Mediterranean Security

New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy

Ian O. Lesser
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Ian O. Lesser

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RAND

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PREFACE

This Report documents research on the effects of the changing strategic environment in Europe and around the Mediterranean on the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Southern Region—Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey—and the implications for U.S. policy and strategy. The Report incorporates the findings of discussions with senior military and civilian officials, and non-governmental observers around the region, and has benefited from a concurrent RAND study of Turkey's strategic future. (See Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War, RAND, R-4204-AF/A, 1992.)

Research for this Report was completed in January 1992. Although the rapid pace of developments across the region, particularly in relation to European defense arrangements and the situation on Turkey's borders, will inevitably render the narrative outdated on a few points, the basic lines of analysis should hold.

The research was conducted within the National Security Strategies Program of Project AIR FORCE (a federally funded research and development center at RAND), and forms an important part of a larger project on "The Air Force in a Changing Europe," sponsored by the United States Air Force, Europe (USAFE) and the Air Staff (AF/XOXXX).
SUMMARY

This Report explores the changing strategic environment in southern Europe and the Mediterranean, its effects on the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Southern Region, and the implications for U.S. interests and policy.¹

THE UNITED STATES AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

The United States has had a significant interest and presence in Mediterranean affairs for almost 200 years, a fact worth noting as a reminder that the U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean and its regions is neither a transitory phenomenon nor simply a product of the Cold War. The importance of the Mediterranean in U.S. strategy has turned on its character as an extension of the European and Middle Eastern security environments, and its position at the crossroads of vital military and commercial lines of communication. It is also a center of strategic consequence in its own right, with serious regional security problems emanating from the Maghreb, the Levant, the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Caucasus. As the Mediterranean becomes more important to the security of Europe as a whole after the Cold War, it will become more important to the United States as a European and global power.

BRIDGE OR BARRIER?

The Mediterranean is the "front line" in relation to many of the most pressing security and security-related issues facing Europe as a whole, from Islamic fundamentalism and migration to the proliferation of sophisticated conventional and unconventional weapons. Historically, the Mediterranean and the hinterland on the Mediterranean periphery have served as both a bridge and a barrier in strategic terms. This dual character is likely to reassert itself strongly in the

¹NATO's Southern Region is understood here to include Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. France, a Mediterranean country of considerable importance, is not normally considered to be a part of this group. A brief assessment of the Mediterranean dimensions of French policy is, however, included in this Report.
post–Cold War strategic environment, with direct implications for southern Europe and, above all, Turkey.

THE CHARACTER OF SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN’S REGIONS

Without ignoring the problem of proliferation that spans the southern and eastern shores, and to generalize somewhat, the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean differ in the character of their security problems. The most pressing problems in the western and central Mediterranean are—for the moment—overwhelmingly political and economic in character, and those that are not are largely “south–south” rather than “north–south.” By contrast, the potential for open conflict in the eastern Mediterranean is closer to the surface and the level of armament considerably greater. Southern European countries, including France, will be attracted to cooperative arrangements in the western and central Mediterranean. Initiatives in the eastern Mediterranean will be more demanding of the active involvement of extra-Mediterranean powers, including the United States. Moreover, as Mediterranean issues occupy a more prominent place on the European agenda, Germany may emerge as a more important political and military actor in the region.

KEY TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The Southern Region faces significant security and security-related challenges beyond the Cold War. The collapse of communism, the strategic contraction and disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) process have had a less direct and in some cases ambiguous effect on the security of southern Europe and Turkey. Southern Region countries continue to face large and increasingly sophisticated arsenals in North Africa and the Middle East, outside current arms control regimes. Greece (and its Balkan neighbors) are also concerned about the effects of CFE-related arms transfers on the military balance in Thrace and the Aegean.

The “threat from the south” is not simply or even primarily a military one. Many of the security-related concerns that have come to the fore in Europe, including the problems of migration and political friction between Islam and the West, are felt most keenly in southern Europe where north–south issues may interact with military risks of a more
traditional sort. Southern Region countries have a keen interest in preventing security-related problems from becoming direct military threats. This sensitivity has provided much of the impetus for cooperative initiatives in the western Mediterranean, the C SCM (Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean) proposal, and efforts to revive the European Community’s (EC) Mediterranean policy. The character of the emerging security environment in the Mediterranean suggests that no single institution can adequately address the full range of security challenges, broadly defined. NATO and new European defense arrangements will have an important role alongside institutions whose objectives are primarily political and economic.

*New regional arrangements reflect a pattern of activism across the Southern Region relevant to U.S. interests and policy.* The growing assertiveness of Southern Region countries on foreign and security policy matters has spawned a variety of regional initiatives, including but not limited to: Italy’s Hexagonale aimed at south-central Europe; Greek overtures in the Balkans; and Turkey’s sweeping proposal for Black Sea cooperation. The process of Western Mediterranean cooperation, and the C SCM concept, address broader Mediterranean and north-south issues (in the case of the latter, extending from Mauritania to the Persian Gulf). Although political and economic cooperation has been the focus of these initiatives, all have longer term security implications. Leaving aside the varying prospects for success of these initiatives, the proposals themselves can affect regional security perceptions, bolster the influence of organizing states, and promote the value of key Southern Region countries as strategic partners for the United States.

*NATO’s southern allies are increasingly willing to contribute to NATO and European rapid response initiatives for contingencies on the European periphery.* The Gulf crisis served as a watershed, with unprecedented deployments and logistical support for coalition operations against Iraq. Across the region, countries are now looking beyond defense of their own borders in forming security policies, with a strong emphasis on the modernization and reorganization of forces to facilitate their participation in multinational units. NATO remains a useful vehicle for this new activism, and retains its symbolic importance for Southern Region countries even as the future of the Alliance is subject to transatlantic debate.
With the important exception of Turkey, foreign and security policies across the region are increasingly framed in European terms. The consensus on defense spending and security arrangements has become critically dependent on the ability of southern European governments to give these issues a multilateral and, above all, European dimension. There is a marked and increasing emphasis on Brussels over Washington as the focus of decisionmaking on political, economic, and security policy. Southern European countries will be increasingly reluctant to adopt views on defense cooperation with the United States, including access to facilities and air space for non-NATO purposes, that are at variance with the European consensus. The implications of this trend for U.S. policy are mixed. Although the ability of countries such as Portugal to offer support on a bilateral basis for operations unpopular in Europe as a whole (as in the 1973 airlift to Israel) has surely declined, much more active support will be possible in those cases where U.S. and EC interests coincide. As the Gulf crisis demonstrated, countries such as Spain and Greece now have a very strong stake in contributing to “European” initiatives.

Turkey stands outside the process of Europeanization shaping the rest of the Southern Region, and has a marked interest in preserving existing bilateral and alliance arrangements. There is little prospect of Turkey joining either the EC or the Western European Union (WEU). The reassertion of Turkey’s strategic importance in Middle Eastern and Central Asian terms in the wake of the Gulf crisis will reinforce the country’s distinctiveness and potential isolation within the Southern Region and the Alliance as a whole. This will inevitably place increasing pressure on the bilateral relationship with the United States. In particular, Ankara will look to Washington and the U.S. presence in the Southern Region as a means of coupling its security interests to those of Europe. The United States, as a European, Middle Eastern, and Mediterranean power can and should promote this linkage.

The prospects for stability in the Aegean and Thrace will be strongly influenced by the extent to which Greek-Turkish relations can be “anchored” (in NATO or new European arrangements) after the Cold War, and the longer term evolution of relations between Europe and the Islamic world. If Turkey remains isolated on the European periphery, the prospects for crisis prevention in the eastern Mediterranean will worsen. More optimistically, Greece and Turkey share an
interest in promoting their images as members (and potential members) in good standing of Atlantic and European institutions. The United States will be in a particularly strong position to promote stability in the Aegean as both countries seek to assure themselves of a secure relationship with Washington in the new strategic environment.

The Southern Region countries share a post-Cold War interest in the U.S. presence as an instrument of regional deterrence and political reassurance. This interest continues despite the declining fear of strategic marginalization in southern Europe as these countries move into the European mainstream and the center of balance of European security concerns shifts southward. Maintenance of a suitable U.S. military presence in the Southern Region, including ground-based tactical airpower and appropriate infrastructure, will help to ensure that the overall post-Cold War U.S. presence in Europe is functionally and geographically balanced and relevant to the security concerns of our allies. A precipitous withdrawal of forces devoted to Southern Region defense could have an adverse effect on the prospects for cooperation in non-NATO crises, particularly as Southern Region countries become more vulnerable to air and ballistic missile attack:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Any errors or omissions in this Report are, of course, my own.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War, together with recent events in the Middle East and the Balkans, has focused attention on security problems in and around the Mediterranean and their implications for U.S. interests. Moreover, these events are unfolding against a background of underlying European concern about security and security-related trends emanating from the "south." As the Mediterranean becomes more important to the security of Europe as a whole, it will very likely become more important to the United States as a European and global power. U.S. interests in the Middle East, and in the Mediterranean itself, will reinforce the importance of the region in U.S. strategy over the next decade.

U.S. perceptions of the Mediterranean after the Cold War and in the wake of the Gulf conflict are being shaped by a growing but still imprecise sense of the area's strategic significance, largely as a result of its proximity to crisis-prone areas beyond the Mediterranean itself. Of equal importance is the realization that Europe as a whole is beginning to look at the Mediterranean basin with new interest and concern. The perception of risks flowing from the demographic and developmental imbalance between north and south, the growth of conventional and unconventional arsenals in North Africa and the Levant, and instability in the Balkans are some of the most pressing concerns in this regard. As Europe develops a broader definition of security in the wake of the Cold War, Mediterranean problems will occupy a prominent place on political, economic, and military agendas. A relevant U.S. presence and involvement in European security affairs (at whatever level) will need to reflect this changing pattern of European interests.

Closer attention to Mediterranean security issues will also be a natural consequence of changing roles within NATO's Southern Region. The Gulf experience has produced a marked reassertion of Turkey's strategic importance beyond the Cold War, with significant long-term implications for U.S. and Allied policy. At the same time, the demilitarization of East-West relations has encouraged a range of potentially important regional initiatives from Lisbon to Ankara. Spain and Italy have emerged as significant actors in the debate over new
European defense arrangements and the development of a new institution for the Mediterranean resembling the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). All of these developments will play a role in shaping the character of the security environment the United States will face within the Southern Region and around the Mediterranean over the next decade.

This Report has a threefold purpose and structure. First, the strategic environment in the Mediterranean and the changing character of security in NATO's Southern Region are explored in historical and contemporary terms. Second, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Greek, and Turkish perspectives on key issues are characterized and critically assessed, including evolving views on arms control, east-west and north-south relations, European and Mediterranean security structures, and the U.S. role and presence in the region. The Mediterranean dimensions of French policy are also explored briefly. Finally, the Report offers conclusions and implications for U.S. interests and policy toward the Southern Region and the Mediterranean.

Obviously, the scope and orientation of this analysis impose certain limitations. The discussion of national perspectives treats views on key issues relevant to U.S. and European policy; it is not intended as an exhaustive survey of foreign and security policy matters. On the discussion of the emerging security environment in the Mediterranean as a whole, again, the focus is very much on key trends. In both cases, the extraordinary pace of events around the region, together with new proposals on security arrangements in Europe, inevitably leads to certain omissions (the research for this Report was completed in January 1992). The fundamental trends and policy orientations described are likely to retain their relevance. Finally, this Report focuses on western, or more accurately, "northern" perspectives on Mediterranean security. Prevailing attitudes in North Africa and the Levant are not treated systematically.¹

¹North African perceptions of the Mediterranean security environment will be addressed in a forthcoming RAND Report.
2. THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY

The United States has been a Mediterranean power, in some form, for almost 200 years, coupling military presence with active political and economic involvement in the region. This background is worth noting as a reminder that the U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean is neither a transitory phenomenon flowing from the strategic requirements of the Cold War, nor is it new in historical terms.

The importance of the Mediterranean in U.S. strategy has turned on its role in economic security and strategic communications (for the United States and its allies) and its relevance to the broader balance of power in Europe. The emphasis placed on each of these considerations has, of course, varied over time. The earliest American military activity in the Mediterranean was the arrival of a naval squadron off Gibraltar in 1801, aimed at the suppression of piracy in the western Mediterranean. The extension of the U.S. presence following the operations against Algiers (with whom a treaty was concluded in 1815) was based on growing American commerce with southern Europe, the Levant, and the Black Sea, and the need to deter attacks on this valuable trade. From 1820, the American squadron in the Mediterranean made use of the naval base at Fort Mahon in the Balearics to support a pattern of presence in the central and western Mediterranean.¹

Very rapidly, however, the focus of American interest in the Mediterranean shifted to the eastern basin, spurred by the progress of the Greek War of Independence and the extension of ties with Ottoman Turkey. Interest in the latter flowed from the growing importance of the “Turkey trade” and the lure of bases in the eastern Mediterranean, but was limited by popular American enthusiasm for Greek national aspirations. An arm’s length approach was also dictated by U.S. reluctance to become too actively engaged in a region with direct

implications for the European balance.\textsuperscript{2} This reluctance to become involved in the “Eastern question,” and specifically the problem of preventing the extension of Russian power into the eastern Mediterranean, would be a theme of mid-nineteenth century U.S. policy (the contrast with post-1945 attitudes is striking).\textsuperscript{3}

The American role in the Mediterranean from its beginnings until World War II, while well established, was ultimately a peripheral one, played out against the background of a \textit{Pax Britannica} extending from Gibraltar through Suez (after 1869) to the Indian Ocean. The importance of the Mediterranean in British strategy from the Napoleonic period through the two world wars lay in its crucial role in Imperial communications and its influence on the European security environment from Iberia to the Caucasus.\textsuperscript{4} Importantly, the military presence and operations in the Mediterranean also formed the basis for an indirect strategy of force projection in European conflicts; thus the peninsular campaigns of the Napoleonic era, the Dardanelles expedition of 1915, and the “Mediterranean strategy” of World War II.\textsuperscript{5} Nor is this history limited to the projection of maritime power. The interdiction of German communications in North Africa, and the successful use of air bombardment as an autonomous instrument in the reduction of Pantelleria prior to the Allied invasion of Sicily, provide examples of the use of airpower to promote strategic objectives around and beyond the Mediterranean shore.\textsuperscript{6}

The British experience in the Mediterranean is noteworthy, above all, for the insight it provides into the problem of how an extra-Mediterranean...

\textsuperscript{2}Nonetheless, Turkey was a large purchaser of surplus weapons and ammunition from the American Civil War. See Field, \textit{America and the Mediterranean World}.

\textsuperscript{3}In another curious contrast to contemporary conditions, petroleum products made up a large proportion of American exports to the eastern Mediterranean before 1900.

\textsuperscript{4}It should be noted that the Mediterranean route through Suez was untenable for large-scale shipping for much of World War II as a result of the mining of the sea between Sicily and the North African coast and the proximity of Axis land-based airpower. See Correlli Barnett, \textit{Engage the Enemy More Closely} (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).


\textsuperscript{6}The operations against the German garrison on Pantelleria, widely hailed as an example of the decisive use of airpower, are discussed at length in Solly Zuckerman, \textit{From Apes to Warlords} (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 181–196.
ranean (and in some respects an extra-European) power should think about strategy toward the region. As the United States replaced Britain as the leading power in the Mediterranean after 1945, the eastern Mediterranean figured prominently in the early history of the Cold War. The containment of Soviet influence in the Balkans was seen as an essential contribution to the containment of Soviet power in Europe as a whole. Beyond the obvious importance of control of the Turkish Straits, the strategic value of Turkey through the 1950s was determined primarily by its position in the “northern tier” barring Soviet access to the Middle East and its oil resources. The exigencies of the East–West strategic competition, and the possibility that NATO might be confronted with threats in both Europe and the Middle East/Southwest Asia in the event of general war, highlighted the importance of communications between these interdependent theaters.

BRIDGE OR BARRIER?

It is axiomatic that the Mediterranean and southern Europe have served as both a bridge and a barrier, and a substantial school of historiography has grown up around the question of whether the Mediterranean divides or unifies, culturally, economically, and strategically. In the context of the old East–West military competition in Europe, the ability to move forces around the Mediterranean without impediment—to use the Mediterranean as a strategic link—facilitated forward defense in key areas of threat around the Southern Region (e.g., in Northeast Italy, Thrace, and eastern Turkey, where the terrain itself favors forward defense). It also allowed for operations designed to influence the outcome of conflict in central Europe, including the attack of targets within the Soviet Union via the Black Sea. At the same time the existence of key “choke points” in the Aegean, at Sicily, Malta, and Crete, as well as at Gibraltar, Suez, and

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the Turkish Straits, made the Mediterranean a formidable barrier from the Soviet perspective.10

Beyond the containment of Soviet power, the Mediterranean and the Southern Region countries can still act as both a bridge and a barrier in economic, political, and military terms. As the pattern of economic migration across the Mediterranean from a poor and increasingly populous Maghreb to a prosperous EC demonstrates, the sea is a relatively ineffective barrier to the movement of people in the absence of concerted efforts to interdict this flow.11 Southern Europe itself is a conduit for migration from south to north, but as Europe's immigration policies tighten, these countries may come to be seen as barriers. Indeed, this is already a common view on both sides of the Mediterranean. As one observer has noted, "for the nations of southern Europe, Spain, Italy and France, the Mediterranean rather than the Elbe has for long been emerging as the real front line."12 Conflict and political instability, including the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and North Africa, also encourage the view that the European periphery will once again emerge as a barrier, insulating Europe from risks emanating from the south and east. The experience of the Moorish presence in southern Spain and Portugal, and the campaigns of reconquest lasting until 1492, have left an enduring mark on Iberian perceptions. So too, the legacy of Ottoman rule in the Balkans encourages a view of southeastern Europe in which Greece and Bulgaria form a strategic glacis on the European periphery. In the prevailing Turkish view the notion of a glacis is also relevant, but here it is to be found on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders (and in a different context, the border with the former Soviet Union). At the same time, the Southern Region countries are keen to emphasize their role as a political and economic bridge between east and west, north and south. Ultimately, the issue of barrier versus bridge—and in the case of the former, the question of where the "fault

lines" lie—is likely to depend, above all, on the overall evolution of Europe's relations with the Islamic world.

THINKING ABOUT THE MEDITERRANEAN IN U.S. STRATEGY: THREE APPROACHES

Three broad approaches to contemporary Mediterranean strategy can be identified, each with specific implications for relations with allies in southern Europe. They should be regarded less as competing alternatives than as overlapping aspects of the strategic environment.

The first approach, and the one that forms the principal focus of this analysis, views the Mediterranean and NATO's Southern Region as an extension of the European security environment. It highlights the problems confronting the Southern Region countries themselves, and defines developments around the Mediterranean in terms of their effect on the security of Europe and the status of transatlantic relations. This approach is particularly attentive to the distinctive effects of arms control in the center and south of Europe, and emphasizes the role of the U.S. presence in binding together security interests across Europe's regions. The dominant strategic trend in this context is the progressive reorientation of European security concerns toward the south after the Cold War.\(^{13}\)

To the extent that Europe as a whole devotes increasing attention to security issues emanating from the "south," the Southern Region countries will become less peripheral in strategic terms within the Alliance, and indeed within any competing European security structure. (Should Turkey's strategic importance continue to be seen largely in Middle Eastern and Central Asian terms, the political benefits of this trend will be difficult for Turkey to capture.) As the

United States considers the extent and character of its post–Cold War military presence in Europe, the need to reflect this change in the European perception of risk will argue strongly for a diversified or "portfolio" approach to basing in which the Southern Region will figure prominently. This approach will itself contribute to the stability of the residual U.S. presence in Europe as a whole and at whatever level, by reducing the risk of politically divisive "singularization" (e.g., in Germany). Overall, the evolving strategic environment in Europe suggests a shift in emphasis—in presence and strategy—to the European periphery.¹⁴

A second approach treats the Mediterranean as "the place where the Persian Gulf begins." Recent events in the Middle East have reinforced the idea, prominent in U.S. strategic thought, that the Mediterranean derives much of its strategic importance from its proximity to areas of crisis and potential conflict outside Europe (some 40 percent of U.S. deployments in response to crises since 1945 have been through the Mediterranean).¹⁵ This approach emphasizes the economic and logistical dimensions of security, including the sea lines of communication for oil, access to the Suez Canal, and the role of forces and facilities in the Southern Region in supporting operations beyond the Mediterranean littoral.

In this view, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf form a single geostrategic entity, with Turkey and Egypt (Suez) providing continental and maritime bridges between Europe and the Middle East/Southwest Asia. The Southern Region countries also occupy important positions on the larger logistical axis stretching from the Atlantic coast of the United States through the Azores to the Gulf. Ninety percent of the material needed to support the coalition operations in the Gulf during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

¹⁴It has been suggested that access to bases in the Southern Region will become even more essential to the extent that the United States adopts a "reconstitution" strategy in Europe, with perhaps little or no permanent presence in the Central Region. See John Roper, "Shaping Strategy Without the Threat," America's Role in a Changing World, Adelphi Paper No. 257 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), p. 80.

arrived via the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{16} If the United States and its allies had been compelled to rely exclusively on the Indian Ocean route in deploying forces to the Gulf, the capacity for rapid power projection would have been greatly reduced.\textsuperscript{17}

From the narrower perspective of naval strategy and the maritime interests of the United States and Europe, it is likely that the free movement of ships between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region will take on greater importance in the wake of the Cold War and the Gulf War. The essential factors here will be the enduring requirement for a substantial presence in and around the Gulf, together with budget-driven reductions in naval forces in the Mediterranean. Even if the United States maintains only a discontinuous carrier battle group presence in the Mediterranean, substantial U.S. and allied naval forces will remain in the region.\textsuperscript{18} But under these conditions the ability to shift forces rapidly between the Mediterranean and the Gulf via the Suez Canal will be a strategic imperative.

The preference for viewing the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the greater Middle East as part of a single strategic complex is not unique to the United States. For political rather than military operational reasons, the Italian approach to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) also emphasizes the universal character and interdependence of security concerns from Gibraltar to Iran (see Appendix).\textsuperscript{19} In addition to giving CSCM a broader and more visible political agenda, the definition of Mediterranean security in comprehensive terms reflects the perceived vulnerability of southern European countries to developments beyond the Mediterranean shore.


\textsuperscript{17} Jonathan T. Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis," \textit{Survival}, vol. 33, no. 3, May/June 1991, p. 247. The presence of naval and air power in the Mediterranean is relevant to power projection beyond the littoral in operational as well as logistical terms. The eastern Mediterranean is closer to Baghdad than the Southern Persian Gulf (roughly 450 versus 1,000 miles).

\textsuperscript{18} During the Gulf crisis, and for the first time in decades, there was a period in which there was no U.S. carrier group in the Mediterranean.

A third approach views the Mediterranean and its subregions as areas of strategic consequence in their own right; that is, in addition to their links with broader issues of European and Middle Eastern security. This approach enjoys a long tradition in Europe (it is not incompatible with the view of C SCM outlined above), but has been largely alien to U.S. foreign and security policy, which has tended to treat the Mediterranean as an extension of the European and Middle Eastern security environments. It has been observed that the United States lacks a “Mediterranean consciousness,” encouraging a piecemeal, ad hoc approach to the region, broken only in times of crisis. More tangibly, the East–West competition in Europe and the Middle East encouraged the linkage of regional and “central” security concerns for purposes of deterrence and political reassurance. In this context, turmoil in Yugoslavia was dangerous because it invited Soviet intervention; conflict between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean was corrosive of Alliance cohesion and weakened deterrence and containment in the Southern Region. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the strategic problem is different, encouraging the isolation rather than the linkage of regional problems. Yugoslavia provides an example of how such crises may now be held at arm’s length. Europe’s desire to distance itself from Turkey’s Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and internal security problems provides another.

CHARACTER OF SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN’S REGIONS

It is clear that the problems and potential responses raised by the crisis in Yugoslavia—and potential conflicts encouraged by the collapse of communist rule elsewhere in the Balkans—are of a fundamentally different character than those originating across the Mediterranean, in North Africa and the Middle East, or in the Aegean. The United States has only a limited involvement in and influence on Balkan affairs (Greece and Turkey apart). In the

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Balkans, European and particularly German influence predominates, and the EC enjoys broad prestige and legitimacy as an interlocutor. This is in direct contrast to the situation in the Levant where the United States is the dominant external actor, or the Aegean, where the United States is both an important actor and a common interlocutor.

More broadly, the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean differ in the character of their security problems. Without ignoring important territorial issues such as the future of the Spanish enclaves in North Africa, or the problem of proliferation that spans the southern and eastern shores, the most pressing problems in the western and central Mediterranean are overwhelmingly political and economic in character. The demographic imbalance between north and south and the resulting immigration pressure are not direct security problems, although friction over immigration policy could encourage a general deterioration of north–south relations in the Mediterranean, thereby increasing the risk of conflict over other issues. Most of the pressing security problems in the central and western Mediterranean are, in any case, south–south rather than north–south, with a secondary risk of European involvement.

