U.S. Strategic Alternatives in a Changing Pacific

Jonathan D. Pollack, James A. Winnefeld

A Report from
The RAND Strategy Assessment Center
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Commander in Chief, Pacific Command. The research was conducted in the National Defense Research Institute, RAND's federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Contract No. MDA903-85-C-0030.

ISBN: 0-8330-1086-7

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Published by The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138
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June 1990

Prepared for the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command

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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
PREFACE

The research documented in this report was undertaken for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC). Its objectives were:

- To formulate and analyze alternative long-term security arrangements for the Pacific basin that would further the long-term strategic interests of the United States.
- To describe potential implications for the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

This report draws on a number of efforts: as-yet unpublished work by James Winnefeld on Pacific Rim security issues and by Kong Dan Oh on economic, political, and security trends in Northeast Asia; briefing material prepared by Jonathan Pollack and Guy Pauker; and two workshops with participants listed in the Acknowledgments section of the report. These background efforts emphasized alternative future strategic options for the Pacific basin and their implications for U.S. security arrangements. The research is linked to an earlier RAND study on global strategic planning. That study argued for an anticipatory approach that seeks to shape the future security environment and minimize the potential for shocks that could disrupt or undermine prospects for continued stability and increasing prosperity.¹ PACOM staff separately requested that RAND assess future strategic directions in the Pacific basin and their implications for longer-term American security interests. This study is the result of that request. The research for both studies has been conducted by the staff of the RAND Strategy Assessment Center (RSAC) under the direction of Dr. Paul Davis. The RSAC is part of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Comments and suggestions should be directed to Dr. Davis or the authors.

¹Researchers Paul K. Davis, Paul Bracken, and James A. Winnefeld will soon be publishing preliminary results on this project.
SUMMARY

This report summarizes a RAND review of U.S. strategic planning issues in the Pacific basin. The review included discussion of widely varying visions of the region and of the U.S. role over the next 25 years. The focus was on future security strategies and alternative security arrangements in a period of a diminishing Soviet threat, increasing questions about the U.S. willingness to invest in the security of Asia, rising nationalism and economic prosperity in the region, and increasingly troublesome U.S.-Japanese economic competition. Within this focus, the report attempts to bridge the separate worlds of the regional specialist and the defense planner.

After reviewing regional trends and possible shocks that are not visible in standard trend studies, and after comparing different visions of the future, the study team developed a set of three broad strategies and 18 "building block" options for security arrangements. The team then assessed the utility of these options across a range of assumptions and, to some extent, strategies. The intricate analysis distinguished between scaling back U.S. forces because of a diminished threat and changing regional conditions, as opposed to retrenchment for budgetary reasons.

The authors conclude that the United States will continue to play a critical regional security role in the future, albeit a changing one. Instead of containment, the United States will focus more on maintaining its presence and stability in the region. The United States should seek to fulfill this role in a constructive and realistic manner while retaining and consolidating its status as the key military power in balancing competing regional interests. In concert with various regional states, the United States should set about defining a security role that is sustainable over the longer term. This should be possible even as force levels decrease and as basing availability changes. Strategic retrenchment is neither warranted nor necessary by reasons external to U.S. domestic political considerations.

Our approach emphasizes: (1) preemptively defusing potential shocks that could upset what would otherwise be very positive trends; (2) maintaining regional stability, thereby making it unnecessary for Japan, China, Korea, or any other state to appreciably expand its military capabilities and set off a destabilizing regional arms competition; (3) increasing the efficiency with which the United States pursues presence and power projection roles; (4) encouraging regional aspirations by reducing direct U.S. oversight of regional security (e.g., turning over
command reins in Korea) and reducing troublesome forms of presence (e.g., sovereignty disputes over U.S. bases); and (5) improving the coordination of the political, economic, and military dimensions of national security policy. All these steps should be undertaken gradually but unambiguously, allowing for reversibility if the Soviet Union changes direction or other threats to regional security emerge.

The core of a U.S. national security agenda for the Pacific should encompass the following dimensions:

- Devising new modalities for Northeast Asian security, especially those that permit a gradual enhancement of multinational interaction and communication that regional states are at present not prepared to undertake.
- Fostering an increased role for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in collaborative security arrangements, with the United States principally in the role of facilitator.
- Emphasizing forward-deployed/based forces, even if total forces available are smaller.
- Reducing the deployment of theater nuclear forces.¹
- Tying more of the U.S. regional military presence to cost offsets by the host country.
- Preparing to participate in the regional arms control process if regional circumstances and U.S. policy move in that direction.

Thus, even as the United States reduces its direct contribution to regional security, means must be devised to prevent any other power from exercising predominant political-military influence while at the same time discouraging any regional arms competition as the American security presence decreases. The United States should continue to play a pivotal role in helping define the contours of regional security, with USCINCPAC retaining central responsibility and executive authority to formulate and carry out those policies.

¹Reducing theater nuclear forces can be done in several ways, including their removal from surface ships but not from submarines. The details are important but beyond the scope of this report.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors of this report gratefully acknowledge the contributions of the following RAND staff members: Kong Dan Oh, Norman Levin, William Schwabe, Robert Komer, Harry Gelman, Donald Henry, Stephen Hosmer, Ted Warner, George Tanham, Guy Pauker, and Paul Davis. In addition, Yong-Sup Han (a RAND Graduate School student), Mary Elizabeth Sperry and Lawrence Robertson (students in the RAND-UCLA Center for Soviet Studies), and Dean Cheng (a RAND summer intern) provided valuable assistance. The authors are especially grateful to William Schwabe and Paul Bracken for their constructive suggestions as formal reviewers of this study.

Numerous other analysts outside of RAND also contributed to our workshops. They include Rodney McDaniel, Lieutenant General John Cushman USA (Ret.), Captain David Bellamy USN, Dean Hoffman, James Delaney, Paul Kreisberg, Michael Mattingly, Thomas McNaugher, Captain Timothy Twomey USN, and Rear Admiral T. W. Wright USN.

Rear Admiral William Pendley USN, David Haut, Karl Eulenstein, Lee Endress, and Captain Cliff Hill USN of the USCINCPAC staff made valuable contributions to thinking through the problems identified in this report.

While these contributors share credit for our analysis, they bear no responsibility for its shortcomings.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This report develops and analyzes alternative future security arrangements for the Pacific basin.\(^1\) The concept of "security arrangements" includes the political, economic, military, and related institutional mechanisms through which the United States seeks to achieve its long-term security objectives. As such, security arrangements follow directly from the national strategies of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. They represent an important mechanism by which strategy acquires operational meaning, and provide a structure within which national policies can be identified, evaluated, and modified in light of changing political, economic, and security circumstances.

Security arrangements therefore comprise the totality of mechanisms, procedures, and processes marshaled to pursue larger strategic goals. They provide a "means test" to determine the relevance of the assumptions guiding national policies and to measure the fit between these organizing concepts and larger policy objectives. Although security arrangements are frequently formalized in treaties, agreements, and other mutual understandings between states, such tangible expressions are not necessarily required, and sometimes may not even be helpful. One of the distinctive attributes of the Asia-Pacific security environment is its fluidity and the absence of an overarching structure for defining national security policies. Although in the late 1940s leaders in the Philippines and South Korea broached the idea of a Northeast Asian security pact, it generated no credible political support. The creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 also proved largely ineffective in addressing threats to regional stability and security.

Thus, East Asian security has always eluded easy definition. Unlike the confrontation between Soviet and Western power in Europe, no comprehensive alliance framework has ever existed. The absence of a single unambiguous threat to regional security, the lack (with the exception of the Korean peninsula) of a clear geographic demarcation for delineating regional security requirements, and the daunting size and complexity of the region as a whole help explain the absence of an

\(^1\)Our focus is more narrowly on East Asia and the Western Pacific. This definition includes the Soviet Union, China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Indochina, and the ASEAN states (see footnote 2). Although generally excluding other areas within the sphere of the U.S. Pacific Command's responsibility, at times in this report we also address Australia, India, and the Persian Gulf.
overarching framework. As we will discuss at greater length in subsequent sections, these characteristics are likely to become more pronounced during the next several decades, underscoring the challenge in shaping future U.S. regional security objectives.

To consider these issues in greater detail, this report is divided into five sections. Section I will bound the geographic, temporal, and analytic scope of the study. Section II will assess the possible evolution of the regional security environment over the next 20 to 25 years, focusing on the major assumptions that are likely to guide U.S. national strategy in the Pacific. Section III will consider the major strategic choices confronted by the United States in shaping future Pacific basin security arrangements. Section IV will identify the major criteria for linking possible security arrangements to these broad choices, and assess their relevance in light of these criteria. Section V will assess the implications of our analysis for the Pacific Command (PACOM), concentrating in particular on the problems likely to confront USCINCPAC in the transition to alternative security arrangements.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

Although PACOM's area of operational responsibility extends from the west coast of the United States to the east coast of Africa, the scope of our analysis will be more limited. Specifically, we will concentrate on Northeast Asia (especially Japan and Korea) and on Southeast Asia (especially the ASEAN states). These two geographic domains have dominated U.S. regional security policy over the last four decades. The structure of security planning within PACOM's area of operational responsibility followed directly from the realization of goals in these two regions. U.S. basing arrangements in the Philippines provide an appropriate illustration. Although the American base presence has contributed directly to fulfilling U.S. security obligations to the Philippines, they are more important in relation to the requirements of deploying U.S. power outside the immediate region (most recently, the deployment of major U.S. forces to the Persian Gulf). Similarly, specific security arrangements and procedures in these two locales assume broader relevance within the Pacific basin as a whole (e.g., the "neither confirm nor deny" policy for U.S. nuclear-capable platforms and facilities in the region).

