SPECIAL-PURPOSE PUBLIC POLICE

James S. Kakalik
and Sorrel Wildhorn

Prepared for the Department of Justice
This research was supported under Grant No. NI-70-057 by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the Department of Justice (authorizing legislation: The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). Views or conclusions contained in this study should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of The Rand Corporation, the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the Law Enforcement Administration, or the Department of Justice.
SPECIAL-PURPOSE PUBLIC POLICE

James S. Kakalik
and Sorrel Wildhorn

Prepared for the Department of Justice
FOREWORD

The principal investigators in this study were Sorrel Wildhorn (study director) and James S. Kakalik. Members of the Los Angeles law firm of Munger, Tolles, Hills, and Rickershauser conducted the analysis of the legal issues and contributed significantly to the suggested policy and statutory guidelines.

Inquiries concerning this report should be directed to Sorrel Wildhorn at The Rand Corporation.
PREFACE

This report is one of a series of five describing a 16-month study performed by The Rand Corporation under Grant NI-70-057 from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice.

The broad purposes of the study are essentially twofold. First, we seek to describe the nature and extent of the private police industry in the United States, its problems, its present regulation, and how the law impinges on it. And second, we have attempted to evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks to society of current private security and, as specifically requested by the NILECJ, to develop preliminary policy and statutory guidelines for improving its future operations and regulation. The results of the study are intended for use by the private police industry and by the governmental agencies that regulate it, as well as by the general public.

The five reports comprising the study are:

R-869-DOJ Private Police in the United States: Findings and Recommendations
This comprehensive summary report draws on information contained in R-870-DOJ, R-871-DOJ, and R-872-DOJ to develop the overall findings and recommendations of the study.

This descriptive report covers the nature, size, growth, and operation of the industry and its personnel. It also describes the results of a survey of private security employees.

R-871-DOJ Current Regulation of Private Police: Regulatory Agency Experience and Views
Licensing and regulation of the industry in every state and several cities is described. This report also includes extensive data on regulatory agency experience, complaints, disciplinary actions taken, and the views of 42 agencies on needed changes in regulation.

*Throughout this study we have used the term private police to include all privately employed guards, investigators, patrolmen, alarm and armored-car personnel, and any other personnel performing similar functions.
R-872-DOJ *The Law and Private Police*

This report discusses the law as it relates to the private police industry. It includes a general discussion of the sources of legal limitations upon private police activities and personnel and sources of legal powers, and an examination of specific legal problems raised by these activities and by the relationships between the users and providers of private security services. The legal doctrines governing particular security activities are evaluated and recommendations for improvement are offered.

R-873-DOJ *Special-Purpose Public Police*

Descriptive information is presented on certain types of public forces not having general law-enforcement responsibilities. These include reserve police, special-purpose federal forces, special local law-enforcement agencies, and campus police. These data provide a useful context for analyzing the role of private police.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are grateful for the cooperation of a variety of federal and local law-enforcement officials. They include Frederick A. Rody, Jr., Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs; Andrew C. Tartaglino, Assistant Director for Enforcement, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; Richard Millar, Assistant Director, Division of Fire Control, U.S. Forest Service; Carl Burrows, Assistant Commissioner for Investigation, and Joseph Staley, Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement, both of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Leon Green, Deputy Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service in charge of Law Enforcement; Keith Miller, Chief, Division of Park Operations, National Park Service; Charles A. Miller, Assistant Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal Service; Thomas Derdock, Chief, Federal Protective Service Division, General Services Administration; Daniel J. Daley, Chief, New York City Housing Authority Police Department; and Robert H. Rapp, Chief, New York City Transit Authority Police Department.

Seymour Gelber of the State Attorney's Office, Dade County, Florida, and John C. Marchant, President, International Association of College and University Security Directors, were very helpful in providing survey data on campus policing.

Sidney Epstein, Richard Laymon, and Lou Mayo of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, offered their cooperation and counsel.

Several Rand colleagues and consultants offered valuable counsel during the conduct of the study; these included K. A. Archibald, H. Averch, R. Danzig, P. W. Greenwood, B. W. Haydon, H. J. Kiesling, and R. S. Post. Rand colleagues F. C. Iklé, M. M. Lavin, and A. B. Moore reviewed and made valuable comments concerning earlier drafts of the final reports.
CONTENTS

FOREWORD ................................................................. iii

PREFACE ................................................................. v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................... vii

Chapter

I. A GUIDE TO THIS REPORT ........................................... 1

II. THE RESERVE POLICE .............................................. 4

III. PROFILES OF SELECTED FEDERAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES .... 10
    U.S. Bureau of Customs ........................................... 10
    U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ................. 12
    U.S. Forest Service .............................................. 14
    U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service .................. 15
    U.S. Internal Revenue Service .................................. 18
    U.S. National Park Service ..................................... 19
    U.S. Postal Service ............................................. 21
    U.S. General Services Administration ......................... 23

IV. SPECIAL-PURPOSE PUBLIC POLICE: TWO EXAMPLES ................. 26
    The New York City Housing Authority Police Department ... 26
    The New York City Transit Authority Police Department ... 28

V. CAMPUS SECURITY AND CAMPUS POLICING .......................... 30
    Introduction ...................................................... 30
    Sources and Limitations of Information ....................... 33
    Some Background Data .......................................... 36
    Legal Authority ................................................. 38
    Roles and Duties ............................................... 39
    Size of Security Unit ......................................... 40
    Use of Part-Timers, Students, and Women ...................... 40
    Age .................................................................. 41
    Educational Background ........................................ 41
    Wages and Fringe Benefits ...................................... 42
    Training ......................................................... 42
    Weapons and Equipment ......................................... 43
    Unionization ..................................................... 44
    Sources of Intelligence and Undercover Agents .............. 44
    Police Liaison .................................................. 45
    Campus Disorder Situations .................................... 46
    Attitudes Toward Campus Security Offices .................... 47
    Recommendations Made in Other Studies ....................... 49
    Needed Work ..................................................... 54

Appendix: GSA GUIDELINE SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONTRACT GUARDING
    SERVICES ......................................................... 57
I. A GUIDE TO THIS REPORT

In the other four reports of this study, we discuss various aspects of both private and public police with a view toward understanding the nature and extent of the private police, and toward developing guidelines for the operation and regulation of the private police industry. Aggregated data on employment, salaries, personnel characteristics, and roles of the public police are also presented in those volumes, where appropriate, so that the private police can be more readily understood in the context of public law enforcement.

To further help place private security forces in the broader context of all security and law-enforcement forces operating in the United States, we present in this report a discussion of several distinctly different classes of public law-enforcement organizations. One characteristic they all share is that of specialized public law enforcement, i.e., these organizations are not charged with general law enforcement in a city or county. They include local reserve police, the federal guard force, federal agencies charged with enforcing specific laws (e.g., customs, forestry, or narcotics laws), and federal, state, and local special-purpose law-enforcement forces such as campus, housing, park, and transit police. The organizations, like municipal or county public police, usually have higher wage scales and consequently higher-quality personnel than do the private police. Thus, they are another benchmark against which private police may be measured. We present available data on the functions, size, personnel standards, training, legal authority and responsibilities, workload, and problems of these special-purpose public police.

These specialized public forces are of particular relevance in understanding the private police in their proper context because the law-enforcement functions and powers of these specialized forces are generally restricted and because the private police and special-purpose public police sometimes function in similar situations. Two examples are building guards and campus security officers.

This report is largely descriptive; it incorporates all readily available aggregated data. Sources utilized include books, articles,
reports, and personal interviews with management personnel of many special public police organizations throughout the country. Although we traced information leads from these numerous sources, we were unable to uncover comprehensive data on the special-purpose public police. We do present data from a few surveys conducted by others, but we generally conclude that the best available remaining sources of information are the thousands of individual special-purpose public police forces themselves. This is not an area that has been well studied in the past. Recommendations with respect to special-purpose public police are not included here, since they are outside the scope of this study.

In Chapter II we discuss municipal public police reserve forces. The discussion is essentially descriptive, and it incorporates all readily available data. The principal sources are three surveys conducted between 1960 and 1969. Over this period, those volunteer reserve forces have been transformed from the older-style civil-defense force to a more highly qualified, highly trained, and active police-oriented force capable of supplementing the regular public police forces in time of need. The chapter also outlines the data needed to undertake analysis aimed at establishing guidelines for local public police reserve programs.

In Chapter III we present brief summary profiles of a sample of eight federal law-enforcement organizations. The eight selected forces vary markedly in size, functions, and legal authority or responsibility. However, all are markedly more professional than almost all private police forces. One of the organizations, the General Services Administration, provides in-house guard services and establishes guidelines for contract guards at most federal installations. Those guidelines appear as an appendix to this report. The law-enforcement officers in the other seven organizations have full police powers to enforce specific federal laws. The information in this chapter was gathered in personal interviews with officials in these agencies.

In Chapter IV we present brief profiles of two special local public police organizations: The New York City Transit Authority Police and the New York City Public Housing Authority Police. Police in both of these organizations have full peace-officer powers, although their primary
jurisdiction is in the subway or in and around housing projects of the Public Housing Authority. Their wages, personnel standards, and training are nearly identical to those of the New York City Police Department. These two police departments are representative of a class of special-purpose public police organizations at local, state, and suprastate levels. There are special local park police, harbor police, airport police, sanitation-department police, building-department police, port police (such as the suprastate police organization of the New York Port Authority), and so on. Some have full peace-officer powers in their limited jurisdictions; some have more limited powers. Since little data are available bearing on the nature and extent of such police departments, we cannot say how typical the two police departments are of this class of special-purpose public police organizations.

Chapter V presents a discussion of campus security and campus policing. Some campus police organizations are public police with full peace-officer powers, some are deputized private police, and some are purely private. The relative quality of the forces on various campuses varies markedly. Because campus unrest and campus security have assumed great importance of late, we have attempted to collect, synthesize, and appraise all of the readily available information on campus policing. Four surveys were located and are summarized. In addition, recommendations regarding campus police issues offered by a variety of sources are presented. Because these recommendations are generally subjective and not fully supported by available data, we do not endorse them. Rather, we discuss the data and types of analysis needed which might relate campus security to campus police policy variables and other relevant factors.
II. THE RESERVE POLICE

Reserve police forces, typically composed of volunteers who operate under the guidance and control of the regular public police organization, serve as an emergency reserve manpower pool for use in the event of civil or natural disaster. The reserves serve as a support or supplement to the regular police force during normal times, especially during peak demands for manpower, such as at shopping centers during the preholiday rush and at athletic events. Some departments utilize reserve policemen as the second man in a patrol car during busy periods. The reserve force also may serve in a public-relations role, or as a source of recruits for the regular force. Reserve forces sometimes supply specialized services not normally needed, such as mounted patrol or in an underwater search and rescue capacity.

To our knowledge, only meager information is available on the reserve public police in the United States. The best source is a survey conducted in 1969 by the Arlington County (Virginia) Police Department.* That department contacted police departments in all 57 U.S. cities with 1960 population of over 250,000. Of the 48 major city police departments that responded, 34 (or 71 percent) had a reserve police force. There were 10,415 reserve and 75,523 full-time regular officers in those 34 departments. The 75,523 regular officers represent 17 percent of all local regular police in the United States in 1969. On the average, the reserve forces were 14 percent as large as the regular force with which they were affiliated. The reserves averaged 14.2 hours of service per man per month and had served an average of 9.9 years. Of the 34 departments with reserve units, 22 (or 65 percent) granted the reserves police powers. Because reserve police in major city police departments may not be "typical" of all departments, the data above may not apply generally.

In addition to being available for use in emergency situations, reserves in 33 of the departments surveyed worked on routine patrol

assignments, usually under the direct supervision of a regular patrolman. Reserve units directed traffic in 97 percent of the cities and escorted prisoners in 21 of the cities. Reserves assisted in the Detective and Juvenile Divisions in only two cities, while only 18 percent of the departments routinely allowed two reserves to staff a patrol car without the presence of a regular officer. Most reserves were uniformed and equipped the same as a regular officer (except for badge and patch) and 65 percent were armed on duty.

All of the reserve units required classroom training, while 79 percent required some form of weapons training and qualification. Details of the amount and type of training were not elicited in the survey. Table 1 is a detailed presentation of data obtained in the survey. Those 14 responding major cities that had no reserve force in 1969 were Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, El Paso, Houston, Louisville, Miami, Oklahoma City, Omaha, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, and Toledo.

The more useful type of reserves are those that can function without direct supervision by a regular police officer. To develop the capability of reserves to function independently, it is not uncommon for them to receive 200 to 240 hours of initial training of the same type given regular officers. In contrast, regular officers may receive up to 600 hours of training. In an effort to select quality reserve personnel, careful screening of volunteers resulted in 67 percent of the applicants being disqualified in one city. All major city departments with reserves conducted local background checks on volunteers and 31 of the 34 conducted an FBI check.