By contrast, the potential for open conflict in the eastern Mediterranean is closer to the surface and the level of armament considerably greater. Even in the wake of the Cold War, the strategic stakes in the eastern Mediterranean will remain high, drawing the attention and involvement of the United States, and perhaps Russia. One consequence of this concentration of direct security issues in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean (e.g., those flowing from the Arab–Israeli and Aegean disputes, friction between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbors, potential disagreements over the use of the Suez Canal, and inter- and intra-state conflict in the Balkans) is that a Mediterranean approach to security becomes more difficult as one moves east. Certainly, security initiatives in the eastern Mediterranean will be more demanding of the active involvement of extra-Mediterranean powers.

Taking an even broader perspective, NATO's allies in the eastern Mediterranean have traditionally played a direct role in forward defense, both in Thrace and eastern Turkey. As the Soviet military threat to these regions evaporates, Greece and Turkey will continue to play a role in Balkan and Middle Eastern security. In the western
Mediterranean, the Iberian peninsula has served to provide strategic depth in a theater where this has, until most recently, been conspicuously absent, providing a secure rear area for the reception of reinforcements and material from across the Atlantic. By virtue of geography, it has also served to guard the western exit of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic approaches, through which a substantial portion of the world's maritime traffic must pass (25 percent of total maritime traffic passes through the waters surrounding the Canaries, including over 65 percent of Europe's energy supplies).\textsuperscript{22} In reality, therefore, the security environment in the westernmost portion of the Southern Region extends to the Azores in the west, and down the African coast to the Canaries and Cape Verde in the south. Attitudes toward security in Spain and Portugal strongly reflect these broader maritime concerns. The peninsula's role as a reception area for reinforcements is likely to retain its importance even in the face of force reductions in Europe. Indeed the relative importance of this role may increase as the United States considers the modalities of a "return" to Europe, should this become necessary.

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{22}}Rafael L. Bardaji, "The Iberian Peninsula as the Western Key to the Mediterranean Sea," Paper presented at an Observatoire Stratégique Méditerranéen Seminar on Security of the Western and Central Mediterranean Sea, Rome and Naples, February 1988, p. 4.
3. SECURITY IN THE SOUTHERN REGION:
ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The Southern Region has traditionally been characterized by political and strategic patterns distinctive within the Alliance.\(^1\) Without disregarding important differences in national perspective across the region, the position of these countries on the periphery of the Alliance, both geographically and, in some respects, politically, has produced elements of common interest and experience. The movement toward European integration, changes in East-West relations, and recent developments in the Middle East have introduced new trends shared to a greater or lesser extent across the region. Important differences in national perspective exist (these are explored in detail in Sections 4–9). But certain common characteristics can be identified, most of which are a product of the position of these countries on the geographic, political, and economic periphery of Europe. In the post–Cold War environment of disengagement in Europe, the Alliance as a whole is perhaps coming to resemble its Southern Region (or more precisely, the traditional characterization of the Southern Region). Perceptions about security reflect a waning of the military threat, less reliance is placed on the nuclear aspects of deterrence and defense, and regional concerns assume a more prominent place in the political-military debate.\(^2\)

SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF EXISTING SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS

The Southern Region countries have had a particularly strong stake in the maintenance of existing security structures and relationships. The debate over the future of NATO is watched with some anxiety in

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\(^1\) A comprehensive survey of political-military issues in the Southern Region prior to the revolutionary changes in Europe can be found in John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: Routledge, 1998).

Southern Region capitals, not least because the outcome may have a direct effect on basing and security assistance issues. Above all, these countries continue to place considerable emphasis on the symbolic value of NATO, membership in which gives them a greater voice in political-military affairs than they would otherwise have. Most important, participation in NATO is seen as a badge of membership in the Western democratic club. This consideration has been of particular significance to Portugal, Spain, and Greece in their transitions to democracy, and has been most pronounced in Turkey, which lacks the institutional alternative of Europe.

A COMPLEX PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC COUPLING AND THE DOMINANCE OF CONVENTIONAL STRATEGY

The problem of strategic “coupling,” a central dilemma for European strategists since 1945 and one which may or may not retain its relevance in light of the changes in Europe, has always been more complex in the Southern Region. Here, the problem has been not only to assure the credibility of extended deterrence across the Atlantic, but also to maintain the linkage between central and southern Europe. As the unifying perception of a Soviet threat to Europe has evaporated, these linkages have become increasingly problematic. Traditionally, the presence and involvement of the United States in Europe as a whole, including the Mediterranean, has been the leading vehicle for coupling security in Europe’s regions and has worked against the marginalization of Southern Region concerns.

Notwithstanding the existence (until very recently) of a Warsaw Pact threat to northeastern Italy, Thrace, and eastern Turkey, the character of the Southern Region has also been shaped by the absence of a focus of military vulnerability comparable to that which has existed in NATO’s Central Region. The fact that the Southern Region itself comprises three separate land sub-theaters and an additional sub-theater in the Mediterranean has meant that deterrence and defense in the south face marked problems of cohesion and coordination. Turkey aside, the remoteness of the Soviet threat even under Cold War conditions, and the existence of diverse strategic traditions and
regional security concerns, has encouraged the persistence of distinct and often assertive national policies toward the Alliance.\(^3\)

Cold War strategy in the Southern Region was driven by the requirements of conventional warfare. The nuclear dimension of strategy in the south developed largely in reference to objectives elsewhere in Europe and the need to hold at risk targets in the Soviet Union itself. Indeed, the nuclear guarantee to Europe, while embracing the southern allies, has been focused overwhelmingly on deterring the Soviet threat to centers of political and economic importance in central rather than southern Europe. The defense of Frankfurt and Athens were never really equivalent in NATO strategy. Moreover, the strategic importance of the Southern Region, in East–West terms, would have been most pronounced in the case of protracted conventional war in which the Mediterranean’s role as bridge and barrier would have been vital. To the extent that strategy in relation to the residual “eastern” threat to Europe is relatively conventional and less nuclear, and features reinforcement (including sealift) over a longer period, the Southern Region may play a more central role. Again, this will also enhance the importance of the Iberian peninsula and the western approaches to the Mediterranean.

**EFFECTS OF EAST–WEST DISENGAGEMENT**

In the immediate aftermath of the revolutions in eastern Europe there was considerable concern from Lisbon to Ankara that new opportunities and imperatives in the east would absorb material and political attention that might otherwise have flowed toward southern Europe and the Mediterranean. In economic terms, these fears have not yet been realized. The limited ability of the reforming economies in eastern Europe to absorb investment, together with Western concerns about the character and pace of change, especially in the Balkans, has introduced an element of restraint (which events in the former Soviet Union may only reinforce). At the same time, developments in North Africa, the Adriatic, and the Gulf have offset the trend toward the diversion of strategic attention toward the East.

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This reversal of fortune has been most pronounced in the case of Turkey.

The end of the Cold War has released a variety of explosive ethnic and regional tensions, with implications for security across the Southern Region. The civil war in Yugoslavia threatens the political evolution of the Balkans and Eastern Europe as a whole, and is of direct concern to Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The disintegration of the Soviet Union itself has affected the welfare and security of the Black Sea region, and could pose enormous dilemmas for Turkish policy toward Moscow and the independent republics on Turkey's borders. In the Middle East, the waning of the East-West competition has reduced the risk of superpower confrontation, but has also removed many of the superpower-imposed constraints on the behavior of regional actors. Thus, it is arguable that under Cold War conditions, Moscow would never have "allowed" Iraq to invade Kuwait for fear of the obvious escalatory risks. The central and eastern Mediterranean is home to a number of actors whose behavior may be shaped by the absence of traditional Cold War considerations, notably Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Their actions will in turn affect the security environment facing southern Europe, including the political and military evolution of the Maghreb.

The relevance of the Portuguese, Spanish, and Greek transitions to democracy and experience of European integration to the process of political and economic reform underway in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has become a common theme among observers in each of these countries. To the extent that the countries of Eastern Europe are anxious to return to the European political and economic fold, and to develop new security relationships as a hedge against the risk of regional uncertainties, the recently democratized countries of the Southern Region, as members of both NATO and the EC, may serve as useful models. A central area of interest in this regard would be the reform of civil-military relations. In development terms as well, there may be useful lessons—positive and negative—to be learned from the Italian experience in the Mezzogiorno. Turkey's role as a potential model is less clear in political terms, except as an example of secular development for the Islamic republics of central Asia.

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4See Ronald Chilcote et al., Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece (New York: Crane Russak, 1990).
On the economic front, Turkey may have a great deal to offer both as an example and a useful partner. Indeed, this is part of the rationale for Ankara's Black Sea cooperation initiative.

A MORE EUROPEAN AND POLITICALLY ACTIVE SOUTHERN REGION

Increasingly, transatlantic relations on security matters are characterized by a discourse between the United States and Europe as a whole. This is the case even in the absence of an operationally potent European defense organization. At the political level, therefore, a "European pillar" already exists. With the important exception of Italy, the Southern Region countries have stood somewhat outside this trend, partly as a result of their secondary but growing role within the EC, and partly as a result of long-standing bilateral security relations with the United States.

This situation is changing rapidly as the Southern Region countries become more "European" in their political, economic, and strategic outlooks. It is less and less thinkable, for example, that individual southern European countries will be willing to grant the United States the use of bases and overflight rights, or to contribute military forces of their own for contingencies outside Europe, if their EC partners are unwilling to do so. The growing importance of a European consensus on defense matters will have implications for the future of bilateral relations with Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The effect may be particularly pronounced in the case of Portugal, where there has been a tradition of independent support for U.S. operations outside the NATO area. Turkey, as a full participant in neither the EC nor the WEU, and whose prospects for full membership in both organizations remain poor, is increasingly isolated from this process of Europeanization affecting the rest of NATO's Southern Region (the potential effects of this are discussed later in this Report). Taken together with the increasing attention being devoted to the Mediterranean in Europe as a whole, another consequence of this trend may be a more general convergence of security perceptions between the center and south of Europe.

In parallel with the trend toward Europeanization, southern European countries, in particular Spain and Italy, have begun to play an active political role in Europe and around the Mediterranean. The
demilitarization of the East–West relationship has given these countries greater freedom of action to pursue new initiatives in the areas of security and political and economic cooperation. Prominent examples include: cooperation between the European countries west of the Mediterranean and the countries of the Arab Union of the Maghreb (the “five plus five”); the Italian-led Hexagonale; Balkan cooperation; and Turkey’s Black Sea initiative. In a broader sense, the CSCM, which has been actively promoted by Italy and Spain, is also a product of the changed situation in Europe, which encourages regional initiatives by smaller and medium powers. Notably, these initiatives, while reflecting a new interest in regionalism, emphasize the acceptance of existing frontiers as the “price of entry.” Finally, these initiatives are both useful vehicles for political activism (including the activism of individual policymakers) and evidence of a desire for political reassurance in a period of strategic flux.

THE MEDITERRANEAN AS A CENTER OF POST–COLD WAR SECURITY CONCERNS

The Mediterranean will be a center of residual military power in the wake of conventional arms reductions and unilateral withdrawals in Europe, as significant arsenals in the Maghreb and the Levant remain unaffected. To these must be added the U.S., European, and former Soviet naval and naval air forces that remain outside the CFE framework. As a result, the link between arms control and increased security is least automatic in the Southern Region. Moreover, countries around the region will be wary of future initiatives that might alter regional military balances; between southern Europe and North Africa, between Greece and Turkey, and among Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbors. As an example, the transfer of equipment “cascaded” to Turkey under CFE, together with expanded security assistance to Ankara in the wake of the Gulf War, will help to address long-standing modernization needs, bolstering deterrence in the Middle East. At the same time, this assistance has given rise to considerable anxiety in Greece and Bulgaria about the longer term effects.

5These initiatives are discussed in detail in relation to national perspectives later in this Report.
of Turkish defense improvement on the regional balance in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{6}

The large and increasingly sophisticated arsenals along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean suggest a future in which there will be a greater balance of military capability between north and south.\textsuperscript{7} One consequence of this trend will be the continued significance of extra-Mediterranean states for regional deterrence after the Cold War.

The experience of the Gulf War has reinforced existing concerns about the post-CFE military balance in the Mediterranean region. Above all, the war strengthened fears with regard to the proliferation of unconventional weapons or "weapons of mass destruction," chemical, biological, and nuclear, and the technologies for their manufacture. The expansion of conventional and unconventional arsenals, including aircraft and ballistic missiles of increasing range, could transform the strategic environment in the Mediterranean and directly affect the Southern Region countries. Looking strictly at the Mediterranean littoral, Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Libya all possess ballistic missiles of varying range and accuracy and are seeking to acquire more capable systems.\textsuperscript{8} The presence of these systems, even in the absence of a parallel nuclear capability, may exert a strong influence on strategic calculations along the northern shore of the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{9} In particular, the threat of retaliation against population centers in southern Europe or Turkey can be expected to complicate decisions regard-

\textsuperscript{6}These concerns are discussed in Yannis G. Valianakis, \textit{Greece and the CFE Negotiations} (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 1991).


\textsuperscript{9}Syria, Libya, and Egypt have been recent recipients of Korean Scud-C missiles with a range of roughly 400 miles, posing a threat to the territory of all of the Southern Region countries. Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," \textit{Wall Street Journal}, July 10, 1991, p. 12. Algeria is also seeking such systems.
ing intervention in the Middle East or the support for U.S. or allied operations outside Europe.

The recent threat of Libyan retaliation against targets in Spain and Italy in the event that bases in these countries are used to attack Libya suggests the possibility of more serious incidents on the pattern of the 1986 missile attack on the island of Lampedusa (site of a U.S. LORAN station), itself a subject of concern in Italy.\textsuperscript{10} Even prior to the Gulf crisis, Turkish officials had been warning of the growing missile threat to Turkish territory.\textsuperscript{11} Reports that Iraq may have placed ballistic missile launchers in Mauritania were a source of widespread concern in Spain and Portugal during the Gulf crisis, and the potential for retaliatory attacks against the Canaries or Madeira played a minor role in the debate over Spanish and Portuguese assistance in the Gulf operations. The provision of Chinese nuclear technology to Algeria, at a time when Algeria has been experiencing political turmoil, including an active fundamentalist movement, is an additional source of concern in southern Europe and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{12}

Taken together, these proliferation trends in the Maghreb and the Middle East suggest the opening of an era in which the sanctuarization of southern Europe in regional crises and conflicts can no longer be assumed.\textsuperscript{13} In addition to population centers, missiles of increasing accuracy (and longer range aircraft), coupled with conventional or unconventional weapons, will pose a potential threat to U.S. and allied military facilities around the Mediterranean. Facilities in Italy and Spain as well as those on Crete would be vulnerable, as would naval forces at sea. Against this vulnerability must be weighed the deterrent effect of forces based ashore and afloat in the Mediterranean, and the reassurance provided to increasingly concerned


\textsuperscript{11}Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are capable of reaching Turkey with existing systems, although it would be difficult to imagine the circumstances under which the latter two would wish to do so. Navias, "Is There an Emerging Third World Ballistic Missile Threat to Europe?" p. 12. Algeria has also sought to process such systems.


\textsuperscript{13}Guazzzone, "Threats from the South and the Security of Southern Europe," p. 13. In some respects, most notably Middle Eastern–inspired terrorism, southern Europe has never been insulated from the effects of regional instability.
allies. A discussion of the existing and proposed regimes for controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology is beyond the scope of this Report. But it is worth noting that efforts to limit the spread of these as well as more prosaic weapons in North Africa and the Middle East may lead to demands for Western naval and air reductions in the Mediterranean as a quid pro quo.

SECURITY-RELATED ISSUES: MIGRATION, RESOURCES, AND COMMUNICATIONS

In the wake of the Cold War, Europe as a whole has begun to embrace a broader definition of security in which social and economic issues play a central role. Many of these "new" security-related (i.e., nonmilitary) problems have their origins in and around the Mediterranean. Although in many cases the southern European countries are most directly affected, the implications are European rather than regional in scope. Three prominent areas of concern in this expanded security canvas are migration, access to energy and other resources, and trends affecting the lines of communication in and around the Mediterranean.

Migration

The notion of an emerging "threat from the south," widely discussed in southern Europe, is, with some prominent exceptions, unrelated to the security of territory in the traditional sense. In many quarters, and most notably on the political right, the issue is the threat to the "fabric" of European societies posed by the scale of economic migration, particularly from the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa. Perhaps six million immigrants of Maghrebi origin already reside in the EC, roughly half of these in France. This has long been a divisive issue in France with its large North African population. More recently, it has emerged as a potent political question in Spain and Italy, where more tolerant attitudes toward immigration have traditionally pre-

14 In the wake of the Gulf War there has also been active interest across the Southern Region in acquiring anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems, notably Patriot. The idea of a mobile NATO ATBM force has also been raised.

vailed. An important factor in this regard has been the increasing prosperity of both countries, and the tightening of immigration policies elsewhere, with the result that the Iberian and Italian peninsulas are now attractive destinations as well as conduits for migration (Portugal remains a net exporter of labor).

The engine of this migratory flow has been the growing demographic imbalance between Europe and the Maghreb, and the stagnation of the North African economies. The North African population (excluding Egypt) is growing at a rate approaching three percent annually, and is expected to increase from 63 million in 1990 to perhaps 142 million by 2025.\textsuperscript{16} If Egypt is taken into account, the greater North African population in 2000 will be in the range of 175 million, 260 million by 2025 (the population of the 12 EC countries in these periods would be roughly 320 and 305 million, respectively).\textsuperscript{17} Over a million youths join the Maghrebi workforce every year.\textsuperscript{18} As the EC imposes more restrictive immigration policies (a requirement made more urgent by the "Schengen" agreement abolishing frontier controls between France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain, and Portugal), the pressure on North African societies and economies will grow, with potentially serious implications for political stability and, ultimately, north-south relations on security matters.\textsuperscript{19} The simultaneous expansion of immigration from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union may also affect the economic opportunities for Maghrebi (and Turkish) workers in Europe.

Over the longer term, the diversion of European and American investment to the East may exacerbate an already dire problem of economic underdevelopment. What Europeans fear, above all, is that prevailing demographic and economic conditions will encourage Islamic fundamentalism and radical nationalism in the Maghreb, interacting with proliferation and territorial issues to produce a more

\textsuperscript{17}These data are summarized in Yves Boyer and Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "Prospects for Enhanced Defense Cooperation Within the Atlantic Alliance," in \textit{Beyond Burden-sharing}, Alliance Papers Proceedings No. 1 (Brussels: U.S. Mission to NATO, April 1989), pp. 49–50.
\textsuperscript{18}Heimboung, "Population Movements in Post–Cold War Europe," p. 35.
\textsuperscript{19}Michael Binyon, "Frontier Pact Opens the Way for Frontier-Free Europe," \textit{The Times}, June 20, 1990.
direct security threat to southern Europe. This risk is felt most keenly in Spain, where it is feared that restrictions on immigration could provoke a wave of anti-Spanish sentiment in Morocco and bring the issue of the Spanish enclaves at Ceuta and Melilla to the fore. As a consequence of its proximity, burgeoning population and economic underdevelopment, the Maghreb is increasingly seen as the "functional equivalent of Mexico," and the Mediterranean, a European Rio Grande. In this context, it has been observed that "the prospect of Maghrebi boat people is not altogether far fetched." The fact that the politicization of the migration issue might extend to already disaffected immigrant communities in Europe, fueling anti-immigrant (and often overtly racist) elements on the right, provides an additional source of concern.

Much of the impetus for Western Mediterranean Cooperation (the so-called "five plus five") and the C SCM resides in the developmental and demographic imbalance between north and south and its implications for security not only in southern Europe, but in Europe as a whole. "The trade-off between stability and development is at the heart of European security in the Mediterranean," just as the original CSCE compromise involved the inter-relationship of human rights and security matters. With some exceptions, political and security elites in southern Europe are reluctant to envision a militarization of north-south relations in the Mediterranean based on the migration issue, preferring an economic and political approach through institutions competent in these areas (e.g., the EC and new frameworks for Mediterranean cooperation). Efforts to engage North Africa in a political and economic dialogue were given new urgency by the extent of the popular (in the case of Tunisia, official) support for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis. This experience has been characterized in many quarters around the Southern Region as evidence of the fact that North Africa is becoming increasingly "Middle Eastern."

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22 See Peter Bruce, "Europe's Other Front Line," Financial Times, September 14, 1990.

23 The "five plus five" refers to Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Malta plus the five members of the Arab Union of the Maghreb: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.

24 Alboni, European Security Across the Mediterranean, p. 34.
The turmoil in Algeria and the imposition of U.N. sanctions against Libya have now combined to place these north–south initiatives on hold.

Turmoil in the Balkans poses an additional migration risk for Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The social and economic costs imposed by the flow of refugees and economic migrants from Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania are contributing to a reassessment of national security in the Adriatic and Aegean regions. If the problems of Kurdish refugees and the very large movements of ethnic Turks that might accompany severe instability in the southern republics of the former Soviet Union are taken into account, it is clear that migration issues will occupy a prominent place on security agendas in the eastern as well as the western Mediterranean. Continued refugee flows and prolonged lawlessness in the Adriatic region could impose considerable costs on Italy and Greece—costs which these countries will wish to "multilateralize." As separatist movements gather momentum in Yugoslavia and perhaps elsewhere in the Balkans, the control of arms shipments may emerge as an equally pressing concern.

Resources and Lines of Communication

Strategic perceptions in the Southern Region are strongly influenced by resource and resource-related issues. In particular, access to energy supplies arriving via the Suez Canal and oil pipelines terminating in the Levant will be a continuing source of Western interest in the region. Prior to the Gulf War, more than half of Europe's oil imports were obtained via the Mediterranean. The shipment of Iraqi oil through Turkish pipelines, halted as part of the program of economic sanctions implemented after the invasion of Kuwait, will undoubtedly resume at some point, not least to facilitate the payment of Iraqi reparations. Over the longer term, the desire to diversify the shipping routes for Persian Gulf oil, avoiding an over-reliance on Hormuz, is likely to assert itself strongly as a permanently operating factor in the eastern Mediterranean.

25In historical terms, economic migration and refugee flows have played a consistently important role in shaping the strategic environment in the Mediterranean. These issues are treated in detail in Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.
Large quantities of oil and natural gas are also exported from North Africa to Europe, and a high-capacity gas pipeline linking Algerian fields to Spain via Morocco and Gibraltar is planned. The latter has given rise to some debate in Spain about the political leverage that might result from this new link. On balance, it is likely to have the effect of tying the Algerian and Moroccan economies even more firmly to one another, and to Europe.26

The control over water resources will be an important dimension of the strategic environment ashore in the eastern Mediterranean, with potentially important implications for Turkey's relations with Iraq and Syria. As with oil, it is unlikely that water and other resource-related objectives will serve as causes of conflict in their own right; that is, in the absence of underlying regional ambitions and concerns. In combination with wider territorial and political concerns, resource issues can exert a strong influence on national strategies and provide a spark for conflict.27 This could be the case in relation to oil and mineral issues in the Aegean, as well as fishing and environmental disputes elsewhere.28

The pattern of communications around the Mediterranean and between the Mediterranean and other regions has been a historically important factor affecting security interests around the Southern Region, and the stake of nonlittoral actors in the area. Greece and Turkey, and to a lesser extent Portugal, are outside the European economic mainstream, lending additional importance to efficient transport links with the "center." In the case of the former two, this situation has been reinforced by the isolation of Eastern Europe from the European economic center during the Cold War.29 The risk of a

29Eberhard Rhein, "Turkey and the New Europe," Remarks presented at a conference organized by the International Herald Tribune, Istanbul, 14 November 1990, p. 10. In this context, it is worth speculating on the long-term consequences of the reintegration of Eastern Europe for the economic balance of Europe and the implications for the Southern Region economies.
prolonged closure of the Yugoslav land link to the European market plays an important role in Greek attitudes toward developments in the Balkans. The desire to improve the infrastructure for communications and transport features prominently in regional initiatives underway in the Iberian peninsula, within the Hexagonale, and around the Black Sea. Economic renewal in Eastern Europe, coupled with new regional efforts in the former area of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, could eventually lead to the revival of the port of Trieste as a link between south-central Europe and the Mediterranean. As the energy economy of Eastern Europe continues to move away from ex-Soviet sources of supply and toward reliance on the world oil market, such links will become even more important. In strategic terms, the result will be the introduction of new actors with a stake in the stability of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean as a whole.

The scale of shipping through the Mediterranean itself contributes to the importance of the sea and the Southern Region in economic security terms. Some 3,000 ships, more than half of which are oil tankers, transit the Mediterranean daily. This represents roughly half of the world's maritime traffic. The republics of the former Soviet Union have a particularly pronounced stake in unimpeded communications with the Mediterranean. Black Sea ports have handled more than 30 percent of all Soviet imports and exports, and Soviet vessels have been among the most intensive users of the Suez Canal, with more than 1,000 transits per year.

