Is Soviet Defense Policy Becoming Civilianized?

Benjamin S. Lambeth
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Benjamin S. Lambeth

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PREFACE

The RAND Corporation is providing analytical support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the subject of ongoing developments in Soviet military affairs. This two-year effort seeks to identify and explain the major elements of change in Soviet military organization, concepts, and goals since the rise of President Gorbachev and his "new political thinking." It looks beyond the rhetoric of glasnost toward the underlying motivations for the many departures that have occurred in such areas as Soviet declaratory policy, operational doctrine, national security decisionmaking, and defense resource allocation.

This report examines the changing structure and context of Soviet defense decisionmaking, with special emphasis on the growing role of civilians in the shaping of Soviet national security policy. Prior to Gorbachev's assumption of power, jurisdiction over such key policy inputs as military doctrine and strategy, force requirements, military resource needs, and, to a considerable degree, arms control negotiating positions was a near-exclusive prerogative of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Today, this former military monopoly is being challenged by a host of newcomers to the defense scene, including the Foreign Ministry, the Supreme Soviet, and an ambitious cadre of civilian defense intellectuals attached to the social science research institutes of the Academy of Sciences. The result has been an unprecedented infusion of pluralism into Soviet defense politics and a significant change in the content and goals of Soviet military policy.

The research reported here was conducted in the International Security and Defense Policy Program of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should be of interest to members of the U.S. defense policy community concerned with evolving Soviet military policy, civilian-military relations, defense policy formulation, and arms control behavior.
SUMMARY

Since Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power in 1985, a host of aspiring players from outside the uniformed ranks have sought to make inroads into the Soviet defense decisionmaking process. These people are well aware of the role played by their counterparts in the United States and are striving for comparable involvement in the Soviet system.

This emergence of a new community of civilian defense intellectuals is the most visible manifestation of a broader trend in Soviet defense politics under Gorbachev. For one thing, there has been a marked increase in the role and importance of the Foreign Ministry. Under the aggressive leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze, this once-marginal institution, at least where defense and strategy were concerned, is now making a determined bid for greater influence over Soviet security policy. There has also been the recent creation of a Defense and State Security committee within the Supreme Soviet. This group has been expressly set up to help staff the Supreme Soviet in the latter's newly established role of providing legislative oversight of Soviet defense policy. The result of these developments has been a significant erosion of the former monopoly held by the Defense Ministry and the General Staff in formulating Soviet military programs and policy.

These new civilian contestants nurture high policymaking ambitions. Yet the returns are not in on whether they have progressed from the status of contenders for influence to more established positions of responsibility and authority. Gorbachev seems determined to shift the locus of power from the traditional national security bureaucracy toward a more open setting. This process, however, remains in flux as the various participants continue to jockey for increased access and a more formalized role. For its part, the military has shown mounting displeasure over the assault on its professional turf. The persistence of the opposing forces makes it too early to tell for sure whether Soviet defense politics have already become civilianized. Yet the trends are unmistakably pointed in that direction and seem likely to remain so as long as Gorbachev's broader reform effort continues on track.

The Soviet defense intellectual community is largely composed of members of the social science research institutes of the Academy of Sciences. The most important and well-known of these are the Institute of the USA and Canada and the Institute of World Economics and
International Relations. Although the leading staffers at these organizations briefly flourished during the latter years of Khrushchev’s rule, they were locked out of the policy arena almost entirely throughout the Brezhnev era. For nearly two decades, they were obliged to show due obeisance to the party line in their academic writings while the Brezhnev Politburo and the High Command maintained a virtual stranglehold over Soviet defense policy.

Since the onset of the Gorbachev reforms, however, these scholars have fought hard, and with considerable success, to become a source of alternative counsel to the Soviet leadership on security policy. With their newly acquired license to speak freely on controversial issues, they have produced a deluge of provocative writings over the past four years on such matters as strategic stability, the conventional balance in Europe, quantitative techniques in defense analysis, military doctrine, and arms control. Because they are not members of the defense establishment, there is much uncertainty about how much access these civilians enjoy. Nevertheless, they are making concerted efforts to be taken seriously by Western defense experts and their own military.

In this respect, the Soviet defense community seems to have entered an experience much like the one the U.S. national security community underwent in the early 1960s, as outside institutions like RAND and civilian experts in the McNamara Pentagon began to develop and apply rigorous techniques of operational analysis, forcing the services to come up with equally convincing ways of justifying their bureaucratic stances in the policy arena. It is too early to tell how this process will ultimately play itself out. Clearly, however, the battle lines are being drawn and the General Staff is taking a hard look at what it must do to remain competitive with these upstart civilian challengers.

