A New Strategy and Fewer Forces: The Pacific Dimension

James A. Winnefeld, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin N. Lewis, Lynn D. Pullen, John Y. Schrader, Michael D. Swaine
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James A. Winnefeld, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin N. Lewis, Lynn D. Pullen, John Y. Schrader, Michael D. Swaine

Prepared for the
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs),
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

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SUMMARY

This report addresses how the United States should repurpose its forces, adjust its policies, and change its military operations in the Asia Pacific region, all in the context of reduced resources and increased burden sharing by allies and other security partners.

Six alternative postures are defined, each representing an important attribute of possible different worlds over the next 15 years. These alternative postures are examined for the regional responses they might evoke, their performance in a variety of future contingencies, and their comparative cost.

The analysis concludes that the base force posture reflected in the current Future Year Defense Plan is probably the best compromise now for sufficient reassurance of our security partners, deterrence of possible opponents, adequate performance in representative contingencies, and acceptable cost. If threats and uncertainties decline markedly, somewhat lower postures would be acceptable. The analysis suggests that risks start to increase rapidly (risks such as adverse regional responses, breakdown of deterrence, or unsatisfactory contingency performance) at postures below the base force level. An Asia Pacific force posture based on withdrawal to U.S. sovereign bases is not supported by the analysis.

The authors recommend a variety of threat reduction, posture enhancement, and hedging measures, including the following:

1. Utilize "proportional engagement" as a candidate strategic concept to extend the DoD Strategic Framework.
2. Foster confidence-building measures in Korea.
3. Accept a nuclear-free Korea with safeguards and an intrusive inspection regime.
4. Preserve power projection capabilities during the drawdown of U.S. forces, sacrificing defensive capabilities if necessary.
5. As air/ground forces are reduced, replace with dual-based forces, prepositioned equipment and support.
6. To replace Philippines bases, use distributed basing in Southeast Asia.
7. Put more emphasis on nonforce military capabilities (e.g., IMET, FMS, civic action, or liaison with regional military leaders).
8. To compensate for a shortage of forward-deployed carrier battle groups in the "U.S. presence" role, use substitute battle group concepts (amphibious groups, sea-launched cruise missiles, Air Force tactical fighter units, etc.).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many individuals have contributed to the shaping and conduct of this research. Within RAND, numerous colleagues enhanced our understanding of the Pacific Rim and the way U.S. strategy interacts with the regional environment. They include Paul Davis, Francis Fukuyama, Norman Levin, David Ochmanek, Kongdan Oh, William Schwabe, and George Tanham. We are especially grateful to the formal reviewers of this document (Fukuyama, Schwabe, and Tanham). We have also benefited greatly from suggestions by RAND consultants Paul Bracken and Rodney McDaniel.

Numerous officials within the Department of Defense were consulted and briefed during the course of our work. The relevant offices included the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs; the research and analysis staff of USCINCPAC; the Strategy Division (J-5) of the Joint Staff of the JCS; the Washington liaison office for COMUSFORKOREA; the Plans and Operations Staff of the Air Staff; the U.S. Army's Plans and Operations Staff; and the Strategic Plans and Policy Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. We have chosen to thank them collectively, even though our debts are very much to specific individuals.

During the course of our work, several members of the project team visited states within the region; we are grateful for the candid insights of both scholars and government officials, which we have incorporated in our study on a not-for-attribution basis.

Our many thanks are also due to Jennifer Taw, who helped smooth the rough edges on preliminary manuscripts in Santa Monica. The authors bear full responsibility for errors of omission and commission.
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GLOSSARY

AAW  Antiair warfare (usually a naval term)
AOR  Area of responsibility; a term normally associated with the area delineating a unified command as set out by the Unified Command Plan (UCP)
APEC  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
APS  Afloat prepositioning ship or squadron; the Army equivalent of an MPS but of varying size depending on the type of unit supported
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW  Antisubmarine warfare
Base force  A term commonly used to describe the reduced force (compared to FY 90) proposed by the Chairman of the JCS and reflected in the current FYDP
CBM  Confidence-building measure
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Composite wing  An Air Force term; a wing made up of different types of aircraft in numbers intended to optimize total fighting capabilities by providing for mutual support across aircraft types
CONUS  Continental United States
CVBG  Carrier battle group; U.S. Navy term
DPRK  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EAEC  East Asian Economic Caucus
EAEHG  East Asian Economic Group (former name of EAEC)
EASI  East Asia Strategy Initiative
FMFPAC  Fleet Marine Force Pacific; a subordinate command of Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
FMS  Foreign military sales
FPDA  Five Power Defense Agreement (UK, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand)
FYDP  DoD’s Future Year Defense Plan/Program
HNS  Host nation support
IMET  International military education and training; a DoD international security program
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff
LHA/LHD  Large naval amphibious support ships with both flight deck and boat-well capabilities; these ships exceed the size of World War II aircraft carriers
MAGTF  Marine air ground task force
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary brigade (an infantry regiment, an air group, and support elements)</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary force (a division, wing, and support elements)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit (a battalion, an aviation squadron, and support elements)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Maritime patrol aircraft (typically P-3 aircraft for the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand)</td>
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<td>MPS</td>
<td>Maritime prepositioning squadron; a squadron of ships configured to transport the equipment of an assault echelon of a Marine expeditionary brigade</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military sealift command</td>
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<td>NCND</td>
<td>“Neither confirm nor deny”; a U.S. policy associated with refusal to declare whether specific units or installations are nuclear weapons capable</td>
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<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly industrializing countries</td>
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<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>Nuclear weapons free zone</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACEX</td>
<td>A major USCINCPAC joint exercise conducted in 1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase I</td>
<td>The first phase of the DoD Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, 1–3 years in the future, measured from April 1990</td>
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<td>Phase II</td>
<td>The second phase of the DoD Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, 3–5 years in the future, measured from April 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>The third phase of the DoD Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, 5–10 years in the future, measured from April 1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>Port of embarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum; the major program development document of DoD components and agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>POMCUS</td>
<td>Prepositioned military equipment configured in unit sets</td>
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<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>Large USCINCPACFLT combined naval exercise</td>
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<td>RSAS</td>
<td>RAND Strategy Assessment System (an automated strategic gaming and force modeling system)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>Sea-launched cruise missile</td>
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<td>SLOC</td>
<td>Sea line of communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special operations forces</td>
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<td>Tactical Framework</td>
<td>As used in this document, the term refers to the DoD policy statement forwarded to the Congress in April 1990 setting out guidelines for U.S. security strategy for the Asia Pacific Rim</td>
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<td>TPCA</td>
<td>Total force capabilities analyses conducted under the auspices of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFS</td>
<td>Tactical fighter squadron; Air Force term</td>
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<td>TFW</td>
<td>Tactical fighter wing; Air Force term</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNF</td>
<td>Theater nuclear forces</td>
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<td>TOA</td>
<td>Total obligatory authority</td>
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<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan; a document signed by the president that defines the top-level command arrangements of the Department of Defense, particularly the commanders of the unified commands (CINCs)</td>
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<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command; one of the several unified commands in the U.S. military command structure</td>
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<td>VMA</td>
<td>Marine attack aircraft category; a squadron of such aircraft</td>
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<td>VP</td>
<td>U.S. Navy patrol aircraft or squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSTOL</td>
<td>Vertical or short takeoff and landing aircraft (e.g., AV-8B aircraft in the Marine Corps)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Informal military terminology for the western Pacific Ocean area (everything west of Midway and east of Singapore)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality; usually associated with ASEAN states</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 ID</td>
<td>Second Infantry Division based in Korea</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests—the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crisis, [and] to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed.

President George Bush
Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990

Applied to the Asia Pacific Rim, these remarks by the president define the domain of this study. How should the United States repurpose its forces, adjust its policies, and change its military operations in the region to achieve the president’s objectives with reduced resources? As he makes clear:

The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or a shrunken-down version of the ones that we possess. . . . If we simply prorate our reductions—cut equally across the board—we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely, and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions, but restructuring.

Before the president’s Aspen speech, the Department of Defense had developed a “strategic framework” for the Pacific Rim. That framework outlined a concept for urging America’s Asian allies to increase their contribution to regional security, and it set forth guidelines for those in government responsible for shaping our future regional forces.

The emphasis of the framework is on objectives, needed mission capabilities, and selected policies (e.g., arms control and burden sharing) intended to shape the longer-term U.S. military presence in the region. By design it is less specific on the details of force posture and does not undertake an in-depth assessment of uncertainties, risks, and options. The purpose of this report is to extend the framework and offer some analysis to help fill its gaps. We hope to provide some of the specifics that might be considered as DoD turns the framework from a plan and a concept into specific policy, programmatic, and operational actions.

As we survey the postwar history of the region and its emerging directions, two characteristics stand out: the importance and continuity of U.S. interests in Asian Pacific security and the changes in the strategies employed to realize them. DoD’s Strategic Framework reflects this continuity and change. The continuity is represented in its most basic form by U.S. insistence on maintaining access to the region’s resources, markets, people, and lines of communication. The change is represented by an evolving blend of political, economic, and mili-

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2See the Department of Defense’s report to the Congress, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century, April 1990 (hereafter, DoD Strategic Framework). An update was sent to the Congress in November 1990. This framework, the president’s Aspen speech, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon’s San Diego speech of October 30, 1990, and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s posture statement of February 21, 1991, are the key policy statements defining U.S. objectives and strategy for the Asia Pacific Rim.
tary instruments to secure that access. Changes in the military threat, the continuing growth in the region’s economic strength relative to the United States, and the evolution of the region's national political institutions have evoked adjustments in strategy. This strategy, if it is to be supported by the Congress and the American people, must provide a basis for focused and consistent policy and programmatic actions.

BOUNDING THE RESEARCH

A key interest of the DoD is cost-effective forward-deployed force postures that preserve American presence in the region and support timely responses to regional contingencies, during a period of declining U.S. defense spending. Thus, this research closely examines the concept of “presence”: the objectives it serves, the forms it might take, and the regional responses it might foster. Some have argued that what is important is not presence itself but demonstrated military capability, whether it is present in the region or not. The argument has merit, but it suggests an additional dimension, not a substitute dimension, to posture assessment. We proceed from the premise that both total capability and presence are important, but we focus more of our inquiry on the latter.

When discussing strategy and security policy it is customary to acknowledge that such policy has political and economic dimensions in addition to its military implications. Defense analysts are frequently criticized for focusing on the military dimension at the expense of the others. We are mindful of that criticism, but also of the research task that requires examination of force postures and their fit with selected assessment criteria. We intend to address the nonmilitary dimensions in two ways:

- When defining force posture and policy initiatives we will include, where appropriate, the political and economic considerations that shape them.
- When assessing force postures we will analyze the impact of economic and political factors on regional reactions.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

This report spends little time on objectives. As important as objectives are to any analysis, we have elected to take as given the national and regional objectives presented in authoritative national policy documents, e.g., the president’s annual National Security Strategy of the United States and the Secretary of Defense’s “posture” statements, and assume they will remain applicable for the period covered by this study. Our emphasis is on strategy, policies, and force postures to achieve these objectives. The two major underlying themes are changes in the mix of forces and bases and diminished U.S. national security resources. Our approach is to examine alternative packages of military resources and their fit with other instruments of national power and with the present and future regional environment. Figure 1.1 portrays the report’s analytic structure.

In Section 2 we sketch out a regional appraisal that encompasses all three phases of the DoD Strategic Framework and looks beyond. (The framework’s phases are defined in the Glossary.) The themes of this section are regional trends and uncertainties and their implications for a range of possible force postures. This examination sets the stage for some of the
regional responses discussed in Section 4 and the scenarios examined in more detail in Section 5.

Because the future is characterized by major uncertainty, we develop six alternative regional U.S. force postures in Section 3. These postures are neither recommendations nor best or worst cases. Rather, they reflect six alternative states of the world consistent with the range of possibilities sketched out in Section 2, but stated in terms of U.S. military force posture. They are intended to cover a reasonable range of possible futures. These forces vary in size—from the number routinely in the region before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to a force some 35 percent smaller—under varying assumptions about base availability and deployment patterns. The postures are described in summary terms in Section 3 and in somewhat more detail in Appendix B. In addition, we outline twelve possible policy and program initiatives that could be applied singly or in groups to the six basic postures.

In Section 4 we examine the role of U.S. forward military presence in the region and a range of plausible regional reactions to each of the six basic postures. The emphasis is on deterrence, reassurance, and continued regional stability and on the linkages of U.S. presence to regional reactions and force postures. In the course of this examination, we develop a comprehensive rationale for the U.S. military presence. To complete the regional response

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³We recognize that military postures can help shape an environment as well as be a product of it. Our use of alternative postures is a reflection of the major uncertainties involved.
analysis, we look at selected policy and program initiatives to identify those that might most benefit future U.S. policy.

In Section 5 we analyze the effectiveness of various force postures in eleven scenarios. This analysis examines the force "demand" in each scenario and contrasts it with the "supply" provided by the alternative force postures.

In Section 6 we present the results of a comparative cost analysis of the six postures. Using both top-down and bottom-up methods, we express the costs of alternative postures as a percentage of a specified baseline posture.

In Section 7 we use the basic analyses contained in Sections 4-6 to assess the force postures and associated initiatives. This assessment is based on a hierarchy of national objectives that is translated into policy, strategy, and force objectives, centering on the utility and feasibility of forward presence and contingency performance. We evaluate utility according to two criteria: (1) Will it engender favorable regional responses (from friend and potential foe alike) to alternative postures and program and policy initiatives? (2) What are the likely outcomes for a range of contingencies? We evaluate feasibility in terms of cost, access to bases, and conformity with likely regional political realities. The products of this assessment are a set of preferred postures and initiatives and a set of conditions under which a given posture might be acceptable.

Section 8 builds on the assessment provided in Section 7. It presents 14 policy, program, operational, and organizational recommendations to be considered during Phases II and III of the DoD Strategic Framework.

We now turn to developing a forward-looking regional appraisal of the Asia Pacific region to sketch out the underpinnings for the remainder of the analysis.

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4 A separate RAND study conducted for USCINCPAC provides most of the basis for this analysis. See Schrader and Winnefeld (forthcoming).
2. ASIA AND THE PACIFIC IN THE 1990s: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. REGIONAL STRATEGY AND FORCE POSTURES

Asia and the Pacific have entered a period of substantial fluidity, uncertainty, and potential realignment. The central directions of regional politics and security seem less predictable now than at any point since the formative period of U.S. Asian strategy, which began with the onset of the Korean War. All along the Pacific Rim, leaders are assessing the potential for change in the regional strategic environment, and they are weighing their own choices accordingly. Although the region has not experienced a political transformation as profound as the one under way in Europe, it retains real possibilities for major internal change in various societies and a corresponding alteration of political and strategic patterns. At the same time, the region continues to demonstrate extraordinary economic dynamism that is reshaping worldwide patterns of trade and technological development. Thus the magnitude, complexity, and consequences of change in the Pacific are potentially very great, with major implications for long-term American political, security, and economic interests.

It is impossible, however, to predict with confidence the region's long-term directions. But the Pacific Rim of the early 21st century may present a political and security environment strikingly different from what the United States has encountered in recent decades. American policy planners need to bear this possibility in mind as they think about regional strategy, including future U.S. military deployments. The successes of U.S. policy in recent decades are beyond dispute, but they offer no guarantees about the future. The United States must fashion its future policy objectives in relation to the political, economic, and security patterns that it could well confront.

This section identifies and evaluates the forces that are reshaping Asia's future and thereby redefining perceptions of and expectations for the U.S. security role. East Asia and the Pacific do not readily admit to comprehensive generalization; the region is simply too diverse to don an analytic straitjacket. It encompasses industrial giants such as Japan and island microstates that barely register a gross national product. It includes societies that have enjoyed long-term economic growth rates unsurpassed in world history and hopelessly backward economies mired in isolation and failure. It features close American allies that have long sought to sustain intimate ties with the United States, nonaligned states that are staunchly opposed to any significant external military presence (as well as other nonaligned states whose policies obscure a far more flexible attitude), and longstanding antagonists of the United States that have sought to undermine the U.S. military presence and security role. It includes states facing severe social and ethnic conflicts and those with highly homogeneous populations. It has some countries that have repeatedly endured external threat and others that have long enjoyed minimal danger to their security. It contains well-established democratic systems, fledgling democracies in the midst of very uncertain transitions from authoritarian rule, and highly centralized systems in which a handful of leaders remain wholly unaccountable to their citizens. Finally, it features an imploding but still militarily powerful postcommunist Russia and Leninist regimes in China, North Korea, and Vietnam that are seeking to prevent a comparable political collapse. It is within this kaleidoscope of political, economic, and social forces that the United States must fashion coherent, sustainable policies to secure America's vital interests in the 21st century.
In the midst of this complexity, the United States is seeking to develop new guideposts to supplant earlier policy formulations. Many of the pivotal factors that once animated U.S. regional strategy no longer carry comparable weight. Chief among these is the passing of the Cold War. Although the former Soviet Union retains sizable military capabilities that still pose a potential threat to forward-deployed American forces and to Japan, the collapse of communism in Russia is certain to prompt far-reaching changes in the military posture and security policies of the Russian republic as well as other republics. The disintegration of the former union has unleashed powerful, long-suppressed political, social, and ethnic forces, making long-term projection a hazardous exercise. Irrespective of particular estimates about the future of Russia and other republics, the power of the former Soviet state is vastly diminished, with all leaders absorbed by the effort to fashion a political and economic order to supplant the discredited Marxist-Leninist regime. Leaders in new and still unstable democratic polities are seeking to sharply reduce the longstanding geostrategic rivalries that animated the history of the Cold War, thereby permitting a level of political and economic cooperation with other powers (including the United States) that would have been unimaginable in the past. Thus, the extension of Soviet political-military influence beyond continental Asia and the projection of Soviet power into strategic locales in the Third World no longer dominate U.S. regional security concerns.

Various regional actors, having achieved political stability and rapid growth under a U.S. security umbrella that extended informally to other states, also envision their future security requirements in different terms. Few see the future regional environment as benign or predictable, but the focus of attention has shifted from the role and activities of the major powers to the ambitions and capabilities of different regional actors. In the aftermath of the collapse of Soviet power, regional states are reassessing threats, opportunities, and national strategies. The United States still looms large in the calculations of all regional states, but their expectations for American policy have changed: no one expects the United States to assume comprehensive responsibility for regional security.

The United States has also revised its view of Asia and the Pacific. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States exercised power in Asia and the Pacific in largely unilateral terms. Although U.S. policymakers established numerous security arrangements with regional actors, these alliance systems entailed a disproportionate commitment of American military and financial resources at a time when regional actors were highly vulnerable. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the end of the period of revolutionary upheaval in Asia, with the region marked by increasing political stability and economic well-being. On this basis, U.S. relations with regional friends and allies moved accordingly toward greater mutuality and maturity.

In the future, as the nations of Asia and the Pacific grow in wealth, stature, capabilities, and self-confidence and as earlier political and military threats recede, relations between the United States and various regional actors will assume a different character. Although the United States retains vital security obligations and political relationships throughout the Pacific Rim, the degree of military threat has declined, and with it the salience of the military dimension of American power. The United States believes that its regional allies and friends are capable of assuming more responsibility for their own defense, either with their own resources or in concert with their neighbors. Also driving these changes are domestic political forces and budgetary limitations in the United States. America is no longer prepared to as-
sume a disproportionate burden in upholding security throughout the region; it must
performe discriminating and more selective in the deployment of a smaller array of
military forces. At the same time, the United States is seeking fuller collaboration with
regional states in devising a security structure in the post-Cold War era. America and its
security partners will assume mutual responsibilities in this process; neither can expect to
operate autonomously. But this mutuality will also require a shift in patterns of influence.
The United States maintains a huge political, economic, and strategic stake in the Pacific
Rim as a whole. It seeks to ensure that the region remains vibrant and secure and that the
United States remains deeply engaged in its future. But the region will be less plant, and
American power less decisive. It is in the context of such shifting power relationships that
the United States must plan for the future.

Very few states, however, would wish the U.S. military presence to shrink abruptly or with-
out compensatory policy actions that reconfirm America's continued commitment to regional
stability and security. Notwithstanding the implosion of power in the former Soviet Union, a
large and diverse array of political and security challenges remains salient in the calcula-
tions of various regional actors. Careful review of the role of U.S. forward-deployed forces
and close consultations with regional friends and allies will thus be essential elements of se-
curity planning, as well exchanges with other states less closely identified with U.S. policy.
America seems very likely to maintain a multifaceted if reconfigured political, economic, and
security role in the Pacific, and it is a role that no other major power can assume. The
United States alone seems able to restrain any single state or coalition of states from exercis-
ing outright domination over others. It can balance, and hopefully inhibit, any tendencies
toward uncontrolled arms rivalries that could make the region more prone to conflict. It can
reassure smaller countries that live in the shadow of much larger states that they have secur-
ity options other than subordinating themselves to powerful neighbors. Finally, it can work
credibly with a diverse cast of regional states to develop collaborative political, institutional,
and security arrangements for the longer term. Thus, the United States enjoys substantial
advantages in planning its future Pacific role: it remains a welcome force in a region where
rivalry and competition seem likely to persist and perhaps assume new forms. The challenge
is to define a strategic concept and associated force postures for the United States that are
relevant to Asia's future and to long-range American interests.

This is no simple task: first one must project the region's longer-term political, economic,
and security directions, then identify the principal uncertainties that attach to these projec-
tions, and then decide what both considerations imply for future U.S. force requirements.
This represents a very complex exercise. The mix of security arrangements in Asia and the
Pacific never achieved the clear-cut geographic demarcation of postwar Europe. (The con-
frontation in Korea was the closest approximation to the central front in Europe, but it could
never be generalized to East Asia as a whole.) Efforts to devise multilateral security frame-
works (e.g., the ill-fated SEATO treaty) failed, because they were neither politically nor insti-
tutionally sustainable and because most regional states possessed neither the will nor the
capability to protect their own security.

But Asia and the Pacific in the 1990s are not what they were in the 1950s and 1960s. Almost
certainly, the extraordinary collapse of Marxism-Leninism in the former Soviet Union means
that many of the vestiges of the Soviet-American rivalry in Asia will dissipate. But the role
of Soviet or Russian power is only one factor in the future of Asia and the Pacific, and by no
means the most important one. Other portentous issues loom on the horizon: the potential capabilities and roles of Japan, China, and other key states; the future shape of Asian nationalism; fears of economic nationalism and threats to the global trading system; accelerating patterns of arms acquisition; possible rivalries over resources; and political transitions within unstable regimes—all these factors could reshape Asian Pacific security in the coming decade. Long-term projection seems a most difficult task in this complex and diverse political, economic, and security landscape. This is especially true for the domestic transitions that numerous states of the region will face in the coming decade. To explore these issues and their ramifications, we need to turn to the principal considerations that are likely to shape the region's future.

ASSESSING ASIA'S FUTURE

No single factor is driving the directions of change in Asia and the Pacific. A complex mix of issues—some derivative of the past, others quite new and not readily predictable—is moving the region as a whole into uncharted territory. In some circumstances, the contribution of U.S. forces to long-term stability and security still seems clear-cut; in other instances, America's force posture may play a negligible or even negative role. A principal objective of this study is to clarify how alternative levels of U.S. military power will affect the emerging dynamics of Asia and the Pacific. How pivotal is America's power in all its dimensions, and what is the specific contribution of its military power to this equation?

At the same time, specific capabilities and force levels cannot stand alone. The United States hopes to build upon the successes of past policy, but an overly static conception of America's power and regional responsibilities will fail to achieve such a goal. To devise an effective, credible long-term U.S. policy, planners will need a political and strategic logic that supports potential changes in the U.S. force posture and clarifies the relationships the United States will seek with states in the region.

This subsection explores the region's future at two principal levels: the broader, cross-cutting issues that affect the region as a whole, and the ways these issues manifest themselves in particular states and in potential power alignments. Some of the shorthand labels at the first level describe specific countries and situations; we will assess both levels in tandem.

Although government officials and strategic specialists speak about the Pacific moving "beyond the Cold War," this phrase has too many connotations related to Europe to be simply transposed onto Asia. Most observers, for example, view Japan's longer-term political and economic role as the largest factor determining the region's future, yet in the eyes of most other Asian states, Japan must still overcome the powerful legacy of its conduct in the Pacific war, not its behavior during the Cold War. In addition, the Cold War in Asia at different times assumed two very distinct forms: the first was the early confrontation between American power and the Sino-Soviet alliance that began with the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949 and was quickly followed by the Korean War; the second form was the geopolitical rivalry and military competition between China and the Soviet Union that began in the early 1960s, of which the United States was largely an indirect beneficiary. The "first Cold War" still retains partial relevance on the Korean peninsula and in the naval, air, and strategic forces of the United States and the former Soviet Union arrayed in the northwest Pacific. The "second Cold War" enabled the United States and China to end their political and mili-
military estrangement in the early 1970s, but it persisted with a vengeance between Beijing and Moscow well into the 1980s, with a substantial if diminishing commitment of Soviet and Chinese forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet frontier. The aftereffects of the second Cold War reverberate in Cambodia and in Vietnam’s abating estrangement from the outside world; the consequences of the first persist in North Korea’s near-total isolation from the region, and in the former USSR’s long alienation from Japan. Even in the most confrontational periods of the Cold War, however, the superpower competition was not as intense in Asia as it had been in Europe. In Asia, the Cold War label meant (and means) very different things to different countries; there is no easy way to impose a European logic on Asian realities.

Even in its Asian variant, however, the Cold War concept entailed basic assumptions that animated American strategy in the Pacific and the relationships that the United States cultivated with various states of the region. Underlying geopolitical conflicts of interest with the USSR meant that the United States would: (1) seek to inhibit the exercise of Soviet political-military influence in the Pacific; (2) counter Soviet alliance relations and its regional military presence by both political and military means; (3) enhance the economic and defense potential of regional actors to resist Soviet encroachment or inducements; (4) forge alliance relations that would enable the United States to implement a forward military posture to deter actions by the Soviet Union or its regional allies and to execute appropriate military actions in the event of deterrence failure; and (5) build a diverse coalition of regional states prepared to align more closely with the United States to counter Soviet political and security objectives in the Pacific.

Although the concept of forging cooperative relations with regional states remains valid, it can no longer be justified on an anti-Soviet basis. (Indeed, few within the region ever judged the USSR’s political ambitions and military reach to be their only security concern.) Without question the United States faces change and uncertainty in its dealings with former Soviet republics as they move toward market economies and warmer relations with the West. But movement away from the era of confrontation can be only part of an overall American strategy. Even larger questions have come to the fore about the future character of America’s relations with the states of the Pacific. Once-vulnerable nations are now robust economic competitors of the United States. Countries that were long willing to accept a subordinate position to the United States and to accommodate American regional goals have grown more capable and more assertive; their political and security options are also likely to become far more diversified. Finally, the United States must weigh its interest in a stable and secure regional order (and the commitment of U.S. resources this could entail) against other policy objectives. Changes of this magnitude and consequence warrant careful, considered appraisal.

Five distinct factors will shape Asia’s future and America’s role in it: (1) the implosion of Soviet power and its political and security consequences; (2) the development of Japan as a global economic and technological power; (3) the primacy of economies in both a domestic and international context; (4) the highly unsettled political and economic futures of the Asian communist regimes; and (5) the reconfiguration of America’s regional alliance relationships in the context of rapid internal change. We now examine the dimensions and implications of each.
The Implosion of Soviet Power

In a remarkably short period, the power of the former Soviet state and its claim to superpower status have diminished precipitously. The collapse of Marxist-Leninist rule in the aftermath of the failed August 1991 coup attempt by traditionalist elements was the precursor of the final disintegration of the USSR in December 1991. Although various republics of the postcommunist era retain major military capabilities that still warrant close scrutiny, the capacity of a truncated, highly unstable post-Soviet system to challenge American power in Asia or elsewhere appears increasingly questionable. Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts, beginning in the mid-1980s, to rejuvenate the Soviet Union by reducing international tensions won Moscow breathing space and a measure of political respectability, but he failed to anticipate the full consequences of undermining long-entrenched policies at home and abroad. A torrent of expectations and grievances was unleashed within Soviet society that ultimately posed a direct challenge to the USSR’s viability as a unitary political system and to the Communist Party’s claim to a power monopoly. Gorbachev proved unable to contain the centrifugal political forces at work in a highly turbulent internal environment; his temporizing and endless tactical maneuvers led ultimately to the severe erosion of his political base and a progressive unraveling of the Soviet administrative and economic system.\footnote{For a detailed review of Gorbachev’s efforts, consult Gelman (1990).} At the same time, a powerful internal backlash to a string of Soviet geopolitical reversals during the late 1980s (most notably, the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact) led to a resurgence of forces on the right, chiefly in the armed forces and the KGB, that culminated in the ineffectual effort to seize power in August 1991.

In the aftermath of the failed Soviet coup, the dismantling of the institutions of central power continued without letup, culminating in the final collapse of the USSR in December 1991. The predominant question for the indefinite future is whether a viable political, economic, and security structure can emerge from the competing forces within the territory of the former USSR. Russia and other republics speak with a multiplicity of voices on many issues, including defense and foreign affairs.\footnote{For example, senior defense policymakers have offered widely discrepant estimates of the size of potential troop cuts among the military forces of the former Soviet Union. See Michael Parks, “Soviets May Cut Forces in Half in Three Years, Official Says,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, October 2, 1991; and Francis X. Clines, “Kremlin Clarifies Plans to Cut Troops,” \textit{The New York Times}, October 3, 1991.} But if the fledgling republics of the postcommunist era are to pursue the opportunities for economic and political integration with the capitalist world (including a coordinated program of Western economic and advisory assistance), they will have to create viable political and institutional structures equal to the challenge.

Changes in the orientation of the military forces are likely to prove especially critical in this regard. The discrediting of numerous senior military officers during the events of August 1991 led to widespread turnover in the top command positions. A new generation of officers, much younger and far more intent on restructuring and professionalizing the armed forces, has rapidly come to the fore in Russia, Ukraine, and other republics. The armed forces are likely to become a much more constrained instrument of state power, although various republics will view the effective organization of such power as essential to sustaining an independent course. (This could prove especially relevant to leadership calculations in states seeking to avoid domination by Russian power.) In addition, many constraints that once in-
hibited a more creative approach to crucial regional issues (for example, relations with Japan) have eased. For the first time, it is possible to conceptualize a full normalization of relations between Japan and various republics. At the same time, the opportunities and pressures to pare back the longstanding Soviet-American strategic competition seem increasingly evident.

Even before the events of the late summer of 1991, the former Soviet Union's capability to compete globally with American power had been reduced drastically. During the late 1980s Moscow had begun to jettison the excess baggage of a long period of external expansion. In East Asia, economic support for Vietnam and North Korea had diminished steadily in recent years, with Moscow no longer prepared to incur the costs of propping up these moribund economies. At the same time, Moscow had assiduously cultivated some of East Asia's dynamic market economies (most notably and most successfully, South Korea), dispensing with dubious political commitments and loyalties that had long inhibited its political opportunities outside the communist world. Even so, such moves could not prevent the final collapse.

In a near- to mid-term sense, domestic imperatives—that is, the effort to forge economic and political arrangements for the postcommunist era—will continue to preoccupy leaders in Russia and the other republics. The crucial issue with respect to external relations will be how well the democratizing forces are able to restrain centrifugal tendencies and achieve a workable consensus among relevant policy elites. This will involve new power-sharing arrangements and will test the capacity of senior officials in different republics to negotiate credibly with the outside world. Thus, the republics of the postcommunist era have a historic opportunity to reshape their relations with one another and with the outside world, but doing so will require unprecedented changes, especially in the military activities and deployments of the former Soviet Union.

These policy changes will be driven by both political opportunity and economic necessity. Relations with Japan constitute an appropriate example. Earlier Soviet approaches to Japan (despite obvious incentives to achieve a political and economic breakthrough with Tokyo) were sterile and uncreative. (This may well have reflected the Soviet military's capacity to block any moves that would have infringed on its military deployments and strategies in Northeast Asia.) Now, in the context of a broader reduction of military activities, the incentives for devising a less confrontational policy toward Japan are self-evident. Doing so will almost assuredly yield understandings with respect to the future disposition of Japan's northern islands, thereby removing one of the lingering vestiges of the Cold War in Asia and one of the principal impediments to fuller relations between Japan and Russia. At the same time, block obsolescence of the former Soviet Pacific fleet and growing resource constraints are likely to dictate further reductions in force levels, including the prospect of additional unilateral force cuts.

Such actions will facilitate related measures for arms and tension reduction with the United States, such as the removal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons presently deployed at sea and matching proposals offered by Russian officials. It is reasonable to expect that lower force levels and a more collaborative relationship with the United States will contribute to qualitative changes in relations between the post-Soviet republics and Japan as well. Corollary steps here will include a more forthcoming Japanese attitude toward economic assistance to the various republics and fewer U.S.-Japanese military efforts directed against Russian naval, air, and strategic forces. Although measures to protect Russian strategic
assets deployed in Asia will be maintained (though presumably on a diminished scale), the broader spectrum of the former USSR's military activities in Asia and the Pacific (including the role of power projection forces) will be severely curbed. It is also likely that the new military leadership will be less overtly hostile to the U.S. regional military presence.

Complementary opportunities also seem likely to sustain efforts at continued force pullbacks along the Russo-Chinese border, although Beijing and its neighbors may for a time approach one another warily. The possibility of heightened instability in the Central Asian republics of the former USSR, for example, could create worrisome problems for Chinese leaders, but practical security interests are likely to dictate continued pursuit of force reductions. Reciprocal negotiated agreements, however, could be complicated if multiple voices increasingly demand a role in the postcommunist decisionmaking process. Thus, successful force reductions may depend on achieving stability in a democratizing polity and whether the Chinese and Russian leaderships—now on divergent political paths—deem it in their respective interests to remain engaged with one another.

The predominant Pacific focus of the various republics will be on developing relations with the region's dynamic market economies; improved relations with China will likely prove an important but subsidiary factor. Loosened from the ideological and military constraints of the past, Russia and other republics will undertake far more flexible and creative steps to enhance their relations with countries along the rim. The grander ambitions of the early Gorbachev era to achieve a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough at the expense of the United States now seem a distant memory. They have been supplanted by the more daunting challenge of avoiding systemic chaos and the prosaic but vital task of linking the republics with the outside world. Such domestic preoccupations seem certain to dominate decisionmaking in all republics for the indefinite future.

Further, the former USSR's plans for a more constructive and fully integrated relationship with the Pacific cannot leave out American interests. For the United States, a preferred outcome would entail the republics emerging as democratically oriented states focused on internal economic reconstruction and seeking to avoid debilitating rivalries with one another. These new states would no longer insist on proprietary claims for national security at the expense of their neighbors. The military forces of the republics would be able to assure defense of their sovereign territory and upholding of their legitimate security interests. The republics would collaborate with the United States, Japan, and other powers in pursuit of credible security arrangements that did not place American military forces at a pronounced disadvantage. Their military capabilities would be proportional and appropriate to their security needs. Under such circumstances, the United States would have a radically different basis on which to plan for its regional defense requirements.

Such an outcome assumes a relatively benign transition to a postcommunist order, but other scenarios are possible. The first grows out of a serious breakdown in working relations among the various republics and a continued decomposition of the economy. The inability to sustain even less binding forms of association would result in a proliferation of military forces attaching to different republics, increasing the chances for internal conflict. (The disposition of former Soviet nuclear forces looms as an especially important issue in this context.) Continuing failure among the republics to establish effective political and security ties would heighten instability, undoubtedly to the great consternation of neighboring states such as China. Ethnic grievances and secessionist tendencies, quite possibly abetted by economic
inequalities, could have pronounced spillover effects in various Central Asian republics, although the impact would be unlikely to extend in a significant way to the Pacific Rim. The former USSR’s neighbors would have every reason to seek an early end to any internal violence that might attend such instability, although some might see an unparalleled opportunity to settle territorial or historical grievances. Even if there were no overt military conflict, external powers (including the United States and Japan) would be very likely to provide far greater levels of humanitarian assistance to various republics in the hopes of avoiding or mitigating any human calamity that extreme instability might create.

A second possibility assumes renewed centralization rather than disintegration. Russian imperial ambitions and cultural predispositions could well produce an authoritarian leadership intent on halting incipient chaos and anarchy. A new ruling coalition would be determined to reverse the former Soviet Union's deteriorating strategic position. Even in truncated form, the Russian state retains power over a vast geographic expanse and could still exert substantial economic and military control over neighboring republics. Such a development could have important security implications for Asia as well as Europe, although it would not necessarily foreordain a hostile relationship between a resurgent Russia and its neighbors. Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that such a successor regime could quickly or effectively reconstitute the full power of its predecessor; even a highly authoritarian government would encounter major restraints on the exercise of absolute power. But the United States should continue to plan prudently for a development of this sort. Indeed, such a prospect argues against precipitate reductions in American military power in the region, absent major alterations in the military deployments of the former USSR.

A third scenario assumes a breakthrough in relations among the republics that allows for the creation of a new political and economic order. Under such new arrangements, the separate republics would be freer to pursue their own interests, but with selected powers (in particular, command and control of nuclear forces) retained by a central decisionmaking authority. (Such a concept was explicit in the promulgation of a Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991, although underlying power rivalries and conflicts of interest between Russia and other republics may doom this approach as well.) This scenario would permit far more effective political and economic engagement between the former Soviet Union (or Russia) and its Asian neighbors, and would also enable the creation of viable market structures throughout the various republics. In such an outcome, the states of the postcommunist era (Russia in particular) would emerge as credible and constructive forces, free of unwelcome ideological trappings or unwarranted security claims and expectations. The United States should be prepared to engage these new governments across a broad spectrum of political and security issues, when and if such circumstances obtain.

Whatever the outcome of the current transition, the decline in power of the former Soviet state has already reconfigured regional security and the U.S. requirements that flow from it. Such diminished capabilities and the much-reduced incentives of the Russian government to project power beyond the Eurasian landmass have altered U.S. regional security needs and the concerns of America’s regional security partners. The United States therefore seems likely to counteract the military power of Russia and other republics only to the extent that such power impinges directly on the U.S. forward-deployed presence or on the core security concerns of U.S. allies.
To the degree that erstwhile Soviet power continues to retrench, the nations of the Pacific will give more attention to the U.S. military presence and to the military activities of various regional powers. When the United States challenged the expansion of Soviet interests and capabilities in the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. forward deployments were accepted by most regional actors, even by states uncomfortable with great-power military activities. With the United States in relative terms now far more capable and active in the projection of its power, the task of generating political support for the presence and activities of U.S. forces could prove much more demanding than it has been in the past. But the diminished nuclear competition with the former USSR is also very likely to enable major alterations in U.S. policies that long imposed limitations on the forward deployment of American military power (e.g., the “neither confirm nor deny” policy for nuclear weapons).