The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states comprise the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei.
The projections in this study will extend to the year 2015. Projection over such a long period is highly speculative. Detailed forecasts or scenarios of regional power configurations are therefore beyond the scope of this study. As an alternative, we shall concentrate on those factors that seem most likely to shape the longer-term security goals, calculations, and commitments of the U.S. and other major powers. What are the decisive trends and directions that will shape the security contours of East Asia and the Pacific? To what extent will these political and security directions affect the region as a whole, and how might these changes redefine U.S. regional security requirements and relationships? Are these changes likely to prove abrupt, or is more incremental adaptation possible? How might unanticipated events confound the opportunities for intelligent long-term planning?

SOME DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Our definition of "security arrangements" is deliberately broad. We hope to capture the full range of collaborative policy instruments at the disposal of governments in pursuit of security goals, although not all of them will be assessed in the report. With the exception of protecting a state's physical boundaries, it is impossible to posit a truly unilateral approach to security planning. Thus, the United States cannot deploy its military power in the Pacific on a sustained basis without understandings and agreements with regional states. The point may seem obvious, but it is hardly trivial. Wherever possible, the United States has sought to make such arrangements predictable and tangible. They include:

- Military command arrangements and procedures (both U.S. and combined).
- Policies related to the operation of U.S. military forces in peacetime (e.g., neither confirm nor deny).
- Base use arrangements and cost offset agreements.
- The modalities of military-to-military cooperation.
- Nation-building and humanitarian assistance.

The fuller range of security arrangements encompasses a diverse array of mechanisms and means. These include:

- Mutual security treaties, agreements, understandings, and long-established practices that have an equivalent implication.
- Bilateral or multilateral military committees, organizations, and practices that provide a focus and logic for interactive security planning.
- Instruments for economic and technological collaboration and support, especially those designed to facilitate longer-term policy coordination.
- Instruments for political consultations among states.
- Means for enhanced communication and information exchange.

Thus, few security arrangements are exclusively military. The United States seeks to shape an approach that coordinates and interrelates political, economic, and institutional dimensions of national policy. In assessing the fit between political and economic policies and military arrangements, three considerations seem paramount:

- Is there a political/economic "superstructure" in place to support the military "infrastructure"?
- Is there a satisfactory linkage between security commitments and political/economic support?
- Are there imbalances that can be exploited by external forces or domestic constituencies opposed to such policies?

A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

This report is not intended as a comprehensive assessment of U.S. regional security strategy. In particular, we have eschewed a detailed assessment of force posture and deployment options. The United States must first embed its regional military role in the context of a larger set of political, economic, and security considerations, as influenced by major-power relations within the region. At the same time, the needs and interests of the United States and its regional security partners are not always congruent or symmetrical. Robust force deployments in the absence of effective mechanisms of security collaboration would therefore achieve little, especially in view of the dynamic forces at work within the region.

To provide a fuller basis for this assessment, project work has proceeded along two tracks. First, a group of regional specialists was organized to assess the security dynamics in the Pacific basin. Although it proved difficult to avoid consideration of more immediate policy trends, a conscious effort was made to move beyond the preoccupations of the moment toward the longer-term patterns influencing the region as a whole. A second group of analysts identified and mapped out alternative strategic concepts for the region, seeking to derive a set of criteria by which to judge the relevance and feasibility of various security alternatives. The work of both groups was also scrutinized in two project workshops that included outside specialists.
This report reflects the perspectives of both groups. We have sought to bridge the separate worlds of the regional specialist and the defense planner. Although it is an exploratory effort, we hope that this report will contribute much-needed clarification and synthesis, since effective policy assessment requires both analytic perspectives.
II. THE PACIFIC SETTING: TRENDS 
TO THE YEAR 2015

The purpose of this section is to identify the potential changes in the Pacific basin environment that are likely to affect U.S. security planning in the next several decades. Our objective is less to anticipate all trends and directions in various national policies than it is to present the larger factors that could alter the existing framework of U.S. regional security planning.

Consideration of potential directions 25 years into the future is inherently risky. Were we to rewind the clock by a comparable amount, it would stop in 1965, just as the first U.S. combat units were deployed in Vietnam and as the Soviet Union began to augment its forces along the Sino-Soviet border. The Chinese had just tested their first nuclear device and the opening forays of the Cultural Revolution had begun; the United States enjoyed a trade surplus with Japan; South Korea was a predominantly agrarian economy with a per capita GNP of less than $120; and Khrushchev had just been purged. Russians and Chinese had yet to clash along their contested border; the Nixon Administration was still six years away from its rapprochement with Beijing (and eight years from withdrawal and subsequent defeat in Vietnam); and China’s border war with its erstwhile Vietnamese allies was a decade and a half in the future.

Anticipating events of this magnitude would have required extraordinary clairvoyance. Indeed, a seer with a flawless crystal ball would probably have been judged insane, not inspired. Even if perfect foresight had been possible, such perspicacity would never have received a serious hearing in policy circles. This cautionary note should remind all would-be forecasters of the hazards of looking too far ahead or expecting a surprise-free future.

At the same time, some trends have proved remarkably consistent. Japan and the “four tigers” of East Asia (South Korea, Hongkong, Taiwan, and Singapore) have experienced an uninterrupted economic boom for the past quarter century. Then and now, U.S. ground forces remain deployed in Korea, though in smaller numbers. American security commitments to Japan, the Philippines, and Australia have remained intact, albeit with occasional rough spots. The Soviet Union (at least until fairly recently) was uniformly rigid and maladroit in its regional behavior. Except for its communist allies, the Soviets had
made no significant political or diplomatic inroads in the region. The Soviets also remained totally uninvolved in East Asia's economic and technological boom, leaving these opportunities fully to the United States and its regional partners. Soviet policy exhibited a distinctly negative character: hostile and inflexible toward Japan, confrontational toward China, contemptuous of the growth of the region's market economies, and avowedly antagonistic to the American regional presence.

Under these circumstances, the continued presence of American forces was widely supported within the region. The forward deployment of American power constituted a pivotal element in the political, economic, and security equation. As a source of technology, as a market for products, and as the principal guarantor of regional security, the United States was essential to development and stability in the Pacific basin.

But the future political and security framework is likely to prove more complicated, with the region as a whole becoming less dependent on American power for direct defense. The economic and political maturation under way in numerous states—and the growing capacity and determination of regional leaders to define their own interests—is already rendering the political and strategic landscape far more complex. Although there is no parallel in the Pacific for the stunning reconfiguration of great-power relations in Europe, Soviet internal preoccupations and efforts to diminish tensions with its neighbors have influenced Asia as well. As a consequence, the readiness of regional states to sustain unambiguous support for U.S. regional defense policies—including continued support for forward-based U.S. naval and air power—is becoming less automatic.

A fluid environment poses uncertainties, but also presents opportunities. The challenge for U.S. policy is to define essential American interests and devise means to pursue them in a consistent and coherent fashion. The United States seems likely to assume more of a balancing position in the future, maintaining military power sufficient to dissuade any regional actor from arming in a destabilizing or threatening manner. Threats to security may prove more ambiguous; they are likely to be more political, technological, and economic than military; and they will derive from a wider array of sources and challenges. Indications of multipolarity have increased, though it seems more accurate to speak of the diffusion of power and the ascendance of multiple

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1Soviet overtures in recent years to South Pacific microstates (e.g., Kiribati) represent a partial if somewhat modest exception to this generalization. Our argument is focused more on the major political and economic actors of the region.
national ambitions, not fully autonomous power centers. The United States seems likely to remain the pivotal guarantor of regional security, but it will require a differentiated strategy less driven by military threats and more focused on enduring U.S. interests. These interests include:

- Denying any single power or consortium of states domination within the region.\(^2\)
- Assuring unimpeded commercial and technical interchange within the Pacific, with states not subject to coercion or threats of the use of force.
- Encouragement of regimes committed to political openness and economic opportunity.
- Seeking to maintain and enhance the incentives of regional states to collaborate with the United States in both politics and economics.

All four broad objectives must be embedded in an integrated national strategy. However, effective security planning also requires a continued ability to reinforce U.S. forces in a potential crisis, thereby making U.S. security guarantees more credible. Thus, the United States will not suddenly disappear as a principal factor in the regional security equation. At the same time, deeply rooted historical differences and asymmetries in the power of various regional and local powers preclude any overarching system of regional alliances. Even as the direct U.S. contribution to regional security seems likely to diminish, American power will remain a decisive factor in the calculations of all regional actors.

To elucidate these issues more fully, we will assess those factors that seem to be driving the changes in Pacific basin security. Among the developments impinging upon present security arrangements, four seem primary:

- Indications of a major reduction in the direct Soviet military threat to East Asia.
- Increasing competitiveness in U.S. relations with its major regional trading partners (especially Japan), leading to pressures to redefine America’s regional defense commitments.
- The growth of assertive nationalism and democratization in Asian societies, thereby redefining perceptions and expectations of the U.S. security role.

\(^2\)This interest would include preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region.
• Domestic budgetary pressures that have diminished U.S. willingness to assume preponderant responsibility for the security of increasingly prosperous and advanced regional allies.

We discuss each of these developments below.

