PART IV

INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
The authoritarian, socialist, and nationalist rulers of the Middle East and North Africa have, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and success, concentrated on four instruments for mobilizing their societies for rapid political modernization—military bureaucracies, political parties, trade unions, and civil bureaucracies. These spearheads of the salaried middle class are examined in the four chapters that follow. Our focus thus is on institutions that can organize large masses of men and integrate them, with authority, into the new body politic. Other available instruments for creating a new political culture—the family, schools, and the media of communication—have been neglected in the present volume.

In the Middle East, the search for effective institutions is borne of a double emergency. Most institutions now in existence are inadequate either to deal with the imbalances and frictions in all areas of life which have already been produced by uncontrolled social change, or to satisfy the growing aspirations for developing a productive modern society. Both political emergencies require the rapid building of institutions that can introduce an element of constancy and control in the midst of continuing social change.
CHAPTER 13
THE ARMY

The Army's Traditional Role

Soldiers have governed a majority of the Middle Eastern countries almost continuously for at least a millennium. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that during 1962 the army ruled five of the eighteen countries between Morocco and Pakistan (Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Iraq, and Pakistan), and constituted the most crucial organizational support of the government in at least eight others (Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Algeria). Since 1930, military coups have overturned governments on at least thirty occasions in this area, and at many other times pressure from the army or an army faction proved decisive in altering the composition of government and the direction of policies.

There has never been a tradition in the Middle East of separating military from civilian authority. On the contrary, the common way for a leader in traditional Islam to form a state (that is, to achieve rule over people not his own kin) was to conquer. Religious conversion might create the nucleus of an empire or win additional adherents, but conquest invariably was the main expanding force. All new states began under rulers who combined in their person both military and civil authority. The Prophet Mohammed and the caliphs after him always bore the responsibility of being "Commander of the Faithful." Once a conquered realm had grown so large that the ruler could no longer rely on his own tribesmen to defend it (because their spirit had become too indolent from the enjoyment of the fruits of
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conquest, or too dangerous as nearest claimants to the throne, or their number insufficient), the ruler customarily resorted to mercenary or slave armies. Thereafter, given the usual weakness of civilian institutions manipulated by interlocking directorates of fickle favorites unable to match the strength of the army, it was only a matter of time until the ruler became the captive of his military protectors.

Thus, within two hundred years of the Prophet Mohammed’s death, or from about 830, the caliphs of Baghdad had lost all but their titular power in the Islamic empire to mercenary soldiers. By the end of the eleventh century, the greatest Islamic medieval theologian, al-Ghazzali, acknowledge the fiction of the Caliphate and admitted that “government in these days is a consequence solely of military power and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph.” The sultans of the final Islamic empire, the Ottoman Empire, often reigned under military duress in Constantinople and so, with even greater frequency, did the rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and Cairo and other Islamic areas which sometimes acknowledged the suzerainty of Constantinople.

When the first Islamic empire was being created in the seventh century, a number of factors combined to give special status to military leaders by identifying their fortunes with the interests of several vital segments of the society. The impetus for military conquest was sustained by the inbred enthusiasm and organizational readiness of Arabian tribes for perennial raiding, the profit interests and urge for secular power which motivated the urban Meccan dynasty, and the religious injection to the new Community of Believers to expand the realm of Islam by “holy wars.”

However, by the ninth century, mercenary or slave armies took the place of voluntary fighters at the core of the military establishment. Individual officers intervened in politics both to enhance their own wealth and power, and to protect the continuity of the army as the instrument of their predominance.

When Islam’s expansion was finally contained, power and wealth could be gained only at the expense of other Moslems,
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and the political unity of the Community of Believers was lost. Then bribery, nepotism, and assassination were frequent tolls paid on the road to power, but the roads themselves led in two principal directions. Booty and land could be seized by expansion into the lands of rival Moslem rulers. The other course was maintenance of sufficient order at home to make tax-farming profitable.

Since these two methods of political aggrandizement were the basic purposes for which states were created by most rulers after the first four pious caliphs, the predominance of the military, or a merger of civil and military authority, remained the common form of government long after the initial stages of empire building.

From Praetorian Guard to Advance Guard

What is novel in the present-day Middle East is not control by army officers. What is new are the groups for which the army speaks and the interests it represents. In this century, army coups have ceased to mirror merely the ambitions of individuals. Instead, they reflect larger forces and issues than were once involved in the frequent changing of the guard. The army has become the instrument of the new middle class.²

The transformation of the army from an instrument of repression in its own interests or that of kings into the vanguard of nationalism and social reform usually began with its unintended subversion by its traditional masters. The royal commanders wanted to borrow the “cutting edge” of Western civilization to

²“The difference between two regimes more than a century apart are instructive,” writes Morroe Berger in Military Elite and Social Change: Egypt since Napoleon (Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 1960, Research Monograph No. 6, p. 30). Egypt’s Muhammad Ali wanted an efficient military force and modern technology. In the process of attaining these ends he had to begin to modernize other institutions such as medical care, education, and administration, though he was not interested in the latter as ends in themselves. . . . Under Nasser an existing, already Westernized military elite consciously undertook to infuse a new spirit into the nation, to modernize social relations directly and not merely the economy and the technology of the society. Nasser wants a strong military force and a modern technology too, of course, but he also knows that he must create a modern nation to achieve such goals.”

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defend themselves better against its encroachments. The change came first in the Ottoman Empire, where the sultans in the late eighteenth century began to invite European army instructors and, in so doing, opened the door to new ideas regarding administration, production, and, ultimately, social and political goals. With the deposition of Sultan Abd al-Hamid II in 1908, it became "clear that . . . the sultans had moved into a new era, when they no longer had to deal with secret palace intrigues or the revolt of disaffected sections of their troops, but were faced with the openly expressed will of political parties—representatives of large groups of the people—. . . backed by responsible military forces." With the victory of Kemal Ataturk in the early 1920's, the transformation of the army was completed in Turkey.

In the Arab world the first inklings of a new spirit in the army had come in 1882 when the revolt of Colonel Arabi against Turkish and Circassian predominance in the Egyptian army officer corps, and against the foreign control of Egyptian finances, attracted the sympathy and support of oppressed fellahin who bore the brunt of paying the foreign debt. That rising, however, was followed by British occupation and more than five decades of British control over the Egyptian army.

Elsewhere in the Middle East also, the assumption of political control by European powers delayed the rise of independent, strong, local armies, or else turned some of them—especially in Jordan, Sudan, and Pakistan—initially into strong supporters of the power which trained them. Army revolts were thus delayed, and were not infused with the spirit of social reform until, somewhat tenuously, the Iraqi army coup of 1936. It was the Egyptian army coup of 1952 that marked the beginning of the end for traditional army regimes in the Arab world.

The modernization of the armed forces of the Middle East, though a powerful catalyst for internal social change, was of no avail against foreign enemies. The successors of Mohammed

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8 Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, _The United States and Turkey and Iran_, Cambridge, 1951, p. 51.
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Ali, the first Egyptian ruler to modernize the army early in the nineteenth century, were defeated by British armies in 1882; the Ottoman Empire was defeated by European arms and Arab rebellion in World War I; the fight of the Arab forces in Syria and Iraq in 1920 against the French and British Mandate was in vain; the Iraqi army was overwhelmed by British troops in 1941. The Iranian army, the special favorite of the modernizing Reza Shah, yielded without fighting to British and Soviet occupation in 1941; the modern Arab armies were defeated by Israel in 1948; the modern Egyptian army overcome by Israel, Britain, and France in 1956.

There have, nonetheless, been noteworthy examples of courage and competence. The core of the Tunisian and Moroccan army is composed of experienced World War II, Indochina, and guerrilla fighters. The majority of the Libyan, Sudanese, and Pakistani army are veterans of World War II. Individual officers in all Middle Eastern armies have risked their lives in combat. The Algerian Army of Liberation withstood an extraordinary and prolonged test. Still, no local army is strong enough to defend itself against any non-Middle Eastern power, and none except Turkey and Israel can hope to defeat that Middle Eastern neighbor whose attack it most fears.

Since the end of World War II, all nations of the Middle East have spent millions of dollars to make their armed forces more modern and powerful. For the five-year period between 1954 and 1959, the sums expended range from about $50,000,000 for Yemen to about $1,000,000,000 for Egypt. Yet their relative military backwardness has remained inescapable, given the present distribution of power in the world and the degree of industrialization, research, planning, and organization required to maintain an independent modern war machine.

These strategic facts strike Middle Eastern nations, perhaps more so than any other group of nations, as being invincible. The Middle East is beset by so many rivalries and conflicts that the possibility of local warfare never seems remote. Since the end

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of World War II, almost half of the nations of this region have found themselves in combat with French or British troops. The area has also experienced the threat of Soviet military pressure, the landing of American troops, and politically inspired maneuvers of the U. S. 6th Mediterranean Fleet. It has therefore been particularly difficult to find adequate substitutes—arranged from within or without—for the anxious yet patently ineffectual attempt of each Middle Eastern nation to establish its own military security.

Modern Moslem rulers are also stimulated to glamorize arms by a climate of world opinion in which the mass media still rank relative military strength second only to relative sexual attractiveness. And the mass media now shape the perspectives of the area’s new middle class more pervasively than any other source of communication. This is occurring, moreover, in a culture which still places manliness and courage above most other values. It was defeat in the Palestine war that set off the first chain of army coups in the Arab world under the leadership of the new middle class. Defeat in that campaign, which was a most unexpected shock, encouraged radical attempts to correct the basic causes. The debacle also illuminated the relationship between external and internal weaknesses in the Arab world. “Listen,” said a comrade to Nasser as they lay surrounded by Israeli troops at Faluja, “the biggest battlefield is in Egypt.” Nasser felt himself “thrust treacherously into a battle for which we were not ready, our lives the playthings of greed, conspiracy and lust, which have left us here weaponless under fire. . . . Over there is our country, another Faluja on a larger scale.”

The Arab fighters in the Palestine war soon discovered that their rulers had failed them. After decades of talk about Arab unity, their leaders were divided on war objectives, and several were plainly giving priority to seizing more Palestinian territory

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7 Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, pp. 45-75; 7 and 152.

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rather than to gaining ultimate victory. Their rulers were also incompetent. After years of anticipating this particular war, they could not plan a common military or diplomatic strategy. Furthermore, they were corrupt: they had appointed commanding generals whose craft lay only in non-military fields, who had failed to get arms that could be trusted to fire, and who had not bought sufficient arms with allocated funds. Moreover, they did not seem capable of reform. After the defeat, these same rulers began everywhere to squash or delay investigations of the reasons for the debacle. They clearly intended to maintain their old favorites in office and to reharness the army to its chief traditional burden—the task of internal repression.

This same kind of incompetence and corruption was common in other Middle Eastern countries besides those involved in the Palestine war. Therefore the kind of shock treatment experienced by the Arab countries surrounding Israel was not always required to start army officers plotting coups d'état, or to sensitise them to those blows of poverty, disease, exploitation, and ignorance that constitute the daily defeats of Middle Eastern life.

The Army's Special Virtues as Political Instrument

One reason why officers showed an acute awareness of the chronic ills of their countries during the late 1940's was that as young men they had undertaken military careers in the first place to escape the frustrations of civilian life. The failure of the traditional elite of landowners and propertied bourgeoisie to expand the civilian economy and to give greater responsibility and status to the civilian bureaucracy turned ambitious young men toward the army, one of the country's few expanding modern bureaucratic organizations. This phenomenon was first observable in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, but was delayed in Egypt until the late 1930's because the British did not permit Egypt to open the military academy to all social ranks until 1936. There has been no shortage of recruits: “Not infrequently, high school teachers and lawyers, dissatisfied

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with their professions, or believing that their ambitions can better be attained in the army, enter military schools and resume their public careers in the military service. General Nagib is not the only one who had a background in law before he entered military training, and those who for a short time served as teachers may be counted in the hundreds.\textsuperscript{10}

The more the army was modernized, the more its composition, organization, spirit, capabilities, and purpose constituted a radical criticism of the existing political system. Within the army, modern technology was eagerly welcomed and its usefulness and power appreciated. By contrast, the political system showed greater inertia, inefficiency, skepticism, and greed in utilizing the products of modern science. Within the army, merit was often rewarded. In civilian politics, corruption, nepotism, and bribery loomed much larger. Within the army, a sense of national mission transcending parochial, regional, or economic interests, or kinship ties seemed to be much more clearly defined than anywhere else in society.

As the army became modernized and professionalized, the traditionalist elements within the civilian sector found army service less to their taste, in large part because it was harder for them to compete on terms relevant to the new tasks of the military and acceptable to the code of the new middle class. In Egypt, for example, “except for the royal family, there was no aristocracy, and the sort of landowners and traders who might have led the Armed Forces were too busy enjoying their wealth to be bothered with military service. The officer corps in consequence was largely composed of the sons of civil servants and soldiers and the grandsons of peasants.”\textsuperscript{11}

As the army officer corps came to represent the interests and views of the new middle class, it became the most powerful instrument of that class.\textsuperscript{12} The army’s great strength lay in the

\textsuperscript{10} Majid Khâdîrî, “The Role of the Military in Middle Eastern Politics,” \textit{American Political Science Review}, June 1953, p. 517. (This article is reprinted as “The Army Officer: His Role in Middle Eastern Politics,” in \textit{Social Forces in the Middle East}, pp. 162-184.)


\textsuperscript{12} In a more cautious formulation, Morrow Berger wrote: “It is often said that the present military regime seeks to ‘represent’ the middle class. If it does, it is not the present middle class it seeks to represent—a middle class of the
kind of men who joined it, the opportunities at their disposal, and the weakness of competing institutions. In contrast to most Middle Eastern political parties, armies are disciplined, well-organized, and able to move into action without securing the voluntary consent of their members. In contrast to modern Middle Eastern bureaucracies, armies are less likely to diffuse responsibility within the hierarchy and are more prone to rebel against the status quo. This combination of discipline and defiance remains almost unique among Middle Eastern organizations. Only in Tunisia and Morocco have political parties (supported by trade unions) shown superior capabilities, and thus shaded the political importance of the army. Almost everywhere else, a modern army has offered the most power to those who most wanted it. They have served as national standard-bearer when others who claimed that role proved irresponsible and ineffective. They have supplied an education in modern technology when industry was too scant to provide it, a disciplined organization without peer, and a unity in the face of the corrupt and unprincipled competition of domestic interests and the threat of foreign imperialism. Little wonder, therefore, that many of the most enterprising members of the new middle class have been attracted to it.

The special caliber of the army leadership has been evident. Willingness to fight for one's convictions has been more common in the army than in the political system. Almost all of the military men who gained political prominence in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, and Jordan during the 1950's had risked their lives in military battles and their liberties in political conspiracies. To have led or participated in contemporary guerrilla activities, or to have risked or endured imprisonment for political activities, counts for much, even (as the contemporary Tunisian and Moroccan leadership demonstrates), when one is a civilian. The soldier, however, often has had more power and hence

older kind of clerical government bureaucracy, the liberal professions and small trade. Rather, it seems to look toward a middle class with technological, managerial, and entrepreneurial functions, a class that is now only taking shape. The military regime, it might be more accurate to say, has really been seeking to create a class to represent." (Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, Princeton, 1957, p. 185.)
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opportunity to translate courage into action than either politician or bureaucrat. Nasser said much the same thing when he noted that "the situation demanded the existence of a force set in one cohesive framework, . . . composed of men able to trust each other; a force with enough strength at its disposal to guarantee a swift and decisive action. These conditions could only be met by the army."  

The compulsion upon army officers drawn from the new middle class to take over a government is overwhelming: to have such dreams, knowledge, and capabilities, and yet to yield first place to the power, status, and ideas of the traditional elite in a political system that lacks all the virtues the army possessed, is more than can be endured. Being closest to the ruling elite and knowing its faults so well, an army which failed to act would seem to implicate itself in the misdeeds of the elite. When the traditional elite assigns to the army the primary task of maintaining domestic order, it gives to the army what is in effect a political mission. It thus also offers the army the temptation of making political choices.

Throughout the Middle East, the army's opportunity to seize control could scarcely have been greater. Constitutions were too new and too often imposed from outside to express or create consensus among peoples who either still believed that law could be based only on the word of God, or had long put all laws in question through casuistry and tyranny, or else were not yet agreed on the methods and objective of government. Parliaments, parties, political brokers, and bureaucracies remained blunt and ineffective instruments while the rule of traditional kings and landlords endured. Elections were almost invariably rigged, and the press silenced or controlled. The traditional elite itself failed to establish organized and responsive relationships with the rest of the population. It had always exploited the great

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10 Mosadeq fell from office in Iran in large part because he tried, with only the power of a prime minister and party coalition leader, to break the alliance between the monarchy and the army and, from the outside, to reorganize army leadership. Courage he had, but his power was not equal to that of the army. (L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics, New York, 1955, p. 206.)

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politically inarticulate majority and had disaffected the loyalties of the new generation of the politically conscious by failing to deal effectively with social change or national defense. Such status quo oligarchies also often placed their national loyalty in doubt by retaining unusually close relations with former imperial powers.

When the Middle Eastern military finally determined “to occupy high political office through the weapons of its own profession”\(^{15}\) it did so with a minimum of violence. Because of its clear-cut preponderance of strength, the army can win victories with far less loss of blood than if the masses were engaged. Since it does not constitute a separate military caste but rather a segment of the salaried new middle class, it is far more inclined than predecessor regimes to maintain itself in power by accepting rather than repressing pressures for change in the structure of the society.

The Size and Composition of the Military Bureaucracies

We know little about the internal structure of the military bureaucracy in the Middle East; hence the blanks in the table below. One can only speculate about other facts and their significance. Among these are (1) the average age of officers (colonels tend to come to political power in their thirties: are majors, who are usually in their late twenties, too young to initiate coups?); (2) the number of officers in each grade (in several Arab states there appear to be very few generals: are colonels in their thirties stimulated to political ambition in part because they have reached the top in the army?); (3) the number who graduated from military academies at home or abroad (Sandhurst, St. Cyr, Benning, or Soviet training institutes) or who rose without schooling. (The difference between Ayub [Pakistan] and Nasser [Egypt] may in part be the difference between the English Military Academy at Sandhurst and the Military Academy of Egypt; also, how important are school ties

\(^{15}\) Khadduri, “The Role of the Military in Middle Eastern Politics,” p. 511.
cementing solidarity in military conspiracies?.)

The table, which clearly shows a trend toward the schooled officer who enters a local academy as a result of passing examinations and is often promoted in the same fashion, cannot tell us why candidates today choose the army. By now it is true of all Middle Eastern civilian and military bureaucracies that there are many more applications than vacancies.

The relative economic attractiveness of the army as a career is suggested by the large sums allocated to it. National comparisons are difficult to make, however, not only because of lack of information but because sometimes the amounts cited (in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, for example) include foreign military aid, and sometimes (as in the case of Syria) do not. The salaries paid are generally high, considering that the average annual per capita income in most of the Middle East ranges from $50-$150. To army pay, moreover, should be added free food, housing, medical care, transportation, and other fringe benefits. Further research might usefully compare the salaries of the military bureaucracy with those of the civilian bureaucracy and those of merchants and professionals. Similarly, it would be profitable to compare the size of officer corps and armies with the hard core and following of past or present political parties in each country. (Figures available for other Middle Eastern countries suggest that estimates for the blank spaces should be made on the basis of one commissioned officer for every 15-30 men.)

All figures cited in the table below may be considered correct within a ten percent margin of error.