Support for the U.S. military presence will still depend primarily on the security perceptions of the regional states themselves. Regional actors are likely to remain accepting of U.S. forces, owing principally to their concerns about local rivalries that might develop in the absence of a stabilizing great power role. In Southeast Asia, for example, the long-term security calculations of regional states have always been determinedly varied and idiosyncratic. Even at the high point of Moscow’s engagements in the Third World, the geographic remoteness of the former USSR generally diminished local concerns about Soviet intentions, though Moscow’s support for Vietnam had worrisome implications for various ASEAN states. Some see the longer-term challenge to the region as far more likely to emanate from China, Japan, or India, and these sentiments could increase in the future. Others worry more about the regional ambitions of Indonesia and Vietnam. Some countries have concluded that U.S. military dominance in a post–Cold War setting will pose the greatest threat to the ability of local states to shape their own destinies. But most still see the United States as an essentially stabilizing force for the mid term, as regional actors reassess their longer-range national security calculations and needs. Such complex (and often contradictory) attitudes are increasingly likely to define regional political and security deliberations.

In sum, barring an extraordinary reversal of the economic and political directions of the former Soviet Union or the ascendance of authoritarian leaders hostile to democratization, the former USSR is unlikely to prove a destabilizing force in the Pacific during the 1990s. Russia and the other republics will continue to seek ways to adapt to regional politics and economics; they will also pursue more constructive collaboration with the United States, thereby lowering past levels of military confrontation. But any security or diplomatic breakthroughs (e.g., on the Korean peninsula) are likely to occur on a case-by-case basis, rather than by grand design. Russia still hopes to achieve fuller integration with the Pacific Rim, but outside the military arena its ability to achieve genuine power and presence remains limited. The transition to a more balanced role will prove halting, uneven, and opportunistic, with the new republics as a whole very likely to remain circumspect in the exercise of power. Under these circumstances, the United States will be freer to concentrate on the larger challenges that it seems likely to confront along the Pacific Rim.

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3The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states comprise the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei.
Japan as a Major Power

Japan looms very large on Asia's changing political and economic map, and in America's long-term policy calculations in the Pacific. Although it is still a close U.S. ally and highly equivocal about the overt exercise of power in a classic great-power sense, Japan seems almost certain to exert a dominant influence over the region's future. Anxieties about Japanese power envelop much of the Pacific Rim; this may be the only question on which all of Japan's neighbors can agree. The concerns include the bitter experience of Japanese aggression in World War II; the depth and scope of Japan's economic domination of East Asia; its extraordinary financial reach; the steady increase of Japanese defense capabilities and the potential contributions of Japan's technological base to its future defense strategy; disquiet over continued U.S. pressure on Japan to assume more responsibility for regional security; and the increasing confidence and conviction with which Japan is assuming a larger international role. Numerous Asians remain convinced that Japan is unreconciled to its defeat in the Pacific war. Having been the target of nuclear attack, it is argued, many Japanese see their country as more victim than aggressor in the war, thereby unable to make a cathartic break with their past. With the United States no longer preoccupied with Soviet expansion, many Asians anticipate a steady, inexorable withdrawal of American military power from the region, with Japan poised to unobtrusively reclaim the mantle of its earlier Pacific empire. The United States must counteract this perception, suggesting that the U.S. military presence and a close bilateral relationship with Japan is a vital, ongoing part of a broader American regional strategy.

At the same time, however, the United States continues to exhibit highly ambivalent attitudes toward Japanese power. Having written Japan's postwar constitution and implanted democratic institutions during the occupation, the United States sought to reshape Japan to serve long-term American interests and keep it from becoming a renewed threat to its neighbors. Following the onset of the Korean War, the United States also sought to accelerate Japan's economic recovery, believing that a productive, successfully modernizing Japan would be the best guarantee against a resurgence of militarism. The ratification of the U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty formalized America's strategic conception of Japan. In return for Japan's subordinate status in the alliance, the United States would protect Japan's physical security, permitting the country to focus on economic development. Japan would not incur the costs and responsibilities of assuring its own security, and this would cement it to a U.S.-led security structure in Asia. In the U.S. conception, the circumscribed exercise of Japanese power would guarantee that Tokyo leaned decisively to the West, thereby facilitating longer-term American goals in Asia. The essence of this strategic bargain has remained in place ever since.

Specific clauses in the strategic bargain, however, have been renegotiated in the intervening years. The asymmetrical character of the relationship—with the United States incurring responsibilities for Japan's defense but not vice versa—has prompted pressure from successive American administrations for Tokyo to assume greater responsibility for its own security. These pressures have increased as Japan has advanced to the front ranks of the world's economic powers. The United States has repeatedly urged Japan to take on a larger and more operational role in the alliance, and Tokyo has slowly but progressively complied. By most

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4See Awanohara (1990).
measures, U.S.–Japanese security cooperation is now at an all-time high, with Japan assuming a much larger role in the defense of the home islands and surrounding territorial waters and air space. This contribution also extends to a wider set of roles and missions and to extensive participation in U.S. military exercises. Burden-sharing agreements have been steadily revised as well: by the mid-1990s, Japan will assume 50 percent of the host nation support costs for the stationing of American forces on its territory; this sum alone comprises approximately 10 percent of Japan’s total defense budget.5

But an uneasiness pervades the Japanese-American relationship, suggesting its limits, pitfalls, and uncertainties. Unlike NATO, where America’s European allies are linked to integrated command arrangements in which all retain a voice, Tokyo remains a highly subordinate partner in its alliance with the United States. This partly reflects an effort to limit the role of uniformed officers in the Japanese policy process, but it also reflects the underlying policy assumptions that have long guided the relationship. As Japan has emerged as the world’s largest creditor nation and second-leading industrial power, and as its technological base rivals that of the United States, American policymakers have increasingly sought to elevate Japan’s major-power standing. But this designation has not given Japan an equal voice in shaping the political and strategic underpinnings of the alliance. In essence, the United States has continued to devise the larger political strategies, and it has expected Japan to furnish a progressively larger share of the financial resources to implement them. This division of labor reflects a keen appreciation of the potential regional implications should Japan assume a more assertive political and security role. But it has left largely unaddressed longer-term American expectations of Japan, and the degree to which Tokyo has participated in devising them. Japan may sit at the great-power table, but it does not always have a full voice.

The shifting regional security context underscores this conclusion. During the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, Japan served as a transit point and supply depot for American military operations. A large U.S. military presence in the region also facilitated Japan’s economic recovery in the 1950s and 1960s. East Asia was then highly unstable, and a subordinate role seemed appropriate. As American attention in the 1970s and 1980s turned toward strengthening deterrence in Northeast Asia, Japan became a quiet but vital partner in fulfilling U.S. strategic requirements. (This extended to Japan’s increasing contribution of technology and components for various U.S. weapons systems.) Tokyo’s position was still subordinate to the United States, but it occupied a much more important position in relation to American global interests and needs.

In the eyes of Japan’s critics in the United States, however, Tokyo’s constrained security role looked like a “free ride.” By subordinating itself to a global military strategy conceived and led by the United States, they argued, Japan was free to pursue its larger development goals, without incurring the costs and consequences of a larger defense effort. As the U.S.–Japan trade imbalance soared in the mid-1980s to record levels, and as successive sectors of American industry saw their market shares decline sharply in the face of severe Japanese competition, the terms of the U.S.–Japan alliance appeared increasingly inequitable. Even as Japan assumed a larger range of obligations under an enhanced concept of U.S.–Japan secu-

5This paragraph draws on discussions with Japanese strategic specialists.
rity cooperation, to many critics the underlying tensions and asymmetries looked still larger. In their view, America had assumed a disproportionate, unreciprocated obligation to Japan.

Rancorous debates over these emotion-laden and politically charged issues increasingly characterized the U.S.–Japan relationship in the 1980s. In the fast-evolving 1990s, these differences could grow even sharper. As the United States seeks to refashion its worldwide defense posture, American expectations that an ever more prosperous Japan should bear a larger share of the costs of global security could become more pronounced. And in sharp contrast to past patterns, Japanese elites highly critical of U.S. economic performance and less deferential to U.S. global leadership could be much more vigorous in resisting these expectations. Thus, the presumed consonance of American and Japanese security interests may prove more problematic in the future.

Japan’s behavior during the Gulf crisis captures some of these possibilities. American expectations of Japan were both financial and political. Despite former Prime Minister Kaifu’s endorsement of U.S. policy, and despite the clear implications of the Gulf crisis for Japan’s long-term energy requirements, Tokyo’s early support seemed equivocal and hardly commensurate with the stakes and the risks to its own security and to broader Western interests. More fundamentally, however, this equivocation reflected a deep unease within the leadership about altering the terms of reference governing Japan’s contribution to the security alliance. When Japan ultimately pledged a far larger contribution in support of Desert Storm, it appeared more a gesture to fend off American criticisms than a deeply felt contribution to collective security. When Kaifu (at the behest of then secretary general of the Liberal Democratic Party, Ichiro Ozawa) belatedly proposed sending Japanese noncombatants to the Gulf, the initiative was defeated resoundingly by factional rivals in the party and heavily criticized by opposition politicians. (Many neighboring states also voiced strong concerns about the implications of such a step.) Kaifu’s defeat was in part attributable to his domestic weakness; a stronger prime minister might well have done better. But it also demonstrated the increased willingness of some Japanese leaders to take issue with the United States on a vital security issue. Had the U.S. victory in the Gulf War proved more costly in lives and money, the reverberations of Japan’s arm’s-length policy would have been far greater.

Even independent of a major crisis, Japanese officials are already more actively exploring their longer-term policy options. At the ASEAN post-ministerial meetings during August 1991, for example, senior Japanese officials for the first time undertook discussions with their ASEAN counterparts that were explicitly focused on regional security. Japan has also pursued the resumption or development of closer relations with China, North Korea, and Vietnam much more vigorously than the United States has done, suggesting a foreign policy orientation less closely coordinated than before. Japan’s increasingly activist stance with respect to regional peacekeeping and its ultimate involvement in Persian Gulf minesweeping operations following Operation Desert Storm are also worthy of note. In addition, as the only Asian member of the Group of Seven, Japan assumes a tacit role as spokesman for the interests of various neighboring states. None of these activities are necessarily divergent from American policy preferences. Over time, however, Japanese officials will surely give

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6See Benjamin et al. (1991).
greater voice to their own policy judgments and prerogatives as representatives of a sovereign state, without simply deferring to American preferences.

Thus, American expectations of an open-ended U.S.–Japan partnership have assumed a largely compliant, accommodating Japan and a congruence of American and Japanese interests. Neither assumption seems assured for the longer term, especially as Japan further enhances its economic stature and technological autonomy. To be sure, a substantial leadership consensus in Japan still favors maintaining the alliance. Few in Tokyo advocate a political and security posture independent of the United States, although many have begun to worry about the possibility of a major divergence in relations that could spur domestic support for such a proposition. Both states recognize that a rupture of the relationship would be an unmitigated disaster, with shock waves that would radically alter security calculations all around the Pacific Rim. But the easy congruence and coordination of American and Japanese policies may increasingly prove a thing of the past, especially as the “security glue” of the Cold War becomes less binding. Although the relationship need not become adversarial, growing numbers of Japanese seem intent upon making a more independent determination of their country’s interests. Voices in Japan have also become more assertive in their depiction of Japan as an incompletely sovereign state, giving vent to frustrations that have generally remained submerged in leadership debate.

Should larger changes begin to materialize in Japanese-American relations, they could pose a major challenge to U.S. regional policy. In Europe, although various “crises of confidence” have periodically intruded upon U.S. dealings with its major allies, the durability of the NATO structure has tended to temper the consequences. (France’s withdrawal from NATO command arrangements represents the principal dissonant case.) By contrast, if a crisis were to arise in U.S.–Japan ties, the bilateral relationship would not be cushioned by a multilateral alliance framework. In the past, this risk was mitigated by two factors that constrained a larger breakdown of relations. First, even as the USSR reduced its threats to various neighbors, there was no appreciable lessening of the potential threat posed by Soviet naval and air power to Japanese security. Second, as Seizaburo Sato has observed, U.S.–Japanese economic interdependence has retained a “mutual assured destruction” quality: neither state has been even remotely prepared to incur the consequences of a large-scale rupture of relations.9

But the constraining power of both factors could diminish in the 1990s. With the implosion of the former USSR, the Soviet threat no longer serves as the central long-term security challenge that the two leaderships face. North Korea’s capacity to undermine stability in Northeast Asia remains a shared concern of Japan and the United States, but the North Korean threat—although palpable and highly worrisome to both—lacks the scope, scale, and consequence of that previously posed by the USSR. The Soviet threat provided the basis for greatly enhanced U.S.–Japanese security cooperation in the 1980s, including a significant upgrading of Japan’s naval and air capabilities. At the same time, heightened U.S.–Japan technological and economic competition (and the increasing politicization of these rivalries on both sides of the Pacific) threatens to undermine the collaboration and close interdependence forged by the world’s two largest economies. The challenge to both leaderships in the 1990s will be to define a bilateral political and strategic concept appropriate to very different inter-

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9For further discussion, consult Sato (1990), especially pp. 70–72, 82–83.
national circumstances, one that can absorb at least some of the potential shocks that could undermine the relationship. This concept must be agreeable to both America and Japan, but it must also win broad support along the Pacific Rim. Without that support from other regional actors, the U.S.–Japan relationship could overwhelm the highly diversified ties that the United States seeks to maintain in East Asia and the Pacific. At the same time, however, the United States must guard against any temptation to play unduly on regional fears of Japan as a means of promoting the necessity of its own presence, even as it must remain attentive to those fears.

A reconfigured Japanese-American relationship in the 1990s would undoubtedly have important implications for future regional security. Should the United States decide that it can prudently reduce its military deployments in Asia well below present levels, it would leave intact the infrastructure, equipment, and doctrine that Japan has steadily developed over the past several decades to counter Soviet military power. Although Japan’s capabilities remain almost exclusively defensive, it also has latent potential to assume a larger regional security role. There is little activity at present in Japan that suggests pronounced movement in this direction, but such a possibility deeply worries many of Japan’s neighbors. Thus, the transition away from the Cold War era must minimize any incentives or imperatives that could lead Japan to pursue an autonomous defense policy that moves toward a power projection capability.

At the same time, however, Japan’s longer-term security calculations will depend on the durability of its relations with the United States. To Washington, Tokyo is both political-military partner and economic rival; the relative balance between the two views could well turn on the specific challenges of regional security and bilateral economic ties. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s military power posed a global as well as regional challenge, providing a clear basis for heightened U.S.–Japan political and security cooperation. Absent an appropriate redefinition of the relationship, the prospects for sustaining equivalent cooperation in the future are much less certain. This tendency could be accelerated by heightened (and increasingly nationalistic) responses in both countries to mounting economic differences. Generational changes could also be a potent factor: future Japanese leaders may be far less prepared to acquiesce to American expectations and urgings. In a world where the distinctions between ally and adversary could become far more blurred, Japanese elites could perceive less value in close identification with U.S. regional policy.

Yet the acute sensitivities of Tokyo’s neighbors to Japanese international activism (particularly in the military arena) bear notice. For all the differences and grievances between Washington and Tokyo, the United States (in the form of its military forces and as ultimate guarantor of Japanese security) remains to many Japanese their only friend in a world of hostile states. American actions, therefore, should not convey to Japan that it is vulnerable and without a dependable ally, a perception that could well trigger highly nationalistic responses to the detriment of all. At the same time, the United States needs to

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10Reaction to the “1 percent ceiling” on Japanese defense expenditure captures the sharp divergence of perceptions of Japan’s security role between the United States and Asia. To American critics of Japan, this restraint typified the unreasonable restrictions that Tokyo long imposed on its contribution to common security needs. To Japan’s neighbors, 1 percent of GNP represented an enormous amount of money, given the absolute size of the Japanese economy. Surpassing this threshold in 1987, therefore, was a source of alarm in Asia, not a cause for satisfaction.
make clear that it has a vital stake in sustaining a multifaceted cooperative relationship with Japan, including a continued if reconfigured defense relationship that is less "threat driven." In the 1990s, Tokyo will seek an international role commensurate with its aspirations, accomplishments, and capabilities; this is very likely to require a renegotiated strategic bargain if Japan and the United States are to sustain close collaboration in the future. It is imperative that a robust relationship with the United States remain integral to long-term Japanese policy; furthering this objective will be crucial to strategic calculations all along the Pacific Rim.

The Primacy of Economics

The most remarkable dimension of the Pacific Rim's emergence has been its economic development. Since the early 1960s, Japan, Korea, and other Asian states have recorded sustained rates of economic growth unparalleled in history, reshaping the global economy in the process. Although there have been variations from case to case, the prevailing pattern has entailed very rapid export-led growth, ultimately including capital-intensive industrial development and innovation and production in high technology. Over time, East Asia's rapid developers have sought to spur domestic growth and much higher levels of intraregional trade; some have become principal sources of international capital. And in a reversal of the 1950s and 1960s, when most regional states were economically weak, politically unstable, and unable to defend their own interests, the majority of regional actors are now economically vibrant and increasingly capable of shaping their own future.

This transition characterizes the central change and challenge confronting the United States all along the Pacific Rim. Over the past four decades, the United States has been both a partner and a beneficiary of Asia's extraordinary economic and political transformation. Asian states looked first to American investment and to an American market, and this preference spawned flourishing societal and institutional connections that continue to develop. In economic development, political and security relations, trade and technology flows, investment patterns, cultural ties, and the growing role of Asian immigrants in American technological development and as a political constituency, the United States has become inextricably intertwined with the nations and peoples of Asia and the Pacific. Although America's historical and institutional bonds across the Atlantic are much more deeply rooted, a dense fabric now links America to the Pacific as well.

Thus, the implications of Asia's economic and technological dynamism loom especially large for the United States. Five of America's ten largest overseas trading partners are Asian states. Two-way U.S. trade with Japan is approximately three times that with Germany, America's second-largest overseas partner. The Pacific Rim has also become a rapidly growing market for American products and services: Japan alone buys more from the United States than do Germany, France, and Italy combined. U.S. exports to Japan more than doubled between 1985 and 1990; only Canada surpasses Japan as a market for U.S. goods. Financial and investment flows from Asia also grew extraordinarily, especially during the latter half of the 1980s. Finally, and by no means least, East Asia (and Japan in particular) is at the forefront of a global revolution in information and communication technologies, with

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its imprint keenly felt in a growing array of products and services, including U.S. weapons systems and related defense technologies.\textsuperscript{12}

These patterns have spawned complex political and economic responses across the Pacific. Although it is a major oversimplification to posit a single East Asian development model, the perception runs deep, prompting from some American observers a complex mix of admiration, envy, resentment, and fear. To many, economic strength represents the true underpinning of the emerging regional order, with ideology or military capabilities now far less relevant as instruments of influence and national power. Some assert that the focus of the United States has been misplaced on military rivalry with the USSR, with its concomitant and costly commitments to regional security (including the defense of Japan) purportedly occurring at the expense of relative economic growth, thereby undermining America's competitive position in the international economy. At the same time, there has been a major debate about what the sources of long-term economic dynamism might be, and whether economic nationalism or economic interdependence represents an appropriate strategy to enhance American economic well-being. Without question, however, the economic and technological development of the Pacific Rim increasingly dominates U.S. views of the region, which in turn shape U.S. political and strategic interests.\textsuperscript{13}

Larger debates about the continued relevance of military power underlie these differences in perspective. Some see America's focus on military capabilities as a relic of the past that no longer corresponds to regional realities. Although most observers would concede the singular importance of U.S. security guarantees when postwar Asian economic development was first launched, they see far less relevance in sustaining such commitments and force levels now, under conditions of diminished vulnerability and much lower levels of overt military threat. This debate, however, is highly skewed. Although many believe that Asia developed while America armed, the reality has always been much more complex. For example, many of Asia's rapid developers confronted acute threats to their security, and they sustained high levels of military expenditure while they were also pursuing economic growth. At present, most of the region's dynamic economic powers continue to sustain high rates of defense spending. None demonstrate much confidence that low levels of armament will assure their well-being and national sovereignty in a highly competitive era.

Even in an era of increased economic interdependence in the Pacific, many manifestations of the Pacific Rim's economic growth remain highly nationalistic. Much of the Pacific Rim's economic future depends on the degree to which any single actor or coalition dominates the region as a whole, with Japanese economic power uppermost on the list of concerns.\textsuperscript{14} The Japanese economy dwarfs all others in the region: for example, South Korea's GNP is still only approximately 6 percent of Japan's. The industrial base of many of Asia's rapid developers also relies to a significant extent on Japanese technology and investment capital. The interconnections between Japan and various national economies along the Pacific Rim thus run very deep, and they have become even more intertwined in recent years. European economic integration in 1992 could trigger major shifts in the global economy, and this also looms very large in regional calculations. Many states fear that the force of events will sub-

\textsuperscript{12}U.S. Department of Defense (1989).
\textsuperscript{13}See, for example, Gourevitch (1989).
\textsuperscript{14}See Yeh, Sze, and Levin (1990).
sume them under a yen trading bloc, diminishing their sovereignty in the process. To counteract this prospect, regional states have developed various institutional frameworks to facilitate Asia's future economic development, e.g., the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework. Such a mechanism is variously deemed a countervailing instrument to constrain Japanese economic domination, a means to inhibit national economic rivalries and induce collaboration rather than competition, or an alternative long-term economic strategy for the region as a whole. The enhanced attention to these concepts underscores the magnitude of regional concerns about maintaining national autonomy in a period of profound realignment of global economic forces. Economic realities, far more than the precise configurations of military forces or formal security mechanisms, are increasingly likely to shape future leadership calculations along the Pacific Rim.

An alternative approach, proffered by Malaysian leaders, has argued for an East Asian Economic Group. Rather than moving to constrain Japanese power, this proposal consciously seeks to incorporate various Asian economies in a collaborative system while excluding non-Asian states, notably the United States and Australia. (A subsequent reformulation, called the East Asian Economic Caucus, sought to diminish concerns about the exclusivity that the original concept had propounded.) The exclusionary character of the original arrangement was highly objectionable to the United States and others omitted from it, since it deliberately sought to restrict participation in the longer-term economic dynamics of the region. But its promulgation underscores the risks to American interests should means emerge to limit future U.S. involvement in the Pacific. Thus, a continuing goal of U.S. regional strategy must be to assure an open trading system and full American participation in the emergent forms of economic and institutional association.

What do the Pacific's shifting economic relationships imply for America's future regional military posture? The U.S. force posture, although influenced by American economic interests in the Pacific, will still be shaped predominantly by America's global and regional security requirements. At the same time, however, the U.S. forward presence provides incontestable definition to the broader spectrum of America's regional interests. Should this presence diminish to a point where regional states no longer deem American power sufficiently engaged and committed, then the United States would no longer be able to wield influence in the Pacific Rim commensurate with the region's strategic importance. Under such circumstances, regional states would increasingly define their political and strategic goals without equivalent regard for and attention to American interests. In such a scenario, therefore, a lead American role in shaping the Rim's future could no longer be assured.

At the same time, there are important yet insufficiently appreciated interconnections between economic and other forms of national power. For example, Japan's economic presence (in particular, Japanese investment in East Asia) presently dwarfs that of the United States. Numerous leaders in the region (particularly in Southeast Asia, where Japanese economic penetration is especially marked) voice mounting concerns that a diminished U.S. political and military presence (in conjunction with a lower American investment profile) will only increase the likelihood of Japanese economic and political domination. Absent a countervailing U.S. role, it is asserted, regional states may conclude that their room for maneuver is much diminished. But this circumstance does not readily translate into specific levels and forms of American military involvement. Influence through the use of economic levers is more subtle yet more pervasive than the patterns of political-military rivalry that dominated American
experiences in Asia for much of the Cold War. Economics constitutes the lifeblood of
decisionmaking in Asian societies, and many leaders are urging the United States to give far
greater weight to economic factors in its future Asian strategy. The challenge for U.S. policy,
therefore, is to embed its security role in a larger conception of its long-term stake in the
Pacific.

In essence, U.S. policy must seek to sustain credible engagement that reassures smaller
powers of its commitment to the region but does not undermine the even more consequential
Japanese-American relationship. A robust and vibrant American economic role will be es-
sential to maintaining a comprehensive U.S. profile in the region, but it cannot stand alone.
Thus, long-term American influence will derive from a complex mix of economic, political,
and security roles. An imbalance in one dimension could stimulate negative consequences in
the others. The future American stake in the Pacific will depend on maintaining sufficient
credibility along all three dimensions of national power, judiciously combining the roles of
political balancer, security partner, and economic competitor. Means must also be sought to
facilitate collaborative security arrangements with increasingly capable but also highly
diverse regional actors, each with its own policy agenda and needs. In a world devoid of a
central compelling threat but still marked by widespread uncertainty about future power
alignments, the United States is venturing into uncharted territory. We shall return to this
consideration in our discussion of future alliance relationships.

The Future of the Asian Leninist States

During the 1950s and 1960s, China, North Korea, and Vietnam dominated U.S. regional
threat assessments. The Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s enabled Beijing to
move toward more constructive relations with the industrial democracies and with many of
its Pacific neighbors. These economic and political linkages expanded greatly during the
1980s, as China shifted its policy emphasis toward tension reduction and rapid economic
growth. North Korea and Vietnam, however, remained mired in isolation and economic
stagnation. Pyongyang continued to pose a direct military threat to South Korea, and Hanoi
still sought to achieve political and military dominion over all of Indochina and a larger re-
gional role. As a consequence, few neighbors of North Korea and Vietnam saw incentives to
initiate regular relations with either state; both therefore remained totally disconnected from
the Pacific boom of the past two decades.

At the outset of 1990s, however, all three states are encountering huge political challenges,
which for Pyongyang and Hanoi are compounded by acute economic crises.15 In all three
capitals, aged revolutionary-era elites entrenched in power for decades uneasily maintain
their grasp on power, fearing that the fate of Marxist-Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe
and the USSR awaits them as well. To varying degrees, all three systems recognize the need
for economic change, but none are prepared to incur the potential political risks of rapid re-
form.

15China's economic problems are also substantial, but (in view of a decade of economic reform and China's major
involvement with the Pacific Rim economies) its difficulties are qualitatively different and not nearly as acute as
those facing North Korea and Vietnam.
The Chinese, having encouraged widespread economic change and exponential growth in the country's political and economic dealings with the West over the past decade, now fear that corrosive foreign influences and "bourgeois values" threaten the Party's claim to absolute authority. Following the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the leadership repressed moves toward political change but still sought to guarantee social and economic stability, especially in China's politically volatile cities. This has quieted the political climate for the moment, while various presumptive successors maneuver for position and advantage. Thus the process of change in China, though not reversed, has been placed on hold, to await the outcome of the inevitable struggle for the succession to Deng Xiaoping and his aged colleagues.

China's internal political trauma also had significant implications for its external posture, especially with the United States. Although Chinese trade with the United States has continued to grow (most dramatically through a major export push to the United States through Hong Kong), Sino-American relations have corroded appreciably. Even before China's political crisis, the strategic logic that animated U.S.–China ties for much of the 1970s and 1980s had largely dissipated. The steady improvements in Soviet-American relations during the late 1980s and the parallel normalization of Sino-Soviet relations deprived Sino–U.S. ties of their previous security rationale. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, the congruence of Chinese and U.S. security interests seemed increasingly questionable. U.S.–Chinese military-to-military ties have remained on hold, and China's policy stance on a range of crucial security and arms control issues (for example, restraints on missile sales to the Third World) continues to conflict with those of the United States.

Although neither Washington nor Beijing would welcome a severe degrading of relations, the limits of these ties now seem clearer. The Chinese appear increasingly discomfited by a world in which the United States is the lone superpower. Beijing's support for U.S. policy during the Gulf War ranged from neutral to highly equivocal, and policy coordination on other international questions remains very difficult. Although some analysts argue that a "renormalization" of relations is only a question of time and the passage of a few old men, Chinese and American policy could easily continue to operate along divergent paths. China's economic incentives unquestionably argue for a steady expansion of relations with the United States and other major Western powers, but the imperatives of Party control could push events in a different direction.

China's future is also affected by events close to its own borders. It increasingly dominates Hong Kong's politics (reversion to Chinese sovereignty is to occur in mid-1997, but Beijing is asserting de facto control much earlier). It is also growing concerned about the implications of pro-independence sentiment in a rapidly democratizing Taiwan. Notwithstanding the rapid growth of economic ties and "semiofficial" contact between the two Chinese regimes, the prospects for an accommodation on the mainland's terms seem increasingly dim. With a brittle, highly vulnerable regime in Beijing increasingly testy about its political prerogatives, latent animosities could generate growing political and military tensions.

A critical factor in this process is the coming struggle for succession to the country's leadership. There is a wide range of possible outcomes, any of which could have a pronounced effect on China's future policy orientation toward the outside world.\(^{16}\) At least four different

\(^{16}\) This paragraph draws on a forthcoming RAND report by Michael Swaine and Jonathan Pollack on policy developments in China since Tiananmen and their implications for the country's future international posture.
scenarios seem plausible: (1) a heightening of political and economic reform following the death of China's aged leaders; (2) continued immobilism at the top, with a weak, divided center unable to reestablish effective control over the system as a whole; (3) reassertion of a strong central leadership determined to uphold China's sovereign prerogatives (e.g., toward Hong Kong and Taiwan and control of sea-based resources); and (4) the outright breakdown of even the semblance of ruling authority by the Chinese Communist Party. We will make no attempt here to assess the relative likelihood of any of these scenarios. All, however, could mean very different Chinese policies toward the outside world; some might also produce divergent policies between the United States and some of China's immediate neighbors. Some of the scenarios have significant implications for the role of China's armed forces. A more assertive, nationalistic government, for example, could press its claims with increased vigor, raising latent concerns (especially in Southeast Asia) about China's longer-term political and military intentions. Thus, China's political, military, and economic evolution seems certain to have important consequences for regional security, in particular Beijing's incentives and capacities for accommodation with its neighbors. These issues all warrant careful scrutiny, and the outcomes remain highly uncertain, as are the implications for U.S.–China relations over the longer term.

Given all this near-term uncertainty, China is likely to give off very mixed signals for some time, as the regime seeks to protect and enhance those dimensions of external behavior vital to its stability (e.g., foreign trade and investment). At bottom, the longer-term prospects for the regime will depend on its economic performance. Much of China's rural economy and areas of coastal China have already made a decisive break with socialist practices; it is extremely doubtful that these changes can be reversed in a major way. The larger question is whether this economic dynamism will ultimately trigger pressures for political change that the leadership is unable to suppress or channel to its advantage. China's policy preoccupations, therefore, will remain intensely internal. Two goals—weathering the death of the elders without severe political instability, and retaining a modicum of political control over the mainland (thereby assuring the survival of the communist regime in some form)—will dominate the leadership agenda.

The preoccupation with domestic factors could spill over into foreign policy, especially if leaders judged their political stake with the West less important to their well-being and in some contexts detrimental to the authority of the state. It is not difficult to imagine the Chinese keeping the relationship with the United States and a highly unstable Russia at arm's length, and instead seeking a higher profile with its neighbors—who fear the consequences of internal instability in China, who see coastal China as a highly promising long-term market, and who are much more accepting of highly authoritarian politics. But an “Asian-based,” highly nationalistic foreign policy presumes an accommodation with Japanese power that many Chinese leaders would find highly distasteful. The range of possibilities for China's external behavior—and its capacity to sustain accommodation with the outside world—remains ominously broad and unsettled.

Even more vexing prospects confront North Korea. All major trends on the peninsula are working dramatically against the North and in favor of the South. The economic balance of power has continued to move decisively and overwhelmingly to South Korea's advantage. Neither the former Soviet Union nor China is any longer prepared to proffer the economic aid to North Korea that earlier helped cushion the severe problems imposed by Pyongyang's
highly autarkic economic strategy. The collapse of Marxist-Leninist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union has further undermined and isolated Pyongyang, as the North's erstwhile socialist allies have all shifted their allegiances to Seoul. The resounding successes of South Korea's "Nordpolitik" have been especially humiliating to the North. Even before the failed coup, Moscow's adoption of an explicit two-Korea policy severely undermined Pyongyang's longstanding claim to serve as the sole legitimate government on the Korean peninsula. China's steadily upgraded relations with South Korea, although thus far avoiding direct offense to Pyongyang's political sensibilities, are hardly more welcome: they suggest Beijing's readiness to pursue an expanding de facto two-Korea policy. Kim Il Sung's political options appear increasingly unpalatable, undermining the already questionable prospects for a successful passage of power to his son.

Numerous analysts, for example, predict a "German scenario," with an abrupt collapse of communist rule and a rapid reunification of the two Koreas following the death of Kim Il Sung. Pyongyang is seeking to resist this scenario, which could be abetted by increasingly desperate economic circumstances. Given the extreme isolation of the North Korean population, it is not possible to measure the attitudes of the citizenry, although officials in the North will quietly acknowledge the country's severe economic plight. The East German case suggests that enormous societal discontent can be masked by the veneer of stability that totalitarian regimes present to the outside world. But stability can be maintained in fact only so long as the regime's claim to absolute power remains unchallenged.

North Korea is also hoping that a higher diplomatic profile and a generally more accommodating posture toward the outside world will yield some economic and political gains and "buy time" for the regime. Intermittent discussions with the South Korean government, including exchanges at the prime ministerial level as well as meetings between visiting delegations and the presidents of North and South, have been part of this strategy. The signing of a North-South nonaggression pact in December 1991 was the most pronounced manifestation of Pyongyang's shifting foreign policy strategy, and it appears to portend acceptance of a "two-Korea" framework through which the North hopes to resist absorption by an increasingly powerful South. Negotiations with Japan over diplomatic relations have proceeded fitfully, with Pyongyang disabused of any expectations of securing large-scale Japanese economic compensation for its half-century of colonial rule. North Korea has also sought to engage the United States, hoping that negotiations might produce pressures to speed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula. Finally, the North had to concede the inevitable and accept simultaneous admission of both Koreas to the United Nations, a step it had fiercely and successfully resisted for more than two decades. These activities have helped fuel expectations within some South Korean circles that a breakthrough on reunification may be imminent. Unification (especially in the aftermath of the events in Germany) is an issue laden with emotion for many Koreans, and part of the North's calculation may be that it can insinuate itself in South Korea's internal debates over this issue.

Despite the North's seeming accommodation with the South, there are also more ominous portents. The most worrisome trend is North Korea's progression toward a nuclear weapons capability. Notwithstanding repeated North Korean denials of either the intention or the ca-
pability to pursue such a program, the evidence of such activity is incontrovertible and growing. Pyongyang probably calculates that a nuclear or near-nuclear capability could prove its ultimate "trump card" in deterring its adversaries in a crisis, and perhaps sees it as a "bargaining chip" to elicit increased economic assistance from the industrialized world, especially from Japan. It also views such a capability as a means to move the United States toward negotiations about American military dispositions and intentions on the peninsula.

In the aftermath of President Bush's initiative to eliminate entire categories of tactical nuclear weapons, the outlook for a negotiated arrangement on these sensitive policy concerns has improved significantly. But any such understandings will be absolutely contingent on highly intrusive inspection regimes that Pyongyang has thus far resisted. Barring an unexpected negotiating breakthrough, therefore, it is possible that North Korea will continue to progress toward this ultimate security goal, potentially stimulating the most destabilizing of repercussions throughout Northeast Asia. The prospect of a highly vulnerable, isolated regime buttressed by even a rudimentary nuclear capability remains a very worrisome possibility; it also argues for continued U.S. prudence in any additional changes in its military deployments on the peninsula.

Such a scenario, however, assumes the longevity of the North Korean regime. Many analysts regard this prospect as extremely unlikely in the post-Kim II Sung era. On the assumption of the "quick collapse" hypothesis, a reunified Korean peninsula would represent a profound change in the regional security environment and in U.S. defense requirements. At present, a renewed Korean conflict is the principal contingency for which U.S. forces must prepare. A reunified peninsula would eliminate that contingency entirely, and it would engender substantial policy shifts in a more complex regional balance of power.

What changes might a reunified Korea induce in Northeast Asia? Although the task of melding the two highly disparate states would likely encounter major problems of the sort now faced in Germany, ultimately one could expect an economically robust, militarily powerful Korea to emerge. It would represent a potent new force in East Asia. The region as a whole could evolve in a number of different directions, including one that would see much more intensive maneuvering and rivalry among China, Japan, Korea, and Russia. Notwithstanding the economic interconnections in Northeast Asia, nationalism remains a very potent force, with far less multilateralism of the sort that characterizes the emergent Europe. But regional incentives to explore avenues for heightened collaboration would also be much enhanced by a unified Korea.

The United States could well emerge as the principal political and security balancer in the context of a reunified peninsula. Given the uncertainties that such a transition would entail, as well as the pronounced asymmetries in the power of the various regional actors, the United States might be positioned to assume a distinctive if substantially reconfigured regional security role in the aftermath of reunification. This would be likely to extend to much more active consultations with the various Northeast Asian powers over a longer-term security structure, one that would seek to constrain any tendencies for unrestricted arms expansion, possibly including new pressures for nuclear proliferation. Without a strong stabilizing

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17 For one such authoritative denial, see Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam's interview with Jane's Defence Weekly, September 14, 1991, p. 492.
18 A forthcoming project paper by Kogodan Oh analyzes some of these possibilities.
presence, the possibilities for heightened political and military rivalry could make Northeast Asia a much more competitive (and potentially dangerous) locale.

Vietnam's political and economic options also suggest a complex mix of possibilities, with potentially large consequences for all of Southeast Asia. There are growing indications of intragenerational tensions and polarization within the Communist Party, which (unlike its Chinese counterpart) has long taken satisfaction in its ability to avoid such factional struggles. But decades of war and economic mismanagement have left the country impoverished and exhausted. The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia was induced in part by Soviet pressure, but it was also based on expectations that doing so would enhance Vietnam's political and economic opportunities within Southeast Asia, extending to Japan and possibly the United States. Vietnam's growing political accommodation with China is part of this process, although longstanding animosities over Cambodia and the potential for a heightened resource rivalry in the South China Sea still place limits on the relationship. But diminished Russian interest in sustaining its military presence in Southeast Asia and extremely worrisome economic conditions leave Vietnam with few options. Its shared political fate with China has required the end of major antagonisms with Beijing, but it is even more urgent that Vietnam break out of its economic isolation from the capitalist world.

