The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and War

Michael Sadykiewicz
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PREFACE

This study is one publication of a RAND-sponsored project on Soviet bloc military affairs directed by A. Ross Johnson. It describes and analyzes the Warsaw Pact military command structure in peace and war. The study was supported by The RAND Corporation, using its own funds. Drawing in part on unpublished research conducted under Project AIR FORCE, this report complements a more general analysis of Soviet bloc-military issues by the same author, R-3559-RC, Organizing for Coalition Warfare: The Role of East European Warsaw Pact Forces in Soviet Military Planning, The RAND Corporation, September 1988.

The author, Michael Sadykiewicz, is a consultant to The RAND Corporation. He served in the Soviet and Polish armed forces for twenty-five years until his discharge from the Polish army in 1967. A graduate of the Polish General Staff Military Academy, he studied at the Soviet (Voroshilov) Military Academy and held important command and staff positions in the Polish armed forces, where he rose to rank of colonel. In preparing this study, Colonel Sadykiewicz drew on his personal military experience as well as on Warsaw Pact military literature and Western publications.
SUMMARY

The missions, importance, and political and military weight of the Warsaw Pact have received considerable attention in Western publications. Much less is known about the Pact's organizational structure and the role of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) nations in Pact decisionmaking, particularly in wartime. However, a great deal can be deduced from publicly available Warsaw Pact sources and from a working knowledge of the Pact's organization and operation in the first quarter-century after World War II.

SOVIET HEGEMONY

The organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact is dominated by the Soviet Union to a much greater extent than the structure of NATO is by any of its members. In contrast to the members of NATO, the NSWP nations are excluded from peacetime regional strategic-operational commands, from any say over nuclear weapons, and from all key command posts. The Soviets claim that their "alliance" is one marked by "full equality" of its partners. In fact, with the exception of the conduct of joint maneuvers and exercises, the Soviets exhibit dominant or exclusive power in all areas of military activity.

As a result, the Pact's decisionmaking on the strategic and operational level will be more efficient than will that of NATO in any future conflict. However, the lack of NSWP input to Pact decisions will constrain the implementability of those decisions. Although the Soviet Union could take action to correct this deficiency, it appears that, quite the contrary, the Soviets are tightening their grip over NSWP military institutions and forces. This trend has not been called into question during the first three years of Gorbachev's rule.

PEACETIME ORGANIZATION OF THE WARSAW PACT

The top organ of the Warsaw Pact, the Political Consultative Committee, has been described at length in Western writings. The Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces is directly responsible to the Committee for the readiness of Pact forces. The Committee is subordinate to the Defense Council of the USSR. Indeed, the most important real channel (as opposed to formal channel) of command
and control within the Warsaw Pact is from the Defense Council of the USSR to the analogous councils of the NSWP nations. (There may be some bargaining over Soviet directives, and Romania does not take orders from the Soviet Union in any event.) The Defense Council in each of the Soviet Bloc countries has authority over the Defense Ministry. Each of the NSWP defense ministries also coordinates directly with the Soviet Defense Ministry. They do not coordinate with each other on matters of general concern.

There are two principal military consultative bodies in the Pact. The Committee of Defense Ministers advises the Political Consultative Committee, and the Military Council issues recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief. Both of these bodies include NSWP representatives. However, there can be no doubt that the Soviet Defense Minister is preeminent on the former: the Pact Commander-in-Chief, a Soviet general, is his man, and the membership of the Military Council is defined to guarantee a Soviet majority. In any event, neither the Committee of Defense Ministers nor the Military Council is a permanent working organ; each has only limited and formal prerogatives.

The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is smaller than those of the national commands, and it is not responsible for the daily activities of its forces. The Staff elaborates the joint aspects of the war plans prepared for the European Theater of War by the Soviet General Staff. The principal executor of those plans is the Soviet General Staff and its Warsaw Pact Directorate. The isolation of the latter from the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces ensures the secrecy of Soviet war plans from the NSWP nations. The Soviet General Staff is also responsible for coordinating the activities of the Joint Command with those of the Soviet Defense Ministry and armed forces. The General Staff, through the Defense Ministry, issues "proposals" to the Pact's Committee of Defense Ministers, which passes them on as resolutions to the national defense ministries.

The Joint Command assigns Representatives to each of the NSWP armies to observe all important events and keep themselves well informed about the overall situation in "their" armies. These Representatives are invariably Soviet and have exclusively Soviet staffs. Their NSWP counterparts—the NSWP Deputies of the Pact Chief of Staff—have duties limited to their own nations' forces. For example, they are involved in the Staff's top-secret war plans but only to the extent that their country is concerned. No NSWP representative has any oversight relative to the Soviet armed forces.

Other Pact organs include the Technical Committee, which is responsible for armaments, and the Inspector General, who oversees training and readiness. Indeed, the Joint Armed Forces are
subordinate to the Joint Command only for training and readiness. Otherwise, each nation's army takes orders from its defense ministry. There are two exceptions. The Pact Commander's Deputy for Air Defense Forces has operational control of all air defenses in the Pact countries, and the armed forces of East Germany are operationally under the control or supervision of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany.

Approximately 70 percent of the Joint Armed Forces are Soviet. There is no evidence, however, that the Soviet contingents based in the Western USSR are under the control of the Joint Command, even with respect to training and readiness. Their presence within the Pact is only a formality to give the Soviets the numerical advantage required to justify their dominance of the Pact command.

WARTIME ORGANIZATION OF THE WARSAW PACT

In the event of war, the Soviet High Command will control all military operational units assigned by other Soviet bloc countries to the Warsaw Pact. Control by the national defense ministries over these units will be strictly limited to administrative functions. The Soviets will also control all transportation systems and strategic pipelines within the Soviet bloc.

In an effort to ensure interoperability, Soviet control over NSWP units will extend to all levels. The Political Consultative Committee and the Committee of Defense Ministers will be reduced to paper formalities. Soviet missions, deputies, advisers, and commanders, along with Soviet General Staff representatives, will be present at the headquarters of any East European National Fronts that are formed. Soviet advisers and General Staff representatives will also be sent to all NSWP armies and divisions. East European liaisons will be assigned to adjoining Soviet units.

The Soviet High Command may exercise its authority over the European Theater of War through the Warsaw Pact Joint Command, rather than directly. Indirect command is suggested by a recent authoritative Polish book, and a European theater command could indeed be assembled from four elements: the peacetime Joint Command; the Soviet General Staff's presumed Warsaw Pact Directorate, whose departmental organization is probably typical of that of a strategic headquarters; special commands, such as rocket and engineering troops, that are excluded from the peacetime Pact structure to isolate them from the East Europeans; and officers from the Soviet Main Political Administration. Despite the current focus of the Joint
Command on administrative matters and the focus of the Soviet Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD) on war plans, the latter will probably be subordinate to the former in wartime. This can be inferred from the ranks of the Western TVD and Pact commanders and their deputies. Nonetheless, either the Pact Joint Command or the Western TVD Command could probably fulfill both ETW and WTVD command functions in wartime.
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GLOSSARY

ABM Anti-ballistic missile(s)
ADF Air Defense Forces
CC Central Committee
CDM Council of Defense Ministers (Warsaw Pact)
CFM Committee of Foreign Ministers (Warsaw Pact)
CGSO Corps of (Soviet) General Staff Officers
CoS Chief of Staff
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPX Command-post exercise(s)
C3 Command, control, and communications
DC Defense Council (of the USSR)
DPA Deputy for Political Affairs (Soviet Army)
EE East European
ECM Electronic countermeasures
ECCM Electronic counter-countermeasures
ETW European Theater of War
EW Electronic warfare
GDR German Democratic Republic
GSFG Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
HQ Headquarters
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
JAF Joint Armed Forces (of Warsaw Pact)
JHC Joint High Command (of Warsaw Pact forces)
JPC Joint Permanent Commission (Warsaw Pact)
JS Joint Secretariat (Warsaw Pact)
MC Military Council
MD Military District
MSTC Military Scientific Technical Council (Warsaw Pact)
NSWP Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
PCC  Political Consultative Committee (Warsaw Pact)
PVO  Air Defense Troops (Soviet term)
R&D  Research and development
SA   Surface-to-air (missile)
Stavka  General Headquarters (Soviet term)
SU   Soviet Union
TC   Technical Committee (Warsaw Pact)
TVD  Theater of Military Operations (Soviet term)
WP   Warsaw Pact
I. INTRODUCTION

Although the Warsaw Pact has been in existence for over 30 years, and has received considerable attention in Western publications, many aspects relating to both peacetime and conflict contingencies are still poorly understood. This study attempts to improve understanding of organizational and decisionmaking aspects of the Warsaw Pact. The Pact's organizational structure, discussed in detail in Sec. II, is taken as the point of departure. Section III describes the peacetime command, control, and decisionmaking mechanisms. Section IV compares the organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact with that of NATO and indicates the nature of Soviet hegemony. Section V considers the Pact's wartime command structure: an analysis of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) command subordination is followed by a discussion of the role of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command.

This study is based on publicly available Warsaw Pact and Western sources, as well as on the author's personal experience through the 1960s as a former high-ranking Pact officer and discussions with other former Warsaw Pact officers. The Pact's organizational structure, command and control system, and decisionmaking mechanism as shown here reflect the author's estimate of their contemporary status and constitute a projection of past trends and an interpretation of current indicators, to be refined and modified as fuller data become available.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE WARSAW PACT

The organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact is shown in Fig. 1. The various elements are described below.¹

CHIEF POLITICAL BODIES

The (Supreme) Defense Council of the USSR (1)² (Soviet Oborony SSSR) is the supreme authority in the Soviet bloc. In practice, this body (an executive organ of the Politburo) has authority over the Party, the administration, the armed forces, and the whole of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc; it is thus the main Soviet center of power.³ This body is also superior to the top organ of the Pact, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC).