By and large, the Soviet military has been grudgingly supportive of perestroika, insofar as the latter has sought to bolster those sectors of the Soviet economy that promise to affect long-term military performance. Where the military has dug in its heels has been with regard to Gorbachev’s defense budget cuts and unilateral force reductions. This unhappiness has been reflected in the High Command’s discomfort over the advocacy of these measures by civilians who, in the military’s view, lack the professionalism and technical competence to render such judgments responsibly. There have been numerous signs of a mounting military backlash against this unwelcome meddling in defense matters by what the High Command regards, with open disdain, as self-promoting academic dilettantes.
Increasingly since 1987, military spokesmen have closed ranks and mounted a lively defense against these affronts to their authority. Not only has the High Command shown an abiding distaste for being lectured to by what it considers untutored amateurs, it has reflected a strong determination to protect the inviolability of its traditional prerogatives in the formulation of Soviet defense policy. Whether the military hierarchy can successfully endure this attempt to undermine its long-standing power base remains to be seen. But it is clear that the General Staff now realizes that it is on the defensive in seeking the ear of Gorbachev and his allies.

Many of the civilian specialists who have begun to speak out on defense matters have expressed a clear vision of their proper role in the Soviet defense process. Some, particularly the younger and more aggressive institute researchers, appear driven less by any particular policy orientation than by a strong career-oriented desire to broaden the arena of defense policymaking and to stake out a more influential place for themselves in it. These newcomers are in for some tough going as they seek to garner the recognition and respect of the military at the same time that they pursue influence at the latter's expense.

By his expansion of the number of participants, the availability of selected military data, the license to hold forth on controversial issues, and the resultant diversity of inputs into the defense debate, Gorbachev has sought to bring about a fundamental change in the structure of Soviet defense decisionmaking. One should take care, however, not to conclude from this still-nascent trend that the Soviet style of security planning is invariably headed toward convergence with our own. The recent rise of civilian involvement in the Soviet defense debate has been a much more political than institutional phenomenon. As such, it remains inseparably linked to Gorbachev's personal ambitions and fortunes and should not be regarded, at least not yet, as a natural outgrowth of heightened pluralism in Soviet foreign and defense policy formulation.

Although the present encroachment of civilian influence in Soviet defense planning remains of uncertain outcome, it nevertheless warrants scrutiny as a trend with important implications for the East-West relationship. The progressive institutionalization of a multiple-advocacy system in Soviet strategic policy formulation would increase the likelihood that other than narrow military-technical and service-specific considerations will begin to govern Soviet defense resource apportionment. This might, in turn, allow for greater integration of military planning into broader Soviet domestic and foreign policy calculations. Such a development would by no means assure an easing of the East-West compe-
tition in and of itself. However, it would certainly heighten the prospect for a moderation in the terms and modalities of that competition. To that extent, it is a trend that should be encouraged by the United States.

The main pitfall for the West to avoid is conjuring up a fait accompli in its own planning by concludes prematurely that what remains an unfinished quest for increased civilian influence in Soviet defense planning has already become an established fact. Those in the leadership responsible for the prevailing vector of policy almost certainly have motivations larger than simply the advancement of the defense intelligentsia. As has been the case throughout their two-decade-old history, the defense intellectuals’ ties to the policy apparatus have been largely personal rather than institutional, and their influence has been entirely at the indulgence of the ruling elite.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular, has recently opened its doors to selected invitees from among the institutional academics. Yet we must remember that the MFA is pitted in a bureaucratic adversary relationship with the Defense Ministry and the General Staff for control over the direction and content of Soviet security planning. It is within the latter two organizations that the operational and technical details of Soviet defense policy continue to be worked out. And there is no sign yet that civilians have been welcomed into that closed arena—or are likely to be in the foreseeable future.

Should the defense intellectuals nevertheless establish themselves as a credible countervailing influence on Soviet defense policy, a plausible response by the services—echoing what happened in the United States when McNamara brought his civilian systems analysts into the Pentagon in 1961—might well be to accept the challenge, cast aside their old ways, and acquire the needed skills to compete with these civilians on their own terms.

