MAOIST THEORIES OF POLICY-MAKING AND ORGANIZATION

Lessons from the Cultural Revolution

HARRY HARDING

A Report prepared for
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND
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This Report is a product of research by The Rand Corporation for the United States Air Force on conditions in Mainland China that bear on that country’s capability to conduct military operations.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which extended from November 1965 to April 1969, affected Chinese leadership and policy-making no less profoundly than it did Chinese life in general. This study examines transformations wrought during the Cultural Revolution at the highest levels of state and party hierarchy. It particularly addresses the different modes of decision-making evidenced by the two groups—Maoist and Liuist—that contended for preeminence in China. Implicit in this analysis is the view that China’s military-political stance will derive in part from the decision-making style of the dominant group. Thus it is hoped that the study will suggest inferences of value to United States Air Force policy-makers in understanding the forces determining the applications of Chinese military power in the post-Cultural Revolution period.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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A particular debt is owed Professor John Wilson Lewis, who sparked the author's interest in problems of Chinese Communist leadership, decision-making, and organizational behavior, and who introduced the author to the concept of the "mass-line" as a key to understanding the operations of the Chinese Communist Party.
SUMMARY

One useful way of analyzing the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) is to examine it as a struggle between two different conceptions of policy-making procedure, organizational behavior, and Party structure. Although it may obscure some of the rich historical fabric of the Cultural Revolution, such an approach provides valuable insights to the GPCR's origins and meaning. Furthermore, it helps revise earlier Western analyses of Chinese Communist policy-making and organization, most of which have been outdated by the innovations and modifications imposed by Mao Tse-tung and his followers during this revolutionary period.

This Report explains the differences between the “Maoist” and the “Liuist” conceptions of policy-making and organization, and thereby indicates important elements in the ideological and political struggle between Mao and his opponents. It then describes the changes in Chinese Communist theories of policy-making and organization produced by the Cultural Revolution, and assesses their probable effects on the Chinese political system.

Taking as one dimension of policy-making the relative use of dogmatic and pragmatic criteria in decision-making and, as the other, the degree of institutionalized, direct mass participation in the policy-making process, the analysis identifies four modes of policy-making: dogmatic mass-line, pragmatic mass-line, dogmatic elitist, and pragmatic elitist. The Cultural Revolution was informed by the disagreement between Maoists and Liuists over the applicability of these policy-making modes to different issues. The positions of the two factions are summarized in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue-Area</th>
<th>Maoist Position</th>
<th>Liuist Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy questions</td>
<td>Dogmatic elitist</td>
<td>Pragmatic elitist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological and doctrinal questions</td>
<td>Dogmatic mass-line</td>
<td>Dogmatic mass-line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political, social, and macro-economic questions</td>
<td>Dogmatic mass-line</td>
<td>Pragmatic mass-line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and managerial (micro-economic)</td>
<td>Pragmatic mass-line</td>
<td>Pragmatic elitist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
Several important points emerge.

First, policy-making under the mass-line can be either pragmatic or dogmatic. The dogmatic mass-line, advocated by the Maoists for political, social, and macro-economic questions, is based on the assumption that every problem has a single correct solution and that the solution is contained exclusively in the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Because decision-making is thus a process of identifying the option that most closely corresponds to dogma, correctness is more important than consensus in the formulation of policy. To the same questions, the Liuists apply the pragmatic mass-line, which is essentially a minimax mode of analysis. If disagreements arise, the Liuists, unlike the Maoists, value compromise as a tactic for creating consensus.

Second, the disagreement between the Maoists and the Liuists is not total, but is dependent upon the issue. To resolve ideological questions, for example, both factions advocate the dogmatic mass-line. On technical questions, both recognize the need for pragmatic criteria, while disagreeing on the desirability of mass participation. And on political issues, both seek mass participation in policy-making, but differ over the suitability of dogmatic decision criteria.

Third, the Cultural Revolution is not a clear-cut struggle between pragmatism and dogmatism. The Liuists accept the need for dogmatic decision criteria on some issues, and the Maoists admit the necessity for pragmatism on others. Still, the Maoists advocate the use of dogmatic criteria for more issues than do the Liuists.

Fourth, the GPCR can better be interpreted as a debate over the question of elitism. Unlike the Liuists, the Maoists do not accept any form of elitism for any domestic questions.

Policy-making in China will be carried on by a Communist Party largely restructured during the past few years. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, it is argued here, Mao Tse-tung had serious reservations about the way in which the Party was performing each of its four major activities. First of all, he felt that the Party's definition of purpose had become perverted: the Party was concerned more with its own self-preservation and its members' social status and political power than with carrying on the revolution in China. It had, in short, become institutionalized. As to task performance, Mao saw that the Party had become bogged down in bureaucratic procedures, had been fractured into policy factions and personal cliques, and was formulating incorrect, revisionist policies—all largely because elitism had gradually replaced the mass-line. These errors had persisted, Mao believed, because the Party's control mechanisms were ineffective. Party leaders who identified deeply with the Party machine—men such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Liu Shao-ch'i—relied too strongly on internal disciplinary procedures such as self-criticism and mild rectification campaigns. They were not willing, as Mao came to feel was necessary, to employ mass criticism and severe struggle to eradicate the "revisionist" and "bourgeois" tendencies in the Party. Finally, prevailing Party recruitment policies favored technical and managerial skills and slighted ideological qualifications, which led Mao to fear that Chinese society would be irreparably damaged by bureaucratism and revisionism unless the Party underwent drastic change, "cleansed the class ranks," and took in "fresh blood."

Mao attempted to remedy these problems by two major reforms: he promulgated a new Party constitution and created revolutionary committees. These developments are analyzed in detail to infer Maoist normative organiza-
tional theory, which minimizes formal and specialized bureaucratic structure, combines Party and state functions into one organization, recruits along social class lines, uses the "masses" to supervise and discipline Party members, and decentralizes administrative power. The Party leader remains above Party discipline so that he can set goals, define dogma, and check tendencies toward decay, ossification, and revisionism.

Implementation of these organizational revisions will probably produce stress in the Chinese political system. While the mass-line can be an effective mode of both decision-making and social integration, its dogmatic variant may lead not only to impractical decisions, but also to factionalism and fragmentation. In a purely Maoist society, the only permissible form of conflict resolution is compliance with dogma. Compromise, logical analysis, and even submission to authority are all illegitimate. In the prevailing politicized atmosphere in China, this can only have the following effects: (1) compliance will become a matter of covert negotiation between superiors and subordinates, with subordinates refusing (supposedly on ideological grounds) to obey unpopular directives until modifications or side-payments are made; or, (2) refusing to compromise, the two sides will resort to force, each attempting to impose its will on the other and each justifying its actions in the name of class struggle; or, (3) the two sides will appeal to high authority (ultimately to Mao, Lin, and the Politburo) for arbitration of their dispute, a right guaranteed in the new Party constitution. Demands for intervention and appeals for arbitration will flood the Party Center, contributing to "input overload" there. The disputants may resist even the Center's resolution of the disagreement, compelling the Center either to compromise or to employ force itself.

Direct mass representation on the revolutionary committees and decentralization of administrative power both promise to increase the responsiveness of policy-making bodies to local demands and conditions. But the institutionalization of the revolutionary committee system may produce five parallel and competing bureaucracies: the mass organizations, the Party, the Army, the revolutionary committee, and the remnants of the State ministries. Decentralization of administration—designed to prevent such a rebureaucratization of Chinese society—is likely to lead to fragmentation and stagnation unless the Center can effectively veto unacceptable local decisions and unless the Center's ideological guidelines are generally compatible with the interests of China's localities and the desires of China's people.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During the early and middle 1960s, there emerged in Communist China serious discrepancies between two conceptions of policy-making, organizational behavior, and organizational structure: that held by Communist Party chairman Mao Tse-tung and his followers, and that held by a loose coalition of Party and Government officials, bureaucrats, and technicians led by chief of state Liu Shao-ch’i. Long-standing but muted differences became more severe and more salient as the two sets of prescriptions evolved in different directions. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), climaxx~ed in April 1969 by the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), represents in large part a struggle between these two opposing viewpoints. And the apparent victory of the Maoist faction in that struggle has wrought major changes in Chinese Communist theories of policy-making and organization. First, it produced major innovations in organizational structure and policy-making procedure, most notably a new form of administrative organ, the revolutionary committee, and a new constitution for the CCP. Second, in denouncing and then finally purging Liu Shao-ch’i, the GPCR led to the total rejection or the significant modification of each of his major contributions to Chinese Communist organizational theory: his understanding of the definition and applicability of the “mass-line,” his view of the nature and purpose of the Party, his guidelines for political struggle and conflict resolution within the Party, and his recruitment criteria for Party membership and Party office.

Because of these changes, Western analyses of Chinese Communist policy-making and organizational behavior made before the Cultural Revolution are now partially out of date. It is therefore necessary to revise those analyses to include the theoretical innovations and modifications occasioned by the GPCR. Such an undertaking will simultaneously indicate important elements in the ideological and political struggle between Mao Tse-tung and his opponents.

This paper, then, is a study of two competing Chinese Communist theories of policy-making and organization as of the close of the Ninth Party Congress. It is a study in three parts: (1) a discussion of modes of policy-making, (2) an analysis of Cultural Revolution prescriptions for organizational structure and task performance, and (3) an estimate of the effects of the implementation of these theories on stress and tension in the Chinese political system.

Some preliminary caveats are required. First, much of this essay is an attempt to abstract what might be called, in accordance with current Chinese practice, the “two lines”—Maoist and Liuist—on policy-making and organization. This approach may have tempted the writer to force dichotomies where none exist. Throughout the paper an effort is made to avoid the tendency to see total divergence between Mao and his opponents and to indicate points of congruence as well as of conflict.

Second, adopting the concept of the “two lines” may encourage the assumption that both Mao’s supporters and his opponents form coherent factions, each with a clear and consistent ideology. This is not the case. The labels “Maoist” and “Liuist” are used as a convenient shorthand to refer to two complex coalitions. The relationships among the components of
each coalition and the variations in their respective conceptions of policy-making and organization are major questions which deserve further study. This essay, however, is written in the belief that the juxtaposition of the two coalitions, while obscuring some of the rich fabric of the Cultural Revolution, can also provide useful insights to its origins and meaning.

Third, virtually any research on contemporary China encounters severe data problems. Information is available in considerable quantity, but its reliability and implications are often uncertain. In an attempt to cope with these difficulties, the following procedures were followed in the preparation of this study. To infer the Maoist positions on organizational questions, several types of materials were used:

- The 1969 constitution of the CCP.
- The pre-GPCR writings of Mao Tsetung.
- Official GPCR statements: statements by major central leaders (including Mao) and directives from central organs of power (State Council, Central Committee, Cultural Revolution Group, Military Affairs Committee, etc.).
- Semi-official GPCR documents: editorials and articles appearing in official periodicals (Jen-min Jih-pao, Hung-chi, Chieh-fung-chiin Pao, Peking Review, provincial newspapers, radio stations, etc.).
- Non-official GPCR documents: pamphlets and wall posters (ta-tze-pao) of Red Guard and other "revolutionary rebel" groups. These documents are the most voluminous (and often the most interesting), but the least reliable. Frequently, however, they do provide ideas and information that are later reflected in semi-official documents and in official statements. A filtered flow of information passes from non-official, through semi-official, to official sources. Thus, for example, one may see a wide range of charges against a given Party leader in Red Guard sources one month, and then see selections from these criticisms in semi-official or official sources several months later. One may also see a variety of proposals for organizational reform in non-official and semi-official sources, a few of which are later endorsed by official statements.

Unfortunately, the infrequency, brevity, and ambiguity of Mao's own public statements during the Cultural Revolution make it difficult to infer his positions directly. But if one relies on semi-official or non-official exegeses, a serious problem arises: the positions attributed to Mao during the Cultural Revolution are not always consistent with his own earlier writings. The explanation offered here is that the Cultural Revolution documents accurately reflect the changing views of a changing Mao, and that the GPCR represents in part Mao's attempt to restructure Chinese institutions to correspond with his revised theories of policy-making and organization. But it is also possible that the Cultural Revolution documents reflect the views of Mao's "followers" rather than those of the Chairman himself. This study will not attempt to explore this fascinating hypothesis. Rather, reference will be made only to "Maoist" positions, employing a deliberately ambiguous term to postpone the major (and perhaps unanswerable) question of the extent of agreement between Mao and his followers and the degree of disagreement among the various Maoist factions.

In contrast to the vast quantity of Cultural Revolution materials issued by Mao's supporters, his opponents have had virtually no public opportunity to put forward their views or to refute the charges made against them. To infer their positions, then, we must rely to a dismaying degree on two sources: pre-GPCR speeches and essays by Mao's opponents, and Maoist polemics published during the GPCR. While speeches and essays prepared in the 1940s and '50s provide an inadequate basis for analysis of events in the 1960s, and while the Maoist polemics are laden with vituperative and distorted characterizations of their opponents, both sources are valuable if used with care. As guidelines to the analysis of the GPCR docu-
ments, we may postulate the following assumptions:

- Maoists quote their opponents accurately, even though these quotations may be taken out of context and their implications distorted. Such quotations may provide useful insights if compared with contemporaneous Maoist statements, or if judiciously re-analyzed in their historical and rhetorical context.

