Delinquency Prevention in South Chicago

A Fifty-Year Assessment of the Chicago Area Project

Steven Schlossman, Gail Zellman,
Richard Shavelson
with Michael Sedlak, Jane Cobb

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PREFACE

This report is one of a series of studies supported by the National Institute of Education of innovative approaches to youth policy, past and present. The report offers a new perspective on delinquency prevention by integrating historical and contemporary analyses of the work of the Chicago Area Project (CAP) in South Chicago during the past half-century. Despite the limitations of evaluation methods for assessing the impact of social programs, the convergence of historical, fieldwork, implementation, and quantitative data indicates that something important is happening as a result of the CAP's presence and that more precise and sophisticated tests of the multimethod approach developed in the present study are clearly warranted.

Other publications in this series include:

- Steven Schlossman and Michael Sedlak, *The Chicago Area Project Revisited,* The Rand Corporation, N-1944-NIE, January 1983.
- Steven Schlossman, *Studies in the History of Early 20th Century Delinquency Prevention,* The Rand Corporation, N-1945-NIE, January 1983.
- Steven Schlossman and Julia Liss, "The Contours of Crime Prevention in August Vollmer's Berkeley," in Andrew Scull and Steven Spitzer (eds.), *Research in Law, Deviance, and Social Control,* Vol. 6, JAI Press, Inc. (forthcoming).

Throughout the research, the authors received splendid cooperation from Peter Hunt and David Reed of the Chicago Area Project, from Henry Martinez and his staff at the Mexican Community Committee, from Donald Norwood and his staff at SCOPE, from Neil Bosanko at Neighborhood House, and from numerous other officials in public and private agencies in Chicago, who disrupted their busy schedules to answer questions and provide access to data. Special thanks are extended to the staffs of the Chicago Historical Society, the Special Collections Department of the University of Illinois at Chicago, and the Illinois Institute of Juvenile Research for facilitating access to data. Marcia Chaiken provided valuable assistance in data collection and preliminary data analysis. We benefited greatly from the criticisms provided by Dan Lewis, Sheldon Messinger, Joan Petersilia, and David Reed.

SUMMARY

In 1984, one of the most remarkable social experiments in modern urban America is celebrating its 50th anniversary, yet hardly anyone seems aware that it continues to exist. We refer to the nation's first community-based delinquency prevention program—the Chicago Area Project (CAP)—which was originated in South Chicago by sociologist Clifford Shaw in 1934.

This report examines the CAP from both a historical and a contemporary perspective. The analysis is divided into three parts. The first part describes the CAP's founding and analyzes the process through which it was established and the operation of its prevention programs. The second part examines the operation of the CAP program in South Chicago in 1980, in light of assumptions derived from the historical analysis of the salient features of CAP philosophy and practice. In both parts, we focus on the ways the CAP was implemented and the implications they may have had for its success, or lack of success, in preventing delinquency. In the third part of the analysis, we combine census data, data on delinquency rates, and data on program participation and operations to develop a rudimentary quantitative method to enlarge upon and with which to make a preliminary validation of our earlier analyses.

All of our data consistently suggest that the CAP has long been effective in organizing local communities and reducing juvenile delinquency. This analysis therefore raises significant doubts about the loudly trumpeted conclusion that "nothing works" in crime prevention, and it indicates several dimensions of successful program implementation that may be especially relevant, now that resources for prevention efforts are shrinking.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1984, one of the most remarkable social experiments in modern urban America is celebrating its 50th anniversary, yet hardly anyone seems aware that it continues to exist. We refer to the nation's first community-based delinquency prevention program—the Chicago Area Project (CAP)—which was originated by sociologist Clifford Shaw in 1934.[1] Shaw and his colleagues succinctly summarized the CAP's basic philosophy as follows:

> The Chicago Area Project is a program which seeks to discover by actual demonstration and measurement a procedure for the treatment of delinquents and the prevention of delinquency. . . . the distinctive emphasis in the Project is to achieve the fullest possible neighborhood participation. . . . All of the activities in the program are carried on with a view to making the neighborhood conscious of the problems of delinquency, collectively interested in the welfare of its children, and active in promoting programs for such improvements of the community environment as will develop in the children interests and habits of a constructive and socially desirable character. . . . [contrasted with the methods employed by traditional, casework-oriented social agencies,] the Area Project emphasizes the development of a program for the neighborhood as a whole, as against a circumscribed institutional setup; (2) the Area Project stresses the autonomy of the actual residents of the neighborhood in planning and operating the program as contrasted with the traditional organizations in which control is vested in lay and professional persons who reside in or represent the interests of the more privileged communities; (3) the Area Project places great emphasis upon the training and utilization of neighborhood leaders as contrasted with the general practice in which dependence is largely placed upon professionally trained leaders recruited from sources outside of the local neighborhood; (4) the Area Project seeks to utilize to the maximum established neighborhood institutions, particularly such natural social groupings as churches, societies, and clubs, rather than to create new

[1]Useful overviews of the CAP and its sociological roots include Robert Faris, *Chicago Sociology: 1920–1932*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967; James Carey, *Sociology and Public Affairs: The Chicago School*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975; Harold Finestone, *Victims of Change: Juvenile Delinquents in American Society*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976; Fred Matthews, *Quest for an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the Chicago School*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977; James Bennett, *Oral History and Delinquency: The Rhetoric of Criminology*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981; Anthony Sorrentino, "The Chicago Area Project after 25 Years," *Federal Probation*, June 23, 1959, pp. 40–45; and Solomon Kobrin, "The Chicago Area Project—A 25-Year Assessment," reprinted in Rose Giallombardo (ed.), *Juvenile Delinquency*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966, pp. 473–482.

> institutions which embody the morale and sentiments of the more conventional communities; (5) the activities program in the Area Project is regarded primarily as a device for enlisting the active participation of local residents in a constructive community enterprise and creating and crystallizing neighborhood sentiment with regard to the task of promoting the welfare of children and the social and physical improvement of the community as a whole; (6) and, finally, an essential aspect of the Area Project is the emphasis which it places upon the task of evaluating the effectiveness of its procedure in constructively modifying the pattern of community life and thus effecting a reduction in delinquency and other related problems.[2]

The lack of interest in the CAP today is surprising on at least two counts. First, the CAP remains of great historical interest; indeed, it has assumed legendary status in the annals of American sociology, criminology, and social work as the first systematic challenge to the dominance of psychology and psychiatry in public and private programs for the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency. Second, the notion of community-based crime prevention has undergone a rebirth in the past several years.[3] The creative work of Peter Berger and Robert Woodson on "mediating structures" and that of Dan Lewis and his colleagues on means to combat "fear of crime" have recently helped revitalize neighborhood self-help as a powerful organizational principle upon which to build new mechanisms of "social control" (to use Lewis's term) in crime-ridden minority communities.[4] Recently, the Ford Foundation funded a major experiment in community-based crime prevention in Chicago, much as it did in the early 1960s when it started Mobilization for Youth; and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention similarly committed 2 million dollars "to test a program designed to prevent and reduce violent juvenile crime through neighborhood organizations." [5]

In this report, we examine the CAP in South Chicago from both a historical and a contemporary perspective. The analysis is divided into three parts. In the first part, we describe the CAP's founding in South Chicago in the 1930s, analyzing the process through which it was

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[2] Ernest Burgess, Joseph Lohman, and Clifford Shaw, "The Chicago Area Project," National Probation Association, *Yearbook*, 1937, pp. 8–10.

[3] In 1980 the CAP sponsored twenty-seven community organizations in eighteen high-crime Chicago neighborhoods. It also served several downstate communities.

[4] See Robert Woodson, *A Summons to Life*, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1981; Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, *To Empower People*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977; and Dan Lewis and Greta Salem, "Community Crime Prevention: An Analysis of a Developing Strategy," *Crime and Delinquency*, 27, July 1981, pp. 405–421.

[5] "Advance for Release," Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Department of Justice, February 22, 1983.

established and the operation of its prevention programs. In the second part, we examine the operation of the CAP program in South Chicago in 1980, in light of assumptions derived from our historical analysis of the salient features of CAP philosophy and practice. In both parts, we focus on the ways the CAP was implemented and the implications they may have had for its success, or lack of success, in preventing delinquency. In the third part of the analysis, we combine census data, data on delinquency rates, and data on program participation and operations to develop a rudimentary quantitative method to enlarge upon and with which to make a preliminary validation of our earlier analyses.

All of our data consistently suggest that the CAP has long been effective in organizing local communities and reducing juvenile delinquency. The analysis therefore raises significant doubts about the loudly trumpeted conclusion that "nothing works" in crime prevention, and it indicates several dimensions of successful program implementation that may be especially relevant, now that resources for prevention efforts are shrinking.

II. THE CHICAGO AREA PROJECT, 1931-1944[1]

THE BEGINNING OF THE CHICAGO AREA PROJECT

By using an elaborate procedure for plotting the home addresses of over 100,000 juvenile delinquents processed by the Juvenile Court of Cook County between 1900 and 1927, Clifford Shaw and his colleagues at the Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research (IJR) determined that several Chicago neighborhoods produced vastly disproportionate numbers of criminals. Delinquency was concentrated in four areas: the predominantly Italian near west and near north sides, the black ghetto on the south side, and the overwhelmingly Polish sections of South Chicago which surrounded Russell Square Park and which were known colloquially as the "Bush" (because of the plentiful wild shrubs in the neighborhood). Bordered on the west side by the Illinois Central railyards, on the north by 79th Street, on the east by the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation, and on the south by 86th Street, Russell Square was geographically isolated and "hemmed in," as one analyst noted, by the sprawling mills and dangerous surface railway tracks.

Russell Square in 1930 was a working-class, Catholic neighborhood, largely dependent on the adjacent steel mills for its economic life. During the Depression, slack demand for steel and occasional strikes periodically closed the mills. When that happened, as one investigator reported, "the pall of gloom descended not only upon the worker but upon all the small businesses operated in the neighborhood."

The overwhelming majority of the residents in the Bush were immigrants or children of immigrants. Probably three-quarters of the residents in the Bush were Polish; the remainder were of Austrian, German, Scandinavian, and Russian origin. Substantial numbers of Mexicans also began to settle in the neighborhood after national immigration restriction laws in the 1920s virtually eliminated further infusions from southeastern Europe. It was estimated that fully 80 percent of Russell Square's citizenry were practicing Catholics who belonged to St. Michael's Church.

Despite the self-evident failure of informal social controls to contain juvenile crime in the Russell Square neighborhood, Clifford Shaw

[1]This section is an abridged and revised version of a much longer, fully documented historical essay, *The Chicago Area Project Revisited*, by Steven Schlossman and Michael Sedlak, The Rand Corporation, N-1944-NIE, January 1983.

considered it an excellent locale for testing his innovative ideas on delinquency prevention and community organization. Russell Square possessed sufficient territorial identity and ethnic cohesiveness, he believed, to serve as a building block for communal self-renewal with only minimal guidance from the CAP.

Shaw moved slowly and carefully into South Chicago and followed a strategy for introducing innovation that would be identified, years later, as the "implementation approach."[2] Key to this approach is the idea that successful innovation may be more closely associated with characteristics of the adopting organization and its implementation strategies than with the innovation itself.[3] Implementation theorists stress that an effective implementation process rests crucially on the adopting organization's capacity to mobilize and build participant support, cooperation, and competence.[4]

Implementation theorists have identified a number of features of the implementation process that are likely to enhance an innovation's success. Those most applicable to the CAP are perceived local need, support and participation of key actors, organizational resources, and adaptability and frequent communication.

Innovations adopted because they address a pressing local need or problem are more likely to succeed than those adopted as a means of appearing methodologically up-to-date or in response to outside funding opportunities. Innovations based on local needs garner greater

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[2]See, for example, Matthew B. Miles (ed.), *Innovation in Education*, New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964; Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973; and Phyllis Ellickson and Joan Petersilia, *Implementing New Ideas in Criminal Justice*, The Rand Corporation, R-2929-NIJ, April 1983.