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16 Army organization may make it peculiarly difficult for generals to succeed in politics unless they are uncommonly blessed with charisma, political skill, or incompetent opponents. It can hardly be a statistical accident that colonels far outnumber generals and majors among emerging politicians in all underdeveloped areas. Is it that majors can still hope for advancement, generals are already content, colonels without illusions about a future left unremedied? Is it that generals are seldom in direct command of operational units, that captains and lieutenants command units too small for overthrowing of government, and that majors are normally the assistants of colonels who command units just large enough for the purpose, and that colonels therefore are best situated for properly assessing where the army as a whole will stand? Is the difference in age between generals and colonels sufficient to imply that a general’s coup will reflect political perspectives of an earlier generation and hence, given the rapidity of change in underdeveloped areas, perspectives already less relevant to the task than those of a colonel?
### The Structure of the Military Bureaucracy

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<td>(1956/57)</td>
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*a The term military forces includes army, navy, and air force, but not police forces, which are often considerable.
*b In addition, there are about 10,000 national police.
*c In addition, there are about 25,000 auxiliary troops, used as territorial and frontier guards.
*d About half of these constitute the Saudi Army, half the tribal White Army; a portion of the former, the Royal Guard Regiment, is about 2,500 strong.
*e In addition, there are about 15,000 frontier guards.
### THE STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY (cont'd)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Selection and Promotion of Men</th>
<th>Selection and Promotion of Officers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Former Moroccan members of French army and former members of guerrilla Moroccan Army of Liberation.</td>
<td>Moroccans trained as former NCO's in French and Spanish armies or as officers in French and Spanish military academies. Now also at Moroccan Academy. Promotions by ability and political reliability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>The army of independent Algeria is composed of men recruited since 1954 for guerrilla warfare. Their allegiance has been molded in part by their service in particular military districts in Algeria, or else by training in exile in Tunisia. Algerian Premier Ahmed Ben Bella announced plans in 1963 to reduce the army from 135,000 to 35,000 men.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Former members of guerrilla fighters and French army and now selection among conscripted of loyal Neo-Destour Party youth members. Promotion by education, ability, and political reliability.</td>
<td>Tunisians trained as former NCO's in French army or as officers in French Military Academy. Promotions by ability and political reliability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya/Egypt</td>
<td>Enforced universal conscription for three-year periods. Promotion by examination.</td>
<td>Written examination for admission to Egyptian Military Academy. Promotion initially by examination, higher ranks by political reliability and length of service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Universal conscription and volunteers. Promotion by seniority and proficiency.</td>
<td>Graduation from Military Academy. Promotion by political reliability and length of service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Life-time volunteers who until recent years tended, like former conscripts, to come largely from Negroid pagan tribes of southern Sudan.</td>
<td>Written examination among graduates of secondary schools for admission to military college. Until 1954, all officers were northern Moslems. Volunteers from among families with political and social prestige. Promotion by personal influence, political reliability, length of service, efficiency. Volunteers from among families with political and social prestige. Promotions by personal influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Three-year volunteers with occasional impressments. Special selection for ability and political reliability for Royal Guard Regiment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Lifetime volunteers with occasional impressments. Some non-commissioned ranks are retained by inheritance within specific families.</td>
<td>Christians, graduates of French military schools, predominate in numbers over Moslems and Druses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Volunteers for prolonged periods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 An unusually large number of officers are drawn from Berber-speaking tribes unlike the Moroccan population at large of whom only about one-third are Berber-speaking; the rest speak Arabic.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Selection and Promotion of Men</th>
<th>Selection and Promotion of Officers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Conscription,</td>
<td>Graduation from Military Academy,</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Three-year enlistments. Promotion by education and time in grade.</td>
<td>Promotion by personal influence and political reliability.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Unevenly enforced conscription for two-year periods. Promotion by education and time in grade.</td>
<td>Graduation from Military Academy, (All high school graduates are required to train for 18 months as reserve officers.) Promotion by seniority.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Enforced universal conscription for two-year periods.</td>
<td>Graduation from Military Academy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Unevenly enforced conscription for two-year periods.</td>
<td>Promotion by personal influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Seven-year volunteers, three-quarters of them drawn from Punjabis, secondly Pathans (both West Pakistani) are given physical, aptitude, and intelligence tests before admission.</td>
<td>Senior officers British-trained, usually Pathan or Punjabi (both West Pakistani). Junior officers commissioned during World War II. Thereafter four-day tests and interviews before admission to Military Academy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Contrasts in the History of Middle Eastern Armies

Although the armies of the Middle East have much in common, this does not prevent different kinds of personalities from rising to the top—martinetts and moderaters, men relying on charisma and men with powers of organization, good strategists but mediocre tacticians, shrewd tacticians with no sense of strategy. Officers do not come in a single mold and hence each army regime has a distinct character.

The histories of the armies also vary as much as the histories of the nations they represent. The contrasts between Turkey and Syria are especially instructive. Turkey has had every reason to take pride in its military tradition and strength. Its army under Kemal Ataturk created modern Turkey in the face of military intervention by Western armies and maintained it in the face of threats from the U. S. S. R. Its prestige has helped it to secure better arms, better pay, better clothes, and better food than it had had for hundreds of years. After 1924, the army as an institution
left the political arena. It believed it could afford to do so because its own men were solidly established in the top positions of the executive and the Grand Assembly.\textsuperscript{17} Social reform, economic progress, and international recognition were patently the fruits of its success. By making it obligatory for all fellow officers active in politics to resign from the army, Kemal Ataturk also neutralized the latter as a ready springboard for further coups. Later regimes compelled all high school graduates to serve 18 months as reserve officers and so linked civilians to an army that served as a school for citizenship, literacy, and obedience.

The Turkish army would probably have been content with its veto power if its professional strength had been kept up and if the broad objectives of Ataturk had suffered no retrogression. Its re-entry in politics in May 1960 was due not to its own ambitions but to Premier Adnan Menderes’ attack on the inheritance of Ataturk. He had made concessions to religious traditionalism, curbed political freedom, and weakened the economy. Above all, he attempted to utilize the army as a police force for destroying the opposition party. To maintain its neutral role in politics, the army overthrew Menderes. Within less than two years, it had succeeded in establishing firmer constitutional, if not yet also political, foundations for Turkish democracy, and cautiously withdrew once more to its barracks and its accustomed role as “Guardian of the Revolution.”

The Syrian army, by contrast, has suffered from many political and military handicaps. For centuries Syria had been governed as a province or a possession of other empires. For only ninety years, and that thirteen centuries ago, was it the seat of an imperial realm under the Umayyad dynasty. When it finally achieved its independence in 1943, its frontiers were those arbitrarily drawn decades earlier by Europeans. A sense of military loyalty and mission was difficult to create in such an entity.

Under Ottoman rule until the end of World War I, Syrian officers served in Ottoman armies only outside their own country.

\textsuperscript{17} For figures demonstrating the preponderance of the military until 1937, see Frederick W. Frey, “The Two-Edged Sword: The Army in Turkish Politics” (mimeographed), June 1960, drawing upon his larger study of Turkish parliamentary politics now being completed.
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Under the French mandate, Syrian officers were outranked by French officers, and the enlisted men were deliberately recruited by the French from linguistic and religious minorities. While the French remained in charge, the politically most active urban Arab Moslems were clearly discouraged from applying for military service since they were also the most nationalist Syrians. 18

To turn this Syrian army into a truly national instrument after 1945 was an immense task that was far from completed when, in 1948, it was called upon to fight the Israelis. Defeat stimulated the Syrians to grant the army henceforth the largest appropriation in the national budget. By the end of 1951, the country had 23,000 men under arms but was probably capable of defending itself only against an unlikely invasion by the Lebanese.

Profound discontent with civilian incompetence and corruption gave rise to a succession of military coups between 1949 and 1953. But the rapid changes in military rule from General Husni Za'im to Colonel Sami Hinnawi to Colonel Fawzi Silu to Colonel Adib Shishakli and the early collapse of military power proved that the Syrian army was also still too weak to impose its will on the nation's civilian population. 19 The failure of these four military dictators after 1953 convinced the more radical military factions that the army could probably assure its predominance by going one step further—breaking the social and economic position of the traditional elite and relying entirely on the political movements of the new middle class. By early 1955, there seemed to be agreement among army leaders on this objective. The extreme right had been eliminated. 20 An uneasy

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18 One son of a landed family of Hama, attracted by the free education at the nearby military school (much as a number of now prominent civilian Americans were drawn by its technical excellence and free tuition to West Point), emerged to become Nasser's principal ally in Syria, namely Colonel Sarraj. (Most of the material in the last two paragraphs and this footnote is drawn from an unpublished manuscript by R. Bayly Winder, "The Modern Military Tradition in Syria," prepared for the Faculty Seminar of the Program in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, March 5, 1959.)


20 In April 1955, Col. Adnan Malki, the assistant chief-of-staff and G-3 of the Syrian Army and one of the principal army adherents of the socialist Ba'th
collaboration had been stimulated among moderate, leftist, and communist army elements by the growing pressure upon Syria by Western and neighboring pro-Western states. Between 1955 and 1958, civilian leaders could no longer play politics without consulting the army.

The intervention of the army in politics did not cure the ills of Syrian society. By 1958 the dominant army faction had strength left only for a desperately idealistic remedy—to try preserving the influence of the reformist pan-Arab group in Syria by uniting the country with Egypt.

In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man may become king. Army leadership, however, can provide no political remedies unless it can transcend the political and social divisions of the country sufficiently to act as its vanguard. Since the break-up of the United Arab Republic in 1961, the army in Syria, as during the mid-1950’s, once again resembles a divided but armed parliament.

In nine Middle Eastern countries, independent civilian rule had preceded the creation or modernization of the army, and so provided an opportunity for fashioning the military as a civilian instrument. In Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, and Pakistan, however, the government proved unable to exploit the advantage it initially enjoyed. In Jordan a large number of officers are already in jail or in exile; it is only as a unified body that the army has not crossed the line to stand against the King. Libya’s army is still in process of creation, and hence its role is not yet fixed. It may intervene in politics if the country does not soon agree upon a new ruler to govern after the death of the aging, childless King.

In only two countries of this region, Tunisia and Morocco, do armies remain subordinate to civilian rule. Beginning in 1956, the civilian leadership of Tunisia’s dominant Neo-Destour Party carefully selected the officers of the army, the national guard, and the police from among politically reliable elements of the guerrilla resistance movement. In 1957, officers trained in the Arab East who might sympathize with Nasser were eased out. However, in

party, was assassinated by a member of the Syrian National Social Party, representing the extreme right. This act provided the justification for a successful purge of the right wing of the army.
early 1963, President Bourguiba foiled a conspiracy, joined by a number of army officers, to overthrow him, allegedly for moving in the direction of more socialism. The Tunisian army may well intervene in politics again if it did not approve of President Bourguiba’s successor.

The main body of the Moroccan army was recruited by French officers among Berber-speaking mountain tribes in a country that is predominantly Arab in language and culture. After independence in 1956, this army, though still largely commanded by French-trained Berber officers, was enlarged from 20,000 to 30,000 men by the addition of guerrilla fighters of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. It is under the control of the King instead of being responsible to a civilian cabinet. Until recently, the army has had no political temptations, hence no political tests. If the hitherto constitution-minded King, Hassan II, should find his power threatened, however, he would probably not hesitate to engage it as a partisan in his behalf, perhaps at the cost of splitting it politically.21

The example of the Pakistani army, which seized control of the government in 1958, illustrates that even the most professional army can in a brief time be transformed into a political body. Prior to the coup, the Pakistani army had been carefully recruited. Regiments were often composed of the sons of earlier recruits. Its officer corps had been selected from the leading families of martial tribes. The status of officers was as high as that of the top echelon of the civil service. For several years after Pakistan became independent in 1947, army officers lived better than most civilians, enlisted men better than civilian workers.22

But the rapid change in the relative position and character of social classes in Pakistan, especially during and after World War II, was soon mirrored in the composition of the officer corps. Elements from the new middle class entered in large numbers through emergency commissions granted to civilians during World War II, by promotion from the ranks, and since 1947 by

21 “There are regular reports of dissension between the younger, more nationalist officers recruited since independence and their seniors who have served the French.” (The Economist, March 4, 1961.)
22 In 1957 there were over 3,000 applications for 80 officer candidate vacancies at the Pakistan Military Academy.
national examinations. The sons of prominent families who once constituted the core of the officer group have since risen to the top, but they no longer directly shape the perspectives of the battalions. From a way of life, the army was converted into a job. Inflation of numbers as well as currency began to sap the perquisites of status. Paternalism, when it survived, became favoritism. As the new middle class entered the army, however, its new values also increasingly became important in the army even though the coups of the generals—Mirza and Ayub—in 1958 still reflect only this transition in social structure rather than its conclusion.

When the status of classes, professions, and politics itself are still embattled, it is unlikely that the army, as the strongest and most modern institution, will remain apolitical. When the ruling institution owes its survival exclusively or predominantly to the army, or lacks the strength to confirm its own successor, armies are not likely to remain outside of politics.

The Circumstances of Army Intervention

Political intervention by armies that have long been apolitical tends to differ, in the first stages, from intervention by armies whose officer corps has already become a latent or disguised political party. A previously unbroken record of loyalty to authority usually means that the coup is staged by the commanding general, urged on perhaps by a faction within the civilian regime. The break with the past is therefore not sharp, at least at first. The general usually has little need to consult many of his fellow officers before taking action, and because of his attitude toward politics he tends to be inexperienced and disdainful of all political acts except those that depend on charisma and command.28 His initial conservatism, however, is likely to yield in time to pressures from an officer corps that has become conscious of its political opportunities and a public that has certainly ceased to be apolitical.

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An army’s intervention in politics may reflect the entire range of middle class ideology. During the single year 1958, the army acted in Lebanon to fashion a compromise among competing political and ethnic groups that might once again assure the army’s own political neutrality. The army intervened in the Sudan to support a moderate regime that could no longer be sustained by the army’s civilian friends. It intervened in Pakistan to bring about those political, social, and economic reforms that previous regimes had been unwilling to undertake. It intervened in Iraq to alter the entire social structure.

Limitations of Army Rule

As a ruling power, an army has several extraordinary advantages. Because of historical circumstances, Middle Eastern armies often tend to produce more able, honest, and decisive leadership than any other institution. Because of its vantage point and the values for which it stands, an army can also speak more convincingly than most other institutions about the changes that a society requires to defend itself.24 For men in a hurry who want to make a forced march into the modern age, the army can impose a revolution from above. Armies in power, however, are often subject to the vices of their virtues. The special problems they face in relating themselves to the rest of the body politic and in ultimately yielding again to civilian control deserve analysis in some detail.

An army’s weapons are its strength; but when the army is speaking for the new middle class, arms are most effective domestically if they remain unused. An army symbolizing nationalism and social change that spills the blood of any whom it cannot successfully label as anti-colonialist and reactionary risks splitting its own following and its ties to the rest of society. It cannot afford to become a Praetorian guard once again. The army’s strength also lies in its discipline, but its leaders usually are less skilled than politicians in gaining consent by means other than direct

24 Guy J. Pauker, in “Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade,” World Politics, April 1959, pp. 325-345, makes a similar diagnosis and prescription for that part of the world.

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call. Its system of communication is very efficient for messages that move from the top down; it works less well for those that start at the bottom.

An army often shows special skill in making contingent plans for the most effective use of men, machines, and organization. This capacity, however, has been warped in the Middle East by a tendency toward conspicuous consumption: most rulers of the area have habitually ordered more arms from the Soviet bloc and the West than they could effectively absorb. This tendency has also been reinforced by continued military dependency. Military planners in the Middle East cannot yet firmly calculate requirements since they cannot be certain that they will be able to buy from the great powers what they need, or how soon their potential enemy will be able to offset such purchases. These persisting obstacles to rational military planning and the resultant excessive military spending do not make Middle Eastern armies the ideal sponsors and supervisors of economic planning.

It is an army’s business to calculate sacrifice and to make such sacrifice dutifully. But to calculate who shall pay for economic development by remaining poor or working harder, and what moral price must be paid for forceful change in traditional institutions, takes reason and courage of a different sort. The army’s esprit de corps is due in large part to its separation from civilian society, its training in a unique style of life, its special uniform, its monopoly of weapons. How readily will such a body encourage wider participation in political activities or feel obligated to account to outsiders for its stewardship? Politics is not warfare, and the army’s virtues would remain virtues only if society as a whole were converted into a garrison state. The problem of conversion is a serious one.

Having experienced the effectiveness of a hierarchic, disciplined organization, army leaders turned politicians often have trouble organizing their newer and far larger constituency. It was perhaps natural for Nasser to suppose “that the whole nation was ready and prepared, waiting for nothing but a vanguard to lead the charge against the battlements, whereupon the nation would fall in behind in serried ranks ... as the ordered advance proceeded toward the great objective. ... Crowds did eventually
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come, and they came in endless droves—but how different is the reality from the dream! The masses that came were disunited, divided groups of stragglers." But when a whole society is in process of revolution, there can be no "serried ranks." Social unity can be built only by dealing with the problems of society; it will not jump into being by command.

Efforts by Middle Eastern military leaders to form mass parties, with the exception of Turkey, have so far failed. One reason is a grave shortage of vital skills. The traditional hierarchy of valued occupations has not yet changed and is still out of balance with modern needs. There are too many lawyers and clerks, and too few organizers and managers, especially at a time when the vast majority to be mobilized are illiterate and pre-modern in values and skills. Neither in Egypt nor Syria, where attempts by army leaders to form effective political mass movements have so far failed, are there sufficient experienced cadres for such a task. Even officers with political experience are usually skilled only in agitation and conspiracy among small groups, not in persuasion, mediation, and organization among large ones.

It is the charismatic leader (frequently a military man) who is still the most attractive political remedy in the Middle East. For most Middle Easterners, in fact, the issue has not yet become military vs. civilian rule. The question for the mass remains: which leader has the more powerful charisma? When men "renounce loyalty to the tribe and the divinities of the tribe, their responsiveness to sacredness, their readiness to discern sacredness does not necessarily die; instead it seek new objects. . . . The nation becomes the charismatic object [and] the political leaders who live in the modern sector of their respective societies, and who are usually less immediately involved in a traditional way with the sacred, are legitimatized in their own eyes by their permeation with the sacredness of the nation."  

Great and powerful as the uses of charisma are, the elite drawn from the middle class cannot avoid isolation from its constituency

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if it relies only on charismatic leadership. Rulers and ruled no longer share the same moral or intellectual universe. There will be no common universe unless the new middle class creates it. The army’s monopoly of force also is no longer as efficacious as it was in the Islamic past when, subject only to the challenge of superior arms, it could dominate a stable social system. Force today cannot, by itself, hope to remodel the relationships of individuals and social classes, once thought natural and God-given, into a new balance capable of motion.

The Army as a Partisan in Conflicts Within the New Middle Class and with Other Classes

Among all the limitations of army regimes, there is one that is far-reaching and that cannot be transcended. The army in politics cannot become an institution above the battle. It intervenes as a partisan, representing a new class with whom the majority in the country does not yet share a common consciousness. It is itself a most sensitive mirror of internal conflicts within the new middle class, reflecting the fissures of partisanship and ideology that differences in age group, education, and opportunity can create. It will be unable to avoid factionalism within the ruling junta unless the whole junta, or its dominant faction, is securely anchored in a well-organized movement representing at least the new middle class.

Since the army constitutes a ready-made symbol of national unity and strength, the presence of the army may easily veil the need for establishing regular institutions for discussions, decision, and review, and for articulating a framework of means and ends that can serve as ideology. Civilians cannot shroud the requirements of politics as easily. Forceful efficiency alone can produce only a temporary stability which is soon destroyed by the continuing pressures of uncontrolled social change. By itself, military rule can be no substitute for the art of politics.
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Making Army Regimes Unnecessary

The final touchstone of achievement for an army regime is its success in making its continued existence unnecessary. This it can accomplish by transforming itself into a civilian regime or, much less likely, yielding supremacy once again to civilian institutions. Armies have been created for preventing or making war, and for holding societies together domestically by force if all other cement fails. For governing itself, and achieving other social and economic ends, mankind has evolved a number of more useful, if at times equally authoritarian, institutions. To create an environment in which these institutions can at last function invariably has been the announced purpose of all army regimes derived from the new middle class. In the Middle East, this conversion to civilian government may be easier than in other cultures. Most officers turned politicians, as we have seen, joined the army not so much in pursuit of the military life as in pursuit of a career in the most powerful, dynamic, and expanding bureaucracy the country offered.

How can army regimes (and their constituency) make sure of such a conversion? The Middle East cannot yet duplicate the conditions which have contributed to the evolution of military rule in Latin America. In Latin America, strong, property owning, and industrially productive upper middle classes and parties and trade unions increasingly act as countervailing forces to the military. In several Latin American countries, there are also expanding economic opportunities which make an army career relatively less attractive to the most ambitious than it formerly was. In the Middle East, the evolution toward more lasting civilian rule faces greater obstacles.

