Bridge or Barrier?

Turkey and the West After the Cold War

Ian O. Lesser

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PREFACE

Turkey's central role in the war against Iraq and its continuing involvement in Middle Eastern problems have kept Turkey in the forefront of Western strategic perceptions even as its traditional role in the containment of Soviet power has evaporated. This report explores the roots of Turkey's Western orientation and the prospects for Turkish relations with Europe and the United States after the Cold War. The analysis treats political, economic, and security issues, with particular emphasis on the interrelationship of these elements and their influence on Turkey's future strategic orientation. In addition to published sources, it draws heavily on discussions with official and unofficial observers in Turkey, Europe, and the United States. Research was completed in March 1992.

Other documents in this series will examine the implications of domestic developments in Turkey, Turkey's evolving role in Central Asia and the Middle East, and Turkey in the Balkans. These studies, together with a forthcoming integrating report, document research on "Turkey's Future Strategic Orientation: Implications for U.S. Interests and Policy," a study conducted jointly under the National Security Strategies Program of Project AIR FORCE, and under the Strategy and Doctrine Program of the Army Research Division's Arroyo Center. Project AIR FORCE and the Arroyo Center are two of RAND's federally funded research and development centers. The specific sponsors are United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and the Air Staff (AF/XOXXE), and the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DAMI/FII).

SUMMARY

Turkey's role in the war against Iraq and its potential as a leading actor in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Black Sea, and Central Asia have kept Turkey in the strategic front rank even as its traditional role in the containment of Soviet power has waned. The reassertion of Turkey's strategic importance in Middle Eastern rather than European terms will challenge established images of Turkey's role in Ankara and the West. As Turkey develops its post–Cold War foreign and security policy and contemplates new risks and areas of opportunity, the traditional notion of Turkey as a *bridge* between East and West will be strongly tested. The history and character of Turkey's relations with Europe and the Middle East suggest that the country's role as a *bridge* in political, economic, and security terms lies in its potential. It is not an automatic result of Turkey's geographical position between East and West.

TURKEY AND EUROPE

Turkey's basic Western orientation will almost certainly hold in the wake of the October 1991 elections. The political, economic, and strategic elites remain firmly wedded to the Western-looking Ataturkist tradition. Yet, the prospects for Turkey "joining" Europe in the formal, institutional sense (i.e., becoming a full member of the European Community [EC] and the Western European Union [WEU]) remain poor even in the wake of Turkey's strong pro-Western stance during the Gulf war. To the extent that the EC expands but continues to exclude Turkey, the political consequences of Europe's arm's-length approach to Turkey will deepen. Above all, the longer-term prospects for Turkey in Europe will be influenced by the character of the West's relations with the Islamic world as a whole.

THE SECURITY DIMENSION

The prospects for full Turkish participation in emerging security arrangements in Europe, and specifically the Western European Union, are poor. As Europe moves toward a common foreign and security policy, it will be less willing to accept the burden of a direct exposure in the Middle East, which full Turkish membership in the EC or WEU would bring. Thus, Turkey will continue to share with the United States a pronounced stake in the viability of NATO as a link

to the European security order. Moreover, Turkey stands outside the process of Europeanization characteristic of the rest of NATO's southern allies, and risks increasing isolation within the Southern Region and the Alliance as a whole. The tendency to consider Turkey's post–Cold War strategic importance largely in Middle Eastern and Central Asian terms reinforces this trend toward distinctiveness. In this context, and as a result of the Gulf experience, Turkish observers are increasingly concerned about the predictability of NATO's security guarantee.

Even prior to the Gulf crisis, Ankara's defense policy was being revised to reflect perceived risks emanating from the Middle East, in particular the expansion of conventional and unconventional arsenals on Turkey's borders. This process of revision, together with the modernization and streamlining of the Turkish armed forces, has been given new impetus by the Gulf experience. Modernization (including the acquisition of additional armaments transferred to Turkey as a result of the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] agreement) and reorganization will yield forces with greater mobility and offensive power, affecting the military balance and strategic perceptions in the Balkans and the Aegean as well in the Middle East.

TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

Despite the continuing risk of confrontation over Cyprus, Aegean issues, and ethnic frictions in Thrace, the end of the Cold War has altered the balance of incentives for Ankara and Athens as both parties seek to promote good relations with Washington and Brussels. As NATO moves through a period of uncertainty, the idea that Turkish involvement in the EC and the WEU could serve to anchor and stabilize Turkish-Greek relations could gain momentum. Should Turkey remain isolated from the process of European integration, the outlook for peaceful relations in the Aegean (and in the Balkans as a whole) will worsen. The prospects for recapturing the spirit of the 1988 Davos meetings and reinvigorating Turkish-Greek détente will turn on the development of confident political leadership in both countries.

TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES

Frustration with Turkey's exclusion from Europe will lend greater significance to the bilateral relationship with the United States. Even as Turkey pursues new initiatives in the Black Sea and elsewhere, Ankara will continue to look to the United States for strategic reassurance, political support, and economic cooperation. Bilateral

relations will also be subject to closer political scrutiny in the wake of Turkey's (domestically) controversial stance in the Gulf. The "window" for a formal expansion of defense cooperation has almost certainly closed—if it was ever open—and the United States can expect a more reserved, conservative approach to security issues, including access to Turkish facilities and air space for non-NATO purposes. Overall, Ankara will seek a more diversified "strategic relationship" featuring increased trade, investment, and defense-industrial cooperation. Given existing sensitivities to Turkey's human rights record, the longer-term prospects for bilateral and multilateral relations will be strongly influenced by the evolution of Turkish policy toward the Kurds and the increasingly violent insurgency in southeast Anatolia.

Notwithstanding the risk of conflict between Turkey and Greece, U.S. and Turkish interests are likely to remain broadly congruent as long as Ankara does not begin to view Europe as an active opponent in key areas such as the Balkans and Central Asia.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

- The United States, as a global power, can and should strive to promote the strategic importance of Turkey in Europe as well as in Central Asia and the Middle East.
- The United States need not press Ankara for a formal expansion of defense cooperation which would, in any case, present formidable problems of political acceptance. New security initiatives involving Turkey should be pursued in a *multilateral* context as a contribution to Turkey's importance in Europe, political acceptance in Ankara, and transatlantic burdensharing. More generally, the United States should work to dispel Turkish doubts about the solidity of the NATO guarantee and the emergence of a "gray area" (i.e., not in-area, not out-of-area) debate about Turkey within the Alliance. The maintenance of a permanent land-based U.S. tactical air presence in the Southern Region will contribute directly to the reassurance of Turkey.
- The longer-term interests of both the United States and Turkey will be served by the development of a more mature and diversified relationship in which security assistance of the traditional sort is accompanied by an expansion of political and economic ties.
- Consideration should be given to the potential role of Turkey as a conduit for Western aid to the southern republics of the former

Soviet Union. Similarly, the United States should lend active political support to Ankara's proposals for Black Sea economic cooperation.

- Finally, the United States should continue to play an active role in promoting a Cyprus settlement, as circumstances allow (that is, if the political situation in Ankara and Athens creates the basic conditions for progress), both as a contribution to resolving the dispute itself and as tangible evidence of a continuing interest in the Aegean balance.

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1. INTRODUCTION

With the revolutionary developments in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the transformation of East-West relations, many observers in Turkey and the West anticipated that Turkey would be a leading casualty of strategic neglect after the Cold War. Events in the Persian Gulf have returned Turkey to the strategic front rank, but the longer-term implications of developments in Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East for Turkey's interests and geopolitical orientation are less clear. The reassertion of Turkey's importance in terms of Middle Eastern rather than European security, in particular, will challenge established images of Turkey's role in Washington, Brussels, and Ankara.

Turks inside and outside the government are increasingly resigned to Turkey's exclusion—at least in the near- to mid-term—from the formal process of European integration, including the development of a European defense identity. But Turkey retains a strong interest in the European connection for political, economic, and security reasons. Beyond this, the Turkish elite remains firmly committed to the Western-looking Ataturkist tradition in cultural and intellectual terms. On a more practical level, frustration with Turkey's limited role in Europe has encouraged Turks to turn to alternative outlets for international activism in the republics of the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, and (perhaps with greater reservation in the wake of the Gulf war) the Middle East. The extraordinary flux in the strategic environment as a whole is encouraging the most active reassessment of Turkey's external interests and policies since the establishment of the Turkish republic. Long-standing assumptions, including the Ataturkist dictates concerning non-intervention and the primacy of relations with Europe, are subject to increasingly critical examination.

The elections of October 1991 swept President Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party from power, leaving doubt as to Ozal's own political future. Any assessment closely following the election must of necessity be a tentative one. Nonetheless, the coalition of nationalists and social democrats led by Suleyman Demirel's conservative True Path Party is unlikely to result in a radical reorientation of Turkish foreign and security policy. But certain trends already evident prior to the elections, notably a growing sensitivity to issues of sovereignty, a tougher approach to the Kurdish insurgency (accompanied by a sur-

prisingly flexible attitude on Kurdish cultural and social questions), and renewed rigidity on the Cyprus question, can be expected to solidify.[1] The coalition government has already surprised many observers with its active overtures in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and around the Black Sea. Developments in the Balkans are creating the conditions for a similar assertion of Turkish interests in that region. An activist stance toward any or all of these areas could have important implications for the character of Turkey's relations with Europe and the United States. The character and substance of Turkey's Western orientation, although not in doubt, will be influenced by changing Turkish perceptions of risk and opportunity. Moreover, Demirel and other mainstream politicians are likely to adopt a more conservative approach to relations with the United States on security matters in the wake of the Gulf experience.[2]

The following analysis explores the "longer-term" prospects for Turkey and the West. Specific issues to be addressed include the relevance of traditional notions regarding Turkey as a bridge between East and West; the prospects for Turkey in Europe, including relations in the Aegean; Turkey's strategic position and Alliance relations; and the outlook for bilateral relations with the United States. Finally, some conclusions and implications for U.S. policy are offered. A central theme, throughout, is that Turkey's future external orientation will not be developed in a vacuum. It will emerge, at least in part, in response to U.S. and European policy. As many Turks will readily admit, "strategy toward Turkey is too important to be left to Turkey alone."

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[1]An early glimpse of the Demirel government's views on external and security issues can be found in the text of the foreign policy section of the prime minister's news conference of December 11, 1991. See "Demirel's Comments on Foreign Policy Reported," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, December 18, 1991, p. 44.

[2]See Chris Hedges, "Results of Turkey's Election May Mean Basic Policy Shifts," *New York Times*, November 18, 1991; "The Blur in Turkey," and "Turkey Steps back to Demirel," *The Economist*, October 26, 1991.

2. BRIDGE OR BARRIER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

DIVERGENT IMAGES

The notion of Turkey as a bridge between East and West is a pervasive theme among the political and economic elite in Turkey and sympathetic observers elsewhere. Geographically, of course, Turkey straddles Europe and Asia. In cultural terms as well, modern Turkey is very much a product of both Eastern and Western influences. As Turks are quick to point out, Westernization in Turkey is not simply a product of Ataturkism. It is much older and can be observed, for example, in the Byzantine influences on Ottoman society.

In political, economic, and strategic terms, Turkey will continue to be a potentially important actor in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. But does this make Turkey a natural bridge between Europe and the Middle East, and does it give Turkey a special role and status? Physically and philosophically, Turkey has the potential to act as a bridge between these regions, but this role is not automatic and requires critical examination.[1] The history of Ottoman rule and the more recent experience of Turkish cooperation with Western aims in the Middle East encourage an arm's-length relationship between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbors. Economic and resource interests (food, water, and oil) might favor the development of closer relations, as they did prior to the Gulf crisis, but these issues could just as easily emerge as causes of friction. Turkey is clearly linked to the Arab world through Islam, but even here Turkey's secular orientation sets it apart. A growing role for Islam in Turkish society and politics—and Turkey has become more overtly "religious" over the past two decades—might reinvigorate these ties, but would risk an equivalent estrangement from the West.[2]

The Turkish elite's keen awareness of Turkey's long involvement in European affairs, indeed its role as part of the European system, is

[1]A geopolitical analysis of Turkey's position in Europe and Asia is offered in Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 42–48.