Over the long haul, there is no assurance that Gorbachev himself will successfully weather the profound forces that currently threaten the disintegration of the Soviet state. Alternatives to perestroika have been vocally articulated across a wide spectrum of Soviet opinion, and there are darker scenarios of the Soviet future that range from a reversion to political stasis and degeneration (possibly even leading to civil war) to the establishment of a military-bureaucratic praetorian guard, with unknown and possibly grave consequences for international security. Should Gorbachev eventually fall by the wayside in this or any other manner, it goes without saying that the trends discussed above could end up becoming a passing anomaly in Soviet history.
For the moment, however, it is irrelevant whether the civilian contenders for influence in the Soviet defense arena are accepted by the military or, as increasingly seems to be the case, are regarded by them as entrenched adversaries to be resisted with every measure available. The fact is that Gorbachev has consciously sought to broaden the base of participation in Soviet defense politics and thus enrich the quality and breadth of inputs into Soviet security planning. Those defense intellectuals and other civilians who have spent years waiting patiently for this moment have been quick to identify and seize opportunities to enter the arena as a result. Their ultimate success, if it occurs, may or may not mean an end to the historic competition between the Soviet Union and the West. It will, however, guarantee that any relationship that eventually emerges will entail a more cosmopolitan Soviet adversary and a major alteration in the geopolitical challenge it represents.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Earlier drafts of this report benefited from the suggestions of my RAND colleagues John Hines, Eugene Rumer, John Van Oudenaren, and Sergei Zamascikov. I also profited from the reactions of various U.S. government participants at a workshop on trends in the Soviet armed forces held in RAND’s Washington Office on May 16, 1990, at which the main findings of this report were presented. My understanding of the changing character of the Soviet defense debate was further enriched by several opportunities I had to discuss some of the trends reported here at first hand with a number of the objects of my study’s inquiry, notably Dr. Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and Major General (Ret.) Valentin Larionov, a consultant to the institute, both at RAND and in Moscow; and Drs. Alexei Arbatov and Aleksandr Savelyev and several of their colleagues during a roundtable discussion at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in Moscow in December 1989. Last, I am indebted to my RAND colleagues Rose Gottemoeller and Stephen Larrabee for their helpful reviews of my final manuscript.
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# GLOSSARY

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APN</td>
<td>Novosti Press Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMEMO</td>
<td>Institute of World Economics and International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear Forces</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>KGB</td>
<td>Committee for State Security</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Main Political Administration</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNIISI</td>
<td>All-Union Scientific Institute for Systems Research</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

As in most areas of Soviet domestic and foreign affairs, radical changes have been under way in Soviet defense policy since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985. Barely months after Gorbachev entered office, the Soviet media began issuing proclamations with mounting insistence that the USSR was forging a more moderate military doctrine, seeking significant reductions in nuclear and conventional arms, and striving for an improved East-West relationship based on mutual accommodation. The first hints of this refrain appeared in a speech by Gorbachev in France shortly after his assumption of power.\(^1\) Confirmation came in the Soviet leader’s keynote address to the 27th Party Congress, which formally codified the new doctrine.\(^2\) This message was later ratified in a joint Warsaw Pact declaration issued in Berlin.\(^3\) In short order, these signals coalesced into what has since come to be heralded by the Soviet press as a new military doctrine built on the twin pillars of “reasonable sufficiency” and “non-offensive defense.”\(^4\)

Although Western observers were at first skeptical about these claims,\(^4\) it no longer suffices to fault the Soviets for purveying words unmatched by actions. On the contrary, the Soviet military scene since 1987 has become a kaleidoscope of activity. Dominating developments has been Gorbachev’s decision, announced at the United Nations on December 7, 1988, to cut Soviet forces unilaterally by 500,000 men.\(^5\) There are likewise moves afoot to scale back Soviet weapons production and to shift a sizable portion of the defense industry to the civilian sector.\(^6\) Finally, and perhaps most important for the

\(^1\)It was in this address that Gorbachev first broached the idea of “reasonable sufficiency” as an appropriate Soviet force planning goal. Speech by M. S. Gorbachev at a dinner at the Elysee Palace, Radio Moscow, domestic service, October 3, 1986.

\(^2\)M. S. Gorbachev, Politicheskii doklad tsentral’nogo komiteta KFSS XXVII s’ezdu kommunicheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, Politizdat, Moscow, 1986.


\(^6\)A detailed analysis of Gorbachev’s efforts to apply Soviet defense industry resources to civilian use is presented in Arthur J. Alexander, Perestroika and Change in Soviet Weapons Acquisition, The RAND Corporation, R-3821-USDP, June 1990.
long-term prospects for international security, there is a serious process of change under way in Soviet defense decisionmaking. This process has been distinguished by a broadening of the base of participation in public debate over security issues and an emergence of new players with decidedly untraditional views.