In Turkey, the example created by Ataturk in transforming army rule into civilian rule, and the existence of several responsible democratic parties carried enough weight to persuade General Gursel to end his military regime by November 1961—eighteen months after his own coup.27 If the new parliament fails to function effectively, however, there is little question that the

27 See Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic,” World Politics, July 1962, esp. pp. 543-552. See also Daniel Lerner

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military “Guardians of the Revolution” will take new political initiatives.

In Egypt, Nasser has so far, with great political skill, eliminated the Revolutionary Command Council—the core of his fellow conspirators—as the principal organ of government. In its place he has substituted a civilian cabinet, retaining only a portion of former Council members for its portfolios. In addition, he has created, after several abortive attempts, a parliament of freely proposed candidates who could not be formally nominated until they had been carefully screened by him prior to a free election. With this cadre of secondary leaders, linked in part to the people and not disloyal to him, and with a partially reformed bureaucracy, Nasser has made major progress toward civilian involvement in government. At the same time, he has converted many army officers into government administrators, diplomats, trade union supervisors, and directors of government owned corporations.

In Iraq, General Kassim’s relationship to civilian institutions from 1958 until his overthrow in 1963 consisted only in the precarious business of playing political parties off against each other. In Pakistan and the Sudan, the ruling generals have eliminated all parties and made no effort to form any of their own, relying largely on the civilian bureaucracy to mobilize popular support.

Establishing autonomous civilian institutions, however, is only the first step toward the end of army rule. The army is not likely to be tempted to confine itself once again to its proper business until all major professions of the new middle class, and especially the army, have a secure status in society and the body politic, and the nation has secure status in the international community. It remains all too easy for the army to insist on an extraordinary role for itself in the Middle East as long as there are no sure barriers to the renewed outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities, while Arab rivalries remain chronic, and while Western nations remain

and Richard D. Robinson, “Swords and Plowshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force,” World Politics, October 1960, pp. 19-44. In Iran, Colonel Reza Khan established a new royal dynasty in 1925, but civilian government has been for most of the period since then, and is now, deeply indebted to army support.
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tempted to try to regain lost positions in the area by military intervention. Furthermore, Soviet intentions toward its Middle Eastern neighbors remain uncertain, the Soviet bloc and the West freely compete in supplying local arms, and Middle Easterners remain acutely anxious to show their strength after centuries of foreign rule. Spectacular success at the foreign and domestic tasks of government is probably the surest guarantee that a military regime will transform itself, and that the rest of the army will become a professional interest group, or at least no more than a political veto group. Failure, even the threat of it, readily reinforces the original nature of a military regime as a hierarchy of organized violence.

The modern age has increased the difficulties, even for Middle Eastern armies that would prefer to return to the barracks, of attempting to define their proper sphere of occupation. They know that they cannot hope to defend themselves for long against aggression by the great powers, even in a war involving conventional weapons. They may recognize that the most effective prolonged defense for them against such encroachments is probably guerrilla warfare, but preparations for the latter appear neither impressive nor prudent for internal political stability. They cannot plan for weapons systems adequate to meet the challenge of their local neighbors because a single lucky purchase can upset existing balances. Even armed internal repression for the first time runs counter to the acknowledged ideology of the new middle class leadership. At such a point in history, the professional task of Middle Eastern armies becomes obscure and even uninviting. The thought of switching the emphasis in army training to literacy, patriotism, and vocations, and in military tasks to engineering and construction, is only now beginning to be heard.

There is likely to be a permanent end to army intervention only when the body politic has achieved a new solidity and cohesion which, in organizational terms, means a new middle class that has established firm links with workers and peasants. The new middle class, by itself, will be unable to keep the army out of politics as long as the latter remains its better organized, better trained, better armed segment.
PROBABLE PROBLEMS AND TRENDS DURING THE NEXT DECADE

So far, the armies of the Middle East have been under relatively conservative or moderate leadership. Army-led governments have generally concentrated on ridding the country of evils associated with imperialism, corruption, and inefficiency. These regimes have moved only gradually into programs of basic reforms aimed at creating a new society.

Such moderation has especially characterized the regimes of the generals in power today—including Ayub (Pakistan), Shehbaz (Lebanon), and Abboud (Sudan). Their strength is based, not merely on seniority, but on their successful transmigration in spirit and skill from the outlook of traditional landowners and tribal chiefs, who once were the generals of the Middle East, to the perspective of the new propertied middle class. These generals have had a rare incentive for making this transition and developing a moderate conservative orientation. Their vested interest, the army, is an institution whose mission rests on ancient principles, whose relative strength gives these leaders a sense of security, whose membership and purpose give them a national perspective, and whose character demands the perpetuation of such conservative values as discipline, hierarchy, honor, competence, and hard work. At the same time, their relative detachment from their social background by virtue of service in the army, and their inescapable interest in technology and in maintaining the army’s (and the country’s) strength, has made them realize that they must make great alterations in existing conditions if their interests are to prosper. Such a perspective may not be enough, however. The small propertied middle class in the Middle East usually does not appreciate how many radical and rapid changes will be required in their society before a much larger and stabilizing propertied middle class can come into being.28

To many Western observers, it has seemed that colonels such

28 Thus, few sharecroppers are likely to get farms of their own under General Ayub’s land reform, because farms of less than 500 acres—and in many instances, farms of larger acreage—are exempt from expropriation. Most of the officers who now support the general, though by no means all Pakistani officers, come from such farms.
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as Nasser constitute one extreme fringe among the officers who have come to the fore as politicians in the Middle East during the twentieth century; and generals such as the late Nuri al-Sa'id of Iraq, the other. Such a view of alternatives is bound to be shortsighted. Especially if army rule is politically and economically unproductive, there is little reason to suppose that new middle class leadership in the Communist Party, in neo-Islamic totalitarian movements such as the Moslem Brotherhood, or in secular fascist movements such as the Syrian Social National Party could not ultimately achieve a similar degree of hierarchy, organization, discipline, emotional commitment, and readiness for violence, and so challenge army regimes through mass demonstrations—or through infiltration of the armed forces, or through alliances with a faction of army officers.

Communist, fascist, and neo-Islamic colonels and generals have so far only briefly crossed the horizon. To speak only of communists: Turkish Communist armies fought in support of Ataturk until 1921. Ten Pakistani army officers, including Major Generals A. Khan and W. Ahmed, and Brigadier M. Latif, were tried in March 1951 for participating in what the government alleged to be a communist conspiracy to seize control of the country. Colonels Yussif Sadiq and Khaled Muhi ad-Din were accused of communist sympathies by Nasser and excluded from the Revolutionary Command Council in 1953. (Khaled Muhi ad-Din, after having been allowed to become editor of al-Massa, was imprisoned by Nasser on March 9, 1959.) Over 650 Iranian officers accused of conspiring with the Tudeh Party or the U. S. S. R. were arrested in the fall of 1954, and several score of them were sentenced to death. General Asif Bizri, thought by many to be a communist sympathizer or a party member, became Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian armed forces in August 1957, while Lt. Col. Mohammed Jarrah, who had similar views, became Assistant Chief of the Gendarmerie at the same time. Both retained their offices until early 1958. In Iraq, after the July 1958 coup, a number of officers with communist sympathies held important positions in the government for a time.

Particular military regimes may be able to deal effectively

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with subversion by extremists. However, the military itself is not immune to subversion. Army leaders can fail again and again as politicians without the army's ceasing to be the principal source of political leaders reflecting various strata and ideologies of the new middle class. At present, army officers in most Middle Eastern countries are drawn almost entirely from the new literate middle class. Enlisted men are almost entirely drawn from illiterate tribemen and peasants, and have no chance of promotion from the ranks. As literacy spreads and universal conscription is increasingly enforced, the divisions of society will be increasingly reflected through all the ranks of the army. If these divisions remain unbridged, and the army's leadership and its rank-and-file divide to fight in opposing causes, the army may suffer a prolonged eclipse both as a political and as a military institution. In that event there may be no segment of society to take the place of the new middle class, no institution to take the place of the army—no group that by its common interests and norms can set limits to personal leadership, yet give continuity to authority. There would be a vacuum instead into which the individual opportunist or fanatic can move.
CHAPTER 14

POLITICAL PARTIES

It has been customary to assume that political parties are not as important in the Middle East—or in other underdeveloped areas—as individual leaders and that few political parties matter at all. This view still had some validity during the 1940’s. During the 1950’s it became outdated. It is now quite apparent that individual leaders, however impressive their charismatic powers, will be unable to construct a single and enduring “political culture” unless they build effective political parties. A number of Middle Eastern leaders have perceived this need—and variously illuminated its ramifications by their failures and their successes.

There is no substitute yet devised for political parties as agents of modernization—i.e., in creating and maintaining a new political culture. The common polarities of many past analyses of Middle Eastern parties have been one-party regimes vs. multi-party regimes, oligarchical regimes vs. parliamentary regimes. But in the present historical period of rapid social change, the important distinction in the character of parties is whether they remain centered upon individuals or crystallize instead around an ideology, that is, whether party life is moving from a conflict of cliques to a conflict of orientations. The important distinction in the function of parties is whether they mean to secure the supremacy of a single individual, interest, region, or class, or whether they mean to initiate all individuals for the first time in the modern age into a common political cul-

1 “Every political system,” writes Gabriel A. Almond, “is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action.” This pattern, never as explicit or systematic as any particular ideology, or necessarily as overt as a political party, he terms a “political culture.” (“Comparative Political Systems,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, 1956, p. 396.)
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ture. Parties organized in defense of particularistic economic, ethnic, or regional interests, or small cliques temporarily joined by calculations of personal advantage and pretending to the name of parties, are dealt with only as they tangentially or by default affect the process of modernization. The totalitarian parties committed to the rejection of the present in the name of a dogma that envisages a preordained leap into the past or future have already been discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. We have ignored the otherwise useful distinction between dictatorial parties whose monopoly is ensured through open or disguised coercion, and the dominant party whose monopoly rests on its successful rallying of the politically active majority during the struggle for independence—not on coercion or the deliberate exclusion of competitors. The latter type (exemplified by India's Congress Party) does not now exist anywhere in the Middle East and North Africa. That even the former type of party is capable of moving toward democracy is exemplified in this chapter especially in the discussion of Turkey and Tunisia. This chapter is concerned primarily with that kind of political party—now favored in the Middle East—which sees itself as a non-totalitarian, yet pre-democratic instrument of political modernization.

Political Parties as the Chief Architects
of the New Political Culture

The Islamic community from the seventh to the twentieth century was an aggregation of autonomous communities which never achieved a common sense of citizenship. In the modern age, when all strata of society are being affected by political issues, and the terms of all issues are new, the need has become all the more acute for institutions that can effectively initiate diverse groups into a common state and society: for example, Arabs, Kurds, Sunni Moslems, Shia Moslems, Nestorian Christians, Syrian Orthodox Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, Yazidis, Sabaean, Baghdadis, army officers, Diwaniyah tribesmen, Istiqlal party members, unskilled workers—which is merely an incomplete way of saying all Iraqis. Schools can

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provide basic knowledge and teach prospective citizens how to think, and so prepare for participant politics, mass media can inform and influence their audience, but they cannot become vehicles of organization; armies leave civilians outside their ranks; parliaments demand intense political activity by a small number of individuals; elections restrict political opportunity to a few occasions. No other existing institution in the Middle East is capable of instilling a sense of citizenship and organizing public participation in political decisions as effectively as political parties. Only a party can be in daily contact with the constituency, teach, propagandize, or put pressure upon that constituency to adopt new ideas and patterns of action. Only a party can stimulate involvement in campaigns for literacy and higher production no less than particular political issues, and gather new talents and thus regularize recruitment into the new elite.

Political parties have peculiar advantages as instruments of social change. They are a form of organization unknown in traditional Islamic society. Hence insofar as they are not novel disguises for restricted traditional cliques, but rather truly voluntary associations operating in a public realm, they cease being organically related to the old social structure and so can move themselves and others beyond the established order.

Only parties can link leaders and masses in almost daily contact. The problem of contact is all the more acute because it arises in the modern age in paradoxical form: the involvement of the masses in politics sharpens the authority of leaders and of personal forms of authority—for none is as readily comprehensible and reassuring—yet never has personal political contact been as difficult to achieve as in a mass society. A political party offers an opportunity for binding together four forces which can resolve this paradox and create a viable political culture:

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is bound to be dire need for learning new "orientations of functional significance to the operation of a system of complementary role-expectations." This definition of "socialization" is drawn from Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe, 1951, pp. 207-208. In this sense, our analysis focuses on political parties as the chief agents of "political socialization"—a phrase which might well head this chapter if popular political discourse were not so likely to suggest a quite different and highly ideological reading quite unrelated to its useful and precise meaning in a more clinical prose.

\textsuperscript{3} Cf. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, p. 168.
charisma, ideology, organization, and accountability to an increasingly larger constituency. There is no escape from discussing these separately and in sequence, but they are effective only in combination—both because they reinforce each other and also act as checks and balances against each other.

The Harnessing of Charisma

In times of social crisis, when customary institutions and values are threatened, losing potency, and can no longer attract implicit assent, men often search for charismatic leaders. They put their trust in the seemingly magically heroic personality, relying upon his policies above all because they accept the man. In periods of social change, the charismatic leader may often serve as the model of the new human being required by the newly evolving pattern of life, and succeed in encouraging, by his very example, a rapid transformation of existing attitudes. It may well be fortunate that at a moment when almost everything is changing or in doubt, and experienced, knowledgeable men are still scarce, people find it possible at least to unite behind an inspiring leader. Pakistan’s political development was doubtless greatly handicapped by the death of several of its most inspired leaders soon after the country achieved independence, and by the country’s inability quickly to discover successors of equal charismatic appeal.

This special gift of seeming grace in leaders, however, appears as readily in fanatics and adventurers as it does in saints and politicians. Unless bound to countervailing forces, charismatic leaders can destroy individual judgment, indeed, individuals and institutions. To perpetuate a new sense of direction requires more powerful magic than the luck that may attend a particular personality. The problem of Middle Eastern governments in the modern age is to routinize charisma by attaching it to secular institutions, at least until these are accepted as legitimate.6

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Charisma by its very nature cannot assure stability but can only originate the foundations upon which stability may be established. Part of the leaders' charisma needs to become routinized in bureaucracy—a set of offices that is not really institutionalized until it can survive the rise and fall of political leaders and political parties. Bureaucracies, however, are in touch with citizens only as they execute orders. Only parties can organize enthusiasm on the basis of a solidarity of interests with citizens outside the government. The routinization of charisma in political parties becomes possible as the leader makes consistent use of that organization, speaks in its name, and lends it his mantle. In the Middle East, leaders and parties who successfully win national independence together have several signal advantages in this respect. To both leader and party a charisma will then already adhere, validated for both by heroic triumph in behalf of the community and its homeland. Both will already be experienced in maintaining an organization under conditions of adversity. Both, upon victory, are likely to possess a relatively unresented monopoly of control to give them confidence and time for routinization. That even they sometimes fail to establish enduring institutions may well be due to weaknesses of organization, ideology, and accountability to a larger constituency. It is to the problems of organization that we turn next.

The Novelties of Voluntary Political Association

The political party is still a novel instrument of collaboration in the Middle East. It is a voluntary organization in a region that hitherto had known only organizations based on kinship, religion, force, economic survival, or on coalitions of personal interests. Organizing a party of autonomous strangers to deal with public affairs is a new and unfamiliar art. Following upon the establishment of a number of secret political societies in the second half of the nineteenth century, the first important cadre parties began to emerge in the Middle East only in the first decade of the twentieth century. The Young Turks Associations were united in 1908; the National Party was founded in Egypt by Mustafa Kamil in 1907. The first mass party in the Middle East
was the Egyptian Wafd, formed in the fall of 1918 by Sa'ad Zaghlul—but by the late 1930's it had lost its contact with the masses.

Few men join political parties until traditional social and political units become uncertain sources of concrete satisfactions, of useful, and above all hallowed ideas, and of solidarity. For a Middle Easterner to become a member of any party is thus to pay dues to a new age. Organizers and members may not be altogether at ease with each other. Organizers are likely to be almost entirely drawn from the salaried new middle class. If they confine their recruitment to other members of that class, they will leave the majority of the population to potential political rivals. They will also fail to establish a single political culture, and hence fail as agents of modernization. It is also difficult to organize well when the organizer entered a new age only a few years ahead of most members. The middle class is still so new that it is just beginning in most countries to overcome the cultural barriers between urban and rural inhabitants, between those literate in the ideas of a new world and those literate in tradition, or illiterate in both.

It is not easy to attract stable support at a time of rapid transfiguration of the individual, of the relevance of his accustomed group loyalties, and of the truth of his values. In this uncertainty, membership in "devotee parties" such as the Moslem Brotherhood or the communist party (which, through its front organizations, is adjusted to exploit various degrees of faith) offers a certainty and solidarity—a sacred movement—more akin to ties of kinship and religion than parties that are secular and pragmatic.

There is not only the task of recruiting but also the problem of restricting membership. While a party must mobilize more than one class to become a mass party, it is not in its interest, as Nasser learned to his chagrin in Egypt, to enlist the entire nation. If everyone is in the party, why should anyone bother to be in it? A conflict of strategies therefore arises and is seldom consciously resolved. If the party contains a multitude that lack discipline and understanding of issues, it will be ineffective. A comprehen-

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5 The phrase is Duverger's, *Political Parties*, p. 70.
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Sive nationalist party may not be eager to purge itself lest it encourage the growth of rivals; yet if it accepts all who favor "nationalism" and anti-imperialism," what will serve to inspire the party by distinguishing it from all other patriotic inhabitants?

The Uses and Abuses of Ideology

Truisms do not constitute programs. Parties in the Middle East will not be capable of inducting their followers into a new political culture or of guiding change effectively unless they become ideological parties. This sounds at first glance like a recipe for profound mischief. Daniel Bell comments: "What gives ideology its force is its passion... A social movement can rouse people when it can do three things: simplify ideas, establish a claim to truth, and, in the union of the two, demand a commitment to action." Similarly, Professor Shils observes: "It has been the belief of those who practice politics ideologically that they alone have the truth about the right ordering of life—of life as a whole, and not just of political life." By assuming that "politics should be conducted from the viewpoint of a coherent, comprehensive set of beliefs which must override every other consideration," ideologists make impossible the pursuit of "civil politics" based on the "virtue of the citizen who shares responsibility in his own self-government" with the understanding that no virtue is final and that every virtue costs something in terms of other virtues.

A passion for dogmas that will once and for all fix loyalties and shape decisions has often been the bent of ideological politics. Much political doctrine in this part of the world, as elsewhere, consists of basic symbols of sentiment and identification whose function it is to arouse shared emotions of enthusiasm, faith, and loyalty, and plausibly to explain situations which leaders have not been able to predict or control in a fashion that can sustain

7 Edward Shils, "Ideology and Civility," The Twentieth Century, July 1959, p. 3.
8 Ibid., pp. 1, 4, and 6.
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For some time to come such emotionally inciting and irrational doctrines may well remain an inescapable aspect of Middle Eastern mass politics. Whenever they are allowed to become the core of political ideologies, they can easily produce a mood that becomes a substitute for constructive action, as in ultra-nationalism, or engender a spirit of dogmatic rigidity in the midst of rapid change, as in neo-Islamic totalitarianism, or be used to justify, as in communism, the sacrifice of all other values for dogma’s sake.

Yet there is a distinction to be made which is not merely analytical but reflects concrete differences in actual Middle Eastern practice. There is another aspect of ideology—the explicitly formulated framework of means and ends, the rational, experimental, and programmatic element in political ideas. The practice of, among others, Turkey’s Ataturk and Tunisia’s Bourguiba demonstrates that the two aspects of ideology—the rational and the passionate—can both be utilized politically, but in a style and combination which minimizes the corruption of reason.