Projections of political and security configurations in Southeast Asia, therefore, must consider the possible futures of Vietnam. Even as economic reform appears to be taking hold, revolutionary-era political and military leaders worry about the erosion of Party control and the flagging support among younger leaders for long-entrenched policies. Many observers, however, believe that Hanoi's acute economic vulnerabilities will compel Vietnamese political restraint and more constructive engagement with the region. As Vietnam seeks fuller engagement, irrespective of the regime's internal political makeup, all states of the region can address Southeast Asia's longer-term political and security configurations without having to give comparable attention to the power rivalries that have dominated regional politics for more than three decades.

Thus the passage of the Cold War opens up a wide range of possibilities in Southeast Asia. The severity of Vietnam's economic circumstances seem almost certain to compel a continuing accommodation with the ASEAN states, with Japan, and with the United States. The scale, scope, and consequences of such normalized relations will depend on a complex mix of internal and external factors. But Vietnam is unlikely to soon resume an antagonistic pose toward the outside world, and this creates an unparalleled opportunity for the region as a whole to enhance and expand the structures and arrangements for political and economic co-operation. Although Cambodia's future remains filled with uncertainties and Vietnam's own political and economic problems will be difficult to solve, a confrontational era is finally drawing to a close. Vietnam's external policies in the 1990s will test the possibilities of the post–Cold War era and also reshape its internal political and economic structures, quite possibly in ways that are difficult to anticipate.

Reshaping U.S. Security Arrangements: The Effects of Domestic Political Change

Asia is approaching the passage from power of the first generation of postindependence leaders. Some of these political figures are undertaking succession arrangements in highly deliberate fashion; others are propelled by social and political forces that are much more difficult
to control. The generations that are beginning to assume power frequently have had little
direct experience with the transition to statehood or with economic backwardness. Their
associations with the United States often do not encompass earlier periods of acute political
instability and intense economic struggle. Thus, their political values tend to reflect the
rapid growth and increased autonomy of recent decades, not the very different experiences of
their political elders.

As the United States seeks to fashion new mechanisms for security consultation and coopera-
tion, the policy predispositions of new generations of regional leadership will prove a pivotal
variable. Their capacity to work effectively with their neighbors as well as the major powers
has yet to be fully tested; in some instances, the transition to fuller democratic rule promises
to be unsteady. These factors do not necessarily presage major problems, but the degree to
which regional elites demonstrate political acumen and internal cohesion certainly will affect
each state's capacity to conceptualize and manage its larger security requirements. The
Philippines are an especially salient example. The rancorous negotiations with the United
States over revised basing arrangements reflected Filipino insularity as well as the country's
extraordinary (and unhealthy) dependence on American power. The Filipino senate's subse-
quent rejection of the agreements and the consequent decision by President Aquino to rec-
ommend a withdrawal of remaining American forces by 1994 proved the ultimate outcome of
these emotionally charged negotiations. Although the disputes had already degraded the
long-term value of the bases to American defense planners, the final outcome demonstrated
the inability of leaders in Manila to undertake reasoned deliberations of their long-term
stake in close relations with the United States.

In other cases, democratization and enhanced nationalism have had a much healthier im-
 pact, manifesting national aspirations to a fuller say in the country's future policy directions.
For example, the assumption of increased command responsibilities by South Korean mili-
tary leaders reflects an intention and ability to work collaboratively with senior American
officers to reshape the modalities of the U.S.–South Korea alliance. Regional states are
coming of age; many want to refashion the political bargains struck when they were highly
vulnerable and far more dependent on outside assistance. In this context, the United States
must prepare to face much greater concern about sovereignty and accountability in relation
to its military presence in various national settings. It must expect demands for fuller disclo-
sure of U.S. weapon capabilities (including the nuclear dimension), sensitivities over
American control of real estate, concern about the environmental effects of U.S. military ac-
tivities, and lingering fears in some countries that the U.S. presence could introduce out-of-
area security problems to locations otherwise not subject to them. These are inescapable
realities of the forward deployment of American power; regional states will have to weigh
these concerns against their expectations of a continued U.S. presence and various forms of
U.S. military assistance. But the United States, in turn, will need to be more attentive to
complex domestic realities that will shape the character and form of its future military
presence in Asia and the Pacific.

The larger challenges for various regional states, however, concern their relations with one
another rather than with the United States. This is particularly relevant to Southeast Asia.
In Northeast Asia, longstanding bilateral alliances and a still-dominant U.S. presence re-
strain impulses in Korea and Japan that could undermine their relations with one another.
(A unified Korean peninsula, however, would be a more profound test of the viability of exist-
ing relationships. Depending on the outcome of the political succession in the North and its aftermath, the potential rivalry between Japan and a unified Korea could pose a very different challenge to U.S. alliance relations with both.) Among the ASEAN states, highly complex and ambiguous patterns are at work. Despite the repeated harangues about undue great-power (i.e., U.S.) influence from the more nonaligned members of ASEAN (i.e., Malaysia and Indonesia), American forward-deployed power in Southeast Asia remains very limited. In tacit recognition of this fact, various ASEAN members in the late 1980s unobtrusively initiated major new arms acquisition programs that will enable them to pursue more fully their own security objectives in the 1990s. At the same time, different ASEAN members are tentatively expanding their defense cooperation, including intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and increased use of one another's military facilities. These measures, although in a fairly early stage and still predominantly bilateral, suggest growing possibilities for a multilateral security cooperation in Southeast Asia, but extending to Australia as well.19 The framework emerging now, of security cooperation in a subregional setting, is likely to characterize the longer-term policy environment in which U.S. forces will operate.

In a basic sense, however, the strategic perspectives of the ASEAN states remain sharply divided between Indonesia's maritime orientation, with its greater long-term concerns about Chinese power, and the more continental perspectives of Thailand and Singapore, which find expression in different perceptions of external threat. At the same time, the disparities in the size, capabilities, and internal situations of various ASEAN states impart quite different security needs.20 Thus it is no accident that Singapore has taken the lead in reaching understandings about future U.S. use of its air and naval facilities, as well as in urging the Philippines to renew the base arrangements with the United States. Singapore exhibits no particular qualms about a world where American power is highly dominant, whereas Indonesia and Malaysia (both with large Islamic populations and neither of which was ever closely associated with the United States) voice unease about such a state of affairs. In a post–Cold War environment, with fading concerns about Vietnamese expansion, these differences in perspective will pose a continuing challenge to the capacity of the ASEAN states to artfully mute their differences and devise a broader concept of regional integration. To the degree that the differences cannot be bridged, it makes the region as a whole much more subject to penetration or undue influence by extraregional powers. Japan and China rank uppermost on this list, with some voicing a longer-term concern about India as well.

It seems clear, therefore, that regional states will face continued challenges to their capacity for collaboration and cooperation, even as a reasoned and balanced understanding of future great-power roles becomes more important than before. This is the complex web in which the United States must seek a security role commensurate with its capabilities and appropriate to future regional realities.

TOWARD A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The Pacific has entered an era that promises uncertainty as well as great opportunity. The United States retains a large stake in this future, and it seeks to be fully engaged with re-

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19See, in particular, Ball (1991a), especially Chapters 4 and 5.
20For a very helpful overview, see Alagappa (1991a).
gional states in the process of change. But four major policy factors are redefining the potential dimensions and scope of the U.S. regional security role: (1) the perception of threat has been radically altered; (2) U.S. defense resources are contracting; (3) the United States is expecting increasingly prosperous allies to pull more of their own weight; and (4) the security outlook in less stable regions appears more threatening, thus warranting an enhanced commitment of U.S. military attention and resources to other areas.\textsuperscript{21} The Gulf War and its aftermath vividly capture the last factor. Development of viable long-term security arrangements for the Persian Gulf will directly impinge upon the deployment of U.S. Pacific-based forces. At the same time, the enhanced importance of prepositioning of equipment and materiel for such contingencies underscores heightened U.S. expectations of its regional allies. In the context of a greatly heightened U.S. emphasis on regional military contingencies, therefore, U.S. political and military understandings in emergency situations become more rather than less important, emphasizing the inclusive, integrated character of future U.S. regional defense policies.\textsuperscript{22}

These observations illustrate the complex demands imposed by the new strategic realities. (See Table 2.1.) Most states in Asia and the Pacific want the United States to assume a leading role, but in a collaborative context. Even as President Bush has noted “a disproportionate [American] responsibility for the kind of military action in pursuit of freedom and against aggression,”\textsuperscript{23} this responsibility cannot be pursued unilaterally. The United States alone has the capability to bring power to bear at great distance, but this will depend on understandings and bargains reached with regional allies and security partners. There is an urgent need for a new strategic vocabulary and corollary ideas and practices appropriate to a world without a singular threat, where highly varied regional threats seem likely to preoc-

### Table 2.1

A Synopsis of Postwar Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Communist Asia</th>
<th>Capitalist Asia</th>
<th>U.S. Political-Security Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s/1960s</td>
<td>Revolutionary upheaval and political-economic consolidation</td>
<td>Beginnings of economic take-off; weak states trying to become strong</td>
<td>Comprehensive, largely unilateral; period of maximum U.S. military commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s/1980s</td>
<td>Expansion of Soviet power; emergence of China</td>
<td>Global emergence of Japan and rapid development of the NICs</td>
<td>Containment/extended deterrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Internal preoccupations; selective adaptation to economic pressures and opportunities</td>
<td>Autonomous growth and political definition</td>
<td>Proportional engagement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{21}For an earlier discussion, consult Pollack and Winnefeld (1990), especially pp. 6–24.

\textsuperscript{22}These considerations, initially presented in President Bush’s Aspen speech of August 2, 1990, increasingly define longer-term U.S. national security objectives.

cupy American defense planners, and where political and security interactions will prove increasingly complex and multifaceted.

One possible strategic concept for the future U.S. regional security role would be a policy of "proportional engagement." We believe this policy accords well with the emergent U.S. regional defense strategy, first articulated by President Bush in his Aspen speech of August 1990. This concept is not focused exclusively on a narrow range of existing threats, but instead seeks to allow for a more diverse range of possibilities (including new forms of security cooperation) that cannot be foreseen at present. Thus, it incorporates a wide spectrum of U.S. roles, interests, and capabilities relevant to the challenges and opportunities that could influence longer-term U.S. policy choices. This strategy seeks to encompass: (1) a capability to respond to specific military threats that may persist or could emerge in the future; (2) the enhancement of working partnerships with Pacific Rim states that would permit policy coordination across a broad range of political, economic, and security scenarios; (3) embedding available U.S. military capabilities within a broader array of policy instruments; (4) channeling U.S. defense resources into those areas where the United States possesses capabilities not available to its regional security partners; (5) wherever possible, achieving "fungibility" of forces across the full range of circumstances where important U.S. interests could be engaged; and (6) imparting flexibility in planning for the uncertainties and unknowns that could affect longer-term U.S. regional security requirements.

In its most elemental sense, proportional engagement assumes a future where the capacity to adapt and respond—including to radical or discontinuous scenarios that are not readily predictable at present—will be crucial. Regional states are seeking to secure their own interests and plan for the longer term; they expect the same from the United States. The United States cannot anticipate all potential political and security alignments that will shape Asia's future. But the United States must be able to impart now that it is committing resources for the longer term. This commitment should be based on an intrinsic stake in the region's future, and not one driven disproportionately by any present or prospective threat.

Absent such a commitment, the United States cannot expect to be fully credible in influencing the perceptions and longer-term calculations of the Pacific Rim states. Proportional engagement, therefore, is a means to an end. The lack of specificity in this concept is deliberate. The United States knows that the Pacific matters deeply to long-term American interests, and that military power will be part of this calculus. Proportional engagement is intended to underscore America's commitment to the region without overcommitting to a specific course of action; in essence, it is the ticket of admission to participate in the Pacific's future.

Toward this end, the United States needs to clarify political and security expectations with respect to U.S. views of its regional partners, regional partners' views of the United States, and regional states' views of one another. This analytic task has begun with the concepts outlined in the DoD Strategic Framework. To consider these issues further, we need to turn attention to various possible force mixes and levels, and how they will interact with future security requirements.
3. SIX FORCE POSTURES

Our success over the years, globally as well as in the Pacific Rim, has been the key contribution to the evolution of the new politico-military conditions that now require us to review our forward-based defense posture.


In this section we define six alternative U.S. force postures for the Pacific Basin. These postures are neither predictions nor objectives. Rather, they reflect six possible alternative states of the world, defined in U.S. military force terms, that span the range of potential security environments suggested in Section 2. Thus, only one of the postures (Posture B) reflects current U.S. policy, as embodied in the force levels outlined in the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI). All the other postures described in this section do not reflect U.S. policy and should therefore be viewed as analytic devices. We also define a number of possible policy and program initiatives that might offer means to compensate partially for weaknesses or vulnerabilities in any given posture.

These postures and possible initiatives provide a basis for the following analyses:

• Assessing regional reactions to force posture changes.
• Identifying policy, strategy, and force changes that might move those reactions in a direction more favorable to the United States.
• Assessing the effectiveness (and risks) associated with a given posture in a range of future contingencies.

In this section we define the postures and initiatives and leave the assessments to Sections 7 and 8.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE POSTURES

The six postures are based on decrements and other variations to the 1990 Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). That FYDP represented the culmination of the Reagan administration defense buildup of the 1980s. Few observers contemplate a larger force in the next decade. Since the focus of this analysis is on fewer DoD resources and how to deal with the possible adverse effects of program reductions, the postures of interest constitute a range of decrements to the high-end FYDP baseline.

The postures fall into three groups: The baseline (A), three deployment or basing variants to the DoD “base force” (B, C, D), and two versions of a force that is about one-third smaller than the baseline (E, F). Consistent with the DoD Strategic Framework and the description of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the base force in the Pacific, the force reductions are taken primarily in U.S. regional ground forces, but all services experience some force decrements.
Aside from these decrements, two deployment variations are portrayed in the postures. In Posture C, U.S. forces are essentially withdrawn from foreign bases and relocated to U.S. sovereign bases and rotated through the region. In Postures D and F, it is assumed that there is a major contingency under way in the Persian Gulf and that USPACOM must provide a major portion of the necessary forces.\footnote{The details of the postures are in Appendix B.}

**Posture A: The Cold War Force.** This force is, in its essentials, the force that helped win the Cold War. Save for modernization, it is the FYDP force through the 1980s and up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In USPACOM it is built around a force of seven carrier battle groups (CVBGs), three Army divisions (including one in Alaska), two Marine expeditionary forces (MEF), and five Air Force tactical fighter wings (TFW). There is an Army division in Korea, a MEF in Okinawa/Hawaii, and two carrier battle groups in the western Pacific and Indian oceans.

In this posture, major exercises were conducted with regional allies (e.g., Team Spirit with the Republic of Korea) and to demonstrate national joint force capabilities (e.g., PACEX). We assume that all Air Force assets have been withdrawn from the Philippines and relocated elsewhere in theater.

**Posture B: The Base Force.** This force is roughly a 15 percent reduction from Posture A. It is an approximation of the USPACOM segment of the base force as that force has been defined in the statements of government officials.\footnote{For example, see the statement of Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the House Armed Services Committee, March 12, 1991. One frequently hears the base force described as some 25 percent smaller than the earlier FYDP force. That figure refers to a global reduction in U.S. forces in terms of personnel, not to any specific region or to force totals. We assume that USPACOM will experience smaller proportional reductions than most other unified commands.} In this posture, ground- and land-based air forces are thinned out in Japan and Korea, but major combat organizations remain in both countries. Naval forces have fewer “deployers”: instead of two carrier battle groups west of Hawaii, there is an average of 1.5 over time. DoD is making the transition to this posture now in Phase I of the *Strategic Framework*. As noted above, this posture reflects current U.S. policy, as represented in EASI force levels.

We assume the exercise tempo and size for this posture to be somewhat reduced from Posture A. PACEX is either eliminated or reduced and replaced by RIMPAC exercises. Other exercises (e.g., Team Spirit and Cobra Gold) are still held, but on a reduced scale compared to Posture A.

**Posture C: Reduced Base Access Force.** This posture is similar in force size to Posture B, but the forces are distributed differently. U.S. forces have withdrawn to U.S. sovereign bases (e.g., Guam). Bases in Japan and Korea are available only for occasional use; no U.S. forces except very austere housekeeping detachments are based there. The forces previously in Korea and Japan have been relocated to Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska.

The assumed rationale for this posture is that American domestic pressures have led to the U.S. decision to relocate the forces. However, this posture might also fit circumstances under which the United States lost host country support (i.e., we were asked to eliminate or reduce our bases). This posture has been called (erroneously) the “Mid-Pacific Strategy” force, on the presumption that such a strategy has received serious DoD consideration. It has been in-
cluded in this analysis to demonstrate an extreme basing and deployment case, as will be seen in Section 4.

**Posture D: Pacific Swing Force.** This posture has the same force size as Posture B, but that force has been “swung” in part to support a contingency in the Persian Gulf. Although all CINC's are providing resources for the contingency, the USPACOM commitment is among the larger ones. The contingency is assumed to be something less in size than Desert Shield/Storm but more than can be handled by forces routinely available in the region.

Navy, Air Force, and Marine forces have been deployed from Hawaii and Japan as well as from the CONUS to meet USPACOM commitments to CINCCENT. The U.S. force posture in Korea is the same as Posture B. There is a noticeable thinning out of forces west of Hawaii. USCINCPAC's capability to simultaneously reinforce Korea is seriously degraded. Major exercises have been canceled and "show the flag" operations largely eliminated.

**Posture E: Lower Budget Force.** This posture is approximately 35 percent smaller than Posture A. It encompasses some of the more severe force posture recommendations suggested by some in the Congress. A single Army brigade remains in Korea, and the carrier battle group presence west of Hawaii has been reduced by a third. Afloat Marine presence in the western Pacific has been eliminated. Ground-based air forces in the theater have been further thinned out. Foreign base access is available to support customary force deployment and rotation patterns, but the size of the reduction implies some alterations and reductions in security commitments as well as the closure of some bases (e.g., parts of the Okinawa complex, Army support in Korea).

**Posture F: Lower Budget Swing Force.** This posture is a composite of Postures D and E: a force that is 35 percent smaller than the A force and is providing major support to CINCCENT in the Persian Gulf. The western Pacific has been stripped of most forces, except for two tactical fighter wings in Japan and Korea and a single brigade in Korea.

Table 3.1 suggests the impact of these force reductions and deployment changes on force presence in the western Pacific. The base force reduces forward presence by roughly a quarter from the baseline. The reduced-base-access posture (C) and the swing-to-the-Gulf posture (D) cut forward presence in half compared to the baseline. The lower-budget posture (E) has a similar effect. But the lower-budget swing posture (F) provides one-third the presence of the baseline (A) and half the presence of the base force posture (B).

### Table 3.1

The Impact of Posture Changes on U.S. Military Presence in the Western Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Presence</th>
<th>Force Posture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-based air</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averaged presence</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: 1.0 = 1990 baseline.
POSSIBLE POLICY AND PROGRAM INITIATIVES

The six postures reflect different U.S. responses to the future regional possibilities outlined in Section 2. There are policy and program variants to these postures that may mitigate some of the disadvantages caused by lower U.S. force sizes and less access to regional bases. We examined 35 possible variants, henceforth called "initiatives." From that number we have selected 12, listed in Table 3.2, that warrant a closer examination to extend and flesh out the DoD Strategic Framework. As noted below, after we began to study these initiatives, several (most prominently President Bush’s September 1991 changes to U.S. theater nuclear weapons policy) were explicitly adopted as official U.S. policy. Our purpose in examining them here is to reaffirm their appropriateness in the context of ongoing changes in U.S. security strategy.

Table 3.2

Core Initiatives That Might Enhance Forward Presence

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Adopt a &quot;proportional engagement&quot; strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Foster a nuclear-free Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Foster confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Reorient U.S. regional base and support structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Revise U.S. theater nuclear weapons policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Increase regional prepositioning of U.S. equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Adjust forward CVBG basing and deployment patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Shift some military missions to allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Adjust theater command structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Employ more nonforce military capabilities to substitute for forward force deployments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Employ innovative force deployment and substitution concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Establish a security consultation arrangement in Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point in the analysis these initiatives are neither recommendations nor predictions. Rather, they are options to be considered while weighing both the regional responses that might be prompted by alternative postures and the likely performance of those postures in selected contingencies. By definition, none of the initiatives requires an increase in force size (because that would define an additional posture). However, some would incur increased costs for force operation or infrastructure development.

1. **Adopt a “Proportional Engagement” Strategy.** This strategy is a variant of the one already embedded in the DoD Strategic Framework: emphasis on reducing U.S. regional forces while increasing the contribution of our regional allies. The strategy makes explicit the U.S. commitment to remain involved ("engaged") in Asian Pacific security matters, but that commitment is not fixed. It is tailored ("proportional") to resources available, threats that exist or may emerge, and multiple U.S. roles and interests. In effect, this strategy affirms that there are no more “free rides” for our security partners—even though their contribution to our mutual security may differ from ours. The United States does not have “a dog in every fight,” and acts accordingly.

2. **Foster a Nuclear-Free Korea.** This initiative assumes that such a regime is negotiable, that it is consistent with U.S. global and regional policies concerning theater nuclear

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3The nuclear-free Korea initiative and the U.S. theater nuclear policy initiative outlined here were the products of research that predated President Bush’s September 27, 1991, announcement on unilateral U.S. reductions in short-range and some tactical nuclear weapons. See Pollack and Winnefeld (1990), pp. 30–33, 38. We continue to
weapons (see Initiative 5 below), and that it is consonant with U.S. regional security goals and policies (e.g., reassuring Japan, not rewarding international lawbreakers). The regime contemplated would have effective safeguards (beyond those required by the International Atomic Energy Agency) and intrusive inspections. It might be guaranteed by the major regional powers or the UN Security Council.

3. Foster Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in Korea. These measures include a wide variety of actions, including thinning out of forces near the DMZ, neutral peacekeepers in the DMZ, hotlines, notifications of troop movements, and so forth. Some similar measures have been proposed by both the North and South, but they have been put aside as each side jockeys for advantage in what is largely a propaganda war for South Korean public opinion and improved international standing. Since Korea is not Europe in either geography or arms control setting, it is unlikely that CBMs will be negotiated unless there is a major change in government in one or both Koreas, or unless the major regional powers bring heavy pressure to bear on the principals. This initiative contemplates a much more aggressive U.S. role in pushing CBMs in international forums (e.g., giving it the prominence that the Cambodian issue has enjoyed in the regional security dialogue).

4. Reorient U.S. Regional Base and Support Structures. This initiative is based on assumptions that U.S. regional forces are below 1990 levels, allies have increased their mutual security role, fewer U.S. bases are necessary, and some bases are no longer available. In these circumstances, the residual U.S. base structure would be smaller, focused in some cases on different missions, and perhaps partially relocated (e.g., to Guam-Marianas). Some of this realignment is already under way in Korea and the Philippines. Additional options are being sought and, in some cases, implemented (e.g., Singapore). The point of this initiative is to anticipate adverse actions affecting overseas basing and put in place the necessary alternative structures (the availability of which might head off adverse actions in the first place).

5. Revise U.S. Theater Nuclear Weapons Policy. This initiative is based on the assumption that the role of U.S. theater nuclear forces (TNF) has changed as a result of the transformation of the Cold War and the negotiation of the INF, CFE, and START treaties. The initiative would bring about changes in U.S. TNF targeting, weapons basing, readiness and loadouts, disclosure policy (e.g., NCND), and perhaps attitudes toward regional nuclear-phobia and nuclear-free zones. To the degree that it includes a comprehensive revision of U.S. TNF roles and missions in the region, this initiative would be a prerequisite to a nuclear-free Korea initiative (Initiative 2).

6. Increase Regional Prepositioning of U.S. Equipment. This initiative is based largely on the assumption that although some U.S. forces will be removed from the region, provisions should be made for their rapid return to their former bases or for an unrelated contingency elsewhere in the region. The forces of interest are the Second Infantry Division in Korea and III MEF in Japan, but this initiative includes U.S. air forces as well. The equipment of interest might be either unit sets or stocks of consumables, or both. Two con-

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4As indicated earlier, U.S. policy was revised by President Bush with his announcement on short-range nuclear force reductions on September 27, 1991. This initiative follows through and expands on that policy change.
cepts are included under this initiative: area-specific prepositioning (afloat or ashore) for
dual-based forces committed to the defense of an ally, and afloat prepositioning oriented to
supporting a wider range of regional contingencies (e.g., MPS in Guam).

7. Adjust Forward CVBG Basing and Deployment Patterns. This initiative is based
on the assumption that there are unlikely to be enough CVBGs to meet commitments that
historically have been met, and a parallel assumption that there will be significant domestic
pressure to return overseas-based forces to the continental United States. This initiative
would consider a number of options: more or less overseas home-porting of CVBGs to help al-
leviate shortfalls; nontraditional (and highly controversial) policies of basing carriers over-
seas and dual-basing their air wings in the United States to get more overseas presence with
little change in the overseas base “footprint”; high-speed transits to overseas operating areas
by nuclear-powered carriers to increase on-station time; and possible substitutes for the
CVBG (discussed below under Initiative 11).

8. Shift Some Military Missions to Allies. This initiative assumes that as forces decline,
some missions will have to be transferred to CONUS-based forces, including the reserve
structure, and that others will have to be picked up by our security partners. The mine-
warfare mission is one such example at present. Missions that might be transferred in the
future include air defense and antisubmarine warfare. It seems likely that the United States
would want to preserve (protect from budget cuts) those forces that our allies cannot or
should not duplicate (e.g., power projection, intelligence collection).

9. Adjust Theater Command Structures. As forces in the theater decrease in size or are
relocated, there could be opportunities to reoptimize the command structure. These oppor-
tunities might lie in forming U.S. structures that better foster the cooperation of U.S. secu-
rity partners—among themselves (e.g., Japan and South Korea, ASEAN) and with the
United States—or that provide more of a regional contingency focus (e.g., regionally oriented
instead of country-specific subunified commands or joint task forces). Regional command
structures in a few cases might be a surrogate for on-scene forces. In any event, these staffs
would be positioned politically and geographically to plan effectively for the integrated em-
ployment of augmenting American forces with allied forces. As the Desert Storm experience
demonstrated, there is significant benefit to having regionally oriented “warfighting” and
contingency operations staffs—the closer to the region and the more politically “connected,”
the better.

10. Employ More Nonforce Military Capabilities to Substitute for Forward Force
Deployments. The assumption behind this initiative is that as deployed forces decrease in
size, other military means to achieve political impact and military leverage will acquire
greater importance. These means are likely to include DoD's IMET program (international
military education and training), foreign military sales (FMS)—including the training com-
ponent—disaster and other humanitarian assistance, exchange and liaison officers from and
to U.S. security partners, military assistance programs, and intelligence cooperation and
sharing. The objective of such an initiative is to put in place a political infrastructure to un-
derpin America's future ability to project military forces into the region if the need should
arise. In the interim, these nonforce capabilities are a means to sustain “presence” in key
functions without creating negative side effects in host states.
11. **Employ Innovative Force Deployment and Substitution Concepts.** This initiative is based on the assumption that as U.S. regional forces get smaller, there will be a need to use force presence concepts that cross traditional service lines—in some cases substituting one service's forces for another, in other cases putting together joint force packages for routine operations (not just for contingency operations). For example, under some circumstances tactical fighter squadrons deployed by the Air Force might partly substitute for overstretched carrier battle groups.⁵ Air Force airlift and Army light infantry might be used to supplement Marine Corps forces in showing the flag during exercises with nontraditional security partners. Alternatively, humanitarian assistance operations might be used as opportunities to also demonstrate rapid deployment capabilities (as in the relief efforts in Bangladesh in the spring of 1991). In addition, the services have opportunities to consider new concepts (e.g., the Air Force composite wing, Navy battle groups built around major amphibious units and Tomahawk “shooters”).

12. **Establish a Security Consultation Arrangement in Southeast Asia.** This initiative assumes that as U.S. forces decrease, we will need closer military cooperation with our security partners in the region. The United States has different bilateral arrangements with the Philippines (e.g., bases), Thailand (e.g., exercises, transient base access), and Singapore (e.g., limited facilities access). There is no multilateral regional security consultation arrangement that involves the United States. The Five Power Defense Agreement (UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore) suggests the possible utility of a broader regional security consultation arrangement. The fact that ASEAN has no formal security arrangement indicates that even when there are common political goals, multilateral arrangements are difficult to effect. This suggests that a reasonable near-term approach for the United States in Southeast Asia is to build on and expand bilateral arrangements, leaving open the future possibility of greater regional security cooperation (perhaps as an off-spring of a mature APEC or other regional organization formed for quite different purposes).

⁵After our research was completed, we were informed that DoD is in fact considering some Air Force forces to pinch-hit for Navy forces redeployed elsewhere.
4. REGIONAL RESPONSES TO ALTERNATIVE FORCE POSTURES

Our presence sends an unmistakable signal to allies and adversaries alike of our commitment to be engaged in a region. It supports our aim of continuing to play a leadership role in international events. In this era of shifting regional power balances, our forward military presence supports our aim of maintaining the stability that lets other nations flourish, by preventing the emergence of dangerous power vacuums or imbalances and by staving off regional arms races.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee
February 21, 1991

This section examines the Cheney thesis more closely and assesses likely regional responses to the alternative U.S. force postures and compensating policy and program initiatives outlined in Section 3. Responses are analyzed from the perspective of two distinct subregions: Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. We first identify the perceptions and characteristics of nations within each subregion most relevant to the future U.S. military presence, focusing on external, security-related concepts and, where applicable, internal, public-opinion-related concerns. These then become the basis for presenting likely responses to the naval, air, and ground deployments associated with the alternative U.S. force postures presented in Section 3.

Our analysis of response will begin with a detailed discussion of the most extreme change in U.S. military presence in the western Pacific (withdrawal from foreign bases, as portrayed in Posture C) and then work backward, ending with consideration of the baseline posture (Posture A). First we analyze the probable effects of each posture upon both external and internal factors, then we discuss those initiatives most likely to reduce the potential adverse effects of each posture. Force postures are evaluated independent of associated initiatives solely for analytical purposes, in order to better understand the significance of these initiatives. In a "real world" setting, any change in force posture would doubtless be implemented in coordination with an array of compensating initiatives.

Regional perceptions of the U.S. military presence derive from the continuity, change, and uncertainty presented in Section 2. Our intent is to define probable trends in regional attitudes and interests that will remain dominant throughout all three phases discussed in the DoD's Strategic Framework and will likely have the greatest effect in determining responses to changes in U.S. policy and military deployments. The analysis cannot, however, take account of every possible variable. For the sake of analytical clarity, we do not consider the effect upon regional perceptions and responses of potential major shifts in the future global environment, including U.S. relations with the republics of the former USSR, even though the latter factor will remain crucial to future changes in the international system.

1Appendix A, a summary of postures and initiatives, may be folded out for convenient reference during the reading of the response analyses.
Both external and internal factors will influence the response of states to future U.S. force postures and associated policy and program initiatives, with external security issues playing the primary role. The external factors include assessments of each individual state's direct security perceptions and interests as well as collective strategic and regional security concerns. In both cases, such assessments are based on the following:

- Perceptions of current and likely future U.S. military capabilities.
- An appraisal of American willingness to employ military forces in the region.
- Estimates of the effect of future U.S. military actions (and of any accompanying political, economic, and military measures) on the individual and collective security interests and capabilities of states.
- Long-term views of individual states or groups of states regarding the involvement of external powers in regional security affairs.

Internal factors influencing responses derive from the domestic social, political, and economic environment confronting the governments of the region, including the following:

- The importance of U.S. economic ties to the performance of the domestic economy.
- Public opinion regarding the U.S. military presence within individual countries and throughout the region.
- The impact of the U.S. presence on the stability or instability of existing national elites.

Such external and internal factors do not operate independently: the interaction between the two sets of factors over time largely determines response. Such interaction is becoming very important in the Asia Pacific region, often involving contradictory interests and concerns that work for and against the U.S. military presence, particularly among U.S. allies. This situation suggests that changes in force posture may stimulate complex political tradeoffs within other countries. We now turn to the response analysis.

NORTHEAST ASIA: CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS

Despite the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Northeast Asia will continue to present a wide range of significant security concerns for the United States. These include

- Acute cross-border tensions involving major military forces (North/South Korea and, to a lesser degree, China/Taiwan).
- Proximity of major U.S. and Russian naval and air forces.
- Growing regional fears of an expanded Japanese military role.

Of the three sets of concerns, regional fears of a remilitarized Japan will likely prove the most important over the long run, given Japan's emergence as a global economic force and its increasing desire to play a bigger political and diplomatic role in many areas crucial to Asian interests. This will be especially true if Korea is reunified peacefully and the end of communism in the former USSR leads to significant reductions in Moscow's Far East forces and a
diplomatic breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations. Under such conditions, regional states will increasingly view the growth of Japanese power as the central security concern of Northeast Asia, supplanting the former Soviet-American rivalry and the prospect of renewed warfare in Korea as the foremost security preoccupation in the area.

In such an environment, the need to maintain existing levels and dispositions of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia will diminish. Yet the continuation of a strong U.S.–Japan strategic alliance and the maintenance of some level of visible U.S. military presence will probably remain central to the security calculations of regional states. In the view of many of these states, only the United States, through its continued military engagement, can serve as a check against the possibility of a remilitarized Japan and as a guarantor of overall balance and stability in a rapidly changing setting.

As discussed in Section 2, scenarios for Korea's future entail a diverse range of possibilities. In several such scenarios, the reunification process will prove far more tumultuous in the region than German reunification has proved for Europe. Moreover, the emergence of a unified, economically strong Korea could lead to a new era of competition to replace the tensions of the Cold War period, centered on the possible advent of intense economic and diplomatic rivalry with Japan and the revival of historical suspicions toward China and Russia. Instability would become all the more likely if a unified Korea saw the need to obtain a nuclear weapons capability.

For U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea, such uncertainties clearly argue in favor of continued close political and military links with the United States, including a long-term U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. Even for states whose views of the United States are currently more complex or even oppositional (i.e., North Korea, China, and the former Soviet Union), the Japan factor, growing internal problems, and the likelihood of significant changes in the overall regional environment all underscore the need to avoid sudden, destabilizing external shifts, particularly in military force levels. China and Russia in particular may increasingly recognize the positive role played by U.S. regional forces.

However, the ability of Japan and South Korea to support a continued U.S. military presence is challenged by the growth of nationalist forces outlined in Section 2. The negative implications of the increasingly serious bilateral economic conflicts between the United States and its major Asian trading partners, along with apparent inconsistencies in U.S. policy, further complicate this situation. As a result, South Korea and Japan present telling examples of the clash between continuing national security concerns and domestic political imperatives.

Japan

Japan's leadership values highly the security relationship with the United States. Conservative politicians, leading government officials, and the Japanese military for the most part

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*Also see Morrison (1990), pp. 107-120.*
recognize the need to exert greater efforts to strengthen U.S.-Japan security ties.\(^5\) These
groups, and a sizable portion of the Japanese public, believe that the region continues to pre-
sent specific security threats that only the United States can counter. These include

- A strong Russian naval and air presence.\(^6\)
- Possible major instability linked to events on the Korean peninsula.
- A belief that the Asian Pacific security environment remains "precarious and fluid," re-
quiring a U.S. presence to prevent the possibility of a power vacuum.\(^7\)

The collapse of communist rule in the USSR and the strong likelihood that Russia and other
republics will curtail defense efforts could ease Japanese concerns about the presence of for-
mer Soviet forces in Asia and the Pacific. Pending the resolution of internal debates over the
former Soviet Union's future defense posture, however, Moscow still retains very large forces
in the region that pose a potential threat to Japan. Hence, until Russian leaders undertake
major reductions in these force levels, Japan's governing Liberal Democratic Party will likely
continue to stress the importance of U.S. bases for countering military power directed
against Japan.

Over the near to medium term, a more significant uncertainty that perturbs Japanese strateg-
ists centers on North Korea's possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.\(^8\) Adding
a third nuclear threat to the two already present (China and the former Soviet Union) would
intensify Japanese security anxieties and severely complicate Tokyo's future defense plans.
Because of this concern, as well as the general Japanese fear of a resumption of con-
lict on the peninsula, Tokyo will probably continue to place a premium on strengthening
P'yongyang's incentives to avoid the nuclear option, in part by increasing diplomatic engage-
ment with the North.\(^9\) It may also support a strategy whereby the North Koreans can be
given convincing assurances by Seoul that no U.S. nuclear weapons are located in the
South.\(^10\) While supporting a nuclear-free Korea, however, Japan will also likely continue to

\(^{5}\)See excerpts from Japanese prime minister Toshiki Kaifu's speech on Japanese foreign policy in the Asian
Pacific, given in May 1991 while visiting ASEAN, in FBIS-EAS-86, May 3, 1991, pp. 19–22. Also see the interview
title hereafter abbreviated as FEER), July 5, 1990, pp. 11–12.


\(^{7}\)From the 1990 Defense White Paper of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency, summarized in The Japan Times

\(^{8}\)"Data Raise Fears of Nuclear Moves by North Koreans," The New York Times, November 10, 1991, and "Japan
Fears Pyongyang's Nuclear Capability," The Japan Economic Journal, May 18, 1991, p. 3. Also see "Playing From
(hereafter abbreviated as APDR), November 1990, pp. 16–17, for a thorough discussion of the evidence suggesting
North Korean efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

From Strength," FEER, May 9, 1991.

\(^{10}\)This may have become a moot issue, however, given President Bush's September 27, 1991, announcement of
the U.S. intention to remove land- and sea-based short-range nuclear weapons from all overseas U.S. facilities. On
October 21, 1991, The New York Times reported: "The United States plans to withdraw all nuclear bombs from
Korea, Administration officials said today [October 19]. That would mean no nuclear weapons would remain in that
country" (pp. 1, 3).
favor the presence of U.S. conventional forces on the peninsula, both to deter the North and to reassure the South.