In sum, an expanding definition of security in Europe as a whole, embracing questions of migration and economic security, is likely to

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31 Turkey's program for Black Sea cooperation includes the proposed expansion of shipping links across the sea and improved infrastructure along the Danube route. "Commentary on Economic Prospects for the Black Sea," FBIS-West Europe Report, August 1, 1991, p. 27.
33 Bardaji, "The Iberian Peninsula as the Western Key to the Mediterranean Sea," p. 5.
draw increasing attention to security and security-related problems in
the “south.” An expanding security canvas may also suggest an ex-
panding set of participants beyond the actors mentioned above in re-
lation to Eastern Europe and its access to the Mediterranean. To the
extent that Germany begins to recast its defense policy to address
risks outside central Europe and to support more actively allied ini-
tiatives outside the NATO area, the Mediterranean will be the first
and most natural outlet. One harbinger of this may be found in the
deployment of a sizable portion of the German navy into the
Mediterranean (under NATO command) during the Gulf crisis.35

NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Having identified some of the most prominent issues and trends af-
flecting the security environment across the Southern Region, distinc-
tive national perspectives must also be noted. A comprehensive
treatment of the foreign and security policies of the Southern Region
countries (including the Mediterranean dimensions of French policy)
is clearly impossible within the scope of this Report. The following
discussion will therefore focus on key attitudes and developments,
with special reference to regional concerns, institutional and bilateral
relations in Europe, and the prospects for cooperation with the United
States on European and extra-European security matters.

35 This presence consisted of 17 vessels and 2,200 men. FBIS-West Europe Report,
February 19, 1991, p. 22. See also Howe, “NATO and the Gulf Crisis.”
4. PORTUGAL

Although not a Mediterranean country in a strict geographical sense, Portugal shares many of the political, economic, and security characteristics common to the Mediterranean members of the Southern Region. The pace of change in Europe, together with the reassessment of the security relationship with the United States in the wake of the Gulf War and in the context of ongoing base negotiations, has contributed to a lively debate in Portuguese foreign and defense policy circles on Portugal's geopolitical place and role in international affairs.

EURO-ATLANTICISM AFTER THE COLD WAR

The growing, even paramount importance of Portugal's European connection as the EC moves toward "1992" contrasts with a revival of interest in Portugal's Atlantic vocation in the wake of the Gulf experience.¹ In fact, the issue of whether Portugal is primarily a European (even Mediterranean) or an Atlantic country is a long-standing source of tension in Portuguese foreign and security policy. The weight of Portuguese history argues strongly for an Atlantic orientation, a view more common in conservative circles, but shared by others across the political spectrum who look to Portugal's ties to West Africa and Brazil as a source of international prestige and activism. Yet, the dominant trend is clearly toward a more European approach to policy across the board, a trend reinforced by Portugal's presidency of the EC from January to June of 1992. Portugal's "Euro-Atlantic" character and its close relations with Africa and Brazil have been described as "trump cards" that increase the country's influence in EC fora.² As elsewhere in the Southern Region, there has been a degree of concern about the potential diversion of economic attention to Eastern Europe, including the republics of the former Soviet Union. The effects of this have yet to be felt in Portugal, but there is a lingering

¹See Tim Dickson, "Growing Relationship with the European Community" (Survey of Portugal), Financial Times, October 24, 1990, p. vi.

worry about the longer term prospects for investment, not only in Portugal, but in areas such as West Africa where Portugal has longstanding political and commercial ties. Similarly, there is little enthusiasm for a formal broadening of the EC eastward or the extension of full membership to Turkey, both of which would dilute the political and economic benefits of integration for Portugal. More positively, many Portuguese observers are enthusiastic about the potential role of Portugal as a model for democratic transition in Eastern Europe.

SECURITY STRUCTURES

Despite the growing importance of the EC dimension in Portuguese policy, many in the political and strategic elite remain wary of a European defense identity that might threaten Portugal’s bilateral relations with the United States (perhaps because Portugal, if forced to choose, would almost certainly opt for Europe). There is a strong faction that advocates a cautious approach to the process of European integration in general, and the idea of a common foreign and security policy in particular. President Mario Soares has been sympathetic to this opinion, despite his credentials as an early advocate of Portugal’s entry into the EC. The prevailing view is more positive, but still falls short of the enthusiasm for rapid movement toward a European defense pillar (e.g., giving the WEU an operational character within the EC) to be found in France, Italy, or Spain. The prospect of European defense arrangements around a Franco-German core would almost certainly clash with Portugal’s interest in maintaining strong transatlantic defense links.3

CSCE and C SCM are viewed with interest, but again without the level of enthusiasm to be found elsewhere. Portugal has been an active participant in the process of Western Mediterranean cooperation, and has joined the core group of countries active in promoting C SCM (Spain, Italy, and France).4 Portugal brings to both Mediterranean

3Official Portuguese calls for a more active WEU are most often coupled with comments on the continuing and essential role of NATO. See, for example, the statement by Defense Minister Fernando Nogueira, reported RDP Internacional, Lisbon, in FBIS-West Europe Report, June 17, 1991, p. 22; and Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro’s article, “The European Security Architecture: Transatlantic Links Remain Indispensable,” NATO Review, February 1991.

initiatives the advantage of a history of involvement in North African affairs untainted by recent colonial experience. Overall, there is a substantial consensus that both NATO and the bilateral relationship with the United States have served Portuguese interests very well. The development of a new security architecture in Europe will be viewed with caution even as Portugal adopts an overtly European approach to political and economic issues.\footnote{Senior Portuguese leaders continue to describe the NATO link as “irreplaceable.” See, for example, “Cavaco Silva Interviewed on EC Course,” \textit{Diario de Noticia}, Lisbon, May 7, 1991, in \textit{FBIS–West Europe Report}, May 31, 1991, p. 17.}

**EUROPEAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS**

The concept of an Atlantic or “strategic” triangle, formed by Lisbon, Madeira, and the Azores, continues to inform the Portuguese approach to security. Portugal’s residual strategic importance in East–West terms focuses on the importance of this area for rapid reinforcement across the Atlantic, given a much reduced U.S. presence in central Europe. The changed political and security circumstances in Europe have already made the Portuguese commitment to the reinforcement of northeastern Italy an anachronism, although Portugal is most likely to devote these or other forces to a new NATO (or WEU) rapid response force.

Even prior to the Gulf crisis, there was a small but steadily increasing concern about the future of Portuguese relations with the countries of the Maghreb. Portugal has enjoyed good relations with Morocco over the past few decades, but the mounting nationalist and fundamentalist pressures on King Hassan raise new questions about the future of relations with the kingdom. Widespread demonstrations in support of Iraq during the crisis in the Gulf have contributed to Portuguese unease. Although Portuguese observers do talk about a “threat from the south,” there is little of the overt concern to be found in strategic circles in Spain (where the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla are at stake). Portugal does, however, share the broader European concern about migration across the Mediterranean. As Portugal moves toward a European standard of prosperity, migrants may not only seek to enter an increasingly barrier-free EC through the Algarve, but may come to view Portugal as a destination as well as a conduit.
Madeira, 360 miles offshore of the Western Sahara, is another source of concern. Libya has attempted to raise the issue of Portuguese sovereignty over Madeira within the Organization for African Unity, but with little success. More serious is the threat posed by ballistic missiles and longer range aircraft to Madeira and the Portuguese mainland. Reports that Iraq had placed improved Scud missiles in Mauritania produced considerable alarm in Portugal during the Gulf crisis. In general, however, there is a marked reluctance on the part of mainstream political and military elites to envision a militarization of north–south relations that would mark a return to the strategic status quo ante—with a new and much closer set of adversaries. Political and economic approaches are preferred, and Portugal has made it known that it intends to make improved relations with the Maghreb and the non-European states of the Mediterranean a theme of its EC presidency.

Portugal’s traditional wariness of Spain continues to make itself felt in the political, economic, and cultural realms, despite recent initiatives aimed at improving bilateral ties. It also exerts an identifiable, if waning, influence on strategic thought. In particular, the continental dimension of Portuguese defense planning has long incorporated what some observers have termed the “theory of the Spanish danger,” reflected in the Portuguese military structure adopted in the 1980s.

DEFENSE PLANS AFTER THE GULF WAR

The Gulf War has given considerable impetus to the planned modernization and reorganization of the Portuguese armed forces, with a

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6Alvaro de Vasconcelos, “Portuguese Defense Policy: Internal Politics and Defense Commitments,” in Chipman, ed., NATO’s Southern Allies, p. 120.


view toward a more active role in NATO (or prospective WEU) rapid response initiatives. Recent comments by the Defense Minister, for example, emphasize that Portugal does not want its role in NATO to be restricted to providing conveniently located facilities, as important a contribution as this may be. Principal tasks for the future will therefore include streamlining the manpower-heavy Portuguese army, a legacy of the colonial period, and acquiring modern equipment. Recent years have also seen an active effort to complete the extension of civilian control over the military and to promote a broader public debate on defense issues, including the restructuring of the armed forces for modern missions.

Portugal is to be the recipient of significant amounts of relatively modern equipment "cascaded" in the wake of the CFE agreement. The Portuguese navy has given priority to the modernization of its submarine and frigate forces (the navy's ships average 25 years in age), and the Portuguese air force intends to acquire 20 new F-16s, to be financed primarily through U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) credits. An aim of both services has been to bolster Portugal's ability to protect the sea lines of communication between the Azores, Madeira, and the mainland. With a vastly diminished, perhaps nonexistent, "eastern" threat to the Atlantic sea lanes, this rationale for modernization may be increasingly difficult to defend. Moreover, defense modernization is unlikely to be a high priority for the current Social Democratic Party (PSD) government, and funding will continue to be strictly limited in the absence of foreign security assistance.

12See Thomas C. Bruneau, "Defense Modernization and the Armed Forces in Portugal," Naval Postgraduate School, unpublished paper, July 1991. A Parachute Commando Brigade, scheduled to be operational in 1993, would be the most likely Portuguese contribution to a NATO rapid reaction force; the so-called Separate Mixed Brigade will be assigned to NATO reinforcement; a Light Intervention Brigade will replace the current Special Forces Brigade, with the mission of defense of the national territory, along with mobilizable territorial defense brigades deployed in the north and south of the country. See "Army Chief of Staff Contemplates Restructuring," O Jornal, Lisbon, in FBIS-West Europe Report, August 8, 1991, p. 29.
13Equipment to be given to Portugal under the NATO equipment transfer program includes M-60 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and air defense weaponry. Jane's Defence Weekly, July 6, 1991, pp. 18–19.
15See Bruneau, "Defense Modernization."
Despite the active Portuguese support for the coalition operations in the Gulf (the use of facilities at Lajes and the offer of bases on the mainland at Beja and Montijo, the dispatch of two frigates to the Mediterranean, and the loan of a logistics ship to Britain for use in the Gulf), the frustration of the Portuguese military at the country's limited operational role has been evident. Additional steps, discussed but not taken, included the deployment of A-7 aircraft to Turkey and troops from the Mixed Brigade to Saudi Arabia. Beyond the constraints imposed by Portugal's lack of suitable equipment and training for such deployments, there was the additional and perhaps more decisive problem of public acceptance in a country unused to deploying forces abroad (with the exception of the unpopular experience of the colonial wars). Nonetheless, in the wake of the Gulf experience, the Portuguese government has been signaling its strong interest in developing an overseas capability for the armed forces, again, in the context of NATO or WEU rapid response initiatives. All of this would support the growing "internationalization" of Portuguese thinking on security matters, as described in the findings of the "Strategy Analysis Group," established by Defense Minister Fernando Nogueira in 1990.

Growing Spanish involvement in NATO, especially in the air and sea defense of Iberia and the western approaches to the Mediterranean, is a source of some concern to Portuguese officials and planners. Here, Spain's more capable forces may allow it to overshadow Portugal within the Alliance just as the latter begins to envision a wider role. Indeed, it is arguable that Portugal's role in NATO and especially in IBERLANT might have been rather different, and more limited, had Spain been an earlier member of the Alliance. Portuguese strategists tend to prefer an interpretation of Spanish security interests and roles that emphasizes that country's Mediterranean rather than Atlantic vocation.

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Portugal's heavy dependence on imported resources, together with the need to bind together security interests within the "Atlantic Triangle" and beyond to Cape Verde, makes unimpeded access to the seas a strategic imperative. As Portugal cannot guarantee the control of the sea in this area with its own limited resources, there is strong interest in maintaining an adequate level of U.S. naval presence in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, even after the Cold War, as a hedge against longer term uncertainties in Europe and Africa. Accordingly, Portugal has expressed little interest in naval arms control, least of all proposals confined to surface ships.

BILATERAL RELATIONS AND COOPERATION OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA

Even as relations between Lisbon and Brussels come to the fore, there continues to be a strong consensus among the Portuguese political elite on the need to maintain the close bilateral relationship with the United States. The fact that the United States was never associated in the minds of the Portuguese with the Salazar regime, and indeed was supportive of the democratic revolution of 1974, has encouraged an environment in which there is very little formal anti-Americanism. This situation provides a direct contrast to Greece and Spain where American support for the colonels and Franco has produced a strong distrust of the United States in many quarters.

The increasingly European thrust of Portuguese policy has, however, had an effect on attitudes toward defense cooperation with the United States outside the NATO area. Automatic Portuguese support, including the provision of access to facilities in non-NATO contingencies, can no longer be taken for granted.19 A great deal has changed since 1973, when Portugal was the only NATO country to allow the use of its bases for the resupply of Israel (in some instances, U.S. aircraft actually flew from Germany to Lajes and thence to Israel).20 Portugal is now a confident democracy, an active member of the EC, and free of the burden of a colonial war in Africa in which U.S. acquiescence was essential. The balance of incentives affecting

19Technically, of course, access to facilities in the Azores and elsewhere in Portugal outside the NATO context has never been "automatic" and has always been subject to case-by-case approval.
Portuguese policy has shifted considerably, making it most unlikely that Portugal would grant the United States access to its facilities in a sensitive crisis outside the NATO area if its EC partners were reluctant to do so. This is not to suggest that Portugal has become an unreliable ally—far from it. Rather, Portuguese attitudes can no longer be seen in isolation from Europe as a whole. In those cases where a broad European consensus for cooperation does exist, as in the Gulf, Portugal is likely to be in the front rank, politically if not operationally.\footnote{Portuguese observers often note the existence of an isolationist current in Portuguese attitudes toward international affairs, a current likened to its American counterpart. In the Portuguese case, the isolationists, or "neo-nationalists," exist in opposition to the pull of Europe on the one hand and the United States on the other. (This school also tends to see Spain as the historical enemy in cultural, economic, and even strategic terms.) See De Vasconcelos, "Portuguese Defense Policy," p. 133.}

Although Portuguese officials have been disappointed by recent levels of U.S. security assistance and concerned about the progress of negotiations over facilities in the Azores, there is a growing consensus that the bilateral relationship will and should move away from its traditional focus on defense cooperation.\footnote{U.S. security assistance for Portugal (requested) for FY91 totaled $127.65 million. Negotiations on renewal of the 1951 agreement governing U.S. access to Portuguese facilities in the Azores are continuing. Although the United States has not wished to portray bilateral relations on this issue as "rent for bases," this is very much the perception in Portugal. See Bruneau, "Defense Modernization."} In this context, Portugal will have a keen interest in moving toward a broader and more mature relationship in which political and economic links play a greater role alongside security ties.\footnote{This point is made very well in De Vasconcelos, "Portuguese--U.S. Relations in the Field of Security," p. 67.} Indeed, these are precisely the advantages offered by the European connection. The long-term Portuguese commitment to the maintenance of a strong transatlantic dimension in European security is nonetheless clear, a commitment reflected in the Strategy Analysis Group's view that Portugal should "play the role of European defender of the United States in NATO."\footnote{FBIS-West Europe Report, September 4, 1991, p. 30.}
5. SPAIN

NEW DYNAMISM IN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Three factors are of critical importance in the new activism that Spain is demonstrating on the international scene. The first is the overwhelming consensus that Spain is now "back in Europe" after centuries of isolation from the mainstream of European affairs, an isolation heightened and prolonged by the Francoist experience. The second factor is the extraordinary fluidity of the political situation in post–Cold War Europe, and the new freedom of action afforded medium powers such as Spain as East–West relations in Europe are progressively demilitarized. Finally, the experience of the Gulf War, and Spain's unprecedented contribution to the allied effort, has given great impetus to the pursuit of a more active security role for Spain beyond its own territory—an enlargement of Spain's traditionally circumscribed philosophy of security.\(^1\) The thrust of Spain's new approach to foreign and security policy was elegantly summarized in Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez's declaration in Rabat following the decision to deploy Spanish warships (one frigate and two corvettes) to help enforce the blockade of Iraq: "We are not going to follow the traditional policy of not participating in the destiny of Europe or not sharing the international unanimity about the conflict. I am not for an isolated Spain. We are going to remain firm in our new role."\(^2\)

Spain in a Changing Europe

In the wake of the political revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Spanish private sector began to voice its concerns that opportunities in the east would draw investment that might otherwise have continued to fuel Spain's rapidly (some would say too rapidly) growing economy. These fears have not yet materialized, although there remains a more

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\(^1\) Foreign Minister Julian Garcia Vargas has observed that one of the lessons of the Gulf War is that "Spain must enlarge the philosophy of its security, which is not to be confined to its territorial space," *El País*, April 25, 1991.

general concern that countries in North Africa and Latin America with whom Spain has special ties or interests will suffer from a decline in development funds. At the same time, political and intellectual circles are anxious to promote the Spanish experience as a model for the transition from totalitarianism to democracy and the reform of civil-military relations.3 Certainly, the Eastern European democracies will take note of the Spanish lesson that membership in both the EC and NATO can give one a greater voice in each. Overall, there is a sense that Spain can make an important contribution to EC efforts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Although there is little enthusiasm for a formal extension of the EC eastward, a number of prominent political figures have reacted positively to the idea of Turkish and Cypriot membership.

Spanish public opinion has embraced German reunification without overt reservations. Gonzalez and others have, however, expressed some concern about the prospect of German economic hegemony within the EC (perceptions about the effects of reunification on German economic strength in the short to medium term are now more modest, as elsewhere within the Community), and the preservation of a Franco-German political balance.4 The rapid pace of Spanish economic growth over the past few years has resulted in high inflation and interest rates. As the EC moves toward monetary union, Spain will face a pressing need to bring both of these rates in line with European norms lest Spain be “forced into the back row of a two-speed Europe,” a development with potential political as well as economic consequences for Spain’s position within the Community.5 Overall, Spain is committed to progress on economic and monetary union, but stresses that this should be accompanied by a more extensive transfer of EC resources from “wealthy” to “less wealthy” members.6

Spain has supported EC initiatives aimed at stabilizing the crisis in Yugoslavia, but has also pointed to the limited results as evidence of the need for a more effective and common European foreign policy.

3See Chilcote et al., Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy.
5Peter Bruce, “Missed Targets on Spain’s Road to ERM,” Financial Times, August 12, 1991, p. 15.
Spanish attitudes toward the Yugoslav crisis have been strongly influenced by the existence of active separatist movements in Spain, most notably in the Basque country and Catalonia, but also in Galicia and the Canary Islands. Until very recently, government officials and mainstream politicians have been reluctant to endorse approaches that would legitimize the revision of internal borders or encourage ethnic regionalism elsewhere in Europe. Spain, along with Italy, Greece, and Turkey, has a particularly strong interest in upholding the principle of national unity based on the territorial status quo in Europe, an interest that is likely to color attitudes toward the evolution of Europe, east and west, beyond the current crisis in the Balkans.7

REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND DEFENSE POLICY

To a much greater extent than Portugal with its strong Atlantic connections, Spain always had a very weak perception of the Soviet threat. Both geography and the political isolation of Spain during the Franco years played a role in shaping Spanish attitudes toward the East–West strategic competition (the ideological dimension of the Cold War and its domestic implications for Spain were, of course, issues of greater concern for the Spanish right). Not surprisingly, Spain has been in the vanguard in urging steep reductions in European and American forces on the continent, including the exploration of naval arms control.8 As the United States contemplates even more substantial reductions in its presence after CFE, and Spain itself becomes more active within NATO, Spanish strategists have begun to assert the importance of Spain should U.S. forces need to return to Europe in strength in response to future crises.


8Over the past decade, Spain has faced repeated demands for naval arms reductions and the establishment of nuclear-free "zones of peace" in the Mediterranean in discussions with Maghrebi states. Most recently, and particularly in the wake of the Gulf War, these demands have begun to be replaced by assertions of equal rights to self-defense, including the acquisition of modern conventional and unconventional technology.
Specifically, Spain has agreed to make the following contributions to the Alliance through a series of six coordination agreements: 1) defense of Spanish territory; 2) air defense of Spanish territory and control of Spanish air space; 3) control of the Strait of Gibraltar and its approaches; 4) naval and air operations in the eastern Atlantic; 5) naval and air operations in the western Mediterranean; and 6) use of Spanish territory as a transit and logistic support area for the Alliance. Coordination agreements have been concluded in four of these areas, with negotiations on the control of Gibraltar and the use of Spanish territory for logistical support now underway. Spanish cooperation in all of these areas will, however, continue to be conditioned by the restrictions set forth in the 1988 referendum on NATO membership—nonintegration into NATO’s military command, non-deployment of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil (although Spain does participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group), and the reduction of the U.S. military presence in Spain.

Overall, the perception of a threat from the east, always remote, has essentially evaporated. Spain hardly needs to consider the risks posed by instability within the former Soviet Union in direct terms, although the implications for the future of Europe, including the prospects for separatist movements, are certainly discussed in Madrid. In many quarters, most notably in the military and conservative circles, the threat from the east has been supplanted by the notion of a “threat from the south,” that is, North Africa in general and Morocco in particular. The existence of the Spanish enclaves at Ceuta and Melilla, both claimed by Morocco, gives this perception of threat a concrete flavor. The defense of the enclaves is the leading scenario on which current Spanish defense planning is based. The enclaves, totaling 33 square kilometers, and with a predominantly Spanish population of roughly 140,000, date from the fifteenth century. The Spanish military garrison of roughly 20,000 men was heavily reinforced during the Gulf crisis.10

9Details of NATO Agreements Published,” El País, March 19, 1991, in FBIS-West Europe Report, April 4, 1991, p. 6; see also Jaime de Ojeda, “Spain’s Role in NATO,” NATO Review, February 1990, pp. 14–16. The prospect of Spanish naval and air operations in the eastern Atlantic has not been greeted with enthusiasm in Lisbon, where there is concern that this would conflict with the existing Portuguese area of responsibility in NATO.

Spanish opinion is increasingly concerned about the broader problems of demography, migration, and political instability in the Maghreb, all of which might affect the position of the Moroccan government toward the enclaves, apart from the longer term consequences for north-south relations in the Mediterranean. Over the past few decades, Spain has experienced little of the divisive debate on immigration that has become a politically important factor in France and more recently in Italy. To a considerable extent, this has been explained by Spain’s position as a conduit rather than a destination for economic migrants to the EC. As this situation has changed—and it is changing rapidly as Spain moves toward a level of prosperity on a par with its northern European neighbors—the significance of immigration as a political and security issue has grown (despite the relatively small number of illegal immigrants, totaling perhaps 300,000 in a population of 38 million). Some observers fear that a radical, post-Hassan regime in Morocco might use EC-wide restrictions on immigration as a pretext for threatening Spanish interests in North Africa.\textsuperscript{11} With the planned construction of a high-capacity gas pipeline from Algeria to Spain via Morocco, these interests will increasingly include access to energy as well as the long-standing problem of the enclaves.

Existing concerns about security to the south have been enlivened by the Gulf crisis and the growth of nationalism and fundamentalism in Morocco and Algeria. In the event, the worst fears of some Spanish observers—anti-Western extremism, possibly the overthrow of King Hassan, and moves against the enclaves or the Spanish mainland—did not materialize. Nonetheless, in the wake of the Gulf experience, Spanish strategic perceptions across the political spectrum are thoroughly focused on the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{12} Consequently, the issue of force projection and the development of a capability for national and multilateral contributions in this area are receiving new attention.


\textsuperscript{12} The decision to move Spain’s naval headquarters to Rota was encouraged by the need to assert Spain’s interest in the surveillance of the Strait of Gibraltar in the context of new NATO responsibilities, but also reflects a broader shift in strategic concern from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. See "Defense Chief Rodriguez Cited on NATO Issues," \textit{El Pais}, May 31, 1991, in \textit{FBIS-West Europe Report}, June 18, 1991, p. 13.
The objectives in this case are both military and political: military to the extent that the rapid reinforcement of Ceuta and Melilla (as well as the other Spanish archipelagos, the Canaries and the Balearics) imposes significant requirements; and political to the extent that Spain seeks to be an active participant in emerging rapid response initiatives in Europe. With regard to the latter, Spain supports the French preference for a European (i.e., a WEU) led force capable of intervening outside the NATO area. Ultimately, Spain might well be willing to contribute to a NATO rapid response force, although this would require some creative solutions to the problem of integrated command.