Principal arguments against reserves include the "high" cost of recruiting, training, and supervising the volunteers; the difficulty in obtaining volunteers; the rarity of disasters when reserves would be needed; and the possibility a reserve policeman will not perform sufficiently well because of lack of training and experience. While each of these arguments has some validity, a careful screening and extensive training program should result in the effective use of the reserve men on assignments which truly assist and supplement the regular police forces. The worth of the meaningful tasks voluntarily performed
Table 1
1969 RESERVE POLICE SURVEY--ARLINGTON COUNTY (VIRGINIA) POLICE DEPARTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Profile of Reserves</th>
<th>Duties Performed</th>
<th>Other Assignments</th>
<th>Working Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full-time Regular Police Officers</td>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>Background Investigation</td>
<td>Duties on Patrol</td>
<td>Other Assignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>popup</td>
<td>Gd.</td>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron, Ohio</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arlington, Va.</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham, Ala.</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo, N.Y.</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlotte, N.C.</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland, Ohio</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, Ohio</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas, Tex.</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayton, Ohio</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver, Colo.</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit, Mich.</td>
<td>4,647</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth, Tex.</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu, Hawaii</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis, Ind.</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach, Ca.</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, Ca.</td>
<td>5,927</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis, Tenn.</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans, La.</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5476
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
<th>Profile of Reserve</th>
<th>Duties Performed</th>
<th>Working Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full-Time Regular Police Officers</td>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>Background Investigation</td>
<td>Types of Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, N.Y.</td>
<td>29,939</td>
<td>3,433</td>
<td>87 158 178</td>
<td>21 X X X 3 16 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark, N.J.</td>
<td>1,339</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>8 12 25</td>
<td>21 X X X 5 5 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland, Ca.</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1 2 6</td>
<td>21 X X X 2 16 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, Pa.</td>
<td>7,319</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>14 15 35</td>
<td>21 X X X 8 30 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix, Ariz.</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2 5 8</td>
<td>21 X X X 8 21 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland, Ore.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>8 12 21</td>
<td>21 X X X 3 8 4</td>
<td>X X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochester, N.Y.</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21 X X X 3 5 5 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento, Ca.</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21 X X X 5 40 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego, Ca.</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>3 7 26</td>
<td>21 X X X 5 20 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose, Ca.</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>5 5 20</td>
<td>21 X X X 2 10 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle, Wash.</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21 X X X 5 13 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis, Mo.</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>6 5 15</td>
<td>21 X X 3 18 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul, Minn.</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21 X X 15 8 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampa, Fla.</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2 4 4</td>
<td>21 X X 8 8 8 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1 27 71</td>
<td>21 X X 8 10 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wichita, Kan.</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6 6 12</td>
<td>21 X X 3 10 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table continues and contains more detailed information.
by reserves may outweigh the cost of the reserve program while at the same time providing a well-experienced reserve force. In addition, providing quality reserves with important assignments may aid in recruiting. The Arlington County Police Department survey of reserves found that "jurisdictions with most success with reserves, as seen by number of duty hours volunteered per man, appeared to be where the men were trained and used on routine patrol with regular men, even though these same departments imposed the strictest conditions for recruitment and training (both classroom and firing range) and maintained a set number of hours per week or month which the men must work."

Some historical trends are evident when 1969 data are compared with data gleaned from older surveys. In 1960 and 1965, surveys of 18 and 20 major departments were conducted by the Philadelphia and St. Louis Police Departments, respectively. In the ten years from 1960 through 1969, the orientation and control of reserves shifted from civil-defense agencies (53 percent control of reserves in 1960) to police departments. The routine use of reserves shifted from traffic control (only 5 of 20 departments routinely used reserves for tasks other than special-events traffic control in 1960) toward use in a variety of patrol assignments. The percentage of reserve forces granted arrest powers increased from 30 percent of all departments in 1960 to 65 percent in 1969. Recruiting standards for reserves also have been changed (in 1960 only 13 of 20 departments had conditions, such as accepting volunteers or not allowing the applicant to have had a police record, whereas all departments ran background checks in 1969). In short, both the quality and the effective use of reserves appear to be increasing over time.

Much is yet to be learned about reserve police. The available data pertain only to reserves affiliated with major city police departments. Smaller city, county, and rural reserve forces may be distinctly different in terms of organization, functions fulfilled, effectiveness, and so on. Details on the types and expensiveness of training given reserves are not readily available. Nor are details available on overall costs as well as recruiting and screening practices. Data are also unavailable on the degree of discretion given to, and exercised by, reserves as well as on the breakdown of the
time spent on various activities. The greatest lack of knowledge con-
cerning reserves has to do with how effective and useful various types
of reserve programs are, and with the extent of any possible disbenefits
generated by improper reserve police actions. If adequate knowledge of
the relationships between alternative reserve program structures (re-
cruiting, selection, training, powers, assignments, etc.) and their
effectiveness were available, and if similar knowledge were available
for the regular police, cost/benefit analysis would establish defini-
tive guidelines for reserve programs. In the absence of such knowledge,
we suggest that an extensive survey be undertaken to reach a larger and
more representative sample of police and sheriffs' departments to gather
those data readily available but omitted from the surveys cited. Such
a survey should include, at least, attitudinal information on effective-
ness of reserves as viewed by the regular police, since objective quan-
titative effectiveness data are almost surely unavailable. The survey
should also attempt to uncover particularly effective recruitment and
selection programs, so that such successful methods may be widely dis-
seminated and applied.
III. PROFILES OF SELECTED FEDERAL LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

To help place private security forces in the broader context of all security and law-enforcement forces operating in the United States, we present in this chapter brief summary profiles of eight federal law-enforcement forces. The eight selected forces vary markedly in size, function, and legal authority. Agencies with broader functions and responsibilities, such as the FBI, have been excluded in favor of agencies with more limited functions and responsibilities. We have included law-enforcement personnel of the U.S. Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Forest Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Internal Revenue Service, National Park Service, Postal Service, and General Services Administration. The latter provides guard services and establishes standards for contract guards at most, but not all, federal installations.

In the profiles, we summarize the functions, size, and legal powers of the law-enforcement force; personnel standards and screening policies; training and retraining programs; complaints against the force; and data on law-enforcement activities if available. The GSA guideline specifications for federal contract guard services are reproduced in the Appendix.

U.S. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS*

The functions of the Bureau of Customs are (1) to assess and collect duties and taxes on imported merchandise; (2) to control carriers and merchandise imported into or exported from the United States; and (3) to combat smuggling and customs revenue frauds. The Bureau is decentralized and most of its personnel are stationed throughout the country, but especially at the 289 ports of entry.

In 1970, the Bureau employed 900 plainclothes Customs Agents and 500 uniformed Customs Enforcement Officers. Turnover rates are less than 5 percent. The Agents' and Enforcement Officers' roles are to detect and seize drugs and contraband, to conduct investigations, to guard and secure customs storage areas, and to make sure that all goods and people entering the country pass through Customs Inspection. The Bureau works closely with other federal law-enforcement agents such as those of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Customs Inspectors and Agents have been given special powers* of entry, search and seizure, and arrest, to enable them to enforce the customs laws and regulations. They are permitted to board common carriers and search both property and people. Further, they may use all necessary force to compel the entry and search. Their search powers are the broadest granted to any law-enforcement personnel in the United States. Probable cause is not needed to justify a search and seizure near a border or port of entry. Probable cause, but not a warrant, is needed to conduct a search in the interior of the United States.

Customs Enforcement Officers start at Civil Service level GS-5 and go up to GS-9. High-school education and a National Agency background check are required. Customs Special Agents start at the GS-7 level and work up to GS-11 after 2 years if they pass the 1-year probationary period. Agents must pass a full field background investigation. Agents are required to have a college degree in law, police science, or accounting, or an equivalent amount of experience (9 months education is equivalent to 1 year experience).

Agents receive 7 weeks of basic law-enforcement training at the Treasury Agent's School, where the IRS and Secret Service also send their agents. The Customs Agents then receive an additional 4 weeks training at the Basic Customs Agent School. Weapons retraining is given every 3 months.

The Bureau employs one supervisor for each 7 or 8 employees and feels that the span of control should not exceed 10.

*Refer to 19 U.S.C. 482, 1461, 1581, 1582 for details.
In many court cases, the defense lawyer for alleged customs law violators will challenge the legality of the search conducted by Customs Agents. Those challenges are usually not successful. Suits against Customs Agents are very infrequent. In December 1970, only 1 was pending (for alleged excessive use of force).

The Agents conducted 32,000 investigations in 1969, resulting in 7,400 arrests.

**U.S. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS**

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) was established to help control the illicit use of narcotics and dangerous drugs through law enforcement, education, training, and research. It is responsible for enforcement of the laws and statutes relating to narcotic drugs, marijuana, depressants, stimulants, and the hallucinogenic drugs. Two of its objectives are to reach the highest level of sources of supply and to apprehend the greatest quantity of illicit drugs before they reach the street. To pursue these objectives, the Bureau stations agents along routes of illicit traffic both in the United States and in foreign countries. In addition, the Bureau regulates the legal trade in narcotic drugs.

The Bureau also provides federal, state, local, and foreign law-enforcement officers with specialized training in narcotic and dangerous-drug control. These training programs include 2 weeks of classes, lectures, and/or films, as appropriate. The 2-week training programs were attended by over 12,000 persons in FY 1969.

The Bureau's Special Agents have full police powers (similar to those granted FBI Agents) to enforce all federal statutes anywhere in the United States.

In 1970, 918 of the 1,530 BNDD employees were Special Agents. Approximately 5 percent of the employees are engaged in education and training activities. The Bureau operates from 16 regional offices, with 6 to 12 of the Special Agents under one supervisor in an "enforcement" group.

To qualify for employment, applicants must have a Bachelor's degree or 3 years of relevant experience or an equivalent combination of education and experience. They must also possess appropriate grades on the Federal Service Entrance Exam or the Graduate Record Exam and have good university grades or additional education and/or experience. Applicants are also given an oral exam. The Bureau would like to give written psychological tests but has been unable to find such a test that is acceptable to them. Applicants undergo a full field background investigation. A felony conviction means rejection, and arrest records are scrutinized carefully. The minimum age is 21 and rigid physical standards are established. Special Agents begin at the Civil Service GS-7 level and normally progress to GS-12 at the end of 3 years. Standard fringe benefits include 13 days of sick leave and 13 to 26 days of vacation per year, plus paid medical and life insurance. The annual turnover rate is 8.8 percent.

Special Agents undergo a formal 12-week training program that includes instruction in self-defense, use of firearms, laws, court procedures, criminology, investigative techniques, and drug and narcotics investigation. Example training times are 83 hours on firearms; 8 hours on surveillance techniques; 8 hours on interrogation; and 52 hours on basic legal training. Refresher training is given annually. Supervisors as well as Special Agents each receive 2 weeks of retraining per year. Firearms retraining is given every 3 months.

There were approximately 150 complaints against Special Agents for improper actions in FY 1970, of which 6 were said to be justified. A very small percentage of the Agents succumb to bribery attempts to which they are reportedly "constantly subjected." The Special Agents are reported to be more "timid" in their actions than they used to be.
More care is taken because of growing civil-rights consciousness on the part of the public. Only one or two assault suits are filed against Special Agents in a typical year.

The Bureau initiated 10,535 criminal investigations resulting in the arrest of 3,978 persons during FY 1969. The narcotics cases presented in federal court resulted in a 97 percent conviction rate. During the same year, the Bureau closed 53 clandestine illicit laboratories where dangerous drugs were produced.

U.S. FOREST SERVICE

The Rangers' functions relate primarily to the forest rather than to law enforcement. Their main responsibilities are fire control, timber and range management, and recreation management. The small amount of investigative and law-enforcement work performed by members of the Forest Service is related primarily to the fire-control function. They usually do not attempt to enforce hunting and fishing regulations. In 1970, the U.S. Forest Service employed over 800 Rangers and 3,200 Ranger Assistants. Only 60 employees are primarily investigators.

Forest Service personnel have the authority to enforce federal forest-related laws and regulations. Typical violations involve theft or damage of trees, setting fires, or failure to have spark arrestors on motor vehicles. Infrequently, an employee will engage in "hot pursuit" of an offender onto non-federal land. In general, when off federal land or dealing with a violation that is not forest-related, the personnel have only the powers of a private citizen. Only a few men are deputized as state game wardens or state fire wardens. When a violation of a state or local law is observed, the usual action taken is to call for the state or local law-enforcement personnel. In managing federal recreation areas and campgrounds, the


**Refer to 16 U.S.C. 559 for details.
Rangers will arrest if federal property is destroyed. However, if rowdy visitors refuse to behave in an acceptable manner, or if drug abuse is noted, the matter is handled by calling in law-enforcement personnel of other agencies. Data on total arrests, summons, or referrals to other law-enforcement agencies are not maintained nationally.

The Forest Service employees receive no regular initial training in law enforcement. Recently 60 employees participated in a 2-week investigation training program, but this program is not conducted regularly. Most employees receive a 1-week course in law-enforcement once or twice during their careers with the Forest Service. Investigators are armed, whereas Rangers are not. There are informal firearms training programs in certain of the Forest Regions. Retraining is not given regularly.

The Special Investigators and Rangers are of Civil Service level GS-11 or 12. Assistant Rangers are GS-9, 10, or 11. Investigators typically have previous experience with the public police or FBI, or as Rangers. Rangers are promoted from the rank of Ranger Assistant and are almost always college graduates in forestry. Personnel are very career oriented with turnover mainly due to retirement. The average age is approximately 35 years. Before hiring a new man, an extensive background check is conducted, including contacting his neighbors of the previous 10 years. Arrests or several traffic violations will usually disqualify a man from consideration.

Complaints of illegal acts by Forestry Service personnel on the job are very rare. No convictions have been reported to the national headquarters in at least 4 years.

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE*

immigration laws. Activities include patrolling the 8,000 miles of U.S. border, inspection of aliens seeking to enter the United States, and adjudication of the immigration status of persons. In addition, Border Patrol Agents are designated as Customs Patrol Agents and furnish general assistance to the Customs Service in preventing the illegal importation of contraband.

Definition and designation of immigration officers are provided by statute and regulation. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provides that "...any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant..."

To interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States;

To arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United States in violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admission, exclusion or expulsion of aliens;

To arrest any alien in the United States if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation, and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest;

To make arrests for felonies which have been committed and which are cognizable under any law of the United States regulating the admission, exclusion or expulsion of aliens if he has reason to believe that the person so arrested is guilty of such felony and if there is likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest;

Within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance or vehicle;

Within a distance of twenty-five miles from any external boundary, to have access to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.

Additional authority to board and search conveyances is contained in Section 235 of the Act, which states: "Immigration officers are hereby authorized and empowered to board and search any vessel, aircraft,
railway car, or other conveyance, or vehicle in which they believe aliens are being brought into the United States." By their designation as Customs Patrol Inspectors in 1955, members of the Border Patrol acquired certain authority, under 19 U.S.C. 1581, relating to search, seizure, and arrest in connection with violations of import and export laws.

The INS employed 1,500 Border Patrol Agents and 750 Immigration Investigators in 1970. There are approximately 8 men under each first-line supervisor. On border patrol, the supervisor spends 1 day a week working directly with the Agent. Investigators (GS-9 through 12) come from the ranks of the Agents (GS-7 through 9). The average starting age is 28, with an annual salary of $8,098. New employees generally have some law-enforcement background. Over 25 percent of new employees have college degrees. The average length of experience at INS is approximately 10 years, with turnover of less than 5 percent per year. Candidates for employment are given both written and oral examinations. An extensive background check is conducted, and a prior arrest or conviction record may rule out the applicant.

Border Patrol Agents receive 14 weeks of initial training, of which 5 weeks include training in the Spanish language. During the first year's work, employment is probationary, and examinations are given at the end of 5 1/2 months and 10 months. Supervisory personnel go through an additional 88-hour training program. In addition, all personnel meet in groups once each 2 weeks to discuss training, policy, or current problems. The total fraction of employment time spent on training is 5 or 6 percent. Three weeks of retraining are given every 2 or 3 years. Firearms qualifications are conducted every 3 months.

In FY 1969, the Service made 231,000,000 inspections of aliens and citizens, admitted 3,645,000 non-immigrant aliens, denied entry to 263,000 aliens, located 284,000 deportable aliens, and gave 359,000 aliens status as lawful permanent residents of the United States. The number of justified complaints against Agents and Investigators was said to be in the "tens" during a typical year, with the most common improper action being the use of excessive force. Only one INS employee was convicted during 1970. The offense was extortion.
U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

The IRS has three law-enforcement forces. Approximately 1,800 Intelligence Special Agents investigate tax fraud, including failure to file tax returns and evasion of income, wagering, and other federal taxes. Nearly 400 Internal Security Inspectors investigate prospective IRS employees and allegations concerning serious misconduct or illegal activities involving IRS employees. In addition, approximately 1,300 Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) Special Investigators are responsible for the investigation, detection, and prevention of violations of the liquor, tobacco, and firearms laws. The ATF Special Investigators not only enforce the tax-related laws but have regulatory functions for the legal liquor and tobacco industry, attempt to eliminate "moonshining," and enforce federal laws relating to the sale, transfer, manufacture, importation, and possession of firearms and explosives.

Internal Revenue Service law-enforcement personnel have special police powers not possessed by other citizens only with regard to the various federal tax, liquor, tobacco, and firearms laws. While they have no special authority to enforce related state and local laws, they assist and cooperate closely with state and local law-enforcement personnel. For example, information on 9,375 violations was transmitted to other law-enforcement agencies in 1969.

As background, IRS law-enforcement personnel entering at the GS-5 level are required to have a Bachelor's degree or 3 years of law-enforcement experience or an equivalent mixture of education and experience. To qualify for GS-7 entrance, they must have upper-third standing in their college class, a 2.9 to 4.0 grade average, honorary scholastic society membership, or a score of 600 or better on the Graduate Record Exam. Appropriate graduate degrees or additional experience also may

qualify a person for entrance at the GS-7 level. Education is preferred over experience because former police investigators were said to have "preconceived notions." Employees may progress to the GS-12 level.

Applicants must pass both a written exam and an oral interview. While the IRS does not preclude hiring enforcement personnel with an arrest record, very few personnel have one. A juvenile misdemeanor arrest may be overlooked. Convicted felons are not hired. In addition to the National Agency Checks conducted by the Civil Service, the IRS runs its own very detailed applicant background investigation.

Internal Revenue Service law-enforcement personnel receive $6.5$ weeks of training at the Treasury Law Enforcement School (which will serve as the nucleus for the new Consolidated Federal Law Enforcement Training Center). In addition, Intelligence Special Agents receive another $12$ weeks of basic training, while ATF Investigators and Internal Security Inspectors receive another $9$ weeks of training. There is currently no routine retraining, with the exception of firearms qualification, which is conducted every $6$ months. On-the-job training and seminars are also given. The ATF personnel do not work on a case alone for the first $2.5$ years. The typical supervisor is in charge of $12$ to $15$ men.

Complaints against ATF Investigators number 20 to 30 a year, with 1 or 2 requiring action to be taken against the employee. In a typical year, no complaint will result in court action.

In FY 1970, IRS law-enforcement personnel conducted 8,100 tax-fraud and special investigations, 22,700 ATF enforcement inspections, and 2,261,000 firearms application and compliance investigations; completed 4,900 illicit liquor cases; and completed 3,000 firearms operations cases.

U.S. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE* 

The National Park Service (NPS), of the U.S. Department of the 

Interior promotes and regulates the use of national parks, monuments, historic sites, and recreation areas.

Of the approximately 1,100 NPS personnel with law-enforcement responsibilities in 1970, 400 were Park Police with full police powers in the District of Columbia. The Park Police also operate in nearby Virginia and Maryland parks. Outside the Washington, D.C., area, the Park Rangers have varied legal authority depending on whether the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over the park, jurisdiction concurrent with the state in which the park is located, or only partial jurisdiction. In the former case, the Rangers have the authority to enforce all federal laws and regulations in the park, whereas in the latter, the Rangers have only the legal power of a private citizen, except with respect to enforcing park rules. In many cases the Rangers are deputized as local or state law-enforcement officers and participate in mutual-aid pacts with other law-enforcement agencies. Rangers typically spend only 20 percent of their time on law enforcement and the remainder on park management, search and rescue, and visitor assistance.

Park Rangers begin at Civil Service level GS-7 and progress to GS-13. A college degree or 3 years of park experience is required. A National Agency background check and a separate Park Service background check are run, and any convictions will usually rule out an applicant. Seasonal employees are checked as extensively as permanent staff. The personal fringe benefits offered amount to 9 percent of base salary for permanent employees and 5 percent for seasonal personnel.

Park Rangers receive 16 weeks of initial formal training, with 80 hours of retraining each 2 years. In addition, each Ranger receives on-the-job training. Park Police receive 13 weeks of formal training initially. Firearms retraining of ½ to 1 day in length is given every 6 months. Permanent career personnel (turnover is less than 10 percent annually) were supplemented by approximately 1,400 temporary Park Rangers during seasonal peaks in park usage. These temporary employees receive 40 hours of training, which was described as "not enough"; however, only limited time and funds are available for training. To compensate for the lack of training, temporary employees work under the very tight control of permanent Park Rangers.
During calendar year 1969, the Park Rangers reported 4,117 major Part I crimes, of which 11 percent were cleared by arrest or other action; 37,855 Part II offenses, including 20,352 traffic violations; and 13,781 Part II violations. The Park Police reported an additional 1,368 Part I offenses, 4,798 Part II offenses, 394 Part I arrests, 1,821 Part II arrests, 57,950 traffic citations, and 17,000 service calls. A total of 23,000,000 people visited U.S. parks in 1969.

No Park Ranger has ever been convicted for assault, false arrest, or similar improper actions. However, one case is pending involving the killing of a camper by a seasonal employee when his gun discharged accidentally. Approximately 10 serious complaints per year are received regarding seasonal employees, and typically none regarding permanent Rangers. The difference in complaints was attributed to better training and experience of permanent employees.

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE*

The investigative arm of the U.S. Postal Service is the oldest federal law-enforcement agency. Postal Inspectors' duties include (1) criminal investigations related to all types of postal offenses (60 percent of effort) and (2) postal service investigations to determine whether postal revenues are being properly protected, and whether the Postal Service is operating in conformance with the postal laws and regulations and in the best interests of the public (40 percent of effort). The Postal Inspectors office employed 1,370 Inspectors (130 in a supervisory capacity) and 609 support personnel on a budget of $38 million in FY 1971.

Public Law 90-560, enacted October 12, 1968, authorizes Postal Inspectors to serve warrants and subpoenas and to make arrests for

felonies cognizable under the laws of the United States. These powers are restricted to the enforcement of laws regarding property of the United States in the custody of the Postal Service, the illegal use of the mail, and other postal offenses. The powers are valid even if the Inspector is not physically on U.S. Postal Service property.

Three years of prior experience as an investigator are required unless the candidate has a Bachelor's degree. Employees with a Bachelor's degree and little or no investigative experience begin at Civil Service level PFS-8. Those with 3 years or more of investigative experience qualify for PFS-10. Inspectors are typically career employees and earn between $10,000 and $27,000 per year. All candidates must pass both a written examination and an oral interview. Psychological tests are administered. Minimum age (21) and physical standards are established. The background checks on a prospective employee include the police, neighbors, spouse, former employers, and personal references. Convictions for other than traffic offenses will lead to rejection, as will certain types of arrests.

All Postal Inspectors receive 12 weeks of initial training at the Inspection Service Training Facility in Bethesda, Maryland. Over half the initial training is on basic law-enforcement topics. This is followed by a structured on-the-job training program of from 18 to 42 months duration, depending on prior experience and learning progress. Personnel report directly to the "training counselor" in their division for their first 6 months on the job. Inspectors receive a 1-week refresher course every 2 years, and firearms retraining every 6 months.

During FY 1969, the Postal Inspectors reported the following crime-related activity: 15,150 arrests; 11,472 convictions, of which approximately 5,000 were convictions for theft from private letter boxes; 1,929 post-office burglaries; 131 holdups; 1,305 assaults and threats; 194,052 mail-fraud complaints; and 234,072 obscene- and prohibited-mail complaints.

The majority of complaints against Postal Inspectors are for illegal search. Hundreds of cases in 1970 included a defense motion for suppression of evidence gathered by the Postal Inspectors on the grounds of an illegal search. However, in less than 20 such cases were these
successful. In 1970, no suits against Postal Inspectors were successful, although one or two multimillion-dollar suits had been filed charging harassment and intimidation of witnesses. No cases of false arrest arose in 1970.

In April 1971, the Postal Service announced that it is creating an additional security force to attack the problem of theft of valuables from the mails and to protect personnel and property at over 100 major buildings under Postal Service jurisdiction. The force is expected to number approximately 1,100 by the end of 1971 and 5,000 by 1975. It will be under the control of the Chief Postal Inspector. Some of the reasons for creating the new force are to respond to increasing crime (burglaries of post offices doubled in the past decade), increased threats of bombings, and the increased value of mail shipments. Members of this new force are expected to have prior civilian or military police service.

U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION*

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) is charged with managing, operating, maintaining, and protecting federal buildings and related real and personal property. In 1970, the Physical Protection Branch of GSA employed 3,400 federal guards and 526 private contract guards to protect personnel and property in some 10,000 federally owned or rented buildings. In January 1971, GSA reorganized the Physical Protection Branch and created the Federal Protective Service Division. An additional 1,600 protective personnel were hired and trained, to bring the total force to approximately 5,000 personnel. All personnel recruited in the program are classified in the police series GS-083, Federal Protective Officer. Guards already on board are being given the opportunity to be reclassified in the GS-083 police series if they meet the established

mental and physical requirements. If a guard cannot meet the requirements, he will remain on board in the GS-085 guard series.

Private guards on contract to GSA are used to protect some federal buildings when it is in the best interest of the government and when more protection is needed than can be provided by Federal Protective Officers, since there are ceilings on the number that may be employed. The present contract guard specifications (see the Appendix) are being revised to upgrade the criteria for private guards to those of the Federal Protective Officer. These specifications are presently under review and a final determination is expected in the near future. In June 1970, GSA had 61 contracts in effect with private security corporations, with an estimated annual cost of $2.7 million.

The primary responsibility of a Federal Protective Officer is to protect life and property. All Federal Protective Officers are armed but may not take their weapons home. Eight percent of the force are supervisors (approximately 12 Federal Protective Officers per supervisor). The GSA Guard Manual is displayed in Appendix B of R-870-DOJ.* It outlines many of the operating procedures and regulations to be followed by the Federal Protective Officers. Supplemental instructions have been issued to the field, which update the Guard Manual. Issuance of a revised manual is proposed for the near future.

GSA Federal Protective Officers have the same powers of arrest as sheriffs or constables while on federal property under GSA control. The jurisdiction and policing powers are currently restricted to federal property; however, legislation has been proposed which would extend their authority to all space under GSA control. The GSA guards have only the powers and authority of a private citizen.

Training of Federal Protective Officers is being conducted at five newly established training academies. Federal Protective Officers receive a 4-week, 160-hour basic training course. Some of the subjects taught during the basic course include bomb search and reconnaissance, first aid, arrest procedures, laws of arrest, firearms training, and self-defense tactics. Upon graduation, each officer begins an on-the-job training period. In addition, each officer will attend an annual refresher course. Special courses for supervisory personnel and

* See Preface, p. v.
special-events cadre men are being programmed for the training centers. Details of the basic training course are presented in Chapter VIII of R-870-DOJ.