[2]The increasing prominence of religion in Turkish society can be seen in the growth of religious schools and organizations, more frequent references to Islam as a component of civil and private life, and such visible manifestations as the growing popularity of headscarves for women in urban areas (the later is attributable, at least in part, to the influx of rural population to Istanbul and Ankara).

only dimly reflected in prevailing European attitudes. The Europeans with the most highly developed sense of Turkey's historical involvement in Europe are to be found in the Balkans, and here the experience has left a negative legacy. With the significant exception of Turkey's role in blocking Russian and later Soviet ambitions in the Balkans and the Caucasus, Europe has traditionally been far more concerned with constructing barriers to Turkish power and influences on the continent than with engaging Turkey as a strategic bridge between East and West. Yet, Turkey has been an active participant in European alliance systems: with France in the 16th century; with Britain, France, and Italy during the Crimean War; and with the central powers during World War I. Turkish participation in NATO may be considered an extension of this experience. The Turkish elite's view of this history is clearly framed in European terms.[3] An alternative interpretation would view much of this experience, certainly that of the 15th through 18th centuries, in terms of Turkish participation in a Mediterranean rather than European security system.[4]

As the half-century imperative of containing Soviet power wanes, Europe has lost a great deal of its interest in the strategic engagement of Turkey. Indeed, as Europe looks to the creation of its own defense identity, there is a risk that Turkey will be seen as a strategic and political liability: a strategic liability because of its complex and immediate security concerns; a political liability because of its position outside the European Community and its close bilateral relationship with the United States.[5]

With regard to contemporary security problems in the Middle East, Turkey is again more likely to be seen as a barrier to extra-European turmoil and military threats than as an agent for dialogue. Only in the more limited sense of Turkey's role as a model for political and economic development in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union does the notion of Turkey as a bridge have much resonance in

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[3]"Turkey, even at its lowest ebb, was never called the 'Sick Man of Asia.'" From the text of a speech delivered by then Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz to the Twelfth Conference of Directors and Representatives of the European Institutes of International Relations, Istanbul, June 1–2, 1989, published in *Dis Politika* (Quarterly Review of the Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara), Vol. 14, Nos. 3–4.

[4]The clash of Spanish and Ottoman power in the Mediterranean is treated extensively in Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976, first published 1949).

[5]See Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's Strategic Dilemma," paper prepared for the RAND–Instituto Affari Internazionali Conference on "The Southern Region of Europe and the Middle East: New Challenges and New Hopes," Rome, September 16–17, 1991.

Europe. Even there, European perceptions are not entirely to Turkey's advantage, as observers are just as likely to identify "Middle Eastern" elements in Turkey's own political situation. In this context, the deepening problem of the Kurdish insurgency in southeast Turkey is likely to exacerbate long-standing European human rights concerns. Western opinion may find it difficult to reconcile the growing openness on Kurdish cultural issues (a trend begun by Ozal and continuing under Demirel) with Ankara's increasingly aggressive response to Kurdish separatism.

A related argument finds the concept of a bridge unconvincing because the Turks themselves are not in a position to fully understand both Europe and the Middle East as a result of their ambiguous history of involvement in both regions.[6] Although there is undoubtedly some truth in this assertion, it ignores the equally important question of whether Turkey's European and Middle Eastern neighbors are interested in having Turkey as an interlocutor. In addition to being a NATO member, Turkey is a full participant in both the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) and the Council of Europe.[7] The character of these memberships is often used to support the argument that Turkey plays a unique bridging role between Europe and the Arab world. In truth, membership in these organizations has not greatly enhanced the understanding of Turkey in Europe or the Middle East.[8] The importance of these associations may rest, above all, on their ability to reassure Turkish elites and, in the case of NATO and the Council of Europe, lend an international imprimatur to the process of democratization in Turkey. Finally, the notion of a bridge suggests a country balanced between East and West. In fact, Turkish attitudes remain heavily weighted toward the Western political and economic system, to the extent that "alternative" opportunities in the Middle East and around the Black Sea are often promoted as vehicles for increasing Turkey's value to Europe and the United States.[9]

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[6]Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 14.

[7]The ICO has been the forum for recent criticism of Turkey's cross-border operations against the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). See "Cross Border Attacks Continue: ICO Reacts," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, August 22, 1991, p. 45. The Council of Europe has been a center of European debate on Turkey's human rights record.

[8]Robins, p. 14.

[9]See for example, Soreyya Yocel Ozden, "Turkey as a Gateway to Eastern European Markets," paper prepared for the Annual Conference of the Turkish-U.S. Business Council, New York, October 30–November 1, 1991; and the speech by President Ozal, stressing opportunities in the Balkans and the Black Sea, presented to this conference on October 31, 1991.

THE BLACK SEA INITIATIVE AS A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BRIDGE

The pursuit of regional cooperation initiatives has emerged as an important foreign policy trend across southern Europe. Turkey has made a substantial contribution to this trend through its proposal for a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project, aimed at the gradual establishment of a free trade zone among the states surrounding the Black Sea. The idea for a Black Sea initiative had been discussed by leading figures outside the government for some time, but was taken up with considerable vigor by President Ozal early in 1990 and given prominence in his discussions with President Bush and President Gorbachev over the course of 1991. Initial priorities include the establishment of more favorable conditions for trade and investment among the littoral states, improvements in communications and infrastructure, and administrative reforms aimed at encouraging commercial contacts. A Black Sea development bank is also under consideration.[10] The first meeting to discuss the Black Sea project was held in Ankara in December 1990, with the participation of Soviet, Turkish, Romanian, and Bulgarian representatives. Subsequent meetings were held in Bucharest and Sofia; principles of cooperation were finalized in Moscow in July 1991 and initialed in Istanbul on January 3, 1992.[11] Six republics of the former Soviet Union have expressed interest in joining the initiative.[12]

The Black Sea project builds on a rapidly expanding volume of Turkish trade and investment across the Black Sea, embracing Moscow and the republics. Turkish enterprises, led by the construction and pharmaceutical industries, have been particularly active in developing commercial ties in those republics with large Turkic populations, but their activities have not been confined to these areas.[13] Turkish involvement has expanded in the southern republics with the support of Moscow, where it has emerged as an attractive secular alternative to the fundamentalist model offered by Iran.[14]

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[10]See Sukru Elekdag, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region Project," draft paper for *Turkish Economy and Dialogue*, May 1991.

[11]"Agreement Reached on Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, July 16, 1991, p. 42; and "Ozal Opens Meeting on Black Sea Cooperation," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, February 4, 1992.

[12]Speech by President Ozal to the Annual Conference of the Turkish-U.S. Business Council, New York, October 31, 1991.

[13]The volume of two-way trade with the Soviet Union as a whole grew dramatically, from $477 million in 1987 to roughly $3 billion in 1991.

[14]See M. Ali Birand, "An Important USSR Request from Anakara," *Milliyet* (Istanbul), in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, September 27, 1991, p. 27.

In strategic terms, the initiative, together with economic and political overtures to Central Asia, has emerged as the centerpiece of Ankara's efforts to develop a more active external policy after the Cold War. The project is not dependent on relations in Europe or across the Atlantic, although if successful it could raise the value of Turkey to its Western partners. A leading architect of the Black Sea project regards it as perhaps Turkey's first independent regional initiative in 50 years, and one with potentially important security as well as economic and political consequences.[15] Turkish officials have also stressed the ability of the project to improve Turkey's longer-term prospects for European Community (EC) membership. At a practical level, and after some hesitation, the initiative has been welcomed in Washington and Brussels as an attractive way of engaging the Black Sea republics without obviously undercutting Moscow. With its relatively good infrastructure, Turkey could prove a most effective conduit for direct U.S. and EC aid to the southern republics.[16] In some quarters, the Black Sea project has also been seen as welcome evidence that Ankara is developing interests beyond the difficult issue of EC membership. Finally, active cooperation around the Black Sea centered on Ankara could serve as a counterweight to Greek influence (and the emerging Athens-Sofia axis) in the Balkans and enhance Turkey's position as a regional economic power.[17] Potential impediments to progress in Black Sea cooperation along the lines proposed by Turkey could arise from more serious turmoil in the former Soviet Union affecting the Black Sea republics, or political paralysis in Turkey itself might inhibit an active policy toward the region.

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[15]Elekdag, p. 8.

[16]I am grateful to RAND colleague Paul Henze for this suggestion. The large amount of aid shipped via Turkish airfields as part of "Operation Provide Hope" in February 1992 reinforces this point.

[17]Jonathan Eyal, "Ozal Aims to Revive Turkish Power," *The Guardian*, April 21, 1991. See also Daniel N. Nelson, "North from the Bosporus: Turkey's Relations with the USSR," *National Interest*, Spring 1990. On strategic cooperation between Greece and Bulgaria, see Paul Anastasi, "Greek-Bulgarian Tactics for Turkey," *New York Times*, February 7, 1991.

3. TURKEY AND EUROPE

The prospects for Turkey joining Europe in the institutional sense, that is, becoming a full member of the European Community (EC) and the Western European Union (WEU), remain poor. Ironically, the prospects for Turkish membership in both organizations are probably worse today than before the Gulf crisis. Events in the Gulf, and Turkey's essential role in the allied coalition, have reinforced the belief, widespread among European policy elites, that Turkey is indeed an important and dependable *Middle Eastern* ally. As the EC explores the development of a common foreign and security policy, it will be increasingly unwilling to accept the additional burden of a direct exposure in the Middle East—particularly in the wake of the Gulf experience. Many Turkish observers are aware of these new obstacles, but persevere in the belief that Turkey will nonetheless be a participant in the general process of European integration short of full membership.[1]

TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

In December 1989, The European Commission, in a move endorsed by the European Council of Ministers, declined to open negotiations on Turkey's 1987 application for full membership. In deferring the Turkish application until 1993 at the earliest, the Commission pointed to the extent of the challenges facing both parties: Turkey's low level of economic development by EC standards (almost half the per capita gross domestic product [GDP] of the EC's poorest countries, despite growth rates averaging over 5 percent throughout the 1980s, well above EC norms); its high rate of population growth (roughly 2.5 percent annually, ten times the EC average) with the prospect of 70 million Turks by the end of the century, compared to a population of some 330 million in an EC of its current size; long-term foreign debt of $38 billion, the world's seventh highest; low tax revenue and high state expenditure (over twice the EC average); and a state-owned sec-

[1]A recent study entitled "Turkey in the Year 2020," sponsored and published by *Cumhuriyet*, surveyed the opinions of 32 leading members of the Turkish political and intellectual elite on a range of issues, including the prospects for Turkey in Europe. The results suggest a solid consensus on the durability of Turkey's Western orientation. Only a third of the participants thought that Turkey would be a member of the EC by 2020. "Intellectuals View Future of Economy, Regime," *Cumhuriyet*, March 26–30, April 2–5 and 9–13, 1991, published in full in *FBIS-West Europe Report (Supplement)*, June 25, 1991.

tor accounting for 40 percent of manufacturing output, despite Ozal's privatization campaign. To this daunting catalog, one might add an inflation rate of roughly 70 percent in the second half of 1991. Turkey is, however, one of the world's most favored agricultural producers. Turkish membership would increase the Community's usable agricultural area by 22 percent and double European output in a variety of important products. In short, even the positive sides of the Turkish situation would pose considerable problems of adjustment for the Community, not least the prospect of the free movement of Turkish labor at a time when immigration policy has emerged as a pressing issue across Europe.[2]

The issue of EC membership is only partly about the economic consequences of extension for Turkey and Europe. Far more significant in the current debate are the political and strategic implications of full membership, the awkward cultural question of how Europe should be defined, and whether it should be defined at all. The fundamental issue for many Europeans is whether Europe can or should embrace an Islamic country of 57 million. Significantly, the issue is being posed at a time of mounting intolerance and xenophobia in Western Europe, much of it directed against Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey. Even on strict geographic grounds, the Turkish foot on the European continent is outweighed in European perception by the sheer size and political and economic weight of Anatolian Turkey. Former Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz's comment that "Europe is a state of mind, not an arbitrary line drawn down the Bosporus" is a very accurate reflection of elite attitudes in Turkey; most Europeans would agree, but would return to the question of cultural differences.[3]

Historically, Turkey has been part of the European and Mediterranean economic systems. The main trading partners of the Ottoman Empire were European, whether Venetian, Ragusan, Genoese, or English.[4] After the nineteenth century, these were dependent relationships, but prior to that point they were conducted essentially on an equal footing. Although Turkey is in the current European economic system, it is not in the European mainstream, a

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[2]See Jasper Mortimer, "Please Let Us In, We Promise We'll Behave," *The Middle East*, January 1989; and by the same author "No Room in Europe," *The Middle East*, February 1990. See also Stephen Hugh-Jones, "Turkey: Half Inside, Half Out," *The Economist*, June 18, 1988; "Are Its Goals in Europe Being Ignored, Turkey Asks," *New York Times*, December 12, 1989; and Edward Mortimer, "Problem Awaiting a Solution," *Financial Times*, May 8, 1991.