A more distant concern for the Japanese is the prospect of a unified Korea.\textsuperscript{11} Given the strong historical animosities linked to the Japanese colonial legacy as well as earlier tensions, such a development would likely lead to a period of intense economic and diplomatic rivalry between Korea and Japan. Even though such rivalry might remain limited to nonmilitary realms, it could become more threatening to regional stability if U.S. forces were no longer deployed on the peninsula and if U.S. diplomatic and economic relations with Seoul were to suffer a major decline. Korea might eventually seek to acquire a nuclear weapons capability as a result of such changes (or even without them), which would doubtless produce acute anxieties in Tokyo.

Ideally, the Japanese would prefer that the United States maintain conventional forces on the peninsula, both during and after any transition to a unified Korea, to forestall the development of significant regional tensions. In the absence of such a presence, however, U.S. forces in Japan would take on even greater importance, to reassure the Japanese that developments on the Korean peninsula would not require them to acquire an independent strategic deterrent. The only alternative to such increased Japanese reliance on a strong U.S. presence might be to establish a multilateral security arrangement in the region, including Japan, Korea, the United States, and perhaps even China and Russia. The Japanese might ultimately favor such an arrangement as a means of avoiding an independent defense policy if relations with the United States deteriorated significantly or if domestic sentiment in Japan turned strongly against the U.S.–Japan alliance.\textsuperscript{12}

Close U.S.–Japan security ties also serve to reassure the United States, Japanese public opinion, and jittery regional neighbors (especially Korea and China) that Japan will remain an alliance partner with the West even as it seeks to expand its global and regional political role.\textsuperscript{13} The desire to strengthen security ties with the United States underlies recent Japanese efforts to develop more complementary U.S.–Japan force structures, expand joint military exercises, engage in greater consultation with the United States and with regional states, increase host nation support for U.S. forces, and raise the level of Japanese procurement of U.S. defense equipment. It also helps explain why the Japanese government continues to reject proposals by Malaysia and Indonesia for pan-Asian economic and security forums that might exclude U.S. participation.\textsuperscript{14} These factors argue for the continuation of strong Japanese support of a highly visible U.S. forward-deployed presence in and around Japan, particularly naval forces. Moreover, this perceived need will likely become even greater if U.S. forces are withdrawn from both the Philippines and Korea, which would


\textsuperscript{12}We are indebted to Dr. Mike Mochizuki of the University of Southern California for presenting this option in discussions with the authors.


heighten the importance of U.S. bases in Japan as the remaining symbol of American commitment to Asian security and to the U.S.–Japan alliance.

However, within Japan there is also growing pressure for a loosening (but in most cases not an abrogation) of the U.S.–Japan security relationship and an alteration of U.S. security policy in other areas of Northeast Asia. This stance is linked to longstanding pacifist and antinuclear views, and its supporters call for

- A lessening or modification of the existing U.S. force presence in Japan.
- A reduction of Japan’s connection to broader U.S. strategic interests in the region. (These views are closely associated with internal opposition to any sizable increases in Japanese defense spending or the overseas use of any portion of the Self-Defense Forces.)

In recent years this contradictory current in Japanese thinking has been strengthened by growing perceptions of an appreciably diminished Soviet/Russian threat to the Japanese islands, combined with increased concern in conservative circles that the United States may not act decisively to defend Japan in a military crisis. The former point has become even more significant as a result of the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union. The latter point underscores a growing Japanese perception of U.S. ambivalence and confusion over the nature and purpose of the bilateral security relationship: many Japanese see a lack of clarity in recent U.S. positions on the preferred level of Japanese defense spending, the future role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and the ultimate U.S. strategic attitude toward Japan (key ally or primary long-term threat). This reaction has also been accentuated by the reduction of the former Soviet strategic threat to the United States and the greater perceived need, in both Tokyo and Washington, to redefine the basic rationale underlying the U.S.–Japan military alliance.

In certain Japanese circles, the questioning of the defense relationship with the United States is prompted by growing resentment toward U.S. demands placed on Japan over various economic and defense-related issues. The most notable examples include the U.S. threat to designate Japan as a violator of free trade practices under the Super 301 Clause unless Tokyo implements specific changes in its economic behavior, and efforts to restrict Japanese access to U.S. aircraft technology during the often heated debate over the proposed joint development of Japan’s FSX fighter. Resentments of this sort were intensified by the Gulf War. Many Japanese were convinced that Japan’s contribution to the U.S.-led coalition came as a result of U.S. pressure, and hence reflected the need to placate the Americans rather than protect any vital Japanese security interests. Finally, the emergence of a new

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19 Discussions with Japanese officials and scholars.
generation of Japanese leaders less aware or appreciative of U.S. contributions to postwar Japanese security and economic growth also helps explain this phenomenon.

On balance, however, these negative factors will probably not outweigh the elements that argue in favor of a continued close security alliance with the United States. Any fundamental change in the prevailing positive Japanese assessment will likely occur as a result of unforeseen actions taken by external powers, particularly the United States. At the same time, however, the Japanese will not necessarily favor the perpetuation of existing U.S. force levels and dispositions throughout Asia and the Pacific. As suggested above, if it were necessary the Japanese could probably accept the gradual removal of U.S. forces from all forward-deployed areas in the region, except from the Japanese islands. Thus, while the total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the western Pacific would very likely prompt a strong Japanese response, the impact of smaller changes will probably depend largely on how quickly and in what specific context they occur. Such shifts will be subject to the contradictory pulls of external security and internal nationalistic responses, producing a more complex picture for the future.

South Korea

South Korean views of the U.S. force presence are strongly influenced by elements quite similar to those in Japan. In the South Korean case, however, the contradictory pressures are even greater, and the sensitivity to questions of U.S. force presence is even more intense.20

As a small nation surrounded by major land powers and an economically powerful Japan, and with a history of exploitation at the hands of its neighbors, South Korea feels particularly vulnerable. More than any other Asian nation, it will remain sensitive to the dangers of any power vacuum emerging in Northeast Asia that could be exploited by Russia, China, or Japan.21 It will also remain fearful of how such a vacuum might affect relations with its hostile northern neighbor. The most serious South Korean concern at present is that rapid, major changes in U.S. force levels on the Korean peninsula could precipitate an even more intense arms race between North and South, if not outright war, and eventually provoke the Japanese to acquire an offensive military capability. This concern will probably continue for the foreseeable future, barring any major improvement of relations between the two Koreas.22

Despite preliminary indications of Pyongyang's greater willingness to engage in tension-reduction measures with the South, growing internal North Korean economic problems, and the opening of a U.S.–North Korea dialogue, the South will remain exceedingly wary of Pyongyang's intentions. And despite the simultaneous admission of both Koreas into the United Nations and the signing of a North–South nonaggression pact, the North's recent accommodating stance has not dispelled four decades of extreme hostility and Pyongyang's long insistence on the South's supposed "illegitimate" status. Seoul is also increasingly concerned

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20C1lfford (1990), p. 32, discusses the contradictory nature of South Korean attitudes toward the U.S. military presence.
22Discussions with South Korean foreign ministry officials, Seoul, November 1990.
about Pyongyang’s continuing efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Such trends underscore widespread concern about the capacity of an isolated, vulnerable Pyongyang to undermine stability on the peninsula.

Although relations have improved significantly between South Korea and Japan, officials in Seoul will also likely remain wary of their powerful neighbor. They express serious concerns about the evolution of Japanese diplomatic and military policy, especially given heightened difficulties in the U.S.–Japan relationship. South Korea was strongly opposed to the dispatch even of noncombatant Japanese military personnel to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf crisis. Moreover, Seoul also remains suspicious of Japanese intentions in opening an official dialogue with North Korea. Many South Koreans suspect that Tokyo does not support the reunification of Korea, favoring instead an indefinite continuation of the status quo. Given such suspicions (as well as the unabated and intense Korean dislike of the Japanese), Seoul also fears that if reunification occurs, Japan could emerge as Korea’s foremost long-term security threat.

The South Korean leadership will also continue to evaluate the role of U.S. forces in relation to its efforts to develop fuller relations with China and the republics of the former Soviet Union and its related dialogue with Pyongyang. The Roh government has a major stake in maintaining positive momentum in these areas. It hopes to control the level and type of pressures and incentives it offers to Pyongyang, particularly given the accelerating North Korean economic decline, the impending leadership succession, and Pyongyang’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons. As part of its strategy toward the North, the Roh government has publicly stated its commitment to a nuclear-free South Korea, thereby increasing pressure on Pyongyang to permit IAEA inspection of its nuclear program. As a result of these considerations, Seoul will remain concerned that any unexpected or extreme shifts in the U.S. force presence or general U.S. policy toward the Koreas might influence North Korean calculations of their capacity for maneuver in the North-South dialogue.

Even if Korea is reunified, many historically rooted concerns and suspicions will remain, particularly regarding Japan. Like Tokyo, Seoul recognizes the long-term value to Northeast Asian stability of keeping a highly visible U.S. force presence in the region. Indeed, a reunified Korea may support the continued presence of U.S. forces on the peninsula as an ongoing indication of the American commitment to its security, and as evidence of its desire to remain a close regional ally of the United States. However, domestic sentiment in Korea (and perhaps the United States as well) would probably make such a long-term presence highly

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26 For a very useful overview of Seoul’s successful ‘Nordpolitik’ policy, see Niski (1991), pp. 31–34.

27 “Roh Declares Nuclear-Free South Korea,” *Korea Herald*, November 9, 1991. President Roh has also indicated that South Korea strongly supports President Bush’s September 1991 announcement concerning the removal of short-range nuclear weapons from U.S. facilities worldwide.
problematic. In such a case, Korea would then probably place increased emphasis on the need to maintain U.S. bases in Japan, as a guarantee against Japanese remilitarization.

Even more than in the Japanese case, however, South Korean domestic factors pressing for a major reduction of the U.S. military presence serve as a counterpoint to the above trends. Growing criticism of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and of existing U.S. force levels emanates from two distinct but interrelated sources: an increasingly vocal opposition movement, and more traditional and increasingly prominent nationalist elements.

Largely arising from rapid economic and social change, the opposition movement became a major factor in South Korean politics following the Kwangju incident of 1980, in which several hundred protesters were killed by armed forces and police. Although its political power has ebbed and flowed in the past decade, the opposition movement has emerged as a more vocal force in a much more open and contentious internal political environment. Many within this movement favor a much smaller U.S. military role on the peninsula, including the removal of all nuclear weapons. Such demands may in some cases be motivated more by a desire to undermine the Roh government than by a genuine commitment to the removal of U.S. forces. Nevertheless, opposition groups often link the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea with the past period of authoritarian military rule and the continued division of the peninsula. Although the Roh government has declared South Korea to be nuclear-free, the importance of these opposition forces in South Korean security deliberations will probably continue to grow.

Reflecting a desire for greater international equality and independence, nationalist elements in South Korea express growing frustration and resentment toward U.S. policy. Criticism often centers on two factors related to the U.S. military presence. First and most important are the perceived "unfair" military burden sharing and "unjustifiable" economic concessions demanded by the United States. Second, many nationalists feel that the U.S. military presence on the peninsula has obstructed the creation of a more self-sufficient and independent South Korean military, thereby depriving Seoul of the ability to devise an independent military strategy toward Pyongyang.

Some South Koreans also view the U.S. military presence as an obstacle to the attainment of Seoul's goals toward the North, since in their view American forces bolster Pyongyang's propaganda portraying the South Korean government as a U.S. puppet. This view is held even though it is likely that North Korea now regards some level of U.S. force presence on the Korean peninsula as preferable to a total withdrawal, considering the political benefits it derives from a continued U.S. presence. Other South Koreans now believe that lowered tensions between North and South Korea should permit a more rapid reduction of the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. Much of the public sees North Korea as far less of a threat than in the past, given the economic prowess of the South and the erosion of Chinese}

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28For a general discussion of these trends, see relevant sections of Cossa (1990), as well as Gordon (1991), pp. 149-150, and Morrison (1990).

29For example, see "Playing From Strength," FEER, May 9, 1991, p. 14.

30Cha (1990), pp. 143, 149-150. Also see the interview with opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, president of the Party for Peace and Democracy, in Asahi Shimbun, March 8, 1991, p. 2.


32See the remarks of John Merrill in Cossa (1990), p. 57.
and Russian support for North Korea. Such domestic perceptions will likely continue, barring major reversals in North/South relations or adverse shifts in Russian and Chinese attitudes.

Thus, a reduction of U.S. conventional forces on the peninsula, along with the formulation of a strategy to provide convincing assurances that no U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed in Korea, would have clear political benefits for the South Korean government. South Korean officials are not categorically opposed to modifications in the structure and level of U.S. forces in Korea. However, in such a highly charged environment, the South Koreans would certainly prefer that any significant changes in U.S. force levels occur very gradually, and that any resulting adverse consequences be lessened as much as possible by the use of compensatory measures.\(^{33}\) This points to the salience of selected policy and program initiatives discussed in Section 3.

The Former Soviet Union

The collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and the breakup of the country into independent and quasi-independent republics greatly complicate attempts to assess the future perspectives of Russia and other republics on the U.S. force presence in the Asia Pacific region. As noted in Section 2, the full dimensions of policy change in a democratizing Russia are impossible to foresee. For all intents and purposes, a single, coherent "Soviet" strategy toward the region no longer exists. Different individual leaders and groups offer different positions and outlooks on the future, and there is little indication that any one voice is authoritative. Moreover, positions often emerge or change in response to domestic exigencies, rather than to external strategic calculations, making attempts to evaluate long-term perspectives and trends even more difficult. However, we can make some general observations.

During at least the short to medium term, the attention of the republics and what remains of the former central government will be focused on coping with internal social, political, and economic difficulties attending the collapse of communist rule. Given its enormous problems, Russia will almost certainly attempt to accelerate military reductions in Asia and the Pacific while also seeking to obtain major infusions of investment capital, technology, and trade benefits from the more dynamic economies of the region. This could lead to more concerted efforts to court Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, perhaps with offers of significant political, economic, and even military concessions for commitments of specific levels of assistance.

Such an approach could produce a breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations in the near term, based on a resolution of the Northern Islands dispute,\(^{34}\) with a resulting expansion in bilateral economic and diplomatic ties. This has become much more likely not only because of the increased Russian need for Japanese economic assistance, but also because conservative military elements lost much of their influence after the collapse of the August 1991 coup.

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\(^{33}\) This is stressed in Clifford (1990), p. 32.

\(^{34}\) Such a resolution need not be based on the immediate and complete reversion of the islands to Japan, however. Other compromise formulas could prove acceptable to both sides, including an initial Russian recognition of Japanese sovereignty, to be followed by eventual reversion, perhaps in stages, or the adoption of the 1956 formula providing for the immediate return of the two smaller islands, to be followed by the reversion of the larger islands as part of the finalization of a formal peace treaty.
These elements had vehemently opposed both the return of the Northern Islands and significant reductions in air and naval forces facing Japan.

A breakthrough on this issue would almost certainly result in the demilitarization of the Northern Islands. Over the medium term, it could also lead to major, unilateral Russian force reductions in the area (particularly ground forces, but also some air and naval units) and hence the virtual elimination of a Russian threat as a factor in Japanese security calculations. Alternatively, it could begin with only modest force reductions, followed by offers to negotiate larger reductions of Russian and U.S. force levels through mutual agreement or as part of a multilateral regional security arrangement. In either case, however, Russian leaders might seek sizable U.S. force reductions in Northeast Asia through appeals to pacifist sentiments in Japan, which would doubtless be bolstered by the breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations. Such initiatives could complicate regional responses to changes in the U.S. military presence by increasing public demands for U.S. force reductions at a pace and to a level unacceptable to both the Japanese government and others in the Asia Pacific region.

Even if there is no breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations, economic constraints seem very likely to compel the former Soviet Union to reduce its military forces facing Japan, irrespective of whether the United States deems it appropriate to enter into formal negotiations. The magnitude and speed of such reductions will probably be greater, however, if the United States acts independently to make significant reductions in its forward-deployed forces in the western Pacific. Russian political leaders will probably seek to use any such U.S. drawdowns or a change in U.S. strategy to press for more substantial decreases in their Far Eastern forces, in order to free resources for use in the crisis-ridden civilian economy. This will further weaken the role of the defense establishment in Russian Far East policymaking.

Assuming that current internal trends continue, the Russian republic might also alter the longstanding negative outlook of the former Soviet Union toward the presence of U.S. forces, perhaps even openly recognizing the value to the region of some level of forward U.S. presence, particularly in Japan. Such a development would mean modification or abandonment of the past strategy of pressuring for continued U.S. force reductions in Asia and the Pacific through self-serving proposals for demilitarization and arms control agreements, nuclear-free zones, confidence-building measures, and arms freezes, as occurred under Gorbachev. However, given the exceptional fluidity in Russian internal politics, conclusive judgments about the prospects for such change are not possible.

As suggested above, future Russian initiatives will probably seek to enhance political and economic links with the capitalist states along the Pacific Rim, serving thereby to lower regional tensions and reduce Japanese and South Korean expectations of a substantial U.S. force presence. At the same time, however, the Russian government will likely continue to favor a loosening of the U.S.–Japan security alliance in favor of a regional multilateral security structure that would give Russia a greater voice in Asian security affairs. Either way, the new government must demonstrate its readiness to diminish its threat to the region.

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and to make meaningful concessions that the former regime was previously unprepared to make.

Overall, post-Soviet military attitudes and behavior in the Asia Pacific region will almost certainly become more passive and nonthreatening. Economic and diplomatic issues will come increasingly to the fore, and any provocative Russian military actions will likely be taken only in response to unexpected moves by other states. As a result, the Russian factor in Northeast Asian security calculations will likely diminish during the next 10 to 15 years, unless the notion of a multilateral security arrangement in the region gains more widespread acceptance. Even under that scenario, however, Moscow’s future role is far more likely to be collaborative rather than competitive with the United States.

This positive assessment will probably prevail under most of the Russian internal scenarios outlined in Section 2. However, a very different set of motives and perceptions could emerge if authoritarian rule resurfaces in Russia during the next 10 to 15 years. The possibility of such a development cannot be entirely dismissed, particularly if ethnic unrest continues to escalate and economic and political instability intensifies. It could also conceivably emerge, over the long run, as part of a resurgence of traditional Russian nationalism within a stabilized Russian republic.

Such a turn of events might translate into attempts to improve Russia’s deteriorating strategic position (as discussed in Section 2) and a more militant Russian stance toward Northeast Asia. This would undoubtedly intensify both Japanese and South Korean security concerns, raising the current sensitivities about any decrease in the U.S. force presence and weakening the influence of domestic forces critical of that presence. Particularly if it occurred during the course of significant reductions in U.S. force levels, such a shift in Russian behavior would strengthen arguments against any further U.S. military withdrawals in the Asia Pacific region. But such a conjunction of events seems improbable.

China and Taiwan

Despite a general deterioration in U.S.–China relations, Beijing recognizes (albeit reluctantly and with some ambivalence) that the U.S. military presence serves an important stabilizing role, as a check on possible Japanese rearmament and as a guarantor of peace on the Korean peninsula in the near to mid term.36

In recent years, China has become more anxious over the future of Japan’s security role, given increased tensions in U.S.–Japanese political and economic relations and Tokyo’s apparent desire to devise a global and regional political role more commensurate with Japan’s economic strength.37 Those anxieties were fueled by the Kaifu government’s efforts to send noncombatant members of the Self-Defense Forces to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. China also fears the prospect of increased ultranationalist sentiment within Japan.38

36 Discussions with Chinese officials; and Delfs (1990), p. 30.
Despite the Chinese leadership's apparent commitment to the survival of the Kim Il Sung regime and its ritualized public support for the North Korean position opposing U.S. forces, Beijing also privately acknowledges the essential function of the U.S. military presence in maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{39} Any precipitate reduction in U.S. force levels there would be of major concern to the Chinese government, since it could disturb an already volatile situation on the peninsula.

Major domestic political uncertainties make predictions regarding long-term Chinese views of the U.S. military presence particularly hazardous. Positive Chinese attitudes toward the U.S. regional presence could crumble as a result of changes in China's highly unstable domestic environment. Hard-line factions could push for greater self-reliance, and a climate of increased xenophobia could emerge, sharpening Chinese suspicions of strong regional neighbors and of the West. Japan in particular could be made a ready target of blame for China's internal economic problems and become a plausible threat against which the nation could unite.\textsuperscript{40} More militant attitudes could also be directed toward Southeast Asia, significantly increasing security anxieties in that region (see below). Under such conditions, China might respond far more negatively to the presence of U.S. forces.

Beijing's plans for military development also influence its perceptions of the U.S. presence. China is seeking to achieve a modest power projection capability by upgrading its air and naval forces. Chinese security concerns have shifted from territorial defense against a Soviet invasion to the greater likelihood of involvement in low-intensity, limited local wars, demanding small, rapidly deployable, and highly trained forces.\textsuperscript{41} This shift has prompted serious concerns in Southeast Asia (see below), and it has also raised some fears in Taiwan. If China's relations with Taiwan deteriorate, or if a more militant foreign policy line emerges in Beijing, the Chinese may be tempted to use their improved power projection capabilities to threaten the island. Such a decision would obviously alter China's current support for the U.S. military presence in the western Pacific.

It is by no means certain, however, that the rise of hard-liners or the development of a limited power projection capability would cause a major shift in current Chinese estimates of the U.S. presence. Instead, Beijing's continued high priority on social order and economic development, and the widespread recognition within China of the value of maintaining cooperative relations with neighboring states, could sustain the stabilizing value that Beijing attaches to the U.S. military presence.

Indeed, a more rigid, hard-line government in China may prove short-lived. The passing of the aged powerholders currently in control of the Chinese political regime may inaugurate a political and economic transition to a more open (and perhaps more decentralized) system. In this case, as in the former Soviet Union, Chinese attention will most likely be drawn inward as leaders attempt to cope with major social, political, and economic problems. Under such a scenario China will be even less likely to engage in provocative external behavior. On the contrary, Beijing will probably seek to expand its ties with the West and otherwise act to ensure the maintenance of a benign regional environment. And, in this case, China will have even greater reason to recognize the positive role played by U.S. military forces.

\textsuperscript{39}Playing From Strength," \textit{FEER}, May 9, 1991.
\textsuperscript{40}Whiting and Xin (1991), pp. 119, 129.
\textsuperscript{41}Far Eastern Economic Review (1990), p. 16.
Taiwan will almost certainly continue to seek a stable external environment conducive to expanded trade and investment, and to avoid any resumption of a coercive strategy by Beijing. The leadership in Taiwan is therefore likely to maintain its support for a strong U.S. military presence in the Asia Pacific region. It will continue to support the maintenance of good relations between the West and China, since this is generally perceived to contribute to Chinese moderation and restraint toward Taipei. Taiwan would regard any substantial, abrupt reduction in U.S. military forces as destabilizing, particularly if it led to a shift in China’s current posture toward the island. Such a development could prompt an accelerated buildup of Taiwan’s military capabilities, reversing current trends toward more restraint in defense spending, and thus rekindle tensions with the mainland.

**NORTHEAST ASIA: THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE FORCE POSTURES AND INITIATIVES**

A range of significant security concerns will likely persist in Northeast Asia. Despite the reduced threat from the former Soviet Union, support for a visible, forward-deployed U.S. force presence will remain strong, both to reassure and to deter. At the same time, there will probably be pressure to reduce those aspects of the U.S. presence especially provocative in a Japanese and South Korean domestic context. There will also probably be a greater overall acceptance in the region of a considerably smaller forward-deployed presence over the long term, as long as the U.S. security alliance with Japan remains intact and some significant U.S. air and naval presence remains based on the Japanese islands.

Thus, extreme changes in the current U.S. force posture in Northeast Asia would be viewed by the states in the area as highly destabilizing, particularly if they were implemented in a precipitate manner and with little or no consultation with allies and friends. Less drastic reductions in force levels, however, will likely produce a more mixed response, presenting certain important domestic benefits for U.S. allies (as well as for China and Russia). How such middle-range postures will affect regional states will likely depend on both the speed and manner in which they are implemented and the final disposition of U.S. forces in each case. Some will likely present serious difficulties, even under the best of circumstances. Others will probably prompt minimal or no negative regional reactions. But all will require the United States to take a sophisticated approach that employs appropriate compensating policy and program initiatives.

**Posture C**

The most destabilizing U.S. force posture for Northeast Asia would be Posture C, the elimination of virtually all U.S. bases in the western Pacific. Without any significant compensating U.S. initiatives, such a drastic change would likely produce a range of negative military and political responses throughout Northeast Asia.

Posture C would produce extreme anxieties in Seoul, especially if it had achieved little progress in relations with North Korea, and if the posture were implemented in a fairly pre-

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42Indeed, our analysis of the postures that posit such a major shift assumes that it would probably occur as a result of a U.S. decision to retrench, not because of local pressures to force the United States out. The very different regional environment that might lead to the latter scenario is not discussed in this section.
cipitate manner (i.e., within three to five years). Such a move would probably prompt the South Korean leadership to alter some of the basic tenets of its present security strategy, leading to one or more of the following actions:

- Major increases in conventional military capabilities, possibly accelerating the arms race with the North and increasing the likelihood of armed conflict.\(^{43}\)

- Reduced cooperation with the United States in favor of a more independent stance, perhaps leading to the acquisition of nuclear or chemical weapons capabilities.

- Closer political and perhaps military association with the former USSR or even Japan, as a substitute for the acquisition of unconventional weapons and to strengthen deterrence against the North.

In addition, the uncertainty of an intensified arms race on the peninsula could ultimately encourage one side or the other to launch a preemptive conventional attack. The temptation for such action would be especially great if both sides were also developing unconventional weapons capabilities. At the same time, Seoul might also seek to augment significantly its naval and air capabilities as insurance against future adverse Japanese military developments.

A shift in South Korean foreign policy toward neutrality would be made more likely if U.S.–South Korean economic tensions were to increase markedly. South Korea might go even further and attempt to establish close political and even security relations with the former Soviet Union, as a substitute for the acquisition of unconventional weapons and to strengthen its overall deterrence capability against the North and possibly Japan as well.\(^ {44}\)

Moscow’s receptivity to such a South Korean overture would depend on whether it had enough incentives to greatly improve relations with Seoul at the expense of Tokyo, as well as on Chinese actions. Given mounting economic problems, further South Korean promises of assistance, and slow progress in improving relations with Japan, Moscow might decide to stand fully with Seoul. On the other hand, Moscow might use the threat of establishing security relations with South Korea to gain significant economic and political concessions from the Japanese. The Russians could at the same time maintain minimal relations with Pyongyang, thereby providing additional incentives for Seoul to reach a more wide-ranging accommodation with Moscow.

Moreover, assuming a continuation of the existing leadership alignments in Beijing, an accelerated arms race between the two Koreas and China’s longstanding desire to avoid isolating North Korea might force Beijing to move closer to Pyongyang, partially reversing recent gains in Sino–South Korean ties. Such a shift could undermine the recent positive trend toward the convergence of Russian and Chinese interests on the Korean peninsula and thus add significantly to the instability created by an intensified North-South arms race.

\(^{43}\) Clifford (1990) states that an unnamed senior South Korean official responsible for security affairs believes a rapid U.S. withdrawal from the peninsula would prompt Seoul to accelerate its efforts to “match” North Korean military capabilities, rather than continue the more gradual buildup currently in progress.

\(^{44}\) FEER, May 9, 1991, p. 15, discusses the “symbiotic” relationship that might emerge in economic and security areas between Moscow and Seoul.
Given such potential dangers, South Korea might take an alternate course and maintain some distance from Moscow while seeking closer defense collaboration with Japan. Despite mutual suspicions and animosity, Tokyo and Seoul would have strong political and economic incentives to cooperate in assuring mutual security in the event of a virtual U.S. withdrawal from the western Pacific. Yet the likelihood of such defense collaboration would depend primarily on Japanese reactions to the U.S. withdrawal (which could serve to quash any contemplated South Korean overtures), and the perception in Seoul and Tokyo of the general level of threat posed by North Korea, China, and Russia.

The precipitate removal of virtually all U.S. forces from the western Pacific would also be a cause for major concern within Japan, particularly if it triggered a heightened arms race on the Korean peninsula. Pressures would grow for

- At the very least, augmentation of Japanese naval capabilities to compensate for the loss of the Seventh Fleet presence.
- A fundamental reevaluation of the U.S.–Japan alliance, the MST, and the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.
- Revision of the peace constitution and movement toward full-scale rearmament.

This last Japanese response would become more likely in the absence of sufficient reassurances that the United States retained a strong commitment to the defense of Japan (especially through the use of compensating initiatives), and assuming continued tensions in the U.S.–Japan relationship in nonsecurity areas. Moreover, any Japanese movement toward acquisition of an independent conventional military capability would probably prompt South Korea to move closer to Moscow as an alternative to the United States. This might further alarm the Japanese, thereby increasing the chances of full-scale remilitarization while damaging or even scuttling the chances for any defense collaboration between Tokyo and Seoul.

If implemented precipitately and with few, if any, compensating initiatives, Posture C could also prompt an array of negative responses from China and Taiwan. These would likely include some or all of the following:

- Greater Chinese emphasis on military development, essentially ending the policy of placing civilian economic growth first.
- Increased Chinese efforts to purchase and sell arms on the international market.
- A more belligerent Chinese foreign policy stance, increasing the tensions with Japan and the pressures on Taiwan.
- Increased uncertainties in Russo–Chinese relations, involving either greater political and military collaboration to counter Japan or, conversely, the emergence of significant tensions over Korea.
- An accelerated military buildup on Taiwan and a hardening of political rule, thus reversing recent trends toward fuller democratization.

Increased uncertainties in Japanese and Korean security policies would likely pressure the Chinese to reorder their development priorities and place much greater emphasis on military
modernization, particularly the strengthening of naval and air capabilities. This would further the trend already begun during the Gulf War by the display of the overwhelming superiority of Western weapons over their Soviet and Chinese counterparts. In addition, the Chinese would likely accelerate the purchase of significant quantities of more sophisticated weapons rather than, as in the past, upgrading existing domestic weapons capabilities by integrating more sophisticated subsystems purchased abroad. To pay for such expensive weaponry, Beijing might be greatly tempted to expand its own weapons sales to Third World states.

Assuming the continued need to maintain a stable external environment, however, the Chinese would probably resist altering their current accommodationist foreign policy stance toward the states of Northeast Asia. But much would depend on the reactions of Russia, Japan, and South Korea to a relatively rapid U.S. withdrawal from the western Pacific, and also on the state of China's internal political struggle. It is possible that changes in these areas would compel a policy reassessment, leading to a more militant foreign policy stance and/or significant realignments in security relationships.

For example, already worried by Japan's increases in military capabilities and its more independent diplomatic policy, the Chinese would respond very strongly to any attempt by Tokyo to develop independent or offensive military forces. If accompanied by an intensified arms race on the Korean peninsula, such Japanese moves would greatly accelerate any initial Chinese military buildup prompted by the U.S. withdrawal. Despite likely diplomatic overtures by the Japanese aimed at calming Chinese concerns over any shifts in Tokyo's military posture, Beijing's general policy stance toward Japan could turn belligerent. Increased instability and uncertainty in Northeast Asia could also encourage hard-line factions to attempt to push for a more assertive foreign policy stance, with Japan the most probable target. Such Chinese behavior would also accelerate the military buildup on Taiwan, thus reversing the recent reduction of defense expenditure as a percentage of GNP as well as the recent movement toward greater political liberalization.\(^{45}\) In addition, the absence of forward-deployed U.S. naval bases in the western Pacific might encourage a more hard-line Chinese leadership to further pressure Taiwan.

Finally, a more militant Chinese foreign policy would also increase the likelihood of Beijing standing behind Pyongyang against Seoul in an intensified Korean arms race. Such a development could create significant tensions between China and Russia if Moscow aligned with South Korea. However, if confronting increased tensions with Japan and in the absence of actual conflict on the Korean peninsula, the Chinese leadership might also attempt to strengthen military and political collaboration with Moscow while downplaying its ties with Pyongyang. Russia might be inclined to join with China in countering Japanese expansion, despite the end of communism in the former USSR and Moscow's strong desire to obtain Japanese economic assistance. Yet much would depend on Chinese and Russian assessments of the extent of the danger posed by Japan, and the actual level of tension on the Korean peninsula.

The Russian leadership would probably attempt to take advantage of a precipitate U.S. withdrawal by seeking major advances in its relationship with Japan. This would likely in-

clude overtures for closer diplomatic and economic ties and perhaps even security guarantees intended to reduce Japanese anxieties. Leaders in Moscow might also seek to gain major economic concessions from Tokyo in return for a significant reduction of Russian ground, air, and naval forces in Northeast Asia, along with a resolution of the Northern Islands dispute on terms favorable to the Japanese government.

A relatively rapid U.S. withdrawal would also increase pressures within Russia for a major decrease in its Far Eastern military deployments. Such pressure, compounded by the likely continuation of serious turmoil within the Russian polity and economy, would greatly diminish Moscow's leverage against Tokyo. More important, Russian attempts to improve relations with Japan would most likely be overtaken by events on the Korean peninsula and both Japanese and Chinese reactions. Instead of obtaining a major opportunity for a political breakthrough in the Asia Pacific region, the Russian government would probably find itself faced with major instability in Korea, a Japanese military buildup, and rapidly deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations.

It is unlikely that Moscow would continue to make advances toward Tokyo under such conditions, fearing a resumption of serious tensions with China. Given their massive domestic problems, the Russians might respond positively to any Chinese overtures for closer political and military collaboration. Yet this could serve to significantly increase tensions with Japan. Alternatively, Russia might try to court both Japan and China, seeking to play an intermediary position between the two and thereby risk alienating both states. In addition, if increased tensions emerged between Seoul and Tokyo, the Russians might also attempt to play these two states off against one another, or they might support South Korea alone, as suggested above.

In short, the Russians would probably face a range of diplomatic options in responding to increased instability in Northeast Asia, yet none would offer the prospect of major political and economic gain, and many could be fraught with danger. Moreover, no matter which diplomatic scenario might emerge, it is quite likely that the Russian government would hedge against increased uncertainty by seeking to slow or stop the reduction of its Far Eastern forces, despite internal pressures for a faster drawdown. Indeed, it may be prompted to accelerate qualitative force improvements while increasing force levels. This, in turn, would likely increase domestic political and economic strains, prompting further internal debate and disarray.

The above analysis presents a range of highly negative regional responses likely to result from a relatively rapid U.S. withdrawal from the western Pacific. Gradual withdrawal over a longer period might produce a less destabilizing set of reactions, particularly under conditions of a reunified Korea, a democratizing and pro-Western Russia, and a reformist China seeking enhanced accommodation with the West, with all three focused on economic development. But even in such an optimum environment, the significant tensions and uncertainties that would remain—most notably those linked to the likely advent of intense rivalry between Japan and Korea and the overall issue of Japanese remilitarization—would still en-

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46 The Korea Times, Seoul, April 19, 1991, p. 1, raised the possibility of Soviet attempts to play off Seoul against Tokyo in the context of Gorbachev's April 1991 trip to Japan.
sure significant instabilities under Posture C. This would be especially true in the absence of compensating initiatives or under the conditions of a nuclearized Korea.47

A wide range of initiatives could conceivably serve to reduce the adverse effects on Northeast Asia of Posture C implementation. Of the twelve core initiatives presented in Section 3, nine would be most relevant:

- Adopt a "proportional engagement" strategy (Initiative 1)
- Establish a nuclear-free Korea (Initiative 2)
- Revise U.S. nuclear weapons policy (Initiative 5)
- Reorient U.S. regional base and support structures (Initiative 4)
- Increase regional prepositioning of U.S. equipment (Initiative 6)
- Adjust forward CVBG basing and deployment patterns (Initiative 7)
- Employ innovative force deployment and substitution concepts (Initiative 11)
- Employ nonforce military capabilities to substitute for forward force deployments (Initiative 10)
- Foster confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Korea (Initiative 3)

Some of these initiatives are aimed at reducing the threat on the Korean peninsula (2 and 3), others are intended to optimize U.S. deterrence and warfighting capabilities and maintain U.S. access to Northeast Asia under the highly restrictive conditions of Posture C (4, 6, 7, and 11), while still others are designed to increase non-force-related interaction between the United States and its allies (1 and 10). A systematic, gradual implementation of these initiatives, done consistently and bolstered by a clearly stated U.S. regional strategy that included justification for the phase-out of U.S. bases (Initiative 1), might reduce regional concerns, especially those in Japan and Korea.

But even with such a U.S. effort, and assuming gradual implementation, it is very questionable whether serious adverse responses could be avoided. The denuclearization of the region and other military and nonmilitary initiatives designed to demonstrate continued U.S. commitment would likely prove unable to compensate for the loss of vital deterrence and defense functions previously performed by U.S. forces in the western Pacific. Major uncertainties and fears in Seoul and Tokyo about the ability and willingness of the United States to live up to its security commitments would probably still emerge, as would the pressures for an arms buildup. Thus, the potential for significant foreign policy shifts and diplomatic realignments contrary to U.S. interests would probably remain, particularly over the short to medium term. Moreover, such developments would have an extremely negative impact on security perceptions in Southeast Asia. In all, even with compensating initiatives, Posture C remains the most worrisome alternative posture from a regional response perspective.

Postures E and F

Force Postures E and F are less drastic than Posture C. They posit a greatly reduced forward-deployed force presence, with continued base access in Japan and South Korea but a major reduction in local U.S. force levels, particularly in naval and ground combat forces. In addition, Posture F involves committing some U.S. regional forces to rotate to the Persian Gulf, thus further reducing overall available forces.

Such cuts would reduce South Korean and Japanese domestic criticism of the U.S. presence. However, the social and political advantages gained would probably not outweigh the security disadvantages associated with a dramatic reduction of a visible, high-profile forward-deployed U.S. presence, especially if implemented over the short to medium term. As with Posture C, such major force reductions would call into question the seriousness of America's overall regional security commitment and its capability to intervene effectively in a crisis. Even if implemented over the long term and under the optimum regional conditions mentioned above, Postures E and F would probably still prove insufficient to reassure both the Japanese and their regional neighbors that the United States could perform the role of balancer and stabilizer.

In South Korea, the loss of one tactical fighter squadron and the major reduction of the U.S. ground presence (from division to brigade) would probably create considerable anxieties for the Seoul government, particularly if little progress had occurred in talks with the North. Seoul would most likely seek to compensate for this loss by

* Augmenting its ground and air capabilities (not necessarily bad from a U.S. perspective).
* Becoming more cautious in its dealings with the North.
* Tightening its internal political control, thereby canceling any domestic gains achieved by a lowered U.S. presence.

