Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe

Objectives, Instruments, Results

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Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe
Objectives, Instruments, Results

John Van Oudenaren

February 1986

A Project AIR FORCE report prepared for the United States Air Force
PREFACE

This report is part of a Project AIR FORCE study on "The Future of Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe." It examines the objectives of Soviet policy toward Western Europe, the mechanisms employed by the Soviet Union in trying to achieve these objectives, and the overall effectiveness of Soviet policy in these efforts. The study is based in part on interviews with government officials, journalists, and scholars conducted in Western Europe in the spring of 1985.

The report is intended to be of assistance to Air Force officers and planners concerned with the overall political and strategic environment that will confront the Air Force in Western Europe in the coming decade. It should also be of interest to a wide range of readers concerned with Soviet policy toward Europe.

Research for this report was completed on August 30, 1985.
SUMMARY

This report analyzes the objectives, instruments, and achievements of Soviet policy toward Western Europe. It focuses on the mechanisms used by the Soviet Union to pursue its objectives in Europe, including diplomacy, military power, arms control, the West European Communist parties, ties with the non-Communist left, propaganda, and trade. Some of these mechanisms are only partially or secondarily intended to further Soviet foreign-policy objectives. Trade, for example, is intended primarily to benefit the Soviet economy and is only secondarily a political instrument.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

While promoting Western Europe's transition to “socialism” remains a declared objective of Soviet policy in the long term, a number of objectives that bear directly on the state interests of the USSR have greater operational significance for Soviet policy.

These objectives, in probable order of importance, include safeguarding the USSR's World War II territorial and political gains; gradually lessening the American military, political, economic, and cultural presence in Western Europe; obtaining a voice in the defense policies of West European countries; securing economic and technological inputs for the Soviet economy; obtaining leverage over the internal politics and policies of the West European countries; and hindering progress toward West European unity under European Community (EC) or other auspices. In Soviet commentaries on Western Europe, all of these objectives are subsumed under the overall objective of promoting a pan-European system of “collective security” and “international cooperation.”

THE MECHANISMS OF SOVIET POLICY

The Soviet Union pursues an active bilateral and multilateral diplomacy toward Western Europe. At the bilateral level, the USSR has concluded agreements with most countries on the basic principles governing bilateral relations and has established patterns of regular summitry and political consultation. At the multilateral level, it has promoted the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the “Helsinki process” as a framework for the
development of East-West political ties. The basic objective of Soviet bilateral and multilateral diplomacy toward Western Europe is to obtain an institutionalized Soviet voice in the affairs of Western Europe.

The Soviet leaders claim that military power is an essential prerequisite for the conduct of a successful political strategy toward Western Europe. According to Soviet statements, the main purpose of Soviet military power in Europe is to enable the Soviet Union to prevail in the unlikely event that war with NATO breaks out. However, the Soviets also regard military power as useful in peacetime, because it impresses Soviet might on the West Europeans and, in the Soviet view, makes them more receptive to Soviet calls for political and other forms of cooperation. There is some evidence to suggest that the Soviets regard active intimidation by military forces, including maneuvers, violations of territorial waters and airspace, and nuclear threats, as politically useful.

The Soviet Union pursues an active arms-control and disarmament policy toward Western Europe. From the Soviet perspective, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), SALT, START, MBFR, and the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) all can serve Soviet political objectives in Western Europe. The Soviet Union is also promoting "declaratory measures" and nuclear-free zones in various regions of Europe. The objectives of this policy are to maximize Soviet military advantages and to undermine the strategic unity of the Atlantic alliance by exploiting potential intra-alliance differences over nuclear deployments and strategy. It would be very desirable, from the Soviet viewpoint, to obtain at least a partial droit de regard over the security policies of the West European countries.

The West European Communist parties are far less important for Soviet policy toward Western Europe than in the past, but they are still considered useful in certain ways. They can serve as domestic pressure groups on behalf of Soviet foreign-policy interests and, over the very long run, can contribute to "progressive" changes in West European societies.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union also maintains and is trying to expand direct contacts with the Socialist and Social Democratic parties of Western Europe. The Soviets view these contacts, most of which have developed since the early 1970s, as a way of exerting pressure on non-Socialist governments by dealing directly with their domestic opposition.

The Soviet Union pursues economic ties with Western Europe for both economic and political reasons. It has worked to establish permanent institutions for bilateral economic cooperation that include
trade agreements, industrial cooperation agreements, and joint economic commissions, primarily for political reasons. The Soviet Union uses various means to undermine the EC, but it is also interested in concluding an agreement between the EC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) that would give the Soviet Union some influence over the future development of the Community.

The other mechanisms of Soviet policy that are examined in this report—propaganda, disinformation, espionage, and agents of influence—are of secondary importance relative to diplomacy, military power, and arms control. However, these secondary mechanisms are of interest for what they reveal about long-range Soviet objectives with regard to Western Europe. They also make modest but, from the Soviet perspective, welcome contributions to the advancement of Soviet objectives.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET POLICY

The Soviet Union has achieved mixed results in its policy toward Western Europe. It was not able to block deployment of new U.S. missiles in late 1983, even though Soviet leaders elevated the missile issue to a test of their policy and tried to use nearly all of the policy mechanisms at their disposal to influence the West Europeans. Failure in the anti-missile campaign showed that the Soviet Union was not able to separate the United States from Western Europe on a decisive issue or to exercise a veto over the defense policies of West European countries.

But over the entire postwar period, Soviet policy can claim a number of successes. The Soviet Union has obtained international recognition that the division of Germany will remain a feature of the postwar order for the foreseeable future, as well as tacit Western recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Soviet policy has also helped to prevent the West Europeans from taking steps that would be harmful to Soviet interests. Although Western Europe's failure to achieve economic and political unity has been primarily due to intra-West European problems, the Soviet Union has played a significant role in hindering the process, both by direct pressure against Western Europe and by promoting limited East-West rapprochement as an alternative rather than a complement to West European integration. Similarly, Soviet policy has helped to assure that Western Europe will not again take part in any American effort, should one be made, to limit Soviet access to the international economic system. The Soviets can be confident that the West European countries would not
impose the kind of international isolation that the Soviet Union endured during the cold war. Although the change in West European attitudes is primarily the result of changes in the way these countries interpret their national economic and political interests, Soviet policy has played a role in altering West European (as well as American) attitudes toward trade and other forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

While it has succeeded in helping to consolidate postwar gains, Soviet policy has not yet made a dramatic breakthrough toward its stated objective of fostering a system of "collective security" in Europe. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that failure to achieve these maximal goals has led the Soviets to rethink their objectives or to lower their expectations. Relying on the same basic mechanisms analyzed in this report, Gorbachev will attempt to make progress toward these long-term goals. However, he is likely to concentrate first on two Soviet foreign-policy objectives that affect Western Europe only indirectly: reconsolidating the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe and, if possible, on the international Communist movement as a whole, and reaffirming the Soviet Union's status as a superpower seen by the world as capable of dealing with the United States as a political equal. Although neither of these objectives relates directly to Western Europe, their accomplishment is seen in Moscow as essential to the successful conduct of a policy aimed at fostering long-term change there.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The fact that the Soviet Union is the only country that is both a military superpower and located (in part) in Europe accounts, in large measure, for the basic features of Soviet policy toward Western Europe. As the leaders of a military superpower, the members of the Soviet Politburo are preoccupied with the United States, which alone can counterbalance Soviet military power and match Soviet achievements in defense, outer space, and the competition for influence in the third world. But as the leaders of a country that is physically part of Europe and tied to Europe by history and culture, the members of the Politburo are committed to undercutting, and if possible eliminating, the presence of a rival superpower on the European continent. While the United States is the chief preoccupation of Soviet policymakers, Western Europe is the chief arena in which Soviet-American rivalry has been played out since World War II. Other arenas, notably the third world, have led to dangerous U.S.-Soviet clashes, but only Western Europe has commanded a sustained commitment of Soviet attention and resources throughout the postwar period.

Soviet leaders recognize that in the competition for global influence, the alliance with Western Europe is an enormous asset for the United States. They view this European “asset” both in narrowly operational terms, as when they complain about the United States’ ability to deploy military forces near Soviet borders while the USSR cannot place the United States in an analogous position, and more broadly, as when they argue that Western Europe is a “reserve” of American “imperialism” that provides the United States with markets and investment opportunities and supplements American military power through the integrated NATO command. Breaking American influence in Western Europe is thus almost a precondition to breaking American predominance in other regions of the world and to undermining the postwar monetary, trade, and commercial order that the Soviet Union continues to regard as “unequal” and an instrument of Western “imperialism.”

While it has been drawn into the competition for influence in Western Europe by its global rivalry with the United States, the Soviet leadership has also been impelled to challenge America in Europe by the long-standing Russian sense that Europe—both Eastern and Western—is a legitimate sphere of Soviet influence. As far back as 1815, Tsar Alexander I played a major role in defining the territorial
and internal political and social order in post-Napoleonic Europe. In the second half of the 19th and the first part of the 20th centuries, Russian influence in Europe declined as a result of internal weaknesses, the temporary rise of Germany as the predominant industrial and military power on the continent, and extra-European clashes with the British Empire and Japan. After 1945, however, Germany was no longer a power, the Soviet internal system could claim to have been vindicated by its performance in the war, and the extra-European empires that had challenged Russia in Asia were on their way to dissolution.

Under these circumstances, Stalin had reason to expect that in time the USSR would wield a predominant influence over the whole of Europe. He was clearly encouraged when President Roosevelt observed at Yalta that he did not expect American forces to remain in Europe more than two years beyond the war’s end. These expectations were dashed in the 1950s when Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and the Korean War led to the return of American forces to Europe, supplementing the extensive economic and political support the United States had offered earlier.

Postwar Soviet policy toward Western Europe can be thought of as a sustained effort to achieve what the Soviets regard as their rightful place in Europe, which they believe was denied them in the late 1940s. While in the 1970s the Soviets extended their influence in the third world and stepped up their strategic nuclear and naval competition with the United States, these efforts strengthened rather than undermined the Soviet view that Western Europe should be less closely tied to the United States and should show greater deference to the Soviet Union. As Malcolm Mackintosh wrote in 1973, “the Russians feel themselves to be not only the most numerous but also the greatest of all European peoples. They believe, on those grounds and on ideological grounds, that the Soviet Union has the right to greater influence in all European affairs than she has now.”

This report examines Soviet policy toward Western Europe, with particular emphasis on the instruments and mechanisms that the Soviet Union uses in attempting to promote its objectives. Section II examines the ultimate and proximate objectives of Soviet policy, as they are reflected both in Soviet policy toward Western Europe as a whole and in policy toward individual countries or groups of countries. Section III examines the mechanisms of Soviet policy in the region. Section IV assesses the overall effectiveness of these mechanisms in

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achieving the objectives outlined in Section II, first from the Soviet and then from the West European perspective, and offers predictions for future Soviet policy directions.
II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

ALL-EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES

The ultimate objectives of Soviet policy toward Western Europe are straightforward: according to authoritative pronouncements of the Soviet Communist party, Western Europe is participating in "man's revolutionary transition from capitalism... to socialism and communism."1 Soviet doctrine holds that the mere existence of a socialist community in Eastern Europe allows for the possibility of revolution in Western Europe and that Soviet foreign policy can promote "progressive" changes in the capitalist world. However, Soviet doctrine also claims that ultimate responsibility for revolution in the West rests with the local Communist parties, whose prospects for achieving power have been remote for much of the postwar period.2 The goal of Communist revolution thus has limited operational significance for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

While promoting Western Europe's transition to socialism remains an ultimate Soviet objective, a number of near-term objectives that bear directly on the state interests of the USSR have greater operational significance for policy. These objectives include:

1. Safeguarding the Soviet Union's World War II territorial and political gains from internal or external challenge.
2. Gradually lessening the American military, political, economic, and cultural presence in Western Europe.
3. Obtaining a voice in the defense policies of West European countries.
5. Obtaining leverage over the internal politics and policies of West European countries, particularly on matters that affect Soviet interests.
6. Hindering progress toward West European unity under European Community (EC) or other auspices.

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1V. V. Zagladin (ed.), Mirnoe kommunisticheskoe doshenie, Izdatel'vno politicheskoi literatury, Moscow, 1982, p. 7 (cited hereafter as MKD).
2The one exception, Portugal in 1974, is discussed below.
The Soviets generally pursue these objectives on an ad hoc and opportunistic basis, using whatever political, military, and economic mechanisms seem appropriate. These mechanisms generally serve the broader Soviet objective of promoting a pan-European system of "collective security" and "international economic cooperation." The pan-European system provides an overarching rationale for numerous mechanisms that the Soviet Union employs in its day-to-day policy toward Western Europe, without contradicting the ultimate Soviet objective of worldwide socialism. It therefore lends both tactical coherence and ideological legitimacy to Soviet policy toward the region.\(^3\)

"Pan-Europeanism" is a longstanding theme in Soviet foreign policy. It dates back at least to Molotov's 1954 proposal for an all-European conference and has antecedents in the late Tsarist period, when France and Russia were allied against Germany in the broader context of the European state system. In contemporary circumstances, where the Soviet Union has far outstripped the other European states in military power, an all-European system that did not "import" American power or that did not include a European defense community in which the smaller states pooled their resources would become a framework for Soviet dominance over the entire continent. Precisely for this reason, Soviet policymakers have for 30 years promoted, in different forms and with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the creation of a system that would be "all-European" and "only European." In such a system, no part of Europe could form an effective alliance against any other, and no extra-European powers—particularly the United States—would play a significant role in security matters.\(^4\)

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviets attempted to win support for their all-European proposals by mobilizing forces in Western Europe against the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and its transatlantic ally, the United States. In essence, the Soviets sought to divert attention from the East-West division of Europe by appealing to anti-German and anti-American sentiments in the West. This attempt won a few backers, but on balance it served to strengthen support among the West European majority for continued alliance with the United

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\(^3\)According to Zagladin, "the interconnection of the strengthening of socialism, the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence and the possibilities of socioprogressive, revolutionary development has been revealed with the greatest fullness in recent years on the European continent in the process of the extension of the relaxation of tension and the implementation of the Helsinki spirit." (MKD, p 26.)

\(^4\)Although some West European and American observers have argued that the Soviet leaders actually want the United States to remain in Western Europe as a check on alleged West German "revanchism," the weight of evidence does not support this view. For a discussion of this question, see "The View from Western Europe," in Section IV below.
States and with the FRG. As long as the Soviet Union occupied Eastern Europe, kept Germany divided, and did nothing to allay suspicions that it would impose the Soviet system on any country over which it gained sufficient influence, it could not expect the West Europeans to respond to Soviet invitations to join in creating an all-European system. In the 1970s, the Soviets modified their all-European policy, changing the focus of their attacks from the United States and the FRG as such to "militarism" and the alleged danger of war, which were linked only secondarily to NATO and the American presence in Europe. Germany was portrayed not as the object of the proposed all-European system, but as the country that would benefit most from the implementation of Soviet proposals for overcoming the division of Europe.

A corollary to Soviet support for a pan-European system is a strong stand against all "groupings" that the Soviets term "subregional." Soviet opposition to European "subregionalism" was already apparent at the October 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, where the USSR sought to enlist British and American support against the plans of European governments-in-exile to form postwar federations. After the war, the Soviet Union pressured President Benes of Czechoslovakia to drop plans for a Central European federation and squelched suggestions by the leaders of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for a Communist federation in the Balkans. In the north, the Soviet Union pressured Finland to refuse participation in a Nordic Customs Union and opposed the NORDEK plan for economic cooperation among Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Above all, the Soviet Union is opposed to the EC, which not only includes the countries that account for the bulk of Western Europe's population and industrial power, but explicitly looks toward political union as its ultimate goal.

Short of actual realization of its ambitious pan-European objectives, the Soviet Union would like to gain as much influence as possible over individual countries in Western Europe. Either in response to direct Soviet pressure or out of their own sense of national interest, many West European countries took steps after World War II that were intended to assuage real or alleged Soviet security concerns, or at least

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5In a note to the conference, the Soviet government stated that it considered it "premature, both from the point of view of the interests of small countries themselves and of the general European postwar settlement, to artificially encourage the unification of any state into federations." (Soviet archives, quoted in Vaevolot, Kniuzhinsky, West European Integration: Its Policies and International Relations, Progress, Moscow, 1994, p. 40.)

had that effect. Finland accepted limitations on its sovereignty in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Sweden refrained from joining NATO. Norway and Denmark qualified their membership in the Western alliance by deciding not to host foreign troops on their soil in peacetime. West Germany, mainly in response to Western concerns but also with an eye to the East, pledged to forgo production of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons as well as submarines and certain categories of ships, missiles, and aircraft. Austria accepted permanent neutralization and limitations on its national defense forces in exchange for ending its status as an occupied country.

Throughout the postwar period, the Soviet Union has encouraged the West European countries to expand the number and scope of self-imposed limitations on their defense activities, and has also sought to interpret existing limitations that were initially self-imposed as bilateral undertakings between these countries and the Soviet Union. By "bilaterializing" these unilateral limitations, the Soviet Union hopes not only to make them irreversible, but to obtain a partial droit de regard over West European security policies.

In addition to efforts to transform national policies into bilateral undertakings, the Soviet Union has put forth a constant stream of proposals aimed at creating new bilateral and multilateral security arrangements affecting all or parts of Europe. In 1952–1953, it proposed the neutralization of Germany. In 1957 and again in 1964, it supported proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free zone covering Poland, East and West Germany, and Czechoslovakia. In the late 1950s, it backed a Romanian plan for the establishment of a Balkan "peace zone" free of foreign bases. Adopting a somewhat expansive definition of the Balkans, the Soviets suggested that the proposed zone include Italy as well as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece. In 1959, the Soviets announced their support for a nuclear- and rocket-free zone in Scandinavia and the Baltic. In 1963, they suggested the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean.

In addition to their expressed interest in the Mediterranean, the Soviets have made proposals that reflect a long-term interest in extending the Soviet security perimeter well into the Atlantic and other seas adjoining the Soviet Union. During the START negotiations with the United States, the Soviets tabled proposals that would have prohibited "heavy bombers and aircraft carriers of one side from entering agreed zones adjoining the territory of the other side" and that

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would have prohibited "any anti-submarine activity in zones established for missile-carrying submarines of the other side." These proposals reflect a long-standing Soviet interest in limiting U.S. naval deployments in the seas surrounding the USSR, or, at a minimum, in justifying the strength of Soviet ground forces in Europe on the basis of U.S. naval and air activities near the USSR.

The range of proposals the Soviet Union has put forward in the name of enhancing its security suggests that the Soviet leaders have adopted a virtually open-ended definition of their own security requirements. It also suggests that at least some of the Soviet interest in security is offensively motivated and aimed at changing the political status quo in Europe. The Soviets are now exhorting even neutral countries that have been careful not to associate too closely with NATO, the United States, or the EC to become more "active" in mobilizing support for Soviet proposals in other countries. In Sweden, many observers interpret the Soviet call for a more "active" policy as a suggestion that Sweden should adjust its neutrality in an eastward direction.

The Soviet definition of "security" is also broad enough to serve as a basis for Soviet complaints about many domestic policies and practices in West European countries. The long-standing Soviet campaign for an international ban on war propaganda—which Soviet authorities claim is constitutionally banned and therefore does not exist in the USSR—is only one example of a Soviet attempt to use security concerns and a professed commitment to peace to gain a voice in internal matters. In most cases, such attempts are rebuffed by the Western governments. Finland, however, practices press self-censorship on matters pertaining to Soviet internal and foreign affairs.

This is not to say, of course, that the Soviet Union does not have genuine concerns about the military capabilities of the West European states and of the NATO alliance. But unlike most governments, the Soviet leadership never spells out these concerns in terms that are credible to non-Soviet audiences. Soviet rhetoric about Western conventional capabilities is often as strident as Soviet statements about U.S. nuclear forces. Criticisms of small and relatively weak countries can be as harsh as those directed at the most powerful members of the alliance. This reluctance to discriminate between greater and lesser threats may reflect an ideologically determined need to deny legitimacy to any defense efforts by an "imperialist" state that are directed at the Soviet Union. But it also suggests a Soviet determination to respond

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8These proposals are outlined in the pamphlet How to Avert the Threat to Europe, Progress, Moscow, 1963, p. 74.
to its real security concerns by unilateral military exertions, while "crying wolf" about all Western defense measures in the hope of generating domestic political opposition to them and pressuring Western governments to negotiate multilateral and bilateral restraints on their own defense policies.

BILATERAL OBJECTIVES AND ASSESSMENTS

While the Soviets pursue their all-European objectives, they recognize and indeed welcome the fact that Western Europe is basically a conglomeration of sovereign states. The Soviets know that to make progress toward general European objectives, they must work with particular countries. The remainder of this section briefly reviews the objectives the Soviets traditionally have pursued with regard to particular countries and the chances they see for making progress in realizing these objectives.

West Germany. The FRG is the focal point of Soviet policy in Western Europe. In addition to having the largest population and industrial base, West Germany is the chief military ally of the United States. Its mere existence complicates Soviet control over the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and by extension over the rest of Eastern Europe.

Soviet objectives with regard to West Germany have not changed fundamentally since the mid-1950s. For about a decade after World War II, Soviet leaders did not rule out the reunification of Germany, provided they could achieve it without dismantling communism in the East and provided they would have opportunities to spread Soviet influence over the whole of Germany. After about 1955, however, Soviet leaders abandoned the all-German option and worked to consolidate and legitimize the East German state. The 1970 treaty between the USSR and the FRG and West Germany's agreements with other Warsaw Pact states, including East Germany, marked the fulfillment of this long-standing objective.

Having achieved what they saw as full recognition of the GDR and its "irreversibly socialist" character, the Soviets believed they were positioned to pursue a long-range strategy aimed at eroding American and other Western influences in the FRG. 9 With détente, the Soviet

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9The West Germans, it should be noted, do not regard Ostpolitik as having accorded full recognition to the GDR. The FRG does not accept the validity of East German citizenship and deals with the GDR through the Ministry of Inner-German Affairs rather than the Foreign Office. The qualified nature of West German recognition of the GDR has been an irritant in GDR-FRG relations since the early 1970s. The Soviets, however, appear to regard West German reservations about full recognition of the GDR mainly as
leaders believed that they had set in motion a gradual process that would result in West Germany's coming to define itself less in terms of its American, NATO, and EC connections and more in terms of its economic and political interests in the East. West Germany's role in taking and implementing the 1979 NATO dual-track decision therefore came as a shock to the Soviet leaders, demonstrating the extent to which these expectations were misplaced.

From the Soviet perspective, the *sine qua non* of détente with West Germany is West German recognition that it can be pursued only on *Soviet terms*—that it must not become a process by which the Germans challenge the Soviet sphere of influence in the East, but rather a process leading to a weakening of American influence in the West. In an apparent attempt to impress this point upon the German government and the public, the Soviet Union has pursued an unusually harsh policy toward the FRG since the spring of 1984. The Soviets have sent only relatively low-ranking delegations to Bonn, compared with those sent to other West European states. Gromyko and other Soviet officials are reported to have been blunt to the point of rudeness in meetings with Foreign Minister Genscher and other FRG officials. In addition, the Soviets have mounted a vociferous "anti-revanchism" campaign against the FRG, which reached its peak during Soviet preparations for the fortieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and has since continued at a lower level of intensity. The Soviets also clearly had a hand in the decision by East German leader Honecker to postpone his planned September 1984 visit to the FRG.

While treating the West German government as harshly as possible, the Soviets and the East Germans have been courting the West German Social Democrats. By differentiating clearly between the West German government and the opposition, the Soviets hope to pressure the government to modify its policies, as well as to help the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in its bid to replace the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)-Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition.

The focal point of Soviet pressure on the West German government is the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), with
technology transfer and COCOM\textsuperscript{10} restrictions a secondary issue. The Soviets want to make clear to the West German government that cooperation with the United States in both areas will hamper the conduct of normal relations with the Soviet Union and even with the GDR. The GDR factor was highlighted in March 1985, when Honecker told visiting SPD parliamentary leader Vogel that the development of inner-German relations would depend on the overall security environment. In his reports to the German public after the visit, Vogel made clear that SDI was at issue and was a new factor in inner-German relations.

**France.** The Soviets have three basic objectives in their policy toward France: (1) to preserve the gains that resulted from de Gaulle's withdrawal from the integrated NATO command in 1966 and his initiation of an independent policy toward the Soviet Union; (2) to encourage France to play a role in encouraging West European and especially West German détente from the United States, but to do so without creating an autonomous West European power that might challenge Soviet predominance in Europe; and (3) to promote certain bilateral Soviet-French agreements and ventures (e.g., the joint space mission) that could lead to new initiatives in Soviet-West European bilateral relations.

Although the Soviets view France as less central than West Germany to the success of Soviet policy in Europe, official Soviet evaluations of bilateral relations with Western Europe always list France first among individual countries, for it pioneered and remains the model for institutionalized bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and countries of the Atlantic alliance. Soviet discussions of French foreign policy usually acknowledge that under de Gaulle France “was one of the first countries in the West to speak out for overcoming the division of Europe.” Although the Soviets know that de Gaulle’s vision of a Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals” was implicitly directed against Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, they have long since concluded that the effect of his policy was to advance their own vision of what French commentators sometimes call a Europe “from the Urals to the Atlantic.” If the division of Europe is overcome, the Soviets believe, it will be on their terms rather than de Gaulle’s. For this reason, the Soviets assign a high priority to maintaining good relations with France. They know that largely for domestic political reasons, all French governments must remain more or less faithful to the Gaullist legacy in defense and foreign policy. The Soviets therefore regard

\textsuperscript{10}COCOM is the Coordinating Committee that was set up in 1949 to monitor exports to Communist countries. It includes Japan and all the NATO countries except Iceland.
France as a check both on trends toward closer European-American cooperation in the Atlantic framework and on potential progress toward creation of a supranational Europe with its own political and defense identity.

The extent to which this Soviet view of France is justified is of course debatable. It could be argued that in recent years France has become more cooperative in both the Atlantic and European frameworks. But the Soviets seem to believe that both trends are of limited importance. They do not appear to be alarmed at a possible upsurge in Franco-German or European defense cooperation, since they know France has very limited latitude in sharing its nuclear planning and programs with other European states or in stepping up cooperation for conventional defense of the central front. And they recognize that there are limits to how far any French government can go in publicly aligning itself with the United States on certain issues.

In 1981, the Soviets did little to conceal their preference for the reelection of Giscard, rather than François Mitterrand, whom they suspected of holding strong anti-Soviet biases and harboring Atlanticist sympathies. To some extent, these fears were confirmed after Mitterrand's election, as France for the first time expressed open support for the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe and attacked the Soviet Union on human rights and other issues. In response, the Soviets criticized Mitterrand for "insufficient realism," although they were very reluctant to conclude that French policy had undergone a permanent shift. In their public statements, they held out hope for an improvement in relations and ostentatiously praised France whenever it distanced itself from the United States, either alone or in concert with other European states. Although all the members of the EC opposed the U.S. effort to block the Urengoi pipeline, the Soviets singled out France for special praise. They also expressed appreciation for France's refusal to go along with sanctions after the Soviet downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007. Although the impetus for revitalization of the West European Union (WEU) came chiefly from France, the Soviets chose to focus their anti-WEU propaganda campaign on the West Germans.

For much of Mitterrand's term, the Soviets were not particularly well rewarded for their efforts to court France, which continued to support INF, joined the United States in Lebanon, and took the lead in attempting to revitalize the WEU. But with the INF issue off the European agenda and Mitterrand facing parliamentary elections in 1986, the Soviets may believe that their prospects are now better. They recognize that in 1981-1983, the French hardened their policy toward the Soviet Union in response to what they saw as alarming
trends in Germany. But with the decline of the West German peace movement and of alleged "nationalist-neutralist" currents in the FRG, the Soviets probably expect that France will resume a more independent stance. Some French observers are also reported to "believe that Mr. Mitterrand is convinced that the balance of power has now been restored between Moscow and Washington, affording Paris more maneuvering room to resume its customary middle role between the two superpowers."\textsuperscript{11}

The Soviets have frequently tried to compensate for poor relations with the United States and West Germany by improving relations with France. In 1980, Brezhnev met with President Giscard d'Estaing in Warsaw, thereby effectively breaking the Soviet Union's post-Afghanistan isolation and paving the way for visits to Moscow by Helmut Schmidt and other West European leaders.\textsuperscript{12} Many factors suggest that in late 1983 the Soviets began to look to France for an improvement in relations that would sustain the momentum of Soviet diplomacy in Western Europe without seeming to reward West Germany for its role in the INF deployments.

Although this effort has met with only limited success, it nonetheless continues. Soviet criticisms of France are less harsh than those directed at most other NATO countries and are markedly milder than those leveled at the West Germans.\textsuperscript{13} It is difficult, however, to judge the extent to which the currently upbeat pronouncements about France reflect objective assessments and the extent to which they reflect wishful thinking in Moscow. The traditional pattern of Franco-Soviet relations, as well as the strains that have arisen between France and the United States and West Germany over SDI, would seem to argue for an improvement in Soviet relations with France. This view is supported by the fact that General Secretary Gorbachev has announced a visit to France before meeting with President Reagan in Geneva.