Since the advent of this new thinking and the heightened expectations of a more tractable East-West relationship that it has prompted, the study of Soviet security affairs has become a virtual cottage industry in the United States. Particularly in the past two years, there has been a flood of articles chronicling this trend and appraising its key features. During this period, the contours of Gorbachev's strategic outlook have come into sharper focus, and there has been an unprecedented succession of fast-breaking events in Soviet declaratory policy, party-military relations, military leadership, and arms control behavior.

Not surprisingly, the most provocative arguments in support of the new doctrine have not come from the uniformed ranks. Rather, they have emanated mainly from a small but increasingly vocal body of civilian commentators on strategic and international affairs. Responding to the expanded room for maneuver opened up by glasnost, a host of aspiring players from outside the defense bureaucracy have sought to make inroads into the national security process. These contenders are well aware of the role played by their counterparts in the West and are eagerly seeking comparable involvement in the Soviet system. They are also making every effort to translate the growing attention and credibility that Western analysts have bestowed on them into increased leverage and legitimacy within their own system.

This emergence of a new community of civilian defense intellectuals is only the most visible manifestation of a broader and more significant trend under Gorbachev. For one thing, there has been a marked increase in the role and importance of the Foreign Ministry. Under the aggressive leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze, this once-marginal institution, at least where defense and strategy were concerned, is making a determined bid for greater influence over Soviet security policy. There has also been the recent creation of a Defense and State Security committee within the Supreme Soviet. This committee, largely composed of representatives from the military-industrial sector, has

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been expressly set up to help staff the Supreme Soviet in the latter’s newly established role of providing legislative oversight of Soviet defense policy.

The result of these trends has been a significant erosion of the former monopoly commanded by the Defense Ministry and the General Staff in formulating Soviet military programs and policy. In the past, one could largely equate Soviet military policy with the parochial views of the High Command. This is no longer true. Today, with the heightened involvement of civilian outsiders, the military viewpoint is but one aspect of what appears to be an emerging Soviet national security policy, an amalgam that shows the growing involvement of participants out of uniform. “For the first time,” observes David Isby, “the military’s role in military affairs is being challenged by civilians.”

Coincident with these developments, some Western Sovietologists have concluded that the mounting civilianization of the Soviet defense debate has witnessed not merely an emergence of new voices offering alternative views, but a formalization of those views into full-fledged influence relationships. Jack Snyder, for one, argues that as Moscow’s defense intellectuals have sought to “force changes that would institutionalize the policies they prefer,” Gorbachev’s security concepts have, in turn, “grown directly from the new domestic institutions he is promoting and the political constituencies he is relying on.”

There is little question that these new civilian players nurture high policymaking ambitions. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General John Galvin, has identified the Soviet leadership’s “permitting civilian think tanks to comment on military strategy” as one of the most notable changes in Soviet defense planning under Gorbachev. There is also no question that the rules and processes of Soviet defense decisionmaking have begun to change with the recent entry of the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Soviet, along with a strengthened Central Committee staff organization, into the defense arena.

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Yet the returns are not yet in on whether the leading members of the civilian defense intellectual community have progressed, at least thus far, from the status of contenders for influence to more established positions of access and authority. Indeed, it is unclear whether Gorbachev intends to endow them with anything more than what, in the United States, would at best be considered consultant status. Clearly Gorbachev is determined to shift the locus of power from the traditional national security bureaucracy toward a broader and more pluralistic setting. This process, however, remains very much in its formative stages, as many of the Soviet participants themselves are the first to admit.

For one thing, notwithstanding glasnost and Gorbachev's conviction that Soviet security is too important to be left to the generals, the Soviet political system remains a closed and compartmented domain. Military secrets are still jealously protected by the High Command, and free information flow—even within the state bureaucracy—is anything but routine. Moreover, although Gorbachev has curtailed the military's dominance over national security decisionmaking, he has neither emasculated it nor fundamentally altered its pivotal role in Soviet force planning. His challenge, in the words of a British expert, has been to get the generals "out of having control of state policy" with regard to the Soviet defense effort, while at the same time taking care "not to destroy ... the General Staff headquarters or smash its power."11 In those crucial areas in which the High Command retains an uncontested edge in technical expertise, it will remain disinclined even to consider, let alone tolerate, any encroachment by civilian outsiders.

For these reasons, any effort to forecast the outlook for civilian involvement in Soviet defense matters beyond the immediate future must be undertaken in a spirit of ambivalence regarding where this trend may be headed. Clearly, since Gorbachev's rise to leadership the Soviet Union has witnessed a flowering of internal defense politics increasingly of a sort that has long been well known to students of defense planning in Western democracies. Yet there remains much uncertainty about the dynamics and direction of that process, to say nothing of the future of Soviet political development as a whole.