The Civil Service Commission has rated the Federal Protective Officer in the GS-083 police series. Each Federal Protective Officer candidate must successfully pass a written Civil Service test and the 4-week training course, undergo an oral interview or supervisory appraisal, and withstand a full field background investigation. The estimated average Federal Protective Officer's age is 34. The turnover rate for the previous guard force was 21 to 25 percent annually. Turnover data for the new Federal Protective Officer are not yet available.

The starting pay for Federal Protective Officers is $6,202 per year except in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, where a special starting pay of $7,444 has been authorized. Fringe benefits are 27 percent of basic salary and include uniforms, retirement after 30 years service at age 55, minimum of $10,000 life insurance, medical insurance, and 13 to 25 days vacation per year, depending on length of service. Administrative and supervisory costs are 8.5 percent, and supplies are 1 percent of basic salaries.

No Federal Protective Officers have been involved in lawsuits because of actions on the job; 4 complaints against guards reached Washington during 1970. However, each region is responsible for its own discipline, and complaints are not normally forwarded to Washington.

During calendar year 1970, there were 836 demonstrations, 776 bomb threats, and 37 actual or attempted bombings of property under GSA control. Data on crimes and arrest are not tabulated. Through the first 6 months of 1971, 509 demonstrations, 413 bomb threats, and 18 actual or attempted bombings were reported.
IV. SPECIAL-PURPOSE PUBLIC POLICE: TWO EXAMPLES

THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT*

The New York City Housing Authority provides security at 171 public housing complexes within the city. The 1,550 men in the Housing Authority Police Department (HAPD) have full police powers to enforce laws anywhere in New York City, but they function primarily in public housing projects. The HAPD operates on an annual budget of over $25 million to provide security services to the more than 600,000 New York City public housing residents. The HAPD is one of four major public police forces operating in the city. The other three are the New York City Police, the New York Port Authority Police, and the New York Transit Authority Police. To supplement the regular New York City Police Department (NYPD), the three special-purpose public police departments were created when the need for large police forces to secure specific types of locations became apparent. The existence of a special public housing police department was partially due, apparently, to a strong tenants' association that made residents more aware of crime and effectively coordinated the tenants' demands for added police services. Chief Daley of the HAPD opined that public housing tenants "get more public services than other citizens" because private neighborhood residents are not as organized as public housing tenants and cannot focus their demands as sharply on a single public agency.

The HAPD started in 1952 as a force of 60 guards. In 1956, they were granted peace-officer status. The Housing Police patrol the grounds, cellars, roofs, stairwells, and elevators of the public housing projects. All officers are equipped with walkie-talkies, but only supervisors have motor vehicles. Men are assigned to housing projects, based on crime patterns. A typical project might have one man on the 2 a.m. to 8 a.m. shift, two men on the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift, and six men on the evening shift.

In addition to enforcing city statutes, the Housing Authority Police enforce housing rules by sending "Incident Reports" to the

*Information obtained in a December 1970 interview with Chief Daniel J. Daley, New York City Housing Authority Police Department.
Housing Authority for action. In 1969, 81,000 incident reports were prepared. Total Housing Authority crimes in 1969 were 1,886 felonies, 2,800 misdemeanors, and 1,052 violations.

Personnel standards at the HAPD and the NYPD are the same; applicants for both forces must pass the same screening test; and officers of both forces receive the same 16-week training curriculum. Top management of the current Housing Authority Force are retired NYPD officers. There is close cooperation between the Housing Authority and NYC Police, with the City Police Department providing records, booking, laboratory, and detention services for both police forces. The Housing Police conduct investigations of all crimes and disturbances on property within the jurisdiction of the Housing Authority but may call on the City Police for assistance if the situation warrants. However, tenants often call the NYPD directly, rather than the HAPD, when needed.

Entering HAPD personnel are typically between 21 and 29 years of age with a high-school education, one or two previous jobs, and non-law-enforcement military experience. Starting wages are $9,000 to $11,000 per year, so the HAPD competes with the NYPD for recruits. A felony conviction automatically causes rejection of an applicant, but an arrest or a misdemeanor conviction may not. Employee turnover was less than 4 percent in 1969.

Complaints against the Housing Authority Police number about 100 per year, including complaints about off-duty actions of the officers. Most complaints are of a relatively minor nature, such as an officer's rudeness. In December 1970, 5 men were under suspension because of pending criminal charges. Indictments of officers number less than 10 per year.

Tenants in some of the public housing projects supplement their police protection by organizing "tenant patrols." The tenants do not patrol but, rather, sit at a desk in the building lobby, question strangers about their destination in the building, maintain a "sign in" book for all visitors, and call the Housing Police if trouble brews. On rare occasions, the "tenant patrols" cause problems by hassling and insulting visitors who refuse to state their business. In general,
however, the Housing Police view the tenant patrols as a welcome added security force.

THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY POLICE DEPARTMENT*

The Transit Authority Police Department (TAPD) provides security services for the NYC Transit System, which contains 483 subway stations. They patrol these stations, ride every one of the more than 300 trains that run between 8 p.m. and 4 a.m., and ride many others between 4 a.m. and 8 p.m. The 3,179 employees in the TAPD have full police powers to enforce all city and state laws anywhere in New York City; their powers are not limited to Transit Authority property and "hot pursuit" situations. The Department operates on an annual budget of over $60 million. Fringe benefits and equipment represent 25 percent and 0.5 percent of the total, respectively.

The Department is one of four major police forces operating in the City. The other three are the New York City Police, the New York Port Authority Police, and the New York Housing Authority Police. The TAPD supplements the regular NYC Police. It was created to serve the specialized law-enforcement needs of the transit system when they became apparent. The Transit Police need and receive specialized training. Perhaps a significant factor in the establishment of a separate Transit Police Department in 1936 was that its employees originally received considerably lower wages than did regular City policemen. However, since 1953, employees of both departments have received the same pay.

The City and Transit Police cooperate closely. If an incident occurs where the Transit Police cannot reach the scene rapidly, the City Police are called to respond. The NYPD furnishes records and jail services for the TAPD and will send men to assist in the case of an emergency, such as a breakdown in the transit system. Transit Police will take action if they witness a crime occurring off Transit Authority property and always notify the City Police of all stakeouts.

There are approximately 200 transit patrolmen on duty round the

*Information obtained in a December 1970 interview with Chief Robert H. Rapp, New York City Transit Authority Police Department.
clock, with an additional 700 men on duty between 9 p.m. and 4 a.m. Patrolmen usually work alone but have walkie-talkies for communication via underground antennas. They are expected to call in once per hour. On the average, there are 12.7 patrolmen to 1 sergeant. A motor patrol unit of 20 two-man cars is also on duty round the clock to patrol stations. A special Public Safety Squad within the 233-man detective force handles juvenile problems. That squad is fully deployed in subway stations between 2 p.m. and 5 p.m., when juvenile after-school traffic and juvenile-perpetrated crimes are highest.

Principal problems, in addition to juveniles' behavior, are assaults of passengers, robbery of passengers and change booths, and tramps. Total crimes reported in 1969 numbered 8,713; 2,450 of these were felonies, 4,585 were misdemeanors, and 1,678 were violations. Suspects were immediately arrested in 725 of the felony cases, 3,642 of the misdemeanor cases, and 1,479 of the violation cases. Total arrests numbered 8,670 in 1969. In addition, 28,090 summonses were issued.

In 1969, there were 255 civilian complaints against Transit Police personnel. Of these, 228 were said to be unfounded.

Personnel standards, pay, and fringe benefits are approximately the same for both the City and Transit Police forces. The entrance exams for the two departments have 80 percent of the questions in common. Of total Transit Police personnel, 1.2 percent have prior private security experience and 71 percent have prior military experience. Of the 86 employees that resigned in 1970, none left to join the private security industry.

Initial training is 14 weeks at a special TAPD academy staffed by FBI-trained instructors. Refresher training programs are given periodically.
V. CAMPUS SECURITY AND CAMPUS POLICING

INTRODUCTION

As the Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest observed:

Many universities today have the attributes and managerial problems of civil communities. They are the scene of growing numbers of demonstrations and of an increasing rate and variety of crime. In addition, more nonstudents are present on these campuses than ever before.

Implicit in these observations are several measures of campus security: the frequency and severity of campus demonstrations or disorders and the frequency and seriousness of reported crimes occurring on campus. These are probably good measures of campus security, but we would add at least another—namely, the perceptions of campus security held by the major groups (students, faculty, and administration). But however one measures campus security, a central issue raised in this chapter is the extent to which policies, efficiency, and effectiveness of campus police influence campus security.

One suspects that variables exogenous to campus policing can affect campus security. For example, does size of student body make a difference? Campus setting (rural, suburban, urban)? Crime levels in the surrounding community? The capability of the local (outside) public police force and the quality of its relations with the institution? The degree to which the student body commutes to, or resides on, campus?

Few suggest that a single "model" campus police organization is appropriate to all campuses. But to what extent does the nature, extent, and depth of recruit training make a difference? In-service training? Size of campus police force? Symbols of authority (firearms, nonlethal weapons, military-like attire)? Legal authority (peace-officer or non-peace-officer status)? Background and experience of campus police? Wages? Education? Relations with students, faculty, and

administration? Background and quality of the campus police chief? And so on.

In order to relate campus police variables and other exogenous variables to measures of campus security, relevant, accurate data must be obtained from a carefully selected sample of colleges and universities. Then it would be possible to conduct a multivariate statistical analysis to test several alternative models which hypothesize the relations among measures of campus security, campus police variables, and other exogenous variables. Depending on availability, the analyses could use cross-sectional data, or data over time, or both. Some of the data would have to come from attitudinal surveys. If the analyses were successful in explaining the effects of campus police variables on measures of campus security, a more objective basis would exist for making concrete policy recommendations for improving campus policing, and thus improving campus security.

However, such is not the case. The available data are fragmentary, at best. Many data have been collected from a biased sample of institutions of higher learning. (The reader, however, should note that by comparison, the quantity of data available on campus security and campus police is superior to the data available on other subareas of special-purpose public or private police. For example, more data are available about campus police than about retail-store detectives, industrial guards, guards at government installations, armored-car guards, airport police, and so on.) But the paucity of reliable data does not seem to have deterred interested observers from offering objectively unsupported recommendations for improving campus policing. And given the paucity of data, such recommendations are often conflicting.

Most observers seem to work with common, though implicit, hypotheses—that campus crime and student unrest are on the increase, that campus police significantly affect campus security, and that campus police need upgrading in terms of numbers, training, education, efficiency, and effectiveness.

The intent of this discussion is twofold. First, we synthesize and summarize the readily available descriptive data, however fragmentary and biased they are. In doing so we also seek to identify what
is not known. We note at the outset, for example, that comprehensive
school-by-school statistics of reported crimes and student demonstra-
tions or disorders are not available, to our knowledge. Neither are
comprehensive school-by-school perceptions of campus security avail-
able. In fact, even aggregated nationwide statistics of campus secur-
ity problems are not available. Thus, the basic "output" data necessary
for analyzing the campus security issue are simply unavailable.

Second, we provide a summary of (often conflicting) recommenda-
tions offered by other sources (discussed below). We hasten to empha-
size that these recommendations are generally unsupported by available
data and they are not endorsed by our study. They are presented here
merely to indicate the directions suggested by others. The cost impli-
cations of the recommendations were not presented, so that neither the
benefits nor the costs are available to be taken into account by the
decisionmaker.

It is not the intent of this discussion to trace the history of
campus security, the causes of student protest, or the university's
and law-enforcement's response to campus unrest and disorder. Recent
publications have discussed student protest and the response to it by
the university and law enforcement.* The history of campus security,
among other things, is discussed in a soon-to-be-published study.**

University security forces run a wide gamut. At one extreme are
low-paid, university-employed watchmen or contract guards—typically
untrained personnel whose main duties consist of controlling access
and parking, locking doors, protecting transfer of monies, detecting
fires, vandalism, and other maintenance problems, and escorting a variety

---

* See, for example, The Report of the President's Commission on
Campus Unrest (op. cit.), and Campus Tensions: Analysis and Recommenda-

** See a doctoral dissertation by Seymour Gelber, The Role of Cam-
pus Security in the College Setting, College of Education, Florida
State University, March 1971.
of university employees during the night hours. Even large, well-endowed, private universities often use only this type of security force. For example, in an interview during the weeks of turmoil at Columbia University in 1968, Mr. John C. Gardner, the University's Associate Director of Buildings and Grounds, stated: *

It's a watchman-type service and guard service—the best we can afford at the moment.

In that same interview the article's author contended that

...campus cops are an institution for ridicule at Columbia just as they are on other campuses. Students usually regard them as not-too-bright buffoons charged with enforcing extremely unpopular regulations. The more willing they are to look the other way, the better they are liked.

At the other pole are the relatively professional forces found at some state universities, often headed by former police officers and organized like a municipal police department, whose officers usually have full police authority and carry sidearms.

Between these extremes lies a wide variety of campus forces, many of which are too poorly financed, staffed, equipped, and trained to function effectively in a situation of campus disorder or major crime. These forces rely heavily on the aid of nearby municipal or county police organizations. The watchman-type campus security force may be the most desirable one where local public police can respond rapidly to major incidents. But there are indications that the "old campus cop" with a key chain and flashlight is disappearing.

SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS OF INFORMATION

Dozens of articles published in several journals and magazines over the past several years were examined for their relevancy to campus security and campus police. The most valuable were The Journal of College and University Personnel Association, American Schools and Universities, College and University Business, College Management, The

Police Chief, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Law and Order, Security World, and Industrial Security. The Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest provided some observations regarding deficiencies in current campus security and recommended courses of action and policies which could improve security. Publications of the U.S. Office of Education provided general background information on numbers and types of educational institutions,* and unpublished Bureau of Labor Statistics data provided upper-bound estimates of overall security employment in educational institutions.**

In relative terms, however, the richest source of descriptive material is contained in four recent surveys. Table 2 summarizes and compares the surveys in terms of the survey instrument employed, number surveyed, number of institutions which responded, the topics or issues explored in the survey, and the institutional variables employed in classifying responses.