A TRANSFORMED SOVIET THREAT

The extraordinary changes in Soviet political and military behavior since the mid-1980s, accelerated in recent months by a burgeoning political and economic crisis at home and in Eastern Europe, are transforming the threat posed by the Soviets in Asia as well as in Europe. For close to two decades, Moscow had steadily augmented its Asian-based forces, imparting a rigid and intimidating style that greatly restricted Soviet political opportunities and enhanced American options. That style has now changed. In a series of incremental and sometimes dramatic rudder orders, Mikhail Gorbachev has tried to turn his enormous ship of state, or at least to slow its movement. Although some dimensions of Soviet Asian policy remain self-serving and opportunistic, the broad trend has been to reduce Soviet defense requirements vis-à-vis Asia, limit Soviet obligations to its beleaguered Asian communist allies, open political doors to noncommunist states, initiate more flexible dealings with the region’s market economies, and work more actively with regional states to defuse festering tensions. Soviet troops have withdrawn from Afghanistan; a total pullout of Soviet forces from Mongolia is scheduled for 1992; drawdowns have begun along the Sino-Soviet border; Soviet naval activities in the Pacific have been restricted; and Moscow has unilaterally withdrawn the bulk of its forward-based military assets from Vietnam.

Although many of these measures are attributable to Gorbachev’s personal will, there is a general recognition that Soviet military actions have yielded neither security nor political dividends. Thus, there is a momentum to Soviet policy changes that seems unlikely to be reversed, at least in the near to mid term. As a result, regional states increasingly perceive opportunities rather than threats, with Moscow likely over time to secure significant political breakthroughs where none had been achieved before. The rapid development of Soviet relations with South Korea constitutes the most impressive example. In the last two years, Moscow’s ties with the ROK have moved from hostile to near-normal. Gorbachev’s June 1990 meeting with President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea would have been unthinkable until very recently, but full diplomatic relations now seem entirely possible in the near future.
At the same time, enduring Soviet security concerns remain intact. The Soviets seem very unlikely to jeopardize their core regional security interests, especially protection of Soviet nuclear and maritime assets deployed in and around the Sea of Japan; barring Soviet-American agreements, this may impose limits on future Soviet force reductions, especially Moscow's highly capable air and naval assets arrayed against the United States and Japan. Moscow has also been much slower to seek meaningful accommodation with Japan than with China, and has kept up its efforts to impose restrictions on the ability of U.S. forward-based forces to operate in the West Pacific. Unlike in Europe, the Soviets have yet to offer concessions to their neighbors that would provide Moscow the more comprehensive political breakthrough that it presumably seeks. The principal question mark concerns Soviet relations with Japan, with Tokyo remaining highly cautious and skeptical in assessing Moscow's longer-term intentions.

However, economic imperatives seem likely to compel continued Soviet accommodation toward the region, including concessions to Tokyo that it has thus far been unprepared to make. In a longer-term sense, it seems inconceivable that the Soviet Union will go on denying itself the opportunity to interact more extensively with the most dynamic economic and technological region of the world, especially given Soviet needs for new commercial relationships and increased capital investment. Notwithstanding major Soviet breakthroughs with South Korea, Japan holds the key. On the assumption that the Soviets remain focused on restructuring their industrial system and achieving fuller incorporation in the global economy, Soviet incentives to practice restraint in its weapons deployments and military behavior will remain in place. Much bolder Soviet initiatives toward Japan (e.g., a unilateral Soviet move to conciliate Tokyo on the northern territories issue) should not be ruled out, especially if Moscow concluded that such actions could decisively alter Japanese attitudes toward future security collaboration with the United States. Independent of such steps, Soviet internal weakness is likely to moderate the U.S.-Soviet military competition that has long been a dominant feature of the regional security environment.

Soviet incentives to seek tension reduction and breathing space extend to China as well. Despite the turmoil caused by China's internal political crackdown and Beijing's unhappiness over Gorbachev's dismantling of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, neither state benefits by an open-ended military competition. Sino-Soviet relations are unlikely to achieve a larger breakthrough so long as Moscow and Beijing are headed in divergent internal political directions, but the general tendency remains the attenuation of the geopolitical rivalry that enveloped
both states during the 1960s and 1970s, including the reduction of the military forces that both previously deployed against one another. Recent drawdowns in Soviet and Chinese force deployments seem likely to continue in coming years, reducing the burden these forces have placed on both economies. In addition, neither Moscow nor Beijing any longer encourages the United States to align against the other, reducing American leverage in the process.

Under such circumstances, the Chinese no longer feel compelled to overtly encourage the U.S. regional military presence, including their previous tacit endorsement of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In a more long-term sense, however, Beijing's security interests seem likely to dictate acceptance of the U.S. regional security role. The challenge over the longer run is to maintain Beijing's incentives to accept the United States in a balancing capacity. On the assumption that the Chinese maintain their pursuit of economic and technological advancement and do not again retreat into a period of hostility toward the outside world, practical long-term interests will dictate continued collaboration with the United States. Longer-term Chinese wariness of Soviet and Japanese ambitions also seems likely to sustain Beijing's relations with the distant (and therefore presumably less threatening) superpower.

All projections about future Soviet and Chinese policy directions assume that both states will maintain their present political and institutional structure, and that both will continue to emphasize internal development and regional stability. In view of the extraordinary developments in both societies during the past year, however, a systemic transformation in either or both states should not be ruled out. In any case, the present vulnerabilities in the Soviet and Chinese systems seem likely to keep both leaderships preoccupied with their internal problems. But the domestic volatility in both nations could limit the prospects for their constructive involvement in regional political and security matters.

The consequences of major political, social, or economic upheaval in China would pose an especially severe risk to the Pacific basin states. During the 1980s, the region as a whole enjoyed the longest period of productive relations with China since the establishment of communist rule on the mainland in 1949. No regional state nor the United States could possibly welcome the return of a xenophobic, isolated China, or a regime whose political and institutional framework was verging on collapse. Indeed, despite the uncertainties associated with the succession to Deng Xiaoping, most observers anticipate that Beijing's incentives for pursuing economic modernization and constructive political engagement with its neighbors will remain undiminished. However, until it
can resolve its internal political crisis, Beijing will be less able to maintain a confident, constructive policy within the region.

The implications for Pacific basin security in the event of a major political upheaval in either the Soviet Union or China would depend on the character of the political-military systems that succeeded the present regimes, whether this reconfiguration occurred gradually or abruptly, and the extent of spillover beyond national borders. The possibility of such outcomes underscores the contingent character of any long-term political and security forecast. It also argues against any precipitate changes in the American regional security presence.

THE GROWTH OF INDIGENOUS POWER: JAPAN AS COMPETITOR AND ALLY

Numerous observers believe that the United States has succeeded too well in East Asia. In only a few decades, Japan has been transformed from its wartime devastation into a global economic giant. Korea's emergence as a burgeoning middle power has occurred even more rapidly. The stunning economic transition along the Pacific Rim, though far from uniform, constitutes one of the most extraordinary developments of the postwar era. Fueled by export-led growth and open markets abroad (especially in the United States), highly dependent, resource-poor societies have been transformed into economic forces of substantial magnitude. Japan has advanced much farther, emerging as the leading source of world capital, the second-leading investor nation in the United States, and a technological powerhouse of increasing scope and sophistication.

The speed of these changes and the highly asymmetrical terms of trade have led many to draw worst-case, zero-sum conclusions about the success of Japan and the newly industrializing economies. By this logic, America's chronic trade deficits and the mercantilist policies of Japan and other major trading states have undermined the political basis of U.S. relations with key Asian partners, with a wealthy, powerful Japan in particular deemed a direct threat to long-term American interests. However, the reality is much more complicated than the headlines, with growing interdependence between the Japanese and American economies and a major enhancement of U.S.-Japanese bilateral security cooperation emerging over the past ten years.

But the damaging consequences of these changes seem undeniable. There has been a pronounced spillover of economic competition into the security arena, with a chorus of American voices demanding that Japan assume an ever larger portion of its own national defense
burden. At the same time, U.S.-Japanese technological rivalries could restrict future Japanese access to American defense technology, quite possibly undermining existing agreements for the transfer of Japanese know-how and technology to U.S. defense programs. Thus, escalating rhetoric on both sides of the Pacific has had a corrosive effect on bilateral ties, though there has been no discernible effect on institutional linkages in the Washington-Tokyo defense relationship, or on U.S. base agreements in Japan.

Although many observers assert that Japan will inevitably assume an autonomous political-military role, such projections do not carry much credibility. A decision by Tokyo to embark on a defense program independent of the United States would come about only in the event of a profound weakening of the U.S. political and security commitment to Japan. This possibility cannot be dismissed with absolute certainty, but it remains exceedingly unlikely. Even though the voices advocating more assertive Japanese nationalism have increased, they represent a distinct minority in Japanese elite opinion. Very few Japanese strategists are prepared to advocate that Tokyo formulate its long-term defense strategy independent of the United States. Even as Japan's defense expenditure has risen to levels surpassed by very few states (the appreciation of the yen has made Japan the world's third leading defense spender in dollar terms), Tokyo's defense plans remain integrally tied to those of the United States. Japan's defense modernization efforts derive directly from sustained American pressure on Tokyo to increase its collaborative security activities. Japan has acquired increasingly capable forces, but these forces do not presage an autonomous defense effort. The Japanese simply do not aspire to such a role.