Politicians across the political spectrum are attentive to the problem of civil military relations as part of the Francoist legacy. One consequence of this has been an interest, shared elsewhere across the Southern Region, in developing a legitimate professional, external, and ideally multilateral role for professional military forces. Rapid reaction forces in a European or an Alliance context would serve this purpose admirably. Plans for restructuring the armed forces along more streamlined and professional lines (perhaps a 50/50 mix of professionals and conscripts) give priority to the creation of a Rapid Intervention Force (FIR) of brigade scale or larger. The FIR would be composed entirely of professionals.

The security of the North African enclaves is especially problematic because their defense falls outside of both the NATO and WEU areas of responsibility (the defense of the small islets offshore of Ceuta and Melilla would actually fall within the NATO area, as would the defense of Spanish shipping or aircraft in the Mediterranean). Indeed, Spanish strategists and policymakers often refer to the problem of defense against “non-shared” threats, meaning the security of Ceuta and Melilla. A coherent defense of the enclaves might well require the seizure of a substantial defensive perimeter on Moroccan territory, thereby raising the strategic stakes for both countries. Ceuta

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15Development of a permanent FIR will require the restructuring or elimination of existing units, such as the Paratroop Brigade, the Spanish Legion, and the Army Airborne Forces. “Army Reorganizes to Meet NATO Requirements,” FBIS-West Europe Report, June 19, 1991, p. 12.
and Melilla are regarded as parts of metropolitan Spain and few Spanish politicians have been willing to question the wisdom of defending them in a crisis.\textsuperscript{16} While a direct Moroccan military action against the enclaves is highly unlikely under current political conditions in Rabat, two more subtle threats to Spanish sovereignty will remain. First, in the event that Gibraltar is returned to Spain, the Spanish government can expect to find itself under considerable pressure on the subject of the enclaves. The history of these possessions may be very different (Spain does not view the enclaves as colonies), but they are likely to emerge as equivalent issues in international opinion. Secondly, under a post-Hassan regime, Spain could confront a relatively peaceful mass occupation of the enclaves on the pattern of the 1975 Moroccan "Green March" into the Spanish Sahara.\textsuperscript{17} If accompanied by backing from the Arab League, the Arab Union of the Maghreb or others, it could prove quite difficult to threaten the use of force in response. Under such conditions, a negotiated settlement might be the only practical option. The prospects for U.S. support in the event of a crisis over the enclaves would undoubtedly be shaped by Washington's need to consider the effect of an American intervention on opinion in North Africa and the Middle East as a whole, a reality that cannot be ignored in Madrid.

Spain's active support of the coalition stance in the Gulf produced a wave of popular indignation in the Maghreb, which the government has tried to assuage virtually from the moment Spanish involvement in the Gulf War became known. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and high-ranking officials have visited key Maghreb capitals in an effort to forestall a deterioration in north-south relations across the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{18} The keynote in these discussions has been the essential connection between economic and political development, and the importance of both for security in the western Mediterranean. Here, as in many other areas of policy, there has been a keen desire for a multilateral European approach to the problems of development and security in the Maghreb.\textsuperscript{19}

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\textsuperscript{17}Marquina Barrio, "Spain and Its North African Enclaves," p. 117.
\textsuperscript{19}Spain has announced additional credits for North Africa ($1.5 billion in aid and investment has already been produced for Morocco alone). See "Debt of Maghreb Coun-
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Spain supports the proposal for European defense cooperation based on an expansion of the existing Franco-German brigade and close ties between the WEU and the EC, and has announced its willingness to place forces under WEU command (although these would, of course, be the same forces currently committed to NATO).\textsuperscript{20} Beyond the cautious but deliberate assumption of new responsibilities within the NATO framework, and active support for what Spanish observers tend to describe as "the French model" for a European defense identity, the intellectual thrust of Spanish policy has been on the elaboration of the CSCM concept. The idea for a CSCE-type approach to Mediterranean problems, ideally a Mediterranean Act paralleling Helsinki, was first outlined by Spain at the Open Skies conference in Ottawa in February 1990. Since that time, Spain, along with Italy, has been in the forefront of efforts to promote the concept.\textsuperscript{21} Apart from the "core" group of European CSCM advocates, Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy, the concept has enjoyed a mixed reception in Europe and is not at all well known in the United States. Many observers, including some in Spain, regard the initiative as a nonstarter. Membership will be one of the most difficult issues. The prevailing view has been that CSCM should embrace the Mediterranean basin as a whole, to include such countries as Jordan and Mauritania that do not border on the Mediterranean but do have Mediterranean interests. In the wake of the Gulf crisis, Italy has promoted an even broader notion of CSCM extended to the Persian Gulf and beyond—from Mauritania to Pakistan (see Appendix).

For Spain, as for Italy, CSCM is a useful vehicle for political activism in a European and north–south context. But it is also an expression of the Spanish interest in developing concrete institutions capable of addressing the longer term problems of security across the Mediterranean, including immigration, proliferation, and the preservation of the territorial status quo, without the "baggage" associated with NATO and the WEU as essentially military instruments. As a conse-


quence, Spain has moved closer to the French preference for pursuing, at least in the first instance, cooperative measures in the western and central Mediterranean where the dominant issues are political and economic rather than military, and where a good deal can be accomplished without the active involvement of the United States. These measures might be pursued through C SCM or through the existing “five plus five” framework for western Mediterranean cooperation (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Malta plus the five members of the Arab Union of the Maghreb: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya). The perceived link between economic and political development in the Maghreb and north–south security in the Mediterranean has encouraged Madrid to propose the formation of a clearinghouse designed to facilitate European investment in North Africa. The proposed institution, which Spanish officials are careful to point out will not be a bank, is viewed as essential in order to mitigate the potentially substantial long-term diversion of aid and investment from south to east.

BILATERAL RELATIONS, COOPERATION OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA, AND THE GULF EXPERIENCE

Having negotiated the departure of U.S. forces from the highly visible base at Torrejon outside of Madrid and the progressive reduction of U.S. activity at Zaragoza, the Spanish government apparently has no desire for further reductions in the U.S. presence.22 The new defense cooperation agreement between the United States and Spain, concluded in December 1988 and entering into force in May 1989, provided for the removal of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from Torrejon by May 1992, while ending economic and security assistance to Spain and permitting U.S. use of Spanish territory and facilities for NATO purposes in times of crisis or war. Most important, the agreement fulfilled a key condition set forth in the referendum on continued Spanish membership in NATO, that is, “to proceed to the progressive reduction of the military presence of the United States in Spain.”23

The contribution of the new agreement in stabilizing the bilateral relationship and securing the active involvement of Spain in the Alliance established the groundwork for Spain's extraordinarily cooperative stance during the Gulf crisis. Spain's contribution to the coalition effort in the Gulf included the decision to allow the United States use of the air base at Moron for B-52 operations against Iraq, the use of Torrejon for logistic support, and the dispatch of a frigate and two corvettes to aid in the allied blockade beyond Suez. Spanish F-18s flew escort missions in support of the B-52 operations, and the Spanish armed forces provided active logistical support at Moron. Co-operation of this sort "out-of-area" was without precedent for Spain and entailed considerable political risk for the Gonzalez government. The government's ability to implement these decisions without strong opposition was based, first, on the new basis for bilateral defense cooperation mentioned earlier, and second and perhaps most importantly on the existence of a European as well as a United Nations consensus for action.

In sum, Spain's growing activism in political and security matters and the evolution of a more mature bilateral relationship with the United States provide the necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for cooperation outside the NATO area in the future. The Gulf experience demonstrates that Spain is willing to play an active role in security beyond its borders, including close cooperation with the United States where national interests coincide, but the need for a European imprimatur for such decisions will be increasingly essential from the Spanish perspective. Future Spanish attitudes toward security matters will be driven by the desire to be seen as a full participant in Europe.

25 In this context, the August 21 meeting of the WEU in Paris was critical to the Spanish decision for active cooperation. See Rodrigo, "The End of the Reluctant Partner," p. 6. An El Pais poll revealed that 52 percent of those interviewed supported Spain's involvement in the Gulf; 15 percent thought the government's response insufficient; only 25 percent expressed reservations about any involvement in the war. "Poll Shows 52 Percent Support Gulf Policy," FBIS-West Europe Report, February 1, 1991, p. 32.
6. MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSIONS OF FRENCH POLICY

This Report is concerned primarily with the evolution of security perceptions and policies in the countries of NATO's Southern Region. Although France is not a Southern Region country in the strict sense, it is very definitely a Mediterranean power, indeed the preeminent European power in the Mediterranean, with a long history of involvement and extensive political, military, and economic interests in the region. A brief survey of French views with regard to the emerging strategic environment in the Mediterranean is therefore worthwhile.

THE GAULLIST LEGACY

French thinking about the Mediterranean in the de Gaulle era was driven, first, by a desire to delegitimize the role and presence of the superpowers in the region as a whole, promoting a vision of the Mediterranean for Mediterraneans. The removal of the French navy from the Mediterranean in 1959 was intended to signal France's unwillingness to participate in any integrated military activity in the region.¹ Second, French policy under de Gaulle favored regionalism over globalism, building on long-standing French ties to the Maghreb and the Middle East. The objective of French policy in this regard was to decouple to the extent possible, security relations in the Mediterranean from the broader East–West strategic competition, thereby maximizing French freedom of action in the region. As Maurice Schumann observed, French policy was aimed at preventing the western Mediterranean, and if possible, "the whole of the Mediterranean basin from being a theater of the Cold War."² To some extent, the French approach found a favorable response in Spain, where the French model in security matters has retained its attractiveness. It found a less enthusiastic reception in Italy, where a NATO-centric

policy emerged as a means of securing Italy's place in the Western mainstream.

Elements of the Gaullist approach to the Mediterranean are still clearly discernible in the views of French officials and observers. The evaporation of the East–West military competition in the Mediterranean has tempered the pursuit of la Mediterranee aux Mediterraneens, but the preference for regional initiatives remains strong.\textsuperscript{3} Confirmation of the strength of this tradition may be found in the current French emphasis on bilateral and regional initiatives in the western Mediterranean within or outside the framework of CSCM, as opposed to the broader "global" (i.e., Mauritania to Pakistan) approach favored by Italy. Above all, France is likely to prefer an evolutionary approach to political and economic cooperation in the western Mediterranean, utilizing the existing "five plus five" arrangement between southern Europe and the Arab Union of the Maghreb. Such an approach would give a clear leading role to France, building upon long-standing experience in the region, and would limit the place of hard security issues on the agenda. The latter would be far more difficult in the central and eastern Mediterranean where direct security problems abound and the active involvement of the United States and (until recently) the Soviet Union would be unavoidable. As a strictly practical matter, the French position in this regard reflects the reality of on-going U.S. initiatives and commitments in the eastern Mediterranean; in the western Mediterranean, Europe can more easily take the lead.

In at least one important respect, the French approach to Mediterranean strategy has more in common with the United States than with any of its southern European partners. Despite the preference for regional initiatives, the strategic importance of the Mediterranean in French perceptions derives as much from interests beyond the Mediterranean littoral as it does from developments within the region itself.\textsuperscript{4} French observers tend to view policy toward North Africa as part of a broader complex of policies toward Africa as a whole, includ-

\textsuperscript{3}For a provocative demonstration of the durability of Gaullist views on the region, see Michel Jobert, "Thoughts on Mediterranean Strategy: From Surprise to Stubbornness," Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1991.

ing sub-Saharan Africa where France continues to play an active role. Similarly, French policy toward the Levant and the eastern Mediterranean cannot be divorced from French interests in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Calculation of the effect of French action or inaction around the Mediterranean littoral and beyond on international perceptions of France’s status and prestige is never very far from the surface. To a lesser but increasing extent, this broader “milieu” interest in Mediterranean policy is evident in Italian and Spanish behavior, as the Gulf experience demonstrated.

CHANGING SECURITY PERCEPTIONS: A THREAT FROM THE SOUTH

The emergence of immigration from the Maghreb as an internal and external challenge, noted elsewhere in this Report, has been most pronounced in the case of France. Awareness of political and proliferation trends in North Africa among the French political and strategic elite has contributed a concrete dimension to the rather ill-defined perception of a “threat from the south,” which has become a prominent issue for the French public and plays an increasingly central role in domestic politics.

Of France’s 55 million population, roughly 4.5 million are legal immigrants, with perhaps an additional million living in France illegally, the vast majority arriving from the Maghreb. The rise of immigration as a perceived threat to “the French way of life” has fueled the popularity of the right-wing National Front and its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, and has driven more moderate politicians across the political spectrum to propose new restrictions on immigration. Most recently, the Socialist government unveiled a series of restrictive measures aimed at reducing the number of illegal residents, including plans (since dropped) to charter aircraft to facilitate deportations. Ironically, the growing sentiment against immigration at the social and political level comes at a time when France, and Western Europe as a

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whole, faces an impending shortage of skilled as well as unskilled labor.\(^7\)

As the number of Arab immigrants in France has grown, and against the background of worsening race relations in French society, mainstream politicians and observers have become concerned about the potential effect of political change in the Maghreb on the immigrant community in France. The most troubling issue in this regard has been the increasing power of fundamentalists in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. In this context, the Gulf crisis demonstrated the difficulty of insulating French relations with North Africa from developments in the Middle East as a whole. An interventionist policy in the Middle East coupled with the mounting estrangement of the Arab community in France could wreak havoc with carefully cultivated bilateral relations in the western and central Mediterranean. The result would be a sharp decline in France's ability to pursue its traditional policy of constructive regionalism.\(^8\)

In an effort to encourage economic development and limit north-south migration at its source, France has pursued an active program of bilateral assistance in North Africa, and has supported the expansion of economic cooperation between the EC and the Maghreb.\(^9\)

Should fundamentalist parties come to power in Algeria or elsewhere in the Maghreb, France might still be in a position to carry on relatively normal political and economic relations if the following conditions are met: 1) the transition comes about as a result of free elections; 2) the fundamentalist regime is capable of preserving order; 3) the regime is not internationalist, that is, does not wish to export Islamic revolution; and 4) existing foreign communities and interests are tolerated (including French cultural and linguistic ties). Many observers believe that the prospects for all, perhaps any, of these conditions being met are limited.

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\(^7\)A recent study by INSEE, the French state statistics and economic studies institute, suggests that under certain conditions as many as 315,000 new arrivals per year might be needed after 2020 to ensure a viable working population in France; over 140,000 might be needed by 2000. Cited in Julian Nundy, "Migrants May Come to Rescue of France," *The Independent*, July 30, 1991.

\(^8\)On the damaging effect of the Gulf War on French relations in the Maghreb, see Michael Binyon, "Lone Stand, Villified by All," *The Times*, February 13, 1991.

\(^9\)France currently contributes roughly 2 billion francs each to Algeria and Morocco and 1 billion francs to Tunisia each year; EC aid to the Maghreb totals approximately 12 billion francs, not including trade concessions. In addition, some observers treat French energy purchases from Algeria as essentially concessionary arrangements.
As elsewhere in southern Europe in the wake of the Cold War, France is engaged in a redefinition of security in which economic and social issues are being given greater prominence. The confluence of north-south immigration issues and French interests in secure energy supplies from the Middle East and the associated sea lines of communication, has resulted in increased attention to the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{10} Again, following a pattern observable elsewhere, the French military has actively embraced the notion of a "threat from the south." The mainstream political leadership expresses many of the same concerns with regard to developments in North Africa, but is more cautious in discussing appropriate responses, preferring to emphasize political and economic initiatives.

To these broader security concerns must be added the more direct risk of the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons. The problem of air defense in the south, including defense against ballistic missile attack, has emerged as an important area of concern for French strategists and planners, and has provided the impetus for expanded cooperation with Italy and Spain. Key initiatives in this area include joint development of the Helios reconnaissance satellite and the integration of the STRIDA early warning network with the Spanish Combat Grande network and Italian NADGE radar sites. French AWACS aircraft operating in the Mediterranean between the Balearic Islands and Sardinia will provide a shared surveillance capability extending "several hundred kilometres" into North Africa.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW EUROPE}

In the prevailing French view, NATO as an essentially military instrument is an inappropriate vehicle for addressing the most pressing security and security-related issues emanating from the Mediterranean; that is, the problems of political and economic underdevelopment and immigration. To this must be added enduring French


reservations about the military dimension of NATO within its current geographical scope, and equally pronounced opposition to any expansion of the NATO mission. With regard to concrete security risks on the European periphery, France has expressed a strong preference for the development of an independent European defense capability within the WEU and ultimately the EC. The French notion of "variable geometry" with regard to the evolution of European political and security policy is regarded by some observers as a convenient formula for "postponing the resolution of important but difficult issues." 12 Many of these difficult issues are centered in the Mediterranean, not least the problem of Greek and Turkish participation in European defense arrangements. Greece, as a member of the EC, might logically be incorporated in these arrangements, but would bring with it serious security problems in the Balkans and the Aegean—all of which would tend to impede the rapid development of a consensus on European defense which the French favor. The inclusion of Turkey would raise far more serious and complex problems of exposure in the Middle East (these issues are addressed in detail later in this Report).

With regard to Turkey, the issue from the French perspective is, in fact, more basic and touches on the fundamental question of broadening versus deepening within the Community. To date, France has expressed a strong preference for deepening, preferring to delay the expansion of the Community eastward. French reservations about the Turkish application for membership are even more pronounced, and include a sensitivity to the issue of the north–south balance within the Community. Beyond this, French perceptions of Turkey are colored by the debate over immigration and a more general concern about Europe's relations with the Islamic world. Finally, one cannot ignore French concerns about the balance of Franco-German influence within the EC and the potential effect of expansion into regions such as Anatolia where German commercial and political influence has been strong.

THE GULF EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS FOR
COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

The question of whether the Gulf experience has shaken the tradi-
tional Gaullist reticence about defense cooperation within NATO or
merely reinforced the French desire to pursue an independent Euro-
pean (or simply French) approach to security is the subject of debate
on both sides of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{13} Less controversial is the observation
that post-Gulf French policy will feature the bolstering of the French
ability to act in the Mediterranean and the Gulf regardless of the
framework (French reliance on American transport to deploy troops to
Zaire in September 1991 will reinforce the lessons of the Gulf experi-
ence). An expanded space-based reconnaissance program, the acquisi-
tion of additional strategic airlift and tanker assets, and the restruct-
turing of the armed forces to increase the number of professional per-
sonnel available for overseas deployment beyond the existing FAR
(Force D’Action Rapide), will contribute to France’s ability to inter-
vene around the Mediterranean and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{14}

The need to strengthen European capabilities relevant to Mediterra-
nean contingencies is even more apparent in the French view as
Europe faces the possibility of a reduction in U.S. naval and air forces
in the Mediterranean in the absence of Cold War requirements.\textsuperscript{15}
The arm’s length attitude of the United States toward the crisis in
Yugoslavia has also raised French concerns about the potential
unwillingness of the United States to involve itself in future contingencies elsewhere around the Mediterranean in the absence of a
direct threat to U.S. interests.\textsuperscript{16} The precedent-setting deployment
of substantial German naval forces in the Mediterranean during the
Gulf crisis could be a positive trend if pursued within a multilateral,
European framework. In the absence of such a framework, the
evolution of a more active German involvement in the Mediterranea

\textsuperscript{13}See, for example, Ian Davidson, “Gulf Shakes Gaullist Taboo,” \textit{Financial Times},

\textsuperscript{14}With a total force of 200,000, France could muster only 10,000 professional troops
for service in the Gulf. Its tactical air contribution was similarly limited by the
absence of appropriate logistical support.

\textsuperscript{15}In this context, French officials and analysts have not been critical of the NATO
decision to develop a base at Crotone in Calabria to house the U.S. 401st Tactical
Fighter Wing after its departure from Torrejon.

\textsuperscript{16}I am grateful to RAND colleague Philip Gordon for his comments on this point.
would be a source of concern for Paris, particularly if it is accompanied by a progressive reduction in the U.S. presence.

One clear lesson of the Gulf experience has been that "habits of cooperation" developed through NATO and bilateral coordination proved extraordinarily useful even for countries outside the NATO integrated command structure, such as France and Spain.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, cooperation in the Mediterranean during the Gulf crisis built on an existing and close working relationship between the French Mediterranean Squadron and the U.S. Sixth Fleet developed through numerous bilateral and NATO exercises and out-of-area deployments (including the 1984 operations in Lebanon).\textsuperscript{18} Taken together with the growing trilateral cooperation between France, Italy, and Spain in the western Mediterranean, the mounting experience of bilateral cooperation with the United States provides considerable reason for optimism with regard to French defense cooperation in Mediterranean and out-of-area contingencies. To the extent that the U.S. naval and air presence in the Southern Region comes under pressure from budget cuts and competing demands for presence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the incentives for cooperation on all sides will grow.

In sum, France, rather like the United States, tends to view Mediterranean strategy in broad terms for reasons closely tied to the perceived French role as a "great power" with historic responsibilities beyond Europe. At the same time, French attention to its regional role within the Mediterranean is likely to become more prominent and important as the Soviet Union (or whatever replaces it) ceases to be a significant actor in the region, particularly if the United States adopts a discriminate approach to involvement in crises around the littoral. The evolution of French policy with regard to the Mediterranean in general, and regional defense cooperation in particular, will be watched with keen interest by other southern European countries for whom the "French model" may exert a powerful intellectual attraction, if not always a politically convincing one.

\textsuperscript{17}See Howe, "NATO and the Gulf Crisis."

\textsuperscript{18}The French and U.S. navies dominate the western naval presence in the Mediterranean and are the only powers operating through-deck aircraft carriers in the region. Palmer, "Paradigms Lost," p. 281.
7. ITALY

Over the past decade, indeed since the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Force) debate of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Italy has been an increasingly active player in European and transatlantic relations. The growing assertiveness of Italian foreign and defense policy reflects a natural desire for an international role commensurate with the country's position as the world's fifth or sixth largest industrial power. It also reflects the four-decade transition from a defeated and politically constrained power to an influential member of NATO and the EC, with a strong domestic consensus on Italy's role in both organizations.1 One consequence of the new Italian attention to international security questions as security questions, that is, not merely as extensions of domestic politics, is that certain long-standing tensions are becoming more visible and the subject of more explicit discussion. The first of these tensions concerns the balance between the Atlantic and European dimensions of security; the second embraces the competition between Italy's role in the center of Europe and the rediscovery of traditional interests and the perception of new risks in the Mediterranean. The nature of these tensions is such that they are unlikely to be resolved in any formal sense. But the effect of European and extra-European developments on each of these areas will continue to shape Italian attitudes toward the Atlantic Alliance, European defense arrangements, and bilateral relations with the United States.2


2An excellent general analysis of Italian security policy prior to the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Gulf crisis is Maurizio Cremasco, "Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean," in Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies. See also Cremasco, "NATO's Southern Flank and Italy's Role in It," The International Spectator, April-June 1988; Luigi Caligaris, "Italy's Strategic Dilemma," NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol. 32, no. 4; and Ian O. Lesser, Italian NATO Policy: The Next Five Years, RAND, N-2950-AF, 1989.
NEW ACTIVISM AND COMPETING INTERESTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

During the Cold War, Italy's "strategic dilemma," but also much of its strategic significance, derived from the fact that it was an actor in both the Central and Southern regions of the Alliance. The evaporation of the military threat in northeastern Italy has left Italy free to pursue the reorientation of its security policy to address risks emanating from the Mediterranean, a trend visible even prior to the changes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. At the political level, however, the tension between Italy's central European and Mediterranean vocations remains, as Italy seeks to play a more active role in both areas. In one respect, however, Italy's strategic situation has changed. Whereas the Italian political and strategic leadership has traditionally bemoaned the Central Region bias of Italy's principal Alliance partners and their lack of attention to security problems—broadly defined—emanating from the Mediterranean, the current security environment in Europe features a general upsurge in interest in southern issues.

The thrust of Italian policy with regard to security challenges on the European periphery, in the Balkans as well as the Mediterranean region more broadly, has been to promote multilateral approaches to problems that would prove politically and materially costly for Italy to address alone. By pursuing a European context for policy on immigration, regional security in the Balkans, or north–south cooperation in the Mediterranean, Italy can work to erode the distinction between central and peripheral security concerns with its attendant risk of marginalization. In any case, the scale and potential consequences of the crisis in Yugoslavia and immigration from North Africa are such that they are necessarily of concern to Europe as a whole.

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3 The progressive reorientation of strategy and forces toward the south was explicitly articulated in the Italian 1985 Defense White Paper.

ITALY IN A CHANGING EUROPE

The rather cautious initial attitude of Prime Minister Andreotti and Foreign Minister De Michielis to German reunification progressed from acceptance to encouragement as the inevitability of the process became evident (on the whole, this evolution in attitude was not atypical of opinion elsewhere in Europe). There is, however, some continuing concern that reunification will adversely affect the economic and political balance within the EC and within Europe as a whole. Italy continues to champion, in the first instance, the notion of rapid and deeper integration within a community of equals. Reunification is judged mainly in terms of its potential effect on Germany's commitment to European integration along these lines.