Although these moves would probably heighten tensions on the Korean peninsula, the overall response would be less drastic than under Posture C, largely because of the continued operation of U.S. bases on the peninsula. Ultimately, however, the extent of adverse response on the peninsula would probably depend for the most part on Japan's response. The key cause for concern in Japan would be the absence of a nearby Seventh Fleet presence, something that has stood as the bulwark against the former Soviet Union and assured the Japanese of the U.S. commitment to defend the seas around their islands. The continued presence of two tactical fighter squadrons at Misawa, although nuclear capable, would not compensate for such a loss. Japanese anxieties would be especially strong under Posture F, if it were to prompt significant additional reductions in U.S. forces available to the region.

As in the case of Posture C, voices would probably be raised for a significant shift in Japanese defense policy, aimed largely at a major increase in naval capabilities. Such a shift would greatly alarm the South Korean and Chinese governments, which would face the prospect of Japanese naval dominance within the region. It is likely that South Korea would respond with a major arms buildup beyond what it would need to defend against North Ko-
rea. This move, or any significant increase in Japanese naval capabilities alone, would likely produce serious repercussions in China of the type described earlier.

Certain compensating initiatives might mitigate the adverse responses to Postures E and F, particularly if both postures and initiatives were implemented on a gradual, long-term basis. Again, the most useful are those listed above for Posture C. If implemented successfully, these initiatives could greatly reduce both South Korean and especially Japanese anxieties and avoid the more extreme response scenarios possible under Posture C. Moreover, the continued presence of U.S. bases under Postures E and F would probably make it feasible to consider shifting principal sea lane and air defense tasks to Japan and perhaps Korea over the medium to long term (Initiative 8). Implementation would be no easy task, however, given the suspicions between the two countries and the general regional fears of a resurgent Japan. A reformulated U.S. strategy (Initiative 1) would need to explain and justify this major shift in defense burdens. Equally important, the transfer of defense duties would have to be responsive to any adverse shifts in the internal political situation in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China.

In short, even under conditions of a generally benign regional security environment, implementing Postures E and F and accompanying compensating initiatives would face great challenges. Although there would be much less chance for an extreme diplomatic realignment and possible conflict postulated under Posture C, implementation would not eliminate the possibility of an accelerated arms race and a more assertive and perhaps militant Chinese foreign policy. This would be particularly true for Posture F. At the very least, such developments would severely disrupt regional efforts to concentrate on continued economic growth and political adjustment, and they might eventually force the United States to reverse course and substantially increase its forward-deployed presence in Northeast Asia.

**Postures B and D**

These postures offer a much less extreme reduction of the U.S. forward-deployed presence in Northeast Asia, involving some reductions of air and ground forces in South Korea and Japan and retention of existing naval capabilities and deployment and rotation patterns. From the security viewpoint, such reductions would likely prompt little significant response, especially if they were augmented by related policy and program initiatives.

The use of POMCUS and MPS (Initiative 6) would help compensate for reductions in immediate warfighting capabilities, particularly under Posture D, which shifts some Marine forces from Japan and Hawaii to the Persian Gulf. However, initiatives designed to lower the overall threat environment in the region and on the Korean peninsula in particular would be extremely important (Initiatives 2 and 3). Moreover, a modification of the U.S. regional strategy (Initiative 1) would be essential, to avoid perceptions that the reduced U.S. presence was motivated largely by budget cuts.

Overall, the way that Japanese and South Korean domestic opinion groups respond to the continued high-visibility presence of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia might prove of greater significance under Postures B and D than external security concerns. As indicated above, these groups are exerting ever more influence on government attitudes toward the U.S. presence. While perhaps effective in defusing public criticism over the near term, it is unlikely
that a minimal decrease of U.S. forward-deployed forces would appreciably lessen such criticism over the medium to long term. This would be especially true if the region witnessed the emergence of the kind of optimum conditions mentioned above (i.e., a pro-Western Russia, etc.). On the contrary, a possible chain of events might include the following:

- Increased domestic pressures in Japan and South Korea for the declaration of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN) for Northeast Asia, or at the very least a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ).
- More confrontations between conservative leaders and rival political and social forces in both states.
- Increased political instability in both the Japanese and South Korean governments, particularly the latter.

The initiatives that might lessen the chances of such adverse domestic responses include the establishment of a nuclear-free Korea (Initiative 2); the use of CBMs (Initiative 3); and, most important, the implementation of major changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy (Initiative 5) that significantly lowered the profile of U.S. theater nuclear capabilities.\(^49\) All three would likely lessen public criticism of the U.S. presence. Moreover, North Korea, China, and the former Soviet Union would likely welcome such moves, perceiving them as major steps toward the reduction of the U.S. nuclear presence throughout Northeast Asia.

American efforts to establish a nuclear-free Korea, however, pose some dangers:

- North Korea might not actually adhere to the policy, despite public assurances that it was doing so, thus creating the danger of eventual nuclear blackmail against the South.
- Even if the initiative were fully implemented, North Korea might feel less constrained from launching a conventional attack against the South, particularly if no progress is made in reunification talks and the North's economic decline continues.
- South Korea, fearing both of these possibilities, could launch a preemptive attack on the North or embark on a major conventional arms buildup.

To remain beneficial over the medium to long term, therefore, any decision to establish a nuclear-free Korea should incorporate safeguards and conditions sufficient to reassure both Pyongyang and Seoul and ensure that neither state will take advantage of the situation. These should include repeated, intrusive, on-site verification, major-power security guarantees to both Koreas, and continued strong U.S. bilateral security commitments to the South Korean government.\(^50\) The use of CBMs would probably be less provocative over the medium to long term, particularly from the perspective of the South Korean government. It would certainly be welcomed by much of the Japanese and South Korean publics (Taiwan's less so), as well as by most nations of Southeast Asia.

\(^{49}\) As suggested above, this initiative has already been made, through President Bush's September 1991 announcement concerning the removal of overseas short-range nuclear weapons, which essentially reduces the relevance of the U.S. NCND policy. Moreover, the Bush initiative will probably result in an unambiguously nuclear-free Korea by assuring the removal of any U.S. nuclear weapons that may be in the South.

\(^{50}\) Presumably, the U.S. government has considered the problems and resulting safeguards likely to be required by the implementation of President Bush's September 1991 initiative.
Finally, major reversals in Russo-American relations over the medium to long term, along with an abrupt decline in North/South Korean relations, could prompt Japan and especially South Korea to compensate for a perceived erosion of the U.S. nuclear deterrent by significantly boosting conventional capabilities, which would undoubtedly alarm China. Yet such an arms-escalation scenario would by no means be inevitable, given the extent of the continued U.S. conventional military presence remaining under Postures B and D and the nature of public opinion within each country. (The probability would be significantly higher under the much lower U.S. presence posited in Postures E and F.) It is even less likely that either Japan or South Korea would consider acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent under such conditions.

Posture A

Finally, Posture A posits a continuation of the existing U.S. presence in Northeast Asia for the next decade. (As noted previously, however, this posture is no longer relevant to U.S. policy. We are employing this “baseline case” solely for analytic purposes.) Here, responses would probably center upon increasingly negative Japanese and South Korean public opinion about the U.S. forward-deployed presence remaining unchanged through the turn of the century. Therefore, the kinds of internal problems outlined in the case of Postures B and D above would have even greater relevance under Posture A. The espousal of a clear and consistent U.S. strategy toward Northeast Asia would be of particular importance under these circumstances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1</th>
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<tr>
<td>Northeast Asia: Levels of External/Internal Instability in Response to Alternative Force Postures</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Posture</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>Major/Low</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>Moderate/ Low</td>
<td>Moderate/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>None/Mod</td>
<td>None/Low–Mod</td>
<td>Maj/Mod–Maj</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>Mod/Mod</td>
<td>Mod–Maj/Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>None/Mod</td>
<td>None/Mod</td>
<td>Maj/Mod–Maj</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>Mod–Maj/Mod</td>
<td>Mod–Maj/Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>None/Mod–Maj</td>
<td>Low/Low–Mod</td>
<td>Maj/Mod</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>Mod–Maj/Mod</td>
<td>Maj/Low–Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>None–Low/Low</td>
<td>Maj/Mod</td>
<td>Low/Low–None</td>
<td>Mod–Maj/Low</td>
<td>Mod/Maj/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>None/None–Low</td>
<td>None/Low–None</td>
<td>Maj/Mod–Maj</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>Mod/Mod</td>
<td>Mod–Maj/Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensating initiatives</td>
<td>1,2,3,5</td>
<td>1,2,3,5,6</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11</td>
<td>1,2,3,5,6,7,8,10,11</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11</td>
<td>1,2,3,4,6,7,8,10,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net regional stability</td>
<td>Slightly unstable</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Very unstable</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Moderately unstable</td>
<td>Very unstable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The impact of force postures and related initiatives upon Northeast Asia is summarized in Table 4.1. It indicates the likely level of external and internal instability prompted by each posture for each major state in the region, and it lists the compensating initiatives most likely to reduce such instability. External instability refers to regionally destabilizing behavior taken by a state in response to a posture (e.g., including such actions as an arms buildup, a more militant foreign policy line, increased tension with neighboring states, a major realignment in strategic relationships, etc.). Internal instability refers to political problems within a state generated by popular criticism of the presence or absence of U.S. military forces in Northeast Asia.

SOUTHEAST ASIA: CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS

Southeast Asia is undergoing a major transition, both in its security environment and in the economic and social conditions facing most nations of the region, contributing to long-term trends of significance for the U.S. military presence. In the former realm, competition among the major powers dramatically decreased during the late 1980s:

- Moscow removed the bulk of its air and naval forces from Cam Ranh Bay.
- The United States removed major forces from the Philippines and started the process of returning base facilities to Filipino control.
- China upgraded its ties with key ASEAN states such as Singapore and Indonesia and opened a dialogue with Vietnam; it also expanded military and diplomatic ties with Thailand.

In the economic area, major internal changes, both positive and negative, are occurring in key nations within the region and beyond:

- Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia have begun to achieve significant levels of economic growth.51
- In Vietnam, growing economic and social problems (compounded by a major decrease in assistance from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) have led to reductions in the size of the military and a greater degree of cooperation with nearby states.52
- Japan has become the predominant foreign trade partner and investor, largely eclipsing the United States.53

The dominant security threats of the past have thus diminished significantly, and Southeast Asia now faces a security environment much less volatile than that in Northeast Asia:

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51 Yeh, Sze, and Levin (1990).
• Major advances have been made toward resolving the conflict in Cambodia, with Vietnam withdrawing its forces and both China and Russia now supporting a peaceful solution to the issue.

• Within the ASEAN states, internal guerrilla movements have been largely eliminated (with the notable exception of the Philippines).

• The attention of most military establishments within ASEAN has turned from counterinsurgency to conventional defense against potential external threats.

• Most ASEAN governments are devoting increased attention to maintaining high levels of economic growth.

At the same time, however, Southeast Asia will probably continue to face significant uncertainties linked to conflicting defense priorities, shifting political and military relationships, and the often divergent pressures created by internal social and political adjustment and economic development. Recognition of the long-term value of U.S. military presence as a stabilizer will increasingly interact with expanded efforts to establish a collaborative order aimed at minimizing foreign military interference.

This will likely produce a highly complex environment that poses significant challenges for altering U.S. force postures in ways that can avoid adverse responses and also serve American interests. Overall, however, although most nations in Southeast Asia would prefer some type of continued U.S. base presence, the region is likely to tolerate significant reductions in U.S. force levels, provided the U.S.—Japan security alliance remains strong, the U.S. capability to reintroduce forces is retained, and regional powers such as China and India do not alter their nonthreatening stance toward the region.

Significant U.S. force reductions are already well under way, as a result of the closing of Clark Air Force Base following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in June 1991 and the likely withdrawal of U.S. forces from Subic Bay Naval Base following the Filipino senate’s September 1991 rejection of the proposed U.S.—Philippines base treaty (and the decision of the Aquino government against a national referendum to overturn that action).

Central Security Concerns: ASEAN and Southeast Asia

As superpower contention has receded in Southeast Asia, the ASEAN states have sought to strengthen regional security arrangements (albeit mostly on a bilateral basis) and encourage greater economic growth and political cooperation by accelerating the pursuit of longstanding regional policy objectives:

• Resolution of local conflicts such as Cambodia.

• Reduction of interference by outside nations in local political and military affairs.

• Expansion of economic interaction among the states of the area.

• Strengthening of national defense capabilities and (largely bilateral) defense cooperation efforts.

To attain these ends, most ASEAN nations have made efforts to
• Update and expand their conventional forces (including the attainment of modest air and naval power projection capabilities).\textsuperscript{54}

• Increase joint military exercises and training activities, intelligence sharing, weapons standardization, and military exchanges.\textsuperscript{55}

• Establish a division of labor concerning certain regional security functions (particularly air defense and maritime patrol among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore).\textsuperscript{56}

• Give greater attention to developing collaborative economic and defense-related institutions.

The Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) among Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain, for example, has been strengthened, and now provides the basis for an integrated air defense system within the region.\textsuperscript{57} In addition, there is continued attention to establishing a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ), perhaps eventually including Indochina.\textsuperscript{58}

**Internal Tensions: Continental Versus Maritime Perspectives**

The trend toward limited cooperation will probably continue for the foreseeable future. However, waning superpower involvement in Southeast Asia has also brought to the fore significant differences within ASEAN over basic security priorities. Largely reflecting different historical and geostrategic orientations, these differences will increasingly influence regional defense planning, especially force structuring, the framework for intra-ASEAN defense cooperation, and the pattern of extraregional alliances and alignments, especially over the short to medium term.\textsuperscript{59}

The most significant division over security priorities is a clash between an inward-looking continental perspective held by Thailand (and, on some issues, Singapore) and an outward-looking, maritime orientation centered on Indonesia and Malaysia.\textsuperscript{60} (In contrast to its fellow ASEAN members, the Philippines expresses little concern over potential security threats to itself or the region. Manila’s attention will likely remain focused on major internal economic, political, and social problems, for at least the near to mid term.)

These differences are sharpened by contrasting concepts of regional economic association. Thus, Thailand is exploring the idea of establishing an economic zone that includes only itself, Indochina, and Myanmar (formerly Burma). Understandably, this has prompted strong criticism from maritime ASEAN members for its potential to divide Southeast Asia into two


\textsuperscript{55}For Eastern Economic Review (1990), p. 17.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid. Also see Cossa (1990).

\textsuperscript{57}Simon (1990), pp. 220, 232.

\textsuperscript{58}These were both put forward as goals for Southeast Asian security in the Manila Declaration of the Third ASEAN Summit, December 1987.

\textsuperscript{59} Weatherbee (1991), p. 290. Also see Menon (1991), pp. 28–30. While acknowledging an increase in ASEAN defense collaboration, Menon states (p. 30): “On balance, there are still too many obstacles in the way of defense alliance formation.” Most defense collaboration within ASEAN is on a bilateral basis.

\textsuperscript{60}Weatherbee (1991), p. 289.
separate economic subunites. Yet Singapore has also proposed a plan for close economic cooperation with Indonesia and Malaysia, aimed at creating an industrial, commercial, and tourist “growth triangle” linking the three nations. In contrast, Malaysia has suggested establishing a broader regional economic community that includes Japan but excludes North America and Australia. This latter proposal, first called the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) and later renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), has prompted considerable debate within the Asia Pacific region and much skepticism from Japan and the United States, although there are signs that some Japanese officials support the notion.

This basic difference in strategic orientation has led to the emergence of significant tensions over defense relationships with non-ASEAN powers, particularly Vietnam and China. For example, despite some recent advances in relations between Vietnam and Thailand associated with the above-mentioned attempt to lure Vietnam into a Thai-led continental economic zone, Bangkok continues to regard Hanoi as its major potential adversary. As a result, Thailand will probably maintain concerted efforts to improve relations with China as a necessary counterbalance to Vietnam, at least over the short to medium term. This has thus far led to significant purchases of Chinese arms by the Thai government (especially ground combat weapons) and the expansion of political and military exchanges with Chinese officials. In addition, Thai officials have recently approached the Japanese with suggestions for joint naval exercises in the South China Sea and discussions between military officials on the repercussions of a U.S. withdrawal.

Such Thai initiatives have brought strong criticisms from Malaysia and Indonesia as well as other ASEAN members. These maritime states view the future role of both Vietnam and outside regional powers in a very different light. Rather than regarding Vietnam as a continued threat to be countered through links with outside powers, they see the need to coopt Hanoi by ultimately incorporating it into any future ZOPFAN concept, and perhaps eventually into ASEAN as well. Such a view has emerged partly in response to indications of greater moderation in Vietnamese foreign policy. It also reflects concern that China, Japan, and India may someday seek to intervene in regional affairs in adverse ways, largely because of the decline of superpower rivalry and their own growing political ambitions.

Such concern is unlikely to diminish in the future. For many reasons, China will continue to be viewed by maritime ASEAN states as the primary long-term threat to Southeast Asia:

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63The EAEC seeks to assure that affiliation with any broad-based regional or subregional economic organization does not sacrifice ASEAN interests to those of the more developed states. Many ASEAN states fear this is now happening with the recently formed Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC). For details on the EAEC and the debate surrounding it, see The Japan Economic Journal, May 4, 1991, p. 12; FEER, April 18, 1991, p. 70; Kyodo News Service, March 21, 1991, in FBIS-EAS-96, March 22, 1991, pp. 8–9; Bangkok Post, March 9, 1991, p. 4; The Economist, March 9, 1991, p. 38; and FEER, January 31, 1991, pp. 32–33.
64Movement toward a more significant improvement in Thai-Vietnamese relations was cut short as a result of the February 1991 military coup in Thailand. The military had been strongly opposed to former prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan’s attempts to improve relations with Vietnam.
67Despite the recent normalization of relations between China and Indonesia, Jakarta continues to urge the United States to improve diplomatic contacts with Vietnam, partly because it believes this will strengthen Hanoi’s role as a barrier to Chinese expansionism in the area. See Chanda (1991), p. 271.
• Its geographic proximity and past history of interference in Southeast Asian affairs.
• Its past exploitation of the large ethnic Chinese populations in many Southeast Asian states to foment internal unrest.
• Continued Chinese dissatisfaction over the territorial status quo.
• China’s efforts to develop a power projection capability.
• The resurgence of a hard-line leadership in Beijing after the Tiananmen incident of June 1989.

Maritime ASEAN will remain concerned over potential future confrontations with China over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which may have considerable strategic and economic value.68 Indeed, the recent Gulf War may raise the significance of this area, given its proximity to lines of communication and transport to the Middle East and its potential as a source of oil supplies.

China insists that its growing military capabilities present no threat to ASEAN and that it prefers to settle all problems, including the Spratlys, through negotiation. It has also offered to engage in joint development of the islands, as long as the sovereignty issue is not raised.69 The general logic of China’s current situation, marked by massive internal problems and a resulting desire for a stable external environment, lends credence to such reassurances. But the ultimate factor in China’s future stance toward the Spratlys will likely be the state of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Even if Vietnam and China fully normalize relations, the islands may still serve as a source of long-term regional tensions, given growing domestic economic requirements and political uncertainties in both countries.

The maritime ASEAN states, as well as the nations of Indochina and Myanmar, will doubtless continue to believe that Japan can best contribute to stability through trade, investment, aid, and technology transfer, not military engagement.70 Japan has repeatedly stated its desire to contribute to peace and security by not becoming a military power.71 Instead, Tokyo will likely continue to seek to implement a range of political and economic initiatives intended to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian states. Through such cooperation, Japan hopes to help resolve the Cambodian conflict, arrest Vietnam’s continuing economic decline, manage growing regional debt burdens, and heighten levels of investment and technology transfer. Moreover, because of Tokyo’s acute awareness of regional sensitivities to its future role in Asia and the Pacific, Japan will remain opposed to any proposed regional trading blocs or security arrangements that would exclude the United States.

Japan’s position reassures most nations of Southeast Asia, given their desire to maintain strong economic growth and encourage a nonthreatening Japanese presence in the region. Still, some are concerned that growing Japanese economic involvement could lead to eventual dependence on Tokyo, particularly in light of the diminished U.S. economic profile in the area. More significantly, many nations express increased concern over growing U.S.–Japan

69APDR, October 1990, p. 19.
70APDR, July 1990, p. 11.
71For the most recent statement of this position, see Kaifu’s remarks during his May 1991 trip through Southeast Asia, in Vatikiotis (1991), pp. 11–12.
frictions and signs of increasing American pressure on Tokyo to take on a greater share of the defense burden. They fear that these developments could eventually prompt Japan to add a military dimension to its enormous economic power.72 Such fears will probably remain strong for the foreseeable future.

The maritime ASEAN states also express some concern over future Indian intentions toward Southeast Asia. Despite India’s present economic shortcomings, some nations remain wary of its longer-term blue water naval ambitions. Moreover, although India has thus far shown little interest in the fate of ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia, recent military interventions in Sri Lanka and the Maldives have aroused some concern among India’s neighbors in the region.73

While paying greater attention to the future role of nearby Asian powers, both maritime and continental ASEAN states also retain concerns about longer-term Russian motives. As it has done in Northeast Asia, Moscow in recent years has stressed the establishment of closer bilateral economic and political ties with many Southeast Asian states. Moscow also unilaterally reduced its military presence in the region, lowering its ship days in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean and removing most of its military forces from Vietnam. It has also placed significant pressure on Vietnam to cooperate on a Cambodia solution and negotiate with Beijing over the Spratlys.

With the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and the likely acceleration of Russian attempts to establish more constructive ties with capitalist states throughout Asia and the Pacific, most Southeast Asian nations will almost certainly become far less suspicious of Moscow. This will be particularly true if Russia adopts a more supportive attitude toward the U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific region, since many Southeast Asian states feared that the primary goal of past Soviet initiatives was to edge the United States out of the region entirely. Under such a new situation, many Southeast Asian states would probably be very receptive to an expanded Russian economic role in the region. But most states would probably continue to oppose any increase in Russian military presence. Some countries, such as Indonesia, would support such a presence only as a counterweight to possible Chinese threats, if the United States were to withdraw totally from the area.

Implications for U.S. Force Presence

Southeast Asian concerns regarding China, Japan, and Russia suggest a connection between local security perceptions and events in Northeast Asia. ASEAN would be very uneasy about any major shifts in the political or military environment in Northeast Asia that either increased Russian, Chinese, or Korean security concerns or raised the possibility of Japanese rearmament. For these reasons, most nations of Southeast Asia will probably remain sup-


Despite the lack of a single, immediate security threat, the ASEAN states will also probably continue to support some type of U.S. military presence in their immediate vicinity, viewed as essential to

- Maintain both domestic and intraregional political and economic stability.
- Deter external aggression, especially regarding potential naval conflicts in the South China Sea.
- Guarantee continued U.S. economic involvement in the region, partly to counter growing Japanese economic dominance.

Even though they recognize the value of a continued U.S. presence, ASEAN's member states will have divergent opinions about its duration, form, and location. Such differences reflect increased nationalist sentiments (especially in the case of the Philippines), religious tensions (including those associated with Islamic majorities in such states as Malaysia), the general reduction of superpower contention in the area, varying mid- and long-term geostrategic perspectives, and the growing ASEAN desire for a neutral, nonnuclear region free from outside political and military interference.

In general, most ASEAN states are likely to favor the continued presence of U.S. naval and air components, pending creation of an independent security capability and establishment of an effective ZOPFAN. However, maritime nations most closely identified with the establishment of ZOPFAN, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, will also seek to reduce the opportunities and means available to outside powers to introduce their own security agendas into the area, particularly over the mid and long term. They will also oppose any actions by outside forces that would appear to compromise their own nonaligned image.

As a result, the maritime-oriented ASEAN states would be likely to oppose any attempts to relocate U.S. military facilities closer to their borders or to the Malacca Straits, but to support some U.S. naval presence. Both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta have publicly stated that any foreign military bases in Southeast Asia must be temporary and that ASEAN should strive to meet its own defense needs through internal cooperation. Officials in Jakarta have informally proposed the notion of a defense community centered on Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Designed in part to gradually replace the FPDA structure with a more regional defense arrangement, the Indonesian proposal would provide a framework for joint exercises and continuous cooperation to defuse potential conflicts, institutionalized

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75In fact, ASEAN differences may have been exacerbated by the Gulf War, particularly through its effect on Islamic populations. See Richardson (1991b), pp. 27–29.
through a military defense committee for planning, programming, and budgeting.\textsuperscript{78} Such proposals will probably continue to be put forward.

While agreeing with the long-term goal of achieving regional neutrality and an independent defense stance, both Singapore and Thailand have expressed great skepticism about Indonesia’s security initiative. They are less concerned about a continued U.S. military presence and are less insistent about accelerating attainment of the ZOPFAN and NWFZ concepts. They would thus prefer a continued high-visibility, forward-deployed U.S. presence, if possible, as well as continued ties with other outside powers, including China.\textsuperscript{79}

Thailand, despite sharing such a preference, is nevertheless pursuing a security policy that assumes a diminishing U.S. presence.\textsuperscript{80} In contrast, Singapore has sought to provide the basis for a continued U.S. force presence by allowing American warships and aircraft access to facilities for short-term visits. This offer was criticized by both Indonesia and Malaysia.\textsuperscript{81} Malaysia, with its history of friction with Singapore, also opposed the offer, expressing fears that U.S. facilities in Singapore might at some point threaten Malaysia.\textsuperscript{82}

The Philippines Base Issue

Although they acknowledge the importance of the Philippines bases to regional security, most ASEAN members will probably continue to regard the U.S. base presence as a bilateral issue, to be resolved by Manila and Washington. Most states would like the Subic naval base to remain, to avoid the problem of locating a U.S. presence elsewhere in the region. Since the bases are to be closed, most ASEAN states will want the process to be gradual. This would give time to wean the Philippines economy from the U.S. military and allow for the possible construction of alternative facilities, and it will permit ASEAN states to build up their own maritime capabilities to cope with potential contingencies.\textsuperscript{83}

However, the September 1991 rejection by the Filipino senate of the proposed U.S.–Philippines base treaty and the Aquino government’s decision not to hold a national referendum to overturn the senate’s action virtually assures that most U.S. forces will be withdrawn from the Philippines within the next few years. Despite private U.S. assurances that maximum efforts will be made to carry out the withdrawal in a nondisruptive manner, such a development will almost certainly force an acceleration of the above adjustment process. Depending upon the specific circumstances attending this withdrawal, this could increase regional anxieties and instabilities.

The negative impact of these developments would be magnified if few compensating actions were implemented during the withdrawal, the U.S.–Japan relationship worsened consider-

\textsuperscript{78} Described in Richardson (1991e), p. 37. Also see Karniol (1991), p. 127.

\textsuperscript{79} Singapore in particular favors strengthening bilateral or even trilateral cooperation within ASEAN in both military and nonmilitary areas while retaining the FPDA with its broader network of defense contacts. See Richardson (1991e), p. 37. Also see Hoon (1991), pp. 14–15.

\textsuperscript{80} The Thai leadership assumes that U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia and support for Bangkok in particular will continue to decline in the 1990s, even though American military sales to Thailand will be sustained. See Simon (1990), p. 226; Cossa (1990), p. 70.

\textsuperscript{81} Far Eastern Economic Review (1990), p. 17.


\textsuperscript{83} Simon (1990), p. 231.
ably, and China and India became more assertive toward the region. Such a worst-case scenario, however, is highly unlikely; thus a rapid closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines, while not beneficial to regional stability and U.S. interests, will probably not produce catastrophic consequences.

Indeed, the worst consequences of a precipitate U.S. withdrawal may take place within the Philippines, perhaps prompting severe domestic repercussions. These could include the following:

- Heightened economic uncertainty and instability, stemming from the loss of revenues associated with the U.S. presence, and the postponement of urgently needed domestic economic reforms.
- Greater internal political unrest, perhaps including an increased insurgency movement, and a resulting partial return to authoritarian political rule.
- An attempt to acquire a military capability beyond current limited counterinsurgency forces, with emphasis on air and naval components.

In the worst case, such developments could produce a chaotic political and economic environment marked by

- An increasingly polarized political system.
- Spiraling levels of political violence committed by both left and right.
- A collapsing economy, characterized by increased foreign debt, inflation, and unemployment.
- Abrogation of security links with the United States and the emergence of a neutral Philippines that seeks to insulate the nation from external interference.

The probability of such a scenario would depend to a significant extent upon the reaction of major foreign investors and traders to the U.S. pullout, as well as the responses of internal forces such as the Philippines military. If the investors were to drastically reduce their economic role in the Filipino economy and the uniformed military attempted to intervene decisively in Filipino politics, the chances of serious internal instability would increase greatly.

What are the implications of the above assessments for the type of U.S. presence desired in Southeast Asia over the next 10 to 15 years? Assuming no major destabilizing developments in Northeast Asia, most nations of the region would probably prefer a future U.S. presence that is

- Near enough and large enough to serve as a stabilizer and a deterrent.
- Low profile enough not to provoke local sensitivities.
- Flexible enough to be removable if and when the region is able to make the transition to neutrality and an independent defense posture.

Such preferences pose a major challenge to any attempts to gauge responses to U.S. force postures, and hence to any American efforts to provide a forward-deployed military presence that will satisfy the nations of the region and serve U.S. strategic interests.
SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE FORCE POSTURES AND INITIATIVES

Reductions in the U.S. force posture in Southeast Asia, even major ones, will not necessarily have outcomes adverse to U.S. interests. Much will depend on factors relating to the broader Asian Pacific environment, including

- The U.S. force posture in Northeast Asia.
- U.S.—Japan security relations.
- Japanese diplomatic and military behavior.
- U.S. estimates of the importance of defending nearby sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
- Chinese, Indian, and Russian behavior.

The effects of specific compensating policy and program initiatives, in the context of various alternative postures, will also be very important.

Posture C

The removal of virtually all U.S. bases from the western Pacific has the greatest chance of provoking adverse responses in Southeast Asia, not only because of its possible consequences for the immediate region, but also because of its highly destabilizing effect on Northeast Asia. Yet even with the virtual withdrawal of the entire U.S. forward-deployed presence from the western Pacific, the overall response would be far from straightforward in many respects.

Posture C could spur further development of ASEAN-wide defense collaboration measures, as well as a strengthening of joint FPDA defense activities and their expansion to include Indonesia and perhaps Thailand. Rather than producing greater security, however, such expanded defense collaboration could increase regional anxieties and uncertainties, leading to a general acceleration of the existing arms buildup in Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. This could involve both defensive armaments and offensive weapons linked to the attainment of modest power projection capabilities. The likelihood of such a development would increase significantly if China, India, or Japan sought to play a more active military role in the region in the aftermath of an American withdrawal.

Alternatively, given the strongly contrasting strategic perspectives of various member nations, it is possible that Posture C would aggravate existing intra-ASEAN security divisions. Specific responses might include the following:

- Further strengthening of Thai-Chinese military relations, and perhaps Singapore-China relations.
- Closer bilateral military ties between Indonesia and Vietnam, as potential maritime allies against Beijing.\footnote{This latter development is mentioned by Simon (1990), p. 220, as possible under present conditions. It might occur as part of a more ambitious Australian defense effort aimed at Southeast Asia, including an increase in air and naval deployments, although this would probably still be on a rotational basis.}

\footnote{Weatherbee (1991), p. 292.}
• Increased maritime defense cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia, in response to Thai actions and as a general expression of greater security fears regarding China.

• Greater receptiveness by Malaysia and Singapore to Indonesia’s proposal for establishing a formal structure of trilateral military ties, excluding Thailand.

This last development could serve as the vehicle for a more assertive Indonesian foreign policy, and possibly eventual Indonesian dominance over the region. This assumes that Indonesia will have continued economic growth and can avoid major political instability in the transition to a post-Suharto regime, and that there is no external intervention in the region. Such a development would alarm Australia and even India, particularly in the unlikely event that Indonesia’s Muslim majority were to put a more fundamentalist stamp on a post-Suharto government.

Ultimately, the overall level of instability produced by Posture C (whether accompanied by greater ASEAN-wide defense cooperation or greater internal division between continental and maritime states) would depend primarily on Chinese and Japanese behavior during and after a U.S. withdrawal, and the impact of any compensating policy and program initiatives the United States might take.

**The China Factor.** The uncertainties of China’s domestic political situation greatly complicate any assessment of Posture C’s likely impact on Southeast Asia. If hard-liners in the leadership manage to consolidate their rule and Sino-American relations experience a major deterioration, a U.S. military withdrawal from the western Pacific could conceivably prompt a “worst-case” chain of events highly detrimental to stability:

• A major Chinese military buildup and a more belligerent foreign policy line.

• Increased security anxieties among the maritime ASEAN states, raising the likelihood of a major arms buildup, particularly the naval and air components.

• A more aggressive Chinese stance toward the Spratly Islands, exacerbating tensions and at least partially reversing recent Chinese diplomatic gains with the ASEAN states.86

• Increased likelihood of closer relations between Thailand and China, thus widening divisions within ASEAN.

• Possible reversal by Vietnam of its current policy of military retrenchment and accommodation with its neighbors.

Although greater intra-ASEAN divisions and increased tensions among maritime ASEAN, China, and Vietnam seem possible in the context of such a scenario, the nations in the area would probably have more incentives to maintain good relations and avoid actual military conflict. Given mounting internal economic and social problems, and despite a hardened domestic and foreign policy line, China would probably seek to maintain stable political and economic ties with ASEAN and avoid undue political or military tension over the Spratlys. Indeed, these incentives may increase rather than diminish if the Northeast Asian security environment worsened appreciably as a result of Posture C and demanded China’s immediate attention.

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86 The combination of Posture C and domestic setbacks in China could prompt a more militant Chinese stance on the Spratlys, even without any prior increases in ASEAN maritime capabilities.
The incentives to maintain good ties with maritime ASEAN would be almost as great for the Vietnamese, assuming continuation of their dismal domestic situation and their desire to acquire allies to counterbalance Thailand. Finally, among the ASEAN states, political and economic incentives to avoid disputes with each other and with China would doubtless remain fairly strong. Most members are experiencing rapid economic growth and would seek to avoid the disruption of the trade and investment environment that increased military tensions could cause. Moreover, Indonesia’s need to assure a smooth leadership succession would be a strong added incentive to maintain regional stability, while the Philippines will remain focused almost entirely on major internal difficulties. Thus, although the possibility of provocative Chinese behavior leading to major instability cannot be excluded, it is more likely that the above worst-case scenario for Southeast Asia can be avoided.

The Japan Factor. An independent assertion of Japanese military influence in Northeast and Southeast Asia would profoundly alter the above optimistic assessment. China would likely counter any such Japanese actions with a sharp set of policy responses:

- Quantitative and qualitative improvements in naval and air capabilities.
- Attempts to consolidate control over the Spratly Islands.
- Attempts to use the Japanese “threat” to Southeast Asia to establish military ties with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and to strengthen existing ties with Thailand.

Such Chinese moves could also prompt India to increase its political and military presence. Then, caught between Chinese overtures/pressures, Indian attention, and Japanese expansion, maritime ASEAN might seek to

- Further expand and formalize regional defense collaboration efforts, to include Thailand, the Philippines, and perhaps even Vietnam.
- Strengthen its military and political ties with Australia.

However, such outcomes are unlikely because the probability of Japan moving to establish an independent military presence in Southeast Asia remains very low. Even assuming a major fissure in U.S.—Japan relations and the emergence of Japanese offensive military capabilities in Northeast Asia (the worst-case scenario for Posture C in that region), a total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia would probably compel Tokyo to

- Strengthen economic ties to the region, including increased trade, investment, official development assistance (ODA), and strategic aid.
- Liberalize technology transfers to ASEAN, especially in dual-use areas.
- Increase political and perhaps even military exchanges with Southeast Asia.
- Provide indirect assistance for the more rapid development of ASEAN self-defense forces, by offering development aid in areas that could help offset increased national defense budgets.87

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87 For this last point, see Simon (1990), p. 234.
Japan would not wish to aggravate any regional instability prompted by Posture C by becoming militarily involved in Southeast Asia, particularly if it were distracted by events closer to home. The only conditions under which such a development might occur would arise from the highly unlikely combination of a total break in U.S.–Japan relations and unambiguous Chinese threats against Southeast Asia.

**Compensating Initiatives.** The use of selected policy and program initiatives would greatly reduce (if not eliminate altogether) the likelihood of many of the more extreme dangers and uncertainties associated with Posture C. The most relevant initiatives are

- Reorient U.S. regional base and support structures (Initiative 4)
- Revise U.S. theater nuclear weapons policy (Initiative 5)\(^{88}\)
- Increase regional prepositioning of U.S. equipment (Initiative 6)
- Adjust forward CVBG basing and deployment patterns (Initiative 7)
- Employ innovative force deployment and substitution concepts (Initiative 11)
- Employ nonforce military capabilities to substitute for forward force deployments (Initiative 10)
- Adopt a “proportional engagement” strategy (Initiative 1)
- Establish a security consultation arrangement in Southeast Asia (Initiative 12)

All these initiatives could be implemented as part of an extensive Southeast Asian security consultation arrangement between the United States and receptive ASEAN states (Initiative 12). This arrangement would encompass

- Temporary basing or “visits” by U.S. forces (most likely in the Philippines).\(^{89}\)
- Increased exercising (even if at reduced levels of U.S. forces).
- Increased efforts to create a mechanism for more cooperation in the event of a crisis.\(^{90}\)
- The incorporation of a range of non-force-related activities with selected states.

As it does with Northeast Asia, Posture C requires a U.S. grand strategy (Initiative 1) to comprise a clear, consistent, and credible security-based rationale for the American withdrawal. In this case, however, such a rationale would need to address both the direct security concerns of Southeast Asia and indirect concerns relating to Northeast Asia. Assessments of the short- and mid-term danger posed by China and Japan (and, to a much lesser extent, India) would be of primary importance. Establishing a clear linkage between such assessments and implementing other transitional initiatives would be especially significant.

\(^{88}\) Again, this initiative will soon be implemented as a result of President Bush’s September 1991 announcement regarding the removal of U.S. short-range nuclear weapons overseas.

\(^{89}\) Such an arrangement could involve some continuing partial use by U.S. forces of naval and air facilities in the Philippines.

\(^{90}\) Much as U.S. discussions with Saudi political and military authorities before August 2, 1990, facilitated the eventual U.S. force buildup for Operation Desert Shield.
Improved rapid deployment capabilities, the adjustment of CVBG deployment patterns, and other individual initiatives intended to partly compensate for the loss of forward bases would provide more tangible indications of a continued U.S. commitment to the security of Southeast Asia. They would also help allay concerns about potential threats from China, Japan, or India, particularly fears of a clash with China over the Spratlys.