The Political Consultative Committee (2) is described at great length in Western writings. However, a few points should be added. First, before major decisions are considered by the PCC, they are discussed bilaterally, not multilaterally, between Moscow and the leadership of the respective NSWP countries. Therefore, resolutions passed by the PCC are usually predetermined. Second, the state interests of the USSR are not, of course, identical with those of the NSWP countries. The same is true of the area covered by PCC activities. Hence, some Soviet proposals are rejected or, more often, adjusted during bilateral consultations. Moreover, it may be assumed that some resolutions of the PCC are the result of initiatives by the NWSP countries. Examples include the structural reforms of the Pact at the March 1969 session of the PCC in Budapest,⁴ particularly the creation of the Committee of Defense Ministers as the supreme military consultative body of the alliance, the appointment of the deputy ministers of defense to replace the national defense ministers as deputies of the Commander-

¹Sources of information in this section are given only for elements not hitherto disclosed in available Pact literature.
²The numbers in parentheses refer to the location of these bodies in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1—The peacetime structure of the Warsaw Pact
in-Chief of the Pact, and the establishment of the Military Council of the Joint High Command. The PCC sessions are not a forum for discussion or debate; their main purpose is to ratify previously reached decisions. A Polish source has stated that after the 1969 PCC session the principle of majority vote was replaced by the principle of unanimity; in practice, PCC decisions are binding on the states endorsing them (Romania has in the past abstained). Third, important issues related to planning the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are outside the scope of the PCC and, generally speaking, are not considered by the NSWP allies.

The PCC has two directly subordinated executive organs: The Joint Secretariat (JS) and The Permanent Commission (PC). Since the PCC is not a continuously functioning body, the Joint Secretariat as a permanent executive organ prepares all technical materials and supervises the fulfillment of PCC directives, whereas the Permanent Commission deals mainly with preparation of PCC recommendations with regard to

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5It has been commonly assumed, both in Western sources and in openly available Warsaw Pact sources, that the Pact Committee of Defense Ministers and the Military Council were formed as late as 1969—14 years after the Pact’s formation—as a part of the so-called “Budapest reforms,” which took their name from the PCC session held in Hungary in that year. However, a reliable Soviet source recently stated that the Pact “Military Council” had been in existence from the very beginning, i.e., from 14 May 1955, and initially had Marshal Ivan Konev as chairman and all the East European national defense ministers—who also served as deputies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pact forces at the time—as members, with meetings taking place at the end of each year. (Colonel Richard Portugalskii, Marshal Konev, from the series Soviet Military Leaders, Voenvizdat, Moscow, 1985, p. 241. Portugalskii is a well-known military historian and contributor to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (1976–1980), in eight volumes, as well as the author of numerous articles in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal.)

Why was the Military Council’s existence kept from public knowledge in the member states for 14 years? The likely answer is the inequitable character of the Pact’s supreme command, in which East European national defense ministers were subordinate to one of the deputy Soviet defense ministers, who was also the Pact Commander-in-Chief. The situation would be obvious and embarrassingly would emphasize the satellite relationship of the East European forces to Moscow. It was only when the East European defense ministers were replaced by their deputies, which offered some semblance of formal parity among the members, that the original Military Council’s existence was made public.


7A. Marcinkowski, Polska w Uchadzie Warszawskim, MON, Warsaw, 1985, p. 240. The veracity of this source is discussed later. The source states: “Documents accepted at the PCC sessions express the joint political position of all members of the alliance, and constitute for them the guidelines which should inform their foreign policies. These declarations do not have the character of acts of international law and do not constitute commitments in the legal sense for members of the Pact” (pp. 115–116, emphasis added).
foreign affairs. Both organs are administratively under the PCC General Secretary, who, along with the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint High Command and its Chief of Staff, take part in all sessions of the PCC.

MILITARY BODIES

The Committee of Defense Ministers (3) is the main military consultative body of the Pact. During its sessions, which are held periodically in the various capital cities, members consider all the military questions that are ultimately to be resolved by the PCC and issue recommendations on those questions. This body also passes resolutions implementing the decisions of the PCC. Finally, the Committee of Defense Ministers considers and accepts or (probably on rare occasions) rejects proposals put forward by the Joint Command and approves (or, again very seldom, disapproves) the yearly reports of the activities of the Joint Command. It then issues recommendations for planning such activities in the following year.

As published photos from sessions of the Committee of Defense Ministers (CDM) indicate, their deputies (mainly Chief Inspectors for Combat Training) and other high-ranking NSWP generals take part in these sessions. The Commander in Chief of the Pact’s Joint Armed Forces (JAF) and his Chief of Staff also participate. This body coordinates in advance, before the regular sessions, all policy issues and some technical matters, using normal channels of communication and cooperation inside the Pact. (These channels are described in Sec. III.) Although Soviet Marshal Kulikov described the Committee of Defense Ministers as a

permanent working military organ with certain obligations and functions. . . . The chairmen of the sessions are, in turn, all the Pact defense ministers, in the alphabetical order of the names of the Pact countries.

he adds that the working organ of the Committee of Defense Ministers is the Staff of the JAF. In light of the infrequency of the sessions of this body (one or two sessions yearly, each lasting about two days), it is hard to share the thesis that this is a permanent working organ. The

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9V. Kulikov, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Kollektivnaya zashchita sotsializma (The Collective Defense of Socialism), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1982, p. 75.
competence and tasks of the CDM include:  

- examining the present state and the developmental trends of the armed forces of the potential enemy, his strategic and operational plans; preparing recommendations and propositions concerning improvement of defense capabilities of the member states of the Warsaw Pact; determining development of the Joint Armed Forces and increasing the level of their combat readiness; considering issues connected with the activities of coalition organs of command and control; assessing the state of preparation of the theaters of military operations and formulating recommendations for undertaking further measures in this field; examining the state of command and control for wartime and their further improvement; considering all other military measures which require coordination among the allied armies.

According to the Hungarian journal *Nephydsereg*:

The positions, recommendations, and proposals of the CDM are standard in the work of the joint [Warsaw Pact] organs as they are in the activities of the national military leadership. Decisions are passed by majority vote, but are binding only on those who join in the yes vote. The earlier consultations of the ministers used to be primarily mutual information forums, but now the committee plays an incomparably greater role in all aspects of the development of military integration.

The Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM) (4) is a consultative body of the PCC on Pact foreign policy, especially with regard to Europe. The members of the Committee of Foreign Ministers usually take part in all the sessions of the PCC. The Soviet "peace agenda" or, to be exact, the peace propaganda campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s, have dominated the meetings of both the PCC and the CFM.

The Defense Minister of the USSR (5) is formally one of the defense ministers of the Pact countries, but in fact he holds a much higher position. Since the creation of the Pact, all the Commanders-in-Chief of the Joint Command have simultaneously been his deputies, as Soviet marshals, and he is the real "boss" of all the former and present commanders-in-chief of this command. All the key command, staff, and military-technical posts in the Joint Command are held by Soviet generals, whose principal superior is again the USSR Defense Minister. Hence, they are directly subordinate to him. The contribution of the USSR armed forces in the overall military balance of the Pact is so much greater than that of all the other members that the Soviets hold a special, privileged position inside the Pact, not only as a "Big Brother" but as the "top-ranking partner" in terms of quantitative

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10Marcinkowski, p. 241.
11No. 48, November 28, 1981.
and qualitative strength, technology, and military experience. The USSR exploits its contribution to the Pact in a disproportionate manner; the Soviets provide approximately 70 percent of the Pact's strength, while 100 percent of the key positions are filled by Soviets.\(^{12}\)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces (6) is responsible to the PCC and to the Soviet Defense Minister for the day-to-day activities of the Joint Command. He is superior to all the permanent personnel of the Joint Command and, formally, of all Soviet and non-Soviet contingents of the Pact forces. In wartime, we believe that under certain circumstances he may be designated as the Commander-in-Chief of the European Theater of War (ETW).\(^{13}\) The Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces is responsible for maintaining the forces under him at a high level of combat readiness and for ensuring that he and his staff are ready, at any time, to take the lead in hostilities anywhere in Europe. Thus, he must be familiar with developments in those Soviet armed services which, in peacetime, are not included in the Pact forces, including the Strategic Rocket Forces, Long-Range Aviation, and Strategic Offensive Navy Nuclear Forces. This is probably the main reason why Marshal Kulikov was given the title of First Deputy Minister of Defense (of the USSR), which granted him the right of consultation with the commanders-in-chief of these forces (Air Defense, Strategic Rocket Troops, Navy, Air Force, Ground Forces) as their superior in the Soviet military hierarchy.

The Military Council (7) is permanently chaired by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command and includes his non-Soviet East European deputies, his Chief of Staff, and the Soviet deputy commanders-in-chief of the Pact for Air Defense, Navy, Air Force, and Rear Services, and the General Inspector of the Joint High Command of the Pact. Such a composition of the Military Council assures the USSR of its majority. This council performs exactly the same function as the Committee of Defense Ministers, but on a lower level and in relation to the Joint Command, not the PCC. The author disagrees with the thesis that the Military Council is "the main channel to transmit Soviet orders in peacetime."\(^{14}\) In fact, the main channel is the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command himself with all his Soviet deputies and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces with all his Soviet deputies and Soviet staff members. The Military Council is only an advisory body to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pact.

\(^{12}\) Figure 1 shows these key posts.

\(^{13}\) This is discussed further below.

It should be emphasized that, in contrast to all other military councils in the Soviet armed forces (from the army-flotilla level to the top) and in the NSWP forces (from the divisional level upward), the Military Council of the Pact functions as such only during its two annual sessions (spring and fall), each lasting two to four days. The military councils in the Soviet and NSWP forces are permanent working organs, fulfilling day-to-day leadership over the troops, with, on the average, 40–50 sessions or so per year (normally one per week). The author hence concludes that the Pact Military Council is, in fact, a paper body, with nominally major, but very limited and formal real prerogatives.

The Pact nations’ Deputies of the Commander-in-Chief (8) have a nominal status only, since they are permanently based in their own national defense ministries along with numerous other deputies of their minister. Only occasionally—that is, a few times a year—do they take part in Military Council sessions. Some of them, including those from Poland and Czechoslovakia, are designated to act as first deputies of the commanders-in-chief of their respective fronts in wartime.15 All of them are responsible, primarily to their own ministers, for the combat training of their national armed forces.