But there are also obstacles to improved Franco-Soviet relations, including French anger over Soviet bilateral trade surpluses; an anti-Soviet mood among some elements of the French public, and especially the intellectuals; and several highly publicized incidents of Soviet industrial spying.


\textsuperscript{12}As Zagladin remarked in 1981, "We greatly appreciated Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Warsaw last year. That visit was the starting point for some major steps in international policy. We are often able to make progress with France." (Interview, Le Point, March 2, 1981.)

\textsuperscript{13}Also worth noting is Zagladin's assessment of post-INF relations in Europe, where he specifically mentioned France as one of five countries with which relations had "taken a favorable turn." (The other four are Greece, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden.) (Asahi Shimbun, November 2, 1984.)
Britain. Soviet leaders and foreign-policy specialists traditionally have regarded Britain as a close U.S. ally that is overly supportive of American policy. Soviet analysts occasionally acknowledge certain beneficial aspects of Britain's role, citing the part it played in slowing West European integration in the 1950s and its part in promoting trilateral arms-control initiatives in the early 1960s. But in the détente period, the Soviets did not invest much political capital in building up relations with Britain, preferring instead to concentrate on France and Germany, which were more independent of the United States in their policy toward the Soviet Union. In addition, Anglo-Soviet relations were overshadowed for many years by Britain's expulsion in 1971 of 105 Soviet spies, an act that many Soviets seem to have interpreted as a severe affront by a declining power to one that was emerging on the world stage as a universally recognized superpower.

Soviet attitudes toward Britain have softened considerably in the last two years as Soviet policymakers have identified possibilities for taking advantage of British eagerness for trade and the Thatcher government's desire, motivated in part by domestic political considerations, for improved relations with the East. The change was manifested in December 1984, when Gorbachev (who by then probably had been selected as Chernenko's successor) led a Soviet parliamentary delegation on a highly publicized trip to Britain. In April 1985, Pravda published an assessment of prospects for Anglo-Soviet relations that one British correspondent characterized as "the most flattering official statement about any Western country for years." Also noteworthy were commentaries that appeared in the Polish Communist press at the time of Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe's visit to Warsaw, suggesting that Britain was now poised to play the role of mediator between East and West.

A remarkable feature of the Pravda analysis was the way in which it praised virtually the entire British political spectrum for its "realism" and "concern about peace," mentioning by name leaders of the Conservative, Liberal, and Labour parties, as well as the British Communist

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15 Hella Pick, "Poland looks to Britain as 'mediator'," The Guardian, April 17, 1985. See also Zbigniew Lonnikowski, "Great Britain—Harbingers of Realism," Trybuna Ludu, April 10, 1985. Poland's desire to insulate relations with Britain from East-West tensions was further underscored when the Poles chose not to protest the laying of a wreath by Howe at the grave of murdered priest Jerzy Papieluszko. Later, attempts by the Belgian and West German Foreign Ministers to make similar gestures were met with harsh recriminations and contributed to the cancellation of planned visits to Warsaw. It is difficult to judge whether Howe's visit was tolerated because it was the first such visit attempted or because Howe was British rather than West German or Belgian. Polish attitudes toward Britain probably played some role.
party. In objective terms, of course, the differences on policy toward the Soviet Union between the Conservative and the Labour parties (not to mention the Communists) are at least as great as if not greater than the differences between the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in Germany and the SPD opposition. But whereas the Soviets are trying to accentuate this gap in policy toward Germany, they are minimizing its importance in dealing with Britain. These contrasting approaches suggest that in their dealings with Germany the Soviets are mainly interested in generating internal pressures against the governing coalition, while in Britain they are hoping to capitalize on potential differences of view between the British and the American governments. The Soviets may see this as a way of putting pressure on the United States to modify some of its policies. The Prauda analysis in fact heavily emphasized two areas of concern to the Soviets in which they see potential divergences between the United States and Britain: SDI and technology transfer. It effusively praised Howe for his March speech on SDI and the British government and business community for their opposition to U.S. technology-transfer policies.

Soviet hopes for improving relations with Britain by focusing on these issues may be overly optimistic, however. Since Howe's March speech, Britain has been careful not to distance itself from the United States on SDI. Trade and technology transfer may serve as irritants in the U.S.-UK relationship, but they are unlikely to assume overriding importance. Moreover, specifically bilateral issues that exist between Britain and the USSR—including a new rash of espionage incidents and of expulsions of Soviet personnel from Britain—could hinder efforts by both sides to improve relations.¹⁶

Italy. The Soviet Union has been unpleasantly surprised by Italy's policies in the last several years. Italy was an early pioneer in West European efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviets have long assumed that Italy's internal weaknesses made it susceptible to Soviet overtures. However, the Italians were strong supporters of the 1979 INF decision and were highly critical of Soviet actions in Poland. Nevertheless, with these issues behind them, the Soviets have moved decisively to improve relations with Italy. Prime Minister Craxi was the recipient of an early Gorbachev letter, one of the first visitors to Moscow after Gorbachev's election to General Secretary, and the first NATO country head to host East German party leader Honecker.

Soviet difficulties in dealing with Italy have been in part the product of Italian domestic politics. In 1976, when Craxi assumed the

leadership of the Italian Socialist party, he decided to adopt a strongly anti-Soviet profile as a way of undercutting Communist support in Italy. But the Soviets may sense that the present political climate in Italy is more favorable for an improvement in relations, even though Craxi has managed to stay in power and the Communist vote has declined. Precisely because Craxi is now in a stronger position relative to the Communists, he may feel less compelled to adopt anti-Soviet positions on key issues. Meanwhile, the Communists, who are increasingly isolated on the Italian domestic scene and have no viable coalition strategy for obtaining a share of power, may be tempted to adopt a more sectarian and pro-Soviet line, which would please the Soviets. The Soviets also enjoy good relations with the left wing of the Italian Christian Democratic party, particularly with Foreign Minister andreotti. Trends within the three largest parties, along with the interaction of these parties in the competition for power, may incline Italy to be receptive to some Soviet initiatives.

The Soviets do not have pressing bilateral objectives in dealing with Italy, but they would see certain developments in Italian-USSR relations as helpful in the broader European context. The Soviets viewed the response of the Italians to a new Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) initiative to the EC as being positive. The Soviets also hope that Italy will lend some support to Soviet views on INF and on the counting of British and French missiles in the Geneva negotiations.

Another important consideration in Soviet-Italian relations is the alleged "Bulgarian connection" in the 1981 assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. Soviet and Eastern bloc officials have taken several steps to pressure the Italian government to prevent a successful prosecution of the Bulgarian defendants. In 1983, the Bulgarians seized several Italian tourists in what appeared to be a crude attempt to secure the release of Sergei Antonov, the one Bulgarian defendant in Italian custody. (Two other defendants are being tried in absentia.) Foreign Minister Gromyko is reported to have raised the Antonov issue in his talks with Craxi, and the Soviets have formed a "Committee for the Defense of Antonov." But, probably recognizing that pressure is unlikely to produce results, the Soviets have changed their approach and are now working to improve relations with Italy, apparently hoping to insulate whatever happens at the trial from the sphere of government-to-government relations.

The Smaller NATO Countries. Throughout NATO's history, the Soviet Union has sought to fragment the alliance on a selective basis. In the 1960s, the Soviets tried to capitalize on neutralist sentiment in Norway and Denmark and encouraged these countries to quit the
alliance when the treaty came up for renewal in 1969. In the early 1950s and again in 1973, the Soviets sought to capitalize on disputes between Iceland and other NATO countries, notably Britain, over fishing rights, lending support to Iceland by stepping in to buy its annual fish catch in exchange for Soviet petroleum products. In 1974 and 1975, when a left-wing military government took power in Portugal, the Soviets were uncertain about how strongly they should support Portuguese Communist party efforts to carry through a total seizure of power. They were clearly delighted, however, to see Portugal’s ties to NATO and the U.S. bases in the Azores threatened by developments in Lisbon. In the 1974 conflict over Cyprus, the Soviet Union tried to exacerbate U.S. relations with both Greece and Turkey, blaming the July coup in Cyprus on “NATO circles” but refraining from overt criticism of Turkey when it invaded the island. The Soviets have also tried, through propaganda and various unofficial means of contact, to fan anti-NATO sentiments in sparsely populated but strategically important dependencies such as Greenland and the Faeroe Islands.

In contrast to the pattern of the 1960s and the early 1970s, the Soviets now seem relatively uninterested in separating individual countries from the alliance, although they would like to see Spain reverse its 1981 decision to join. They seem to see greater prospects in undercutting the strategic unity of the alliance by promoting regional nuclear-free zones and special bilateral arrangements with countries that remain in the alliance. Soviet policymakers see particular prospects for gains in Greece, where Prime Minister Papandreou has embraced Soviet positions on many issues in an effort to appeal to anti-American sentiment in Greece. The Soviets would like to see a further radicalization of Papandreou’s Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the development of ties between its left wing and the Greek Communist party (KKE). Before PASOK won an absolute majority in the June 1985 elections, the Soviets may have hoped for the formation of a PASOK-KKE coalition or, more likely, an arrangement whereby a minority PASOK government would remain in power with tacit Communist support. Although these expectations were not fulfilled, the Soviets expect that Greece will continue to act to undercut EC and NATO unity.

In the North, the Soviets will continue their campaign of propaganda and intimidation to pressure and cajole Denmark and Norway into semi-neutrality. This campaign includes proposals for a Nordic nuclear-free zone, diplomatic protests against Danish and Norwegian

17 In his 1967 speech at the Karlovy Vary conference, Brezhnev suggested that for the countries of northern Europe, “neutrality would be an alternative to participation in military-political groupings of powers.” (Pravda, April 26, 1967.)
participation in various NATO activities, and support for domestic pressure groups that are opposed to the alliance.

The Soviets have always relied upon a combination of direct pressure and purported concern about NATO activities to try to influence Norway to distance itself from the alliance. In January 1949, the Soviet Union sent a sharp protest note to the government of Norway, alleging that the Atlantic Pact, which Norway was proposing to join, was planning to establish “air and naval bases” on the territory of countries near the Soviet Union. The Norwegians replied to the Soviet note, assuring Moscow that Norway's territory would not be used for aggressive purposes and that Norway would not “join any agreement . . . involving obligations to open bases for the military forces of foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not attacked or exposed to threats of attack.”

Based on this exchange of notes and subsequent communications, Soviet sources now claim that “the no-bases and no-nuclear-weapon policy of Norway and Denmark was formalized in the fundamental declarations by their governments, including those addressed to the Soviet government, as well as in a number of joint communiqués.”

From a Western perspective, this claim is only partly true with respect to Norway and even less true with respect to Denmark, which has never formally pledged to the Soviet Union that it would not host foreign forces. However, the Soviets frequently appeal to these understandings in protesting activities by the Norwegians and Danes in the NATO context.

The Soviets also have ongoing disputes with Norway over the demarcation of economic zones in the Barents Sea, over the island of Svalbard, and over fishing rights in the Arctic. The Soviets would like to settle all these disputes on advantageous terms, but without dissuading the Norwegians from cooperating in the development of offshore oil deposits in the Barents. The Soviets have long been suspected by the Norwegians of having designs on Svalbard, a large island to the north of Norway that is under Norwegian sovereignty, but on which the Soviets are entitled, under the terms of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, to mine coal and carry out civilian research activities. The pattern of

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19 Y. Denisov, “Sixty Years of Relations Between the USSR and North European Countries,” International Affairs, No. 7, 1984, p. 49.
Soviet activities on Svalbard suggests to many Norwegian observers that the Soviets would like to obtain greater control over the island, either by revising the treaty, as they unsuccessfully attempted in 1944, or by encouraging the Norwegians to overlook Soviet violations.\textsuperscript{20}

The Soviets see Belgium and the Netherlands as less likely candidates for neutrality than the Scandinavian countries, but they are hoping that Belgium’s internal domestic difficulties and Holland’s “nuclear allergy” eventually will translate into a decisive break with the alliance on key issues. The Soviets would like to convince the Dutch government to decide against cruise missile deployments in November 1985, and they have announced a moratorium on Soviet deployments in an effort to sway Dutch public opinion.

Soviet policy toward Belgium, which has decided to accept deployments, is currently quite harsh and conforms more closely to Soviet policy toward Germany than toward France, Italy, or Britain. In early 1985, Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans traveled to Moscow and offered to strike a bilateral deal with the Soviets that would allow Belgium to forgo INF deployments in exchange for cuts in Soviet missiles. But, as a Belgian observer noted, the Soviets “gave Tindemans the back of their hand.” The Soviets probably were unwilling to undermine their principled stand on INF by dismantling even a few SS-20 missiles, and in any case they are looking forward to the October 1985 elections in which the current center-right government could be replaced by a center-left alternative that would include the Flemish Socialists, who remain committed to reversing any INF deployments.

**Austria, Sweden, and the Other Neutrals.** In the 1970s, Soviet objectives with regard to the westward-oriented neutrals in Europe, notably Sweden and Austria, appeared to undergo a change. No longer satisfied that these countries remained outside NATO, Soviet officials called for them to assume a more “active” role in Europe, i.e., to join with the Soviets in pushing proposals aimed at weakening NATO. Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme’s support for various nuclear-free zone initiatives and his frequent criticisms of the United States have been held up as examples of “active” behavior.

Coupled with suggestions about assuming more active roles, the Soviets have issued new warnings to these countries about their levels of cooperation with the United States, other NATO countries, and the EC. They have strongly criticized efforts by Austria and Sweden to assuage American concerns about the transshipment of illegally exported American technology to the East, and have warned against the purchase of weapons from the United States or other NATO countries.

The Soviet Union has an ongoing dispute with Sweden over the demarcation of economic zones in the Baltic and is using various levers, including the illegal boarding of Swedish fishing boats, to pressure the Swedes to change their position. Over the long run, many Swedish observers of Soviet policy toward the Baltic believe that the Soviet Union would like to reach agreement with other littoral states on making the Baltic an inland sea to which access by external powers would be denied or limited. Violations of Swedish territorial waters by Soviet submarines may be part of a Soviet campaign of pressure against Sweden, as well as a product of operational military planning by the Soviet navy.

Finland. While "Finlandization" is used in the West in a pejorative sense, Soviet officials have never tried to hide the fact that they regard Soviet-Finnish relations as an example for Soviet relations with all non-Communist states in Europe. In addition, the Soviets have concluded specific agreements and established patterns of cooperation with the Finns that presage Soviet proposals and negotiating positions with other Western states.21

The government of Finland has always described its international policy as one of neutrality. At the official level, the Soviet Union appears to have endorsed this position—for example, by signing joint communiqués that laud Finland's "peace-promoting policy of neutrality." In unofficial statements, however, the Soviets have made clear that in their view, Finland's neutrality is heavily qualified even during peacetime by the requirement that it be "peace-promoting." In a recent book on a nuclear-free northern Europe, Lev Voronkov, a leading Nordic specialist at the Institute for the Study of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), surrounded the words "Finland's neutrality policy" with quotation marks and claimed that the military provisions of the 1948 treaty "directly oblige Finland to pursue an active policy for détente and peace."22

Although some Finnish newspapers have reacted critically to these and similar statements, critics of Finland's policy argue that it has invited increased Soviet pressures by acquiescing in a gradual reinterpretation of its neutral status and its relationship to the Soviet Union.23 Some NATO officials and even other neutral states have

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21 The joint Soviet-Finnish communiqué that was issued at the conclusion of Soviet President Podgorny's October 1974 visit to Helsinki states that the 1948 treaty forms "an essential element of the all-European security system which is being set up by the joint efforts of European countries." (TASS, October 17, 1984.)


concluded that Finland is no longer seeking merely to avoid raising Soviet suspicions, but is acting to promote Soviet interests in Nordic and all-European forums. As one Western diplomat stated, “Finlandization today is not the same as the Finlandization of ten years ago.” Another diplomat who participated in meetings of the group of neutral and nonaligned countries at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reported that even Communist Yugoslavia was irritated at the degree to which the Finns worked to advance Soviet interests within the group.

Originally conceived of as an arrangement that would terminate Finland’s full sovereignty in the event of war, i.e., of an attack on the USSR by Germany, the 1948 treaty has been interpreted by the Soviets as obliging the Finns to support overall Soviet objectives in Europe. Up to a point, the Finns have tried to anticipate Soviet demands and to promote Soviet-sponsored initiatives such as the European security conference. By doing so, they do not appear to have increased their own security and may even have encouraged the Soviets to make added demands. During the INF controversy, for example, Soviet spokesmen claimed that Finland’s neutral status required that it take measures to intercept U.S. cruise missiles that might overfly Finnish territory en route to targets in the Soviet Union. In what appeared to be an effort to placate the Soviets, the commander of the Finnish defense forces announced in November 1983 that a new radar system designed to detect low-level violations of Finnish airspace soon would be completed.

By periodically hinting that they could challenge Finland’s neutral status, the Soviets not only spur the Finns to adjust their own policies, but encourage the governments of Norway and Denmark to do likewise in the hope that this will relieve Soviet pressure on the Finns. According to a prominent Norwegian journalist, “Norway’s policy inside NATO has always been conducted with a glance over the shoulder toward the Finns.”24 In 1978, Norway reversed earlier plans to increase the level of participation of West German military units in NATO exercises on Norwegian soil. In 1976, a company of 180 Bundeswehr medics had taken part in NATO maneuvers, marking the first time since World War II that German forces were on Norwegian territory. Protests by the Finns, who are believed to have raised concerns about increased Soviet pressures on them, prompted the change on the part of the Oslo government.

Soviet influence over Finland now extends well into the realm of domestic affairs. In addition to censoring their reporting of the Soviet Union, the Finns are reported to have a separate agreement with the

Soviet Union on border crossing that supplements the United Nations Convention on Refugees. Whereas the UN Convention obliges signatories to grant political asylum in cases where the return of a fleeing individual is likely to lead to persecution, the Soviet-Finnish agreement, which was signed at Soviet behest in 1965, is reported to require that Finland return Soviet citizens who face criminal charges. Because the Soviet Union claims to have no political prisoners and usually charges dissidents with criminal offenses, it can demand the return from Finland of any escaped Soviet citizen.

Finland is also highly responsive to the Soviets in economic affairs, and has restructured its international trade and to some extent its domestic infrastructure to accord with Soviet wishes. For most of the 1970s, Finland’s economy benefited from its bilateral clearing arrangement with the USSR. Finnish exports to the Soviet Union helped to sustain economic growth in periods when the West was in recession, as Finland was able to increase its manufactured exports by taking larger quantities of higher-priced oil. But this benefit was mainly a consequence of the oil price explosion of the 1970s and is now becoming a liability, as world oil prices decline. With Finland buying 90 percent of its oil from the Soviet Union, there is little room to expand exports in exchange for increased energy imports. In 1984, in fact, the Finns inquired whether the Soviets would be willing to pay for some Finnish goods in hard currency. The Soviets were reportedly cool to this idea and have countered with the familiar suggestion that the Finns buy more Soviet manufactured products.

Recently, conservative commentators have hailed developments in Finland that they believe imply a certain distancing from the Soviet Union. Finland’s trade with the Soviet Union has reached a saturation point and is now increasing more slowly than trade with Western partners. In their desire to increase trade with the West, the Finns are quietly becoming less willing to serve as a conduit for Western technology sought by the Soviets. The Finnish Communist party, which has always been a useful although not essential means for influencing Finland’s foreign policy, is in disarray, having split into pro-Soviet and “Eurocommunist” wings. But these developments may not necessarily lead to diminished Finnish support for Soviet diplomacy. They may in fact make the Finns more eager to allay Soviet mistrust by performing diplomatic functions in support of Soviet objectives.

III. THE MECHANISMS OF SOVIET POLICY

THE LEVELS OF SOVIET POLICY

This section analyzes the range of mechanisms that Soviet policymakers have at their disposal for pursuing various objectives concerning Western Europe. Some of these mechanisms have existed for many years, while others are products of the détente period. Their effectiveness in accomplishing Soviet objectives is examined in Section IV. To place these mechanisms in proper perspective, it is necessary to note two factors, ideology and the party-state duality, which affect all aspects of Soviet policy toward Western Europe.

Western analyses of Soviet foreign policy traditionally have emphasized that the Soviet Union pursues a dual policy toward the non-Communist world, on the one hand promoting limited cooperation among “states with different social systems,” but on the other lending support to revolutionary forces that aim to overthrow the governments and constitutional systems of these non-Communist states. But with the relative decline in the importance of the West European Communist parties and the decrease in prospects for revolution in the West, some analysts of Soviet foreign policy have downgraded the significance of the party-state duality and have shifted attention to purely state-to-state relations.

Although this shift in emphasis may be justified up to a point, to neglect the “class” aspect of Soviet foreign policy is to overlook two important factors: first, long-term revolutionary change and the promotion of “progressive” trends remain important, if secondary, goals of Soviet policy; and second, even Soviet state objectives cannot be explained or justified without ultimate reference to the ideological tenets of Soviet foreign policy and the self-proclaimed link between “socialism” and “peace.” Soviet policy toward Western Europe in essence consists of a broad effort to enhance the Soviet Union’s own security by unilateral means while using bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, arms control, and other mechanisms to limit the security options of other countries. Up to a point, the Soviet Union is able to pursue this policy without recourse to ideological arguments. As a superpower, it demands self-denying behavior on the part of other European countries, not because these countries in themselves pose a threat to Soviet security, but because their actions impinge upon the
Soviet Union as it exercises its "right" to insure its security against the other superpower.

But beyond certain limits—which obviously vary within and between countries—West European political leaders refuse to accept the "right" of the Soviet Union to security privileges beyond those of any other European state, particularly since the Soviet Union tries to reap political, economic, and security benefits by stressing its European identity. Pressed to defend its claim, the Soviet government must stress its inherently "peace-loving" and "socialist" character. The party-state duality therefore remains fundamentally important for the way the Soviet Union defines its role in Europe.

For a variety of reasons, however, this duality has lost its utility as a framework for analysis of the instruments of Soviet policy. In the 1920s and 1930s, the party-state duality prescribed by Soviet ideology corresponded to a duality in the means employed in Soviet foreign policy. At the level of interstate relations, the USSR relied upon embassies, trade missions, and other traditional diplomatic means to conduct its policy. At the level of "class struggle," it relied upon the international Communist movement and its subsidiary front organizations. At both levels, open and legal policy mechanisms were supplemented by illegal and clandestine methods. Soviet embassies were used to conduct espionage and other illegal activities, while Comintern involvement with foreign Communist parties entailed certain forms of clandestine activity as well as public solidarity.

With détente and the resulting upsurge in contacts between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, the neat correspondence between ideology and organization has broken down. Soviet relations with the West are now better thought of as a spectrum of overlapping sets of activities that are neither unambiguously "state" nor "party," and in many cases neither unambiguously "legal" nor "illegal." The spectrum includes four basic elements:

1. Official contacts with national governments and their representatives.
2. Contacts between Soviet public organizations and their Western counterparts, with or without the explicit encouragement of the governments of the Western countries involved, but clearly within the bounds of what these governments regard as consistent with the maintenance of good state-to-state relations.
3. Actions in Western countries (involving government, Communist party, or unofficial representatives) that remain within the bounds of legality, but that constitute unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of these countries.
4. Activities that are explicitly forbidden under the national laws of the countries in which they take place, and that, if detected, are grounds for prosecution or, in the case of individuals protected by diplomatic status, expulsion.

These categories are difficult to define and in many cases overlap. Easiest to classify are activities at the extremes of the classification schema: on the one hand, perfectly correct official visits by ministers or heads of state; on the other, actions that are unambiguously prohibited by national or international law—espionage, forgeries, deliberate violations of national territory, political murder, smuggling, and support for terrorism. Between these extremes, activities in one category often shade into another or can be classed differently by different observers.

Official visits by Soviet leaders or foreign ministers generally have an important "mobilizational" aspect that makes it difficult to decide where acceptable contacts leave off and unacceptable "interference" begins. Similarly, the line between official state-to-state relations and unofficial contacts between nongovernmental organizations is often blurred, as is the line between acceptable and government-encouraged contacts with Soviet public organizations and unofficial Soviet activities that are offensive to governments. Leading Soviet "scholars" who are welcomed by European governments as official or semiofficial delegations may on the next occasion come as unofficial witnesses in "tribunals" at which these governments are tried.1

Given the Soviet "democratic centralist" model of organization, Soviet nongovernmental organizations have an inherently "official" character. The Soviet practice of assigning numerous posts to a single individual further blurs distinctions between governmental, party, and "public" roles.2 Leonid M. Zamiatin, for example, the head of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet press spokesman on visits of the General Secretary in the West, is also head of the Soviet-FRG Friendship Society and a member of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

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1 In 1983, for example, Daniel Proktor was a witness at the Green-sponsored "Nuremberg trial" of U.S. and NATO nuclear policy. In early 1983, Soviet lawyers took part in a London tribunal sponsored by the Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament, which decided that Britain's defense policy was contrary to international law. (Paul Brown, "MoD cold-shoulders atom war tribunal," The Guardian, December 24, 1984.)

2 "Public" organizations include friendship societies, trade unions, Soviet peace organizations, and so forth. These organizations are all linked indirectly to the Communist party.
But even leaving aside ambiguities that result from characteristics inherent in the Soviet system, the process of détente has tended to blur unofficial-official distinctions. In developing functional cooperation with Western countries, the Soviets seek to create mechanisms that will allow them to retain control over contacts between nongovernmental groups in the West and their counterparts in the East. At the same time, the Soviets often try to undercut Western governments by using their own direct access to Western organizations and interest groups.

Soviet activism on these different levels presents difficulties for the analyst of Soviet international behavior as well as for governments that must deal with the Soviets. Western Sovietology has not kept pace with or fully probed the implications of the huge upsurge in East-West contacts and their institutionalization at all levels and across different functional areas. This upsurge probably has rendered moot the debate about the degree to which the Soviet Union pursues long-range plans and the degree to which its foreign policy proceeds on an ad hoc basis. Soviet policy toward Western Europe (as well as toward other areas) is best thought of neither in terms of master plans nor in terms of purely ad hoc moves, but in the terms the Soviet themselves use, i.e., programs. The following discussion highlights the programmatic nature of Soviet policy toward the region, examining the roles played by diplomacy, arms control, military power, economic cooperation, and numerous other mechanisms.

Many of these mechanisms serve other goals in addition to their political function, and Soviet officials are not always able to reconcile the pursuit of goals in one area with overall political objectives. Trade, for example, is intended primarily to benefit the Soviet economy, and the Soviet leaders often cannot maximize the political benefits from trade without sacrificing desired economic gains. However, all the mechanisms are available, at least in theory, to advance high-priority political goals. Therefore, Soviet policymakers are interested in expanding and strengthening these mechanisms for their long-term utility, as well as in using them to influence West European policy over the short run.

DIPLOMACY

In contrast to many of their Western counterparts, Soviet leaders attach considerable importance to détente as a process of creating a body of interstate law that they claim regulates relations between "states with different social systems." In the 1970s, when Soviet officials spoke of making détente "irreversible," they had in mind not only changes in the power relations between states, but also the ever-
growing body of bilateral and multilateral agreements that in their view made it increasingly difficult for Western governments to act in ways the Soviets defined as contrary to the spirit of détente. The legalistic element in Soviet thinking was evident in one of Brezhnev’s best-known descriptions of détente:

The salutary changes in the world, which have become especially appreciable in the 1970s, have been called international détente. These changes are tangible and concrete. They consist in recognizing and enacting in international documents a kind of code of rules for honest and fair relations between countries, which erect a legal and moral-political barrier to those given to military gambles. . . . They consist of a ramified network of agreements covering many areas of peaceful cooperation between states with different social systems.3

This “ramified network” includes both agreements codifying what Robert Legvold has called the “institutionalization of bilateralism”4 and the broad, all-European “mandate” provided by the Helsinki Final Act. The preferred Soviet formula for East-West relations in Europe thus is one of bilateralism in a multilateral framework. The formula does not allow for, and indeed rejects, more than purely tactical accommodation with “subregional” organizations such as the EC.

Bilateral Relations

The Soviet approach to bilateral relations in Europe is characterized by a fundamental dichotomy: On the one hand, the Soviets are highly adept at shading policy toward particular countries to take advantage of both temporary opportunities and enduring national peculiarities. In dealing with the French, for example, the Soviets play up the traditionally good relations between France and Russia and their common interest in containing Germany; with the Germans, they recall a thousand years of trade and the shared suffering of the Russian and German peoples in World War II; with the Swedes and Finns, they stress a common Nordic heritage; with the Greeks, a common religious heritage and a history of shared resistance to the Turks. On a short-term basis, Soviet diplomacy has taken advantage of de Gaulle’s rift with the United States, Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the Greek-Turkish dispute, Britain’s “Cod War” with Iceland, and numerous other situations.

On the other hand, the Soviets have worked to base their relations with all countries in Western Europe—national peculiarities

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3Pravda, November 8, 1977.
notwithstanding—an identical set of political principles, and to conduct these relations through virtually identical mechanisms and instruments. The Soviets generally base their bilateral political relations with individual West European states on three elements:

1. An agreement on “basic principles” between the two sides.
2. Regular summit meetings supplemented by regular meetings at lower levels.
3. A set of joint commissions to promote trade and other forms of cooperation.