[3]M. Yilmaz, "Turkish Foreign Policy," *Dis Politika*, Vol. 14, Nos. 3–4, p. 13.

[4]The history of these trading relationships is described at length in Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.*

situation reinforced by the marked westward drift of the European economic center since 1945. Its position on the European periphery hinders communication with the rest of Europe, although this is undoubtedly a declining bar to economic relations in many areas (e.g., access to financial markets). Moreover, being outside the European mainstream is not unique to Turkey. Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and, to an even greater extent, the Balkan countries confront the same situation. In this context, it is worth speculating on the long-term consequences of the reintegration of the East European countries, and perhaps the emergence of some of the republics of the former Soviet Union as significant economic actors, for the economic balance of Europe and Turkey's position in relation to it.[5] The notion of Turkey as a bridge between East and West may well be more convincing in the economic than the political context. Turkish initiatives in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, including the ambitious plan for a Black Sea economic zone, could make Turkey a more promising economic partner for Europe, regardless of EC status.

From a strictly practical point of view, the essential economic objective for Turkey is not EC membership per se, but assured access to the European market. Less tangible, but critical from the Turkish perspective, are the symbolic value of EC membership and its domestic and external political consequences. Full membership would confirm and reinvigorate the Western-looking Ataturkist tradition and give a valuable external imprimatur to the democratic process in Turkey. It would also provide a strong context for Turkish foreign and security policy at a time of strategic flux. The incentives for Turkey are elegantly summarized in Professor Seyfi Tashan's observation that "NATO is our legal foot in the Western camp, but the EC is the real one."[6]

The European Commission's 1989 decision rules out the possibility of full membership in the near term. The longer-term prospects for membership will be shaped not only by economic and political developments in Turkey but by the evolution of the EC itself. An EC of roughly the current size and composition, giving priority to the deepening of existing institutions and arrangements, is unlikely to encourage the formal integration of Turkey. On the other hand, an expanded EC, having embraced the European Free Trade Association

[5]Eberhard Rhein, "Turkey and the New Europe," remarks presented at a conference organized by the *International Herald Tribune*, Istanbul, November 14, 1990, p. 10.

[6]Seyfi Tashan is president of the Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara. Quoted in *The Economist*, June 18, 1988, p. 29.

(EFTA) countries and perhaps some of the countries of Eastern Europe, may be more amenable to Turkish membership. In October 1991, Turkey concluded a free trade and cooperation agreement with EFTA. Together with the EC's recent decision to include the EFTA countries in its conception of the post-1992 European economic space, the new agreement will contribute significantly to Turkey's integration in the European economic system.[7] If formal expansion of the EC into Eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans, does not lead to more active consideration of the Turkish application, Turkish frustration and resentment are bound to increase.

From the Turkish perspective, the EC Commission's assessment of Turkey's economic position reflects an overly "static" approach. Critics of the Commission's opinion charge that it fails to reflect the dynamic quality of Turkey's economic, industrial, and social evolution, and neglects the rapidly narrowing gap between the EC and Turkey. Moreover, it is argued that similar disparities existed at the start of accession negotiations with Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The EC's failure to establish even an approximate date for the opening of accession negotiations is seen as a particularly discouraging indication of the Community's intentions.[8]

Indefinite postponement of the Turkish application has, however, been accompanied by a commitment from Brussels to revitalize economic cooperation under the existing Association Agreement, including completion of the customs union between the EC and Turkey by 1995, release of assistance funds earmarked for Turkey (distribution of which continues to be blocked by Greece pending progress on the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Cyprus), and the expansion of joint programs in science and technology and education.[9] To the extent that Turkey's application is taken seriously in Brussels, there has been considerable confusion over the meaning and implications of recent Turkish trade initiatives. The notion of a free-trade agreement with the United States, however unlikely, and elements of the Black Sea program are regarded as incompatible with full Turkish membership in the Community. Indeed, these initiatives might conflict with arrangements to which Turkey has already committed itself under

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[7]"Trade Cooperation Agreement Signed With EFTA," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, October 18, 1991, p. 4.

[8]Ali Bozer, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Changing World," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Summer 1990, pp. 17–18.

[9]See John Murray Brown, "Turkey, EC in New Push for Customs Union," *Financial Times*, December 6, 1991, p. 3.

the Association Agreement, not least the establishment of a full customs union.[10]

PROSPECTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The likelihood that Turkey will be excluded from efforts to construct a European defense identity (with an operational dimension) around the WEU has emerged as a more disturbing prospect for Ankara than the broader problem of exclusion from the EC.[11] President Ozal had expressed his dissatisfaction with Turkey's observer status in the WEU, asserting that Turkey cannot be expected to play its traditionally strong role in defense of the continent if it is unable to "participate fully in the making of the new Europe."[12] Uncertainty about the future role and significance of NATO will reinforce Turkish interests in emerging European defense arrangements. Turkish exclusion from these arrangements, regardless of their precise form, would be understood in Ankara as a demonstration of Europe's unwillingness to grant Turkey a legitimate security role on the continent.

The denial of a formal role would, in the Turkish view, ignore centuries of involvement in European security affairs. The fact that the Turkish role has more often been that of an adversary than an ally does not change the fact that Turkey's involvement has been of great importance to the European balance in the past (does the history of Franco-German enmity argue against the participation of either country in the WEU?). The reemergence of the Balkans as a center of European security concerns reinforces the relevance of this history.[13]

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[10]The original Association Agreement, concluded in 1963, envisioned a three-stage movement toward full membership over 25 years. The agreement is now in its second or "transitional" stage. The stagnation of Turkish-EC relations in the 1970s, and efforts to revitalize these ties in the late 1970s and again following the return to civilian rule in 1983, are described in Ismail Erturk, "Turkey and the European Community," *International Relations*, November 1984. See also David Barchard, "Turkey and Europe," *Turkish Review*, Autumn 1989.

[11]Turkey applied for full membership in the WEU in 1987; its application is being held under "active consideration." A special consultative mechanism has been established whereby the country holding the WEU presidency is empowered to act as a liaison with Ankara.

[12]Speech to the Western European Union, Paris, June 5, 1991; quoted in Reuters. On the WEU role in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern security, see Roberto Aliboni, *European Security Across the Mediterranean* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1991).

[13]See Charles Eliot, *Turkey in Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 1965).

Turkey's concerns about its role in future European defense arrangements have been of two sorts: The broader fear of a security future cast largely in extra-European terms, and the narrower concern that the European security umbrella would be extended to Greece but would exclude Turkey, with serious implications for stability in the Aegean. In this context, former Foreign Minister Safa Giray declared that "EC efforts to add a military dimension to the goal of geopolitical union should not undermine the balances among the countries that play a role in this."[14] Clearly, the WEU's concern about the risks involved in embracing Turkey have also affected debate on the Greek application, but not to the extent of excluding Greece from full participation, as the Maastricht decision to offer full membership to Athens made clear.[15] Those European countries that wish to move quickly toward a common foreign and security policy will wish to defer difficult membership decisions. The most recent Franco-German proposal for European defense cooperation, in calling for the expansion of the WEU to include Denmark, Ireland, and Greece, and the adoption of this approach at Maastricht, will reinforce Turkish concerns about exclusion from the emerging European security order.[16] If, as seems likely, the EC embraces the WEU as its security arm, or co-opts it altogether, the prospects for formal Turkish participation in European defense arrangements will almost certainly evaporate. On the other hand, a more confident WEU might well seek to bolster existing consultative arrangements with Ankara. The decision to offer Turkey associate status in the WEU, while far from ideal from Ankara's perspective, is evidence of this. Broader cooperation between Turkey and the EC on foreign policy matters might also be encouraged by giving Turkey a role in European Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanisms.

In the wake of Turkey's strong pro-Western stance during the Gulf crisis, the outlook for Turkish participation in the security dimension of European integration, like the outlook for formal participation in the process of economic integration, is no brighter than before. The reassertion of Turkey's strategic importance for Western interests in

[14]"Giray Views of EC Moves for Military Union," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, October 24, 1991, p. 28.

[15]The results of the December 1991 Maastricht summit are widely interpreted as a setback for Turkish ambitions in Europe. See Sami Kohen, "Inauspicious for Turkey," *Milliyet* (Istanbul), December 12, 1991, in "Commentary on Decisions Reached at Maastricht," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, December 18, 1991, p. 49.

[16]The alternative Anglo-Italian proposal preserves a leading role for NATO and insists on the full participation of non-EC NATO members in new European security arrangements.

the Middle East has given new momentum to Turkey's transatlantic relations, but has failed to produce a similar effect in Turkey's relations with the EC and the WEU.[17]

BILATERAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE

Turkey's institutional difficulties in Europe are exacerbated by, and to an extent derive from, a lack of solid bilateral support. Not all of the friction between Turkey and Europe at the bilateral level stems from the Greek-Turkish dispute and the unresolved problem of Cyprus. Indeed, many Turkish observers will agree that Greece does not represent the only or even the most important opponent to Turkey in Europe.

Turkish-German relations provide the leading example of the difficulty of relations with Europe at the bilateral level. Germany is Turkey's largest trading partner. Both countries share a history of active economic, political, and strategic cooperation dating to the nineteenth century.[18] This background, together with the presence of roughly 1.5 million Turkish workers in Germany, complicates Turkish-German relations, raising expectations but also producing a certain wariness on both sides. The reluctant German response to Turkish requests for assistance and reinforcement from NATO during the Gulf crisis has left a negative impression on Turkish opinion, an impression that has not been erased by subsequent contributions. Eighteen German Alpha jets were eventually deployed to Erhac and Diyarbakir as part of the AMF–A (Allied Mobile Force–Air) reinforcements.[19] The swiftness of German assistance to Kurdish refugees in Iran only reinforced the impression in Ankara that the German problem was less the propriety of action outside NATO's Central Region than a reluctance to commit forces in Turkey's defense. German behavior is particularly troubling for Turks because it calls into question the solidity of the NATO security guarantee to Turkey in the wake of the Gulf experience. Ozal's pointed remarks on the German response may contain an element of crisis-induced exaggeration and rhetoric, but there can be little doubt that they reflect an

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[17]Sezer, "Turkey's Strategic Dilemma," p. 20.

[18]A notable period in this history is addressed in E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway* (New York: Macmillan, 1924).

[19]Germany also provided air defense equipment and deployed a large portion of its navy to the Mediterranean in support of coalition operations; see Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," *Survival*, May/June 1991, p. 251.

acute and continuing sense of frustration over German policy and attitudes.[20]

German public and official opinion has been among the most sensitive in Europe on the issue of Ankara's human rights record in general and the Kurdish problem in particular. As the insurgency in the southeast has intensified, criticism of Turkish policy, and especially the cross-border operations against the PKK, has increased. In the winter of 1991–1992, a portion of German military credits to Turkey was placed on hold pending the resolution of questions concerning the use of German-financed equipment in raids against Kurdish separatists.[21] Turkish officials, for their part, have been highly critical of Bonn's tolerant attitude toward the activities of Kurdish political organizations in Germany. Overall, the apparent indifference of German politicians and press toward the new government's more direct treatment of human rights and Kurdish issues has come as a keen disappointment to the Turkish political and economic elite.[22] The deterioration of bilateral relations with Germany suggests that the Demirel government's more liberal approach on human rights matters will not necessarily clear the way for closer relations with Europe if the Kurdish insurgency continues to escalate and perhaps develops an urban dimension.