The Gelber study, the richest and most comprehensive of the four, used two mail questionnaires to survey the 245 schools whose security directors are members of the International Association of College and University Security Directors (IACUSD). One questionnaire, submitted to security directors, examined operational performance, security personnel characteristics, and training. A second questionnaire, submitted to security directors, faculty members, students, and university administrators, appraised and assessed the role of campus security and the relationship of campus security with other components of the institution. The Gelber study also provides a legal overview of campus security as described in the statutes of each state, in case law interpreting these statutes, in Attorney General opinions, in the regulations of state regulatory agencies, and in the administrative rules of the various institutions.

The Marchant survey was quite limited in scope in that its main focus was to obtain statistics relating to the arming of campus police.


Table 2
OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE CAMPUS SECURITY SURVEYS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Gelber&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Marchant&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Bartram-Smith&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Adams-Rogers&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Institutions Pollled</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Institutions Responding</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several mail questionnaires</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail questionnaire</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail questionnaire</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail questionnaire</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Urban-suburban</td>
<td>Urban-rural</td>
<td>Urban-rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional variables employed in classifying responses</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control (private or public)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic level</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community setting</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Urban-suburban</td>
<td>Urban-rural</td>
<td>Urban-rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students, residents, or commuters</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical location</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topics covered in survey</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal authority of campus police</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of security unit</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles or duties</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security personnel description</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons and equipment carried</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fringe benefits</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment and selection procedures</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of female security officers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of intelligence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison with regular law enforcement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies and functions in campus disorders</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes of others toward campus security</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended improvements</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It employed a mail questionnaire to survey the member institutions of IACUSD and the Northeast College and University Security Association—271 institutions in all.

The Bartram-Smith study surveyed 650 institutions by mail questionnaire. Topics covered were duties assigned to security personnel, size of security unit, education and training requirements, wages, and the nature and extent to which women were involved in campus police work. Since the study does not report on how the sample of 650 institutions was selected, we have no way of knowing how representative the 350 responding institutions are.

The Adams-Rogers study surveyed 325 institutions by mail questionnaire. Again, the study does not report on how the original sample was selected or on how representative the responding sample was. Topics covered included the role of campus security, recruitment, selection and training, security personnel characteristics, wages, unionization, and arms.

All of the surveys have serious limitations. Because of the nature of IACUSD membership, the Gelber and Marchant survey responses are biased and cannot be generalized to the total campus security population. For example, most universities that contract with outside private security agencies to provide campus policing are not members of IACUSD. Thus, institutions employing contract guards are essentially omitted from the sample. The latter two surveys are not as comprehensive in scope as is the Gelber study and, as noted above, it was not reported whether the sample selected or responding is representative of the total population of institutions of higher learning.

The remainder of this section should be read with a constant awareness of the sources of bias (and hence the inability to generalize the results of the Gelber and Marchant surveys to the total population) as well as the lack of comprehensiveness of the latter two surveys.

**SOME BACKGROUND DATA**

As of 1970 there were some 7 million students enrolled in 2,551 institutions of higher learning in the United States. Forty-two percent
of the institutions are public and 58 percent are private. Between 1948
and 1962, the public/private distribution had remained at 35/65 percent.

Of the total, 296 (11.6 percent) offer the Ph.D. (or equivalent);
517 (20.3 percent) offer the Master's and/or second professional degree;
835 (32.7 percent) offer the Bachelor's and/or first professional degree;
and 903 (35.4 percent) offer 2, but less than 4, years beyond the 12th
grade. Doctorate institutions are 47 percent public and 53 percent pri-
vate; for Master's, Bachelor's, and 2- to 4-year institutions the pri-
vate/public split is 39/61 percent, 11/89 percent, and 72/28 percent,
respectively. These statistics are relevant background when considering
the various survey results disaggregated by these institutional variables.

The total number of guards, watchmen, police, and detectives employed
at institutions of higher education is unknown. But an upper-bound esti-
mate of in-house security employment is available from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics which gives security employment statistics for all educational
levels (colleges, high schools, and grade schools), both publicly and
privately controlled. From the figures displayed in Table 3 we see that
in 1967 over 15,000 people were directly employed in security occupations
by all educational institutions. Roughly one-third were classified as
policemen or detectives and two-thirds as guards or watchmen. Accurate
estimates for later years are not available. The figures in Table 3 do
not include contract security personnel, since the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics tabulates them in the "miscellaneous business services" industry.

Table 3
SECURITY EMPLOYMENT IN THE EDUCATIONAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guards, watchmen, etc.</td>
<td>8,898</td>
<td>11,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police, detectives, etc.</td>
<td>2,041</td>
<td>4,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10,939</td>
<td>15,379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aSource: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

*Education Directory, op. cit.
Although comprehensive campus crime statistics are not available, either on a school-by-school, state-by-state, or regional basis, observers generally acknowledge that the crime rate has increased sharply over the past few years. At Stanford University, for example, the reported crime rate doubled over the past two years and increased much more sharply over the last decade.

The most frequent campus crime problem is reportedly theft. There are several reasons for this, it is claimed. Students have much valuable property on campus, especially televisions, stereos, and radio sets. Then too, transients are attracted to college communities by campus life styles. Finally, because of fewer social restrictions, students (particularly women) tend to remain out later at night, when they and their property are more subject to crime. For example, in 1970, Stanford University reported property theft losses of $117,757. In addition to crime problems, traffic accidents and violations are quite numerous.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

It is only in recent years that the legal authority of campus police has been clarified by statutory law in some states. Until recently most campus security units had little legal authority and the few that did derived their authority through deputization by the local sheriff or municipal police. Others functioned under statutes that appeared to provide color of legal authority but in fact had not been tested in court. According to the Gelber study, the only one of the four surveys that addresses the legal authority of campus police in a comprehensive way, 27 states now permit the state governing body for higher education to appoint campus police officers with power to arrest. The remaining 23 states permit deputization through the governor, the court, a law-enforcement agency, or by a city government.

The Marchant survey showed that of 192 useful responses received from the sample of 271 institutions, 140 (73 percent) reported campus forces having full police powers and 52 (27 percent) either had less than full police powers or city or county police were usually used for campus law enforcement.
Private educational institutions have received little statutory consideration, with only seven states providing direct authority. The extent to which city and county police officers may exercise authority on campus has not created serious legal controversy. Jurisdiction over criminal law violation on campus has been generally held to be concurrent with that of campus police. However, as we indicate later, the Gelber study concluded that although there is no serious legal controversy about concurrent jurisdiction on campus, all campus groups felt that overreaction by outside police agencies to potential threat exacerbated matters.

As to arrest powers in surrounding off-campus areas, about 50 percent of the responding institutions in the Marchant survey indicated that campus police possessed this power.

However, despite the increase in statutory provisions, deputization is still generally practiced.

According to Gelber, the authority of a campus security officer to search a student dormitory for contraband without a search warrant has changed somewhat in recent years. Prior to 1961 the prevailing legal attitude was that the student's right to be secure against unreasonable search need not be inviolate. This attitude prevailed because of the view that the college was a "unique" institution due to the in loco parentis relationship. Whereas in the past, entry and search had been virtually at the whim of school authorities, it is now necessary for the authorities to show a "reasonable cause to believe" that a criminal offense has been committed or is in the offing. However, this standard does not encompass the more stringent requirements of "probable cause," which is less speculative, but it points in the direction of the standard afforded all citizens (i.e., nonstudents).

ROLES AND DUTIES

Not surprisingly, the Bartram-Smith survey found that in smaller schools, particularly in rural locations, and in schools using contract personnel, duties were mostly concerned with parking enforcement, traffic control, and watchman-type services. Urban schools were more likely to specify police-type duties, such as crime prevention and investigation, search and seizure, apprehension, interrogation, and booking.
The Gelber survey found that nonpolice service functions were common. For example, over half of the institutions reported that lost-and-found duties were the responsibility of campus police, 43 percent supplied ambulance service, and 35 percent supplied key-control services. And only limited use was made of various specialists; 38 percent reported any use of such specialists, 17 percent had a narcotics expert on the staff, 10 percent had full-time undercover agents, and 2 percent had a vice officer.

The role of campus police in campus-disorder situations is discussed separately below.

SIZE OF SECURITY UNIT

The Gelber study indicates that in both smaller and larger institutions the range of variation in campus police per 1,000 population is roughly the same as that in municipal police per 1,000 population in cities of comparable size. For example, FBI figures indicate that cities of 15,000 to 20,000 population have approximately 20 to 25 police officers. Of the 27 colleges in that enrollment range that were surveyed, 11 percent employ 9 or less officers, 48 percent have 10 to 24 officers, and 41 percent employ over 25 officers.

Over 88 percent of the responding security directors indicated a need to increase the security staff. Seventy-one percent supported a staff increase on the basis that there were now more buildings to patrol, 70 percent on the basis that student enrollment had increased, 60 percent on the basis that there were more vehicles on campus, and 53 percent on the basis that campus crime rates had increased. But student demonstrations were cited as a reason in only 33 percent of the responses.

USE OF PART-TIMERS, STUDENTS, AND WOMEN

The Gelber study showed that part-time officers, students, and women are not used to any large extent. One-half of the private and one-third of the public colleges had part-time officers. Less than 30 percent of private or public institutions employ students as campus security officers. Students employed in this capacity are usually enrolled in the police science curriculum. Thirteen percent of private
and 24 percent of public colleges employ women as security officers. The Bartram-Smith survey generally confirms the very low incidence of women, student, and part-time security officers on campus. But the Adams-Rogers survey found that 68 percent of responding schools use part-time student help—largely, however, in nonpolicing functions such as clerks, parking attendants, and dispatchers.

AGE

Campus security officers are generally older than municipal police only at private institutions, according to the Gelber survey. Thirty-two percent of private and 40 percent of public colleges have security staffs within the age range of 21 to 35 years, whereas 41 percent of municipal police are within this age bracket. Twenty-four percent of private and 12 percent of public colleges have security staffs with average ages between 48 and 60 years.

The Adams-Rogers survey found that 40 percent of all the institutions sampled reported no age limits on recruitment, but there was great variation among institutions with different academic levels. Two-thirds of junior and community colleges have no age limits, whereas only 22 percent of the universities have no age limits. Sixty percent of all security units surveyed employ one or more retired public police personnel, although the exact number was not ascertained in that study.

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

In the Gelber sample, 91 percent of private and 85 percent of public colleges have campus security personnel with the average equivalent education of a high-school diploma or less. In only 11 percent of all colleges did the average school years completed exceed 12. These figures contrast with the median level of 12.4 years of education completed by regular public police officers in 1966.

As expected, educational attainment of security personnel was higher in the larger institutions. For example, in 25 percent of schools with enrollments over 20,000 students the average campus security officer had had some college education.
The Bartram-Smith and Adams-Rogers surveys only elicited educational requirements imposed by the colleges; they did not survey the educational backgrounds of the existing security forces' personnel. But the requirements implied general agreement with the other surveys. For example, 86 percent of responding institutions in the Adams-Rogers study required a high-school diploma or less. And larger institutions offering graduate study tended to require some college education, whereas smaller 2- to 4-year institutions did not.

**WAGES AND FRINGE BENEFITS**

The Bartram-Smith survey found that in 1969 the average monthly wage of campus security officers was $521, or about $3.00 per hour. Rural schools averaged $476 and urban schools averaged $547 per month. Geographically, West Coast salaries were highest, averaging $652 per month. Midwestern schools ranked second, followed by Great Plains, Southwest, Northeast, and Southeast—the latter averaging only $452 per month.

The Adams-Rogers survey does not provide average salary figures but does provide those for average minimum and maximum salaries. Over all schools, average minimum was $508 and average maximum was $630 in 1971—two years later than the Bartram-Smith survey.

Ninety percent of all responding schools had retirement plans, according to the Adams-Rogers study. The comparable figure from the Gelber study was 87 percent. All but 5 percent of the institutions offer paid vacations. Private and small schools are more likely to omit pension plans. Civil Service advantages are provided by 24 percent of the schools, and 20 percent offer high-hazard insurance, according to Gelber.

**TRAINING**

The Gelber study showed that only 55 percent of all responding schools require prework recruit training; 41 percent of the private schools require such training, as contrasted with 64 percent of the public colleges. Only 33 percent of the schools with enrollment under 5,000 require recruit training, but all 28 responding schools with over 20,000 students require it.
However, in-service training is required at 84 percent of the schools (80 percent in private and 86 percent in public colleges). Riot-control training has found acceptance at 40 percent of the schools (only 14 percent in private but 55 percent in public colleges).

Neither the Gelber nor the Adams-Rogers study, however, provides any notion of the depth or extent of initial or in-service training or of training in riot control and student behavior. Other sources intimate that the range of variation is great—from essentially zero to training equal to or better than that in large municipal police departments. For example, in the University of Texas system, all campus policemen receive 250 hours of recruit training before they are commissioned.*

The Adams-Rogers results generally agreed with the Gelber findings on recruit and in-service training.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

The Marchant survey found that sidearms were carried full-time at 74 percent of the responding schools and carried only on specific assignments (such as money protection) or at specific times (nights, weekends) at 14 percent of the schools. Only 13 percent of the schools indicated that sidearms were never carried. But 70 percent of the colleges indicated that shotguns or rifles were never carried in patrol vehicles and the remainder indicated that they were either carried in the vehicle or were available for emergency use.

