Polish National Security Thinking in a Changing Europe

A Conference Report

Ronald D. Asmus, Thomas S. Szayna
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Ronald D. Asmus, Thomas S. Szayna
with Barbara Kliszewski

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PREFACE

This report analyzes the discussions between Polish and U.S. security experts during a workshop on “The Military and National Security Policy,” held in Warsaw, Poland, on June 11–13, 1990. The workshop was one of a series of gatherings sponsored by RAND in Eastern Europe and designed to establish a broad dialogue between American policymakers and the new democratic security elites in the region. The Polish cosponsor of this workshop was the Senate Center of International Studies.

This report should interest U.S. policymakers and analysts concerned with the Polish military and with the evolution of East European foreign and security policies. Funding for the workshop was provided through a grant from The Ford Foundation to the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies.
SUMMARY

This report summarizes the results of a workshop entitled "The Military and National Security Policy" held in Warsaw, Poland, on June 11–13, 1990, and sponsored by RAND and the Polish Senate Center of International Studies. The workshop was devoted to the issues of civil-military relations and national security policy in the new democracies of Eastern Europe.

Throughout Eastern Europe civil-military relations are undergoing a process of tremendous change as new civilian elites gradually assert control over military establishments previously controlled by ruling communist parties. The process is further complicated by the relative lack of experience of the new civilian elites in national security matters. In the Polish case, the legacy of martial law constitutes a special problem as do the complex transitional arrangements that resulted from the Polish June 1989 elections. At the time this workshop was held, the Polish President was still General Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Polish Defense Ministry was headed by General Florian Siwicki, thereby complicating the lines of authority between the military and the new civilian government.

Such problems notwithstanding, the Polish government has made considerable progress in establishing civilian control over the armed forces and in depoliticizing the armed forces. The workshop took place at a crucial juncture in this process as the Polish government had recently appointed two civilian Deputy Defense Ministers, Janusz Onyszkiwicz and Bronislaw Komorowski, to quicken the pace of developments. Considerable tensions remain as evidenced by the discussions in the following pages. American participants emphasized the importance the new civilian leadership must give to national security policy and the need to establish a routine dialogue between civilians and the military.

With regard to national security policy, one central conclusion can be drawn from the proceedings of this workshop. Poland sees itself as having inherited a new set of national security concerns as a result of the far-reaching political and military changes that have taken place in Europe. These concerns are rooted in geography and history, with Poland again finding itself faced with the dilemma of being sandwiched between two powerful neighbors in the East and in the West. The collapse of communism and German unification have trans-
formed Poland into a frontline state in any potential military conflict involving NATO and the USSR. Regardless of the likelihood of such a conflict, Poles find it worrisome that Poland would be the main battleground in such a conflict and that they would have little control over the course of events.

Polish national security concerns are further exacerbated by the prospect of expanding German influence in the region and growing instability in the Soviet Union. German unification has reawakened latent Polish concerns over the permanence of Poland's borders. The prospect of prolonged political and economic weakness and fragility over the next decade has heightened the Polish elite's sense of dependence on German economic assistance and political support.

To be sure, the Polish policymaking elite does not see any short-run threat from Germany. Rather, Polish concerns center on the longer-term ramifications of potentially pervasive German influence. The new Polish democratic elite continues to enjoy excellent relations with its West German counterpart. At the same time, anti-German sentiments remain an important factor in Polish public opinion and are rooted in Polish nationalism and 40 years of communist indoctrination.

The Polish elite also perceives a national security threat coming from the USSR. In the short run, Polish fears center on a return to a more authoritarian form of rule in Moscow which would enhance the influence of the Soviet military. Several Polish participants in the conference voiced fears that elements in the Soviet military might seek to again bring Poland under Soviet control. Polish foreign policy must therefore keep Soviet security interests in mind in an attempt to strengthen the democratic forces in the USSR and support the reformist tendencies. In the long run, Poland sees a victory of the democratic forces in Moscow as the surest guarantee of its own security.

The possible disintegration of the USSR nevertheless confronts Poland with the prospect of civil war to its East. Polish officials are seriously thinking and planning for scenarios entailing the emergence of several independent states on their eastern border. Although the Poles have sought to establish good relations with the independent movements in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltics (above all Lithuania), considerable mistrust toward the Poles continues to exist in the western republics of the USSR. The consequent chaos and instability in the Western USSR would have a direct impact on Poland. Armed clashes in areas bordering Poland could draw Poland into a civil war. Even if such spillover does not take the form of armed con-
flict, Poland could be confronted with emigration flows, disease, and economic and political hardships that could constitute a tremendous burden for the fragile Polish economy and political system.

Polish officials clearly see a need for an ongoing U.S. role in European security affairs as crucial for Polish security—both to balance against the residual Soviet threat as well as to help contain German influence in the region. Many Polish fears in the security realm are based on the perception that the United States may ultimately choose to or be compelled to withdraw from Europe. At the same time, many Poles perceive a dilemma. The core of the U.S. engagement in Europe is through NATO. Although the Polish government clearly supports NATO, the Atlantic alliance is also part of the old bloc system that Poland seeks to overcome. Not only does the Alliance exclude Poland, but NATO military strategy and doctrine are viewed as targeting Poland, a process over which the Poles have little influence.

In short, Polish officials are clearly worried about the creation of a European security system in which they enjoy what they perceive as a second-class status. The CSCE process, the only currently existing means of establishing a pan-European security framework in Europe, is therefore a high priority in Polish foreign policy. At the same time, Polish officials realize that the expansion and institutionalization of the CSCE will be a slow and long process that will not necessarily provide sufficient guarantees during this transition period.

Against this background there is a growing need for the United States to more clearly sketch out its policy with regard to the security concerns of Poland and East-Central Europe. Polish policymakers are likely to push for greater clarity on American policy with regard to East European security concerns, NATO’s role with regard to Eastern Europe, and the future of the CSCE. Continuing instability in the USSR is bound to accelerate these trends.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe has profoundly altered the political landscape in these countries. The reorientation of the East European countries toward democratic pluralistic political rule and market-oriented economies has been followed by a parallel reorientation in their foreign and security policies. One of the most powerful political yearnings in the region is the notion of a "return to Europe" not only in terms of domestic politics but in foreign policy as well.

Yet whereas many East Europeans have fairly concrete ideas as to what a "return to Europe" means in terms of political pluralism and capitalism, it is far less clear what the implications of this notion are for national security policy. East European attempts to redefine their national security policies must be seen against the background of radical change in several different contexts. First, this is the first time in over four decades that the East Europeans are able to formulate sovereign foreign and defense policies.

Second, the new democratic elites in the region are nonetheless largely inexperienced in foreign and defense policy matters. The veil of secrecy that surrounded national security matters under communist rule has led to an almost complete lack of expertise among the non-communist elites. Moreover, many in the new democratic elites harbored a good deal of skepticism toward the military rooted in their experience with the military as a tool of domestic oppression and the armed wing of the communist party. Furthermore, many in the region’s new foreign policy elites formed their initial views on foreign and security affairs while in the opposition during the 1970s and the 1980s. Their intellectual roots were often based in the Helsinki process and the detente experience with its emphasis on pan-Europeanism and collective security. Similarly, many of the contacts these groups enjoyed with the West were largely through the West European left and the peace movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The cumulative effect of such factors has been that the region’s new elites have been engaged in a crash course in national security thinking, attempting to redefine civil-military relations and national security doctrines simultaneously. Such challenges must be surmounted in a third context, namely, the radically new and often uncertain en-
environment in which such decisions must be made. Not only are these countries faced with fundamental economic transformations, social upheavals, and the establishment of new political systems, but they must seek to assess the ramifications of German unification and West European integration and the possible disintegration of the USSR. It is a time of sweeping change that has few parallels.

Against this backdrop, RAND has initiated a series of workshops with the new democratic elites in the region. An initial workshop was held in February 1990 in Budapest, shortly before the Hungarian parliamentary elections. This report summarizes the results of the second workshop held in Warsaw, Poland, in June 1990. Additional workshops are scheduled in 1991. Although the specific agenda of each workshop has varied somewhat, they have all centered on the twin themes of civil-military relations as well as the integration of these countries into a new European security system. The Polish case is especially interesting for several reasons. First, Poland stands out in Eastern Europe because of its size and strategic location. Second, as became quite evident in the course of the workshop, Poland sees itself as having a new set of security problems as a result of changes in the USSR and the unification of Germany.

Third, the issue of civil-military relations is also unique in Poland because of the legacy of martial law and the specifically Polish aspects of the transition from communist to democratic rule. Precisely because Poland was the first East European country to engineer the collapse of the communist system, it also paid the most attention to Soviet security concerns. Following the overwhelming defeat of the communists in the June 1989 parliamentary elections, a deal was struck that essentially postponed any major decisions on civil-military relations and national security doctrine. The Presidency and four ministries, including the Ministries of Defense and Interior, remained in communist hands in deference to Soviet security concerns.

During the first few months of its existence, the new Polish government concentrated its efforts on economic matters. Such an arrangement soon proved anachronistic. The rapid collapse of communist rule throughout the region and the specter of German unification radically changed the geopolitical constraints that had previously confronted Polish policymakers, simultaneously compelling them to pay

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more attention to foreign and security affairs and to reexamine their own decision to postpone any radical changes in the realm of national security.

These were the specific circumstances when the U.S.-Polish workshop took place. Participants from the U.S. side included active and retired senior military figures and civilian officials from the U.S. Defense Department, researchers from RAND, and academics and specialists dealing with Eastern Europe. Participants from the Polish side included senior military figures, civilian officials from the Ministry of Defense, scholars from the Polish Senate Center of International Studies, and other Polish officials and experts in security studies (see Appendix A for the full list of participants).