[3]See, for example, Paul Berman and Edward W. Pauly, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Vol. II: Factors Affecting Change Agent Projects*, The Rand Corporation, R-1589/2-HEW, April 1975; Paul Berman and Milbrey McLaughlin, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Vol. VII: Factors Affecting Implementation and Continuation*, The Rand Corporation, R-1589/7-HEW, April 1977; Paul Berman and Milbrey McLaughlin, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Vol. VIII: Implementing and Sustaining Innovations*, The Rand Corporation, R-1589/8-HEW, May 1978; and Michael Fullan, "Research on the Implementation of Educational Change," in R. Corwin (ed.), *Research in Organizational Issues in Education*, JAI Press Inc., Greenwich, Connecticut, 1980.

[4]See, for example, Paul Berman and Milbrey McLaughlin, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Vol. I: A Model of Educational Change*, The Rand Corporation, R-1589/1-HEW, September 1974; Berman and Pauly, 1975, op. cit.; Berman and McLaughlin, 1977, 1978, op. cit.; Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977; Judith K. Larsen and Rekha Agarwala-Rogers, "Re-invention of Innovative Ideas: Modified? Adopted? None of the Above?" *Evaluation*, Vol. 4, 1977, pp. 136–140; and John A. Emrick and Susan M. Peterson, *A Synthesis of Findings Across Five Recent Studies in Educational Dissemination and Change*, Far West Laboratory, San Francisco, California, 1978.

staff commitment and are more likely to withstand loss of outside funds. Successful implementation typically requires the support of several key actors and/or groups, e.g., the adopting organization's leadership, a project director or "entrepreneur" who guides the implementation process, and those individuals who convert it into practice (variously called users, practitioners, or participants). In the case of community-based innovations, support from key community organizations may also be critical. Involving key actors in planning, development, and problem solving typically increases the likelihood of success; frequent communication is also a by-product of this strategy.

Translating an idea into practice cannot succeed without adequate resources—particularly money, time, and expertise. Most implementation analysts have studied federally funded innovations launched under conditions of relative fiscal abundance, hence they have downplayed the importance of fiscal resources to successful innovation and have failed to consider the extent to which time, particularly volunteer time, can replace money. Expertise has been found to be an important staff attribute in technologically sophisticated, federally funded innovations, but it may be less important in community-based efforts.

Finally, a high level of adaptability is associated with success. Adaptability refers to a planning process that continues *throughout* the period of implementation and typically involves mutual adaptation of both the innovation and the organization (e.g., the organizational context undergoes changes to accommodate the innovation, and the innovation itself is modified to meet local needs and requirements). Frequent communication is a corollary feature of an adaptive implementation strategy.

Shaw, we believe, understood these lessons intuitively. His first step in entering South Chicago was to determine which local institutions were most critical for the CAP to align itself with in order to gain entree to the social life of the community and, most important, to gain direct access to juveniles via their play groups or gangs. Shaw, it would appear, expected initially to ally the CAP with the two social settlements in Russell Square: the nonsectarian Common Ground, founded in 1930, and, especially because of its long-established roots, the Baptist-controlled Neighborhood House, founded in 1911. However, he eventually shifted his search for local sponsorship to the one institution that evoked universal allegiance, St. Michael's Church. By gaining the support of St. Michael's, Shaw hoped to involve key community actors in CAP efforts. The Area Project, Shaw frankly told St. Michael's pastor, Father John Lange, intended to "capitalize on the relationship between the church and the people."

Community support was a critical second step in Shaw's implementation strategy. Local residents who became involved, he anticipated, would provide the CAP with a sense of neighborhood needs, would encourage broad-based involvement in resulting CAP programs, and would assure a democratic, bottom-up implementation process. Local involvement in planning and implementation would give local residents a feeling of ownership, thereby increasing both participation and support. Shaw emphasized to Lange that the CAP's philosophic commitment to local control distinguished it from all social settlements. Social settlements, Shaw charged, "were superimposed upon the community by individuals residing in communities of higher economic level, who were quite strange to the neighborhood and its problems. These people decided what was wrong with the neighborhood and prescribed the treatment of it." The Area Project, on the other hand, would embody "a democratic approach" that would encourage innovation from the "bottom up," an approach later found to be generally effective in implementing innovation. Neighborhood residents would analyze community problems, sponsor appropriate programs, and manage the entire enterprise through an elected or appointed Board of Directors. Shaw's pitch apparently satisfied Lange—as well it might: The CAP was, in effect, proposing to subsidize at St. Michael's a youth program that the church could not afford on its own, and that would give it leverage against its local Protestant competitors.

The community support Shaw sought was not easily won. Shaw himself, along with the academic research tradition he represented, evoked grass-roots resistance at several points. Shaw's classic analysis of a Polish juvenile delinquent from Chicago, *The Jack-Roller*, had been published just a few years earlier to great scholarly and popular acclaim. *The Jack-Roller* could be interpreted, not unreasonably, as a lament over the inability of Polish immigrant families in industrial neighborhoods to socialize their children in conventional American values and behavior. It was thus not entirely surprising that Father Lange, after agreeing to sponsor Shaw's enterprise, began to receive anonymous letters charging that the institutions that supported Shaw's research were now attempting to develop a "crime school" in the community, and that they were "primarily interested in getting material to show the amount of crime among the Polish people."

To allay such suspicions, Shaw's chief neighborhood sponsor, Dr. A. S. Mioduski, convened an open meeting at which all South Chicagoans could air their grievances concerning the Area Project philosophy or program. Representatives of several Polish nationalist organizations were conspicuously in attendance. Shaw and University of Chicago sociologist Ernest Burgess represented the Area Project.

Community spokespersons' concern centered more on Shaw's and Burgess' motives and methods in conducting past research than on the intentions or design of the Area Project *per se*. The community apparently wanted to judge for itself the character of these "friendly intruders,"[5] rather than to challenge a program that already enjoyed the blessing of Father Lange and Dr. Mioduski. Thus, Shaw had to defend *The Jack-Roller* for its alleged emphasis on the main character's Polish nationality. In fact, as Shaw could doubtless have demonstrated, the entire thrust of *The Jack-Roller* was to downplay nationality as a causal factor in juvenile crime. He did not have to do so, however, because Dr. Mioduski rose to his defense and assured his fellow Poles that he had read the book and "personally did not think that Mr. Shaw meant to cast any reflection upon the Polish people."

The open forum resulted in no formal approval or disapproval, but in a period of "watchful waiting" regarding the future of the CAP in Russell Square. In retrospect, however, the forum seems to have played a crucial role in calming diffuse fears, in explaining the Area Project philosophy to a broad segment of influential South Chicagoans, and in demonstrating by example Shaw's openness and responsiveness to community opinion. As Shaw reiterated time and again, it was not his purpose to impose the Area Project on communities, willing or not, in order to do them good. Rather, Shaw insisted, the CAP had to emerge as much from "the bottom up" as from "the top down." It had to take shape "naturally" in order to serve as both symbol and catalyst of a profound shift in community sentiments. It began to do so in 1933 when the CAP-sponsored St. Michael's Boys' Club had its gala opening.

THE CHICAGO AREA PROJECT IN ACTION IN SOUTH CHICAGO

Shaw's plan for reducing juvenile crime in South Chicago relied on implementing one old stand-by in delinquency prevention—organized recreation programs—and two innovations, furthering communal self-renewal through broad-based resident involvement, and mediation with youth and youth-serving agencies in order to divert youth from the juvenile justice system.

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[5]Carol Joffe, *Friendly Intruders*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

Recreation

Clifford Shaw always insisted that recreational programs sponsored by the Area Project were means to more ambitious ends, and not (as he viewed the recreational activities of social settlements, churches, schools, and parks) ends in themselves. The fact remained, however, that in Russell Square the St. Michael's Boys' Club absorbed the great bulk of CAP energies and enlisted the greatest community enthusiasm. To most children and parents in the Bush, the Area Project and the Boys' Club were virtually synonymous, and organized recreation was indeed valuable in itself. Shaw, sensitive to the principle that local need must dominate the successful implementation process, no doubt watched the burgeoning of the recreation programs with mixed feelings. Clearly, they were meeting a local need, as evidenced by the widespread community enthusiasm and support they evoked. At the same time, Shaw had bigger aims for the CAP. Ever the astute implementer, even as he encouraged the growth and adaptation of recreation programs to expressed community needs, he was creating several additional structures and processes that built directly upon the Boys' Club to serve his larger ends.

The CAP's recreational program was centered at St. Michael's, but it also encompassed a variety of activities at two other neighborhood social centers and at the local public parks, whose formal programs for youth were essentially placed under CAP control. Athletic contests remained the most important recreational activities that the CAP sponsored. Football was particularly encouraged because it (allegedly) channeled sustained aggression while discouraging blatant brutality, and it siphoned energies that might otherwise go into fighting and stealing. Leagues were formed in basketball, baseball, volleyball, and tennis. To accommodate these programs, CAP workers obtained permission to convert approximately ten vacant lots into playgrounds, where they also sponsored competitions in badminton, horseshoe pitching, archery, and track and field events. Boxing and wrestling events were also strongly encouraged, both for the opportunities they provided for strenuous exercise and as a means for settling disputes between individuals and gangs with minimal bloodshed. In the summers, the CAP sponsored swimming instruction in public parks and transported youth to nearby lakes. In the winters, on a smaller scale, it introduced youth to skiing, tobogganing, and ice skating. Considered *in toto*, the CAP offered Russell Square youth organized opportunities for athletic participation equal to, or more extensive than, those available to youth in more economically advantaged neighborhoods.

The St. Michael's Boys' Club, unlike many other boys' clubs, was no mere after-school or weekend recreational center. It was ordinarily open every evening until 10 p.m., although younger children were routinely sent home an hour or so before closing time. While precise daily attendance data are no longer available, the Club's directors claimed that at least three-quarters of Russell Square's eligible boys, and one-half of the eligible girls, were regular participants in a CAP program. Club staff and volunteers all took their responsibilities to children and parents most seriously. They kept detailed activity cards on each youngster, covering the total time spent at the Club and the activities pursued, so that parents could find out (if they were so inclined) how their children were spending their time away from home under formal adult supervision.

To orient the program more directly toward delinquency prevention, Club staff members went to great pains to establish ties with virtually every youth from Russell Square who had had formal contact with the police, whether or not the youngster was officially charged. The object was to involve delinquent youth in as many structured recreational activities as possible; indeed, this was probably a condition of (and an incentive to grant) unofficial police probation. CAP staff and volunteers assumed responsibility for knowing where such boys were after school and during early evening hours. If the boys failed to attend Club activities, CAP workers generally knew where to locate them in their favorite haunts.

Because the St. Michael's Boys' Club became such a popular local institution, it presented in classic form a dilemma Shaw faced in each of the communities he entered: how to sustain momentum for realizing all of the CAP's objectives after rallying the community sentiment behind a new and elaborate recreational facility. The most distinguishing feature of the Area Project philosophy, Shaw stressed, was its community, rather than institutional, focus. The truly innovative work was to go on "out there," in the community, rather than inside four walls, as in the traditional boys' club, social settlement, or YMCA, however attractively designed to appeal to youth. To fulfill Shaw's objectives, the St. Michael's Boys' Club had to serve as a catalyst for building a new, confident, well-organized community spirit in Russell Square, and as a springboard for sundry "mediative" activities that would neutralize the attractions of delinquency for gang youth and smooth their relations with educational and social control institutions. Shaw proceeded to make it so by utilizing several important principles of implementation analysis, including "bottom-up" planning, participant control of daily operations, and local involvement in modifications to the innovation.