With Finland, the original agreement on basic principles is embodied in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance; with France, in the 1966 Political Declaration, the 1970 Protocol, and the 1971 Principles of Cooperation Between the USSR and France; with West Germany, in the 1970 treaty and subsequent bilateral communiqués. The Soviets have concluded similar agreements with most other West European states (see Table 1).

In negotiating these agreements, the Soviets have followed two general rules: First, they have tried to give the agreements the highest possible standing under international law. The agreements with Finland and the Federal Republic of Germany are full-fledged treaties, ratified by the national parliaments of both sides and deposited with the United Nations in New York. In their negotiations with France, the Soviets reportedly tried to obtain a “Friendship Treaty” but were rebuffed by President Pompidou and forced to settle for a joint protocol containing an agreed listing of principles.

Second, the Soviets have sought to negotiate similar or identical texts in these agreements, including (1) a general commitment to the principles of the inviolability of existing borders, noninterference in internal affairs, equality, independence, and the renunciation of the use of force or the threat to use it; (2) commitments to increased cooperation in various fields, including pledges by governments to promote cooperation between competent organizations in the two countries; and

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6 Reported in the Annual Register of World Events, 1971, p. 111.
Table 1
BASIC PRINCIPLE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Level of Signatories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Austrian State Treaty</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Consultation Protocol</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Joint Communiqué</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers*—Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Protocol renewing FCMA Treaty</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Political Declaration</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Joint Protocol</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Principles of Cooperation</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Joint Declaration</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Joint Declaration</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Consultation Protocol</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Consultation Protocol</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Joint Declaration</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Joint Declaration</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Declaration on Principles of Good Neighborly Relations</td>
<td>Summit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Declaration on Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Joint Statement and Consultation Protocol</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
* Brezhnev, CPSU General Secretary; after 1977, USSR President.
* Molotov, who signed as Foreign Minister and Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
* Podgorny, until 1977, President of the USSR.
(3) joint commitments to regular consultations and to emergency consultations in the event of a threat to peace.7

Securing Western commitments to consult, both on a regular basis and in emergency situations, has been a long-standing Soviet objective. Soviet negotiators tried to include consultation clauses in the Helsinki Final Act, but were rebuffed by Western delegations.8 Soviet negotiators have been more successful in bilateral talks with Western countries. The original and strongest "consultation" agreement—but one that all Western countries flatly reject as a model—is the 1948 Soviet treaty with Finland, which stipulates that "the high contracting parties will consult each other in the event of the existence of a threat of military attack provided for under Article 1." Article 1 specifies an attack by Germany involving Finnish territory.

The commitments to consult with other countries have little if any operational substance. Concrete threats to peace are not specified in advance and must be established by mutual agreement. But the Soviets clearly regard some consultation clauses as more valuable than others. In particular, they single out for praise the consultation protocols concluded with Italy in 1972, Denmark in 1976, and Greece in 1985.9 These are the only NATO countries that have agreed to establish permanent high-level political consultation commissions with the Soviet Union. It is unclear exactly what benefit the Soviets see in establishing such consultation commissions, but reports from Greece prior to Papandreou's 1985 visit to Moscow suggest that conclusion of a protocol and establishment of a consultation commission were high on the list of Soviet objectives for the visit.10

The wording of the consultation agreements with Italy, Denmark, and Greece closely follows that used in the Franco-Soviet Protocol of 1970, which states that the sides will consult "in the event of the emergence of situations creating, in the opinion of both sides, a threat to

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7Because it dates from 1948, the treaty with Finland differs somewhat from those concluded later. Article 6 states: "The high contracting parties pledge themselves to follow the principles of mutual respect of state sovereignty and independence as well as non-interference in the internal affairs of the other state." There is no explicit reference to "equality" or to the inviolability of borders.

8Ljubivoje Acimovic, Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe, Stijhoff & Nordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1981, p. 120. Acimovic was a special adviser to Yugoslavia's CSCE delegation.

9According to one Soviet writer, the 1976 Protocol between the USSR and Denmark is "quite uncommon in the practice of the USSR's relations with NATO countries . . . ." (Denisov, "Sixty Years of Relations Between the USSR and North European Countries," pp. 50-81.) For the protocol with Italy, see Pravda, October 27, 1972; with Denmark, Pravda, October 8, 1976; with Greece, Pravda, February 15, 1985.

peace, a violation of peace or causing international tension.”11 This wording differs from that used in agreements with other Western states, in which no reference is made to crises or situations threatening peace.12

Although the French may view the 1970 agreement as an elevation of France’s international and European status, since it alludes to Soviet and French permanent membership in the UN Security Council and the two countries’ shared responsibilities for Berlin, it is difficult to see how similar agreements do much to enhance the international stature of smaller countries such as Denmark and Greece. In theory, these consultation clauses could serve as a wedge enabling the Soviet Union to insert itself into foreign-policy deliberations in these countries. The Soviets may hope that over time the legal and customary basis for consultation will develop to a point that West European leaders can be summoned to Moscow to be informed of Soviet preferences on particular issues.

This long-range objective sometimes becomes apparent in Soviet discussions of how the consultation process works. For example, one Soviet writer notes that

Article 2 of the Protocol [with Denmark] provides that should a situation arise which, in the opinion of the sides, poses a threat to peace, breaks the peace or gives rise to international tensions, the governments of the USSR and Denmark shall contact each other with a view to exchanging opinions as to what measures could be taken to improve the situation. In late October 1983, Foreign Minister of Denmark Uffe Ellemann-Jensen came to Moscow to exchange views with Andrei Gromyko.13

The reference to Ellemann-Jensen’s visit to Moscow on the eve of the initial INF deployments is misleading, but probably intentionally so. The talks with Gromyko took place in the course of a routine working visit. According to TASS reports, the Dane even “tried to justify the U.S. approach to the Geneva talks, the line aimed at installing new

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12For example, Article 5 of the 1978 Soviet-FRG declaration states: “The two sides regard active and businesslike exchange of views as an important means to improve further mutual understanding and greater trust. They therefore intend to consistently continue such exchange of views, including in the form of regular consultations, and at all suitable levels, with the aim of expanding the basis for agreement.” (TASS, May 6, 1978.)
13Denisov, “Sixty Years of Relations Between the USSR and North European Countries,” pp. 50–51. The actual text of the Protocol reads: “Second, if any situation should arise which, in the opinion of both sides, creates a threat to peace or a disruption of it or which causes international tension, the two governments will contact one another with a view to discussing what can be done to improve the situation.”
U.S. nuclear missiles in Western Europe."\textsuperscript{14} But in linking the visit to the sharp deterioration in East-West relations and by implication the INF deployments, the author reflects a fairly typical Soviet tendency to define unilaterally those actions that are said to "create threats to peace."

Within the context of the basic principle agreements and the formal commitments to consult, the Soviet Union uses letters, diplomatic protest notes, meetings between ministers, and other means to make known its positions on all West European actions that affect, or that the Soviet government claims affect, the security of the USSR and its allies. In 1978 Brezhnev wrote letters to the leaders of Italy, Britain, France, and West Germany warning of unspecified "consequences" if these countries sold weapons to China.\textsuperscript{15} In 1979, the Soviet Union filed an official protest with the government of Norway over NATO plans to preposition allied military equipment on Norwegian territory. In September 1981, the Soviet embassy in Madrid presented a long memorandum to the Spanish Foreign Ministry outlining the USSR's opposition to Spain's accession to NATO. In November 1983, shortly before the Soviet Union broke off the Geneva INF talks, Andropov sent personal letters to Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain, and Prime Minister Craxi of Italy, reproaching them for allowing the INF deployments to go forward and informing them of the Soviet decision to take unspecified countermeasures.\textsuperscript{16} He also sent letters to the heads of the other NATO countries in which he explained the Soviet decision to walk out of the Geneva talks.

Although they rarely result in Western governments complying with Soviet wishes, these communications introduce a Soviet "voice" in virtually all Western security discussions—a voice that is often echoed by influential non-Communist groups in the West. West European governments frequently reject these interventions as unacceptable interference in their internal affairs, but the Soviet protests often refer to vague bilateral and multilateral commitments that the governments themselves have made and that the Soviets claim have been violated.

In addition to using diplomacy to try to obtain a negative voice in West European policies, the Soviet Union has worked to negotiate bilateral agreements that define the conditions under which the positive aspects of détente such as trade, scientific, cultural, and other forms of exchange are to develop. Virtually all "basic principle" agreements

\textsuperscript{14}TASS, October 31, 1983.


between the Soviet Union and Western states contain pledges that the governments on both sides will encourage:

everything capable of promoting mutual enrichment by cultural values and the development of means for constantly improving the reciprocal acquaintance of the Soviet and [West European] peoples with each other's culture and activities, taking into consideration their long relations in this field, their traditions and friendship. The attainment of these aims shall be served by the further expansion of university, scientific and art exchanges and the distribution of information and by contacts between organizations of the two countries, in particular youth organizations. This also applies to contacts between citizens, including youth meetings, trips on a collective or individual, official or unofficial basis. The initiatives undertaken in this direction shall be supported by the competent authorities.17

This passage, taken from the 1971 agreement with France, reflects the delicate balance of Western and Soviet interests that is usually struck in agreements providing for functional cooperation and non-governmental exchange. From the Soviet perspective, the phrase “supported by the competent authorities” constitutes tacit recognition of the Soviet government's right to regulate all contacts with the West. From the Western perspective, references to the Soviet and Western “peoples” and to “individual” and “unofficial” trips open the door to direct contacts between artists, scientists, youth, and so forth. The Soviets view the joint “mixed commissions,” which bring Soviet organizations such as the Academy of Sciences and the Chamber of Commerce into contact with their Western counterparts, as institutional mechanisms for implementing the political mandate for increased cooperation.

**CSCE and Collective Security**

It is difficult to overstate the importance of CSCE and the “Helsinki process” in Soviet diplomacy toward Western Europe. In the decade since the conclusion of the European conference, Soviet diplomats have negotiated scores of communiqués, protocols and trade agreements with other European states, every one of which reaffirms the mutual commitment to the Final Act. In 1977, the Soviet Union incorporated the Final Act's “decalogue” in the new “Brezhnev” constitution.18 These

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17Principles of Cooperation Between the USSR and France, October 30, 1971.
18However, there are a few differences between the actual Final Act and the language incorporated in the Soviet Constitution. The most important is that the “self-determination of peoples,” contained in the Final Act, is left out, and in its place is substituted a phrase on the “equal rights of peoples . . . to decide their own destiny”—the wording, in fact, of the draft declaration presented by the Soviets on July 4, 1973. See
internal and international affirmations of the Soviet commitment to CSCE have been supplemented by thousands of articles and broadcasts extolling the significance of “Helsinki.” In addition, for much of the past decade, the Soviet Union has subjected itself to Western recriminations over human rights abuses, Afghanistan, and martial law in Poland to keep the CSCE process alive at Belgrade and Madrid.

The Soviet commitment to CSCE reflects long-standing Soviet foreign-policy preferences as well as the personal role of Leonid Brezhnev, who made CSCE a top foreign-policy priority. Essentially, the European conference, which was first proposed by Molotov in 1964 and went through numerous changes before it was finally completed in 1975, is a multilateral umbrella under which the Soviet Union seeks to build up its network of preferential bilateral political, security, and economic links with the individual states of Western Europe. It can be thought of as the Soviet Union’s preferred mechanism for promoting its old program of collective security in the political conditions of the 1970s and 1980s.

The collective security theme in Soviet policy goes back to the 1930s, when Stalin concluded a series of nonaggression pacts with France, Poland, and the then-independent Baltic states. These pacts served as a form of reinsurance against Germany, which at that time was the dominant industrial and subsequently the dominant military power in continental Europe. Toward the end of World War II, Stalin, while paying lip service to Roosevelt’s universalist plans for the postwar order, quietly began to lay the groundwork for a postwar European collective security system that would be based on a network of bilateral security agreements. As early as December 1943, the Soviets concluded a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar cooperation with the government-in-exile of Czechoslovakia. This was followed a year later by a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance with General de Gaulle’s French Provisional Government.

But with the imposition of Soviet control in Eastern Europe after 1945, bilateral collective security agreements such as these lost their earlier utility. For countries that passed into the Soviet sphere of control, the agreements were superseded by stronger bilateral security agreements with the USSR and ultimately by the Warsaw Treaty of 1955. France’s collective security treaty with the Soviet Union became for all practical purposes a dead letter when France fell on the western side of the intra-European divide. Molotov’s 1954 proposal to convene


an all-European conference for the purpose of negotiating a European collective security treaty was an attempt to breathe new life into the collective security theme by casting it in multilateral rather than bilateral terms and by advancing it as the key to solving the German problem. Had the conference been convened on Molotov’s terms, the Soviets would have succeeded in heading off the pending accession of West Germany to NATO, gained de facto recognition of the GDR, and established a mechanism for eliminating American influence in Western Europe. Following rejection by the West of these terms, Molotov made several new and less overtly anti-American proposals in 1954, but was never able to secure Western agreement to convene the conference.

The Soviet campaign for a European security conference waned in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as Khrushchev concentrated almost exclusively on the “big two” rivalry with the United States, which he saw as the key to solving pressing European issues such as Berlin. But the campaign was revived by the Kosygin-Brezhnev regime in 1966 and was ultimately brought to fruition in the early 1970s.20 After considerable diplomatic wrangling involving President Pompidou of France, Chancellor Brandt, and other Western leaders, the Soviets secured a pledge for the opening of the conference in July 1973. However, to secure Western support, the Soviets had to agree to American and Canadian participation, to a quadripartite agreement on Berlin, and to the opening of talks on the mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. Once the conference was convened, the Soviets were unable to secure quick adoption of a general declaration reaffirming the territorial status quo and were drawn into protracted negotiations on human rights and related issues.

Exactly what the Brezhnev regime hoped to accomplish in CSCE has been a subject of speculation in the West, where many observers have claimed that CSCE backfired by encouraging dissident movements in Eastern Europe. Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko recalls that even in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the International Department of the Central Committee there were officials who argued that the Soviet Union already had achieved its basic objective—acceptance of postwar borders—in bilateral treaties with the FRG and had launched an ambitious détente policy with all of the West European states on a bilateral basis. In light of these achievements, some argued that CSCE would produce few new gains for the Soviet Union, and

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that the hard bargaining of the West European states would force the Soviets into compromises on long-standing matters of principle.\textsuperscript{21}

These objections apparently carried little weight with Brezhnev and Gromyko, both of whom appeared to regard the conference not only as a crowning achievement of the postwar "normalization" of relations with Western Europe, but as a mechanism that would set in motion a process of long-term political change that would be favorable to and largely under the control of the Soviet Union. Gromyko, who was the first speaker at the opening of CSCE in 1973 (a junior Soviet diplomat stood outside the door of the Finnish Foreign Ministry all night to reserve this slot for Gromyko), told the assembled delegates that the documents concluded at the conference would set "long-range guidelines for peaceful development in Europe."\textsuperscript{22} He stated that the Soviet Union was seeking "a situation in which it will be possible for trust and mutual understanding gradually to overcome the division of the continent into military-political groupings."\textsuperscript{23} The preamble to the Soviet "Draft General Declaration on the Foundation of European Security and Principles of Relations Among European States," the precursor to the 1975 Final Act, stated that the signatories regarded "as desirable a transformation of relations among states in Europe that in the future will make it possible gradually to overcome the division of the continent into military-political groupings . . . ."\textsuperscript{24}

The bargaining that led up to the convening of the conference, the actual negotiations between the summer of 1973 and the signing of the Final Act in the summer of 1975, and the follow-on proposals for implementation that the Soviets made after 1975 all reflect the Soviet interest in using CSCE as a mechanism for promoting political change. The Soviet attitude was typified by Brezhnev in his February 1981 address to the 26th CPSU Congress, in which he endorsed various proposals for nuclear-free zones and "zones of peace," claiming that "the decisions of the European conference are in effect aimed at making all of Europe such a zone."\textsuperscript{25} Brezhnev's claim, which was made in spite of the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear-free zones are nowhere mentioned in the Final Act, reflects the Soviet interpretation of Helsinki as a "process" rather than a set of static norms.

In the aftermath of the Helsinki conference, the Soviets worked to impart momentum to this process in several ways. First, they began a

\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Pravda}, February 24, 1981.
major propaganda campaign, aided by the West European Communist parties, designed to interpret the provisions of the Final Act in a manner that served Soviet interests. Second, they launched a series of proposals and initiatives, many of them superficially attractive to West European governments or interest groups, that were said to follow from the Final Act's provisions and that were to be implemented under CSCE auspices. These proposals touched upon the security, energy, transportation, environmental, and economic aspects of cooperation in Europe. Third, they launched a campaign of bilateral diplomacy aimed at generating support for the Soviet view of Helsinki as process. At least at the level of words, they scored some modest successes. In Italy, Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Rumor signed a joint declaration which stated that "the Soviet Union and Italy proceed from the premise that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe defined objectives on a broad historical scale for all its participants and also defined the paths of achieving these objectives."\(^{26}\)

By the time of the Belgrade (1977) and Madrid (1980) follow-up conferences, Soviet enthusiasm for CSCE had waned considerably. The change in Soviet thinking was partly the result of persistent Western attacks on Soviet human rights violations. But it also had a great deal to do with the general decline in the momentum of détente in the late 1970s. From the Soviet perspective, CSCE was primarily an offensive instrument, intended to encourage favorable processes in Europe that the Soviets claimed would follow from the "normalization" of the early 1970s and the ratification of postwar boundaries. To impart momentum to the processes allegedly set in motion by the Final Act, the Soviets needed ongoing breakthroughs in their bilateral political and economic relations with the individual West European states. After May 1978 and the Schmidt-Brezhnev summit, fewer such breakthroughs were forthcoming. By early 1980, the USSR was back to relying on its bilateral relationship with France to overcome the temporary diplomatic isolation that followed the invasion of Afghanistan.

CSCE may take on new importance for the Soviets in 1986, when the third follow-up conference is convened in Vienna. For now, CSCE's main value is in providing a mandate for the European Conference on Disarmament, which has been meeting in Stockholm since January 1984. At Vienna, the Soviets are likely to continue to press for new "declaratory measures" and to stress the security component of CSCE, while downplaying human rights, one of the top Western concerns. In any case, dealing with human rights in CSCE may become easier for the Soviets. Most of the Soviet and many of the European

\(^{26}\)Pravda, November 21, 1975.
dissident movements have been crushed, and the Soviets are having some success in channeling the discussions of human rights and security issues into separate forums. At the 1985 Ottawa experts' conference on human rights, the Soviet Union was subjected to familiar Western criticisms for its human rights record. But it was not compelled to be flexible on human rights issues to advance its security agenda, which it was able to promote in a separate forum in Stockholm.

Over the long run, the Soviets may try to revive interest in the establishment of some kind of permanent security organ or secretariat under CSCE auspices. The Soviet plan for a European collective security arrangement originally proposed by Molotov in 1954 had as a central element some kind of permanent organ for the enforcement of peace and security.27 Later, the Soviet Union endorsed Rakpci's proposal for the creation of a permanent "control machinery" that could enforce the demilitarization of central Europe. As the campaign for a European security conference gathered momentum in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviets again pressed for the creation of a permanent institutional mechanism that could be invested with an all-European role. In June 1970, the Warsaw Pact called for the setting up of an "appropriate body" that could deal with security questions.28 However, largely because of lack of interest on the part of the West, the Soviets dropped their proposals for permanent machinery in the CSCE negotiations. They could revive these proposals, however, if they see influential minorities in Western Europe becoming more receptive to them than they have been in the past.29


29It is worth noting that as recently as 1980, an official of the government of Finland, which has often anticipated Soviet moves regarding CSCE, raised the prospect of a permanent CSCE secretariat. According to the Finn: "The CSCE system does not have any secretariat or any international organization and it was certainly not the intention of the participating governments to start a new burdensome international body to deal with the follow-up of the Helsinki Final Act. In my opinion, however, for practical reasons there is an obvious need to establish some kind of a geographical point of contact, a modest post-office, a minimum of a secretariat, a coordinating committee, or a permanent consultative commission—whatever can be agreed upon—both to provide the basic services for meetings for those who so desire, and to serve as a place for contact and for the exchange of current problems." (Kiejo Korhoven, "A Finnish View of Detente," Survival, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1980), pp. 27–28.) The phrase "permanent consultative commission" has a distinctly Soviet ring to it.
MILITARY POWER

Military power serves both political and security objectives in Soviet policy toward Western Europe. Politically, it underpins the favorable "correlation of forces" on which Soviet détente policy is based. This function is acknowledged in the latest edition of the Soviet guide to the world revolutionary process, which states:

The active struggle of the main forces of the world revolutionary process and also the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism... led on the eve and at the outset of the 1960s to an appreciable change in the world arena in favor of socialism. By the start of the 1970s this change in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism had essentially assumed an irreversible nature. The turning point in the correlation of forces between the two systems was the elimination of imperialism's superiority in the military sphere.^[36] Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces must be prepared, in the view of the Soviet leadership, to fight and win a conventional, chemical, and theater nuclear war in Europe. Soviet doctrine calls for the armed forces to have the might to preserve the USSR's World War II gains and if possible to finish on favorable terms the decisive struggle between "socialism" and "imperialism." How confident Soviet military and political leaders are that they now have or in time will acquire the capability to achieve these objectives is uncertain.

Under current circumstances, the top Soviet leadership is probably more interested in maximizing the political utility of Soviet military power than in making rapid progress toward achieving a high-confidence war-winning capability. Soviet refusal to compromise politically "principled" stances in exchange for concrete military advantages (as exemplified by Soviet rejection of the "walk in the woods" proposal that Nitzze and Kvitinskii discussed in 1983) suggests that the Soviet political leaders are more interested in defining the conditions under which Europe will evolve politically than in improving their military position in the short run. By the same token, the Soviet Union by no means neglects the armed forces that it has deployed against Western Europe.

Soviet Conceptions of Security

"Military balance" as an equivalence of military forces is not a concept that figures prominently in the Soviet political vocabulary. The Soviets call the MBFR negotiations "mutual force reduction" talks or, to avoid using any descriptive term at all, "the Vienna talks." Instead

of balanced forces in Europe, the Soviets speak of the "equal or undiminished security of the sides." Security is a far broader concept that not only allows for political considerations, but also enables the Soviet Union to appeal to its global military requirements to justify its force levels in the European theater.

The Soviets attached considerable importance to the 1978 Schmidt-Brezhnev communiqué, which stated "the two sides deem it important that no one should seek military superiority. They proceed from the assumption that approximate equality and parity are sufficient to secure peace." Soviet officials subsequently interpreted this joint declaration as a West German admission that parity and equality exist in Europe and claimed that all NATO deployments and modernizations were an attempt to undermine parity in contravention of the 1978 principles.

It is clear that by parity and equality the Soviets mean at least equal forces in all the separate theaters around the Soviet periphery, as well as a robust strategic nuclear parity with the United States. Although in their propaganda and arms-control diplomacy the Soviets portray these separate subbalances as independent of each other and no threat to any particular country, operationally these subbalances reinforce each other and raise the prospect of global military superiority for the Soviet Union. Soviet conventional and theater nuclear advantages in Europe are magnified by Soviet achievements in other areas, notably in the strategic nuclear competition with the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the naval competition in the North Atlantic.

Perhaps the most important component of Soviet military power deployed against Western Europe is the Soviet strategic forces that counterbalance the American triad. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Soviet leaders regarded the U.S. ability to hit the Soviet Union with nuclear and conventional weapons while the Soviet Union could not do the same to the United States as an intolerable source of political and military weakness. In his memoirs, Khrushchev recalls that shortly after World War II, Stalin ordered his aircraft designers to build a plane that could bomb the United States and return to the Soviet Union.32

The Soviet military was not to fulfill Stalin's order until the mid-1950s, when it developed its first ICBMs. But when the Soviets finally overcame—or at least claimed to have overcome—the earlier asymmetry, they believed they were in a position to reap major political

gains in Western Europe. Khrushchev demanded that the West settle the Berlin crisis on Soviet terms, claiming that “with equal forces there must be equal political opportunities.” The Soviet belief that U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity enhances the prospects for Soviet political gains in Europe was demonstrated once again in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which most experts regard as an attempt by Khrushchev to close the U.S.-Soviet nuclear gap in order to extract a favorable settlement in Berlin. In the early 1970s, after the Soviets had achieved genuine nuclear parity and had seen it codified in SALT I, they again claimed that the way was open for favorable political change in Europe. In the 1970s, however, they did not try to force these changes as Khrushchev had done, but opted to pursue them gradually through a process of competitive détente.

To the degree that they undermine the credibility of American extended deterrence by acquiring the ability to devastate the United States, the Soviets believe that they restore to the Soviet Union the “natural” military advantage in Europe to which the USSR is entitled by virtue of its size, its proximity to Western Europe, and its victory in World War II. As if consciously striving to maximize the advantages in Europe of the emerging strategic parity, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime presided over a sustained buildup and modernization of Soviet ground forces in the European theater. By the 1970s, virtually all Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and in the Western military districts of the USSR were equipped with modern tanks and self-propelled artillery.33

Improvements in Soviet ground forces were followed in the 1970s by the transformation of Soviet tactical air forces from an essentially defensive force to one that could support a Soviet ground offensive. Improvements in tactical air power were paralleled by improvements in Soviet and Warsaw Pact air defenses. New deployments included the SA-12 at the army level, the SA-11 at the division level, and the SA-13 at the regiment level. This dense, overlapping, and mobile network of air defenses is supported by improved electronic countermeasures and radar capabilities.34


In 1975, the Soviets deployed the first SS-20s, initiating a long-term program to modernize their theater nuclear forces. Also in the 1970s, the Soviets upgraded their tactical nuclear weapons deployed against Western Europe, thereby negating a previous NATO advantage in this area. In the last several years, the Soviets have deployed new mobile and highly accurate surface-to-surface missiles—designated the SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 by NATO—that could be used to strike NATO airfields and other high-value targets early in a conflict. The SS-22 carries a nuclear warhead, but the other two missiles can be equipped with nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads.

In terms of doctrine and objectives, Soviet military policy toward Western Europe has proceeded in stages. The first objective of the Kosygin-Brezhnev regime was to achieve strategic nuclear parity with the United States, thereby undercutting the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent. Following this, the Soviets dramatically improved their conventional and theater nuclear forces in what appeared to be an effort to gain the capability to overrun Western Europe with a “combined arms offensive” in which nuclear weapons below the central strategic level might be used. Now, the Soviets appear to have begun efforts to acquire capabilities to overrun parts of Western Europe and to seize key military installations before nuclear weapons can be brought to bear against Warsaw Pact forces. The recent development of Operational Maneuver Groups and of Spetsnaz forces appears geared toward facilitating rapid seizure by conventional means.35

In addition to its efforts on the central front, the Soviet military has improved its abilities to move against NATO’s northern flank. The Soviet Union, Poland, and East Germany have amphibious, naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces stationed in the Baltic region that might be able to seize parts of Swedish and Danish territory and thereby deny NATO entrance to the Baltic in time of war. Since 1970, the Soviets have stationed amphibious landing craft on the Kola Peninsula from which they could be deployed to seize Norwegian territory. During the Okean naval exercise of that year, a large Soviet fleet sailed from Baltic ports, through the Danish straits, and along the coast of Norway. It then staged a landing some 20 kilometers east of the Norwegian-Soviet border. At the conclusion of the exercise, much of the equipment used remained stationed with the Soviet northern fleet.36

While the Soviets have worked to maximize their own military advantages in the European theater, much evidence suggests that they are by no means unimpressed by NATO’s conventional and theater nuclear improvements in the last decade. The INF deployments that began in 1983 were the most visible but not the only NATO program that the Soviets appeared to take quite seriously. Some in the Soviet military appear to be concerned about new high-technology weapons that NATO may deploy in the 1990s. They also seem impressed by some of the results of the 1978 Long-Term Defense Program and by NATO’s ability to agree on and collectively fund alliance-wide infrastructure projects. The Soviets see these commonly funded projects, AWACS in particular, as giving the United States increased latitude in tapping into the resources of the small NATO countries and in encouraging them to make defense contributions that they might not make on their own.

Another matter of concern for the Soviets is the growing interest in West European capitals in increased European security cooperation. This interest could help or harm Soviet interests, depending upon how it develops. On the one hand, the Soviets look with favor on developments that appear to separate Europe from the United States. On the other hand, they are concerned about the emergence of stronger European defense capabilities, especially those involving West Germany. For now, it appears that the Soviets have not made up their minds about how seriously they should take the trend toward “Europeanization” and are watching developments closely. In May 1984, the Permanent Commission of Research Institutions of the Socialist Countries on Problems of European Security and Cooperation met in Moscow to establish a research agenda on security trends in Europe. The Commission, which on the Soviet side includes IMEMO and other branches of the USSR Academy of Sciences, called for concentration on four areas: “(1) the basic directions of the development of NATO’s military potential (with regard for the plans to modernize conventional arms); (2) the evolution of military and political cooperation in West Europe, including the activity of the West European Union, West European political cooperation and cooperation in the sphere of security policy; and (3) the trends in military and politico-military interaction between

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37This question is discussed in Michael J. Sterling, Soviet Reactions to NATO’s Emerging Technologies, The Rand Corporation, N-2294-ARF, August 1985.