- The theoretical and operational deviations ascribed to Liu Shao-ch'ı were in fact committed, but not necessarily by Liu himself. Rather, Liu is used by the Maoists as a symbol of a divided opposition group. In fact, three distinct components of the opposition to Mao are discussed in this paper: the central Party leaders purged in the Cultural Revolution, notably Liu Shao-ch'ı, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and P'eng Chen; major regional and provincial Party officials, such as T'ao Chu (Central-South Region), Wang En-mao (Sinkiang), and Li Ching-ch'üan (Southwest Region); and the technicians and "experts" in lower levels of both Party and government. Again, while it is not the purpose of this study to analyze fully the relationships among these three groups, it is important to realize that their conceptions of policy-making and organization may differ.

A final problem concerns the linkages between theory and practice. The concepts discussed in this study are, as already indicated, largely normative prescriptions. Although serious efforts are under way to put Maoist theories of organization and policy-making into operation, the success of these efforts is as yet uncertain. There is a need for studies of Maoist organizational structures and policy-making procedures in practice, as well as in theory. It is possible to speculate, for example, that the prescriptions are not meant to be implemented in toto, but rather, sufficiently to combat opposing forces in the system. Just as a pilot must oversteer his airplane when it is flying in a cross-wind, so Mao may be trying to keep China on course by pushing it to the left of the true target. Because of this gap between theory and reality—and because of the inadequacies of available data—the propositions and conclusions presented in this paper should be considered tentative and speculative.
II. POLICY-MAKING

Analysts of the policy-making process frequently adopt the convenient assumption that policy-making groups and organizations are homogeneous units, acting like single individuals, which gather and process information from the political environment. If this assumption is made, policy-making can be conceptualized as a set of five tasks:

1. Problem selection. Since attention spans are limited, no decision-making unit can cope simultaneously with all unsolved problems and unresolved issues. Some selection process is necessary to draw up a manageable agenda of problems for decision-makers to tackle. At times, problem selection involves no choice—the issue is forced upon the policy-makers by external crises or internal political pressures. But at other times, policy-makers can select the problem whose solution they believe would be most beneficial to the system and/or most advantageous to their own political positions.

2. Proposal formulation. After the problem has been selected, possible solutions are collected from both inside and outside the policy-making unit.

3. Policy selection (decision). A proposal is selected as policy. This process is usually assumed to be rational (i.e., selection of the option that combines maximum probable gains with minimum probable costs), but it need not be. Irrational elements may be introduced by stress, crisis, time constraints, previous commitments, contingency plans, operating procedures, etc. A major portion of the policy-selection stage may involve establishing the criteria for decision: the values to be maximized, the goals to be sought, and the levels of cost and risk to be accepted.

4. Policy implementation.

5. Policy appraisal. After the policy is implemented, its actual effects are compared against the criteria established in the policy-selection stage. This appraisal may lead to the ratification and extension of the policy, to its modification, or to its complete termination. It is during this stage that feedback reaches the policy-making unit.

A more sophisticated approach to policy-making analysis is to drop the assumption that the policy-making group is an integrated, homogeneous unit and to recognize the possibility of disagreement and conflict within it. To the tasks outlined above a sixth is added: resolving the differences of opinion that arise among the policy-makers in the course of the other five tasks. Disagreements over which issues to tackle, disputes over the goals and values to be pursued, divergent predictions concerning the outcomes of various options, resistance within the organization to implementing the policy finally selected, different appraisals of the policy's effects—all these represent additional elements that complicate group policy-making.

There is no single method for carrying out all these six tasks. Different individuals, groups, and organizations may employ different policy-making modes, each acting in the belief that its chosen mode will produce the
most satisfactory results if correctly applied. Furthermore, the same policy-maker may employ different modes for different issues. And debates may arise among policy-makers as to the best mode for solving a certain kind of problem. It is a major theme of this study that such procedural disputes—disagreements over the definition and applicability of policy-making modes—were a major characteristic of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

These disputes suggest the relevance of two dimensions along which policy-making modes may differ: (1) the degree of mass participation in the process, particularly in the stages of proposal formation and policy appraisal, and (2) the relative use of pragmatic and dogmatic criteria for making decisions. Table 1 combines the two dimensions to generate four possible policy-making modes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High mass participation</th>
<th>Pragmatic Criteria</th>
<th>Dogmatic Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic mass-line</td>
<td>Dogmatic mass-line</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic elitist</td>
<td>Dogmatic elitist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section will further describe the pragmatic mass-line, the dogmatic mass-line, and the pragmatic elitist modes; will identify their respective proponents; and will attempt to analyze the fate of each mode in the Cultural Revolution.

THE MASS-LINE AND ITS DERIVATIVES AS POLICY-MAKING MODES

The “mass-line” is advocated by both Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch’i as a mode of policy-making; it includes procedures for information gathering, problem selection, proposal formulation, policy selection, policy implementation, and policy appraisal. Mao’s essay, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership,” written in 1943, remains the most basic and most important description of the mass-line:

In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily from the masses, to the masses. This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of the ideas in such action.

In this passage Mao is, in effect, assuming that policy-making is to be performed by the hypothetical “homogeneous” unit mentioned above, or by a single individual. How, according to this view, should each of the first five policy-making tasks be performed?

1. Problem selection. The policy-maker (hereafter, “cadre”) gathers information on social, political, and economic conditions in the system. According to Mao’s theory of contradictions, each social problem is the manifestation of one of the unresolved contradictions inherent in all social situations. One of these unresolved contradictions “is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine and influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.” Therefore, the cadre’s research should analyze the principal unresolved contradiction in the social situation under study; in so doing, he is identifying the problem whose solution is most urgent.

2. Proposal formulation. The cadre “takes the ideas of the masses” on how to solve the problem.
3. **Policy selection (decision).** The cadre "concentrates" (Mao also uses the phrase "sums up"\(^{19}\)) these ideas, and authorizes the result as Party policy. What these two expressions (in Chinese, *chi-chung* and *tsung-chieh*, respectively) mean in practice is, as we shall see, not at all clear. In fact, their ambiguity provides a crucial component of a major dispute between Mao and his opponents over policy-making procedure.

4. **Policy implementation.** The cadre is to "go to the masses" and, preferably by persuasion, enlist them in implementing the policy; the masses are to "hold fast" to the policy and "translate [it] into action."

5. **Policy appraisal.** The "correctness" of the policy is determined in the course of implementation.

Thus, the basic form of the mass-line is a series of interactions between an individual cadre (the "leader") and the masses (the "led"). Two major derivatives of the mass-line acknowledge that most policy-making is performed not by individuals but by groups (committees) within organizations. The derivative applicable to committees is known as "collective leadership with individual responsibility," and that applicable to the organization as a whole is called "democratic centralism." The same process of investigation of conditions, summarization of proposals, authorization of policy, and implementation of the decision\(^{16}\) applies in each, with the analogous roles filled as shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Led</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass-line</td>
<td>Cadre</td>
<td>Masses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective leadership</td>
<td>Committee chairman</td>
<td>Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with individual</td>
<td></td>
<td>members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic centralism</td>
<td>Higher organ</td>
<td>Lower organs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mao Tse-tung and the Party opposition would undoubtedly agree on this general outline of the mass-line and its derivatives as a mode for making doctrinal, political, social, and economic decisions.\(^{17}\) But, as the following pages will try to indicate, they disagree on (1) the criteria to be used in making decisions and resolving disputes; (2) the best procedures for coping with risks; and (3) the range of the applicability of the mass-line as a problem-solving strategy.

**TWO VARIANTS OF THE MASS-LINE**

In *On Inner-Party Struggle*, Liu Shao-ch'i divides political and social problems into two types, "questions of principle" and "practical and concrete problems," whose solution requires two different forms of the mass-line.\(^{18}\) For "questions of principle," Liu advocates using the dogmatic mass-line, a policy-making mode that combines high mass participation with dogmatic decisional criteria.\(^{19}\) But for "practical and concrete problems," Liu proposes a variant of the mass-line that is considerably more pragmatic, retaining high mass participation but employing different criteria for decision. The two forms of the mass-line, which are in effect two separate methods of "summarization," reflect different conceptions of policy alternatives and lead to different criteria for choosing among them.

In contrast to Liu, Maoist statements during the Cultural Revolution have argued that
no distinction can be made between questions of principle and practical problems, that all issues are questions of principle, that to insist otherwise is to "negate the class struggle" and to ignore the "class basis of truth," and that therefore only the dogmatic mass-line is a legitimate policy-making mode.

Thus, Liuists and Maoists disagree on the correct policy-making mode to be applied to political, social, and macro-economic issues. Both factions advocate the use of the mass-line; both approve of high levels of mass participation in the policy-making process. But where the Maoists insist that dogmatic criteria be used to evaluate the proposals generated through consultation with the masses, the Liuists suggest that pragmatic criteria be employed. The discussion below compares these two viewpoints and the two variants of the mass-line.

*The Maoist Mode: The Dogmatic Mass-Line*

The Maoist mode of policy-making is based on the following assumptions:

- Every problem has a single correct solution; there is a one-to-one correspondence between problem and solution. Problem-solving is, therefore, less a matter of *choice* among options than a *diagnostic process*, the accumulation of sufficient information so that the nature of the problem and the single correct solution become apparent.

- The Thought of Mao Tse-tung, as supplemented by the Chairman's "latest directives," already contains all social laws and theories necessary to make such a diagnosis. This assumption is crucial and represents a major addition to the claims made for Maoism. Previously, Maoist models of problem-solving and policy-making were based on the premise that all the laws governing social behavior are discoverable and that the procedures set forth in "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" provided the *means* for discovering them. Now, however, Mao's thought has become dogmatized: social laws are not only "knowable" but already "known"; Maoism does not merely help men *find* solutions but already contains them. Many of Mao's opponents were criticized in Cultural Revolution documents for refusing to accept this refinement. P'eng Chen, for example, was quoted as saying in 1966 that Maoism can "open the way" for solving social problems. To the Maoists, he was thereby erroneously implying that "Mao Tse-tung's Thought has not yet opened the way for us [to solve problems] and that the way has to be opened anew." 

- *All* differences of opinion—even within the Party—are based on *class* differences. Conversely, those Party members with the same class standpoint and employing the same information will inevitably arrive at the same conclusions. Thus disagreements may arise during policy discussions for two reasons: (1) incomplete or incorrect information, or miscalculation, or (2) different class standpoints. If a disagreement is caused by miscalculation or by incomplete information, it can quickly be resolved. But if the disagreement persists, it must reflect differences in class standpoint.

- Policy choice occurs only between two contradictory options: the proletarian (0) and the bourgeois, revisionist, feudal, or imperialist (not-0). In the course of discussion, a polarization will occur between 0 and not-0; possibilities that seem, at first glance, to be additional alternatives will, upon more careful scrutiny, fall into one of the two opposing categories. This assumption seems to represent a change in Mao's thinking. In the past, he assumed that a trichotomization would occur between the left, the middle, and the right. Now, these three categories are to be read as "left in form but right in essence," "left," and "right"—that is, a dichotomy. A recent Hung-ch'i editorial quoted Mao as saying, "There are basically only two schools, the proletarian and the bourgeois. It is one or the other, either the proletarian or the bourgeois world outlook." 

- Given such a dichotomization, one op-
tion is necessarily correct, and the other incorrect. Mao has explicitly declared that all contradictions—both those "between ourselves and the enemy" (antagonistic) and those "among the people" (non-antagonistic)—are "a matter of drawing a clear distinction between right and wrong."25 The Thought of Mao Tse-tung provides the relevant criteria for identifying the "correct" proposal; the cadre’s task is to assign the proper labels to the two options at hand.

On the basis of these assumptions, we can abstract the Maoist mode for dogmatic mass-line policy-making. Investigation and study of a problem will yield information and proposals, each of which is incomplete, but which fit together—like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle—into the correct remedy. The remedy will be in accordance with the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, which is the highest and most complete systematization of the ideas of the working classes.

Thus, in the Maoist mode, summarization is a process of accumulation, addition, and synthesis that can be virtually automatic. The policy-maker is very similar to a high school student solving a physics problem or constructing a geometric proof. The student’s textbook contains not only all the relevant axioms, postulates, and formulae, but also (in the back) the correct solution itself. The Chinese Communist cadre’s text is the “little red book,”26 which concisely sets forth all necessary social knowledge and the solution to all social problems. Like the student, the cadre—after summarizing the ideas of the masses—checks his answer against those contained in his copy of the Quotations. Or, unable to arrive at his own solution, he summarizes the available information, identifies the problem, and obtains the solution directly from dogma. In short, every problem is assumed to have one correct solution; the cadre’s task is to find it.