Accordingly, the following analysis will not offer a conclusive judgment on the extent of policy influence currently wielded by the emerging civilian defense experts in the Soviet Union. Nor will it venture a prediction of their staying power in the event that perestroika or Gorbachev himself should ultimately fail. It will, however, present a broad

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characterization of these contenders, assess their ambitions and strategies, and consider the factors that will affect their prospects for becoming a more established presence on the Soviet security scene.
II. THE EVOLVING SETTING OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE DEBATE

To understand the recent growth of civilian involvement in Soviet defense politics, we must first consider the radically altered context of Soviet military policymaking that has emerged under Gorbachev. Moscow's defense intellectuals have not acquired prominence simply on the merits of their views. Rather, they have been the beneficiaries of a broader process of institutional change, the ultimate outcome of which remains only dimly foreseeable.

It is now common knowledge that Gorbachev has been seeking to wrest control of the defense agenda from its traditional repository in the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. This effort has unleashed a high-level struggle for dominance over Soviet national security policy, in which the High Command has found itself increasingly beset by a determined reach for greater access and authority by outside contenders, notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the formal backing of Gorbachev and his Politburo ally, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has sought to subordinate Soviet defense policy to the overarching interests of Soviet foreign and national security policy. He has also made it clear that he intends to play a central role in the ultimate integration of that policy. In a related development reflecting the trend toward greater pluralism in Soviet defense planning, the Supreme Soviet has formed a Committee on Defense and State Security. This group is openly seeking to establish for itself a real legislative oversight function over all major government decisions affecting the Soviet military.

This process remains in flux as various players jockey for increased influence and a more formal role. The military, for its part, has shown mounting displeasure over this assault on its professional turf. The persistence of these competing forces makes it too early to tell for sure whether Soviet defense politics have already become civilianized. Yet the trends are unmistakably pointed in that direction and seem likely to remain so as long as Gorbachev's broader reform effort continues on track.

Spearheading this civilian reach for greater involvement in Soviet security matters has been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the

leadership of Shevardnadze, the MFA has steadily evolved from a silent backer of the Soviet military to one of its most vocal institutional adversaries. Shevardnadze has laid claim to the inside track in Soviet security decisionmaking by openly insisting that his ministry "carries direct and immediate responsibility for assuring that everything at a high political level [concerning Gorbachev's announced troop cuts and arms control goals] is implemented, realized, and carried out." He has also imparted a strong proactive cast to the Foreign Ministry's involvement in Soviet external relations at a time when the leadership finds itself confronting an unprecedented multitude of high-stakes international security decisions. This new style stands in marked contrast to the MFA's demeanor throughout the long years of Andrei Gromyko's tutelage, when the organization took a back seat to the General Staff on matters of arms control and defense and was mainly cast as an instrument of state heel-dragging in support of a foreign policy largely based on the concept of nyet.

Particularly since the 19th All-Union Party Conference stipulated in 1988 that the USSR must rely more on "political means" in dealing with its security problems, Shevardnadze and the MFA have increasingly taken on the General Staff and the Defense Ministry in pursuit of greater influence over Soviet defense and arms control policy. Toward that end, Shevardnadze has authorized his ministry to establish a "Scientific Coordination Center" to help pull together outside talent in support of the MFA's expanded agenda. He has also enlisted the MFA's monthly journal Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn (International Affairs) as a forum for serious writing on security issues by aspiring civilian defense professionals, including articles highly critical of the armed forces.

The MFA's bid for a more substantial role in Soviet defense policy remains far from decided at this writing, and Shevardnadze has fallen short of consolidating his bureaucratic gains at the military's expense. There is no question, however, that he has put the High Command on

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2For a thorough analysis of this centrally important development, see John Van Oudenaren, Shevardnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy, The RAND Corporation, R-3808-USDP, forthcoming.


4I am grateful to my colleague Rose Gottemoeller for bringing this point to my attention. For amplification from an MFA perspective, see the commentary by the editor of the ministry's journal: B. D. Pyadyshchev, "From Mr. 'No' to Mr. 'Yes?'," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, No. 3, March 1990, pp. 159–160.

the defensive as a result of his initiatives. He is also continuing to make slow but steady progress toward his goal.