Ataturk sought deliberately to stir and stimulate passion in politics. The political tasks which his society faced were enormous and the sacrifices and efforts involved were unlikely to be contributed merely as the result of cool calculation. The principles of Ataturk’s revolution—nationalism, secularism, populism, etatism—attracted the deep emotional and intellectual commitment of many. But these principles never became political myths to be both believed and admired without question. They were strong and clear enough to set broad limits (for example,

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10 This aspect of ideology is sometimes excluded by definition. Erich Fromm, for example, has usefully distinguished two meanings of the term rationalization. Sociological rationalization refers to the way in which a social process becomes organized and systematized. Psychological rationalization is the construction of plausible excuses for one’s action. When the latter is socially patterned, adds Fromm, it becomes an ideology. (In Dissent, Winter 1954.) We have adopted essentially the same distinction, but defined the term ideology differently on the premise that in political practice, ideology usually contains both kinds of rationalization, and that the crucial question is—how much of each?

11 Ataturk at one time also encouraged the invention of the “sun-theory” according to which all the world’s languages owed their origin to Turkish—but
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nationalism was to be non-expansive, secularism was opposed to archaic religious practices but not to religious faith). As the fruits of decades of earnest and, at least within the emerging new middle class, open discussion, they remained flexible and never received final codification as a comprehensive and coherent doctrine.

Ataturk felt no compulsion to arrogate to the newly emergent secular state a sacred and totalitarian task—to create a new faith. As a result, he became neither the prisoner of his own doctrine nor the executioner for its sake. He remained free to learn, experiment, and change. Growing discussion and participation among politically alert Turks became possible at least without being permanently confined to an authorized political grammar and vocabulary. Passion in Turkish politics was being harnessed primarily to buttress Ataturk’s charismatic position and to support each individual, concrete act of policy. Passion attached itself less intensely to the less-crystallized, and indeed still-evolving symbols of the revolution and its ideology. Hence Ataturk remained free, within broad limits, constantly and with an open mind to weigh strategies and costs in transforming his society.

An ideology that passionately fuses political myth and political requirements can devour even its adherents. A party that offers merely a set of political planks may not possess enough that is relevant to an age in which not only political power but the sense, spirit, and survival of the whole society are at stake.

There are Middle Eastern parties whose program, implicitly or explicitly, expresses the aims of a vested interest group, or of a traditional class, or else the perpetuation and opportunistic exploitation of existing popular preconceptions. None of these will save a party, or a country, for long. Egypt, for most of the years between 1907 and 1952, was alternately controlled by parties offering one of these three kinds of program, and so failed to deal with social change. None of these parties—however large some grew during this period—have survived. In Iraq, most parties

this was a temporary and uncharacteristic aberration of new-found pride. (See Bernard Lewis, “History-Writing and National Revival in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Affairs, June-July 1953, pp. 218-227.)
organized during the Mandate period gradually died after the achievement of independence in 1932. They had differed only on how independence was to be won, and most of them had little desire to come to grips with internal changes thereafter.¹²

If a political party accepts the task of becoming one of the principal agents of social transformation, its success depends upon the adoption of an ideology in tune with rapid change—a framework of values, methods, and direction concerned with all issues of modernization, and therefore without a final comprehensiveness, a final coherence, or a final intensity. Such an ideology, given the Middle East’s scarcity of expert analysts and practitioners in problems of social, political, and economic change, is seldom likely to be the intellectual creation of a single man. In practice it is more likely to emerge as the product of continual and intense discussion and bargaining among leading members of the new middle class. Organization and accountability to a larger constituency must accompany the tempting powers of charisma and ideology if the vital encounter with political realities is to be maintained.

In today’s Middle East, however, there is a tendency to infuse ideology with too much passion and also, obversely, to ignore the task of clarifying political doctrines intellectually. The daily, unexpected exigencies of power that confront any elite, whatever the class from which it springs and the ideology it cherishes, are bound to muffle the clarity and consistence of thought and expression of party leadership. One particular obstacle to ideological clarification looms large—the dominant role of nationalism among ideologies. When independence is gained, as it is in most states of the Middle East, by a single party uniting many different political and social views under one nationalist banner, there is often a reluctance to split such a large and comprehensive political vehicle by refining its ideological orientation. Every politician everywhere in the modern age prefers to speak in the name of all the “people.” In an area of great scarcities and inequalities, and in an era of a plurality of rapidly, but unevenly, changing values, populism can be a mask for almost any pro-

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gram, or else a nostalgic emotionalism for no program but immediate satisfaction. An ideology concerned not only with nationalism but also with social reform cannot help identifying domestic enemies.

As long as landowners dominate the state and exploit the majority of its people, for example, there will be no opportunity for important reforms. As long as education remains under religious control, only the past will be memorized. As long as extremist movements such as the Moslem Brotherhood and the communist party are not decisively kept out of power, the freedom to choose future courses may come to an end. Bribery and nepotism may be endemic, but it takes political courage to name names. A call for sacrifices to be made for future investments will find many unwilling to subject themselves to an equality of wants. Thus, however prudently and shrewdly a party may proceed in transforming society, it cannot avoid making domestic enemies. And however reluctant it may be to publish this fact by formalizing its ideology, a party’s leadership will find it difficult to win and keep the kind of following it requires unless its path and purpose are made clear.

Accountability in One-Party Regimes

A party that perceives itself as an agent of modernization may act to establish a one-party state on the grounds that only a single party can make sure that it is a truly national organization. A plurality of parties at this stage of development is likely to give scope to movements representing only particularistic economic, religious, ethnic, or regional interests, and hence prevent agreement on long-range planning; only a single party can sustain a determined course of economic development for a sufficiently long time to secure the foundations of national unity and prosperity; only a strong, single, national party can keep the army subordinate to civilian administration and the bureaucracy alert and efficient, only a single, well-organized party can marshal public opinion, which is by no means any longer feeble in the Middle East, or protect itself against coups by a score or less who can otherwise still overthrow Middle Eastern governments; only

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a party with a clear monopoly of control can undertake those far-reaching reforms in the social, economic, and political structure which are needed to remove the barriers to democracy.

Nowhere in the Middle East where single-party states have emerged, as in Egypt or Tunisia, is the situation a regression from democracy simply because no effective constitutional democracy had preceded such regimes. In contrast to the totalitarian neo-Islamic and communist parties, no one-party regime now in power in the Middle East justifies its right to govern alone in terms of dogmatic assumptions concerning the laws of historical development.13

The arguments for taking an authoritarian road in the Middle East may be strong—but what are the odds that a political party so oriented will actually move in the direction of more democracy rather than more authoritarianism? The great obstacles involved have been explored elsewhere in this book.14 One optimistic note may be sounded, however, which stems from the very structure and substance of this analysis. If a party chooses to face the problems of modernization and social change, and hence accepts the task of creating a new political culture, it will find that one requisite for its success is the institutionalization of accountability to an increasingly larger constituency.

If a party is to be effective as an agent of modernization, it will need to attract as its nucleus a cadre of politically sensitive and skilled men, not merely party hacks awaiting favors. It will need to listen to experts and, for the very survival of their craft, allow them to debate, even if it does not always accept their advice. If a

13 Middle Eastern communist parties have their own reasons, however, at this point of the area's political evolution for being explicitly opposed to the one-party state. Thus the Communist Baghdad daily, Sawt al-Ahrar, on November 11, 1959, simultaneously defended the one-party system of the U.S.S.R. while opposing the formation of a single national party under the leadership of General Kassim. In the Soviet Union, it asserted, deducing from dogma rather than fact, that there are no longer any classes requiring separate defense of their interests by separate parties. Inspired by a concern for tactical advantages rather than freedom, it observed that Iraqi "democracy springs from . . . the nature of the multitude of its classes, interests, and aspirations."

14 Chapter 11 attempts to translate the polemics of these non-totalitarian, yet pre-democratic parties into political theory—an art still neglected in the area itself—and to explore viable relationships between freedom and authority in the Middle East. Chapter 17 relates this issue to the requisites and probabilities of political stability.
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regime intends to be effective in creating a new political culture, it will also need to reach out for mass support, and teach new standards and patterns of political behavior. Such efforts will inevitably involve more flow of ideas and demands from the top to the bottom than the reverse, and much distortion and propaganda will accompany that flow. However, if contact is to be maintained, the leadership will have to know what conceptions, expectations, and criticisms are in fact current among the masses so that their own communications relate to real emotions and concerns. If the local party branches meet regularly, much autonomous discussion of political issues is bound to be generated. This dialogue will be uneven, but, in contrast to earlier political relationships, almost constant. It is quite unlikely, given the rapidity of social change and the varieties of its expressions in the Middle East, that any leader should ever be so omnipotent as to manipulate this dialogue entirely to his own satisfaction.

These points must not be exaggerated. Manipulation of cadre and ideas alike is becoming, if anything, a more refined art, distorting the process of political accounting to the constituency in many countries, not only in the Middle East. To turn skepticism into cynicism, however, is to miss certain potentialities. From a recognition of these requisites under single-party regimes, grew, as we shall see in the following section, the parliaments of Tunisia and Egypt, and the multi-party system of Turkey.

We shall now take a brief look at several case histories: (1) political parties that come closest to possessing all the attributes they require—charisma, organization, ideology, and accountability to a larger constituency—namely those of Morocco and Tunisia, yet parties which in their contrasts with each other help illuminate the relative weight of each factor; (2) a political party that failed in its first attempts because it neglected most of these requisites, and is now trying again with these in mind, namely that of Egypt; and (3) a multi-party parliamentary regime that evolved from a one-party regime, namely that of Turkey. These cases will reveal many of the difficulties and potentialities of one-party regimes. Other types of political parties are neglected here since it is one of the basic estimates of this volume that clique parties will almost certainly not succeed in modernizing the Mid-
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dle East, and multi-party systems which precede the attainment of a modern political culture are unlikely to endure.\textsuperscript{15}

Morocco and Tunisia: Modernizing Parties in Action

In Morocco, the Istiqlal Party was until about 1958 referred to simply as “al-hizb” or “the party” rather than the Istiqlal, as was the tendency in French and English newspapers.\textsuperscript{16} From its inception the largest of Moroccan political organizations, the Istiqlal—which grew out of nationalist movements of the 1930’s and was formally organized in 1944—has seen itself as “a means of political, social, and cultural education . . . a true school where the human being learns to serve his country and his fellow patriots.”\textsuperscript{17} It does not want all Moroccans to join, however. Members must undergo probationary periods, and are not finally accepted until their candidacy is reviewed by both local and regional bodies. Nonetheless, by 1958, the Istiqlal had about 1,600,000 members in a country of 10,000,000 inhabitants. Istiqlal leaders themselves acknowledge that about 250,000 of the party’s members are active and well-informed, and about 80,000-90,000 are militants capable of organizing local activities, explaining the party’s purposes, and making major sacrifices of time and money to the party’s cause.\textsuperscript{18}

The Istiqlal organization is based on cells of between 25 and 400 members, sub-sections, and sections divided among 17 regions which are each supervised by an inspector and a regional

\textsuperscript{15} In Iraq, where since 1960 a number of parties have come to share similar perspectives toward political modernization—and where a modern political culture is thus already in existence among factions of the new elite—coalition government might prove a feasible mode of attaining further political modernization.

\textsuperscript{16} All the material in the first three paragraphs of this section is drawn from Political Change in Morocco, a doctoral dissertation by Douglas E. Ashford (Princeton University, September 18, 1959), one of the most detailed expositions of political institutions and their activities we possess for any Middle Eastern or North African country. A condensed version was published by the Princeton University Press in 1961.

\textsuperscript{17} From the Istiqlal Party newspaper al-\textit{Alam}, December 29, 1955, cited by Ashford, p. 481.

\textsuperscript{18} It is particularly remarkable that its proportion of membership to the total population among that third of Morocco which speaks Berber is almost as large (13 percent) as among the Arabic-speaking inhabitants (19 percent).
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committee. The three officers of each cell elect the officers of a sub-section, two of whom from each sub-region represent the section committee and in turn elect one member to sit on the regional committee. The regional inspector, appointed by national headquarters, reviews all elections. A Political Committee of about 40 members has in recent years acted as the Istiqlal’s governing body, while its formal supreme authority, the Congress, meets rarely and does not initiate issues and decisions. Of all these institutions, the inspectors are perhaps the closest in touch with both the top and the base of the party. It is their job to organize new sections and sub-sections, review the admission of new members and all disciplinary actions, supervise the submission of reports from the subordinate levels, and guide the party’s major campaigns. They are salaried officials, earning about $300 a month, and are equipped with a car and clerical assistance. Once a month they convene at party headquarters in Rabat for two or three days to hear reports from the top party leadership and Istiqlal members of government. “These reports . . . do not appear to be passively reviewed, but are open to questioning and debate.” In turn, these inspectors meet about once a month with their sections to explain the subjects covered at Rabat. In addition, central and regional cadre schools have trained several thousand militants for two- or four-week periods since 1956, in part to fill gaps created by the departure of skilled Istiqlal members for government positions. Although efforts are being made to have at least one literate officer per cell, known as the instructor, who can read the party’s Internal Bulletin to the cell and give literacy lessons, normally only every fourth or fifth cell now has such an officer.

These links of organization and accountability—themselves not without charismatic overtones, since similar (if less bureaucratic) patterns of operation had been practiced before independence under conditions of great danger, clandestine, and

although the former are largely rural. Ashford also estimates that if only 10 percent of the members pay dues regularly, the party would have an income of slightly under $500,000 a year, not counting special contributions from wealthy donors.

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repression—are further reinforced by the frequent speeches and rallies of the heroes of the party, especially Allal al-Fassi, throughout Morocco.

In a country that had been isolated from the main currents of European, Ottoman, and modern Arab thought at least until the first decade of the present century, and then was governed until 1956 by France without free Moroccan participation, the building of a party of such magnitude and organization is an extraordinary accomplishment.20

Nonetheless, in January 1959, the Istiqlal split, and the Democratic Istiqlal Party, restyled later that year as the National Union of Popular Forces (NUPF), emerged from its ranks. The new party, no less than the old, believes in "collective direction, discussion at the base, and the extension of national responsibilities to all levels of the population."21 The novel element in the National Union, as its leader, Ben Barka, declared, is that "the NUPF marks the changeover from organizations centered on personalities to those based on ideologies."22

This had been the weakness of the Istiqlal. It contained leaders like Allal al-Fassi, 'alim and descendent of an 'alim23 of Fez. Fez, one of the oldest cities of Morocco, had changed its culture and faith even by the middle of the twentieth century far less than Rabat, not to speak of Casablanca, Morocco's largest city, which

19 Thirteen of the 16 inspectors Ashford interviewed had been imprisoned for some period during the nationalist struggle between 1952-1955.
20 There are other Moroccan parties, but these are all quite small and play only a minor role. It is characteristic of the emerging political consensus of Morocco that all parties feel compelled to oppose "feudalism" and favor "socialism." However, the Popular Movement—led by Captain Mahjoubi Ahardane, one of the principal organizers of the Army of Liberation, and Dr. Abdelkrim Khattib, a Casablanca surgeon married to the daughter of the hero of the Rifian War, Abd al-Krim—speaks primarily for the mountain Berbers and rural countryside, especially in the Rif. During the Rifian disorders in the fall of 1958, both leaders were arrested for a time. (For their program, see the Ahardane interview with Vie Française, Casablanca, April 24, 1959). The Democratic Party of Independence, led by Mohammed Hassan Wazzani, speaks for the more conservative, but secular urban elements. Its course, like that of the still smaller Unity Party, led by Mekki Naciri, has often been opportunistic. (For the present program of the former, see Vie Française, Casablanca, April 17, 1959).
21 Mehdi Ben Barka, the organizer of the new party was also one of the Istiqlal’s principal organizational innovators.
23 La Vie Marocaine, Casablanca, January 26, 1959.
23 'alim is the singular of ulama, signifying scholars of Islamic tradition. Al-
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had been a mere village at the turn of this century. The Istiqlal also contained French-educated Ahmed Balafrej, its Secretary General, son of an upper-class Rabat family and founder of Istiqlal-supported, coeducational, secular, and higher level free schools. One of its most generous financial supporters was Mohammed Laghzaoui, a self-made businessman who, after independence, was appointed Director of National Security under the King's sole authority, and who was expelled from the Executive Committee of the Istiqlal in 1958 for allowing the police to intervene ruthlessly in Istiqlal's public demonstrations. Until 1959, the Istiqlal also held Mehdi Ben Barka, who spoke for labor and youth. Son of a policeman, Ben Barka trained at Algiers University before he became a professor of mathematics and subsequently president of independent Morocco's Consultative Assembly. Thus the Istiqlal could not speak with a single, clear, and emphatic voice on the political destiny of post-independent Morocco.

Although the Istiqlal had frequently declared that “independence is not an end but a means,” and had sponsored “Operation Labor,” a cooperative farm project, and the building of the “Unity Road,” these slogans and actions were largely initiated by those who subsequently broke away because they discovered that such efforts marked the outer limits of the existing Istiqlal consensus.

The new National Union of Popular Forces proclaimed that “there is no contradiction whatsoever between the interests of the various classes among the Moroccan people.” It is a more closely knit alliance than the Istiqlal, being composed primarily of the younger members of the new middle class and the majority of the trade union movement. It has especially attracted those

Fassi’s father taught at the famous Karouiine University at Fez; Allal al-Fassi himself, having passed the examination for ‘alam but having been denied the title for refusing to declare himself loyal to the French Protectorate, taught Islamic subjects unofficially to large audiences.

20 See the Manifesto of its Constituent Congress, September 6, 1959.
27 Its National Administrative Committee of 33 contains several of the principal trade union leaders, five teachers, three journalists, three administrators,
members of the Istiqlal who organized armed resistance against France while al-Fassi and his fellow-leaders were in prison or exile, and these include particularly men who arrived in the city only recently from the rural countryside. It is on this base that Ben Barka intends to broaden the National Union into an alliance of workers and peasants with the new middle class.\textsuperscript{25}

As a result, the ideology of the new National Union is much more explicit than that of the old Istiqlal. It is based on “leadership, planning, and democratic association” and on “austerity and work.”\textsuperscript{20} In the wake of this split, the perspectives of the rump Istiqlal have also become crystallized. Although al-Fassi still speaks of social and economic progress, he now focuses his attacks on the National Union by accusing it of constituting a “heresy,” while rallying the remains of the Istiqlal around the “defense of Islam and tradition against ‘secular materialism,’ if not monarchial faith against revolutionary spirit.”\textsuperscript{20} He also concentrates much attention on the need to liberate Mauritania, Ifni, Rio de Oro, Ceuta, and Melilla.

By early 1960, the increasingly sharp contest for control of the government between the National Union and its various opponents, including the Crown Prince and the army, was being kept in bounds only because King Mohammed V still remained the supreme legal, traditional, and charismatic arbiter of the public realm. When, upon the death of Mohammed V, Crown Prince Hassan became both King and Prime Minister, he read-

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\textsuperscript{20} Problèmes d'Édification du Maroc et du Maghreb, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{20} Manifesto of the Constituent Congress of the National Union.
\textsuperscript{25} See al-Istiqlal, the French-language newspaper of the party, January 31, 1959, quoted by Ashford, Political Change in Morocco, p. 582.
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firmed his father's promise that Morocco would move toward constitutional and more representative government. Formally speaking, progress in that direction may be noted. In actuality, however, the King is attempting to become the country's chief modernizer while avoiding dependence on any political party. It remains an open question whether and at what price parties of this caliber may be prudently ignored.