38The Soviet military paper commented in 1979, “it has long been noted that NATO is playing an increasingly autonomous role with respect to its members. . . . [T]he policy implemented in the bloc’s name by its leading organs frequently differs markedly from the policy proclaimed by any particular state belonging to it.” (Krasnaya zvezda, May 27, 1979.)
the FRG and France and the position of Britain. In carrying out this research agenda, the institutes plan to pay "paramount attention," as IMEMO's journal put it, "to factors counteracting the confrontational policy of the imperialist states."39

What this research effort has produced so far and what effect, if any, it has had on Soviet policy are impossible to determine. It does seem, however, that the Soviet and Eastern bloc institutes are approaching the question of West European security cooperation in a fairly relaxed manner, tending to regard it as a trend that at most may impede Soviet gains in "the struggle for security and arms limitation in Europe," but hardly as one that threatens to roll back Soviet influence in Europe or that threatens the USSR's geopolitical position by, for example, creating a united West European "superpower" or by conferring nuclear status on the FRG. There was, in fact, a large element of posturing in the Soviet reaction to the lifting of the WEU restrictions, which Soviet propagandists sought to link with the INF deployments and an alleged West German hankering for a "finger on the trigger."

The Political Uses of Military Power

With the turn to détente in the early 1970s, the Soviet leadership evidently hoped, as Adam Ulam has suggested, that the West Europeans would "become less nervous about the Soviets' intentions, while at the same time growing more impressed with Soviet power and skeptical about the U.S. ability to guarantee their security."40 The Soviet purpose was to impress a "double motif" upon Western Europe:

(1) the Soviet Union was enormously powerful, hence it was unwise for the Europeans to rely on NATO rather than on Soviet friendship for their security; and (2) Russians were essentially peaceful, hence the Europeans should give no credence to Washington's insinuations that unless NATO was strengthened the USSR might have some military tricks up its sleeve.41

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the Soviet leadership believes that overt military intimidation can be used to promote this

39"Vstrecha ekspertov postoiannoi komissii (Meeting of the Standing Commission of Experts)," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenii (MEiMO), No. 7, 1984.
double motif. If undertaken with sufficient subtlety, intimidation can be a useful, low-cost way of impressing the West with the Soviet Union’s overall might and the dangers of confrontation in the contemporary age. But intimidation can undercut the motif of the essential peacefulness of the Soviet Union. Whatever the views of the Soviet leadership on these issues, military intimidation appears to play some role in Soviet policy toward Western Europe. Intimidation is probably at least a partial motive in three broad categories of Soviet actions:

1. Violations of national airspace and territorial waters.
2. Certain military exercises that are conducted near the West European countries.
3. Nuclear threats.

**Territorial Violations.** Soviet air or naval forces have violated the territory of virtually all the West European states on or near the periphery of the Soviet Union at one time or another. The most celebrated incursion took place in October 1981, when a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine ran aground in Swedish waters near the naval base at Karlskrona. A commission formed by the Swedish government to investigate the incident later reported that between 1969 and 1982, 122 certain, possible, and probable submarine incursions occurred in Swedish waters. Swedish sources also report that these incursions have continued despite protests from Stockholm. Norway has reported similar activities by what are believed to be Soviet submarines in the fjords along Norway’s Atlantic coast, and Soviet submarines have been suspected of operating in Italian territorial waters.

Different explanations have been advanced for the Soviets’ continuing violations of Sweden’s waters, which have helped to turn Nordic public opinion against the Soviet Union and dampened public support for a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The commission that investigated the Whiskey intrusion concluded that the grounded submarine had been taking part in a larger operation that probably involved six submarines operating in the Stockholm archipelago, including three midget submarines with bottom-crawling capabilities. According to the commission’s report, the objectives of the operation were entirely military and could not be seen as part of a Soviet effort to intimidate for political purposes. But others in Sweden believe that the intrusions are intended to intimidate and to make the Nordic countries more receptive to

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Soviet initiatives. A variation of the intimidation hypothesis holds that the violations are intended to back up Soviet demands for a change in the legal status of the Baltic Sea. There may be some validity to all of these explanations. Having initially intruded into Swedish waters for military purposes, the Soviets may have been pleased at the mild reaction of the Swedish government and may have chosen to continue for political purposes.

The Soviets also have violated or come close to violating the airspace of neighboring countries in recent years. In the 1970s, Soviet air and naval forces began to conduct military activities on the edge of Denmark’s airspace and territorial waters. John Erickson noted in 1976 that the intensification of Soviet air and naval activity within minutes of Danish airspace turned what had been “an abnormal situation into a regular occurrence” and thereby “strained the Danish military alert system.” According to a Norwegian source, Norwegian fighter aircraft “carry out on the order of 150 interceptions of Soviet military aircraft, mostly bombers, over international waters, per year.” In addition, since 1970, Soviet aircraft have committed ten serious violations of Norwegian airspace that resulted in formal protests. Violations have occurred in the airspace of neutral Sweden and Austria as well. In August 1984, a Soviet SU-15 interceptor entered Swedish airspace off the coast of Gotland and followed a Swedish civil airliner for more than 4 minutes, penetrating almost 40 kilometers into Swedish territory.

During the 1978 airlift to Ethiopia, the Soviets violated an agreement with Turkey specifying that only commercial aircraft can fly through defined corridors and only after 24 hours’ notification. The Soviets used military aircraft, but they suspended further overflights when they were met by Turkish interceptors. The Soviets also have clashed with the Turks on the movement of warships through the Turkish-controlled Dardanelles. The 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates navigation in the Turkish straits, prohibits the passage

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44This was the position adopted by a task force within the Swedish Liberal party that prepared its own report on the violations and that was critical of the official commission. (Reported in Gatan, September 29, 1983.) Those who ascribe a purely military rationale to the intrusions believe that the Soviet military is preparing contingency plans for the rapid seizure of Swedish territory in the event of war. (See Walter S. Mossberg, “Sweden Says It Believes that Soviet Sub Visits Reflect War Planning,” The Wall Street Journal, June 23, 1983.)


of submarines through the straits except by day and on the surface. As a Black Sea power, the Soviet Union is not bound by the convention’s 15,000-ton upper limit on the size of warships it can send through the straits. However, the Convention stipulates that even Black Sea powers must notify the Turkish government eight days in advance of plans to transit the straits and that large warships can be escorted by not more than two destroyers. No more than nine ships of any size may pass through the straits at any time. The Soviet navy generally adheres to the letter of these provisions but could be said to violate their spirit in certain ways. The Soviets avoid giving the Turks a true picture of their naval activities by notifying them of many more planned passages through the straits than are actually carried out. There is also controversy in the West over whether the Soviet Union has already or will in the future violate the Convention by transiting aircraft carriers through the straits. This is not expressly prohibited by the Convention but would be a violation, in the view of some Western legal experts, of its intent.

The fact that air and naval violations occur, and equally important, the high-handed way in which the Soviet Union has responded to complaints about them are indicative of Soviet attitudes toward small countries on the Soviet periphery. When the Swedish commission investigating the submarine incidents issued its report, the Soviet embassy lodged a protest denying that any violations other than the Whiskey incident had occurred and ascribing the whole controversy to unspecified “enemies” of good Swedish-Soviet relations. In the August 1984 air incident, the manner in which the Soviets responded caused almost as much controversy in Sweden as the violation itself. On September 7, the Swedes delivered a diplomatic protest to the Soviet embassy in Stockholm in which they outlined details of the incident. In its reply, the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated that it was “unable to confirm” that a violation took place, a statement that some Swedes took to be a semi-admission. However, some six weeks later, Vadim Zagladin, in an interview with a Swedish newspaper correspondent, produced a “secret report” that showed that “the so-called violation did not take place.” The Swedish Foreign Minister characterized the Soviet willingness to supply highly detailed information to a newspaper

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48The text of the Montreux Convention is reprinted in Ferenc A. Vell, The Turkish Straits and NATO, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1972, pp. 200–228.


that it had withheld from the Swedish government as an “affront that was difficult to understand.”

Military Exercises. Most of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military exercises that take place near Western Europe presumably are staged to serve the operational requirements of the Soviet military. Some, however, are intended to convey political messages. Premier Kosygin admitted as much in 1968 after Soviet tanks had rolled right up to the Soviet-Norwegian border. Asked by reporters in Stockholm why they had done so, Kosygin replied they were an “answering maneuver” (otvenyi maneuv) to NATO exercises that had taken place in Norway some 800 kilometers to the south.\(^{52}\)

In the spring of 1984, as Soviet-West European relations reached their post-INF deployment low, Soviet military forces staged several exercises that many Western officials believe were politically inspired. In April, the Soviet Northern and Baltic fleets staged the largest naval exercises ever held in Atlantic waters.\(^{53}\) At least 29 Soviet surface warships, accompanied by support vessels, submarines, long-range reconnaissance planes, and Backfire bombers, surged from bases in the Baltic and on the Kola Peninsula to the Atlantic. Also in the spring of 1984, Soviet forces in the GDR conducted military exercises that forced Western commercial and military planes en route to Berlin to alter their normal flight patterns. The Western powers concluded that the Soviet authorities, although technically entitled to reserve air corridors for their own use on short notice, were “abusing their privileges” in the GDR.\(^{54}\) In mid-July 1984, at the height of the Soviet “revanchism” campaign against West Germany, the USSR staged on East German territory the largest Soviet field exercise ever held. According to West German sources, this was the first exercise held in East Germany without the participation of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces and was conducted closer to the intra-German border than any previous exercise.\(^{55}\)

One of the striking features of Soviet exercises in the USSR and in Eastern Europe is their overtly offensive character, which the Soviet


\(^{52}\)Quoted in Hegge, “The Soviet View of the Nordic Balance,” p. 64.

\(^{53}\)This assessment was made by British officers at Northwood naval headquarters. (Quoted in R. W. Apple, “Soviet Is Holding Big Naval Games,” The New York Times, April 4, 1984.)


\(^{55}\)Details reported by German Defense Minister Woerner, in “Largest-Ever Soviet Maneuvers in East Germany in July,” Armed Forces Journal, August 1984, p. 51. It is possible that these maneuvers also may have been intended, in part, to impress East Germany.
military makes little effort to conceal. In October 1984, the West German government released tape recordings of Soviet staff exercises in East Germany, on which Soviet officers were heard directing a simulated attack across the Rhine as far west as Eindhoven in the Netherlands and the Belgian cities of Gent and Maastricht. Some Germans were particularly disturbed by the evidence the tapes offered of an effort to instill in Soviet officers a callous attitude toward civilian casualties. In one simulated incident, a Soviet battalion commander received word of a collision between a Soviet tank and a German passenger car, but was ordered to proceed even though the officer in the field reported, “It’s one of our tanks and people are burning in the car.”

Nuclear Threats. Subtle forms of nuclear intimidation have become increasingly prominent in Soviet efforts to influence West European publics. In trying to mobilize popular opposition to nuclear weapons, Soviet spokesmen have dramatized the effects of nuclear war in a manner that recalls Khrushchev’s “rocket rattling” of the late 1950s. In April 1984, Gromyko pointedly told visiting Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti that the volcanic destruction of ancient Pompeii would pale beside the effects of a single nuclear warhead.

Soviet officials have suggested to countries that have their own or host American nuclear weapons that they would be more secure if they became “nuclear-free.” Offers to “spare” cooperating countries in a nuclear conflagration of course imply a latent threat to those countries that fail to go along with Soviet proposals. In their appeals to countries that do not have nuclear weapons on their territory, the Soviets adopt exactly the opposite position, arguing that nuclear-free status or even outright neutrality can guarantee no real security and that these countries therefore must take an active part in promoting nuclear-free zones and the other Soviet proposals. As Georgi Arbatov told a Swedish radio audience,

in World War II Sweden was able to remain neutral and almost entirely unharmed according to its own decision. [But] in a nuclear war you can never manage equally well no matter how hard you try, because a nuclear war will bring about such destruction that hardly any part of Europe will be able to survive. Therefore, Sweden’s neutrality must be an active neutrality. This means that you must very actively participate in efforts to carry out very radical improvements,

56CDU: Moscow’s Aggressive Games,” Sueddeutsche Zeitung, November 10/11, 1984; Kurt Kister, “Breakthrough to Eindhoven,” Sueddeutsche Zeitung, October 25, 1984. Release of this information was condemned by the Social Democrats and Greens, who accused the government of building up negative “images of the enemy” (Feindbilder) for political purposes.
that is, to secure very solid guarantees against a nuclear war and for disarmament.57

One of the most overt but least successful attempts by the Soviet Union to use the nuclear threat to influence West European political behavior was the Soviet deployment of SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe as a countermeasure to the NATO INF deployments of 1983. Before mid-October 1983, the Soviet Union had never acknowledged that it had any short-range nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe. But in an interview with the West German magazine Stern, Colonel General Nikolai Chervov, a member of the Soviet general staff, stated that tactical nuclear weapons are deployed “everywhere outside the USSR where Soviet army divisions are stationed.”58

Despite Chervov’s admission that these weapons were integral to the Soviet ground forces, in 1984 the Soviets deployed additional SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 missiles, claiming that doing so was necessary to restore the balance allegedly overturned by the cruise and Pershing II deployments.59 Whatever the military value of the Soviet missiles, the announcements of their deployment did not have the intended political effect in Western Europe, where the public and even the peace movement had lost much of their interest in the missile issue once the first U.S. weapons were deployed. Few in the peace movement seemed to see any added threat in the new Soviet deployments. Some Europeans even argued that the new missiles would allow the Soviets to claim that they had restored a balance and thus would provide a face-saving way back to the Geneva talks. In addition to not having their intended effect on the publics of Western Europe, the new Soviet missiles had unintended effects in Eastern Europe, where the tiny unofficial peace movements of East Germany and Czechoslovakia spoke out against them. Some evidence suggests that the East German, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian governments also expressed concern in Moscow about the effects of the deployments on regime stability.

ARMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

In the course of improving its military forces, the Soviet Union has maintained an active campaign of propaganda, diplomacy, and arms control in support of what the Soviets call “military détente.” The objective of this campaign is not only to obtain concrete military

advantages by slowing Western defense efforts, but also to make Soviet military preponderance seem a part of the natural state of affairs in Europe—a factor for stability that is accepted by both East and West and that is codified in an ever-growing body of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements. Military power and arms control are thus closely linked in Soviet policy, with the latter providing an institutionalized forum in which military advantages that the USSR has achieved by unilateral exertion can be codified and given de jure international recognition.

Like their Western counterparts, the Soviets know that arms control, however desirable from the point of view of Western publics, is politically difficult to manage within the Atlantic alliance. Opportunities to exploit potential intra-alliance differences can arise because of particular actions by one Western government or another. More fundamentally, they grow out of the diversity of national situations in the alliance. The Soviets know that certain arms-control agreements with the United States would be seen in Europe as impinging on American nuclear guarantees. They also know that other arms-control proposals that might be attractive in Western Europe would be less so in the United States. The Soviets recognize that there are potential differences of outlook and interest between Britain and France on the one hand and the nonnuclear states of Western Europe on the other, as well as between those countries that have American nuclear weapons on their territory and those countries that do not.

Soviet negotiators have attempted to use virtually every East-West arms-control forum—the nonproliferation talks, SALT/START, the Geneva INF talks, MBFR, and the Conference on European Disarmament (CDE)—to support their broader political objectives as well as to pursue objectives that are more narrowly military. In some forums, notably SALT, Europe clearly has been a secondary consideration. In others, such as MBFR and CDE, it has been the prime focus of Soviet interest.

**NPT, SALT, INF, and MBFR**

When the Kennedy and Johnson administrations began to promote nuclear nonproliferation as a world-order objective in the 1960s, the Soviets were quick to make clear that from their perspective, nonproliferation was relevant to Western Europe and they would use the NPT negotiations to limit NATO's military options as much as possible. In January 1964, the Soviets replied to the first U.S. nonproliferation and nonacquisition proposal by stating that they regarded NATO's proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) as the chief nonproliferation
danger and that no agreement with the United States could be reached as long as MLF remained under consideration. In September 1965, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft treaty to the United Nations General Assembly that not only would have prevented MLF, but, as President Johnson recalled in his memoirs, "raised doubts that . . . we could have carried out even the kind of intensive consultations on nuclear matters within NATO that we planned to develop." In provisions aimed at both the MLF and the various U.S.-West German dual-key systems, the Soviet draft prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons "directly or indirectly, through third states or groups of states not possessing nuclear weapons." It also barred nuclear powers from transferring "nuclear weapons, or control over them or their emplacement or use" to military units of nonnuclear allies, even if the weapons were placed under joint command.61

The Soviets ultimately dropped their insistence on these provisions in 1967, when they became co-sponsors (with the Americans) of a draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. Although the specific provisions of this draft were less objectionable to the European allies than were those of the original Soviet proposal, the Soviets were well aware that the French, most West Germans, and the leaders of many of the smaller countries continued to regard the very process of U.S.-Soviet cooperation on NPT as discriminatory and inimical to alliance cohesion.

SALT was another forum in which the Soviets sought to use U.S. concerns about stability to undercut the American position in Western Europe.62 Early in the negotiations, the Soviets made it clear that they expected the United States to include its so-called "forward-based systems," consisting mainly of dual-capable aircraft stationed in Europe and on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, against its totals of central strategic systems. Under the formula of "equality and equal security," which figured heavily at the 1974 Vladivostok talks and again at

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62 To increase their bargaining leverage, Soviets informally linked NPT and SALT. According to one U.S. official involved in SALT, "I think that for the Russians the Nonproliferation Treaty was a precondition [for SALT]. They didn't spell it out formally. But there was tacit understanding that we had to stand shoulder to shoulder with them on the treaty before going on to SALT." (Butch Fischer, Deputy Director of ACDA, quoted in John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1973, p. 104.)
the INF talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union demanded the right to counterbalance all U.S. systems targeted on the Soviet Union, including those dedicated to NATO missions. As was the case in the nonproliferation discussion, the Soviets sought to use arms control to insert themselves into intra-NATO arrangements designed to "couple" Western Europe to the United States and to implement flexible response. This attempt was not particularly successful in SALT I, but it paved the way for more serious intra-alliance difficulties in SALT II and the follow-on Geneva INF talks. In SALT II, the Soviets once again began to hammer away on the FBS issue. This time, however, the matter was complicated by the Soviet deployment of the SS-20 IRBM and the Backfire bomber. Ultimately, it was the disparity in these systems, coupled with the robust parity that the Soviets enjoyed at the level of central strategic systems, that led German Chancellor Schmidt to raise the issue of the SS-20 and the INF imbalance in Europe.

The Soviets also demand the right to offset French and British systems. In the SALT I negotiations and at the Vladivostok summit, the Soviets argued that the United States had to accept lower levels of its own forces to compensate for the existence of French and British systems. The fact that the Soviets exerted little direct pressure on France and Britain to limit their missile programs suggests that the Soviets were less concerned with the military capabilities of the European systems than with constraining U.S. defense efforts and using SALT to legitimize, in ostensibly technical language, the Soviet Union's political claim to "equality and equal security." In the INF talks, the Soviets again showed a preoccupation with American rather than French and British systems. At the 1980 summit with West German Chancellor Schmidt, Brezhnev went so far as to exclude the non-American systems from consideration in his discussion of the INF issue. Later, when the Soviets began to negotiate on the INF issue, they launched an enormous propaganda campaign focusing on the French and British weapons. But the purpose of this campaign, which won the backing of most of the non-Communist left in Europe, was to forestall deployment of even a single American missile, which, in the Soviet view would upset the balance that was already said to exist, rather than to place limits on the French and British forces themselves.

63U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze, in discussing this concept with his Soviet counterpart, is reported to have asked: "Is that your idea of equality? If so, then it illustrates the underlying problem. What you're demanding is nuclear forces equal or superior to the aggregate of nuclear forces of all other countries. That amounts to a demand for absolute security for yourselves, which means absolute insecurity for everyone else." (Strobe Talbott, Deadly Games, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1984, p. 110.)

Another aspect of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms control with implications for Western Europe concerns the Soviet proposals for creating ASW and bomber sanctuaries near the national territories of the two superpowers. These proposals, which have been rejected by the United States, reflect a Soviet interest in extending the USSR's "defensive" perimeter in ways that would call into question the unconditional right of the United States to operate in waters and airspace adjoining the territory of its European allies and Japan.

In MBFR, the Soviets have tried to obtain multilateral legitimation of the favorable balance they now enjoy on the central front. In their initial MBFR proposals, they insisted that the West agree to national subceilings on troop strengths rather than collective ceilings that would apply to the blocs as a whole. Although Western observers generally attributed the Soviet interest in national subceilings to a latent fear of the Bundeswehr, this interest was also politically motivated. Formalizing a Soviet role in determining the size of military establishments in Europe, even if it required the Soviets to accept limitations on their own troop strength, is consistent with the overall Soviet interest in "bilaterializing" security arrangements in Europe and gradually extending the Soviet droit de regard over Western security policies.

Largely because of Western opposition, the Soviets have now dropped their insistence on explicit national subceilings and are proposing that no member of either alliance can provide more than 50 percent of the manpower. This provision is implicitly directed at the Bundeswehr, which under such an agreement would not be able to compensate for withdrawals of U.S. forces. The disagreements over explicit and implicit national subceilings will loom larger in the negotiations if the database problem, currently the chief obstacle to an agreement, is resolved. The Western countries claim that Warsaw Pact forces exceed those of NATO in the MBFR area by some 150,000, while the East claims that the numbers on both sides are approximately equal.65

Declaratory Measures

Soviet policymakers have always attributed greater significance than their Western counterparts to statements of principle and related "declaratory measures." Kissinger recalls that at the May 1972 Moscow summit, Brezhnev told him that he regarded the joint declaration

of principles as more important than SALT. Shevchenko claims that "Moscow would have been happy even if the summit's only product had been the declaration of principles," which formalized the principle of equality in U.S.-Soviet relations and "was considered juridical recognition by the United States of the Leninist idea of peaceful coexistence."

The Soviet interest in declaratory statements goes beyond obtaining general Western recognition of principles such as "equality" and "peaceful coexistence." It also reflects a Soviet interest in using such statements to undercut Western unity and NATO's flexible-response doctrine. At the May 1972 Moscow summit, Brezhnev proposed to Nixon that each side agree not to use nuclear weapons against the other, a step that the United States rejected as inconsistent with American commitments to NATO. However, a year later, the Soviets secured Nixon's support for a bilateral "Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War," which West European governments generally disliked and which, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, "was interpreted by some as an abrogation of the American security commitment to Europe and as a renouncing in advance the use of nuclear weapons in Europe's defence."

In the multilateral context, the Soviets have been pressing for the conclusion of agreements that would introduce, in contractually regulated form, what the West Germans call "inequalities of risk" among the members of the alliance. In 1976, the Warsaw Treaty states proposed that all the CSCE participating states sign a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. This was followed by a proposal that the same states conclude a general nonaggression treaty banning all use of force. At the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), the Warsaw Pact proposed that all participating states agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. In the face of Western resistance to the no-first-use proposal, the Soviets may be prepared to settle for Western acceptance of an obligation not to use either nuclear or conventional arms. At Stockholm, the NATO

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67 Brekling With Moscow, p. 206.
68 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1208.
69 Strategic Survey, 1973, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1974, p. 64. Most European officials did not take so extreme a view. Eventually, France and Britain both made their own agreements with the Soviet Union on preventing nuclear war. On July 16, 1976, the USSR and France formalized by exchange of letters an Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental or Unsanctioned Use of Nuclear Weapons. On October 10, 1976, the USSR and Britain concluded an Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War.
countries have now agreed in principle to the Soviet proposal for a general non-use of force declaration (although not a treaty) but are demanding that in exchange the East agree to concrete confidence-building measures.

Supplementing these multilateral proposals, the Soviets have proposed that individual West European countries conclude agreements with the Soviet Union eschewing cooperation with nuclear states in exchange for Soviet pledges not to attack them in the event of nuclear war. The Soviet ambassador to the Netherlands gave a highly publicized speech in March 1984 in which he stated that the Soviet Union would promise never to attack the Netherlands with nuclear arms if the Netherlands decided not to deploy U.S. cruise missiles.70 Along these same lines, in November of the same year, General Secretary Chernenko told Neil Kinnock, the visiting head of the British Labour party, that if Britain were to dismantle its own nuclear forces and close all U.S. nuclear bases in Britain, the Soviet Union would reduce its own forces an equivalent level and guarantee that its own nuclear forces would not be targeted on British territory.71

**Nuclear-Free Zones**

The Soviet Union is backing, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, proposals for the establishment of internationally guaranteed nuclear-free zones in northern Europe, central Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean.72 These regional initiatives must be seen in the context of the broader objective, proclaimed by Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress, of making all of Europe a nuclear-free zone.

The Soviet Union traditionally has pressed the nuclear-free zone theme to complicate relations between the United States and West Germany, to "decouple" the United States from Europe, and (as in MBFR) to bring about the creation of an international regime that juridically discriminates against West Germany while at the same time bolstering the international status of the GDR. All these objectives were apparent in the Soviet-backed Ralacki and Gomulka proposals of 1957 and 1964. The Soviet Union has been relatively unenthusiastic about limited, technical measures aimed at increasing stability by

thinning out or eliminating tactical nuclear weapons along relatively narrow intra-border zones. Such measures would create operational problems for Soviet forces in Germany, without accomplishing any of the larger Soviet political objectives.

For these reasons, the Soviet Union has been restrained in its support for the Palme Commission's proposed 300-kilometer-wide nuclear-free zone in central Europe. In the Soviet view, the Palme proposal "proceeds in the same direction as the efforts being made by the socialist countries," but clearly does not go far enough. The Soviet Union has suggested that the proposed zone be widened to 500 or 600 kilometers and is relying on the efforts of Georgi Arbatov and retired General Milstein, the two Soviet members of the Palme Commission, to promote support for the proposal. Running 250 to 300 kilometers west of the intra-German border, such a zone would effectively denuclearize the FRG along with parts of Belgium and the Netherlands.

The Soviets have always regarded an internationally guaranteed nuclear-free zone in northern Europe as a more feasible prospect and a more useful propaganda theme than such a zone in central Europe. Although (as Nordic officials often point out) northern Europe is already nuclear-free (except for Soviet nuclear installations on the Kola Peninsula), a contractually regulated zone would undercut NATO's strategic and political unity by creating bilateral and multilateral undertakings between the Soviet Union and individual NATO states that would supersede their commitments to the alliance.

Short of actual implementation, the Soviets see the nuclear-free zone as a device to mobilize popular opposition in the Nordic countries to conventional defense efforts. In an interview with a Swedish newspaper, Zagladin stated that the stationing in Norway of AWACS and Loran C amounts to "a violation of the undertakings Norway at one time made," adding that "if you are really going to talk about making the Nordic area into a nuclear-free zone, then you have to talk about such things." Zagladin did not specify the content of the "undertakings" made or to whom they were addressed, although presumably he was referring to the three diplomatic notes that Norway addressed to the Soviet Union in 1949 and 1951. But the call for discussion of Norway's role in NATO air defense and other alliance activities suggests that Soviet objectives go beyond formalizing Norway's nonnuclear status.

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To broaden the base of support in Scandinavia for the nuclear-free zone, the Soviets might have to accept limitations on their own forces on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic, both of which they have argued should be excluded from the zone. The Soviets claim that "the military potential of the Kola Peninsula is part of the global strategic balance between the United States and the USSR and is not aimed at the Nordic countries." In the Soviet view, the quid pro quo for reductions on the Kola Peninsula is not formal acceptance by the Nordic states of the nuclear-free-zone proposal, but limitations on activities in "the international waters of the North Atlantic, where rocket-carrying American submarines and carriers are constantly in operation."75 The Soviet Union traditionally has argued that the Baltic must be discussed in the context of the central front in Europe and the nuclear weapons deployed there by the United States. The 1981 Novosti statement on the Baltic explicitly mentioned the West German province of Schleswig-Holstein, thereby excluding the possibility that actions by Denmark and the other Nordic countries alone could lead to Soviet concessions on the Baltic. This position was reaffirmed by Georgi Arbatov in a 1982 interview in Sweden and in a long study of the Nordic nuclear-free zone that was published by an IMEMO researcher in 1984.76

Other Soviet officials have hinted that the USSR might be willing to include the Baltic or parts of it in a nuclear-free zone. At a June 1983 dinner in Moscow for the visiting president of Finland, General Secretary Andropov announced that the Soviet Union was ready to discuss "the question of giving nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea."77 Several months earlier, Colonel General Nikolai Chervov had said that if the Baltic was declared a nuclear-free zone, the Soviet Union would withdraw the six SLBMs based there.

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75Novosti statement, quoted in "Moscow Bars Key Area from Atom-Free Zone," The New York Times, July 24, 1981. The Novosti statement may have been intended to dampen speculation about a change in Soviet policy that was generated by Brezhnev's answer several weeks earlier to a question posed by a Finnish Social Democratic newspaper. He stated: "The guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons against countries included in the zone is the chief obligation and undoubtedly the obligation of utmost importance for those countries that the Soviet Union is prepared to assume. But this does not preclude the possibility of considering the question of some other measures applying to our own territory in the region adjoining the nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe. The Soviet Union is prepared to discuss this question with the countries concerned." (These replies were reprinted in Pravda, June 27, 1981.)