Italy's term as President of the EC in the second half of 1990 was characterized by an array of meetings and initiatives that left many European policymakers and observers breathless. The dynamism that Italy demonstrated in organizing the two inter-governmental conferences on economic and political union was very much a part of the recent pattern of Italian activism in international affairs, reinforced by the energy and vision of Foreign Minister De Michielis. In particular, Italy used the period of its presidency to promote its interest in rapid progress toward European union based on the federal model, and to propose the expansion of the Community's ties with Eastern Europe and non-member countries around the Mediterranean, a long-standing concern.

Italy's proposal for absorbing the WEU within the EC as a vehicle for developing a common security policy has been more controversial. Italian leaders themselves have shown declining enthusiasm for this proposal which was, perhaps, both a response to and a victim of EC passivity during the Gulf crisis. Certainly, it has continued to be the subject of intense debate in Europe and across the Atlantic where some observers have seen the proposed merger as evidence of a distinct shift in Italian attitudes with regard to the balance of European

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and transatlantic security interests. It would be more accurate to say that De Michielis and many leading members of the Italian strategic elite have concluded that a European defense identity is inevitable, and will most likely exist alongside NATO. Within the Southern Region, Greece had also been a strong advocate of the idea, not least because it would encourage an end to the anomaly of its membership in the EC while remaining outside the WEU.

Italy in tandem with Britain has put forth a proposal for developing a European defense capability within the WEU, with equal links to the EC and NATO. The plan would place European defense policy firmly within the context of the Alliance, and contrasts strongly with the current Franco-German emphasis on the eventual absorption of the WEU within the EC. In the context of Italian policy, the Anglo-Italian proposal signals an attempt to reconcile the preservation of NATO, with its demonstrated political and military utility, while moving toward a more European approach, which virtually all Italian observers view as necessary and probably inevitable.

From the earliest periods of East–West detente, Italy has viewed itself as a privileged interlocutor between Western and Eastern Europe, particularly in relation to investment. Italy remains an important source of aid and investment for Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union, but its role in this regard is no longer unique. Resources and political will have replaced ideology as the requisite tools for involvement in the East. Nonetheless, Italy is the second-ranked trading partner and, after Germany, the largest source

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11It was always a more or less open secret that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) acted as a broker for Italian investment in Eastern Europe. With the changes in the East and the decline of the PCI, the field has shifted to parties with influence in industrial and financial circles. See “DC, PSI Seen Vying over Soviet Credits,” L’Espresso, November 27, 1988, in FBIS–West Europe Report, January 30, 1989; see also the interview with Prime Minister Andreotti in the same issue.

12As a consequence of large energy and raw material imports, Italy has traditionally run large trade deficits with the Soviet Union, Romania, and Hungary. Clyde Haberman, “Italy, Looking to the East, Seeks Economic Influence,” New York Times, July 9, 1990.
of direct investment in the former Soviet Union. As early as October 1988, then Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita proposed a sweeping program of economic aid for the Soviet Union based on the example of the Marshall Plan, and Italy has been at the forefront of efforts to expand Western aid and investment in the wake of the failed coup in Moscow. Most recently, these efforts have extended to the independent republics, including a program of 6–7 trillion lire energy-related investments in Kazakhstan.13

REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

The Italian debate on security matters has become more active and also more diverse as the concept of national security has undergone a process of redefinition to embrace economic and social as well as military risks. The emergence of a broader concept of security was well underway even before the East–West disengagement in Europe, and has gathered pace in the wake of recent developments. Italian regional security concerns are now broadly focused on the Mediterranean, with distinctive Balkan/Adriatic and North African/Middle Eastern dimensions. The Italian sensitivity to developments in these areas is a function first and most obviously of proximity, but also of long-standing economic and diplomatic interests in the Balkans, the Maghreb, and the Middle East. Arguably, no other Southern Region country is as vulnerable in all three areas across a full range of interests. Italy can be said to have an exposure tout azimut with respect to the Mediterranean.14

MEDITERRANEAN INTERESTS AND RISKS

Italy, once a net exporter of labor, has become a major destination for economic migrants and asylum seekers from the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa who are attracted by Italy’s prosperity, proximity to other Western European labor markets, and relatively permissive


immigration rules. Current estimates suggest that there are some 1.5 million non-EC immigrants in Italy, more than half of whom have arrived illegally. As the immigration issue has become more prominent in Italian politics—it is already a significant factor in local and regional elections—the pressure for further restrictions on immigration from Africa and the Maghreb has grown. As the EC moves to liberalize the movement of people within its borders, Italy cannot remain immune to similar pressures on immigration policy emanating from Brussels. The problem of patrolling Italy’s 2,000 kilometers of coastline to prevent illegal arrivals is a formidable one. Although the role of the Italian navy in interdicting illegal immigrants from North Africa has been raised in political circles, there has been only limited enthusiasm for this mission within the military. To date, the Italian approach to the social and security-related problem of immigration from the south has focused on a longer term strategy of promoting economic and political development in the Maghreb: a north–south bargain to limit migration at its source. Concern with regard to Italy’s relations across the Mediterranean has limited the Italian willingness to impose unilateral restrictions on immigration. A common European policy would be preferred.

The re-discovery of Italy’s traditional strategic interests in the Mediterranean is attributable, in part, to the steady erosion of the stigma that had been attached to discussion of the country’s role in the Mediterranean following the interwar and World War II experience (the legacy of this experience continues to influence Italian perceptions of how its policies will be received around the Adriatic, in the Horn of Africa, and in the Maghreb). So too, Mediterranean policy has been a natural outlet for interest in north–south cooperation and the Terza Mondismo shared by the Christian Democratic left, the Socialists, and the Roman Catholic Church. Italy has also maintained close economic relations around the Mediterranean, most notably in


16Right-wing parties, notably the Lega Lombarda, which advocates the devolution of the prosperous Italian north from the bureaucracy in Rome and the economically depressed south, have seized on the immigration issue. The traditional Italian tolerance toward immigrants has been called into question by violent anti-immigrant incidents in Italian cities.
the energy sector.\textsuperscript{17} The perception of resource vulnerability has played an important role in the formation of Italian foreign and security policy since the interwar period, and can be expected to play a continuing role in the security debate in the wake of the Gulf War.

More proximate sources of Italy's current focus on southern security issues can be found in the steady growth of the country's involvement in Mediterranean and Middle Eastern affairs since the late 1970s. Prominent examples include participation in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (1979); agreements for economic, technical, and military assistance with Malta (1980 and 1986); maritime patrol activities in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba (1982); participation in the multinational force in Lebanon (1982–1984); minesweeping operations in the Gulf of Suez (1984) and in the Persian Gulf (1987); and most recently, participation in the coalition operations against Iraq. To this one must add the Achille Lauro hijacking and the U.S. confrontation with Libya culminating in the missile attack on the Italian island of Lampedusa.\textsuperscript{18}

The expansion of conventional and unconventional arsenals in the Maghreb and the Middle East troubles Italian policymakers and observers. The principal concern in this context has been the Libyan acquisition of aircraft and ballistic missiles of increasing range, together with the Qaddafi regime's apparent commitment to the development of chemical, possibly even nuclear, weapons. The Scud experience in the Gulf War brought to public attention the issue of the growing vulnerability of Italian population centers to attack with "weapons of mass destruction" outside the East–West context, concern over which had previously been limited to a narrow circle of defense experts. The implications of a Libyan attack on Sicily or Naples, however successful or unsuccessful, would be of a very different order than the attack on Lampedusa.

Proliferation across the Mediterranean is a particular source of concern given the poor prospects for economic development and the

\textsuperscript{17}Italy relies on overseas sources for over 90 percent of its energy supplies and has a strong stake in secure access to Libyan oil and Algerian natural gas in addition to supplies from the Persian Gulf arriving via the Mediterranean. See FBIS—West Europe Report, December 19, 1986; and Cremasco, "Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean," p. 196.

\textsuperscript{18}See Cremasco, "Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean"; and Lesser, Italian NATO Policy: The Next Five Years.
highly uncertain prospects for political stability in North Africa. Whereas a direct threat to Italian territory is a possible, but hardly a likely case, the potential for domestic or regional turmoil across the Mediterranean affecting Italian interests and perhaps requiring Italian or allied intervention, is quite real. Given the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Maghreb, Italian observers have noted with relief the limited effect of the Gulf War on domestic politics and external policies along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Future crises might well have a more widespread and radicalizing effect, with serious implications for Italy's interests and security in the Mediterranean.

SECURITY ACROSS THE ADRIATIC

Even prior to the civil war in Yugoslavia and turmoil in Albania, Italian policymakers were keenly aware of the potential for instability in the Balkans and the consequences of this for Italian security, broadly defined. With the resolution of the Trieste dispute, relations with Yugoslavia had ceased to have a prominent security dimension, and extensive economic cooperation had developed, particularly between the industrial north of Italy and Slovenia. Indeed, Italy has been Yugoslavia's main trading partner in the West, and its strong stake in the political and economic stability of the country produced a policy of support for its neighbor in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and elsewhere.

The disintegration of the Yugoslav federation and the subsequent civil war have presented Italy with a foreign and security policy crisis. Even more serious challenges might arise from a further escalation of the violence in Yugoslavia and the very large refugee flows this might produce (in the spring of 1991, prior to the most serious fighting in Bosnia-Hercegovina and elsewhere, estimates ranged as high as 200,000) even in the absence of fighting in Slovenia. A prolonged insurgency across the Adriatic would similarly impose a long-term

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19 The Italian port of Trieste and its hinterland was the subject of a serious territorial dispute between Rome and Belgrade in the immediate post-war period. The Ossimo Treaty of 1975 effectively resolved the remaining political and economic issues surrounding the status of Trieste.

commitment to the interdiction of arms and people. The Italian experience of Albanian asylum seekers arriving en masse at Adriatic ports in March and August of 1991 pointed to the dilemmas, both domestic and external, that a more massive influx of Yugoslav refugees would cause.21

The Italian leadership, in particular Foreign Minister De Michielis, has taken an active stance with regard to the civil war in Yugoslavia, emphasizing the role of European institutions, including the EC and the WEU. Italy has also stated that it would be willing to contribute substantial forces to a European or United Nations peacekeeping contingent. The deployment of "lightly armed" forces has been discussed, but knowledgeable observers in Rome admit that this would probably be inadequate to guarantee the safety and effectiveness of the force, and that a more heavily armed presence might well be required.22

Italian policy toward the crisis has been pursued almost entirely in a multilateral context. A significant exception was President Cossiga's offer of early October 1991 to allow the withdrawal of Yugoslav federal armored forces from Slovenia across Italian territory (they would be taken from Trieste to Montenegro by sea, thereby avoiding any transit of Croatian territory). The offer was subsequently withdrawn in a decision coordinated with EC foreign ministers.23

Two additional factors have shaped Italian perceptions of the Yugoslav crisis. The first concerns the fate of some 30,000 ethnic Italians living in Istria and Dalmatia as fighting continues to affect the Adriatic coast. While unlikely to serve as the pretext for Italian intervention in Yugoslavia, the threat to the Italian population has emerged as a potent issue on the political right in Italy, and would contribute to the Italian rationale for participation in any multina-


tional European action. Operations to evacuate Italians from Istria and Dalmatia, apart from broader peacekeeping activities, have already been the subject of discussion and planning in Rome, despite the risk of violent opposition ashore. A second factor of some importance in Rome has been the concern that developments in Yugoslavia may encourage existing separatist movements in French- and German-speaking Alpine regions of northern Italy. Separatism has been a movement with "soft edges" in the Valle d'Aosta, but the German-speaking Alto Adige has been the scene of sporadic extremist violence since the Italo-Austrian agreement of 1946 granting a measure of autonomy to the South Tyrol (the region was under Austrian rule prior to World War I). Beyond the issue of Alpine separatism, there is the more tangible political concern that the precedent of Yugoslavia's wealthier north pressuring for independence from the Serb-dominated center may strengthen the hand of the Lombard League in its demands for a similar separation of north and south in Italy.

A NEW DEFENSE MODEL

Even prior to the Gulf crisis, the Italian government had begun a review process building on the changes introduced in the 1985 Defense White Paper and aimed at producing a "new defense model." The new model, yet to be described officially and in detail, is likely to include the following recommendations: 1) movement toward a more professional military, with a gradual reduction in the extent of conscript forces; 2) a reduction in the number of commands; 3) a reduction in the size of the army by at least five brigades and a reduction in the readiness of others (cuts aimed largely at the ground forces in northeast Italy); 4) further emphasis on air defense and the protection of sea lines of communication in the south; and 5) strengthening of the FIR (Forza d'Intervento Rapido). A final and more controversial element of the new model is likely to involve the reorganization of the Chiefs of Staff to give more power to its Chairman, on the pattern of

the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in the United States.\footnote{Some of the these points are discussed in the NAA Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, Draft Interim Report, pp. 9–10. See also “Rognoni Interviewed on Military Restructuring,” Mondo Economico, July 6, 1991, in FBIS–West Europe Report, August 6, 1991, pp. 23–24.}

The initiatives contained in the proposed defense model have been given special impetus by the experience of the Gulf War and the decision to create a rapid response force within NATO. Italy's limited deployment of ten Tornado fighter-bombers and five naval vessels as part of the coalition operations in the Gulf (apart from forces active in the Mediterranean), while important in political terms, raised questions about the country's capacity to participate in future multinational military initiatives in a manner commensurate with its political and economic role in Europe.\footnote{See John Wyles, “Italy Ponders Leaving War to the Professionals,” Financial Times, March 5, 1991.} A shortage of professional troops suitable for overseas deployment, together with the absence of adequate means for the logistical support of forces outside Italian territory, placed strict limits on the extent and character of the Italian contribution. As Italy seeks to be an active player in NATO and possibly WEU rapid response plans (including a leading role in the southern component of the Alliance rapid response corps), these basic limitations must be overcome, a difficult task given the relatively low level of Italian spending on defense.\footnote{In 1990, Italian defense expenditure amounted to 2.3 percent of gross domestic product, by this measure the lowest in NATO after Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, and Spain.}

Italy, to a far greater extent than France or Britain, shares with its southern European partners a strong need for a multilateral framework to assure consensus on security matters. This is very clearly the case with regard to intervention outside the NATO area. It is also the case in relation to the allocation of resources. For Italy to maintain its spending on defense, much less improve the capitalization of its forces in critical areas, a more multilateral and specifically a more European look will be necessary. The fundamental reorientation of Italian strategy and defense policy toward the south, signaled in earnest by the 1985 White Paper, has continued and gained momentum in the wake of developments in Europe and the Middle East. In discussing the rationale for the new defense model, Defense Minister
Rognoni has referred directly to "the Islamic threat" and "the risk in the Mediterranean—an area where the increase in tension shows no sign of abating." Cooperative programs in the fields of air defense and space-based surveillance (the Helios program being pursued jointly with France and Spain) are being elaborated in a Mediterranean context.

NEW SECURITY STRUCTURES

Beyond the Italian proposals on the future of the WEU and the evolution of a European defense identity, Italy has been at the forefront of two noteworthy regional security and cooperation initiatives, the Hexagonale and CSM. Foreign Minister De Michelis has been central to the promotion of both initiatives, although in the case of CSM, much of the political energy has been provided by key figures in the Spanish Foreign Ministry and within the office of Prime Minister Gonzalez.

Many observers have speculated on the extent to which De Michelis's Venetian origins have given him a strong interest in the Hexagonale with its nostalgic echoes of Adriatic and central European ties. The initial meeting of the group, held in Budapest in November 1989 and composed of Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary (Czechoslovakia joined the group shortly thereafter), was consciously billed as a "Hapsburg reunion." In addition to promoting regional economic development, with an emphasis on improving communications and infrastructure, the (then) pentagonal initiative was seen as a tutorial exercise in political development for emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. Italian officials have been careful to place the initiative in the context of CSCE and the EC, stressing the complementary nature of the association as a vehicle for bringing together an active Community member, a country looking toward EC membership in the near term (Austria), and former communist countries with aspirations to

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Indeed, one observer has described the grouping as less a forum among states than among regions. De Michiel has asserted that one of the initiative’s goals must be “to contain the centrifugal forces of disorder in central Europe.” In this, “Italy has a special role to play—a contribution to make in stabilizing a part of Europe that politically has been called the East, that geographically is in the center but culturally is part of the West.”

From a somewhat narrower, national perspective, the project may also be seen as a useful vehicle for asserting Italy’s interests in central Europe at a time when the link traditionally provided by Italian participation in NATO Central Region defense (i.e., in the northeast) has evaporated. The initiative could also have the effect of balancing the potentially overwhelming influence of a united Germany in the political and economic life of the region. The recent addition of Poland to the original pentagonal group (now known as the Hexagonale), reportedly at the insistence of Czechoslovakia, may dilute its regional character but also increase its utility as a counterweight to German influence—a subject of concern to Eastern European countries as well as Italy.

Italy has been a strong supporter of the CSCE process. There has, however, been some concern in Rome that CSCE will be captured by questions of stability in central Europe (in which, of course, Italy has an important stake) to the detriment of pressing security and security-related problems around the Mediterranean. Thus, Italy has been a leading proponent, along with Spain, of the CSMC concept as a means of assuring equal attention to southern issues; in short, to create “a stable system of regional cooperation, based on a set of rules and principles accepted by all the states concerned, along the lines of what Europe has been doing over the past two decades.” The CSMC proposal was “launched” in September 1990 at the CSCE

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34See comments by Stefano Silvestri, NAA Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, Draft Interim Report.
35De Michiel, “A Hapsburg ‘Reunion.’”
Mediterranean meeting in Palma de Mallorca, and has been the subject of sporadic discussion among the current “core” group of Spain, Italy, France, and Portugal. The debate over the proper character of C SCM has focused on questions of scope, membership, and regional priority. France, in particular, has favored a more limited approach, giving first priority to economic and political questions in the western and central Mediterranean, a view that has found support in Madrid and Lisbon. By contrast, the Italian view as articulated by De Michelis emphasizes the “universal” and “global” character of C SCM. In practical terms, this has meant the extension of the proposed membership to the Persian Gulf, including Iran. Membership would also be open to nonlittoral states with an interest in the Mediterranean, such as Mauritania and Jordan. The United States and the relevant successor entities to the Soviet Union would be included, as well as some form of Palestinian representation. Finally, papers produced by the C SCM “core” group have emphasized the principle of gradualism, particularly with regard to the security basket. Initial priority would be given to economic cooperation and human rights, on the Helsinki pattern.

Few observers suggest that rapid progress on C SCM is likely, certainly in its broader Italian formulation. Ironically, the Gulf War has strengthened the intellectual and political rationale for the notion of an expanded C SCM, while raising new difficulties in implementation. To the extent that C SCM directly embraces Middle Eastern problems including the Arab–Israeli dispute, the prospects for progress without strong U.S. support will be limited. Indeed, Italian officials suggest that subsequent steps toward the establishment of C SCM will in all likelihood need to await the outcome of current U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East. In the meantime, the C SCM concept will remain as a useful vehicle for Italian political activism around the Mediterranean, and a hedge against the continued stagnation of the EC’s Mediterranean policy.

37The core group may well be expanded to include Greece and Egypt. See “De Michelis on Middle East Peace, C SCM,” La Repubblica, August 14, 1991, in FBIS–West Europe Report, August 16, 1991, p. 19.
PROSPECTS FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION
AFTER THE GULF WAR

The role of domestic political considerations in Italian foreign policy, while declining, can still produce problems of consistency in bilateral relations. The strong opposition to Italian participation in the Gulf operations voiced by the Party of the Democratic Left prompted Prime Minister Andreotti to support (briefly) a Soviet peace proposal. Neither the proposal nor the Italian statement of support were well received in Washington, D.C. Nonetheless, the Gulf crisis and Italy's active involvement demonstrated a significant maturation of public opinion with regard to Italy's role in international security affairs. In many ways this has been a natural extension of the trend toward increasing Italian activism and assertiveness evident since the late 1970s. There is little to suggest that this trend will not continue, provided that suitable multilateral outlets for Italian participation exist. The most promising outlets in this regard are likely to be European, a fact clearly reflected in current Italian policy. Nonetheless, Italian interests would not be served by a precipitous change in the balance of security roles in Europe. A European security system in which the United States plays only a peripheral role might exacerbate Franco-German competition, or produce an effective Franco-German condominium. Neither situation would benefit Italy. By contrast, a system characterized by a constellation of institutions, including NATO, will maximize the opportunities for Italian participation. These considerations provide the leading rationale for the Anglo-Italian proposal on European defense arrangements, in which a prominent role is given to the Atlantic Alliance. In sum, Italy is likely to demonstrate a continued preference for balance between the Atlantic and European dimensions of its foreign and security policy, including support for a significant residual U.S. military presence and political engagement in Europe.

Security concerns in the Mediterranean, particularly in the wake of the Gulf experience, also dictate support for the U.S. presence in and around the continent. The Italian government has not wavered in its support for the planned air base at Crotone intended to house the

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F-16s of the U.S. 401st Tactical Fighter Wing after their withdrawal from Torrejon, despite continuing controversy over the plan in the U.S. Congress. Italian support for Crotone derives from a combination of genuine strategic interest—it mirrors a general reorientation of Italian defense planning southward—and political necessity. The latter has a domestic dimension related to the desirability of the project in economically depressed Calabria and contractual commitments made by the government. More importantly, the offer to accept the wing has been seen as an important Italian contribution to Alliance burdensharing in the broadest sense. The completed base could play a key role in supporting the air component of the new NATO rapid response arrangements in the Southern Region, arrangements in which Italy expects to have a leading position. Despite the broad congruence of U.S. and Italian strategic interests in the Mediterranean, there can be little prospect for change in the long-standing Italian policy of approving the use of facilities on Italian territory for non-NATO purposes on a case-by-case basis. As noted earlier in relation to policy elsewhere in southern Europe, Italian decisions on cooperation outside the NATO area will clearly be made in a European context.

Overall, Italy is now “more a producer rather than only a consumer of security.” As such, it has become a significant partner for the United States in Europe and around the Mediterranean. Italy’s mounting activism in Europe is in no sense incompatible with the maintenance of a strong bilateral relationship with the United States. Indeed, the Italian interest in balanced political development in post-Cold War Europe suggests that Italy can be an articulate and increasingly influential advocate for transatlantic cooperation on security matters.

42See comments by Silvestri, NAA Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, Draft Interim Report, p. 7.
8. GREECE

THE NORMALIZATION OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

After a decade in which Greek foreign and security policy was characterized by an aggressively independent approach, the election of a conservative New Democracy (ND) government in April 1990 was widely seen as the opening of a new era. The new government led by Mitsotakis has moved firmly, and with some success, to resolve long-standing questions and restore Greek credibility in Europe and across the Atlantic. At the same time, daunting domestic challenges and developments in the Balkans and the Middle East have complicated the security picture as seen from Athens. In particular, the environment facing Greece has been strongly affected by Turkey’s role during and after the Gulf War, and by the expanding crisis in Yugoslavia.

Many observers have noted the fact that Papandreou’s independent and often actively anti-NATO, anti-U.S. line was more a matter of style than substance, aimed at eliciting the support of an electorate particularly sensitive to issues of sovereignty. In practice, the PASOK (Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement) government demonstrated a highly pragmatic approach to international political and security matters, maintaining important links to Brussels and Washington, and deferring promised referenda on bases, nuclear weapons, and NATO membership.1 At the rhetorical level, certain aspects of Papandreou’s foreign policy displayed a curious separation from prevailing trends. As the nonaligned movement declined, Greece pursued closer ties with the anti-western neutrals of North Africa and the Middle East; as U.S.–Soviet arms control initiatives began to bear fruit, Greece supported an independent proposal by six neutral states to promote global nuclear disarmament and pressed for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. Even on such issues as Soviet policy in Poland and the downing of the Korean airliner by Soviet aircraft, Greek pol-

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icy was at variance with the Western consensus.² Taken together, the rhetoric if not the reality of policy during the years of PASOK rule has been a difficult legacy for the current government to overcome.

The Mitsotakis government has been keen to promote Greek integration within the EC and to make Europe the principal focus of political activity. Over time, PASOK has also adopted a more European approach, with the result that the commitment to Europe is now a strong point of consensus within mainstream Greek politics. In many key issue areas, including security, Greek policymakers now look first to Brussels rather than Washington, a trend only partly diminished by the Gulf experience. At the same time, Greece, much like Italy and Spain, has adopted a more active stance in international affairs, particularly in relation to the Balkans.³ The essential problem for Greek foreign policy, however, remains the restoration of the country's image as a member in good standing of NATO and the EC, a task that one observer has described as shedding "the independence syndrome."⁴

GREECE IN EUROPE

In its relations with the EC, Greece has suffered from its image as a major recipient of Community loans and development assistance that has also been incapable of implementing badly needed economic reforms. The principal problem in this respect has been the perpetuation of a swollen public sector budget and resulting national debt.⁵ With its precarious majority in Parliament, the conservative government is proving almost as unwilling as its socialist predecessor to enforce politically unpopular cuts in government spending. Cuts will,


however, be necessary, and the impetus for them will continue to come from Brussels.\(^6\) There is now growing recognition that the failure to move toward European norms in economic matters will pose the risk of permanent marginalization within the EC just as the European connection becomes more and more critical to Greek political and economic development and security.