The Representatives of the Joint High Command (9) are exclusively Soviet. Most of them are high-ranking, experienced generals who are responsible for supervising combat training and combat readiness in the NSWP armies to which they are assigned. Their staffs consist solely of Soviet officers. These Representatives or their assistants participate as observers in all important events of the supervised armies, except strictly internal events such as sessions of the Military Councils of the respective armies, top Party conferences, and the like. They are very well informed about the overall situation in “their” armies, sometimes even better informed than the respective defense ministers. They have two channels of subordination: their Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command and probably a Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. This one-way supervision, i.e., from the major ally to all other minor allies, is probably unique in the history of great military alliances. None of the representatives of the NSWP countries has any right of control over the day-to-day activities of the Soviet armed forces.

Since at least 1983, the Representatives also have their Deputies for Political Affairs, who are, in fact, the Kremlin’s military-political commissars (of a kind) to the NSWP forces. Officially they are named

15 In this case, the commanders-in-chief would be, probably, the Defense Ministers of the countries.
Deputies for Political Affairs to the Representatives of the Joint High Command.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16}In Poland, the post of Deputy for Political Affairs (DPA) of the Representative of the Joint High Command was successively held by Lt. Gen. V. G. Serebriakov (formerly Deputy Chief, Political Directorate, Odessa Military District, and Chief, Political Directorate, Ural Military District; now he is the head of the Personnel Directorate of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy); Lt. Gen. V. A. Sharigin; and now Lt. Gen. Mikhail Kulikov. (See Zolnier Wolski, February 21, 1987.) In Czechoslovakia, this post is held by Lt. Gen. A. M. Overchuk. (See Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials: A Reference Aid, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, LDA 86–11907, October 1986, p. 11.) Overchuk is a former chief, Political Directorate, Transcaucasian Military District. There is indirect evidence of high-ranking Soviet Politruks in the missions of Pact Representatives in other NSWP states. In Bulgaria, Pact Representative Col. Gen. A. M. Zvartsev (the former deputy chief, Main Personnel Directorate of USSR Defense Ministry) has two deputies: Lt. Gen. V. Kotov and Lt. Gen. D. Michenkov; one of them is probably the Deputy for Political Affairs (DPA). In Hungary, there are again two deputies to the Pact Representative: Lt. Gen. S. Vinitilov and Maj. Gen. N. Kulibin, one of whom is probably a Political Deputy. (Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense, 1986.)

It would be logical to assume that these Deputies for Political Affairs would have a branch superior—a high-ranking political general inside the Pact Joint High Command who coordinates and supervises the deputies’ duties, and to whom they report on the political and morale situation in the forces to which they are attached. The following possibilities exist with regard to these Political Deputies: (a) They are directly subordinate to the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet armed forces; (b) they are (in the case of Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia) directly subordinate to Col. Gen. B. Utkin, the Deputy for Political Affairs of the Commander-in-Chief of the Western TVD; and (c) the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, in one of its sessions, undertook a decision, not disclosed publicly, to establish a Political Directorate of the Pact Joint High Command. In case (c), all the above-mentioned Deputies for Political Affairs of the Pact Representatives would be directly subordinate to that Political Directorate. The head of such a Directorate could be Soviet Col. Gen. P. Fominchev, the former Deputy for Political Affairs of the commander of the Odessa Military District, mentioned by Krasnaja zvezda, January 3, 1984, as a member of the Joint High Command. On the other hand, it would be hard to believe that there is an official Political Directorate of the Pact Joint High Command, because this would, in an obvious way, formalize and expand Soviet interference and control over the internal political matters of the national NSWP armies.

In the 1960s and 1970s, there was no direct, official Soviet involvement in the internal political affairs of NSWP forces. This was one of the few national prerogatives of the NSWP states underlining their, albeit limited, sovereignty. The introduction of the DPAs may change this. It is their right to take part in almost all the activities of the NSWP forces, particularly those of any political character. But the chief prerogative of the DPAs is probably their insight into the cadre policy of the East European forces. In these forces, as in the Soviet army, orders for personnel matters must be co-signed by the defense minister and the chief of the Main Political Directorate. If the chief of each respective NSWP Main Political Directorate must coordinate his activities with the respective DPA, then personnel matters must be agreed between them before such orders are issued at ministry level. If such an arrangement exists, Moscow has created through the DPAs a system to directly influence personnel changes inside the NSWP forces.

With some evidence of other additions to the staffs of Pact Representatives to the NSWP states. In the 1970s, a Soviet general held such a post in each of the East European countries, with a very small staff of colonels and majors. In Poland today, Col. Gen. V. I. Sivenok (who in 1985 replaced his predecessor, Army General A. Shcheglov) is the Pact Representative; he has at least three other Soviet generals as his deputies or
The First Deputy of the Commander-in-Chief—the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces (10)—is also one of the first deputies of the Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Therefore he is under double Soviet subordination. We believe he also supervises a Pact Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. He is second in command in the WP forces; the NSWP deputies are not “first” deputies of the commander-in-chief. In wartime, he may be designated as the Chief of Staff of Hq ETW. He coordinates the activities of the other deputies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Command (six Soviet and six non-Soviet) and leads the activities of his staff.

The First Deputy Chief of Staff (11) is a Soviet general responsible, within the Staff of the Joint Command, for coordinating the activities of the other deputies to the Chief of Staff.

There are at least five Soviet Deputy Chiefs of Staff (12). They deal, respectively, with the following matters: operations, intelligence, communications, organization and mobilization, and training and educational exchanges.

The NSWP Deputy Chiefs of Staff (13) are involved in the top-secret war plans prepared by the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, but presumably only insofar as their respective national armed forces are concerned. They do not have access to all the plans. Their main task, as the permanent detached senior generals on the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, is to coordinate the activities of all other permanent members of this staff from their countries and to represent their national armies’ interests in the preparation and programming of the joint plans for combat training, joint exercises, and other plans of the Joint Armed Forces. They are actually the Pact nations’ permanent assistants. The DPA, as mentioned above, is Lt. Gen. M. Kulikov. Another deputy (assistant) is Maj. Gen. V. Evdokimov. (Zolnierz Wolnosci, February 21, 1987.) And Sivenok has an “Assistant for Air Force”—Aviation Col. Gen. Mikhail Odintsov, who has been in charge of this post since 1981. (The Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, 2nd ed., Voenizdat, Moscow, 1986, p. 510. Odintsov is mentioned in this role in this source because he is twice a Hero of The Soviet Union. This category of Soviet generals and officers is, as a rule, noted in all such Soviet publications. If colleagues of Odintsov in the remaining NSWP countries are not twice Heroes of The Soviet Union and not Army generals (this category is also mentioned in all such publications), there is no official confirmation of their existence.)

17See Sec. V.
18According to the Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials, A Reference Aid, CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, CR 78–15073, October 1978, p. 33, this post was held by Col. Gen. S. M. Romanov. In 1981, according to Krasnaja zvezda, November 14, 1981, the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint High Command was Col. Gen. M. N. Tereshchenko. In 1984 he was promoted to the post of First Deputy/Chief of Staff of the Western TVD (theater of military operations).
representatives to the Joint Command Staff, rather than deputies of the Chief of Staff.

The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces (14) is responsible for the preparation of war plans (Operations, Mobilization, etc.) and perhaps the preparation of the ETW. The principal executor of these measures is the Soviet General Staff and its presumed Pact Directorate; therefore, the role of the Staff of the Joint Command in this area is small. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is also responsible for the organization of training within the Joint Armed Forces contingents and especially for conducting and supervising staff training for troop leadership at the army level and above. One of its most important tasks is the planning, preparation, and conduct of joint high-level exercises, i.e., maneuvers and command staff exercises. The staff also coordinates educational exchanges of high-ranking Pact officers.

The principal difference between this and other Soviet and non-Soviet Pact staffs is that the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is not responsible for the day-to-day activities of its forces. Therefore, it is not obliged to deal with various kinds of administrative, technical, supply, and personnel replacement matters; it is thus relatively small (in comparison with other staffs on this level) and able to concentrate almost entirely on training and strategic operational matters. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces coordinates the activities of all other bodies within the Joint High Command.

As a principal executive and working organ of the Committee of Defense Ministers and the Military Council, the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces prepares the sessions of these bodies and supervises the implementation of their resolutions and recommendations. Finally, it is the direct operational organ of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint High Command.

NSWP Permanent Representatives to the Joint Command (15) were the only permanent non-Soviet generals in the Joint Command before the reform of the Pact command system ratified at the Budapest session of the PCC in March 1969. Now their functions are merely those of formal representatives, participating in official ceremonies, and so forth. Their tasks are similar to those of military attaches, but they are limited to Joint High Command activities. The real superiors of the NSWP representatives are the NSWP Deputies of the Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the Navy (16) is a Soviet admiral responsible for coordinating the Navy's affairs within the Joint
High Command and the Joint Armed Forces. He has a small naval staff and supervises both of the Joint Pact High Naval Commands: the Joint Baltic Fleet Command and the Joint Black Sea Fleet Command.

The Navy Staff (17) is the operational entity of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the Navy. It consists solely of Soviet naval officers and serves as an intermediate link between the Soviet Main Naval Staff and the Joint High Command.

The Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief of the Pact Air Defense Forces (18) is a Soviet marshal who is simultaneously the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Defense Forces and a deputy of the Soviet Defense Minister. Only formally under the Joint Command, he is actually under the direct control of the Soviet Defense Minister. He is the only commander within the Joint Armed Forces who operationally controls part of the NSWP forces. He is officially entitled to give orders, especially for attack of non-Pact aircraft and other air targets, and these orders must be complied with at once. The respective national Defense Ministers must be informed of such orders, both directly by the Soviet headquarters from which they are issued and by the national commands of the forces that carry them out. This does not prevent the orders from being carried out in emergencies, when the national authorities cannot be contacted. However, the national headquarters of the Home Air Defense also have the right to strike or destroy air targets on their home territory, either on their own initiative or upon orders issued by their national superiors.