The Polish civilians were of two kinds: Solidarity ex-activists now in power with little background in security affairs, and "liberal" members of the former communist foreign affairs establishment. Polish military representatives came from the former communist military establishment now struggling to redefine their role in a post-communist world. As the opinions expressed during the workshop showed, there were differences along and across the lines of Polish civilians and Polish military participants. In general, though, the opinions of the Polish civilians seemed more attuned to the changes in Europe than the opinions of the Polish military participants. A Polish civilian summed up this difference when he remarked that in the struggle to choose their own fate, the peoples of Eastern Europe had left their politicians behind, while the politicians had left the generals behind. One specific aim of the workshop was to facilitate a better dialogue between the Polish civilian and military decisionmakers.

The workshop was divided into three sessions: (1) The Military's Changing Role, (2) American and Polish Security Roles in a Changing Europe, and (3) Perspectives on European Security. A more detailed agenda can be found in Appendix B. The proceedings of the workshop are summarized in an issue-based format that pulls together opinions on a certain issue or set of issues over the course of the two days. Although several important changes have been introduced in Polish security policy since the workshop was held, the underlying driving forces identified in this report remain crucial for the future evolution of Polish thinking. This report updates the proceedings of the conference through January 1991.

The workshop was held on a not-for-attribution basis. The participants are therefore identified only by nationality as civilians or members of the military. Individual opinions expressed at the workshop are clearly noted as such in the report.
2. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The evolution of civil-military relations in Poland since the collapse of communism must be seen in the context of several interrelated factors: Poland’s transition to a democracy, the complicity of the Polish military in upholding the communist regime in the past, and the overall transformation of the relationship between the military and the society in Poland.

As mentioned above, the parameters of the deal that brought the first non-communist government to power in the summer of 1989 essentially placed civil-military relations in a state of limbo while the government took the first major steps toward the consolidation of democracy and the introduction of a market economy. It was only in late 1989 that the new democratic government under the aegis of Tadeusz Mazowiecki took the first steps to bring the Interior and then the Defense Ministries under full control and to initiate the depoliticization of the military and its transformation into an institution serving the Polish state, not the discredited communist party. A crucial milestone in this process was the appointment of two Solidarity figures, Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Bronislaw Komorowski, as Deputy Defense Ministers in April 1990.

The goal of the new Polish political elite was clearly expressed during the workshop. Several Polish civilian officials stated unequivocally that it is a normal practice for civilians to be in charge of the armed forces in a democratic country and that it is a direction that Poland, too, will follow. Yet, the practicalities of such a process can be quite interesting. At the time of the workshop, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the man who proclaimed martial law in 1981 and who imprisoned most of the current Polish leaders (including Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first Prime Minister of the post-communist era), still retained the Polish Presidency and the communist Ministers Florian Siwicki and Czeslaw Kiszczak continued to serve as Defense and Interior Ministers respectively.1 Although the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) was disbanded in January 1990, its successor party retained some influence in the Polish Parliament under the terms of the roundtable agreement of April 1989, according to which only a portion of the seats were contested during the June 1989 elections.

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1In December 1990, Lech Walesa was elected President of Poland, the first democratically elected president in the postwar period.
Most important, the old Constitution from the communist regime has yet to be replaced. As a result, the institutional lines of authority between the new civilian elite and the military remained in flux. For that reason, the new civilian elite had to seek control over the military through indirect ways, often using the legislature that was the power base of the new Solidarity government. A Polish civilian participant gave an example of how this process of gaining civilian control over the military actually worked in practice. One key venue for establishing civilian control was through the Parliament, above all through the Commission on National Defense, which was able to gain access to detailed information on the military budget and thereby acquire considerable political leverage over the military. On the basis of that information, the commission threatened to cut off funds to the military unless the commission’s specific recommendations were taken into account. The military complied, reducing its bloated centralized bureaucracy and submitting a revised budget plan.

Public opinion was another factor reinforcing the process of the depoliticization of the military. As it became clear that communist rule throughout the region had collapsed, that Germany was going to be unified, and that the Soviet Union really meant its pledge to withdraw all of its troops from Eastern Europe, the initial Polish concern to take Soviet security sensitivities into account became less pressing and public pressures for the removal of communists from key positions began to grow. In July 1990, a month after the workshop took place, the Polish defense minister, a man who had held the post for many years, was relieved of his duties. The new defense minister, Navy Admiral Piotr Kołodziejczyk, was broadly seen as a transitional figure and it is widely expected that a civilian will assume the post following the unveiling of the new Polish Constitution scheduled for May 3, 1991, the 200th anniversary of the first Polish Constitution.

Even the gradual process of establishing civilian control over the military has nonetheless revealed the inherent tension between the two groups. Although distrust exists on both sides, the sources are quite different. The role of the military as the upholder of the communist regime as well as the role it played more recently during the martial law period (1981–1983) when Solidarity was driven underground has left a bitter legacy that has yet to be fully overcome. There is clear concern among some in the military establishment that the new civilian elite will exploit the political changes to settle old scores and take away the privileges and benefits that the military has traditionally enjoyed in Poland. At the same time, depoliticization offers new opportunities and there are indications that many officers welcome the chance to shed the role of upholders of an unpopular political
regime and to revert to the role of defending the Polish state. Although the new civilian elite welcomes such an attitude, there remain residual suspicions that some of the Polish military who claim to support reforms are acting for reasons of opportunism rather than conviction.

Another concern highlighted during the workshop by several Polish civilians was the sense that the Polish military, above all its officer corps, had been “denationalized” as an institution as a result of 40 years of Soviet domination. One Polish civilian at the workshop, for example, termed the Polish military an institution that had been a part of the Soviet imperial superstructure. He pointed to the role that the Polish military had assumed throughout the postwar period and stated that despite shifts in Soviet strategies for ensuring political control over Poland and Eastern Europe, the military had always remained part of the core imperial Soviet structure. Following de-Stalinization in the 1950s, for example, the Soviets became far more flexible in political relations, increasingly reducing direct intervention in Polish domestic affairs and preferring to exercise control through indirect means.

In practical terms, this meant that Moscow delegated power and authority to the Poles to run their own part of the Soviet empire while seeking to ensure that the leadership of the Polish Communist Party remained in pro-Soviet hands. The Polish civilian described the process as a classic attempt at devolution of empire by assuring friendly client states. The Warsaw Pact, he insisted, nonetheless remained a real imperial institution and the Polish military was part of this machine. Thus, the Polish military was denationalized, it was made to serve Soviet interests, and it was isolated from Polish society for over 40 years. Such views may not necessarily represent those of the Polish leadership, but they are nevertheless significant as they illustrate the depth of skepticism toward the loyalty of the Polish armed forces that exists among some in the new civilian elite.2

Another source of tension among the Polish participants at the workshop was rooted in different views on the role of the military in post-communist societies. Martial law notwithstanding, mainstream Solidarity views were certainly not pacifist or antimilitary. In the early 1980s, however, a group called Freedom and Peace emerged in the Polish political opposition that was decidedly antimilitary and es-

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2 These views also differ somewhat with past Western assessments of the Polish military, namely, that the Polish military was simultaneously Polish and a part of the Soviet imperial system. See A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier, RAND, R-2417/1-AF/FF, December 1980.
poused some elements of pacifist thinking. The initial catalyst for the emergence of Freedom and Peace was the demand of a small number of young Poles for an alternative to conscription and what they viewed as a Soviet surrogate army. The agenda of Freedom and Peace quickly widened into a broader critique of the pervasive militarization of Polish society. One representative of Freedom and Peace who spoke at the workshop explained his group's views. According to him, the military had enjoyed a highly privileged position under communist rule, with its influence extending into the school system and down to the use of military terminology in all kinds of tasks unrelated to the military. Although attempts by the military to indoctrinate Polish youth and society had failed, such efforts were deeply resented in Polish society. One specific demand of Freedom and Peace that was eventually implemented was the modification of the Polish military oath which had contained a pledge of allegiance to the Soviet army. Although many Polish opposition groups were not as strident as Freedom and Peace, considerable sympathy for such demands had existed, again highlighting the residual antimilitary sentiments resulting from the Communist Party's past misuse of the military.

The course of the discussions during the workshop revealed that many changes have already occurred in the Polish military, and that Polish civilians recognize that the military is moving in a positive direction. The length of conscription has been cut from 24 to 18 months. Obligatory military training in schools has been reduced and is scheduled to be cut back further, alternative service for conscientious objectors has been introduced, and religious freedom in the armed services is now given greater leeway. These are far-reaching changes in a country where only recently every school textbook included a section on military education. The new civilian elite nevertheless still believes that it has a long path to travel for the reform process to be fully successful. As one Polish participant aptly remarked, the militarization of society has been stopped and the military is assuming its proper role as an institution that serves the nation rather than subordinating the nation to the needs of defense and the army, as defined by the communist authorities.

The issue of how Poland could perhaps learn from the experiences of other countries who have made the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy and have established civilian control over the military was another focal point of the discussions. One purpose of the workshop was to share the American experience in civil-military relations with the Poles. One American civilian, an expert on civil-military relations in democratizing societies, pointed to several relevant lessons from the experience of other countries that might apply to Poland and Eastern Europe. First, the East Europeans must avoid several pit-
falls in civil-military relations that could prove fatal to their budding democratic systems. Other cases of countries seeking to make the transition to democratic and civilian control over their armed forces have shown that civilians in the government must demonstrate concern with national security policy lest they are perceived by the military as abdicating their responsibilities as leaders. A lack of attention to national security matters almost always leads the officer corps to feel that the military is the only institution in the country that cares about national security. If a civilian leadership then seeks to assert its authority on national security matters, it often does so in the absence of any demonstrated expertise or a pre-existing routine relationship with the military. This is often a recipe for a coup d'etat. It is therefore crucial to establish a routine dialogue between civilians and the military on national security policy that is rooted in a democratic system and supported by the inclusion of universities and research institutes; this enables civilians and the military to interact on a broader basis.

