Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe

An Overview

J. F. Brown, A. Ross Johnson

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PREFACE

Rand recently completed a project entitled “Soviet Vulnerabilities in Eastern Europe” as a part of its research in the National Security Strategies Program under Project AIR FORCE. This project examined the security issues posed for the United States by the likely evolution of the Soviet bloc during the remainder of the 1980s and beyond. Primary emphasis in the study was placed on the political, economic, and social challenges to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, as the necessary framework for appraising the extent to which East European military forces can augment Soviet military capabilities in the late 1980s and the degree to which the Soviet army can operate in Eastern Europe unconstrained by local developments.

Project research results are reported in the following Rand publications:

*Poland in Crisis*, N-1891-AF, July 1982, by A. Ross Johnson, provides an assessment of the origins and significance of the Polish crisis. This Note benefited from the discussions of a Rand-organized workshop on Poland in August 1981.


*Economic Adjustment in Eastern Europe*, R-3146-AF, September 1984, by Laura D'Andrea Tyson, analyzes a major aspect of the East European economic crisis, the degree to which two important countries, Hungary and Romania, have been able to adapt to unfavorable
international economic conditions and the implications for their future economic viability.

*The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe: Romania, Hungary, and East Germany*, R-3190-AF, by F. Stephen Larrabee, December 1984, examines the degree to which three key East European countries are assets or liabilities to the USSR.

The present report summarizes and further develops the project findings. It is intended to be read in conjunction with the specialized project reports, which provide documentation and supporting analysis. To present a comprehensive overview, this report also includes brief discussions of economic developments in Eastern Europe generally, and of key trends in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria (topics not examined in the detailed project publications).

The report is intended to assist Air Force officers responsible for evaluating and planning against the military threat from non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces and from Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

J. F. Brown, a consultant to The Rand Corporation, is the author of Rand Report R-1742-PR, *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its East European Allies: A Survey*, November 1975, which provided background for the present project. A. Ross Johnson, the project director, participated in discussions in all six East European countries during 1983–84.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The analysis in this report, and in the monographs on which it draws, suggests a number of conclusions about Eastern Europe and the challenges that developments in that region will pose for the USSR over the next ten years. These are stated categorically as the authors' judgments about the most likely tendencies and course of development:

- Poland has been pacified but not "normalized," in the way that Czechoslovakia was after 1968 or that Hungary was, more ruthlessly, after 1956. Latent and active opposition continues in Poland. The process of pacification has made the army, rather than the regular communist party apparatus, the real locus of power.

- Poland and Romania are in economic crisis, and economic problems are severe throughout the region. Tinkering with the centrally planned economic mechanism—"reforms" of the centralist type—will be attempted, but such reforms are unlikely to improve economic performance significantly. Economic growth will stagnate and in some countries will decline. Forced domestic austerity will not reverse this trend. Fundamental, decentralist, market-oriented economic reform on the Hungarian model is needed but is not likely to be adopted, because the process would be economically difficult, socially unpopular, and politically threatening.

- Nonetheless, the East European economies have developed to the point where they have no chance of improved performance if they are cut off from the international economy, and the Soviets, as well as the East European leaderships, evidently recognize this and do not seek autarky within CMEA.

- The decline of consumerism (what Khrushchev called "goulash communism") will contribute to social ferment and especially to working-class frustration, since it is being experienced by a new "socialist" working class that has known nothing except consumerism. This economic dissatisfaction will be greatest in Poland and Romania. Economic grievances will be linked with intellectual and political ferment, heightened by the exposure of Eastern Europe to Western influences, particularly in Poland and potentially in East Germany.

- Hungary is the only East European country to have accomplished a successful in-system reform, and that reform is only
partial and fragile. Moreover, whatever happens in Hungary, the Hungarian experience is scarcely a model to be followed by Poland or other countries. The prospects for in-system reform elsewhere in Eastern Europe are poor. The East European regimes retain the reins of power; but as they emphasize the authority of the military and security forces, these institutions will acquire powers formerly reserved to the party apparatus itself and, as in Poland, may supplant the party as the effective center of power.

- The East European regimes have different foreign policy, economic, and ideological interests from those of the Soviet leadership. They will continue to promote these interests, as did Hungary, East Germany, and Romania in 1984. But when pressured by Moscow—as they will be again—the leaderships are more likely to be responsive to the USSR than to the aspirations of their own societies or their own sometimes reformist sub-elites.

- The USSR and local leaderships in Eastern Europe will attempt to muddle through by pursuing conservative and repressive, rather than adaptive, status quo policies in the face of greater social ferment. However, considering the numbing effect of the crushing of Solidarity, this is likely to result not in organized opposition but in periodic outpourings of dissatisfaction or unrest, suppressed with the degree of violence dictated by the circumstances.

- Ferment in Eastern Europe will continue to contribute to the growth of national and political dissent in the USSR, especially in contiguous areas.

- By requiring considerable Soviet political attention and economic resources, Eastern Europe will serve as a constraint on active Soviet policies elsewhere in the world.

- Trends in Eastern Europe will limit the ability of the USSR to augment its military capabilities with bloc military forces and to operate unconstrained by local developments on East European territory. The post-1956 quiescence in Eastern Europe was the prerequisite for the decision taken by Khrushchev and Grechko to assign East European military forces a key supporting role in Soviet military planning for the European theater. That quiescence no longer obtains. Eastern Europe's economic crisis limits the defense burden the region can assume. The net result of the Polish crisis has been the subtraction of a significant component of the Polish armed forces, who are now needed on the "internal front," from Warsaw Pact offensive
capabilities. Eastern Europe has become a less hospitable environment for the stationing of Soviet military forces in peacetime or for their operations in crisis or wartime conditions. All these developments could occasion a Soviet reappraisal of Warsaw Pact “coalition warfare.”

Events and circumstances may qualify and modify these conclusions, and alternative possibilities exist; these qualifications are discussed in the body of the report.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union has dominated Eastern Europe for 40 years. It has rigorously controlled the northern states—East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—and despite its reverses, with the defection of Yugoslavia and Albania and the weakening of control over Romania, it has remained the key power in the less important southern states. Bulgaria has remained tightly in the Soviet grip, while Hungary has conducted its experiments with more liberal policies under the Soviet shadow.

Yet though this Soviet hegemony has persisted, all the countries concerned except Bulgaria have made attempts to either reject or severely modify it. Yugoslavia achieved independence in 1948, as did Albania in the early 1960s. Beginning in the late 1950s, Romania has gradually, and sometimes perilously, shaken off many of the coils of subservience that characterize Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Hungary’s effort to achieve independence was crushed in 1956. Three years earlier, a workers’ revolt in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was also crushed. The attempt of the ruling communist party in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to drastically reform and adapt led to a Soviet invasion. In Poland, the attempt of the vast majority of the nation to assert itself in 1981 was defeated by a coercive strike, delivered by local Polish forces but prompted, directly or indirectly, by the Soviet Union.

These attempts at revolution or reform have been widely scattered over the 40 years of postwar Soviet rule. But this does not mean that there is no basic connection among them. They are, in fact, symptoms of the basic failure of Soviet rule, of the refusal of Eastern Europe to accept it, and of the Soviet Union’s inability to accommodate the aspirations of the nations and societies of Eastern Europe. The East European nations are very different in history and outlook, but their aspirations for self-determination have been similar, and these have not been compatible with Soviet rule. In this context, Eastern Europe’s general—though not universal—historical antipathy to Russia assumes both relevance and importance. The Soviet failure to accept the aspirations of the East European nations has had two interacting and mutually reinforcing aspects: One concerns Soviet relations with the individual countries of Eastern Europe, which have been characterized by Soviet domination; the other concerns the type of system applied domestically in most of those countries, the Soviet-style
“Marxist-Leninist” system that precludes the expression of social pluralism.

Long-standing grievances, then, have led to the present impasse—Eastern Europe’s “time of troubles”—so forcefully dramatized by the events in Poland in 1980–81. The basic issue for the rest of the 1980s and beyond is whether there is any way out of this impasse. Can the present system be reformed? Is basic systemic change necessary that will alter beyond recognition Soviet hegemony as it has been practiced for 40 years? Are the Soviets capable of doing this and remaining what they are? If the Soviets have this capability, what would the East European reaction be? Could an “organic relationship” between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe be developed that would satisfy the legitimate interests of both sides, providing security for the Soviets and a degree of independence consonant with the dignity of nations for the East European countries?

These are questions that affect not only the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but East-West relations in general, on both a European and a global scale. It is not a matter from which the United States, or the West in general, can insulate itself. What happens to the Soviet system in Eastern Europe may have diplomatic, political, and military consequences of major importance for the United States and NATO. This report addresses these questions, drawing on the findings of the more detailed project publications listed in the Preface and supplemented by additional analyses documented throughout the text.
II. THE PRESENT VACUUM

There can be no doubt about the importance of Eastern Europe, particularly its northern tier, to the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe serves the USSR as a security buffer, with military, political, ideological, and economic dimensions. Control of Eastern Europe augments Soviet military strength while keeping hostile armies away from Soviet borders. Such control limits (albeit less today than in the immediate postwar years) penetration of hostile, Western political-ideological influences into the USSR. And communist Eastern Europe helps funnel Western technology to the USSR, even though the Soviet Union is no longer in a position to exploit the region economically and, indeed, has had to subsidize it in a variety of ways.