The Main Staff of the Soviet Air Defense Forces (19) is the headquarters of these forces as well as of the Home Air Defense Forces of all the NSWP nations.

The Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the Air Force since at least 1980 has been Soviet Col. Gen. A. N. Katrich. It may be assumed that, in contrast to the Navy, there are no operational commands of joint Pact air forces. So Katrich's role, as well as that of his staff, is reduced to inspection of combat training and readiness, unification of

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20 This post was disclosed by Zolnierz Wolnosci, October 10, 1981.


Air Force doctrine, and participation in decisions concerned with Air Force armament in the Joint Armed Forces.

The Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Armaments\(^\text{23}\) (20) is a Soviet general whose primary mission is the standardization, modernization, and normalization of weapons and all other technical military aspects of the Joint Armed Forces. He is also responsible for coordinating armament production planning and R&D in the Pact countries. He works in close cooperation with the Military-Industrial Commission of COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister for Armament.

The Technical Committee (21) is the primary body responsible for executing the above-mentioned missions. Furthermore, it organizes the exchange and dissemination of new developments in military equipment and technical warfare inside the Joint Armed Forces. This committee is presumably divided into subcommittees which manage the activities relating to each group of weapons and equipment, including tank, air defense artillery, and rocket troops; naval armament; engineering combat equipment; and aviation armament.\(^\text{24}\)

The Military Scientific-Technical Council\(^\text{25}\) (22) is a consultative body to the Technical Committee, dealing primarily with R&D problems such as rationalization, modernization, and innovation.

The Inspector General (23) is a Soviet general\(^\text{26}\) who is responsible for organizing and supervising inspections of the Joint Armed Forces, mainly with regard to combat training and readiness. The plans for such inspections are approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces. The Inspector General works in close cooperation with the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Defense Ministry. In practice, he controls only the units of the NSWP forces and the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe.

The Inspectorate (24) is the working body of the Inspector General; it consists solely of Soviet officers.

The Joint Armed Forces (25) comprise the Ground, Air, Naval, and Air Defense forces of all the NSWP countries, as well as the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe and a large part (but not all) of the Soviet forces in the Western Military Districts (MDs).

\(^{23}\)This Pact post was disclosed by the Hungarian journal *Nephasereg*, November 28, 1981.

\(^{24}\)Personal communication from a former senior Warsaw Pact officer.

\(^{25}\)Former Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Jakubovskii disclosed the existence of this body; see "Pod sztandarem bojowej waspólnoty," *Wojsko\cy Wo\'zeglad Historyczny*, Vol. 20, No. 1–2, 1972, p. 70.

In peacetime, these forces are subordinate to the Joint High Command only with regard to training and combat readiness. In all remaining aspects, i.e., operational, personnel, political, administrative, logistics, etc., they are under their respective Defense Ministers, probably with the exception of the East German contingent, which is closely supervised by the headquarters of the Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany.  

The Ground and Air Forces designated to the Joint Armed Forces (26) consist of Soviet and NSWP contingents and probably comprise the following:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>No. of Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>10 (including 5 separate tank brigades)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>11 (including 3 separate mountain brigades/regiments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>195</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soviet Contingents (27) include the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe (28) and designated forces from the Soviet Western Military Districts. The Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern European countries are wholly supervised by the Joint High Command in training and readiness but, being an integral part of the Soviet Armed

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29 Tank, motor, rifle, airborne, and amphibious assault divisions. The Soviet divisions include all those deployed west of the Ural, except those attached to the Southern TVD, but include North- and Trans-Caucasus military districts.

30 According to the Polish military press, recently the 6th Polish Pomeranian Airborne Division was transformed into an Airborne Brigade and the Polish 7th Amphibious Assault Division was transformed into an Amphibious Assault Brigade (see *Zodziez Wolnosci*, February 17, 1987). These transformations are not counted here.
Forces, they are also controlled by the USSR Defense Ministry, to which they are subordinate in all other aspects.

Contingents from Soviet Western Military Districts (29) comprise all ground and airborne divisions, all operational support units on the army and front level, and all operational (not training) units of tactical (frontal) aviation. There is no evidence that these contingents are under the permanent control of the Joint High Command with regard to training and readiness. In fact, they are included in the Joint Armed Forces only as a formality to give the Soviet contribution a numerical advantage and, in this way, to justify the dominant position of the Soviets within the Joint Command.

NSWP contingents (of ground and air forces) (30) include all active ground and airborne divisions, all support units on the army level and the front level (if one exists), and tactical aviation units.

The Navy (31) consists of two independent Joint Fleets: the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.

The Joint Baltic Fleet (32), commanded by a Soviet admiral with headquarters in Baltiisk, includes the Soviet Baltic Fleet (operative units only, not the "Redbanner Leningrad Naval Base") and the East German and Polish Fleets.

The Soviet Baltic Fleet (33) is the main component.

The East German Fleet (of the Joint Baltic Fleet) (34) includes all operative naval units. It is under the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Baltic Fleet with regard to training and readiness. In all other aspects, it is subordinate to the East German Defense Ministry, although it may be operationally under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Group of Forces in East Germany.

The Polish Fleet (of the Joint Baltic Fleet) (35) includes all operative units and is subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Baltic Fleet in training and readiness aspects only; all other aspects are under the control of the Polish Defense Ministry.

The Joint Black Sea Fleet (36) is commanded by a Soviet admiral with headquarters in Sevastopol; he most probably is simultaneously the Commander of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet (37). The Joint Black Sea Fleet includes the Romanian and Bulgarian Fleets. Its main component is the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which in wartime will also include the reestablished Danube Flotilla.\(^{31}\)

The Romanian Fleet (38) and the Bulgarian Fleet (39) are under the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Black Sea Fleet for

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\(^{31}\)The (Soviet) Danube Flotilla, reinforced by the Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian Danube River naval units, will be under the operational control of the respective front or perhaps the TVD headquarters.
training and readiness. In all other aspects, they are under their national Defense Ministers.

The Home Air Defense Forces (of the Joint Armed Forces) (40) are composed of two main components: the Soviet and Pact Air Defense Forces.

The Soviet Home Air Defense Forces (41) (Voiska PVO) consist of the air defense districts and regions covering the European part of the USSR.32

The NSWP Home Air Defense Forces (42) include the forces of all the NSWP countries.

Nothing has been disclosed on the chiefs of branches of the Joint High Command (43) but, according to the principles of the Soviet forces command system, at least the following should exist:

- Chief of Rocket Troops and Artillery
- Chief of Engineering Troops
- Chief of Signal Troops

In addition, there should be chiefs of Chemical, Railroad (maintenance and construction), Highway (maintenance and construction), and other troops. Each of these chiefs should have its own staff, as the executive and controlling body over the respective troops of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Soviet General Staff (SGS) (44) is the top permanent military entity of the USSR. Because of the dominant position of the Defense Council of the USSR and the Soviet Defense Minister with regard to the Warsaw Pact, the SGS plays an extremely important role in relation to the Joint High Command.

In particular, the SGS:

- Coordinates the activities of the Joint High Command and the Joint Armed Forces with the whole Soviet Defense Ministry and the Soviet armed forces;
- Prepares drafts, for consideration by the Soviet Defense Minister and the (Supreme) Defense Council of the USSR, of the

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32 As noted by David R. Jones (Soviet Armed Forces Annual Review, Academic International Press, Cambridge Station, King’s County, Canada, 1980), “Organizational changes have occurred in the strategic defense forces. PVO Strany and the Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces appear to have merged, enabling better control and coordination of all air defense forces.” The term Voiska PVO Strany is no longer used in the Soviet armed forces; therefore, Jones assumes that the new term Voiska PVO covers all such forces, including the Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces, under one centralized command. The thesis is repeated by IISS, The Military Balance, 1982–1983, p. 11. However the new entry “Voiska Protivovozduzhnoi Oborony Sukhoputnykh Voisk” (Air Defense Troops of the Ground Forces) in the 2nd edition of the Soviet Military Dictionary, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1986, p. 154, is evidence to the contrary.
most important Soviet proposals regarding political-military, strategic-military, and technical and organizational military matters, which are to be discussed at meetings of the PCC, Committee of Defense Ministers, and Military Council of the Pact, and subsequently supervises their implementation;

- Prepares and constantly updates war plans for the ETW, plans which serve as a basis for planning the use of the Joint Armed Forces;
- Standardizes military doctrine inside the Joint Armed Forces, particularly military strategy and operational art;
- Prepares Tables of Organization and Equipment for the Joint High Command;
- Is the senior branch staff and thus superior to the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

The Warsaw Pact Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (45) is, we believe, a working entity which directly implements all the tasks mentioned above. The isolation of this directorate from the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces ensures that the non-Soviet generals of the Joint Command have no access whatsoever to secret plans for the preparation and conduct of a war in Europe, particularly plans for the use of Soviet forces not included in the structure of the Warsaw Pact, such as Strategic Rocket Troops, Strategic Offensive Nuclear Naval Forces, Long-Range Aviation, airborne divisions, etc.33

The NSWP Government Representatives (to the headquarters of the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe) (46) are delegates from the Pact nations to joint committees (with Soviet delegations) whose task it is to ensure compliance with bilateral agreements regarding "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in these countries.

The Political Department (47) controls the Party-political work of the Soviet generals and officers within the Joint Command. It has no other powers. It is not a political organ in relation to the non-Soviet personnel of the Joint Command and Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, nor is it in any way superior to the national political organs.

The CPSU Party Committee (48) is subordinate to the Political Department and controls only the Party work of CPSU members who serve within the Joint Command and the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

The six Party Committees (49) control the Party work of members of the national Communist parties who serve in the Joint Command and the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces.