But Japan is undoubtedly planning for the longer term. As Japanese technological and industrial prowess has grown, the Japanese have ventured into areas where they previously relied on American high technology, notably satellites and aerospace. The 1988–1989 conflict over Japanese access to U.S. fighter-aircraft technology (the FSX controversy) epitomized this phenomenon, with Japan unwilling to accept purchases of off-the-shelf weapons systems from the United States. The move toward an increased role in defense technology development reflects Tokyo's desire to develop its own defense industries, as well as a prudent hedging strategy over the longer term. The Japanese do not want to face the possibility of a future cutoff in access to critical technologies, however remote that possibility might appear. Thus, the enhancement of indigenous technological capabilities is specifically intended to blunt the potential effects of such a worst-case scenario.
The heightening of technological rivalries and the seeming inability of the U.S. and Japan to reach agreement on their persistent trade disputes leave the future shape of relations uncertain. In the midst of the increasingly strident debate over a supposed "Japanese threat," the implications of a major degradation of U.S.-Japanese political and security ties remain virtually ignored. The consequences of a Pacific future without a strong U.S.-Japanese anchor are frightening to contemplate. A Japan freed from its American moorings would presumably move with speed and decisiveness to establish an autonomous security role within East Asia, which would profoundly reshape the regional environment. Such a step would pose a major challenge to all states in East Asia and the West Pacific and would inject major uncertainties in the U.S. political-military role. Denied the use of Japanese bases and facilities, unable to draw upon Japan's increasingly impressive surveillance and antisubmarine warfare assets, and presumably with far less claim on Japanese economic and technological resources, the United States position in the Pacific basin would be gravely weakened.

These observations underscore two inescapable facts. First, Japan remains the linchpin of U.S. Pacific strategy, for which there is simply no substitute. Second, the U.S. security commitment to Japan links Tokyo to American goals and interests in the region while also reassuring states throughout the Pacific that they will not have to confront Japanese military as well as economic might. The United States does not uphold Japan's security as a favor to Japan; it does so because it serves American interests.

Thus, the continued commitment of American military power remains essential to maintaining a relatively stable balance of power in the region, serving to check and to channel Japanese political-military ambitions. As Japanese power continues to grow, the United States is likely to be seen as a principal stabilizing element in the security equation, calming potential anxieties in China, Korea, ASEAN, and the Soviet Union about the unconstrained development of Japanese defense capabilities. In an increasingly fluid political and security environment, American military capabilities could prove quietly decisive.

Should the United States forgo this role in response to or in retaliation for Japan's growing economic and technological challenge, it would constitute a decisive break in postwar U.S. regional strategy. If Japan concluded that the United States was no longer prepared to uphold its security interests, the door would be opened to other options (e.g., a major realignment in Soviet-Japanese relations) that could significantly undermine the U.S. regional position. In the wake of any such policy shift, the capability of the United States to shape longer-term
political and security directions in the Pacific basin would undoubtedly be weakened, perhaps profoundly.

THE IMPACT OF NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Internal political changes in various Asian societies have also placed strains on their alliances with the United States. Countries that were once highly dependent on the United States for their security—South Korea, for example—no longer accept unquestioningly the long-standing basis of these relationships. This does not mean that continued close ties with the United States are unimportant to South Korea, only that there is increased public pressure to alter the terms of the relationship. Even in far more unstable and vulnerable societies (e.g., the Philippines), the combined effects of assertive nationalism and democratization are transforming perceptions and expectations of the U.S. role. It matters little whether the United States considers these effects detrimental to American interests: they are a fact of life that U.S. planners cannot ignore.

The policy context of the desire for more equitable relations with the United States varies from case to case. In South Korea, there have been calls to alter the U.S.-ROK Mutual Security Treaty, including proposed changes in command relationships between American and Korean officers. (We will consider some of the alternative arrangements in a subsequent section.) Some Koreans see less need for reliance on the United States, and want security arrangements to reflect these new circumstances. The pressures for change extend to high-level policy considerations (e.g., continued deployment of tactical nuclear weapons) as well as to local issues that arouse popular resentment (e.g., land use patterns). Neither are trivial: they concern the basis upon which U.S. forces operate within various states, and the economic and political price that must be paid to do so. But very few in Korea would want these changes to prompt a major U.S. reassessment of its continued commitment to Korean security.

Quite apart from the specific policy disputes, these controversies suggest a coming of age along the Pacific Rim. This phenomenon should be considered part of the successful transition from a relationship of dependence on the United States to one in which regional leaders are more able to chart their own course. The ROK presents a highly illustrative case. The South Koreans take justifiable pride in their society's accomplishments; they are increasingly confident about their capacity to counteract North Korean pressure and mount military
forces that can deflect and defeat any potential threats; and they seek engagement with the major communist powers (the "Nordpolitik" policy) from a position of strength and economic advantage. Over time, therefore, the need for U.S. forces is deemed less compelling, even if few Koreans would advocate abrogation of formal U.S. security guarantees to the ROK. Viewed in a long-term sense, then, the direct American security role in South Korea will diminish.

At the same time, these political, economic, and security trends represent a major reconfiguration of the balance of power on the Korean peninsula. With the eventual passage of Kim Il Sung from the political scene in Pyongyang, events could move rapidly in one of several different directions. One scenario posits an abrupt collapse of the authority of the North Korean regime, leading to a rapid move toward reunification comparable to the one now under way in Germany. Another forecast posits a step-by-step accommodation between North and South, thereby reducing the need for U.S. security guarantees. A third possibility might be the continuation of North Korea's confrontational policy toward the South, with a vulnerable, isolated leadership in Pyongyang posing a continued military threat to the ROK.

Although no attempt will be made in this study to assess the relative likeliness of these various scenarios, all would have major implications for the U.S. security role. A reunified, noncommunist Korea would be especially laden with political and strategic significance. The prospect of such a powerful new state as a neighbor to Japan, China, and the Soviet Union would lend added complexity to the regional balance of power. Deeply rooted historical animosities and power rivalries could well be restimulated in such a context. Even if the need for direct U.S. security guarantees to Korea would no longer have the same resonance, American power might be expected to play an important role in balancing (and hopefully ameliorating) the regional rivalries that could well ensue in such a context. Above all, therefore, the United States would seek to inhibit any state or coalition of states from exercising regional political-military predominance.

More immediately volatile issues surround the future of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. These complexes and facilities have been central to the U.S. power-projection role not only in Southeast Asia, but in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as well. Pressures from the Philippines to increase U.S. payments for the bases and proposed restrictions on their use by U.S. forces have reduced their attractiveness to the United States. But the political issue is equally important. American actions to retain specific bases or to renegotiate arrangements for their continued use by U.S. forces imparts a political
signal about the longer-term U.S. stake in the region. As long as the United States deems it essential to project its power in the West Pacific, the bases are an important element in U.S. regional defense planning. This does not make the bases irreplaceable, however, especially if economic and political tensions in the Philippines increase. Consideration therefore needs to be given to the possibility that sustaining the U.S. military presence in the Philippines is no longer a viable option. A U.S. pullout from the bases and the modalities and timing of a repositioning of U.S. forces would constitute a powerful indicator of a change in U.S. commitments.

With the conspicuous exception of the Philippines, however, the immediate U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia is fairly limited. The larger questions are political (i.e., whether to respond to regional calls for reducing potential sources of Soviet-American contention within the region) rather than operational. With the withdrawal of Soviet air and naval assets from Vietnam, pressures to reduce U.S. forces deployed in the region could increase accordingly. Some of these pressures are oriented toward U.S. nuclear weapons deployments, with corollary calls for attenuating the role of major-power military forces (e.g., establishing a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality). However, other states voice concern that a modification of U.S. policy might presage an outright U.S. military withdrawal from the region. For example, leaders in Singapore and Malaysia have both expressed worries about a total U.S. pullout, since this would be an unambiguous indication of the diminished value of Southeast Asia to American interests. It would also compel regional states to confront longer-term challenges to their security without recourse to direct American support.

Viewed in these terms, U.S. adaptations to internal political changes in the Pacific basin will have a pronounced effect on subsequent political and security calculations within the region, especially in the absence of a discernible framework for security collaboration. Among the ASEAN states, for example, diminished concerns about Vietnamese ambitions in the aftermath of Hanoi's withdrawal from Cambodia and lessened anxieties about polarization induced by either the Sino-Soviet rivalry or Soviet-American competition could be supplanted by longer-term worries about Japanese or Chinese domination. Some are expressing concern about the growth of India's naval and air reach. In addition, rivalries over control of natural resources and conflicting territorial claims have led various ASEAN states to augment their indigenous defense capabilities, especially through acquisition of modern combat aircraft. The extremely unsettled outlook in the Philippines adds further to these uncertainties.
Thus, the future U.S. regional presence and American readiness to facilitate collaborative security arrangements within the region will impart a strong signal about the importance that the United States attaches to the region, and could help dampen the drives of various ASEAN members to acquire more advanced arms. American actions will continue to exert a powerful effect on the political, economic, and security dispositions of the regional states, including their incentives to sustain close working relations with the United States. Thus, maintaining a credible and consistent U.S. policy could prove decisive in avoiding destabilizing shocks that would undermine an otherwise very encouraging regional security forecast.