Aerosols or gases, such as Mace or tear gas, were less available to officers than were sidearms. Thirty-five percent of the schools indicated that aerosols or gases were carried on the person of the officer, 11 percent indicated they were carried in patrol vehicles, 37 percent indicated they were available for emergency use, and 40 percent indicated that they were neither carried nor available for emergency use. The Gelber study generally agreed with the Marchant findings, although the information is presented in somewhat different form. Gelber

found that 45 percent of the responding schools used no crowd-control equipment such as aerosols or gases. Tear gas and Mace were available at 28 percent and 45 percent of the colleges, respectively; pepper foggers and other equipment were available at 12 percent of the schools. Public colleges, graduate schools, and large schools were more likely to have crowd-control equipment available.

Marchant found that the percentage of campus police who carried sidearms at all times was noticeably greater when the student body exceeded 5,000. But the fact that the campus was located in an urban or suburban area, or that a majority of students were residents or commuters, did not materially affect that percentage.

The Adams-Rogers survey found that 55 percent of junior colleges, 69 percent of 4-year colleges, and 76 percent of universities armed their campus police officers with either a revolver, baton, sap, or Mace. But no further information was provided regarding whether the weapon was carried on the person or in the vehicle, or was merely available in emergencies.

With regard to the use of other kinds of equipment, the Gelber study found that 91 percent of all colleges use the walkie-talkie and 45 percent use automatic burglar-alarm systems. However, sophisticated detection instruments are not commonplace on the campus. Less than 10 percent of the schools used closed-circuit television, and 90 percent of these are graduate schools.

**UNIONIZATION**

The Adams-Rogers survey found that 23 percent of all the campus police units surveyed were unionized, but the incidence of unionization varied considerably among schools of different academic level. No junior- or community-college security units were unionized, but one-third of the 4-year colleges and almost one-half of the universities indicated that their campus police were unionized.

**SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE AND UNDERCOVER AGENTS**

The Gelber study found that 55 percent of the private colleges and 76 percent of the public colleges use undercover agents. The most
frequent sources of undercover agents are the off-campus police agencies who provide agents for 35 percent of the private colleges and for 50 percent of the public colleges.* Members of the regular campus security staff act as undercover agents at 18 percent of private and 28 percent of public colleges. Students are used almost as frequently to inform on their fellows.

Intelligence sources are primarily outside police agencies. Eighty-four percent of all schools surveyed used outside police agencies as an intelligence source, but 66 percent and 54 percent of all schools also indicated that intelligence was provided by informants and by other schools, respectively. Again, public colleges and larger schools tended to make greater use of these intelligence sources than did private colleges or small schools.

POLICE LIAISON

The campus security unit or officer provides little assistance to students arrested by the off-campus police, according to the Gelber study. Seventy-five percent of the schools offer no legal aid. At only 11 percent of the colleges did campus security officers offer to take arrested students in their personal custody in lieu of bail; at only 8 percent of the schools did the security office attempt to obtain legal counsel; and at only 5 percent of the schools did the security officer appear in court as guardian for the student. And most of the schools that did provide such assistance were in the category of enrollment under 10,000.

The local off-campus police are available as emergency manpower at 87 percent of the schools. They are available for joint investiga-

*The use of off-campus policemen as undercover agents on campus is an irritant on some campuses. For example, early this year, 13 students and faculty of UCLA filed a class action suit in U.S. District Court to halt the use of police undercover agents who pose as students. This practice was said to have created "an intense climate of fear" and was said to "destroy academic and political freedoms necessary to a democratic society." The suit asked $1 million damages plus an order forbidding police use of files already completed by undercover agents. See "Thirteen UCLA Students File Suit Over Police Spies," Los Angeles Times, January 22, 1971.
tions at 86 percent of the schools. They provide special-events man-
power at 74 percent of the schools, meet in regular joint conferences
at 50 percent of the schools, and provide training for campus security
personnel at 36 percent of the educational institutions.

The local off-campus police permit the campus security office to
handle the following violations within the college's disciplinary
structure: vandalism at 45 percent of the schools; drunkenness at 42
percent; petty larceny at 40 percent; homosexuality at 24 percent; and
narcotics at 18 percent. It is interesting to note that 39 percent
of the schools reported that local police do not permit any violations
of municipal and state law to be handled within the college's disci-
pline structure.

**CAMPUS DISORDER SITUATIONS**

At 71 percent of the schools, according to Gelber, the college
president is the primary security policymaking authority. The campus
security office assumes a secondary role in the decisionmaking process
in regard to policy, tactical deployment, and enforcement action.
Campus security and the dean for student affairs are involved at 39
percent of the schools, and joint command decisions are made at 36 per-
cent of the schools.

When outside police aid is present, decisions as to tactics to be
employed become less a presidential matter and more of a group deci-
sion. Current tactical planning calls for joint command decisions at
45 percent of the schools, presidential decisionmaking at 40 percent,
campus-security-director decisionmaking at 36 percent, outside-police
decisionmaking at 34 percent, and decisionmaking by the dean for stu-
dent affairs at 23 percent. However, these figures, gleaned from re-
sponses by campus security directors, were somewhat at variance with
the various universities' "Master Plans for Student Disorder Situations,"
which place less tactical control in joint decisionmaking and greater
tactical control under the direction of outside police forces. These
Master Plans, which are summarized in the Gelber study, are policy
and planning documents which outline generally the organizational, tac-
tical, and decisionmaking procedures to be followed in the event of
campus disorder.
A recent survey of 450 campuses, conducted by the American Council on Education, shows that almost two-thirds have made some preparations since the spring of 1970 to prevent future campus disruptions. And the Adams-Rogers survey generally confirms this figure. That study indicates that 27 percent of the 100 institutions responding stated that they had no policy to cope with campus disruptions.

In attitudinal surveys, the Gelber study indicated that there was little support among students, faculty, administrators, and campus security directors for the view that the campus security office's efforts to control student demonstrations brought on campus disorder. But the failure of the campus security office to take prompt, early, deterrent actions was cited by 57 percent of the security directors as a contributing factor in demonstrations which escalated to major disorders, whereas only 17 percent of the students and 34 percent of the administrators cited this reason.

About half of the students, faculty, and administrators felt that demonstrations were an appropriate means of student expression, but only one-third of the campus security directors felt this way. All groups agreed that a formal policy enables students to know the bounds of institutional acceptance of demonstrations.

All groups strongly supported the proposition that overreaction by outside police agencies to potential threat increased the severity of campus disorders. All four groups agreed that the campus security office was most qualified to respond to campus disorders in the event that force was deemed necessary.

ATTITUDES TOWARD CAMPUS SECURITY OFFICES

The Gelber study also probed the attitudes of students, faculty, and university administration toward the campus security office. In general, attitudinal differences were most marked between students and security officers, whereas similarities were most pronounced between university administration and the security officer. All four groups indicated overwhelming agreement that two goals of campus security are to provide for protection of property and persons and to organize a traffic and parking system. However, the goals of both
establishing and enforcing rules of conduct found support among one-third of the campus security offices but only 13 percent support among the other three groups. On the appropriateness of having campus security maintain order on campus, sentiment was divided. Ninety-three percent of the security officers, 79 percent of the administrators, 67 percent of the faculty members, and 54 percent of the students favored this goal.

As to administrative procedures aimed at improving the operation of the campus security office, there was strong support but no consensus among the four groups. The establishment of a centralized statewide coordinating body to establish standards for the campus security office and of a chain of command in which the campus security director is responsible directly to the president had strong support from security directors but much weaker support from the other three groups. But the use of a student ombudsman to review campus security performance was endorsed by 63 percent of the students, 51 percent of the faculty, 22 percent of the administrators, and only 12 percent of the security directors. A joint faculty-student committee to review campus security performance had very strong support by administrators, faculty, and students, but only 37 percent of security directors favored this procedure.

With regard to personnel policy changes which would improve campus security performance, faculty, students, and administrators specified the same three highest-rated changes, although not necessarily in the same rank order. These were (1) more specialized training in human behavior, (2) higher educational requirements, and (3) higher salaries. On the other hand, security office preferences were (1) higher salaries, (2) higher educational requirements, and (3) larger staff. There was little need expressed for female security officers among any of the four groups, and the use of students in campus security work found limited support among faculty and students, slight support among administrators, and virtually no support from security directors.

As to causes for student misunderstanding of the role of campus security and as to the proposition that too few channels of communication exist between the campus security officer and the students, no
wide differences of opinion were expressed among the four groups. Certain enforcement actions are likely to create stress situations between students and campus security officers. Searching dormitories for contraband had consistent agreement as the greatest creator of stress situations. The use of unnecessary force in reaction to student disorders was also viewed by all groups as a source of discord. In general, patrolling the grounds, investigating crimes of violence, and enforcing parking regulations were not viewed as sources of discord. There was no consensus regarding the proposal to eliminate the use of informers; only 5 percent of the security officers viewed this as an improvement, while the support among students, faculty, and administrators was 51 percent, 29 percent, and 23 percent, respectively.

Increasing the campus security officer's authority to equal the status of municipal or state law-enforcement agencies found strong support among security officers but little support among students and faculty. But the concept of limiting the campus security officer to nonarrest authority found only 34 percent support among students and much less support among the other three groups. Only between 20 percent and 30 percent support was evidenced by the four groups for the replacement of standard police uniforms with civilian-like attire. And very little support appeared for the proposition that security officers carry concealed weapons on their persons.

In general, then, the three appraising groups (students, faculty, and administration) in the Gelber study saw shortcomings. There was little desire to enhance the authority or position of campus security; they saw the security force as being unable to adequately relate to or provide supportive services to students; and only in comparison with lowly regarded outside police agencies did campus security gain relative acceptance.

RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN OTHER STUDIES

A series of recommendations that have been suggested by other observers—by the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, by the Gelber and other studies, and by others with experience in managing the campus security function—are presented below. As indicated at the outset
of this chapter, the current state of knowledge regarding campus security issues is fragmentary, at best. For this basic reason none of the recommendations presented here are fully supported by hard evidence. In some cases the little evidence available is conflicting; in others, the recommendations conflict with each other.

Only limited resources could be applied to the topic of campus security, given the broad scope of this private police study. This meant that we could not attempt to gather new information from a careful sample of colleges, nor could we attempt to do the sort of analysis, referred to earlier, which might relate campus security "outputs" to campus police "inputs." For these reasons we refrain from endorsing any of the recommendations proposed by others or from proposing specific changes of our own.

No Single Model

Most observers agree that no single "model" campus security force is appropriate to all campuses. There are too many variables, such as the size and location of the institution, the likelihood of serious crime and disorder, the capability of the local outside police force, and the quality of the outside force's relations with the institution.

But Gelber does not shrink from proposing a universal "model" for campus security forces. Some of its characteristics are included among the recommendations listed below. However, Gelber's study does not provide sufficient evidence to support a universal model, nor is it adequate to support many aspects of the particular model he suggests.

Personnel Policies

- One observer suggests that retired policemen not be hired as campus security officers because they are likely to exhibit narrow, rigid attitudes. Others suggest that retired police officers should be hired.

* See John W. Powell, "Ten Important Questions Colleges Are Asking About Security Today," College Management, Vol. 4, October 1966, pp. 35-38. Powell, well-known in university security circles, has an FBI law enforcement background as well as experience as director of security at Yale University.
• Gelber and others suggest that campus security forces which perform police functions should hire college-trained officers, particularly those with prior training in police science, social science, administration, and government. Still other observers suggest, in addition, that these officers should be paid significantly more than the local public police, on the grounds that a campus security officer’s job is more difficult and sensitive than the local policeman’s.

• Some observers suggest that selection review boards (comprised of members from the campus security unit, the student body, and faculty) be used to probe in interviews the candidate’s attitudes toward, and understanding of, students, faculty, and so on.

• Gelber, Adams-Rogers, and others* suggest that students be employed as interns, part-timers, or as regular personnel in the campus security unit. These sources assert that this practice would be an important asset in ameliorating differences between the campus security officer and the student body, even though the Gelber study suggested that the use of students in campus security work found little support among faculty, students, administrators, and security directors.

• Low-level, nonpolice functions such as parking control, key control, lost and found, and clerical functions can be adequately filled by persons with lower qualifications or by students. These functions should be assigned to a department other than campus security.

• Gelber, Couper,** and others suggest that academic education be encouraged by providing opportunity and incentives for campus security officers.

---

*See, for example, David C. Couper, "The Need for Excellence in Campus Policing, Some Specific Organizational and Behavioral Recommendations," The Police Chief, January 1971.

**Couper, op. cit.
Training

- Most observers agree that training should be specialized and supervised by university administrators. In addition to training in student organizations and objectives, fire safety, public accident investigation, and university organization and policies, the campus security officer should receive training in human relations. For those universities which confer peace-officer status on their security personnel, this specialized training should be in addition to the training required to meet state criteria for peace-officer training.

- The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has extended educational benefits under its programs to campus police officers of public institutions. The President's Commission on Campus Unrest suggests that personnel at private universities who have peace-officer status should receive the same benefits as the public police.

Organization and Operations

- The Commission on Campus Unrest and other observers suggest that for colleges where the security force performs only watchman services, it is appropriate to place the campus security force under the direction of a business manager or treasurer. For forces that perform police functions, the campus security unit should be placed under the immediate control of an experienced, well-trained chief, who, in turn, should be accountable to a high administrative officer or dean.