This section has discussed the individual elements of the peacetime structure of the Warsaw Pact for which there is evidence in Soviet bloc publications, or which logically exist given the structure of national Soviet and East European military institutions. We cannot definitively confirm all of the structure inferred here. Nor can we exclude the possible existence of other bodies.34

34We can find no evidence of the following Warsaw Pact organs mentioned in some Western sources:

- "Central Administration" of the Joint High Command (with a subdepartment: "Training") (Ibid.).
- "Committee for Coordination of Weapons and Technology" (this is the Technical Committee) (mentioned in Jeffrey Simon, Warsaw Pact Forces, p. 63).
- "A Warsaw Pact Agency for Paramilitary Youth Training Organizations" (Rakowska-Harmstone et al. (eds.), pp. 204–205).
- "Military Missions" (these are formally the Representatives of the Joint High Command) (Ibid.).
III. WARSAW PACT PEACETIME CHANNELS OF COMMAND, CONTROL, AND DECISIONMAKING

The main channels and the directions in which the Pact organs operate are shown in Fig. 2. These channels are divided into four categories: operational subordination; coordination, proposals, and projects; directives and orders; and supervision.¹

Each of these channels is briefly described below. They are numbered to facilitate reference to Fig. 2.

Channel 1 is the most important channel in the whole of the Warsaw Pact, the one through which the most vitally important directives are communicated. Officially, because the East European countries are not legally an integral part of the USSR but are its “allies,” such directives take the form of proposals. These “proposals” may be subjected to a certain amount of bargaining (via Channel 2) but, in effect, their basic content must be approved by the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members (with the exception of Romania which, on many coalition matters—even important issues such as the size of military contingents and the size of the defense budget—manages to adopt a different stand from that desired by the Kremlin).

Channel 1 includes direct working telephone discussions between the Kremlin and the Cabinets of the General/First Party Secretaries in the East European countries, coded telex messages and special couriers for conveying correspondence on this level, and visits by Soviet ambassadors to the leaders of the East European countries. It also includes “short resting holidays” or “short working visits” to the Crimea, participation in Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Bloc, and other official and unofficial events where the ruling elite of the Soviet bloc has an opportunity to meet and receive instructions and guidelines from the Kremlin.

Channel 2 is used for joint coordination of proposals that have been transmitted by Channel 1 and usually have only minor “cosmetic” alterations. Channel 2 is used for communication along only one line, i.e., between the leaderships of the East European countries and the Kremlin. It is bilateral, not multilateral, since the East European leaderships communicate only with Moscow and never with each other on vital issues (or even lesser issues) concerning the whole Pact.²

¹This depiction of Warsaw Pact channels is a composite estimate based on personal experience, Warsaw Pact and Western literature, and discussions with other former Warsaw Pact officers.
²See the Appendix.
Fig. 2—The main channels of command, control, and decisionmaking within the Warsaw Pact in peacetime
Through Channel 3, the Committee of Foreign Ministers receives directives and instructions, previously agreed upon via Channels 1 and 2, concerning political resolutions to be passed by the PCC.

Channel 4 is for direct instructions from the (Supreme) Defense Council of the USSR to the PCC concerning nonpolitical matters. These instructions have been previously agreed upon via Channel 2.

Channel 5 is the line of direct operational command from the USSR (Supreme) Defense Council to the Soviet Defense Ministry and, through this ministry (via Channels 16 and 29 through 32), to the Joint High Command, the Soviet armed forces, and the East European Home Air Defense Forces.

Channel 6 is used for conveying proposals from the Soviet General Staff to the Committee of Defense Ministers. Like the proposals conveyed via Channel 1, these proposals are usually binding on this Committee, particularly since they are the result of previous negotiations via Channel 20.

Channel 7 carries resolutions passed by the Committee of Defense Ministers, which are binding on the Soviet Defense Ministry as well as on all the other Defense Ministries of the Warsaw Pact. However, these resolutions are passed primarily, and quite often exclusively, as a result of proposals passing through Channel 6.

Channel 8 is the NSWP counterpart of Channel 4.

Channel 9 is used for directives relating to resolutions of a political tenor, previously agreed upon with the Kremlin via Channel 2, which are to be passed on in the PCC forum.

Channel 10 is the line of operational command from the East European Politburos and Defense Committees (or Defense Councils) to the East European Defense Ministries. Through the Defense Ministries and their General Staffs, two of the three main components of their armed forces (East European national contingents of the Warsaw Pact, and other national armed forces not included in the Pact) are brought under the Politburos, via Channels 23 and 24. The National Home Air Defense Forces, which constitute the third component, are subordinate to the East European Defense Ministries via Channel 28, and via Channel 29 they are simultaneously under the operational control of the Soviet Defense Ministry.

Channel 11 is for coordinating the political-military proposals which are to be presented to the PCC as draft resolutions via Channel 12.

Channel 13 is for conveying drafts of resolutions which the PCC is to pass on—matters such as the size of the military budgets and national contingents of the members of the Pact, armaments plans, structure of the central organs of the Pact, and other matters within the purview of the PCC. After these resolutions have been passed,
they are binding on all those countries endorsing them in the PCC forum, and through Channel 14 they are conveyed back to the Committee of Defense Ministers for execution or for precise definition and implementation.

Channel 15 is for conveying resolutions passed by the Committee of Defense Ministers concerning individual national Defense Ministries. These resolutions are previously agreed upon, at the working stage, through Channel 20.

Channel 16 is the channel of operational control by the Soviet Defense Ministry over the Joint High Command. This is not a formal or official channel, since according to the statutes of the Pact, its Joint Command is subordinate only to the Committee of Defense Ministers and the PCC. But it is the actual channel. Channel 16 is used for conveying those war plans and amendments to war plans prepared by the Soviet General Staff which are to be made accessible to the Joint Command and its staff. It is also the channel for appointing and withdrawing Soviet generals and officers serving on the Joint High Command.

Channel 17 conveys PCC resolutions which are to be implemented by the Joint Command.

Via Channel 18, the Joint Command presents its opinions on draft resolutions which are later to be passed by the Committee of Defense Ministers and submits its own proposals on matters falling within the powers of that committee. This is also the channel for Joint Command reports to the committee about the activities of the Joint Command and the Joint Armed Forces.

After the draft resolutions and Joint High Command proposals have been approved, amended, or rejected, they are returned via Channel 19.

Channel 20 is for coordinating all coalition military matters on the Defense Ministry and General Staff level. This channel, like all the other coalition channels, is bilateral, between Moscow and the national Defense Ministry concerned (or its General Staff). The East European national Defense Ministries do, of course, communicate with each other, but only on matters concerning their relations with each other, not on general matters concerning the Warsaw Pact as a whole.

Channel 21 is primarily a reporting channel. It is used by the Pact national commands to report on the execution of Joint High Command instructions and orders. These reports are usually signed by the Deputies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces on behalf of the national Army concerned. Channel 21 is also used for conveying projects and proposals from the national commands to the Joint High Command which do not require Committee of Defense Ministers or PCC approval.
Channel 22 is for transmitting Joint Command orders, directives, and guidelines on matters arising from the day-to-day activities of the Joint High Command or from PCC and Committee of Defense Ministries resolutions.

Channels 23 and 24 are the command and control channels of the East European national armed forces.

The Joint High Command supervises the East European national contingents through Channel 25.

Channel 26 is the line of command from the Joint High Command to its Representatives to the East European forces.

Channel 27 is the channel for Representatives of the Joint High Command to supervise and control the national armed forces.

Channel 28 is the command and control line of the East European national Home Air Defense Forces.

Channel 29 is the line of operational command and control over the East European national Home Air Defense Forces.

Channels 30 through 32 are the command and control lines of the Soviet armed forces, and Channel 33 is the NSWP counterpart of Channel 6.

Channel 34 carries resolutions passed by the Military Council of the Pact Joint High Command, which are binding on the Joint Armed Forces after being signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces.

Channel 35 is used for conveying proposals from the NSWP national defense ministries to the Military Council.

Channel 36 is a Soviet counterpart to Channel 35.
IV. SOVIET HEGEMONY IN THE WARSAW PACT

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT COMPARED

A comparison of the organizational structure of the Pact (see Sec. II) with the structure of NATO\(^1\) shows the following principal differences:

1. The Pact lacks peacetime regional strategic-operative commands such as those in NATO (AFNORTH, AFCENT, NORTHAG, CENTAG, etc.). Similar organs do exist in practice, but in the form of the Soviet headquarters of the Western TVD, Southwestern TVD, Soviet Group of Forces in Germany (SGFG), and so on; therefore, the NSWP allies are excluded from participation in their activities. The same applies to the two Warsaw Pact naval headquarters.

2. There are no permanent Pact coalition consultative organs such as there are in NATO (e.g., the permanent working specialist committees within the North Atlantic Council).

3. There are no coalition consultative organs whatsoever for dealing with nuclear policy and nuclear warfare such as there are in NATO (NATO Air Defense Committee and Nuclear Planning Group). All decisions concerning the development and use of these most important weapons are exclusively in the hands of the USSR.

4. There is no coalition organ dealing with R&D and the problems of warfare in space equivalent to the European Air Space Committee (ASC) in NATO.

5. There is no structure of any kind permitting the NSWP allies to exert operational control over coalition military forces in peacetime. On the contrary, the only two kinds of troops that are under the operational control of the Joint High Command—the Air Defense Forces and East German contingents to the Pact—are under the direct control or supervision of Soviet headquarters. Moreover, all NSWP contingents are under the permanent supervision of Soviet generals and officers (the representatives of the Joint High Command and their staffs); at the same time, none of the NSWP allies is

\(^1\)Data on the NATO structure and the access of its members to the key posts and organs of the alliance are from NATO Handbook, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1982.
permitted any insight into the affairs of Soviet contingents assigned to the Warsaw Pact.

6. The following Soviet troops are outside the structure of the Warsaw Pact: Strategic Rocket Troops; Strategic Aviation (long-range and strategic military-transport aviation); strategic offensive nuclear naval forces; strategic defensive ABM forces; the Northern Fleet (the most powerful Soviet fleet in terms of strength and quality, and probably involved in the ETW); and the airborne divisions (only a small number of which are nominally included in Pact contingents).

