13 single-program schools as nonalternatives.

In Minneapolis, some observers in the district suggested that a number of the schools located along the outer perimeter of the district were not truly alternative schools, but were being automatically labeled a contemporary program if they were not a continuous progress or an open program. Upon closer study, we concluded that 26 Minneapolis elementary schools, all bearing the label of a contemporary program, were not alternative schools for a number of reasons: First, these schools were not clustered with other schools offering different educational programs and they did not exchange students with other types of programs; second, the majority of the teachers in these programs did not consider themselves to be teaching in an alternative school; and third, the schools were seen by teachers and parents alike simply as neighborhood schools. These 26 schools, therefore, were eliminated from our analysis of the Minneapolis alternative schools.

Measurement Issues

Principal Behavior

For this study of school principals we needed some way of comparing principals. Obviously, there are many characteristics on which to compare principals; decisionmaking behavior seemed particularly relevant for this study, since alternative programs are often designed to foster a change in the school's decisionmaking process. One way to measure behavior is through direct observation. Direct observation

3 The main problem with this method is the bias that might be introduced in the respondent's behavior by the presence of the observer. See Webb et al. (1970).
of principals in four districts over an extended period of time was beyond the scope of this study, however. Two additional methods are principal self-reports and reports from other informed persons. This study utilizes both of these methods to assess the dominant behavior of the alternative school principals.

During personal interviews, alternative school principals were asked to respond to a variety of questions that enabled us to determine their response to different situations. In addition, the mail questionnaire asked teachers to indicate the behavior of their principals under different circumstances. Three separate behavioral archetypes emerged from a set of nine items asked of teachers on the survey. The first archetype, the director, consists of four items (15a-d) and has an internal consistency reliability of .71. The second archetype, the administrator, consists of one item (18d), while the third archetype, the facilitator, consists of four items (18a-c,e) and has an internal consistency reliability of .83. As can be seen from the data in Table A.1, each item is more highly correlated with items in the scale to which it is assigned than it is to any of the other items.

Table A.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Q15a</th>
<th>Q15b</th>
<th>Q15c</th>
<th>Q15d</th>
<th>Q18a</th>
<th>Q18b</th>
<th>Q18c</th>
<th>Q18d</th>
<th>Q18e</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q15a--Principal has influence on curriculum</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15b--Principal has influence on budget</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15c--Principal has influence on staff</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q15d--Principal has influence on students</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.063</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18a--Principal helps me</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.644</td>
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<td>Q18b--Principal is source of new ideas</td>
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<td>0.323</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
<td>0.445</td>
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<td>Q18c--Principal approves the educational philosophy</td>
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<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Q18d--Principal is mostly administrative</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.073</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Q18e--Principal encourages new ideas</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1Spring 1977 Teacher Questionnaire, Questions 15a-d and 18a-e.
As a check on the validity of teacher perceptions of their principals' behavior, we independently categorized principals as to their dominant behavior using the interview data. In Alum Rock and Eugene, where the size of the districts enabled us to reinterview the same principals and to thus collect more in-depth data, our categorization and teacher perceptions were congruent in approximately 9 out of 10 cases. In Minneapolis, a larger district with fewer opportunities to reinterview principals, the congruence was approximately 3 out of 4 cases.¹

Finally, we wanted to check the appropriateness of our assumption that principals could be categorized by one dominant mode of behavior. We were basing our analysis on the grounds that principals will settle on a managerial style with which they are most comfortable and will tend to follow that style despite the situation. Others believe, however, that a principal will change his leadership style to meet the needs of varying situations, and that to categorize principals by only one style would be an error. To test this assumption, we used analysis of variance to determine whether our three behavioral archetypes were school-level or program-level variables in multiprogram schools. We reasoned that if principals utilized different decision-making behavior in different situations, then teacher perceptions of principal behavior should show a differentiation by program since programs in one building often followed different classroom practices and espoused different philosophies.

The results indicate that all three variables are school-level variables. For two of the three variables, the between-program variance was significant in only 1 of 18 cases, a result that has a .05 probability of occurring by chance. For one of the three archetypes, the between-program variance was significant in 2 of 18 cases, for a .1 probability of occurring by chance. Therefore, throughout this study, principal behavior is treated as a school-level phenomenon.

¹It was not possible to undertake such a test in Cincinnati, of course, since a teacher questionnaire was not administered there.
Program Characteristics

A systematic observation of alternative programs to determine their characteristics was beyond our means; yet, we considered the relationship between leadership style and program characteristics to be an important aspect of the study. Consequently, we utilized teacher responses to questions in the mail survey that asked them to describe their classrooms along 13 dimensions as a measure of program characteristics. These dimensions were analyzed to determine whether certain combinations were explaining the same phenomenon or factor. The results of this factor analysis indicated that 11 of the 13 items were explaining the same phenomenon, while 2 were not. These 2 items (e and z) were too short for a separate scale and were dropped from the analysis.

We next undertook a reliability analysis to determine whether the reliability of the scale changed as items were included or dropped. The results of this analysis indicated that 7 of the 11 items were an adequate set for the scale. Whether or not the remaining 4 items were included had no effect on the reliability of the scale, and they were subsequently dropped from the analysis (b,c,g,h).

The final step in constructing this scale was to test whether these remaining 7 items discriminated between the three Minneapolis program types with a probability of .001 or better. Five of the 7 items did; 2 did not. The latter 2 items (d and j) were subsequently dropped from the scale. The resulting scale contained 5 items (a,f,i, k,m) and had an internal consistency reliability of .73. Essentially, this factor represents a continuum of classroom practices along an "open structured" dimension: Programs that ranked at one end of this continuum were following open classroom practices, while programs that ranked at the opposite end were following very traditional or structured classroom practices. Programs that fell into the middle of this continuum tended to follow an individualized approach.

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1 Spring 1977 Teacher Questionnaire, Questions 46a-m.
The known difficulty with using self-report data rather than observational data is that frequently respondents will report an ideal rather than an actual situation. However, in this instance we were able to test the robustness of our measure by comparing our results to the results of the classroom observation study in Alum Rock. Recall that in Alum Rock, a systematic observation of 92 classrooms was undertaken to provide a detailed description of the kinds of educational programs that have developed over the course of the voucher demonstration. The results of this study show that the Alum Rock programs can be compared mainly along three dimensions: a "traditional versus nontraditional," a "self versus other pacing," and a "subject-centered versus student-centered" dimension. These dimensions are essentially variants of our "open-structured" dimension. Furthermore, this analysis in Alum Rock went on to test the extent to which teacher reports of their classroom practices correlated with the assessments made by independent and trained observers. They found teacher reports and observer assessments to be very nearly congruent.¹ Given these results, we are confident of being able to differentiate between programs on the basis of the "open-structured" variable used throughout this study.

¹For further details of this study see Barker, Bikson, and Kimbrough (1978).
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