But the intensity of Soviet security concerns varies among the East European countries. Soviet watchfulness in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia is as close and keen as ever, in sharp contrast to the Soviet attitude toward the southern tier of states and Hungary. Here, Moscow’s concern has been less, and its permissiveness has therefore been greater. Romania’s behavior has been tolerated because of its relatively unimportant strategic location (as well as its domestic orthodoxy); the same may apply to Hungary’s recent domestic policy (against the background of past Soviet invasion and ruthless suppression). But efforts by any of the northern tier countries to imitate Romania’s foreign and intrabloc policy would not have been countenanced by Moscow. And Hungary’s economic reform, though implemented against a background of loyalty to the Soviet Union externally and the retention of party control internally, would probably not have been tolerated in, say, the GDR.

The USSR has also viewed Eastern Europe in a more active light, as a “springboard”—diplomatically, politically, and militarily—in its attempts to decouple Western Europe from the United States and make it responsive to Soviet interests. This remains a factor of great importance for the northern tier. Further south, in view of the unpredictable defiance of the Papandreou government in Athens toward its NATO allies, Bulgaria might well assume a “springboard”

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importance for diplomatic manipulation in the Balkans. Turkey, too, could become more of a target.

Eastern Europe is also essential to the Soviet Union in another respect, i.e., in terms of the USSR's view of itself as the leader of a bloc of states and as a world power whose "Marxist-Leninist system" is not only legitimate but on the ascendant. Despite the problems of the last 40 years, Eastern Europe is still important in this role, although a more successful Soviet-East European relationship would obviously have greatly enhanced this importance.

The decisive task for the present Soviet leadership is to make Eastern Europe's value to some degree commensurate with its continuing importance. Eastern Europe as an asset has declined to the point of not only diminishing returns, but very few returns at all. One might assume, therefore, that some elements in the Soviet leadership would conclude that Eastern Europe's lack of value presents a greater danger than do the risks of comprehensive liberalization or even systemic change.

But what Soviet leadership? There have been leadership struggles in the USSR in the past, of course, and both Khrushchev and Brezhnev required several years to assert their dominance. The illness of Andropov and the uncertainty associated with it created a similar situation. But whatever Andropov's ability to conduct operations behind the scenes before his death, Soviet political life since Brezhnev's death has been characterized by doubt, apprehensiveness, uncertainty, and perceived power vacuum. Chernenko's age and poor health suggest that this uncertainty may not only persist but may loom larger.

The impact of this situation on Eastern Europe—on both ruling elites and society at large—is considerable. The sense of drift, immobility, and near-paralysis that characterized the last years of Brezhnev's rule are likely to continue, to accelerate, and to become more engulfing. But it was this sense of drift—reflected in toleration more than sanctioning of limited diversity in individual East European countries, the failure of bloc-wide economic integration, and the strengthening of Western influences as a consequence of East-West détente, as well as conditions specific to Poland—that led to the rise of Solidarity. Once Solidarity was crushed, the Soviet response to Poland has been to blame the crisis on the West, to reemphasize certain kinds of CMEA\(^2\) integration while granting at the same time that economic autarky is no longer possible, and to look favorably on minor economic reform—and even major economic reorganizations, provided they do

\(^2\)The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
not portend dangerous political changes—while taking a tougher line on dissidence and the admissibility of pluralism of any kind in Eastern Europe. This approach does not provide any clear line of march for Eastern Europe; the ruling elites and society in Eastern Europe are, to a considerable extent, also experiencing a lack of direction, stagnation, and uncertainty.

The consequences of this Soviet lack of decisiveness may take several years to become fully apparent. Yet one consequence has already emerged: bloc disarray in East-West relations and the Soviets’ difficulties in forcing their allies to march behind, and in step, with them. The spectacular developments in relations between the two Germanies in the summer of 1984; Hungary’s continued insistence on assuring the West that it seeks (and needs) business as usual; Romania’s determination to maintain its bridges to the West, despite concessions to Moscow caused by economic weakness; even Bulgaria’s quiet unwillingness to sever the Western links forged during the decade of détente—all this was in sharp contrast to the Soviet decision to shun not just the United States, but the major West European powers also. This especially applies, since its INF decision, to West Germany, the country which is precisely, for several East European states, the most important Western partner. Differences of interest between the Soviet Union and some of its partners were thus embarrassingly demonstrated in 1984.

But while Soviet bloc diplomacy was in ferment in 1984, the East European domestic scene was relatively quiet. Following the demise of Solidarity, no societal elements are likely to take advantage of the vacuum in the immediate future to mount an organized challenge to the ruling parties, as they did in Hungary and Poland after Stalin’s death, in Czechoslovakia after Khrushchev’s fall, and, of course, in Poland during Brezhnev’s decline. The Polish crisis has demonstrated that real power lies not with the political elites but with the forces of coercion—the security police and the army. Never in the 40 years of communist rule in Eastern Europe has such a political vacuum existed.

The political malaise is accompanied and conditioned by an economic situation that is serious everywhere, and in Poland and Romania is well past the crisis threshold—economic conditions are worse than they have been for 25 years.3 Economic growth in Eastern

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Europe declined after 1975 to nearly half the rate of the early 1970s (from 7.3 percent yearly to 4 percent yearly) and turned negative after 1980. The downturn would have occurred sooner and would have been worse had it not been for revived industrialization drives, Soviet trade and other subsidies, and cheap Western credits. But by 1980, these bromides were no longer effective. Most of the East European economies had to shift from extensive to intensive development (i.e., from concentration on developing a few key economic sectors, such as steel production, to comprehensive economic development); and stepped-up investment (a proven instrument for increasing the performance of a centrally planned economy at a lower stage of development) was less effective. The East European systems were unable to adjust to the second international economic “shock” of the late 1970s as readily as other economic systems at comparable stages of development. Soviet trade subsidies, especially for energy imports, were reduced. And Western credits first became more expensive and then practically stopped.

The East European economies performed slightly better in 1983–84: The net material product increased 3 percent in 1983, while the hard-currency Western debt was reduced in all countries except Poland through a combination of austerity and import restrictions. Yet Western (and many East European) economists generally agree that the underlying structural economic problems have, if anything, worsened.4

The consequences of the developments traced above is a systemic crisis in Eastern Europe. It is a condition, both political and economic, that calls for leadership and reform. At present, except in Hungary, there is little sign anywhere in the USSR or in Eastern Europe of either.

III. COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS

POLAND

Poland remains in 1984 the USSR’s most urgent and seemingly intractable problem in Eastern Europe. The Soviet leadership must be anxious for three things to happen as soon as possible in Poland: (1) the achievement of societal normalization, as occurred in Czechoslovakia soon after August 1968; (2) recovery of the economy from the brink of disaster; (3) the communist party’s resumption of its full powers and responsibilities.

It is difficult to see any of these happening in the next three or four years—at least, to the degree expected by Moscow. The reasons are to be found in the nature of the crisis that engulfed Poland after 1979 and that brought:

- The rise of the independent trade union, Solidarity, which won 10 million members and became the first mass, nonviolent challenge to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.
- Solidarity’s wresting of concessions from the regime in 1980–81 by means of strikes and other forms of pressure from below, with a total absence of party-initiated reforms.
- Assumption of a more political role by the Catholic Church, which at times mediated between the regime and Solidarity while expanding its institutional prerogatives.
- Demoralization and paralysis of the communist party itself.
- Gradual assumption of power by the army, in the name of “preserving socialism,” through the person of General Jaruzelski, who had earlier become an arbiter of party leadership politics.
- Proclamation of martial law in December 1981 by the Polish army, with Soviet support, as a response not to Solidarity’s radicalism (the union proved unprepared to wage active resistance), but to its inherent challenge to the party’s monopoly over lower-level political organizations, the media, and internal security.

• Failure on the part of the military leadership and the slowly revived party apparatus to establish or even define a “post-Solidarity” political conception.

With regard to normalization, it should be understood that Polish society has never been “normalized” in the sense, or to the extent, that other East European societies have. This the Soviets know very well; they have used it as part of their explanation for the debacle that led to the rise of Solidarity. They grant that, in their terms, the question of “who will come out on top” (kto kogo) has not been settled in Poland.2 The strength of the Church and that of the private peasantry have been important political anomalies distinguishing Poland from other East European countries. Polish society as a whole has alternated between rejections of the system, both violent and nonviolent, and a cynical—sometimes sullen, sometimes good-humored—contempt for it. Only at the beginning of the Gomulka era in 1956 and the Gierek era in 1971, before hope turned into disillusion, was there any kind of societal mood of accommodation. It is likely that society will now remain pacified rather than normalized, repressed but not defeated. Workers in large industrial enterprises remain undisciplined and rebellious. The new regime-sponsored trade unions, despite occasional shows of militancy, have taken hold slowly; they are still boycotted by much of the work force. The newly established public organizations, especially the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), have not won popular acceptance.3 The regime could mobilize only between 60 and 75 percent of the “electorate” for local elections, despite the risks assumed by those who did not vote. The July 1984 amnesty—which freed most imprisoned Solidarity and Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) leaders—seemed to have the consequence not of satisfying sections of Polish society but of leading to more self-assertiveness, in the form of demonstrations and calls for trade union and other forms of pluralism. And the murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko at the hands of a group of secret policemen in October 1984 outraged Polish society and made it more suspicious of the regime.