The Neo-Destour (New Constitution) Party of Tunisia seems almost to be a twin of the Istiqlal, yet it has experienced none of the travail of the Istiqlal. The comparisons are instructive. The Neo-Destour, like the Istiqlal, was founded in the 1930's, is organized on the basis of cells and, until recently, federations, with a corps of internal party inspectors. In 1959, it contained about 350,000 members in a country of 3,650,000 inhabitants, or about 25-30 percent of all adult males. About 100,000 of these members, from 18-25 years of age, were organized in youth groups, disciplined enough to be called upon at times to reinforce the police at public demonstrations. Furthermore, about 300,000 Tunisians, many in addition to their individual membership in the Neo-Destour, were members of the General Union of Tunisian Labor, the Tunisian Union of Artisans and Merchants, the National Union of Tunisian Farmers, the National Union of Tunisian Women, the General Union of Tunisian Students, and the Tunisian Boy Scouts—all affiliated with the Neo-Destour. Unlike the Istiqlal, however, the Neo-Destour's control over its affiliated organizations has never been seriously challenged, and its membership is distributed evenly in proportion to the population everywhere in the country.51 This may be partially due to the fact that Tunisia is a more homogeneous country than Morocco. Only a few thousand Tunisians speak Berber in contrast to the Arabic-speaking majority; in Morocco, about one-third of the population speak Berber, and many parts of the

country are mountainous, making communication difficult. The Neo-Destour's advantage may also stem from Tunisia's earlier political evolution. In Tunisia, the split in the umbrella-like nationalist movement (akin to India's Congress Party) took place in 1934 when the Neo-Destour broke away from the Destour Party. In Morocco, this same splitting did not take place until 1959.

The charismatic character of the Neo-Destour's leader, Habib Bourguiba, who is also President of Tunisia, has never had to suffer serious competition. In Morocco, King Mohammed V had far greater charismatic appeal than any Istiqlal leader. Within the Istiqlal, al-Fassi has never been more than first among equals. Moreover, the Istiqlal was forced by pressures from without and weaknesses within to forego certain vital sources of charisma. With most of its top men arrested or in exile after 1952, the Istiqlal leadership was unable to retain control and inspiration of the entire resistance movement against France. While Bourguiba became the "Supreme Warrior" of Tunisia's resistance, leadership in Morocco at the crucial historical moment devolved on only a portion of the Istiqlal and the charismatic sanction flowing from the activities of this period therefore has to be shared with other organizations—in rural areas with the Army of Resistance, in urban areas with trade unions and separate terrorist groups.

The Neo-Destour, in contrast to the Istiqlal, did not have to wait to be called to power in an independent country, nor then share its power with other parties, and always at a lower level than that of a royal house. On the contrary, the Neo-Destour, from the beginning of independence, when it was voted into power in a free election, has been entirely in control of government, and Bourguiba has been the uncontested leader of both party and government. No other party matters; both the Old

32 The royal Beylical family had lost its popular appeal sometime before its deposition as Tunisia's ruling house by Bourguiba in 1957.

33 A Secretary General of the Neo-Destour, Salah Ben Youssef, contested Bourguiba's power briefly in 1955, and lost. His timing, at the very least, made it a hopeless attempt. He opposed negotiations with France and demanded a return to violence at a point when Bourguiba's diplomacy had clearly placed independence within grasp. Exiled to Egypt, he was accused of making attempts
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Destour Party and the Communist Party are moribund.

Until recently, Bourguiba has been the chief executive and legislator, with power also to appoint and transfer judges. Almost from the beginning of independence, Bourguiba has discussed political problems in regular weekly “fireside chats” on the radio, and in many visits to all parts of the countryside. His party and its front organizations are continually active in explaining, mobilizing, supervising, and recruiting. Each party cell, containing between 50 and 1,000 members, continues to be part of a party intelligence network that was shaped under conditions of repression and clandestineness of the pre-independence days. No position is filled in the civil service or army, no job in any government controlled enterprise, and no scholarship granted without approval of the party, even if party membership itself is not essential. The party not merely links the people to the government, it cannot be ignored.

To prevent slackness in the face of sheer size, and corruption and abuse in the face of such power, Bourguiba has been strict— but humane. There is little corruption in Tunisia; neither is there an atmosphere of police terror. Much has been accomplished by the sheer spirit of trust and devotion. Most of the leaders share a similar intellectual and social background (much more so than the leaders of the Istiqlal), and have known each other for decades under the most trying political, economic, and personal pressures. Unlike the Istiqlal, the party has kept itself young and disciplined. Thus in late 1958, Bourguiba abolished the headquarters of the regional federations, where old fighters had tended to relax into sinecures or abused their influence, and replaced them with young inspectors responsible to the national center. Much has also been done by prevention. The 15 Regional Governors, almost all of them quite young, are never sent to a region in which they have been born or raised. They may acquire no real estate or business interests in their area without permission of the Secretary of State for Interior. And those who disagree do not necessarily remain in the wilderness. When the news-

to assassinate Bourguiba, and several of his accomplices have been sentenced to death in recent years by Tunisian courts. In 1961, he was himself assassinated while in Germany.
paper *L'Action* was suspended in the summer of 1958 for its sharp criticism of Bourguiba's foreign and domestic policies, one of its editors, Mohammed Masmoudi, was also dropped from the Neo-Destour's Political Bureau and removed as Ambassador to France. By year's end, however, he was back in the Political Bureau and made Secretary of State for Information. Similarly, Ahmed Ben Salah, after disagreeing with Bourguiba and so seeing himself ousted as Secretary General of Tunisia's trade unions, soon returned to the fold to receive a cabinet appointment.

In fact, it is in Neo-Destour's relationship with labor that its strength and character are most apparent. The trade union's membership is almost as large as that of the Neo-Destour Party (about 250,000) and, indeed, over half of the dues-paying members of the Neo-Destour are also members of the General Union of Tunisian Labor (*Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail*—UGTT). In Morocco, the trade unions were for four years autonomously allied with the Istiqlal, having been organized in 1955 before the Istiqlal had quite reconstituted itself as a disciplined organization after the years of repression; in 1959, the trade union movement became an equal partner of the Istiqlal splinter, the National Union of Popular Forces. In Tunisia, on the other hand, they have always remained the Neo-Destour's junior partner.

The Tunisian union cannot avoid recognizing Bourguiba's power: he controls the Neo-Destour Party and no leader matches his popularity; he controls the police, the press, and could influence the courts. Few jobs are to be had without Neo-Destour approval. There are also positive reasons for the alliance. In contrast to Morocco—where the new middle class had to share its leadership of the Istiqlal with men who received a traditional Moslem education, descended from notable families, or possessed major business interests—both the Neo-Destour and the Tunisian

84 Masmoudi renewed his newspaper criticism of Bourguiba in the summer of 1961 after the French massacre of largely ill-armed and unarmed demonstrators against the remaining French military base at Bizerte caught the Tunisian President off guard. This time Masmoudi was dismissed from the party and all official positions for having resorted, as Bourguiba told the Tunisian people, to public criticism rather than discussion within the party.
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Trade unions were under almost exclusive control of the new middle class. These two organizations therefore find it easier than parallel organizations in Morocco to share the same perspectives on the need for unity, reform, and austerity. When they differ, there is ample opportunity for continuous discussion. All trade union and Neo-Destour factions are represented in the latter's Political Bureau. Trade union leaders head the Ministries for Commerce and Industry, Agriculture, Education, and Social Affairs. Thus they consult and are consulted: they also know first-hand the tough realities of Tunisian life and share in responsibility for its successes and failures. They remain junior partners, but they also know that there lies behind the appearance of the Neo-Destour as a mass party that explicitly disavows class struggle, as in the disavowal of Morocco's new National Union of Popular Forces, the reality of a class alliance between the new middle class and the workers. The trade unions recognize that they cannot compete against the charismatic personality of Bourguiba and the superior organization of the Neo-Destour. The Neo-Destour knows that it could not maintain a superior organization or a unified country without the support of the trade unions.

The Neo-Destour is committed ideologically to account for the use of power to an increasingly effective constituency. On November 8, 1959, Bourguiba kept his promise to hold free elections for an Assembly that for the first time in Tunisian history would possess legislative and financial powers. Although only Neo-Destour members, including 16 trade union figures, were elected, the arena of discussion and action has been broadened. Extraordinary power has been employed to fashion a new political culture, and now power is being relaxed in the confidence of a new consensus.

The Neo-Destour's experiment has benefitted from several special advantages. Tunisia has a cultural homogeneity rare in North Africa or the Middle East. It has been continually open

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In contrast to Morocco, the Tunisian traditional bourgeoisie and many Moslem religious leaders stand discredited as a result of their collaboration with France. In Morocco, most of the traditional bourgeoisie did not thus discredit itself and retains considerable influence, while religious leaders could be found in both the French and nationalist camps.

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for centuries to currents of thought coming from all shores of the Mediterranean. Its prolonged struggle for independence was carried on under unified leadership which succeeded in enlisting the majority in well-organized and sacrificial campaigns. But the Tunisian experiment may yet fail. Being still fresh and novel as an experiment, it could suffer severely by the early death of so capable and charismatic a guide as Bourguiba. Even more serious is the great shortage of economic resources in the face of a rapidly growing population. The Neo-Destour, under such pressures, might suffer a split between its party and its trade union affiliate.

Such a split need not by itself mean the end of stable government. If the competition to satisfy the sheer necessities of life does not become unbearable, if the military does not become partisan in its own cause, and if a split within the Neo-Destour does not exclusively pit a new middle class party intent upon austerity for the sake of long-term gains against a workers' party intent upon immediate rewards—all grave "ifs"—a fruitful encounter could ensue. If both splinters accept, albeit in different degrees, a common consensus resting on socialism, nationalism, and guided democracy, they may be able to acknowledge each other's presence in the political realm since they could thus concede legitimacy to each other.

Egypt: Learning from Failure

Egypt elected its first consultative Assembly of Notables in 1866 and organized its first open political party in 1907—each the earliest of its kind in the Arab world. Nonetheless, its parliaments and parties experienced few periods of sustained freedom and effectiveness and were forced to yield to military rule in 1952. The reasons seem clear.

First, all critical powers affecting Egypt's social and economic structure, no less than all its foreign and domestic relations, always remained under the control of the king, and the king was usually under the influence of the British Residency. The result was a constant but unevenly balanced struggle between the king's friends and those political leaders who wished to serve non-royal
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interests, whether those of the nation or their own. The first Egyptian ruler to find warrant in the Koran for the thought that he should govern with the advice of his people, the Khedive Isma'il, established the Assembly of Notables to serve his own needs. He required domestic support against increasing foreign pressures, and needed the appearances of a constitutional monarchy to receive more favorable European loans. Although this Assembly, composed largely of village notables, thoughtfully discussed the administration of agriculture, finance, and justice, Isma'il kept a strict rein. The Assembly could receive no petitions, and had to meet in camera. When, in 1878, a petition signed by 1,600 was presented to the Khedive stressing the absolute necessity of modern representative institutions for the sake of orderly communal life, the Khedive, with British and French advice, responded by firing both the chief petitioners and dismissing the Assembly. Thus the road was left open for the only remaining force, the Egyptian Army under Colonel Ahmed Arabi, to stage a coup for the first time in modern history in behalf of nationalism and reform. British occupation of Egypt in 1882 put an end to this first army coup, though it was to fail at Suez in 1956 to put an end to the second.

A new advisory Legislative Council and Assembly were established in 1883. Yet when, on March 2, 1907, the Khedive Abbas II received a petition for the creation of a really effective Assembly, he replied that this request "was too important to be dealt with by . . . the Assembly." The Constitution of 1923 opened an era that might have been more liberal—two-thirds of the Parliament could now override the King’s veto—had that constitution also marked a willingness on the part of the King and the British to accommodate themselves to major changes in Egyptian political, economic, and social relationships. This was not the case, and consequently a structure suited to bargaining and compromise was destroyed both by outright battles among irreconcilable forces and by the means used to avoid such battles. As parties inside and outside

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56 Sura 42, Verse 38.
58 Ibid., p. 53.

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parliament strove for fundamental alterations in the system—at least in ending British influence and curbing the King’s—the King reacted by revising the liberal constitution, or ruling without constitutions, rigging elections, curbing the freedom of press, assembly, and speech, and, with his resources as largest landowner in the nation, bribing party factions and parliamentarians.

It is unlikely under such circumstances that an effective party system could have come into being, whether inside or outside of parliament. But the parties that grew up also contributed faults of their own. The first to arise, Mustafa Kamil’s National Party, concentrated on a foreign issue—the removal of British controls—and in the domestic realm confined itself to constitutional and educational reforms designed to give greater scope to the new professional groups. Apart from a single appeal for industrialization, there were no allusions to economic questions. “It is more than doubtful if Kamil or his chief adherents, most of them members of well-to-do families, actually appreciated the great social gap between the rich and the fellahin, with no influential middle class to bridge it. As is manifest in their official programmes, they were not particularly concerned with Egypt’s social problems; and up to 1907, towards the end of his life, Kamil himself, in his speeches and articles, exhibited but little interest in the lot of the fellahin.”

The Wafd party, beginning in the fall of 1918, became under Saad Zaghlul’s leadership the first truly national party in Egypt with an organization sufficient even outside the principal cities to win any election. Though its leadership drew from a broader component of society than the National Party—including professional men, landowners, industrialists, and members of the intelligentsia—it focused its attention just as exclusively on ending British controls and limiting royal prerogatives.

When the first of these goals came within much closer reach through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the Wafd lost its élan and much of its hold on the salaried and would-be salaried new middle class and the urban workers. To the growing pres-

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sure for domestic reforms, the Wafd responded most gingerly. While the new middle class began to conspire against such a system, especially within the army, or, together with urban workers, joined the Moslem Brotherhood and other anti-parliamentary groups, the Wafd leadership split. Faction or new parties emerged within its body, some favoring the special interests of landlords or industrialists, some seeking safety in the face of pressures from below in continued dependence on Great Britain, or else trying to channel social discontent into even more intense anti-British campaigns. Others tried to use the system while it endured at least to enrich themselves or to plead vainly for major social reforms.

The other parliamentary political parties in Egypt had made no effort at all to recruit broad support. The pro-British and usually pro-royalist Constitutional Liberal Party, founded in 1922, and the always royalist Union Party, founded in 1925, had sufficient social and economic power not to require mass support in order to function within a system manipulated by men like themselves. Indeed, with their policies, they had no hope of gaining such support.

The army coup of July 1952 was designed to clean away a system that had been neither effective nor representative. Sweeping away the hollow or corrupt forms of the past was simple enough. The task which thereafter faced the Revolutionary Command Council—a small group of officers headed by Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser, with General Mohammed Nagib as their intended figurehead—was far more difficult. The new regime set out to accomplish all that the old had neglected: to fashion beyond the evident charismatic appeal of the new leaders a disciplined, enthusiastic political organization able to come to grips with the problems of social change and willing to account for its actions to the Egyptian constituency.

In the beginning, it had not anticipated having to plan and act in this fashion. Like the Syrian military dictators between 1949

41 It established free primary and secondary education, but failed to build enough schools to accommodate the majority of children of school age. It legalized trade unions, but continued to restrict their freedom of action. It opened rural reconstruction centers, but did not touch land reform.
and 1954 (Za‘im, Hinawi, Silu, and Shishakli), the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council looked for support first to those political parties which seemed nearest in ideology and most eager to cooperate. The military regime maintained contact with the Moslem Brotherhood, permitting its existence when all other parties were dissolved. For a long time, the new government continued to negotiate with the Brotherhood’s leaders, looking for some way of integrating the movement into the junta’s ruling system.\footnote{See Anwar al-Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, New York, 1957, especially Chapters 3, 4, 7, and 10. Also al-Ahram, Cairo, December 12, 1954. Part of the material and formulations in this and the following six paragraphs of this section are drawn from an unpublished seminar paper by Shimon Shamir, “The Failure of Single National Parties under Government Leadership in Egypt and Syria in the Last Decade,” Princeton University, Fall 1958. See also Shamir’s “Five Years of the Liberation Rally in Egypt,” Hamizrah Hahadash, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1957, pp. 261-78.}

All these attempts proved futile and even dangerous to the regime. The old parties had been corrupt and corrupting; the newer ideological parties had ambitions of their own, and were not eager to have their most appealing planks adapted by military officers who would yield only second place to civilian politicians.\footnote{This has twice been the fate of the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party of Syria—first under Shishakli in Syria, later under Nasser in the United Arab Republic. Both times much of their thunder was stolen; then, as they sought to profit from it, the military ruler formed his own party.} Yet Nasser could not survive if he could reach for support only as far as his small Revolutionary Command Council. Within a small executive committee in which one cannot decisively measure one’s own political strength, or that of any rival, cohesion is bound to be unstable. Hence Nasser (like all other modern Middle Eastern leaders, whatever the strength of their charisma) was compelled to organize a political movement of his own, both as a steadying balance to the small nucleus of equals to whom he originally owed much of his success, and as an instrument for recruiting secondary leaders and mobilizing broad support.

In January 1953, therefore, Nasser dissolved all political parties and founded the Liberation Rally.\footnote{The program of the new party was published in al-Ahram, Cairo, January 16, 1953. Mohammed Nagib’s Egypt’s Destiny, pp. 184-185, contains an English translation.} Its purpose was to
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cement support for the regime, mold a “new” Egyptian individual and a united, proud, and productive Egyptian society, and mobilize the nation for raising its standard of living. Officers carried the “message of the revolution”—unity-order-work—to villages and tribes, universities, trade unions, mosques, Coptic churches, and Jewish synagogues. They preached self-reliance, productivity, efficiency, and self-sacrifice, and called for a recovery from the servile qualities attributed to long imperialist occupation. The Liberation Rally organized its own youth movement and reorganized the trade unions.

The early days of the Liberation Rally were spontaneous, ascetic, and idealistic. Officers personally settled local blood feuds and sometimes forbade the audiences to whom they spoke to cheer them.45 “Liberation Medical Missions” composed of volunteer doctors and nurses and military medical staffs freely treated villagers once a week. “Liberation Classes” by volunteer teachers taught reading to illiterate adults. In collaboration with the Supreme Council for National Production, the Liberation Rally also published during its first year a plan for “The Popular Mobilization for Economic and Social Reform” involving the organization of investments, experts, and cooperatives in order to build a new system, “fifth to the fascist, capitalist, communist, and socialist systems.”46

Yet the Liberation Rally failed. After 1955, it was scarcely mentioned in the government controlled Egyptian press. Its necessary educational and economic ventures were being continued under governmental auspices. The reasons for this failure are worth analyzing. First, there was a shortage of shrewd, enterprising, disciplined organizers. This is a scarce talent in all fields of endeavor in a society which, until recently, had no room for the innovator and saw no need for organizing what did not already exist. As a result, the Liberation Rally reorganized itself repeatedly but vainly in its first few years of existence, while control over local branches was frequently lost.

Secondly, there was a scarcity of political skills and experience.

45 A similar attitude toward applause characterized the early days of General Kassim’s regime in Iraq.
46 al-Ahram, Cairo, July 27, 1953.

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Unlike the Tunisian Neo-Destour Party, Nasser's Liberation Rally could not draw upon the loyalty and cohesion of a movement tested in the battle for power. In Egypt the leadership had triumphed alone as a result of a successful conspiracy. The need for a party arose afterwards. Yet instead of building a reliable core first, favored by the authorities in return for its talented services, the regime tried to mobilize millions in a few weeks. Vast crowds were assembled to repeat in unison the oath of the Liberation Rally. Entire trade unions and other organizations joined through the signature of their presidents or secretaries. Then everyone went home as before while spokesmen for the Rally announced that five to six million members joined in the first wave.

Finally, no one attempted to define the movement's ideology and the member's tasks except in terms so broad that no Egyptian inside the movement could readily distinguish himself from Egyptians without. Thus, no one was ideologically attracted to the Liberation Rally; on the contrary, the Rally came to incorporate people who remained uncommitted.47

After 1955, the Liberation Rally became an instrument for neutralizing rather than mobilizing labor unions, student groups, and other potentially independent political groups, while membership in it became a screening device for checking and selecting all political appointees. Single party movements can thus become tools for preserving the new status quo. They can accomplish this task, however, only at the cost of failing as instruments of political modernization.

In 1958, after the merger of Syria with Egypt, Nasser set out

47 In all these facets of political mobilization, the Syrian military dictator, Colonel Adib Shishakli, had earlier failed even more quickly than the Egyptian regime. Shishakli, who came to power in November 1951, did not form his Arab Liberation Movement until October 1952, and by then his position had already been weakened. He had never enjoyed the popularity of Nasser and his colleagues, who appeared as liberators, whereas Shishakli was seen as the fourth of a series of military dictators. Syria was also a far more divided country than Egypt. Shishakli's platform, even more so than that of the Liberation Rally, failed to distinguish clearly between partisan and opponent: "Let all those who believe in God, in their country, and in the Arab idea come forward to us, but let those whose hearts are not pure abstain from placing obstacles in our way, for they will be crushed." (New York Times, October 25, 1952.) In 1954, Shishakli's regime was overthrown, and his party disappeared.
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once again to build a new party—the National Union—as an instrument that would concentrate on mobilizing popular support for the tasks of internal reconstruction—the doubling of the national income of the United Arab Republic in ten years and the establishment of a "cooperative, socialist and democratic society." In 1961, after Syria broke with Egypt, Nasser was compelled to reorganize his movement for a third time.