In light of the relative lack of civilian experts on national security matters in Eastern Europe, the American commentator noted that there was a danger that civilian leaders might not show sufficient interest in national security issues. There is also a real possibility that some in the military in East European countries—disaffected because of sizeable budget cuts and reductions of the military's influence in the society—may start to view themselves as the sole patriots who care about and understand their country's security problems. The problem is exacerbated by the existing mistrust between the military and the new civilian elites. In short, all the factors mentioned by the American participant are present to some degree in Poland. At the same time, the new Polish civilian elite appears to recognize such dangers and is seeking to play an active role in such matters.

A second lesson for civil-military relations in Eastern Europe highlighted by the American commentator is that the new civilian elite, while attempting to establish control over the military, must not forget that it is managing a very important part of the state apparatus. He pointed to several examples in Latin America where the military was either largely ignored by a new civilian government, e.g., Brazil, or where a new civilian government moved too quickly to punish the military for past misdeeds, e.g., human rights violations in Argentina, thereby leading to crises that actually endangered fledgling democracies.\(^3\) A far more positive example is the Spanish model, where the

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\(^3\) Some investigations have been made into the Polish military's complicity in violent crackdowns against protesters during the communist rule (especially in 1970), but the
socialist government under Prime Minister Gonzalez has devoted a
great deal of attention to creating a positive role for the Spanish mili-
tary, thereby strengthening Spanish democracy and the role of the
Spanish military in society.

Poland, the commentator observed, may be vulnerable on this point,
both because of the mistrust and because of the Polish military's in-
volvement in martial law. Finally, the American observer warned
against blindly copying foreign models without taking the unique
Polish or East European situation into account. Many Poles, for ex-
ample, favor the establishment of a strong presidential system and
some have looked to the United States as a possible model for emula-
tion. The American political system, however, is a product of a
unique American experience. The American system of checks and
balances has many adversarial features built into it, above all with
regard to civil-military relations. Such features have worked in the
United States with its strong democratic traditions, but they may not
be appropriate in other countries struggling with fledgling democra-
cies. Several American participants felt that although the new
democracies of Eastern Europe could learn a great deal from aspects
of the American system, the U.S. model might not be appropriate in
other ways for the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, includ-
ing Poland.

A problem that was touched on during the discussions but not re-
olved was how to best address the longer-term problem of fitting a
military with past authoritarian traditions into a democratic system.
At first glance, the Polish military appears to be rapidly converting to
a depoliticized institution. It remains unclear, however, how long it
will take before the principles of civilian control under democratic
rule are accepted by the officer corps. Since the spring of 1990, the
Polish government has sought to come to grips with this problem
through sweeping personnel changes and the retiring of a large por-
tion of the senior ranks of the communist-dominated Polish officer
corps. There has also been a program aimed at eradicating the com-
munist influence (and improving professionalization) implemented by
the office of the Education Department of the Armed Forces. The
evolving state of civil-military relations in Poland deserves close at-
tention, as it will remain an important barometer of the overall suc-
cess of Polish democratization.

efforts have been limited. More extensive attention has been devoted to investigations
of murder and torture carried out by the internal security and police forces.
3. POLISH SECURITY, GERMANY, AND THE USSR

The key goals of Polish domestic reforms are to establish a liberal democracy and to establish a market economy. Both goals have an international component, namely, the reintegration of Poland into Europe and the world economy. Shortly after assuming power, the Polish government under Prime Minister Mazowiecki formulated three guidelines for Polish foreign policy: closer relations with the West, a new relationship with the USSR based on equality and full sovereignty, and an increased emphasis on international law and international organizations. These guidelines amounted to a radical shift from the previous pillars of Polish foreign policy as Poland ceased to be a Soviet satellite and embarked on the road to become a part of Western Europe.

At the same time, the radical shifts on the European political stage that helped reestablish Polish independence have also created a very new and different geopolitical constellation that Polish foreign and security policymakers need to contend with. The collapse of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, German unification, and the uncertain future of the USSR have radically altered the security map in Europe. Poland's geography inevitably places it at center stage in the future of European security and confronts it with a new set of security concerns.

Polish security concerns need to be placed in their proper historical context. The Second World War led to major territorial shifts in Central Europe that centered largely on Poland. Having been instrumental in defeating Hitler's Germany and having suffered tremendous losses during the war, the USSR insisted on territorial compensation to guarantee its future security needs. Soviet demands centered on the Eastern territories of prewar Poland. Although Moscow had gained control over these territories, as well as the Baltic Republics, through the 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact, the West acceded to Stalin's demands. As it was considered unacceptable to punish Poland in this fashion in light of the tremendous suffering Poland endured under Nazi occupation and as a result of the war (proportionally, Polish losses were higher than Soviet), Poland was compensated by granting it territory from prewar Germany East of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, some of which had been contested between Germany and Poland. In addition, East Prussia was divided between Poland and the USSR. The Polish population in those parts taken over by
the USSR was largely expelled, as was the German population from
the part of prewar Germany taken over by Poland. Although the ter-
ritorial changes were approved by the Four Allied Powers, they were
never ratified in a peace treaty as a result of the outbreak of the Cold
War. The German Democratic Republic soon recognized the Oder-
Neisse border with Poland, but the Federal Republic of Germany to
the west did not because of a complex legal position adopted by Bonn.
Thus, the boundaries of postwar Poland were never fully ratified in
legal terms, most important, not by Germany.¹

This situation saddled postwar Poland with a security dependence on
the USSR. So long as there was any question mark over the perma-
nence of Poland’s western border, Warsaw inevitably looked toward
Moscow and Soviet power as the final guarantor of its western border
against possible German revanchism in the future. This situation
was skillfully exploited by successive Polish communist regimes,
playing on Polish fears of Germany to solidify an alliance with the
USSR. This is the tradition in which the Polish military is steeped,
and the anti-German mindset was heavily inculcated in the postwar
period in the Polish military and in the Soviet military as well. As
long as Bonn refused to recognize the Oder-Neisse border and the
German Question remained unresolved, Poland seemed to be locked
into a security dependence on the USSR to guarantee its western
boundary. Germany’s division was increasingly viewed by many
Poles as the sine qua non of Polish security.

In the early 1970s the government of Willy Brandt moved to grant de
fatto recognition of the Oder-Neisse border in the context of Brandt’s
“new” Ostpolitik. Although Bonn still insisted that a final decision on
the border would have to await a peace treaty, West German political
assurances that they would not question Poland’s western border
started to ameliorate Polish fears about German ambitions. Brandt,
the leading architect of West German detente policy, would subse-
sequently claim that Ostpolitik’s greatest success was that it removed
the anti-German card from Moscow’s diplomatic arsenal, thereby
eliminating one of Moscow’s most effective means of assuring its dom-

¹The West German Basic Law views the Federal Republic as the juridical successor
to the Third Reich as constituted within the borders of Germany in 1937. At the same
time, the Basic Law was designed as a provisional constitution pending unification and
it states that final decisions on Germany’s borders can be taken only by a future unified
German state. The position of the West German government throughout the postwar
period was that a final decision on Germany’s postwar borders could not be taken by
the Federal Republic alone and therefore that a final decision on the Oder-Neisse
boundary could be taken only in conjunction with a resolution of the German Question
and by a future unified German state.
ination of East-Central Europe and thereby opening the possibility of the eventual loosening of the Soviet bloc. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the border issue seemed to be gradually losing its political and emotional substance, kept alive only by extremist groups in the Federal Republic and by Polish communists who depended on the "German revanchist threat" to justify Poland's dependence on the USSR. In the Polish military, however, the "German threat" remained the core of Polish national security doctrine.

The sudden collapse of the GDR reawakened fears connected with the unresolved German Question and Poland's western border. The prospect of a unified powerful German state on the Polish western border reignited Polish concerns over German power and political ambitions in the region. Poles once again found themselves faced with the historical nightmare of being wedged in between a powerful Germany and a powerful Soviet Union. Bonn claimed that it harbored no territorial ambitions toward Poland, but Chancellor Helmut Kohl seemed unwilling to push for immediate and unequivocal recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. Such concerns were only reinforced by Poland's recognition of its political and economic fragility and its dependence upon external support for leverage in its dealings with Germany or the USSR.

**GERMANY AND POLISH SECURITY**

The workshop discussions clearly underlined the fact that Poland is the clearest example among the former Warsaw Pact satellites of a country that sees itself as having inherited a new major security dilemma as a result of the autumn 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe. There are two paradoxes in this state of affairs. First, Poland was a tremendous catalyst and driving force in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

Along with the reform movement in Hungary, Solidarity in Poland was a key stepping stone to the agonizing reappraisal of Soviet policy that led to "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy and the advent of

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2Kohl's position was the traditional legal view that such recognition could only be granted in a treaty signed by a unified Germany and that therefore such a step had to await the completion of German unification. In its first meeting following East German elections in March 1990, the first democratically elected East German parliament nonetheless immediately issued a proclamation recognizing the Oder-Neisse border. Following widespread protests over Kohl's vacillation, the Bundestag also adopted an additional resolution recognizing the border and this was one of the first issues taken up by an all-German parliament.
Mikhail Gorbachev. One Polish civilian remarked that the developments in Poland in the eighties were a major catalyst for perestroika and the reorientation of Soviet thinking on security issues. In his view, the watershed in Soviet thinking came when the Soviets realized that Polish society could no longer be controlled, that Poland was a political time bomb ticking away, and that Moscow therefore would have to use different concepts to safeguard Soviet interests in Poland and in Eastern Europe in general. This shift in Soviet thinking became clear in the course of 1989 when the USSR began to identify its own security with the internal stability of its neighbors and to allow individual East European countries to pursue their own paths.