TRENDS TOWARD A LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT ROLE

A development in the broadening civilian involvement in Soviet security planning with potentially far-reaching consequences was the establishment of the Defense and State Security committee during the final session of the Supreme Soviet on June 10, 1989. This organization, one of some 25 such groups set up in the Soviet legislature, is expressly modeled after the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. According to one American press account, it "has been stretching its fledgling muscles in a manner that, if continued, could help reshape the political landscape of the Soviet Union." The formation of the committee was a direct outgrowth of earlier advocacy by Shevardnadze and others for an end to the military's monopoly on defense information and its replacement with a system of public accountability and legislative oversight.

The opening round in this campaign came in a pivotal speech by Shevardnadze at a July 1988 MFA conference, in which the foreign minister called for a "democratization" of Soviet national security policy. He specifically endorsed the idea of "introducing into the practice of the USSR Supreme Soviet open hearings on particular international problems and replies by the Minister and other Ministry officials to unofficial requests by deputies." Predictably, the foreign policy elite wasted no time climbing aboard Shevardnadze's bandwagon. Georgii Arbatov was among the first to suggest openly that the USSR should develop a civilian oversight mechanism modeled after Western-type parliamentary defense committees. Even before Shevardnadze's speech, Arbatov's son Alexei had written that "democratization of the decisionmaking process and

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7International Affairs (Moscow), No. 10, 1988, p. 7, cited in Van Oudenaren, Shevardnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy. At this conference, Shevardnadze also spoke of an "urgent need to insure active public involvement in formulating foreign policy" and called for constitutional changes that would give added powers to the strengthened Supreme Soviet with regard to the discussion and implementation of major foreign policy decisions. See Michael Parks, "Soviets Blame Own Policies for Some World Tensions," Los Angeles Times, August 30, 1988.
greater openness in the discussion of military affairs" were "necessary" in the interest of "making the entire military policy more consistent and more balanced with economic and international political realities."

Fedor Burlatskii likewise called for an end to the system "by which people assume the leadership of the country not in a normal democratic procedure ... but by way of covert maneuvering...." The only guarantee against such abuses, said Burlatskii, was "social pluralism, which is now being implemented."  

Seemingly in anticipation of developments to come, political observer Stanislav Kondashov argued that the Soviet parliament "ought to have a group of deputies who are specially briefed in detail and not committed to departmental interests [the current circumlocution for parochial military or defense industry prejudices]—something along the lines of the armed services committees existing, for example, in both chambers of the U.S. Congress, to comprehensively study the administration's budget requests in the military sphere." In order that such deputies have the appropriate knowledge to be effective in this role, Academician Goldanskii called for "removing nonsensical restrictions on the availability of information." He further said that "completely removing secrecy from all data not containing state and military secrets should become a prerogative of the activities of people's deputies and commissions of the Supreme Soviet."

As for the process by which the defense budget and its constituent programs should be determined, another commentator suggested that there was something here as well to be learned from the American experience: "In the U.S. Congress, review and approval of the military budget occurs in the form of hearings during which the members of Congress, representatives of the Defense Department, and often representatives of business circles, science and public organizations, and the press openly discuss the budget right down to individual projects. Highly qualified experts are called in and alternative points of view are presented. Information on the hearings and detailed accounts are published."  

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This last depiction oversimplified the role of Congress in American defense policy. Yet there was no mistaking its author’s intent in calling for “a permanently active body from among the deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet which would be occupied with budgetary questions, including military allocations. Such a body would be able to call on any officials and demand any kind of information from them that fell within the purview of its competence. Its main task would be to guarantee the highest organ of state authority and the entire nation that the assigned resources are adequate to ensure a reliable defensive capability, and that each ruble of these allocations is used in the most effective way.”

The oversight committee that eventually emerged from these deliberations was presaged in Gorbachev’s closing address to the Supreme Soviet. In it, Gorbachev defended the “principle of pluralism” that was “being put into practice” by the legislature. He added that any realistic transfer of “power to the Soviets” required “creating a system of democratic institutions.” That the committee would have more than a token role was suggested in another report by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nikolai Ryzhkov. According to Ryzhkov, the leadership was initially “compelled to envision a traditional growth of defense expenses at a pace exceeding the growth of national income” in its planning for 1986–1990 because of the “prevailing international system” and the persistence of an offensively oriented Soviet military doctrine. However, he went on to say, things would be different as a result of subsequent developments: “In the spirit of restructuring and the development of glasnost, the procedure for working out and adopting decisions on defense questions will alter substantially. They will undoubtedly be examined in the same way as the state plan and budget.”