Germany is widely viewed as the one country that could successfully promote Turkey's application for membership in the EC. The fact that German policymakers have been unwilling to do so has reinforced the Turkish sense of frustration over German policy. The principal German concern in this context has been the prospect of additional Turkish migrants in Germany if all restrictions on the movement of labor were to be removed. Indeed, the future of the 1.5 million Turks in Germany is set to emerge as an even more pressing issue in bilateral relations as migrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union begin to compete with Turks in the German labor market and as the general climate facing foreigners in Germany deteriorates. The return of substantial numbers of guest workers to Turkey, as a result of official policy or disinclination to remain in Germany, would pose serious problems for Ankara. Turkish workers

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[20]In an interview of January 24, 1991, broadcast on German television, Ozal termed Germany "an unreliable NATO ally" that had been protected by the Alliance for forty years and was "now unwilling to stand by Turkey in its time of need." Ozal went on to note the role of German firms in supplying chemicals to Iraq. BBC World Service, January 24, 1991.

[21]*Briefing* (Ankara), December 23, 1991, p. 10.

[22]"Kurdish Issue Raises Tension in Turkish Ties," *Frankfurter Allgemeine,* December 9, 1991, in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, December 26, 1991, p. 8.

abroad come from predominantly rural and religious backgrounds, and many have developed fundamentalist inclinations in response to their marginal position in German society (fundamentalist groups, Kurdish nationalists, and others have been able to organize and operate with greater ease in emigre communities than in Turkey). Their return would introduce a body of unemployed and dissatisfied younger people into the Turkish political equation and perhaps strengthen the position of the religious right. The loss of foreign remittances would have an adverse effect on the Turkish economy.[23]

Germany has been a leading source of foreign investment in Turkey, and by far the largest source of tourist revenues.[24] Turkish investment in Germany has also been substantial. The prospects for increased German investment and aid to Turkey will undoubtedly be limited by the rise of competing outlets for financial attention in eastern Germany and Eastern Europe.

France, with its long tradition of support for Greece, a highly politicized immigration problem, and its preference for rapid integration within the existing EC, is unlikely to emerge as a champion of Turkish membership in Europe. Italy and Spain could play a helpful role on the issue of Turkish membership and improved EC-Turkish relations in general.[25] Certainly, the prompt Italian response to Turkish needs during the Gulf crisis has been noted in Ankara.[26] The concept of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) for the Mediterranean or "CSCM" promoted by Italy and Spain could provide a useful vehicle for Turkish participation in a framework that is neither too European nor too Middle Eastern.[27] To date, however, CSCM has not evoked much more than passing in-

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[23]Workers remittances totaled over $3 billion in 1989. International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments Statistics: Yearbook* (Washington: IMF, 1989).

[24]Germany currently accounts for slightly over ten percent of foreign investment in Turkey, ranking fourth after Britain, Switzerland, and the United States. Germany accounted for over 18 percent of foreign arrivals in Turkey in 1990. *Turkey 1991: An International Comparison* (Istanbul: Foreign Economic Relations Board, 1991).

[25]Portugal has adopted a less enthusiastic attitude to Turkish membership and EC enlargement in general. Portugal has expressed its particular concern about competition from the Turkish textile industry, and worries about the diversion of EC development assistance funds from southern Europe. See David Buchan, "Greek Veto on EC Aid to Turkey," *Financial Times*, March 5, 1991.

[26]Italy deployed six RF-104Gs to Turkey as its contribution to the AMF–Air reinforcement.

[27]See the joint "non-paper" and other documents on the CSCM concept assembled in *The Mediterranean and the Middle East After the War in the Gulf: The CSCM* (Rome: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1991).

terest in Ankara, perhaps because of the primacy Turkish policymakers place on the U.S. role in the eastern Mediterranean.

With the end of the Cold War, north-south relations in the Mediterranean have become the focus of growing debate, not only in the southern European countries but in Europe as a whole. Issues of concern include the developmental and demographic imbalance between north and south and the resulting immigration pressures, the implications of fundamentalism and political change in the Maghreb, and the continued growth of conventional and unconventional arsenals along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The debate on these security and security-related issues is taking place against a background of uncertainty on the broader question of Europe's evolving relationship with the Islamic world—including the Islamic population in Western Europe and the Balkans. It is unlikely that Turkey's relations with Europe can remain unaffected by the evolution of this broader relationship. Ozal has hinted at the risks inherent in allowing religion to drive political decisions in Europe's institutions, asserting that if Islam emerges as an overt bar to Turkey's membership in the EC or the WEU, this might drive Turkey into a closer relationship with the Middle East, encourage the spread of fundamentalism, and "send a wrong message to the rest of the Arab world."[28]

TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS

Despite broad rhetorical support in Ankara for attempts to reinvigorate the process of détente launched by Ozal and Papandreou in Davos in 1988, there has been little progress toward this goal.[29] The declining sense of political confidence within the conservative government in Athens has made it a difficult task. Equally problematic are the results of the October 1991 Turkish elections and the return of coalition government. Under these conditions, bold new initiatives in Aegean relations are unlikely. In the absence of political personalities with the confidence and freedom of action enjoyed by Ozal and Papandreou at the height of their political careers, the prospects for a sweeping improvement in Greek-Turkish relations on

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[28]Quoted in Clyde Haberman, "Turkey Remains Confident It Will Join European Community," *New York Times*, March 17, 1990.

[29]See the Joint Statement by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of January 31, 1988, summarizing agreements on political and economic relations and confidence-building measures, published in *Turkish Review*, Spring 1988.

the pattern of the extraordinary Ataturk-Venizelos détente of the interwar years must be considered small.

A full discussion of the history and points of contention in the Aegean dispute is beyond the scope of this analysis.[30] A brief list of key issues would certainly include the dispute over military and civil air traffic control zones, the delineation of sovereign rights on the continental shelf, the question of territorial waters claimed by each country, and the fortification of Greek islands in the Dodecanese and the eastern Aegean.[31] Beyond these issues is the separate but related question of the status and treatment of minorities—the residual Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul and the Turkish islands of Gokceada and Bozcaada, and the more substantial Muslim (and predominantly Turkish) minority in Greek Thrace.[32]

Above all, Turkish relations with the West have been most seriously affected by the continuing dispute over Cyprus, where the northern half of the island has been occupied by some 30,000 Turkish troops since the intervention of 1974.[33] The issue of Cyprus looms large in Greek and European perceptions and has been a consistent impediment to Turkey in its relations with the EC and the United States. In the case of the "Johnson letter" of 1964 and again with the 1974 arms embargo, the Cyprus question has led to a crisis in bilateral relations.[34] Nonetheless, Cyprus and the issue of Greek-Turkish relations in general, while relevant to Turkish domestic politics, do not occupy the attention of Turkish policymakers and elites to anything like the extent found in Athens. Ankara simply faces too many competing foreign and security policy issues. By contrast, the Cyprus dispute has enormous symbolic importance in Greek perceptions.

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[30]On the outlook for Greek-Turkish relations generally, see Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992). See also *Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1989); James Brown, *Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey—Problems, Policy Choices and Mediterranean Security* (London: Brassey's, 1991); and Dimitri Constas (ed.), *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), with contributions by Greek and Turkish authors.

[31]For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Andrew Wilson, "The Aegean Dispute," in Jonathan Alford (ed.), *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

[32]The Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul was the scene of anti-Greek demonstrations in the fall of 1991. Anti-Turkish incidents flared in Greek Thrace in the same period.

[33]A comprehensive survey of the dispute is offered in Robert McDonald, *The Problem of Cyprus*, Adelphi Paper No. 234 (London: IISS, Winter 1988/89).

[34]The "Johnson letter" of 1964 warned against a Turkish move over Cyprus, and suggested that if such a move encouraged Soviet action against Turkey, the United States and NATO might not feel obliged to respond.

Resolution of the Cyprus problem would transform the overall climate of Greek-Turkish relations and facilitate the settlement of more practical questions concerning air and sea space and resources in the Aegean.[35]

In the wake of the Gulf war, the United States adopted an active approach to the Cyprus issue, a policy that resulted in serious negotiations under United Nations auspices.[36] A September meeting in Paris between then Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz and Prime Minister Mitsotakis, although a clear display of political goodwill, failed to produce an anticipated agreement on a quadripartite conference. The leading obstacles to progress in this case appear to have been the growing wariness of Turkish Cypriots coupled with impending elections in Turkey that left Ankara with little ability to negotiate.[37] Neither a coalition government in Ankara nor a precarious conservative leadership in Athens (the New Democracy party rules with a single-seat majority) are likely to risk accusations of having "sold out" the interests of their respective communities on Cyprus. Developments in the former Soviet Union could also affect the prospects for a settlement. Should one or more of the emerging Central Asian republics recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, ending its isolation, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot policy might harden.

Finally, there is a certain amount of inertia associated with an apparently tolerable status quo. The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus both enjoy a higher standard of living than mainland Greece or Turkey. Indeed, a post-settlement Cyprus would be a prime candidate for EC membership.[38] In the absence of progress toward a Cyprus settlement, Greek opposition continues to serve as an impediment not only to Turkish membership in the EC, but also to a significant deepening of relations at the current level. As noted earlier, Greece has consistently used its veto power within

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[35]F. Stephen Larrabee, "The Southern Periphery: Greece and Turkey," in Paul S. Shoup (ed.), *Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s* (Washington D.C.: Wilson Center Press, 1990), p. 188.

[36]See Maureen Dowd, "Bush Names the Next Challenge: Cyprus," *New York Times*, July 19, 1991.

[37]See "Greek, Turkish Prime Ministers Meet in Paris," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, September 12, 1991; and Kerin Hope and John Murray Brown, "Ankara Denies Agreement to Return Territory in Cyprus," *Financial Times*, August 8, 1991.

[38]Turkish Cypriot leaders insist, however, that Cyprus can only join international organizations in which both Greece and Turkey are members. See "Denktash Calls Cyprus EC Membership Last Move," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, September 3, 1991, p. 34.

the EC to prevent the release of more than $800 million in financial assistance earmarked for Turkey in 1986, pending movement toward the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Cyprus.[39]

Opinion in Ankara regards the conservative government in Athens with some suspicion precisely because of its comparative popularity elsewhere in the West after a decade of socialist rule. In short, it is feared that the Mitsotakis government will use its support in the United States and Europe to pursue a more aggressive policy toward Turkey, including new pressure on the Turkish minority in Thrace.[40] The presence and position of this minority constitutes a leading source of risk in contemporary Greek-Turkish relations. Whereas territorial and resource disputes in the Aegean may ultimately be amenable to discourse and compromise between governments, frictions in Thrace, like those on Cyprus, are more likely to be driven by the perceptions of residents whose behavior may or may not be controllable from Ankara and Athens.

There are roughly 200,000 Muslims, mostly ethnic Turks, in Greek Thrace, a community that is growing rapidly by Greek standards. Indeed, the Greek government has sought to offset this progressive change in the ethnic balance by resettling in Thrace ethnic Greek immigrants from the Pontus region of the former Soviet Union.[41] To the extent that the Turkish minority in this economically underdeveloped region looks to Turkey as its natural protector, Athens fears that the conditions may exist for a new Cyprus-like intervention. This concern is reinforced by the existence of broader cleavages between Orthodox and Muslim communities elsewhere in the Balkans.[42] The status of Muslim minorities in Greek Thrace, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bulgaria is of direct concern to Ankara, not least because of public anxiety about the prospects of further migration from the Balkans (as well as the Caucasus and the Middle East). The

[39]Buchan, "Greek Veto on EC Aid to Turkey."