Following the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine, change came rapidly—a breakthrough in Poland followed by the fall of communist regimes elsewhere in the region. The overwhelming defeat of the Polish communists in the June 1989 elections indirectly prepared the ground for the collapse of other communist regimes, including the GDR. In short, Poland and Solidarity were a major precipitating factor behind German unification, as leading German politicians such as Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher have repeatedly acknowledged.

Second, in the early 1980s there were the first signs of a significant revision in some Polish dissident intellectual circles on the German Question. Having failed to overthrow the pillars of communist rule from within, a number of Solidarity strategists increasingly focused on how to use external forces to bring about fundamental change in Europe. Leading Solidarity intellectuals increasingly questioned the previous raison d'être of communist Polish foreign policy, namely, that Germany's division was central to Polish security. Intellectuals such as Adam Michnik and Bronislaw Geremek pointed out that the maintenance of an artificial Stalinist creation in the form of the GDR that was dependent on the USSR for its survival and extraordinarily hostile to Polish reform was counterproductive to Polish interests, for it locked Poland into an alliance system that precluded any substantive domestic reforms and formed a barrier to greater interaction with the West.

A number of Polish intellectuals increasingly argued that, provided the border issue could be resolved unequivocally, German unification could indeed be in long-term Polish interests, as it would break the Stalinist hold on East-Central Europe and open the gate for Poland's reintegration into Western Europe. It was in this context that a number of Solidarity intellectuals criticized the West German SPD and the German peace movement, accusing them of pursuing policies
that only stabilized the division of Europe rather than seeking to overcome it.

In short, there is considerable diversity in Polish views on Germany within the new political elite in Poland. At the same time, considerable reservations toward Germany remain within Polish society. Many Polish intellectuals who believed that considerable progress had been made in Polish-German relations may have misjudged public sentiments. According to a Polish civilian participant, the Polish government was surprised by the massive popular reaction in Poland to Kohl’s vacillation on German recognition of Poland’s western border. Survey research conducted on Polish attitudes toward Germans demonstrates that strong reservations toward Germany remain in Polish society.

The paradox confronting Poland lies in the fact that Warsaw pins great hopes on Germany as the symbolic gateway to the West and as one of the countries in the European Community that has advocated a rapid expansion of ties with the new democracies of Eastern Europe. At the same time, the mass-level feelings have compelled the Mazowiecki government to adopt a firm position on negotiating guarantees from Germany on the border issues and concessions in other areas that many Germans find excessive. As one Polish civilian participant in the workshop put it, trust is not enough at this point in German-Polish relations, for mistrust of German intentions is a political fact for any Polish government that has to be sensitive to the Polish public. The border between a non-communist Poland and a unified Germany is, in a sense, a new reality and will require a learning process on both sides that will take time. Several Polish civilians at the workshop suggested that it may be a decade before the two countries learn to deal with being neighbors.

Virtually all Polish commentators voiced their agreement with the view that the best guarantee for Polish security concerns relating to Germany was the firm integration of a unified Germany in NATO. Several Polish civilians pointed out that Poland was one of the first countries to speak out against German neutrality and that it had publicly disagreed with the USSR on this point. Polish participants repeatedly stressed that Poland was counting on U.S. policy toward

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3Although Kohl never questioned the Polish border, his hesitancy in recognizing it immediately with the degree of finality demanded by Poland led to very harsh criticism in Poland and elsewhere. Kohl’s motivation was to nip the right-wing Republican Party in the bud and to prevent it from stealing votes from his party’s conservative wing. Although he succeeded in pushing the German Republican party from the political stage, he paid a heavy price in Polish-German relations.
Germany to keep Germany integrated in Western structures, for that is how Poles perceived their own security. Moreover, Polish commentators were unanimous in their view that the maintenance of U.S. forces on German territory was a factor of stability.

At the same time, several Polish participants questioned whether the U.S. side did not have too sanguine an attitude toward German unification and the potential challenge it presented to the United States. Such a view was especially strong among several of the Polish military participants. They emphasized that although unification would constitute a short-term political and economic burden for Germany, in the longer term a more powerful Germany would inevitably emerge as a global challenge to the United States. Several Poles questioned whether the United States had fully recognized the challenge posed to the long-term U.S. presence and interests in Europe by German unification. Several Americans responded by suggesting that many East Europeans underestimated the strength of the German-American relationship and the willingness of both countries to work toward forging a new basis for a broader strategic partnership that would include a residual American presence in Europe.

Most Polish commentators recognized that an affluent, democratic Germany presented no immediate threat to Poland, but there were nevertheless clear differences with regard to the potential threat that a unified Germany might pose at some future point. Some Polish commentators did not want to rule out the possibility of a less benign evolution of political trends in Germany. One worrisome scenario emphasized by a Polish commentator concerned the prospect of German economic influence in Poland becoming so vast it could ultimately lead to German demands for a peaceful revision of the border.

A second set of concerns articulated by Polish civilian and military participants revolved around residual German military capabilities. Many Polish commentators found German declarations on the future military nature of Germany enigmatic and felt it was difficult to predict what kind of a military partner a reunified Germany might be. One Polish worry expressed at the workshop was that many decisions concerning German military power would be an internal NATO matter and Poland would have little influence over this process. In their view, the reduction in the German armed forces mandated by the CFE treaty would only increase the disproportion between Polish and German forces. One Polish military representative maintained that the conventional capabilities retained by Germany after the CFE treaty would still surpass the German needs for self-defense.
Another specific Polish grievance was that whereas the West appeared willing to take Soviet security interests into account, there was less willingness to take Polish aspirations into account. Several Polish commentators expressed fears that Poland would be left to face Germany alone. A Polish military participant added that Polish fears should be seen in conjunction with discussions of possible reductions in or withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Europe. Several Polish participants called for further reductions in the national ceilings for German armed forces as well as a formula guaranteeing that German forces would have a strict defensive orientation. Germany, they insisted, had no need for such capabilities to support its international standing and that it was important to further reduce the military factor to assure a stable balance of power in Central Europe.

Acknowledging Polish concerns, one American participant pointed out that German officials had publicly stated that the size of the Bundeswehr had been tailored to take into account the concerns of Germany's neighbors, including Poland, and that many Americans believe that planned force levels for the Bundeswehr were needed to assure a military balance against residual Soviet capabilities. Several American participants supported the need for a candid German-Polish dialogue on these issues as well as expanded contacts between NATO and Poland.⁴

An additional subject that was touched upon was Polish concerns about the future evolution of NATO strategic and operational doctrine. American participants pointed out that several important questions remained to be resolved within NATO with regard to the future relationship of Germany and NATO to Eastern Europe, and especially to Poland. Several Americans suggested that the Polish side was not well informed about the ongoing intra-NATO debate about future military strategy, defense planning, and force structures. If, for example, Berlin becomes the capital of a reunified Germany and NATO is committed to defending Berlin, this would have ramifications for future NATO defense planning that might affect Polish security concerns. Moreover, in light of the planned reductions in allied forces in Germany, it is clear that the Germans will assume greater responsibility in future NATO planning for the Central Region.

⁴Since the workshop there has been a considerable expansion in German-Polish discussions as well as discussions between Polish officials and NATO. Poland established relations with NATO in August 1990, and NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner’s visit to Poland in September 1990 began the process of regular contacts.
An American civilian participant emphasized that such trends would have major implications for Polish national security thinking. In principle, the existence of German troops as part of an integrated Western force should be a confidence-building measure, yet there is a danger that such steps would be falsely interpreted in the Polish debate in light of history and previous German aggression against Poland. He detected an urgent need for an open dialogue on the roots of Polish concerns about Germany and on how the West can satisfy them. The atmosphere for such a dialogue exists, for all of the parties in the Federal Republic have publicly stated that they strive to establish the same type of relationship with Poland that was reached with France in the postwar period. The American civilian added that, as long as U.S. troops are in Germany, Poland has no need to fear Germany, since the type of Germany that welcomes U.S. troops will not be a belligerent one; thus, it is in Polish interests to see U.S. troops in Germany as well.

Perhaps the best indication of latent Polish fears of Germany was revealed in several direct references by Polish participants to the possibility of a second Rapallo—a rapprochement between the USSR and Germany at the expense of Poland. Several Polish civilian and military participants detected a confluence of interests developing between Poland's two neighbors based on Germany's enormous economic potential and the USSR's need for enormous economic aid. They suggested that, to secure a favorable relationship with Germany, certain forces in the USSR were ready to make far-reaching concessions to the Germans. One example given was reports on concessions the USSR was ostensibly willing to make in the Kaliningrad oblast (the northern portion of ex-German East Prussia, taken over by the USSR following World War II). According to Polish participants, the USSR was relocating Soviet ethnic Germans from the Volga region and offering Germany special concessions in an attempt to attract German investment. Several Poles suggested that such trends could reignite German interest in former German eastern territories, including those in Poland.