DIMINISHING U.S. DEFENSE RESOURCES

After a decade of significant growth in the U.S. defense budget, the United States has entered a period when the resources committed to national defense are very likely to diminish. The extent of these cutbacks will depend in the final analysis on perceived threats and risks to American interests. However, there is mounting public skepticism about the desirability of maintaining the present force posture, especially in light of decreasing superpower tensions and reduced East-West conflict in the Third World. At the same time, the growth in size and sophistication of various regional economies has convinced many of the necessity for more equitable burden-sharing arrangements, with fewer unilateral U.S. security guarantees. Under these circumstances, the military dimension of U.S. policy will play a less central role in securing U.S. interests; Americans seem less willing to pay the price.

Thus, U.S. defense resources will shrink in the 1990s, setting limits on military deployments not only in the coming decade but into the early twenty-first century as well. Short of a major crisis that reverses this trend, the U.S. regional military posture is very likely to contract. The larger questions concern the extent of these reductions, the pace at which they occur, and the areas targeted for cutbacks. Ideally, any reductions would follow a careful consideration of the ends, means, and strategic priorities of U.S. policy, but this process all too often bears little relation to the political and security goals that American power is intended to serve.

In the present context, however, a number of trends have converged in American thinking and on the part of its regional security partners. Considered as a whole, they suggest a still vital role for U.S. forces in the Pacific basin, but at lower numbers.
Thus, the assumptions that have guided U.S. regional security policy are undergoing major modification, which will in turn shape subsequent political choices for the United States. Six major conclusions seem apparent:

- The Soviet threat, though still very real in the Pacific, will at least partly recede, with Soviet capabilities focused more narrowly on homeland and bastion defense.
- Total U.S. defense expenditure seems very likely to decline in real terms.
- PACOM will share in these cuts, though reductions in the European theater are likely to be greater.
- The relative emphasis devoted to warfighting in the Pacific will diminish, with increased priority to the more political purposes served by U.S. military power.
- Maintaining sovereignty over U.S. bases will prove less critical to overall U.S. strategy, though access for maintenance, refueling, and related needs will continue to be important.
- As the direct security role of U.S. forces contracts, there will be an increasing effort to define American engagement and regional commitments in nonmilitary terms.

The search for a political concept for the future American role in the Pacific basin must be conducted in light of these judgments and factors.
III. DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE U.S. STRATEGIES

The rapid changes under way in the Pacific basin have spurred greater attention to formulating a viable American security strategy beyond the year 2000. The need is not necessarily for a new grand design or for a comprehensive security structure (neither has existed in the Pacific in the past), but for crafting a security role appropriate to the regional conditions the United States seems likely to face, and to secure the interests that derive from those conditions. The operative assumptions of previous decades—in particular, the extreme vulnerability of numerous Asian states and their extraordinary dependence on U.S. power and security guarantees—are no longer nearly as relevant. Although very few regional states desire outright U.S. disengagement, many are less willing to support an American security role driven by disproportionate perceptions of the Soviet threat. American military involvement is still widely supported in the Pacific, but this support does not necessarily translate into the precise forces, commitments, and basing arrangements that have long dominated U.S. regional planning. Thus, there is a need for an appropriate political concept to legitimate the U.S. military presence, both to help secure long-term American interests and to embed the American security role in a fully integrated regional policy.

Under conditions of a diminished Soviet threat and with the increasing diffusion of national capabilities, the vocabulary of previous U.S. policy—i.e., containment and extended deterrence—no longer seems fully relevant. However, in the eyes of most Pacific states the United States remains a relatively nonthreatening power and presence, a role that no other major power can fill. Although it is impossible to foresee the precise regional power relationships in another 20 to 25 years, the United States will surely remain an important and most likely the preeminent military power, especially in a maritime context. Most Asian states view the presence of U.S. forces, not the specific capabilities they possess, as the operative symbol of a continued American stake in the region. The United States need not be apologetic about the role played by military power in securing American interests. But there is a need for an explicit argument about the purposes of military power in the short term as well as the long term.

In a short-term sense, sustaining the presence of U.S. forces reflects the persistence of particular military threats, the uncertainties in
longer-term trends, and the unpredictable consequences of the United States falling below a certain level of power, leadership, and involvement. A major contraction in U.S. security responsibilities, in the absence of unambiguous changes in the threats that have driven American regional defense planning, would send the worst of signals—that the United States no longer deems it vital to maintain a major stake in the region. Even as trends suggest a greatly lessening Soviet threat, highly capable Soviet naval and air forces remain deployed in the Northwest Pacific. North Korea’s threat to South Korea—the specific challenge that prompted the buildup in American forces 40 years ago—remains undiminished. Last, and by no means least, U.S. deployments in the Pacific possess an intrinsic importance to U.S. global interests (e.g., the continued need of the United States to project power in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia more generally). The United States should seek to maintain a presence that reassures allies, cautions potential adversaries, and avoids any implication of disengagement that might contribute to highly undesirable outcomes. Such a presence cannot be achieved by simply withdrawing American forces and abdicating U.S. defense responsibilities.

Even if most would concede the need for an appropriate hedging strategy in the short term, many observers see military power as a diminishing asset in the longer run, especially among the industrial democracies.¹ The need, therefore, is to adapt future military deployments and security arrangements to a politically sustainable role for American forces in the Pacific. Thus, the United States must seek to define and maintain an appropriate level of engagement and military strength, even if this does not predict to a force posture of a specific size and configuration.

However, the relationship between military power and international influence is often assumed rather than provable. Military capabilities are not equivalent to other “currencies” of national power (economic power, for example), but they are an essential ingredient in national strategy, even when not geared toward deflecting specific threats. The Pacific region contains some of the world’s most heavily armed states, and absent persuasive evidence that this military power will diminish appreciably, major reductions in U.S. strength are not warranted. By maintaining its forces at a credible level, the United States will convey to adversaries, allies, and nonaligned states its long-term stake in upholding stability and development in the Pacific.

As noted previously, the uncertainties in projecting trends in the Pacific over a period of 20 to 25 years are very large. The relevant "what ifs" include the diminution of the Soviet threat and the character of future Soviet regional involvement, the future political-military role of Japan, China's military capabilities and political-economic orientation, the long-term relationship and balance of forces between the two Koreas, the potential local dominance of regional powers such as Thailand and Indonesia, and (in an Indian Ocean context) the future military capacities and security directions of India. Anticipating or predicting specific outcomes or scenarios is beyond the scope of this report. But the uncertainties associated with this emergent power equation underscore the critical role of American forces: the United States, and only the United States, can play a balancing role among the diverse power relationships that will emerge in the next quarter century. Even if this role is more political than operational, it cannot be performed in the absence of a credible level of U.S. military involvement.

This alternative function is especially relevant to the central issue likely to transcend all others in Pacific basin security over the next quarter century: the political-military role assumed by Japan. The United States must seek to avoid Japanese recourse to an autonomous, offensive military capability. If Japan should arm in a manner that threatens the security of other regional states, other states will follow suit. Thus, the United States assumes a central role in determining future Japanese behavior, and hence regional responses to this behavior. The fact that the United States is now the region's preeminent military power decisively influences perceptions in the Pacific about Japanese power. Absent this U.S. role, Japan's economic and technological dominance would be far more threatening to the Pacific basin as a whole. This consideration makes it imperative that the United States maintain a closely integrated security relationship with Japan that does not invite Japan to move beyond its present responsibilities.

American concerns extend beyond Japan. In the coming decades, the likely enhancement of Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Indian power (as well as the continued strength of the Soviet Union) will also pose major challenges to maintaining regional stability. Smaller states that live in the shadow of more powerful neighbors want neither superpower contention nor domination by larger regional actors. An appropriate American security presence can help prevent a destabilizing military competition among fledgling major powers, as well as provide assurance against any state seeking to achieve predominant influence in the Pacific.
Thus, future security arrangements will serve as a vital indicator of U.S. political intent, goals, and interests; they should contribute to, rather than undermine, the incentives of regional actors to maintain support for the U.S. regional presence. This is easier said than done. There is an unwieldiness in democratic states to reasoned security debate, with deliberations operating at multiple and frequently conflicting levels. The gap between private and public perceptions of threat, the role of domestic politics in security policy debate, and the quieter ongoing understandings that often exist at a military-to-military level frequently confound orderly understanding and analysis. This underscores the need for the United States to articulate clearly the purposes served by the deployment of its military power.

Viewed in the context of likely long-term trends, there appear to be three broad strategic choices that are potentially relevant to the future U.S. regional role.2

The first broad option would be to continue the current strategic design, albeit from a reduced posture (i.e., fewer forces, less base access, etc.). The existing modalities of security cooperation would remain largely intact. These would likely entail a lessened U.S. presence in Korea and Japan, but the base agreements and related understandings would remain largely undisturbed. The U.S. presence in the Philippines would also be reduced, but residual base access would probably be retained, at least for an interim period. This approach would therefore involve changes in the quantity but not the quality of the U.S. role and presence.

The second broad option would be to reduce the U.S. security role and presence and enter into arrangements that progressively shift the security burden to various regional states. The United States would retain a significant role, but more as a balancer and stabilizer. This would likely include changes in the command arrangements and U.S. military presence in Korea, perhaps extending to Japan as well. The modalities of security cooperation would therefore undergo a significant change, with regional actors assuming much greater responsibility for their own security. This could extend to heightened forms of regional or subregional defense collaboration that the United States would seek to facilitate. The United States would remain an important adjunct to these arrangements, but its forward deployments would be greatly

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2A fourth choice, one that would augment U.S. forces in the region, seems increasingly unlikely for both security and budgetary reasons. It would emerge only if the Pacific again becomes a theater for major U.S. military operations, as in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Although such a possibility cannot be excluded logically, it does not comport with the trends identified in this report, and is therefore excluded from further consideration.
reduced, with the United States for all intents and purposes out of the Philippines.