Vigilance and Communal Self-Renewal

A key component of Shaw's implementation strategy was the Russell Square Community Committee (RSCC), an indigenous organization created to administer and coordinate the entire Area Project program in South Chicago. The RSCC was the structural embodiment of the CAP's communal self-help philosophy, encouraging expression of local needs and broad-based involvement in governance and operations. While it supervised programmatic details and advised on treatment of individual youths, its chief role and goal was to develop a new sense of potency among law-abiding residents to transform their neighborhood so it would no longer tolerate conditions that fostered juvenile crime. As one spokesperson put it, the RSCC was nothing less than a "vigilante organization."

The RSCC was composed of a Board of Directors responsible for setting policy and for fund-raising; program staff (full-time and part-time) paid by either the Committee itself, CAP headquarters (Shaw), the IJR, or the federally funded Works Progress Administration (WPA); and numerous unpaid volunteers, all of whom came from the community. During most years, the RSCC employed the equivalent of approximately five or six full-time staff. In the 1930s, however, WPA funds were periodically available to considerably expand the staff, especially for recreation programs. In addition, the Area Project controlled certain city funds, enabling it to place its own personnel in special project positions as probation officers, truant officers, and park supervisors. St. Michael's Church also contributed the time of at least one of its priests to serve the CAP as a youth counselor.

While the Board of Directors and the two key staff supervisors during the 1930s and 1940s, James McDonald and Stephen Bubacz, exerted great influence on all CAP activities, concrete planning and program implementation were mainly in the hands of several subcommittees staffed largely by community volunteers. These subcommittees covered such areas as education, family counseling, juvenile delinquency, and camping, and they were the prime avenue through which the CAP recruited new members. It was mainly through the subcommittees, moreover, that concerned adults gained direct access to youth, whether by pleading a delinquent's case before juvenile court, visiting children's homes to discuss problems with them and their parents, managing an athletic team, or supervising construction and repair of recreational facilities. The sundry subcommittees engaged the services of between 150 and 200 Russell Square adults each year.

Along with the CAP's self-help ethos went self-financing. Although Clifford Shaw provided the RSCC with initial financial as well as

organizational assistance and continued to offer small amounts of money throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the RSCC raised the great bulk of its funds in the community. This was no mean task, of course, considering the low income of Russell Square residents, the irregular employment occasioned by the Depression, and the mandatory sums that residents contributed to St. Michael's Church. Hundreds of men and women collected money door to door; held bazaars, fairs, talent contests, tag days, and handicraft exhibits; and sponsored smokers and innumerable athletic events. Although women in the community were important in supervising the Boys' Club programs for girls and in serving occasionally as street workers for female gangs, their most significant contribution lay in fund-raising, where they drew extensively on their experience in raising money for their church. (They apparently did not draw Father Lange's ire, for the simple reason that most monies helped sustain the St. Michael's Boys' Club.)

The RSCC pursued diverse strategies of "vigilantism" in its efforts to change social conditions it considered responsible for delinquency and to enhance the Bush's self-image in the eyes of both youth and adults. Perhaps the most basic step toward communal self-renewal, concluded the RSCC, was the improvement of the neighborhood's dilapidated physical appearance, which was a source of considerable shame and self-denigration. "Let us be honest with ourselves," read a broadside which the Committee distributed throughout Russell Square. "Are we proud of our community? Do we hesitate to tell a stranger where we live? You fellows and girls who work downtown or go to dances can answer that one."

While the RSCC spearheaded myriad projects to rehabilitate the physical appearance of the Bush, its "vigilantism" was generally aimed at social conditions which, in its view, were directly linked to juvenile delinquency. The RSCC cooperated closely with Jessie Binford's aggressive Juvenile Protective Association (JPA), on whose Board of Directors Clifford Shaw actively served. With the JPA, the RSCC worked diligently to restrict access of minors to taverns, to close down houses of prostitution, and to drive out "fences" from the community.

The achievement that perhaps best symbolized growing communal solidarity and purposefulness in the Bush was the establishment of Camp Lange. As Shaw would have wished, the initiative for it appears to have come from the community rather than from CAP headquarters. And as is sometimes the case when ideas come from the bottom up, it clashed with Shaw's goals for the CAP. Shaw identified the whole notion of camping with the offerings of traditional social agency programs. The rural sentimentality and escapism associated with the camp movement in the early 20th century was indeed at odds with the

unique, distinctively pro-urban sensibility with which Shaw and the Chicago School of Sociology were widely identified. Nonetheless, Shaw was foremost a brilliant implementation strategist. As with his courting of St. Michael's Church, Shaw responded to local preferences. After some initial hesitation, he encouraged the RSCC to pursue the idea of a camp program as far as it could, and he provided a small subsidy for the venture.

Working together with the CAP headquarters, the RSCC leased a small camp for weekend use on the Lake Michigan sand dunes near New Buffalo, Michigan. To adapt the camp to CAP needs, the Committee purchased and transported a portable school building to the site and constructed several small bunkhouses for sleeping quarters. Capacity was only 25, not counting the "army of sand fleas and mosquitoes who in no small measure contributed to camp activities."

Although children used the camp regularly between 1935 and 1938, parents complained that facilities were inadequate to satisfy a pent-up demand for organized outdoor adventure. They asked the RSCC to locate a suitable piece of land in the countryside upon which Bush residents could, by pooling their time and skills, build a permanent campsite of their own. The RSCC organized a feverish campaign to garner funds early in 1939 and within a short time raised nearly $5,000 from some 600 local contributors. This was sufficient to purchase 27 acres adjacent to a lake in Michigan City, Indiana, a used bus for transportation, and building materials (which were supplemented by contributions from The Pullman Car Company and other South Chicago businesses). Working whenever they could, volunteers with skills in carpentry, plumbing, masonry, and roofing built essential equipment and furniture for the camp in Russell Square machine shops. They also traveled to Michigan City to build a kitchen, an underground storage cellar, a mess hall (seating 60), eight bunkhouses (each sleeping 5), a hospital tent, a director's tent, and a garden (which was expected both to cut food costs and to instill respect for nature). The dedication ceremonies for Camp Lange, named for the patriarch of St. Michael's Church, were attended by fully one-fifth of the residents of the Bush, an "inspiring sight," as one observer remarked.

Clifford Shaw would certainly never have predicted that the two most visible monuments to the CAP's influence in South Chicago would be a boys' club located in a Catholic church and a lakeside camp in Indiana named after the church's patriarch. But this very unpredictability exemplified what Shaw never tired of repeating to skeptics—that the Area Project was not a blueprint for reform but simply a

conceptual framework that, when well implemented, encouraged and facilitated indigenous social invention.

Mediation as Delinquency Prevention

"Mediation" was a key component of Shaw's implementation strategy. Under this rubric, the Area Project engaged in a variety of innovative efforts at delinquency prevention. On the one hand, CAP staff and volunteers sought at every opportunity to explain to representatives of formal social agencies without indigenous roots—e.g., schools, police, and probation departments—why troublesome children from the Bush behaved as they did, and what they were like as individual human beings. On the other hand, CAP workers tried to persuade local youth—in a low-keyed, tolerant, nonabusive manner—that it was both morally right and, ultimately, in their best interest to conform to the values and expectations of conventional society.

The best-publicized and best-documented form of CAP mediation was the one-to-one interaction between street workers and youth gang members, an activity that became known popularly as "curbstone counseling." The process hardly lends itself to easy description or analysis. The following "definition" by one of the counselors is typical: "Sometimes the most important thing to an individual is just to sit on a curbstone and talk to someone he can trust. It's hard to explain, but I guess the biggest thing we do is to make ourselves available for whatever help a youngster would expect of a close friend. And if we can't be that friend to him, we'll try to find someone who can."

So in playgrounds, parks, city streets, schools, courts, police stations, places of employment, camps, beaches—wherever—CAP staff and volunteers served as concerned, knowledgeable older brothers and close friends to young people who were already in trouble with the law, or who were committing delinquent acts that would lead them into legal difficulties. Curbstone counselors were, ideally, young adults from Russell Square with whom delinquent youth could identify relatively easily, people who had somehow internalized and acted upon conventional values despite their upbringing in the Bush, or who had once been active criminals but after punishment or simply maturation, had changed radically and become law-abiding citizens. These indigenous street workers were supplemented, especially at the beginning stages of community organization, by energetic, idealistic, highly educated young men from CAP headquarters who attempted in their own way to develop close rapport with delinquent youth.

Curbstone counselors advised boys on appropriate language and manners, tried to dissuade them from serious criminal behavior, suggested alternative courses of action that would prove equally

stimulating and rewarding in the long run, stood by them when they got into trouble, and, above all, tried to *be* with them as much as possible. They served as both model and translator of conventional social values with which youth from the Bush had had little previous contact (or so the counselors assumed). To the chagrin of professional social workers who came to observe, the Area Project street workers did indeed appear to accept the boys' deviant attitudes, values, and behavior as "normal" within the cultural matrix of Russell Square. Convinced that formal contact with the police or the juvenile justice system only reinforced children's allegiance to a deviant code of conduct, CAP staff and volunteers made every effort to keep lawbreakers at home and to rehabilitate them in the Bush. In sum, curbstone counseling, like the CAP that spawned it, was not a "technique" of intervention, but a philosophy, a style, an individual moral presence. It was less social work *per se* than aggressive, omnipresent caring and monitoring of "youth at risk" in their natural, criminogenic habitats.

While the methods of curbstone counseling were informal, they did not lack a basic strategy. That strategy was predicated on two key assumptions: first, that gangs were pervasive in high crime areas and were directly responsible for most delinquent behavior (i.e., delinquent conduct was a group rather than an individual phenomenon), and second, that all gangs generated "natural" leaders who wielded extraordinary influence and who could thereby be employed, once rehabilitated themselves, as change agents.[6] These propositions were basic to the many studies on urban youth published by the Chicago School of Sociology. Their importance to the Area Project, though, derived as much from necessity as from theory. Unless CAP street workers believed, as an article of faith, that the rehabilitation of a few "natural" gang leaders would ramify and transform the behavior of other gang members who looked to them for guidance, the CAP could not possibly—given its finite numbers of staff and volunteers—exert much influence on crime rates in Russell Square.

The Area Project supplemented curbstone counseling with another set of equally important mediation activities which received less publicity at the time and are more difficult to document in retrospect. These activities bore a close resemblance to what would probably be called child advocacy and/or diversion today. By interceding with officials in schools, police stations, and juvenile courts, CAP staff and volunteers attempted both to humanize the operation of educational

[6]We borrow the term "change agent" from the U.S. Office of Education, which first used it in 1973 to describe federally funded programs designed to introduce and spread innovative practices in public schools. For reports of the "change agent" study, see Paul Berman and Milbrey McLaughlin, 1977, 1978, op. cit.

and social control institutions and to convince those institutions that the community (i.e., the RSCC) possessed the will and ability to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents without the need for official, punitive intervention. The Area Project was aggressively against institutional treatment and in favor of community treatment in cases of juvenile misconduct and crime. No work was more important than convincing a truant officer or school counselor not to recommend a juvenile court hearing for a child; a policeman not to arrest or detain in jail a child caught committing petty thievery; a probation officer or judge not to give up on a youngster and send him to reform school; a parole officer not to recommit a minor offender to prison. These efforts at mediation doubtless played an important role—though one that cannot be precisely measured—in diverting youth from the juvenile justice system and, perforce, in lowering official crime rates in South Chicago. Unfortunately, few of these diversion activities were carefully documented. There is little doubt, however, that they were as much a part of the day-to-day delinquency prevention venture as the Boys' Club or curbstone counseling.

The Area Project's most systematic efforts at institutional mediation in South Chicago were directed toward the schools and parole—the beginning and the end of the prevention process, in Shaw's eyes. Mediation in the schools (both public and parochial) centered on the issue of truancy, which the conventional scholarly wisdom of the period held to be one of the most accurate predictors of delinquency. Street workers in Russell Square sought regularly to convince youth that school success was the key to personal advancement. They complemented personal exhortation with vigorous efforts to change the schools—to make them more appealing and responsive to children's individual needs, so that the students would have less reason for playing truant or dropping out. Via discussions with school administrators and teachers, they tried to modify inappropriate curricula, to have children transferred from one school to another where the program or personnel were more suitable, to mainstream children inappropriately placed in classes for incorrigible or backward students (and likewise to have children who required special treatment transferred to appropriate school programs), and to have children reinstated who had been expelled for minor delinquencies. On a more mundane level, they provided carfare for poor children who lived far from school and eyeglasses for students who could not obtain them elsewhere.