[40]The status and treatment of this and the much smaller Greek minority in Turkey has been the subject of complaint and countercomplaint on both sides. See, for example, Sadik Ahmet, "Grievances and Requests of the Turkish-Muslim Minority Living in Western Thrace, Greece," *Turkish Review*, Spring 1989, and an interview with the author of this article (a member of the Greek Parliament) in *Nokta* (Istanbul), April 14, 1991, in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, June 5, 1991. See also Alexis Alexandris, "Political Expediency and Human Rights: Minority Issues Between Greece and Turkey," paper prepared for the conference on "Minority Rights: Policies and Practice in Southeast Europe," Copenhagen, March 30–April 1, 1990.

[41]Some Turkish observers have likened this policy to the situation in Israel and the West Bank.

[42]The implications of this cleavage are explored in detail in a parallel study by a RAND colleague, James Brown, "Turkey in the Balkans."

1989 exodus, in which some 320,000 Bulgarian Turks fled to Turkey, is to many Turks an indication of the potential consequences of too close an involvement in neighboring regions.[43] In the post–Cold War environment, key issues in Turkish-Greek relations are increasingly tied to the broader evolution of ethnic and interstate problems in the Balkans.

Of the many points of contention in the Aegean, one of the most pressing from the Turkish perspective has been the presence of Greek forces on islands close to the Turkish coast in the eastern Aegean. Ankara has consistently opposed the introduction of these forces, which began in earnest in the 1960s, as an illegal remilitarization of territory demilitarized under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Turkish strategists and policymakers are concerned about preserving unimpeded movement through the Aegean archipelago, both as a practical commercial and strategic matter, and as part of a less tangible sense of geopolitical vulnerability. In this context, Turks are keenly aware of the history of Greek operations in Anatolia in 1922 and the continuing debate in Greek political and intellectual circles on the "Great Idea," the quest for reunification of former Greek territories around the Aegean basin.[44]

A recent Greek proposal for the demilitarization of borders in Thrace, supported by Bulgaria, has been rejected by Ankara, ostensibly because it failed to embrace Greek forces in the Aegean islands.[45] Greek and Bulgarian interests in the Balkans would clearly be served by arms control arrangements that would encourage a shift in the center of gravity of Turkey's strategic orientation from Europe to Asia. Despite the existence of competing strategic requirements on its Middle Eastern borders and the evaporation of the Warsaw Pact threat to Thrace, Turkish military and civilian leaders can be expected to react warily to future proposals affecting forces in Thrace, not least because of the perceived value of Turkish military superiority in deterring the mistreatment of Muslim minorities in Bulgaria,

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[43]Roughly half of these refugees have returned to Bulgaria, encouraged by the liberalization of the new Bulgarian regime's policy toward its Turkish population. See "Mass Migration and International Security," *Strategic Survey 1990–1991* (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1991), p. 43.

[44]See Oral Sander, "Turkish-Greek Relations After World War I: A Vicious Circle of Sixty Years," *Turkish Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1985–86. Greek geopolitical concerns are treated in Yorgos A. Kourvetaris, "The Southern Flank of NATO: Political Dimensions of the Greco-Turkish Conflict Since 1974," *East European Quarterly*, January 1988.

[45]"Northern Demilitarization Proposal Discussed," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, August 7, 1991, p. 55.

Greece, and elsewhere in the Balkans. The evaporation of the Soviet threat to Thrace has allowed Greek defense planners to shift their attention to Turkey, completing a trend observable since the Cyprus crisis of 1974.[46] Greek and Bulgarian concerns about the effect of allied equipment transfers to Turkey as a result of CFE (and the potential concentration of forces in the "exclusion zone"—including the port of Mersin from which the Turkish garrison in Cyprus is supplied—allowed under the agreement) have been reinforced by the Gulf crisis and the prospective modernization of Turkish forces.[47]

The prospects for Turkish-Greek relations remain highly uncertain. Cyprus, the Aegean, and Thrace will remain potential flashpoints and pose a continuing problem of crisis prevention for Europe and the United States. The Greek sense of insecurity in relation to a neighbor of continental scale and "uncertain strategic orientation" is certain to persist, and will be supported by deep-rooted cultural and historical factors. Should Turkey continue to be isolated from the process of European integration and the development of new defense arrangements, the outlook for peaceful relations in the Aegean and Thrace will very likely worsen. More optimistically, there are tentative signs that Athens and Ankara have recognized that expressions of animosity may no longer serve the interests of either country in a less tolerant post–Cold War environment. The balance of incentives may well be changing for both parties as they seek to bolster relations with the United States.[48]

As NATO moves through a period of uncertainty, the idea that Turkish involvement in the EC could serve to anchor and stabilize Turkish-Greek relations, widely discussed in moderate circles in Athens and Ankara, may gain momentum. Members of the business community in both countries are among the strongest advocates of Aegean détente as a means of improving relations with the EC and as a source of opportunity in its own right.[49] Ironically, as the incentives

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[46]See Thanos Veremis, "Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change," in John Chipman (ed.), *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges* (London: Routledge, 1988).

[47]On Greek perceptions of CFE and the Aegean balance, see Yannis G. Valinakis, *Greece and the CFE Negotiations* (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 1990).

[48]See Maureen Dowd, "Bush Names the Next Challenge: Cyprus," *New York Times*, July 19, 1991. On the general question of "ripeness" and the U.S. role in international disputes, including Cyprus, see Richard N. Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

[49]See Faruk Sen, "The Opportunities for Economic Cooperation Between Turkey and Greece," *Turkish Review*, Spring 1989. A joint Turkish-Greek business council has been established to explore avenues for cooperation.

for Greek opposition to Turkey within the EC may be declining, there is a growing perception in Turkey that Europe as a whole tolerates and even fuels Greek-Turkish enmity as a pretext for holding Turkey at arms length.[50]

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[50]John Murray Brown, "Turkey Survey," *Financial Times*, May 20, 1991.

4. THE SECURITY DIMENSION

A shift of Turkey's strategic priorities from traditional lines in the Balkans and the Caucasus to address new risks in the Middle East, including those emanating from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the activities of Kurdish separatists in southeast Anatolia may encourage a further separation of Turkish and European security interests.[1] Nonetheless, Turkey will retain a strong interest in European security arrangements, and will look to its ties with the United States and NATO to assure itself of a continuing role. The success of this approach will depend in large measure on the evolution of Western perceptions of Turkey's strategic importance and the implications of prospective defense improvements.

TURKEY AND NATO

Turkey shares with the United States a strong interest in the preservation of existing security structures and relationships, not least the NATO link. Traditionally, this observation has applied to most of the NATO Southern Region countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey), but the Turkish stake in the maintenance of the institutional status quo is especially pronounced since the alternative of a European defense identity remains closed to Turkey. Germany's response in the context of the NATO decision to send allied reinforcements to Turkey during the Gulf crisis, referred to earlier, has also left lingering doubts about the dependability of the NATO guarantee in the absence of a Soviet threat. Yet, the NATO connection retains tremendous symbolic and material importance. Above all, participation in the Alliance is seen, rather like the prospect of EC membership, as a symbol of Turkey's membership in the Western democratic "club." It also gives Ankara a greater voice than it might otherwise have in international affairs. Equally important in relation to developments in Europe and the Gulf is NATO's ability to provide a multilateral and Euro-Atlantic framework for defense cooperation that might otherwise appear too heavily weighted toward the bilateral relationship with the United States and Middle Eastern security.

[1]The rise of competing security interests in the Middle East had begun to affect Turkish perceptions even prior to the Gulf crisis. See Duygu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policy, Challenges of Adaptation to the Post-INF Era," *RUSI Journal*, Winter 1989; and Alain Gresh, "La Turquie Ebranlee par les Mutations Regionales," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, July 1991, pp. 16–17.

Indeed, this may take on even greater importance for the Demirel government as the Turkish political debate reflects growing sensitivity on these points.

Despite the new attention to Mediterranean security within NATO, including the risks facing Turkey, it is worth considering how useful the Southern Region framework will be in assessing Turkey's future position within the Alliance.[2] Traditionally, Turkey has shared certain characteristics with NATO's other southern allies. Leaving aside the Italian case, which is somewhat unique, these characteristics have included a lower level of economic and defense-industrial development, the experience of a recent democratic transition, and a relatively low level of military capability despite high manpower levels. Unlike its Southern Region allies, Turkey has never seen the Soviet threat as distant and diffuse but rather as an historically potent and pressing reality.[3] Indeed, until quite recently, Ankara has retained a conservative view of developments in the Soviet Union and the strategic implications of East-West disengagement in Europe. As late as the spring of 1990, it was still possible for a visitor to the Turkish ministries of foreign affairs and national defense to hear the "Soviet threat" described in traditional terms, in striking contrast to the official mood elsewhere in the Southern Region (and in NATO headquarters).

Turkey stands apart from the trend toward Europeanization that is driving the evolution of foreign and security policies across the Southern Region. In strategic terms, this has meant that countries such as Portugal and Greece are increasingly unwilling to adopt positions on security issues, including defense cooperation with the United States, that are at variance with their European partners. Southern Europe looks first to Brussels in these as in other matters in a general movement toward convergence with the European main-

[2]NATO's new "strategic concept" refers explicitly to the growing importance of security problems around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th–8th November, 1991," *NATO Press Communique,* No. S-1(91)85, pp. 3–4.

[3]The history of Ottoman imperial decline is in large measure the story of Turkish retreat in the face of Russian power. See Paul B. Henze, *Turkey, the Alliance and the Middle East: Problems and Opportunities in Historical Perspective,* Working Paper No. 36, (Washington, D.C.: International Security Studies Programs, The Wilson Center, 1981). See also Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); and W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828–1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953).

stream.[4] Turkey's isolation from this process alone suggests that the Turkish position within the Southern Region—indeed within NATO as a whole—is becoming more rather than less distinctive.

Ankara retains a wary attitude toward the development of an "out-of-area" role for NATO. In practice, a formal expansion of the Alliance's area of responsibility is both unlikely for NATO and problematic for Turkey. In the Turkish perspective, the defense of Turkey's Middle Eastern borders is clearly an in-area responsibility for the Alliance. Although the NATO treaty leaves no doubt that Turkey is correct on this point, the experience of the Gulf crisis, particularly the debate over AMF reinforcements, has undermined Turkish faith in the NATO guarantee outside East-West contingencies. Ankara can have little interest in the growth of a debate about out-of-area, or worse, "gray area" responses. Turkish sensitivities on this point include the possibility of being called on to provide forces or more automatic access to bases for the support of operations in the Middle East. NATO's adoption of a more active role outside Europe would severely complicate Turkey's already delicate relations with the Arab world.

CFE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES

Even in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ankara retains a rather conservative view of the residual military threat to Turkey from that quarter. This view of the implications of recent developments in East-West relations is, as noted earlier, a product of Turkish historical experience. It also reflects a natural attachment to a strategic view that has served Turkey well throughout the Cold War, as well as more tangible concerns. The security benefits of the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the CFE agreement are less direct, and even ambiguous in the Turkish case. The large conventional (and unconventional) arsenals facing Turkey in the Middle East fall outside current arms control initiatives, and constitute a risk only partially offset in Turkish perceptions by the exclusion zone in southeastern Turkey provided for by the CFE agreement. Moreover, Turkey's proximity to former Soviet forces behind the Urals, and the prospective improvement in the quality of forces in

[4]On this and other trends affecting the Southern Region, see Ian O. Lesser, *The United States and Southern Europe After the Cold War*, RAND, P-7679, 1990, and *Southern Region Perspectives on Security and International Affairs*, RAND, N-3269-AF, 1991. See also Diego Ruiz Palmer, "Paradigms Lost: A Retrospective Assessment of the NATO–Warsaw Pact Military Competition in the Alliance's Southern Region," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 9, 1990; and Ellen Laipson, "Thinking About the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter 1990.

that region, could leave Turkey in a relatively unfavorable position within the Alliance after implementation of the CFE accords.