The "Arab Socialist Union" which he set in motion in 1962 constitutes more than another administrative reshuffle. It is the sum of many lessons learned. The Liberation Rally welcomed all active citizens so that they might become organized in a mass movement. The National Union, by combining open nominations, official screening of nominees, and free elections of all local committees, hoped to fashion a transitional organization which, while capable of rallying mass support for specific local and national tasks, would generate and train the nucleus of a future cadre party. In each village, town, and province committees of the National Union supervised and organized Egyptians in activities ranging from building schools with volunteer labor to writing prize essays on the nation's aims. The results, however, were uneven. In some villages and towns the committees effectively substituted their power for that of the traditional leading families. In others, these families managed to fill the committees with their own clients and followers. 49

Stung by the ability of anti-socialist and locally powerful elements to overthrow the government of the Syrian Region of the United Arab Republic, Nasser abandoned what he came to regard as the dangerously, or at least inadequately mixed, composition of the National Union. The rapid forward movement into socialist planning outlined in the "National Charter" of July 1962 also required a more disciplined, ideologically sensitive political movement. The Arab Socialist Union, therefore, has

49 al-Ahram, Cairo, July 2, 1959.
49 In one Egyptian village visited by the author, the established local headman had picked himself, plus two members from each of the three rival factions into which the village has been traditionally divided, for the required seven in the executive committee. His group had been elected. What was new in the village, however, was that the headman had been unable to dissuade an opposition slate, led by a teacher, from running. Indeed, he found himself, after election, appointing most of his opposition to sub-committee chairmanships.
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been organized from the beginning as a cadre party. A control committee will decide who is fit for membership—selecting probably no more than ten percent of the nation. Not less than half of all its committees will be composed of workers and peasants—thus reflecting the movement’s social concerns, leaving little room for traditional landed or bourgeois elements to enter, and making it easier for the educated salaried middle class to control the organization. Villages, factories, and towns will be allowed to vote in order to decide who among the members of the Arab Socialist Union should hold specific offices.

Nasser’s repeated efforts thus amply demonstrate that a charismatic leader committed to rapid modernization cannot avoid trying to solve the problems of political organization, ideology, and accountability.

Turkey: From the One-Party to the Multi-Party System

Turkey’s extraordinary achievement in deliberately and peacefully evolving from a dictatorship in the 1920’s to a multi-party system in the late 1940’s demonstrates that such a transition is not a utopian expectation. Nowhere else in Asia or Africa has modernization so far maintained its momentum except under one-party rule (as in Tunisia) or under a multi-party system in which the ruling party is not threatened by defeat (as in India). Only the Turks have sustained an effort to modernize while maintaining at least two parties that expected, from time to time, to yield power to each other.

There are good reasons why this Turkish experiment has so far survived several major crises. Some of its strong foundations were originally created by the good fortunes of history, others by the perceptive strength of leadership. But the first conclusion one may draw is that in Turkey, as everywhere else, democracy did not arrive as a gift from above: it had to be struggled for

50 The first detailed and critical exploration of this particular achievement and its unfinished tasks is at last available in Kemal H. Karpat’s penetrating book, *Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*.

51 The character of Ataturk’s leadership has been described earlier in this chapter; the historical foundations that have given Turkey more political stability than most other Middle Eastern countries are discussed in Chapter 17.
and is still being severely tested. After being in power for more than two decades, the Republican People's Party showed courage and resiliency in moving toward democracy after World War II. It was being faithful to Ataturk's promise, but it was also responding to a changed international environment in which many dictators had fallen and there were new advantages both in looking and in being democratic. And its change in course was at least equally the result of a clear perception of domestic realities. The Republican People's Party could either allow some free scope to an opposition composed of landowners fearful of Republican attempts to pursue land reform, businessmen chafing at government controls, ambitious but politically frustrated leaders of its own party, workers and urban consumers dismayed at the constantly rising cost of living, religious conservatives, Christian and Jewish minorities recently hit hard by a confiscatory tax, and poor peasants whose expectations had at last risen but remained unsatisfied. Or it would be forced to embark on a much harsher dictatorsip than ever before, yet with few prospects of being able to contain these dissidents either within its own ranks or outside.

The leadership of the new Democratic Party in 1946 was drawn almost entirely from the experienced ranks of the Republican People's Party. The initial tolerance of the Republicans may well have rested on the assumption that their former allies neither would nor could soon organize a strong, or boldly opposing, party from among such disparate elements, and thus for long be content to remain an innocent ornament of democracy. Within a few months, however, the Republicans became frightened by the new democracy and rigged the elections of 1946 to defeat the rapidly gaining Democrats. Democracy was to become all the more strongly felt and rooted in Turkey for having had to be wrested over a four-year period from the dominant regime by heavy but skillfully organized political pressure. In 1950, the Republican regime became the first Middle Eastern regime in modern history to allow itself to be defeated in a free election.

53 Karpat, Turkey's Politics, pp. 152-153.
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A second conclusion to be derived from Turkey's experience is the reaffirmation that democracy is never finally won but must always be vigorously sustained if it is to survive. Between 1954 and 1960, under the Democratic Premiership of Adnan Menderes, the Turkish government once again restricted freedom of speech, public assembly, and the press, and curbed the activities of opposition parties and the autonomy of universities. The chief underlying cause for this retreat would seem to be that Turkey had adopted democracy before it was well-launched on a course of self-propelled growth, and before its new urban consensus had yet been adopted by the rural countryside. Despite its enormous gains, the Turkish economy cannot yet envisage the day when it will prosper without large infusions of foreign credits. Despite the secularization of most of the Turkish middle class, the majority of the people remain far more familiar with the habits and outlook of traditional Islam than with those of Ataturk.

Menderes himself reflected some of the limitations of a society whose economic structure and political majority had not yet quite the capacity to sustain a steady course of modernization. He was the first Turkish ruler to seek the support of the majority, but he neglected and ultimately alienated Turkey's educated men. By temperament alone, Menderes was an energetic, high-living, back-slapping man of action who felt ill at ease with men of ideas. Projects interested him more than the plans of which they might (or might not) be a part. He spread roads, tractors, silos, subsidies, and credits through much of the countryside, but he neglected to accompany these new advantages with new ideas or new forms of organization. He could not provide them himself, and thought it might dilute his own influence if he were to rely on the large number of intellectuals that such a transformation of the traditional countryside required. Thus, two-thirds of the people were still illiterate by 1960, and the building of new minarets was subsidized by the Menderes government as deliberately as the erection of factory chimneys.

54 By contrast, note the roots of the British Parliament in a pre-industrial age, the slow extension of the franchise, and the century given to British society, instead of decades, to prove its resilience in adjusting to socio-economic upheaval. (Leslie Lipson, "The Two-Party System in British Politics," American Political Science Review, June 1953, pp. 337-358.)
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By developing the countryside, Menderes created a new economic group intermediate between city and peasantry, but he could not avoid damaging them by repeated economic crises, nor meet all their new aspirations. Farmers bought out, or thrown out of jobs, by those who could afford the newly available tractors thronged to the cities without finding steady employment. The inflation caused by the pace of investments hurt urban pocketbooks. New opportunities for private businessmen increased, but too often only if bribes were paid. The major gains in industrial and agricultural production that were scored were the rewards of foreign aid (and to some extent, good weather) far more than of domestic savings, and remain as yet too insecure and uncoordinated to serve as a firm ground for steady future advance.

By 1954, corruption plainly began to take the place of ideas, and opportunism the place of organization. In 1957, Menderes was returned to power in an election which—there is reason to believe—he won by fraud. By 1960, he had become a repressive ruler ready to stamp out all opposition.

In May 1960, the army took over the reins of government, and ousted Menderes. Yet this military intervention was not the setback for Turkish multi-party democracy that it seemed to be at the time. On the contrary, the army intervened because its established role of political neutrality was in danger. Either it must willingly become Menderes' tool for repressing all opposition, or it would have to intervene at its own initiative to protect both Turkish democracy and its own position above parties. The latter alternative was an easy choice for an army whose ranks had produced Atatürk and, by its victories, the new and independent Turkey. Within eighteen months after its coup, however, the army restored multi-party democracy to Turkey, for it recognized that such a system had already proved its strength and worth.

The existence of a multi-party system had given an opportunity to institutions other than political parties to establish a vigorous autonomy—especially to the universities and the press—and for the educated middle class to become conscious of its own strength. From all these together came the momentum of organized pro-
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tests to the Menderes regression that prepared the way for army intervention. In the rest of the Middle East, the army intervened in politics during the 1950's in order to establish, through authoritarian rule, the conditions for rapid modernization and broader political participation. In Turkey, the army re-entered politics briefly in 1960 in order to preserve and enlarge the multiple foundations on which democracy had already come to rest.

Between 1946 and the final few years of the Menderes regime, the Republican Peoples Party and the Democratic Party had actually offered still relatively little choice to Turkish voters. The leadership of both parties shared a heritage of common beliefs reinforced by decades of earlier collaboration with each other. The Democratic Party fought for greater political and intellectual freedom between 1946 and its victory in 1950; the Republicans were obliged to fight against repressive policies under the Democratic Party regime. The Democrats advocated greater freedom for individual entrepreneurs against the etatism championed by the Republicans. Since the Democratic victory led to greater elbow-room for only a few favored businessmen while governmental planning, not without errors, remained the controlling force, the Republicans now favor more skillful planning for a more mixed economy. The Democrats were the first to put full steam behind a belated Republican policy of helping the peasants, and hence won predominant support among the latter. By the late 1950's, however, the Republicans were beginning to catch up with Democrats in rural areas by speaking more boldly in favor of assistance to the peasants.

The coup of 1960 decisively enlarged the frontiers of the governing consensus. The basic values of the Ataturk Revolution are to be preserved, but the new army regime recognized that Turkey now faces problems that never confronted Ataturk and

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56 All leftist parties were outlawed in 1946. Since "leftism," in the definition held by Turkish governments prior to the coup of 1960, included "a good many ideas which in the West are generally accepted or at most can be labelled 'liberal,'" it followed that all were "bound to defend one set of ideas and this in itself is the very denial of the multi-party system." (Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p. 386.)

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therefore must come up with new answers. The army regime attempted to set in motion reforms which would change the character of the debate among political parties. Parties will not be allowed to oppose the development of a secular, democratic society dedicated to rapid modernization. But they will no longer be confined to the extreme center in debating alternate roads to progress. Multi-party democracy in Turkey will therefore face still harder tests in the future.
CHAPTER 15

TRADE UNIONS

Obstacles to Effective Organization

At first glance it seems unlikely that trade unions could play a significant role in an area where most people are peasants, industry is underdeveloped, and the workers themselves predominantly unskilled and unemployed. Indeed, in the sixteen countries under consideration here, trade unions are non-existent in three (Afghanistan, Yemen, and Libya), outlawed or else too small to be more than sporadically active in six (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iran, Syria, and Pakistan\(^1\)), and sizeable but subservient to government guidance in one (Egypt). In Lebanon they owe their modest strength (about 5,000) to the spirit of traditional guilds and the traditional division of labor among various religious and ethnic groups. In Algeria, Turkey, and Iraq, trade unions are growing in importance, but only in Tunisia and Morocco are they already organizationally and politically strong.\(^2\)

\(^1\) They are outlawed in Saudi Arabia, where membership figures are unavailable, but where 13,000 out of 15,000 oil workers struck for three weeks in 1953 for union recognition and other grievances, and where minor work stoppages and demonstrations have occurred since. In Pakistan, where they are tolerated but not yet legalized, unions have about 160,000 members, most of them in East Pakistan. Iranian and Jordanian trade unions, operating under similar conditions, have about 80,000 and 4,000 members each. Syrian unions have about 30,000 members. The Sudan is discussed in detail in this chapter.

\(^2\) In Algeria, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens, affiliated with the National Liberation Front, has about 75,000 members. Turkish trade unions, containing about one-fourth of all industrial workers, possess about 220,000 members. The Iraqi case is detailed in this chapter.

For a valuable analysis of trade union problems in an area of the Middle East outside the purview of this analysis, see Willard A. Belling, "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrain," The Middle East Journal, Spring 1959, pp. 156-169.
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This weakness among most labor organizations will probably continue. The growth of population is likely to swell the ranks of the unemployed, the underemployed, and the unskilled—who all need protection most but have the least strength to bargain for it. Industrialization, which would increase the number of skilled, literate, and employed workers—the core of any trade union movement—is likely to make rapid strides only in a few countries of the Middle East during the next decade.

Whenever governments are sympathetic to labor unions, and that will hardly be the case soon in more than a minority of Middle Eastern states, their attitude is often likely to resemble that of a recent government of Syria: “In the field of labor and laborers, we are now carrying out extensive studies through which we intend to bring about legislation and measures which will safeguard the workers’ rights and will promote the projects of the employer, so that the workers will not obstruct national production and the employers will not exploit the workers in an unlawful manner. Before anything else, we aim at bringing about harmony between the worker and the employer. Through the alliance of these two elements we shall begin our industrial life, so that it will be possible for us to avoid social and economic crises which have shaken the foundations of civilized states.” At the same time, it is often customary for such governments to ease the relationship between government and trade unions by subsidizing the latter. If workers are dissatisfied with the paternalism

3 Colonel Fawzi Silu, Premier of Syria, speaking over Damascus Radio, March 4, 1952.
4 A decree published by Premier Silu on February 4, 1952, grants government aid to trade unions to meet administrative expenses, provided this aid does not exceed 50 percent of the organization’s ordinary expenses. Additional funds are to be made available for union projects, after receiving approval from the Ministry of National Economy, to assist workers in emergencies, organize ethical and technical studies for workers, fight illiteracy, engage in publicity, and construct workers’ houses, clubs, and trade union offices.

More recently, al-Asyam, Damascus, published the following figures on January 12, 1959, regarding annual subsidies given to trade unions by the Syrian Ministry of Social Affairs. (The figures are given in Syrian pounds):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federation of Labor</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Federation of Labor</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Damascus Federation of Labor</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo Federation of Labor</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homs Federation of Labor</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hama Federation of Labor</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latakia Federation of Labor</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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of private employers, the best they can hope for is a paternalistic government.\(^6\)

**The Trade Union under Government Control**

Since 1952 Egyptian trade unions have relied on the Ministry of Social Affairs as a friend “who will extend to us expert advice.”\(^6\) Their experience during these years illustrates some of the problems that trade unions encounter when they lack adequate independent sources of strength.

In 1947 there were only 91,604 trade union members in Egypt.\(^7\) By 1955, these numbers had increased to 373,000 and represented the unionization of nearly all industrial enterprises employing 50 or more workers, all transport and railroad workers, and almost all larger trading and commercial establishments. This growth has made the Egyptian trade union movement the largest and strongest in the Arab East. With respect to union strength in medium and large-scale enterprises, it probably exceeds that of India, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and most of Latin America.\(^8\) Nonetheless, trade unions represent only 20 percent of the industrial, commercial, and service workers of Egypt, and less than one percent of its agricultural workers. In this sense they are far weaker than the trade unions of Tunisia and Morocco (the Arab West), and until recently, of the Sudan.

Government support has been the chief instrument of trade union achievement; government control and restrictions, its main obstacle. Because Egyptian governments have never exercised protective control over enterprises employing fewer than 50 workers (and the great majority of these hence retain the spirit of paternalistic family-owned enterprises), trade unions have made little headway in organizing this majority of urban workers. Dependent on government initiative, encouragement, and protection, trade unions have been quick to acknowledge

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\(^6\) As phrased by the President of the General Federation of Labor and quoted in *al-Musawwar*, Cairo, February 8, 1957.


TRADE UNIONS

their subservient position. In 1930, when the royal house was supreme in Egyptian politics, the unions elected Prince Abbas Halim president of their confederation. In 1942 they chose Fouad Serageddin, the Secretary General of the Wafd Party, whose government had legally recognized labor's right to organize, as "honorary president" of many trade union federations. Since 1952 they have responded readily to Nasser's guidance. Prior to 1952, when the government became the union's patron, many local unions had responded to paternalism in industry by electing management officials to union office.

Egyptian trade unions were organized at the turn of the century by skilled workers of European origin. Since earlier legislation in 1890 had destroyed guild protection, the new and less familiar form of organization began to attract Egyptian membership. By 1911, there were 11 unions with about 7,000 members. Growth was slow, however, because both British and subsequent Egyptian rulers in the country regarded labor primarily as a threat to political security. Through most of the first third of this century, labor problems were considered to be within the jurisdiction of the police.

On September 6, 1942, a Wafd government for the first time enacted legislation to recognize trade unions in an attempt to win labor's political support against the King. The government continued, however, to restrict many union activities. Thus, in response to landlord interests, it forbade the organization of any agricultural workers. Subjected to repression by King Faruk in the mid-forties after the ouster of the Wafd, labor's strength suffered further by a division in its ranks principally between two anti-royal factions: the modern, secular coalition of liberal Wafdists, leftists, and communists on the one hand, and a religious-political movement opposed to both King and Wafd, namely the

9 "Whether he had any real interest in or understanding of labor unionism and whether the existing union leadership was really loyal to him are questions which have never been answered. Yet the formation of the federation under the Prince was significant in that it indicated that Egyptian leadership of unions had no ideological objective, that unionism had survived government repression, and that any viable labor movement would seek acceptance by the ruling regime." (Harbison and Ibrahim, Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise, p. 176.)
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Moslem Brotherhood, on the other.\(^9\) Governmental repression of labor continued during the period 1945-1948, which was marked by frequent strikes and work stoppages, and eventually culminated in a declaration of martial law at the outbreak of the Palestine war.

The overthrow of King Faruk in July 1952 opened new opportunities for Egyptian labor. Under a new Labor Code,\(^1^{11}\) strikes are still outlawed, unions cannot engage in political activities, and trade union officials must be regularly employed as workers, and hence cannot give full attention to union activities.\(^1^{12}\) Records of membership, minutes of meetings, and financial accounts are open at all times to government inspection. With the permanent displacement of landlords as the ruling class, however, trade unions were henceforth permitted to organize farm workers. Whenever three-fifths of the workers of an enterprise join the union, the union can require the employer to deduct union dues from all workers.\(^1^{13}\) Thus, ten years after the de jure recognition of the right to organize, trade unions became financially secure.

Since unions are not free to strike or to engage in collective bargaining, the new code also established the basic conditions of employment,\(^1^{14}\) including not only minimum wages, hours, and conditions for the employment of women and minors but also provisions for company-financed housing, clinics, transportation, recreation centers, and stores. Workers cannot be discharged without substantial reason, and lay-offs cannot take place without government permission.

Having made so many gains under the legislation of the new regime and under the organizational guidance of army officers loyal to Nasser, labor unions in 1954 backed Nasser with a

\(^9\) An important portion of the first faction was organized in 1946 as the Workers' Committee of National Liberation, later known as the Workers' Congress. Most of its leadership were arrested within the year.


\(^1^{12}\) The implications of this last rule are discussed more fully in the section on the Sudanese labor union in this chapter.

\(^1^{13}\) By law, trade unions must spend one-third of their income on social welfare activities among their members.