The third broad option would entail a major retrenchment in the U.S. role in Pacific basin security. The United States would retain a largely token presence in the region, with its primary security role restricted to nuclear deterrence and the maintenance of selected naval forces. Although alliance arrangements would most likely remain in place, there would be few if any forward-deployed ground or air forces to meet these obligations in the face of a specific crisis. Regional actors would be expected to “go it alone,” except where the interests of the major powers were to clash openly.

To consider these three broad options in greater detail, we shall now shift attention from these macropolitical alternatives to a consideration of the criteria appropriate to evaluating various potential security arrangements.
IV. FITTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

In Sec. III we sketched three alternative broad strategic concepts that might underlie the future role of U.S. forces in the Pacific region. These choices will shape U.S. security strategy and the regional arrangements the United States develops to carry it out. Since we cannot predict the future environment or the strategic choices with any certainty, we must define and assess alternative sets of security arrangements.

Our approach to defining and assessing these alternative security arrangements is shown in Fig. 1. As a first step, we propose a set of criteria for evaluating security arrangement alternatives. We then develop individual building blocks of candidate security arrangements in the form of cooperative military relationships with security partners, posture and basing options, and security policies. The next step is to assess these building blocks, applying the criteria against the three alternative strategic concepts. The intention is to evaluate security arrangements under each concept. Some building blocks will appear under more than one concept. These arrangements will form the core of a recommended agenda for meeting U.S. security challenges in the Pacific basin over the next 20 to 25 years. The implications of that agenda for USCINCPAC will be examined in Sec. V.

ASSESSMENT CRITERIA FOR CANDIDATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The overriding criterion for evaluating security arrangements is the fit with the strategic concept under consideration. However, an arrangement may fit well with a strategic choice or concept but poorly with the projected regional environment, the U.S. domestic political scene, and the means available to implement the specific course of action.\footnote{One hopes the strategic concept that is selected will be consistent with regional and domestic realities and the means available. In Sec. II we made judgments on what we believe these realities and means available will be.} Accordingly, we posit four criteria for evaluating candidate security arrangements:
Fig. 1—An approach for defining and assessing security arrangement options
The fit of the candidate arrangement with the strategic concept. The principal indicator of the fit is whether or not the arrangement supports (or is at least consistent with) the U.S. regional and global interests and objectives inherent in the concept.

The fit of the candidate arrangement with the projected regional (and global) environment.

The fit of the candidate arrangement with the projected U.S. domestic political environment and the processes and constraints affecting the development of U.S. security policy.

The fit of the candidate arrangement with the projected U.S. means to fulfill this role. These comprise the political, economic, and military capabilities likely to be available to the U.S. leadership in undertaking a security policy for the Pacific region.

We now turn to an examination of candidate security arrangements. We will return to the above criteria later in this section when we assess groupings of building blocks under each strategic concept.

BUILDING BLOCKS OF CANDIDATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

As indicated earlier in the report, we define “security arrangements” as encompassing security relationships with allies (e.g., treaties, agreements, and “understandings”), some specifics of those relationships (e.g., base access, combined exercises, and planning), and U.S. policies that shape the quality of those relationships (e.g., “neither confirm nor deny,” increased burden sharing, and forward deployment posture). This definition suggests the need for a typology to examine subsets of these arrangements. We have found the following categories to be useful for this analysis:

- Military cooperation with security partners to include command modalities, planning, and exercises.
- U.S. military posture and basing in a general sense (not specific force levels and specific bases).
- U.S. security policies to include the economic and political as well as military dimensions.

In the discussion below we specify options in each of these categories.

Military Cooperation. There are at least three modalities of military cooperation: combined command arrangements, planning, and exercises. Table 1 specifies some options in each category and portrays their pros and cons.
### Table 1

**MODALITIES OF MILITARY COOPERATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTHEAST ASIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Establish (gradually) <strong>U.S. military command arrangements in Northeast Asia</strong> that foster greater regional security cooperation</td>
<td>Builds on current bilateral arrangements; fosters more integrated joint operational planning; may reduce demands for staff resources</td>
<td>Runs counter to deep regional sensitivities; may raise more issues than it solves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Turn <strong>UN, CFC commands in Korea over to ROK; reduce U.S. participation</strong></td>
<td>Recognizes increased ROK role in own security, ROK domestic pressures; reduces shock effect of transition in security roles</td>
<td>Undermines basis for increased U.S. role if DPRK invades ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Establish <strong>U.S./Japan/ROK military committee to orchestrate combined defense</strong></td>
<td>Provides clear deterrent signal of resolve for regional defense; creates precedent for regional cooperation</td>
<td>Fails to recognize regional sensitivities; may inflame tensions with DPRK, USSR, PRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Broker <strong>Korea arms control agreement through 4-power (USSR, PRC, Japan, U.S.) security guarantee</strong></td>
<td>Defuses tension in Korea; heads off DPRK irrational act leading to major-power involvement</td>
<td>Could foster image of U.S. abandonment of ROK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHEAST ASIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Foster increased <strong>ASEAN role in regional security; U.S. continue to deter outside interference</strong></td>
<td>Recognizes increased prosperity, nationalism in region</td>
<td>Diminishes U.S. voice in regional security matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <strong>Stronger U.S. bilateral security ties with ASEAN states</strong></td>
<td>Maintains U.S. leverage in regional security matters</td>
<td>Overlooks some ASEAN domestic political factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENTIRE REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reduce level of <strong>U.S. participation</strong> in regional security planning activities and exercises; nuclear deterrent principal U.S. contribution</td>
<td>Cuts back U.S. need for peacetime deployments, costs; retains flexibility</td>
<td>Reduces U.S. leverage in regional security matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Maintain <strong>status quo</strong> in military cooperation, giving way slowly to accommodate regional facts of life as necessary</td>
<td>Exploits current experience, strengths; may strengthen some allies’ confidence in U.S. steadfastness</td>
<td>Puts U.S. on political defensive, surrenderers initiative; may fan nationalism; leaves U.S. vulnerable to shocks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U.S. Military Posture and Basing. This class of security building blocks overlaps both with the underlying strategic concepts that support the U.S. regional military role and with the military strategies intended to implement them. We leave the specifics for follow-on research. In this study, we are interested in broad perspectives and options, e.g., strategic focus on forward-deployed forces or centrally based forces. Table 2 portrays the options we have examined. To avoid confusion as we refer to specific options later in this section, the option numbers continue sequentially from those used in Table 1.

U.S. Security Policies. The last aggregation of security arrangement building blocks lies in the area of U.S. security policies—such as the U.S. arms control stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the "neither confirm nor deny" policy as it applies to the presence of nuclear weapons. These policies influence and are influenced by the first two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
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<tr>
<td>9. Emphasize forward-deployed/based forces</td>
<td>Emphasizes retention of deterrent and major U.S. regional role</td>
<td>Conflicts with basing and fiscal realities; ties down forces in one region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Retain as much base structure as regional situation will allow</td>
<td>Provides flexibility for uncertain future; permits effective force redeployment</td>
<td>Involves possibly unacceptable political and monetary costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Withdraw some forces from region and close some bases; rely more on U.S.-based forces, nuclear deterrent</td>
<td>Recognizes increased role of regional powers; reduces costs; may be in better accord with domestic political realities</td>
<td>Results in loss of regional leverage, ability to respond to important contingencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Emphasize power projection component of forward-deployed forces (at expense of defensive component)</td>
<td>Complements force capabilities of regional states; plays to U.S. force strengths</td>
<td>Unbalances U.S. capabilities for unilateral action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Augment current base or access opportunities to hedge against loss</td>
<td>Offers potential of retaining U.S. regional leverage at acceptable political cost</td>
<td>Involves possibly unacceptable monetary costs; may not attenuate regional political pressures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2
MACROPOSTURING AND BASING OPTIONS
sets of building blocks. Table 3 portrays the options we have examined. Again, to avoid later confusion the numbers continue sequentially from those used in Table 2.

**LINKING BUILDING BLOCKS TO CANDIDATE CRITERIA**

As discussed in the preceding section, there are three broad strategic concepts:

- *Continuation of the current strategic concept*, albeit from a reduced force posture (i.e., fewer forces, less base access, etc.). The existing modalities of security cooperation would remain intact.
- *Reduction in the U.S. security role* and regional presence and entering into arrangements that progressively shift the security burden to various regional states. There would be fewer U.S. forces and bases, but those that remained would be designed to fit more closely with the capabilities of our regional security partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Pros</th>
<th>Cons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. Reduce deployment of theater nuclear forces</td>
<td>Lowers visibility of contentious basing issue; conforms in principle with &quot;nuclear free&quot; interests</td>
<td>Reduces credibility of extended deterrence; reduces nuclear warfare fighting posture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Participate in regional arms control</td>
<td>Improves U.S. image; seen as responsible step by some U.S. friends</td>
<td>Reduces U.S. flexibility in contingencies; &quot;slippery slope&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Accept Soviet offer to leave Vietnam as part of overall regional reduction</td>
<td>Makes virtue of necessity if U.S. leaves Philippines bases</td>
<td>Is not a fair trade—U.S. values presence in region more than USSR does</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Tie much of regional military presence to cost offsets by host country</td>
<td>Lets U.S. have best of both worlds: leverage at lower cost</td>
<td>Involves unwelcome &quot;strings&quot; tied to offsets; host reluctance to pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Use economic leverage as substitute (not complement) for deployed forces in maintaining regional influence</td>
<td>Poses less contentious issues than bases, military presence</td>
<td>Involves possible false choice, not clear-cut &quot;either/or&quot;; invites U.S. political meddling</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
• A major political-military retrenchment in the U.S. security role in the Pacific basin. The United States would retain a largely token presence in the region, with its primary security role restricted to nuclear deterrence and reduced naval forces.