As time went on, the Area Project's relationship with the schools became increasingly important in Clifford Shaw's thinking on delinquency prevention. In order for a school to become accepted in its community, he argued in 1940, it must follow an implementation

strategy much like the one Shaw had initially used in bringing the CAP to South Chicago. First, the school must be active in convincing local residents that it "belongs" to them, that it is an integral part of the community rather than "a self-sufficient institution within it." Moreover, Shaw believed, schools had to incorporate community needs and values in their operations. In particular, schools had to recognize that antisocial behavior which easily offended school authorities was normative in many lower-class, heavily immigrant urban neighborhoods. Unless teachers and principals adopted less decorous standards of conventional, school-appropriate behavior, they would never be able to redirect the attitudes and behavior of youth in communities like Russell Square.

In 1939, Shaw managed to institutionalize this strategy when he convinced the Chicago Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools to appoint six individuals of his choosing as special truant officers in CAP neighborhoods. In Shaw's vision, the publicly supported truant officer could become a vital link between neighborhood youth and all social service institutions, but only if that individual was indigenous to the community and could deal with its residents in a language and style they could easily comprehend.

One of the most important features that distinguished the Area Project from other social agencies was its willingness to work with persistently difficult and delinquent youth. Ideally, the CAP intervened early enough into children's lives to disrupt patterns of misconduct before they led to serious confrontation with social control authorities. But the CAP did not turn its back on older youth who, for one reason or another, ignored the advice of staff and volunteers and persisted in criminal conduct to the point where they were committed to reform schools, jails, or prisons. The logic of the Area Project actually required it to make special efforts to incorporate the young adult ex-convict into CAP programs, for he, as a potential spokesperson for mature criminal values, could easily subvert whatever staff and volunteers had accomplished in weaning juveniles (particularly members of his former gang) to more conventional conduct. Thus, in effect, the Area Project had no choice but to extend its prevention program to correctional school and prison parolees.

As in the monitoring of truants from school, the most innovative feature of the CAP's parole project in Russell Square was the relationship it developed with a public agency, in this case, the Illinois State Parole Board. By establishing close communication with the Parole Board, the CAP exerted substantial control over conditions for release from prison of young men whose homes were in Russell Square. Whenever an inmate from Russell Square became eligible for parole,

the RSCC was asked to develop a program of rehabilitation specifically designed to reintegrate that individual into the community. The Area Project kept careful files on each youngster sent to a correctional institution, covering his family life, school, and employment record, level of participation in community activities, and history of delinquent conduct. These personal and social profiles were generally more illuminating than those compiled by professional social workers who worked for the Parole Board.

CAP staff and volunteers tried to smooth a parolee's reintroduction to the Bush in a variety of ways. They encouraged and helped parolees to make "new and worthwhile" friendships in the neighborhood with "conventional groups" with whom they shared common interests. To help parolees "gain status and recognition," they arranged for nearly all of them to participate in one or another CAP-sponsored project for community improvement. Finally, to the extent possible in a Depression economy, the CAP attempted to find each parolee a job "suited to his skills, and sufficiently remunerative to care for his financial needs." On occasion, parolees were assigned to do rehabilitative work with gang members in WPA positions that the CAP controlled.

The Area Project's parole program lent itself more readily to statistical evaluation than did the other mediation activities. The most systematic of several evaluations covered the years 1935 to 1944 and compared the subsequent violation records of Russell Square youth released on parole under CAP recognizance with the records of a similar group released on parole in another area of South Chicago outside of Area Project jurisdiction. The results should be viewed as suggestive only, in light of the relatively small number of parolees involved and the rudimentary evaluation design.

The data indicate that at the time of the evaluation, significantly fewer CAP parolees (46 percent versus 63 percent) had acquired additional criminal records during or after parole. Most of the crimes of the Russell Square parolees appear to have been fairly minor violations of parole regulations. During their periods of parole, only 10.8 percent of the Russell Square parolees were formally arrested, and none was returned to prison on a new charge. In the control area, by contrast, 19 percent were arrested and 11.4 percent were returned to prison. Further, in Russell Square, only 2.7 percent of the parolees were returned to prison for technical violation of parole, as compared with 17.2 percent of the control group. It thus seems likely that the CAP exerted influence on the criminal justice system to keep parolees in the neighborhood and out of institutions. The statistics thus reinforce what more qualitative data reveal more poignantly: The CAP did not abandon persistent juvenile offenders before, during, or after conflict

with social control authorities. For both child and community, the CAP was an advocate for all time.

Evaluation

Clifford Shaw never claimed more for the success of the Area Project in reducing crime and developing community than "objective evidence" allowed. Indeed, he often had to temper the enthusiasm and extravagant claims of community spokespersons whose sense of accomplishment outpaced the accumulation of verifiable empirical data. Above all, Shaw insisted that the CAP be understood as a "social experiment" subject to the principles and procedures of scientific evaluation.

Shaw's most systematic appraisal of the CAP's performance came in 1944, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of its formal incorporation (although the program in South Chicago had been in operation for over 12 years). Shaw pointed up a variety of "conditions which complicate delinquency prevention in low-income communities." He also singled out a number of factors—notably the conservatism of professional social workers—that impeded the widespread application of "the self-help principle." Nonetheless, his overall assessment, which included both qualitative implementation data and quantitative outcome data, was decidedly optimistic. When given the chance, Shaw argued, residents in high-crime areas had demonstrated that they could "organize themselves into effective working units for the promotion of welfare programs," that they could uncover and effectively utilize previously untapped talent and leadership, that their organizations were stable and evidenced increasing solidarity over time, and that they were remarkably efficient in both raising and expending funds locally. Moreover, because of their greater knowledge of immigrant languages, cultural traditions, and neighborhood social processes, the community committees had been able to elicit interest and participation from individuals and institutions that were previously indifferent or hostile to the appeals of professional social workers. School/community relations had been vastly improved, the activities of junk dealers and tavern owners had been substantially curtailed, and a few communities had begun their own summer camp programs.

The two accomplishments that Shaw elaborated at length in his 1944 evaluation were both identified principally with the RSCC. First was the parole program, which had been "unusually successful" in Russell Square and which promised to "yield facts which may have far-reaching significance for probation and parole officers throughout the country." Second, and the point to which he devoted greatest

attention, was the substantial decline in official rates of delinquency in two of the three pioneer CAP communities (South Chicago and the near west side). The decline in South Chicago was especially sharp. Between 1932 and 1942, police contacts of juveniles between the ages of 2 and 16 in Russell Square dropped from approximately 60 per 1000 to 20 per 1000, a decline of two-thirds.[7] Equally telling was the fact that for Russell Square, Shaw could not employ an additional statistical measure which he used to assess delinquency rates on the near west and north sides—petitions filed in juvenile court—"because the number of cases was too small to provide an adequate sample." Thus, the RSCC stood out as a brilliant success on the two measures that lent themselves most easily (in Shaw's view) to statistical evaluation.

These downward trends first became evident to Shaw in the mid-1930s. He was then inclined to believe that they provided conclusive proof of the CAP's direct impact on crime. He was especially confident of the statistical results because, he asserted, in a comparable South Chicago neighborhood which the CAP did not serve, juvenile delinquency (as measured by police arrests) did not decline at all, whereas in Russell Square the rate was more than halved between 1932 and 1937.

By 1944, Shaw had become more aware of some of the statistical inadequacies of his measures and of more general difficulties in empirical assessment of delinquency prevention programs. His comments remained upbeat, but his language was guarded. "The reader is cautioned against ascribing the marked decrease in delinquency in Russell Square and the West Side to the activities of the Area Project," he warned. "Less marked decreases have been observed in some areas in which no special program has been carried on.... While it is impossible to ascertain accurately the extent to which this trend is due to the work of these committees, it is not improbable that the heightened activity of the citizenry and the downward trend of delinquency are related phenomena."

As time went on, Shaw became more and more reluctant to cite statistical data on delinquency rates to demonstrate the wisdom and effectiveness of the Area Project. He never even bothered to publish the statistics he collected on crime in individual Project communities after 1942. In fact, as he wrote in 1953 to Helen Witmer (who was preparing a national evaluation of delinquency prevention programs), he doubted that it would ever be possible to demonstrate statistically a causal link between the Area Project and downward delinquency rates

[7]In contrast, on the near west side, police contacts dropped from approximately 39 per 1000 to 23 per 1000, a decline of less than two-fifths.

in Russell Square or elsewhere:

> Conclusive statistical proof to sustain any conclusion regarding the effectiveness of this work in reducing the volume of delinquency is difficult to secure for many reasons. Trends in rates of delinquents for small areas are affected by variations in the definition of what constitutes delinquent behavior, changes in the composition of the population, and changes in administrative procedures in law enforcement agencies. We know from our experiences in the inner city areas that there is no fixed volume of delinquency. We know that there are a large number of unofficial cases of unlawful behavior, and the extent to which these unofficial cases become apprehended and dealt with as official delinquents depends upon a wide variety of influences and pressures which vary from one community to another.[8]

According to Witmer, Shaw was no longer much interested in statistical trends on delinquency. He had turned his attention to developing means to assess the results of the CAP's intervention with individual, seriously delinquent youth.

If Shaw was no longer willing to trumpet the RSCC's success in measurably reducing crime within its neighborhood domain, certainly no one else in the scholarly community would be willing to do so either. Nearly all commentators on the Area Project during the past 40 years have viewed the pioneer communities as a more or less indistinguishable group, none of which demonstrated statistically verifiable effects on local crime rates. Russell Square's early claim to special fame was casually forgotten.

The bulk of Clifford Shaw's public utterances on the Area Project further contributed to the tendency of scholars to view the several pioneer communities *en masse* rather than individually. Shaw stressed that all community committees subscribed to a common philosophy of delinquency prevention, rather than focusing on the particularities of implementation in each. Promised case studies of individual communities (which were apparently in preparation in the late 1930s) never materialized. Shaw seemed most interested in demonstrating the workability of general organizational principles, particularly the self-help principle in coping with urban social disorganization, and in emphasizing that the CAP was a genuine scientific experiment based upon specific theories of crime causation. Like most commentators on the Area Project, Shaw usually interpreted the CAP's significance in highly ideological terms, as a battle of philosophies of social amelioration.

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[8]Helen Witmer and Edith Tufts, *The Effectiveness of Delinquency Prevention Programs*, Washington, D.C.: United States Children's Bureau, 1954, p. 16.

In our judgment, however, to portray the Area Project mainly in ideological terms is to create serious distortion. It encourages neglect of the *process of implementation*, obscures the CAP as an *operational reality*, and directs attention away from Shaw's own strong *pragmatic, adaptive strain* in his relations with individual community committees. All of these elements, as recent research indicates, are critical for evaluating success or failure in a wide range of social innovations.[9] By failing to examine these facets of his own "social experiment," Shaw may well have missed an opportunity to explain systematically why the CAP was more successful in some communities than in others.

Obviously it is impossible today to analyze the genesis, programmatic structure, and evolution of the CAP's pioneer experiment in Russell Square at the level of fine detail and nuance that would have been possible in the 1930s and 1940s. Considerable oversimplification of the early history is inevitable. Yet, accepting these limitations, it seems to us that two broad features of the RSCC's early history stand out with considerable clarity. First, the implementation process was characterized by several factors which, as indicated earlier, social scientists today consider essential to successful social innovation. Second, the RSCC managed to overcome many of the operational hurdles that continue to bedevil the vast majority of innovative programs in delinquency prevention today.