An obvious question arises. What if the proposals do not fit together so neatly? Suppose they are contradictory rather than partial and complementary? What has "gone wrong," and what should be done about it?

For Maoists, the crucial dimension of disagreeement and conflict in the decision-making process is its persistence. Perhaps the conflict is illusory, based merely on miscalculation, different sources of data, incomplete information, and the like. If so, discussion will quickly clarify the dispute and the correct solution will readily be recognized. But if the disagreement persists despite discussion, sufficient evidence exists that a class contradiction is at work. If so, continued discussion alone will not resolve the contradiction, but it will collapse the various proposals into two contradictory options. The selection of the "correct" option is then made by comparing each option with the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. No other criterion (such as how many people support which option or what their reasons are) is necessary; correctness means correspondence with the Thought of Mao.27 As a recent editorial enjoined: "Use Mao Tse-tung Thought to analyze and resolve contradictions...[and] to distinguish right and wrong."28

As an example of Maoist problem analysis as just described, we might cite the case of the Revolutionary Committee of Wenhsien, a county in Honan Province. Soon after its establishment, a problem arose: in employing the mass-line, could the cadres make extensive use of the Poor and Lower Middle Peasants Association, or must they bypass the representatives of the peasantry and deal directly with the masses? In the investigatory report of the Revolutionary Committee’s activities, this issue was posed in the following terms:

After the county revolutionary committee was established in the storms of class struggle, its leading members still had differences in their understanding of whom to rely on. The overwhelming majority of committee members held that it was necessary to rely firmly on the broad masses of the poor and lower-middle peasants. However, certain members of its standing committee felt that it was only necessary to rely on a former poor and lower-middle peasant organization. Heated arguments took place....29

Debate and discussion continued, but—according to the report—"no one would give in." The persistence of dissent clearly indicated that class forces were at work. The dispute was finally settled by checking the two different
"answers" against the little red book, which revealed that:

The task of struggle-criticism-transformation cannot be carried out well by merely relying on a section of the poor and lower-middle peasants and it can be accomplished well only by relying firmly on the masses of poor and lower-middle peasants. The article concluded by stressing that this dispute represented "the dividing line between Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and the bourgeois reactionary line.”

Thus two options were discovered. By checking them against the writings of Chairman Mao, one option was labelled "bourgeois," and the other "revolutionary." No other criteria were employed to analyze the two options. In this example, the majority opinion prevailed, but (in theory, at least) this was mere coincidence.

As both the general analysis and the specific example indicate, correctness is more important than consensus. Disputes should be sharpened, not glossed over; the very persistence of a dispute despite discussion provides a necessary reason not to compromise. Nonetheless, there are two mechanisms built into the Maoist mode that tend to force compliance with the decision taken. First, there is the threat of being labelled a class enemy. Those who continue overt opposition to the "correct" policy run the risk of being told that the contradiction between themselves and the rest of the group has become antagonistic. Second, even if they decide that the risk of continued opposition is still worthwhile—perhaps given their conviction that the policy chosen would have disastrous consequences—they will nonetheless find that their continued opposition has made adherence to the policy even more tenacious. Objections raised by class enemies only make Maoists more convinced that their policy is correct: "Vigorous attacks by the capitulationists and diehards testify to its revolutionary and progressive nature and add to its lustre." Opposition to revealed "truth," in short, is both fruitless and dangerous, no matter how well-founded it may be.

The Liuist Mode: The Pragmatic Mass-Line

The pragmatic form of the mass-line combines reliance on mass participation in the proposal-formulation and policy-appraisal stages with the use of pragmatic criteria in the decision stage. It probably originated with Liu Shao-ch’i’s realization that not all issues could best be resolved on the basis of dogmatic criteria.

Liu agrees with Mao that "questions of principle" are class-based and must be handled uncompromisingly according to the dogmatic mass-line. But Liu believes that there are also "practical and concrete" problems, which must be handled differently. For each such problem there are several feasible solutions. These options do not represent a simple dichotomy between right and wrong (0 and not-0), but rather "various ways and roads" (0, 0, 0, ... 0), each with a degree of merit and a degree of risk. There is no expectation that the information collected by policy-makers will converge into a single option, or even into two contradictory options.

The mode presented by Liu for the solution of such "practical and concrete" problems is the "rational choice" model familiar to organization theorists everywhere, posing a choice, under conditions of uncertainty, among several possible options, the relative merits of which may be obscured because of inadequate information regarding their costs and risks. Selection among these alternatives is made by calculating the expected utility of each option (by subtracting the probable costs from the probable gains) and choosing the option with the highest expected utility. If such procedures are followed, the policy-maker may well reject the option that might bring the highest gain in favor of an option which, although less desirable, has a better chance of being successfully effected. No analyst has expressed this "minimax" strategy of choice under conditions of uncertainty any more succinctly than Liu Shao-ch’i himself:

There are often several solutions for concrete and practical problems. These ways and roads have their respective merits and demerits so far as the situations confronting us at the time are concerned.
Some ways and roads are the most advantageous to us but they are risky so, to play safe, we had better take the less advantageous ways and roads.  

It may occur that for each of the known options the expected cost is greater than the expected gain, or that uncertainty and risk are too great to permit a decision. If so, none of the options will be chosen as policy, even if this entails vetoing the "unanimous" voice of the masses. The problem will remain unsolved pending the invention of new alternatives or the acquisition of new information that favorably alters cost, gain, or risk calculations. There is thus no assumption that a "correct" solution exists for every problem.

The criteria used in such calculations are not necessarily political or ideological. For example, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, in his 1956 report on the revision of the Party constitution, called for "classification, analysis, critical judgment, and synthesis" of the information and opinions obtained by cadres during their investigations, but did not mention the necessity of using political criteria. Such a view has been condemned by the Maoists; to them, since all proposals are class-based, even the suggestion that decisions can be made on apolitical criteria is to hide the "class basis of truth" and thus to "negate class struggle."

The procedures of the pragmatic mass-line for dealing with disagreements among policymakers are markedly different from those of the dogmatic mass-line. To Liu Shao-ch'i, disagreement over the correct solution to "concrete and practical problems" is not necessarily class-based; honest disagreements over cost, risk, and utility estimates may arise even among men with similar goals and values. In such cases Liu would argue that "two can be merged into one":  

we should make all possible compromises with Party members holding different views concerning questions of a purely practical character.  

There can even be temporary compromises with those in the Party "who hold divergent views regarding certain questions of principle which are relatively not so important or urgent." In short, incorporated in the pragmatic mass-line are such consensus-building tactics as logrolling and bargaining, which are anathema to those who advocate a dogmatic approach to policy-making.

**Risk Control and the Use of Models**

To cope with the problem of uncertainty inherent in policy planning, all policy-makers must evolve strategies of risk-taking and risk-control. The strategies developed by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i are by no means totally dissimilar: they share a common reliance on models and experimentation. But there are significant differences between their approaches toward risk calculations prior to a policy decision, toward experimentation, and toward the use of models to reduce the risk of inaccurate policy implementation.

Unlike Mao, Liu has advocated the incorporation of risk considerations into the policy-maker's pre-decision calculations. As noted above, he has written that risk calculations before a decision is made may induce a policy-maker to choose "less advantageous ways and roads" over options that are more advantageous but more risky. Mao Tse-tung apparently believes that attempting to determine the risk or viability of an option before it is actually implemented is futile:

Only through the practice of the people...can we verify whether a policy is correct or wrong and determine to what extent it is correct or wrong."

Thus, instead of calculating the probability of failure in advance, Mao seems to assume that policy initially will fail:

...[G]enerally speaking, whether in the course of changing nature or of changing society, men's original ideas, theories, plans, or programmes are seldom realized without any alteration. This is because... [they] fail to correspond with reality in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect."
To correct the errors, investigation is made, during policy implementation, of the effects of the policy, and policy is revised accordingly. Risk is controlled, not by calculating it in advance but by keeping policy flexible.

As a further means of reducing risk, Liu Shao-ch'i has relied largely on small-scale, controlled experiments. "Key points," experimental units, and pilot projects are used to develop and test techniques that can later be employed on a larger scale. For example, Liu was quoted in a Red Guard document as saying:

"We must not set up too many [communes] at one stroke and go too fast. We should first conduct experiments to create the models and then gradually set them up in a well-prepared, methodical and orderly manner, by separate stages and groups.... The practice of daring to think, speak and act should not be followed on a nationwide scale but should be carried out in a small scope with typical experiments conducted first."

Both this statement by Liu (very likely a criticism of Mao's communes strategy) and Mao's own writings indicate that Mao has a different understanding of the role of experimentation and models in risk control. Mao does not rely on small-scale experimentation in pre-selected units before reaching a decision. Rather, he relies on the iterative features of the mass-line: large-scale experimentation is to be conducted after a tentative decision has been made, and policy is to be modified in accordance with the feedback received. As Mao declared:

"Put [policies] to the test in many different units...; then concentrate the new experience (sum it up) and draw up new directives for the guidance of the masses generally."

Such testing and revising of the tentative policy decision may have to be done "many times" before the "anticipated results can be achieved in practice." But each failure is acceptable, for losses are relatively small, and valuable lessons are learned from each mistake. A characteristic application of this strategy is to rely on competition among various units—each employing whatever methods and techniques it thinks will work best—in order to identify the best means of implementing predetermined policy. The most successful unit is then held up for emulation. The essential difference between Mao and Liu here is that they identify their models at different points in time. Liu pre-selects the model as the locus of planned experimentation; Mao post-selects the model after the results of the competition are in.

So far, we have discussed the functions of models as devices for policy appraisal, risk reduction, and proposal formation. Another major role of models is to aid in securing policy implementation: once the model is identified, its "case-history" is disseminated for emulation. This role is particularly prominent in China, for emulation of models is a major element in Chinese cultural learning patterns. As John H. Weakland has put it, for Chinese, "Imaginative preparation...may largely be a process of discovering the models to which a present or potential situation conforms and considering the permutations which they may undergo." But Mao's excessive reliance on the use of models has produced "blindness," as Liu has reportedly said. To Liu, learning from models is more effective than trying to implement vague directives, but relying on models runs the risk of mechanically copying the experiences of other units, without analyzing the special conditions and characteristics that contributed to their success:

"It appears that promotion at the present time of the method of comparing with learning from, catching up with the advanced and helping the backward [a model-emulation campaign in the early '60s] is better than the past method of abstractedly calling for exertion of efforts and aiming high. But if the method is overly promoted, blindness may also be produced."

Mao's major shortcoming is his reliance on a single model for the implementation of national policy. Because of China's diversity, this model has merely exhortatory value and little practical use. The success of the model convinced Mao that "it can be done," but this does not aid other units throughout the country. Their attempt to copy the model can "produce blindness"; Mao's enthusiasm over a single success may lead him to authorize policy that is infeasible on a national scale. Indeed, one explanation of the failure of the commune move-
ment is that Mao was unduly impressed by successful prototypes in the neighboring provinces of Hopei and Honan, established those atypical cases as models for national policy, and thus insisted on communication in areas with widely divergent political, economic, and social conditions.\textsuperscript{85}

The Two Modes In Conflict

A graphic illustration of the operational differences between the two policy-making modes is the construction of an aqueduct between two rivers in Chiyuan County of Honan Province.\textsuperscript{86} The basic problem was simple. The county lies in a rugged, mountainous region, between the Chinho and Mangho Rivers. Because of the contour of the land, water for irrigation was inadequate, drought was a constant and serious threat, and grain yields were consistently low. Given the proximity of the two rivers, the peasants naturally would "dream and spin tales that someday the Chinho would flow to the mountain districts and become a boon to the land." A relatively small-scale irrigation project in 1957 had diverted some of the water of the Mangho to Chiyuan County, but had since proved inadequate. The Mangho was a small stream with an insufficient flow of water. For a satisfactory irrigation system, it would be necessary to supplement water from the Mangho with water from the larger Chinho.

The basic-level cadres discovered that the masses hoped that an aqueduct would be dug connecting the two rivers. Water could flow from the Chinho into the Mangho, and then through the 1957 project to the fields of Chiyuan. As the construction of an aqueduct was the "unanimous desire of the masses," a proposal was drawn up and presented to the Chiyuan Party Committee in 1959. But the county cadres, employing the pragmatic variant of the mass-line, critically analyzed the proposal in terms of its costs, gains, and risks. The county cadres admitted that the gains achieved from constructing an aqueduct would be considerable. But they concluded that the successful completion of the project would, because of the mountainous character of the land, require technical and financial resources that were unavailable at the time. Accordingly, they vetoed the project on the grounds that "the masses are short of reserves having been through several years of natural calamities, so we can't take on this engineering job. As there is no state investment, we can't start this work."

But continued demands for more adequate irrigation led the county Party officials to invent a compromise: they proposed that a pumping station be constructed instead of the aqueduct. The costs and risks of such a project were considerably lower, and the gains would still be substantial, although not as great as those of the aqueduct. Of the three options—doing nothing, constructing the aqueduct, or installing the pumping station—the latter seemed the most feasible. Doing nothing was still seen as preferable to embarking on the costly and risky aqueduct construction project.