However, these initiatives would be more effective if combined with a general Southeast Asian security consultation arrangement (Initiative 12), as part of an overall, low-visibility security regime facilitated by the United States. Besides reassuring ASEAN states that instabilities in Northeast Asia would not spill over into their own region, such an arrangement could provide the basis for greater military cooperation between Thailand and the maritime ASEAN states.

Even with the full implementation of these initiatives, however, the removal of all U.S. bases in Southeast Asia, as part of a decision to withdraw forward-deployed forces from the western Pacific, would still very likely lead to significant instability. Air and naval buildups would probably accelerate, and political and military divisions within ASEAN would continue. Moreover, even under conditions of strong U.S. encouragement and implementation of the above initiatives, any resulting expansion of Japanese military activities would stimulate even greater defense buildups than might otherwise occur under Posture C.91 It might also produce strong Chinese reactions to an independent Japanese military presence, especially if Japanese military involvement occurred under conditions of worsened Sino-American and/or Sino-Japanese relations.

Posture E

In terms of the immediate Southeast Asian security environment, Posture E would be viewed as only slightly less drastic than Posture C. While positing a minimal forward-deployed U.S. presence for Northeast Asia, this posture still assumes the withdrawal of major forward-based U.S. forces from the western Pacific. Thus, the initiatives relevant to Posture C would remain valid. Any difference in Southeast Asian responses to Posture E as compared with Posture C would depend almost entirely upon whether or not major instabilities could be avoided in Northeast Asia. This would in turn depend on the overall efficacy of the positive initiatives proffered in the discussion of Northeast Asian responses to Posture E. In general, the possibility of avoiding major instabilities in Southeast Asia would probably be marginally greater than with Posture C, given the greater U.S. presence that would remain in Northeast Asia. This would be especially true if Posture E were implemented gradually.

Posture F

Unlike the case for Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia's response to Posture F might differ significantly from its response to Posture E. The implications for Southeast Asia of an extended U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf would be very great, given that Southeast Asia is astride the SLOCs connecting the Asia Pacific region with the Middle East. The extent and

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91 Before the Gulf War, congressional discussions about the possibility of Japan taking on the task of defending SLOCs from Japan to the Indian Ocean had already elicited considerable anger in Southeast Asia. See Chanda (1991), p. 272.
type of response, however, would depend very much on specific U.S. actions taken in Southeast Asia to support that extended presence.

The increased U.S. transient military presence (as more U.S. forces transit the region to and from the Gulf) would probably have a net positive effect on Southeast Asia, despite any instabilities created in Northeast Asia as a result of U.S. forces transferred to Persian Gulf duty. This would reassure most of the states regarding their fears of future interference by China, Japan, or India, assuming that Northeast Asia did not witness the most adverse possible outcomes that could follow implementation of Postures E and F. On the other hand, if the United States demanded that Japan extend its naval defense beyond the current 1000 nautical miles radius, the effects could be extremely negative, inciting Southeast Asian (and Chinese) fears of Japanese rearmament.

Postures B and D

These postures involve a minimal reduction of the U.S. forward-deployed presence in Northeast Asia. This would make unlikely any major security instabilities in that region. Accordingly, this would tend to reduce potential negative effects in Southeast Asia as well, in contrast to the effects of Postures C, E, and F. Unless accompanied by specific policy initiatives, however, the direct impact of Postures B and D on Southeast Asia might prompt some adverse responses.

Posture B posits the closure of all U.S. bases in Southeast Asia and the introduction of one tactical fighter squadron (TFS) on a rotational basis, to supplement both the recently instituted practice of deploying part of an Air Force TFS to Singapore and the comparable Australian deployment currently provided under the FPDA. Such a significant reduction in the U.S. presence may soon occur as a result of the Philippines' rejection of the base treaty. While this might prompt anxieties within ASEAN concerning the ability of U.S. forces to deter potential future conflicts, such security concerns could be mitigated by the implementation of several initiatives:

- Increase regional prepositioning of U.S. equipment (Initiative 6)
- Employ innovative force deployment and substitution concepts (Initiative 11)
- Establish a security consultation arrangement in Southeast Asia (Initiative 12)

If implemented early, as part of a clear regional strategy (Initiative 1), these initiatives would likely minimize any disruption to Southeast Asia, assuming no major adverse shifts in Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

Moreover, if the implementation of Posture B and its accompanying initiatives included a continued, albeit minimal, U.S. presence in the Philippines (perhaps as one site for the rotated TFS and visiting naval units), this would probably reduce, but not eliminate, many of the domestic instabilities formerly associated with the U.S. bases. On the one hand, a major reduction of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines would lessen public protests against the United States and hence reduce pressures on the government. (The modification of U.S. nuclear weapons policy as a result of President Bush's September 1991 announce-
ment will probably further strengthen this positive trend, given the strength of antinuclear sentiment in the Philippines. On the other hand, the continuation of a minimal U.S. conventional presence would also reassure the political and military leaders who privately favor that presence. It must be stressed, however, that tremendous social, political, and economic unrest might still occur in the Philippines.

As with Posture F, Posture D could serve to further reduce security concerns, as long as a major U.S. presence in the Gulf implied a higher level of U.S. naval activity in Southeast Asia, as opposed to a Japanese naval presence. At the same time, however, under Posture D a larger but transient U.S. military presence linked to Gulf operations might significantly increase domestic criticism of the United States, depending on the size and location of the supplemental forces involved in such activities.

Posture A

This posture, which posits the continuation of the 1991 U.S. military presence to at least the year 2000, has been rendered “null and void” in light of the rejection of the U.S.–Philippines base treaty and programmed reductions in U.S. force structure already in progress. We employ it solely for analytic purposes. Were such a scenario to persist, even in the near term, the effects upon the region would most likely be similar to those under Posture B. The principal consequences would be to

• Allay security concerns of most nations in Southeast Asia.
• Greatly aggravate adverse Filipino reactions to the U.S. presence based on nationalist and democratic sentiments.

The trend toward closer China-Thailand military relations would probably slow, and tensions within ASEAN over the dangers posed by interference from extraregional powers would likely be reduced. At the same time, however, the strong nationalist sentiments among some segments of Filipino public opinion would be further inflamed. Moreover, the strong desire of Indonesia and Malaysia to attain a ZOPFAN and a NWFZ by the end of the century would not be addressed.

Indonesia and Malaysia would probably seek some near- to mid-term action from the United States that would contribute to the ZOPFAN and NWFZ goals, while Singapore and Thailand would strongly resist such moves. Such a confrontation might at least partially counter the positive benefits to ASEAN of a lessened threat from extraregional powers. The security benefits of a continued high-visibility U.S. military presence might be eroded significantly as a result of such pressures, especially if the United States were ultimately forced by a hostile public to greatly reduce its existing posture.

Although it is frequently discussed, the distribution of U.S. forces already in the region to other bases outside of the Philippines (Initiative 4) probably would not reduce adverse domestic responses under Posture A. On the contrary, this action would most likely lessen the Philippines problem but probably provoke nationalist opposition elsewhere, leading to pro-

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92 In addition, this initiative will also probably serve to minimize any increase in domestic anti-American sentiments within other ASEAN states to which U.S. air and naval forces were rotated, such as Indonesia and Malaysia.
tracted negotiations over the exact conditions governing basing arrangements as well as heightened sensitivities toward the U.S. presence by nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia. However, a temporary distribution of the components of a reduced U.S. force structure to other areas in the region would probably be acceptable to most states. Such an action could be considered as an initiative under Postures B–F, perhaps as part of a security consultation arrangement (Initiative 12).

The impact of force postures and initiatives upon Southeast Asia is summarized in Table 4.2, using the same categories and definitions as Table 4.1.

**OVERALL ASSESSMENT**

A continued U.S. military forward presence is needed to help sustain regional stability and avoid the unleashing of regional forces that could lead to heightened tensions or even armed conflict. In terms of regional responses, however, the question of how much U.S. presence is enough cannot be determined exactly, given the enormous complexity and uncertainties of the future regional environment and the multitude of variables that will influence long-term regional responses to changes in the American force presence. Viewed in this broader context, the optimum force posture is most likely to be somewhere between Posture B (base force) and Posture E (35 percent reduction)—in other words, something close to Posture D (Pacific swing force). Of course, diminished threats to regional security or acceptance of larger risks (e.g., no multiple contingencies, betting on a quiescent Persian Gulf and North Korea) could alter the relative scope and scale of the needed U.S. presence.

Finally, except for the extremes in U.S. presence (Postures A and C), the extent of adverse regional response to any force posture will be subject to the effect of accompanying initiatives.

**Table 4.2**

**Southeast Asia: Levels of External/Internal Instability in Response to Alternative Force Postures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Posture</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Low–None/Low(^a)</td>
<td>Low/Low</td>
<td>Maj/Mod(^b)</td>
<td>Low(^g)/Low</td>
<td>Maj–Mod(^d/)</td>
<td>Mod(^d/) Low–None(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>None/None</td>
<td>None/None</td>
<td>Mod/Mod</td>
<td>Low/None</td>
<td>Low/None</td>
<td>Low/None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>None/None</td>
<td>None/None</td>
<td>Maj–Mod/Mod</td>
<td>None/None</td>
<td>Mod/None</td>
<td>Mod/None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensating initiatives</td>
<td>4,5,12</td>
<td>1,5,6,11,12</td>
<td>1,4,5,6,7,10, 11,12</td>
<td>1,5,6,11,12</td>
<td>1,4,5,6,7,10, 11,12</td>
<td>1,4,5,6,7,10, 11,12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net regional stability</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Very unstable</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Moderately unstable</td>
<td>Moderately unstable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

\(^a\)Mod/Maj for the Philippines.

\(^b\)Assuming a gradual rate of U.S. withdrawal.

\(^c\)Assuming no Japanese involvement in sea lane defense.

\(^d\)Includes fears regarding Northeast Asian instability.
The policy and program initiatives that would be most beneficial are the ones that reduce the visibility and intrusiveness of the U.S. presence in regional states yet clearly impart America's continued security commitment and permit the reintroduction of major U.S. forces in the event of specific contingencies.

We have evaluated the significance of alternative force postures and associated policy and program initiatives largely in terms of the deterrence and reassurance functions they perform for the major states in the Asia Pacific region. We now analyze these postures and initiatives from the perspective of their impact on the military capability of the United States in specific conflict scenarios.
5. FORCE POSTURE PERFORMANCE IN SELECTED CONTINGENCY SCENARIOS

To this point in the analysis we have considered the role of U.S. forward military presence in shaping the future Asian Pacific security environment: reassuring our security partners, deterring states that might destabilize the region, and protecting a broad range of U.S. interests. This world is the domain of the DoD Strategic Framework. But underlying the broad regional understanding of the capabilities of the residual U.S. military forces is the expectation of a relatively benign, if uncertain, world. Should circumstances change for the worse, the latent capabilities of U.S. forces would be transformed into military operations in crisis or war. This section measures important attributes of force posture performance—the comparison of supply and demand—within the world outlined in Sections 2 and 4 and with the alternative force postures outlined in Section 3.

In this analysis we are not “worst casing.” We are simply assuming that events may not unfold as anticipated and that we may someday find ourselves in a situation with forces developed years earlier under different expectations and circumstances. One can accept the world described in Sections 2 and 4 as plausible and buy forces to match, only to find out later that circumstances have changed even though fundamental security assumptions remain intact. Since it takes 6 to 10 years to build forces in peacetime (even with an aggressive investment program), the potential for a situation-force mismatch is great.\(^1\) In short, it is impossible to escape risk. Measuring risk is a task for analysis; deciding how much risk is acceptable is a political judgment.

To gain some insights into the adequacy of force posture in a world where deterrence may break down and the unlikely event may occur, we have employed 11 scenarios that place requirements on the U.S. force posture.\(^2\) This analysis is a doubly risky and speculative enterprise. We may not have the right scenarios, and we may misjudge the utility of a given force posture in addressing these potential conflicts. We are unable in this research to undertake a comprehensive multiscenario force-on-force analysis typical of the JCS total force capability analysis (TFCA) process, or even the more modest wargaming commonly performed by numerous policy research institutes and contract research firms. But where that research is available and relevant, we have used it.

For example, we have drawn extensively on RAND Strategy Assessment Center (RSAC) work and the annual Global War Games at the Naval War College, net assessments, and other analyses to support some of the judgments we present in this section. For some scenarios, we were unable to find any relevant analysis and had to speculate on possible results. In summary, for our contingency performance analysis we have relied largely on the expert

\(^1\) The “Reagan” defense buildup really started in 1979, in the aftermath of major destabilizing events in Southwest Asia. That buildup was not essentially complete until 1986–1988. The U.S. defense buildup prior to World War II started in 1936–1937 and was far from complete (in terms of peacetime force objectives) when the attack on Pearl Harbor overtook it in December 1941.

\(^2\) These scenarios are based heavily on parallel RAND research for USCINCPAC. See Schrader and Winnefeld (forthcoming).
SCENARIOS

The selected scenarios are presented as illustrative planning stimulants, not predictions. For example, 12 years ago few in government would have predicted or based planning on the events that occurred just before and during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. At that earlier time, planning focused on repulsing a Soviet threat into Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. Yet the planning and resource programming undertaken in response to that earlier threat (which never materialized in concrete form) provided the essential underpinning for the quite different scenario that defined Desert Shield/Storm. The point is that scenarios need not be “right” in the form of the opponent faced, the circumstances and location of combat operations, and the exact character of U.S. response so long as the problems encountered and the range of capabilities needed can shape policies, plans, and force programs.

Many of our scenarios are drawn from the rich scenario literature. Table 5.1 cites some of the sources of the scenarios we have selected. In some cases the literature has not caught up to the post–Cold War world, and we have speculated on the sources and results of tensions in the future world and its uncertainties as sketched out in Section 2. We have also excluded scenarios that are at variance with the fundamental assumptions of the Strategic Framework. For example, we assume that the United States and Japan remain security partners for the period we examine, even though the content of that relationship and U.S. force presence may change to fit the emerging regional circumstances.

Moreover, we have omitted one important scenario category: provision of humanitarian aid in the form of food, medical supplies, evacuations, and disaster relief. The form of military assistance that might be needed here covers a wide quality and quantity of capabilities. However, forces and support are rarely purchased solely for this purpose. Accordingly, we have assumed that the humanitarian mission is a collateral mission that provides an additional, but not unique, justification for a military force posture. Each of the six force postures we examine contains considerable latent humanitarian aid capabilities, but the smaller postures would be less able to respond quickly and with all the needed capabilities inherent in the larger postures.

Renewal of the Korean War (Conventional War)

This scenario represents a class of scenarios in which a U.S. security partner is the victim of a cross-border attack by a regional aggressor state. There is a high potential for major-power involvement.

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[The diversion of a Navy amphibious task group (with the larger part of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked) en route home from the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1991 to provide humanitarian aid to flood victims in Bangladesh is a dramatic example of these capabilities. Navy and Marine aircraft, vehicles, and boats were particularly well adapted to the flood environment. Marine aircraft are frequently used to fly relief supplies to beleaguered populations around the globe.]
### Table 5.1

**Sources of Pacific Scenarios**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>RAND, Nonstandard Contingencies&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>IDA, Realistic Planning Scenarios&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>RAND, U.S. Army in Conflict Scenarios&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Naval War College, Global War Game 90&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Rethinking Taiwan and the Pacific&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear confrontation with North Korea</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war in a major Asian state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstitution of a Russian threat, plus a crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure of key maritime chokepoints</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Taiwan tensions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Gulf oil fields</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indo-Pakistani war</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military response to terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war in Philippines</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Winnefeld and Shlapak (1990). Contains scenarios and campaign analysis.

<sup>b</sup>Bleichman, Smyel, and Utgoff (1987). Contains scenarios and some campaign analysis.

<sup>c</sup>Unpublished RAND analysis by Hugh DeSantis, "Conflict Scenarios and Army Intentions."

<sup>d</sup>Naval War College (1990), Annex A. Generalized scenarios.

<sup>e</sup>Segal (1990).


The mission of U.S. forces: Assist South Korean and UN forces in the defense of the South to restore prewar boundaries. Conduct operations against the North consistent with that mission (e.g., air attack, blockade).

**Nuclear Confrontation with North Korea**

This scenario is a surrogate for a class of scenarios in which U.S. interests are endangered by a regional nuclear power other than Russia. In this scenario the crisis stops short of armed conflict.

The mission of U.S. forces: Be prepared to defend South Korea and conduct a preemptive conventional attack on North Korean nuclear installations and forces. Be prepared to conduct theater nuclear operations.

**Civil War in a Major Asian State**

This generic scenario (for illustrative purposes in East Asia) poses dangers to the United States to the degree that regional stability is endangered, the war spills over into areas where U.S. interests are engaged, or U.S. citizens are at risk. Such a civil war could be a precursor to a new government more hostile to U.S. interests.
The mission of U.S. forces: Reassure security partners adjacent to the conflict by judicious force deployments and be prepared to evacuate U.S. citizens and protect lines of communication adjacent to the combat zone.

**Reconstitution of a Russian Threat**

This regional scenario would be part of a global scenario. The scenario does not assume a full return to the Cold War. Rather, it assumes a new Russian government that is much more hostile to U.S. interests but has a much reduced military power base except for naval and nuclear forces. This trend does not develop quickly, but it is brought to a head in a rapidly developing crisis. U.S. security partners close to Russia support a rapid buildup of U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific region.

The mission of U.S. forces: Increase U.S. forward force deployments, while the U.S. leadership reexamines the need for force reconstitution.

**Closure of Key Maritime Chokepoints**

This generic scenario (for illustrative purposes, in Southeast Asia) is initiated by a medium-sized regional state (or faction within that state) attacking U.S. or allied shipping in or near chokepoints. The United States acts as part of an ad hoc coalition to ensure freedom of passage.

The mission of U.S. forces: Protect U.S. and allied shipping by unilateral or concerted action. The action may include limited attack on bases and forces used to attack shipping.

**China-Taiwan Tensions**

This crisis is a surrogate for others in which a major power endangers regional stability but U.S. vital interests are not directly threatened. U.S. forces are not committed to the defense of Taiwan in this scenario, but they are prepared to assist Taiwanese forces if ordered to do so.

The mission of U.S. forces: Be prepared to assist in the defense of Taiwan if so ordered.

**Spratly Conflict**

This scenario is representative of a class in which maritime territorial claims are at issue and force is employed. The U.S. interest is in restoring regional stability and in protecting U.S. and allied commerce moving through the region.

The mission of U.S. forces: Protect U.S. and allied commerce in the region. Be prepared to perform a peacekeeping role.
Threat to Gulf Oil Fields

This is a partial reprise of the Desert Shield/Storm scenario and might require forces similarly sized and configured. In this case hostilities have not occurred, but precautionary force deployments have taken place.

The mission of USPACOM forces: Deploy forces in support of CINCCENT.

Indo-Pakistani War

This scenario is a reprise of earlier conflicts, except that here the use of nuclear weapons is threatened by both sides. Both belligerents have attacked neutral shipping near their territorial waters. U.S. citizens have been killed (as innocent bystanders) in the air attacks conducted by both sides.

The mission of U.S. forces: Deploy forces to rescue U.S. citizens when ordered. Protect U.S. shipping. If ordered, participate in a UN or other peacekeeping force.

Military Response to Terrorist Actions

This generic scenario would involve either a hostage rescue or a retaliatory strike against terrorist elements. The former is assumed to occur in Southeast Asia, and the latter could occur anywhere in the Asia Pacific region.

The mission of U.S. forces: Rescue hostages and/or conduct offensive military operations against terrorist elements and their sponsors.

Civil War in the Philippines

This scenario is a surrogate for others in which a U.S. security partner confronts a major insurgency or civil war, one that is perhaps aided and abetted by other regional states. U.S. objectives are not served by interfering, but the United States is interested in restoring regional stability, relief operations, and protecting other interests.

The mission of U.S. forces: Evacuate U.S. citizens and protect any remaining U.S. bases from attack. Be prepared to evacuate those bases and provide selected support to the government of the Philippines (e.g., humanitarian aid).

FORCE REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY

Table 5.2 suggests some of the force requirements associated with a vigorous and prompt response in specific contingencies. While the crisis situation portrayed in each scenario may have developed over an extended period, the need for—and decision to deploy—U.S. forces occurs suddenly. The initial response is carried out by U.S. in-place forces and those that could reach the contingency area in approximately one week. In all appropriate cases prompt allied response and support is assumed.
### Table 5.2
Illustrative U.S. Forces Required to Support Scenario Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>U.S. In-Place Forces&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>U.S. Rapid Reinforcement Forces (By C+7)</th>
<th>U.S. Follow On and Mobilization Forces (By C+30)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td>1 MEF 2 TFW</td>
<td>1 MEF</td>
<td>1 MEF</td>
<td>Assumes sufficient POD/APOD in South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear confrontation with North Korea</td>
<td>1 MEU</td>
<td>1 CVBG 2 TFW</td>
<td>2 CVBG 2 TFW</td>
<td>South Korean ground forces assumed adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war in major Asian state (East Asia assumed)</td>
<td>1 MEF 2 TFW</td>
<td>1 CVBG 2 TFW</td>
<td>1 CVBG 2 TFW</td>
<td>Noncombatant evacuation, shipping escort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstitution of a Russian threat, plus crisis</td>
<td>1 TFS or 1 CVBG, MPA</td>
<td>1 CVBG 2 TFW</td>
<td>1 CVBG</td>
<td>Assumes crisis stops short of combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure of key maritime chokepoints</td>
<td>1 TFS or 1 CVBG, MPA</td>
<td>1 CVBG 2 TFW</td>
<td>1 CVBG</td>
<td>More forces required if land operations eventuate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Taiwan tensions</td>
<td>1 CVBG</td>
<td>1 TFW(C)</td>
<td>1 TFW(C)</td>
<td>Assumes precautionary deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly conflict</td>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>CVBG MPA</td>
<td>Naval escort forces</td>
<td>Assumes U.S. maritime escort role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Gulf oil fields</td>
<td>1 TFW(C) or 1 CVBG</td>
<td>2 TFW</td>
<td>4 TFW</td>
<td>Of total, CINCPAC to provide 1 CVBG, 1 MEF, 1 TFW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indo-Pakistani war</td>
<td>1 CVBG or 1 TFW(C) in Gulf</td>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Naval escort forces</td>
<td>Assumes U.S. maritime escort role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military response to terrorism</td>
<td>1 CVBG</td>
<td>1 CVBG 2 TFW</td>
<td>Navy control forces</td>
<td>In-theater retaliation would require larger forces by C+30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war in Philippines</td>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Sea control forces</td>
<td>Assumes role limited to defense, evacuation, support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>In some cases, larger C+7 forces could compensate for smaller in-place forces. The in-place forces are intended as deterrent, tripwire, and force expansion base.

NOTE: Blank cells indicate no U.S. forces required.

The cells in the table address only major forces. Not shown are the significant support tail, lift, and specialized forces. The force requirements assume that forces from unified commands other than USPACOM are available to meet C+30 requirements.

**POSTURE PERFORMANCE SUMMARY**

Using the force requirements summary set out in Table 5.2 and the force posture data contained in Appendix B, it is possible to gain some sense of posture performance in meeting...
scenario requirements. Using these data and the RSAS force deployment model, we show our overall judgments in Figure 5.1.4

Our analysis shows that even the strongest posture (A) is marginally effective in rapidly developing Korean and Southwest Asian scenarios. With extended warning, acted on promptly, Posture A forces would probably be adequate. Of the 15 percent reduction postures (B, C, D), a combination of B and D provides an attractive balance of capabilities. Posture C jeopardizes U.S. ability to respond adequately in Northeast and Southwest Asia, though it is marginally effective in Southeast Asia. The 35 percent reduction postures (E, F) seriously jeopardize U.S. response effectiveness, unless threats in Korea and Southwest Asia decrease significantly from current levels, or unless sufficient warning is available and acted on to allow drawing forces from other unified commands. We have not examined the impact of a drawdown on those other commands in meeting their commitments (e.g., USCINCLANT and USCEUR in meeting NATO commitments). We would only caution that it is relatively easy to fall into a “shell game” mind-set by planning on the availability of forces from other unified commands while those commands are simultaneously planning on the availability of USPACOM forces for their own regional contingencies.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Posture A</th>
<th>Posture B</th>
<th>Posture C</th>
<th>Posture D</th>
<th>Posture E</th>
<th>Posture F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renewal of Korean War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear confrontation with North Korea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war in a major Asian state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstitution of a Russian threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure of key maritime chokepoints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Taiwan tensions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly conflict</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Threat to Gulf oil fields</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indo-Pakistani war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military response to terrorism</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war in the Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.1—Adequacy of U.S. Force Commitment in Selected Scenarios

4The RSAS force deployment model is described and its operation illustrated in layman's terms in numerous RAND publications. See Bennett et al. (forthcoming).

5The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) comes to grips with these dilemmas, but there is a significant residual area of risk that is not always highlighted to political authorities (including the Congress).
If USCINCPAC were required to provide forces to other unified commands (other than USCENTCOM as portrayed in our analysis), we can gain some insight into the risks involved. Starting from Posture B, for example, if USCINCPAC were required to send forces to support USCINCLANT or USCINCEUR, the PACOM force posture might decline from B to the functional equivalent of Posture E or F. The risk thus incurred would be the differential between Posture B and Postures E/F as shown in Figure 5.1.

Until now we have considered the presence provided by alternative postures and their effectiveness in contingencies. In Section 6 we turn to an examination of the costs of the postures.
6. COST AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALTERNATIVE FORCE POSTURES

In this section we examine the relative costs and budgetary consequences of the six alternative Asia Pacific region force postures. More specifically, we use two different methods to show the extent to which the "costs" of the various alternative postures vary when compared with the baseline posture defined in Section 3 (i.e., Posture A). The results are not intended to provide a dollar estimate of the "costs" of the alternative postures, nor do posture cost variations from Posture A provide a "money in the bank" estimate of what some might interpret as the potential savings of the various alternatives. Rather, the aim is to show, in comparative form, the relative long-term budgetary significance of adopting one or another of the alternative postures.

PROBLEMS WITH REGIONAL BUDGETING

In spite of (and perhaps in part because of) Congress's continuing interest in coalition burden sharing, and even though there are detailed data on various functional and organizational defense spending and budget allocations, no formal U.S. government effort has ever been made to compute either the actual or proportional costs of U.S. national security undertakings on a regional or theater-oriented basis. Indeed, informal and unofficial efforts to do so are typically marked by controversy and disagreement. Arguments against and problems with a regional budgeting approach are based on several grounds: policy-related, technical, and strategic. Among all the regional or functional defense tasks, the strategic and other issues inherent in any regionwide cost or budgeting effort seem the most intractable. This is so largely because the services with the greatest presence in the region (the Navy and Marine Corps) emphasize strategic flexibility in their operational planning. Thus, while units may be deployed in the region and may have specific regional and subregional responsibilities, their inherent flexibility permits their use in whatever form best serves national interests in any contingency. It is very difficult, therefore, to allocate these units to any particular subregion within Asia and the Pacific. This problem is compounded by the fact that the Southwest Asian theater has typically drawn, in operational planning, on forces owned by both the Pacific and Atlantic theater commands of the sea services.

Allocation of other theater forces—the majority of Air Force and Army general-purpose forces—is similarly complex and contentious because the reinforced Pacific region has, for these services, tended to be a "mobilization" theater. Unlike the European theater, here relatively few forces have been stationed forward in peacetime (and relatively few forces are allo-

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1 Detailed discussion of the data, methods, and findings summarized in this section can be found in Lewis (forthcoming).

2 However, manpower percentages and ratios across theaters have been used to suggest relative resource commitment.

3 See Lewis (1989).

4 Moreover, given the increasing flexibility over time of the forces concerned, they resist "pigeonholing" on functional grounds. For instance, with their multipurpose wings and increasingly powerful multipurpose escorts, carrier battle groups can operate in a variety of roles.
cated for reinforcement under many planning scenarios). But when conditions require (as with the Korean, Vietnamese, and Gulf conflicts), substantial forces can be committed. Thus, forecasts of what might be assigned to the region should be viewed with some skepticism—as should the estimates of the costs of such forces. In short, for strategic (and a host of other policy and technical) reasons, it is very hard to develop anything that one might describe as a reliable regional-costed program or budget.

OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH OF THE ANALYSIS

Such difficulties aside, we were asked by the Department of Defense to identify the most cost-effective (forward) force posture that preserves U.S. presence in the region and allows response to regional contingencies. This charge posed the dilemma of having to develop some costs that could be used to analyze cost-effectiveness but to do so without an accredited cost methodology for force packages within the unified commands and, especially, for any of the major subregions under the jurisdiction of those commands.

In light of the difficulties, we have adopted the following compromise solution. We interpret the costs and budgetary ramifications of our Asian Pacific force posture options on a comparative or relative basis. We assume that flaws in any costing or budgeting methodology act systematically upon our estimated costs of the alternative postures. Although the calculation of the costs of different postures might be subject to dispute, the variation among modestly different postures costed according to the same methodology would allow observations about the relative budget and cost consequences of adopting one posture variant in lieu of another. At the same time, the estimates should have some limited interest in themselves as relative indications of the rough, order-of-magnitude costs of the particular force packages.

Given the assumption of systematic effects in regional budgeting, what techniques might best capture the cost and budget issues of interest? We began with a “bottom-up” analysis of the cost and budget consequences of maintaining six alternative Asia Pacific regional postures. These assessments were based specifically on the force packages assigned to the region in peacetime, as well as on those available during mobilization scenarios (i.e., “earmarked” forces).

Yet this bottom-up, or force module, approach obviously omits any costs associated with a considerable theater-related overhead structure. This overhead includes both forces and programs in the theater and elsewhere that would directly support the combatant posture being evaluated in each case (e.g., airlift and aerial refuelers to support force deployments, MSC ships, Guard and Reserve augmentation units, etc.), as well as the considerable state-side support infrastructure that might be allocated on a pro rata basis to the Asia Pacific force postures (e.g., the procurement and training of personnel and units, the costs of headquarters and communications resources supporting forces in the region, etc.).

These limitations prompted a second method—a “top-down” approach. This approach attempted to allocate total pertinent DoD and service budgets to the Asia Pacific region on the basis of the total force structure assigned to the Pacific (under both routine and reinforced cases) expressed as a fraction of total worldwide force structure of like kind. For instance, if under a particular scenario some X percent of Air Force tactical forces were scheduled for Pacific operations, then we would assume that a “total cost” estimate of the Air Force’s theater contribution should be X percent of the corresponding Air Force theater-related total budget.
Clearly this approach should be expected to yield much softer results, unlike the bottom-up costs, which are particularly sensitive to changes in posture size. The assumption that regional costs should parallel the proportions of worldwide force structure assigned to the region is also less obvious. Nonetheless, this second method provided a useful check on the results obtained by the first; using it produced relative budget data that closely paralleled those obtained by the first method.

We find the application of the two methods to be useful for understanding the relative and, to a lesser extent, absolute cost differences across the alternative postures. We do not have great confidence in the absolute costs we have developed, but we believe they are generally representative and may be useful in comparative analysis.\(^5\)

**COST ANALYSIS RESULTS**

The data are presented in Table 6.1 for the six postures described in Section 3. Data for the various modules have been aggregated by service, with the exception that Navy and Marine Corps results have been combined inasmuch as these budgets were inseparable for the two costing methodologies employed. Method I is bottom up; method II is top down. Two readiness/deployment cases (routine and reinforced) are shown for each posture and methodology.\(^6\) In each case, the comparative cost of each posture is computed as a percentage of the Posture A cost.

Before reviewing Table 6.1, a brief explanation of the indices used is in order. Because of the different methods used, we standardize the material presented in Table 6.1 by using the cost or budget consequences of adopting one or another of the six alternative postures in relative terms. That is, the cost/budget consequences of each posture were computed (in different ways, of course, using the two methods) for the forces assigned to the Asia Pacific region on a service-by-service basis. Each value thus produced was then figured as a fraction of the cost of the baseline posture (A). Thus, if the cost of Navy/Marine Corps forces under Posture B (using method I) is given as 84, it simply means that Posture B costs 84 percent as much as A. Put another way, reducing the forces called for in Posture B from the levels called for in Posture A involves a 16 percent reduction in costs relative to those of A.

Because method II allocates forces on the basis of total force structure (that is, it represents the product of a ratio—the costs of the forces assigned to the Asia Pacific region under a given posture as a fraction of total available posture—times the total service budget for conventional forces), the reader should be aware that the entries in Table 6.1 for method II are often based on different numerators as well as denominators, depending on the case being examined. For example, under the "routine case," we are considering, as the force ratio to be multiplied against a service's total theater warfare budget, the number of forces normally assigned to the Asia Pacific region divided by applicable active-duty force units. But for the fully reinforced scenario case, we may be adding (depending on the force allocation assumption—

\(^5\) We do not consider in this analysis various factors that could play important roles, especially in short-run political deliberations over posture alternatives, e.g., host nation support, the costs of construction of new facilities or environmental restoration and other costs associated with either opening new or closing old facilities, and the impact on and relationships with local labor forces.

\(^6\) The "reinforced" case assumes that many of the C+30 actions associated with the Korean and Persian Gulf scenarios depicted in Table 5.2 have been taken.
Table 6.1
Summary of Analytic Cases: The Two Methods
(as a fraction of Posture A, with A = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Force Posture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy/Marine Corps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced case</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Method II resource allocations to the Asia Pacific region (percentage of worldwide totals, representing an average of routine/reinforced cases):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy/Marine Corps</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, the factors producing the entries in Table 6.1 are based on consistent budgetary factors, but the ratio of forces assigned may be different in each case. For this reason, it is not assured that in every case there is a systematic way in which the entries in Table 6.1 change for each posture. In general, in mobilized cases the decline in the results of our method II analysis (the product of force ratio times theater budgets) will be larger for the reinforced case than for the routine case. However, because of different service approaches to the active/reserve mix of their force structures, this is not always true. But the relationship generally holds, demonstrating again that the Asia Pacific region is a “mobilization” theater.7

A few conclusions stand out. First of all, the cost reductions of the different postures as a fraction of Posture A are less dramatic under method II than under method I, though the

7For example, USCINC PAC operations plans of the early 1960s envisioned a total Southeast Asia force commitment of six division equivalents at most. Yet at the height of the Vietnam War, a total deployment of twice that size had occurred. This deployment was attained only by the creation of substantial new force structures, thereby illustrating what is meant by “mobilization” contingency.
rates of change are relatively symmetrical. This is because the size of the "overhead" slice is coming down less quickly (in relative terms) than are the costs of the Asia Pacific region posture. It is not immediately clear whether this means that some other theater's priority might be declining less quickly or that the size of the total force overhead (regardless of theater, e.g., the stateside force reserve, training base, etc.) is increasing in size relative to deployed and/or earmarked force contingents. But we believe that it is the defensewide overhead base that is behind this phenomenon.

The declines in Pacific-assigned costs also vary greatly as a function of mobilization case, posture, and service. For instance, the Army's reinforced case (method II) shows almost no decline; Guard and Reserve forces that remain fairly constant for all cases are assumed to be available in an emergency situation for the Asia Pacific region. However, the method I Army data (for either mobilization case) show a considerable decline, with respect to Posture A, for Postures E and F. This is because the normally assigned forces are small in terms of their peacetime deployment patterns and relatively inexpensive (compared with other Army forces) for their reinforcement patterns (because they are lighter forces), and because as the force shrinks, the in-theater force element assumed to be part of the method I modules for the Pacific shrinks as well.

Generally speaking, the Navy/Marine Corps case shows the most consistent pattern of decline across all cases and also the most similarity of results between the two methods used. This is somewhat reassuring, inasmuch as the "billable" Navy/Marine Corps posture is roughly about half of the total posture for both mobilization cases. The similarity of the ratios for both method I and method II suggests that the Navy posture is highly balanced among theaters and also that the bottom-up approach captures the general sense of what is happening to the worldwide Navy general-purpose force posture.

U.S. Air Force cost shares for the alternative postures represent the unique situation, in which the decline is greater in reinforcement cases than in the routine cases. This effect is really a function of two factors: the relatively small peacetime Air Force presence in the theater (compared with total active force size), and the growing share of the total Air Force tactical force structure that is to be contained in the Guard and Reserve.

Table 6.2 aggregates the service data appearing in Table 6.1 to theater totals. It reveals a very close correspondence between the various cases and methods and the initial assumptions about overall DoD budgets (which are assumed for Postures B, C, and D to be about one-sixth to one-fourth less than those for Posture A and about one-third less for Postures E and F). These findings might be an artifact of the linkage of various data used in this analysis. However, the values for method I (which does not depend on any knowledge about the total DoD top line in a direct way) correspond more closely to these overall DoD budget declines than do the results developed in method II. The results in Table 6.2 also suggest that the force levels, while hypothetical, seem relatively consistent with overall budget reality, and they endorse the well-known historical tendency of the U.S. defense budget to grow in its overhead and support components in proportional terms during times of relative austerity.8

8See Lewis (1990).
Table 6.2
Aggregated Data from Table 6.1 for All Services' Forces and Budgets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Posture</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All U.S. Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method I Routine case</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced case</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method II Routine case</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced case</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The similarity in outcomes for both methods in the pairs of mobilization cases is also noteworthy, suggesting that the Asia Pacific region as a planning problem will follow the lines of the ongoing "Total Force" approach to planning. The stability across the lines in Table 6.2 is explained in part by these facts: (1) the majority of theater spending for the Asia Pacific region is Department of the Navy spending, (2) the Navy puts two to three times the relative weight of its posture (and budget) into the theater compared with the Army and Air Force, and (3) the Navy is, as noted above, less subject to perturbations in posture and budgets affecting the other services.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

We extract four policy implications from this comparative costing.

First, the differences in comparative costs across costing methods are greatest for the weakest Asian Pacific postures (D, E, F). The stubbornness of overhead costs to decreases in posture suggests that the top-down method is more reliable for the lower postures.

Second, the cost "savings" (relative to the baseline) do not adequately reflect the benefits associated with USPACOM forces in the role of supporting other CINCs. While Postures D and F reflect a level of support for USINCCENT, they also underestimate USINCCENT's costs and overstate USCINCPAC's costs. Contingent support for USCINCEUR is not reflected at all—nor are costs USCINCPAC might incur if he were supported by forces of USCINCLANT. Put another way, if the situation in the Asia Pacific region warrants placing a higher premium on forward presence in peacetime, but other theaters have a higher priority in the event of major theater or global war, the costs attributable to USCINCPAC are misleading: he is providing a war reserve for other theaters, but those other theaters are not "paying" for it.