76Tidningar och Telebrombyra, April 25, 1982; and Voronkov, A Nuclear-Free Status for Northern Europe.

These signs of Soviet flexibility on inclusion of the Baltic may reflect operational developments. The six submarines mentioned by Chervov are very old and are now being phased out of service. Their replacements are based at Severodvinsk on the White Sea and at Poliarny near Murmansk. The Soviets also have now completed the Baltic-White Sea Canal, which allows them to transfer nuclear submarines between the Northern and Baltic fleets without transiting international waters. Both developments give the Soviets greater latitude in shifting the emphasis in the Baltic from the Soviet navy's military requirements to the Soviet Union's politically inspired interest in a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

Traditionally, the Soviets have been only lukewarm supporters of the Balkan nuclear-free zone, which they have regarded with suspicion as a Romanian-inspired idea. Since 1981, however, Soviet support has become more enthusiastic, probably for two reasons: First, rhetorical support for the zone is consistent with the overall anti-nuclear campaign the Soviets have mounted. Second, the Soviets see such support as a way of encouraging the anti-NATO activities of Greece's Prime Minister Papandreou, who strongly supports the zone.

Like the call for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, Soviet proposals for turning the Mediterranean into a "sea of peace" are intended mainly for their propaganda value. Strategically, the Soviets believe that their position in the Mediterranean is weak, and that the United States has strengthened its position by its aid and arms sales to Egypt and Israel, by reintegrating Greece into the NATO command, by encouraging Spain's admission to NATO, and by improving its ties with a more self-confident and more NATO-oriented Italy. However, the Soviets see most of these American achievements as fragile and reversible. Changing the status of the Mediterranean is likely to remain at least a low-key theme in Soviet policy, which Soviet propagandists will use to appeal to anti-American and anti-nuclear sentiment in the region.

Confidence-Building Measures

At the negotiations that led to the CSCE Final Act, the Soviet Union adopted a generally hostile attitude toward confidence-building measures (CBMs), which were being promoted mainly by the neutral and nonaligned countries. Soviet opposition was based in part on military grounds and the traditional penchant for secrecy. More

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important, it was based on political factors and the fundamental Soviet objection to any agreement that would cover even a part of Soviet territory while exempting the United States.\textsuperscript{73}

The Soviets regard CSCE as a forum in which the USSR can assert both its right to a place in a "Europe of the nations" and its right to certain special privileges that it claims by virtue of its status as a superpower. At CSCE, therefore, Soviet negotiators sought to uphold the USSR's special status as a superpower by never making concessions that were not counterbalanced by equal concessions on the American side. At the same time, the Soviets tried to use CSCE to underscore the Soviet Union's inherent geographical, historical, and cultural place in Europe and contrast it with the position of the United States, which is in Europe (at least in the Soviet view) only by virtue of the legal and political arrangements growing out of World War II—the Potsdam agreement, the 1971 Berlin agreement, and membership in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

The demand by the European neutrals that CBMs apply to Soviet territory was in effect a demand that the USSR accept certain disadvantages (relative to the United States) in exchange for participation in security arrangements limited to Europe. Although the Soviet Union was eager to pose as the chief sponsor of an emerging European security system, it was unwilling to accept any limitations on its own activities, even if they were largely symbolic and in any case voluntary. With Soviet negotiators reluctant to give up their insistence on having it both ways on this issue and the non-Warsaw Pact states equally opposed to a total exemption of Soviet territory, what emerged at Helsinki was a compromise: The Final Act left the Soviet Union's principled objection to any disadvantages vis-à-vis the United States largely intact, but did not totally exempt Soviet territory. It specified that notification of military maneuvers exceeding 25,000 troops applies to all such maneuvers "which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space." "In the case of a participating State whose territory extends beyond Europe [i.e., the Soviet Union and Turkey], prior notification need be given only of maneuvers which take place in an area within 250 kilometers from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating State." Because the United States has no frontier facing a European state, its non-NATO military activities are exempt from this provision. Offsetting this American advantage, the Soviet Union managed to exempt all but a 250-kilometer-wide strip of its territory from these provisions, even though European Russia

extends several hundred kilometers beyond the zone in which the CBMs apply. The same provision applies to Turkey, but 250 kilometers east and south of Turkey’s intra-European borders (with Greece and Bulgaria) is well inside the continent of Asia.

The initial objective of the French government when it proposed the extension of CBMs “from the Atlantic to the Urals” was to eliminate the privileged Soviet position or, what was perhaps more likely, to draw attention to the disparity between the Soviet Union’s European diplomacy and its demand for special superpower privileges. But the French attempt to take the offensive on this issue was not an unqualified success. At the second CSCE review conference that convened in Madrid in late 1980, the participating states met to negotiate an agreement that would define the terms of reference for the Stockholm conference. In what was widely interpreted as a reply to the French initiative, Brezhnev indicated in his 1981 26th Party Congress speech that the Soviet Union would be willing to negotiate CBMs as far east as the Urals, “on the condition that the Western states make a corresponding extension of the area of measures of trust.” In the negotiations at Madrid, the French proposal and the Soviet counter-offer became the basis for the agreement that ultimately was signed.

At best, this agreement did nothing to eliminate the privileged status the Soviets had won at Helsinki; at worst, it represented an advance toward the maximal Soviet position. According to the Madrid Document, CBMs will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and airspace. [1] [In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe. (Footnote inserted in the original.)]

As far as the adjoining sea area [1] [the same footnote is referenced] and airspace is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating states taking place then whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a

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80The French position has been expressed unofficially by Benoit d’Aboville of the French Foreign Ministry in the following terms: “The Soviet Union wants to be a European power which is ‘more equal’ than others and at the same time to be considered a superpower. This is precisely why the extension of the zone of application for CBMs to the Western part of the Soviet Union is so important. It is an important military and political requirement for any serious debate on European security. How can European countries accept a negotiation excluding the territory of the Soviet Union from constraints without accepting ipso facto a second class status on the Continent?” (“CBMs and the Future of European Security,” in F. Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds.), Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York, 1985, p. 202.)

81Pravda, February 24, 1981.
part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify.\textsuperscript{87}

From the Soviet perspective, the stipulation that CBMs will cover “adjoining sea area and airspace” meant that the West had accepted, at least in principle, Brezhnev’s offer to extend “the area of measures of trust” to the Urals, provided the Western states made a “corresponding extension.” It thus represented no advance by the West over what had been attained in the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the application of the measures was functionally broadened from applicable to major military maneuvers (with such applicability to be judged unilaterally by the parties to the agreement) to “activities [that] affect security in Europe” as well as “constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe.” The Soviet definition of the activities that are covered by this provision is likely to be a broad one.

Western and particularly U.S. negotiators at Madrid were concerned that the Soviets not succeed in negotiating CBMs in Europe that would constrain European governments from cooperating with the United States in transporting the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to the Middle East in a crisis. They therefore claimed that by agreeing that the maneuvers covered would have to be a part of activities taking place within Europe, the East had made a major concession.\textsuperscript{88} But this “concession” amounted to the Soviets’ dropping a demand that they had not previously put forward and that they had not won in any previous agreement. It certainly did not represent, as the French had hoped in the 1970s, a successful use of CSCE to advance the security of Western Europe by gaining implicit recognition of the existence of geographical asymmetries in Europe that favor the Warsaw Pact.

As a practical matter, the Soviets probably will not succeed in transforming CDE into a mechanism by which to constrain NATO and U.S. naval operations in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. But Western agreement even to discuss these activities has long-term implications. It helps to shift the terms of the European security debate and gives added credibility to those in Western Europe who argue that Soviet ground forces in Europe are deployed defensively against American air and naval power in the seas around Europe.


\textsuperscript{88}See the assessment of the Madrid agreement by chief U.S. negotiator Max Kampelman, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 83, No. 2078 (1983).
Territorial Questions

The Soviets have long used the ostensibly technical provisions of arms-control agreements to establish political precedents and to generate pressures for international acceptance of Soviet positions in territorial and political disputes. The use of arms control for covertly political purposes was most prominent in the 1960s, when the Warsaw Pact tried to use the Rapacki plan as a vehicle to obtain Western recognition of the GDR. With the 1970 USSR-FRG treaty and the other treaties between West Germany and the East European states that provisionally settled the postwar disputes over borders and sovereignty, arms control as an instrument for creating precedents in territorial and political disputes was rendered superfluous for all but a few secondary issues. These issues include the international status of the Baltic and demarcation of the Barents Sea boundary between Norway and the Soviet Union.

As noted, the Madrid Final Document charges the Stockholm conference with concluding binding CBMs that apply not only to forces on land, but also to those in bordering seas and airspace when their activities are functionally related to maneuvers on land. Swedish officials are concerned that the Soviets could use CBMs as a lever to press for international acceptance of their position, advanced over many years but rejected by Sweden and other littoral states, that the Baltic is a closed inland sea that should be under the control of the nations along its coast. If the Swedes were to accede to the Soviet position and agree that the Baltic should be regarded, from the strategic perspective, as part of the European land mass, they might obtain Soviet acquiescence to CBMs covering the entire Baltic. If they continue to resist the Soviet interpretation, however, and support unregulated access to the Baltic for commercial and military vessels of all nations, the Swedes have less chance of achieving CBMs in the whole of the Baltic.84

As the case of the Baltic illustrates, the Soviet position on freedom of the seas is by no means one of unconditional support. Where it suits their political and military interests, the Soviets have tried to increase the share of the USSR’s adjoining waters that are considered inland rather than international. According to one observer of Soviet maritime policy:

84See Lars Christiansen, Svenska Dagbladet, June 6, 1984. Some Swedish officials also are concerned that the Madrid Final Document lends implicit support to the Soviet position by drawing an explicit distinction between oceans and seas.
The Soviet Union has been making great efforts to obtain international recognition for its claim that the adjoining waters of the Soviet Union in the north are historical bays, in terms of international law, and to come to international peripheral sea arrangements about weaker claims, as in the Barents Sea around Norway's Bjornoya (Bear Island) and the Spitzbergen archipelago, in order to prohibit naval operations by outside countries in these areas.85

The manner in which the Soviets used arms control to advance their position in the Barents Sea negotiations was rather ingenious. In 1977, the Soviets chose a point west of the median line that Norway claims demarcates the Norwegian section of the Barents from which to "burn off" the required number of SLBMs to comply with the provisions of the SALT I treaty. With American submarines assumed to be standing by to monitor Soviet compliance, the Soviets had hit upon what they must have regarded was a perfect mechanism for driving home the USSR's special superpower status and thereby pressuring the Norwegians for concessions in the demarcation talks that were then under way.86 The Soviet Union claims that because of "special circumstances," by which it means the strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula, the line between Norway and the Soviet Union should be demarcated according to the sector rather than the median line principle. Both are recognized under international law (as is the permissibility of "special circumstances"), but the median principle is more common. At stake is control of 155,000 square kilometers of sea and undersea rights.

THE WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES

The importance of the West European Communist parties in Soviet foreign policy has declined in the last two decades as these parties have lost their domestic appeal or, as in the Italian case, have maintained or strengthened their appeal by distancing themselves from the Soviet Union. In addition, the relative usefulness of these parties has

85Hans-Georg Wieck, "The Soviet Threat," Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, Supplement, December 1984, p. 31. Wieck is a former West German ambassador to the Soviet Union and was ambassador to NATO when he made these remarks. Also noteworthy is the Soviet decision, in June 1984, to invoke the Law of the Sea Treaty and to declare unilaterally a 200-mile economic zone in the Black Sea. Because the Black Sea is around 300 miles wide in most places, establishment of a 200-mile zone would deprive the Turks of fishing and mineral exploration rights previously guaranteed under the Soviet-Turkish continental shelf agreement based on a "median line" drawn through the center of the Black Sea. (Reha Muhtar, "We React to Soviet Decision," Milliyet, June 27, 1984.)

declined as the Soviets have gained other means to influence West European society and politics. With access to state-run broadcasting media and to major "bourgeois" publications, the Soviets are bound to have downgraded their opinion of the propaganda services of the West European Communist parties. Similarly, having forged direct contacts between the CPSU and the Socialist and Social Democratic parties, the Soviets have less need to rely on local Communists to try to exert influence on the non-Communist left in Western Europe.

Despite this relative decline, the West European Communist parties remain important for Soviet policy. As Richard Lowenthal has pointed out, the Soviets have three kinds of interests in advanced Western countries, all of which are promoted by the maintenance of an international Communist movement:

1. A latent interest in revolutionary seizures of power by pro-Soviet Communist parties in these countries.
2. A strong interest in influencing the foreign and defense policies of these countries.
3. A permanent interest in using the existence of the international Communist movement, particularly in the advanced capitalist countries of the West, to bolster the legitimacy of Communist rule inside the Soviet Union.87

In addition to these major areas of interest, the West European Communist parties or individuals in these parties perform certain useful tasks in the areas of trade, propaganda, disinformation, and espionage. In France, the so-called "Red millionaire," Jean-Baptiste Doumeng, has built a large commercial empire that handles West European agricultural exports to the Eastern bloc. Despite denials by Doumeng, rumors persist in France that his Interagra firm helps the Soviet Union to channel funds for clandestine activities in the West and the third world. The British government also suspects Interagra of illegally helping the Soviets to circumvent the EC's 1980 post-Afghanistan sanctions by diverting to the Soviet Union butter that was originally sold to Cuba.88

Soviet thinking on the first of these interests—the revolutionary seizure of power—is clouded in secrecy and given less emphasis in Soviet pronouncements than more immediate objectives such as "peace" and "democracy." Soviet leaders clearly regard revolution in

Western Europe in a very long-term perspective and probably would be surprised if a revolutionary situation suddenly arose in one or more countries.\textsuperscript{98}

This evidently was the case in Portugal in 1974, when the Portuguese Communist party (PCP) made an unexpected bid for power that placed the Soviet leadership in a difficult dilemma. Although the Soviets did not want to miss an opportunity for a major political gain or appear to be selling out a revolution, they also were concerned that a blatant Communist bid for power in a NATO country, particularly if it was supported openly by the Soviet Union, could bring the unfolding détente process to a halt and could even lead to cancellation of the Helsinki Conference. Faced with this dilemma, the Soviets performed a balancing act. Although they channeled funds to Cunhal’s PCP, they made their strongest declarations of support (which took the form of attacks on the Italian Communist party and its excessive commitments to electoral and parliamentary procedures) only after the tide appeared to have turned and the Portuguese Communists seemed likely to fail in their bid to seize power.\textsuperscript{99}

Although the Soviet leaders had reservations about the course of events in Portugal, they generally look favorably on any advance of Communist influence in a Western country that comes about in an orderly and nonprovocative way. The most recent edition of \textit{The World Communist Movement} notes that although the West European Communist parties suffered setbacks after the high hopes of the 1970s, developments of the past decade were on the whole positive. It notes that “in the 1970s . . . , the workers’ movement of West Europe, North America and Japan scored considerable successes, coming very close in a number of countries to formulation of the fundamental question—of power.”\textsuperscript{101} The class battles of this period are said to “go beyond the framework of the positional struggle, as it predominantly was in the 1950s–1960s, and are objectively acquiring a different, more profound and dynamic character.”\textsuperscript{102}

In view of the poor political prospects facing most of the West European Communist parties, such pronouncements seem wildly optimistic

\textsuperscript{98}In the course of the 1968 negotiations with the Dubček government, Brezhnev is reported to have told his Czechoslovakian interlocutors, “You are counting on the Communist movement in Western Europe, but that wont amount to anything for fifty years.” (Zdenek Mlynar, \textit{Night Frost in Prague}, C. Hurst, London, 1980, p. 241.)


\textsuperscript{101}MKD, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid.
and can be attributed in part to the ideologically determined need to maintain hope for Communist advances rather than to an objective assessment of trends in Europe. But they probably also reflect the Soviet view that while prospects for Communist revolution are remote in Western Europe, limited forms of power sharing cannot be ruled out and in fact have become more likely as a result both of international détente and domestic developments in particular countries. Soviet officials may believe that Communist participation in a Western government that creates a precedent or that in some way dilutes the sources of anti-Communism in the West eventually will benefit the Soviet Union. In this regard, it is worth noting that Soviet commentators invariably refer to the French Communist party's participation in the Mitterrand government in favorable terms, even though it probably helped to accelerate the electoral decline of the party and in any case ended prematurely in 1984 when the four Communist ministers left the government in a dispute over economic policy.

Short of actual participation in government, the West European Communist parties, in the Soviet view, have considerable potential to assume leadership positions in their national "peace" movements. In France, where the anti-missile movement has been relatively weak, the Communist party has been its principal supporter. In Italy, the party has given considerable support to Soviet "peace" campaigns, although it has been careful not to compromise its domestic base of support. In the Netherlands, the Communist party played a role vastly out of proportion to its electoral strength in launching the anti-"neutron bomb" campaign of 1977-1978. In West Germany, the numerically small DKP came to occupy as many as half the posts in the leadership of the peace movement.53 While recognizing these contributions, the Soviets remain unconvinced that some parties, especially the Italian, did everything in their power to block the NATO INF deployments. They also object when West European Communists equate Soviet with American or NATO armaments, as they occasionally have done.

Some of the tension in relations between the Soviet and West European Communist parties has arisen because of the self-serving Soviet demand that these parties subordinate their own electoral needs to the interests of Soviet foreign policy. Because they claim that the mere existence and growing might of the socialist camp contributes to the ultimate success of world Communist revolution, Soviet ideologists can

53This estimate was made by West German government officials. Peace movement leaders dispute the figure as too high, but are nonetheless concerned about Communist influence in the movement. For background on this issue, see Alexander R. Alexiev, The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy, Tactics, Means. The Rand Corporation, N-2290-AF, February 1985.
argue to the leaders of the West European Communist parties that "defense of peace," i.e., support for Soviet foreign policy, contributes as much or even more to the world revolutionary struggle than striving by electoral or other means to come to power in the domestic setting.

One indication of the importance for foreign policy the Soviets attribute to the international Communist movement is the continued Soviet interest in international and regional conferences of ruling and nonruling Communist parties. The Soviet leadership regards these conferences as useful platforms for launching important foreign-policy campaigns. In 1976, the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties marked the beginning of a campaign to press for "implementation" on Soviet terms of the Helsinki Final Act. In 1980, a meeting in Paris of the European Communist parties marked the start of the intense campaign against NATO's planned INF deployments.94 To convene the 1976 meeting, the Soviet Communist party was forced to make limited but nonetheless embarrassing concessions to other ruling and nonruling parties. The Soviets secured Romanian participation only by agreeing to a formulation in the final document that diluted the world Communist movement's traditional commitment to "proletarian internationalism." In 1980, the Soviets chose to go ahead with the meeting, which technically was sponsored by the French and Polish parties, even though the Italians refused to attend. Soviet willingness to endure setbacks within the international Communist movement to secure the participation of even some Communist parties in Soviet foreign-policy campaigns attests to the instrumental way the CPSU regards the nonruling parties and the importance it attaches to their agitational activities.95

The Soviet Communist party is now trying to generate support for a new international conference of Communist parties. At a 1984 theoretical conference in Prague, Boris Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary and head of the Central Committee International Department, stated that "the imperative of the present moment" was for the members of the international Communist movement to "formulate stances regularly and to agree on joint actions within the framework of

95It also attests to a Soviet hope that the semi-independence of the Western Communist parties will prove to be short-lived. Despite the concessions they were forced to make at the 1976 conference, Soviet officials subsequently claimed that "proletarian internationalism" had been reaffirmed. (See, for example, V. V. Zagladin, "Internationalism: borba za evropu mira i sozial'novo progressa," in Zagladin (ed.), Za evropu mira i progressa, Mezhunarodnye otnoshenia, Moscow, 1977, pp. 208-218.)
the movement. Ponomarev's suggestions were seconded by the Czechoslovakian Communist party and the hardliner Vasil Bilak. The Soviets and Czechoslovakians also have stepped up their criticisms of the Italian and French parties who "willy-nilly help the bourgeois and break the unity of the Communist movement." These calls for greater Communist cohesion on international issues have been accompanied by stepped-up attacks on the domestic strategies of the reformist Western Communist parties, particularly the Italian. These attacks have intensified despite the fact that the PCI has toned down its criticisms of the Soviet Union and all but eliminated the word "Eurocommunism" from its political vocabulary.

The increasingly harsh Ponomarev-Bilak line on the West European Communist parties suggests that the top officials of the International Department may be resigned to a protracted period of tensions with the West and therefore would like to create a smaller but more cohesive Communist movement that will be ready to adopt "principled" stances in rigorously defending the Soviet Union during this period. Unlike the 1976 conference, which was intended to celebrate Soviet diplomatic triumphs and push for "implementation" of new Soviet initiatives, the push for a new conference may reflect the "hunkering down" tendency of Soviet Communist officials in times of heightened international tension. This tendency runs directly counter to the interests of the Italian Communists, who would rather exploit concerns about peace in the West to build bridges to the West German and other Social Democratic parties.

The extent to which Soviet interest in maintaining the ideological and organizational purity of these parties reflects a desire to preserve them as the core of future Communist governments in Europe is difficult to judge, as is the more general question of how, if at all, Soviet analysts envision revolutionary seizures of power in the West. Soviet ideologues now discuss revolution in terms of a combination of internal and external factors and stress that in contemporary circumstances, "the significance of the external factor for the fate of each given revolution increases." The "external factor" is a code word for international conditions and, not least, for the external support the Soviet Union might render to local Communist parties trying to seize power. For a revolution to succeed, international conditions would have to be such as to preclude the "export of counterrevolution" by other Western countries. CPSU officials probably see such changes occurring in the distant future and only after the interstate "correlation of forces" has

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97 MKD, p. 30.
shifted much further to the advantage of the Soviet Union and the West European societies have been “democratized” by long processes of internal evolution.

TIES WITH THE NON-COMMUNIST LEFT

Soviet attitudes toward the West European Socialist and Social Democratic parties long have been characterized by a mix of ideologically based hostility and a pragmatic interest in cooperation for specific purposes. Soviet ideology continues to uphold the concept of an international workers’ movement that is united in its fundamental long-range objectives but that is presently split into Communist and non-Communist wings. The task for the Communist parties, which alone are said to have a Leninist insight into the class struggle and a principled commitment to the revolutionary transformation of society, is to serve as the “hegemon” of the revolutionary and progressive forces and to guide them toward the seizure of power.

After World War II, the Soviets actually engineered a merger of the German Communist party (which at that time was still a substantial political force even in the regions under American, British, and French occupation) and the Social Democratic party in the Soviet occupation zone, bringing into existence the Socialist Unity party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) that rules the GDR today. The Communists also created a Socialist Unity party in West Berlin. This party failed to attract the support of the local Social Democrats, however, who remained a part of the West German party. In Western Europe today, the Soviets are urging the local Communist parties to engage in various forms of “united action” with the Socialist and Social Democratic parties.

Although the myth of the potentially monolithic “working class” continues to play a role in Soviet behavior toward the non-Communist left in Western Europe, the real driving force behind Soviet policy toward the Socialist and Social Democratic parties since World War II has been foreign-policy considerations. In the 1950s, the Soviets adopted a position of unmitigated hostility toward West German Social Democracy, largely out of “defensive” concerns for Eastern Europe and the GDR. Far more than was the case with Adenauer’s westward-oriented CDU, the SPD was committed to the reunification of Germany and the SPD’s reestablishment as the dominant political party in the industrial regions of East Germany. From the Soviet perspective, Social Democracy’s popular appeal in East Germany reinforced the Adenauer government’s “position of strength” policy, which was
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premised on the eventual dismantling of Communist control in the GDR. Soviet hostility toward the SPD, particularly on the part of key ideologists such as Mikhail Suslov, was bolstered by the views of East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht, who not only had a vested interest in the stability of SED rule in East Germany but an intense personal dislike for the West German Social Democratic leaders, notably the ex-Communist (and therefore “renegade”) Herbert Wehner.

Even as they were attacking the SPD out of concern for its effect on stability in their own sphere of control, at least some Soviet leaders recognized the potential role the SPD could play in undermining American influence and the German role in NATO. Because of its commitment to reunification, the SPD had opposed West German participation in the European Defense Community, membership in NATO, and the first deployments of American tactical nuclear weapons in Germany. Some Soviet leaders opened lines of communication to the SPD. In 1959, for example, Khrushchev met with party leader Erich Ollenhauer in East Berlin.

For the most part, however, Soviet attitudes toward the SPD remained hostile. With the West enjoying a “position of strength” that Khrushchev was unable to change either by launching the 1958–1961 Berlin crisis or by placing offensive missiles in Cuba, there was no guarantee that political change in central Europe would not roll back Soviet positions in East Germany while consolidating the existing system in the West. Faced with the probability that change, if permitted, could occur on unfavorable terms, the Soviets devoted themselves to bolstering the stability and political legitimacy of East Germany. Soviet reactions to the “bridge-building” and “small steps” policies of the mid-1960s confirmed the primacy of “defensive” concerns in the early post-Khrushchev years.

By the late 1960s, Soviet policy toward the SPD was ripe for change. The erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 had not only helped to stabilize the GDR by halting the outflow of population, but had convinced Brandt, Bahr, and other West German Social Democrats that they had to modify their objectives with regard to the East and work with rather than against the Soviet and East German regimes. By the late 1960s, it was increasingly difficult for any CPSU official, no matter how suspicious of the Social Democrats he might be, to argue that a partial rapprochement with the SPD would undermine East Germany’s legitimacy and stability.38

38In his memoirs, Willy Brandt describes the impact of the Wall on his thinking. See People and Politics, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1976, pp. 13–41.
The decisive shift came in 1969, when Boris Ponomarev, Suslov's deputy and an influential Central Committee department head, partially revised the Soviet 1930s description of social democracy as "social fascism" and its designation as the main enemy of the working class. The warming trend in Soviet attitudes toward the SPD continued throughout 1969 and took on added significance in the fall of that year when the first SPD-FDP coalition government was elected to power in Bonn under the leadership of Brandt. From that time onward, Soviet-West German normalization at the state level was accompanied by a change in Soviet attitudes toward Western Social Democracy.

By the mid-1970s, Communist ideologues were elaborating the potential for increased party-to-party cooperation between the CPSU and the Social Democrats. In outlining the requirements for and objectives of successful party-level cooperation, Soviet sources began calling for "unity in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism." In Soviet usage, "peace," "democracy" and "socialism," which are always listed in that order, are loaded terms that require a note of explanation. The "struggle for peace" basically means support for Soviet foreign policy and opposition to NATO and all ties with the United States. By "democracy," Soviet writers mean a stage of development in which the "working class" and its "vanguard," the Communist party, have not yet seized power and begun to build socialism, but in which domestic sources of resistance to such a seizure have been severely weakened or even eliminated. These sources include such familiar Communist bétes noires as the military-industrial complex, large privately owned corporations, and ideologically motivated anti-Communism in academia and the press. "Democratized" societies, of which no real models can be said to exist (Finland comes closest to approximating a "democratized" society), will be "friendly" to the Soviet Union, although not on the same "class-based" grounds as the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. "Socialism" of course does not mean West European-style Social Democracy or even the more radical alternatives favored by the left wings of the Latin Socialist parties, but "scientific socialism" along Marxist-Leninist lines.

In the 1970s, Soviet writers started to claim that "peace" and "democracy" not only were ends for which the Communists and Social Democrats needed to "struggle," but that the "struggle" itself was a means by which the Communists could build bridges to the Social

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99See, for example, I. M. Krivoguz, Kommunisty i souremennaja sotsial-demokratija, Mysl', Moscow, 1975; and Ia. Golembewski, "Zapadnoevropeiskaja sotsial-demokratija v uslovijakh kritices kapitalizma," in Zagladin (ed.), Za etropus mira i progressa, pp. 172-186.
Democrats. Opposition to the American role in Vietnam, the overthrow of Allende in Chile, and U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe were prominent "peace" and "democracy" issues. But the high expectations of the early 1970s were dashed when the end of the Vietnam war and the waning of student unrest in Europe halted further radicalization of the Social Democratic parties.

However, new opportunities for cooperation of a different sort with the Social Democrats arose at the end of the decade as a result of the rise of international tensions and the increased saliency of arms control and the "peace" issue. In May 1978, Ponomarev attended a disarmament conference hosted by the Socialist International—the first time since the Bolshevik revolution that a representative of the CPSU had been invited to a meeting of the Second International. Ponomarev later wrote an article in Kommunist calling for the establishment of permanent CPSU-Social Democratic working groups in various countries.