7. In contrast to NATO practice, the Pact is dominated by one member—the USSR. Soviet generals and marshals hold, without exception, all key military posts, as shown in Fig. 1, where all such posts are marked with an asterisk. NATO maintains a proportional (to the weight of forces of each ally) appointment principle with regard to all key posts. In the Warsaw Pact, NSWP forces comprise about one third of the overall troops and yet their generals are not admitted to any key post. Even the Sports Committee\(^2\) is led, permanently, by successive Soviet generals.

**SOVIET CONTROL**

The Pact is thus entirely dominated by the Soviets, and the NSWP countries play a secondary role, indeed that of satellite states, in this “alliance.”\(^3\) Soviet propaganda has attempted to deny this fact for years. A recent attempt to do so by Mikhail Gorbachev ran as follows:

> History has not known an alliance such as ours, in which relations are based on the principle of full equality and the friendly mutual help of sovereign states.\(^4\)

The Soviet military historical journal is more explicit:

> The interrelations which exist in practice within the Organization of the Warsaw Pact completely disprove the theory propagated by the bourgeois press that this Pact apparently violates the sovereignty of the Socialist States and reduces their national independence. From

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\(^2\)This committee is not formally a Pact organ, since it includes non-Pact nations.

\(^3\)Again with the exception of Romania which, like the other East European countries, has no real influence on the functioning of the Pact, but has managed to secure the right of veto with regard to its own participation in Pact activities.

an objective point of view, it is quite evident that the Warsaw Pact is an alliance in which all the partners have equal rights. In this alliance, there are no big states dominating small ones and the principle of real equality is constantly upheld in practice. In the face of this undeniable fact, any fictitious arguments invented by the enemies of socialism are powerless.\(^5\)

Let us therefore consider once again how this “real equality” presents itself. Assuming that the degree of power held in any given area is measured on a scale of 0 to 4 points, if all the members of this Pact were entitled to participate in joint decisionmaking on an equal footing in the 15 most important “indicator areas” listed in Table 1, each would have a total of 30 points (15 × 2). However, as illustrated in Table 1, the Soviets have 52 points, while each of the NWSP countries has only 8 points.

Using the words of George Orwell, we could say that all the partners in this Pact are equal but some are more equal than others. This fact cannot be concealed even by spectacular measures such as the leadership of joint maneuvers by the defense ministers of the countries on whose territory the maneuvers are being conducted, or the fact that sessions of the top Pact organs are held successively in different capital cities of the Warsaw Pact nations and are chaired by local national leaders (except for the Military Council, which is always chaired by the Commander-in-Chief). Table 1 shows clearly that the NSWP members play satellite roles in the Pact and do not have equal rights.\(^6\)


\(^6\)The testimony of Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski confirms this picture of Soviet hegemony in the Warsaw Pact and provides important new details. (Kuklinski was a deputy head of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff and chief of the 1st Department for Strategic-Defense Planning prior to his defection in November 1981. His testimony was published as an extensive interview in the Polish-language journal Kultura, Paris, April 1987, pp. 3–57.) According to Kuklinski, the Warsaw Pact High Command and other top organs down to heads of departments and sections are manned solely by Soviet officers. NSWP officers, irrespective of their nominal functions, carry out purely informational and liaison tasks in relation to their respective national armies. In peacetime this domination of the Warsaw Pact High Command by the Soviet High Command is hidden.

At the beginning of the 1980s the Soviets “already controlled virtually everything that was connected with the defense of Poland and the functioning of the Polish armed forces. Moscow designates in multi-year cycles the numerical strength of the Polish Army in peacetime and in wartime, its organizational structure, its state of combat and mobilization readiness, its trends in training, its tasks and plans of employment during
Table 1

COMPARISON OF SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN INFLUENCE: INDICATORS OF POWER WITHIN THE PACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator Area</th>
<th>Soviet</th>
<th>EE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supreme peacetime joint high command</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional peacetime joint command</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime joint high command</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime regional joint command</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War planning for the ETW (general)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War planning for use of the JAF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans for nuclear warfare</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over nuclear stocks</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans and preparation for space warfare</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over Soviet Pact contingents</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over EE Pact contingents</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime operative subordination of Soviet Pact air defense</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime operative subordination of EE Pact air defense</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic intelligence activities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation and conduct of joint maneuvers and exercises</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Rating scale: 4 = exclusive unlimited power; 3 = dominant power; 2 = equal power; 1 = power limited to own national forces; 0 = no power.

If we combine this situation with the "Brezhnev Doctrine," i.e., the right of armed Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of NSWP countries—endorsed in practice by all the Pact members except Romania—then the nature of the Pact becomes very clear: It serves the imperial military interests of the USSR, frequently at the expense of the national interests of its NSWP "allies."

wartime . . ." (p. 55). It may be assumed that these Soviet prerogatives extend to the other NSWP national armies as well (except Romania).

Kuklinski's testimony shows that the Warsaw Pact High Command was the direct supervisor and executor of the Kremlin's directives regarding Poland during preparations for the imposition of martial law. Kuklinski depicts a more political role for the Pact Commander-in-Chief in 1981 than during Soviet preparations to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968. Then, Marshal Jakubovskii dealt exclusively with the preparation of the military operations conducted against Czechoslovakia. Talks with the leadership of Czechoslovakia were conducted exclusively by Brezhnev and his entourage. During the Polish crisis, besides being in charge of the military aspects, Kulikov conducted most direct contacts and talks with the Polish party-governmental leadership. "Kania's and Jaruzelski's contacts with Brezhnev occurred only on rare occasions. On a daily basis they were tormented exclusively by Kulikov" (p. 40).
V. WARSAW PACT WARTIME COMMAND

WARTIME COMMAND OF THE EAST EUROPEAN FORCES

The estimated wartime command system of the East European forces is shown in Fig. 3. The system would generally come into operation immediately preceding the onset of war, during deployment for battle.

The East European defense ministers and their general staffs (here termed National Commands) would have their forces divided into two parts in wartime:

- Those under the operational control of Soviet commands
- Those under national operational control

The National Commands' responsibilities for the East European forces under Soviet control are to:

- Ensure alert, mobilization, and deployment of the forces for battle and their efficient transfer to Soviet command, together with the support units specified in the war plans, and to bring stock reserves up to the prescribed level.
- Ensure their supplies, personnel replacement, and reinforcement with reserve and carrier units, according to the demands of the Soviet High Command.
- Ensure high morale and fighting spirit among the forces by means of appropriate political propaganda work.

The composition and characteristics of these East European forces and other bodies shown in Fig. 3 are described below.

The Army in the Field comprises all the units acting on the so-called "External Front"—field armies, air forces, and front/army-level support units.

Electronic Warfare (EW) units are various EW, ECM, and ECCM East European units at the central level (above army level). Although they may be located on the territory of any East European country, they will be under the operational control of the respective front.

Units of Strategic Reserves are East European units intended for placement in successive strategic and operational echelons and in successive stages of the war, stationed in their respective East European countries while awaiting assignment.
Fig. 3—Estimated system of Soviet control over the East European forces in wartime
Navy Task Forces comprise the national navy, reinforced by mobilized ships of the merchant marine. They will be under the operational control of the respective commands of the Soviet fleets (Baltic or Black Sea).

Units of National Air Defense are the same units with the same roles as in peacetime, but without double operational control; their only chain of command will be to the Soviet Air Defense Forces.

Military Transportation Service is the entire national transport management system: rail, road, water, and air. This system, starting from the rear border of the rear zone of the fronts, will be under the Chief of the Soviet Rear Services.

Strategic Pipelines are all the main pipelines (national and international) running across the territory of an East European country. In all matters relating to their use, protection, and repair, they will be under the control of the Chief of the Soviet Rear Services (inside the boundaries of fronts, they will belong to the chiefs of the rear services of the individual fronts).

Signal Communication Units are all of the state and military communications systems having permanent lines. This system will be entirely subordinate to the Chief of Soviet Communications, who in turn will be subordinate to the Soviet General Staff.

Joint High Command of the Warsaw Pact is an intermediate link between the Soviet Stavka and the National Commands. Under certain circumstances, this body could also assume command of the whole ETW, as shown by the dotted line on Fig. 3. This is discussed further below.

Military Districts will each form a field or tank army, under the command of the existing Military District commander. These field armies will be sent to the External Front. However, the Military Districts will remain, maintaining their prewar boundaries. The Deputy Commander of the Military District for Territorial Defense will take over as the new Commander of the Military District, and the new Chief of Staff will be the former Deputy of the Military District Chief of Staff for Organization and Mobilization Affairs.

Most of the Military District staff will be included in the staff of the field army, and only the non-combat staff sections dealing with administrative matters will remain in the garrison of the Military District as the new Military District staff.

The new Military Districts will control the units and institutions shown in Fig. 3, operationally as well as administratively.

1Each army will consist of three to five divisions (tank and motorized rifle) and an appropriate number of army-level support units: artillery and rocket, antiaircraft, engineering, signal, chemical warfare, intelligence, etc., as well as logistic units.
National Defense Ministers (and their General Staffs) will have very limited control, strictly confined to administrative functions, over that part of their forces now under Soviet operational control. The ministers will exercise operational and administrative control over those forces remaining in the country and not under Soviet operative control.

If a national front is formed, the Defense Minister of the country will assume command of it and his Chief of General Staff will become the Chief of Front Staff. Likewise, the remaining staff, logistic, and political command functions on the front level will be assumed by the deputies of the Defense Minister and other generals at the central level.

Internal Security and Border Troops are troops placed under the front commander whose operating zone they enter.

**C³ INTEROPERABILITY**

To achieve a high degree of interoperability between the Soviet and East European forces, and to ensure adequate Soviet control over the East European forces, the wartime Pact command system appears to include the entities and functions described below.

National Level. The top military-political organs of the Warsaw Pact (PCC, Committee of Foreign Ministers, and Committee of Defense Ministers) will exist only on paper. All major military-political and economic matters concerning the Soviet Union and the East European nations will be handled directly via Channels 1 and 2 (See Fig. 2). Matters at the Defense Ministry and General Staff levels will be communicated via Channels 16, 20, and 22.