The announced reductions in NATO's substrategic nuclear forces, including those based in Turkey, will ensure that Turkey remains within the Alliance mainstream on nuclear matters.[5] The new initiative will result in the removal of all nuclear weapons in Turkey with the exception of those carried by aircraft.[6] The continued presence of those forces in Turkey as short-range weapons are withdrawn from Europe would have raised the prospect of Turkey's "singularization." This would be as politically unattractive in Turkey as in Germany or elsewhere in the Alliance.[7] Over the longer term, however, Turkish attitudes on nuclear questions will be influenced by the extent of the proliferation threat on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders. Ankara will need to pursue policies designed to deter the threat of weapons of mass destruction without giving additional encouragement to regional proliferators.

EXTRA-EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS AND THEIR EFFECT

Turkey's armed forces are the second largest in NATO, totaling 579,000 personnel in active service (almost 500,000 of which are conscripts), with over one million in the reserves. The defense budget for 1991 is $4.8 billion, a marked increase from the 1990 figure of $3.4 billion, which itself represented a virtual doubling of the previous year's budget even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.[8] Defense spending currently represents roughly 12.5 percent of the Turkish budget. These figures are a tangible reflection of two realities. First, Ankara remains wary of the longer-term implications of instability on its border with the former Soviet Union, and, above all, sees a range of serious security risks flowing from the Middle East. These latter include the challenge of an increasingly aggressive Kurdish insurgency led by the PKK, with its bases in Iraq and Syria. Second, Turkey is now addressing in earnest its long-standing military mod-

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[5]NATO has announced cuts of roughly 80 percent in its stocks of shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe. See *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, NATO Press Communique S-1(91)86, November 8, 1991.

[6]See Hadi Uluengin, "Reduction of Nuclear Arms and Turkey," *Hurriyet* (Istanbul), October 1, 1991, in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, October 7, 1991, p. 44.

[7]See Duygu Sezer, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Year 2000," *Turkey in the Year 2000* (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1989).

[8]IISS, *The Military Balance 1990–1991*; and Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, p. 43.

ernization needs, an imperative highlighted and given new urgency by the experience of the Gulf war.

The Iran-Iraq war and the process of militarization affecting Turkey's neighbors, including Syria, have stimulated a progressive shift in Turkish defense priorities away from traditional lines in Thrace and the Caucasus and toward the south and east. Consideration of Turkey's strategic vulnerabilities and assets in relation to security on its Middle Eastern borders also has received increased attention.[9] As an example, from the mid-1980s, Turkish defense officials began to pay close attention to the mounting dependence of Iraq on Turkish pipelines and road transport for the export of oil during the war with Iran. The Gulf war and its aftermath have simply confirmed and reinforced emerging perceptions about the regional ambitions and expanding arsenals across Turkey's borders, not least the growing threat from weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles of increasing range and accuracy.

The prospect of a revived Iraq posing a conventional and unconventional threat to Turkey is an obvious source of concern in light of Turkey's prominent role in the coalition against Baghdad. The recent upsurge in PKK activity from bases in Iraq, and the Turkish cross-border operations aimed at suppressing it, have drawn Turkey closer to the problem of Iraq's future and raised new concerns in Europe about Turkey's policy toward the Kurds.[10] The prospects for additional European (especially German) security assistance to Turkey may well be affected by the perception that Turkey's defense requirements are being driven by the Kurdish insurgency, which has caused at least 3500 civilian and military deaths in southeastern Anatolia since 1984. Indeed, many critics point to Ozal's activist stance in the Gulf as a leading source of the deepening Kurdish problem as well as a very uncertain outlook for Turkey in the Middle East as a whole.

Above all, Turkey faces longer-term security risks from Iran, with its competing aims in Azerbaijan and active interest in nuclear and ballistic missile technology, and Syria. Points of risk with regard to Syria include a territorial dispute over Turkish Antioch, continuing Syrian support for the PKK (the PKK and Dev Sol, the leftist terrorist

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[9]The prospects for Turkey's relations in the Middle East are assessed in a companion document by RAND colleague Graham E. Fuller, forthcoming.

[10]See "German Envoy Denies Alleged Support for PKK," *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), August 21, 1991, in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, August 26, 1991, p. 43; and Chris Hedges, "Iraqis Are Arming the Rebel Kurds in Turkey's South," *New York Times*, October 20, 1991.

organization, have been allowed to establish training bases in the Syrian controlled Bekaa Valley), and the growth of the Syrian arsenal. Turkish population centers in the southeast are already vulnerable to Syrian SS-21 and Scud missiles.[11] To these issues, one might add the ongoing friction over Turkey's control of the Tigris and Euphrates waters. Syria and Iraq have alleged that the Ataturk Dam, under construction as part of Turkey's Southeast Anatolia Project, will severely restrict the downstream flow.[12] The aggressive strategy that Turkey has adopted toward the Kurdish insurgency, including cross-border operations in Iraq (involving on one occasion some 2000 troops and extensive air strikes) and the establishment of a *de facto* "security zone" inside Iraqi territory, may eventually affect Turkey's relations with Syria.[13] Some Turkish observers have even speculated on the possibility of a Turkish strike against PKK and Dev Sol bases in the Bekaa Valley. Short of this, a "hot pursuit" incident on the Syrian border, against the background of long-standing frictions on other matters, would pose a serious risk of escalation.

DEFENSE IMPROVEMENT AND GULF LESSONS

Given the nature of the security challenges facing Turkey in the Middle East (Turkish officials like to use the metaphor of "living in a tough neighborhood"), the impetus for continuing and expanding Turkey's defense modernization program will be strong. Turkey is scheduled to be the recipient of substantial CFE-surplus armaments "cascaded" under NATO's Equipment Transfer Program. The transfers will include roughly 1050 M-60 and Leopard tanks, 700 armored combat vehicles, 70 110-mm artillery pieces, 40 F-4 fighters, Cobra attack helicopters, and Roland surface-to-air missiles. These arms will make a significant contribution to the modernization of Turkey's

[11]On ballistic missile proliferation trends affecting Turkey's security, see Janne E. Nolan, *The Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); Martin Navias, *Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World*, Adelphi Paper No. 252 (London: IISS, 1990); and W. Seth Carus, *Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990).

[12]See "En Turquie, Ce Barrage Qui Commande Tout," *L'Express*, August 16, 1991. Turkish efforts to organize a "water summit" to discuss the future use of the Tigris and Euphrates and the Water for Peace initiative have been postponed pending the outcome of the Middle East peace talks in Madrid. See "Turkey's Giray Announces Water Summit Postponed," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, October 3, 1991, p. 1.

[13]See John Murray Brown, "Turkey Sets Up a Buffer Zone in North Iraq to Curb Rebels," *Washington Post*, August 8, 1991; and "Turks Raid Rebel Kurds in North Iraq," *New York Times*, August 8, 1991.

forces while satisfying the reduction requirements of the treaty.[14] The scale of the armaments acquired in this manner, together with other prospective transfers in the wake of the Gulf war, has raised questions about the future of Turkey's own defense industrial programs as well as the operations and maintenance burden of those weapons.[15]

The Gulf crisis has had the effect of reinforcing a trend already under way toward the reorientation of Turkey's defense priorities from Thrace and the Caucasus to the Middle East. The crisis has also influenced the thinking of Turkey's strategic elite in other ways. In contrast to the experience elsewhere in NATO's Southern Region, where as a rule the enthusiasm of the military for active participation in the coalition operations was tempered by the conservatism of the political leadership, the Turkish General Staff adopted a cautious approach to military involvement in the Gulf. Their conservatism can be explained, in part, by their adherence to Ataturk's precepts against foreign adventurism and compromising Turkish sovereignty. Beyond this, however, the military leadership apparently had serious doubts about Turkey's ability to deploy and sustain forces beyond their own territory, or even to conduct large-scale mobile operations on the border with Iraq. In short, close observation of the campaign in the Gulf confirmed the unpreparedness of the Turkish armed forces to wage modern conventional warfare. It has even cast doubt on the value of the relatively modern equipment to be acquired from the allies as a result of the CFE agreement.

The deployment of 100,000 Turkish troops along the border with Iraq (posing the threat of a second front and an important contribution to the coalition strategy in the Gulf) required the largest movement of forces since the 1974 invasion of Cyprus. Difficulties encountered in this operation and more general observations of Gulf "lessons" have led the General Staff to undertake a series of sweeping reforms aimed at improving the operational ability of the Turkish military. Land forces are to be reduced by roughly one-third (to 350,000) by July 1992. The division system is to be eliminated entirely and replaced by a system of brigades, with the aim of improving mobility. Airborne refueling operations practiced with American forces during the Gulf

[14]Greece will also be a substantial recipient of equipment under the program. See *Jane's Defense Weekly*, July 6, 1991, pp. 18–19; General Dogan Gures, "Modernization and Restructuring of the Turkish Land Forces," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, February–March 1990; and an October 6, 1990, interview with then Minister of Defense Safa Giray, quoted in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, November 16, 1990, p. 36.

[15]See John Murray Brown, "Arms Windfall Dilemma for Turkey," *Financial Times*, June 27, 1991, p. 6.

crisis (Turkish aircraft remained within Turkish airspace) have led to plans for the acquisition of two tankers, which would dramatically increase the operational range of Turkish fighters and allow them to be based at less vulnerable bases away from Turkey's borders.[16]

Not surprisingly, air defense, including the acquisition of Patriot and additional F-16s (Turkish F-16 strength will eventually reach the impressive total of 320 co-produced aircraft), has emerged as a leading priority. In the absence of these systems, Turkey will remain vulnerable to air and ballistic missile attack, a vulnerability that could affect Turkey's willingness to permit foreign military operations from Turkish bases in non-NATO contingencies. Indeed, Turkey's inability to defend itself against the Iraqi SCUD and conventional air threat, and the consequent need to allow the presence of NATO air defense forces on Turkish territory as a deterrent, has been seen as a double blow to Turkish sovereignty. Nonetheless, the expansion of Turkish airpower and ground-based air defenses to a level commensurate with the scale of forces facing Turkey in the Middle East (Syria deploys some 650 combat aircraft) will inevitably raise questions about the military balance in the Balkans. These questions will not be limited to air defense. The restructuring and modernization of Turkey's land forces will, as noted earlier, be driven by the need to develop a capacity for mobile operations in the Middle East, rather than a positional defense against a Soviet threat in Thrace or the Caucasus. The net result of this strategic and operational reorientation will be an increase in the offensive capability of the Turkish armed forces from the Aegean to the Iraqi border.[17]

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[16]Ertugrul Ozkok, "Important Decisions in the Turkish Army," *Hurriyet* (Istanbul), August 2, 1991, in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, September 9, 1991.

[17]"Circular Promises Improvements in Armed Forces," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, July 30, 1991, p. 29.

5. TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES

The relationship between the United States and Turkey dates from the first quarter of the 19th century, when the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean began to expand eastward, spurred by the attractions of the "Turkey trade" and the lure of bases in the Levant. The deepening of ties between the United States and Ottoman Turkey was at the same time limited by popular American enthusiasm for Greek national aspirations and a reluctance to become embroiled in the "Eastern Question," specifically, the problem of containing Russian power in the eastern Mediterranean as an element of the European balance (the contrast with post-1945 attitudes is striking). Economic ties with the Ottoman Empire did, however, grow steadily through the turn of the century. In a curious reversal of the current situation, petroleum products made up a large percentage of American exports to the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant before 1900. Ottoman Turkey was a large purchaser of surplus weapons and ammunition after the American Civil War.[1]

Relations with the Ottoman Empire were severed following the U.S. entry into World War I, and were not fully restored with the new Turkey until 1927. The Treaty of Lausanne, establishing postwar arrangements for the former Ottoman territories, of which the United States was a signatory, was not ratified by Congress until 1930. Turkish observers often refer to this extended delay in ratification as the first serious setback in bilateral relations, noting that the obstacles to smoother relations—perceptions of Greek-Turkish and Armenian-Turkish issues—have hardly changed since 1930. Turkish neutrality during World War II ensured that bilateral ties remained at a modest level through 1945, after which Turkey emerged as a key actor in the early years of the Cold War. Indeed, the Cold War and the strategy of containment could be said to have had their origins in the eastern Mediterranean with the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. commitment to bolster the "Northern Tier" of Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan as a bar to Soviet adventurism in the Middle East.[2]

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[1]See James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); and Frank Gervasi, *Thunder Over the Mediterranean* (New York: David McKay, 1975).