Many Greeks remain concerned about the possibility that developments in Eastern Europe will siphon away investment and political attention that might otherwise have been devoted to southern Europe. Greek officials accept the fact that the real question is not whether the Community will be enlarged, but rather “when this will happen and to what extent.” Nonetheless, former Foreign Minister Samaras, in particular, was careful to assert that deepening of the Community must come first, a position consistent with the Greek interest in forestalling a dilution of the symbolic and material benefits of membership.\(^7\) Greece has supported the establishment of full economic and monetary union and has strongly opposed the notion of a “two-speed” approach with regard to these objectives.

The narrower question of Turkish membership in the EC is, of course, a critical concern in Athens. The overwhelming consensus of Greek opinion holds that Turkish membership cannot even be entertained in the absence of serious progress toward a settlement on Cyprus. At a more theoretical level, however, there is some support for the view that eventual Turkish membership in the Community, or at a minimum the expansion of political and economic relations between Turkey and Europe, would be useful as a means of “anchoring” Turkey and the Greek-Turkish relationship. This notion, analogous in some ways to arguments made elsewhere in Europe with regard to Germany and the Franco-German relationship, is perhaps all the more important as the future of NATO, a traditional force for stability in the Aegean, remains uncertain. One should note, however, that

\(^6\) Early in 1990, Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, put the Greek government on notice that the financial situation in Greece threatened the evolution of Greece within the Community and indeed the viability of the Community itself. Henceforth, EC loans to Greece would be granted only on “strict and comprehensive” conditions, including the reduction of inflation, central government borrowing, and the number of public employees and the expansion of the tax base. See Kieran Cooke, “Relations with Europe: The Piper Calls the Tune,” Financial Times Survey of Greece, April 25, 1991.

\(^7\) Adonis C. Samaras, “Greek Foreign Policy: Foundations, Philosophy and Purpose,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Fall 1990, pp. 11–12.
this view is still largely confined to moderate circles outside the government. Greece continues to block the distribution of more than $800 million in EC assistance to Turkey, pending Turkish concessions on the Cyprus problem. In the wake of the formal Turkish application for Community membership it has also become increasingly clear that Athens is not the only, or even the most important, source of opposition to Turkey's integration within the Community.

As Athens looks toward the post–Cold War strategic environment, full membership in the WEU extended to Greece at the Maastricht Summit meeting of December 1991 will be seen as an important factor in relations with Europe and across the Aegean. The security guarantee that membership confers in relation to conflict with Turkey, although an obvious advantage for Athens, raises uncomfortable issues elsewhere in Europe. By taking on the responsibility for the defense of Greek territory, the WEU acquires an immediate and tangible security problem with an intimate connection to NATO and U.S. interests. For these reasons, and leaving aside the pending Turkish applications to the EC and the WEU (Turkey was offered associate membership in the WEU at the Maastricht Summit), Greek membership poses a particular challenge of adjustment as the debate over the form and function of a European defense identity unfolds.

Consolidation of Greece's new membership in the WEU, the restoration of economic and political credibility within the EC, and the quest for support on pressing Balkan issues such as the "Macedonian problem" constitute the principal objectives of Greece's current European policy. The Greek position has been summarized elegantly by Mitsotakis in describing the need to transcend the "lost decade" of 1980–1990 in which Greece failed to take advantage of the great economic and political opportunities offered by EC membership.9

REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

Greek security concerns in the wake of the East–West disengagement can be seen in terms of three overlapping circles, corresponding to risks emanating from the Balkans, the Middle East, and the overarch-

8 See David Buchan, "Greek Veto on EC Aid to Turkey," Financial Times, March 5, 1991.
9 Mitsotakis on Greek, Turkish Relations with EEC, FBIS-West Europe Report, September 27, 1991, p. 22.
ing problem of relations with Turkey. The first two areas are sources of risk in their own right, but the most serious scenarios in both cases would, in the Greek view, arise from the involvement of Turkey.

The Balkans

Greece, by virtue of its location and historical connections (e.g., the cultural and political dimension of the Orthodox tradition), has always had a strong stake in the stability of the Balkans as a whole. With the political revolutions in Eastern Europe, Greek observers began to foresee a special role for Greece as an interlocutor in the Balkans, not least because of its EC ties in a region in which the Community enjoys considerable prestige. The most visible aspect of the new Greek activism in the Balkans had been the expansion of cooperation with Bulgaria, building on a process that began with the “Balkan opening” pursued by Prime Minister Caramanlis in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus crisis.10 Greek-Bulgarian consultations on security matters were encouraged by the sense of insecurity felt by both countries in relation to Turkish military power and political interests in the Balkans (Bulgarian-Turkish relations have been particularly difficult as a result of the mistreatment of the large Turkish minority under communist rule). In this context, commentators began to talk openly of an Athens-Sofia axis.11 More recently, as Greek concerns about Bulgaria’s potential role in Macedonian separatism have grown, and political ties between Sofia and Ankara have improved, the prospects for such an axis have weakened considerably.

In July 1991, Athens issued a proposal for disarmament along the borders between Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Bulgaria expressed its support for the proposal which was, however, quickly rejected by Turkey primarily because it failed to embrace forces in the Aegean.12

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The short-lived proposal was notable as a reflection of the Greek and Bulgarian concern that a more assertive Turkey might be tempted to use its military superiority in the Balkans as a pillar for its minority policy in the region. The disarmament scheme also flowed from a well-established history of Greek-Bulgarian interaction on arms control matters, including past proposals for the establishment of a Balkan Nuclear-Free Zone.\textsuperscript{13}

The deepening crisis in Yugoslavia is the subject of enormous concern in Athens for several reasons. First, there is a specific sense of vulnerability arising from proximity and the fear that Balkan instability, whether limited to Yugoslavia or more general, will inhibit the integration of Greece within the European mainstream. In more immediate terms, Greece relies on road and rail communications through Yugoslavia for some 40 percent of its trade with the European market. Prolonged disruption of this vital link would have direct economic consequences for Greece, as will the imposition of EC sanctions against the Yugoslav federal government. Greek authorities estimate that the imposition of sanctions will result in losses of up to $10 million per day. The EC is expected to accede to a Greek request for as much as $500 million in compensatory aid.\textsuperscript{14}

Second, and most troubling for Athens, has been the growth of Macedonian separatism with the collapse of the Yugoslav federal system, and the reassertion of irredentist claims affecting Greek Macedonia. Greek insistence that the EC refuse recognition to an independent republic using the name Macedonia ("New Skopje" would be an acceptable alternative) has provoked a storm of criticism within the European mainstream community and has worsened the outlook for Greek integration. Even short of efforts to create a "greater Macedonia" embracing parts of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, protracted friction between Yugoslav Macedonia and the Serbian "center" could create a large-scale refugee problem on Greek borders at a time when Greece faces a more general crisis of immigration from Albania.


and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, the Greek government has been among the strongest supporters of the territorial status quo in Yugoslavia, both internal and external. The result has been firm support for the Serb-dominated central government, a stance that has only begun to weaken in the face of European and international consensus against Serbian aggression. More serious still would be the violent assertion of Serbian authority in Yugoslav Macedonia, possibly leading to a confrontation between Sofia and Belgrade, or worst of all, clashes in largely Moslem Kosovo that might provoke a Turkish response.

The Middle East

Turning to the broader security environment, Greek concerns with regard to the Middle East are of three sorts. The first might be described as a milieu concern stemming from the country's geographical position and the sense that developments in the Levant and elsewhere in the Middle East can affect Greek security directly or indirectly. Second, Greece shares the concern of other southern European countries about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems of longer range around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Greek observers also note with increasing alarm the potential expansion of Islamic fundamentalism across the greater Middle East, including Turkey. Finally, there is the persistent question of Greek involvement in U.S. or European-led activities outside the NATO area that might threaten Greek relations with the Arab world. In a related field, the Mitsotakis government has adopted a much tougher stance on inter-

15 Greece absorbed perhaps 150,000 migrants in 1990–91, including 30,000 Pontian Greeks from the Soviet Union, 50,000 Albanians (roughly half of whom were ethnic Greeks), and 8,000 Romanians. See Marlise Simons, "Acharnai Journal," New York Times, August 5, 1991.


18 Colonel Qaddafi has asserted that he planned a missile attack on U.S. facilities on Crete following the El Dorado Canyon raid on Libya in 1986 but decided against the attack to avoid civilian casualties and preserve good relations with the Papandreou government. See "Qaddafi Tells of Plan to Attack U.S. Bases," New York Times, May 8, 1990.
national terrorism, a departure from the tolerant attitude of the PASOK government toward the activities of Middle Eastern terrorists in Greece.

The broad international character of the action against Iraq limited the regional reaction to Greek cooperation in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations. Consideration of the potential negative consequences for relations in the Arab world would, in any case, have been outweighed by the need to participate in an initiative with strong European backing, and in which Turkey was playing an active and visible role. Athens also regarded the coalition stance against Iraqi aggression as a positive precedent in relation to Cyprus, and specifically to the Greek interest in putting international pressure on Turkey to withdraw its 30,000 troops from northern Cyprus. The Greek contribution to the coalition effort in the Gulf included the largely symbolic deployment of a modern frigate to assist in the interdiction of Iraqi trade and, more importantly, the provision of access to Greek bases and air space to support the deployment of U.S. forces to the Middle East. For Greece, as for several other Southern Region countries, the Gulf crisis marked a significant departure from past experience with regard to active participation in operations outside the NATO area as well as public acceptance of overseas deployments.

Greek-Turkish Relations

Despite the apparent interest of the Mitsotakis government in restoring the momentum for improved relations with Turkey, there has been little substantive progress on the most serious questions in Aegean relations. Certainly the conservative government has been unable to recapture the spirit of optimism created by the Papandreou–Ozal meetings of 1988 in Davos. A full discussion of points of contention in the Aegean is clearly beyond the scope of this Report, but a brief list would include: the dispute over military and civil air traffic control zones; the delineation of sovereign rights on the continental shelf; the question of territorial waters claimed by each

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19 On the perceived linkage between the Kuwaiiti and Cypriot cases, see "Mitsotakis Explains Position on Gulf War," FBIS-West Europe Report, January 22, 1991.
21 See the joint statement by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Prime Minister Turgut Ozal of January 31, 1988, summarizing agreements on political and economic relations and confidence-building measures.
country; and the fortification of Greek islands in the Dodecanese and eastern Aegean. Beyond these are the separate but related questions concerning the status and treatment of minorities: the residual Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul and on the Turkish islands of Imbros (Gockeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), and the more substantial Moslem minority in Greek Thrace.

Looming above all is the dispute over Cyprus, with its enormous symbolic importance in Greek perceptions. The Aegean and Cyprus disputes, although largely unrelated in practical terms (the Aegean issues are actually more central to Greek national security interests), are linked in a psychological sense. A resolution of the Cyprus problem would transform the overall climate of Greek-Turkish relations and facilitate the resolution of more practical questions concerning air and sea space and resources. In the wake of the Gulf conflict, the United States has adopted a more active approach to the Cyprus issue, a policy that has resulted in serious negotiations under United Nations auspices. A September 1991 meeting in Paris between Mitsotakis and then Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, although useful as a display of political goodwill, failed to produce an anticipated agreement on a four-party conference. The emergence of the United States as a broker in the Cyprus dispute could change the balance of incentives in Athens and Ankara and encourage a settlement as both sides seek to assure themselves of a secure bilateral relationship with the United States after the Cold War. In this respect, the Cyprus question has perhaps reached the requisite degree of "ripeness" for a settlement.

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The principal obstacles to a settlement are likely to be the existence of more extreme voices on Cyprus itself and, in the short term, the inability of the Turkish government to negotiate while the political picture in Ankara remains unsettled. Had a conference on Cyprus been held prior to the October 1991 Turkish elections, as many hoped, the outcome might well have been positive. A coalition government in Ankara and an increasingly troubled conservative leadership in Athens are unlikely to risk accusations of having "sold out" the interests of their respective communities on Cyprus. Finally, there is a certain degree of inertia associated with the political and economic status quo on the island, where both communities enjoy a higher standard of living than in mainland Greece or Turkey. Indeed, a post-settlement Cyprus would be a prime candidate for EC membership.\textsuperscript{28}

In more general terms, the Greek perception of a Turkish threat remains high and is perhaps even more pronounced in the wake of the Cold War and the Gulf conflict. With regard to the latter, there is widespread concern that Turkey may be moving into a period of unprecedented activism and assertiveness in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East, with direct implications for Greek security. Moreover, there is some fear in Athens that Turkish adventurism in the Balkans and elsewhere may be tolerated by the United States as Turkey's strategic importance is reassessed in Middle Eastern and Central Asian terms. Under these conditions, Greece will seek strategic reassurance from the United States and, most importantly, Europe. Indeed, Greek strategists tend to portray the Aegean and Thrace as vital regions on the European marches, barriers to security risks emanating from Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East. This notion has obvious historical resonance in Athens and elsewhere in the Balkans. Existing Greek concerns that the "cascading" of relatively modern weapons to Turkey as part of the CFE process would threaten the balance in the Aegean were strengthened enormously by the Gulf War and its aftermath, in which Turkey achieved considerable prominence and was the recipient of large-scale military assistance.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} Turkish Cypriot leaders insist, however, that Cyprus can only join international organizations in which both Greece and Turkey are members. See "Denktash Calls Cyprus EC Membership 'Last Move,' " FBIS-West Europe Report, September 3, 1991, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{29} Valinakis, Greece and the CFE Negotiations.
A leading source of risk in contemporary Greek-Turkish relations lies in the rise of ethnic tensions in northwest Thrace. Whereas territorial and resource disputes in the Aegean may ultimately be amenable to rational discourse and compromise between governments, frictions in Thrace are more likely to be driven by the emotions of residents whose behavior may or may not be controlled from Athens or Ankara. To the extent that the rapidly growing Turkish (the Greek government prefers the term Moslem) population in underdeveloped northwest Thrace looks to Turkey as its natural protector, Athens fears that the conditions may exist for a new Cyprus-like intervention. This concern is reinforced by the existence of broader cleavages between Orthodox and Moslem communities elsewhere in the Balkans. At the same time, Greek policymakers will have to reckon with growing scrutiny from Europe and the United States with regard to the legal status and practical treatment of minorities.

The overall prospects for Greek-Turkish relations remain highly uncertain, with the problem of crisis management becoming more complex as a result of developments in the Balkans. To the extent that Turkey is isolated from the process of European integration and cooperation on security matters, the outlook for Greek-Turkish relations will very likely worsen. The Greek sense of insecurity in relation to a neighbor of continental scale and “uncertain strategic orientation” is certain to persist and will continue to be supported by deep-rooted cultural and historical factors.30

SECURITY STRUCTURES AND DEFENSE POLICY

For a variety of reasons, including the more Atlanticist outlook of the ND government and growing insecurity about Greek-Turkish relations in the new strategic environment, Greece is making efforts to improve its participation in NATO even as new European security initiatives take center stage in political terms. In this context, it was significant that the initial round of senior military appointments following the ND election victory in 1990 drew heavily on officers with NATO experience. Long-standing plans to establish a new ATAF

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30 A notable volume, with contributions by Greek and Turkish authors, is Dimitri Constas, ed., *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
(Allied Tactical Air Force) headquarters at Larissa have been revived even though there is no longer a Warsaw Pact threat to Thrace.

The movement toward multinational rapid reaction forces in NATO will provide a new vehicle for Greek participation and will increase the need for restructuring and modernizing of the Greek armed forces.\(^{31}\) As part of this process, the Special Forces Division, disbanded in 1987, may be reestablished as a unit suitable for assignment with multinational forces organized by NATO or (eventually) the WEU. The changing character of Alliance strategy also brings with it new problems. The active participation of Greek elements in NATO rapid response exercises will undoubtedly require creative solutions to the problem of command and control in the Aegean, a historically difficult issue. Above all, Athens is concerned that Turkey may be given a leadership role in multinational arrangements for the Southern Region (NATO, aware of sensitivities on this point, is unlikely to propose this; Italy is a more probable candidate).\(^{32}\)

The evaporation of the Soviet threat to Thrace has allowed Greek strategists and planners to turn their attention to the problem of deterrence and defense against Turkey.\(^{33}\) In reality, this shift of defense priorities is merely the extension of a trend that has been observable since the Cyprus invasion of 1974, and on which there has been a high degree of political consensus.\(^{34}\) Greek concerns about the effect of equipment transfers to Turkey as a result of CFE (and the concentration of forces in the Turkish “exclusion zone”) on the military balance in the Balkans have, again, been reinforced by the Gulf crisis and the prospective expansion and modernization of Turkish

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\(^{32}\)See Iordanidi, “Changes in NATO Trouble Greece.”

\(^{33}\)An extensive discussion of the military balance in Thrace and the Aegean and the likely character of a Greek-Turkish conflict is provided in James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey—Problems, Policy Choices and Mediterranean Security (London: Brassey’s, 1991).

forces. These concerns are only likely to be relieved by a shift in the center of gravity of Turkey's strategic orientation from its European to its Asiatic sector, a shift that recent Greek arms control proposals for the Balkans were designed to encourage. In concrete terms, Greek analysts are particularly concerned about the balance of air power in the Aegean as Turkey acquires up to 320 F-16s of its own manufacture. Greek officials have also expressed an interest in acquiring Patriot missiles to match those deployed in Turkey and to address the broader problem of defense against aircraft and ballistic missiles in the eastern Mediterranean.

PROSPECTS FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS

The problem of reassurance vis a vis Turkey in the wake of the Cold War and the Gulf War argues for the maintenance of a healthy bilateral relationship with the United States. The conservative government in Athens is well placed to pursue this, not least because of the substantial support Greece has traditionally enjoyed in Congress. The conclusion in July 1990 of a new eight-year bilateral agreement on bases and security assistance, together with initiatives proposed during President Bush's July 1991 visit to Athens, has established the conditions for a more predictable relationship on key issues. The new bilateral agreement provides for the continued use of the naval and air base at Souda Bay and the communications facility at Gournes (Heraklion) on Crete, as well as smaller communications installations elsewhere. With Greek approval, the United States may also use other facilities to support military operations. The agreement also provides for the closure of the Hellenikon air base and communications facilities at Nea Makri. Hellenikon, on the outskirts

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35 Jane's Defence Weekly, July 6, 1991. Greece will also be a substantial recipient of "cascaded" equipment, including 700 tanks, 150 armored combat vehicles, and 70 artillery pieces.


37 During the July 1991 visit, it was announced that the United States intended to lease two additional frigates to Greece and accelerate delivery of 28 F-4E aircraft.

38 Facilities on Crete played an active role in supporting U.S. deployments to the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf, handling some 100 vessels and 31,000 aircraft sorties.
of Athens had, rather like Torrejon near Madrid, served as a lightning rod for opposition to the U.S. military presence in Greece.\textsuperscript{39} The concentration of the residual U.S. presence at less visible locations on Crete is expected to improve the outlook for public acceptance over the longer term. Foreign Minister Samaras has described the agreement as ushering in "a new era of national reason in our relations with the United States." Under the agreement, Greece will receive more than $1 billion in U.S. arms, including $350 million in credits in the first year of the accord.\textsuperscript{40} The text of the new agreement mentions the U.S. commitment to preserve the regional balance between Greece and Turkey.\textsuperscript{41} Perhaps more important from the Greek perspective, the agreement includes new language on the U.S. commitment to actively participate in the prevention of threats to Greek territory.

Recent U.S. efforts on the Cyprus question are also viewed as broadly supportive of Greek aims. Nonetheless, the recent history of U.S.-Greece relations, even in the post-Papandreou period, has not been entirely positive. Athens will not easily be reassured about the prospect of increased U.S. aid to Turkey, even if the commitment to the "7–10 ratio" in security assistance is maintained. In this context, Greek critics point to the ease with which the 7–10 principle can be circumvented through emergency provisions and trade-offs between essentially fungible military and economic assistance funds. Moreover, the bulk of U.S. security assistance to Greece has been in the form of concessionary loans (interest payments on the accumulated loans will total $356 million in 1992 alone), whereas Turkey has received a far greater percentage of assistance in outright grants. Nonetheless, maintenance of the 7–10 ratio provides substantial sym-


\textsuperscript{41}In past security assistance allocations, the U.S. Congress has been guided by the principle of providing seven dollars in aid to Greece for every ten dollars given to Turkey.
bolic benefits for Greece and helps in keeping the regional balance and the Cyprus problem on the U.S. agenda.42

The U.S. State Department has borne the brunt of recent Greek criticism for its issuance of a travel advisory discouraging tourism to Greece during the Gulf crisis and, much more significantly, its reference to Greek mistreatment of its "Slavic-Macedonian" minority.43 On balance, however, such points of contention are unlikely to upset the essential interest of the conservative government in preserving good relations with the United States as a hedge against uncertainties in the Aegean and Thrace. Greek and U.S. officials have also begun to emphasize the importance of developing the economic dimension of the bilateral relationship—echoing the desire for a more diverse "strategic" relationship that has become common across the Southern Region.44 Indeed, this element is likely to acquire greater significance if, as most Greek observers believe, U.S. security assistance budgets decline (i.e., as the Gulf experience fades).

More significant for the longer term will be the mounting Greek emphasis on Europe in political and economic affairs, and increasingly on security matters. The degree to which Athens will be forthcoming on the important question of cooperation in crises outside Europe is likely to turn on the extent to which such cooperation can be framed in multilateral and preferably European terms. The prospects for the United States being allowed access to facilities on Crete, for example, to support a unilateral intervention in North Africa or the Middle East cannot be considered promising, except in the extraordinary event of a parallel threat to Greek territory. In this, Greece is within the mainstream of evolving attitudes across southern Europe. In virtually all foreseeable cases, Greece will act as Europe acts. From the U.S. perspective, this trend is essentially a neutral one, dependent for its consequences on the broader evolution of transatlantic relations on security outside the NATO area. On the broader issue of the U.S. presence in Europe after the Cold War, Athens can be expected to support the reduction of forces on the continent to minimum levels.

At the same time, Greece will continue to have a strong stake in the maintenance of the U.S. presence in the eastern Mediterranean as a contribution to regional stability.
9. TURKEY

CONSEQUENCES OF A CHANGED ENVIRONMENT

Whereas the revolutionary developments in Europe between 1988 and 1990 suggested that Turkey would be the victim of strategic neglect after the Cold War, the Gulf crisis returned the country to the front rank in Western strategic perceptions. But the reassertion of Turkey's importance in the wake of the Gulf crisis has emphasized its role in Middle Eastern rather than European security. It has also introduced a certain tension between Turkish political and economic aspirations and U.S. and European interests in and images of Turkey. In this sense, the perception of Turkey's strategic importance has come full circle from the immediate post-war focus on the country's critical position in the “northern tier” blocking Soviet access to the Middle East, to its role in the containment of Soviet power in Europe and, once again, to its role in regional security in the Gulf, the Levant, and Central Asia.

Turkey's continued isolation from the formal process of European integration, together with the emergence of new opportunities and challenges in Central Asia and the Middle East, raises important questions about the future strategic (in the broadest sense) orientation of the country. Rapid change in the external environment is confronting Ankara with numerous challenges to its traditionally conservative outlook on foreign and security policy. Of all the Southern Region countries, Turkey faces a future that is least predictable and arguably most important to the security interests of its European and American allies. In contrast to prevailing trends in

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1This section draws heavily on a more extensive report documenting concurrent RAND research on Turkey and the West. See Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War, RAND, R-4204-AF/A, 1992.


3This evolution is portrayed in detail in Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East.
Southern Europe, Turkey is becoming increasingly distinctive in political, economic, and security terms.

To these external uncertainties must be added uncertainty about the country’s domestic political and economic future. The inconclusive October 1991 elections unseated the ANAP (Motherland Party) government of Mesut Yilmaz and returned Suleyman Demirel to the Prime Ministership for the seventh time. The elections also ushered in a period of coalition government led by Demirel’s nationalist True Path Party (TPP)—with the left-of-center Social Democratic Populist Party as a junior partner. With inflation running at roughly 70 percent, Yilmaz declined to enter into a coalition with the TPP, preferring to remain in opposition and let popular fear of inflation and coalitions erode Demirel’s position. Many Turks and outside observers associate coalition government in Ankara with political chaos and its resolution through military intervention. Although recent history supports such conclusions (Demirel has himself been ousted twice by the military), the current political landscape in Turkey is far healthier than in the past, with a strong center and only marginal support on the right and left. The polarization, which encouraged the descent into political violence of the late 1970s and led to the last military takeover, is largely absent from the contemporary scene.