The main forum of coordination of military-strategic matters will be the Joint High Command of the Pact. If this command is reorganized as a theater headquarters, its coordination functions will remain the same.

Front Level. The headquarters of Soviet fronts that include East European forces in their composition or operate on the territory of an

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2 Such a concept existed in the 1960s. Under present conditions it may no longer exist because of the growing importance of the Internal Front of each East European state, especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

3 Another variant, often applied during Pact strategic command post exercises, has the respective National Deputy of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint High Command as front commander, and the Main Combat Training Directorate as the front headquarters.

4 The above-mentioned NSWP forces, formations, and units which in wartime are to remain on the territory of their respective states are discussed in the author’s *Wartime Missions of the Polish Internal Front*. The RAND Corporation, N-2401-1-OSD, July 1986.
East European country will include East European military missions from the national General Staffs.  

Five kinds of Soviet representatives will be present in headquarters of East European national fronts (if established):

1. Soviet military missions designated by the Soviet General Staff or the theater headquarters.
2. Soviet deputies to East European commanders in the front headquarters; these deputies will hold posts in all the major directorates and departments of the headquarters.
3. Soviet advisers to other commanders inside the front headquarters.
4. Soviet commanders of armed services' troops; these Soviet generals, working within the front headquarters, will be particularly involved in the mixed fronts (composed of East European and Soviet armies) and will hold the most important posts in the frontal rocket troops and artillery, frontal aviation, signal troops, chemical warfare troops, and intelligence directorate.
5. Direct representatives of the Soviet General Staff, known in the Soviet Army as the Corps of General Staff Officers (CGSO). The function of the CGSO, similar to its wartime function within the Soviet forces, will be to act as observers, without any authority to interfere in operational-command matters. The CGSO detachments are the direct “eyes and ears of the General Staff” in relation to the respective commands. The mission of such detachments is to inform the Soviet General Staff, using their own channels of communication, about the development of hostilities and especially about what is going on inside the controlled commands and units. Examples include the location of the forward edge of the battle area, the time and place of the commitment of the second echelon to action, the targets achieved by the controlled forces, the nuclear-chemical situation, and the like.  

Army Level. In Soviet armies operating alongside East European armies there will be designated East European liaison groups with their own communication channels. All East European armies will have the following Soviet representatives:

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5As was the case in 1944–1945.
6CGSO detachments are forbidden to report on matters that its officers have not personally observed.
1. Advisers to the main army headquarters department and section chiefs and commanders of the army rocket and artillery troops, antiaircraft troops, etc.
2. Military liaison missions from (Soviet) front headquarters as well as liaison groups from neighboring Soviet armies.
3. The above-mentioned CGSO detachments.

Division Level. Soviet divisions operating alongside East European divisions will have East European liaison officers. East European divisions will have Soviet advisers to the divisional commander and some of his deputies, as well as Soviet liaison officers from the neighboring divisions, and sometimes from the Soviet armies. In all first-line East European divisions, there will also be one or two members of the Soviet CGSO, with their own communications channels.

The Soviet concept of coalition warfare is thus clearly based on total domination of East European forces; Soviet control and supervision will extend from the divisional level to the very top. In the Soviet view, only such domination will ensure effective interoperability among the various East European forces and between them and the Soviet forces.7

7See Sadykiewicz, Organizing for Coalition Warfare, R-3559-RC. Colonel Kuklinski's testimony provides additional information on Soviet wartime command of NSWP forces:

At the turn of 1970–80, all NSWP states except Romania accepted the "Statute of Joint Armed Forces (of the Warsaw Pact) and Organs of Their Command in War-time", which stipulates (with respect to Poland):

- In times of threat of war (as determined by Soviet authorities) and in wartime, the leadership of the Polish armed forces is to be assumed completely by the Supreme and Highest Command, to be indivisibly the Soviet Supreme High Command and its sole executive agent will be the Soviet General Staff;
- At the Supreme and Highest Command there is not and there will not be any Polish representatives or even liaison mission
- The Polish Front, i.e., all operational Ground and Air forces are to be directly subordinate to the Soviet High Commander of the Western TVD;
- The entire Polish Navy, including its coastal bases, is to be directly subordinate to the commander of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, who, in case of crisis and/or war, is to be automatically the commander of the Joint Warsaw Pact Baltic Navy;
- The Polish National Air Defense Forces are to be subordinate to the Soviet Air Defense Command. These forces can be used outside Polish national territory at the decision of Soviet authorities;
- Altogether, up to 90% of Polish armed forces are to be subordinate to Soviet commands;
- Party-political work is to be coordinated not by the Central Committee of the Polish communist party (PUWP), but by the Political Directorate of the Western TVD. (Kuklinski, Kultura, April 1987, pp. 53–54.)
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT HIGH COMMAND AND THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE SOVIET WESTERN TVD

The relationship between the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command and the High Command of the Soviet Western TVD is of considerable interest. The absence of authoritative information on the subject, either Soviet or East European, makes it impossible to come to any categorical conclusion.\(^8\)

There has been no precedent in the history of the Soviet armed forces of two parallel, regional high commands existing at the same time, covering the same geographic area, as is the case of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command and the High Command of the Western TVD.

Only one explanation can justify, in terms of military-strategy command and control principles, such a situation: that the Warsaw Pact High Command, with Marshal Kulikov as Commander-in-Chief, is not a wartime operational command body and in peacetime is concerned mainly with administrative and training matters. In wartime its exclusive mission will be to coordinate the military efforts of the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, being a link between the Soviet Supreme High Command and the national High Commands of the NSWP forces.

This view is shared by most, if not all, Western observers.\(^9\) Indeed, with one exception, there is no evidence to suggest that the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command includes wartime operational bodies such as an operational directorate, intelligence directorate, rocket troops and artillery command, chief of engineering troops, etc. However, a book on the Warsaw Pact recently published in Poland may be interpreted as contrary evidence.\(^10\) The authority of this book stems, first of all, from one of its consulting editors, Colonel General Eugeniusz Molczyk, from 1972 until 1986 one of the Deputies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pact High Command. The book describes the role of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command and its staff:

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Their tasks include: working out strategic coalitional plans as well as securing conditions for their successful implementation in case of aggression against any alliance member; raising the level of troop combat training and providing optimum conditions for allied armies’ cooperation; preparing joint exercises and military maneuvers of the Joint Armed Forces; formulating directives concerning the supply system of operational forces; securing state territories against unexpected attack, as well as preparing theaters of military operations (p. 238, emphasis added).

The italicized tasks are precisely those which must be prepared in peacetime and carried out in wartime by strategic-level organs such as General Staffs.\textsuperscript{11}

The Pact Joint High Command is ideally suited to assume Soviet High Command functions relating to Europe. It is well acquainted with the Theater of War/Theater of Military Operations and the multinational forces deployed on its territory—both in terms of their combat readiness and their capabilities. All necessary wartime organs for this command (operational and intelligence directorates, etc.) belong to the Soviet General Staff in its Warsaw Pact Directorate in peacetime.

Why are these operational command bodies not included in the structure of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command? Such an arrangement allows the Soviets to keep the East European members of this command sufficiently distant from operational matters connected with wartime planning for a European Theater of War. In this way, the Soviets ensure that NSWP commands and generals are involved in the wartime planning process only insofar as their own national forces are concerned and are left in the dark on the overall wartime operational plans for the European Theater of War, or even particular TVDs.

Army General Anatolii Gribkov, Chief of Staff of the Pact Joint High Command, is at the same time one of the First Deputies of the Chief of the Soviet General Staff. He is thus the superior of the aforementioned Warsaw Pact Directorate\textsuperscript{12} of the Soviet General Staff.

\textsuperscript{11}This conclusion would be more certain if the tasks noted above were published in a Soviet source. But it is worth a reminder that the Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs) were publicly disclosed in 1981 by the Polish military press: to date no open Soviet source has mentioned the existence of the OMGs.

\textsuperscript{12}The so-called “Warsaw Pact Directorate of the General Staff” may stem from the former “10th Directorate of the General Staff.” Its full name at one time was: “Foreign Military Assistance Directorate,” and in the beginning (1954–55) it was led by Army General A. Antonov, former Chief of the General Staff. Now this body has the name “Foreign Military Assistance Main Directorate,” led currently by Lt. Gen. E. Kondakov, a former chief of staff of the Caucasian Military District (see Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials: A Reference Aid, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, LDA 86–11907, October 1986, p. 3, and previous editions of that directory).

The USSR now gives military assistance to other countries around the world in addition to the Warsaw Pact. For this reason, it is possible that the 10th Directorate was
and supervises its day-to-day activities. (It seems to be the only reason justifying Gribkov’s nomination in the Soviet General Staff.)

Other directorates and service commands in the formal structure of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command are:

- Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Air Force, Col. Gen. A. Katrich;
- Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Naval Forces, Admiral N. Khorvin;
- Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Rear Services, Lt. Gen. G. Khoreshko;
- Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Air Defense, Army General I. Tretiak.

There is also the Chief of Armaments (so far not disclosed), who is at the same time the Chairman of the Technical Committee of the Pact Joint High Command.

Responsibility for political affairs in the wartime Pact Joint High Command (if it is a Soviet strategic intermediate command in wartime) will be taken over by one of the deputies of the Chief of the Main Political Administration, who in peacetime is the direct superior of Political Deputies of the Pact Representatives to the East European national forces.

There is a lack of information about the third necessary element of a wartime strategic headquarters: directorates (commands) of artillery and rocket troops, engineering troops, and chemical troops. Two possibilities may be assumed. The first is that these directorates are already included in the form of departments in the Warsaw Pact directorate of the General Staff. The second, much more probable, is that they exist inside their respective Soviet directorates (commands), and at activation of a wartime Pact Joint High Command they will be automatically included.

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Reorganized into a Main Directorate, and that the Warsaw Pact Directorate is one of a number of such bodies inside the Main Directorate. The remaining bodies presumably deal with other potential continental and intercontinental Theaters of War/TVDs and associated Soviet clients and subsatellite forces.