Several American participants saw references to the possibility of a second Rapallo as unrealistic, for they did not see any trace of such thinking in Germany. Since the workshop, the Kaliningrad oblast has been opened for foreign investment, and rumors over the resettling of Soviet ethnic Germans from Kazakhstan persist. However, none of this implies a repeat of Rapallo. Subjective perceptions are nonetheless important in politics and Polish thinking along these lines only confirmed how sensitive the question of German influence and potential dominance in this region remains to many Poles.
THE USSR AND POLISH SECURITY

Current Polish security concerns revolve around the future of Germany and the future of the USSR. Polish views of developments in Germany and in the Soviet Union were an important theme during the workshop. Changing Polish attitudes toward Germany have been paralleled by equally far-reaching shifts in Polish attitudes toward the USSR. Moreover, there is a parallel in the territorial problem in Polish-German and Polish-Soviet relations, with exaggerated fears and historical prejudices playing a part in both cases. In Poland there is no perception of a territorial problem in Polish-Soviet relations. Although there is concern for the lot of over one million ethnic Poles living in the USSR and sentimental attachment to places like Lvov and Vilnius, no responsible politician in Poland talks of regaining old eastern Polish provinces. At the same time, distrust of Polish intentions exists among some Byelorussian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian independence movements (this distrust has been skillfully exploited by local antireform elements in western USSR). There are obvious parallels with Germany, where no responsible politician talks of regaining the old German provinces that are now a part of Poland, but the perception of the problem is a political reality in Poland.

Apart from the minority issue, the major issue in Polish-Soviet relations is the question of a future security relationship. The workshop took place at a time when rapid progress toward German unification and the initial calls for a reassessment of the Warsaw Pact security relationship elsewhere in Eastern Europe, above all Hungary, had turned the question of the future of the Warsaw Pact into a major issue in the Polish debate. The restoration of Polish sovereignty and renewed fears of Germany had led to an initial acceptance, at least in some official Polish circles, of the need for a continuing security relationship with the USSR with the provision that this new relationship be one between equals as opposed to Soviet dominance.

In the spring of 1989 Polish thinking was still very much concerned with seeking to maintain a reformed and transformed Warsaw Pact and the discussions at the workshop reflected this. Shortly after the conclusion of the workshop Polish diplomacy abandoned this goal. Much of the discussion at the workshop over the future of the Pact is nonetheless revealing for it highlights some of the security dilemmas Polish policymakers are seeking to come to terms with, above all in the civilian and military leadership in the Polish Defense Ministry.

The need for insurance against the possibility of a resurgent Germany was the primary reason for Polish interest in maintaining some version of the Warsaw Pact. Several Polish participants emphasized
that their goal was to bring about a restructured, modernized, democratized Warsaw Pact that would provide its members an enhanced feeling of security from external threats as well as enhanced security among the members. Several Polish civilian participants claimed that Poland had been the main initiator of plans to transform the Warsaw Pact into a looser and authentic defense coalition among equals.⁵ According to several Polish participants, Poland had taken several initiatives aimed at changing the structure and functioning of the Warsaw Pact. A Polish civilian who had attended the June 1990 Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee summarized several specific proposals to reform the Warsaw Pact's military structure that had been discussed at the meeting: (1) separating the Warsaw Pact military structure from the national structures (the commander-in-chief of the Joint Warsaw Pact Forces also has always been the deputy defense minister of the USSR); (2) stationing the deputy commanders of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (East Europeans) in Moscow and giving them a real role as commanders rather than liaison officers; and (3) instituting a system of rotation for various command posts, perhaps even for the post of commander-in-chief.

According to the Polish participant, all of these proposals were included in the formal decisions made in Moscow regarding the command of the Joint Armed Forces. With regard to the future, he suggested that Poland also hoped to see officers in the General Staff of the various countries play a role in all of the Warsaw Pact military structures rather than simply carry out liaison tasks. In addition, Poland also wanted to see changes in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact that were now required as several countries, foremost among them Poland, had declared that their armed forces would fight only on their own territory. Some Polish participants suggested that a far-reaching debate and changes within the Warsaw Pact could transform the Pact into an institution similar to NATO, where countries could be political members of the alliance but remain outside the integrated military command.

Polish participants recognized the uncertainty regarding the Warsaw Pact's future and growing calls in other East European countries for its abolition. They also admitted that plans for a viable reform of the Warsaw Pact would hinge upon the active participation of their neighbors, above all Czechoslovakia. Several Polish participants

⁵Indeed, in early 1990, the Warsaw Pact began work on the general revision of its operational principles and ideology.
pointed out their dilemma, namely, that they wanted to be a part of Western institutions such as the European Community (EC) in political and economic terms and that they were dependent upon German support to achieve these goals, yet they were also striving to simultaneously maintain an Eastern military alliance designed as insurance against Germany.

Recognizing such problems, most Polish participants nonetheless insisted that the demise of the Pact was not likely to take place in the immediate future. They noted that at the Moscow meeting Czechoslovakia, although making clear its intention to ultimately withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, did not intend to do so in the immediate future. Hungary, the most outspoken on this issue, still spoke about a possible withdrawal in 18 months. Thus, Polish commentators felt that efforts to reform this alliance remained worthwhile and that the Pact could play an important role in the transition to an all-European security system, a process they expected to take some three to seven years.

Several commentators pointed to Poland's special position with regard to the future of the Warsaw Pact. As one Polish civilian stressed, Poland's situation cannot be compared to that of a country such as Hungary. If Hungary were to withdraw from the Pact, nothing significant would change. If Poland were to withdraw, however, the Pact would collapse rapidly. Such a development, they believed, could worsen Gorbachev's position, stop the conventional arms reduction talks, and derail the CSCE process—all of which Poland is interested in supporting.

Although a number of Polish speakers spoke out strongly in favor of the Warsaw Pact, the issue of Soviet troops in Poland led to disagreements among the Polish participants. One Polish civilian offered a rationale for the continued stationing of Soviet troops. On the one hand, he rejected the link between the stationing of Soviet forces in Poland and the developments in Germany. Pointing out that a powerful Germany is unlikely to allow the long-term stationing of Soviet troops on its territory, and that during the next few years Poland will not be threatened from the West, he concluded that there was no need to have two Soviet tank divisions and 350 aircraft in Poland, ostensibly to protect lines of communication to Soviet troops in Germany; at most, the combat troops should be replaced by communications troops. Nevertheless, he argued that the Soviet troops should be allowed to stay in Poland for different reasons. First, such a measure would help in the psychological perception of stability. Second, it would be a good neighborly gesture from an ally. There is
an extreme shortage of accommodations in the USSR for soldiers being withdrawn from Eastern Europe and, according to him, Poland could wait until the barracks and bases were built in the USSR to accommodate the Soviet soldiers before requesting their withdrawal.

Another Polish civilian disagreed sharply. He insisted that severe problems with housing or employment for Soviet soldiers in the USSR were not good enough arguments for Polish public opinion. In his view, the question was whether the Soviet forces in Poland decreased or increased Polish security. He stated that the two Soviet divisions in Poland are not significant militarily. Furthermore, their continued stationing in Poland (coupled with withdrawals of Soviet forces from other East European countries) would single out Poland as a special case. The Polish civilian thought that the singling out of Poland would decrease Polish security. In such circumstances, the Polish commentator did not think that it was valid to argue in favor of allowing Soviet forces in Poland on humanitarian grounds. He acknowledged the existence of strong pressure in Poland to demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In his view, it was a problem that could not be avoided; if the Soviet troops withdrew from Germany in a few years, there would be no justification whatsoever for them to remain in Poland.

The position on the future of the Warsaw Pact advocated by most of the Polish participants may not have been shared to the same extent in the Polish Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry had always taken a more reserved position and in the summer of 1990, one month following the workshop, Poland reversed its stance. By the fall of 1990 Polish officials spoke of the Pact as irrelevant and Warsaw’s official position became that Poland should no longer seek to artificially prolong the Warsaw Pact’s existence. The shift in Poland’s official stance was undoubtedly tied to the successful solution of the Polish-German border issue, the rapid deterioration of the Soviet internal situation resulting from ethnic nationalism, and growing political pressure on the Mazowiecki government from Lech Walesa. Similarly, a few months following the workshop Poland changed its official position on the presence of Soviet troops on its territory. Although negotiations regarding the stationing of Soviet troops had been going on since the spring of 1990, in September 1990 the Polish government asked the Soviets for talks about a total pullout; negotiations began in November 1990. The talks have taken on an increasinglly tense tone because of Soviet intransigence and Polish demands.

The future of the USSR was a pervasive Polish concern during the workshop. Several Polish participants made it clear that the situa-
tion in the USSR was highly unstable and they saw trends in the USSR as having far-reaching implications for Polish national security. Many Polish participants believed that elements especially within the Soviet armed forces still viewed Poland as a military buffer zone. For that reason, several Polish civilians emphasized that Poland needed to understand Soviet security interests and to continue to behave as a good ally of the USSR.

Other Polish commentators saw the main threat from the East in terms of the consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet state. They saw a real potential for a breakup of the USSR within a few years, with the threat facing Poland coming from the possible spillover of political chaos, potential nationalist clashes, and massive emigration flows as the USSR disintegrated as a unitary state.

In the view of several Polish participants, such problems would certainly affect Poland and they could even draw Poland into an armed conflict. The most likely scenario leading to armed conflict discussed by Polish military and civilian participants was a dissolution of the USSR. Several Polish commentators expressed concern about Soviet reaction to Byelorussian and Ukrainian desires for independence. The Russian leadership might allow the Baltics to become independent but such a solution would be far more difficult for the non-Russian Slavic peoples of the USSR. Since Poland is going to be politically and economically a weak state for some time, Polish commentators were worried that they might become hostage to a chain of events that could lead to a catastrophe over which they would have little control.