Resistance in differing degrees and through different kinds of non-cooperation is likely to be practiced by millions of Poles for years to come. “Organic work,” famous in Polish nineteenth century history, in which citizens reject overt opposition to their rulers and work for the good of the nation, not of the occupier or what they consider the

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puppet regime installed by him, is likely to gain more adherents if the Jaruzelski regime, or its civilian successor, shows more conciliatoriness, political sense, governing skill, and economic efficiency. So far, however, the signs of this are limited. The “occupied country” syndrome is likely to become a permanent feature of the Polish psyche—something that was not the case from 1917 to December 1981 except during the Nazi occupation—and this is certainly not normalization.

The impact of the Church in this situation will be crucial. With the demise of organized Solidarity, the Church has resumed its role as the single alternative authority to the communist regime. Its already great prestige has increased, particularly at the local level, where the pastoral authority of the parish priest, always tinged with politics, has assumed more importance. At the higher levels of the hierarchy, particularly in the person and political preferences of Primate Glemp, there is no doubt that “organic work” is favored, while a few bishops and many parish priests are still inclined to more direct defiance and to keeping alive the spirit of Solidarity. Presumably, Glemp has the support of or is prompted by the Pope in his views. Glemp has been the target of criticism for his “soft” approach; he has evidently attempted to continue the policy established by his predecessor, Cardinal Wyszynski, which was essentially based on the “organic work” principle. Glemp, however, has neither Wyszynski’s authority nor his political skill. In any case, it is open to question whether, after the momentous shock of the Solidarity episode, such continuity is possible. Events in 1984 argue against it. Spontaneous youth protest sparked largely successful Church resistance to an attempt to remove crucifixes from public schools in a regional town. The Church hierarchy at first distanced itself from but then implicitly supported underground Solidarity’s call to boycott the June 1984 local elections. It demanded the release of political prisoners. It endorsed the popular demand for trade union and other forms of pluralism after the July 1984 amnesty, and it restated these demands after Father Popieluszko’s murder.

Any solution to Poland’s economic crisis will require reform and austerity. Tinkering with the centrally planned economy in its present form is not likely to help. Since 1956, Poland has witnessed a long series of “reforms” which were timidly conceived, sabotaged by the economic and party bureaucracies, abandoned without any serious effort at implementation, and which in fact did not constitute significant reform at all. What the Polish economy evidently requires is a thoroughgoing market-oriented reform, of which the present Hungarian

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reform, the 1968 Czechoslovak reform plans, and the ideas of many reform-minded Polish economists in 1956 and thereafter would seem to be indicators. The extent of the present economic crisis and international economic circumstances that are much less favorable than those Hungary faced when it introduced significant reform in the late 1960s constitute real barriers to economic reform. Beyond these economic realities, there are also three serious political-social obstacles to such reform: (1) opposition inside the present ruling establishment; (2) doubts in Moscow (Soviet leaders may like parts of the Hungarian model but, as argued earlier, Poland is not Hungary); (3) a strong disinclination on the part of Polish society to make the necessary initial sacrifices. The outworn command structure has brought Poland, more dramatically than other East European states, to the point that the cure for the illness is apt to be very painful indeed—unemployment, transfers of workers, higher prices, lowering of living standards. And for these to be accepted, society, particularly the workers, must have some political trust in the government. In Poland, there is practically none. There is an alternative basis for introducing economic reform and the accompanying austerity: total national defeat, such as Hungary experienced after the 1956 revolution, when Kadar gradually imposed his economic reform. The Poles feel themselves far from that.

Poland's hard-currency debt of some $27 billion compounds the problem of austerity. As Poland, like other East European countries in the same plight, makes strong efforts to improve its debt position, the rescheduling terms granted by Western creditors may become more generous. If Poland rejoins the IMF, its debt problem will ease somewhat. But the efforts Poland and the other countries are making consist largely of mounting massive export drives to hard-currency markets and reducing imports to a minimum. These efforts are achieving positive balances of trade, and the debts are at least being contained. But it is the domestic consumer who inevitably bears the burden, encountering more shortages and a further depressing of the living standard, and whose cynicism increases.

The third Soviet requirement—the restoring of the party's power and responsibilities—will be difficult to achieve. At the conclusion of martial law, the military "commissars" posted throughout the governmental, party, and economic apparatus were officially withdrawn. A national party conference was held in March 1984, and party supremacy was officially reasserted. But the real power will remain with the military and the security apparatus, as evidenced by Jaruzelski's personal role, by the presence of leading generals in key party secretariat, regional party organization, and "civilian" state posts,
and by the continuing informal military presence and influence throughout the country. In late 1983 and early 1984, the powers of the military as the "ultimate authority" were strengthened with the expansion of the powers of the National Defense Committee and the establishment of a new Committee for the Protection of Law, Public Order, and Public Discipline.

The Polish military leadership influenced the leadership struggle within the Polish party as early as 1970; in 1981, it effectively supplanted the regular party apparatus. That it did this in the name of party rule and to preserve the communist system in Poland in no way diminished the importance of this shift of power. The party may be hustled back to the center of the stage, but its function will be that of an actor. The director—and the prompter—will remain the army and the police. That is also the way the population perceives it, and this perception will remain an important political factor in itself.

Thus, although organized Solidarity has been crushed, Moscow continues to face a greater challenge to its interests in Poland than anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

**Jaruzelski and the Soviet Connection**

Following the imposition of martial law in Poland, there was much speculation about General Jaruzelski's relationship with Moscow. There is still considerable disagreement over his motives for leading the coup (i.e., the imposition of martial law) in December 1981—how much it was ordered by and closely coordinated with the Soviets, and whether it was intended on patriotic grounds to head off a Soviet invasion or intended on pro-Soviet grounds to spare the Soviets the necessity of invading. Some observers note that Jaruzelski's family was killed by the Soviets and see him as motivated by Polish patriotism; others dismiss him as a quisling or, in view of his years in the Soviet Union, as a janissary; still others believe his motives to be a mixture of these seemingly incompatible impulses.

The case of neither side is proven, and each depends as much on the perspective of the observer as on the "facts." In many respects, Jaruzelski remains an enigma. He doubtless considers himself a patriot of a Poland that has no future except in close alliance with the USSR. His public remarks suggest that he would have viewed Soviet

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invasion as a national catastrophe.\textsuperscript{6} He was the archetype of the group of generals that assumed command of the Polish army in the 1970s: relatively young; Polish; products, as very young officers, of the Polish army organized on Soviet territory during World War II; well-educated in Polish and Soviet military academies; products of line more than of political career tracks.\textsuperscript{7}

Questions about Jaruzelski’s background and motivations aside, seldom in the history of Soviet-East European relations has a satellite leader appeared, by the logic of events, to have the potential for so much bargaining power with Moscow as has Jaruzelski since the success of his coup. The very skill of the coup, the huge benefit it conferred on the Soviets in obviating the necessity for them to invade, the disarray in Moscow where strong leadership was lacking, the obvious Soviet interest in normalizing Poland—all these factors signified important leverage for Jaruzelski, had he been ready and able to use it.

There are four possible explanations for the fact that Jaruzelski has evidently made so little headway in Moscow. First, as a line general and not a political leader, he is unsuited for such a political role. Military men who take over political leadership usually, although not always, give order higher priority than conciliation and reform. Whatever his motives and intentions, and whatever the objective constraints, Jaruzelski was professionally and personally an unlikely candidate to be Poland’s “Great Conciliator.” Using force to preserve the communist system and avoid Soviet invasion, Jaruzelski thrust the Polish military—the autonomy and professionalism of which he had attempted to foster in the 1970s—into a role of supreme political leadership for which the military generally and Jaruzelski personally were unprepared and ill-suited.

Second, the Soviet attitude (reinforced by the East German attitude, as discussed below) has been so rigid and unbending that Jaruzelski has won few concessions. Most important, there appears to have been much less Soviet economic assistance to Poland since December 1981 than there was during 1980 and 1981, when Solidarity was on the ascendency and total Soviet economic assistance was estimated to have been $4 billion.\textsuperscript{8} And the Soviets appear to have kept up the pressure for harsher policy measures in Poland, as indicated by periodic Soviet

\textsuperscript{6}See Johnson, N-1891-AF, op. cit., p. 37.
\textsuperscript{7}See Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, op. cit.
media attacks on “liberals” like Vice-Premier Rakowski and adviser Jerzy Wiatr. Jaruzelski, in this interpretation, must be given some credit for the fact that repression in Poland is not much worse.

The third possible reason for Jaruzelski’s failure to make headway with the Soviets is that hardliners within the Polish regime—in the party and particularly in the security apparatus—have far greater strength than was initially suspected and have moved to block or dilute Jaruzelski’s conciliatory moves. Stefan Olszowski, a Politburo member and foreign minister, is often mentioned in this connection as the main and most able party hardliner. While these elements undoubtedly have contacts and support in Moscow, this would seem to be of limited importance, given the primary domestic political importance of the army, as discussed above.