Nonetheless, President Ozal himself has suggested that the “Ozal era” is essentially over, even if he manages to retain the Presidency and thus his position of considerable (and some would say extra-constitutional) influence over foreign and domestic policy. Demirel, although clearly pro-Western, is more sensitive to sovereignty concerns as they affect Turkish security cooperation, and is likely to pursue a harder line toward the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast (despite liberalization on Kurdish cultural matters) and the Cyprus dispute. Certainly, he will be less capable of either building or overriding the consensus on international issues. Moreover, a coalition government, regardless of its political complexion, is unlikely to be capable of the decisiveness that Turkey displayed under Ozal during the Gulf crisis.4

TURKEY IN EUROPE

The prospects for Turkey joining Europe in the institutional sense, by becoming a full member of the EC and the WEU, remain poor. Indeed, the prospects for Turkish membership in either organization have probably worsened in the wake of the Gulf crisis, a development that has not gone unnoticed in Turkey. Turkey's active involvement in the coalition against Iraq reinforced the belief, already widespread in Europe, that Turkey is an important Middle Eastern ally. As the Community moves to develop a common foreign and security policy, it will be increasingly difficult for its members to accept the additional and very tangible strategic exposure in the Middle East that Turkish membership would imply.5

Beyond the substantial reservations about Turkey's size and relative underdevelopment in comparison with EC norms lie even more significant concerns about the political and cultural implications of Turkish membership, as many European countries grapple with the broader problem of relations with the Islamic world. Behind much of the European debate about Turkey and the EC lies a thinly veiled concern about whether an Islamic country of Turkey's scale, albeit a moderate and secular one, can "fit" within a more fully integrated Europe.6 The highly Westernized and Western-looking Turkish political and economic elite is well aware of European reservations on this score, and is moving toward a more pragmatic approach on the question of Turkey in Europe. Although few members of the Turkish elite believe that Turkey will be a member of the EC within the next decade, there is strong consensus that Turkey will be a participant in

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5The original Association Agreement with the EC, concluded in 1963, envisioned movement toward full membership over a period of 25 years. The stagnation of relations with the EC in the 1970s and efforts to revive these ties in the late 1970s and again following Turkey's return to civilian rule in November 1983 are described in Ismail Erturk, "Turkey and the European Community," International Relations, November 1984; and David Burchard, "Turkey and Europe," Turkish Review, Autumn 1989.

6President Ozal has hinted at the risks inherent in allowing religion to drive membership decisions in the EC, suggesting that this might drive Turkey into a closer relationship with the Middle East, encourage the religious right within Turkey, and "send a wrong signal to the rest of the Arab world." Quoted in Clyde Haberman, "Turkey Remains Confident It Will Join the European Community," New York Times, March 17, 1990.
the general process of European integration short of full membership.\footnote{See the comprehensive survey of elite opinion conducted by Cumhuriyet, "Turkey in the Year 2000," re-published in full in FBIS-West Europe Report (Supplement), June 25, 1991.}

From a strictly practical point of view, the essential objective for Turkey is not EC membership per se, but assured access to European markets. Although within the European economic system, Turkey is not truly in the European mainstream, a situation reinforced by the westward drift of the European economic center since World War II.\footnote{Rhein, "Turkey and the New Europe," p. 10.} Turkish commentators increasingly stress the consequences of political developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for the economic development of Europe as a whole, and the growing potential of Turkey as an economic partner in relation to these two regions. In the event that Europe continues an arm’s length approach to Turkey, economic and political opportunities in Central Asia and across the Black Sea will loom large as alternative outlets for Turkish activism.

What would be lost in this case is the considerable symbolic value of EC membership and its internal as well as external influence. Full membership would, in the view of many Turks, confirm and reinvigorate the Western-looking Ataturkist tradition and give a valuable imprimatur to the democratic evolution of Turkey. Moreover, it would provide a context for Turkish foreign and security policy at a time of extraordinary strategic flux (as EC membership has elsewhere in the Southern Region). As one prominent Turkish observer has commented, "NATO is our legal foot in the Western camp, but the EC is the real one."\footnote{Seyfi Tashan, President of the Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, quoted in The Economist, June 18, 1988, p. 29.}

The question of EC membership, and the issue of Turkish-European relations in general, has been strongly affected by Turkey's active stance during the Gulf crisis. Turkish contributions to the coalition effort included the early closure of the Turkish pipeline through which Iraq had exported much of its oil, the provision of Turkish bases for allied air operations, and the deployment of some 100,000 troops on the Iraqi border. The closure of the pipeline, together with the loss of trade with Iraq is estimated to have cost Turkey up to nine
billion dollars in lost revenue, a loss that will continue to mount even as compensation arrives from the United States, Europe, and the Gulf.\textsuperscript{10}

Against this background, the outlook for Turkey in Europe is no brighter than before the crisis, but the political consequences of exclusion from Europe have risen. Similarly, the scope for Turkish resentment will expand to the extent that the Community moves to embrace the EFTA (European Free Trade Area) countries and new applicants in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{11} Most disturbing from the Turkish perspective would be the extension of full membership to former communist states in the Balkans. From the perspective of Brussels, the escalation of the Kurdish insurgency and Ankara's response have reinforced existing European sensitivities with regard to the human rights situation in Turkey.

Turkey's difficulties with Europe at the institutional level are exacerbated by, and to an extent derive from, a lack of solid bilateral support. Not all of the friction between Turkey and Europe at the bilateral level stems from the Greek-Turkish dispute and the continuing problem of Cyprus. Turkish-German relations provide the leading example. The fact that both countries share a history of cooperation is a complicating factor, raising expectations and wariness on both sides. The reluctant German response to Turkish requests for assistance and reinforcement within NATO during the Gulf crisis has been openly and pointedly criticized by the Turkish leadership. It is widely perceived that the leading problem from the German perspective was less the propriety of action outside NATO's Central Region than a reluctance to commit forces in Turkey's defense. German behavior during the crisis is particularly troubling to Ankara as it calls into question the solidity of the NATO security guarantee to Turkey in the wake of the Cold War. The obvious unwillingness of Germany to promote Turkey's application for EC membership (and Germany is widely seen as the one country within the Community whose views on the matter could influence the outcome) has reinforced the Turkish.

\textsuperscript{10}The pipeline closure alone is estimated to cost Turkey $500 million per year. See "Foreign Ministry on Failure to Sell Iraqi Oil," FBIS-West Europe Report, November 1, 1991, p. 41. Pre-war trade with Iraq had represented some 10 percent of total Turkish exports.

\textsuperscript{11}Turkey has concluded a free trade and cooperation protocol with EFTA. See "Trade Cooperation Agreement Signed with EFTA," FBIS-West Europe Report, October 18, 1991, p. 4.
sense of frustration over German policy and attitudes. The future of the roughly 1.5 million Turkish workers in Germany, perhaps a third of whom are Kurds, may emerge as a more pressing issue if migrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union begin to displace Turks in the German labor market, and if the general climate facing foreigners in Germany continues to deteriorate.

German public and official opinion has been among the most critical in Europe on the issue of Ankara's human rights record in general, and the Kurdish problem in particular. As the insurgency in the southeast has intensified, criticism of Turkish policy, and especially the cross-border operations against the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), has increased. In the winter of 1991–1992, German security assistance to Turkey was placed on hold pending the resolution of questions concerning the use of German-financed equipment in raids against Kurdish separatists. The deterioration of bilateral relations with Germany suggests that the Demirel government's more liberal approach on human rights matters will not necessarily clear the way for closer relations with Europe if the Kurdish insurgency continues to escalate and develop an urban dimension.

REGIONAL CONCERNS

Traditionally, Turkey has been extremely sensitive to the geopolitical reality of Russian military power on its border. Even in the wake of the strategic contraction and disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ankara retains a very conservative view of the residual security risk to Turkey from this quarter. In this respect, the Turkish position differs sharply from prevailing views elsewhere in the Southern Region. This conservative approach to the implications of recent developments in East–West relations is a product of history, attachment to a strategic view that has served Turkey very well throughout the Cold War, and the unequal effects of prospective conventional force reductions and transfers. The security benefits of the Soviet with-

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12 Turkish observers are keenly aware of the violent history of Russo-Turkish relations. Indeed, the history of Ottoman imperial decline is in large measure the history of retrenchment in the face of Russian power. See Stanford J. Shaw and Esel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Paul B. Henze, Turkey, the Alliance and the Middle East: Problems and Opportunities in Historical Perspective, Working Paper No. 36 (Washington, D.C.: International Security Studies Program, The Wilson Center, 1981); and W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars
drawal from Eastern Europe and the CFE agreement are less direct, and even ambiguous, in the Turkish case. The large conventional arsenals facing Turkey in the Middle East are outside current arms control initiatives, a risk only partially offset in Turkish perceptions by the "exclusion zone" in southeastern Turkey provided for by the CFE agreement.

The announced reductions in NATO's sub-strategic nuclear forces, including those based in Turkey, will ensure that Turkey remains within the Alliance mainstream on nuclear issues. The new initiative will result in the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey, with the exception of weapons carried by aircraft. The continued presence of these forces in Turkey as short-range weapons were withdrawn from Europe would have raised the prospect of Turkey's "singularization," as politically unattractive in Turkey as in Germany or elsewhere within the Alliance. Over the longer term, however, Turkish attitudes on nuclear questions may be influenced by the extent of the proliferation threat on Turkey's borders in the Middle East.

In light of the accelerating process of disintegration in the former Soviet Union, Turkish concerns increasingly focus on the risk of turmoil spilling across borders, mixed with a new sense of economic and political opportunity. Traditionally, Ankara has distanced itself from independence movements in the southern republics while pursuing a careful policy of increased ties in Azerbaijan and elsewhere in the Soviet Union. The expansion of Turkish involvement in the southern republics has, in fact, been supported by Moscow as an attractive secular alternative to the fundamentalist model offered by Iran. With the decline of central Soviet control, Turkish enterprises have

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16Trade with the Soviet Union as a whole grew dramatically, from $477 million in 1987 to almost $2 billion in 1990.
become increasingly active throughout the region, including Armenia. Despite this new wave of economic contacts to the north and east, Turkish policymakers and observers remain wary of the potential for serious turmoil affecting ethnic Turks in Central Asia and the Caucasus. While pan-Turkic elements remain on the political margin in Ankara, ethnic Turks in the former Soviet Union (as well as the Balkans and the Middle East) are beginning to look to Turkey as a cultural and economic beacon, and perhaps as a political and security guarantor. Although there is little enthusiasm in Ankara for any form of military involvement across Turkey’s borders with the former Soviet Union, there is real concern that Turkey could be drawn by circumstances into conflicts in Azerbaijan, where Turkish and Iranian interests clash, or Armenia. With regard to the latter, Turkey has an obvious interest in preventing the establishment of an independent state with claims on Turkish territory. Nonetheless, 1991 has seen a remarkable increase in commercial and political contacts between Turkey and Armenia.18

Balkan Interests and Concerns

Turkey looks to the Balkans with increasing interest and concern in light of on-going events in southeastern Europe.19 Turkish interests in the region stem from a long history of involvement dating from the Ottoman period and the existence of large Turkish and Moslem minorities in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greek Thrace.20 In addition, the Balkans lie astride Turkey’s main transit route to central Europe. Should the cultural cleavage between Orthodox and Moslem communities in the Balkans acquire a more active character as part of a larger process of ethnic and national fragmentation, Ankara may face growing pressure to intervene on behalf of its ethnic and religious compatriots.21 The natural outlet for Turkish involve-
ment in this case would be growing activism on the political front, perhaps in cooperation with the EC. But, as Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia are well aware, Turkish military power in Thrace is relevant to political calculations across the region. Ankara has rejected a Greek call for the demilitarization of borders in Thrace, ostensibly because the proposal ignored the presence of Greek forces in the Aegean, but also perhaps because it recognizes the value of the Turkish presence in deterring the mistreatment of Turkish minorities in Bulgaria and elsewhere. The status of Turkish minorities is of direct concern, not least because of public anxiety about the prospect of more economic and political migration from the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. In this context, the experience of 1989, in which some 320,000 Bulgarian Turks fled to Turkey (roughly half have returned, encouraged by the liberalization of the new Bulgarian regime's policy toward its Turkish population), remains in the minds of many Turks who view it as an indication of the potential consequences of too close an involvement in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{22}

Turkish policymakers and entrepreneurs point to the substantial economic opportunities offered by Turkey's position in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{23} On the political front, the opportunities for Turkish activism are more limited. The poor prospects for Turkey's membership in the EC may limit the attractiveness of Ankara as a partner on political and security matters in a region where the "return to Europe" is the focus of national aspirations.

\textbf{Aegean Relations}

As in Greece, there is broad support for reinvigorating the process of Aegean detente launched by Ozal and Papandreou in Davos in 1988. The declining sense of political confidence in Athens makes this a difficult task. Equally problematic is the ambiguous result of the October 1991 Turkish elections and the resulting coalition government and, perhaps, prolonged political paralysis. Under these conditions, bold initiatives in Aegean relations are extremely unlikely, despite the incentives raised by the post-Cold War environment and


U.S. policy referred to earlier. The conservative transition in Athens, hailed elsewhere within the Alliance, has in fact been greeted with some reservation in Ankara. Indeed, it is feared that the Mitsotakis government will use its greater support in the United States and Europe to pursue a more aggressive policy toward Turkey, including new pressure on the Turkish minority in Thrace.\textsuperscript{24}

Of the many points of contention in the Aegean, one of the most pressing from the Turkish perspective has been the presence of Greek forces on islands close to the Turkish coast in the eastern Aegean. Since the 1960s, Ankara has consistently opposed the introduction of these forces as an illegal remilitarization of territory demilitarized under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Turks are concerned about preserving unimpeded movement through the Aegean archipelago, both as a practical commercial and strategic matter, and as part of a less tangible sense of geopolitical vulnerability.\textsuperscript{25}

Overall, questions concerning Greek-Turkish relations, although relevant to Turkish domestic politics, do not occupy the attention of the Turkish public and elites to an overwhelming degree. Certainly, Aegean problems do not feature on political agendas to anything like the extent common in Greece. Ankara simply faces too many competing foreign and security policy issues. In the absence of political personalities with the confidence and power of Papandreou and Ozal at the height of their careers, the prospects for a sweeping improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, on the pattern of the extraordinary Atatürk-Venizelos detente of the interwar years, must be considered limited. The failure to reach agreement on a conference to address the Cyprus issue, despite the active intervention of the United States, is indicative less of a desire for obstruction than of political divisions

\textsuperscript{24}There are roughly 200,000 Moslems, mostly ethnic Turks, in Greek Thrace. The status and treatment of this and the smaller (and declining) Greek population in Turkey has been the subject of argument and counterargument. See, for example, the interview with Sadik Ahmet, member of the Greek Parliament, \textit{Nokta}, Istanbul, April 14, 1991, in \textit{PBS-West Europe Report}, June 5, 1991; Sadik Ahmet, \textit{"Grievances and Requests of the Turkish-Moslem Minority Living in Western Thrace, Greece,"} \textit{Turkish Review}, Spring 1989; and Alexis Alexandris, \textit{"Political Expediency and Human Rights: Minority Issues Between Greece and Turkey,"} Paper prepared for the conference \textit{"Minority Rights: Policies and Practice in Southeast Europe,"} Copenhagen, March 30–April 1, 1990.

\textsuperscript{25}A good survey of Turkish views may be found in \textit{The Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects} (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1989), a compilation of papers presented at a symposium held in Cesme, Izmir, 15–17 October 1987.
prior to the October 1991 elections and subsequent paralysis in Ankara. Similar constraints affecting the Greek position have already been noted.  

**Middle Eastern Concerns**

A shift in the emphasis of Turkey’s strategic priorities from traditional lines in the Balkans and the Caucasus to address new risks in the Middle East, including those posed by Syria, Iran, Iraq, and the activities of Kurdish separatists in southeast Anatolia, may encourage a further separation of Turkish and European security interests. In fact, the rise of competing security concerns in the Middle East had begun to affect Turkish security perceptions prior to the Gulf crisis. As an example, from the mid-1980s Turkish defense planners had begun to pay careful attention to the mounting dependence of Iraq on Turkish pipelines and road transport for the export of oil during the war with Iran. The Gulf War has simply confirmed and reinforced existing perceptions about the militarization of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors as a consequence of the Iran–Iraq War, and the growing threat from weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of increasing range and accuracy.

The prospect of a revived Iraq is an obvious source of concern in light of Turkey’s leading role in the coalition against Baghdad. The recent upsurge in PKK and the leftist terrorist group, Dev Sol activity from bases in Iraq, and the Turkish cross-border operations aimed at suppressing it, have drawn Turkey more directly into the problem of Iraq’s future. Indeed, many critics point to Öztal’s activist stance in the Gulf as the source of the deepening Kurdish problem, as well as a very uncertain outlook for Turkey’s relations in the Middle East as a

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27Turkish observers are more optimistic about the prospects for improved economic contacts across the Aegean, and a joint business council has been established to promote such ties. See Faruk San, “The Opportunities for Economic Cooperation Between Turkey and Greece,” *Turkish Review*, Spring 1989.


whole. Above all, Turkey faces a long-term security problem emanating from Syria. Risks from this quarter are based on persistent Syrian territorial claims on Antioch, continuing support for the PKK (including training bases in the Syrian controlled Bekka Valley), and the extent of Syria’s land and air forces. To these one might add the on-going friction over access to the Tigris and Euphrates waters, specifically Syrian (and Iraqi) allegations that the Ataturk Dam, under construction as part of Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia Project, will severely restrict the downstream flow.31 Damascus must reckon with the reality of Turkish control over this vital resource and the linkage with Syrian policy toward the Kurdish insurgency.32 The increasingly aggressive strategy that Turkey has adopted toward the PKK, including cross-border operations in Iraq and the establishment of a de facto “security zone” inside Iraqi territory, may also affect Turkish relations with Syria.33 A “hot pursuit” incident on the Syrian border, against the background of long-standing frictions on other matters, would pose a serious risk of escalation.

The results of the October 1991 elections, in which Islamic fundamentalists failed to demonstrate any real increase in strength, have only partially allayed the concerns of Turkey’s western-looking elite with regard to the longer term prospects for fundamentalism in Turkey. These prospects, not very bright under current conditions, will in the opinion of most observers depend on the evolution of the Turkish economy and the scale of support for religious institutions provided by Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors, principally Iran and Saudi Arabia.34 In any case, the involvement of Middle Eastern countries in promoting religious institutions in Turkey has emerged as an important additional issue in Turkey’s regional relations.

The enthusiasm of Turkish policymakers for pursuing deeper political and commercial ties in the Middle East, evident during the 1980s, has

32Turkish efforts to organize a “water summit” to discuss the future use of the Tigris and Euphrates have been suspended pending the outcome of the Middle East peace talks in Madrid. See “Turkey’s Giray Announces Water Summit Postponed,” FBIS–West Europe Report, October 3, 1991, p. 1.
34Some 300,000 Turkish students are currently enrolled in religious schools, many of which are financed by Saudi Arabia. Whether or not these institutions represent a wellspring of fundamentalism, or merely reflect an increasing interest in Islam, is a subject of debate both inside and outside Turkey.
been dealt a blow by the Gulf War and its aftermath. Interest in the Middle East as an alternative to stagnant relations in Europe has largely been overtaken by perceived opportunities across the Black Sea and in Central Asia as a result of developments in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the post-Ozal era, Turkey is likely to revert to its traditionally cautious approach toward the Middle East—to the extent that it can. With regard to broader developments in the Middle East, including the Arab–Israeli dispute, Turkish policy must tread a fine line between interests and relations with the West and the Arab world.35 Progress toward an Arab–Israeli settlement would simplify the problem of Turkish policy toward the region. In the absence of this, and to the extent that the West increasingly defines Turkey’s strategic importance in Middle Eastern terms, the various elements of Ankara’s external policy may become more difficult to reconcile.

BLACK SEA INITIATIVE

The emergence of regional cooperation initiatives has been an important development in foreign policy terms across the Southern Region. Turkey has made a substantial contribution to this trend through its proposal for a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project, aiming at the gradual establishment of a free trade zone among the states surrounding the Black Sea. The idea for such a project had been discussed by leading figures outside the government for some time, but was taken up with considerable vigor by President Ozal early in 1990 and given prominence in discussions with Presidents Bush and Gorbachev over the course of 1991. The initiative has, as its initial priorities, the development of more favorable conditions for the expansion of trade and investment among the littoral states, including improvements in communications and infrastructure, and administrative reforms aimed at facilitating commercial contacts.36

35 On this point, see Ali Karasmanoglu and Seyfi Tashan, eds., The Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), in particular the chapter by Karasmanoglu on “Turkey’s Discreet Foreign Policy Between Western Europe and the Middle East”; and Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991).

The first meeting to discuss the Black Sea Project was held in Ankara on December 19, 1990, with the participation of Turkish, Soviet, Romanian, and Bulgarian representatives. Subsequent meetings have been held in Bucharest and Sofia, and principles of cooperation were finalized in Moscow in July 1991 and signed in Istanbul on January 3, 1992.37 Six republics of the former Soviet Union have expressed interest in joining the initiative.38 The Black Sea Project builds on a rapidly expanding volume of Turkish trade and investment across the Black Sea, both with Moscow and the republics.

In strategic terms, the initiative, together with parallel overtures to Central Asia, has emerged as the centerpiece of Ankara's efforts to develop an independent and active external policy after the Cold War. A leading architect of the project regards it as "perhaps" Turkey's first independent initiative for regional security and prosperity in the last 50 years.39 Turkish officials also stress the potential of the project to increase Turkey's economic and political value to Europe and the United States. At a more practical level, the initiative has been welcomed in Washington and Brussels as an attractive way of engaging the southern republics without obviously undercutting Russia, and as evidence that Ankara is developing interests beyond the difficult issue of EC membership. Finally, active cooperation around the Black Sea centered on Ankara could serve as a counterweight to Greek (or revived Greek-Bulgarian) influence in the Balkans and enhance Turkey's position as a regional economic power.40 Two broad developments could derail plans for Black Sea cooperation: political paralysis or turmoil in Turkey and the absence of a dynamic leadership interested in the idea, and the possibility of severe turmoil in key republics on the northern littoral.

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38Speech by President Ozal to the Annual Conference of the Turkish–U.S. Business Council, October 31, 1991.
SECURITY STRUCTURES AND DEFENSE POLICY

The likelihood that Turkey will be excluded from efforts to construct a European defense identity (with an operational dimension) around the WEU has emerged as a more disturbing prospect for Ankara than the broader problem of exclusion from the EC. President Ozal expressed his dissatisfaction with Turkey’s observer status in the WEU, asserting that Turkey cannot be expected to play its traditionally strong role in defense of the continent if it is unable to “participate fully in the making of the new Europe.”41 The offer of associate membership at Maastricht has been viewed with disappointment, especially in light of the WEU’s offer of full membership to Greece.42 Turkish uncertainty about the evolution of NATO and the future of the U.S. presence in Europe will reinforce these concerns. Turkish exclusion from the WEU would be understood in Ankara as evidence of Europe’s unwillingness to grant it a legitimate security role on the continent.

Those European countries that wish to move quickly toward a common foreign and security policy will wish to defer difficult membership decisions concerning Turkey. To the extent that the EC formally embraces the WEU as its security arm, the prospects for full Turkish membership will almost certainly evaporate, although a more confident WEU might well seek to develop a closer associative arrangement with Ankara.

Turkey shares with the United States a strong interest in preserving a central role for NATO in European security affairs. Traditionally, all of the Southern Region countries have placed considerable symbolic importance on the NATO link. But the Turkish stake in the maintenance of the institutional status quo is perhaps strongest of all, because the alternative of a European defense identity remains closed to Turkey. Participation in NATO is seen, not unlike the prospect of EC membership, as a symbol of Turkey’s membership in the Western democratic club. Important too, in the wake of developments in Europe and the Gulf, is the Alliance’s ability to provide a multilateral

41 Comment during the June 5, 1991 Paris meeting of the WEU, quoted in Reuters. Turkey first applied for membership in the WEU in 1987.
42 Former Foreign Minister Safa Giray declared that “EC efforts to add a military dimension to the goal of political union should not undermine the balances among the countries that play a role in this” (i.e., Greece and Turkey). “Giray Views of EC Moves for Military Union,” FBIS-West Europe Report, October 24, 1991, p. 28.
and Euro-Atlantic context for security cooperation that might otherwise seem too heavily weighted toward the bilateral relationship with the U.S. and Middle Eastern security.

Even as NATO devotes increasing attention to Mediterranean security, including issues concerning the defense of Turkey, the Southern Region framework may be of declining utility to those assessing Turkey's position. Turkey shares many of the characteristics typical of the Southern Region as a whole (leaving aside the Italian case, which is in some respects atypical), specifically: a relatively low level of economic development by European standards, the experience of a democratic transition, and limited military potential despite high manpower levels. Unlike its allies in southern Europe, however, Turkey has never viewed the Soviet (or Russian) threat as distant and diffuse, but rather as a historically clear and pressing reality. Most importantly, Turkey stands apart from the trend toward Europeanization that is driving the evolution of foreign and security policy across the Southern Region. Turkey's isolation from this process alone suggests that the Turkish position within the Southern Region—indeed, within NATO as a whole—is becoming more, rather than less, distinctive.