We have already reviewed the basic facts regarding implementation. Shaw's vision of the CAP did indeed include a grand reform strategy, but that strategy was not unchangeable and, most important, Shaw believed it could not be imposed on local residents without subverting the principle of communal self-help. Consequently, the CAP entered Russell Square slowly and cautiously, and by the time-worn path of least resistance to children and parents alike: organized recreation. While recreation was a desired end to many local residents, it represented to Shaw only a means to larger programmatic and organizational ends. In short order, Shaw expanded recreational contacts with juvenile gangs to include extensive curbstone counseling. Becoming fully rooted and accepted in the neighborhood, though, required more than CAP energies alone could provide. Recognizing this early, Shaw carefully courted the local Catholic church and influential Catholic laymen. This turned out to be a lengthy process, but one that Shaw would not force or rush. In the end, "inside" sponsorship proved crucial for galvanizing widespread community support and

[9]See, for example, Carol Weiss, *Using Social Research in Public Policy*, Boston: D.C. Heath, 1977; and Milbrey McLaughlin, "Evaluation and Alchemy," in John Pincus (ed.), *Educational Evaluation in the Public Policy Setting*, The Rand Corporation, R-2502-RC, May 1980.

participation in all phases of the CAP's venture in Russell Square. To local residents, the CAP may have appeared mainly as an appendage to St. Michael's. To the pragmatist in Shaw, however, the church connection was essential to get his own experiment off the ground, even if it entailed risks, demanded compromises, and necessitated occasional smoothing of priestly feathers. The implementation of the Area Project in Russell Square was a classic example of mutual adaptation of ideology and local context.

Mutual adaptation continued throughout the early years. Shaw exercised his authority minimally and discreetly, but his presence remained unmistakable, an energizing force to inspire local "natural" leaders and CAP staff alike. Ideology may have dictated turning over control of local operations to indigenous residents without delay, but James McDonald, assigned from CAP headquarters, remained in charge for over four years until an especially talented local leader (Stephen Bubacz) could be found, trained, and set loose. Ideology may have dictated that indigenous street workers carry the burden of curbstone counseling because they shared the local youths' culture and world view, but nonindigenous street workers from CAP headquarters remained the bulwark of curbstone counseling throughout the 1930s. At first glance, furthermore, camping seemed irrelevant to CAP ideology. Camping smacked of rural sentimentality and inappropriate genteel solutions to the problems of streetwise gang youth. Ideology notwithstanding, however, once it became clear that Russell Square youth wanted to go to camp, that their parents wanted it for them, and that the community considered camping an essential tool of delinquency prevention, Shaw became reconciled to camping as integral to the Area Project philosophy—a new means to foster community organization activities and an extension into the countryside of Russell Square's revitalized community spirit. In this as in other CAP endeavors in the Bush, Shaw both guided and followed as the occasion dictated. He was a pragmatic ideologue, ever ready to adapt general principles to local conditions and desires.

If implementation of the CAP's program in Russell Square combined authoritative direction, flexibility, and adaptation in a manner that appears (in retrospect) conducive to successful social innovation, so was its mode of daily operation consistent with its ultimate objective, namely, the reduction of crime. That this was no mean achievement is attested to by the inglorious history of federally sponsored innovations in delinquency prevention during the 1970s. These programs were ostensibly designed to increase the capacity of local youth-serving institutions to reduce rates of delinquency in relatively small areas (not unlike the CAP). In practice, however, these programs—in addition to

floundering in purpose due to diffuse, often conflicting theoretical orientations—rarely dealt with and often assiduously avoided seriously delinquent youth; confined their treatments largely to recreation; fostered only superficial cooperation among youth-serving agencies and between agencies and schools; systematically avoided developing close working relationships with vital social control institutions, notably police and juvenile courts; ignored problems and characteristics distinctive to individual communities; and failed to elicit sustained participation from local volunteers.[10]

We have already seen how different the CAP's program was in practice. A clear but relatively unconfining theoretical orientation guided the enterprise from beginning to end. The RSCC reached out especially toward seriously delinquent youth, including highly antisocial gang members and ex-convicts, and dealt with them in every phase of its program. Recreation remained central to the program, but it served as a springboard for attaining broader goals: facilitating counseling with gang youth; providing employment for "natural" youth leaders; eliciting adult participation in structuring and monitoring social activities for youth, and introducing adults to one another; solidifying the Catholic church's authority in the community; and so forth. There were limits to the RSCC's willingness to cooperate with other youth-serving social agencies. But the RSCC did work closely with the JPA and, perhaps most important, it developed very close links with local public and parochial schools, serving children as advocates and prodding administrators and teachers to more conscientious performance and assessment of children's individual needs. Even more systematic were the RSCC's links with the police and juvenile court, for whom, in modern-day terms, the RSCC served essentially as a community-based diversion agency. Throughout its endeavors, the RSCC shaped programs and assigned personnel to take maximum advantage of its knowledge of local communal needs and sensibilities. Finally, the RSCC was built upon volunteer, indigenous leadership and elicited sustained participation and financial support from a sizable portion of the local residents, both men and women. The RSCC's program in the 1930s and 1940s, in short, appears in practice to have embodied the very features whose absence, in the opinion of recent scholars, foredoomed attempts in the 1970s to innovate in the field of delinquency prevention.

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[10]These, at least, were the conclusions reached by the two most comprehensive evaluations: Jerry Walker, Albert Cardarelli, and Dennis Billingsley, *The Theory and Practice of Delinquency Prevention in the United States: Review, Synthesis and Assessment*, Columbus, Ohio: Center for Vocational Education, The Ohio State University, 1976; and Barry Krisberg, *The National Evaluation of Delinquency Prevention*, San Francisco: National Council on Crime and Delinquency Research Center, 1981.

In that limited sense, then, the CAP in South Chicago was undeniably a success. Carefully and thoughtfully implemented, it succeeded in building an indigenous structure, the RSCC, which in turn elicited widespread and broad-based community support for its programs. But did it "really" work? That is, was the CAP in the 1930s and 1940s responsible for reductions in rates of delinquency in Russell Square? Though Shaw's data suggest that the CAP was achieving its goal of delinquency reduction, these same data and the designs that produced them do not permit an unqualified "yes" or "no." But some points are clear: The CAP organized the Russell Square community, helped it to help itself, provided new recreational opportunities, encouraged the emergence of indigenous leadership, and forged important links with other youth-serving agencies that in turn changed the way they treated local youth. The CAP experience in South Chicago seems, at the least, a social invention worthy of further study.

III. THE CHICAGO AREA PROJECT IN MODERN-DAY SOUTH CHICAGO

THE MEXICAN COMMUNITY COMMITTEE AND SCOPE

Modern-day South Chicago bears a stark similarity to the South Chicago of a half-century ago. It remains a working-class, largely Catholic neighborhood, dependent on the adjacent steel mills for its economic life. Today, as then, nationwide economic distress has occasioned slack demand for steel and has led to mass layoffs. The air in South Chicago is more fit to breathe, and even the sky is visible, but the many mill closings, as during the Great Depression, have cast "a pall of gloom" on the workers, their families, and neighborhood businesses.

Just as in the 1930s, South Chicago seems like a world unto itself—a small town rather than a part of the city of Chicago (see Fig. 1). Its physical isolation contributes to this perception. The skyscrapers and modern architecture of downtown Chicago are at considerable remove. Close to the Indiana border, shaped roughly like an inverted equilateral triangle, the area is bounded on the west side from its apex to its base by an interstate highway. South Chicago Avenue parallels the highway, hiding it and forming a more natural boundary. On the east, the steel mill area, fenced with heavy chain link, forms a clear boundary. The steel mills loom forbiddingly over the area and separate South Chicago from adjacent communities. Nearby Lake Michigan remains entirely hidden; easy access to the lakeshore is difficult for most residents.

These similarities, while hardly trivial, obscure the remarkable population changes that have radically transformed the ethnic and racial composition of South Chicago in the past half-century. The once dominant Poles now form a small minority; those who remain are generally quite elderly and reside almost entirely in the Bush. The blacks, who until 1960 were a very small but stable (and segregated) population, now form a large, socioeconomically diverse minority group. They live among themselves in two main areas: Millgate, the original black ghetto directly adjacent to the mills, composed of badly deteriorated, two-story frame houses (plus a more recent public-housing garden apartment complex), vacant lots scattered with rubble, trash, and weeds, and numerous boarded-up, vacant houses; and, since the 1960s,



Fig. 1—Community areas in the City of Chicago

a new middle- and lower-middle-class neighborhood of squat, solid-looking, two-story brick homes in South Chicago's northwest corner, which was previously occupied by eastern Europeans (see Fig. 2).

The most notable population change in South Chicago since the 1930s, though, is the ascendancy of the Hispanics. Mexicans first arrived in South Chicago as strikebreakers imported by the mill owners to counter labor union insurgency during the recessionary period following World War I. Although hated by the Polish workers, a small group of Mexicans remained after the strikes were broken, resolved to work in the mills. They gradually brought their families and settled in the less-populated southern portion of South Chicago (within walking distance of the mills, but far from the Polish-dominated Bush). After the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act in 1924, which severely restricted immigration from eastern Europe but did not apply to Western Hemisphere nations, Mexicans were the only immigrant group to continue to settle in South Chicago in substantial numbers. By the late 1950s, as a result of continued immigration and natural population increase, they began to challenge the Poles for neighborhood cultural (although not political) supremacy. At this point, second- and third-generation Poles began to leave South Chicago—first slowly, and then in droves—and by the mid-1970s the ethnic succession was complete. Except in the two black neighborhoods, the Hispanics are the dominant population in every South Chicago neighborhood, including the Bush (which they share with the few remaining Poles).

Inevitably, these massive population shifts disrupted the CAP's work in South Chicago. As we have seen, the critical links between the CAP, the RSCC, and St. Michael's Church all presumed the perpetuation of Polish territorial and cultural supremacy. When the Hispanics began to make substantial inroads into the Poles' territory, and when younger Poles began to leave the community, the CAP had to either adapt or disintegrate. While we have not investigated all the reasons for the decline of the CAP in South Chicago in the late 1950s, it is clear that the Polish old guard in both the RSCC and St. Michael's did not accommodate easily to the demographic transformation of their community. The possibility of sharing power in an expanded CAP organization which embraced the Hispanic settlements (then limited to the southern sections of South Chicago) as well as the Bush was never seriously entertained. The RSCC (including the Boys' Club) quietly went out of existence in 1959.

In that same year, a small group of residents, largely Hispanic, began to meet informally with a community worker from the State Department of Corrections, Henry Martinez, to discuss juvenile delinquency and other unaddressed local problems. Martinez had grown up



Fig. 2—Neighborhoods of South Chicago

in South Chicago in the 1940s. Unlike most Hispanics in the community at that time, his family resided in the heart of the Bush. No doubt for survival, if nothing else, Martinez earned a reputation as a tough street fighter. Predictably, he came to the attention of the RSCC and soon became one of the few Hispanics to participate regularly in the Boys' Club. Stephen Bubacz took a special interest in Martinez, working closely with him in the classic CAP mode of the curbstone counselor. Following service in the Korean War, Martinez returned to South Chicago with a vague hope of carrying on the Bubacz/CAP tradition but extending it to cover the growing Hispanic community.

Following his initial meetings with local residents, Martinez formally organized them in 1960 as the Mexican Community Committee (MCC). With support from volunteers, the MCC offered a modest array of recreational and other service programs for Hispanic youth. The following year, the CAP, anxious to be represented again in the community where it had once boasted its greatest successes, gave the MCC its imprimatur (which included a financial subsidy).

Once again, the CAP accepted ethnic exclusivity as a precondition for getting things done in South Chicago. The MCC catered only to youngsters and adults in the Hispanic southern sections of the community. By 1965, it had raised enough money to rent a storefront for its local headquarters. But it was not until the mid-1970s, when the MCC purchased a large four-story building (a former Masonic Lodge), that it acquired a notable presence and offered an array of activities that could at all be compared to those of the RSCC and the St. Michael's Boys' Club.