Third, the cost savings of Posture C are marginal when compared to Posture B. Posture C has to be justified on a basis other than cost—particularly given the adverse effects set out in Sections 4 and 5. That basis might be the loss of foreign base access, or a decision driven by U.S. domestic factors to bring forces home to congressional districts to replace others lost through earlier budget-driven reductions.
Fourth, for “mobilization” posture components concerned with the Asia Pacific region (the majority of which are Army and Air Force capabilities), the cost differences are particularly small, depending on our assumptions about national priorities in times of crisis. Obviously, if there is a sufficiently small risk of simultaneous conflicts, more in the way of the national reserve posture can be committed to the Pacific region as required. This would confirm our historical experience regarding this theater of operations.
7. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FORCE POSTURES

The good news is that we can safely, significantly reduce our [forces] . . . because of what's happened in the world. . . . The bad news is that in all the time previously, certainly in this century that we've been through this exercise of reducing our military forces, we've screwed it up every single time. We've never once done it right. With the result that subsequently, within a matter of a few years, we found ourselves having so weakened our military position that that, in and of itself, became provocative, encouraged others to take chances they might not have otherwise taken.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney
Address to the Executive Club of Chicago
(at the State Department)
November 7, 1991

The ultimate test of any element of security strategy is the degree to which it supports the achievement of national objectives. This report has focused on the Pacific force posture element of our security strategy and to a lesser extent on its ties to the political and economic elements. In examining the force posture element we have

• Speculated on the shape of the future Asia Pacific Rim environment and the role that USPACOM forces might play in it.
• Specified six alternative U.S. force postures that cover a not implausible range of Pacific futures.
• Developed some likely regional responses to those postures.
• Assessed the likely performance of those postures in a range of possible future Pacific contingencies.
• Provided some comparative cost data on the postures.

OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

It is now time to measure those postures and selected initiatives against U.S. regional objectives and strategy. The DoD Strategic Framework sums up our security objectives and strategy in Asia in a single sentence:

The principal elements of our Asian strategy—forward-deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements—will remain valid and essential to maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and preserving U.S. interests.¹

We have proposed an extension of the framework's security objectives and strategies to make it more comprehensive and to highlight important points that are currently only implicit.

¹DoD Strategic Framework, p. 4.
U.S. Regional Objectives

• A regional environment conducive to orderly, gradual, and beneficial change consistent with U.S. interests.
• Deterrence or defeat of actions by others in the region that would disturb that environment.
• Unhampered U.S. access to the markets, raw materials, lines of communication, political institutions, and peoples of the region.  

U.S. Grand Strategy (as it applies to region)  

• Emphasize the political and economic development of the region, and U.S. participation in it, as the best long-term guarantee of assuring regional stability and growth.
• Prevent any single power or combination of powers from dominating the region, to assure beneficial change and continued U.S. access.

U.S. Regional Military Strategy

• The bedrock of the military strategy is our bilateral security arrangements with individual regional states. In the longer term, multilateral arrangements may be more appropriate.
• These security arrangements are underpinned by forward-deployed U.S. forces to reassure friends, deter aggression, and enhance regional stability.
• Our security partners are expected to carry their part of the security burden by sharing security costs, by fielding necessary defensive capabilities, and by providing bases and access for forward-deployed U.S. forces.
• Because the future regional environment is characterized more by uncertainty than by any single central threat, U.S. military capabilities must be flexible, interchangeable, and mutually supporting.

TRANSLATING OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY TO REQUIRED CAPABILITIES OR CONDITIONS

These objectives and strategies place requirements on the U.S. regional force posture. These requirements may be called needed mission capabilities, or necessary operational capabilities, or conditions. But in fact they are the "demand" placed by strategy on DoD policies, force operations, and programs. In the analysis to follow we specify this demand in the form of six discrete needed capabilities and conditions. Our objective is to establish a metric for measuring the six force postures and the associated policy and program initiatives.

2 Some would expand these objectives to include the fostering of politically independent nation-states with democratic institutions and humanitarian policies. We believe this concern is reflected in these objectives.
3 This is a regional subset of the "National Security Strategy of the United States," published annually by the president. In Section 8 we will recommend an extension of this strategy to include the concept of "proportional engagement." 
4 For an expansion of the supply and demand concept as applied to military force requirements, see Winnefeld, Hosmer, and Webb (1989), pp. 9-15.
**Required Capability 1.** Posture must be sufficient, in conjunction with allied forces, to deter military actions that would degrade regional stability and U.S. access.

The principal measures of this capability lie in regional perceptions of U.S. power in the form of military presence. Is the power sufficient to reassure a threatened ally and deter a regional opponent? What does contingency analysis say about outcomes if deterrence fails? What regional responses would decreases in posture evoke?

**Required Capability 2.** Posture must be sufficient, in conjunction with allied forces, to defeat military actions that would degrade regional stability and U.S. access.

The principal measures of this capability are the outcomes of analyses of opposing force postures in important representative scenarios.

**Required Condition 3.** Posture must be consistent with both global and regional political and economic realities.

A posture must be achievable and sustainable in the projected regional environment. Moreover, it must be consistent with the political and social stability of individual regional states.

**Required Condition 4.** Posture must be consistent with U.S. domestic political and fiscal realities.

A posture must enjoy an appropriate level of popular support and be affordable given projected U.S. domestic priorities.

**Required Capability 5.** Posture must be robust enough to provide a hedge against uncertainties and major failure of policy/strategy assumptions.

A posture should not be optimized for a single view of the future. It must have some built-in resiliency to permit timely and effective adjustment to meet new circumstances either in threats, responses to threats, or resources available. In short, the posture should be consistent with the prudent acceptance and management of risk.

**Required Capability 6.** Posture should be sufficient to permit the United States to retain or regain the political or military initiative and to assure a beneficial regional equilibrium.

A posture should not be relegated to a reactive role. It must provide a basis for preemptive or anticipatory as well as remedial actions to achieve U.S. objectives.

In the assessment that follows, we subject our six alternative postures to these six tests. As part of our analysis we identify those related initiatives that seem most appropriate for reducing adverse effects of force reductions in any given posture.

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5 See Taylor (1988), p. 9: "All too often, planning is based on a single, unique, and surprise-free scenario that has been derived from a consensus view of a continuation of current trends . . . The surprise-free scenario approach tends to create and accommodate a more subjective future than an objective one."
MEASURING THE ALTERNATIVE POSTURES

Postures as a Key Element of Deterrence and Stability

In Section 4 we examined several aspects of deterrence and regional stability. To extend that examination we measured the six force postures against eleven contingency scenarios to better understand deterrence. The results of these analyses are summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 and Figure 5.1.6 They suggest that although the highest deterrence posture is Posture A, the better regional stability postures are probably B or D, and (in a more benign environment than we project) perhaps Postures E or F.

Posture C is the most worrisome since it would signal U.S. withdrawal, might foster a regional arms race, and could ultimately lead to a breakdown in deterrence. Postures C, D, and F highlight the need for threat-reduction initiatives (e.g., arms control) or posture initiatives that compensate for reductions in forward-deployed forces. The most useful forms of threat reduction would be some form of arms control or political agreement on the Korean peninsula that relaxed U.S. and South Korean readiness and response time requirements and removed some of the potential for rapid accidental escalation. Initiatives 3, 5, 6, and 11 apply. At the same time, a way must be found to deny North Korea a nuclear capability—either through an enforceable arms control regime or through preemptive action. Initiative 2 applies.

Postures as the Means to Deal with Contingent Combat Operations

In Section 5 we examined the adequacy of the six postures in a variety of possible future crises and conflicts. The summary in Figure 5.1 suggests that Postures A and B are marginal to adequate for all contingencies except an attack on Persian Gulf oil fields, while Posture D is the best all-round posture. Postures C, E, and F are inadequate for a variety of important contingencies, including a renewed Korean War and an invasion of the Gulf oil fields; they are marginal for most others and clearly incur major risks. To improve the war-fighting performance of Postures C, E, and F, measures are needed for even closer coordination with allies (e.g., Initiatives 8, 9, 10, and 12) and for improved contingency response (e.g., Initiatives 6, 7, 8, and 11).

Postures Consistent with Regional and Global Political Realities

Postures should be consistent with the realpolitik aspects of the regional security environment and with the domestic political and economic situations in regional states. Postures can be inconsistent with the realities of regional security, which is what happened with the U.S. posture in the western Pacific in late 1941. In that case it was a matter of interests and commitments outrunning force posture.

Postures can also be inconsistent with the domestic and political factors operating within states in the region. U.S. policy and posture relative to the Persian Gulf in 1979 and in

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6In Tables 4.1 and 4.2 the “external instability” dimension is applicable, though we are quick to point out that external instability as perceived in some states is not necessarily detrimental to U.S. interests. We discuss the "internal instability" dimension of the tables later in this section, when we examine conformance of the postures with regional realities.
Lebanon in 1983–1984 suggest this form of inconsistency. How does one give postures a reality check in the context of projected regional environments? One method is to assess the degree to which U.S. security interests and domestic support in regional states for U.S. forward presence coincide. This match is partially captured in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, if we assume it is to our advantage to have our allies and security partners experience “external stability” at minimal expense to their “internal stability.” But our interests go beyond stability, and they include regional access and influence.

The principal risks to access and influence are that our posture will either be so intrusive that it will anger our friends or so unobtrusive that it will embolden potential foes. The issue becomes one of maintaining essential combat capabilities without unnecessary irritants to regional stability.

Two irritants that cause continuing problems are

- The visibility and intrusiveness of the U.S. military presence on the territory of our allies.
- The nuclear dimension of our forces at a time when nuclear war between the superpowers is becoming increasingly remote; nuclear proliferation is a burgeoning issue to some, and nuclearophobia an issue to others.

Postures B, D, E, and F move in the right direction, whereas Posture C goes too far. Postures B or D appear appropriate for Phase II, and Postures E and F should be examined for Phase III as the future evolution of the Pacific Rim security environment becomes clearer.

The adverse effects (on our security partners) of U.S. theater and tactical nuclear weapon deployments in the region will be reduced if not eliminated by President Bush’s September 1991 initiative removing classes of short-range nuclear weapons from U.S. ships and overseas bases. But there is a delicate balance between removing a source of friction and maintaining the extended deterrence underwritten in part by the nuclear umbrella. This balance is particularly important to the maintenance of the U.S. security relationships with Japan and South Korea.

An added benefit of removing nuclear weapons from U.S. ships and bases in the region is that the United States for the first time can exploit nuclearophobia in the region to reduce incentives for nuclear proliferation. Nuclear-free zones (underwritten with appropriate safeguards) may be consistent with U.S. interests in some areas (e.g., Korea) but not in others (e.g., at sea) where an uncertain future may require redeployment of nuclear weapons. Our assessment is that our revised nuclear weapons policy opens up new opportunities and requires a reexamination of old policies if we are to shape the new realities beneficially and accommodate to those we can’t change.

**Postures Consistent with U.S. Domestic Political and Fiscal Realities**

U.S. domestic political realities clearly point to a continuation of the current trend toward lowered U.S. defense budgets absent a clearer appreciation of the changing calculus of costs, risks, and opportunities on the Asia Pacific Rim. The Asia-Pacific Strategy Development Workshop put it this way:
In the absence of an imposing threat, the influence of domestic policy over foreign policy is likely to grow in the United States even without a domestic crisis. The American public will become more unpredictable, and less likely to support defense and foreign policy initiatives.\(^7\)

As the analyses in Sections 4–6 make clear, we do not lose much in the way of in-theater contingency response as we go from Posture A to Posture B. On the benefit side, we reduce the costs of our Pacific posture by 13–16 percent and gain some positive regional benefits from a smaller base presence in allied states. Moreover, our capability to respond to in-theater contingencies is not degraded unacceptably. We do lose some flexibility to reinforce other CINCs with USPACOM forces and incur significant risks while responding simultaneously to a Pacific contingency.

However, if to reduce defense expenditures we were to progress from Postures B/D to Postures E/F, we would start to incur destabilizing responses from both our security partners and potential opponents, and we would lose our ability to respond to a wide variety of contingencies. The cost savings would be roughly those associated with going from Posture A to Posture B. Thus, if we double up on the savings already reflected in the FYDP, we would incur major risks, and these risks we find unacceptable unless one projects a much more benign and certain environment than we have sketched out in Sections 2 and 4.

With lowered defense budgets (particularly in Postures E and F), there will be increased pressure to reduce U.S. forces stationed overseas and bring them home or to bases closer to the United States.\(^8\) This "double whammy" could have the effect of accelerating movement to Posture C or beyond. To counter, or compensate for, these pressures, Initiative 8 (shifting defense tasks to allies) and Initiatives 4, 6, 7, and 11 (changing force deployment policies) should be considered.

**Postures That Hedge Against Uncertainty**

In the post–Cold War era we are confronted with the loss or transformation of many of the threats that have provided the rationale for our force postures since World War II. During that earlier era we were faced with uncertainties in force posturing, but not about the identities of potential opponents. Now, in place of well-defined threats we are obliged to posture on the basis of a range of uncertainties on the most fundamental level: Who are likely to be our future opponents?

The most difficult task in preparing for war is choosing the right enemy—a task far more ambiguous today than at any time since World War II. . . . Democratic nations rarely get to choose their enemy: An enemy usually chooses them.\(^9\)

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\(^7\)Cossa (1990), p. 27.

\(^8\)One might imagine the responses of the mayors of San Diego and Alameda, California (where currently six CVs are based) and Yokosuka, Japan (where one CV is based). As CV force levels are reduced in Postures B through F, one can easily guess where the powerful California congressional delegation would prefer the CV reductions to be made. Indeed, since the associated air wings and support vessels are based all along the West Coast and in Hawaii, one could expect the domestic impact of CV force reductions to have a major political impact beyond California. Add to this the longstanding opposition of the mayor of Yokosuka to continued U.S. CV basing in his city, and the problems become apparent.

This problem leads to the type of regional analysis we attempted in Section 2 and the contingency analysis presented in Section 5. We (and others) may have misread

- The future regional environment.
- Identification of possible future opponents and allies (easier to misread in a multipolar as opposed to a bipolar environment).
- When the threat might develop—in 5, 10, or 15 years.
- The circumstances of future conflict: trade war, terrorism, denial of access, guerrilla warfare, Desert Storm-style frontal combat.

Because the lead time in acquiring forces and bases is so long, these uncertainties invite caution in reducing certain forces, transferring functions to the Reserves and Guard, returning bases to host countries, entering into arms control agreements that could later embarrass us, and so on.

General Colin Powell gives a concrete example of the interaction of capability, funding levels, and risk. In speaking of Desert Shield/Storm, he stated

> I was able to take an entire heavy corps out of Germany and leave a corps there. If it was five years from now and I needed to take a corps out of Germany, there wouldn't be a corps remaining. I was able to take forces from the United States and still have a number of divisions left in the United States to respond to something else that might come along. If I do that five years from now there won't be those extra divisions in the United States. So, of course, the risk is higher. . . . But if you want to give me more money, I can use it profitably. Money equals risk.10

Not surprisingly, our postures provide successively less insurance as we proceed from A to F. However, the force level common to Postures B through D suggests significant flexibility to meet different circumstances with acceptable risk. Those risks lie primarily in the possibilities of the onset of a new form of Cold War, a North Korean invasion of the South, and seizure of the Persian Gulf oil fields. Insofar as renewal of the Cold War is concerned, our national strategy is now based on the availability of sufficient warning time to undertake reconstitution.11 That assumption would appear to make any of our six postures an adequate base for the needed force expansion. If that assumption fails, postures at the high end (A, B, and D) are fully warranted.

As for seizure of Gulf oil fields, the assumption is that the "base force" (our Postures B and D) would be adequate to respond. If that assumption fails, reconstitution would be the only alternative.

To hedge against a renewal of the Cold War under Postures B through F, we recommend consideration of Initiatives 1 and 4. To hedge against a renewal of the Korean War (and the threat of it) at reduced force postures, we recommend pushing harder for arms control on the peninsula (Initiatives 2 and 3) and provision of additional prepositioned equipment forward in the theater (Initiative 6).

To hedge against base denial in Northeast Asia, we recommend consideration of some development of U.S. sovereign bases (Initiative 4) and greater prepositioning at those bases that are retained (Initiative 6). For Southeast Asia, we recommend consideration of Initiative 12 and changes in deployment policies (Initiatives 7, 10, and 11).

**Postures That Enable the United States to Retain or Regain the Political and Military Initiative**

Here we consider postures that are consistent with the United States as the senior partner in Asian Pacific security. That is, American power is likely to prove decisive in close matchups of political will and military capabilities between the United States and possible future opponents. If the United States is to retain influence in the region, it must bring capabilities to the negotiating arena that its allies do not possess. These capabilities, when added to those of our allies, should prove decisive in dealing with potential opponents.

This point suggests that there is a limit to burden sharing—really burden shifting—beyond which U.S. interests suffer in direct proportion to its loss of willingness to invest resources and leverage in regional security matters. Those who support burden shifting should be asked the following:

- At what point has the burden shifted far enough?
- What influence do we exercise with allies and opponents when all (or most) burdens have been shifted to others?
- At what point does burden shifting deny us the ability to act independently of our allies when vital nonshared U.S. interests are at stake?

We sense that this point lies somewhere between Postures B/D on one hand and Postures E/F on the other. The more uncertainty one sees, the closer the posture should be to B or D. If the future appears relatively clear and much less threatening than today, one might go closer to Postures E and F. This assessment leads us to consideration of those initiatives that would improve U.S. capabilities to retain political and military flexibility and maneuvering room.

Initiatives 1 and 12 are by definition political and would fit with nearly any U.S. reductions in current military posture. The arms control options (2, 3) are also political initiatives. But we need to be clear about the difference between initiatives that are unilateral concessions and those that potentially offer significant advantages to the United States. Turning to more military initiatives, most of the command and control (8, 9) and non-force-related (4, 10) options offer significant advantages, particularly against a backdrop of declining U.S. force postures.

**A Recapitulation of the Posture Assessment**

The six criteria and their application to the six force postures suggest the assessment shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1
Correlation of Force Postures with Required Capabilities/Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required Capabilities</th>
<th>Force Posture</th>
<th>Relevant Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency performance</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conforms to global and regional realities</td>
<td>Moderate/</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conforms to U.S. domestic realities</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Posture A scores highest but suffers from the flaw of not being in accord with current domestic and some Pacific Rim realities. It is not at all clear that the current or somewhat reduced Asia Pacific base posture will remain viable under conditions of increased domestic opposition to U.S. bases or access in allied states. Moreover, Posture A may be unduly disturbing to China and the former USSR, both of whom might feel obliged to retain force levels and undertake a degree of modernization they might otherwise forgo. Postures B and D are next (D being the Persian Gulf commitment version of B) in preference, followed by Postures E, F, and C, in that order. Postures C through F suffer major drawbacks in deterrence power, hedging potential, and the ability to insure that the United States keeps the political and military initiative in the region. Proponents of lower force postures should be clear about what they give up as they strive for savings by lowering force postures and relocating forces to CONUS.

Our preference is for Posture B or D, with Posture E a distant second.

The initiatives that would go far toward making Posture B or D more the security equivalent of A are

2.3. CBMs and nuclear arms control in Korea.
6. POMCUS or APS in Korea (with drawdown of 2 ID), and MPS to replace any Marine Corps units withdrawn from Okinawa.
7. Maintain CVBG basing overseas (increase if feasible).
11. Substitute Air Force/Army composites for CVBG/MEU deployments when needed.

Initiatives that have more general application include

12. A security consultation arrangement for Southeast Asia, with the United States as a member or observer.
4. Reorient U.S. regional base and support structures.
10. Employ more nonforce military capabilities to substitute in part for formal deployments.
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON THE POSTURES

To this point we have conducted a rather straightforward assessment of the alternative postures and related initiatives. Suppose we were to turn the argument around and ask: Under what circumstances would posture X be acceptable? That is, when would it deter a breakdown in regional stability and deterrence, be adequate to deal with most contingencies, and conform with regional and domestic realities (including cost)? In short, what set of circumstances must prevail before posture X is a prudent choice? We leave it to the reader to assess the current and future likelihood of those circumstances.

Posture A (The Cold War Force)

This force and its historical predecessors are those that helped win the Cold War and Desert Storm. For Posture A to be a reasonable choice, one or more of the following conditions would be required:

- A return of some form of the Cold War with the former Soviet Union, or the emergence of a China that portended an enlarged military role in East Asia.
- A future conflict in the Middle East that exceeded the force demands of Desert Storm (e.g., an Arab alliance against the United States and Israel).
- Two major contingencies occurring simultaneously (e.g., a North Korean invasion of the South and a future Desert Shield/Storm).
- A breakdown in U.S. alliances in Europe or East Asia, wherein the United States might have to act unilaterally in some important contingencies, or even against former allies.
- A U.S. domestic consensus that supports significant annual real growth in DoD total obligation authority (TOA).

Posture B (The Base Force)

This force, or something close to it, is what the U.S. force posture might look like after the current round of force reductions (reflected in the 1992–1993 DoD budget) is effected and after all major forces are withdrawn from Southwest Asia. For Posture B to be a reasonable choice, the following conditions (current and future) would be required:

- Low probability of a need to recommit U.S. Desert Shield/Storm forces to Southwest Asia.
- Low to medium probability of two simultaneous major contingencies (e.g., Southwest Asia and Korea).
- A planning horizon of 5–10 years for a renewal of the Cold War or fundamental security structure changes in East Asia (e.g., a threatening Chinese stance in the region, or a remilitarized Japan with a ruptured U.S. security relationship).
- An intact U.S. alliance structure and access to some minimum set of overseas bases (particularly in Japan).
- A U.S. domestic consensus that will support level (or slight increases in real growth) DoD spending after base force levels are achieved (i.e., DoD spending “free fall” arrested).
Posture C (Reduced Base Access Force)

This posture might be the result of overseas base loss in the Asia Pacific region, a national strategy change that required more centrally located forces to respond to a variety of global threats, or a decision to base forces in U.S. congressional districts to satisfy domestic pressures. As portrayed in this report, it is a caricature designed to portray the effects of a de facto “mid-Pacific” strategy. For Posture C to be a reasonable choice, one or more of the following conditions (current or future) would be required:

- Very low probability of North Korean aggression.
  - And, the former Soviet threat largely neutralized (as a result of political disintegration, major change in domestic spending priorities).

- Loss of access to Japanese and Korean bases (perhaps as a result of host governments finding that U.S. base access was at variance with their new relationships with the former USSR).
  - And, loss of base access in Southeast Asia (perhaps prompted by a new security role for ASEAN that is incompatible with continued U.S. access).

- A new threat and responsive strategy that required basing U.S. forces so that they could swing east, south, or west from CONUS bases.
  - And, an assumption that other threats were more likely or greater than those in Asia.

- A domestic consensus that required bringing home forces based overseas (e.g., move forces to congressional districts).

Posture D (Pacific Swing Force)

This posture appears nearly as likely to occur as Posture B. The near-term reality is probably a midpoint between the two. This posture is very fragile, since whatever slack existed in it has been taken up by the need to retain substantial USPACOM (and other unified commands’) forces in Southwest Asia. We note that Posture D, insofar as Asia and the Pacific are concerned, is the functional equivalent of the force reduction of Posture E. Therefore, if the stability and deterrence provided by Posture E is considered fragile, the offsetting benefits of the larger posture afforded by Posture D in the Asia Pacific region must lie in the example the U.S. commitment to Southwest Asia sets and in the belief that forces deployed in Southwest Asia could be rapidly redeployed to the east if a contingency occurred there.

For Posture D to be a reasonable choice, the following conditions (current and future) would need to be satisfied (in addition to those stipulated for Posture B):

- Substantial USPACOM forces are required in Southwest Asia at least through the mid term (approximately five years).
- The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states will provide basing rights for forward-deployed U.S. forces on a continuing basis.
- Potential aggressors in the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) will not exploit the diversion of USPACOM forces outside the region.
• U.S. security partners in the Asia Pacific region believe that U.S. force deployments in the Persian Gulf are to their benefit, and those forces could be quickly redeployed to Asian bases and waters if a major contingency so required.

Posture E (Lower Budget Force)

Although this posture does not assume a major force commitment to Southwest Asia, some of the conditions that would apply have already been addressed in our discussion of Posture D. For Posture E to be a reasonable choice, the following conditions (current and future) would need to be satisfied:

• The former Soviet near-term threat has all but disappeared. If it were to reemerge, there would be sufficient time to reconstitute the needed USPACOM forces.
• Only one contingency will occur in the USCENTCOM and USPACOM AORs at a given time. A second contingency would be met by assets from other unified commands.
• The chances of a North Korean invasion of the South are very low. But, if one occurs, there will be sufficient warning to effect a major reinforcement of South Korea.
• U.S. security partners remain convinced that although the United States has smaller forces in USPACOM, it will honor its commitments with the same speed and force as if it had larger forces forward deployed in the region.
• U.S. force reductions will not foster or reinforce any destabilizing regional arms races.
• Although the United States has fewer forward-deployed forces, it will retain contingent access to a large regional base structure should major reinforcement be necessary.
• The smaller overall U.S. force structure will not generate unsurmountable domestic pressures to bring the remaining forces home.

Posture F (Lower Budget Swing Force)

This posture combines the salient features of Posture D (major forces in Southwest Asia) and Posture E (major force reductions). This force is, insofar as Asia and the Pacific are concerned, less than half the size of the Posture A force. There are almost as many USPACOM forces in Southwest Asia as there are on the Pacific Rim. For Posture F to be a reasonable choice, the following conditions would need to be satisfied:

• The former Soviet near-term threat has all but disappeared. If it were to reemerge, there would be sufficient time to reconstitute the needed USPACOM forces.
• The Asian Pacific security environment is generally benign. Either Japan and China do not have any significant hegemonic ambitions, or such ambitions cannot be realized because of economic or political problems (China) or military limitations (Japan).
  — The North Korean threat to the South has diminished to near the vanishing point with the establishment of workable CBMs and nuclear arms control agreements.
• U.S. Asian allies are capable of conducting their own ground and air defense. U.S. forces are needed only for a few specialized capabilities (naval and air power projection forces) and for their tripwire role.
— The U.S. security role in the region is largely symbolic and based more on U.S. political acceptability ("least unloved") than on its military power.

- Substantial USPACOM forces are required in Southwest Asia at least through the mid term (approximately five years).
- The Gulf Cooperation Council states will provide basing rights for forward-deployed U.S. forces.
- U.S. security partners in the Asia Pacific region remain convinced that although the United States has smaller forces in USPACOM, it will honor its commitments with the same speed and force as if it had larger forces forward deployed in the region.
- U.S. force reductions will not foster or reinforce any destabilizing regional arms races.
- Although the United States has fewer forward-deployed forces, it will retain contingent access to a large regional base structure should major reinforcement be necessary.
- The smaller U.S. force structure will not generate insurmountable domestic pressures to bring the remaining forces home.

Measuring the conditions we have listed above against global and regional conditions today gives a vivid reminder of the distance we have come and the distance we must go to provide for lasting security in the region. What are the implications of this assessment for the future security of Asia and the Pacific and the policy actions the United States should take? It is to that subject we turn in the final section of this report.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS

Nearly every nation in the region holds some kind of geographical, ethnic, religious or political complaint against one or more of its neighbors. Our Pacific forces continue to deter would-be aggressors in the region, and demonstrate our commitment to our allies.\footnote{Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 12, 1991, p. 8.}

In broad expanses of the Pacific there are not any real major threats out there with the possible exception of Korea. We are not going to get into a major war on the Asian land mass any time soon. . . . For the most part it is an economy of force region. Maritime forces. Marines. Some Army presence, but light Army presence.\footnote{General Colin Powell, in Air Force Times, April 8, 1991, p. 3.}

The apparent contradictions in these two statements suggest some of the difficulties in articulating a clear message on our requirements for forces in the Pacific. The biggest "threat" is the uncertainty inherent in a multipolar international system, most of whose members are on the move economically and who leave the underwriting of regional stability to others. We can do with less posture, but how much less?

In this report the postures we specified were intended as an aid to answering this question, not an end in themselves. They represent alternative states of the world expressed in military posture terms for the USPACOM AOR. Nevertheless, the analysis has illuminated the strong and weak points of each posture. The reader is invited to extend the analysis by positing his own postures, scenarios, and regional responses. Our intent has been to demonstrate a method of analysis as well as to address the substantive issues. Given the realities of lower defense funding, we are persuaded by the case for Postures B or D, depending on U.S. commitments in Southwest Asia. Postures E and F as policy choices suggest a world much less dangerous than the one we inhabit today and one that we believe remains implausible in the mid-term future. Posture C we would reject out of hand as a policy choice—though it may need further appraisal if there is a major breakdown in the U.S. security partnerships in Asia and the Pacific or if there is a dangerous erosion of domestic support for forward military presence. One could lead to the other.

**Recommendation 1.** Retain Postures B/D—at least in the mid term—as the focus for U.S. force-level, deployment, and basing decisions as they affect USPACOM. If the prospects for Asian Pacific political stability improve markedly and if the uncertainties in the regional political environment decrease, consider further decreases in posture to the D/E levels. Conversely, if stability is endangered by the emergence of a major hostile power in Asia, return to Posture A (Phase II).

We now turn to an examination of the policy, strategy, and force initiatives as the Department of Defense thinks about security on the Pacific Rim.
THE STRATEGY

The United States seeks to develop a long-term regional strategy that will help manage uncertainty, change, and potential realignment. This revised strategy must reassure regional actors that collaboration with the United States affords a better means for achieving their security goals than going their own way or seeking to devise alternative security arrangements that exclude the United States. The United States must seek to prevent undue concentration of power or the development of a power vacuum. Especially in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United States must also retain capabilities sufficient to deter abrupt threats to its own or its security partners' vital interests, and to respond to such threats should deterrence fail. Such capabilities will also help shape internal debate in societies that are deliberating their political and security futures; they will help provide incentives for disparate states to sustain cooperative relations with the United States.

At the same time, military presence is not a panacea, nor can all challenges to long-term American interests be deterred or reversed by military power alone. Military capabilities cannot prevent or determine the full range of potential economic and political challenges that could confront the United States, but they need to be available to help shape the new environment. The United States cannot serve as a comprehensive guarantor of long-term security in the Pacific, though its contribution to this goal will be pivotal.

In working toward a viable, stable environment conducive to orderly progress in the region, the United States needs to be especially attentive to its relations with present or prospective security partners. American policy must be commensurate with the aspirations, capabilities, and needs of these partners. Although the United States can help contribute to a regional security order, any effort to dictate such an order is doomed to failure. Asian leaders are comfortable with the supple and flexible use of power; to be effective, the United States should follow their lead in this regard.

Asia and the Pacific have entered a new era. The principal challenge for U.S. regional security planning will be to redefine a role for military power in a period of diminished threat and far greater political-military diversity and uncertainty. No single central, compelling security problem now challenges the interests of the United States or its regional allies. But America has an incontestable stake in Asia's economic, political, and strategic future that must be imparted unambiguously in policy and in presence.

It would be highly premature, however, for the United States to commit to a specific course of action. Since we cannot ascertain the precise dimensions of future regional development, we must retain flexibility amidst a range of alternative futures. A flexible strategy permits latitude and freedom of action. U.S. policy, therefore, must be proportional without appearing conditional; it must be unobtrusive yet remain credible. The United States desires a central leadership role, but this cannot entail taking the lead on every issue, especially as regional states begin to devise collaborative political, economic, and institutional arrangements appropriate to their own circumstances.

These points are all addressed implicitly in, or at least are not inconsistent with, the DoD Strategic Framework. But these points are crucial to our clarity of purpose as we adjust force levels, basing agreements, and deployment patterns in the region and attempt to mesh them with the other instruments of national power. While we have no wish to fashion new slogans that might confuse already complex strategy formulation and articulation tasks, we believe a
shorter definition of our strategy—one that captures both its proportional nature and the bedrock of our engagement in security matters in the region—is necessary.

**Recommendation 2.** We propose “proportional engagement” as a candidate strategic concept to extend DoD’s Strategic Framework. This label suggests the need for involvement commensurate with the long-term U.S. stake in Asia's future. But the degree of commitment cannot be fixed; it must be tailored to resources, potential threats, and multiple roles and interests. At bottom, the United States seeks to signal to all that its power and its interests are engaged, with the scale and character of its involvement to be determined by specific circumstances and needs. The objective is not to leave regional states guessing about American intentions, but to avoid any implication that U.S. power in all forms is insufficiently committed to the region, or rigidly committed to a specific course of action. This will require a versatile and flexible force structure that is congruent with a much more unsettled, complex policy environment.

**POLICY, STRATEGY, AND PROGRAM INITIATIVES**

**Threat Management**

Although the Asia Pacific region has been affected by the changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and by the crisis in communism generally, it still holds many significant uncertainties that could easily become threats. The major current regional security concern remains the possibility of an attack by North Korean conventional forces on the South. Most of the other possible contingencies, such as many of those outlined in Section 5, are longer-term concerns. Some of those concerns seem implausible today, but the implausible requires at least as much attention as the plausible, since it is the former that leads more directly to unpreparedness and surprise. The most vital long-term concern is a future rupture of the U.S.–Japan alliance, something that would transform the strategic landscape of the Pacific Rim and make current U.S.–Japan trade concerns appear trivial by comparison. The possible emergence of a Russian threat in a future renewal of the Cold War provides a short- and long-term backdrop to those concerns.

Thus, our threat management activities should have four objectives:

- Management of the short-term North Korean conventional threat and mid-term nuclear threat.
- Management of relations with Russia so as to transform the post-Soviet state into a sometime security partner in the region, instead of an opponent.
- Management of Japanese relations so as to maintain the current alliance and reduce Japanese incentives for major rearmament.
- Management of Chinese relations to provide incentives for support of cooperative relations with the emerging Russian state, Japan, and South Korea.

The North Korean threat remains troublesome in spite of recent progress in direct North-South talks designed to reduce tensions and define a path for future cooperation, with a long-term goal of reunification. Although a new Korean War would be against the interests of all four major regional powers, they have expended little diplomatic capital in developing joint
endeavors to head it off. Instead there has been a series of separate bilateral actions between each major power and each Korea.3 What has been lacking is concerted major-power action to define the bounds of acceptable conduct on the peninsula.

**Recommendation 3.** After consultation with the South Korean and Japanese governments, seek Chinese and Russian diplomatic support for the establishment of confidence-building measures on the Korean peninsula. If the United States and the other regional powers can press hard for a political settlement in Cambodia, similar pressure is warranted in Korea, where the vital interests of the major powers are more strongly engaged. We are fully aware that the South Korean government rejected such a “2 + 4” framework in the fall of 1991. We nonetheless believe there is substantial merit in proposing such a framework for confidence building and threat management. By deferring to their allies on the peninsula and not pushing more strongly for stabilizing measures, the major regional powers are pursuing the diplomatically easier path at the major risk of a political-military explosion in Northeast Asia that would adversely affect them all.

Although somewhat more awkward, a similar result might be achieved by use of a UN Security Council resolution that would recognize that the eventual reunification of Korea is a desired end and an internal matter to be resolved by both parties. An invasion of one Korea by the other would be a threat to world peace and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter.

The longer-term North Korean threat centers on its future efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Even though North Korea is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is a strong presumption that such development is under way.4 We can envisage few events in the region more destabilizing than a nuclear-armed North Korea. Although U.S. leverage in preventing this situation is very limited, we see several possibly useful initiatives.

The first is an extension of the confidence-building measures suggested above to include mutual safeguards and inspections of nuclear power facilities. These safeguards might be extended to include challenge inspections to a specified number of suspected nuclear material storage facilities on both sides. A second initiative is already in progress with the pairing of the U.S.-announced withdrawal (in September–October 1991) of all nuclear weapons from Korea with a step-up in the diplomatic pressure on the North to cease its nuclear weapons development activities.

However, given the example of the Iraqi resistance to UN inspections of its nuclear and other important weapons facilities, we remain skeptical of the power of “jawboning” in reducing the potential North Korean nuclear threat. Tougher sanctions are likely to be needed unless a more reasonable leadership comes to power in the North. The United States needs to be thinking now of the options available and whether multilateral application is feasible. We

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3To outline just a few, we would cite the establishment of USSR–South Korea diplomatic relations, the near regularization of China–South Korea commercial relations, Japanese initiatives to consult with North Korea on matters of mutual concern, Soviet/Russian moves to distance itself from the more extreme North Korean international positions and reduce aid, and some first halting steps in establishing a U.S.–North Korea dialogue.

4For a useful open-source discussion of this question, see Andrew Mack’s “North Korea and the Bomb,” *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1991, pp. 87–104. One need not agree with Mack’s policy recommendations to benefit from his marshaling of the open-source facts and his formulation of the relevant issues.
see those options falling into a matrix defined by political, economic, and military measures and by unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral application. Direct military action should not be ruled out.⁵

In spite of a general improvement in U.S.–Soviet/Russian relations over the past five years and the accelerated disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the fact remains that the Russians have the only military force in the region that can directly and effectively threaten U.S. vital interests. These forces are no longer increasing, but they continued to modernize even as the former USSR’s economy declined precipitously. Both navies face serious block obsolescence problems, and their size will decline under all foreseeable circumstances short of a renewal of some undetermined form of Cold War. Arms control would seem to be a problem that is taking care of itself by the unilateral actions of the major regional states.

But there is continuing pressure in some parts of the Congress and among some Pacific Rim states for naval arms control in the region. Most calls for regional naval arms control apply to U.S.–Russian forces and focus on CBMs. To this point the U.S. response has been negative, and in our view appropriately so. However, in the changing circumstances in the region there is an incentive to draw the Russian leadership into a more cooperative stance on regional security matters. One way to do this would be to undertake some first, even if intrinsically unimportant, steps in addressing Russian security concerns, so long as those steps are matched by similar consideration of U.S. interests. For example, there is an opportunity for expanding the coverage of the 1989 Dangerous Military Activities Agreement to cover headquarters-to-headquarters hotlines, to announce a policy of demonstrating sensitivity to mutual concerns on exercises, deployments, and intelligence collecting, and to expand an exchange of naval order-of-battle data to include what is already available in the unclassified literature.