The seriousness of Soviet efforts to work with the Social Democrats was underscored at the February 1981 26th CPSU Party Congress, where Brezhnev acknowledged that the Social Democrats had "considerable political weight" which they could use in "defending the vital interests of the peoples [and] above all in defending peace, restoring the international situation and rebuffing fascism and racism, as well as the offensive of reactionary forces against the political rights of workers." In July 1981, the Central Committee of the CPSU took the unprecedented step of making a formal offer of cooperation to the European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. The offer was made in the form of a long letter that was delivered by the Soviet ambassador in Rome to Bettino Craxi, the secretary of the Italian Socialist party (PSI). After reiterating Soviet positions at the Geneva INF negotiations and at the CSCE review conference in Madrid, the letter concluded: "We proffer our hand to the Socialists, Social Democrats and Laborites for a joint struggle aimed at freeing mankind from further wars of extermination and to salvage peace. To achieve these aims of vital importance to mankind, we are willing to cooperate with you in forms mutually acceptable to both sides." Among the forms of cooperation specifically mentioned in the letter were institutional contacts between the Socialist International's Advisory Council on Disarmament and Arms Control and the CPSU. Such contacts now have been established.

101 Pravda, February 24, 1981.
102 CPSU Addresses European Socialists," Avanti, July 5-6, 1981.
The CPSU's investment in building ties with the West European Social Democratic parties has given the USSR established channels of communication to these parties. These links are being forged at lower and more specialized levels. The editorial staff of *Die neue Gesellschaft*, the SPD's theoretical journal, has exchanged delegations with its CPSU Central Committee counterpart, *Kommunist*.\(^{103}\) The CPSU also appears to be encouraging the development of ties between the SPD and the East German SED. These ties achieved new prominence in June 1985, when the SPD and the SED announced that they were jointly offering a proposal for the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe.\(^{104}\)

In their policy toward the Social Democrats, the Soviets are sometimes uncertain about the relative priorities to assign to partially conflicting objectives. In the short run, they want to encourage the Social Democrats to oppose NATO policy. Over the long term, they want to build institutional and organizational links to these parties to create a permanent Soviet influence over the non-Communist left. Although they failed to block the INF deployments, Soviet leaders are gratified that the "struggle for peace" has helped to erode long-standing barriers to cooperation with the Communists erected by the Social Democrats in the cold war period. Within the West German peace movement, DKP-controlled fronts have been the strongest defenders of joint cooperation with mainstream and left-wing Social Democrats, in contrast to the Greens, who have tried to keep the SPD out of the peace movement through fear of cooptation. Meanwhile, for the first time since the late 1950s, local Social Democratic organizations are participating in the Communist-sponsored Easter marches. This increase in contacts and cooperation has led the West German Communists to conclude that the previous SPD policy of drawing a line between itself and the DKP has "fundamentally changed," a claim that is echoed by many Soviet commentators. CPSU officials now would like the small West European Communist parties to use their newly found prominence in the anti-INF struggle to increase their influence with West European workers. A 1983 editorial in *Kommunist* urged the West European Communists to link the "struggle for peace" with traditional working-class concerns such as jobs.\(^{105}\)

Despite rhetoric about common action on a range of issues, the Soviets are probably less interested in increasing Communist influence

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\(^{103}\) *Pravda*, November 4, 1984.


with the extreme left wings of these parties—an achievement that may be ideologically gratifying but is likely to yield few concrete dividends for Soviet foreign policy—than in assuring that these parties adopt positions on defense and foreign policy that cause difficulty for the United States. In an obvious attempt to increase their appeal to the Social Democratic parties, the Soviets are now adopting the SPD's concept of an East-West security community or partnership, as well as warming up to concrete initiatives such as the proposal for a central European nuclear-free zone.\(^{106}\)

Although the West German SPD is clearly the focus of Soviet policy toward the non-Communist left in Western Europe, the Soviets also see encouraging trends in other parties, including the Dutch Labor party, the Social Democratic parties of Britain,\(^{107}\) Denmark, and Sweden, the Flemish Socialist party, and the Norwegian Labor party. All of these parties reject the INF deployments and are highly critical of SDI.

Offsetting these favorable developments in northern Europe are trends in the Socialist parties of France and Italy that the Soviets regard as basically unfavorable. Under Craxi, the PSI has adopted openly anti-Soviet positions on many issues. The French Socialist party (PS) under Mitterrand also has been strongly anti-Soviet on many issues, as has the Portuguese Socialist party. The critical stance of most of the southern European socialist parties toward the Soviet Union is ironic in view of the earlier pattern of relations between these parties and the CPSU, which was far different from CPSU relations with the Social Democratic parties of the north.

But partly for domestic political considerations, i.e., competition with the Communists for dominance of the left, in the 1970s both the PS and the PSI decided to accentuate their foreign-policy differences with the Soviet Union and became more critical of Soviet policy and the Soviet domestic model than even some conservative and centrist parties in these countries. At the same time, these parties continued their cooperation with the Communists at home, the PSI in governing numerous Italian cities with the PCI, the PS in the 1972 Common Program with the PCF. The picture, then, was one of foreign-policy disagreement in the context of both domestic competition and limited domestic political cooperation.

In northern Europe, the pattern is almost exactly reversed. Despite the erosion of barriers to cooperation with the Communists in parties

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\(^{107}\) i.e., the British Labour party, which remains the British affiliate of the Second International, rather than the newly founded Social Democratic party (SDP).
such as the West German SPD, little Communist-Social Democratic cooperation at the local or national level has yet been or is likely to be achieved. Most northern Communist parties are in any case too small to offer much electoral or coalition support. On the foreign-policy level, however, the SPD and other Social Democratic parties of the North have become far less critical of the Soviet Union than they were in the past. As in France and Italy, Social Democratic attitudes toward the Soviet Union are determined largely by domestic politics. Whereas the PSI and PS regard anti-Sovietism as politically useful, the northern Social Democratic parties see political advantages in adopting strongly pro-détente and arms-control policies that lead them to support certain Soviet initiatives.

Soviet policy toward the West European trade unions is closely related to policy toward the political parties of the non-Communist left, most of which have formal and informal ties to their national trade union movements. Since the late 1940s and the breakup of the West European trade union movement into free and Communist-dominated wings, Soviet influence in the West European trade union movement has been limited. France and Italy, where the majority of the trade union movement remained allied with the national Communist parties and affiliated with the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), were significant exceptions to the general pattern.

With the onset of détente, Soviet trade unions began making strenuous efforts to build links to the non-WFTU trade unions of the West. These efforts sought to capitalize on the same set of factors that attracted CPSU apparatchiks to cooperate with the Social Democrats: the radicalization of a small portion of the non-Communist left and the increased interest of the left as a whole in a dialogue with the Soviet Union centered on “peace” issues.

Far-left trade unions that have attracted Soviet interest include the British miners and the West German printers, both of which have dismantled the barriers to cooperation with Communists that were erected in the early postwar period. During the 1984–1985 coal strike in Britain, Soviet trade unions provided substantial financial aid to the striking British miners, who were portrayed in the Soviet press as victims of the worst excesses of contemporary capitalism. In October 1984, Aleksandr Belousov, a secretary of the Soviet coal miners’ union, announced that the Soviet Union was planning to embargo fuel supplies to Britain in support of the strike. After protests from the
British government, the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry denied that there had been any decision to embargo Britain.\footnote{Bohdan Nahaylo, "Gorbachev’s Visit to London and the Elusive Anglo-Soviet Thaw," \textit{Radio Liberty Research}, RL 449/84, November 26, 1984, pp. 5–6.}

In addition to proposing across-the-board cooperation with the far-left trade unions, the Soviets are trying to build cooperation with moderate trade unions by focusing on the “peace” issue. For example, in early 1984, the national secretary of the British Transport and General Workers’ Union, which represents, among others, Britain’s construction workers, received a letter from Igor Lanskin, head of the Soviet Building Materials Industry Workers’ Union, outlining “concrete proposals on expansion of anti-war collaboration between trade unions of the socialist, capitalist and developing countries.” Lanskin’s letter alleged that America was intransigent in the face of constructive Soviet proposals and argued that military spending led to a curtailment of construction and increased unemployment in the building trades.\footnote{John Ardill, “Challenge the Kremlin” advice by TGWU to Russian union,” \textit{The Guardian}, January 10, 1984.}

The Soviets have also invited numerous other Western trade unions to participate in various peace forums in Moscow and other cities.\footnote{See S. Shaiaev, "Sovetskie profsoiuzny v borbe za mir (Soviet Trade Unions and the Struggle for Peace),” \textit{Kommunist}, No. 5, 1984.}

Despite these initiatives from the Soviet side, cooperation with the West European trade unions is likely to yield limited foreign-policy dividends for the Soviet Union. Many of the free West European trade unions are considerably more anti-Soviet and pro-NATO than the national Socialist and Social Democratic parties. Moreover, the reaction of the West European trade unions to the outlawing of Solidarity has actually hardened attitudes toward the Soviet Union in the international trade union movement and has led to conflicts with the Soviet and East European trade unions in the International Labor Organization (ILO).

**PEACE CAMPAIGNS**

The Soviet leadership was surprised and gratified by the success of the 1977–1978 anti-“neutron bomb” campaign and the explosive growth of the West European peace movement following NATO’s 1979 dual-track decision. But having failed to foresee the potential of the peace movement in the late 1970s, the Soviets made the opposite mistake in 1983 and overestimated the strength of the anti-missile movement and its prospects for blocking the INF deployments.
Soviet failures to correctly assess the peace movement and its prospects for success may derive in part from the Marxist-Leninist framework, which has difficulty categorizing and explaining the behavior of mass movements that do not have a distinct and well-defined "class" base of support. These difficulties were compounded by Moscow's apparent indecision about the prime Soviet objectives in dealing with the peace movement. Some Soviet statements assigned priority to the immediate goal of blocking the INF deployments, whereas others placed greater emphasis on using the peace movement to build lasting sources of support for the Soviet Union in Western Europe. When the peace movement suddenly burst upon the scene, the Soviets immediately set about adapting the almost moribund front organizations that had been established in the 1950s to the task of penetrating and influencing the new mass movement, even though this helped to discredit the movement in the eyes of some members.\textsuperscript{111}

At present, the Soviets see fewer opportunities for working within and through the mass demonstrations that were frequent in Europe in the early part of the decade. They also have encountered more criticism of their own military programs and more resistance to organizational penetration of the peace movement in recent years. Prominent movement leaders such as E. P. Thompson in Britain and Alfred Mechtersheimer in Germany have spoken out against Soviet weaponry and have questioned Soviet motives. In any case, mass demonstrations have died out, at least for now, as the chief form of "peace" protest in Western Europe. In response to these trends, the Soviets have shifted attention to smaller but potentially influential special groups, placing particular emphasis on religious groups and the scientific community.\textsuperscript{112} Working with these more select elements in the "peace movement" has required changes in tactics and greater subtlety than was evident in Soviet policy during the period of mass demonstrations. Leading Soviet religious organizations, especially the Moscow Patriarchate, have been given added responsibilities in working with their counterparts in the West, as has the Soviet scientific community. The latter is particularly important in the anti-SDI campaign, where members of the Soviet Academy of Science are playing an active role.


\textsuperscript{112}See L. Istinin, "Konfessional'nye organizatsii FRG v antivoennom dvizhenii (FRG Religious Organizations in the Antiwar Movement)," \textit{MEIMO}, No. 12, 1983.
PROPAGANDA AND THE PRESS

Western Europe has always been a primary target of Soviet foreign propaganda. Until the mid-1970s, Soviet propaganda efforts in the region relied chiefly on traditional instruments: weekly and monthly foreign-language periodicals, press releases from TASS, shortwave radio broadcasts, cultural exhibits, and cooperation from the Western European Communist press. While continuing to use these instruments, Soviet propagandists have taken advantage of détente and its subsequent breakdown to increase the quantity and improve the quality of their access to all sectors of the West European public. The Soviets have profited from a general receptiveness in Western Europe to at least hearing, if not accepting, “the Soviet point of view” on major issues. They also have taken advantage of the opportunities for communication generated by the increased role of the Soviet Union in Western European affairs (trade, arms control, and so forth).

The Soviets are able to take advantage of this newly acquired access to the Western media largely because of the efforts of a group of high- and middle-level officials who can speak effectively to Western audiences. This group includes Valentin Falin, Georgi Arbatov, Vadim Zagladin, Nikolai Portugalov, and Genrikh Trofimenko. Since the mid-1970s, these officials have made frequent appearances on West European radio and television, given background briefings to Western reporters, and conducted interviews in prominent non-Communist media such as West Germany’s Der Spiegel and Italy’s La Repubblica.113 The Soviets also have improved the quality and increased the accessibility of Novosti (APN) press releases for publication in the Western press. These releases usually are identified as unofficial expressions of the Soviet view and appear even in such conservative publications as the London Times.

These open and entirely above-board efforts to promote Soviet positions by working through the independent West European press have been supplemented by a range of other attempts to pressure, deceive, or, it is sometimes alleged, even gain outright control of sections of the West European press.

In Greece, alleged Soviet efforts to tamper with the news media have become the subject of a widely publicized court case and a heated political debate centered on Ethnos, Greece’s best-selling daily newspaper. In a book published in 1983, Cypriot journalist Paul Anastasiades charged that Ethnos, which adopts the position of the Soviet

113 For a study of these interviews, see John Van Ouderen, Interviews by Soviet Officials in the Western Media: Two Case Studies, The Rand Corporation, R-3328-FY/RC, October 1985.
government on most issues and persistently attacks NATO and the United States, was launched by the KGB in 1951. Working through Greek Communists and companies controlled by them that conduct trade with the East, the KGB is alleged to have funneled money to Ethnos, enabling it to expand popular features such as photographs, sports, and serials.\textsuperscript{114}

"Active measures," which are believed to be the work of the KGB, are another instrument by which the Soviet Union seeks to influence the content of the Western press. In November 1981, Spanish journalists received copies of a forged letter purporting to have been sent by President Reagan to the King of Spain urging a crackdown on pacifists and the left-wing opposition. Copies of the forgery were later circulated to delegations at the Madrid CSCE follow-up conference. In November 1981, shortly after the grounding of the Whiskey-class submarine near Karlskrona in Sweden, journalists in Washington received mailgrams offering to make available the text of an alleged secret agreement concerning U.S. use of Karlskrona for intelligence purposes. In July 1983, the Rome left-wing weekly Pace e Guerra published forged U.S. embassy telegrams proposing a large-scale disinformation effort aimed at implicating the Soviet and Bulgarian secret services in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II. Earlier that year, a forged letter, ostensibly from AFL-CIO official Irving Brown to Luigi Scricciolo, an Italian labor official, surfaced in a Sicilian paper. This forgery purported to show that Scricciolo, who had earlier admitted to being an agent for Bulgarian intelligence, was really a CIA agent who had funneled American money to Solidarity.\textsuperscript{115} The West German Interior Ministry has revealed that Soviet forgers have manufactured documents intended to discredit Chancellor Kohl and Franz-Josef Strauss, the leader of the Bavarian CSU. The Ministry also reports that Soviet agents were responsible for a letter purporting to be from the U.S. Department of Commerce asking West German companies to disclose details concerning their technology exports to Eastern bloc states.\textsuperscript{116} These "active measures" are considered by experts to be less effective in Western Europe, where the news media are generally too

\textsuperscript{114}\textsuperscript{114} Further details of the Soviet connection emerged when Ethnos brought a criminal libel suit against Anastasiades. Ethnos won this suit, but the government of Greece commuted Anastasiades' two-year prison sentence. Ethnos did not dispute the substance of most of the charges in Anastasiades' book. (See "The Anastasi Affair" (editorial), The New York Times, January 21, 1984; and Heiko Flottau, "Who Directs the Voice of the People?" Sudddeutsche Zeitung, January 9, 1985.)

\textsuperscript{115}\textsuperscript{115} U.S. Department of State, Soviet Active Measures, September 1983; and Soviet Active Measures: An Update, July 1982.

\textsuperscript{116}\textsuperscript{116} Reported by the West German news agency Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), February 1, 1985.
sophisticated to accept improbable-sounding stories without independent verification, than they are in other parts of the world.

In addition to increasing their access to the non-Communist media in the West, the Soviets are trying, so far with little success, to pressure Western governments, news organizations, and individual journalists to curtail unfavorable reporting of the Soviet Union and its policies. Throughout Western Europe, protests by Soviet embassies about particular items in state-owned and privately owned media have become routine. Except in Finland, where the media practice self-censorship on matters pertaining to the Soviet Union, these pressures have yielded few results. They are worth noting, however, for what they say about long-term Soviet objectives, which clearly go beyond traditional sphere-of-influence politics.

In December 1982, the Soviet embassy in Paris sent letters to the directors general of French radio and television and to the editors of several French newspapers to protest speculation in the French media about an alleged Bulgarian role in the attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II. These letters asked the French media to publish or broadcast the full text of TASS’s statement on the “Bulgarian connection.” In October 1984, Boris Pankin, the Soviet ambassador to Sweden, lodged an official protest with the Swedish Foreign Ministry against publication of a book outlining Soviet espionage activities in Sweden. Pankin characterized the book, which was written by a former Communist, as full of “slanderous lies.” In early 1985, the Soviet embassy in Paris lodged an official protest with the French External Relations Ministry about a story in the weekly L’Express that had identified the top KGB resident in France and described his activities. In April of the same year, the Soviet embassy in Paris issued a statement protesting the failure of the French government to censure a program produced by French actor Yves Montand that portrayed a hypothetical Soviet attack on Western Europe.

In a few cases, evidence suggests that either direct Soviet pressure or fear of Soviet retaliatory action have prompted local, if not national, governments to withhold mention of incidents involving the Soviet Union. For example, in January 1984, Amsterdam narcotics officials confiscated 6,000 kilograms of hashish and marijuana from the Soviet freighter Alexander Putyd. Dutch journalists have alleged that municipal officials in Amsterdam, eager to secure an agreement with the

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Soviets to ship pipe through the port, worked to keep any mention of a Soviet role out of the press. On balance, however, neither direct pressure by the Soviets nor fear of Soviet reprisals has affected the content of most European reporting.

ECONOMIC TIES

General Objectives

In its economic dealings with Western Europe, the Soviet Union pursues both economic and political objectives. In the economic realm, the Soviets use trade to close gaps in domestic production, reap the advantages of the "international division of labor," and obtain Western technology by both legal and illegal means. In the political realm, the Soviets are interested in using trade to support their overall diplomacy toward Western Europe (in Soviet parlance, to "strengthen the material basis of détente"), foster divisions within the Atlantic alliance, and subsidize local Communist parties.

Soviet policymakers recall that until the 1960s, many West European political leaders regarded trade as a privilege rather than a right—one that Western governments often denied the Soviet Union because of particular actions or more generally because of its continued occupation of Eastern Europe. In 1963, Chancellor Adenauer tried to block a sale of American and German wheat to the Soviet Union, asserting that grain should be delivered "only if Russia was willing to pay a political price—the destruction of the Berlin Wall." In 1965, Fritz Erler, the floor leader of the SPD delegation in the West German Bundestag, wrote that "credits to the Soviet Union are equivalent to development aid without political dividends, and should not be given without [obtaining] political advantages." In addition, until well into the 1960s, the United States had the economic leverage and political prestige to severely affect the character and level of Western Europe's economic ties with the East.

123 Section 117 (d) ("the Mundt amendment") of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 directed the administrator of the Marshall plan to refuse delivery of any aid commodity that would "go into the production of any commodity for delivery to any non-participating European country which commodity would be refused export licenses to those countries by the United States in the interest of national security." The Battle Act
In the course of the 1960s, the West European states gradually abandoned most attempts to link trade with Soviet political behavior. With the exception of the sale of military technology, West European governments now are opposed to systematic discrimination against the Soviet Union on general political or ideological grounds. They are not entirely opposed to economic sanctions in response to specific Soviet actions (e.g., the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the imposition of martial law in Poland), but they believe that sanctions do little to influence Soviet behavior.

While much discussion in the West has focused on the differences between Western Europe and the United States in their approach to East-West trade, technology transfer, and credit, less attention has been paid to how the Soviets have interpreted the change in Western attitudes toward trade that occurred with the onset of détente. In economic terms, the change in Western policy is probably seen in Moscow less as a "gain" for the Soviet Union than as a cessation of Western efforts to impose certain "losses" on the Soviets for political purposes. But the change in Western and especially West European policy on dealing with the Soviet Union was politically important in the eyes of the Soviet leadership. By the early 1970s, the Soviets had obtained assured access to the Western-dominated trading and financial system without having made concessions on territorial, political, or human rights issues. Soviet negotiators now can assume that East-West antagonisms will in no way affect the outcome of commercial negotiations involving Europe. In the course of negotiating a 1984 Eurodollar loan, Soviet bankers argued that they should not have to borrow money at rates of interest higher than those offered Belgium or Algeria.124 The very fact that Soviet negotiators chose to put forward this kind of argument attests to their confidence that commercial criteria (under which the Soviet Union probably does compare favorably with Belgium and Algeria) rather than political or alliance considerations will determine the terms of East-West trade.

The abandonment of policies that were intended to force the Soviet Union to pay extraordinary economic and political costs for its access to the Western-dominated trade and financial system ushered in an era in which the West European governments actually began to subsidize the Soviet economy on a modest scale. Because all Western countries

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subsidize export credits and because the EC heavily subsidizes its exports of agricultural products, a decision not to discriminate against the USSR is in effect a decision to grant it access to these subsidies on an equal basis. The West German government argues that unlike many other West European countries, it does not offer subsidized credits to the Soviet Union. But the government-controlled Hermes export insurance agency guarantees credits to the Soviet Union in the same way that it does for all German export customers. To eliminate these guarantees, which amount to a subsidy indirectly paid to the Soviet Union by competing borrowers, would require Hermes to discriminate against the USSR in a way that the West German government does not now see as desirable.

Other European governments go beyond the West Germans and make available to their export banks direct subsidies that enable them to offer the Soviets credit at below-market rates of interest. The level of subsidized credits was highest from 1975 to 1980, when the United Kingdom and Italy provided the USSR with subsidized lines of credit.125 These credits were not renewed in 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (However, in 1980, France signed a five-year agreement with the USSR to provide credits at “most favorable rates.”) The July 1982 OECD decision to reclassify the USSR from Category II (intermediate) to Category I (relatively rich) in the OECD’s roster of borrowers was another action intended to lessen the credit subsidy to the USSR.126

The Soviets obtain most of their meat and grain imports from low-cost suppliers outside Europe and have resisted pressures from the West Europeans—notably the French—to increase imports of European grain just for the sake of bringing bilateral trade accounts into balance. But as European surpluses mount against the backdrop of a strong U.S. dollar, the Soviet Union is steadily increasing its purchases of grain from Western Europe. This includes not only the EC, but Sweden and Austria as well. In addition, Soviet importing firms have taken advantage of the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy and the huge surpluses it generates by purchasing 200,000 tons of butter from EC

125For estimates of the magnitude of the credit subsidy, see Daniel F. Kohler, et al., Economic Costs and Benefits of Subsidizing Western Credits to the East, The Rand Corporation, R-3128-USDP, July 1984. Kohler calculated Western (including Americas and Japanese) credit subsidies to the East as a whole to be $3 billion in 1981.

warehouses at extremely low prices as well as low-priced European wine, beef, and veal.\textsuperscript{127}

In addition to benefiting from credit and agricultural subsidies, the Soviets have reaped the benefits of a favorable shift in their terms of trade with Western Europe that resulted primarily from the oil price explosions of the 1970s. (This shift has now been partially reversed as energy prices have dropped.) The Soviets also benefited from the worldwide recession and the resulting overcapacity in many European industries that made firms eager to sell to the Soviet Union, like other export markets, at highly favorable prices.\textsuperscript{128} In negotiating contracts for the Urengoi pipeline, Soviet traders managed to play competing firms against each other to obtain highly competitive prices. In 1984, Franz-Josef Weisweiler, the chief executive of Mannesmann AG, the major supplier of large-diameter pipe to the Soviet Union, admitted that in order to keep its plants running, his company had been forced to take orders from the Soviet Union and China at prices significantly below its average production costs.\textsuperscript{129}

As noted, the one remaining exception to the West European policy of not discriminating against the USSR in economic matters concerns the transfer of military technology, which the members of COMC have agreed to restrict. However, the European governments claim that American definitions of dual-use technologies—i.e., those technologies that can be used for both military and civilian purposes—that should appear on COMC lists are far too broad. No doubt recognizing the potential for sowing alliance discord on this issue, the Soviets have now mounted a highly vocal campaign against COMC.

In the course of his January 1985 trade mission to West Germany, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei K. Antonov held out the prospect of huge new contracts for German industry, but stressed that COMC regulations were an unacceptable political hindrance to "normal" trade. It has also been reported that Soviet trading organizations have been instructed by the Central Committee to reduce business with companies that too strongly abide by COMC restrictions.\textsuperscript{130} During his visit to Britain in late 1984, Gorbachev went even further than Antonov by alleging that "the policy of embargoes and sanctions to


\textsuperscript{130}Frederick Kempe, "Moscow's Bid to Close Technology Gap Will Test Gorbachev," \textit{The Wall Street Journal}, June 6, 1985.
which some people resort from time to time is frankly aimed not only against the socialist countries. It is also intended to weaken competitors, including some in Western Europe.” The view that the United States is restricting technology to hinder West European competitors (which would seem to be called into question by the fact that the American business community, the alleged beneficiary of these restrictions, is often opposed to them) is popular in Western Europe and for that reason is being amplified by the Soviets.

Although the Soviets may genuinely fear that U.S.-imposed restrictions will curtail their access to key technologies, many factors suggest that the campaign against COCOM is inspired as much by political as by economic motives. Most of the equipment that the Soviets want to buy is not on the COCOM lists. In Britain, from which the Soviet Union obtains only about 4 percent of its imported Western technology, comments such as those by Gorbachev and those in the glowing April 1985 Pravda article on Britain would appear to be intended to capitalize on local resentment of U.S. policy rather than to gain access to particular technologies. Soviet complaints about the effects of COCOM on trade with West Germany, which provides the USSR with over 30 percent of its imported Western technology, may be motivated more by genuine concern. But even in Germany, the Soviets are trying to capitalize politically on the technology transfer issue, which leading Social Democrats have sought to dramatize for domestic political purposes.

Bilateral Economic Links

For political and economic reasons, Soviet interests are best served by conducting trade and other forms of economic cooperation with Western Europe primarily on a bilateral basis. Bilateralism undercuts West European political unity and gives the Soviet Union opportunities to play national industries against each other in the competition for Soviet contracts.

As in the political realm, the Soviet Union has worked to place its bilateral economic relations with the West European states on an institutionalized basis that in form varies little from country to country. The elements of Soviet-West European institutionalized economic cooperation include:

1. Long-term trade agreements, supplemented by trade protocols at periodic intervals.
2. Formal industrial cooperation agreements.
3. General and specialized economic commissions, usually composed of a mix of government and nongovernment representatives on both the Soviet and Western sides.

Although this institutional apparatus has some effect on the way trade is conducted, it is important mainly for political reasons. From the Soviet perspective, it serves as an economic counterpart to the institutionalized political cooperation that has developed in Europe since the mid-1960s. Within the context of this formal set of economic relations, Soviet trade negotiators strike deals largely on the basis of commercial criteria, as do their West European counterparts.

The Soviets also see long-term trade agreements as symbolizing the Soviet Union's commitment to permanently peaceful relations with the capitalist West. Soviet negotiators have proposed, although they have never successfully concluded, agreements intended to last as long as 40 years. In 1978, they concluded a 25-year treaty with West Germany, although economists and businessmen generally agree that 25-year agreements are utterly meaningless in economic terms. In any case, these long-term agreements must be supplemented by shorter-range trade protocols that must in turn be followed by negotiations between Western firms and Soviet trading organizations before a single unit of currency or ton of commodity is exchanged. To the extent that they are able, Soviet negotiators try to make bilateral trade protocols coincide with the USSR's five-year plan periods. This strategy may help Soviet economic administrators somewhat, but is probably also important for symbolic reasons, in that it implies Western recognition of the special requirements of the centrally planned economies and a willingness to adjust to them.

The industrial cooperation agreements, which mainly consist of long lists of industrial branches in which the two sides agree to work together, are supposed to give political impetus not only to trade but to more comprehensive forms of cooperation such as the development of energy resources, joint research and development activities, and infrastructural projects. The first such agreement was the 1972 FRG-Soviet Long-Term Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, which called for the establishment of joint industrial complexes, the modernization of individual industrial enterprises, and the exchange of patents, licenses, and technical documentation. It also established the Soviet-West German mixed commission. In the course of the 1970s, the Soviets concluded similar agreements with other West European countries.
The mixed commissions, most of which were set up under provisions of trade and industrial cooperation agreements, bring together representatives of government and industry from both sides. Soviet representatives of industry are usually officials of industrial ministries, employees of foreign-trade organizations, or members of the Soviet State Committee on Science and Technology. Western participants are usually representatives of individual firms or of business groups such as the Confederation of British Industry.\textsuperscript{132} The importance of the mixed commissions varies from country to country, depending upon the relationship between government and industry. In France, where government and industry work closely together (especially now that much of French industry is nationalized), the mixed commissions have a strong influence on policy. The kinds of mixed commissions established sometimes reflect national industrial specialities; Greece and the Soviet Union, for example, have a commission for merchant shipping, as well as for economic and industrial cooperation.\textsuperscript{133}

Irrespective of the actual volume of trade between the Soviet Union and a particular West European country, Soviet policymakers regard the institutional structure that governs economic relations as politically valuable in itself. In a study of Soviet-Finnish economic relations, two high-ranking Soviet trade officials welcomed what they called the “politicalization of economic relations and the ‘economization’ of political relations” that has occurred between the Soviet Union and Finland.\textsuperscript{134} By the “economization of politics,” these officials mean the creation of permanent structures of functional cooperation that they believe constrain the ability of Western governments to take certain political actions. By the “politicalization of economics,” they mean intervention by Western governments in the affairs of private organizations to provide an administrative stimulus for economic ties with the East.