At the same time, several Polish commentators emphasized strongly that the USSR needs to be integrated into Europe rather than to be kept out of it. They emphasized that fears of isolating the USSR from Europe, as well as considerations of human rights, were the motivating forces for their tactical support of the Warsaw Pact. In their view, the Soviet army was still cohesive and interested in maintaining the old empire; isolating the USSR from Europe could only strengthen the hand of the military in Soviet domestic affairs.

Polish concerns were also motivated by the longer-term hope that such policies could reinforce a possible victory of the democratic forces in the USSR which were viewed as the best guarantee for the future of European security. According to one civilian, there was a continuation of the historic struggle in the USSR between two traditions—the pro-Western one symbolized by Herzen and recently by Sakharov, and the nationalistic Russian one associated with the Slavophiles and whose contemporary echoes could be found in Solzhenitsyn. The civil-
ian stressed the importance of the victory of the European, democratic tradition in the USSR and that is how he justified Poland's reaching out to the Soviet Union and that tradition. In the words of one Polish civilian commentator, Polish support for the Warsaw Pact should be understood solely in tactical terms. No one was happier about the Cold War being lost by the Warsaw Pact than the Poles, who fully realized that it was American military power that led to the end of what he referred to as the Soviet "Cold Occupation" of Poland and much of Eastern Europe.
4. MILITARY ISSUES

Discussions of military issues during the workshop focused on three topics: future U.S. military strategy in Europe; the future of the arms control process; and the future of Polish military doctrine. The first revolved around Polish concerns with regard to future U.S. war-fighting concepts in Europe. Polish officials have, of course, repeatedly voiced support for an ongoing U.S. military presence in Europe, above all in Germany. Polish proposals during the workshop for the formation of joint U.S.-Polish brigades, along with joint brigades with countries such as France and Germany, testify to the Polish desire to keep the United States engaged in European security and to integrate Polish forces with Western forces even if only in a symbolic sense.

At the same time, the new Polish government has been clearly uneasy about the prospect of being a buffer state between NATO and the USSR, above all as any future conflict between NATO and the USSR would inevitably involve Polish territory. In short, Poland now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of being a frontline state, faced on both sides by nuclear and conventional weapons. Although such a conflict is unlikely at the present, its potential lethality constitutes a serious worry for Polish planners. Such concerns were reflected in considerable Polish questioning about the evolution of American military doctrine in the new Europe. Polish misgivings centered on two specific issues: NATO nuclear strategy and possible “first use” and the American war-fighting concept of “follow-on-forces attack” or FOFA.

Several Polish military and civilian commentators at the workshop called for a rapid reduction and eventual complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. Moreover, several Polish military representatives questioned whether the U.S. adherence to FOFA was still justified in view of the lack of any potential threat from the Warsaw Pact, and especially from Poland. In the view of some Polish commentators, the combination of nuclear weapons and concepts such as FOFA had the potential of turning Poland into a war zone or at least exposing Poland to dangers from such weapons being used in territories adjacent to Polish borders.

It is important to recall that NATO’s nuclear strategy and FOFA were major targets of Soviet propaganda, which portrayed them as evidence of aggressive U.S. policy and military intentions in Europe.
Yet, the focused questioning of Soviet-trained officers about such aspects of U.S. strategy and war-fighting doctrine suggests that such concepts created considerable concern in the military establishments of East European countries which realized that their territory included a considerable number of potential targets in a future military conflict. Such views are similar to the fears raised by the GDR military in the mid- and late-1980s and which were articulated in East European military journals. The fears are the logical response of a military that directly faces NATO and understands the capabilities and concepts for the use of FOFA. A few American civilian participants also raised the question whether FOFA still made strategic sense in Central Europe, in light of the erosion of the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority, increasing distance between forces, and the unreliability of Soviet “allies.”

American military participants emphasized that Polish concerns about some U.S. military plans were in part rooted in a different understanding and interpretation of some concepts. As an American military commentator pointed out, “first use” is a statement designed for deterrence purposes as much as for war-fighting reasons, and its military implications need to be separated from the political context. Polish commentators were focusing solely on the military implications of “first use.” One American civilian nonetheless suggested a confidence-building measure that would allow NATO to take into account the changed relationship of the East European countries to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. He suggested that NATO consider declaring that it would not use force against a country that was neither using its own forces to support an attack against NATO nor permitting its territory to be so used.

Another military issue of considerable concern to the Polish military at the workshop was the pattern of the arms control process. The Polish side clearly viewed conventional arms reductions negotiations as one of the main venues for mitigating any immediate military threat to Poland and one that would retain considerable validity in the future. Moreover, the CFE talks in Vienna also provide a crucial forum where the smaller European countries have more leverage and are able to articulate their views on security matters.

At the same time, several Polish participants found it worrisome that the rapid pace of political changes in Eastern Europe had outstripped the interalliance framework that still prevails at the CFE talks. The original CFE framework locked the Poles into a bloc-to-bloc paradigm that no longer corresponded to political reality. Several Polish civilian and military commentators expressed concern that the U.S.
seemed to be negotiating only with the USSR, and that the East Europeans' interests were not adequately taken into account.

Many Polish participants urged the United States to recognize this increasing gap between the political framework in Vienna and Polish needs. One concrete example of Polish concerns was distribution of national ceilings and limitations on major weapons within the Warsaw Pact. The Polish side strongly rejected discussions in the West that the USSR should be given a bonus in the level of forces because of the unreliability of its Warsaw Pact allies. Instead, they stressed that interpretations of force posture and the verification systems should be at the national level (i.e., Poland should have the right to hold inspections using its own national forces as well as the unrestrained freedom to allow inspections of its own territory). Although interested in the quickest possible agreement in Vienna based on the obsolete CFE framework, the Polish commentators hoped to see changes in the framework in favor of individual nations rather than an interalliance basis for consequent rounds of the CFE talks.¹

The third set of military issues discussed during the workshop related to Polish military doctrine. Although the Warsaw Pact was ostensibly a defensive alliance, it relied for years on purely offensive concepts of carrying the battle onto enemy territory as a means of waging war. One of the early signs of a greater Polish emphasis on national interests was the new Polish military doctrine. Meeting in East Berlin in 1987, the Warsaw Pact had proclaimed a new military strategy of defensive defense, and initiated steps to bring the size of forces, training, and equipment in line with the new strategy. According to a Polish military participant, the adoption of this new doctrine had allowed the Poles to develop a new, purely defensive Polish military doctrine, issued in February 1990. The essence of the Polish doctrine, according to the Polish military, is the renunciation of force in international relations, the categorical exclusion of the initiation of military operations against another country, and the refusal to become engaged in any war in which Poland is not an object of an armed aggression.

¹Since the workshop, the CFE treaty has been concluded. The concerns expressed by the Poles about the inapplicability of the bloc-to-bloc framework have become evident in the disagreements between East Europeans on the one hand and the USSR on the other regarding Soviet proposals for weapon ceilings within the Warsaw Pact. The problem was solved after a lengthy impasse but the different interests of the USSR and the East Europeans were evident.
Several Polish military and civilian commentators nonetheless pointed out that such changes were already obsolete in light of the radical political changes taking place in Europe. The gradual changes in Polish military doctrine had long been overtaken by the revolutions in 1989 and the change of government in Poland. Thus, the Polish military doctrine, published in February 1990, but seemingly prepared between 1987–1990, is a hybrid in that its terminology and some concepts are a throwback to the pre-1989 era, even though they are combined with a new, defensive, Polish-centered orientation that emphasizes Polish state interests.

Several Polish commentators acknowledged that the doctrine was undoubtedly a step forward but its continuing perception of a bipolar world, its embodied perceptions of threat, and the command and control arrangements in the alliance as they relate to the national command and control were major weaknesses. Responding to such criticism, a senior Polish military participant emphasized the open nature of the document. According to him, a subsequent version of the doctrine will reflect the latest changes in the international arena; indeed, in his view, certain formulations within the doctrine already could have been worded differently or given a different emphasis. Since the workshop, there have been growing signs that further changes are taking place and that a new military doctrine will be formulated following the adoption of the new Constitution.

Discussions over the future of Polish military doctrine simply highlighted the broader lesson that several Polish participants repeatedly emphasized, namely, that Polish military thinking is in a tremendous state of flux as a result of rapid changes in Poland and Central Europe. Several points of consensus nonetheless emerged. First, a majority of the Polish participants concurred that the primary threats to Poland in the short term were not military in nature. The primary threats facing Poland could result from either the disintegration of the USSR and the spillover problems such a process would entail, the reemergence of a hard-line Soviet state in which the military had a greater say, or a preponderance of German political and economic influence in the region. In light of the current positive political climate and Polish economic difficulties, the Polish civilians were in agreement that the Polish military should be substantially reduced during the next few years.

Several Polish civilian commentators agreed that, in the future, a more comprehensive Polish concept of national security would have to be worked out, to include nonmilitary threats and to exclude any categorizations of countries as friendly, neutral, or hostile (because of a
lack of military threats to Poland and its need and desire for a relationship of partnership with other European countries). Several Polish civilian commentators stressed that in the future Poland would not be a member of any grouping or system that could be seen as opposed to Western Europe, and it hoped to establish closer military ties (consultations, perhaps arms purchases and military cooperation) with the West. They emphasized that as long as the Warsaw Pact existed, Polish military activity would be limited to defense of Polish territory only.