[2]The evolution of Western policy toward the Northern Tier is assessed in detail in Bruce Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

Thus began the cycle of strategic perception in which Turkey's importance in American eyes has been defined alternately in Middle Eastern and European terms. In the aftermath of recent developments in the Gulf, Middle Eastern terms once again predominate.[3] The first bilateral military aid agreement, signed in June 1954, provided the basis for more extensive security assistance and set a precedent for numerous subsequent agreements on defense and economic cooperation.

The perception that Turkey has long been treated unfairly at the political level in the United States, particularly in Congress, is pervasive among the Turkish elite. The 1964 "Johnson letter" warning against a Turkish move against Cyprus, and the arms embargo of 1975–1978 imposed following the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus, are still vivid in Turkish minds. More recently, Congressional and Executive treatment of the Armenian issue has been the source of frustration and dismay in Ankara. Congress did not approve a resolution on the Armenian genocide introduced in 1990, but the Administration's comments in the spring of 1990 (actually intended to defuse the issue) struck a negative chord in Turkey. President Bush's statement was understood as implicating the modern Turkish state as well as the Ottoman government, setting a possible precedent for U.S. policy toward an independent Armenia. An argument common in Europe, but rarely heard in Ankara, is that the Armenian issue will remain an impediment to Turkish policy internationally, and can be overcome only through the Turkish government's acknowledgment of responsibility. Thus, it is argued that in an era in which Moscow can admit Katyn, and the former German Democratic Republic could admit the Holocaust, surely Turkey can acknowledge events of the Ottoman period. For reasons closely bound up with Turkish political culture, an admission of this sort is extremely difficult. The development of tentative ties with the Armenian Republic may well necessitate and facilitate this process. In the meantime, the Kurdish problem and the broader issue of human rights in Turkey are likely to emerge as more immediate obstacles to Turkish policy in Washington and Brussels. In certain quarters, notably the Turkish foreign ministry, it is argued with growing conviction that the success of Turkey's policy toward the West will

[3]Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952. Two years earlier, the deployment of a Turkish division in Korea under UN command had a favorable effect on U.S. opinion (it has also contributed to a certain mythology within the Alliance concerning the ferocity of Turkish troops).

depend on a complete overhaul of Ankara's approach to human rights.[4]

To the extent that Turkey is frustrated in its efforts to join Europe, the bilateral relationship with the United States should, in theory, acquire greater significance. An important longer-term question concerns the degree to which Turkish public and elite opinion will distinguish between Turkey's difficult relations with Europe and relations with the West as a whole. In the absence of a dramatic expansion of bilateral cooperation across the board—and this is unlikely for a variety of reasons—it may prove difficult to insulate U.S.-Turkish relations from the adverse effects of a European rebuff.[5] Although the Gulf crisis has resulted in a great deal of good will toward Turkey at the official level and a greater awareness of Turkey and its regional problems among the informed public, a measured expansion of economic and security cooperation may fail to satisfy heightened expectations in Ankara. The change of leadership in Turkey, and Demirel's disinclination to pursue bilateral relations with quite the same zeal as Ozal, introduce a new element of uncertainty.

Two broad features of the post–Cold War, post–Gulf war bilateral relationship have already emerged. First, the consensus for maintaining a viable defense relationship with the United States will almost certainly hold, but there will be little interest in the formal expansion of existing arrangements. A second and related feature is Ankara's emphasis on building a new and more diversified "strategic relationship" in which economic and political cooperation plays a leading role and defense issues are subjected to closer scrutiny. Both trends were visible prior to the elections—in fact, they developed in full during the Gulf crisis—and are likely to prove durable.

A WINDOW FOR EXPANDED DEFENSE COOPERATION?

The window for expanded defense cooperation that some had foreseen in the wake of the Gulf crisis has almost certainly closed, if indeed it was ever open. Developments in the Gulf provided some incentives for Turkey to consider a more active security relationship with the United States: a heightened sense of insecurity with regard to the

[4]See "Turkey's New Government: The Art of the Compromise," *The Economist*, November 23, 1991, p. 56.

[5]Notably, only a small number of the respondents in the *Cumhuriyet* "Turkey in the Year 2020" survey thought that Turkey would have closer relations with the United States than with Europe through the end of the century and beyond. *FBIS-West Europe Report*, June 25, 1991, p. 33.

Middle East, more evident security assistance needs, and, above all, a sense that the NATO commitment to Turkey might not be ironclad in all cases. Yet, the prospects for a formal increase in U.S.-Turkish defense cooperation remain limited. Ozal's willingness to provide bases for U.S. and allied forces during and after the conflict provoked strong domestic opposition from quarters as diverse as the Turkish left, the nationalist and fundamentalist right, and the military leadership itself.[6] The latter, although thoroughly pro-Western and champions of bilateral security cooperation as an essential element in the modernization of the armed forces, regarded the large-scale use of Turkish facilities by foreign forces as an affront to Turkish sovereignty. Moreover, many senior officers were inclined to distrust Ozal's motives in the Gulf (relations between Ozal and the military have never been particularly warm in any case), suspecting a link between his active support for the Gulf monarchies and his tactical courting of the religious right in domestic politics. The net result of this experience has been heightened sensitivity across the political spectrum on sovereignty-related issues, including security cooperation with the United States. Turkey's decision to extend for another year the bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), which was due to expire in December 1991, effectively postponed any question of a formal change in the ground rules for U.S. access to facilities, the presence of U.S. personnel, or the prepositioning of materiel (special arrangements outside the DECA involving the use of Turkish facilities for non-NATO purposes will remain possible).[7]

The United States, for its part, is unlikely to seek an expansion of its permanent presence in a period of force reductions and economic stringency. An expansion of this presence would, of course, also send inappropriate signals to Moscow and the southern republics. Indeed, Turkish officials are more likely to be confronted with modest reductions in the U.S. presence. Turkey has given strong support to NATO plans for maintaining a land-based U.S. tactical air presence in the Southern Region following the departure of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from Torrejon in Spain. Ankara regards this presence as a contribution to regional deterrence and evidence of a continued Alliance

[6]Opposition within the military leadership to Ozal's activist stance in the Gulf crisis reached a peak with the resignation of Turkey's chief of staff, General Necip Torumtay, in December 1990. See "Torumtay's Resignation Seen as a Blow to Ozal," *Briefing* (Ankara), December 10, 1990, p. 4. See also the critique offered by Bulent Ecevit in Norman Frankel, "Conversations in Istanbul: An Interview with Bulent Ecevit," *Political Communication and Persuasion*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1991; and "Public Opinion: Approval for the War but Not for Turkish Role," *Briefing* (Ankara), January 28, 1991.

[7]"Defense, Economic Pact with U.S. Renewed," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, August 30, 1991, p. 27, and September 17, 1991, p. 25.

commitment to Turkey (the bulk of the 401st TFW has traditionally been earmarked for the reinforcement of Turkey, and elements of the wing are rotated periodically to Incirlik). Turkey is, however, unlikely to accept the "permanent" presence of U.S. aircraft.

The possibility of placing substantial prepositioned stocks of U.S. equipment in Turkey as a means of facilitating the rapid deployment of forces to the region has been the subject of some discussion. Although doubtless a more acceptable alternative to the permanent deployment of U.S. forces (a political impossibility under current conditions), extensive prepositioning would raise problems of its own. For contingencies in eastern Anatolia, stocks held afloat at Izmir or Iskenderun would be of doubtful value, while prepositioning in the southeast might actually limit flexibility (it would also place these stocks and associated personnel in the middle of an active insurgency).

The problem of an adequate *quid pro quo* for any expansion of the bilateral security relationship will persist despite the increase in aid as a result of the Gulf war, in which U.S. security assistance to Turkey was raised from $553.4 million to $635.4 million in current appropriations. Most of this aid will be in the form of outright grants and additional emergency assistance is likely. If CFE-related transfers are included, Turkey will be the recipient of roughly $8 billion in U.S. and German equipment. Although Congress has shown no sign of abandoning the "7/10 ratio" governing the allocation of security assistance to Greece and Turkey, the prospect of further "emergency" assistance and the essentially fungible nature of economic and security assistance funds suggest that the future significance of the 7/10 ratio will be largely symbolic. But the symbolism of the ratio matters a great deal in political terms to both Greece and Turkey and will remain an important issue on the trilateral agenda. Leaving aside the current windfall resulting from CFE and the Gulf war, Turkish observers are aware of the declining enthusiasm for security assistance in Congress, although Turkey will certainly continue to be among the strongest claimants for future funding even at lower levels (barring, of course, a debacle over Cyprus, the Balkans, or the Kurdish problem).

The United States has been instrumental in raising international support to compensate Turkey for the economic costs of the Gulf war. The closure of the oil pipeline from Iraq, together with the loss of Middle Eastern trade, is estimated to have cost Turkey up to $9 billion in lost revenue. The pipeline closure alone will cost Turkey some $500 million per year. Prior to the Gulf crisis, trade with Iraq

had accounted for ten percent of Turkish exports.[8] Roughly $3 billion in oil, grants, and loans has been raised thus far from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Japan, France, and the European Community. Taken together with the potentially large role of Turkish enterprises in the reconstruction of Kuwait, the economic costs of the Gulf crisis may be covered or perhaps exceeded by compensatory arrangements and arms transfers.[9] Nonetheless, many Turks argue with conviction that their country is unlikely ever to be adequately compensated for the short- and longer-term security consequences of its cooperative role in the Gulf crisis, not least the deepening insurgency in the southeast.

The prospects for U.S. access to Turkish facilities in non-NATO contingencies will be influenced by the waning of Ozal's ability to influence the Turkish security debate and the natural conservatism of the military leadership regarding foreign forces on Turkish soil (and in Turkish air space).[10] Turkish interests in the Middle East will also encourage a careful approach. As in the past, Turkey's leadership will be compelled to consider the regional effects of too close and too visible cooperation with the United States outside the NATO context. Turkish policy in future crises may well resemble its restrained behavior in relation to the Middle East conflicts of 1967 and 1973 rather than the recent and perhaps unique experience of the coalition against Iraq. Even before the October 1991 elections, evidence of a return to a more cautious policy could be seen in then Prime Minister Yilmaz's comments ruling out the use of Turkish bases for renewed air strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq.[11] Demirel was similarly reserved in his discussions with President Bush in February 1992, warning against the use of force to topple Saddam Hussein.[12]

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[8]"Foreign Ministry on Failure to Sell Iraqi Oil," *FBIS-West Europe Report*, November 1, 1991, p. 41.

[9]On the potential for Turkish infrastructure and construction contracts in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Middle East, see Feyyaz Berker, "Infrastructure and Construction in Turkey and the Middle East," paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Turkish-U.S. Business Council, New York, October 31, 1991.

[10]On the Turkish military's sensitivities in this area, see John Murray Brown, "Kurds Seek to Prevent Allied Pullout from Turkish Border," *Financial Times*, September 18, 1991.

[11]"Bush Says Iraq Is Mistaken to Bar Access to Nuclear Arms Programs," *New York Times*, July 29, 1991. Turkey also insisted upon detailed consultations on military operations mounted from its territory as part of Operation Provide Comfort. Patrick Tyler, "U.S. Has Trouble Maintaining Unity of Allies on Iraq," *New York Times*, July 28, 1991.

[12]Barbara Crossette, "Turkish Leader, on Visit, Cautions Bush on Toppling of Hussein," *New York Times*, February 13, 1992.

A NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP?

Over the next decade, Ankara can be expected to place great emphasis on the development of a "more mature" relationship with the United States in which security assistance and defense cooperation play a less prominent role and political and economic ties are strengthened. This interest has already taken the form of calls for what the Turkish elite likes to describe as a broader or expanded "strategic relationship." The term strategic, in this case, is meant in the broadest sense. Increased trade and investment is at the heart of Turkish proposals for a diversified relationship.