The Maoists, writing about this decision in 1969, presented a retrospective critique that points out several differences between the dogmatic and pragmatic mass-lines:

- According to the \textit{pragmatists}, the original proposal was vetoed because its probable costs outweighed its probable gains and because outside resources necessary to reduce the risks were not available.
- According to the \textit{Maoists}, the original proposal to build the aqueduct represented the unanimous view of the masses, did not conflict with doctrine, and therefore should not have been vetoed. The criteria used by the pragmatists were not contained in the Thought of Mao, and thus were illegitimate.
- According to the \textit{pragmatists}, the grounds for the veto were economic and technical.
- According to the \textit{Maoists}, the grounds for the veto were political and were class-based: the county Party cadres were "capitalist roaders" singing a "worn-out Right opportunist tune," and their cost calculations violated Maoist maxims that "the masses can perform miracles."
- According to the \textit{pragmatists}, a compro-
mised (the pumping station) could be devised that could substantially meet the demands of the peasants and the basic-level cadres at more acceptable levels of cost and risk.

- According to the Maoists, such a compromise was a "deceptive" and illegitimate way of settling a class-based dispute. The disagreement could properly be resolved only when the county cadres accepted the fact that constructing the aqueduct was the only "correct" option. The pumping station was seen not as a third option, but merely as a deceptive variant of doing nothing.

The differences between the dogmatic and pragmatic mass-lines are summarized in Table 3.

### Table 3

**Comparison of Dogmatic and Pragmatic Mass-lines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Dogmatic Mass-line</th>
<th>Pragmatic Mass-line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic model of &quot;summarization&quot;</td>
<td>Diagnostic: identification of the &quot;correct&quot; option</td>
<td>Rational choice: selection of the most feasible option, with the highest expected utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of factions</td>
<td>Class standpoint</td>
<td>Different information, analyses, predictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of options</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>Several</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for decision</td>
<td>Dogmatic: options compared with doctrine</td>
<td>Pragmatic: options compared with each other in the context of the concrete situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis for resolution of factional disputes</td>
<td>&quot;Correctness&quot;</td>
<td>Agreement on cost and risk calculations, or compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk control</td>
<td>Post-decision risk control through feedback and policy modification</td>
<td>Pre-decision risk control through prediction, calculation and experimentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Applicability of the Mass-Line: The Fate of Experts in the GPCR***

Mao Tse-tung's attitudes toward Chinese intellectuals and experts have always been somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, he has recognized that "China needs the services of as many intellectuals as possible for the colossal tasks of socialist construction." But on the other hand, he has feared that intellectuals and experts tend to be divorced from the masses, hold undesirable attitudes and values because of their predominantly bourgeois backgrounds, and even make serious and costly errors because of their lack of practical experience and their unwillingness to engage in labor.

Until the GPCR, Mao's policy towards China's experts and intellectuals was (1) to contain their influence within technical and micro-economic spheres, relying on mass-line policymaking modes for social and political decisions; and (2) periodically to attempt to reform the attitudes and values of which he disapproved. But in the 1960s Mao apparently arrived at a new perception of Chinese intellectuals and experts that made these two strategies seem
inadequate. He came to realize that experts are by nature an elite, a minority that can exercise influence disproportionate to its numbers because of its possession of special resources. Increasingly, Mao found, experts had formed an independent power center espousing attitudes and values which he opposed.

They thought they had "the 'capital' to bargain with the Party and the people" for political power, high income, and prestige; they strove to justify their influence by making their activities seem "mysterious" and beyond the ken of the masses; and they attempted to perpetuate their existence as an elite by molding "revisionist successors" in an educational system which they controlled and which favored youth of bourgeois background. On the basis of these new perceptions, Mao changed his strategy from containment and reform to an attempt to destroy intellectuals and experts as a social class.

A major element of Mao's attack on experts during the GPCR was an unprecedented effort to deny the desirability of employing experts for policy-making and decision-making and to affirm the feasibility of the dogmatic mass-line as a mode for solving even technical problems. The dogmatic mass-line, Mao's spokesmen claimed, is applicable to all issues; will automatically produce correct results, thereby surpassing pragmatic elitist decision-making; and does not require special training to employ it. "Expert" knowledge can be derived simply from a thorough investigation and study of the opinions of the masses: "To investigate a problem is to solve it. Just get moving on your two legs, go the rounds of every section placed under your charge and 'inquire into everything'... and then you will be able to solve the problems, however little your ability.""s1

In short, at the beginning of the GPCR Mao and his followers no longer merely said that experts and intellectuals posed a problem because, despite their valuable and necessary skills, they were politically and ideologically deficient. Instead, they claimed that the skills and expertise acquired in higher education and technical training are a sham, that "the lowly are most intelligent—the elite are most igno-

rant," and that the functions of the experts could be filled by ordinary workers and peasants perfectly satisfactorily. "Workers armed with Mao Tse-tung's Thought can perform miracles."

The Cultural Revolution ideal was to create a society in which every man would be an intellectual, every citizen an expert. China as a society with an intellectual class would be replaced by a society in which everyone would be a "peasant-intellectual" or a "worker-intellectual." Mao's ideal semi-intellectual would be ideologically correct, constantly purging himself of bourgeois and revisionist elements. He would be taught the necessary theory and skills to make important contributions to production, where his task would be to help solve practical problems as they arise. He would be available for leadership positions but would neither demand nor expect them; he would spring to the fore when needed, but would selflessly return to the ranks when the job was done; he would be a leader, yet would not act like an official.

Thus, the replacement of the pragmatic elitist mode of decision-making—with its reliance on experts—by the dogmatic mass-line was seen to have two advantages. First, it would prevent the waste and errors of the pragmatic elitist mode by assuring that decision-makers maintained close ties with the masses and workers. Second, the dogmatic mass-line—which did not require that the decision-maker possess expertise or advanced training—could justify the elimination of experts and intellectuals as a social class in China.

This hyper-romantic vision could not, of course, be realized. From the beginning of the Cultural Revolution the ideal was qualified and compromised. Scientists and technicians engaged in national defense work were exempted by the August 16 Directive from participation in the GPCR. And one of Mao's "latest directives," issued in Autumn 1968, declared:

The majority or the vast majority of the students trained in the old schools and colleges can integrate themselves with the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and some have made inventions or innovations; they must, however, be re-educated by the workers, peasants, and soldiers under the guidance of the correct
line, and thoroughly change their old ideology. Such intellectuals will be welcomed by the workers, peasants, and soldiers.

With this directive, Mao retreated from a strategy of destruction to one of reform.

But the emphasis on the mass-line for technical decisions continues. It is now institutionalized in at least one factory by the creation of the "three-in-one organization of scientific research." The tasks of the experts are now to be performed in tandem with the workers and "revolutionary cadres." The implication is that the workers and cadres will represent the opinions and ideas of the masses, and the technicians and experts will analyze and choose among them. The new system, in short, seems very much like the pragmatic mass-line described above, with high mass participation institutionalized in the decision-making process, but with continued reliance upon rational criteria for decisions. The experts will be retained, but they will be subject to ideological reform campaigns and supervision by ordinary workers. In addition, continued emphasis will likely be placed on the recruitment and training of technical personnel from worker-peasant backgrounds.

**SUMMARY**

Experienced politicians in China and elsewhere realize that the character of the policy-making process has a significant impact on the content of policy. The way in which a society formulates policies—the breadth of participation in the policy-making process and the criteria employed in reaching decisions—strongly influences what its policies will be. But even though they agree that procedures are important, Chinese leaders have differed as to which specific policy-making procedures are most conducive to the formation of effective policy. In this section we have identified four such policy-making procedures or "modes": the dogmatic mass-line, the pragmatic mass-line, dogmatic elitism, and pragmatic elitism. And we have argued that a crucial component of the Chinese Cultural Revolution was a debate over the relative applicability of these four policy-making modes to the solution of political and social problems.

A common interpretation of the GPCR is that the struggle between the Maoists and the Liuists represents a struggle between dogmatism and pragmatism and between the mass-line and elitism. This dichotomization, however, is an oversimplification. The differences between the Maoists and the Liuists are more subtle. One way of sharpening our understanding of this aspect of the GPCR is through the concept of "issue-area." Neither Maoists nor Liuists seek to apply a single set of policy-making procedures to all problems. Rather, their choice of policy-making mode is dependent upon the kind of question under consideration; Chinese decision-makers understand that policy-making procedures suitable for one kind of problem may produce inadequate decisions if applied to a different issue. A valid comparison of the Maoist and Liuist positions therefore requires that we consider each issue-area separately.

The notion of "issue-area" has been implicit throughout the preceding discussion. The "questions of principle" referred to by Liu Shao-ch'i are ideological and doctrinal issues; his "practical and concrete problems" appear to comprise political, social, and macro-economic questions. And the debates during the GPCR over the role of experts and intellectuals in Chinese society have largely been discussions of the proper personnel and procedures for solving technical and managerial (i.e., micro-economic) questions. In tackling these three sets of domestic issues and in coping with problems of foreign policy, the Maoists and the Liuists employ competing sets of policy-making modes. The positions of the two factions may be summarized as follows:
Table 4

MAOIST AND LIUIST APPLICATIONS OF POLICY-MAKING MODES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue-Area</th>
<th>Maoist Position</th>
<th>Liuiist Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy questions</td>
<td>Dogmatic elitist</td>
<td>Pragmatic elitist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological and doctrinal questions</td>
<td>Dogmatic mass-line</td>
<td>Dogmatic mass-line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political, social, and macro-economic questions</td>
<td>Dogmatic mass-line</td>
<td>Pragmatic mass-line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and managerial (micro-economic) questions</td>
<td>Pragmatic mass-line</td>
<td>Pragmatic elitist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the Cultural Revolution is viewed in these terms, some important conclusions emerge. First, the procedural disagreement between the Maoists and the Liuiists is not total, but is dependent upon the issue. To resolve ideological questions, for example, both factions advocate the dogmatic mass-line. On technical questions, both recognize the need for pragmatic criteria, while disagreeing on the desirability of mass participation. And on political issues, both seek mass participation in policy-making but differ over the suitability of dogmatic decision criteria. Second, the Cultural Revolution is not a clear-cut struggle between pragmatism and dogmatism. The Liuiists accept the need for dogmatic decision criteria on some issues, and the Maoists admit the necessity for pragmatism on others. Still, the Maoists advocate the use of dogmatic criteria for more issues than do the Liuiists. Finally, the GPCR can be interpreted as a dispute over the acceptability of elitism in that Mao—unlike Liu Shao-ch’i—does not apply elitist modes of policy-making to any domestic issue-area.

The struggle between pragmatism and dogmatism can be seen quite sharply in political, social, and macro-economic issues. Here, both factions advocate the mass-line and approve of high levels of mass participation in the decision-making process; but they differ over the criteria that should be used to analyze policy proposals and resolve disputes among policymakers. The crux of the dispute is the Maoist assumption that in discussions of public policy, as in discussions of dogma and ideology, divergent policy proposals stem from different class standpoints, and that policy-making is therefore a form of class struggle. This assumption the Liuiists reject. While the Liuiists accept the necessity for minimax analysis, compromise, and bargaining, the Maoists insist that conformity with dogma is the only criterion for decisions about public policy.

The struggle between elitism and the mass-line is clearest in the technical-managerial issue-area. As previously indicated, the Maoists initially advocated the dogmatic mass-line for the solution of these problems as a way of justifying the elimination of experts and intellectuals as a social class in China. When it became obvious that the “miracles” performed by “workers armed with Mao Tse-tung’s Thought” were not sufficient for continued technological innovation and managerial efficiency, the Maoists retreated a bit: while they still insist that the mass-line be applied to these problems, they now seem willing to accept its pragmatic variant, as institutionalized in the “three-in-one” organizations for research and management. The knowledge and skills of technicians and managers will be used in the policy-making process, but the participation of mass representatives in all domestic decisions will restrict the power and influence of China’s ideologically unreliable intellectuals and experts.
III. PARTY ORGANIZATION

A principal aim of the Cultural Revolution has been the rectification and reform of the Chinese Communist Party. According to a major Hung-ch'i editorial of Autumn 1968:

The great proletarian cultural revolution is an open Party consolidation movement carried out on an unprecedented scale by revolutionary methods. In scope and depth, in profundity of ideological criticism and repudiation and in thoroughness of organizational consolidation, it far surpasses any previous Party consolidation movement since liberation."

A distinguishing feature of such "organizational consolidation" has been its sweeping reform of Party structures, which has supplemented the customary rectification of individual Party members. In the early 1960s, the Maoists seem to have finally discovered for themselves one of the major tenets of organization theory: people's behavior is determined not only by their own values and attitudes but also by the goals and structure of the organization in which they work. Consequently, no thoroughgoing program of Party reform can rely solely on the re-education of Party members; it must also involve the restructuring of organizational activities. In short, the reform of role occupants must be accompanied by the reform of role structures.