Several Polish commentators expected that by the year 2000 Poland would have a military stance in place designed to make any form of aggression or an attempt to impose a nonsovereign solution on Poland unprofitable using only Polish means. First, there would be a mobile, technologically sophisticated, professional field army, consisting of similarly structured brigades of operational forces. Second, there would be a home army—an organization of territorial forces that would work closely with the operational forces and which would deal with logistics based on civilian systems. In the view of Polish participants, such a structure of the Polish armed forces would make Poland credible to both East and West not as a buffer zone but as a territory from which no aggression could be launched.

A Polish civilian elaborated further in this vein with the idea of purchasing defensive weapons from both the West and from the USSR, but locating them in such a manner that Polish forces could be easily integrated with outside forces coming to the aid of Poland, i.e., locating Western-equipped Polish forces in Western Poland, so that in any aggression from the East, the Polish forces would be ready to fight alongside the Western forces. In the view of the Polish civilian, such a concept would guarantee the defensive orientation of the Polish forces and it would aid its ability to defend Poland.

Polish concepts for the future Polish military, as expressed at the workshop, were closely modeled on the militaries of European neutrals, notably Sweden and Switzerland. However, it is questionable how realistic they are in view of the very serious Polish economic problems. To some Polish commentators the plans for Polish national security seemed unreachable and they foresaw continued Polish reliance on some alliance system as a guarantee of security. Proposals for diversification of arms suppliers also seemed unreasonable to some Polish participants because of the cost as well as the disturbance the switch would cause in Polish-Soviet relations.

An American civilian pointed out the difficulties in Polish military thinking. In the previous Polish doctrine, the external front (slated
for offensive operations against the Federal Republic and Denmark) was more important than the internal one and greater effort was devoted to conflict outside Polish territory than on it. The argument in support of such a concept was fairly logical in that it would have been suicidal to wage a national defense. Yet, the new Polish doctrine was nationally oriented and it assumed fighting on Polish territory. There has been a radical change in Polish perceptions toward what was seen previously as suicidal. Paradoxically, the favorable political changes have led to a seemingly much worse situation for Poland in the doctrinal sense if conflict were to erupt.

These comments pointed to a deeper problem that was not addressed by Polish participants. The concept of a strong, armed neutrality may be applicable and sufficient for a secondary military theater. However, Poland is on a plain between the USSR and NATO—hardly a secondary location. As Polish officials (whether under the communists or in the present non-communist elite) realize, Poland will not be able to opt out of a European war between the USSR and NATO. Because of Poland’s weak military potential (relative to the USSR or Germany), the applicability of armed Polish neutrality will vary inversely with the fear of a NATO-USSR conflict (with neutrality becoming less satisfactory as the danger of major war increases). Although NATO may see Polish armed neutrality as the best posture, such an orientation is not the best from a Polish viewpoint, for the posture assures that Poland will be the main battlefield in any NATO-Soviet conflict. Poland is in the difficult situation of being unable to be admitted to Western security structures (the West is reluctant to make such a move in case it is perceived as provocative by the USSR) and it does not want to be allied with the USSR. This is the current Polish security dilemma and the reason for the eager Polish support for alternative security arrangements (such as a CSCE European security structure). Polish ideas of active neutrality attempt to address the situation but it is not clear that they are sufficient. Indeed, Poland’s geopolitical problem has no easy solution to it.
5. FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

The fundamental aim of Poland, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe, is to become fully integrated into what is now Western Europe. Membership in West European institutions, such as the European Community, is seen as ensuring democratization, economic growth, and implicit security guarantees.

East Europeans are fully aware that they cannot rejoin Europe as long as the continent is divided into military blocs. At the same time, the discussions of this workshop underscored the fact that Poland is very uncomfortable about being perceived as a buffer zone and remaining on the West's periphery.

Poland, along with other East European countries, has therefore looked toward the CSCE process as a means of breaking down the division of Europe. The CSCE is the only framework that the East Europeans know well and through which they can integrate themselves as the terms and conditions for future membership in organizations such as the European Community remain unclear. Countries such as Poland therefore hope to expand and institutionalize the CSCE process so that it becomes a useful instrument in overcoming the present divisions in Europe. According to Polish civilian participants at the workshop, the actual form of institutionalization is not important, whether it takes the form of a European Cooperation Council as proposed by Havel, or a European Security Council as proposed by Mazowiecki; strengthening the process is crucial.

Many Polish participants felt that the proposed CSCE institution could deal with several new, nonmilitary threats that can be addressed only within the general European framework and above the level of the still existing military alliances. In the view of one Polish civilian, the CSCE institution could lead to the formation of a genuine European center for the prevention of military and other conflicts and the setting up of a multinational peacekeeping force in Europe under its auspices.

Several Polish civilian commentators saw a growing need for such a center because of certain unconventional security threats posed by the unstable economic situation and increasing social conflicts in Eastern Europe and especially in the USSR. Examples of such threats are: (1) uncontrolled migration of peoples across the European continent as a result of the opening of borders combined
with worsening standards of living in Eastern Europe and the USSR (this is a real fear of the Poles concerning the Polish-Soviet border); (2) uncontrolled epidemics related to deteriorating standards of hygiene (the USSR is also a potential culprit in this area because of shortages of basic hygiene products); and (3) nuclear disasters such as Chernobyl (there are many power stations similar to Chernobyl in Eastern Europe and there is a chance of other accidents happening).

One Polish worry is that the new European security structure will turn out to be ineffective, in the manner of the League of Nations. A situation where the old security structures have fallen apart but new ones have not yet materialized (or have been shown to be ineffective) is a strong Polish fear. Because of such fears, most of the Polish participants at the workshop saw a continuing need for the Warsaw Pact during the transition phase to the new security system. In such a view, the Warsaw Pact’s role during this phase was that of one regional security system among the many making up the overall European system. Such a Warsaw Pact would be a restructured, authentic alliance that would prevent a vacuum in the region and it would also act to increase the members’ security from each other (an important consideration for several Polish commentators who worried about the consequences to Poland of the breakup of the USSR).

According to one Polish civilian, if the Warsaw Pact were to dissolve before it could play a constructive role in the transition phase, a renegotiated bilateral Soviet-Polish agreement on cooperation, expanded Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian ties, or other arrangements could fulfill some of the Pact’s security functions. The Polish civilian also stated that an East European Union was not being considered seriously because it would only set East Europeans off from Western Europe rather than bringing them closer to it. Indeed, the model the East Europeans want to adopt is the Elysee Treaty—regional cooperation that strengthened West European integration.

The differences regarding the viability of the Warsaw Pact set up an exchange at the workshop concerning the U.S. role during Europe’s transition to a new security system. The exchange touched the essential points of the workshop. Many Polish participants accused the United States of having a detailed vision of a security structure for a unified Germany but no similar vision with regard to East-Central Europe and countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In their view, the United States was simply watching the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact without offering a vision of what should replace it. Several U.S. participants agreed with such criticism, pointing out that whereas the United States did have a concept for the
internal evolution of Eastern Europe, there was no security concept that could be applied to countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

One Polish civilian presented for U.S. consideration a rather sophisticated blueprint for guaranteeing future Polish security needs. The proposal was based on the perceived Polish dilemma of contradictory pulls from security and political considerations as well as the current presence of instability to Poland's East and West. The main points of the proposal were:

- Poland is too large and at the same time too little and too weak to afford an independent and passive neutrality. Poland is neither Iceland nor Switzerland, nor is it in Scandinavia.

- The existing principle that Polish forces will not take part in operations outside Polish territory should be expanded and codified internationally to establish a "Polish nonantagonistic zone," whereby no nuclear or chemical weapons would be allowed to enter Polish land, sea, and air space.

- Besides an authentic security arrangement with the USSR, Poland would conclude strictly defensive agreements with NATO. The aim would be to assure Polish security from threats in all directions through an active and balanced neutrality.

- The Polish zone would fit within a larger Central European system of security between the Elbe and the Bug Rivers, to replace a sharp line of contact between the two military alliances with a wide, disengaged, "common security space."

- Each zone would be different but would include joint early warning systems and other such arrangements so that "overlapping security interest circles" would be formed. The whole thing would be kept together by the institution that comes out of the CSCE.

- The new, active form of Polish neutrality of interlinked agreements can lead to a situation whereby Poland would have friendly relations with countries to its east and west, thus breaking with past patterns.

In short, the blueprint proposed that the CSCE constitute the permanent stabilizing regime in Europe that would offset Soviet and German power. Other participants suggested that the military doctrines of the countries falling within this new zone could be internationally codified along defensive lines, with existing forces structured accordingly. The size of the zone was open to speculation—some participants suggested a large version of the zone, extending from the
Elbe to the Bug and encompassing Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Others recommended a smaller zone, extending from the Elbe to the Vistula and including parts of Czechoslovakia.

The blueprint has continued to be significant since the workshop. It represents an attempt to get out of the Polish geopolitical dilemma. Whether it succeeds is debatable, for an expanded zone of armed neutrality in Central Europe only would expand the problem geographically. The CSCE link seems to be most promising.

Finally, the workshop discussed the U.S. role in safeguarding the transition to a new security system for Poland. Polish participants had several specific requests aimed at American policymakers. First, Polish participants were virtually unanimous in viewing U.S. presence on the continent as essential for the preservation of peace. Second, several Polish civilians called for a more sophisticated U.S. policy toward the USSR, since they viewed Polish security as dependent on good U.S.-Soviet relations. In such a view, U.S. policy was too narrowly focused on Gorbachev and excluded some of the ethnically based problems in the USSR. Third, several Polish participants strongly favored implicit and explicit U.S. security guarantees for Poland, such as the stationing of U.S. forces on Polish territory or a closer relationship between Poland and NATO. Polish proposals for closer contacts included possible Polish weapons purchases from the United States or other NATO countries and wide participation of U.S. business in the Polish economy, with U.S. corporations establishing footholds in Poland and operating from Poland in other markets.