Neither the RSCC nor the MCC, of course, paid the least attention to the blacks in Millgate. Prior to 1970, a local settlement-type organization, the South Chicago Community Center, provided some services for black youth. However, the Center received little indigenous support; it folded after serious financial irregularities were discovered and few in the black community came to its defense.

Following the Center's demise, a number of concerned black residents in Millgate met with a community worker from the Illinois Commission on Delinquency Prevention to develop a more permanent youth-serving organization (this was in the aftermath of riots and "torchings" of buildings in Chicago by disgruntled young blacks following the assassination of Martin Luther King). The meeting resulted in the founding of SCOPE—South Chicago Organized for People's Efforts—a community-based, self-help organization to which the CAP soon extended its sponsorship, guidance, and financial assistance. Unlike the MCC and most of the CAP-affiliated organizations, SCOPE could not afford a full-time director like Henry Martinez. It relied very

heavily on volunteers, particularly its executive director, Donald Norwood, for both leadership and management.

Although our knowledge of their beginnings is sketchy, the initial implementation of the MCC and SCOPE appears to have conformed in important ways to the ideal process suggested by implementation theory (discussed above). In each case, the organization was begun as a means of addressing local needs for social services, particularly delinquency prevention. Each began with broad support from the people who lived and/or worked in the community. And each institutionalized volunteer involvement through creation of a large board, the members of which were expected to contribute substantial amounts of time to fund-raising, administration, and direct services to youth.

In these respects, initial implementation of the MCC and SCOPE was similar to the implementation process Shaw had spearheaded years before. But one difference is also significant. Shaw saw himself, quite accurately, as a "friendly intruder," and he spent much time and effort selling himself and his idea of the CAP to the South Chicago community. He did it brilliantly, enlisting the support of the powerful local Catholic church and of significant community leaders. Neither Martinez nor Norwood saw themselves as intruders. Indeed, much of their initial appeal—to the community and to the CAP that later subsidized each organization—lay in their local origin and preexisting community contacts. With this human capital, there seemed less need to painstakingly build community or institutional support, as Shaw had done, for these were assumed.[1]

Although the MCC has grown since its founding in 1960, its structure has remained basically the same.[2] A large and occasionally unwieldy board of directors (the number fluctuates but is generally around three dozen) is elected annually from the general membership. Nearly all of the board members work in the community and grew up in the area as well. Board membership entails considerable time and responsibility. Each member is expected to spend about 30 hours a month on various activities, including fund-raising, board meetings, work on subcommittees (e.g., education), and one-on-one counseling of

[1]Martinez has tried to enlist Catholic church support, but with only marginal success, as discussed below. Martinez's and Norwood's tendency to simply assume community support may have been a strategic error in the long run. At the very least, neither the MCC nor SCOPE has been able to draw as readily on the services and support of other key community institutions as the RSCC had done.

[2]This discussion draws upon fieldwork conducted early in 1982, supplemented by later telephone interviews and by monthly reports describing program activities submitted by the MCC and SCOPE to CAP headquarters between 1976 and 1980. We focus particularly on programs that were in place as of 1980 in order to correspond with the 1980 census data we use in the following section to suggest possible program impact.

youth. In recent years, the MCC's capacity to exert communitywide leadership has been somewhat diminished by recurring clashes between Martinez and certain board members. During a visit to the MCC in May 1982, we found that recent difficulties had temporarily been resolved, but the likelihood of further clashes seemed very real.

In many important respects, the MCC follows closely in the traditions of the RSCC. Its focus is on youth and on delinquency prevention via community organization. It is closely identified with its founder and executive director, Henry Martinez, who sees himself as a disciple of Clifford Shaw and a direct descendant of Stephen Bubacz. The MCC employs several full-time staff members, utilizes a large number of volunteers, and eschews "professional" social work philosophy and technique in favor of curbstone counseling by indigenous, street-wise community residents.

Like the RSCC, the MCC is strongly committed to community treatment of juvenile misconduct and crime. It maintains close relations (both formal and informal) with the schools, the juvenile court (probation), and especially the police in order to convince those institutions that the MCC possesses the will and the ability to rehabilitate the great majority of South Chicago's Hispanic delinquents without the need for official intervention.

Close relations with the police are a key component of the MCC's efforts to reduce delinquency. Like the RSCC, the MCC is well known to the police. The official policy of the youth division is to contact the MCC whenever a Hispanic youth is brought in. An MCC staff member then comes to the police station and attempts to negotiate for the youth's release. When such an agreement is struck, it is nearly always contingent upon a promise by the MCC to counsel the youth and accept responsibility for his behavior. Martinez and his staff have a reputation in the community for being understanding but tough with youth referred to them for criminal misconduct. Indeed, they have much more freedom than public authorities to dress down belligerent youngsters with language and occasionally a show a force that the kids are unlikely to forget. Although it is impossible to provide exact measures of impact, our interviews with the community's social control agents (including police and school staff) left little doubt that the MCC, like the RSCC, is performing key mediative functions for neighborhood youth and diverting many from official processing by truant officers, the police, and the juvenile justice system.

If (without pretending to be comprehensive or systematic in our comparisons) there are notable similarities in the organization and conduct of the MCC and the RSCC, the dissimilarities are equally apparent. A few stand out: First, while the MCC can legitimately

boast considerable community support and active participation by volunteers in its various delinquency prevention efforts, it is obvious that the RSCC commanded wider and more emotional allegiance from both children and adults. It is no strong criticism of the MCC, or of the modern-day practice of the CAP philosophy, to observe that the MCC has not been able to infuse its delinquency prevention efforts with the quasi-religious aura of a child-saving crusade that was so evident in the RSCC's work 40 years ago.

A second notable difference (which may, to some small extent, explain the first) is the lack of church involvement in the MCC's affairs. The intimate relationship between St. Michael's and the RSCC in the years before World War II may occasionally have seemed a mixed blessing to some CAP partisans, but its importance in galvanizing community sentiment cannot be overestimated. The MCC has tried, but with only marginal success, to gain more active support for its work from local churches (including St. Michael's). The difficulties encountered will not be readily resolved, we suspect, for they are embedded in the more general problems experienced by Chicago's Catholic churches in adapting to the city's growing Hispanic populations.

Programs and services, and especially their funding sources, comprise a third area of obvious difference between the MCC and the RSCC. In the years following the MCC's founding, substantial government funds became available to community self-help organizations. Martinez was quick to tap these sources, applying for and receiving funds from a number of agencies. In contrast, the RSCC received minimal government support for personnel or programs.

In 1980, outside funds supported several programs somewhat different from those provided earlier by the RSCC. For example, a state grant-in-aid program funded by the Commission on Delinquency Prevention supported counseling activities of various kinds for youths who were referred by juvenile court, the police, other agencies, or parents. A program funded by Title XX supported three hours of daily services for young, nondelinquent children from a nearby elementary school who were academically behind others in their age group, as well as a full-day camp program for several dozen youngsters during the summer. CETA funds provided several dozen summer jobs for local youth. The Illinois Status Offender Project supported staff who dealt exclusively with youngsters who had run away from home. City funds supported activities for senior citizens. While such programs were not inconsistent with the MCC's goals, several were at some remove from

the work with delinquents to which the MCC is most committed.[3] The motivation for each was to some extent opportunistic, i.e., outside funds became available to support certain types of activities. To receive the funds, one proposed these kinds of activities, even if they were not precisely expressive of the organization's primary goals.

Implementation theorists suggest that when an organization proposes an innovation as a means (at least in part) of acquiring badly needed operating funds, the innovation, once begun, often suffers a stepchild status in the organization. Resented for its relatively large budget, often peripheral to other activities, it may be abruptly dropped if and when the outside funds that support it are withdrawn. Outside support may also decrease perceived need for volunteer efforts or donations, or for general community support. At the same time, these funds provide an organization with increased financial stability. The programs they support, by incrementing the number of services, may increase an organization's perceived usefulness to the community. Hence, the availability of outside funds creates a dilemma for community-based organizations: Active and successful pursuit of such funds may sustain services and allow growth, but it may also divert an organization from its goals and reduce community involvement.

Some of these effects have been evident at the MCC. Staff members noted that clients of several programs were not those to whom the MCC was nominally most committed. For example, the tutoring program excluded the more difficult delinquent boys. Eligibility requirements and related constraints imposed by outside funding sources limited the usefulness of other programs. A case in point was the runaway program, which required court contact for participation. The several funded positions these monies provided subtly shifted the image of MCC as a grass-roots organization. The imposing MCC headquarters contributed to this shift, and the substantial debt incurred in acquiring the headquarters also influenced the MCC and its operations. Board members were spending disproportionate amounts of their volunteer time on fund-raising, and outside funds were eagerly sought as a means of subsidizing operating expenses.

On the other hand, the MCC was not supporting several activities that were central to the work of the RSCC in the 1930s and 1940s. It did not concern itself with the special problems faced by parolees, one of the RSCC's best-known and apparently most successful projects. It was not providing nearly the scope of recreational activities sponsored

[3]The MCC also ran an extensive adult education program, Project Venceremos, which offered instruction in English as a Second Language, preparatory courses for a General Education Diploma, and Central YMCA college courses.

by the RSCC through the St. Michael's Boys' Club, although ample space for such activities was available in the large MCC building. Finally, the MCC has never attempted to operate a residential camp of its own, which, as we have seen, was one of the most popular RSCC programs, for children and adults alike. These differences reflect both shifts in community need and changes in focus prompted by outside funds, as suggested above.

SCOPE is a smaller and more modest operation than the MCC. Its motto nicely embodies the CAP philosophy: "Concerned People Striving to Make South Chicago a Better Place to Live." Its work is widely known and respected in light of the run-down condition of its immediate Millgate neighborhood. While Martinez and Norwood share good personal relations, each maintains a wholly independent relationship to the CAP, and each works solely within his own territory. The possibility of crossing ethnic/racial and turf boundaries (railroad tracks divide Millgate on its western boundary from the Hispanic settlements) to foster a coordinated, CAP-inspired attack on delinquency is simply not a realistic consideration in the eyes of most community workers in South Chicago.[4]

SCOPE's activities are monitored by two boards, each specializing in the services it provides. The regular board makes policy and serves as a financial watchdog, approving every check that is written (no doubt to prevent the irregularities that led to the downfall of the South Chicago Community Center in 1970). The honorary board helps SCOPE raise funds and provides volunteer time. As in the MCC, board membership confers status and entails considerable time and responsibility. Active participation by indigenous volunteers remains at the heart of SCOPE's philosophy and the actual delivery of services to youth. SCOPE staff are particularly gratified by the active participation of 8 to 10 young adult volunteers who came through SCOPE's early youth programs.

At the time of our visit, SCOPE employed two full-time and three part-time staff members. They supplied specific services for targeted youth with funds from state grant-in-aid, Title XX, CETA, and the Illinois Dangerous Drug Commission. The key to SCOPE's positive public image was the dedicated leadership of its volunteer director, Donald Norwood. A full-time postman, Norwood works the 4:30 a.m.-

[4]United Neighborhood Organization (UNO), a relative newcomer to South Chicago (established there in 1980), has tried to bridge racial and ethnic cleavages through traditional community organizing efforts. An umbrella organization, UNO works with existing agencies, attempting to unite them in addressing communitywide problems such as social service gaps, poor school facilities and programs, and inequities in insurance rates. UNO is privately funded and provides no direct services.

1:00 p.m. shift, which leaves his afternoons and early evenings free to coordinate SCOPE's activities and counsel youth. Norwood holds up his own success at the Post Office (he holds a high civil service ranking and supervises numerous lower-level postmen) to exemplify to Millgate youth the advantages of working through the system. He also utilizes the political expertise he has cultivated in his civil service career to build community support and to raise funds for SCOPE, both within and outside South Chicago's black community. SCOPE's modest physical plant and limited outside funds further encourage community support.