This section examines the two major examples of organizational restructuring that occurred during the GPCR—the adoption of a new constitution and the creation of revolutionary committees—in an effort to infer some of the components of Maoist normative organizational theory. A fruitful way of ordering such an analysis is to consider, in turn, three major organizational activities: (1) the organization's definition of purpose and its relationship with other major societal actors, (2) discipline and control, and (3) recruitment. Finally, we will discuss the structural characteristics of the organization: its levels of centralization, specialization, and formalization."

DEFINITION OF PURPOSE

The Cultural Revolution has revealed that the primary goal of a Maoist CCP is less the creation of a utopian society than constant struggle against a virtually immortal and persistently powerful enemy. Maoists have severely criticized Liu Shao-ch'i for his vision of an idyllic future communist society in which there will be no exploiters and oppressors, no landlords and capitalists, no imperialists and fascists, nor will there be any oppressed and exploited people, or any of the darkness, ignorance and backwardness resulting from the system of exploitation.... By then all humanity will consist of unselfish, intelligent, highly cultured and skilled communist workers; mutual assistance and affection will prevail among men and there will be no such irrationalities as mutual suspicion and deception, mutual injury, mutual slaughter and war."

According to the Maoists, Liu described the communist society as "a bed of roses, without darkness or contradiction," thereby neglecting the need for continual struggle against the class enemy. These charges are unfair to Liu. Immediately after the passage just cited, Liu went on to warn that victory for the communist cause "can only be won through long and arduous struggle." And he admitted that, even after the Communist Party seizes power, the struggle against the influence of the exploiting
classes would have to continue “for a long time.” But the Maoists seem to feel that even holding out the promise of a future utopia is an invitation to complacency and relaxation.

The primary goal of a Maoist Party, then, is to steal itself, to keep itself pure, and to continue the struggle. This middle-range goal is an idealized process rather than an idealized final state. Accordingly, the GPCR is not a millenarian rebellion seeking a utopia. Rather, it is both a jacquerie and a “nostalgic” rebellion, seeking both to purge those who usurped Mao’s power in the Party and to restore the Party to the lean instrument of revolution that it had been in the Yanan days.68

The CCP serves as a link between the leader and society. The GPCR saw a redefinition of the Party’s relationships with both society and the leader. As to the former, the Maoists altered the way in which the Party is to provide society with political guidance. Before the GPCR, the administration of the state was characterized by dual rule:69 the supervision of any government organ was to be shared by its own superiors in the state machinery (who would supervise the technical details of the work), and its Party branch (which would supervise ideological and political affairs). This division of supervisory powers was based on Section 7 of Mao’s essay, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership,” a section written specifically to increase the Party’s control over governmental operations during the Yanan period.70 And the concept of dual rule was written into Article 51 of the old constitution:

Since special conditions obtain in public institutions and organizations, the primary Party organizations therein are in no position to guide and supervise their work, but they should supervise ideologically and politically all Party members in the said institutions and organizations.

But, interestingly enough, Section 7 of Mao’s essay is not quoted at all in the little red book, and no section comparable to Article 51 appears in the new constitution. The objection to dual rule seems to be twofold: (1) that it gave the Party insufficient control over state operations, and (2) that it gave rise to two complete bureaucracies—one Party, one state—parallel to each other. In his political report to the Ninth Party Congress, Lin Piao criticized the “organs of state power” as a “duplicative administrative structure divorced from the masses.”71 In accordance with an early 1968 directive of Mao Tse-tung, Lin declared, this duplication in administrative structure is to be eliminated: revolutionary committees will combine both Party and governmental functions in one unit under the principle of “unified leadership.”72 The doctrine of unified leadership is written into the new constitution as one of the organizational principles of the Party (Article 7), replacing the concept of dual rule.

As to the relationship between the Party and the leader, Mao’s ideal CCP is a smoothly running transmission belt between him and the masses, a static-free communications network for gathering and disseminating information and directives, and a frictionless organizational machine for implementing his policy decisions. Mao does not want the Party to become an institution with goals and purposes of its own. The Party is to have no goals other than the ones he authorizes; it is not even to value its own self-preservation, for it is to be discarded, remolded, or bypassed at the will of the leader. Mao wants to play neither the role of “honorary chairman,” stripped of influence and divorced from Party operations, nor that of chief executive officer, bound by institutional norms and enveloped by the Party. Rather, he wants to remain in constant contact but slightly aloof, so that he can both set the Party’s goals and actively supervise their pursuit. Too close to the Party, he would be restricted. Too remote from the Party, he would be unable to control it.

This conception of the relation between leader and Party is diametrically opposed to that held by Liu Shao-ch’i and Teng Hsiao-p’ing, the chief stewards of the Party apparat. Teng publicly declared in 1956:

Unlike the leaders of the exploiting classes in the past, the leaders of the working class party stand not above the masses, but in their midst, not above the Party, but within it. Precisely because of this, they must set an example in obeying the Party organization and observing Party discipline. Love for the
leader is essentially an expression of love for the interests of the Party, the class, and the people, and not the deification of the individual.73

And as Liu reportedly wrote more recently (1962):

Unless in the name of the organization, no one is allowed to lead. Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the leader of the whole Party, but he too submits to Party leadership.74

For Teng and Liu, then, love for the leader is love for the Party; for Mao, however, love for the Party is love for the leader. In a Maoist society, only the position of the leader is a social institution, valued for itself. The Party remains an organization, valued only for its service to the leader.75

DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL

How do Party leaders assure that their policy decisions are effectively and accurately implemented by lower levels in the organization? The new Party constitution and other Cultural Revolution documents have established new procedures for maintaining discipline and control in the Party, based upon considerable innovation, experimentation, and debate during the GPCR. In order fully to understand the new control structures, we must first discover the strains in the Party that led Mao and his followers to discard the old control system, and then discuss their theories of Party discipline and their prescriptions for organizational control.

Strains in the Party

A major source of strain and tension in the CCP—and indeed in any organization—is the complex and conflicting set of demands and expectations placed on cadres at all levels.78 Demands from above for production in greater quantity and quality at lower cost conflict with demands from below for more central assistance and lower quotas. Demands from above for uniform compliance conflict with demands from below for waivers and dispensations to meet local conditions. These conflicting role pressures are compounded by psychocultural factors, for, according to Richard H. Solomon, vertical communication is extremely difficult for Chinese because of their ambivalent feelings toward authority.77 As a result, the stress and tension for each cadre are quite severe. And their attempts—out of self-defense—to balance the incompatible demands on them may lead to serious violations of organizational norms and discipline.

Lower-level cadres,78 for example, may attempt to minimize responsibility, avoid making decisions, flatter their superiors, file false reports, and engage in corruption—all of which are potentially damaging to the system’s decision-making ability and to the regime’s ability to secure compliance from the basic levels.79 At the middle levels, these organizational tensions have contributed to the creation of “independent kingdoms”—intra-organizational cliques whose members are more committed to their bailiwicks, their colleagues, and themselves than to the center. These independent kingdoms produced serious disruption of Party communications and distortion of Party staffing policy. Downward communication was disrupted by distorting or pigeonholing unpopular central directives, by quoting them out of context, and even by forging them. Upward communication was disrupted by filing false reports, overly optimistic reports, or no reports at all. As the PLA Bulletin of Activities summarized the problem, middle-level cadres had “created a communications block by failing to relay in time instructions of the Party and their superiors on the one hand and failing to submit reports to their superiors on the other.”80 In addition, middle-level cadres were accused of placing their friends in key posts, of unjustly attacking and dismissing rivals, and thus of creating “watertight” Party organs and committees virtually impervious to outside pressure.

These strains in the Party became particularly intense in the “three hard years” following the Great Leap Forward. The ranks of cadres throughout China were plagued by corruption, extortion, squandering of state resources, speculation in state funds and state property, and a high rate of turnover. And the established Party control structures seemed unable to cope with the problem to Mao’s satisfaction.
The "Two Lines" in the Theory of Discipline

The theories of discipline of Mao and Liu are closely related to their views on factions in policy-making. A theory of discipline, in effect, represents the answer to the question, "What happens if factions persist after a policy decision has been made?"

As indicated above, Liu Shao-ch'i believes that factions within the Party usually represent honest disagreements over the best solutions to problems, and that differences of opinion among such factions—even on minor questions of principle—should be compromised in the formulation of policy. Once the decision has been made, however, it must be carried out. Party members who disagree may appeal the decision to a higher level, but they must obey the directive if the appeal is denied. The obedience of the Party member, in short, is not contingent on his perception of the correctness of the directive; it is, rather, unconditional. Insistence on absolute obedience and discipline is necessary, Liu has written, because of the heterogeneous composition of the Party; if everyone were allowed to go his own way, the Party would become irreparably fragmented.

The Maoist critique of Liu's views reveals the perennial Chinese Communist concern over the proper relationship between democracy and centralism. Mao paradoxically rejects the concept of unconditional obedience but accepts the necessity for much harsher disciplinary measures than does Liu. Mao's position is based on the premise that factions are class-based and that disciplinary questions in the Party are therefore forms of class struggle. Obedience is to be based on the political correctness of the directive; policy directives that are not correct (i.e., not in accordance with the Thought of Mao) are not to be implemented. Liu is accordingly accused of advocating a "one-man dictatorship," of insisting on absolute obedience in an attempt to turn Party members into "docile tools" so that they would "obey and follow his anti-Party, anti-Socialist instructions."

But if a lower level decides that a directive is incorrect, what is to be done? According to Mao's solution, lower levels may address a criticism of the directive to any higher organ, including the Central Committee. The higher organ must carefully examine the criticism to see whether or not it corresponds with Maoist ideology. If the criticism is found to be correct, the policy must be reversed. But if the higher organ believes that the original instruction is correct, it is to discuss the question with members of the lower organ and patiently persuade them that the policy is correct. In short, criticism should be handled in such a way that both levels "learn from each other" until agreement is reached.

Once again, Maoists fall back on two assumptions: first, that their ideology provides a clear set of answers and criteria for all policy questions, and second, that based on those criteria, agreement can always be reached among those who truly possess the proletarian standpoint.

The latter assumption leads to the conclusion that if agreement still cannot be reached after patient discussion, there must exist class enemies who must be ferreted out. Because the opposition has now been clearly identified as a class enemy, the relationship is one of antagonistic contradiction, and the most severe kinds of struggle tactics are to be employed. Obedience to correct orders (as opposed to any orders) is not an expression of the "slave mentality" advocated by Liu Shao-ch'i, but rather an expression of "proletarian party spirit."

The New Structures of Control

The persistence of corruption and speculation, of "commandism" and "tailism," and of "independent kingdoms" and "water-tight" fief-doms made Mao increasingly dissatisfied with the established procedures for Party control and Party reform. The Party stewards—relying on the regular Party control commissions, on routinized self-criticism and self-cultivation, and on the dispatch of work teams to supervise the basic-level cadres—seemed unable or unwilling to solve the Party's disciplinary problems. Mao's suspicions were by no means unjustified. In many cases, the middle-level cadres gave only lip service to the rectification programs, and the lower-level cadres knew it. As
one put it, "The higher-ups always talk about morality but they have something different in their hearts. Their words and actions never coincide."87

Mao's approach was to bypass the formal Party machinery and to create extra-organizational methods for Party reform. It was to this end that he oversaw the formation of Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations (PLMPAs), in the belief that if the PLMPAs could control the cadres, then he could control the PLMPAs. Similarly, he welcomed the emergence of the Red Guards, for they too seemed at first to be an organization that could easily be appropriated as an instrument for Party reform. And Mao's faith in extra-organizational control is also reflected in the new Party constitution. The old intra-organizational control structure—the system of control commissions—does not appear in the new constitution. Rather, it provides for direct supervision by the masses:

Leading bodies of the Party at all levels shall constantly listen to the opinions of the masses both inside and outside the Party and accept their supervision. (Article 5)

Other Cultural Revolution documents have indicated that this supervision is to take four forms. First, there is increased emphasis on direct, face-to-face contact between cadres and masses during the investigation stage of the mass-line; cadres are told to rely on personal inspection and research rather than on written reports and staff briefings. As Mao directed in late 1967,

From now on, cadres should go to the grass-roots level and make investigations; they should persist in the mass-line, consult the masses on matters that have come up, and be their pupils.88

A second form is mass criticism during the policy-implementation stage of the mass-line.89 Third, the masses are to be represented on all revolutionary committees. Such representation, it is affirmed,

...provides the revolutionary committees at [various] levels with a broad mass foundation. Direct participation by the revolutionary masses in the running of the country and the enforcement of revolutionary supervision from below over the organs of political power at various levels play a very important role in ensuring that our leading groups at all levels always adhere to the mass-line, maintain the closest relations with the masses, represent their interests at all times and serve the people heart and soul.90

Finally, the masses are to be permitted to attend Party branch meetings. Under the principle of "unified leadership," representation of the masses on revolutionary committees contributes to supervision over the Party, since revolutionary committee standing committees are simultaneously Party leading groups. But to provide even closer control, Mao has directed (probably at the First Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee) that "the masses outside the Party attend the [Party "reconsolidation"]/meetings and give comments."91 Party reform is no longer to be conducted behind closed doors.