The fourth possibility is that given the sheer magnitude of the problems facing Poland, the discrediting of successive communist leaderships, and the strength of the societal opposition, any policy of attempted national reconciliation that might increase Poland’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Moscow is impossible. In any case, developments in Poland over the last three years hardly bear out the image of Jaruzelski as a moderate conciliator. Such an image cannot be supported by the argument that in many respects, despite martial law and the crushing of organized Solidarity, Poles are politically better off than other East Europeans, except perhaps the Hungarians; that situation is the consequence of the self-assertion of the Polish nation, not of Jaruzelski’s policies. Jaruzelski can be credited with attempting with considerable success to minimize the bloodshed associated with the imposition of martial law, with imposing relatively benevolent repression. But there is no sign—in the treatment of Lech Walesa, in the activities of the PRON, in the attitude toward various professional and intellectual groups, in the organization of new local elections—of any real attempt at national reconciliation or even dialogue.

In Moscow, then, Jaruzelski is perhaps viewed as the indispensable Polish leader for the holding operation that is all the Soviets can expect from any Polish communist leadership. His services in crushing Solidarity outweigh the dangers of “Bonapartism” (military domination of the communist party), and his efforts were recognized during his May 1984 Moscow trip by the Order of Lenin and Chernenko’s praise.
The Warsaw Pact and the Link with the GDR

From the Soviet viewpoint, Poland is not simply an issue or a problem in itself but is the key East European country in the Soviet bloc and an essential part of the Soviet power position in central Europe. Poland is the largest and most populous East European country. The Polish army, the third largest in Europe, was given a key role in Soviet coalition warfare planning in the 1960s and 1970s for any NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. This planning included some variant of a Polish Front and the allocation of all 15 Polish divisions and associated support units to the “external front” in the West. But with the introduction of martial law, the combat capability of the Polish army declined. Training programs were curtailed; equipment was not modernized; senior officers assumed political as well as military responsibilities; conscripts and some junior officers were deeply affected by the Solidarity movement. Although this situation improved with the end of martial law, both Jaruzelski and the Soviets would today fear to dispatch the entire Polish operational army outside Poland, since part of it is now needed for internal security. Hence an exclusively Polish Front can no longer be organized. Although Soviet forces have had to take up most of the slack, one consequence of this development is the increased importance of the East German military.

But the linkage between Poland the the GDR extends well beyond the military dimension. Poland is essential to the very survival of the GDR, the forward bastion of Soviet strength, the key element in the “springboard” factor discussed earlier, and the linchpin of the postwar division of Europe. As the Soviet-East German link, therefore, Poland is vital, both militarily and economically. For example, 80 percent of the commerce between the Soviet Union and the GDR goes by surface through Poland. Thus, Moscow had another reason to be grateful to Jaruzelski: His coup assured the link and the lifeline to the GDR.

This “East German connection” is often overlooked, with the whole Solidarity episode being seen simply in the light of Soviet relations with Poland. But for the GDR, Solidarity was seen as a matter of survival. Many East Germans may have scoffed at Solidarity’s “anarchy,” but the Honecker regime knew that if a radical reform were allowed in Poland affecting relations between rulers and ruled, with a degree of national autonomy included, the impact on its own population would be momentous. Squeezed between such a Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), East Germany could have been faced

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9 See Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, op. cit.
10 See Johnson and Kliszewski, op. cit.
11 See Larrabee, op. cit., Section V.
with another popular rebellion like that of June 1953. The danger was much greater than that presented by the Prague Spring in 1968. Whatever the Soviet hesitation and vacillation about how to handle Solidarity may have been, it cannot have been shared by the East German leadership (indeed, there were many reports from East Berlin in 1980–81 calling for decisive action, reminiscent of East German efforts to stiffen Soviet policy in response to Bonn's new Ostpolitik in the late 1960s). Honecker visited Warsaw in 1983, and this was interpreted as a gesture of favor toward the Jaruzelski regime. But the favor will always be grudging and watchful—and tinged with distrust. The Soviets and the East Germans are building a ferry from Klaipeda in Lithuania to Brukan on the East German island of Rugen. It will be a huge project involving six ferries, each carrying 100 container-type wagons.12 It is a “Poland bypass” just as the Illichovsk-Varna ferry between the USSR and Bulgaria is a “Romania bypass.” Moscow and East Berlin will presumably be looking for more ways to bypass Poland, even as they seek to “normalize” it.

EAST GERMANY

The GDR, as an artificially created state, is unique in Europe.13 Its strategic value and importance to the Soviet Union are, as already mentioned, immense, and because of this, in addition to its economic strength and Poland's internal crisis, the GDR has developed into the political “pace-setter” of the northern tier countries. It has continued to expand its military capabilities while those of other East European countries have stagnated. The former protectorate has become a “junior partner” with the most influence in Moscow of all the East European states. Moreover, its activity as “proxy” for the Soviet Union in the Third World should not be overlooked.

East Germany’s importance also and especially lies in the complicated nature of its relations with the other Germany—the Federal Republic. One aspect of this is its weakness in relation to the FRG, the awareness in both East Berlin and Moscow that despite the economic progress of the last 20 years and the recent remarkable series of attempts at nation-building, the vast majority of East Germans, given the choice, would opt for some form of reunification. This weakness is one aspect of East Germany's acknowledged “special relationship” with the FRG, a relationship comprising weakness, hatred, envy, an inferiority complex, a degree of economic dependence that has

13See Larrabee, op. cit., Section V.
increased as international and domestic economic conditions have become less favorable (West German economic subsidies to the GDR amount to over $1 billion yearly), and the exposure of East German society to developments in the Federal Republic, which has increased through greater personal contacts and exposure to West German media in the course of the 1970s.

East Germany's "special relationship" with Bonn is not without its negative aspects for Moscow, although it has been of some economic advantage to the Soviet Union, either through direct transfers of West German technology or indirectly through East German exports incorporating that technology. The "special relationship" can be viewed in Moscow as a safeguard against bellicose West German policies toward the East. Yet there must also lurk a suspicion in the minds of some Soviet leaders that this relationship could develop in the wrong direction—that the potential for cooperation could be misused. Many Soviet officials may well fear that after all, these people are Germans, whether East or West, and, even when the Honecker regime makes overtures or sends signals to Bonn expressly on Soviet instructions as part of the alliance's diplomatic division of labor, there exists some specific GDR-FRG component that might bode no good. All of this has created some potential for East German-Soviet conflict, which appears to have developed in the summer of 1984. The improvement of inter-German relations while East-West relations generally remained cool was perhaps initially promoted by Moscow in an effort to influence West Germany, especially to reverse NATO's decision to station new intermediate-range nuclear missiles. But by August, the Soviets had coupled harsh media criticism of West German "revanchism" with all-but-open warnings to East Berlin about the dangers of dealing too eagerly with Bonn. East Berlin sought support for its stand from Hungary and even Romania, but in early September, these warnings led Honecker to postpone indefinitely his planned late-September visit to West Germany.

Too little is yet known about the reasons behind what appeared to some to be a near breakthrough in East-West German relations in 1984 and about the degree of Soviet connivance or frustration in these events. It seems possible that what began as the usual orchestrated policy toward Bonn between East Berlin and Moscow not only acquired a specifically East German dimension, it also developed a momentum over which Moscow lost control. Not intentionally, but simply through the dynamic of events and its own ineffectiveness, Moscow became not a director or even a partner in East German relations with Bonn, but rather a mere observer. Whatever the motives prompting Honecker—economic need, the unending search for
legitimacy, the further opportunity to assert East German distinctiveness—he appears to have alarmed a calcified Soviet leadership that eventually decided he had to be checked. But the canceling of his visit to West Germany by no means portends the end of closer relations between the two Germanies.

As the GDR has shifted from the position of protectorate to junior partner within the Soviet bloc, its image as the model satellite domestically has begun to tarnish. The last few years have seen stirrings of dissent and opposition in the GDR—social dissatisfaction, intellectual dissent, the independent peace movement, and most important, the new public role of Catholic and especially Protestant churches—which remain limited in scope but which are on the rise. These stirrings are nurtured by the GDR’s economic problems, which are less dramatic than those elsewhere in Eastern Europe but are nonetheless considerable, and which have affected East German consumers, who face greater shortages of goods.

In response to mounting economic difficulties in the late 1970s, East Germany introduced new economic reforms, characterized partly by decentralization, but mainly by reorganizations designed to improve productivity and overcome the chronic labor shortage in East German industry. These limited reforms, which have gained a good deal of praise from Soviet experts, appear to have achieved considerable success. But—and this is the real test—there is very little room allowed for the market mechanism in the East German reforms, and the decentralization so far implemented still does not allow factory directors to make the kind of decisions considered essential in a radical economic reform like that planned in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or like the Hungarian reform.