All of SCOPE's programs are oriented to delinquency prevention, either through direct services to youth or through community organization and improvement. A dearth of outside funding has kept programs tightly coupled with organizational goals.[5] Like the MCC, SCOPE devotes little attention to serious offenders. Also like the MCC (though on a smaller scale), it offers an impressive range of tutoring, referral, and recreational services, some of which are funded externally. These activities seem to appeal especially to girls.[6] SCOPE also offers several informal programs, some of which are uniquely designed for its milieu and clientele. For example, Norwood encourages exasperated parents to bring in "headstrong" children for informal counseling before confrontations escalate and the children run away or are declared by their parents to be "ungovernable." In addition, SCOPE houses the Radio Patrol, a locally conceived, largely volunteer effort to reduce crime and fear of crime by monitoring the streets. A group of 35 men began in 1977 to keep track of activities by patroling in cars and communicating via CB radios, mostly at night. In 1980, the CAP central headquarters voted to subsidize the Radio Patrol's purchase of more sophisticated CB equipment. By the time of our visit, the Patrol maintained visibility by assisting at parades and funerals, but had curtailed its active patrol functions.

Like the MCC, SCOPE is strongly committed to community prevention and treatment of juvenile misbehavior. Yet it does not appear to be as closely tied to youth-serving agencies. This is particularly true concerning the police. Whereas the MCC is contacted automatically

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[5]One respondent indicated that this lack of funds was the result of a conscious decision by staff to forgo outside funds in favor of indigenous, volunteer support.

[6]In 1979, the weekly activities included boys' sports, girls' sports, arts and crafts, dance, job preparation training, modeling, music, and social hours in the gameroom. Although boys from the neighborhood participated in the sports events and mingled with the girls during social hours, 78 percent of the children involved in all the activities were girls. One respondent suggested that SCOPE was more appealing to girls and less so to boys because it stressed nurturing and caretaking roles for volunteers and lacked the jobs and vocational programs that might attract boys.

when a Hispanic youngster comes to the youth division, no such automatic referral to SCOPE is made for black youth, who comprise most of the youth division's clientele.[7]

Obviously, SCOPE cannot seriously be compared to the RSCC in its heyday, nor should it be. Yet in some ways it better exemplifies CAP traditions than the MCC, notably by relying more on volunteer support and less on outside funding to determine its programmatic objectives. Before SCOPE, the CAP had long been frustrated by its inability to make inroads into South Chicago's black community. SCOPE's modest scale should not obscure the significance of its very existence and its relative stability for over a decade.

BUT ARE THEY WORKING?

By all measures employed so far, the CAP programs in South Chicago seem to be effective. But the skeptic, while admitting program implementation and apparent impact on community organization, presses for evidence of reduced delinquency rates attributable to the programs and not to some other factor. "Are these programs really working?"

Our response, of course, will not be completely satisfying. We are well aware of the many problems involved in evaluating delinquency prevention programs, and we are sympathetic to the many researchers who have virtually thrown up their hands in disgust at the gaps among theory, prevention policies, proposed programs, and actual practice in the field.[8] We are not bearers of the true experiment; nor are we

[7]Black youth are directed to the city's youth service bureau if the parents request a referral. Our police respondents did not know why SCOPE was not a referral option or why a community-based advocate was not automatically contacted for black youth, as is done for Hispanics. We may speculate that close police/MCC ties have their basis in earlier strong relations between the RSCC and the police, but more data on this point are obviously needed.

[8]For discussion of evaluation problems see, for example, Helen Witmer and Edith Tufts, *The Effectiveness of Delinquency Prevention Programs,* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1954; Michael Dixon and William Wright, *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Programs,* Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1974; Don Gibbons and Gerald Blake, "Evaluating the Impact of Juvenile Diversion Programs," *Crime and Delinquency,* Vol. 22, October 1976, pp. 411–420; Walker, Cardarelli, and Billingsley, *The Theory and Practice of Delinquency Prevention in the United States,*, op. cit.; William Berleman, *Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Experiments: A Review and Analysis,* Seattle: The National Juvenile Justice Assessment Center, October 1980; Delbert Eliot, "Recurring Issues in the Evaluation of Delinquency Prevention and Treatment Programs," in David Shichor and D. H. Kelly (eds.), *Critical Issues in Juvenile Delinquency,* Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1980, pp. 237–261; Krisberg, *The National Evaluation of Delinquency Prevention,* op. cit.; Malcolm Klein, "Where Juvenile Justice Meets Social Service: Social Intervention with

bearers of a definitive answer. Rather, we present some quantitative data which, when combined with the more qualitative analyses up to this point, suggest that the CAP may, indeed, have an important impact on crime rates and that these findings are sufficiently interesting to warrant further, detailed inquiry. That is, the data we present suggest that certain elements of the CAP may well be working.

Our approach, a variant of Shaw's initial attempts to evaluate the CAP's effects on delinquent behavior,[9] is quite straightforward. First, we matched program participants' addresses to neighborhoods (see Fig. 2).[10] In this way, we were able to identify the specific neighborhoods served by each prevention program. Second, using census data from 1980, we predicted what the delinquency rates would be for the neighborhoods in South Chicago in the absence of the CAP. Next, we compared the predicted delinquency rates with delinquency rates reported in 1980. If the CAP has had an effect on delinquency, certain reported delinquency rates should be below their projections for the CAP neighborhoods, but not for adjacent neighborhoods outside of the CAP's purview. Finally, if such discrepancies were found, we looked for a logical association between the discrepancy and the CAP program practices. For example, if arrest rates were lower than expected, we looked for program practices, such as close relationships between the program and the police, that might explain the discrepancy.

Predicted delinquency rates were calculated using census data shown in Table 1. These data served as proxy measures for three demographic descriptors that Fox and others have used to construct remarkably accurate models for projecting future delinquency rates. Fox's model included (1) the percentage of the minority population aged 14–17 years, (2) the percentage of the minority population aged 18–21 years, and (3) the consumer price index.[11] For our study, data on

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Troubled Youths," in Edward Seidman (ed.), *Handbook of Social and Community Intervention*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982.

[9]Shaw collected data on the number of police contacts with juveniles and juvenile court appearances in the original project neighborhoods. We too used official statistical data to predict crime rates, which we then used, in turn, to assess program effects in specific neighborhoods. Shaw also proposed to evaluate the CAP's effects on community organization. For a reevaluation of this aspect of program effects in the 1960s, see Harold Finestone, "The Chicago Area Project in Theory and Practice," in Irving Spergel (ed.), *Community Organization*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972, pp. 149–186.

[10]We aggregated data on the residences of participants and staff to census tract level to preserve their anonymity and to provide an analysis unit comparable to our other data.

[11]See James Fox, *Forecasting Crime*, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1978; and James Fox "Reexamining Some Perils of Quantification in the Econometric Study of Crime: A Reply to Decker and Kohfeld," *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* Vol. 19, 1982, pp. 122–131. For a brief review of this literature,

Table 1

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS, 1980

Neighborhood	Population	Minority Population[a]	Minority Population 5–17 Years	All Youth 10–17 Years	Median Rent ($)
South Shore	12,881	12,153	3,038	2,077	218
	(28%)	(94%)	(25%)	(16%)	
Unnamed area	15,892	12,464	3,358	2,179	173
	(34%)	(78%)	(27%)	(14%)	
The Bush	4,164	3,255	991	665	122
	(9%)	(78%)	(30%)	(16%)	
Bessemer	1,725	1,403	369	230	161
	(4%)	(81%)	(26%)	(13%)	
Mexican settlement	10,495	9,578	2,714	1,627	130
	(23%)	(91%)	(28%)	(15.5%)	
Millgate	1,265	1,255	397	260	130
	(3%)	(99%)	(32%)	(21%)	
TOTAL	46,422	40,108	10,867	7,038	146
	(100%)	(87%)	(27%)	(15%)	

SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population and Housing 1980: Summary Tape*, File 1A, Cook County, Illinois, 1981 (microfiche); data for South Shore, unnamed area, and the Mexican settlement were obtained by aggregating census tracts.

[a]Nonwhite (black, American Indian, Asian) or Spanish origin.

percentage of minority population within Fox's particular age ranges were not available. However, we did have data on the percentage of the minority population aged 5–17 years and other indicators such as the percentage of the total population that were of minority (non-white or Spanish) origin. A measure of the consumer price index for the South Chicago neighborhoods was, of course, not available. We therefore sought economic indicators unique to the particular South Chicago neighborhoods under study. We used the median monthly rent on renter-occupied buildings as a proxy for economic level.

To obtain the quantitative assessments of predicted delinquency rates presented in Table 2, we followed Fox and combined data on the percentage of the minority population between the ages of 5 and 17 years with our economic data (the median rent on renter-occupied

see Jan Chaiken and Marcia Chaiken, "Crime Rates and the Active Criminal," in James Q. Wilson (ed.), *Crime and Public Policy*, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1983, pp. 11–29.

Table 2

PREDICTED AND REPORTED RATES OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN SOUTH CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS[a]
(Rankings are shown in parentheses)

Neighborhood	Predicted Delinquency Rate[d]	Reported Delinquency Rates in 1980				
		Runaway and Ungovernable[e]	Police Contacts[b]		Arrests/Contacts[c]	
			Males	Females	Males	Females
South Shore/South Chicago	−2.86 (L)	34.45 (H)	24.40 (M)	9.30 (H)	30.89 (MH)	24.47 (MH)
Unnamed area	−0.86 (ML)	24.27 (MH)	25.10 (M)	4.30 (M)	30.60 (MH)	28.26 (H)
The Bush	1.69 (H)	21.01 (M)	24.80 (M)	8.30 (H)	14.08 (ML)	28.57 (H)
Bessemer	−0.91 (ML)	4.46 (L)	12.50 (L)	4.60 (M)	5.00 (L)	0.00 (L)
The Mexican settlement	0.70 (MH)	20.84 (M)	26.00 (M)	4.30 (M)	20.85 (M)	14.29 (ML)
Millgate	2.24 (H)	4.79 (L)	35.71 (H)	0.68 (L)	42.50 (H)	(f)

NOTE: To obtain rank ordering, each scale was converted to a standard (z) score and the following categories were mapped onto the z scores: low (L) = ≤ 0.75; moderately low (ML) = −0.75 to −0.26; moderate (M) = −0.25 to +0.25; moderately high (MH) = +0.26 to +0.75; high (H) = > +0.75.

[a]These data were in part supplied by the Institute for Juvenile Research, Illinois Department of Mental Health Research Department, and in part were taken from the IJR publication, *Youth Problems in the City: A Data Inventory. A Report of 1980 Data*, October 1980.

[b](Number of male (female) contacts/number of males (females) 10–17 years of age) × 100.

[c](Number of male (female) arrests/number of male (female) 10–17 years of age contacts with police) × 100.

[d]Expected crime rates were determined by z(% of minority population aged 5–17 years) + (−1) z(median rent for renter-occupied units).

[e]"Runaway" takes on the usual definition: runaway youth apprehended by the police. "Ungovernable" is defined as youth beyond the control of parents, guardian, or custodian. (Number of runaway and ungovernable youth aged 10–17 years/total number of youth aged 10–17 years) × 1000.

[f]Only one police contact, which resulted in the release of the 16-year-old girl.

dwellings). Since the metrics differed for the minority/age and economic variables, data for each neighborhood on each variable were transformed to standard (z) scores with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. For each neighborhood, an expected delinquency rate[12] was calculated as follows:

Rate = z(% minority population 5–17 yrs. old) + (−1)z (median rent)

Unit weights were used because (1) the sample size (n = 6) was too small to estimate weights; (2) weights based on samples from different populations, e.g., Fox's, might not be applicable to South Chicago; and (3) prediction equations with unit weights often do as well as equations based on estimated weights, especially upon cross-validation.[13] Median income was weighted at −1 to reverse the direction of the scale so that low rents and high percentage of minority youth would combine to indicate high expected delinquency rates. Thus, a negative expected delinquency rate indicates lower rates while a positive expected delinquency rate indicates higher rates.