With no objections, the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Anatoly Lukyanov, proposed Vladimir Lapygin to head the new Defense and State Security committee. Lapygin, a hitherto unknown defense industrialist, was at the time director of the “Kosmonavtika” production association, with predominant experience in the design of automated control systems for aircraft and space vehicles, including the Soviet space shuttle. His committee was composed of 43 members of the Supreme

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14 Ibid. (emphasis added).
15 Speech by M. S. Gorbachev at a Congress of People’s Deputies session in the Kremlin, Moscow television service, June 9, 1989.
16 Report by N. Ryzhkov to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, Moscow television service, June 7, 1989.
Soviet, including Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Gorbachev's principal security adviser; Oleg Belyakov, head of the Central Committee's Defense Department; Mikhail Simonov, director of the Sukhoi aircraft design bureau; General Vitaly Shabanov, the deputy minister of defense for armaments; and a variety of other deputies drawn from the armed forces, the defense industry, and the KGB.

The immediate impression formed in the West was that this committee would become a part of the broader challenge that the Supreme Soviet had already begun to present to traditional Soviet authority. For one thing, it comprised not only mainstream figures from the military-industrial complex, but also a fascinating blend of radicals and junior officers with highly eclectic attitudes toward Soviet security. These people seemed not only willing but even eager to go head-to-head with the security establishment. During his confirmation hearings in July, for example, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov was subjected to withering criticism by committee members, including an outspoken Soviet air force lieutenant. In the end, Yazov was only sustained in office by Gorbachev's personal intervention and an eleventh-hour rule alteration that permitted confirmation without an absolute majority. 18

A similar hint of impending change came from Yevgenii Primakov, a former head of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations and the newly elected chairman of the legislature's upper chamber. In endorsing Lapygin's appointment, Primakov noted that although Lapygin "understands very well that we must naturally strengthen the defenses of our country, he also understands that a portion of the defense industry should be converted." Primakov added that Lapygin was committed to bringing defense outlays "down to a reasonable sufficiency so that the rest can be used chiefly for the development of the civilian sectors." 19 The deputy director of the committee, Colonel Valery Ochirov of the Soviet Air Force, showed a particularly expansive conception of the group's jurisdiction when he asserted that "Yazov is going to have to appear before our committee to defend his arguments about why a particular program is necessary for defense." 20

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19 Moscow television service, September 1, 1989.

20 More boldly yet, Ochirov added that "we can redistribute the funds and reprogram." Quoted in Gordon, "Soviets Are Trying Out Legislative Oversight of the Military."
PROSPECTS FOR THE SUPREME SOVIET'S DEFENSE COMMITTEE

The formation of Lapygin's committee was undoubtedly seen by many aspiring Soviet civilian defense experts as an attractive opportunity for them to translate their long-suppressed ambitions into real policy influence. Such hope could only be heightened by the presence of their long-time sponsor, Aleksandr Yakovlev, as a Gorbachev confidant on the Politburo, along with Primakov as a leader in the Supreme Soviet and Academician Yevgenii Velikhov, vice president of the Academy of Sciences, as the appointed head of one of Lapygin's three subcommittees.²¹ This upbeat mood was given especially prominent expression in an article by Valentin Falin, who argued for bringing outside foreign affairs analysts into the defense policy process on a regular basis. In a related vein, Yevgenii Shashkov spoke of an increasing need for involving "objective experts" in the Supreme Soviet's legislative deliberations. Both men clearly had in mind a broadened defense role for the civilian specialists from the social science institutes of the Academy of Sciences.²²

Thus far, however, such hopes appear to have been premature. To begin with, the Lapygin committee is made up largely of mainstream conservatives who can be counted on to share the broad values of the national security establishment. Indeed, the committee has been criticized repeatedly by liberal members of the Supreme Soviet for its disproportionate "insider" representation. There is a widely shared view even among informed Soviet defense professionals that although the idea of a legislative oversight committee like Lapygin's is a good one, this particular group is too heavily weighted with military-industrial personnel to be sufficiently detached or objective as an outside governing body.²³

²¹On the armed forces, the other two concerning military production and intelligence, headed respectively by M. P. Simonov, chief designer at the Sukhoi aircraft design bureau, and G. P. Kharchenko, first secretary of the Zaporozhye regional committee of the Communist Party.

²²Falin and Shashkov are, respectively, head of the Central Committee's International Department and deputy editor of the International Relations Department of the party journal Kommunist. See the interview with Falin, "Judge Yourself Critically," in Argumenty i Fakty, No. 9, March 4-10, 1989, pp. 4-5, and Shashkov, "Security at What Cost," Kommunist, No. 4, March 1989, pp. 110-117. For further discussion, see also Jeffrey Checkel, "Improved Oversight of National Security Policymaking?" Soviet Defense Notes, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, No. 4, September 1989, pp. 7-8.