- Gelber proposes a universal campus security model for a force that performs police as well as service functions. The force would have three main units: patrol, investigation, and student services. For patrol, employment would require minimum qualifications similar to those of the city police officer. For investigation, employment would require a Bachelor's degree, with additional in-service training. For the student-services unit, the campus security officer would be a career
officer who had completed an interdisciplinary Master's degree program in police science, political science or government, and education. He would concern himself with student problems as they relate to the law; his role would be preventive and educational. Student interns would be employed in all three units.

- Observers such as Gelber, Couper, and others feel that authority symbols should be used sparingly. Nonmilitary, civilian attire should replace uniforms, wherever possible.* Still others feel that military-like attire is preferable.

- The Commission on Campus Unrest suggests that watchman forces should not perform a law-enforcement role in situations of campus disruption. Other observers take quite the opposite position.

- Most observers, including the Commission on Campus Unrest and Gelber, suggest that a college's campus police force should enter into a clear jurisdictional understanding with local law-enforcement authorities and should establish a working arrangement and channels for the regular exchange of information.

- There should be adequate planning for mobilization and tactics during a situation of campus disorder. The plans should specify a formal chain of command and a clear notion of who is in command among the various forces which may be present—campus police, local police, state police, etc. The plan should provide for a common radio channel, a command post, and a clear notion of the destination of, and tactics to be employed by, each unit. Also, there should be adequate consultation with university officials before any outside law-enforcement officers are sent on campus.**

*There is some evidence which indicates that civilian attire is preferable. For example, at Brigham Young University an experiment was performed in which a regular uniformed campus security officer and one attired in blazer and slacks worked in close proximity. Students were observed to converse more frequently and to conduct more business with the blazer-attired officer.

**For example, the special Jackson State Panel Report (included in the Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest) concluded that there had been neither adequate consultation with university officials nor adequate planning along the lines suggested above.
Peace-Officer Status

- The Commission on Campus Unrest concluded that since state legislation in many states distinguishes between public universities, whose police often have the powers of sworn peace officers, and private institutions, whose personnel have little authority (and sometimes no more authority than that of private citizens), state legislatures should consider conferring peace-officer status on personnel of private university police departments that meet state criteria for recruitment, training, and organization.*

- The Commission further concluded that the large majority of institutions, however, will be adequately protected by security personnel not enjoying peace-officer status, or by the services of regular county or municipal officers. But other observers feel that peace-officer status is essential.

Firearms and Nonlethal Weapons

- Some observers, such as Adams and Rogers, feel that most campus security officers should carry a sidearm at all times, while others, such as Gelber, feel that authority symbols such as the revolver, baton, aerosols, and gases should be used sparingly. **

Where university police have primary responsibility for maintaining peace on the campus its uniformed officers may be required to perform law enforcement duties that make it appropriate for them to carry sidearms, batons, or nonlethal weapons. Obviously, only well-trained personnel should be permitted to carry weapons and strict guidelines should be adopted for their use.

NEEDED WORK

From the foregoing discussion it is clear that currently available published material on campus security and campus police is fragmentary,

---

*But see Chapter II of R-872-DOJ on the ramifications of such increased state involvement in private security affairs.

at best. None of the surveys or other material discussed in this chapter provided a detailed, yet comprehensive, description of a sample of institutions which could be generalized to the total university population. Each one failed on one or both counts. To provide such a description a representative sample of institutions should be surveyed by mail questionnaires, and follow-up face-to-face interviews should be conducted at a subset of this sample. Responses should be classified by control (private or public), highest level of academic offering, size (i.e., enrollment), setting (urban, core-city ghetto, suburban, rural), geographical region, and so on.

In addition to the topics covered by existing surveys, we list below those topics which were either completely omitted or addressed only superficially. These should be addressed in detail in future work:

- Campus crime-rate history (by major category).
- Frequency and severity of campus demonstrations and disorders.
- Size and type of campus security force—breakdown by personnel with peace-officer status, college-employed, and contract personnel without peace-officer status. Further breakdowns by full-time, part-time, and student participation are also required.
- Other personnel background characteristics such as previous jobs, longevity.
- Detailed descriptions of scope and depth of recruit training and the frequency and content of in-service retraining.
- Frequency, nature, and disposition of complaints against security personnel.
- Background, education, training, experience, and compensation of campus security directors.
- Policy on arms, use-of-force, and handling demonstrations and disorders.
- Relations with surrounding communities.
- Costs of current and suggested campus security programs.

But an accurate, comprehensive description of campus police in the United States is only a first step toward supportable policy-relevant suggestions for improving campus security. As we indicated at the outset, the second step should undertake quantitative analyses of the data
of the sort suggested. From such analyses might emerge concrete and objectively supportable policy-relevant suggestions for improving campus security and campus police.
Appendix

GSA GUIDELINE SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONTRACT GUARDING SERVICES

INDEX OF SPECIFICATIONS

GUARDING SERVICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PART I GENERAL REQUIREMENTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Heating and Airconditioning</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Emergencies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Property</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Identification/Building Passes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Locker Facilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Wage Rates</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Recording Presence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PART II CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9a</td>
<td>Contractors Authorized Representatives</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9b</td>
<td>Preliminary Inspections</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9c</td>
<td>Performance Inspections</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PART III WORK AND SERVICES REQUIRED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Service Requirements</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Inspection Tours</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Deviation from Prescribed Schedule</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hazardous Conditions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Unauthorized Access</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Reports and Records</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Additional Duties</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Mail and Messenger</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Traffic Control</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Key Control</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Lost and Found</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Injury or Illness</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Emergency Assistance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Civil Disturbances</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Operation of Equipment</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Building Rules and Regulations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Change of Duties</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Post Orders</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART IV</td>
<td>QUALIFICATION OF PERSONNEL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Previously Qualified Employees</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Health Requirements</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Physical Conditions</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Security and Health Certificates</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Special Qualifications</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36a</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36b</td>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36c</td>
<td>Job Knowledge</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36d</td>
<td>Firearms Use</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36e</td>
<td>Supervisor Requirements</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36f</td>
<td>Appearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36g</td>
<td>Waivers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Dual Positions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Standards of Conduct</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART V</td>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Firearms Qualifications</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Initial Training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Periodic Training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Elevator Operations Training</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART VI</td>
<td>POLICE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Police Authority</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Special Police Appointments and Gun Permits</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Bonds</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Liability</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Security Clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47a</td>
<td>Special Security Clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47b</td>
<td>Limited Access to Buildings</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47c</td>
<td>Criminal Liability</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART VIII</td>
<td>SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, AND EQUIPMENT</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section 1 - Furnished by the Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Furnished by the Government</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Property Accountability</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Safeguarding Property</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Use of Government Property</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Section 2 - Furnished by the Contractor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Furnished by the Contractor</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52a</td>
<td>Dials and Tapes</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52b</td>
<td>Replacement Clocks</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITEM</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>PAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52c</td>
<td>Patrol Equipment</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d</td>
<td>Uniforms</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52e</td>
<td>Sidearms</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52f</td>
<td>Personal Equipment</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PART IX  MINIMUM MAN-HOUR REQUIREMENTS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Man-hours</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PART X  DEDUCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Work Performance Deductions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Non-work Performance Deductions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PART XI  PAYMENTS TO CONTRACTOR</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Payment Method</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Invoice for Additional Services</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Final Payment</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GUIDELINE SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONTRACT GUARDING SERVICES

PART I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

1. Performance. Quality guarding service will be required, including full performance of all specified daily services on the first official working day of the contract period.

2. Heating and Airconditioning. Normally, heating is curtailed when the space is vacated by the building occupants. Airconditioning will be provided only during the official hours of duty of the building occupants.

3. Emergencies. In case of an emergency condition requiring immediate attention, the contractor shall divert guards as directed by the contracting officer's representative, from their normal assigned duties to meet the condition. When the guards diverted are no longer needed for the special work assignment, they shall be directed by the contractor to return to their normal assignment. No additional cost shall be charged the Government for the diversion, and the contractor shall not be penalized for the normal daily work which was otherwise scheduled.

4. Property. The contractor shall be responsible to see that his employees do not disturb papers on desks, open desk drawers or cabinets, or use Government telephones, except as authorized.

5. Identification/Building Passes. The contractor shall insure that each employee has a GSA/contractor identification/building pass before the employee enters on duty. The contracting officer's representative shall make available GSA Form 15, Night, Weekend and Holiday pass for this purpose. To be valid, the contractor or his authorized representative and the contracting officers' representative must sign each pass issued. The contractor shall see that all passes are returned to the contracting officer's representative when his employees are dismissed, terminated, or when the contract expires.

6. Locker Facilities. The contractor shall require employees to change their clothes in the locker room provided and maintain the locker rooms in a neat and sanitary condition.

7. Wage Rates. The contractor shall either notify each employee when first hired of the locally applicable wage rates he is required by law to pay for guard services or post current said wage rates on his employee bulletin board.

8. Recording Presence. Contractor shall require his employees to sign in and sign out in the guard desk book when reporting for duty and when leaving at the end of the workday.
PART II

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

9. General. To facilitate contract administration and inspection by representatives of the contracting officer, the contractor shall:

   a. Contractor's Authorized Representatives. Five days prior to the contract starting date, submit in writing to the contracting officer's representative, the names of at least two representatives who are authorized to act for the contractor in every detail at all times. The representatives, their location, and their availability must be satisfactory to the contracting officer's representative.

   b. Preliminary Inspections. Each bidder should, in company with the contracting officer's representative, make a walk-through inspection of the facility covered in the specification in order that bids can be responsive to the work required. Immediately after award of the contract, and prior to performance, the contractor and the contracting officer's representative shall make an on-site review of total job requirements, including a walk-through of the facility covered in the specification. At this time the contractor shall review in detail the general types of work performed by the occupants. The contractor should be provided floor plans of the facility which depict emergency evacuation routes, the location and type of each fire alarm, location of utility cut-off valves or switches, utility systems controls, special instructions pertaining to security controls, etc.

   c. Performance Inspections. Authorized GSA representatives will periodically conduct on-the-job inspections to determine the overall quality of contract performance, the job knowledge of individual guards, the effectiveness of training, and to observe and determine the conduct and appearance of guard personnel.

PART III

WORK AND SERVICES REQUIRED

10. General. The contractor shall furnish all labor, uniforms, badges, equipment, materials, supplies, and supervision to satisfactorily perform the protection and patrol services in the manner and at the frequencies set forth below, and in the post orders contained in Appendix A.

11. Service Requirements. Provide, operate, and maintain an armed protection force to perform all necessary guard functions and such other related functions
as specified herein, including the monitoring and operation of building fire
alarm systems and other protection devices or building equipment, and full
participation in building fire brigade activity, where such systems or activ-
ities exist or may be installed.

12. Safety. Perform all necessary services to assure the safety and protec-
tion of building occupants and real and personal property against injury,
 molestation, loss or damage from any preventable cause including, but not
limited to fire, theft, trespass, espionage, and sabotage.

13. Inspection Tours. Make inspection tours in accordance with patrol
routes and schedules established by the Government as indicated in the Post
Orders (Appendix A). Where installed and in working order, the watchman
reporting systems shall be used by the guards to record their presence at the
designated stations.

14. Deviation from Prescribed Schedule. Guards are authorized to deviate
from prescribed schedules covering patrol routes whenever unusual conditions
or circumstances so demand. Such deviations and the reasons therefore are to
be recorded in a log book and on the dial or tape records, if such are used.
Where such systems are used, only the Guard Supervisor shall remove the dial
or tape records, and file it with the daily patrol report. The dial or tape
shall be annotated explaining the deviation whenever skips or irregularities
in punch time of any type are shown. It shall be dated, showing the time of
removal and the name of the person removing the used dial or tape and inserting
the new dial or tape.

15. Hazardous Conditions. Report daily to the Contracting Officer's represent-
ative potentially hazardous conditions and items in need of repair, including
inoperative lights, leaky faucets, toilet stoppages, broken or slippery floor
surfaces, etc.

16. Unauthorized Access. Discover and apprehend persons gaining unauthorized
access to the property.

17. Law and Order. Maintain law and order within the areas of assignment.

18. Reports and Records. Prepare required orders, instructions and reports,
including reports on accidents and fires, and maintain and make available all
records in connection with the duties and responsibilities of the assignment.

19. Additional Duties. Turn off unnecessary lights, check safes, lock type
repositories and cabinets, close windows, open and secure doors and gates,
raise and lower the flag as prescribed.

20. Mail and Messages. When so authorized, receive, safely keep, and turn
over to appropriate persons, official mail, messages and/or telegrams and
receive telephone calls in connection with the responsibilities of the
assignment.
21. **Traffic Control.** Serve as required in traffic direction; control and monitor admittances to parking areas.

22. **Key Control.** Receive, issue, and account for all keys to the building, various offices, gates, etc.

23. **Lost and Found.** Receive, receipt for, and safely store, lost and found articles pending return to owner or for other appropriate disposal, in accordance with procedure outlined in Handbook for Guards.

24. **Injury or Illness.** Obtain professional assistance in accordance with local procedures in the event of injury or illness to Government employees or others while in the building or on the grounds.

25. **Emergency Assistance.** In the event of emergency or unusual occurrence adversely affecting the interest of the Government, summon appropriate assistance such as the local fire and/or police departments and immediately notify the contracting officer's representative or other designated officials. Protection force members shall also assist in firefighting duties when fires occur within the facility, covered in this contract.

26. **Civil Disturbances.** Perform such other functions as may be necessary in the event of situations or occurrences such as civil disturbances, attempts to commit espionage, sabotage, or other criminal acts adversely affecting the security and/or safety of the Government, its employees, property, and the general public lawfully in buildings or on the grounds under control of the Government.