The two South Chicago neighborhoods in our analysis that are served by the MCC and SCOPE (the Mexican settlement and Millgate, respectively) were projected to have moderately high or high official rates of delinquency (0.70 and 2.24, respectively), as was the Bush (1.69). A moderately low delinquency rate was expected for Bessemer (−0.91) and the unnamed area (−0.86), while a low rate was expected for South Shore/South Chicago (−2.86), the best-maintained and wealthiest South Chicago neighborhood.

The projected overall delinquency rates can be compared with the reported rates of runaway/ungovernable behavior, police contacts, and arrests shown in Table 2.[14] Our intent was to discover patterns of

[12] Expected delinquency rates were calculated in two other ways including: (a) z(% minority aged 5–17 years) + (−1)z (median rent − median rent in South Chicago), and (b) z[(% youth aged 10–17 years) × (% minority in neighborhood)] + (−1) z(median rent). Methods (a) and (b) produced results similar to those reported for the equation we used.

[13] R. M. Dawes and B. Corrigan, "Linear Models in Decisionmaking," *Psychological Bulletin*, 81, 1974, pp. 95–106, and H. Wainer, "Extracting Coefficients in Linear Models: It Didn't Make No Nevermind," *Psychological Bulletin*, 83, 1976, pp. 213–217.

[14] Most of the data needed for our evaluation were graciously provided by various individuals and agencies. A few we collected ourselves. The Institute for Juvenile Research, Illinois State Department of Mental Health, supplied us with data on police interactions involving South Chicago juveniles in 1980. The data were broken down by census tract in which the juveniles lived and included information on the sex of the juvenile, the offense or incident type, and the outcome (arrest or community adjustment). All data on juvenile delinquency were supplied by the IJR. To determine the extent to which children in specific neighborhoods were involved in delinquency prevention programs, we used attendance data for 1980, which were graciously supplied to us by Henry Martinez of the MCC, Donald Norwood of SCOPE, and Neil Bosanko of Neighborhood House. Where gaps in attendance data existed, we used comparable data from 1979 or 1981.

discrepancies among the neighborhood delinquency rates that would lead us to inquire further into whether the CAP had an impact on delinquent behavior. How close were the actual and projected rates?

Two neighborhoods showed higher rates than were projected: the unnamed area and especially South Shore/South Chicago. Our fieldwork, focused as it was on the Mexican settlement and Millgate, was inconclusive regarding these divergences,[15] except to demonstrate (via analysis of program attendance records) that the children in the unnamed area and South Shore/South Chicago neighborhoods were not participating in the MCC, SCOPE, or Neighborhood House (discussed below).

The actual delinquency rates for the remaining four neighborhoods were mostly lower than expected. This pattern of discrepancies between projected and actual delinquency rates can be explained, at least in part, by fieldwork and demographic data.

The Bush, surprisingly, had some delinquency rates as low as or even below those recorded in the Mexican settlement or Millgate. Runaways and police contact and arrest rates for males were lower than projected. This finding can be explained, at least partially, by the fact that the Bush is served by Neighborhood House, an institution originally founded under Baptist auspices in 1911. Reflecting its settlement-house origins, its programs are a good deal more diverse than either the MCC's or SCOPE's. Nonetheless, much of Neighborhood House's energy is directed toward similar goals and methods. A search of its records revealed that Neighborhood House draws its clientele primarily from its surrounding neighborhood. Our observations at Neighborhood House, however, were too superficial to allow even a tentative analysis of the relationship between specific program elements and specific outcomes that we perform below for the MCC and SCOPE. Clearly, it would be useful to do so, both as a means of investigating Neighborhood House's apparent successes in preventing delinquency and as a way of expanding our findings beyond the CAP.

Likewise, Bessemer had consistently lower delinquency rates than projected on all measures but female contacts with police. While few children from Bessemer participated in any of the community

[15] We hoped that our informal observations in South Shore/South Chicago would allow us to identify some obvious factors that would explain the surprisingly high rates. We found none. The area was carefully maintained, with relatively new medium-priced cars parked in the driveways. Families were attempting to achieve upward mobility in much the same way that the former residents had achieved their goals: by placing heavy emphasis on education. Numerous private preschools and kindergartens, including a Montessori school, served the area, and many of the children attended local Catholic schools, which boasted a better reputation for serious education than the neighborhood public schools. Residents were self-consciously trying to maintain the area's appearance and respectability. Several block clubs announced their presence with attractively designed signs. The basic question remains: Why are rates of delinquency so high in an otherwise self-conscious, proud, middle-class neighborhood?

prevention programs, the low rates can probably be explained in part by a unique element in the neighborhood's social organization: the presence of the precinct police station, which may have served to deter delinquent conduct by youth who lived in its immediate vicinity. (The police station has since been relocated outside of the Bessemer neighborhood.)

The Mexican settlement ranked slightly lower than expected on all indices of officially recorded delinquency, especially the arrest rate for females. Most police contacts seem to have resulted in "community adjustments" rather than arrests.

While patterns of reported juvenile delinquency in Millgate were different from those in the Mexican settlement, they also diverged systematically from our projections. As Table 2 shows, delinquency rates on two of the indices (police contacts with males and arrests of males) were fully as high as expected, whereas on the remaining indicators, they were much lower than projected.

Were the MCC and SCOPE in any way responsible for the variation between projected and actual rates of reported juvenile delinquency in their respective neighborhoods? To be accorded a role, they had to meet two conditions, as discussed above. First, their clientele had to come overwhelmingly from their immediate neighborhoods. This was found to be the case. Second, programs and operations had to bear some face-valid relationship to specific outcomes. That is, we had to observe activities that, if effectively implemented, could reasonably be assumed to contribute to a divergence between expected and observed rates for a specific index of delinquency.

Explaining quantitative data with qualitative findings is imprecise at best, since observations are always selective.[16] Our qualitative findings are particularly subject to such selection biases, as our visits were brief and our observations informal; nor did we ask the same questions of each program.[17] Hence our "evidence" must be regarded as suggestive only.

Nevertheless, we did find a number of mechanisms in place in both the MCC and SCOPE that appear to relate to specific quantitative measures and that may explain at least some of the variation between reported and expected delinquency rates. For example, the MCC's

[16] Karl Weick, "Systematic Observational Methods," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. II, 1967, p. 361, argues that observers do make choices in what they observe, whether such editing is intended or not. The more structured the observational method, the more obvious these choice points are. In the informal observations we made, such choices were largely implicit.

[17] Nevertheless, our data were far better than those typically collected by evaluators of delinquency prevention programs. Process studies of delinquency prevention programs traditionally have provided little more than on-site validation than that the activities offered actually occurred. For example, studies of counseling activities have mainly gathered data on the number of children counseled and the number of counseling hours. See, for example, Krisberg, *The National Evaluation of Delinquency Prevention*, op. cit.

close contacts with the local police precinct may well be related to the relatively low arrest rates in the Mexican settlement. One key criterion that the police use in deciding to allow a young offender to remain in the community rather than incorporating him into the juvenile justice system is the readiness of a concerned neighborhood adult who will take responsibility for the child's behavior.[18] The MCC is obviously willing, indeed eager, to do so. Systematic observation of these processes is obviously essential, but it seems quite possible that by providing advocacy and an adult willing to take formal responsibility for monitoring the behavior of youth "in trouble with the law," the MCC may be reducing the formal processing of children by police.

In contrast, SCOPE does not have such a close relationship with the police, nor does it work with as large a proportion of boys. This may explain why the rates of police contacts with juvenile males and the overall arrest rate in Millgate are no lower than projected. Seemingly, SCOPE has not been effective in reducing formal processing of youngsters by the police because it is not regularly called in to provide an alternative to arrest. One might expect that the Radio Patrol would have contributed to lower-than-projected delinquency rates. However, because the Patrol's active surveillance functions had been sharply curtailed by the time of our visit, it was not possible to observe its operation or to ascertain why it appears not to have worked, at least in terms of the above criteria.

Another mechanism that may account for lower-than-expected delinquency rates was observed at SCOPE. Donald Norwood's policy of encouraging parents to bring their children into SCOPE for informal joint counseling at the first sign of serious intrafamilial hostilities may account for the surprisingly low rate of runaway and ungovernable youth in Millgate. Independent of what happens during "counseling" (and a more complete evaluation would have to include such data), SCOPE provides an easily accessible alternative to escalating confrontations. Encouraging parents who are disturbed by their children's behavior to refer them to the program may reduce rates of serious, overt family conflict that results in children running away and in parents turning their care over to government authorities. The impact of this effort is particularly notable, since most Cook County runaways are girls, and SCOPE serves a disproportionately female clientele.

In contrast, the MCC had a moderate rate of runaways and ungovernable children in 1980, a rate considerably higher than that in the area served by SCOPE. While the MCC has a specific program for

[18]See Aaron Cicourel, *The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965; and Robert Emerson, *Judging Delinquents*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969.

runaways, its funding source allows program participation only after the child has been brought to court.

Finally, because SCOPE serves far more girls than boys, the unexpectedly low rate of police contacts with girls in Millgate may be due to their high involvement in SCOPE's day-to-day formal activities.

Our quantitative and qualitative analyses, taken together, suggest that the community-based delinquency prevention programs we examined are engaged in diverse activities that may account, in part, for the lower-than-expected delinquency rates reported in the areas they serve. Our analyses and conclusions are limited by our rather narrow measures of delinquency, by the informal and unstructured nature of our observations of program operations, and by the small number of programs we studied. Nevertheless, the results show sufficient promise to justify more precise and sophisticated tests of our multimethod approach.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

In recent years, a fashionable political cynicism has fueled various initiatives to discontinue youth programs popular in the 1960s and early 1970s and to introduce (allegedly) less expensive means to control crime, such as longer prison sentences for persistent offenders. These recommendations have flowed naturally from numerous condemnations of prior experiments in delinquency prevention. Consider, for example, the grand put-down by the distinguished commentator, James Q. Wilson: "A series of delinquency prevention programs have been mounted over the decades, many, if not most, of which were explicitly based on the strategy of altering primary group influences on delinquents. On the basis of careful, external evaluation, almost none can be said to have succeeded in reducing delinquency."[1]

Wilson's blanket indictment is, in our judgment, premature. It exaggerates the authoritativeness of evaluation methods in the field, and it obscures the extraordinary diversity of who did what, to whom, when, where, and why in the name of delinquency prevention in both the distant and more recent past. Obviously, we offer no cookbook method of evaluating prevention programs, but we do see substantaal room for imagination and optimism in attempting to determine what "works" in a field where scientific precision will inevitably remain elusive.[2]

After the passage of several decades and dramatic population shifts, the CAP philosophy remains vital to the Hispanic and black residents of modern-day South Chicago. The diverse evidence we have amassed and the tentative explanations we have offered, while hardly foolproof, justify a strong hypothesis that the CAP has long been effective in reducing rates of reported juvenile delinquency. To be sure, firm conclusions about the CAP's impact require more encompassing indicators of conflict between children and adults and more structured observation of program processes, as well as the application of our methods of analysis to other CAP and non-CAP programs and neighborhoods. Nonetheless, the convergence of historical, fieldwork, implementation,

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[1]James Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime*, New York: Random House, 1975, p. 57.

[2]In addition to the references cited earlier, see also Hans Mattick and Broderick Reisch, *Some Problems in the Evaluation of Criminal Justice Programs*, Chicago: Center for Research in Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, September 1975; and James Hackler, "The Dangers of Political Naivete and Excessive Complexity in Evaluating Delinquency Prevention Programs," *Evaluation and Program Planning*, Vol. 1, 1978, pp. 273–283.

and quantitative data indicates to us that something important is happening as a result of the CAP's presence in South Chicago, and that multiple methods of inquiry are essential to analyze the CAP's purpose, experience, and impact. To rediscover the CAP is to be reminded that despite never-ending hard times and political powerlessness, some lower-class, minority neighborhoods still retain a remarkable capacity for pride, civility, and the exercise of a modicum of self-governance.

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