Ferment in East German society is likely to be reinforced by the East German regime’s efforts to increase its legitimacy by an ongoing “rehabilitation” of the German past. An artificial state seeking to become real needs to develop a distinctive consciousness. Beginning in the late 1950s, Ulbricht started the campaign to achieve a national consciousness and by now, under Honecker, figures like Luther, Frederick the Great, and even Bismarck are being hailed, adopted, and adapted. But Honecker’s efforts to appropriate Martin Luther and now even Bismarck would seem to elicit skepticism from the mass of East Germans, who are more likely to be reminded of their “Germaness” and their affinities with the Federal Republic than to be inculcated with “GDR consciousness” by such symbols. The active or implicit challenge to the regime that has ensued is further nurtured by the GDR’s “special relationship” with West Germany.
East Germany has thus presented an increasingly complex image to Moscow in the past few years. It has become more important in the Soviet bloc as Poland has weakened. It remains an instrument of policy vis-à-vis West Germany. Yet the inter-German links have had negative repercussions within the GDR, and the activism of the Honecker leadership vis-à-vis West Germany stands to increase domestic ferment in the GDR while working against Soviet efforts to restrain ties with the West elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

ROMANIA

Romania, the “maverick” of the Soviet bloc, today exhibits traditional East European nationalism, modified by at least a nominal deference to Marxism-Leninism and an overriding necessity for skill and restraint in handling the Soviet Union and relations with the Soviet bloc as a whole. Thus far, head-of-state and party leader Ceausescu has combined these qualities with courage and nerve. But Romanian nationalism, while doubtless a frequent irritant to the Soviet leaders, has not developed into a fundamental challenge to the Soviet Union. Romania is strategically the least important of the countries of Eastern Europe. It has succeeded in blocking unanimous Soviet bloc stands on sometimes important international issues, and it can articulate positions in intra-Soviet bloc forums that other East European states support. Romania has pursued an autonomous foreign policy vis-à-vis the West and the Third World since the mid-1960s, sometimes differing with Moscow on major issues, including the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Middle East, and China. Yet Romania under Ceausescu has not served as an example to either the political elites or the societies of the rest of Eastern Europe. A dictatorship dominated by Ceausescu personally, an amalgam of some of the worst aspects of old Balkan legacy and new communist practice, the Romanian regime stands isolated in Eastern Europe except for a shallow alliance of convenience with Yugoslavia—and it is isolated from no one more than its own population.

The Ceausescu leadership, after years of “permanent purge,” has become ingrown, blatantly nepotist, and erratic. The economy has deteriorated since the late 1970s, more the consequence of a rigidly centralist economic system, a misguided industrialization drive emphasizing petrochemical industries, and neglect of incentive in agriculture than of international economic shocks. Romania’s economic

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14See Larrabee, op. cit., Section III.
crisis is mainly of domestic origin.\textsuperscript{15} Romania has reestablished a positive balance of international payments through harsh austerity measures at home, but deteriorating living standards and increased repression have led to an increase in alienation and cynicism even among the political elite outside the Ceausescu "family," to sporadic work stoppages, and to an increase in applications to emigrate. Romanian nationalism (with anti-Soviet undertones) no longer provides the Ceausescu leadership with the degree of popular support it was once able to mobilize. Yet Ceausescu's constant and skillful shuffling of personnel appointments (along with the infrequency of total purges) has limited elite disloyalty. If there is an alternative source of power and leadership to Ceausescu, it would appear to lie in the army and security forces. While these institutions have been considered loyally pro-Ceausescu, the reported coup preparations of a group of military officers in January 1983 may suggest that loyalty has its limits.

Romania has in recent years continued to follow a foreign policy that is a challenge to Soviet interests on some key issues. For example, it refused to join the Soviet bloc in boycotting the 1984 Olympics. But whatever crisis Romania ever presented to the Soviet leaders, they have managed it well. Their restraint has not, of course, excluded occasional threats, pressure, and economic blackmail. Romania's economic crisis has resulted in an expansion of economic ties with the Soviet bloc; and this has given Moscow greater potential leverage in Romania. Political contacts have intensified. But, especially during the last few years, as domestic conditions have deteriorated and strains have increased between Romania and Western countries, and as altered international conditions have decreased Romania's room for maneuvering, Moscow has seemed generally content to wait for conditions in Romania to change to Soviet advantage—presumably, after Ceausescu.

BULGARIA

Bulgaria has long been considered the most subservient satellite of all,\textsuperscript{16} and this generalization was supported in 1984 by the speed with which Bulgaria followed the Soviet lead in withdrawing from the 1984 Olympics and Zhivkov's sudden cancellation of his scheduled visit to Bonn, following Honecker's cancellation.

\textsuperscript{15}See Tyson, op. cit., Section III; also Crane, op. cit., Section VIII.

\textsuperscript{16}The present project did not include detailed consideration of Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria. Short overviews, based on both secondary and primary sources, are included here for completeness. For background on Bulgaria, see J. F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1970; J. F. Brown, "Bulgaria," in a forthcoming book to be published by Macmillan for the University of London School of Slavonic and East European Studies.
Yet unswerving Bulgarian support for Moscow in international affairs has not necessarily meant a lack of initiative in domestic affairs, an unreadiness to defend national interests in intrabloc affairs (particularly those relating to economic cooperation), or a timidity in dealing with adjacent states, all of which, in varying degrees, have been considered historically inimical. Nor, probably, has Bulgaria's unswerving support of Moscow in international affairs been without considerable calculation on Sofia's part. Certainly the benefits derived from obedience have been considerable. Not only has Moscow's help been indispensable in the industrialization and partial modernization of Bulgaria throughout the last 40 years, Sofia has evidently received special Soviet consideration (in terms of the relative size of the Bulgarian economy), mitigating the impact of recent adverse changes in the price and supply of Soviet raw materials to its East European allies.\(^{17}\)

Nor can the resurgence of Bulgarian national pride in the second half of the 1970s, prompted by the nationalist cultural policy of Todor Zhivkov's daughter, Lyudmila, be ignored. This was a policy designed to make Bulgarians aware of their medieval cultural achievements and also to stress that these achievements made Bulgaria a part of European civilization. It was this aspect of Zhivkov's policy which apparently raised eyebrows in Moscow and caused unusual strain between the two regimes, with Zhivkov, perhaps more for paternal than political reasons, refusing to rein in his remarkable daughter. Her premature death in November 1981 undoubtedly removed a growing irritant to the Soviet Union and enabled the two countries to resume the kind of normalcy the Soviets preferred.\(^{18}\)

Lyudmila Zhivkova's policy of cultural nationalism struck a chord with many Bulgarians and made it clear that this nation, which manifested so pronounced a nationalism for many years following its liberation from the Ottoman Empire, had not allowed itself to become engulfed in an all-pervasive deference to Soviet Russia. Indeed, Zhivkov's policy should not have allowed any doubts about Bulgaria's nationalism to have arisen. Bulgarian foreign policy toward Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey—countries which in Bulgaria's modern history have been the immediate objects of national concern—has been nationally oriented. In particular, the Zhivkov regime's stand on the nonexistence of Macedonians has been popular in Bulgaria. In the Balkans, therefore, Bulgarian policy has acquired a distinctive profile, while by no means working against Soviet interests.

\(^{17}\) See Vanous, "East European Economic Slowdown," op. cit., Table 5.

\(^{18}\) See Brown, "Bulgaria," op. cit.
Domestically, Bulgaria does not appear to have experienced the economic deterioration that has affected other East European countries in the last decade. Economic growth continues at a respectable rate, although lower than in the 1970s; Bulgaria’s hard-currency debt has been reduced to apparently easily manageable proportions; consumer shortages are relatively minor. In addition, an economic reform adumbrated since the late 1970s and implemented since the beginning of 1982 has attracted considerable attention in the West. In the East European context, this reform is “liberal” by all but Hungarian standards. It involves considerable decentralization, managerial as well as worker incentives, and some concessions to the market mechanism. In agriculture (but in no other area), the private sector is granted more leeway. One of the reform’s striking characteristics is the departure from the mania for “bigness” in industry, agriculture, and local administration that has dominated this small country and its many domestic experiments for so long. On balance, though, the Bulgarian reform remains conservative, closer to the East German reform model than the Hungarian.\(^1\)

The conception and introduction of this reform is attributable to the emergence of a technocratic elite that is now finding its way into the middle and senior echelons of the economic hierarchy and whose ideas are being tolerated, even encouraged, by the political leadership. It may also be this class that prompted the political leadership—despite its (and the technocrats’ own) loyalty to Moscow—to try to avoid breaking all Western contacts following the onset of the freeze in Soviet-American relations. (Relations with the United States warmed briefly in 1983, but then again worsened, in part over new reports of Bulgarian complicity in smuggling drugs into Western countries and in the Papal assassination plot.) Western contacts, facilitated during the decade of détente, convinced many Bulgarian officials that only through Western technology and contacts could Bulgaria be assured of the lasting benefits of modernization. In a sense, this new class, Zhivkova’s cultural policy, and the predilections of most of Bulgaria’s youth are part of a basic change that has recently affected Bulgaria: its transformation from a provincial backwater to a nation aware of Europe and of its own role in Europe.

This transformation will presumably continue. The Soviets may consider it basically incompatible with their own view of Bulgaria, but many Bulgarians, even senior officials, may see no conflict between the transformation and Sofia’s pro-Soviet orientation. Finally, relations

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with Moscow, and indeed the whole future course of domestic politics, could be complicated by the emergence of serious top-level factionalism after the 72-year-old Zhivkov’s death or retirement. Even if arrangements for the succession had been made, the end of an era that began over 30 years ago would be bound to be unsettling. But no such arrangements have been made, and without them the future of Moscow’s only Balkan ally could contain serious elements of instability.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Today, 16 years after the Prague Spring, Czechoslovakia is still ruled by men who experienced, survived, and then helped Moscow crush that experiment. And what for most Czechs and Slovaks remains but a memory, often irrelevant to their daily lives, is for their rulers an immobilizing trauma. The immobilism affects all important aspects of their rule: relations with the Soviet Union and with Czechoslovakia’s allies; relations with the West; and domestic policy in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. It is prompted by a fear of change, because change might, in some way or to some degree, set in motion again those trends that operated in the 1960s and coalesced so dramatically in 1968.20

The position of Slovakia somewhat modifies generalizations about the country as a whole. Its population, amounting to about one-third of Czechoslovakia’s total 15 million, has derived considerable advantage from the federal structure established in 1968 (the only surviving reform of the Prague Spring), from the relatively relaxed administration exercised by the Slovak state and party leadership in Bratislava (except in its persecution of the Catholic Church), and from the fact that the federal regime in Prague has a stronger Slovak composition and orientation than any Czechoslovak government since the country was created after World War I. Slovakia has ceased to be dominated by Czechs; it has its own Slovak administration. Many Slovak national ambitions were fulfilled in 1968; once these were achieved, few Slovaks were prepared to reach for the political liberalism that was the essence of the Prague Spring. Resistance since then has been slight. But Czechoslovak policy, domestic and foreign, is still made in Prague.