\(^1^{14}\) Harbison and Ibrahim, Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise, pp. 157-166 discuss these in some detail.
general strike against Nagib's efforts, opportunistically supported by Wafd, Moslem Brotherhood, and communists, to make himself the actual and not just the nominal leader of Egypt. Thereafter, in its industrial disputes, labor could frequently count on arbitration favorable to its interests. The government also took the initiative in planning and administering schools in trade unionism, labor laws, and vocational skills. Nevertheless, labor leaders who failed to consult the government or took an independent course found themselves ousted or arrested. Both the relative strength of the labor movement (Nasser's regime by 1959 still lacked the support of a dues-paying, organized political movement of equal size) and the relative weakness of the labor movement (Nasser could not hope to spur industrial development without a reliable and disciplined labor force) called for more decisive measures. On April 7, 1959, a new Labor Law was promulgated which once again improved conditions of labor, among other things, reducing the nine-hour working day to eight. This law proposes to reorganize the 1,300-1,400 local trade unions under the jurisdiction of a small number of federations, one for each profession or trade. Tripartite boards composed of workers, employers, and government officials will determine wages, conditions of work, and standards of productivity for each industry. In this manner, presumably, the unions will be able to extend their gains. (The workers in privately owned transport lines and foreign-owned petroleum industries are now the best organized and best paid.) These boards, one may suppose, will now equalize conditions of work, especially for those Egyptian-owned industries where paternalism continues to characterize most relationships and labor-management relations are least stable. Through participation in these official boards, labor unions will thus have considerable influence beyond the enterprises they have so far organized.

Labor's increased influence, however, has brought upon itself increased governmental control. The new law confirms an earlier

16 See Harbison and Ibrahim, Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise, pp. 194-204 for a discussion of the typologies now characterizing employer-employee relationships in Egypt.
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law that was designed to harness labor: only active members of the National Union—the U.A.R.’s only legal political movement—may serve as officers of trade unions. As coordinator of the reconstructed trade unions, Lieutenant Colonel Khaled Fawzi took the place of Major Ahmed Abdullah Toema. The revolution of the military vanguard of the new middle class is assigning the workers a more significant role in the national mobilization and modernization of Egypt, but there is no question about who remains in charge.

The Trade Union as the Government’s Junior Partner

The government of Tunisia has also harnessed labor unions to its purpose. Yet the relationship between the Tunisian General Union of Labor (UGTT), the Neo-Destour, and the government differs markedly from that obtaining in Egypt. Labor unions in Tunisia have a long record of strength, courage, and political sophistication. Having first gained trade union experience in Tunisian branches of the French-controlled General Confederation of Labor (CGT), founded in 1924, the Tunisians established their own separate federation in the summer of 1937. The alliance of trade unions with the Neo-Destour thus began over two decades ago with the common purpose of achieving national independence, and this was greatly facilitated by the fact that almost all employers were French.

From the very first, labor unions and the Neo-Destour Party possessed an interlocking leadership drawn almost exclusively from the new middle class. The political and ideological sophistication of the UGTT was enhanced, moreover, by its battle against the remnants of the communist-controlled CGT trade unions. In this struggle the UGTT quickly succeeded in becoming Tunisia’s principal labor federation and in reducing the membership of the CGT from 25,000 in 1948 to 5,000 in 1956 when Tunisia became independent. Moreover, in several crucial periods of nationalist agitation, when the Neo-Destour was outlawed but the UGTT was not, the latter carried much of the organizational burden of the political struggle and at all times was one

of its principal participants. In Egypt, by contrast, the struggle
for national independence was, until 1952, in the hands of land-
owning, commercial, and industrial interests that were reluctant
to organize the underlying population, and called upon it for sup-
port primarily in the form of mobs. After 1952, Egyptian na-
tionalist leadership passed to the army, an organization more self-
sufficient than any other.

As a result of its experience and skill, the UGTT now contains
150,000 members or 70 percent of Tunisia's employed industrial,
commercial, and service workers, despite the fact that about
350,000 or almost 50 percent of all Tunisian workers are un-
employed or underemployed. It is financially independent, and
no rumor of corruption has been raised about the use of its
funds. Even so, it has accepted the role of junior partner in
Bourguiba's governing apparatus. It abstains from strikes; it
does not press for higher wages; it does not frow class warfare;
it accepts austerity and sacrifice as the price of economic develop-
ment. In September 1956, the UGTT's leader, Ahmed ben Salah,
called for more radical social and economic reforms than the
government was prepared to countenance. He sought the na-
tionalization of land and industry and the establishment of govern-
ment-directed cooperative farms. However, the UGTT moderated
its demands after a temporary split within its ranks, induced by
the government, had forced Ahmed ben Salah to resign.

Nonetheless, the UGTT has also had its rewards. Ahmed ben
Salah, soon after his resignation as Secretary General of the
UGTT, was appointed by Bourguiba as Secretary of State for
Public Health and Social Affairs and given sufficient support to
do an outstanding job, and later, to become Minister for Eco-

The rank and file of the UGTT has benefitted, not by an ex-
tensive social security program, which the government is too poor to provide, but by official support of union efforts to improve working conditions and to remedy individual grievances. The UGTT has been active, through its own banks, in building housing projects and organizing marketing and consumer cooperatives. It has sponsored adult education for literacy and technical skills. It has persuaded the government to finance relief projects for the unemployed, to build vacation camps for employed workers, and to hasten the “Tunisification” of jobs in government and private employ. By early 1960, there was talk of union participation in factory production councils.

The UGTT has good reasons for remaining content with its status as junior partner. The Neo-Destour Party is much larger than the union, even though probably half of its membership of 250,000-300,000 overlaps with that of the UGTT. It has no leader to rival Bourguiba in his popularity among the people and in his power over the government. It recognizes the necessity of austerity and knows from long and intimate experience the sincerity of the present political leadership. Hence it consults, and is consulted.18

The Trade Union as an Independent Force

The difficulty for labor unions in the present evolution of the Middle East is that trade union independence often invites repression. Recent events in the Sudan make this clear.19

Only two percent of the Sudan’s population of 10 million are non-agricultural wage earners. Of these about half (100,000) had by 1955 joined 157 local unions, most of which were affiliated with the Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation. The largest group were the 25,000 members of the Railway Workers Union. Next in size were unions organized by tailors, public

18 For a further analysis of this partnership, see Chapter 14.
TRADE UNIONS

works employees, hotel and domestic servants, and employees of
the post and telegraph services. A high proportion in most trade
unions were unskilled and illiterate.

The impetus for organization came in the beginning from
railway workers. The first fifteen of the twenty workers to or-
ganize in 1946 were graduates of the technical school in Atbara,
the headquarters of the railway company.

During these early years the union prospered through the
benevolence of a colonial administration controlled by the Brit-
ish Labour Party. In contrast to most trade unions of the
Middle East, it was free to strike, even in essential industries.
Between 1947 and 1952, 1,750,000 man-days were lost through
strikes, occasioned chiefly by wage disputes and secondly by the
discharge of workers. The unions were also allowed to add to
their strength through federation. The government, which em-
ployed 60 percent of all non-agricultural workers, showed great
respect for union demands, and private employers generally fol-
lowed suit. In addition, labor legislation regarding pay, hours,
paid vacations, and retirement and other benefits compared
favorably with that of Western Europe.20

On December 3, 1958, less than a month after the army coup
of General Ibrahim Abboud, the Sudan Workers’ Trade Union
Federation and all its affiliated unions were suspended and have
not been permitted to function since. What had gone wrong?
The communists had gained control of the executive council of
the Federation soon after its creation in 1949, but had lost it in
1953 when they misjudged the political temper of the country.
Denouncing the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement that would shortly
make the Sudan independent as an imperialist plot to “impede po-
itical freedom,” they called for a three-day general strike. Not
supported by the union members, the communists were left iso-
lated. By June 1956, a new non-communist Sudan Government
Workers’ Trade Union Federation (four-fifths of all organized
labor is composed of government employees) had gained the
allegiance of the local unions, including the Sudan Railway
Workers. The rapid growth of the non-communist Federation—

20 Kitchen, “Trade Unions: Communist Stronghold,” p. 12; Fawzi, The
Labour Movement in the Sudan, pp. 123-126.

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founded only in April 1956—may have been due more to official
government intervention than to the skill of its own leadership.
In the summer of 1957, it agreed to negotiate with the
communist-controlled Federation for the reunification of all Sudanese
labor, and acquiesced in the creation of a reunification committee
that contained 20 communists and only 3 non-communists. The
non-communist Federation soon had second thoughts and with-
drew, but the communists, strengthened by the prestige of their
efforts on behalf of labor unity, in 1958 recaptured control of
the Railway Workers' Union and other local unions embracing
altogether more than 70 percent of trade union membership.21

Since the Sudanese trade union movement is probably the
only Middle Eastern labor union federation controlled by communists,22
it is worth discovering how they came to play such
a large role in its rise and decline. The chief reason for com-
unist influence in trade unions in the Sudan—the communist
party probably has no more than 750 members23—has to do with
the problem of recruiting trade union leadership. Can workers
who are fully employed effectively lead labor unions? In Egypt,
where the law requires union officials to be full-time workers,
unions have been unable to secure greater union independence.24
It is doubtful that unions led by amateurs rather than profes-
sionals can do much to promote local causes let alone those of
national importance. In the Sudan, where there was no law
against union leadership by the new middle class, educated com-
munists were elected because no union had the money to pay
a full-time official (dues are normally delinquent). In addition
the communists had resources of their own, and government
pressure on the government-employed union leader often handi-
capped the union in competing with communists. Finally, many

22 Probably the only such: the communists have lost control of the trade
union movement in Iraq, and elsewhere control only certain union locals
or splinter "Federations."
23 World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Intelligence Re-
port No. 4489 R-11 (Unclassified), Bureau of Intelligence and Research, De-
partment of State, January 1959, p. 41.
24 If the new Egyptian law of 1959 (discussed above) creating fewer and
more effective union federations results in paid full-time trade union leaders,
these will, presumably, be expected to act as links between government and
trade union rather than as independent heads.
of the non-communist trade union pioneers left their unions for management positions. No party in the Sudan other than the communist has consistently concerned itself with daily labor problems. In general elections, the two principal Sudanese parties have thus far relied on the sectarian loyalties of workers to the two major religious brotherhoods, which are the backbone of these parties. Neglected by those for whom they had loyally voted, the workers have turned increasingly for support to secular, neutralist groups in national politics and to the communists, who made sure to appear little more radical but much more energetic than other nationalist groups. In the end, the conservative groups called in the army to reorganize a regime that had become unpopular. Communist leadership of Sudanese trade unions at that point provided only the excuse for a control measure that the new military regime would almost certainly have taken in any event.

The Trade Union as Equal Partner of a Political Party

The Moroccan trade union movement acquired skill, convictions, and solidarity by having to struggle both against colonial repression and communist control of unions during the decade preceding national independence. After 1956, given much greater freedom to organize and strike, the Union of Moroccan Labor (Union Marocain du Travail—UMT) swelled its membership to become the largest and strongest trade union in the entire Middle East and North Africa. In a country of ten million, it has about 600,000 members, about 10,000 of them agricultural workers, and thus holds in its ranks almost all employed industrial, commercial, and service labor.

Such growth and strength suggests that we may not yet have taken fair measure elsewhere in the Middle East of the true potential of labor organization. Repression by and dependence upon

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25 Thus in the first Sudanese general elections in 1953, Atbara workers still voted in a solid block for candidates backed by their sectarian leader while one of the most prominent executive officers of the Labor Federation received only negligible support in his own headquarters area. (Fawzi, The Labour Movement in the Sudan, p. 101.)
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governments, the limitations of junior partnership, or simply missed political opportunities are specific causes of trade union weakness in this region. They are not inevitable, however, simply because of the underdeveloped character of these countries. Repression, involuntary dependence, and reluctant acquiescence are likely to remain the most common forms of Middle Eastern political behavior, but the Moroccan situation shows that such obstacles to free trade unionism can be overcome even in underdeveloped countries.

It is easy to underestimate this possibility. One would never have supposed that trade unions should be of such importance so soon in Morocco—hard to believe that they should count for more here than in Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan. Only Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen had been more isolated than Morocco from the modernizing reforms of Europe of the Ottoman Empire. Morocco had never been part of the latter, and while it became alert to the economic and cultural advantages of the modern age in the latter part of the nineteenth century, its internal weaknesses left it defenseless before European imperialism. Its European administrators did not succeed in gaining firm control over all tribes until the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century. Nationalist reactions did not come until the third decade. Yet by the end of the fifth decade of the century, labor, allied with the National Union of Popular Forces, has become one of the most important civilian political forces in the country.

Labor unions were first established in 1938 when French workers set up branches of the Confédération Général du Travail in Morocco. By 1949, it had 80,000 members, of whom four-fifths were Moroccans. Already by 1947, two General Secretaries were elected by the Confederation—one French, one Moroccan, and the latter was a member of the nationalist Istiqlal party. After 1950, Moroccans took the initiative in forming local unions. By 1952, the Confederation had 250,000 members, only one-tenth of these being Europeans.

The capture of the trade unions by Moroccans and their

26 See also Chapter 14.
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utilization for nationalist purposes was a signal achievement. It took place in the face of Protectorate decrees that forebade Moroccans to form their own trade unions (thought acquiescent on the right of Moroccans to join trade unions), and clearly restricted election to top leadership in all unions to Frenchmen. The leading Frenchmen in the Confederation, moreover, were usually communists, with obvious ambitions of their own.

On December 7, 1952, a trade union demonstration of sympathy for the murdered Tunisian trade union leader, Ferhat Hached, was dispersed with unusual violence by Casablanca police. The next day, the Confederation and its branches were dissolved (only a few all-European locals were permitted to continue) and many of its leaders arrested. When trade union leaders were granted amnesty in September 1954, they did not need to mourn the interval as a setback. Their followers had maintained spirit and organization by engaging in clandestine political and terrorist activities designed to oust the French and bring back King Mohammed V (exiled in August 1953) to an independent Morocco. Having regained freedom to act almost a year before the leaders of nationalist parties were permitted to return from jail or exile, the union leaders strengthened their organization even before the established Nationalist Party leaders recovered full control over their following.

With the support of the American Federation of Labor and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, but before the Protectorate had authorized its formation, an independent nationalist Union Marocain du Travail (UMT) was established in March 1955. The former communist leaders of the Confederation were all rejected for being communist and French, and hence foreign twice over. Led by Mahjoub ben Seddik, a man of the middle class by birth and marriage, and Taib ben Bouazza, a self-educated former mine worker, the union rapidly gained strength. By early 1956, it had about 400,000 members. Soon after the country's independence in March 1956 had reunited the French and Spanish Protectorate zones, the UMT was able to organize many new unions and to establish training schools.

27 It is commonly believed that Hached, the Secretary General of the Tunisian UGTT, was killed by French terrorists.
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for cadre and organizers. By 1959 and in the face of greatly increased unemployment, it had grown to about 600,000, collecting an estimated $600,000 a year in dues. Its locals are usually organized directly by teams sent out by UMT headquarters and usually comprise all the employees of a single enterprise. Each local elects its own leaders, but the UMT is likely to intervene if the slate is unsympathetic to current UMT objectives.

A decree of July 1957 gave the union the right to organize farm workers, and rent or buy machines, seeds, plants, animals, and feeds in order to organize farm cooperatives. The union has organized almost all urban workers and has even formed a youth group of about 5,000-10,000 members. Its further growth now depends largely on organizing agricultural workers, a difficult task in view of the large number of seasonally employed migrant workers.

In addition, the UMT was represented at almost all negotiations leading to Moroccan independence, and was given 10 of 76 seats in the Consultative Assembly. Ben Seddik, the UMT's General Secretary, became the Assembly's Vice President. UMT representatives also sit on the Superior Council for economic planning and its various commissions, on labor courts, the Central Commission for Prices, the Bureau for Labor Placement, and the committees of the Fund for Social Aid. Its internal growth has been more vigorous than that of any of the political parties, and in securing workers' rights by legislative action it has far outstripped the accomplishments of politicians. 28

As in most Middle East countries, the UMT's task of organizing had been simplified by the clustering of urban industrial and commercial activity. Half of all such establishments in Morocco are located in Casablanca; nearly three-quarters are in four towns—Casablanca, Rabat, Safi, and Meknes. As in many Middle Eastern countries, organizing trade unions in a nationalist era is facilitated by the fact that most modern enterprises are owned by foreigners, in this instance French.

28 See also Ashford, *Political Change in Morocco*, especially pp. 270-301. The largest segments of unorganized employees are workers for artisans and sales clerks and white-collar clerks in the smaller enterprises. Those in department stores are fully organized. The largest group of urban workers left unorganized are those who are not employed at all, perhaps 500,000 of them.
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Its vigor, growth, and independence, however, have more particular causes. As a part of a European trade union movement, it had access to first-hand trade union experience. It learned how to distinguish its own ends from those of communists within its ranks as well as those of the more conservative leaders of the dominant nationalist Istiqlal party, some of whom were in exile or jail when vital decisions had to be made. Its solidarity is due not only to its trade union activities, but to its participation in the violent battle for national independence, and subsequently to its success in effecting major domestic reforms. After the restoration of the King, it regained organization momentum even before any of the political parties could get under way. Even when its leaders held influential positions in the guiding councils of the Istiqlal party, it maintained its separate identity by voicing more radical foreign and domestic policies than the Istiqlal itself, and often had the satisfaction of seeing these ultimately adopted by the Istiqlal.

When Ben Barka seceded from the Istiqlal in 1959 to establish the National Union of Popular Forces, he took with him the great majority of the UMT. A few of the oldest trade union locals remained loyal to the leadership of the rump Istiqlal: most dockers and some miners who were more concerned to preserve their present relatively high status than to fight national political battles, and the older generation of teachers who owed their education and jobs to the "free schools" established years before by Istiqlal leaders. But the greater part of the UMT chose to become an equal partner in a party that speaks for labor and the more radical members of the new middle class.

The National Union of Popular Forces is committed to austerity and increased production, not higher wages or the redistribution of wealth. Although King Hassan II's insistence on monopolizing political power in Morocco has caused labor prudently to reduce its links with political movements, its extraordinarily rapid evolution has probably already served to demonstrate its permanent political importance.

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The Trade Union as a Sudden Avalanche

How much eagerness for trade union organization there may lie beneath the repression and restriction imposed by government was also revealed after the July 1958 overthrow of the Nuri regime in Iraq. Labor's first reaction was easily explicable in traditional terms. Ignorant of the relation between wages and production, workers demanded extraordinarily high pay, and when this was not forthcoming, they became violent, or stole, or simply waited patiently for the better life now that the tyrant was dead.

Trade unions were authorized by law for the first time in Iraq on December 18, 1958, although strikes (starting in 1930) had broken out in earlier years among railway, port, and oil workers.29 Within less than a year, among a population of 6,000,000, fifty unions came into being, one for each trade, craft, industry, profession, and service. All of them together claimed a membership of 250,000. Communists, once again benefitting from their avowed championship of labor, took the lead in organizing many of these unions, and brought the Central Federation of Trade Unions under their control.

Three factors have temporarily reduced the role and growth of the trade union movement of Iraq since the middle of 1959. The government's arrest of the Federation's communist leadership helped to break communist control but split the trade union movement. The revolution attracted many rural inhabitants to Baghdad, where most modern enterprises are located; but there the regime's failure to deal quickly with economic issues produced almost fifty percent unemployment in the industrial and commercial sector and made it harder for unions to organize. The temporary outlawing of all political parties also made it more difficult to focus discussion and action on labor issues.

The political direction of Iraq remains uncertain at this writing. That organized labor, only sporadically on the scene before the summer of 1958, will henceforth play a major political


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role is scarcely to be doubted. Since all Iraqi political organizations begin with almost equal inexperience, labor's role—as an independent or dependent force—is yet to be determined.

The Role of Trade Unions in the Political Modernization of the Middle East

In most countries of the Middle East, trade unions remain weak. There is a great and growing surplus of semi-skilled and unskilled labor. The productivity of illiterate, untrained workers new to the discipline of industrialization is low. The traditionally Middle Eastern “feudal” relations persist in many modern enterprises in which highly personalized obligations are owed to the master, but few by the master to his servant. All these factors continue to keep workers from joining unions or, if they do join, prevent them from matching the strength of the employer.\(^\text{30}\)

Nonetheless, the preceding analysis suggests that it is not economic backwardness but political opportunities that are decisive in shaping the fortunes of trade unions in the Middle East. This is true if one asks merely how traditional trade union interests—wages, hours, working conditions, and the right to organize—are to be attained. Local unions, commonly drawn from the employees of a single enterprise, can seldom hope to triumph by strikes and collective bargaining. Better working conditions can be won only by political success—by securing the right to create strong federations of unions so that, having become a movement to be reckoned with, unions can achieve in national politics what most of their affiliates are too weak to gain in economic bargaining at individual plants. To gain support for national legislation regarding minimum terms and conditions of labor, to ensure the enforcement of such laws, to be able to press for favorable government conciliation or arbitration when free collective bargaining is not yet possible—all these demand concentration on political strategy, and cannot be successfully treated as autonomous economic issues.