In the view of American participants, proposals for the stationing of U.S. troops in Poland were out of the question. Similarly, explicit Western security guarantees to Poland directed against the USSR would be unlikely—they would not necessarily be credible and they could be seen as provocative by the Soviets. However, several American commentators suggested that some form of favorable U.S. action in favor of Poland through NATO—by expanding the circle with increasing affiliation to NATO—could be possible.
6. CONCLUSIONS

One central conclusion can be drawn from the proceedings of this workshop. Poland sees itself as having inherited a new set of national security concerns as a result of the far-reaching political and military changes that have taken place in Europe. These concerns are rooted in geography and history, with Poland again finding itself faced with the dilemma of being sandwiched between two powerful neighbors in the East and in the West. As a result of the collapse of communism and German unification, Poland has been transformed into a frontline state in any potential military conflict involving NATO and the USSR. Regardless of the likelihood of such a conflict, Poles find it worrisome that Poland would be the main battleground in such a conflict and that they would have little control over the course of events.

Polish national security concerns are further reinforced by two prospects, namely, expanding German influence in the West and growing instability toward the East as the Soviet Union disintegrates. German unification has reawakened latent Polish concerns over the permanence of Poland's borders. Moreover, Poland faces the prospect of prolonged political and economic weakness and fragility over the next decade which reduces any potential bargaining leverage it might enjoy over Germany. Instead, Poland depends greatly upon German economic aid and capital for reconstruction as well as on German political support for gaining entrance to the European Community.

To be sure, the Polish policymaking elite does not see any short-run threat from Germany. Rather, Polish concerns center on the longer-term ramifications of potentially pervasive German influence. The new Polish democratic elite continues to enjoy excellent relations with its West German counterpart. At the same time, anti-German sentiments remain an important factor in Polish public opinion and are rooted in Polish nationalism and 40 years of communist indoctrination. Although the new Polish elite desperately wants a good relationship with Germany, popular prejudices in Poland constitute a brake on any rapid rapprochement. The situation remains paradoxical when one considers the important role Solidarity played in paving the path for the demise of the GDR and German unification.

Polish security concerns with regard to Germany, coupled with the Polish desire not to isolate the USSR, initially led Poland to advocate
the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into a new, looser, and more authentic coalition. In many ways, Poland became the driving force behind attempts to reform the Warsaw Pact. The future viability of the Warsaw Pact as an institution, however, was already questionable at the time of the workshop and Poland has since reversed its position. In the final analysis, support for retaining the Warsaw Pact was too weak in the region and ongoing membership in an eastern-oriented alliance was out of sync with Poland's broader political-economic agenda of integrating itself into Western Europe and, above all, improving ties with Germany. The considerable discussion devoted to this subject during the workshop nevertheless highlighted the dilemmas confronting current Polish policy.

The Polish elite also perceives a national security threat coming from the USSR. In the short run, Polish fears center on a return to a more authoritarian form of rule in which the military would again gain considerable influence. Several Polish participants in the conference voiced fears that such a coalition in Moscow might seek to again bring Poland under Soviet control and to use it as a buffer against the West. Polish foreign policy must therefore keep Soviet security interests in mind in an attempt to strengthen the democratic forces in the USSR and support the reformist tendencies. In the long run, Poland sees a victory of the democratic forces in Moscow as the surest guarantee of its own security.

The possible disintegration of the USSR nevertheless confronts Poland with the prospect of civil war to its east. Polish officials are seriously thinking and planning for scenarios entailing the emergence of several independent states on their eastern border. Although the Poles have sought to establish good relations with the independence movements in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and the Baltics (above all Lithuania), considerable mistrust toward the Poles continues to exist in the Western republics of the USSR. The primary security concern currently facing the Polish government is the possibility of a spillover of ethnically based strife and conflict from the USSR into Poland. The consequent chaos and instability in the Western USSR would have a direct impact on Poland. Armed clashes in areas bordering Poland could draw Poland into a civil war. Even if such spillover does not take the form of armed conflict, Poland could be confronted with emigration flows, disease, and economic and political hardships that could constitute a tremendous burden for the fragile Polish economy and political system.

Polish officials clearly see the need for an ongoing U.S. role in European security affairs as crucial for Polish security—both to bal-
ance against the residual Soviet threat as well as to help contain German influence in the region. Many Polish fears in the security realm are based on the perception that the United States may ultimately choose to or be compelled to withdraw from Europe. At the same time, many Poles perceive a dilemma. The key pillar for the U.S. engagement in Europe is through NATO. Although the Polish government clearly supports NATO, it is not a member of the alliance and has little to say in the formulation of alliance strategy and doctrine. Polish officials expressed concern over future NATO nuclear strategy, above all short-range nuclear forces and operational doctrine that they perceive as offensive in orientation. The Atlantic alliance is also a reminder of the old bloc system that Poland seeks to overcome.

Polish officials are clearly worried about the creation of a European security system in which they enjoy what they perceive as a second-class status. The CSCE process, the only currently existing means of establishing a pan-European security framework in Europe, is therefore a high priority in Polish foreign policy. At the same time, Polish officials realize that the expansion and institutionalization of the CSCE will be a slow and long process that will not necessarily provide sufficient guarantees during this transition period.

Against this background there is a growing need for the United States to more clearly sketch out its policy with regard to the security concerns of Poland and East-Central Europe. Blueprints such as the concept of a Polish nonantagonistic grey zone deserve attention and a closer look by American policymakers. Polish policymakers are likely to push for greater clarity on American policy with regard to East European security concerns, NATO's role with regard to Eastern Europe, and the future of the CSCE. Continuing instability in the USSR is bound to accelerate these trends.
Appendix A
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Participants

Alexander Alexiev, RAND
Ronald D. Asmus, RAND
Colonel Glen Bailey, U.S. Embassy, Warsaw
Keith Crane, RAND
Paula Dobriansky, U.S. Department of State
Eric S. Edelman, U.S. Department of Defense
A. Ross Johnson, Radio Free Europe
Barbara Kliszewski, RAND
Andrzej Korbonski, University of California, Los Angeles
F. Stephen Larrabee, Institute for East-West Studies
I. Lewis Libby, U.S. Department of Defense
General James P. McCarthy, U.S. Air Force
Peter Morgret, U.S. Embassy, Warsaw
Major General Richard O’Lear, U.S. Air Force
General (Ret.) Robert H. Reed, National Training Systems Association
Captain Larry Seaquist, U.S. Department of Defense
Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. Army
Walter B. Slocombe, Caplin & Drysdale Chartered
Alfred Stepan, Columbia University
Thomas Szayna, RAND
James Thomson, RAND
Kenneth Watman, RAND
**Polish Participants**

Major General Tadeusz Cepak, Polish Army  
Jacek Czaputowicz, Senate Center of International Studies  
Kazimierz Dziewanowski, Senate Center of International Studies  
Przemyslaw Grudzinski, adviser to the Minister of National Defense  
Artur Hajnicz, Senate Center of International Studies  
Jerzy Jaruzelski, Polish Embassy, USA  
Andrzej Karkoszka, Polish Institute of International Affairs  
Colonel Stanislaw Koziej, Polish Army  
Wojciech Lamentowicz, Senate Center of International Studies  
Eligiusz Lasota, journalist  
Colonel Marian Moraczewski, Military Adviser to the Office of the President  
Robert Mroziewicz, Center for Research on Eastern Europe  
Janusz Onyszkievicz, Deputy Minister of National Defense  
Maciej Perczynski, Polish Institute of International Affairs  
Major General (Ret.) Tadeusz Pioro, publicist  
Major General Zdzislaw Poznanski, Polish Army  
Major General Marian Robelek, Polish Army  
Zygmunt Skorzynski, Senate Center of International Studies  
Ryszard Stemplewski, Polish Parliament  
Piotr Switalski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Lieutenant General Henryk Szumski, Polish Army  
Jacek Zyzmanderski, Member of Parliament
Appendix B
AGENDA

Monday, June 11, 1990
19:00 Dinner hosted by the Center of International Studies in the Polish Parliament

Tuesday, June 12, 1990
9:00–10:30 Session 1: The Military's Changing Role
Changes in U.S. Doctrine
Polish Perceptions of American Strategy
Discussion

10:30–10:45 Break

10:45–13:00 Poland and the Military Alliances
The Development of National Security Policy: The Role of Civilians
Views on Polish Defense Policy in a New Political Setting
Discussion

13:00–14:30 Luncheon
Keynote Speaker: James A. Thomson, President, RAND
Perspectives on Future European Security

14:30–16:00 Session 2: America and Polish Security Roles in a Changing Europe
Poland as a Nonantagonistic Region
Formulation of National Security Policy
Discussion

16:00–16:15 Break
16:15–17:30 New Strategies and Missions—Civilian Perspectives
19:00 Dinner hosted by RAND at the Hotel Europejski

Wednesday, June 13, 1990

9:00–10:30 **Session 3:** Perspectives on European Security
   Implications of German Unification
   Polish Hopes for the CFE Talks
   Discussion
10:30–10:45 Break
10:45–12:30 Structures of European Security: The Creation of Institutions through the CSCE Process
   The United States Security Role in Europe
   Discussion
12:30–14:00 Luncheon
14:00–17:00 Visit to the Polish Military Academy