The immobilism of the Czechoslovak regime has been matched by the malaise of the vast majority of Czechs who, after the inspiring events of 1968, relapsed into one of those troughs of passivity with

which their history is replete. The lack of pressure from below (Chapter 77 dissident activities being only a minor irritant) has served only to strengthen the regime’s propensity for inactivity. While Czechoslovak agriculture has recently been performing well, industry and its infrastructure remain in need of drastic modernization. Outdated technology and equipment have made what was once Czechoslovakia’s main asset into a growing liability. And modernization has been delayed at least partly by a refusal to seek Western credits and acquire Western technology. Czechoslovakia’s Western debt is therefore minor, but the avoidance of a major debt embarrassment may be a small success compared with the huge problems an antiquated Czechoslovak industry now faces. And the problem is compounded by growing uncertainty about the future volume of Soviet raw material exports and the certainty that, whatever the volume, their price will steadily increase.

Moreover, the economic problem hardly ends there. The regime’s refusal to countenance anything except the most limited and peripheral economic reform makes the prospect of improvement even more remote. Many Czechoslovak officials appear to realize that the rut into which the economy has been allowed to drift will eventually bring disaster. Many ideas for reform, both marginal and basic, have been suggested.\textsuperscript{21} So far they have been rejected by the political leadership, ostensibly on ideological grounds, but in reality because of the memories of 1968, when economic reform became political reform and the entire system seemed threatened. Thus, modernization is precluded by fear of contact with the West; reform is precluded by fear of not being able to contain such contact.

With such an inhibited outlook, it is not surprising that the present Czechoslovak leadership is the most conservative in the Soviet bloc and that it seeks to make a virtue of its conservatism by exposing the dangers of reform and the cultivation of Western contacts in Hungary, the GDR, and Romania. Such behavior, the Czechoslovak leaders argue, is a threat to “real, existing socialism” and to Soviet-led cohesion.\textsuperscript{22} In mid-1984, the Czechoslovak leadership was the Soviets’ solid supporter in their railings against Bonn and, by implication, the Honecker regime’s German policy. Thus the long-standing Prague-East Berlin “axis” in intrablocl affairs was broken. The present Moscow leadership, much to Prague’s gratification, generally seems satisfied with normalization in Czechoslovakia. In the meantime, however,


\textsuperscript{22}Polemics within the Soviet bloc on the issue of relations with the West were intensified by an article by Czechoslovak party officials in \textit{Rude Pravo}, March 30, 1984.
the "hidden" problems steadily mount. Only with a change of leadership, which cannot be long delayed (Husak is 71 years old and not in good health), is a change of attitude holding out prospects for reform and revival of Czechoslovakia's economic strength—and perhaps for a less obsequious attitude toward Moscow—likely to occur.

HUNGARY

Hungary is politically and economically the most venturesome East European state at present. Since the late 1960s, the Kadar regime has gradually and successfully introduced a major market-oriented economic reform in the dominant state economic sector and has encouraged more private enterprise. Political control is retained by the party and security police, and political opposition remains anathema, but Hungarians enjoy more freedom to devote themselves to private pursuits and to travel to the West. The "freedom fighters" of 1956 who had emigrated are again welcome to visit Hungary. What future has reform in Hungary? How far can other states be expected to take the whole or parts of the Hungarian reform as a model or a guide?

There is generally more discussion of the second question than the first, for several reasons. First, the reform, or New Economic Mechanism (NEM), has been successful. Second, it has been both tolerated and accepted by the Soviets. Study teams from the Soviet republic of Georgia, for example, have examined various aspects of Hungarian agriculture. Third, the Hungarian system has received much attention in Poland, leading to speculation that emulation of Kadar may point the way for Jaruzelski. Fourth, the Hungarian reform is seen by many in both the East and the West as the last or best chance of the Marxist-Leninist system to demonstrate its reformability and thus its durability. Hence, both the prospect of systemic breakdown, with all the international dangers that it might imply, and the need for a systemic transformation, with all the dislocation that it might imply, could be avoided.

Such optimism invites skepticism. It makes three assumptions: First, it assumes that communist models can be readily transplanted; there are no examples of this so far. (The Soviet model was not transplanted in Eastern Europe, but imposed.) The Hungarian NEM had three essential prerequisites: a "social compact" between a nation defeated (with tens of thousands killed) in the 1956 revolution and a communist leadership headed by Kadar, who saw that repression had

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23See Larrabee, op. cit., Section IV; and Tyson, op. cit., Section II; also Crane, op. cit., Section V.
to be relaxed if Hungary were to develop; a leadership which then saw the need for economic reform before crisis conditions developed and was capable of introducing it “from above” throughout the economy; and favorable international economic circumstances. These conditions do not exist elsewhere in Eastern Europe. There would be manifold difficulties (in addition to the possible Soviet objections mentioned earlier) involved in Poland, for example, adopting the Hungarian model. An essential feature of the model is its experimental collectivized agriculture; Poland’s agriculture is largely private. The dislocation involved in a Hungarian-type reorganization of industry would paralyze the Polish economy. In this context, it is worth remembering the Western speculation between 1969 and 1971 about Husak adopting the Kadar model, when Czechoslovak economic conditions were far more conducive to that than Polish conditions are today.

The second assumption concerns the alleged enthusiasm among Soviet and other East European elites for the Hungarian model. In fact, only certain aspects of it—agriculture, in particular—are praised elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, not the model as a whole. Soviet leaders and experts have also praised certain aspects of the Bulgarian and East German reforms. At the 26th CPSU Congress in 1982, Brezhnev praised aspects of all three. Moreover, while many economists throughout the Soviet bloc see much to admire in Hungary, most political and ideological apparatchiks see much to fear. In Czechoslovakia and the GDR, criticism of the NEM has been frequent and vehement, and many political figures in the Soviet Union undoubtedly have serious reservations about its implications. What Andropov thought of it remains an open question. But admiration for Hungarian productivity clearly should not be construed as endorsement of the reform as a whole. The apparent conviction of many Hungarians that they indeed had full endorsement from the former ambassador to Budapest may contain a considerable element of wishful thinking.

The third assumption is that the Hungarian reform is not only successful, but durable—a permanent feature on the East European landscape. This is by no means assured. In fact, the basis for the Hungarian success is both narrow and tenuous. In economic terms, the reform has been successful and was extended, with the encouragement of private initiative outside the state sector, in the late 1970s. Hungary, like the other East European countries, has faced serious problems since the late 1970s, but these have been more the consequence of international economic shocks than a failure of the domestic system.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24}See Tyson, op. cit., Section II.
The net economic success of the Hungarian reform depends on a political balance not only personified but created and maintained by one man, Janos Kadar, and Kadar can be expected to remain active for only a few more years at most. There is no successor of his caliber in sight. The balance that originated with the 1956 revolution still casts its long shadow over Hungarian political life, creating taboos and unwritten understandings in the relations between rulers and ruled—a very special "social contract." Twenty-eight years later, a new generation has grown up to which the revolution means little and which certainly does not feel bound by the taboos of its parents. It is not prepared to be as quiescent. It has no means of comparing the present "better" with the previous bad. It is from the ranks of this new generation, both workers and intellectuals, that serious dissent could well emerge. Indeed, some small degree of intellectual dissent is evident already,\textsuperscript{25} and worker dissent could surface if the current relatively prosperous economic conditions begin to deteriorate. In that event, particularly if the guiding hand of Kadar is no longer present, there could be considerable worker anger, perhaps not so much against the system as against Hungary’s large and growing "middle class"—political and economic officials, professional people, and the growing number of entrepreneurs. It is they and the farmers, not the workers, who have really benefited from the NEM and "Kadarism" in general.

Finally, and most basically, economic reform in Hungary has now advanced so far that the need for accompanying institutionalized political reform is becoming more evident and is widely articulated. Soviet tolerance and then acceptance of the reform, it can be assumed, were predicated on Hungarian assurances that this would not happen, that reform would not spill over into politics, that single, monolithic party rule would not be affected, as it was in Czechoslovakia in 1968. There is now serious discussion in Hungary about what kind of political pluralism is necessary in the next stage of reform; discussion of the trade unions and the united front organization, the Patriotic People’s Front, acquiring real political independence, and some share of the party’s political power; and discussion of greater power for Parliament. The Kadar leadership is facing growing demands from intellectuals to initiate political change and is stiffening its resistance against them. A leading intellectual has privately described the atmosphere, and many of the subjects of discussion in intellectual circles, as reminiscent of the Petöfi Circle, the intellectual spark of the 1956 revolution. This is precisely what many in Moscow, East Berlin, Prague, and elsewhere have anticipated and feared.