27. **Operation of Equipment.** When required by written instructions from the contracting officer's representative, perform minor operations and/or record data in connection with the operation of building utility systems.


29. **Change of Duties.** The Government reserves the right to act through its contracting officer's representative to amend, modify, and reissue the Post Orders, special orders, and to issue Post Orders for assignment of guards in other adjacent buildings or areas. This will not require modification to the basic contract unless such changes increase or decrease the number of productive hours required.

30. **Post Orders.** Perform duties as described in the post orders contained in Appendix A.

**PART IV**

**QUALIFICATION OF PERSONNEL**

31. **General.** Unless otherwise specified, the contractor will submit to the
contracting officer's representative, within five days after the execution of the contract, completed fingerprint chart, SF87, and GSA Form 176, "Statement of Personal History" for the contractor and all employees who have access to the buildings and grounds in performance of the contract. These forms will be submitted for replacement employees before entrance on duty. Necessary forms will be furnished by the Government. When the contracting officer receives an unsuitable report on any employee after processing of these forms or if the contracting officer or his representative find a prospective employee to be unsuitable or unfit for duties, under the terms of the contract, the contractor shall be advised immediately that such employees cannot continue to work or be assigned to work under this contract.

32. Previously Qualified Employees. For employees cleared while employed by a contractor who is subsequently replaced by another contractor, in the same buildings, the new contractor is not required to submit another set of these forms.

33. Health Requirements. All employees assigned by the contractor to the performance of work under this contract shall be physically able to do their assigned work and shall be free from communicable diseases. Each employee must be given a physical examination without cost to the Government and a physician's certification on GSA Form 2503 (Figure 6-45.2) giving notice as to the results shall be furnished to the contracting officer or his representative before the employee is assigned to duty. In some special circumstances the contracting officer's representative may, in his judgment, permit a contract employee to enter on duty and work for as long as three days before obtaining the physician's certification. Notwithstanding the furnishing of this certificate, however, the contractor shall not be relieved from the obligation imposed upon him by the first sentence of this paragraph.

34. Physical Conditions. Members of Contractor's Protection Force shall be well proportioned as to height and weight; be in good general health without physical defects or abnormalities which would interfere with the performance of duties; possess binocular vision correctable to 20/30 (Snellen); be free of color blindness; and be capable of hearing ordinary conversation at fifteen (15) feet with either ear without benefit of hearing aid.

35. Security and Health Certificates. The certificates specified in paragraphs 31 and 33 shall be submitted by the contractor to the contracting officer's representative as indicated therein. No employee shall be permitted to work under the contract until the contracting officer's representative approves such employment.

36. Special Qualifications. Except as authorized in writing in advance, each contract guard shall meet the following additional minimum qualifications:

   a. Citizenship. Be a male citizen of the United States of America, and have reached the age of twenty-one, but not over sixty years of age at the time of employment under this contract. The contractor shall be required to produce evidence of such citizenship, if the contracting officer so requests.
b. **Literacy.** Be literate to the extent of reading and understanding printed regulations, written orders and instructions, training instructions, and be able to compose reports which convey complete information.

c. **Job Knowledge.** Possess the capacity to acquire a good working knowledge of all the duty requirements of a guard within the terms of this contract.

d. **Firearms Use.** Establish proficiency in the use and safe handling of .38 caliber service type revolvers, prior to entry on duty.

e. **Supervisor Requirements.** The contractor's supervisors in charge of work under this contract must be individuals of unquestionable integrity. Each must have at least two (2) years of successful protection experience in an administrative and supervisory capacity. These supervisors shall at all reasonable times be available to receive and implement orders or instructions from the Government which affect the operation of the Protection Force.

f. **Appearance.** The face shall be kept clean shaven, except a mustache shall be permissible. If worn, a mustache shall be kept neatly and evenly trimmed so that no portion of the mustache shall extend more than one-quarter inch below or beyond the line of an individual's upper lip. Hair shall be worn neatly trimmed. The hair shall be so clipped on the sides and back so as to present an evenly graduated appearance. Hair on the top of the head shall not be overly long and shall be neatly combed or brushed in such a manner that it shall remain clear of the forehead and not protrude beneath the band of the cap. Sideburns shall be neatly trimmed and straight and shall not extend past the lower edge of the ear nor shall they be wider than one and one-half inches at the bottom or conspicuous in manner. Beards, chin and lip whiskers are not permitted.

g. **Waivers.** Any of the above qualifications may be waived in writing by the contractor officer's representative when such waiver is in the best interest of the Government.

37. **Dual Positions.** The position of guard and that of supervisor cannot be held by the same incumbent. In the event of a temporary emergency, a supervisor may assist in the performance of any duty to effectively discharge the requirements of this contract.

38. **Standards of Conduct.** The contractor shall be responsible for maintaining satisfactory standards of employee competency, conduct, appearance, and integrity, and shall be responsible for taking such disciplinary action with respect to his employees as may be necessary.
PART V

TRAINING

39. Firearms Qualifications. Qualify each guard initially at the beginning of the contract period in the use of firearms using the GSA qualifications standard or one with higher requirements. A written record of each guard's firearms qualification shall be provided the contracting officer's representative prior to a guard's entrance on duty.

40. Initial Training. The contractor shall within thirty (30) days following assignment to duty, certify to the contracting officer's representative as to the satisfactory completion of the following basic training of each employee:

- General orientation on conduct and attitude on and toward the job;
- Functions of the Protection Force and specifically the protection of the locations stated herein;
- Specific duties of the individual, including sufficient "breaking in" training;
  - Guard orders - general and specific;
  - Authority of the individual guard;
  - Employee and public relations;
  - Elementary fire protection, including the use or operation of special equipment, such as fire extinguishers, fire alarms, sprinkler control valves, and standpipe systems;
  - Traffic control;
  - Report writing; and
  - Discipline.

41. Periodic Training. All of the contractor's Protection Force personnel shall undergo periodic in-service training to include review of basic material to insure their ability to perform satisfactorily.

42. Elevator Operations Training. Arrangements shall be made with the local GSA Buildings Manager for the training of contractor's Protection Force members in the operation of elevators as required.

PART VI

POLICE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

43. Police Authority. The contractor shall provide each employee with police authority sufficient in scope to make arrests for any violation of law occurring at the locations specified in the contract, except locations where the Government has exclusive jurisdiction. When a location has exclusive jurisdiction, contract guards' power to arrest is no greater than that of a private citizen.

44. Special Police Appointments and Gun Permits. The contractor shall, at no cost to the government, make and complete all necessary arrangements with the
appropriate officials in the City, County, Parish, or the State, in which the
buildings are located to (1) have each guard appointed as a Special Police or
Conservator of the Peace, (2) obtain a permit for each guard to carry a gun,
and (3) furnish the contracting officer's representative with proof of the above.

45. Bonds. The contractor shall provide any official bonds required, pay any
fees or costs involved or related to the appointment of employees as Special
Police, or Conservators of the Peace, and/or authorization for the arming of
any employees engaged in providing services specified under this contract.

46. Liability. The contractor shall assume full liability for any act of
his employee(s) in the exercise of any such police authority.

PART VII

SECURITY

47. Security Clearance. The following criteria are applied with regard to
an employee's security clearance and the security requirements of individual
occupant agencies:

a. Special Security Clearance. When an occupying agency requires that
the contractor's employees have a special security clearance before entering
on duty under the contract, the contractor shall agree not to permit any such
employee to have access to the building or grounds designated herein until the
contracting officer, or his representative, grants such security clearance.
When special security clearance is required by an occupying agency, the contract-
or's employees shall complete necessary forms, but the contractor shall not be
liable for any costs connected therewith.

b. Limited Access to Buildings. The contractor shall not permit any
individual to have access to the buildings or grounds designated herein until
it has been determined that permitting such person(s) to have such access will
not be contrary to the public interest and that the individual(s) is authorized
to be admitted in accordance with applicable orders, rules, and regulations.
The foregoing prohibitions and requirements shall also be applicable to all in-
dividuals with regard to access, removal and/or possession of classified data,
materials, supplies, equipment, and all Government-owned property at the loca-
tion(s) designated in the contract.

c. Criminal Liability. Disclosure of information relating to the ser-
dices hereunder to any person not entitled to receive it, or failure to safe-
guard any classified information that may come to the contractor or any person
under his control in connection with work under this contract, may subject the
contractor, his agents, or employees to criminal liability under Title 18,
Section 794 and 798 of the U.S. Codes.
48. Furnished by the Government. The Government will furnish at no cost to the contractor the following:

a. Electrical and mechanical protective and communications equipment where installed such as alarm and surveillance systems, communications equipment, closed circuit television, portable watchlocks and related keys including written operating procedures and instructions.

b. Repair and maintenance of equipment in "a" above.

c. Required GSA forms and issuances including a GSA Guard Handbook for each guard, desk books, physical protection handbook, etc.

d. Telephones are deemed necessary by the Government for the conduct of official Government business under this contract.

e. Guard office, locker space, and office equipment excluding office machines.

f. Sentry booths.

g. Utilities and cleaning in accordance with GSA Standards.

49. Property Accountability. All property furnished by the Government under this contract shall remain the property of the Government. Upon termination of the contract the contractor shall render an accounting of all such property which has come into his possession under this contract.

50. Safeguarding Property. The contractor shall take all reasonable precautions, as directed by the Government, or in the absence of such direction in accordance with sound industrial practices, to safeguard and protect Government property in his possession or custody. Unless otherwise provided in the contract, the contractor assumes the risk of and shall be responsible for any loss of or damage to Government furnished property in his possession except for reasonable wear and tear and to the extent that such property is consumed in the performance of the contract.

51. Use of Government Property. The Government property shall be used only for official Government business in the performance of this contract.

Section 2. Furnished by the Contractor

52. Furnished by the Contractor. The contractor will furnish, install, operate, and maintain in acceptable condition, at no cost to the Government, all other equipment, materials, and supplies necessary for performance under this contract including, but not limited to the following:

a. Dials and Tapes. All dials or tapes for portable patrol clocks.
b. Replacement Clocks. Temporary replacement clocks for any that may be out of service for repairs.

c. Patrol Equipment. Patrol equipment desired and provided by the contractor as approved by the contracting officer's representative such as scout cars, motor scooters, etc., including all costs relative to operation and maintenance.

d. Uniforms. Approved uniforms for all Protection Force personnel. Guard uniforms shall be worn by all members of the Protection Force at all times while engaged in the performance of the duties required. Such uniforms and the wearing of same shall in general conform to standards and usage prescribed and in effect for General Services Administration guards (information available upon request). The color of the contractor's Protection Force uniforms may be other than blue; but must be a color in general use by large guard or police organizations in the United States. All Protection Force personnel performing under this contract shall wear the same color and style of uniform. Appropriately lettered breast badge and cap ornament indicating the jurisdiction from which police authority is obtained shall be worn and prominently displayed as a part of the uniform. Shoulder patches not larger than 4 1/2 inches by 4 1/2 inches, lettered to indicate the identity of the contractor shall be worn on the left shoulder of the uniform coat and shirt. No other identification of the contractor is to be worn or displayed on the uniform. No guard may enter on duty until he has a complete uniform which meets the approval of the contracting officer's representative.

e. Sidearms. Regular sidearms, for all guards while on duty (.38 caliber, service type revolvers) including ammunition, holsters, belts, etc. Sidearms shall be inspected and oiled regularly to ensure that each sidearm is in optimum operating condition.

f. Personal Equipment. Flashlights, batteries, and replacement parts, (one complete watchman type flashlight for each guard), and foul weather clothing shall be provided as required.

PART IX

MINIMUM MAN-HOUR REQUIREMENTS

53. General. The minimum number of productive man-hours and supervisory man-hours required to satisfactorily perform the services outlined herein including the attached Post Orders are specified in item 54 below. These man-hours do not include man-hours for substitute guards. Bidders are cautioned that the below stated minimum man-hour requirements may be less than that which they will need to perform work requirements. The determination of the total man-hour requirement for the performance of all services herein specified, as well as all other cost factors above those required by minimum man-hours specified is the sole responsibility of the bidders. Nothing in this provision should be construed as being contrary to this bidder's responsibility.
54. Man-hours. The minimum number of man-hours required under this contract is as follows:

PART X

DEDUCTIONS FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM

55. Work Performance Deductions.

a. Use of Government employees to perform work specified in this contract

x

b. Use of other contract employees to perform work specified in this contract

Actual Cost plus % overhead

c. Deduction for posts not covered in this contract

x

x Use hourly rate multiplied by the hours involved.

56. Non-work Performance Deductions. Deductions shall be made for failure to respond in a timely manner to open gates, doors, telephones, radios, etc. This item subject to evaluation by the contracting officer with an equitable deduction determined and applied on the basis of frequency and gravity of each contract deficiency . . . (to be determined).

PART XI

PAYMENTS TO CONTRACTOR

57. Payment Method. The Government will pay for services rendered under this contract monthly in arrears, provided all services covered by the contract have been satisfactorily completed and deductions are not necessary. A monthly invoice for the fixed cost of the contract is not required.

58. Invoice for Additional Services. Each invoice for additional services must reference the contract number, indicate the facility where services were provided, and reflect the dates, the number of hours worked, and names of GSA representatives authorizing the additional services. The invoice is to be forwarded to the contracting officer's representative within five working days after the first of the following month.

59. Final Payment. The last payment due the contractor will be delayed approximately twenty (20) days to make any necessary adjustments. The contracting officer will render a final decision in regard to deductions taken during the life of the contract, and will forward the contractor a final decision which is appealable within thirty (30) days under the Disputes Clause.