Although most West European countries stop well short of Finland in mixing politics with economics, Soviet negotiators have tried to inject a political note in the joint communiqués that are issued after sessions of the mixed commissions. Many of these communiqués affirm that the sides regard East-West trade as a contributor to


\textsuperscript{133}The Soviet-Greek maritime commission is important as a forum in which the Soviet Union has lobbied Greece to oppose protectionist measures by the EC against competition from Soviet merchant shipping. (See Tu Nea, October 11, 1984.)

\textsuperscript{134}A. N. Manzhulo and Ju. E. Piskulov in \textit{Finnish-Soviet Economic Relations}, a book jointly produced by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and IMEMO. This account is based on a review in \textit{Hufvudstadbladet}, January 11, 1984.
détente and international friendship. In some cases, notably those involving the Soviet-West German mixed commissions, Western businessmen refuse to accept inclusion of such broadly political language, and agree only to a mutual reaffirmation of the economic advantages of economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{135}

**Policy Toward the European Community**

The Soviet Union pursues a two-pronged policy toward the EC. On the one hand, it uses every means at its disposal to limit the Community's further development and to negate its political importance. Ultimately, the Soviet Union would like to see the Community dissolved into its constituent national parts or absorbed into a larger pan-European economic grouping. Underpinning this negative side of Soviet policy is a principled, ideologically based refusal to accept the Community on the grounds that it is a closed economic bloc, dominated by the "monopolies" and directed against the working class of the member states and the countries of the Soviet bloc.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union recognizes the reality of the Community's existence and deals with it in certain limited ways. Its purpose in doing so is to influence, if possible, the Community's future development, enhance Soviet control over contacts between the EC and the countries of Eastern Europe, and protect Soviet economic interests when doing so absolutely requires dealing with the Community. In undertaking these limited contacts, the Soviet Union is careful never to compromise its principled rejection of the Community—especially its pretensions to political supranationality.

The negative thrust of Soviet policy toward the EC consists of the following elements:

1. Refusal to accord diplomatic recognition to the Community.
2. Persistent efforts to undercut the Community's supranational competence in matters pertaining to foreign trade.
3. An ongoing campaign in the CSCE process to upgrade the status of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe at the expense of the Community and to introduce into CSCE concluding documents wording that can be interpreted as invalidating the Community's common external tariff and its overall trade policy.
4. Opposition to any enlargement of the Community.

5. Strict limitation of Finland’s ties with the Community.
6. Exertion of pressures on the other European neutrals—Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland—to limit their contacts with the Community.
7. Efforts to sever all legal, political, and institutional connections between the Community and West Berlin.
8. Exertion of pressure on third world states to shun formal cooperation with the EC under the Lome Convention.

Unlike the United States, Japan, China, and most other countries, the Soviet Union has no ambassador accredited to the Community in Brussels. In 1975, Aldo Moro signed the Helsinki Final Act in his capacity as Prime Minister of Italy and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, a fact which is sometimes acknowledged in Soviet scholarly works.\(^{106}\) But in general, the Soviet government withholds any formal acknowledgment of the special status of the EC Council Chairman. It has even less to do with the Community’s Commission, which the Soviets see as the embodiment of supranationality. Here too, however, exceptions are made when economic or political necessity dictates. From 1974 to 1976, the Soviet Ministry of Fisheries negotiated with the Commission on Soviet access to fishing grounds in EC waters, responsibility for which the members had transferred to the Community. Although the Soviet approach to the Commission was hailed in Western Europe as a potential breakthrough, Soviet behavior in the negotiations soon dispelled these hopes. The Soviets were unwilling to sign an agreement that included the name “European Community” and opposed the inclusion of a Berlin clause in the proposed agreement. In the end, the negotiations broke down.

The Soviets would like to undercut the “subregional” cohesion of the Community both by dealing directly with EC members on a bilateral basis and by trying to impose certain pan-European norms derived from CSCE. Under the terms of the Treaty of Rome, the members of the EC agreed to transfer exclusive responsibility for tariffs, quotas, and import levies to the Community by January 1, 1975. In theory, this transfer of jurisdiction, which occurred as scheduled, meant that Soviet trade negotiators would have to deal with the Community rather than with national governments. In practice, however, the Soviet Union has continued to negotiate bilateral cooperation agreements with EC member states. The line between those forms of cooperation that remain under national jurisdiction, and matters such as tariffs and quotas, which are integral to the Community’s trade policy, is vague.

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\(^{106}\)E.g., Kniazhinsky, *West European Integration*, p. 283.
enough to permit the Soviets opportunities to negotiate agreements
with member states that in the view of some observers, including at
times the Commission, undercut EC competence.

In the Basket Two (economic) negotiations at CSCE, the Soviet
Union's top priority was to secure a multilateral affirmation of the
most favored nation (MFN) principle and the need for "equality" in
international economic relations. MFN was resisted by representa-
tives of the EC countries, who argued that trade matters were under
the Community's jurisdiction, which could not be superseded by CSCE.137
Nonetheless, the Soviets achieved a limited success by negotiating a
clause in the Final Act stating that the participants "recognize the
beneficial effects which can result for the development of trade from
the application of most favored nation treatment." Soviet trade ne-
gotiators frequently appeal to this clause in arguing that Community pol-
icy on quotas and tariffs is in violation of the Helsinki agreement. The
Soviets also claim that the Helsinki agreement prohibits restrictions on
trade with the East, and find some support for this view among
influential West European political leaders.138

In the CSCE negotiations, the Soviets also explored the possibility
of transforming the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
into a pan-European forum that might eventually play a role in bring-
ing together CMEA and the EC (as well as the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA)) on terms favorable to the Soviet Union. The
ECE, which is mentioned 13 times in the Helsinki Final Act (the EC
and CMEA are not mentioned at all), was assigned new responsibili-
ties, most of which relate to exchange of economic data, by CSCE.
After the conclusion of the Helsinki conference, Brezhnev proposed
convening all-European energy, environment, and transport confer-
ences under ECE auspices.139 Despite these efforts, the ECE remains a
politically moribund organization that is likely to be influenced by
rather than exercise influence on the EC.

In addition to limiting its own dealings with the Community, the
Soviet Union exerts pressures on third countries to act likewise. In the

138For example, according to Horst Ehrke of the SPD, "it would be good if those who
are today pleading in favor of restricting trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern
European countries took a careful look at the CSCE agreements of Helsinki and Madrid.
We cannot constantly accuse the Soviet Union of violating CSCE principles if we are not
ourselves willing to implement what we agreed to in the CSCE framework." ("Europe's
Technological Self-assertion," speech delivered in the Hague, May 24, 1986.)
139See Ilka Bailey-Wiesbecke and Evgeny Chossudovksy, "Folgewirkungen der KSZE
im multilateralen Bereich: Die Wirtschaftskommission der Vereinten Nation fuer
Europe (ECE)," in Jost Delbrueck, et al., Gruenbuch zu den Folgewirkungen der KSZE,
1960s, the Soviets objected to Finland's joining EFTA, fearing that this could become a step toward closer Finnish integration in a West European "subregional" economic grouping. The Soviets eventually acquiesced in Finland's becoming an associate member of EFTA, but made clear that closer ties with EFTA or with the EC would not be tolerated. In 1973, Finland became the first non-Communist country to sign a treaty with CMEA, the text of which paralleled the draft treaty that CMEA later presented to the EC. The Soviets have since promoted Finland's ties with CMEA as a model for other West European countries.\footnote{See Ilkka Tapiola, "Co-operation between Finland and the CMEA, 1973–1977," Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 1977, pp. 49–51.} The Soviets also have used their bilateral ties with member countries to lobby against enlargement of the Community. In his meetings in 1980 with President Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt, Brezhnev is said to have insisted that Spain not enter the EC (or NATO).\footnote{See Pierre Hassner, "Moscow and the Western Alliance," Problems of Communism, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1981), p. 51.}

As it frequently does on many issues, the Soviet Union tries to have it both ways on the issue of the Community's relevance for the East-West military competition. The Soviet Union counts on the support of EC members Denmark, Greece, and neutral Ireland to limit the Community's involvement in security matters, including defense industrial cooperation. At the same time, the Soviets have argued forcefully to nonmember states such as Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland that because of the Community's alleged closeness to NATO, formal cooperation with it constitutes a breach of these countries' neutrality. The Soviet government expressed satisfaction in 1971 when Prime Minister Olof Palme declared that EC membership would be inconsistent with Sweden's neutrality. The Soviets also argue that ties of any kind between Austria and the Community not only would represent a breach of Austrian neutrality, but would lead to a German-Austrian Anschluss that is proscribed under the terms of the 1955 treaty.\footnote{See N. Polyakov, "Austria, Neutrality, Europe," International Affairs, No. 9, 1973; and G. Rozanov, "Austria: Twenty Years of Independent and Democratic Development," ibid., No. 7, 1975.} Soviet protests have not succeeded in forcing the Austrians, who have a bilateral free-trade agreement with the EC, to limit their dealings with the Community, but they probably have encouraged the Austrians to strive for greater "evenhandedness" in their dealings...
with the East by, for example, reacting positively to Soviet and CMEA initiatives.\textsuperscript{143} The Soviet government has protested the establishment of EC offices in West Berlin and participation by its people in elections to the European Parliament. In July 1976, when the West German delegation to the EC Council announced that Berlin would elect three deputies who would sit with the West German parliamentary group, the Soviet Foreign Ministry addressed a formal protest to the American, British, and French ambassadors in Moscow, claiming that West German actions with respect to Berlin constituted a "crude violation" of the Quadripartite Agreement.\textsuperscript{144} The Western powers rejected these protests, however, and West Berlin continues to share all the benefits accorded by West German membership in the Community. In the third world, Angola and Mozambique reportedly decided not to adhere to the 1979 Lome-2 Convention because doing so would entail recognizing West Berlin as part of the Community and would thereby displease the Soviet Union and East Germany. However, in December 1984, Mozambique decided to adhere to Lome-3, and Angola followed suit in April 1985.\textsuperscript{145}

Largely because efforts to undercut the Community have been unsuccessful, the Soviet Union has been forced to accord a grudging recognition to its existence and to adopt policies that might provide for some Soviet influence over the Community's external ties and its...

\textsuperscript{143} In a 1984 radio interview, Austrian President Rudolf Kirchschläger claimed that in his view there was a connection between Austria's links with the EC and the refusal of the USSR to revise its stance on missiles for the Austrian armed forces. According to Kirchschläger, "The fact that we were not allowed to have missiles was, shall we say, a punishment, or we might call it a compensatory reaction by the Soviet Union, for our EEC negotiations. As far as the interpretation of the various restrictions contained in the State Treaty is concerned, we have in some fields demonstrated that something can be done about them by means of interpretation—for example regarding the ban on training and regarding certain aircraft made in Germany. . . . Then we attempted the interpretation regarding the missiles. There the Finns were ahead of us. Their missile ban was lifted, because they did not negotiate with the EEC in Brussels. We did not get the missiles because of our contacts with Brussels. At that point, a decision was necessary. We decided in favor of Brussels because of our economic needs. I believe that it was a good decision, because had we fallen into an economic downturn, this would have affected our security much more. Thus we quietly said to ourselves: Keep your missile ban, we will not let ourselves be blackmailed." (\textit{Neue Kronen-Zeitung}, February 26, 1984.)

\textsuperscript{144} The text of this protest appears in Kniazhinsky, \textit{West European Integration}, p. 379.

\textsuperscript{145} "Angola Adheres to the Lomé Convention," \textit{Le Monde}, April 18, 1985. Along with Ethiopia and several other third world countries, Angola and Mozambique have observer status in CMEA, an arrangement that Soviet writers hold up as a countermodel to formal ties with the EC. For typical Soviet views on the Lomé Convention, see Yu. Devidov, \textit{SSHA-Zapadnaja Europa: Partnerstvo i sopsnuchenstvo}, Nauka, Moscow, 1978, p. 25; and Nikolai Mironov, \textit{CMEA and Third Countries: Legal Aspects of Cooperation}, Progress, Moscow, 1981, pp. 54-55.
internal development. In April 1972, Brezhnev signaled the adoption of a policy toward the Community that was somewhat less negative than its predecessors. In a speech to the Soviet Trade Union Congress, he stated that "the USSR is far from ignoring the present situation in Western Europe, including the existence of such an economic grouping as the 'Common Market.'" He added, "Our relations with its members will depend, naturally, on the degree to which they, on their part, recognize the reality existing in socialist Europe."

Brezhnev's remarks were intended in part to influence the debate in West Germany on ratification of the 1970 FRG-USSR treaty, which CDU/CSU critics charged was being used by the Soviets to undercut West Germany's ties with the EC. In any case, Brezhnev's "recognition" was highly qualified. In keeping with the Soviet tendency to treat the EC as a customs union rather than a political entity, he used the term "Common Market" rather than the Community's official name. More importantly, he suggested possible changes in the USSR's relations with the EC's members (not the EC itself) in exchange for unspecified Western concessions to the "reality" in Eastern Europe. As he managed to do with remarkable skill at other times in his career (e.g., his 1981 proposal on extending the geographical applicability of CBMs), Brezhnev offered to change the Soviet position provided the West offered a similar quid pro quo. In so doing, he was able to preserve the principled essence of a Soviet position while simultaneously appearing to make a concession.

Brezhnev's new and more subtle approach to the Community was reflected in the initiatives that were forthcoming once the Soviets were assured of achieving their primary goal in Europe, the convening of CSCE. In August 1973, one month after CSCE opened in Helsinki, CMEA Secretary General Nikolai Fadeev met with Ivar Norgaard, Denmark's Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs and at that time Chairman of the EC Council, to discuss CMEA-EC contacts. This meeting resulted in the establishment of low-level contacts between representatives of the two organizations.

In February 1976, CMEA presented a draft proposal for an EC-CMEA accord. The CMEA proposal called for a basic-principles agreement between the two organizations and a set of bilateral agreements between all of the CMEA members and the EC members. The CMEA draft agreement, which was rejected by the Community, would have undercut the EC's supranational authority on trade matters by further "bilateralizing" relations with the East European states, while at the same time conferring upon CMEA a political status that the EC claims

\[^{146}\text{Trud, March 22, 1972.}\]
it does not possess.\textsuperscript{147} Despite its rejection of the 1976 proposal, the EC continued to negotiate with CMEA on an agreement until 1980, when talks broke down in the strained post-Afghanistan atmosphere.

The West European negotiators know that much of the Soviet interest in a CMEA-EC accord is aimed at bringing contacts between Eastern Europe and the Community under greater Soviet control. Romania has concluded a formal agreement with the EC that recognizes the latter’s competence in trade matters, and Hungary has expressed interest in a similar agreement. To protect their access to West European markets, most of the East European countries (and in one case, the Soviets themselves) have had to negotiate sectoral agreements with the Community that do not explicitly accord political recognition, but are nonetheless a dilution of the maximalist Soviet stance on the Community.\textsuperscript{148} A CMEA-EC accord and the establishment, as CMEA has proposed, of a multilateral mixed commission would create a forum in which the Soviets could monitor these contacts.

In the spring of 1985, the Soviets reactivated their efforts to secure a politically acceptable CMEA-EC accord. In May 1985, Gorbachev received Gianni Cervetti, a leading PCI official and the chairman of the Communist and allied group in the European Parliament, with whom he is reported to have discussed CMEA-EC ties in detail.\textsuperscript{149} In one of his first meetings with a West European leader as General Secretary, Gorbachev told Italian Prime Minister Craxi that it was time "to establish mutually beneficial economic relations in economic affairs" between the EC and CMEA. He added, "Insofar as the EEC countries act as a ‘political entity,’ we are prepared to seek a common language on concrete international problems with it."\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{147}According to a Soviet legal authority, "the CMEA Charter creates a sort of joint or parallel treaty-concluding competence of the Council and its member-countries. This substantially raises the efficiency and extends the sphere of the application of international treaties within CMEA, as distinct from the EEC, for instance, which does not recognize such competence for individual member-countries." (Mironov, \textit{CMEA and Third Countries}, p. 135.)

\textsuperscript{148}Romania, Poland, and Hungary negotiated textile quotas after 1976, in response to EC restrictions under the GATT Multi-Fiber Arrangement. After the EC adopted a Steel Anti-Crisis Plan in 1977, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union all accepted Community quotas on their steel exports. (See Peter Marsh, "The European Community and East-West Economic Relations," \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies}, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1984), p. 5.) It is ironic that East Germany, because it enjoys free access to markets in the FRG, can afford to be among the most "principled" CMEA states on the matter of formal dealings with the Community.

\textsuperscript{149}See the interview with Cervetti in \textit{L’Unità}, May 22, 1985.

\textsuperscript{150}Pravda, May 30, 1985.
Gorbachev's carefully phrased acknowledgment that the EC "countries act as a 'political entity'" and his decision to meet with a representative of one of the more "political" and supranational organs of the Community suggests an effort to preempt in advance Western claims that the East will not accept the political character of the Community. It also suggests that the Soviets have decided to take a more relaxed view of the EC in the hope that cooperation with this "political entity" will put strain on U.S.-West European ties. The phrase "common language on concrete international problems" clearly suggests an interest in a joint approach on key issues that would be tacitly directed against the United States. Two such issues are SDI, which is seen in Europe as an economic as well as a strategic issue, and technology transfer. The Soviets followed through on Gorbachev's remarks on June 14, when CMEA formally submitted a new but not substantially different proposal to the EC for an agreement.  

Energy Dependence

The dispute between the United States and its European allies over the Urengoi gas pipeline dramatized Western Europe's reliance on the Soviet Union for a part of its energy supply. In 1984, the European Community obtained about 14 percent of its total imports of energy from the Soviet Union.  

The neutral states in Europe are significantly more dependent on Soviet energy. Austria, for example, is wholly dependent on the USSR for its supplies of imported gas. Whether or to what extent these purchases of energy afford the Soviet Union political leverage over Western Europe is a hotly debated subject.

Soviet commentators often talk about the political and strategic implications of Soviet energy abundance and the relative scarcity of energy in Western Europe, pointing out that the Soviet Union is the


185Commission of the European Communities, Trade with State-Trading Countries, Brussels, August 1984, Table 14.

186Technically, Austria buys about 20 percent of its imported gas from the North Sea, but through pipeline displacement, it takes this amount of gas from Soviet exports to West Germany. ("Austria: Dependence on Soviet Gas Unavoidable," Journal of Commerce, April 26, 1984.)

187Exactly how energy-poor Europe really is has been debated. With abundant coal in many countries, Dutch gas, North Sea oil and gas, and high percentages of electricity generated by nuclear power, Europe has considerable indigenous energy potential. But there are economic, political, and environmental obstacles to developing this potential.
only major industrial country that is self-sufficient in energy. 155 Occasionally, lower-ranking Soviet officials have hinted at the possibility of politically motivated cutbacks in the supply of energy to Western Europe. Such warnings were made in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and were intended to pressure the West Europeans not to impose economic sanctions in support of American policy. 156

More generally, Soviet officials and commentators stress the positive opportunities that are offered by Soviet energy resources. They claim that integration of the Soviet, East, and West European energy supply and distribution system can form part of the "material basis" of détente. At the 24th Party Congress in 1971, Premier Kosygin called for increased East-West cooperation in energy matters and the inclusion of all-European energy projects on the agenda of the proposed European security conference. At CSCE, Soviet negotiators were chiefly responsible for a paragraph stating that the conference participants "consider that the fields of energy resources, in particular, petroleum, natural gas and coal, and the extraction and processing of mineral raw materials, in particular, iron ore and bauxite, are suitable ones for strengthening long-term economic cooperation and for the development of trade which could result." It was on the basis of this provision that Brezhnev launched his 1975 call for a European energy conference under CSCE auspices.

The Soviet Union is now connected to Western Europe by two major natural gas pipelines, one of which was completed in the early 1970s, the other in 1983. Because of the current gas glut in Europe and political sensitivities growing out of the 1982 controversy, the Soviets are unlikely to secure European support for a third major pipeline. Instead, they are planning to compensate by exporting more gas to Eastern Europe, thereby freeing up petroleum for export to the West. They also are negotiating to build smaller pipelines to countries on the European flanks. In 1984, the Soviets signed a gas export agreement with Turkey. During his February 1985 visit to Moscow, Prime Minister Papandreou agreed to begin negotiations for the signing in 1986 of an agreement on the construction of a pipeline to Greece through Bulgaria and the purchase of 4 billion cubic meters of Soviet

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155 Strictly speaking, this claim is not true. Britain is currently a net exporter of energy, as is Canada.

156 Theo Sommer, co-publisher of the West German weekly Die Zeit, was told by an unidentified Soviet official in early 1980 that "it is an open secret that you get not only natural gas from us, but also a considerable quantity of strategic raw materials. This has so far worked without any restriction." (Die Zeit, April 4, 1980.)
gas annually. In March 1985, the Soviet Union and Finland announced a plan to extend an existing pipeline to enable the Finns to burn more Soviet gas.

For the remainder of this decade, energy will be a weak lever in Soviet hands for trying to influence West European policies. With the current natural gas glut and the onset of the long-awaited decline in Soviet oil production, the Soviets will be struggling to maintain market shares and hard-currency earnings. However, the Commission of the European Community has warned that by 1990, drops in indigenous European gas and oil production and increased domestic demand could force Western Europe to dramatically increase its imports of gas above the current level.

For commercial reasons, West European governments and companies are now slowing down or postponing investment in gas supply diversification. Norway, for example, has delayed developing certain large offshore gas fields. The effect of current trends may be to leave only the Soviet Union and Algeria in strong positions to meet Europe's increased demand for gas in the 1990s.

Economic Infrastructure

In addition to expanding trade in goods and services, the Soviet Union is working to promote the gradual integration of its own economic infrastructure—roads, railroads, canals, ferries, pipelines, and electricity supply grids—with that of Western Europe. Its motives for doing so are both economic and political. On the economic level, the Soviet Union is not competitive in the manufacture of highly differentiated finished and semi-finished products, but often performs well in selling undifferentiated goods (raw materials and energy) and in providing services with a high labor-cost component. Moreover, location and geography give the Soviet Union certain comparative advantages in transport and energy. On the political level, the emergence of a pan-European economic infrastructure would be a highly visible symbol of détente.

The Soviets are working on a project-by-project basis with Austria, Finland, Greece, and other European countries to create the actual building blocks of such an infrastructure. In addition, the Soviet Union has obtained high-level political commitments to infrastructural

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159 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council Concerning Natural Gas, Brussels, April 9, 1984.
development. At CSCE, the Soviets were responsible for the provisions of Basket Two pledging the signatory states to consider "exchanges of electrical energy within Europe with a view to utilizing the capacity of the electrical power stations as rationally as possible; co-operation in research for new sources of energy and, in particular, in the field of nuclear energy; development of road networks and co-operation aimed at establishing a coherent navigable network in Europe; [and] cooperation in research and the perfecting of equipment for multimodal transport operations and for the handling of containers."

The largest infrastructural linkages completed so far involve trade in natural gas. Unlike oil, a fungible commodity that moves by tanker, natural gas requires a huge infrastructure of pipelines, compressors, and processing plants. The existence of this infrastructure helps to assure the Soviet Union a long-term source of hard-currency earnings and militates against the disruption of trade for political purposes. For economic and technical reasons, the Soviets have been less successful in promoting the interconnection of the East and West European electricity grids. In 1982, they concluded a 20-year agreement with Austria under which the USSR would exchange 472 million kilowatt-hours of Soviet electrical current in winter for 590 million kilowatt-hours of Austrian electric current in summer.\textsuperscript{150} Turkey also imports Soviet electricity and agreed in 1984 to construct a second high-tension line linking Soviet power stations with the Turkish electricity grid.\textsuperscript{161}

Soviet firms have carved out strong positions in merchant shipping and are working to improve their relatively weak position in truck and rail transportation. To save on foreign exchange, Soviet importers usually stipulate that cargoes bound for the Soviet Union must be transported in Soviet ships. Soviet exporters similarly rely on Soviet vessels, with the result that over 70 percent of the goods that travel by sea between the USSR and the West European countries move on Soviet ships.\textsuperscript{162} In addition, the Soviet merchant marine has expanded its share of trade between third countries. About half the cargoes carried by Soviet ships involve "cross trade."\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{150}\textit{Wiener Zeitung}, September 2, 1983.


\textsuperscript{162}For the Netherlands, the Soviet share is 80 percent. (Frank Lafort, "Soviets Play Rotterdam and Amsterdam Against Each Other," \textit{Elsevier's Magazine}, July 28, 1984.) For West Germany, 77 percent of maritime trade with the USSR in 1982 was carried on Soviet ships. ("Nevy Concerned about Moscow's Fleet," \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung}, March 20, 1984.)

Competition from Soviet shippers, who are heavily subsidized by the Soviet government and who pay wages far below those paid by European companies, has damaged the freight and passenger cruise fleets of Italy, Britain, Germany, and other countries. The maritime transport committee of the OECD has issued a report warning that Soviet shipping, some of it offered at rates as much as 40 percent below those of the West, threatens to drive many Western firms out of business. The problem will be exacerbated when the many ships the Soviets now have on order go into service.\footnote{The OECD report is summarized in \textit{East-West}, No. 349, October 23, 1984, p. 10.}

Despite widespread recognition in Europe of the threat from Soviet competition, reaction has been limited. The Soviets have largely ignored voluntary self-limitation agreements, and governments are wary of taking more forceful action that could provoke Soviet retaliation. The Soviets are able to argue that ships operated under “flags of convenience” with third world crews also pay very low wages and threaten the viability of European fleets. In the United Nations and other forums, the Soviets have sided with third world shippers in trying to deflect complaints about the Soviet Union toward U.S. and other Western multinationals. This Soviet line has found a certain resonance in Greece.\footnote{See the remarks by G. Katsafaros, the Greek Minister of Merchant Marine, in \textit{To Nea} (Athens), October 11, 1984.} In addition, Western interests are divided. Local port authorities, cargo handling companies and the members of some trade unions profit from Soviet activities and are opposed to protectionist actions—particularly if they are not instituted on an EC-wide basis and thus allow the Soviets to shift cargo to rival ports.

As the Soviet merchant fleet has grown, the Soviets have placed a growing number of shipbuilding and ship-repair contracts in the West, thereby neutralizing opposition in part of the maritime industry. Certain Finnish yards work almost entirely for the Soviets, mainly on icebreakers but also on general ship construction.\footnote{In 1983, Finland’s Wartsila yard delivered 31 new ships, 28 of them to the Soviet Union. It also completed 14 repair and conversion jobs, all for the Soviets. (Barnaby J. Feder, “Finland’s Booming Shipyard,” \textit{The New York Times}, August 8, 1983.)} The Soviets have placed large orders, primarily for refrigerator ships, in Denmark, where rumors have circulated that the Danish government opposed EC sanctions against the USSR after the Soviets threatened to cancel shipbuilding contracts.\footnote{John Palmer, “Danes lift Soviet sanctions,” \textit{The Guardian}, February 19, 1983.} During Prime Minister Papandreou’s 1985 visit to Moscow, the Soviet Union agreed to commission $120 million worth of shipping and shipbuilding repairs in Greek yards over the next three years.\footnote{Andriana Jerodiaconou, “Athens-Moscow links boost projects,” op. cit.}
Soviet inroads in the trucking industry are less extensive than in shipping, but they are expanding as output from the giant Kamkaz plant increases the size of the Soviet inventory of trucks. Sovtransavto, the Soviet trucking firm, has been hauling cargoes between Western Europe and northern Iran since 1974. More recently, Soviet truckers have begun servicing trade between West Germany and Afghanistan and between Western Europe, Iraq, and northern Syria. By cutting prices, the Soviets have made it profitable for Finnish firms to transport goods to and from Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece on roads inside the USSR. In a step designed to increase the volume of such shipments from Scandinavia, in May 1984 the Soviet Union and Sweden initiated a regular ferry service from Stockholm to Leningrad. The service, which will be provided by a Soviet vessel, will offer a shortcut for trucks traveling between Norway and Sweden and points in the USSR, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.¹⁶⁹

European and Japanese shippers also are taking advantage of the Soviet "land-bridge" across the Trans-Siberian railroad. This traffic will increase with the completion of a second rail line across Siberia, the Baikal-Amur Railroad (BAM). Soviet and West German officials agreed in 1983 to explore the feasibility of a rail-ferry link between the Soviet Baltic port of Klaipeda and northern Germany, which would connect directly the Soviet and West German rail networks. German security officials, however, are opposed to any such link, as are German shipowners, who claim the link will bring the reach of the trans-Siberian railroads "to our very door."¹⁷⁰ But port officials in Kiel and Luebeck are among the backers of the proposed rail-ferry link, and the West German government has decided to go ahead with the ferry, provided certain changes are made to meet the concerns of the West German navy and security officials. The German government also has decided, again in response to regional economic interests, to permit completion of the Danube River canal that will link the Rhine, Main, and Danube rivers. West European barge operators fear that this may allow Soviet and Eastern bloc companies to win a share of the inland water traffic in Western Europe in the 1990s. Finally, the Soviet Union has announced that it is ready to launch Western satellites at cut-rate prices with its Proton rocket. For a time, Soviet space officials undertook discussions with the British electronics firm Marconi


about a launch, but these talks were terminated after the UK Ministry of Defense voiced strong objections.\footnote{Peter Marsh, “Moscow ‘scrapes rocket deals with West’,” *Financial Times*, February 25, 1985, and Marsh, “Marconi ends Soviet satellite deal after warning,” *Financial Times*, February 18, 1985.}

**ESPIONAGE**

The scale of the Soviet and Eastern bloc espionage effort directed against Western Europe is impressive both in its overall size and in the high levels of government to which it has occasionally penetrated. The latter was demonstrated most dramatically in 1974 when Chancellor Willy Brandt was forced to resign after one of his advisers was arrested as an East German agent. The scale of Soviet and bloc espionage efforts at lower levels can be estimated only very roughly. Government officials in Bonn estimate that 3,000 to 4,000 Soviet-bloc agents are active in West Germany.\footnote{John Tagliabue, “A German Magazine Names 4 as Soviet Spies,” *The New York Times*, May 18, 1983.} Other government officials place the number as high as 10,000.\footnote{Federal prosecutor Kurt Rebman, cited in William Drozdzak, “Soviet Industrial Spying in Bonn Said to Increase,” *International Herald Tribune*, October 31, 1984.}

Soviet and Eastern bloc espionage activities fall into three broad categories: political, military, and industrial. There is no reason to expect that Western Europe is inherently more vulnerable to political espionage than the United States.\footnote{West Germany, with its large number of refugees from East Germany, is probably a partial exception to this generalization.} In the military and industrial fields, however, the scale of economic and other interchange along with geographical proximity provide the Soviets with opportunities that go beyond those available in the United States.