The next step is to evaluate the specific arrangements. We display the results in Fig. 2, wherein individual security arrangement building blocks are measured against the three strategic concepts and the four criteria. A filled box in Fig. 2 suggests an adequate fit. However, we first need to say a few words about the process used to make these judgments.

Our assessment requires thinking qualitatively in three dimensions simultaneously. We did not find it a simple exercise—both because of its complexity and because of the absence of important information in a necessarily brief description of each concept, criterion, and security arrangement. The reader is asked to feel free to expand the matrix in all dimensions—criteria, alternative concepts, and security arrangement options. We believe that the identified arrangements are important and useful, but not necessarily complete. Similarly, judgments as to "fit" represent long-range projections of regional security trends supported by a number of knowledgeable regional and security policy analysts.  

Some arrangements appear more than once across strategic concepts and across criteria. These options are the most robust, and in some cases the most obvious. They should represent at least part of the U.S. security policy agenda for the future of the Pacific basin.

According to this assessment, the following security arrangements should form the core of a national security agenda for the Pacific as the United States adjusts to the changing environment and seeks to avoid adverse shocks.

Option

1. Revise U.S. command arrangements in Northeast Asia to provide an umbrella organization to foster greater regional security cooperation.  

2 The authors used a workshop to help vet candidate security arrangements, political concepts, and evaluation criteria. Participants in the workshop are identified in the Acknowledgments section of this report. As in any workshop with such diverse membership, consensus views were difficult to identify with certainty. Needless to say, the information in Tables 1 through 3 and Fig. 2 was not agreed upon by all participants. These disclaimers notwithstanding, we believe the tables can be reasonably described as a product of that workshop.

3 There are several possible forms for such an organization—some of them controversial. Our point is that it is unlikely that current U.S. organizational structures in Korea and Japan will continue to fit regional realities over the next 25 years.
### Building Blocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Strategic concept</th>
<th>Global, regional considerations</th>
<th>U.S. domestic considerations</th>
<th>U.S. means available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. U.S. commands in NEA</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. ROK commands</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Korean arms control</td>
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<td>5. Increased ASEAN role</td>
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<td>6. Bilateral U.S./ASEAN ties</td>
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<td>7. Reduced U.S. role</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Status quo cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Emphasize forward forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Retain base structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Withdraw some forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Emphasize power projection</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Augment access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Reduce th. nuc. deployment</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Regional arms control</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Trade RP for VN bases</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17. More cost offsets</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Use economic leverage</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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Fig. 2—Fit of security arrangement building blocks with strategic concepts and assessment criteria
2. Turn UN and CFC commands in Korea over to the ROK, and reduce U.S. participation.
3. Establish a U.S./Japan/ROK military committee to orchestrate combined defense.
5. Foster an increased ASEAN role in regional security as the U.S. role decreases.
8. Maintain the status quo in military cooperation, giving way slowly to accommodate regional facts of life as necessary.
9. Emphasize forward-deployed/based forces, even if total forces available are smaller.
12. Emphasize the power projection component of forward-deployed forces at the expense of the defensive component.
14. Reduce the deployment of theater nuclear forces.4
15. Prepare to participate in the regional arms control process if regional developments and U.S. policy move in that direction.
17. Tie more of the U.S. regional military presence to cost offsets by the host country.

The principal thrusts of this core agenda are:

- To rationalize U.S. security arrangements in Northeast Asia in the form of a regional security partnership. (1,2,3)
- To foster an increased ASEAN role in Southeast Asian security, with the U.S. maintaining as much of a support role as regional realities permit. (5,8)
- To maintain U.S. power projection forces based or deployed forward in the region while reducing the deployment of theater nuclear forces. (9,12,14) This would also reduce defensive forces as necessary to fit the means available.
- To discourage further increases in Japanese military spending while seeking funding offsets for U.S. security expenses. (1,3,12,17)

The other options in the core agenda are not necessarily unimportant. Rather, they should be considered as circumstances and U.S. political concepts evolve. Seen in this context, the Philippines bases are not a central issue if there are other means of supporting a comparable or somewhat lower forward-deployed force level.

The selection of strategic concepts and building block security arrangements is a decision to be made by the U.S. national security leadership. USCINCPAC's role is to assist in the identification of

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4Reducing theater nuclear forces can be done in several ways, including removing them from surface ships but not from submarines. The details are important but beyond the scope of this report.
candidate arrangements, assess their utility and cost, provide advice throughout the process, and implement the ultimate decisions. Most of this report has been developed from a top-level national perspective. In the next section, we will turn to the implications of our analysis for USCINCPAC.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR USCINCPAC

Implications of the changing environment and the suggested alternative strategic concepts for security arrangements can be categorized in many ways.

- Across the time of interest—e.g., short term (0–3 years), mid term (3–10 years), and long term (10–25 years).
- Across environmental attribute—e.g., political, economic, and military.
- Across strategic concepts that shape national security policymaking—e.g., status quo, some role modification and retrenchment, or major reductions in commitments as outlined in Sec. IV.
- Across types of security arrangement—e.g., military cooperation, U.S. military posture and basing, and U.S. security policies.
- By the roles that USCINCPAC might play in affecting policy and resource allocation changes—e.g., developing options, proffering advice, assessing alternatives, and implementing decisions.
- Across degree of difficulty—e.g., default, likely with small expenditure of political capital, problematic.

The most useful dimensions for USCINCPAC are likely to be temporal (item one), specific options (item four), and role (item five). The other dimensions will be woven into the discussion presented below as opportunity permits. Our assumption is that USCINCPAC is most interested in the core policy and resource allocation actions that would support the widest plausible range of possible future developments. While he must hedge against the implausible, he is not likely to make it the foundation of his planning. Moreover, whether we are examining the short, mid, or long term, we are interested in what actions USCINCPAC should take now (or soon) as they affect the term of interest. Thus, the discussion to follow has a dual focus: contingent futures in the short, mid, and long terms, and actions USCINCPAC should take now to shape or adjust to those futures.

In structuring our discussion, we will invert the normal order and address the long term first—to temper the recommended national security actions so that they are not unduly distorted by the pressures of short-term expediency. That is, midterm actions should be consistent with long-term actions, and short-term actions consistent with both.
THE LONG TERM (10–25 YEARS)

This period extends to the horizon of broad strategic planning—not
the resource programming, war or contingency planning, or current
policy planning horizons. Here the CINC is acting as the on-scene
steward of the nation’s long-term national security interests in Asia.
He is the only person in the national security establishment who has the
perspective, the responsibility, and the authority to undertake those
duties.1 If USCINCPAC does not look at the long term seriously, there
are few who can remedy that oversight.

USCINCPAC’s current efforts oriented to the long term should be
centered on three areas: information collection and analysis, policy
research, and “consciousness raising” within the national security
establishment. He should be attempting to help shape the long-term
U.S. national security agenda for the region. He will do this by being
well informed and by having thought through and assessed the most
interesting options. He should be identifying those things that need to
be done in the short term to influence the long term, and then advising
the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. The research
documented in this report and other project papers is intended as a
modest contribution to collecting some of the necessary information
and structuring the analysis.

A principal target of USCINCPAC’s efforts should be long-range
planning within the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Perhaps even more important is
the PACOM Headquarters Staff’s contribution to the CINC’s speeches,
appearances before the Defense Planning Board and congressional
committees, and communications with foreign officials.

What security arrangements should be of most interest to the CINC
in long-term planning? Our analysis suggests that his most important
task is to understand the potential for significant changes in the security
environment, particularly adverse changes, since current circumstances
in the Pacific basin are generally favorable. Dangerous potential
changes or strategic nightmares need to be examined closely. These
changes might include:

- A rupture in the current Japanese-American relationship that is
  based on or aided by:
    - Accession to power of a left-wing or right/nationalist govern-
      ment.
    - Increasing threats of economic warfare between the two
      states.

1The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs does not have
executive responsibility and authority.
— A détente between Japan and the Soviet Union.
— U.S. military retrenchment followed by a Japanese decision to rearm, possibly with nuclear weapons.
— Aggressive Japanese action to "corner" the resources of Southeast Asia, either economically or militarily.
— Exclusion of Japan from major commercial markets.

• An expansionist or increasingly hegemonic China that had enough nuclear capabilities to render extended deterrence by U.S. forces less credible. This development might be based on or aided by:
  — A relative decline in Soviet power because of internal weakness, permitting China to remedy political grievances with Taiwan and along its southern border.
  — A resumption of Korean hostilities with Chinese involvement.
  — A need to counter Japanese expansionism—a race to gain the resources of Southeast Asia.
  — A political or military humiliation administered to China by Japan or the United States.

• A global or regional arms control environment that seriously limits U.S. freedom of action in protecting its security interests. Such an environment might follow from the following developments:
  — A U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement that greatly reduced forces on both sides or restricted their employment, such that the U.S. could not protect its interests against a non-Soviet adversary.
  — Nuclear arms control agreements that degraded the U.S. theater nuclear posture and weakened deterrence against irrational acts by an antagonistic power.