RECRUITMENT

The maintenance of organizational unity and discipline depends not only on control structures but also on recruitment policies. A third organizational issue in the GPCR has been the standards to be used in the recruitment of new Party members.

As an indication of the importance of the recruitment issue, all but one of Liu Shao-ch'i's "six theories of party-building" (each roundly condemned by the Maoists)92 have immediate application to recruitment policy. According to the Maoist critiques, Liu neglected class background in recruitment in favor of technical expertise and management skills, and was willing to offer the possibility of promotion and personal gain as incentives to potential Party members. These policies "opened the door" for all kinds of bourgeois, revisionist, and self-serving elements to enter the Party.

To correct this situation, the new constitution drastically altered Party admission criteria, so that Party membership is now based much more stringently on class. The old constitution stipulated:

Membership in the Party is open to any Chinese citizen who works and does not exploit the labor of
others, accepts the program and Constitution of the Party, joins and works in one of the Party organizations, carries out the Party's decisions, and pays membership dues as required. (Article 1)

The new constitution states:

Any Chinese worker, poor peasant, lower-middle peasant, revolutionary armyman or any other revolutionary element who has reached the age of 18, who accepts the Constitution of the Party, joins a Party organization and works actively in it, carries out the Party's decisions, observes Party discipline and pays membership dues may become a member of the Communist Party of China. (Article 1)

Thus the Maoist approach to recruitment is highly selective, an attempt to keep the “class ranks” of the Party pure by admitting only those of “revolutionary” background. Liu Shao-ch'i's approach, as set forth in How To Be a Good Communist, was quite different. Liu recognized the practical impossibility of restricting membership to those with “demonstrated proletarian standpoint,” especially when the Party needed new members to supervise the administration of its rapidly expanding territory. He was therefore willing to accept lower—but more realistic—admission criteria, while putting faith in the Party's disciplinary and educational measures to keep its heterogeneous membership in line.

[It is not a bad thing that [those lacking a firm proletarian standpoint] turn to the Communist Party... We welcome them—everyone except for enemy agents, traitors, careerists and ambitious climbers. Provided they accept and are ready to abide by the Party's Programme and Constitution, work in one of the Party organizations and pay membership dues, they may be admitted into the Communist Party. As for deepening their study and understanding of communism and the Party's Programme and Constitution, they can do so after joining the Party.... Indeed, for most people it is impossible to have a profound understanding of communism and the Party's Programme and Constitution before joining the Party. That is why we only prescribe acceptance, and not a thorough understanding, of the Party's Programme and Constitution as a condition for admission.]

Mao, who came to distrust both the disciplinary and educational systems of the Party by the mid-1960s, obviously found this approach unsatisfactory. To him, it was this recruitment policy that had facilitated the “usurpation” of Party and governmental power by his opponents at all levels.

**STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS**

The new Party constitution, Maoist polemics, and the course of the GPCR all indicate that the new Party and the new revolutionary committees will be less specialized, less formalized, and will have elements of both greater centralization and greater decentralization than the old Party and governmental structures.

**Specialization**

The revolutionary vision of Mao Tse-tung has little room for specialization of either men or structures. To Mao, division of labor merely creates shortness of vision, unnecessary social cleavages, and barriers to communication. In his Directive of May 7, 1966, Mao in effect called for interchangeability of roles in all segments of society. Specialization of function would no longer exist: workers would become peasants, peasants would become soldiers, and soldiers would become workers. Coordination and communication would be promoted not by building linkages between specialized roles, but by enabling men to transfer from one role to another.

Translated into organizational terms, Mao's attack on specialization appears as a call for "simple and efficient structure." Emphasized throughout the GPCR, this slogan has been made an organizational principle in the new Party constitution (Article 7). A good summary of the Maoist position appeared in a Wen-hui-pao editorial criticizing "pluralism":

Pluralism is an old trick with many demerits. You take charge of politics and I production, so that there are many systems, many different groups of men, many organs with a big staff at many different levels; meetings are held excessively, contradictions are numerous and troubles are frequent.... The plural form of organization impedes the bringing of proletarian politics to the fore, bars the leaders from going among the masses and hinders the organization of a revolutionized leading group that keeps in contact with the masses.
To Maoists, excessive division of labor and excessive specialization lead to delay, departmentalism, and lack of coordination.

The major model in the application of the principle of "simple and efficient structure" is the Revolutionary Committee of Lingpao County, Honan Province. Jen-min Jih-pao commended the report of the committee's experience to all revolutionary committees and governmental departments. The Lingpao reforms proceeded in two phases. In Phase I (January 1968) the old government and Party organs were replaced by a revolutionary committee of 10 sections. (While information on government and Party structure in Lingpao before the GPCR is not available, a typical county studied by A. Doak Barnett contained 35 major government and party units in 1962.) That was, however, insufficient. According to the report, "The administrative structure was still unwieldy. . . . Many problems could not be solved in good time, thus adversely affecting both revolution and production." As a result, in Phase II (probably June or July 1968), the revolutionary committee was trimmed once again, both in the number of staff (from 100 to 30) and in the number of sections (from 10 to 4). The administrations of Barnett's "County X" and the two Lingpao reforms are compared in Table 5.

Formalization

An indication of the lack of formalization in the new Party structure may be derived from comparison of the Party constitutions of 1956 and 1969. In the old constitution, specification of the functions and powers of Party congresses, committees, and secretariats above the primary level required 16 articles (Articles 31-46). In the new constitution, discussion of the same organs constitutes three very brief articles, which deal not at all with powers, only with structure. For example, in the old constitution the National Party Congress is given the power (1) to elect the Central Committee, (2) to hear and examine reports from the Central Committee and other central organs, (3) to determine the Party's line and policy, and (4) to revise the Party constitution (Article 32). In the new constitution, the National Party Congress is formally empowered only to elect the Central Committee, although the Ninth Party Congress (which adopted the new constitution) did in fact perform the other three functions as well.

Disciplinary procedures are also left unformalized in the new constitution. The 1956 constitution devoted six articles (Articles 13-18) to discipline of Party members. It provided that disciplinary measures must be approved by either a higher Party committee or a higher Party control commission; that the accused had the right to defend himself; and that the convicted could appeal disciplinary measures to higher Party committees and control commissions up to and including the Central Committee. The 1969 constitution, in contrast, devotes only one article to disciplinary proceedings: there is no provision that disciplinary measures need be approved by higher Party organs or that Party members have the right of defense and appeal. Instead, the constitution provides a virtual blank check for a Party purge: "Proven renegades, enemy agents, absolutely unrepentant persons in power taking the capitalist road, degenerates and alien class elements must be cleared out of the Party and not be re-admitted." (Article 4)

Still another set of procedures left unformalized are those of elections. The provision in the old constitution that "The leading bodies of the Party at all levels are elected" (Article 19(1)), has now been replaced by, "The leading bodies of the Party at all levels are elected through democratic consultation" (Article 5—italics added). What this means is uncertain; election through democratic consultation, according to one source, refers to selection "as a result of repeated arguments, deliberations, consultations, and examinations. The cadres are discussed and examined by the revolutionary masses and approved of by the leadership, and besides there are always partial replacements and adjustments."

Whether the lack of formalization represents a deliberate decision to keep structures flexible or simply reflects uncertainty as to the most desirable procedures remains to be seen. Given Mao's past predilection to rely on formal-
### Table 5

**Administrative Structure in Two Chinese Counties: "County X" (1962)* and Lingpao County Undergoing Reform (1968)†**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>&quot;County X&quot;</th>
<th>Lingpao County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Party</strong></td>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization and personnel</td>
<td>Organization department</td>
<td>Personnel section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Administration)‡</td>
<td>Party committee staff</td>
<td>People's council staff office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and legal</td>
<td>Political and legal department</td>
<td>Political and legal staff office; public security bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces work</td>
<td>Seacoast department</td>
<td>Military service bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United front work</td>
<td>United front department</td>
<td>Overseas Chinese affairs section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and education</td>
<td>Propaganda and education department</td>
<td>Education bureau; culture bureau; health bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural work</td>
<td>Rural work department</td>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, and water conservancy staff office; agriculture bureau; water conservancy bureau; agriculture and land reclamation bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and trade</td>
<td>Finance and trade department</td>
<td>Finance and trade staff office; finance and tax bureau; communications bureau; grain bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and commerce</td>
<td>Industry and commerce department</td>
<td>Industry bureau; construction bureau; communications bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Statistics)‡</td>
<td></td>
<td>Planning and statistics committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Control)‡</td>
<td>Control commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Miscellaneous)‡</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil affairs section; labor bureau; market management committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS | 10 | 24 | 10 | 4 |

‡ Not included in Barnett's functional systems.
ized procedures (such as the mass-line) as insurance for correct performance, one suspects the latter explanation to be the more plausible.

Centralization

The degree of local initiative in policy-making has been a major issue throughout the GPCR. At the beginning of 1967, cadres frightened by the excesses of the Red Guards and by the potential consequences of making mistakes tended to pass problems upward rather than attempt to make decisions themselves. This apparently caused considerable confusion at the top, and Chou En-lai warned of a "big plot to pass the burden of all kinds of contradictions [problems] up to us." This abdication of decision-making power by lower levels was coupled with an increase in the total number of problems actually being processed by the system, as the power struggle between the two sides increased in both scope and violence.

In August 1967, however, following the Wuhan incident, Lin Piao reversed Chou's call for decentralization in an effort to preserve control for the leaders in Peking. Local decision-making initiative was severely curtailed.

One must report to and ask instructions from Chairman Mao, the Central Committee, and the Cultural Revolution Group. You must not think that you have yourself understood and need not report to the center; you must not think that it is clear and that you can deal with it yourself. . . . You need not fear that you are causing trouble to the center. No matter whether it is a big or small affair, everything must be reported and instructions sought for. The Premier and Cultural Revolution Group comrades are working day and night. You can send telegrams or [make] trunk calls.

Now that the situation is less chaotic, local initiative in decision-making has once again been increased. To use Franz Schurmann's terms, the final outcome of the Cultural Revolution seems to be a combination of "centralization" and "decentralization I," that is, power to the center and the bottom at the expense of the middle.

Legislation—the general, strategic direction of the Party—is to remain centralized. The Party Center retains control over supreme directives and ideological pronouncements, the convening of all Party congresses, and the election of Party committee members at all levels. Such an arrangement suggests that the Center will exercise its power primarily through general statements of policy and specific vetoes, rather than through the supervision of detail. Administration—the specific, tactical direction of the Party—is to be decentralized. Ideally, problems will be solved at the grass-roots level; the basic-level Party and administrative organs are told, "We cannot consistently wait for the leadership at higher levels to map out all the work details for us."

This decentralization may be a rationalization of Peking's current inability to provide central direction. But more importantly, it is also due to a reluctance by the Maoists to reconstruct the large, middle-level bureaucracy that would be required to transmit and administer detailed central directives. The Maoists have apparently concluded that it was the middle-level bureaucracy that was primarily responsible for distorting central directives in the past. By maintaining general direction at the very top and by delegating most specific decisions to the very bottom, the Maoists can reduce the functions and power of the middle levels. As in the case of the experts, an effort is under way to minimize the need for—and thus the Center's reliance on—Party members who have proven unreliable. In the meantime, it seems that the middle level's transmission and control functions are being performed by the Army.

SUMMARY

On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Mao Tse-tung had serious reservations about the way in which the OCP was performing its four major activities. First of all, Mao felt that the Party's definition of purpose had become perverted: the Party was concerned more with its own self-preservation and its members' social status and political prestige than with carrying on the revolution in China. It had, in short, become institutionalized. It was no longer the instrument for revolution that Mao had created. Indeed, it was more the master of the
leader than the leader was the master of the Party; the creation had supplanted and subordinated its creator.

As to task performance, Mao felt that the Party had become bogged down in bureaucratic procedures, had lost (or had deliberately broken) contact with the masses, and had fractured into a myriad policy factions and personal cliques. As a result, the Party was no longer a transmission belt between Mao (the leader) and the masses (his followers). It had instead become a block to communications, formulating incorrect, revisionist policies of its own or else perverting the correct, proletarian policies which Mao had entrusted to it.

These errors of task performance had persisted, Mao believed, because the Party's control mechanisms were ineffective. Party leaders who identified deeply with the Party machine—men such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Liu Shao-ch'i—relied too strongly on internal disciplinary procedures such as self-criticism and mild rectification campaigns; they were not willing, as Mao came to feel was necessary, to employ mass criticism and severe struggle in an attempt to eradicate the "revisionist" and "bourgeois" tendencies in the Party.

Finally, the prevailing Party recruitment policies, which favored technical and managerial skills and slighted ideological qualifications, produced in Mao a fear that Chinese society would be irreparably damaged by bureaucratism and revisionism unless the Party underwent drastic change.