We are not persuaded by the “slippery slope” analogy that argues against even innocuous CBMs as setting a bad precedent for U.S.–Russian discussions on naval arms control. The U.S. national leadership has demonstrated that it is up to the demands of carrying out serious negotiation on arms control and dealing with negotiating partners’ attempts to achieve propaganda advantages. We believe the time is approaching in Phase II to consider (after consulting with affected allies) military-to-military negotiations on regional CBMs with the successors to the Soviet state.

Base Access

In Southeast Asia we see the need for continued gradual progress in ensuring U.S. base access. Although some possibility exists for continuing limited U.S. access to bases in the Philippines in spite of its Senate’s rejection of the negotiated agreement, we remain skeptical that long-term access is feasible—or even in the U.S. interest. It is not appropriate for the Philippines or Singapore to carry the entire political burden of supporting continued U.S.

⁵While such an operation might be seen as the equivalent of the Israeli strike on Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osirak in 1981, we can see some possible major differences, including significant diplomatic preparation, with the possible use of economic sanctions on the 1990–1991 Gulf War model; major-power involvement; more surgical and less risky force application; and a possible negotiating quid pro quo on the removal of any U.S. nuclear weapons from the South. This option has already been raised (and disavowed) by South Korea’s defense minister, Lee Jong Koo. We believe the problem and this option will receive much more visibility during Phase II.
forward presence in the region. A more creative exploitation of existing instruments is needed.

**Recommendation 4.** Seek some U.S. participation in (or an analog to) the current Five Power Defense Agreement, perhaps initially as a "nonsignatory observer." Seek a comparable role in the UK-Brunei agreement as British forces leave the Far East after the return of Hong Kong in 1997 (Phase II).\(^6\)

**Nuclear Employment and Deployment Policies**

Early in our research for this report we suggested a reexamination of U.S. nuclear employment and deployment policies and consideration of the option of taking theater and tactical nuclear weapons off U.S. warships.\(^7\) President Bush, in his September 27, 1991, announcement on unilateral U.S. actions to reduce short-range nuclear weapons and withdraw them (except for some in Europe) from forward deployments, overtook our recommendations on this subject. Subsequent U.S. announcements on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea took this new policy a step further.

We believe this bold change in policy will provide major benefits for supporting continuing U.S. military presence in the region and in affording greater flexibility in force deployments. The policy provides the correct balance between defusing important basing and access issues and applying political leverage (e.g., against North Korea) on the one hand and maintaining potentially important military capabilities on the other. We believe it important to maintain capabilities to redeploy nuclear weapons in the theater if the security environment deteriorates to approximate some of the worst-case scenarios outlined in Sections 2, 4, and 5. For example, a future Japan faced with a nuclear-armed Korea (unified or not) may need some tangible evidence of the extent of the U.S. nuclear umbrella besides a Trident submarine on patrol or a missile in a silo in North Dakota.

The new U.S. nuclear weapon deployment policy has one potential benefit that may be overlooked. Heretofore, regional "nuclearphobia" worked against regional access by U.S. dual-purpose forces. That obstacle has been largely removed.\(^8\) The United States now has an opportunity to take the higher ground. It is already doing this in its attempt to apply political leverage against North Korea. But there is a larger potential benefit in exploiting regional antinuclear sentiment to discourage nuclear proliferation. It is not in the U.S. interest to see any new nuclear powers in the region, whether they are current friends or potential foes. One way to advance this policy, particularly against a backdrop of greater popular involvement in regional governments, is to carefully channel and direct antinuclear sentiment rather than oppose it across the board.

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\(^6\)The intermittent deployment of Air Force fighter aircraft to Singapore provides an opportunity to "piggyback" the FPDA exercises described in *Defence*, June 1990, pp. 357-368.

\(^7\)See discussion on related initiatives in Section 3. We make no claim for the originality of these suggestions. Our point was to emphasize the importance of a global and theater review of the role and deployment requirements for short-range nuclear weapons before considering nuclear arms control and related initiatives (e.g., nuclear arms control on the Korean peninsula, abandonment of the NCND policy). That review has been conducted and the resulting policy changes announced.

\(^8\)We realize that there will always be some who link nuclear power (and naval nuclear propulsion plants) with nuclear weapons. Many in this group have used their nuclearphobia as a thin screen to mask a deeper anti-Americanism.
Recommendation 5. Reappraise current U.S. policies that relate to antinuclear sentiment in the region. Such sentiment may retard future nuclear proliferation more than it hampers U.S. force posture. We believe Japan’s nuclearphobia is of long-term benefit to the United States and the region generally (Phase III).

Role Specialization

As U.S. forces in the Pacific decline in size and their overseas components decline accordingly, the question arises as to what posture capabilities should be retained and what should be given up or assigned to others. While reductions can be apportioned across the force, such a course risks sacrificing the most important capabilities in the interest of “equity” to those supporting relatively less important capabilities. Note that we speak in relative, not absolute, terms. We would posit two essential guidelines for safeguarding essential capabilities in the face of reductions:

- Preserve capabilities our allies cannot or should not provide for themselves.\(^9\)
- Preserve capabilities that are essential for unilateral U.S. action if such action is required.\(^10\)

The first guideline suggests that the United States should retain sufficient power projection capabilities to perform that role for both partners in any conflict requiring invocation of one of our bilateral security agreements. The same argument would apply with even more force to nuclear weapons capabilities. However, the second guideline requires that the United States retain some minimum forward-deployed defensive capabilities. Together the guidelines suggest that our allies should focus on counterinsurgency, local sea control, air defense, and ground force capabilities optimized for defense of their own territory, and that the United States should focus on power projection (tactical air power, amphibious assault, lift) and nuclear capabilities.

To apply these guidelines to specific cases by U.S. service component would argue for the following:

- Retain F-16s and/or F-15Es and give up some F-15Ds.
- Keep tankers and AWACS aircraft.
- Retain carriers and AAW escorts, but give up some ASW escorts and MPA.
- Give up some Marine units for which lift or MPS is not readily available.
- Reconfigure carrier air/wings to put more emphasis on offensive weapons delivery and less on air defense and sea control.
- Retain flexible, readily deployable force packages, and reduce forces that are relatively base-bound.

\(^9\)Japan can develop power projection and nuclear weapons capabilities. We argue that it should not, for the future peace and tranquility of the Asia Pacific region.

\(^10\)But we acknowledge that the scope for unilateral U.S. military response is decreasing—particularly as base access is restricted and force structure declines.
To apply these guidelines to the forces of specific allies would argue for the following:

- Japanese force expansion should be halted. Modernization of air defense, sea control, and ground forces should continue. The current defense zone of 1000 nautical miles should not be exceeded, and Japanese air and ground forces should not be deployed outside of Japan.\footnote{We would argue with those who supported deployment of Japanese military forces or other military capabilities to the Persian Gulf during Desert Shield/Storm. While there might be some short-term gain in such action, the potential long-term risks to regional stability are profound.}
- Continue to oppose any nuclear proliferation in the region, and turn nuclearphobia to our long-term advantage.
- Support development of air defense and local sea control capabilities by regional security partners. Ground forces should be tailored to defensive operations and not be provided significant lift, heavy armor, or long-range missiles.

\textbf{Recommendation 6.} During any drawdown—particularly forces approximating Postures E and F—preserve power projection capabilities, at the expense of defensive capabilities if necessary (Phase II).

\textbf{CVBG Gap Management}

We are not likely to have enough carrier battle groups to cover our requirements adequately in Postures B through F. The answer is not to buy more battle groups and reduce other forces, because those other forces face shortfalls of their own. While there may be no fully satisfactory substitute for a carrier battle group (or an Air Force tactical fighter wing, for that matter), there are other force packages that provide some of the battle groups' capabilities and in some cases provide capabilities the battle group does not. Figure 8.1 suggests some of the dimensions of overlap and uniqueness.

\textbf{Recommendation 7.} Where feasible, substitute deployable Air Force composite wing and augmented amphibious ready group packages for CVBG deployments (Phase II).

For example, a rotating composite wing could fill in for CVBGs during otherwise “gapped” periods in Southwest and Southeast Asia.\footnote{In a future (perhaps exemplified by Postures C and F) where all Air Force tactical fighter squadrons are withdrawn from permanent stationing in Korea or Japan but retain dual-basing assignments, it is not inconceivable that a CVBG might fill in the gaps between Air Force TFS deployments. While this pattern is less likely than TFW substitution for CVBGs, it highlights the need to be more flexible in accepting substitutes to current force deployment patterns.} Where bases for an Air Force composite wing are not readily available, an amphibious ready group could be substituted. That group could be augmented with an escort made up in part of some Tomahawk-launching platforms; the LHA/LHD flagship could have a full VSTOL VMA squadron embarked to provide some minimal tactical air capability. The Chief of Naval Operations alluded to this possibility when he stated
The addition of newer, more capable surface combatants to the fleet will bring additional flexibility to carrier battle groups. When the threat level and mission permit, these potent forces can sail without a carrier in smaller battle groups to meet specific circumstances.\textsuperscript{13}

This type of interchangeability will not be popular within the Department of Defense. It carries the potential for unseemly roles and missions and interoperability arguments. But resolving these issues, and accepting the next best, will be part of the price for maintaining deployments in the face of resource scarcity.\textsuperscript{14}

An additional option for closing the CVBG gap is to change CVBG deployment policies and basing. An additional CVBG home-ported overseas in the Pacific would close the peacetime deployment gap that results from the lower carrier force levels inherent in Postures B through F.\textsuperscript{15} However, overseas home-porting is costly and raises many unpleasant host

\begin{figure}
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\caption{Overlapping and Unique Capabilities}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{13} Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, "Charting a Course for the Future," \textit{Seapower}, April 1991, p. 18. The authors are aware that the Center for Naval Analyses has studied some possible CVBG substitutions but do not have access to the study documentation.

\textsuperscript{14} Admiral David Jeremiah made a similar point in a March 1991 interview. "A complementary mix of land- and sea-based components of air power is what you're going to see more of in the future . . . more joint force packages." \textit{Defense News}, April 1, 1991, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{15} This option helps solve the peacetime rotation gap problem, but it does not address overall carrier requirements for major war when rotation concerns are put aside and carriers are surged forward. This dilemma highlights the need to reexamine the tradeoffs between presence and force levels. In the future we may prize the deterrence and fast-reaction capabilities afforded by forward presence for subregional conflict more than surge and mobilization capabilities for a big or extended war.
country support and interface issues. Even less attractive is the suboption of increasing CVBG deployment times and accelerating the rotation cycle. This has been tried in the past, with disastrous consequences for the retention of skilled crews.

The 1991 JCS-sponsored Worldwide Naval Presence Review approved by the secretary of defense has addressed most of these questions. The new policy represents a series of compromises among reduced force levels, contingency response times, substituting the forces of one service for those of another, and risk acceptance. But those compromises are tailored to what we have portrayed as Postures B and D; they and the resulting policy will not hold up under Postures C, E, or F. Under those reduced postures and under changed circumstances in the Pacific Rim, the policy will have to be revisited and more radical solutions considered to achieve a new balance of commitments and resources.

**Prepositioning**

Prepositioning is not a substitute for forces in place. It is expensive (additional equipment is needed at CONUS bases for training). Use of prepositioned equipment and supplies requires sufficient warning to deploy associated unit personnel, marry them up with their equipment and support, and then redeploy them in-theater to where they are needed. Prepositioning does not give allies the same type of assurance that fully equipped forces on station do. It is a very fragile tripwire for guaranteeing greater U.S. involvement in incipient conflict. But whenever the choice is between “no on-site capability” and “prepositioning,” the choice is relatively easy if the threat is sufficiently compelling.

As matters stand, or will stand at the end of the redeployment of forces from the Gulf, there are two MPS (at Diego Garcia and Guam) to support two deployable MEBs in the USPACOM AOR. There are also nine prepositioning ships normally at Diego Garcia to provide support for Air Force and Army forces designated for contingent deployment to Southwest Asia. In the futures we have considered (particularly those associated with Postures C, E, and F), there may be a need to preposition support in or near Northeast Asia.

We believe this support would have two components: supplying APS support for each Army brigade equivalent withdrawn from Korea during Phases II and III of the DoD Strategic Framework, and replacing a MEB in the western Pacific with an MPS with a MEB’s equipment embarked.

**Recommendation 8.** For every Army brigade withdrawn from Korea, replace it with a prepositioned brigade set of equipment. We recommend afloat rather than ashore prepositioning to reduce the U.S. footprint on Korean or Japanese soil in the face of increased nationalistic pressures, and to provide a swing capability to support Army forces needed elsewhere (Phase III).

While CONUS-based fast sealift may be preferable for some contingencies, the distances in the Pacific are so large that afloat prepositioning is a preferred alternative. Moreover, fast

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16 There is also the question of the ability of remote heavy Army divisions to get to West Coast points of embarkation to link up with the fast sealift. The deployment of the 1st Infantry Division from Kansas to Southwest Asia through U.S. ports on the Gulf of Mexico was a difficult and time-consuming operation in spite of heroic efforts by all concerned.
sealift and deployable divisions in CONUS do not have the same reassurance impact as committed equipment near allied territory.

A somewhat similar situation may evolve concerning the Marines on Okinawa. If the MEF(-) is reduced to MEB size, the additional equipment for a deploying MEB in the Guam MPS is probably adequate for initial commitment in most contingencies. But if the MEF leaves Japan (Postures C, D, and E), we believe there is a case for an additional MPS in Guam or Japan. But we should be clear: we believe there is an excellent case for retaining at least a MEB in Okinawa. Indeed, absent any further reductions in the regional threat, the only reason for reducing the MEF currently there is to accommodate DoD cost pressures and local Japanese sensitivities.

**Recommendation 9.** If the Okinawa MEF is removed, it should be partially replaced (at the minimum) by an additional MPS to support a deployable CONUS-based brigade (Phase III).

**Exercising**

Exercises are justified not only on the basis of force readiness, but for the political signals they send to friends and potential foes. We strongly support USCINC PAC's current exercise structure, built around the centerpiece RIMPAC, Team Spirit, and Cobra Gold exercises. However, we believe PACEX 89, with major deployments in the northwest Pacific and an attendant "Soviet" concern, should not be the pattern for future exercises. Major exercises should be rotated throughout the region to include a naval exercise in the Philippine Sea and various exercises that require simulated debarkation of MPS and APS equipment in receptive host countries.

We favor placing continued attention on exercising with our security partners in Southeast Asia. Massive deployments are probably counterproductive. But short combined-arms exercises with Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei on the FPDA and USARPAC's Expanded Relations Program (ERP) models would be most helpful.

**Recommendation 10.** Direct JCS/USCINC PAC to develop a new plan for regional exercises to fit the changed regional circumstances and U.S. force posture. The principal U.S. objectives in the new plan are to expand access to allied military leaders, gain contingent use of regional bases, and lay the basis for coordinated action against potential common opponents.

**International Military Education and Training (IMET)**

IMET is a ... low-cost grant aid program that provides military education and training [by] the United States to approximately 6,000 foreign military personnel each year. The IMET program is one of the most cost-effective foreign policy tools of the U.S. Government.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^{17}\)There is usually a deployed MEU (from CONUS) in the western Pacific in addition to Marine units on Okinawa. We assume this practice will continue.

Total costs for IMET in the Asia Pacific region have run about $10 million annually—or 22 percent of the worldwide allocation.\textsuperscript{19} Historically, this program, along with other foreign aid programs, has been the target of budget reductions and reallocation to specific states with powerful friends inside the U.S. Congress. These reductions are highly visible in the prospective recipient states, with adverse effects on U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{20}

During a period of force reductions, it is prudent to increase the emphasis on military-to-military ties as we attempt to compensate for a loss of forces with greater influence in regional state military staffs.

**Recommendation 11.** The secretary of defense should support a major increase in the IMET program to fully fund USCINCPAC-identified requirements and ensure the increase is defended through the DoD programming and budget-development processes and before the Congress. USCINCPAC should expand and improve supporting rationales for this program and take special measures to emphasize its need in testimony before the Congress (Phase II).

**Distributed Basing in Southeast Asia**

The loss of the Philippines bases is a near certainty following the Filipino senate’s rejection of a new base agreement.\textsuperscript{21} This subject was addressed in an earlier RAND study.\textsuperscript{22} That research examined six distributed basing options: incremental annualized costs ranged from $178 to $1426 million per year. The “best bet” alternative carried estimated transition costs of $729 million per year, compared with the some $530 million per year that was estimated for continued access to Philippines bases. Although we do not necessarily support the specific base configuration of this “best bet,” we find the concept a useful one and in accord with what we believe will be future regional realities.\textsuperscript{23}

**Recommendation 12.** Undertake the necessary long-range planning to implement the distributed basing concept in Southeast Asia (Phase III).\textsuperscript{24}


\textsuperscript{20}For example, IMET is one of the few continuing U.S. ties to the Indonesian military. Indonesian officers discussing regional affairs with one of the authors never fail to mention past reductions in that program and the damage they did to the image of the United States.

\textsuperscript{21}Some forget that the United States fought a major war in the Pacific from 1942 to 1944—a war that extended to both Southeast and Northeast Asia—without the use of Philippines bases. To say that they are “essential” is to introduce considerations of U.S. interests, cost, preference, influence, and views of future conflict scenarios that are by no means simple to understand and relate to one another. We have no such difficulty in understanding the “essentiality” of Japanese bases and their role in the U.S.—Japan security partnership.

\textsuperscript{22}Henry, Crane, and Webb (1989). “Distributed basing” means breaking down base capabilities into their component parts and then being prepared to distribute them among several bases, often in different states.

\textsuperscript{23}The Henry et al. “best bet” distributed basing capabilities among Guam, Brunei, Sasebo, Songkhla, Singapore, and Clark AFB (the latter for limited training).

\textsuperscript{24}The already agreed-on temporary use of Singapore’s facilities is a step in this direction.
DoD Organizational Initiatives

The revised Unified Command Plan (UCP) would leave most command arrangements in USPACOM much as they are today. However, the turnover of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in Korea during Phase II and the parallel reductions in headquarters strength in USPACOM suggest that some reorganization below the CINC level will occur.

Because USPACOM is such a large theater, historically it has been divided either between two CINCs or (as it is currently) under one CINC with two major subunified commands. In USPACOM the service component commanders have had a major warfighting role, either independent of or coordinated with the commanders of the subunified commands. During the Vietnam War this resulted in complexity and unneeded confusion at some cost to unity of effort.

As U.S. force reductions occur in Northeast Asia, particularly during Phase III, we see some merit in consolidating COMUSFORKOREA and COMUSFORJAPAN to provide a single focus for operational planning for the region. However, we realize that because of sensitivities in Seoul and Tokyo, separate country-specific commands will continue to provide the needed interface with host governments. But in the absence of a consolidation of current subunified commands in Northeast Asia, a standing Joint Task Force (JTF) should be considered for the planning and conduct of contingency operations in the region. This JTF would function much as JTF 120 now functions for USLANTCOM. There is a case to be made for a separate standing JTF for Southeast Asia, and perhaps one for the northwest Pacific as well.

**Recommendation 13.** As forces are reduced in the western Pacific, consider reorganization of the command structure, in ways that provide natural focal points for regional (not country-specific) security planning and the conduct of regional exercises. The JTF concept, applied subregionally, should be among the options considered (Phases II and III).

Although many of the longstanding command and control problems associated with joint tactical air operations appear to have been solved during Desert Shield/Storm, we believe that the circumstances of those operations were sufficiently unique as to suggest caution, particularly insofar as Pacific applications are concerned. The long planning horizon for Desert Storm (over five months) and the clear recognition of a lead service (the U.S. Air Force) by all concerned provided the essential foundation on which a single integrated air operations plan could be built for joint and combined operations. Shorter planning horizons and lack of clarity as to a lead service for air operations have characterized joint tactical air operations in the Pacific since the early days of World War II.

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25 During World War II there were two CINCs: CINCSOWESPAC (General MacArthur) and CINCPAC/CINCPAO (Admiral Nimitz). During the Korean War there were also two CINCs (CINCPAC and CINCPAC). During Vietnam there was only one CINC (USCINCPAC) but three major subunified commands (COMUSFORKOREA, COMUSFORJAPAN, and COMUSMACV).

26 For a discussion of these issues, see Winnefeld and Johnson (1991).

27 Commander Fifth Air Force (in Japan) and Commander Seventh Fleet (home-ported in Japan) already do some joint contingency planning. But these arrangements are ad hoc and involve additional links with the service components and COMUSFORKOREA. Some critics of the joint task force concept we suggest point out that JTFs are intended to be temporary organizations, constituted for a specific task and dissolved upon its completion. We would respond that standing JTFs are a common feature of the DoD organizational landscape and offer significant advantages to the CINC as he exercises oversight of contingency operations.
**Recommendation 14.** Assess Desert Shield/Storm experience in combined and joint tactical air operations for its relevance to changing USPACOM organizations and contingency plans (Phase II).

As force levels decline and threats change, the services will carefully scrutinize their own tactical organizations to ensure that they are consistent with the new realities. We are particularly impressed with the Air Force's composite wing concept. While the traditional Air Force wing organization has proven strengths, particularly in planning and operations of massed air power, the composite wing concept seems better attuned to the likely contingency operations and smaller force structures that will characterize Phases II and III. An added advantage is that it brings Air Force practice into closer alignment with Navy and Marine Corps practice. We make no recommendations on this subject, but it is this type of innovation we believe will be most needed as forces are reduced.

We believe similar innovative thinking is needed in considering future organizational and operational planning for Navy and Marine tactical air power. The Marine Corps believes strongly in the indivisibility of its Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) concept. While we recognize the strengths of that concept for many operations, we also believe that force scarcity in the future will on occasion require separate deployment of Marine air and ground units. Some operations will require ground forces and few if any air assets (other than helicopters), while others will require Marine tactical air forces and no ground forces. We believe Marine flexibility is needed; indeed, it is often demonstrated, as, for example, when Marine squadrons fill in for Navy tactical air squadrons during extended carrier deployments.

**CONCLUSION: THE COMPONENTS OF U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC**

We would summarize our views of U.S. regional security strategy as follows:

**U.S. Strategic Objectives**

- A stable regional environment that fosters positive political and economic development.
- Deterrence or defeat of any military actions by others in the region that are inimical to U.S. interests.
- Unhampered U.S. access to regional markets, raw materials, and lines of communication.

**Regional Security Strategy**

- Emphasize political and economic development of the region, and full U.S. participation in it, as the ultimate guarantor of regional stability and growth.
- Prevent any one power, or combination of powers, from dominating the Asia Pacific region.
- Proportional engagement is the strategic concept for extending the DoD Strategic Framework into Phase III. U.S. involvement is commensurate with long-term U.S. interests, but

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the degree of commitment cannot be fixed. It must be tailored to resources, potential threats, and multiple roles and interests.

- Foster increased burden sharing by our security partners.
- Retain regional arms control as the servant of security strategy, not an end in itself.

Constraints on Strategy Development

- Lower U.S. defense budgets, smaller U.S. forces, reduced forward deployments.
- Probability of less peacetime access to the bases and territory of our security partners.
- Some of our security partners may not cooperate with one another.
- Greater uncertainty about the nature of the threat with the retrenchment of Soviet/Russian military power, a multipolar political environment, and major political and economic changes in the region with the possibility of concomitant unrest.

Regional Military Strategy

- Foster the fielding of effective forces by our security partners.
- Shape those forces to be primarily defensive in nature.
- Maintain forward-deployed U.S. forces that complement the capabilities of our security partners.
- Emphasize power projection capabilities in U.S. force development and deployment.
- Improve modalities for military cooperation with our security partners.
- Emphasize threat-capable, ready, forward-deployed forces over total force structure and sustainability.

Critical Assumptions Underpinning the Strategy

- U.S. nuclear deterrent is adequate for regional security.
- U.S. access to foreign bases in peacetime will be less than it is today, but adequate when and where regional security is imperiled:
  - Korean and Japanese bases will be available for the defense of the South Korea.
  - Bases will be available in Southeast Asia if one or more states in the region are threatened.
- There are no cataclysmic domestic political events in Japan or China that upset the current rough military balance.
- The former Soviet military threat to the region continues to recede.
- The United States maintains sufficient deployable forces to project power effectively in the region.

Implications of Failure of Critical Assumptions

- Incipient failure of nuclear deterrence or major nuclear proliferation in the region would require major theater nuclear forces.
• Failure to gain access to bases in wartime would require long-legged and self-contained forces capable of unilateral intervention.

• Failure of Russia, China, or Japan to head off major domestic changes that might bring about political realignment in the region and necessitate arrangements with new/different security partners.

• Failure of the United States to maintain sufficient deployable forces would require it to protect its own interests closer to home and rely on its regional security partners to carry the critical defense load.

• Any reversal of the current downturn in the Russian regional threat would require a reformulation of the strategy.

The Rationale for Retaining Forward Deployments

• Forward deployments are a defense against military threats smaller than a Soviet/Russian attack or stemming from a reversal of current favorable trends.

• Stability and access are in fact the central American interests in the Pacific Rim. American forces are part of the existing system that has worked well; rapid removal of U.S. forces could revive suspicions and rivalries and supplant the existing framework of cooperation.

• U.S. prosperity is closely connected to Asian Pacific prosperity. The destabilizing effects of withdrawal could slow down the economic progress on the Pacific Rim by fostering arms races, intraregional conflict, and a reduced willingness to accommodate the United States on economic issues.

• U.S. forces give the United States a seat at the Asian Pacific table and a voice in many economic and political matters as well as security affairs.

• Until an alternative instrument is found, U.S. forces on the Pacific Rim provide the major representation for a wide variety of U.S. regional interests.

Military Tasks for USCINCPAC

• Maintain the maximum amount of power projection forces forward that the available base posture and available funding will support.

• Emphasize forces that leave a small “footprint” on the territory of security partners.

• Develop improved modalities for coordinating planning and operations of U.S. forces with those of security partners.

• Insure that U.S. forces are commanded and configured to be “combined arms” packages.

• Maintain sufficient theater nuclear capabilities to provide a credible theater deterrent and the ability to engage in theater nuclear warfare if required.

• Develop host nation support, prepositioned support, and lines of communication to support dual-based forces.

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29 This framework has been adapted from Levine (1990).
• Employ forces in peacetime for maximum political impact, e.g., giving humanitarian assistance, showing the flag without extended tenancy on allied territory, or demonstrating the reach and range of military capabilities.
Appendix A
FOLDOUT SUMMARY OF POSTURES AND POLICY/PROGRAM INITIATIVES

POSTURES

A. The Cold War Force. USPACOM forces as they were in July 1990 to reflect the FY 90 DoD FYDP.

B. The Base Force. A roughly 15 percent force reduction from Posture A. This posture reflects current U.S. policy as specified in the force levels postulated in the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI).

C. Reduced Base Access Force. Same size force as Posture B, but with greatly reduced base access in the western Pacific.

D. Pacific Swing Force. Same size force as Posture B, but reflecting continuing major USPACOM commitments in support of USCINCENT in the Persian Gulf.

E. Lower Budget Force. A roughly 35 percent force reduction from Posture A.


CORE INITIATIVES THAT MIGHT ENHANCE FORWARD PRESENCE

1. Adopt a “proportional engagement” strategy.
2. Foster a nuclear-free Korea.
3. Foster confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Korea.
4. Reorient U.S. regional base and support structures.
5. Revise U.S. theater nuclear weapons policy.
6. Increase regional prepositioning of U.S. equipment.
7. Adjust forward CVBG basing and deployment patterns.
8. Shift some military missions to allies.
9. Adjust theater command structures.
10. Employ more nonforce military capabilities to substitute for forward force deployments.
11. Employ innovative force deployment and substitution concepts.
Appendix B
DESCRIPTION OF THE SIX ALTERNATIVE FORCE POSTURES

The force data tables that follow are intended to be more suggestive than definitive—regardless of the detail offered. They are provided here to give the reader some sense of our image of the size and distribution of the forces associated with each posture as we conducted our analysis. They are not recommendations. As the reader will recall from our discussion in Sections 1 and 3, the postures are alternative states of the world expressed in USPACOM force terms.

The observant and knowledgeable reader will note that we have taken some liberties in categorizing, distributing, and naming forces (e.g., we have split Marine forces into air and ground components). Moreover, we discuss some equipment currently in service (e.g., A-6 aircraft) as though they are still in service at the turn of the century. We recognize some modernization will occur that is not reflected in the tables.

Because this document is based on unclassified information, we may not have accurately described forces earmarked for reinforcement of USCINCPAC in the current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
## Table B.1
Distribution of PACOM Forces Outside CONUS

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<thead>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>Force Posture</th>
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</tr>
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<td>Korea</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
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<tr>
<td>(squadron/aircraft)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimenal/brigade equiv. (Army/USMC)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA aircraft</td>
<td>3/48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Naval forces, except for forces in CONUS and MPA, are shown as "at sea." Thus, a carrier battle group that is based in Yokosuka, or one that is at sea in the Indian Ocean, is carried as "at sea." A battle group operating off the West Coast of the United States would be carried as "in CONUS."

²Posture A is the 1991 baseline force reflected in the DoD FYDP projected to 1995. It does not reflect the congressionally mandated overall force reductions for FY 91 and the out years. The decision to remove tactical fighter aircraft from Clark AFB in 1991 is reflected for all Philippines basing options.

³Posture B is an estimated 1993 force that reflects continued force reductions resulting in a 15 percent DoD force level reduction. The estimated PACOM share of that reduction is reflected in the forces shown. This force bears a close resemblance (in total numbers) to the GLOBAL 90 force and to those in the revised U.S. force plan (see The New York Times, August 2, 1990, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan") announced by President Bush on August 3, 1990. The distribution shown here is based on the New York Times article and the authors' estimates.

⁴Posture C is identical in size to Posture B but has been relocated to bases in U.S. sovereign territory, except for the small rotational deployments indicated. This is the force that would be used to execute the "mid-Pacific" strategy.

⁵Posture D is identical in size to Posture B. Large residual forces (below Desert Storm levels) from PACOM and other CINC's were required to deter further aggression in the Gulf.
6Posture E reflects a major reduction in U.S. force structure—perhaps as much as 50 percent of the FY 91 forces, although a 35 percent reduction is shown. This force posture assumes some limited foreign base access.

7This force is a combination of Postures D and E. It is 35 percent smaller than the baseline (Posture A) and is deployed to support the commitments in Posture D.

8One tactical fighter squadron (24 F-15s) at Hickham AFB and three Marine fighter attack squadrons at Kaneohe (24 F/A-18s, 20 AV-8s, and 10 A-6s). These Marine air units, with those in Okinawa, make up the 3rd Marine Air Wing.

9An Army infantry division (light) and a Marine expeditionary brigade, both with supporting elements.

10Four patrol squadrons at NAS Barbers Point between overseas deployments.

11Two Army brigades from an infantry division (light) and the ground component of a MEB, all with supporting elements. The round-out brigade for the Army division would be obtained from the Guard/Reserve.

12Three patrol squadrons at NAS Barbers Point in training between overseas deployments.

13An Army infantry division (light) and a Marine ground part of a Marine expeditionary brigade.

14The 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade has moved to the Gulf.

15One MPA squadron has moved to Masirah, Oman.

16Two tactical fighter squadrons (+) with F-15s. Anchorage, Fairbanks, and satellite fields.

17Two brigades of an Army infantry division (light) with supporting elements at Fairbanks and Greeley.

18One patrol squadron at Adak.

19A deployment of four MPA aircraft to Adak from CONUS.

20One tactical fighter squadron has deployed to the Persian Gulf. Note: It probably would not be this particular squadron, but as a result of a draft Canada, Alaska would be down one and the Gulf up one tactical fighter squadron.

21While the division headquarters remains in Alaska, it contains only one brigade/regiment with one round-out regiment in the National Guard. The remaining brigade is in CONUS, serving as a rotation base for Gulf-deployed forces.

22One Air Force tactical fighter wing at Misawa (48 F-16s) and one at Kadena (72 F-15s); four Marine fighter-attack squadrons (24 F-18s, 40 AV-8s, and 10 A-6s) at Iwakuni and Okinawa.

23A Marine expeditionary force (-) with air support in Okinawa.

24Deployed from Barbers Point.

25Two reduced-strength tactical fighter wings, one at Misawa (48 F-16s) and one at Kadena (48 F-15s). Three Marine fighter-attack squadrons (24 F-18s, 20 AV-8s, and 10 A-6s) at Kadena (Iwakuni returned to Japanese).

26One Marine expeditionary brigade with supporting air on Okinawa.

27All permanently based U.S. forces have been removed from Japan. One rotational Air Force tactical fighter squadron remains in Japan and operates with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

28One U.S. MPA squadron is split between Alaska and Japan. A four-plane detachment is at Misawa.

29All Marine air would be deployed to the Gulf. Two understrength TFWs remain (48 F-15s and 48 F-16s).

30The Okinawa MEB would be deployed to the Gulf.

31One tactical fighter wing (72 F-16s) at Kunsan.

32The 2nd Infantry Division is uniquely configured for its role in Korea. It includes two brigades and a special force configured for Panamanian security.

33All permanently based U.S. forces have been removed from Korea. One rotational Air Force tactical fighter squadron remains in Korea and operates with South Korean forces.

34A reduced-strength tactical fighter wing (48 F-16s) would remain in Korea.

35A U.S. Army brigade plus supporting elements would remain in Korea, along with some prepositioned equipment for an additional brigade.

36Most of MPA squadron at Cubi; the remainder on temporary deployment in the region.

37Two carrier battle groups plus escorts and underway replenishment ships. One of these groups is home-ported at various bases in the western Pacific (Yokosuka, Sasebo, Guam), and the other rotates from the West Coast of the United States. Each air wing is assumed to be a "Theodore Roosevelt" air wing: 20 F-14s, 20 F-18s, and 20 A-6s, plus supporting aircraft. Fifty percent of the time there is a CVBG in the Indian Ocean, and 50 percent of the time one is in Southeast Asian waters.

38These submarines (all SSNs) are on rotational deployment from bases in CONUS and Hawaii. At least one is normally with each battle group.

39One Marine expeditionary unit is on deployment from the 1st MEF based in CONUS, and the other is from the 3rd MEF based in Japan. Each has its own amphibious shipping.
Transit times coupled with peacetime constraints on deployment time and time away from home port result in the capability to sustain a carrier in the Indian Ocean for only 50 percent of a normal year from a total U.S. force of 12 CV/CVN.

Five SSNs would be deployed forward in the Pacific and Indian oceans from bases in Hawaii and CONUS.

One MEU would be deployed to the western Pacific from the MEF in CONUS.

The carrier battle group formerly home-ported in Japan and other western Pacific states is now home-ported in Guam. Ship repair is done in Japanese or Singapore yards.

Transit times coupled with peacetime constraints on deployment time and time away from home port result in the capability to sustain a carrier in the Indian Ocean for only 50 percent of a normal year from a total U.S. force of 12 CV/CVN.

One or two CVBGs would be deployed forward in USPACOM full time. One carrier is home-ported in Japan, and one CONUS-based carrier is deployed to cover gaps when the Japan-based carrier is in home port. Each battle group would have a "Theodore Roosevelt" air wing of 60 fighter or attack aircraft.

Although the posture emphasizes Southwest Asian presence, the five carriers assigned to USPACOM can provide only 50 percent presence in the Indian Ocean and 50 percent presence in the western Pacific.

A rotating detachment of F-16s (4–12 aircraft) at Singapore or a Thai airfield.

A rotating detachment of three MPA aircraft at Singapore, U Tapao.

A rotating squadron at various airfields in Southeast Asia. Squadron would probably be F-16s, to take advantage of widespread compatible support throughout the region.

An Air Force tactical fighter wing (72 F-15s) is based at Anderson AFB. A Marine air group comprising three fighter and attack squadrons (24 F/A-18s, 20 AV-8s, and 10 A-6s) is based at NAS Agana.

A Marine infantry regiment, including supporting elements, has been relocated from Okinawa to Saipan.

A rotational MPA squadron operates out of NAS Agana and occasionally sends a detachment to the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

Two Air Force tactical fighter squadrons and five Marine squadrons normally assigned to USCENTCOM are under CENTCOM OCON in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, aircraft normally assigned to I MEF under USCENTCOM OCON and USAF TFS in CONUS are assigned to CENTCOM.

Fleet Marine Forces Pacific supports the MEF remaining in the Gulf. Two MEUs remain in CONUS.

One VP squadron is at Masirah, Oman, and a three-aircraft detachment operates from Bahrain.
### Table B.2

Summary of PACOM Forces

<table>
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<th>Forces</th>
<th>A¹</th>
<th>B²</th>
<th>C³</th>
<th>D⁴</th>
<th>E⁵</th>
<th>F⁶</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(squadron/aircraft)</td>
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<td>10/222</td>
<td>8/174</td>
<td>14/300</td>
<td>9/198</td>
<td>13/276</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>CVBG/sea-based tactical fighters</td>
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<td>11/232</td>
<td>13/280</td>
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<td>Grand total all PACOM + earmarked forces⁹</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹Posture A is the 1991 baseline force reflected in the DoD FYDP projected to 1995. It does not reflect the congressionally mandated overall force reductions for FY 91 and the out years. The decision to remove tactical fighter aircraft from Clark ABF in 1991 is reflected for all Philippines basing options.

²Posture B is an estimated 1992 force that reflects continued force reductions resulting in a 15 percent DoD force level reduction. The estimated PACOM share of that reduction is reflected in the forces shown. This force bears a close resemblance (in total numbers) to the GLOBAL '90 forces and to those in the revised U.S. force plan (see The New York Times, August 2, 1990, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan") announced by President Bush on August 3, 1990. The distribution shown here is based on the New York Times article and the authors' estimates.

³Posture C is identical in size to Posture B but has been relocated to bases in U.S. sovereign territory, except for the small rotational deployments indicated. This is the force that would be used to execute the "mid-Pacific" strategy.

⁴Posture D is identical to Posture B. Large residual forces (below Desert Storm levels) from PACOM and other CINCs were required to deter further aggression in the Gulf.

⁵Posture E reflects a major reduction in U.S. force structure—perhaps as much as 50 percent of the FY 91 forces, although a 35 percent reduction is shown. This force posture assumes some limited foreign base access.

⁶This force is a combination of Postures D and E. It is 35 percent smaller than the baseline (Posture A) and is deployed to support the commitments in Posture D.

⁷These are the totals for all forces deployed outside the lower 48 states.

⁸These totals are for those forces in the western Pacific and Indian oceans.

⁹These totals are representative of the totals for U.S. forces under PACOM control in CONUS or earmarked for USPACOM planning for a future contingency.

¹⁰These grand totals include all USCINCPAC assigned and earmarked forces.
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