• A militant, expansionist Indonesia that threatened to close lines of communication in its claimed territorial waters and air space. Such a development might result from:
  — A rise of Muslim fundamentalism on the Iranian model.
  — Resentment of great-power military intrusion in what it considered its own sphere of influence.

• A revolution in the Republic of Korea, with strong anti-U.S. overtones.

• A nuclear-armed North Korea.
There are other nightmares (for example, a Korea unified on DPRK terms), but these will do for a starter set. USCINCPAC should undertake analysis that defines the scenarios and the potential paths leading to them. These scenarios and their contributing events should provide the basis for long-term policy actions taken to avoid or prepare for these possibilities. Implications of the scenarios for USCINCPAC are:

- He should regard the Asia-Pacific region as an arena for multiple major actors in the unfolding regional security equation. None of our relationships with those actors are immutable in the long term. His short-term and midterm force rationale should allow consideration of the major changes in the long-term threat.

- He should prepare alternatives to current U.S. positions on antinuclear sentiment in the region. Antinuclear sentiment in Japan and elsewhere may be less a curse than a blessing in disguise. Future CONUS-based systems may be adequate to discharge U.S. theater missions.

- He should prepare alternatives to current short-term and midterm policies, such as “neither confirm nor deny,” to see if they fit trends in the region. Our alliance with Japan under a future government more sensitive to the nuclear issue should not be allowed to suffer as a consequence of policies that have outlived their utility.²

- He should evaluate the role of theater and tactical nuclear weapons in PACOM in a post-START I and II environment. Proliferation may be more of a threat than limits on our nuclear weapons or deployment of nuclear-powered forces.

- He should reexamine (perhaps using gaming) the implications of a possible renewed Taiwan crisis as China regains sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao.

- He should start thinking now about how a smaller—perhaps much smaller—PACOM force structure should be postured: the balance between forward- and rear-deployed forces, the balance between projection and defensive forces, the balance among air, ground, and naval forces, the balance between active and reserve structures, and the balance with force structures of our allies. Forces take decades to build and deploy; planning must start now

² Some have suggested denuclearizing the U.S. surface fleet to ensure continued regional access with conventional forces. We are not prepared to go that far. But it is important for USCINCPAC to understand the logic of such arguments and to assess the middle ground as circumstances change.
and its baseline adjusted regularly to reflect current political realities and potential future changes.

- He should define the desirable baseline military relationships (e.g., exercises, staff exchanges, confidence building) with all the major and second-line powers in the region to hedge against future uncertainties. A future security relationship with the Soviets should not be ruled out.

All of these topics offer a rich menu for analysis, consciousness raising, and intellectually groundbreaking actions. In many cases these efforts might take the form of informed conversations with officials in DoD and the State Department, and (discreetly) with foreign governments.

Looking back at the 18 candidate security arrangement options examined in Sec. IV, the following warrant particular attention as they apply to the long term:

Option

4. Broker Korea arms control agreement through four-power security guarantees.

5. Foster an increased ASEAN role in regional security, with the U.S. role limited to deterring outside interference.

11. Withdraw some forces from the region and close some bases, relying more on U.S.-based forces and the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

14. Reduce deployment of theater nuclear forces.

15. Participate in regional arms control.

THE MID TERM (3–10 YEARS)

The mid term represents the programming and the extended-range war planning horizon. In this period the CINC acts as the developer of requirements associated with the midterm strategic landscape. He is an advocate seeking to ensure that regional security needs are adequately addressed in national leadership councils. His efforts focus on three areas: threat analysis, military strategy development, and resource allocation at various investment levels.

3We are not recommending adoption of these security arrangement options. We are saying that their implications need to be fully understood so that USCINCPAC can argue against them persuasively or, alternatively, participate effectively in their implementation if they are adopted by the national political leadership in future years.
All these efforts are measured against alternative assumptions about security arrangements. While the long term is more oriented to shaping the domain of choice, in the mid term the CINC must begin to make (or advise on the selection of) choices. During this period the operative political concepts become clearer. He needs to supplement core planning on security arrangements with particular attention to the arrangements most closely associated with the emerging political concept.

The principal objective of USCINCPAC's efforts should be to influence military strategy development and the programming of resources. The Defense Planning Guidance, the National Military Strategy, and related processes and documentation are the focus of these activities.

Looking beyond Washington, the CINC's interest is in fostering a regional environment in which future commanders can employ national military capabilities effectively, in concert with other instruments of national power. He is setting the stage for needed changes. For example, if that stage setting involves stimulating a greater ASEAN role in regional security as U.S. force deployments decline, it means attempting to generate a consensus for greater regional security coordination. This might start with expanded bilateral exercises and inviting defense officials from ASEAN to USCINCPAC briefings, demonstrations, and exercises. Recent CINCs have been keenly aware of this responsibility.

What security interests should be given priority during the mid term? Our analysis suggests five major interests:

- Preserving the U.S.-Japanese alliance against the vicissitudes of possible commercial warfare, a somewhat reduced U.S. regional military posture, and a reshaped political environment (e.g., a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and the return of the northern territories).

- Planning prudently for an altered security relationship with the Republic of Korea. The CINC must help define how the United States can provide for Korean security during a time of an undiminished threat and a reduced U.S. military posture.

- Fostering greater regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia while protecting vital U.S. interests. The two most vexing questions are reducing potential instability on the Korean peninsula and orchestrating greater Japanese-ROK-U.S. security cooperation.

- Establishing a security regime in Southeast Asia that better distributes the political costs of the U.S. military presence among the host nations. A prudent transition to less reliance on Philippines bases is integral to this question.
• Reposturing PACOM forces to fit reduced DoD resources. Left to their own devices, other players (the services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress) will restructure forces to optimize traditional service missions, meet narrowly defined cost-effectiveness objectives, or bring forces home to specific congressional districts. USCINCPAC must be the advocate for regional security to counteract these tendencies.

Looking back at the 18 candidate security arrangement options examined in Sec. IV, the following seem likely to warrant particular attention in the mid term:

Option

1. Reexamine U.S. military command arrangements in Northeast Asia with a view toward fostering greater regional security cooperation and streamlining U.S. staff resources.

2. Transfer command of forces in Korea to ROK.

5. Foster an increased ASEAN role in regional security, with the U.S. role limited to deterring outside interference.

9. Emphasize preservation of forward-deployed/based forces in any future drawdown, sacrificing some warfighting capability if necessary.

12. Emphasize preservation of the power projection component of forward-deployed forces in any future drawdown.

THE SHORT TERM (0–3 YEARS)

This period encompasses the budget execution and war and contingency planning horizons. The CINC is vitally interested in the current budget, the one being considered by the Congress, and the one being developed within the DoD programming and budgeting cycle.

This period covers current and planned force operations and exercises, responding to present political and military threats, and exercising stewardship over the resources committed to the security of the Pacific region. The planner calls this capabilities planning and operations, as opposed to the requirements planning that characterizes the mid and long terms.

The principal objectives of the CINC’s planning should be to interact with the services, the JCS, and the Secretary of Defense to insure that budgets and forces support current operations and war and
contingency planning. In the short term, he is bound by existing security arrangements. But changes are likely to be implemented "on his watch." He must be involved in or apprised of ongoing negotiations about arrangements that affect his responsibilities (e.g., Philippines base negotiations).

Which security interests should be of particular importance to the CINC during the short term? Most of them are obvious:

- Preventing undue jeopardy to long-term regional security objectives that might result from budgetary turbulence and premature downgrading of regional security threats. Timely CINC inputs to the National Military Strategy documents and his testimony before the Defense Planning Board and the Congress are therefore critical.

- Gaining a better understanding of regional force requirements absent a Soviet threat.4

- Preparing alternative options in the event of a phaseout of the Philippine bases or a major reduction in U.S. access to the bases.

- Buttressing U.S.-Japanese security cooperation and information sharing in advance of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan in 1991. The United States and Japan need to insure that their actions and responses to Soviet initiatives do not surprise one another and that the Soviets surprise neither. USCINCPAC has a key role in this confidence building and planning.

- Assessing arms control options and proposing alternatives that safeguard U.S. interests.5

SOME CLOSING OBSERVATIONS

The next five years will probably mark a major watershed in postwar regional security planning in the Pacific. The threat is changing. Our friends are getting more powerful in almost every dimension. At the same time, our resources committed to regional security will surely decrease—at least in the short term, and probably in the mid-

4See testimony of James A. Winnefeld on January 31, 1990 before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the subject of Arms Control in Asia.

5Pacific arms control proposals in general, and naval arms control proposals in particular, have received short shrift in Washington. While an unpleasant prospect to many in DoD, future developments may result in U.S. entry to the regional arms control dialogue. To be an informed and articulate participant in that dialogue, USCINCPAC will need his own assessment of the situation. He should not rely solely on DoD guidance.
and long terms as well. Furthermore, the potential for adverse shocks is substantial. The margin for error is shrinking and the stakes are increasing.

Not since the dark days of World War II has there been a more important time for clear thinking, articulate and balanced advocacy, and careful broad-gauge planning by USCINCPAC and his staff. Their most difficult task will be getting ahead of the problems rather than reacting to them. They can expect guidance, but not much help, from Washington. They must give priority to shaping that guidance. To perform that role effectively, USCINCPAC must be recognized as the most knowledgeable adviser to the national leadership on regional security issues. That credibility is gained by a combination of knowledge (based on analysis and planning), open minds, imaginative thinking, and candor.
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