To remedy these problems, the following concepts and structures have been adopted:

1. Dual rule, in which the governing of China was shared by Party and state, is to be replaced by unified leadership, in which the revolutionary committees will assume both Party and state functions.
2. The leader of the Party is to remain above Party discipline, so that he can set the Party's goals and check tendencies toward decay, ossification, and revisionism.
3. The disciplinary system based on inner-Party mechanisms (the control commissions, self-criticism, Party discussion meetings, etc.) is to be replaced by supervision by the masses. This will take three forms: re-emphasis of the mass-line as a mode of policy-making, representation of the masses on revolutionary committees, and mass attendance at Party meetings.
4. Recruitment criteria, although still somewhat vague, are to be based much more stringently on social class.
5. Specialization of structure is to be reduced.
6. Party structure is to remain unformalized pending the formulation and codification of desirable procedures.
7. Legislation—the general, strategic direction of the Party—is to be centralized. Administration—the specific, tactical direction of the Party—is to be decentralized. Power is granted to the center and the bottom at the expense of the middle, which the Maoists feel was the primary obstacle to the implementation of their policies during the early and middle 1960s.
IV. CONCLUSION

In *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, David Easton suggests stress as the organizing concept for the study of political systems. To Easton, stress is any threat to the effective performance of either of a system's two "essential functions": making decisions and gaining compliance. Easton's work provides a useful framework for estimating and evaluating the effects that Maoist theories of policy-making and organization, if implemented, will have on the Chinese political system. How adequate are Maoist organizational theories as models for making decisions and securing compliance? How well do they provide for the reduction or control of threats to the performance of these two "essential functions"?

THE MASS-LINE

Setting aside for the moment the question of decision criteria, the mass-line appears in many respects to provide an effective program for both decision-making and social integration:

- It places considerable emphasis on thorough investigation and research by policy-makers.
- It provides an effective means of restricting and regulating the flow of demands to policy-makers by giving legitimacy to demands only when articulated under the guidance of cadres. That is, the masses can legitimately present their views only when asked to do so. At the same time, the emphasis on constant investigation reduces the possibility that a backlog of unheard and unsatisfied demands will threaten the level of support for the regime.
- As Easton points out, a high level of "input volume" — the multitude of problems facing decision-makers — can threaten effective task-performance if not properly regulated. The mass-line aids in the assignment of task priorities by prescribing that cadres concentrate on the principal contradiction at each point. (It additionally assumes that the successful resolution of the principal contradiction will greatly facilitate the solution of secondary problems.)
- The mass-line provides a strategy for risk-taking based on the repeated testing and modification of policy. Experimentation and trial and error prevent inflexible commitment to infeasible policies. (On the other hand, the Chinese fascination with models also carries the danger that decision-makers will, on the basis of success in a few prototypical units, overconfidently authorize policy on a broader scale than is objectively warranted.)

The use of dogmatic decision criteria, however, adds some potentially stress-creating aspects to the mass-line model. Granted, a dogmatic approach to policy-making offers assurance that every problem can be correctly diagnosed if the proper procedures are followed. Granted, by using dogmatic criteria all "legitimate" demands can be aggregated into a single policy option, and that conflict and disagreement are therefore "illegitimate." But these assumptions may create self-confidence and unity...
at the expense of wisdom and creativity. The assumption that dogma holds the answers to all problems may blind decision-makers to more realistic and feasible solutions; the assumption that opposition is illegitimate may deprive leaders of discerning criticisms of their policies.

Most important, systems of organizational discipline and programs for policy-making based on dogma alone can function only if dogma is specific, and if complete compilations of doctrine are available to everyone. But Maoist dogma in its most familiar form is a slim volume of general and ambiguous aphorisms, supplemented occasionally by "supreme directives" of comparable vagueness. Such a body of dogma doubtless creates as many disputes as it resolves.

Yet no other method of conflict resolution is permitted. To compromise is to "neglect class struggle." To reason is to "ignore the class basis of truth." To submit to authority is to become a "docile tool." But if dogma is to be the arbiter of all disagreements, who then is to be the arbiter of dogma? In the politicized atmosphere now pervading China, continued reliance on dogma can only have the following effects:

- Compliance will become a matter of covert negotiation between superiors and subordinates, with subordinates refusing (supposedly on ideological grounds) to obey unpopular directives until modifications or side-payments are made; or
- Refusing to compromise, the two sides will resort to force, each attempting to impose its will on the other and each justifying its actions in the name of "class struggle"; or
- The two sides will appeal to higher authority (ultimately Mao, Lin, and the Politburo) for arbitration of their dispute, as is guaranteed in the new Party constitution. Demands for intervention and appeals for decision will flood the Party Center, contributing to "input overload" there. Even the Center's definitive resolution of the disagreement may be resisted, compelling the Center

either to compromise or to employ force itself.

As Teng Hsiao-p'ing once commented, the possibilities for chaos, fragmentation, and factionalism in such a situation are endless:

Since this group of people can rise up to overthrow that group of people, why can't that group of people rise up to overthrow this group of people?107

**ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

Three significant features of post-Cultural Revolution organization are direct mass participation in policy-making, the replacement of "dual rule" by "unified leadership," and the increasing power of the center and the basic level at the expense of the middle.

Mass representation on revolutionary committees seems to be an effective way of increasing the responsiveness of policy-making bodies to local demands and conditions. The "three-in-one combination" for policy-making and technical innovation is quite similar in both form and function to direct community participation in poverty agencies in the United States. But one wonders what will happen as this "three-in-one" system becomes routinized. One possible effect is that the mass organizations will become increasingly powerful, selecting "mass" representatives to serve on revolutionary committees at all levels. If this occurs, a second possible effect is the nightmarish growth of five parallel bureaucracies in China. Each component of the revolutionary committees would possess its own hierarchy: the Party, the mass organizations, and the Army. The system of revolutionary committees—extending from the provinces down to the basic levels—would form a bureaucracy of its own. And the ministries of the State Council might well retain their own nationwide organizations, although this state machinery would probably be considerably weaker than it was before the GPCR. In short, "dual rule" would be replaced not by "unified leadership" but by "quintuple rule."

The reemergence of such bureaucracies will, in theory, be prevented by increasing de-
centralization. Vast middle-level organizations will not develop because they will not be needed; most decisions will be made at the basic levels. Such a plan seems viable. But will the center be able to provide—and enforce—the general guidance and the specific vetoes necessary to prevent the fragmentation and stagnation of the system? Increased decentralization will alleviate stress on cadres by reducing the flow of central directives. Nevertheless, role stress will continue to be a major problem as long as central Party policy remains less a response to the desires of the Chinese people than a reflection of what dogma decrees those desires should be. As in the past, inactivity, corruption, disobedience, and high resignation rates at the basic levels may plague the Party in the future.

Despite their shortcomings, however, Maoist theories of policy-making and organization represent serious attempts to tackle some serious problems, the implications of bureaucratization, routinization, and specialization in a modernizing society. They should neither be dismissed as the fantasies of a senile peasant, nor be embraced as the insights of a visionary sage. Instead, they deserve careful and critical attention, and their success or failure in the China of the 1970s will provide valuable lessons for us all.
NOTES

1. Such theories are, of course, normative rather than empirical.


3. These inconsistencies will be identified as they appear in the paper, but they might conveniently be summarized here. The Cultural Revolution documents differ from Mao’s earlier writings as to (1) the applicability of “collective leadership and individual responsibility,” (2) the claims made for the Thought of Mao Tse-tung as a body of knowledge, (3) the number of options that will emerge during discussion of questions of principle, (4) the necessity for developing strategies to cope with risk, (5) the proper policy toward intellectuals and experts, and (6) the applicability of the mass-line for technical and administrative decisions.

4. We know that at least two factions were so radical that they were suppressed. One was the Sheng-wu-lien of Hunan Province, apparently a student group, which opposed the establishment of revolutionary committees, criticized the lenient treatment afforded most bureaucrats, and proposed a purge of the PLA. See Union Research Service, Vol. 51, No. 19-20 (June 7, 1968), and Vol. 51, No. 5-6 (April 19, 1968); and Klaus Mehnert, Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad, (China Research Monograph No. 4, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1969). The other was the “leftist” component of the central Cultural Revolution Group (Wang Li, Ch’i Pen-yü, Kuan Feng, and Mu Hsin), purged in late 1967. The views of this virulently radical clique may have influenced some of the documents used in this study, but most of the materials analyzed here were published well after their purge.

5. Such studies are currently being prepared by two analysts who were instrumental in sparking and sustaining this writer’s interest in these questions, Michel Okensberg and Thomas Robinson.

6. Some evidence for this speculation will be provided in the discussion of the fate of “experts” in the GPCR, in Section II.


8. Note that (1) policy implementation and policy appraisal are, in the following model, considered to be integral components of the overall policy-making process rather than parts of a separate, subsequent process, and (2) both problem selection and policy appraisal may involve extensive decision processes themselves, since an element of choice is inherent in each.

9. "Mass participation" refers to direct, institutionalized consultation between policy-makers and their constituents. Excluded from this concept are indirect forms of participation in policy-making such as elections (in which only policy-makers, not policy itself, are selected) and uninstitutionalized forms of participation such as protest demonstrations.

10. As used here, "pragmatic" means that the options under consideration are compared with each other and are evaluated in terms of their outcomes; "dogmatic" means that the options are compared with established doctrine and are evaluated in terms of their conformity to its tenets.

A Maoist would, of course, deny the validity of this distinction. He would argue that, since doctrine is derived from practice and is tested in practice, dogmatic criteria are simultaneously pragmatic. This claim should be considered seriously; certainly "dogmatic" is not employed here in a pejorative sense. Indeed, the two sets of criteria often suggest the same policy choice. On the other hand, the degree of correspondence between doctrine and practice may vary considerably. In fact, the reliance of theoreticians on a large bureaucracy for reports on concrete situations and the resistance of doctrine itself to modification (see below, n. 46) both pose obstacles to the realization of "pragmatic doctrine."

11. One can speculate that in a Maoist regime foreign policy decisions would be made by a mode using dogmatic criteria but low mass participation. As foreign policy is outside the scope of this study, this "dogmatic elitist" policy-making mode will not be discussed further.


17. One caveat should be made, however. Although Mao himself laid the basis for the theory of collective leadership and individual responsibility (CL/IR) in his directive "On Strengthening the Party Committee System," (SR, pp. 293-294), and although major portions of that directive are cited in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), Section X, "Leadership of Party Committees," CL/IR is not mentioned as an organizational principle of the Party in the 1969 constitution as it was in Article 19(5) of the 1956 constitution. And while during the GPCR literature frequently called for the implementation of the mass-line and the improvement of democratic centralism in the Party, this writer has seen none that ad-
vocated collective leadership and individual responsibility. A likely reason for this omission is that the Maoists consider the political situation still so fluid that recourse to purely individual (i.e., dictatorial) leadership at various levels must be retained as a legitimate option. There is no point in giving the opposition ammunition with which to attack the obvious cases of non-collective leadership. It should be pointed out, however, that CL/IR has not been condemned, nor has it been associated with Liu or Teng. This suggests the possibility of its re-introduction in the future, when the political situation has stabilized.


19. This is not to say that Mao and Liu have identical models for the operation of the dogmatic mass-line. Mao and his followers make greater claims for the power of Maoist doctrine than does Liu; see second assumption, p. 7.


21. “Circular of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (May 16, 1966),” in Peking Review, May 19, 1967, Section 10. Italics added. Both Lyman Van Slyke and Michel Oksenberg have suggested to the writer that, to use Franz Schurmann’s terms, the GPCR represents the elevation of “Maoism” from the realm of “thought” or “practical ideology” (a set of ideas that provides methods of action) to that of “theory” or “pure ideology” (a set of ideas that provides a unified and conscious world-view). (See Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 22 ff.) As Mao once applied Marxism-Leninism to China, the Chairman’s disciples (notably Lin Piao) are now to apply Maoism to the current situation. While this argument is persuasive, it should be noted that the CCP still refers to Mao’s works as “thought” (suzuhsiang), not “theory” (chu-yi).

22. As Mao wrote in “On Contradiction,” p. 76, “Every difference in men’s concepts should be regarded as reflecting an objective contradiction... Opposition and struggle between ideas...is a reflection within the Party of contradictions between classes and between the old and the new in society.” Italics added.


26. There are now other little red books, such as Chairman Mao Tse-tung on People’s War, but Quotations remains the little red book.


30. Ibid.

31. For an article stressing that the majority view should prevail only if it conforms to the “basic interests” of the masses (i.e., to the Thought of Mao), see “Whose Opinion Should Prevail?”

32. For an explicit warning that continued opposition to established policy would lead to being so labelled, see “Realize

33. Mao, "To Be Attacked by the Enemy is Not a Bad Thing But a Good Thing," SR, p. 130.

34. One is reminded of Don Quixote's response to the attempts of his friends to "prove" that his quest was merely a delusion: "Facts are the enemy of truth."