Soviet military espionage is geared toward gathering information that would be useful in war and that would facilitate the rapid seizure of Western Europe by Warsaw Pact forces. Because this effort is so massive, it is well known to West European governments and from time to time is publicized in the Western press. Much of the Soviet military espionage effort takes place in conjunction with Soviet and Eastern bloc commercial activities. Soviet and Eastern bloc truckers who routinely haul cargo throughout Western Europe have reconnoitered Europe’s roads, bridges, rail facilities, tunnels, and other objects of interest. Truck drivers have been observed wading into rivers to probe their depth and measure their currents. Many of these truckers are believed to be members of tank crews, trained to observe...
anything that would be important for Soviet commanders to know in advance of an attack. Eastern bloc commercial vehicles operating in the West are also known to carry sophisticated electronic equipment for monitoring and recording telephone conversations and radio and radar signals.\textsuperscript{175}

Soviet and Eastern bloc commercial airlines frequently deviate from their prescribed flight paths to pass over sensitive military installations. The government of Norway has announced that after January 1986, two airfields will be closed to Eastern bloc charter flights, which have been used to spy on sensitive military installations in northern Norway. Norway also severely restricted access to four other airfields throughout the country, although not at Oslo.\textsuperscript{176}

Aeroflot ground personnel also assist the Soviet espionage effort. In the Rotsch case (which involved plans for the Tornado aircraft), an Aeroflot employee served as the Soviet contact with Rotsch.\textsuperscript{177} In Sweden, Aeroflot mechanics are believed to have entered a Scandinavian Airlines System hangar in an attempt to obtain information about submarine-hunting helicopters undergoing refit.\textsuperscript{178}

Soviet espionage efforts also are directed at major ports that NATO would use in a resupply of Europe from North America. The increased activity of the Soviet merchant marine in West European ports has brought about the creation of a permanent shore-based infrastructure in those ports dedicated to servicing Soviet ships. In Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Genoa, joint ventures between Soviet and local partners, usually under effective Soviet control, own and manage warehouse and freight-handling facilities. In Antwerp, which handles about 1,200 Soviet ships each year, there is a Soviet consulate and a sailors' home for the roughly 35,000 Soviet seamen who pass through each year. The presence of so many Soviet ships and crew members in Western ports facilitates espionage and the diversion of Western technology and military equipment, as was demonstrated in 1985 when American hel-
icopters were secretly transported from Rotterdam to North Korea on Soviet freighters.\(^{179}\)

The Soviets would like to open a consulate in Rotterdam and are pressing for a larger number of directorships on the boards of joint Soviet-Dutch shipping and cargo-handling enterprises. For security reasons, the Dutch government has refused the request for a consulate and has come under pressure from trade unions, businesses, and municipal authorities in Rotterdam as a result. To step up the pressure on the government, the Soviets are reported to have diverted their trade to Antwerp and the rival Dutch port of Amsterdam.\(^{180}\)

In response to increased U.S. efforts to impede the flow of sensitive technology to the East, the Soviets have placed an even greater emphasis than previously on industrial espionage. According to West European officials, industrial espionage now accounts for a larger share of the money and manpower committed by the KGB than political and diplomatic espionage. An indication of the scale of this effort was provided in April 1985, when the French newspaper *Le Monde* published documents that French agents had obtained from the Soviet Ministry of the Aviation Industry. The documents, which were reported to have helped to convince President Mitterrand to expel 47 Soviet agents in 1983, outlined in great detail specific items of Western technology sought by the Soviets and the money the Soviets calculated they had saved through espionage.\(^{181}\)

Governments in all West European countries are aware of the problems posed by Soviet industrial espionage, and most have taken steps to combat it. These steps include monitoring exports and preventing "dummy companies" on their territory from serving as transshipment points for goods destined for the East. Even neutral Austria and Sweden have tightened restrictions, at some cost to their relations with the Soviet Union and over the opposition of domestic groups.\(^{182}\) At the same time, however, these governments are mounting vigorous diplomatic and lobbying campaigns to pressure the United States to liberalize its restrictions on exports of technology, which they claim are too stringent to be justified on grounds of military security.


AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

As far as is known in the West, Soviet policy in Europe generally has not relied on agents of influence, which are far more important in Soviet third world policy. The "Treholt affair" in Norway, however, may represent a break with past patterns, the significance of which cannot yet be judged. The "affair" became public in January 1984 with the arrest of Arne Treholt, a career diplomat in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, on charges of espionage. Treholt was later convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, the maximum term allowable under Norwegian law. Although the charges against Treholt were confined to espionage, many Norwegians suspect that he was asked not only to provide secret information, but to promote Soviet negotiating positions from inside the Foreign Ministry. In his position as State Secretary to the Minister for the Law of the Sea, Treholt may have worked to advance Soviet positions in ongoing negotiations over demarcation of the Norwegian-Soviet border in the Barents Sea and to drum up support in Norwegian circles for a Nordic nuclear-free zone.¹³³

If Treholt did indeed serve as an agent of influence, he did not accomplish much for the Soviets: Negotiations on the Barents have not been concluded, and the Norwegian government remains opposed to the Soviet nuclear-free-zone initiative. But a Soviet decision to use an agent to attempt to influence ongoing negotiations on a clearly secondary issue would be consistent with the mix of boldness and contempt that is evident in Soviet border violations, espionage, and other actions directed at the small West European countries.

Soviet agents of influence also are reported to be active in private organizations, especially the peace movement. With so many open and entirely legal instruments available to them for advancing Soviet views, clandestine action by the KGB might appear superfluous and perhaps even counterproductive from the Soviet perspective. But this does not appear to be the view of the KGB, which has made strenuous efforts through Soviet embassies, TASS, Novosti, and other organizations to build ties with the peace movement. In Denmark, KGB officers recruited a left-wing journalist, Arne Herlov Petersen, to serve as a Soviet channel to the cooperation committee that runs the Danish anti-nuclear movement. Through Petersen, KGB money may have gone to pay for advertisements in Danish newspapers in which prom-

¹³³Georg Ring, "The Work of a Spy is Reconstructed," Sueddeutsche Zeitung, March 15, 1984, and Ring, "For the KGB, Arne Treholt Was Priceless," January 25, 1984. Treholt retracted earlier confessions and pleaded innocent to all charges, claiming that he was being framed by the FBI. (Barnaby J. Feder, "Confessions Denied In Oslo Trial," The New York Times, February 27, 1985.) He is now appealing his case.
inent Danish writers and artists expressed support for the Nordic nuclear-free zone.

It is often difficult for West European governments to respond forcefully to KGB activities. Governments are reluctant to publicize the work of Soviet agents of influence in the peace movement for fear that this will be perceived by publics and opposition parties as an attempt to defame the movement. In 1981, when the Danish government expelled a Soviet diplomat for his activities, disarmament groups denounced what they charged was a government plot directed at them. Peace groups in Switzerland acted in much the same way when the Minister of Justice closed the Bern offices of Novosti, which the Soviets were using to maintain contact with Swiss peace activists.\footnote{John Vinocur, “K.G.B. Officers Try to Infiltrate Antiwar Groups,” \textit{The New York Times}, July 26, 1983.}
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET POLICY

Any attempt to assess the overall effectiveness of Soviet policy must be considered preliminary. The Soviet Union and Western Europe will go on sharing a continent, and it is impossible to conclude that major changes in the Soviet-West European relationship will not occur. A definitive assessment of the success or failure of Soviet policy also would have to factor in the long-term effects on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union of mechanisms such as CSCE which are instruments not only of Soviet policy toward the West, but of Western policy toward the Soviet Union. While assessments of effectiveness are incomplete and subject to change, they nevertheless influence the policy of the Soviet Union and the West European countries.

THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Soviet assessments of present trends in Europe are usually characterized by references to the “complex” and “complicated” nature of the situation. Soviet analysts and policymakers no longer claim that détente is in the process of becoming “irreversible” or that creation of an all-European economic and security system is proceeding smoothly. Soviet commentators generally blame “imperialist reaction,” spearheaded by the United States but supported by “circles” in West Germany and other European countries, for halting the favorable processes of the 1970s.

But the “failure” of Soviet policy in recent years must be set against the background of the very high expectations about prospects for change in Europe that were prevalent in the early 1970s. The recent disappointments in no way invalidate, at least for most Soviet analysts, the major successes that Soviet policy has achieved over the whole of the postwar period. Whereas Western observers tend to regard Europe as having been basically stable since the mid-1950s, Soviet observers see a record of dynamic and for the most part favorable change.

From the Soviet perspective, the greatest “change” in Europe since the late 1940s has been the success of the Soviet effort to foreclose the possibility of other changes that once seemed likely, probable, or at least possible. Many in the West have forgotten that such changes once were expected and therefore have tended to portray as static a situation that in fact has been fundamentally transformed. In specific terms, the Soviet Union has obtained international recognition that the
division of Germany will remain a feature of the postwar order and that Eastern Europe will remain a Soviet sphere of influence. In addition, the Soviets have good reason to expect that other potentially harmful developments in or involving Western Europe are most unlikely to occur.

The Soviets probably can be assured that the countries of Western Europe would resist any attempt by the United States to reimpose on the Soviet Union the kind of isolation—from international financial institutions, international markets, or sources of nonmilitary technology—that it experienced during the cold war. Although the West Europeans would resist efforts to isolate the Soviet Union largely because of the way in which they interpret their own economic and political interests, the Soviet Union can claim some credit for changing the way these interests are calculated. It has done so by building up relations with Western Europe, thereby progressively raising the costs of a breakdown in East-West relations, by working to undercut American power on a global basis, and, in the Soviet view, by developing its military power.¹ For Soviet policymakers such as Gromyko, who are old enough to remember the period in which the United States had the power to block the sale of goods and the provision of credit to the East, to keep Soviet oil from finding markets in the West, and to otherwise counter Soviet activities on all fronts, the current situation represents an advance of historic proportions.

The Soviets probably also can be assured that Western Europe will not unite to form a West European counterweight to Soviet power, or even a strong European “pillar” within the Atlantic alliance. Although Western Europe’s failure to make decisive progress toward unity is chiefly the result of internal factors, the Soviet Union can take some credit for lowering the prospects for European unification. In a remark that surely did not go unnoticed in Moscow, French President Giscard d’Estaing once told the newspaper Le Monde that defense integration in Europe should not proceed because the Soviet Union “would never stand for it.”² By building up its military power directed against Western Europe and asserting its claim to superpower coequality with the United States, the Soviet Union has assured that Giscard’s

¹West German Sovietologist Hannes Adomeit has written: “[T]he status of the USSR as a military power equal to that of the USA... as seen from Moscow, plays a crucially important role in Soviet-West European relations in as much as Europe is largely instrumental in frustrating US attempts at isolating the USSR, conducting a coherent policy of sanctions against the Soviet Union or embarking on a large-scale effort to restore the East-West military balance.” (“Soviet Decision-Making and Western Europe,” in Moreton and Segal (eds.), Soviet Strategy toward Western Europe, pp. 48-49 (italics in original).)

prediction is at least plausible to many West Europeans, whose behavior is influenced accordingly. In another remark that did not go unnoticed in Moscow, Herbert Wehner, the longtime head of the SPD parliamentary group, characterized Henry Kissinger’s 1973 proposal for a new Atlantic Charter as “an outline for a monster” that would interfere with West Germany’s emerging policy toward the East.3

By threatening West Germany to the degree that it has with conventional and nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has made it unlikely that any German government would trade American protection for closer integration with France, as de Gaulle had hoped Adenauer would do in the early 1960s. But by offering West Germany a growing stake in ties with the East, the Soviet Union also has helped to establish limits to the degree to which West Germany can support certain American initiatives. Soviet policy is at least partially responsible for creating and helping to sustain a tension between West German Ostpolitik and West Germany’s place in Western Europe and in the Atlantic alliance.

Although the Soviet Union can claim credit for helping to head off potentially unfavorable developments in Western Europe, it has been far less successful in making progress toward its long-term goals of “collective security” and a “pan-European system.” Whereas in the 1970s Soviet leaders spoke of making détente irreversible, they now advocate a return to détente, after which it will be possible, they claim, to resume movement toward more ambitious goals. As Gorbachev remarked in his speech on the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over Germany:

We believe that the process of détente should be revived. This does not mean, however, a simple return to what was achieved in the 1970s. It is necessary to strive for something much greater. From our point of view, détente is not the end goal of politics. It is needed, but only as a transitional stage from a world cluttered with arms to a reliable and all-embracing international security system.4

Those responsible for Soviet policy toward Europe are probably uncertain and divided about how this can be done under current circumstances.5 The Soviet Union confronts a situation in which domestic political forces in most of the major countries of Europe are polarized, with the non-Communist left drifting toward a posture of

4Pravda, May 9, 1985.
5For a detailed discussion of Soviet policy options, see Alan Platt, Soviet-West European Relations: Recent Trends and Near-Term Prospects, The Rand Corporation (forthcoming).
equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and some of the smaller countries—notably Greece and Denmark, but others to a degree as well—drifting away from the broader NATO consensus. In all countries, anti-nuclear forces are calling for changes in NATO doctrine that could lead to added pressures for acceptance of Soviet disarmament proposals. These factors are cause for long-run optimism in Moscow.

On the other side of the ledger, however, there is a long list of less favorable developments in Europe, as well as what in some respects is a worsened global situation for the Soviets. Within Europe, the most unsettling development of recent years from the Soviet perspective is the failure of West European governments to show the Soviet Union the kind of deference, particularly on security matters, that Soviet leaders had come to expect in the 1970s. The “neutron bomb” controversy of 1977–1978 turned out favorably for the Soviets, but the series of events was too complex to serve as an unambiguous test of Soviet influence—at the governmental, parliamentary, or mass public levels—on European behavior. The first truly unambiguous tests of Soviet influence were the 1979 INF decision and the individual country decisions to deploy in Britain, Germany, and Italy in 1983 and in Belgium and the Netherlands in 1984–1985. Although the Soviets stated very explicitly that they regarded West European policy on INF as an acid test of détente, they were unable to prevail on this issue. The Netherlands is still wavering. Denmark failed to support the common infrastructure costs of the deployment, and Greece denounced NATO as well as Soviet missiles. But in the main, the Soviets failed to sway the key groups in the most important countries.

In view of this complex mix of dangers and opportunities on the West European and global levels, the Soviets see three pressing requirements for their policy toward Western Europe: (1) to preserve the gains in Europe that were consolidated in the early 1970s; (2) to head off any further erosion in the Soviet Union’s global power position, if possible drawing upon the successes of Soviet détente policy in Europe; and (3) to resume the momentum of change in Europe, both for its own sake and as a way of undercutting American influence.

Soviet leaders probably can be assured of holding those gains that were made early in the postwar period and that were consolidated in the early 1970s. In the aftermath of the INF deployments, the Soviets moved quickly to demonstrate that Soviet positions—military, political, and economic—in Europe were fundamentally “irreversible.” They

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*Outside Europe, there are also unfavorable developments for the Soviets, including the rapid U.S. defense buildup of the early 1980s, continued poor relations with Japan, and, compared with the 1970s, fewer opportunities for expansion in the third world.*
redressed what they claimed was the military imbalance by deploying new weapons systems and by breaking off the arms-control talks. In response to statements by the Kohl government and prominent CDU members about possible German reunification (as well to West German support for INF), the Soviets mounted a harsh “anti-revanchism” campaign against the Federal Republic. In response to attempts by the West Germans to maintain relations with some of the East European states without “going through Moscow,” the Soviets pressured Honecker and Zhivkov to cancel previously scheduled visits to Bonn.

In the economic realm, the Soviet Union made clear that it would not be pressured by the West Europeans. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade told its Italian counterpart that it needed a “pause for reflection” before concluding new import agreements with Italian firms, thus mimicking Italy’s more than two-year “pause for reflection” before it concluded an agreement to buy Soviet gas in May 1984. In response to increased European cooperation with the United States on technology transfer issues, the Soviets announced that they would discriminate against firms that cooperated too closely with COCOM. While adopting tough and “principled” stances on these various issues, the Soviets continued to hold out the prospect of cooperation with the West European governments, but only on terms acceptable to the Soviet Union.

The second requirement of Soviet foreign policy is to shore up the USSR’s global power position relative to the United States. Traditionally, there are two ways a Soviet leadership can go about reasserting its superpower status. It can reconsolidate the “socialist community,” primarily by rallying the East European countries, but also by improving relations with North Korea, Yugoslavia, China, and the non-ruling Communist parties. Or it can take what European commentators sometimes call the “super Yalta” approach: to seek a dialogue, preferably centered on arms control, with the United States over the heads of the smaller powers.

These two approaches—consolidation of the “socialist camp” and resumption of a special U.S.-USSR dialogue—are of course not mutually exclusive and can in fact be mutually reinforcing. At present, Gorbachev appears to be following both to some extent. His most immediate concern appears to be to shore up the Soviet sphere of control in Eastern Europe. But he is also using familiar instruments—the return

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8 For a detailed discussion of the East European factor in Soviet policy toward Western Europe, see A. Ross Johnson, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: The Role of Eastern Europe, The Rand Corporation (forthcoming).
to bilateral arms control, "big two" discussions on regional issues, improved trade relations, and agreement to a summit with President Reagan—to show that the Soviet Union has business to conduct with Washington that it does not conduct with other powers.

Although the Soviets recognize that a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations will lessen concerns in Western Europe about a new cold war and thus benefit the United States, they also recognize that superpower status and the ability to deal equally with the United States on extra-European issues is an important Soviet asset in dealings with Western Europe. The Soviets know that when they deal bilaterally with the United States on important strategic, political, and trade issues, conservative circles in Western Europe are quick to grow apprehensive about U.S.-Soviet "collusion" that is harmful to West European interests. Such apprehensions encourage these governments to work to improve their own relations with Moscow as a form of reinsurance. The Soviets also can be confident that the left in Western Europe is likely to give them the benefit of the doubt in U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations and thus place pressure both on their own national governments and on the United States to be forthcoming in talks with the Soviets.

The third basic requirement of Soviet policy toward Western Europe is to resume the momentum of change that Soviet leaders and analysts claimed was under way in Western Europe in the 1970s, and that in their view was having a positive effect on global developments as well. In attempting to resume what they regarded as progress toward these more ambitious goals, the Soviets are not likely to devise radically new approaches. Rather, they will continue to use, refine, and develop those mechanisms that were outlined above. Soviet analysts probably believe that in the long run, active Soviet policies on all the levels and across all the functional areas are working and ought to be continued and intensified. The Soviet leaders can be confident that because of the way in which many in Western Europe interpret détente, almost nothing they do, including territorial violations, espionage, mobilization against foreign governments, nuclear threats, sudden interruptions of oil deliveries for "technical" reasons, thinly veiled threats to the air routes to Berlin, pressure on authorities to suspend judicial proceedings, or even farcical episodes such as the Bitov affair, would produce a fundamental change in West European policy toward the Soviet Union.

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9Bitov is a Soviet journalist who defected in Italy, moved to Britain, and then returned to the Soviet Union telling fantastic tales of how he had been drugged and kidnapped by British agents. He is now suing in British courts to win back the money he left in Britain—money he claims was banked on his behalf by these agents. (See Martin Walker, "Defector wants his cash back," The Guardian, February 23, 1985.)
The outlook, therefore, is for continued Soviet pressure on Western Europe.

THE VIEW FROM WESTERN EUROPE

For obvious reasons, the range of opinions in Western Europe on the effectiveness of Soviet policy is considerably broader than the range of views that is allowed to be voiced in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it is possible to speak of a few schools of thought among government officials and interested private citizens concerned with East-West relations.10

As in the United States, West European bureaucracies have their "hawkish" and "dovish" members. Relative to their American counterparts, however, continental European diplomats appear more in agreement among themselves on the fundamental objectives of Soviet policy and the mechanisms by which the Soviets pursue these objectives. Few West European professional diplomats seem to take very seriously the view often expressed in the United States that the Soviet Union actually wants the United States to remain in Europe as a restraint on a potentially resurgent West Germany. Many are blunt in concluding that the Soviet Union regards Europe—East and West—as part of its "natural" sphere of influence.11

10 There are few good studies of West European perceptions of the USSR. Among the best is Pierre Hassner's "Western European Perceptions of the USSR," Doedalus, Vol. 108, No. 1 (1979), which treats both governmental and nongovernmental attitudes.

11 This view is not shared by some in the West European (and American) academic communities who argue that the Soviet Union actually wants the United States to remain in Western Europe, because, as one representative of this viewpoint phrased it, "Europe has a history of turbulence and is, from a Soviet perspective, still politically fragile." (Lawrence Freedman, "The United States Factor," in Moreton and Segal (eds.), Soviet Strategy Toward Western Europe, p. 87.) In this view, the Soviets fear that European political fragility could lead to the one thing the Soviets fear most—German revanchism. Those who take this view usually offer a single piece of evidence to support it: Brezhnev's May 1971 speech that helped to defeat the Mansfield amendment (which would have mandated unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe) by reiterating a previous Soviet offer to negotiate mutual force reductions. The weight of evidence does not support this view. Brezhnev's speech can be accounted for by several alternative explanations: It may have been a blunder; the Soviets may have taken seriously the "linkage" between MBFR on the one hand and CSCE on the other, which Kissinger had been attempting to negotiate; and perhaps most convincingly, it may have reflected the fact that the Soviets traditionally have regarded proposals to negotiate as an inextricable part of their efforts to undercut Western military power and have failed to see (although this may be changing) how Western governments have used the "dual-track" approach to sustain public and parliamentary support for arms spending. The argument that the Soviets desire the U.S. presence as a curb on "revanchism" may have had some validity at one time, but it surely has lost credibility in Moscow as West Germany has "internalized" the postwar constraints on its military power. In any case, in Soviet attacks on alleged West German "revanchism," this phenomenon is always associated
In contrast to some of their American counterparts, however, European officials are highly sensitive to the blend of legalism and ideology that helps determine Soviet policy toward the region. As such, they have been more careful than American negotiators in drafting bilateral and multilateral agreements. Privately, European officials are often critical of the United States for allowing incorporation of the Marxist-Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence in the 1972 Basic Principles. European negotiators rebuffed attempts by the Eastern bloc states to include the term in the Helsinki Final Act.

The surprising degree of agreement among West European officials about the objectives and mechanisms of Soviet policy breaks down when it comes to assessing how successful this policy has been. Probably the majority of the West European officials who deal with the USSR believe that all else being equal, Soviet policy in Europe has not been successful. In this view, if the Soviet Union has improved its power position relative to Western Europe, it is because of factors outside Europe: the American loss of strategic superiority, the breakup of colonial empires that weakened Western Europe and gave the USSR opportunities to gain influence in the third world, and the oil price explosions of the 1970s that at least for a number of years shifted the balance of market power from net energy importers (e.g., Europe) to exporters (e.g., the Soviet Union). These factors, rather than Soviet successes "on the ground" in Europe, are said to account for whatever gains the Soviets have made relative to Western Europe. Those who take this view often conclude that Western Europe's current dual-track deterrence-détente policy has been successful over time and will remain adequate for the future. These "optimistic" West European observers, particularly those who have dealt directly with the USSR on policy matters, are aware of the range of mechanisms the Soviet Union uses in trying to cajole and pressure Western Europe. On balance, however, they are inclined to regard much Soviet activity, particularly in the areas of propaganda and unofficial contacts, as more of a nuisance than a mortal threat to vital West European interests. Nevertheless, there is a minority of West European officials who are impressed with gains that the Soviets have made, persistently and unspectacularly, "on the ground" in Western Europe. As one foreign ministry official put it, "Let's not kid ourselves. Compared to the situation of twenty or thirty

with the United States, which is said to use it for its own purposes. Finally, numerous Soviet officials have made remarks that reflect a visceral dislike of and a sense of grievance at the U.S. presence in Europe. These include Gromyko's famous speech at the 23rd Party Congress and Soviet negotiator Kvitinskii's outburst to his American counterpart at the Geneva arms-control talks: "You have no business in Europe!" (Reported by Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits, p. 113.)
years ago, Soviet influence in Europe is enormous." To back up this assessment, he cited the growing propensity of many in the non-Communist left to allow the Soviets to define the terms of the European security debate. He also cited such factors as Western Europe's purchases of gas from the Soviet Union, the extent to which certain large factories in Western Europe depend on Soviet orders for their survival, and the access of Soviet propagandists to the West European media.

The differences between the "optimists" and the "pessimists" among West European officials only partly reflect assessments of Soviet policy. More importantly, they reflect how these officials think about their own countries. The "optimists" look at the vast upsurge in contacts between the Soviet Union and Western Europe and are confident that these contacts will not impair West European independence or erode fundamental Western values. The "pessimists" are less confident of the West's ability to deal on an equal basis with the Soviet Union and its policy instruments.

The West European governments, while they might contain or employ a few officials of "pessimist" persuasion, are nearly all proceeding on "optimistic" assumptions. As such, in their policy toward the Soviet Union they are basically concerned with carrying through existing policy and preventing the Soviets from splitting the alliance. This policy is based an on explicitly stated, official optimism that long-run trends will work and are working in favor of Western values and objectives.

Ironically, this optimism about the long term persists alongside extremely low expectations of what in the short-to-medium term can be expected of the Soviet Union in its behavior toward the outside world. Many in Europe regard détente as a success largely because they have extremely low standards for what constitutes desirable or acceptable Soviet behavior, not only around the world, but in Europe itself. They see the massive Soviet arms buildup against them, the constant propaganda, and the countless lesser irritations, but on balance are grateful that they retain their domestic political systems, their prosperity, and peace.

If anything, then, these officials worry far more about American policy than they do about the Soviet Union. They are concerned that the United States keep the arms-control process going with the Soviet Union in order to defuse domestic anti-nuclear sentiment, but at the same time, they are wary of the United States getting back into an arms-control regime that could be harmful to European interests. Similarly, they want the United States to move on cutting its budget deficit and often mention defense spending as an area for cuts, yet they
are worried that the United States could swing back to a period of no or negative growth in defense spending, which in their view would send the wrong signals to the Soviet Union. To some extent, then, the West Europeans view their own relations with the Soviet Union as very dependent upon American policy and are therefore likely to exert pressures on the United States to pursue a policy delicately balanced between "hard" and "soft" alternatives that serves European interests.

A NET ASSESSMENT

A net assessment of the success or failure of Soviet policy toward Western Europe can be made only if one spells out one's criteria for judging this policy and applies these criteria on a consistent basis over time. If success for Soviet policy is defined as the achievement of political dominance in Europe, then so far this policy has failed. But if one adopts a less demanding definition of success, the Soviets can be satisfied with the results of their policy and optimistic about its future prospects. Soviet policy has helped to neutralize much of the West's capability in the struggle with the Soviet Union, thereby leaving the United States with a much more difficult and open-ended task than was expected by U.S. officials earlier in the postwar period. In looking to the future, the Soviets cannot be confident of succeeding in their ultimate goal of gaining a dominant influence over Western Europe. But they can be confident that much of Western Europe's political, economic, and potential military capability will not be used in the East-West rivalry, thus leaving the Soviet Union free to challenge the United States in other areas, as well as free to continue to pursue its long-term goals with regard to Western Europe itself.
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