\textsuperscript{25}See Larrabee, op. cit., Section III.
How might this trend develop? There would seem to be two possibilities. The first is that the present leadership, meaning Janos Kadar, by a mixture of persuasion and the repressive steps it is already taking against dissident intellectuals, will check or contain the trend. But that may lead in turn to inertia and economic stagnation. The second is that the reform will continue despite regime efforts and will cause a crisis in relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union. In either case, even while acknowledging the considerable reformist achievements of Hungary to date, one should be cautious about proclaiming the reform to be successful and stable. The crucial adaptation of the Hungarian political structure to the economic reform, involving greater pluralism, lies ahead, not behind. Failure to go forward means stagnation and erosion; and that could well be what occurs.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE REGION

Present indicators do not point to basic reform of the Leninist regimes in Eastern Europe, much less to a repudiation of them. In one sense, of course, Marxism-Leninism has already been repudiated in Eastern Europe. This happened when communist ideology and motivation ceased to have any real meaning, even for the “true believers.” Since the crushing of Czechoslovak reform in August 1968, the regimes in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Hungary, as discussed) have increasingly assumed the characteristics of classic authoritarianism, posing as Marxist-Leninist or operating behind the facade of an ideology to which homage is only ritualistically paid. What is at issue is power—holding it, justifying it. In Eastern Europe, the exercise of power will continue to be justified in a particular, elaborate, recondite way. But, whereas power might have been used initially to practice ideology, today ideology is used to justify power. That is the perspective from which the future of Eastern Europe must be viewed.

CHALLENGES TO ELITES

The effort of the communist elites to maintain their power, as ideologically defined and justified, constitutes the major obstacle to genuine political evolution in Eastern Europe. The political leaderships are likely to be dominated by a status-quo-oriented element whose response to increasing problems and challenges will be essentially conservative and, when necessary, coercive. This prediction does not necessarily imply total immobility. Perhaps taking the lead from Brezhnev’s successors in the Soviet Union, perhaps initiating it themselves, these East European elites could implement a considerable amount of economic reform; but that reform would be conservative, probably like that in East Germany, involving tinkering with the mechanism of central planning. The aims would be modernization generally, with special emphasis on labor-saving and productivity. But in terms of the economic challenges that are likely to increase toward the end of the 1980s, such efforts will probably be inadequate. The Hungarian reform, far from becoming a model, could gradually or abruptly be curtailed during the next few years.

While the political leaderships in Eastern Europe are likely to favor conservative economic policies at home (including conservative economic reforms), encouraged by the managerial and technical elites,
they will continue to press for economic ties with the West rather than Soviet bloc autarky. In Hungary, Romania, Poland, and the GDR, important segments of the economy have become dependent on Western machinery and parts. These countries are heavily in debt to the West; hence, all want the best rescheduling terms. In general, the last 15 years have seen a remarkable swing in economic relations toward the West, largely financed by the lavish Western credits of the 1970s. To break these relations abruptly could have serious consequences in both the short and long terms, adding to the myriad of economic problems that already exist. Thus the political leaderships are anxious for Western contacts to continue and are sending signals accordingly. If these contacts are confined to economics, they all presumably have Moscow’s acceptance, however grudging, since the Soviets hardly wish to be faced with further economic difficulties in Eastern Europe. This approach seemed to be confirmed by the long-postponed June 1984 CMEA “summit,” which did not signal a return to economic autarky in the Soviet bloc.

The responses of the East European and Soviet regimes to the economic challenge in the region will have a major impact on the nature of the East European systems. Other challenges are likely to emerge during the rest of the decade which will affect both regimes and societies and thus the shape of the East European systems. First, leadership changes will be necessitated in some countries simply by mortality. The leaders in Czechoslovakia (Husak), Bulgaria (Zhivkov), Hungary (Kadar), and the GDR (Honecker) are all over 70 years of age. It is doubtful whether any will last out the decade. Their departures could lead to factional struggles like those of the 1950s.

Second, there is the question, arising from army rule in Poland, of the power of the military and the security police. However long the military keeps the power it has in Poland, the truth of who sustains communist rule has been demonstrated—not just for Poland, but for all East European countries. This could lead to an increase in the assertiveness and powers of the security apparatus and the military elsewhere in the region. The performance of the ZOMO in the first few weeks after martial law was declared in Poland has certainly not been lost on the other regimes, and it may be assumed that all have begun improving comparable capabilities. Such a situation, of course, strengthens the authority of the forces of coercion, an authority they might not hesitate to use in the future, not only against their own rebellious societies, but also against their supposed masters in the party.

1Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej (Motorized Reserve of Citizens Militia), the Polish internal security force.
Third, the technical-managerial class may assume greater importance in both Eastern Europe and the USSR. The power and influence of this class has been a matter of some controversy, and the very distinction between the “apparatchik” and the “technocrat” may be questioned. Certainly the ruling elites are becoming better educated, and in all the countries discussed here, the second, technocratic “layer of leadership” (under the top political layer) is genuinely concerned with economic modernization and very much aware of both the shortcomings of the East European systems and the technical superiority of the West. There is probably some support at this secondary elite level throughout Eastern Europe for the conclusion reached in a recent Hungarian economic study that the CMEA countries can advance only with “an adjustment to the changed world economic conditions together with a simultaneous implementation of comprehensive domestic reforms.” Many of the hopes for evolution of the East European systems have been pinned on this secondary layer of leadership. But, except in Hungary, where these elements have been actively encouraged in the framework of a reform that has given them both influence and fulfillment, and perhaps in the GDR, where Ulbricht saw them as part of the building of a new state (perhaps now in Bulgaria too), the technocrats appear to have had relatively little influence on general policy direction. In fact, the recent Polish, Czechoslovak, and Romanian experience has shown them as not prepared to commit themselves to using their undoubted political leverage. Indeed, those coopted into the topmost layer of government have seemed all too ready to adapt and comply—another facet of the disappearance of motivation mentioned earlier. Nor would the expected climate of the 1980s seem conducive to any basic change in their attitude. Many in the technocratic elite know that system transformation is essential, but they also know that it would disturb the whole structure of power, place, and privilege—and for this they should not be expected to press.

PRESSURES FROM BELOW

The main pressures for change in Eastern Europe in the 1980s are not likely to come from the elites. Rather, such pressures will come—as they almost always have, except in Czechoslovakia in 1968—from below, from workers and intellectuals, sometimes acting together, sometimes alone. The workers will be reacting to an economic situation that will probably worsen. The “consumerist” bubble, growing

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ever larger for a time in the 1970s because of world prosperity, cheap energy, and Western credits, has burst. This is admitted openly even by the regime leaders. But the deterioration could be worse than originally anticipated, partly, as mentioned earlier, because of the need to increase exports and cut imports. After the crushing of organized Solidarity in Poland, given the ability of probably all the regimes to manage that kind of crisis, mass upheavals should not be expected. A more likely scenario for the rest of the 1980s is sullen discontent, punctuated by social disturbances of various dimensions, put down with varying degrees of severity according to the nature and nerve of the regime concerned. The mounting disaffection of youth is a particularly dangerous element in this context and may be the cause of a considerable increase in random violence, especially in the urban centers of the more industrialized countries.

Intellectual dissent, though it captures headlines, never brings down governments by itself. Only in combination with workers (or peasants) can it do that, and any welding of worker and intellectual discontent, as witnessed strikingly in Solidarity, is likely to be made very difficult by better-organized overt and covert police activities. The same would apply to student disaffection. Basically, this type of disaffection can be controlled, although student strikes, for example, also capture attention, both domestic and foreign, and are clearly an embarrassment to any regime.

In the case of a real power vacuum, however, intellectual dissent alone could have a strong impact. A scenario involving a lack of direction from Moscow and a local power struggle over a leadership succession (such as occurred in Poland in 1956) is not too fanciful for the 1980s. In such a situation, particularly if worker discontent also existed, an alliance could develop between more liberal elements in the governmental apparatus and engaged intellectuals. (Such an alliance has already developed in Hungary, in circumstances quite different from those just outlined.)

In this context, moreover, the possibility of active peasant discontent should not be discounted. Generally, the peasantry has not played a militant role in communist Eastern Europe since the resistance in the late 1940s and early 1950s to collectivization in some countries. Indeed, peasants in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Bulgaria have recently enjoyed varying degrees of relative prosperity. In Romania, however, their situation has deteriorated to the point where many are widely believed to have withheld their produce from the state markets, thus exacerbating food shortages in the towns and increasing the discontent of the workers. Peasants in Poland have also taken similar actions. This deliberate withholding, either for self-
consumption or for selling on the free market, is more likely to be the expression of peasant discontent than of any Jacquerie-type militancy. But it could have lethal effects. This the regimes know (even the Romanian leadership seems to be becoming aware of it), and continued efforts to appease the peasants by higher subsidies and prices may be expected. But such efforts would inevitably be made, directly or indirectly, at the expense of the workers.

Discontent cutting across social groups and derived from concerns about military developments may also increase. The Soviet “counter-deployment” of Eurostrategic missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia has evidently caused considerable concern and antipathy in those countries, fed by the very publicity put forth in the Soviet and East European media. The resulting ferment may be strongest in the GDR because of the prior reaction among segments of GDR society to “militarization” of the country.