35. A major theme in both On Inner-Party Struggle and How To Be a Good Communist (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964) is the insistence that the two kinds of problems not be confused. One of Liu's major fears is that all differences in the Party will be magnified into matters of principle, and that the resulting continuous and bitter struggles will tear the Party apart: "The principle of inner-Party struggle does not mean that when there are no differences of principle...in the Party, we should deliberately magnify into 'differences of principle' divergences of opinion among comrades on questions of a purely practical nature." (How To Be a Good Communist, p. 88.)

36. On Inner-Party Struggle, p. 50.

37. For an example of such a veto—vehemently condemned by the Maoists—see "Today's 'Foolish Old Man' Nurtured by Mao Tse-tung Thought," Peking Review, July 18, 1969, pp. 14-17. This particular case will be discussed in some detail below.


39. The phrase is not from Liu but from philosopher Yang Hsien-ch'en. It is suggested, however, that Liu would agree with its implications.

40. Liu, On Inner-Party Struggle, p. 50. Italics added.

41. Ibid., p. 52.


43. Mao's strategy for dealing with risk is superfluous if one assumes that the use of his ideology makes policy formulation infallible. This contradiction may be resolved in one of several ways: (1) the two elements of Mao's policy-making program are simply inconsistent; (2) the use of his ideology makes general policy prescriptions infallible, but the details of implementation must be worked out by trial and error; or (3) Mao's risk-taking strategy was worked out before the dogmatization of his ideology, at a time when his writings contained only the methods for finding answers, not the answers themselves.

44. Quotations, p. 6.


46. A more recent quotation from Mao suggests that policy can be revised only if the revision is in conformity with doctrine: "[K]nowledge...is applied in social practice to ascertain whether the theories, policies, plans or measures meet with the anticipated success. Generally speaking, those that succeed are correct and those that fail are incorrect..." (Mao, "Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?" [1963], SR, p. 405.) The qualification "generally speaking" explicitly admits the possibility that policy that is doctrinally correct can nonetheless fail. Mao goes on to say that failure in such a case is due to the temporary "balance of forces," and that policy
should not be altered, because it will "triumph sooner or later." Mao believes in flexibility, but only if dogma is not compromised. Italics added.

47. Readers of an earlier draft of this paper pointed out that this section might be interpreted as a suggestion that Mao is "reckless" or "irrational," particularly in foreign policy. Such an inference would be totally unwarranted. The type of risk control strategy described here is as respectable, reasonable, and "rational" as are attempts to calculate risks in advance. One can predict, not that Mao will embark on reckless foreign policy initiatives, but that he will select policy options that (1) facilitate the maintenance of strict central control over their execution, (2) are reversible and thus preserve flexibility, and (3) provide opportunities to assess the outcome before irrevocably committing China to their pursuit.

Evidence for these propositions is already available. In the intervention in the Korean War in 1950, the Quemoy crises of 1954-55 and 1958, and the invasion of India in 1962, the initial Chinese actions were either tentative (Korea and India) or reversible (Quemoy). As to the maintenance of central control, apparently reliable Red Guard sources have accused Lo Jui-ch'ing (former chief of staff) of delegating to the Foochow military district the authority to "take the initiative to attack the enemy [in the Taiwan Strait]...so as not to miss the chance of battle." Lo acted, according to the Red Guard sources, in direct violation of the Military Affairs Committee, which had ordered that all combat actions in the Straits be approved in advance by the Central Committee. Lo was described as "rash" and "reckless," not so much for advocating risky actions, but for delegating responsibility for decisions away from the Center. (See Liaison Center for Repudiating Liu, Teng, and Tao, Chinese Science and Technology University's Tungfanghung Commune, Red Guard Congress, "Down with Lo Jui-


49. In fact, the experimental farms developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s were criticized during the GPCR as being unrepresentative of local conditions, isolated from the masses, and divorced from political study—from a broadcast over Radio Chengtu, February 13, 1968.


55. See Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 474 ff. for the location of the prototypical communes.

56. The following section is based on "Today's 'Foolish Old Man' Nurtured by Mao Tse-tung Thought," pp. 14-17. This case
study is not necessarily accurate in every detail. It is based upon a retrospective rewriting of history by the Maoists, intended to clarify the differences between two styles of decision-making, rather than to present an objective historical account.

57. The term "expert" here refers to those Party and government bureaucrats and industrial and scientific technicians who employ the pragmatic elitist mode of decision-making, characterized by a reliance on expertise and rational decisional criteria. The term "intellectual" is used interchangeably with "expert" in the sense that all experts are simultaneously intellectuals. Chinese Communists define "intellectuals" in several ways: (1) as a class ("mental workers"), (2) by educational achievement ("all those who have had middle school or higher education"), and (3) by occupation ("university and middle school teachers and staff members, university and middle school students, primary school teachers, engineers and technicians"). See Mao, "Rectify the Party's Style of Work," SR, p. 186, n. 2.


59. Morton White makes the point that political leaders can adopt any of three strategies in dealing with intellectuals who espouse "undesirable" attitudes and values: they can grant them a degree of autonomy but attempt to contain their influence within prescribed areas; they can admit their value to society but attempt to reform their undesirable attitudes and values; or they can deny altogether their value to society and attempt to destroy them as a class. See his "Reflections on Anti-Intellectualism," Daedalus, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Summer 1962), pp. 457-468.

60. "Letter of Fourth Class of Senior Third Grade, Peking No. 1 Girls Middle School," China Reconstructs, Vol. 15, No. 10 (October 1966), pp. 52-53.


65. These dimensions for analyzing organizations are drawn from Parsons' functional needs of social systems, as described in Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1966), pp. 57 ff.; from D. S. Pugh et al., "A Conceptual Scheme for Organizational Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (December 1963), pp. 289-315; and from R. H. Hall et al., "An Examination of the Blau-Scott and Etzioni Typologies," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (June 1967), pp. 118-139. A fourth organizational activity is, naturally, goal attainment, which was discussed in Section II.

66. Liu, How To Be a Good Communist, p. 36.

68. According to Chalmers Johnson, jaccuer-
ies are rebellions “motivated by a belief
that the system had been betrayed by its
elite” and that “one or more of their au-
tority statues is occupied by a usurper....” “Nostalgic’ rebellions” is
my own term for what Johnson described
as rebellions “which espouse the revival
or reintroduction of an idealized society
that allegedly existed in the society’s own past.” See Johnson, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
On the GPCR’s deposing of usurpers, see
Lin Piao, “Report to the Ninth National
Congress of the Communist Party of
14: “Liu Shao-ch’i gathered together a
gang of renegades, enemy agents, and
capitalist-rovers[and] usurped impor-
tant Party and government posts....”
Italics added.

69. For a discussion of the distinction be-
tween dual rule and vertical rule, see
Schurmann, Ideology and Organization,
pp. 188-194.

70. Mao, “Some Questions Concerning Meth-
ods of Leadership,” pp. 237-238. For the
background of the inclusion of the dual
rule section in this essay, see Mark Sel-
den, “The Yenan Legacy: The Mass Line,”
in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), Chinese Commu-
nist Politics in Action (Seattle: University

71. Lin, “Report to the Ninth National Con-
gress,” p. 20.

72. Mao’s directive is quoted in ibid. In one
model factory, for example, the Party’s
leading group concurrently served as the
revolution committee’s standing com-
mittee; the separation was in name only—
“Using Chairman Mao’s Line on Party
Building to Consolidate the Party Organ-
36. Overlapping membership in Party and
state organs, which had existed particu-
larly at lower levels, was to be vastly in-
creased.

73. Teng, Report on the Revision of the Con-
stitution, p. 82. Italics added.

74. Liu, “Organizational and Disciplinary
Cultivation,” quoted in “Selected Edition
of Liu Shao-ch’i’s Counterrevolutionary
Revisionist Crimes,” by Nank’ai Univer-
sity, August 18 Red Rebel Regiment (un-
der the banner, “Pledging to Fight a
Bloody Battle with Liu-Teng-T’ao to the
End”), April 1967, in Selections from
China Mainland Magazines, No. 651

75. This distinction between “institution”
and “organization” is based on Philip
Selznick, Leadership in Administration
(Berkeley: University of California Press,
1957). To Selznick, organizations are “ex-
pendable tools,” designed to perform a
task; institutions are organizations or
roles that are infused with value for mem-
ers of the organization or members of
society.

76. For a valuable study of these “role pres-
sures” and their impact on both organi-
zation and individual, see Robert L. Kahn
et al., Organizational Stress: Studies in
Role Conflict and Ambiguity (New York:

77. See, for example, “Communications Pat-
terns and the Chinese Revolution,” China
Quarterly, No. 32 (October-December

78. Throughout this paper, “center” refers to
the Central Committee and organs at-
tached to it; “lower” and “basic” levels refer
to levels below the hsien (county); and
“middle” level refers to hsien, provin-
cial and regional organs.

79. On these tactics, see Michel Oksenberg,
“China: A Quiet Crisis in Revolution,”
Asian Survey, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January
1966), pp. 3-11; and idem “The Institu-
tionalization of the Chinese Communist Re-
volution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve
of the Cultural Revolution,” China Quar-
terly, No. 36 (October-December 1968), pp.
61-92.

80. Philip Bridgham, “Mao’s Cultural Revo-
lation: Origin and Development,” China
Quartely, No. 29 (January-March 1967), pp. 1-35.

81. Liu, On the Party, pp. 17, 100.

82. "Resolutely Defend the Party Principle of Democratic Centralism," Peking Review, April 19, 1968, pp. 20-22. Indeed, in the original draft of the new constitution, obedience to superiors was not mentioned as a duty of a Party member. Even in the final version, lower organs are merely placed "subordinate to" higher organs, rather than specifically ordered (as they were in the old constitution) to "obey" their superiors.

83. For a Maoist attempt to sort out these problems see T’ang Hsiao-tao, "Submission or Boycott?" Jen-min Jih-pao, December 17, 1967, in Current Background, No. 849 (March 11, 1968), pp. 14-15.

84. Under the old constitution (Article 26), such an appeal could be addressed only to the organ issuing the directive.

85. On revision of policy by a higher organ to comply with "correct" criticism, see "A County Revolutionary Committee Having Close Ties With the Masses," pp. 6-7.

86. Two such rectification campaigns—allegedly administered by Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and P'eng Chen—were the Socialist Education Movement (1962-66) and the socialist (as opposed to proletarian) cultural revolution (November 1965—July 1966). On the former, see Richard Baum and Frederick Teiwes, Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962-66 (China Research Monograph No. 2, Center for Chinese Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1968); and Baum and Teiwes, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadre Question," Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 4 (April 1968), pp. 323-345. On the latter, see "Circular of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (May 16, 1966)," and "'Hit Hard at Many in Order to Protect a Handful' is a Component Part of the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," Hung-ch'i, No. 5 (1967), in Peking Review, April 7, 1967, pp. 18-20. These campaigns, conducted primarily by means of work teams led by middle- (and often central-) level cadres, have been condemned by the Maoists for exaggerating the number of errant cadres, for placing restrictions on participation by the masses, for limiting the scope of the rectification, and for protecting the truly "revisionist power-holders" while transferring or dismissing vast numbers of merely "mistaken" or "bewitched" cadres. The criticisms deal largely with the content of the campaigns, but the attacks on the work teams and on "closed door reform" (self-criticism and study) indicate Maoist rethinking of rectification procedures as well.


89. For example, see "A County Revolutionary Committee Having Close Ties with the Masses," pp. 6-7.


92. The six theories are (1) the theory of "the dying out of the class struggle," (2) the theory of "docile tools," (3) the theory of "entering the Party in order to become an official," (4) the theory that "the masses are backward," (5) the theory of "inner-Party peace," and (6) the theory of "merging public and private interests." See "Thoroughly Repudiate Liu Shao-ch'i's Counter-Revolutionary Revisionist Line on Party Building," Peking Review, December 20, 1968, pp. 10-15.


101. Michel Oksenberg, in a private communication, has pointed out that as the middle level of the Party has been weakened, the middle level of the Army (particularly the provincial commands) has been strengthened correspondingly.


103. It should not be assumed that stress is always dysfunctional for a political system (or, for that matter, for an individual). Indeed, a moderate degree of stress may be more conducive to efficient and effective task performance than either low stress or high stress. On the relation between level of stress and task performance in individuals, see I. L. Janis and H. Leventhal, "Human Reaction to Stress," in E. F. Borgatta and W. W. Lambert (eds.), *Handbook of Personality Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1968), pp. 1041-1086. On the relation between level of stress and performance for organizations, see Lewis A. Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1967), Chap. 1. As the work of Richard H. Solomon and Robert J. Lifton has indicated, the "operational code" of Mao Tse-tung includes several techniques deliberately to induce psychological and systemic stress in order to attain the regime's objectives.

104. Easton calls this process "gate-keeping" (op. cit., Chap. 6).

105. Ibid., Chap. 4.


108. For a study of this trend and its effects on policy implementation, see Chalmers Johnson, "Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response: The Yenan Period and the Socialist Education Campaign," in Ho and Tsou (eds.), *China in Crisis*, pp. 397-437.
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