13The reason Marshal Kulikov (like his predecessors) also holds a dual appointment—as Pact Commander-in-Chief and as a First Deputy of the USSR Defense Minister—was explained in Sec. II.


15This is probably Col. Gen. V. S. Nechaev, one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Main Political Directorate.
To sum up, the wartime composition of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command, if it serves as a Soviet intermediate strategic command, will include four elements:

- The peacetime structure of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command;
- The Warsaw Pact Directorate of the Soviet General Staff;
- The special directorates (commands) of artillery and rocket troops, engineering troops, and chemical troops assigned to this command, which in peacetime are an integral part of their Soviet directorates;
- The generals and officers from the Soviet Main Political Administration assigned to this command.

All four elements exist in peacetime and are deeply involved in the current deployment of Warsaw Pact (Soviet and non-Soviet) forces in the European Theater of War (and its particular TVDs), their planned wartime assignments, and their training and mobilization readiness. Thus, the activation of this command in its wartime embodiment is, once the order is given, a matter of hours, not days.

In this context it is worth recalling that in World War II, Marshal Zhukov was designated Commander-in-Chief of the decisive First Belorussian Front in its 1944–1945 offensives. At that time Zhukov was, after Stalin, No. 2 in the military hierarchy and No. 1 in the Soviet armed forces. Today, the Commander-in-Chief in the decisive European Theater of War (or its Western TVD, in the event of a three-level strategic command system) will again presumably be one of the top Soviet military leaders. This can explain why such high-ranking leaders as Marshals Konev, Grechko, Jakubovskii, and now Kulikov (No. 3 after Marshal Akhromeev in today's hierarchy of Soviet armed forces) were successively Commanders-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact forces. Additionally, their Chiefs of Staff included two former Chiefs of the Soviet General Staff: Antonov and Shtemenko.

If the Pact Joint High Command is to fulfill the wartime command role described above, the question arises: What will be the wartime appointments of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command, including the national deputies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command, national deputies of the Chief of Staff of this Command, and others? It may be assumed that these non-Soviet generals will in wartime preserve their Pact titles, which are, in fact, nominal only, and unconnected with operational functions within the Pact. Some of the current East European deputies of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pact forces will, in the case
of war, take over the functions of the commanders of their respective national fronts\textsuperscript{16} if such formations are set up,\textsuperscript{17} or become nominal deputies of the Soviet Commanders-in-Chief of the TVDs. In turn, the East European deputies of the Chief of Staff of the Pact forces will become the Representatives of their national commands to the Soviet strategic intermediate commands—the role which they fulfill, in fact, in peacetime.

If the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command headed by Kulikov should become an operational command in wartime, how would that affect the position of the command of the Western TVD now headed by Ogarkov? In other words, which of these commands will be subordinate to the other—Kulikov to Ogarkov or vice versa?

Four arguments speak in favor of Kulikov's command as superior to Ogarkov's command:

- Kulikov now holds a higher position than Ogarkov.
- Kulikov's First Deputy and Chief of Staff Army General Gribkov is, along with Kulikov, a full member of the party Central Committee, whereas Ogarkov's First Deputy Army General M. I. Sorokin\textsuperscript{18} is not even a candidate-member of the party Central Committee, nor is Ogarkov's First Deputy and Chief of Staff, Colonel General Tereshchenko.
- Kulikov's Chief of Staff (Gribkov) is an Army General, whereas Ogarkov's (Tereshchenko) is only a Colonel General. Moreover, Gribkov is also one of the First Deputies of the General Staff; Tereshchenko is not.
- Colonel General Tereshchenko's previous post was First Deputy of the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint High Command.\textsuperscript{19} It is typical of the promotion system in the Soviet

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{16}Or deputy front commanders if these commanders will be the respective NSWP defense ministers themselves.
\textsuperscript{17}If national fronts are not set up, the deputies will take over the posts of army commanders (of the respective NSWP armies).
\textsuperscript{18}Army General M. I. Sorokin, a former commander of the Leningrad Military District, has since 1981 held "a leading post in the troops," as stated in the \textit{Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary}, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1986, p. 692. This sentence is, as a rule, used to describe marshals and generals assigned to a TVD command. In the same source, this sentence, "Na rubovoditsechei rabote v voiskakh," is also used with regard to the following past or current TVD commanders and their deputies: Ogarkov, Govorov, Petrov, Zaitsev, Tretiak, Voloshin, Krivda, Gerasimov, and others. Sorokin and Tereshchenko have been mentioned, respectively, as First Deputy of the Commander-in-Chief of the Western TVD and Chief of Staff of that Command. However, in July 1987 Sorokin was assigned to the post of Main Inspector of the Soviet armed forces as well as to the post of deputy defense minister, thus skipping over General Gribkov.
\textsuperscript{19}See the \textit{Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials: A Reference Aid}, October 1986.
\end{footnotesize}
Army that a deputy chief of staff is promoted to the post of a chief of staff of a one-step lower command, e.g., a deputy chief of a divisional staff becomes the chief of a regimental staff, or a deputy chief of a Military District staff becomes chief of an Army staff.

The question then arises: What is, in peacetime and in war, the division of responsibilities between these two High Commands? It seems to the author that the most likely answer is that in peacetime Kulikov’s headquarters deals mainly, but not exclusively, with administrative matters (coordination of training programs and control of their execution, unification of military doctrines of the NSWP forces, standardization of combat technology, exchange of experiences and achievements in combat training, maintenance of combat readiness, organization of joint maneuvers, and the like). Ogarkov’s headquarters, in contrast, probably deals mainly, but again not exclusively, with wartime plans and preparation of the TVD (Podgotovka Teatra Voennykh Deistvii).

Geographically, Kulikov’s headquarters commands the entire European Theater of War (including all three of its TVDs: Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern), whereas Ogarkov’s headquarters commands only one of them (the Western TVD). Consequently, in a multitheater war, the Soviet strategic leadership would establish in Europe a four-tier chain of command: Stavka, High Command of the European Theater of War, High Commands of TVDs, and fronts; Kulikov’s command may be appointed as the headquarters of the entire European Theater of War, whereas Ogarkov’s command will fulfill its mission as the headquarters of the Western TVD.

We may nonetheless assume that either command could become the nucleus of the High Command of the European Theater of War. Moreover, we must assume that either command (the Western TVD command and the ETW command) would be prepared to serve both functions simultaneously, should the other be destroyed in wartime.
VI. CONCLUSION

To recapitulate, the notable characteristic of the organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact is the absolute Soviet dominance in all key departments. There is no corresponding characteristic in NATO's structure. The NSWP nations are excluded from peacetime strategic-operational commands, from any say over nuclear weapons, and from all command posts. In times of threat of war and in wartime, the leadership of the East European forces will be assumed solely by the Soviet Supreme High Command and Soviet regional strategic commands.

In wartime, the Pact's strategic and operational decisionmaking will be able to take place much faster than can NATO's, under future combat conditions in which the time factor will be of great importance.

Although Pact decisionmaking may be easier, its implementation, compared with NATO's, will be more difficult. NSWP members, constituting approximately one third of all the forces and over 50 percent of the first strategic echelon of the Pact, are relegated, de facto, to the role of inferiors; in wartime they may be called upon to execute decisions without the slightest influence on their formulation. This may lead to resistance on the part of Pact members and will clearly constrain the implementation of decisions, irrespective of initial military success.

Can any reforms be expected which would give NSWP members greater real powers? Although this might be the logical conclusion to a comparative analysis of the efficiency of Pact and NATO military leadership, nothing of the sort is likely. Indeed, the trend is quite the opposite, with a tightening of the Soviet grip over NSWP military institutions and forces. This trend has not been called into question during the first three years of Gorbachev's rule.
Appendix

INTRA-PACT RELATIONS: A PERSONAL POSTSCRIPT

There is an unwritten but rigorously observed rule that individual NSWP states can negotiate among themselves on a bilateral basis only on matters of exclusive concern to themselves. Its similarly unwritten corollary is the prohibition of discussion of Pact matters involving allied parties other than themselves. Any negotiations involving more than two Pact states are not allowed without Moscow's participation, again on the strength of unwritten convention.

Given my conviction that certain aspects of the Pact are not subject to change, I illustrate the practical application of these rules with a personal example. In 1960, I led an official delegation of the Polish Main Inspectorate for Combat Training to Prague\(^1\) with the aim of agreeing on cooperation in the field of production and exchange of military training films between our two countries. At a meeting with the Czech Chief of the Main Directorate for Combat Training, I spontaneously proposed the organization of regular military training film festivals for the entire Warsaw Pact. The Czech general immediately inquired whether this had the blessing of the Pact's command in Moscow, and on hearing that it was my own initiative, the topic was instantly dropped and his attitude toward our party cooled considerably.

Surprised by all this, I returned to Warsaw to a raging storm. General Bordzilowski (a Soviet-Pole who was Chief of the Polish General Staff at the time) summoned me and demanded to know who gave me permission to raise issues which went beyond the narrow confines of bilateral cooperation. Bordzilowski stressed that nobody gave me the right to put forward any proposals whatsoever concerning the Pact as a whole. My commanding officer, General Duszynski,\(^2\) gave me to understand that since I violated this sacred rule, it would be my last trip abroad in any official capacity, be it as chief or simple member of a delegation; and this indeed proved to be the case.

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\(^1\)Apart from myself, the delegation was composed of Lt. Col. Piotr Przyłęcki, my aide at the time (presently Deputy Commander of the Pomeranian Military District, with the rank of Major-General), and the Defense Ministry's military film studio director.

\(^2\)Deputy National Defense Minister and the Main Inspector for Combat Training.
This personal example shows that if inadvertent references and proposals can cause such a furor with regard to such a minor issue—ironically my idea was taken up by Moscow and there are regular Pact military film festivals to this day\(^3\)—then it is not difficult to imagine the jealousy with which Moscow guards its primacy and exclusivity of access with regard to a myriad of issues of considerably greater importance.

\(^3\)The fourteenth such festival was reported in Krasnaia zvezda, November 15, 1986.