Briefly, then, social discontent, open at times, may be expected through the rest of the decade. But the efficiency of the instruments of repression will have been enhanced sufficiently that the authorities should be able to contain or quell the discontent. If, however, there is a sustained period of immobilism and lack of direction from the Soviet Union, the resistance will become more persistent and widespread, as the ruling elites—civil, military, and police—begin to lose their confidence. Then, in the early 1990s, an almost classic revolutionary situation could develop, for which the closest recent parallel would be Hungary and Poland in 1956. The strongest catalyst for such a development could be the simultaneous outbreak of unrest in two or more East European countries.
V. FUTURE SOVIET POLICY

Most efforts to project alternative future Soviet approaches to Eastern Europe over the next 25 years contain variations on three Soviet policies: decolonization, re-Stalinization, and “muddling through.”

Under a policy of decolonization, the East European states would be permitted to undertake domestic reform and liberalization and become more autonomous internationally, while respecting Soviet security interests. At one end of the scale of decolonization is “Dubcekization,” the approach of Czechoslovakia in 1967–68: maintenance of party rule but with internal transformation, membership in the Warsaw Pact but with more emphasis on national defense interests. At the other end of the scale is “Benesization” (Czechoslovakia’s position in 1945–48) or “Finlandization”: rule by noncommunist parties in countries that are formally neutral but respectful of Soviet security interests. A few empires in history, e.g., the British, have encouraged rather than resisted decolonization at a certain stage.

Re-Stalinization would imply a return to the total Soviet control of Eastern Europe and the domestic terror that occurred in the years between 1948 and 1953. Many empires in history have undergone cycles of liberalization and reaction, and the same might pertain to the Soviet empire.

Muddling through can subsume a variety of approaches, ranging from encouraging modest reform in Eastern Europe as long as the “commanding heights” of power remain intact to insisting on greater repression of oppositional forces. Empires can seek to adapt to change, as did the Austrian in the late nineteenth century, or they can resist change, as did the Russian during that period.

The second alternative is most easily discussed. Re-Stalinization in any literal sense seems unlikely, for the Stalinization of Eastern Europe was a phenomenon of the first postwar years of communist power in war-weary and economically backward countries. Those conditions passed long ago.

Alternatively, the USSR could eventually take a “decolonizing” approach toward Eastern Europe. The Soviet leadership, as suggested at the beginning of this report, might quite deliberately decide that the risks of such an approach would be less than the damage, drain, and

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1See Van Oudenaren, op. cit.; and Larrabee, op. cit., Sections II and VI.
cost involved in trying to maintain the present system. A decolonization approach would not be meant to “surrender” Eastern Europe, but to control it more effectively, to create an “organic relationship” between Eastern Europe and the USSR, perhaps in a “Europe of fatherlands” in which West European states would be less closely aligned with the United States.

There is no doubt that the Eastern Europe of today is an embarrassment to Moscow in several ways. The distinction made at the outset of this report between importance and value involves more than semantics. The importance of Eastern Europe—particularly the northern tier—remains in security, political, economic, and ideological terms. But Eastern Europe’s present condition, appeal, and prospects—its value—are far from what Moscow hoped for 40 years ago. Eastern Europe does not present any propaganda attraction to the outside world; it is a poor advertisement for alliance with the Soviet Union; it has tarnished rather than enhanced the Soviet image. It lessens rather than increases Soviet opportunities in Western Europe, and it has been anything but an effective “springboard.” It has increasingly become a conveyor belt for Western ideas moving Eastward. Many elements of the Soviet system have been affected by this conveyor-belt process: Soviet intellectuals generally; the Ukraine, in 1968 via Czechoslovakia and in 1980–81 via Poland; and the Baltic republics, also via Poland. In Lithuania, religious dissent centered in the Lithuanian Catholic Church has acquired a mass, oppositional character, has openly challenged the regime, and has won some concessions. The Lithuanian Church has ties with the Polish Catholic Church and has been helped and encouraged by the “Polish Pope,” John Paul II. Baltic political dissent, encouraged and influenced by the rise of Solidarity in Poland, resulted in a rise of nationalism and an attempt to organize a strike movement in Estonia.2

While Eastern Europe’s strategic importance remains unchanged, there must be new reservations about the military value of its armed forces, possibly necessitating a reappraisal of parts of Soviet military doctrine. Once an economic plundering ground, Eastern Europe is now an economic millstone. Nationalism and the Westward gravitational pull are both stronger than ever. The Soviet Union is more despised than ever. Communist legitimacy is further away than ever. The governing establishments throughout the region are large and tenacious, and they hold the levers of power. But their self-confidence is faltering and in some cases being considerably undermined (the

statements of Polish leaders leave no doubt about this in the Polish case), while their clinging submission to Moscow reflects not so much real loyalty as nervousness and fear when facing their own populations.

This is the price the Soviet Union is paying for its hegemony over Eastern Europe, and it would be surprising if some in the USSR were not asking whether it was worth it. Yet decolonization is as difficult to imagine in the foreseeable future as re-Stalinization. Soviet control of an Eastern Europe cast, however imperfectly, in the Soviet mold remains crucial to the Soviet leadership's sense of legitimacy as the leading power of a "world system" that is on the historical ascendancy and in control of the multinational USSR itself. A change in that self-image doubtless would involve a full change of generations in the USSR, modernization and reform of the Soviet system itself, and a marked improvement in East-West relations. This set of prerequisites is inconceivable over the remainder of this decade—and perhaps in the early 1990s as well. Thus the possibility of any basic reappraisal in the USSR of the value of Eastern Europe that would soon be translated into Soviet policy would appear minimal. Moreover, many in Eastern Europe itself would have reservations about Soviet efforts to reform and relax their hegemony over the region. Assuming genuine Soviet steps in that direction, past and recent experience with the USSR and the Westward gravitation of East European society—much stronger today than it was half a century ago—would probably lead many in Eastern Europe to reject a looser but still subordinate relationship with the Soviet Union.

What then remains? As John Van Oudenaren has suggested, the Soviet "alliance" may come to look more like the Soviet empire than ever, "with propaganda maintaining a facade of unity, while in reality a kind of mechanical unity will be imposed by the kinds of coercive controls 'from above' usually associated with empires.\textsuperscript{3} This version of the Soviet empire—a "hard" variant of the "muddling through" alternative—would have the following characteristics:

- Abandonment of all pretense at establishing the legitimacy of communism in Eastern Europe; rather, more explicit emphasis on the cultivation of key elites and interest groups that are able to impose control.
- Less reliance on "consumerism" (a desired but increasingly unobtainable approach to limiting mass dissatisfaction); less attention to modernizing (let alone humanizing) socialism, and greater resort to police oppression.

\textsuperscript{3}Van Oudenaren, op. cit.
• A corresponding increase in the internal role of police and paramilitary forces.
• Accentuation of the prevailing bilateral pattern of economic, military, and cultural ties rather than multilateral integration through CMEA, the WTO, or other institutions.
• Increasing demands on Soviet “bailout” economic resources, offset by greater internal and other foreign demands on the Soviet economy that are likely to make such Soviet assistance relatively smaller than in the past.
• Less intrabloc diversity in terms of Soviet-sanctioned policies in Eastern Europe, but continuation of the distinctiveness of each East European country and a greater discrepancy between the pays legal and the pays réel.
• Periodic outbursts of unrest, oppressed by force.

It remains to be seen how vigorous Moscow’s attention to Eastern Europe will be in the coming years and how consistently a policy of “empire” will be pursued. There is no question that at times of crisis, Moscow’s attention to Eastern Europe has been, and will remain, intense. But the Soviets should know by now that vigilance is needed during the periods of quiet as well. There have been two such periods in the last 40 years: the five years preceding 1968, and most of the 1970s. These were periods when the Soviets did tend to lower their guard, and this contributed in the first case to the Prague Spring, in the second to Solidarity. Soviet neglect before 1968 was mainly the result of the new Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership needing to consolidate its position after Khrushchev’s fall in 1964. In the latter part of the 1970s, following the “normalization” of Czechoslovakia, the neglect was due to complacency over the restored situation and the global concerns into which Brezhnev had pitchforked the Soviet Union.

At present, the Soviets might conclude that with the suppression of Solidarity in Poland another period of quiet has descended on Eastern Europe, and they might relax their guard. Moscow is clearly and understandably preoccupied with domestic concerns, especially the two-stage, post-Brezhnev and post-Andropov succession. Soviet global commitments, inherited from Brezhnev, exist and are unlikely to be abandoned. Indeed, in the first part of 1984, Moscow seemed to display a certain neglect of Eastern Europe. Soviet inattention may be one explanation for the continuation of Hungary’s more active foreign policy and the surprising activation of East German foreign policy, vis-à-vis West Germany and the West generally. Yet if the immediate absence of “explosions” in Eastern Europe, Moscow’s domestic preoccupations, especially the succession, and Soviet global interests result
in further neglect of Eastern Europe and a continuation of political drift and vacuum, the chances of upheavals in the region toward the end of the decade will only increase. On the other hand, a severe and contested Soviet leadership succession, perhaps linked with one or more leadership succession crises in Eastern Europe, would raise the possibility of unrest in Eastern Europe comparable to that of 1956 occurring much sooner. In any case, the Soviet Union will probably have to devote more attention and resources over the next decade to preserving its East European empire from foreign infection and internal corrosion.