Through the 1970s, the total volume of bilateral trade averaged $500 million per year. The growing export orientation of the Turkish economy in the 1980s, of which Ozal was the leading architect, produced a marked increase in the level of economic activity between the United States and Turkey. During the 1980s, the volume of bilateral trade more than tripled, from $846.4 million in 1981 to $3.25 billion in 1990. Despite the growth in volume, Turkey has registered consistent bilateral trade deficits.[13] Negotiations spurred by the Gulf crisis have led to a doubling of the U.S. quota for Turkish textile imports through 1993. But with a relatively small share of the U.S. market to begin with, the effect of such apparently large increases remains incremental. The prospects for further quota adjustments of this scale must be considered limited, especially in the sensitive area of textile imports. During his visit to Washington of March–April 1991, Ozal proposed a free trade agreement between the United States and Turkey. Few observers regard this as a serious proposal. Certainly, the United States has too many pressing issues on its trade agenda, including the future of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and arrangements for a North American Free Trade Area, to consider opening negotiations on this front. From the Turkish perspective, the proposal is perhaps a useful vehicle for keeping economic issues at the forefront of the bilateral relationship.

Defense industrial cooperation is an area in which the pursuit of a broader strategic relationship merges with strategic issues of a narrower and more traditional sort. Existing co-production arrangements with U.S. firms for the manufacture of F-16s and armored fighting vehicles are seen in Ankara as important contributions to Turkey's security, economic development, and, not least, international

[13]Turkish exports to the United States in 1990 represented only 0.42 percent of imports. Leading exports to the United States are tobacco, textiles, and iron and steel; leading imports from the United States are iron and steel, boilers and machinery, and tobacco. Turkish-U.S. Business Council, *Turkish-American Relations* (Istanbul, 1991).

prestige. Turkey will also produce 46 F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force by 1995. Overall, Turkey is pursuing an active program of collaborative defense procurement with its NATO allies, and defense-industrial development will be a leading consideration in future Turkish proposals for bilateral cooperation.[14] In the short term, Turkey looks to an expansion of its defense-related exports to the United States under the free trade provisions of the DECA.[15]

Finally, Turkey will seek U.S. support for its regional policies and initiatives as part of an active strategic relationship. Support for the Black Sea plan and Turkey's application for EC membership will be priorities for Ankara, although the prospects of influencing European attitudes on the latter from Washington will be dim. Short of this, the United States may be in a stronger position to press for Turkey's inclusion, in some form, in emerging European security arrangements. As U.S. interests in Turkey continue to focus, for valid strategic reasons, on that country's role in Middle Eastern and Central Asian security, the task of promoting Turkey's role in the new European security order will be difficult. The reorientation of Turkey's own security concerns and defense policy toward the southeast will further reinforce Western perceptions in this regard.

More problematic may be Ankara's desire for U.S. backing in its policy toward the Kurdish insurgency. A hard-line response to increasingly severe PKK attacks could prove an impediment to closer relations with the United States as well as with Europe, where Turkey's human rights record has long been the subject of scrutiny.[16]

The reassertion of Turkey's regional role in the Balkans, around the Black Sea, in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East would introduce an entirely new and less predictable element into relations between Ankara and Washington. Given the (probably healthy) disinclination on both sides to view Turkey as a Western gendarme in regional matters, the emergence of Turkey as a regional power raises the important question of whether U.S. and Turkish interests will be divergent or convergent over the longer term. Some Turkish commentators have already raised this issue in relation to the "new strategic relationship," questioning whether Turkey's local and regional interests will be compatible with the global interests of the

[14]See Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Building an Industry: The Turkish Dimension," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, November 9, 1991, pp. 881–890.

[15]Turkish exports of defense goods to the United States under the DECA "Memorandum of Understanding" amount to roughly $185 million annually.

[16]See M. Ali Birand, "Someone Is Doing Something Wrong," *Milliyet* (Istanbul), in *FBIS-West Europe Report*, October 24, 1991.

United States in all cases.[17] U.S. interests in the stable evolution of political and economic systems around the Black Sea and in the Middle East, and in preventing the emergence of regional hegemonies (e.g., Iran) are broadly compatible with Turkey's regional preferences. In the Balkans, Turkey's interest in safeguarding the well-being of Muslim minorities is not incompatible with U.S. interests in the region, but the West as a whole may well give higher priority to ensuring that ethnic conflicts in the Balkans do not threaten the European order. It is difficult to imagine a Turkish intervention of any sort finding support in the United States, unless it was part of a European Community operation. The potential for a divergence of interests and approaches is more substantial in the Aegean. Even here, however, the United States and Turkey share a substantial milieu interest in crisis avoidance. One of the very few points of agreement between Ankara and Athens has been on the stabilizing role of the U.S. presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

Barring a sweeping change in the character of Turkey's domestic political orientation—an unlikely development—a fundamental clash of interests must be considered remote. The Western orientation and natural conservatism of Turkey's foreign and security policy elite is probably too strong to countenance a deliberate policy of confrontation. Nonetheless, as with Cyprus in 1974, the potential for serious friction on regional matters will remain should the Turkish leadership confront what it perceives to be a basic challenge to Turkey's security and well-being. The United States, both bilaterally and through its role in NATO, will remain the best guarantor of Turkish security in relation to the most dangerous risks facing Turkey over the longer term (i.e., those emanating from Syria, Iran, and Iraq), and this will necessarily influence the shape of Ankara's foreign and security policy. The threat from the Middle East may not entirely replace the containment of Soviet power as a unifying element in Turkey's external relations, but it will exert a powerful influence on its cooperative relationships. Turkey's continued exclusion from Europe will inevitably put increased presure on the relationship with the United States. To the extent that a new strategic relationship between the United States and Turkey can be placed in the context of broader Western cooperation, it is likely to prove more resistant to the vagaries of domestic politics and regional change.

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[17]Comment by Oral Sander, quoted in *Briefing* (Ankara), April 1, 1991, p. 8.

6. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The changing character of the strategic environment will pose substantial problems of adjustment for Turkey in its relations with the West. Long-standing priorities are being critically examined in light of the end of the Cold War, instability in the Middle East and the Balkans, and new opportunities and challenges in the Black Sea and Central Asia. At the same time, Europe and the United States will need to reassess the pattern of relations that has been dictated by the strategy of containment and the traditional perception of Turkey's role in European security.

Turkey's basic Western orientation will almost certainly hold. The October 1991 elections suggest a substantial strengthening of the center in Turkish politics. Groups on the left and the religious and nationalist right espousing anti-Western policies have not registered significant gains. The political and economic elite, as well as the military, remain deeply attached to the Western-looking, Ataturkist philosophy.

Turkey will remain outside of Europe. The prospects for Turkey joining Europe in the formal, institutional sense have not improved in the wake of the Gulf war and Turkey's active support for coalition policy. Ironically, the prospects for Ankara's EC application probably worsened as Europeans found confirmation for existing perceptions about Turkey's importance and exposure in the Middle East. The longer-term outlook for Turkey in Europe will turn on the future character of the EC itself. An expanded EC might be more amenable to closer ties with Turkey, but a wider EC that still refuses to entertain Turkish membership will only reinforce the sense of frustration in Ankara. In the meantime, and in the absence of closer ties with Europe, Turkey's political and economic elite is looking to new areas of opportunity outside Europe or on the European periphery (e.g., the Black Sea).

Most significantly, the prospects for Turkish inclusion in new European security arrangements will remain poor. To the extent that Europe moves toward a common foreign and security policy, EC members will be increasingly unwilling to accept the immediate and additional exposure in the Middle East which Turkey's full participation in the WEU (or other European security arrangements) would imply. As a result, Turkey will continue to share with the United

States a pronounced interest in the viability of the Atlantic Alliance as the dominant European security institution.

At the same time, Turkey will become increasingly distinctive and perhaps isolated within the Alliance. As Turkey remains outside the process of Europeanization affecting the rest of NATO's Southern Region, and if its strategic importance is defined largely in Middle Eastern rather than European terms, Turkey, the United States, and NATO will face a difficult problem of adjustment even without an expansion of NATO's current area of responsibility.

If Turkey is frustrated in its relations with Europe, the bilateral relationship with the United States will acquire additional significance. Even as Turkey pursues new initiatives around the Black Sea and elsewhere, Ankara will look to the United States as a source of strategic reassurance and political and economic cooperation. The bilateral relationship will also be the subject of closer political scrutiny in the wake of the Gulf experience. The "post-Ozal" era is likely to be characterized by a more reserved approach to bilateral defense matters. Ankara will seek a diversified "strategic relationship" in which increased trade and defense-industrial cooperation are given priority.

Despite continuing risks for crisis management in the Aegean, U.S. and Turkish interests are likely to remain broadly congruent as long as Ankara does not begin to view Europe as an opponent in key areas such as the Balkans and Central Asia. In this context, perceptions in Turkey—indeed the prospects for Turkey's relations with the West—will be driven to a great extent by the future character of relations between Europe and the Islamic world as a whole. Should southeastern Europe come to be seen as a strategic *glacis* insulating the European Community from turbulence and risks in the Middle East (including those affecting or emanating from Turkey), the United States will be faced with more difficult dilemmas in its policy toward Turkey.

7. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The United States, as a global power, should strive to promote the strategic importance of Turkey in Europe as well as the Middle East and Central Asia. Movement toward a new European security order that excludes Turkey (or actively opposes it in the Aegean) would contribute to instability in the Balkans and work against the longer-term convergence of Turkish and Western interests. It would also pose substantial dilemmas for U.S. policy in the Aegean and the Middle East. The United States should continue to support Turkish efforts to participate in the process of European integration (formally or informally), not least the creation of a European defense identity.

The United States need not press Ankara for a formal expansion of bilateral defense cooperation, which would, in any case, present substantial problems of political acceptance. From the U.S. perspective, the current situation on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders and the prospect of an increasingly violent Kurdish insurgency in southeast Anatolia do not suggest the need for a large and visible presence. The key objective for the United States should be to maintain a healthy, broad-based political relationship that will enhance the prospects for Ankara's support, including access to Turkish facilities and air space, in non-NATO contingencies.

New security initiatives involving Turkey should, to the extent possible, be pursued in a multilateral context; that is, through NATO or in cooperation with individual European allies. This would promote Turkey's importance in Europe; pose fewer political challenges for Ankara and thus contribute to the durability of security ties; and, not least, contribute to "burden-sharing" within the Alliance. Similarly, new initiatives on the political and economic fronts should be given a trilateral (U.S.-Turkish-European) character wherever possible.

The United States should work to dispel Turkish doubts about the predictability of the NATO security guarantee and the emergence of a "gray area" debate within the Alliance. On a practical level, the maintenance of a U.S. tactical air presence in the Southern Region (with periodic rotations to Turkey) will contribute directly to the reassurance of Turkey. Turkey should be encouraged to participate in new multinational rapid-response initiatives for the Southern Region, as well as the development of a standing naval force in the Mediterranean.

The longer-term interests of both the United States and Turkey will be served by the development of a more mature, diversified relationship, in which security assistance of the traditional sort is accompanied by an expansion of political and economic cooperation. Leaving aside the proposal for a bilateral free trade agreement, priority should be given to new trade and investment incentives, support for Turkey's regional economic initiatives, and a wider program of cultural and educational exchanges. The growing interest in Turkey should not be limited to the strategic and foreign policy communities.

In developing U.S. policy toward the independent republics of the former Soviet Union, consideration should be given to the potential role of Turkey in supporting political and economic initiatives. This would build on the increasingly active Turkish involvement in the region and contribute to the continued convergence of Turkish and Western interests. Specifically, the United States (and the EC) might use Turkey as a base for a more direct program of aid to the Caucasian and Central Asian republics. Similarly, the United States should lend its active support to Ankara's plan for Black Sea cooperation.

The United States should continue to play a role in promoting negotiations on Cyprus, as circumstances allow, both as a contribution to resolving the dispute and as tangible evidence of a continuing interest in the Aegean balance. The clear concern of Ankara and Athens in assuring themselves of secure relations with the United States after the Cold War has reinforced the already substantial stabilizing role of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean.

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
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