Ankara retains a wary attitude toward the development of an "out-of-area" role for NATO. In practice, the evolution of such a role is both unlikely for NATO and problematic for Turkey. In the Turkish view, the defense of Turkey's Middle Eastern borders is clearly an in-area responsibility for the Alliance. While the language of the NATO Treaty suggests that Turkey is technically correct on this point, the experience of the Gulf crisis, in particular German reservations about the deployment of Allied Mobile Force air reinforcements to Turkey, has undermined Turkish faith in the NATO security guarantee outside East–West contingencies. Ankara can have little interest in the growth of a debate within the Alliance about "gray area" and out-of-area responses. With regard to the latter, Turkish sensitivities center on the possibility of being called on to provide forces or more automatic access to facilities to support future operations in the Middle East. NATO's adoption of a more active policy outside Europe would severely complicate Turkey's already delicate relations with the Arab world.

Turkey is scheduled to be the beneficiary of substantial CFE-surplus armaments under NATO's Equipment Transfer Program. The pro-
gram is expected to result in the "cascading" to Turkey of roughly 1,050 M-60 and Leopard tanks, 600 armored combat vehicles from the United States and Germany, 70 110mm artillery pieces, 40 F-4 fighters, attack helicopters, and surface-to-air missiles. These transfers will make a significant contribution to the modernization of the Turkish armed forces while satisfying the reduction requirements of the treaty. The scale of the armaments acquired in this manner may also raise questions about the future of Turkey's own defense-industrial development program.

As noted, the Gulf crisis has had the effect of reinforcing a trend already underway toward the reorientation of Turkey's defense priorities from Thrace to the Middle East, including the suppression of the Kurdish insurgency in the southeast of the country. The experience of the Gulf War itself has also affected the thinking of Turkey's military leadership and civilian strategists. In contrast to the experience elsewhere in the Southern Region where, as a rule, the enthusiasm of the military for active participation in the coalition operations was tempered by the political leadership, the Turkish General Staff adopted a very cautious approach to involvement in the Gulf. Their conservativeness may be explained, in part, by an orthodox interpretation of Atatürk's precepts regarding the avoidance of foreign adventurism and threats to Turkish sovereignty. Beyond this, however, the military leaders simply had serious doubts about their ability to deploy and sustain forces beyond their own territory, or even to conduct large-scale mobile operations on the border with Iraq. The experience of the Gulf War confirmed the unpreparedness of the Turkish armed forces to wage modern conventional warfare, and even cast doubt on the value of the relatively modern equipment to be acquired from the allies as a result of CFE. Overall, the Gulf experience will have the effect of redoubling Turkish efforts to modernize and streamline the armed forces, including a reduction of its land forces to roughly 350,000 from a current 470,000 by July 1992.

44Established modernization plans are described in General Dogan Gures, "Modernization and Restructuring of the Turkish Land Forces," NATO's Sixteen Nations, February/March 1990; and an October 6, 1990 interview with then Minister of Defense, Safa Giray, quoted in FBIS-West Europe Report, November 16, 1990, p. 36.
Not surprisingly, air defense, including the acquisition of Patriot missiles and additional F-16s (the Turkish F-16 strength will eventually reach the impressive total of 320 aircraft) has emerged as a central priority following the Gulf War. In the absence of these systems, Turkey will remain highly vulnerable to air and ballistic missile attacks on its territory, a vulnerability that could affect Turkey's willingness to permit foreign military operations from Turkish bases. Indeed, Turkey's inability to defend itself against the Iraqi Scud and conventional air threats, and the consequent need to allow the presence of NATO forces on Turkish territory as a deterrent, has been seen as a double blow to Turkish sovereignty. At the same time, the expansion of Turkish air defenses to a level commensurate with the scale of forces facing Turkey in the Middle East (Syria deploys some 650 modern combat aircraft) will inevitably raise questions about the military balance in the Balkans. These questions will not be limited to air defense. The modernization priorities for Turkey's land forces will be driven by the need to develop a capacity for mobile operations in the Middle East rather than positional defense against a Soviet threat. The net result of this strategic and operational reorientation will be an increase in the offensive capability of Turkish forces.

PROSPECTS FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS

Turkish frustration in its efforts to "join" Europe will lend increasing significance to the bilateral relationship with the United States. Although the Gulf experience has resulted in a great deal of visibility for and good will toward Turkey in Washington, a measured expansion of economic and security cooperation may fail to satisfy heightened expectations in Ankara. The change of leadership in Turkey, and Ozal's declining ability to promote a strongly pro-American line, introduces a new element of uncertainty in bilateral relations. Two broad features of the new post-containment, post-Gulf relationship

\[\text{[Footnote 46] Turkey has a well-established program for the co-production of F-16s, and has recently announced its intention to procure a second lot of 160 aircraft for its own use, with financing provided by the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait ($3 billion total, of which the United States will contribute $500 million, pending Congressional approval). Since 1984, Turkey has produced 75 aircraft out of a total of 160 planned for 1994. "Gulf States Pledge $2.5 Billion for F-16 Project," FBIS-West Europe Report, October 24, 1991, p. 29.}
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had begun to emerge even prior to the elections, and they are likely to prove durable. First, the consensus for maintaining a viable defense relationship with the United States will hold, but there will be little interest in expanding existing arrangements. A second and related feature of the emerging relationship is the emphasis on building a new and diversified “strategic relationship” in which economic cooperation plays a leading role.

Defense Cooperation

The window for expanded defense cooperation has almost certainly closed, if indeed it was ever open. In theory, the Gulf experience provided a number of incentives for Turkey to consider a more active security relationship with the United States, notably a heightened sense of insecurity with regard to the Middle East, more evident security assistance needs for the modernization of the armed forces, and above all, a sense that the NATO commitment to Turkey’s security might not be ironclad in all cases. Yet, the prospects for a formal increase in U.S.–Turkish defense cooperation are quite limited for a number of reasons. Özal’s willingness to provide bases for U.S. and allied forces during and after the Gulf conflict provoked strong opposition from quarters as diverse as the Turkish left, the nationalist and religious right, and the military leadership. The latter, while thoroughly pro-Western and interested in security cooperation as an essential element in the modernization of the armed forces, regarded the large-scale use of Turkish facilities by foreign forces as an affront to Turkish sovereignty. Moreover, key elements of the military leadership were inclined to distrust Özal’s motives in the Gulf, suspecting a link between his active support for Saudi Arabia and his tactical courting of the religious right wing in domestic politics. The net result has been a growing sensitivity across the political spectrum on issues of sovereignty. Turkey’s decision to extend the existing bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) for another year has effectively postponed any question of a formal change in the ground rules for access to facilities, or the prepositioning of materiel.

48See, for example, the critique offered by Bülent Ecevit in Norman Frankel, “Conversations in Istanbul: An Interview with Bülent Ecevit,” Political Communication and Persuasion, vol. 8, no. 1, 1991.
(special arrangements outside the DECA involving the use of Turkish facilities for non-NATO purposes will remain possible). 49

The United States for its part is unlikely to seek an expansion of its military presence in a period of force reductions and economic stringency, not to mention the inappropriate signals such an expansion would send to Russia and the southern republics. Indeed, Turkish officials are more likely to be confronted with a reduction in the U.S. presence. Moreover, the problem of an adequate quid pro quo in the form of security assistance will persist despite the expansion of aid during and after the Gulf crisis. 50 Turkish observers are aware of the declining enthusiasm for security assistance in Congress, although Turkey will certainly continue to be among the strongest claimants for future funding, even at lower levels.

The prospects for U.S. access to Turkish facilities in non-NATO contingencies will undoubtedly be influenced by the waning of Ozal's ability to influence the security debate and the natural conservatism of the military regarding foreign forces on Turkish soil (Demirel and his coalition partners will most likely give the military a wide berth on such questions). 51 Turkish interests in the Middle East will also encourage a careful approach. In the absence of political obstacles, Turkey is in a position to play an active role in the economic reconstruction of Kuwait, Iran, and possibly Iraq (the latter's oil exports through Turkish pipelines will almost certainly resume at some point). As in the past, Turkey's leadership will be compelled to consider the regional effects of too close and too visible defense cooperation with the United States outside the NATO framework. Turkish policy in future crises may have more in common with its restrained behavior during the 1967 and 1973 Middle East crises than with the recent and perhaps unique experience in the Gulf. Evidence of a return to a more cautious policy can be seen in then Prime Minister

50 In the wake of the Gulf War, U.S. security assistance to Turkey has been increased from $553.4 million to $635.4 million in current appropriations, mostly in the form of outright grants. Additional "emergency" economic assistance is also likely.
51 On Turkish military concerns with regard to the presence of foreign personnel outside the terms of the DECA, see John Murray Brown, "Kurds Seek to Prevent Allied Pullout from Turkish Border," Financial Times, September 18, 1991.
Yilmaz's comments ruling out the use of Turkish bases for renewed air strikes against nuclear facilities in Iraq.\textsuperscript{52}

A New Strategic Relationship?

Over the next decade, Ankara can be expected to place great emphasis on the development of a more "mature" relationship with the United States in which security assistance and defense cooperation play a less prominent role and political and economic ties are strengthened. This interest has already been expressed in calls for what the Turkish elite terms an "expanded strategic relationship," meaning strategic in the broadest sense. Increased trade and investment will be a central issue in building this diversified relationship.\textsuperscript{53} Bilateral negotiations following the Gulf crisis led to a doubling of the U.S. quota for Turkish textile imports through 1993. But with a relatively small share of the U.S. market, the effect of such apparently large increases remains incremental. In his visit to Washington during the Gulf crisis, Ozal proposed a free trade agreement between the United States and Turkey. Few observers regard this as a serious proposal—certainly the United States has too many pressing issues on its trade agenda to consider opening negotiations on this front—but rather a means of keeping economic issues at the forefront of the bilateral relationship.\textsuperscript{54}

Defense-industrial development is one area in which the pursuit of a broader strategic relationship merges with strategic issues of a narrower and more traditional sort. Existing co-production arrangements for the manufacture of F-16s (Egypt also plans to purchase Turkish-built F-16s with U.S. security assistance funds) and armored


\textsuperscript{54}Both the proposed free trade agreement with the United States and the Black Sea Economic Zone are widely (and Turks would say conveniently) perceived within the EC as evidence of Turkey's lack of seriousness with regard to eventual membership in the Community. Indeed, some observers in Brussels argue that these initiatives would be incompatible even with existing obligations under the Association Agreement.
fighting vehicles are seen in Ankara as important contributions to Turkey's economic development and national prestige. Turkish firms also look to expand their defense-related exports to the United States under the free defense trade provisions of the DECA.\textsuperscript{55}

More broadly, Turkey will seek U.S. support for its regional policies and initiatives, including the Black Sea Proposal and its application for EC membership. The prospects for U.S. pressure influencing European attitudes on the latter are extremely limited. Short of this, the United States may be in a stronger position to press for the inclusion of Turkey in emerging European security arrangements. Yet, as the U.S. interest in Turkey focuses increasingly on the country's role in Middle Eastern rather than European security (and as Turkey's own defense concerns are reoriented toward the southeast), the task of developing a role for Turkey in the new European security order will become more difficult. Finally, Ankara can be expected to seek continued U.S. support for its policy toward the deepening Kurdish insurgency in southeast Anatolia. This has already emerged as a prominent and inhibiting element in Turkey's relations with Europe. On the pattern of sporadic bilateral frictions over the Armenian question, a tough Turkish response to increasingly severe PKK attacks could prove a significant impediment to closer bilateral relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{55} Turkish exports of defense goods to the United States under the "Memorandum of Understanding" (Appendix 2) of the DECA amount to roughly $185 million annually.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

With the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean will remain a center of security risks of a traditional, military character for southern Europe and Turkey. More significantly, as the definition of security expands to embrace less traditional concerns such as development, migration, and economic well-being, the Mediterranean is likely to become more prominent in the strategic perceptions of Europe as a whole. Southern Europe and the Mediterranean will, in turn, become more important to the United States as a European and Middle Eastern power after the Cold War. From the perspective of a global power, the region's strategic significance derives from its position at the crossroads (in political and logistical terms) of Europe and the Middle East, and its character as a center of regional security problems, including those of the Maghreb, the Balkans, and the Aegean. The end of the Cold War has released a variety of explosive ethnic tensions affecting the security of the Adriatic and Black Sea. In the Middle East and North Africa, the waning of the East-West competition has reduced the escalatory risks of regional instability, but has also removed many of the superpower-imposed constraints affecting the behavior of Libya, Algeria, Syria, and Iraq. This, in turn, will have a direct effect on the security environment facing NATO's southern allies.

The Mediterranean basin is a place where Western democracy and fundamentalist Islam confront one another as potentially competing ideologies, and is the most obvious if permeable divide between the rich north and the poor and increasingly populous south. In more concrete terms, the Mediterranean, and the Southern Region in particular, is where the proliferation of unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles in the Third World poses the most direct threat to Western security. The sea itself is an increasingly ineffective barrier against political, economic, and military risks emanating from North Africa and the Middle East.

The character of America's relations with the countries of NATO's Southern Region will arguably play a more important role in determining when, where, and how the United States chooses to involve
itself in European and Middle Eastern crises than had been the case during the Cold War. Issues of access and defense cooperation will take on new significance to the extent that the focus of European security concerns shifts southward. Moreover, countries such as Spain and Italy have emerged as important regional actors with broad ties and influence across the Mediterranean and in central Europe. Turkey may emerge from the Cold War and the Gulf crisis as an active regional power with interests and vulnerabilities stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia.

TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The security of southern Europe and Turkey has improved as a result of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the strategic contraction of the Soviet Union, and conventional arms control. But these developments have not transformed the security picture to the same extent as they have in the center and the north of Europe. The countries of the Southern Region continue to face large and increasingly sophisticated arsenals outside current arms control arrangements, and remain concerned about the effects of CFE-related arms transfers on regional balances. At the same time, the ability of countries around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean to threaten population centers in southern Europe and Turkey may complicate future decisions regarding cooperation with the United States in Middle Eastern and North African crises.

Many of the security-related concerns that have come to the fore in Europe in the wake of the East–West disengagement, including the problems of migration and political friction between Islam and the West, are felt most keenly in southern Europe. For countries outside the Southern Region, including established Mediterranean powers such as France, these concerns have had a marked influence on the post–Cold War security debate. The experience of the Gulf War has also set a precedent for more active German involvement in the Mediterranean.

There is a clear and continuing interest across the Southern Region in maintaining a visible post–Cold War U.S. presence in the Mediterranean for purposes of deterrence and political reassurance. In weighing the proper size and composition of residual U.S. air and naval forces, consideration should be given to the effect of this pres-
ence on the prospects for cooperation outside the NATO area. The withdrawal of forces devoted to Southern Region defense will make it more difficult to ask for and expect cooperation across the region, especially in an environment of increasing vulnerability to air and ballistic missile attack.

On some problems, including economic development in the Maghreb and the related issue of migration, Europe will naturally play a leading role. But U.S. reluctance to demonstrate interest in the specific regional risks facing southern Europe and Turkey will damage the prospects for cooperation on issues of enduring importance to the United States, including access to Middle Eastern contingencies.

Southern Region countries are increasingly willing to support and contribute to NATO initiatives aimed at strengthening allied rapid response capabilities for contingencies on the European periphery. The Gulf crisis served as a watershed in this regard, with unprecedented deployments and logistical support for the coalition operations against Iraq. Across the region, countries are looking beyond their own borders in defining their future security policies, with a consistent emphasis on the modernization and reorganization of military forces to facilitate their participation in multinational units. NATO remains a very useful vehicle for this new activism and retains its symbolic importance for Southern Region countries even as the future role and character of the Alliance is debated on both sides of the Atlantic.

Nonetheless, with the very significant exception of Turkey, foreign and security policies across NATO’s Southern Region are increasingly framed in European terms. The consensus for defense spending and security arrangements, in particular, has become critically dependent on the ability of governments in southern Europe to give these issues a more European look. Southern European countries are also among the strongest advocates of progress toward a common foreign and security policy as part of the broader process of European integration. One consequence of this has been an increasing emphasis on Brussels over Washington as the focus of decisionmaking on political, economic, and, to a growing extent, security policy. Southern European countries will be increasingly reluctant to adopt views on defense cooperation with the United States—including access to facilities and air space for non-NATO contingencies—that are at variance with the European consensus. The implications of this trend
for U.S. policy are essentially neutral. Although the ability of countries such as Portugal to offer support on a bilateral basis (as in the airlift to Israel in 1973) has surely declined, the ability of Madrid, Rome, or Athens to place such cooperation in a multilateral, European context will permit much more active support where U.S. and European interests coincide.

Turkey very clearly stands outside this process of Europeanization affecting the rest of the Southern Region. There is very little prospect of Turkey joining in the formal process of European economic and political integration, much less the development of new European security arrangements. The reassertion of Turkey’s strategic importance in Middle Eastern and Central Asian terms will reinforce Turkey’s distinctiveness and potential isolation within the Southern Region and the Alliance as a whole. As southern Europe becomes more “European” in political and economic terms, and as Turkey remains isolated on the European periphery and faces unique and primarily extra-European security challenges, the very notion of a NATO “Southern Region” may become less useful as a framework for discussing the strategic environment around the Mediterranean. From the perspective of Washington and Brussels, there will be a range of problems to which the southern European countries are particularly exposed, and there will be the unique situation of Turkey. At the political level there will be a declining connection between the two, with the important exception of Greek-Turkish relations.

The prospects for stability in the Aegean and Thrace will be strongly influenced by the extent to which the Greek-Turkish relationship can be “anchored” in the wake of the Cold War, and the longer term evolution of relations between Europe and Islam. The magnitude of Turkey’s security problems and military modernization requirements in the wake of the Gulf War, and the concern that this has engendered in Greece, give both countries a strong stake in secure relations with the United States.

Southern Europe has traditionally looked to the United States and NATO to couple security interests in the center and south of Europe, and to prevent the marginalization of Mediterranean security concerns. The post–Cold War interest in Mediterranean security problems in Europe as a whole, and the progressive integration of the southern European countries into the European mainstream, have offset much of the concern about being relegated to the strategic
periphery. These countries will, however, remain wary of the potential competition between southern and Eastern Europe for economic and political attention. For Turkey, the problem of coupling its security interests to those of Europe will remain and perhaps intensify. The United States, as a European, Middle Eastern, and Mediterranean power can and should promote this linkage.

The increasing activism and assertiveness of Southern Region countries in foreign and security policy matters has spawned a variety of regional initiatives, including but not limited to Italy's *Hexagonale*, Greek overtures in the Balkans, and Turkey's sweeping proposal for Black Sea cooperation. The "five plus five" consultations in the western Mediterranean, and the C SCM concept, address wider north-south issues (in the case of the latter, extending the concept of Mediterranean cooperation to the Persian Gulf). Although political and economic cooperation has been the focus of these initiatives, all have longer term security implications. To the extent that some of these arrangements prove successful, they may improve the prospects for regional stability, bolster the regional influence of organizing states, and raise the importance of key Southern Region countries as strategic partners for the United States. On this basis, such initiatives merit U.S. support.

The character of the emerging security environment around the Mediterranean, in which serious social, political, and economic problems exist alongside military risks of a more traditional sort, suggests that no single institution can adequately address the full range of security challenges, broadly defined. Southern European countries are keen to preserve NATO and to explore new European-based arrangements as contributions to deterrence and regional stability. But they also wish to avoid, to the extent possible, the militarization of north-south relations in the Mediterranean. This sensitivity provides much of the impetus for western Mediterranean cooperation, the C SCM proposal, and efforts to revitalize the European Community's Mediterranean policy. An essential motivation in each of these cases will be to prevent security-related problems from becoming direct military challenges.
Appendix

JOINT DOCUMENT ON CSCM BY FRANCE, ITALY, PORTUGAL, AND SPAIN

The fading away of block-to-block confrontation in Europe and the alarming developments of the Gulf crisis have shown the world the need for a new approach to ensure stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

A different kind of relationship among all the nations in the area is urgently required, in which new avenues for economic cooperation and intercultural dialogue should be opened up within a framework of common security. The economic and social causes of instability must be addressed, while a consensus is being achieved on the progressive introduction of confidence-building measures and immediate attention is being paid to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Above all, however, a new sense of economic and political solidarity must provide inspiration for the future balance of the region.

We believe the response to this collective challenge could lie in the convening of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). It would constitute a process to address the region’s problems in a complete, progressive, and comprehensive way. It would be aimed at defining a set of generally accepted rules and principles covering at the same time the aspects of security, economic cooperation, and human dimension. Such a process would lead to the adoption of a catalogue of principles in the form of a “Mediterranean Act,” which would set the rules of behavior and coexistence in the area. The sources of inspiration for such rules will be the Charter of the United Nations, the experience of CSCE, and the peculiar conditions of the region.

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1The text of this appendix is taken from The Mediterranean and the Middle East After the War in the Gulf: The CSMC (Rome: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1991).
1. WHAT IS CSCM?

CSCM is intended to be an instrument for creating and managing common interests in the fields of security, cooperation, and human dimension by providing means to improve relations among the countries of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region. CSCM would define a catalogue of common principles and progressively implement its baskets or dimensions. It would draw its inspiration from the experience of CSCE while adjusting to the peculiarities of the region.

2. WHAT IS THE USE OF CSCM?

CSCM would be a system for promoting stability and generating detente. As a framework for general understanding and detente, it would provide an umbrella for specific mechanisms for the solution of conflicts. CSCM would act as a complement to those mechanisms. As an accompanying structure, CSCM might contribute to the post-crisis settlements in the Gulf and to the solution of the Palestinian issue.

3. FUNDAMENTAL GOALS OF CSCM

• safeguarding the security of all the countries in the region and contributing to a greater degree of global stability;
• promoting a balanced economic and social development in the area, thereby reducing economic, social, demographic, political, and cultural imbalances;
• setting up a framework in which diverse civilizations could coexist peacefully;
• establishing in the area a more stable order based on solidarity and fostering cooperation as an alternative to confrontation;
• laying the foundations for a system of good neighborhood, co-responsibility and interdependence among all the countries in the region;
• ensuring an active role for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region within the new international order to be fashioned.
4. CRITERIA GUIDING CSCM

CSCM will be based on a global and progressive approach. CSCM will be global in scope, participation, and content.

- Scope: CSCM's geographic scope will be the Mediterranean region in a broad sense, including the Middle East and the Gulf.
- Participation: CSCM will be open to all the countries in the region as well as to countries having an interest in it.
- Content: CSCM will cope with all matters that are relevant to cooperation and stability in the region according to a pattern of balance and compensations.

CSCM will be progressive both in reference to the selection of the themes and to the dynamic nature of the process, which is expandable. CSCM would address matters according to their degree of maturity, and would advance by steps, opening up new avenues for understanding as results are achieved.

5. PARTICIPATION

Both the countries of the region and those having an interest in it would be called to participate. CSCM's scope is political, it is broader than a strictly geographic one, acknowledging the need for including all countries that are relevant to ensure cooperation and stability in the region.

Accordingly, all countries belonging to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Gulf will be called upon to participate as well as the European Community and its Member States, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union. Palestinians would have to be appropriately represented.

6. THE BASKETS

Security

The aim of this basket is to build a stable order in the region. Such a goal will be achieved by dealing with the deep-rooted causes of insecurity and by bringing under control at the same time the most destabilizing effects of military competition. The deep-rooted causes of insecurity are basically economic, social, and political factors. A
particularly destabilizing effect is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In order to ensure stability in the region, emphasis should be laid at the outset on the land dimension, especially under a South–South profile. Priority should be given to a number of preliminary and voluntary confidence-building measures (MCM, Mediterranean confidence-building measures), as well as to political measures aimed at controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Cooperation

This basket is essential if CSCM is to achieve its objectives. Its fundamental goal would be to promote co-development as a necessary choice to tackle the economic and demographic imbalances of the region. Without substituting other bilateral and multilateral instances, this basket would: realize a synthesis of all forms of cooperation; implement economic and financial solidarity; enhance the existing instruments, above all in the framework of the EC’s Mediterranean policy; foster the processes of regional integration; and meet the broad expectations of the people.

Human Dimension

The basket would aim at bringing the peoples of the region closer together. The pursuit of such a goal would develop in a double direction: first, by building a framework for co-existence through dialogue, tolerance, and understanding among societies, civilizations, and beliefs; secondly, by working out a common approach to human rights both in theory and practice.

7. TIMETABLE

Bearing in mind how ambitious and complex an initiative CSCM is, its preliminary, informal stage should be carried through as thoroughly as possible. The formal stage, which would be inaugurated by the convening of a Preparatory Committee, would start as soon as a sufficient measure of consensus had been built. In the meantime, the perspectives that CSCM could open up for the future of the region should be appropriately underlined.
8. MEDITERRANEAN PLATFORM

The Mediterranean region is an area of wide diversities. In order to establish an initial common denominator and ensure a degree of convergence, all the countries wishing to join CSCM would be called upon to pledge their way into the process by preliminarily subscribing to a basic set of principles, or Mediterranean platform, as an expression of their determination and commitment.

Such a set of principles would include:

- territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, non-use of force, and peaceful settlement of disputes;
- co-development, economic and financial solidarity;
- tolerance, co-existence, and mutual understanding among civilizations.
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