\(^\text{30}\)These weaknesses are discussed by Yusif A. Saei in "Management-Labour Relations in Selected Arab Countries: Major Aspects and Determinants," International Labour Review, June 1958, pp. 519-537.
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It is also true that political opportunities and strategies are the primary causes of trade union progress at this stage of Middle Eastern evolution in a larger historical sense, and not only in the light of the concrete examples we have examined. In a Middle East in transition, no important issue can be successfully solved in isolation. Those who are under the illusion that the order of things is still fixed, or who worry only about particular wages for a particular job, will find that all crucial decisions, including their social, economic, and political status in life, will have been made for them.

Middle Eastern trade unions have many alternatives. They can remain impotent and so earn the occasional rewards of docility. They can allow themselves to be subverted by extremist political movements until the unions are destroyed together with the extremists who used them or are betrayed by the very triumph of extremism. They can acquiesce in dependency upon a sympathetic government or party, or they can choose to ally themselves with a political party. They can be company unions, communist-controlled unions, government unions, or partners of political parties. But they cannot stay out of politics and hope to change wages and hours, much less the status of labor.\textsuperscript{31}

The pressure upon unions to concentrate on gaining increased wages is strong. Earnings are, in general, exceedingly low. Yet there is another painful fact: the misery of Middle Eastern humanity cannot be cured by beginning with higher wages. The area's most dire economic need is to raise production: there simply is not enough to go around. Higher wages unaccompanied by improved skills, health, and adjustment to the discipline of industrial work will probably not increase productivity, but only raise consumption.

Is labor (or any other class) to act merely as a separate interest concerned with immediate rewards in a period in Middle Eastern history when the price of rapidly creating a new stability and prosperity will patently demand both material sacrifices and new forms of collaborations? The majority of trade unions in the

\textsuperscript{31} For a different point of view, see George E. Lichtblau, “The Politics of Trade Union Leadership in Southern Asia,” World Politics, October 1954, pp. 84-101.
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Middle East have chosen to put economic growth and social change ahead of wage gains. They intend to concentrate on creating a “disciplined, stable, contented, and loyal industrial force” by cooperating with the government in plans to expand the economy, help adjust workers psychologically and socially to industrial life, restrain consumption, increase production, and mitigate distrust of the government.\(^\text{32}\)

This is not an easy task for labor leaders. Few of them have worked their way up as workers and peasants to the rank of labor leaders. Hence between the new middle class leadership and the largely illiterate, semi-skilled and unskilled following there is a profound cultural gap, which is much easier to bridge with union victories that bring concrete gains than with talk of social transformation.

Trade union leaders may become too energetic in protecting the government against demands on industry when most enterprises are owned or guided by the government, and the rising costs of industry tend to become the rising costs of industrialization. A labor union that has had no opportunity to fight economic or even nationalist battles, and hence has no victories to look back upon, may never turn into a genuine trade union at all, but remain simply another bureaucratic arm of the state. Such a union, far from providing a safety valve for labor protest, is likely rather to drive protest to express itself in absenteeism, in quitting employment without notice, in simple reluctance to work, in passive or open insubordination, in sabotage, sporadic work stoppages, or, in desperation, in supporting extremist movements.\(^\text{33}\) The necessary balance between national and trade union interests demands extraordinary statesmanship of the relatively inexperienced labor leaders responsible for exploited workers in a region of great scarcities and inequalities.

Labor, even as an interest group, however, has a direct stake

\(^{32}\) This sentence embodies the views of Asoka Mehta, a leader of the Indian Praja Socialist Party and Member of Parliament, who plays an influential role in India’s second largest labor union, Hind Mazdoor Sabha. (See his article, “The Mediating Role of the Trade Union in Underdeveloped Countries,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, October 1957.) It probably reflects also the views of the present leaders of the Moroccan, Tunisian, Algerian, and Egyptian trade unions.

\(^{33}\) Harbison and Ibrahim, Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise, p. 207.
in rapid economic progress. Only such progress can reduce the surplus of workers, reduce the misery of their present existence, diminish the political and economic power of employers whose profits depend on the present system of exploitation, and put a greater premium on labor’s cooperation in economic development.

Labor unions that have had the political courage and opportunity to choose their allies are in a position to ask for immediate payment in return for their support. They can insist on a greater equality of sacrifices, and hence a realignment, if not an increase, in wage scales. They can demand opportunities for improving skills, conditions of safety and health, greater justice (i.e., more universalistic criteria) in hiring, firing, and supervision—all conditions now gravely lacking in most enterprises.

Trade unions that enter political alliances in the unstable environment of the Middle East may find their allies ousted from government, but such setbacks are unlikely to last long. Any Middle Eastern government that means to make rapid economic progress on any except totalitarian terms requires the cooperation of labor. The ability of labor unions to bargain with governments or parties is enhanced by the fact that they are relatively disciplined mass organizations in an environment in which mass political parties are still new. When free to organize, Middle Eastern trade union federations, like Middle Eastern mass parties, often include manual workers, the skilled and the unskilled, and members of the secular intelligentsia—an alliance, in short, of the new middle class, the workers, and the peasants. Though almost as broadly based as parties, the unions’ relatively more limited range of classes and interests and the impact of common problems in a common environment can make it a more cohesive body than many a political party. Yet in the Middle East, where increasing the number of jobs and the drive for indi-
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Individual and national independence require fundamental changes in society, the concerns of workers are scarcely less encompassing than those of political mass parties.

A Middle Eastern government as keenly interested in guarding against totalitarian rule as in rapid social and economic progress would derive vital advantages from encouraging the growth of trade unions that have such broad social concerns. Close and genuine alliance with such unions would not only ease the task of mobilizing a crucial segment of the population for national reconstruction, it would also set limits to authoritarian rule by ensuring continual discussion and bargaining among a significantly large group of political leaders who share a common framework of values.

This is not a utopian solution, as the Tunisian and Moroccan examples illustrate. That government leaders and the party they control will usually possess the stronger hand in such alliances is highly probable, since trade unions in most countries have lacked political opportunities for strengthening themselves. Government and party leaders who misuse their superior strength in relation to trade unions may not immediately bring about labor dissidence and strife. They will be building instead a political structure that is temporarily and superficially stable, but one whose inner life is likely to dwindle into an apathy that will, at best, delay the explosion of discontent. The leader who succeeds perfectly in controlling labor organizations will also have come much closer to creating a totalitarian state.

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CHAPTER 16
THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY

Bureaucracies in the Middle East not only administer laws, but, in the absence of parliamentary institutions, usually fashion them. They not only license, supervise, and tax, but often also organize and manage major financial, industrial, and agricultural enterprises. They ought therefore to be the most permanent, the most expert, the most efficient institutions of the state.

From Oriental to Modern Bureaucracy

Few bureaucracies in the world have been in existence as long as those of Iran and Egypt, or even those in the areas occupied until recently by the Ottoman Empire. This weight of tradition is the first burden of most Middle Eastern bureaucracies. For centuries, bureaucrats were the personal representatives of a personal ruler. They operated at the ruler's whim. When at some distance from the ruler, and while they could maintain that distance, they had whims of their own and acted upon them. Their main task was to enforce the ruler's will and to collect taxes. When it seemed unavoidable, they engaged in public works, for public welfare was then as unknown a concept as that of citizenship. In the best of times, when the ruling institution had received its due, the bureaucrats left society to live its own life.1

Such a bureaucracy, unenterprising except in a personal cause and dedicated to the past rather than to the future, did not give way to a modern bureaucracy until the late nineteenth or early

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twentieth century. Three new types of bureaucrats can be distinguished.2

One group of bureaucrats brought old habits to new tasks and opportunities. With their passion for governing others much stronger than their desire for personal independence, they gladly accepted employment in European controlled administrations. "Each of their number is willing, like the private soldier in an army, to abdicate his personal freedom of action into the hands of his general, provided the army is triumphant and victorious, and he is able to flatter himself that he is one of a conquering host, though the notion that he has himself any share in the domination exercised over the conquered is an illusion."3

Under European rule, opportunities were of course limited. In Egypt, for example, less than one-fourth of the higher posts were filled by Egyptians in 1920.4 For many bureaucrats and would-be bureaucrats of a traditional cast of mind, the coming of independence greatly enlarged the possibilities for place hunting. Educated men came into the government,5 but the spoils system on which it was based continued to reinforce the initiative for personal enrichment. In most Middle Eastern states during the 1930's and 1940's, and in some of them still, government had no larger purpose than stabilizing political fortunes by rewarding its friends and placating its enemies through government employment.

As numbers swelled, incompetence became easier to conceal. With several people filling the same vaguely defined job, the sense of responsibility and the test of competency became equally vague. In Egypt, one inquiry found that in many departments "the number of those not qualified for their tasks had reached 40 or 45 percent."6

2 Occasionally, the three kinds succeeded each other; sometimes all three were blended in the same person, but in various proportions: for the moment, it seems best to keep them analytically distinct.
3 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, pp. 159-160, speaking of a similar tradition but in a somewhat different context.
5 Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, p. 42 found that 77 percent of his sample of higher bureaucrats possessed a B.A. degree or its equivalent.
6 Republic of Egypt, Civil Service Commission, Report of the Commission [341]
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The modern age has also produced a new kind of bureaucrat—a man trained in the classical and humanistic heritage of his former European overlord. The Civil Service of Pakistan, in part the successor of the Indian Civil Service, is the outstanding example of this kind.7 Honesty, vigor, and intelligence have been its hallmarks. Its ideals have kept it from subordinating human to technocratic elements, but its detachment from the cultural traditions of its own people, though a necessary precondition for the organization of change, has developed far enough to hinder its communication with those it governs. Its predispositions have tended to make it suspicious of both rational planning and empiricism, especially in such intellectually and morally alien fields as economics and politics. It is thus handicapped in dealing with the nation’s principal problems—economic development and social and political transformation.

“The chasm thereby created between the nature of the problems faced and the philosophical apparatus a nation can muster to face them is at the root of difficulties of many Asian nations which have turned in desperation to military dictatorships. Of all sectors of the public bureaucracy, the military, by virtue of its mission, has more quickly discarded both the intuitive disposition of the masses and the . . . literary-generalist tradition of the civil bureaucracy.”

The third type of bureaucrat, one who confronts modern tasks with relevant skills—and without him neither military nor civilian politicians can succeed—is as scarce as the skilled farmer, the skilled worker, the skilled entrepreneur, and the skilled politician. The Middle East will not have enough of any of these for sometime to come, and it will not be able to enter the modern age until it has enough of them.9

As we have already seen, the army often becomes impatient

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8 Ibid., p. 287.
9 A knowledgeable account of the consequences of shortages of qualified personnel is Peter G. Franck’s “Economic Planner” in Social Forces in the Middle East, pp. 137-161.
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and intervenes. The military bureaucracy has a tradition of resisting, not merely by inaction, but by independent assertion against its rulers. Trained to initiate action, it is not hindered by respect for the traditional procedures of civilian institutions. Its prestige is often greater than that of civilian organizations because it is never as pliable and its leaders are never as anonymous as the civilian bureaucrats. Yet while military leaders, supported by their own military bureaucracy, may be able to organize a more rapid “take-off” into the modern age, they will be able to maintain momentum only if they build effective civilian institutions. In fact, if they are faithful to their slogans of national mobilization and reform, they will need to refashion a civil bureaucracy even sooner than the more conservative civilian regimes. There are substitutes for armies in civil government, but none for bureaucracies.

Recruiting Bureaucrats: Too Many and Too Few

The most remarkable fact about contemporary Middle Eastern bureaucracies is that they function as well as they do. Foreign or traditional rule ended in the majority of Middle Eastern states only after World War II. That day found most states with a bureaucracy inadequate both in size and skill for solving the problems of modernization. Morocco and Tunisia are only the most recent examples of the scope of the task involved in the “Moroccanization,” “Tunisification” (or earlier) the “Egyptianization” of a civil service.

In Morocco, for example, in 1955, a year before independence, 33,000 out of 51,000 civil servants in the central administration were Frenchmen, who had almost exclusive control of the higher positions. An additional 10,000 Frenchmen held posts in public corporations and utilities. Nationalist leaders themselves acknowledged that there were probably no more than 2,500-3,000 experienced Moroccans to take over the French-held posts. Yet by the end of 1958, 21,000 French civil servants had left the administration and 7,500 Frenchmen the public corporations and utilities. That a country 85 percent illiterate could build a cadre of civil servants quickly enough to maintain

\footnote{Ashford, Political Change in Morocco, pp. 118-124.}
and indeed expand governmental services, and at a time when all sectors of Moroccan life were equally short of skills, is an extraordinary accomplishment.

Similarly, in Tunisia, Frenchmen occupied 13,500 out of 18,400 civil service positions in 1955, the year before independence. By 1959 there were only 1,800 Frenchmen left, including 1,200 French school teachers, in a bureaucracy that had grown to 23,000. While Tunisia continues to suffer greatly from a shortage of experienced planners and experts, the change was made without a breakdown in vital services. And while civil service salaries and fringe benefits have been reduced for all ranks since independence, the integrity of the new civil service has been exceedingly high by any standards.

The distance between a scarcity of bureaucrats to a surplus is, however, surprisingly short. By 1947, for example, twenty-five years after Egypt became independent, about one-third of all Egyptians who had at least a primary school certificate were already employed by the government. Almost two-thirds of Egyptian higher civil servants recently interviewed said that they had entered the bureaucracy because there was limited opportunity elsewhere, had had inadequate funds to start their own business, or had regarded government as the only place of work for an educated person. To these might be added 23 percent who entered the civil service because it promised security, presumably in contrast to other employment. Those who found such security may now feel more insecure than ever. The number of opportunities outside the civil service has not grown in most countries of the Middle East; the number of men with skills similar or perhaps superior to those of civil service incumbents and with similar, but more pressing, economic frustrations has grown enormously. In the past, the threat of insecurity to the bureaucrat came only from above—from the intrigues of his masters. Now for the first time, there is a growing threat from below.

22 Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, p. 71.
23 For more detailed analysis of this point, see Chapter 4.
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The Changing Status of Bureaucrats

To the great illiterate majority of the Middle East's population, the civil servant, however lowly his rank, is a remarkable man. He can read and write, he makes more money than most, and he is in daily contact with the powerful. To his peers outside, he is an object of envy and criticism. But for the first time in Middle Eastern history, the bureaucracy no longer has a near monopoly of literacy and education but must make its actions acceptable to an ever-growing number of people who resemble bureaucrats in all but their frustration.

Middle Eastern bureaucrats are themselves becoming more concerned about their own status. They cannot, however, easily form a united front to defend themselves. The various ranks differ profoundly in outlook. It is symptomatic of this difference that when the Moslem call to prayer is sounded, the lower ranks rise to obey it, the higher ranks tend to stay at their desks. Their pay varies widely. In East Pakistan in 1958, for example, the lowest paid government employee (Class IV) earned about $200 a year; a probationer with a B.A. degree started at about $900 a year.

This pay scale, characteristic of most of the Middle East, places the average civil servant's earning far above the average per capita income in his country. Yet it usually also falls considerably short of providing him with the kind of life he knows members of his group can lead in the more developed countries. And since most of his ideas, attitudes, tastes, and skills are derived from these more fortunate lands, his deprivations hurt. A Pakistani professor can buy books, newspapers, travel to an occasional meeting, or he can get married. He cannot do both. More than half of a sample of higher ranking bureaucrats in Egypt declared that they could not live on their income, and 70 percent of them did in fact have outside incomes. The inflation that normally accompanies rapid economic development in these areas particularly affects the fixed incomes of civil ser-

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13 This distinction was observed in Egypt by Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, p. 13. In Pakistan by Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan," p. 301.
14 Berger, Bureaucracy and Society, p. 106.
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vants. Yet in an increasing number of Middle Eastern countries, it has recently also become dangerous to earn extra money by exploiting one's special powers or to accept bribes.15

The Middle Eastern bureaucrat no longer receives the kind of recompense that once placed him absolutely above his fellow men. He can no longer bask in the reflected glory of an absolute ruler. His skills are not as rare as they once were. Because of the tenure system, which has recently come to a few Middle Eastern countries, bureaucracies may be institutionally and in membership more stable than political parties, but the rapid change in political leadership tends to make bureaucrats more timid. Political purges have not yet come to an end.

The Role of Bureaucracy in the Modernization of the Middle East

The Middle Eastern bureaucrat remains vulnerable in his status and incomplete in his skills, but his role has never been as important in history as it is today. In the past, his task was to maintain an empire. Today it is to alter both society and the body politic. To fit himself for such work, he must simultaneously reform himself and his world.

To improve administrative procedures within the bureaucracy remains a dire necessity. Responsibilities are seldom clearly defined, data for effective planning and budgeting are often lacking, and in-service training is rare. But modernizing also demands a new range of values, imagination, and willingness to take risks. This is not an age for the conservation of routine and security. What role can bureaucrats play?

In the present Middle Eastern environment, conservative questions produce revolutionary answers: Whose interests would be served by the creation of a talented, honest, independent civil service? Obviously, the traditional elite of kings, landlords, and

15 In the United Arab Republic, a decree of June 17, 1958, obliges all civil servants to declare their own financial position and that of their wife and children, as of either January 1946 or the date of entry into service. During 1959, a number of important Egyptian officials, including the Minister of Waqf, the President of the Industrial Bank, and the Director of the Cairo Municipality, were compelled to resign on charges of corruption.
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trading bourgeoisie could survive such a bureaucracy no better than it did the emergence of modern armies. Such a new civil service can come into its own only with the achievement of political power by the new middle class. Sharing the latter’s interest in national mobilization and transformation because it is a very part of that class, its values make it a partisan of that class as well as its instrument of government.

This point must not be made in reverse. Present membership in the bureaucracy is no guarantee of such partisanship. In most countries, there are some whose values belong to an earlier age. There are careerists with no concerns but their personal survival. There are many, especially at higher levels, whose thinking is closer to Thomas Babington Macaulay’s than to Harold Laski’s: both Englishmen have had an enormous influence in the education of Middle Eastern officials. Even bureaucratic partisans of the new middle class may differ on the means and pace of transformation. Some of them, discouraged by the moral slackness and organizational inefficiencies in economic and non-economic realms of life, have pressed for broader interventions or withdrawn from government altogether.

In the transformation of society by revolution from the top, a willing bureaucracy may be asked to do what it is unable to accomplish— to take risks, to marshal public opinion, in short, to be politically enterprising. Yet in most of the Middle East, bureaucrats have no tenure of employment. Except in Turkey, the new middle class attained power only during the past decade,

10 Macaulay wrote: “We must...do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern: a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.” (Minute of February 2, 1835, text in H. Woodrow, Macaulay’s Minutes on Education in India Written in the Years, 1835, 1836, 1837, Calcutta, 1862, p. 115, cited by Brabanti, “The Civil Service of Pakistan,” p. 265.) Harold Laski, in such works as Authority in the Modern State, New Haven, Connecticut, 1927, and Liberty in the Modern States, London, 1930, obviously had a different class structure and political purpose in mind.

and in Iran its fortunes were reversed in 1953. In a number of countries the factional battles among members of the new middle class persist and are marked by coups and counter-coups. Political leaders, under constantly changing pressures, continue to fashion constitutions and laws that are meant to be only partly enforced or may be intended instead to impress, exhort, surround controversial issues with ambiguities, or by sheer pronouncement create an illusion of activity.

Before bureaucracies in the Middle East can play useful roles in the modernization of their society, there must be enterprising and enduring politicians. Only when politicians have taken the initiative and issued clear-cut directives can bureaucracies administer them in the general interest. Bureaucrats cannot substitute for politicians. Only when there is promise of an enduring regime is the bureaucracy likely to show the courage of proposing and criticizing measures appropriate to the direction established by politicians.