²³This impression derives from conversations that my RAND colleagues John Hines, Eugene Rumer, and I had with senior defense industry and academic institute representatives during a trip to Moscow in December 1989.
Furthermore, Lapygin has indicated that he has no immediate plans for bringing aboard a contingent of outside consultants, since he lacks the necessary resources. Beyond that, he added in an interview, “Why should military affairs be left to dilettantes? After all, it is very specialized. It takes years to understand its problems and peculiarities.”

Whether or not Lapygin was referring directly to the civilian international security analysts (the best of whom are increasingly becoming anything but dilettantes), he was plainly showing his natural predilections as a career member of the defense-industrial establishment.

Finally, the Lapygin committee remains undetermined leverage and outlook. At the least, it is likely to face an uphill climb in establishing its presence in the political process, regardless of the extent to which it eventually enlists talent from outside the armed forces and the defense industry. For example, during an important speech in which he sought to define a broad vision of his committee’s responsibility, Lapygin was cut off in mid-sentence by an obviously irritated Gorbachev, who proceeded to scold him for voicing ambitions that were “premature” and that usurped the rightful prerogatives of the Defense Council. As the uppermost national security decisionmaking body, that collective retains final claim on many of the functions that Lapygin was seeking to ascribe to his own group.

Nevertheless, with the formation of the Lapygin committee and the prospect it offers for significant legislative involvement in Soviet defense matters, the relationship between the armed forces and the civilian apparatus has entered a new era. At a minimum, the military’s monopoly on defense information has been decisively broken, and new participants have been empowered to compete for a role in the policy process. All signs indicate that Lapygin is taking his responsibilities seriously and aims to carve out a significant “advise and consent” role much like that fulfilled by his counterpart committees in the U.S. Congress. Shevardnadze and the MFA have also left no room for doubt that a new rule book is being written and that they intend to establish a commanding role for themselves in the shaping of Soviet security policy.

\[24\] Quoted in Scott Shane, “Soviets Set Up Committee to Oversee Defense, KGB,” Baltimore Sun, June 27, 1989. Lapygin later conceded that “in addition to reports and information provided by government bodies,” his committee would “rely on the analyses of independent experts.” He did not specify, however, who those experts would be and reiterated that his own staff would be limited to ten people “because we don’t have enough money.” Interview in Moscow News, No. 36, September 10–17, 1989, p. 6.

\[25\] Lapygin’s proclaimed functions included questioning the General Staff on the meaning of “reasonable sufficiency,” reviewing the Defense Ministry’s arms development programs, and “controlling the armed forces.” Speech before the Supreme Soviet, Moscow television service, June 28, 1989.
To be sure, there are indications that Shevardnadze and Lapygin do not see eye to eye on many issues and that the latter has allied himself more closely with the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. For his own part, Lapygin seems to appreciate that he faces a daunting challenge in establishing a role for his committee. After all, its existence has no precedent in Soviet experience. No doubt this explains much of the enthusiasm with which the Lapygin group has embraced a series of exchange visits with members of the House Armed Services Committee in search of inspiration and guidance from its ostensible American “role model.”

An interesting assessment of the committee’s progress so far and the challenges that remain ahead was recently provided by Georgii Sturua, a section head at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), who argued in measured tones for greater committee involvement in Soviet defense policy deliberations, as well as for an expanded role for civilian analysts like himself in support of that effort. Sturua began with the now-familiar lament that Soviet defense affairs under Brezhnev had progressively evolved into not merely a vast “zone above criticism,” but indeed a mysterious “terra incognita,” as high-level planning by the state bureaucracy assumed “a kind of sacral character, one which did not brook interference by the uninitiated.” He cited the emergence of the Defense and State Security committee as an important step away from that deplorable state of affairs. He added, however, that as long as there was no established means for implementing its decisions, the 1988 constitutional amendment granting the Supreme Soviet the authority to determine “basic measures in the area of defense and state security” would remain nothing more than an “empty declaration.”

No doubt echoing the interests of Lapygin and his fellow deputies, Sturua listed several functions that would impart real influence and relevance to the committee. These included determining the optimum size of military expenditure (which, he said, should become the committee’s “most important task”); reviewing draft laws on military

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26 As this study goes to press, it has been reported that Lapygin has been replaced as committee head “for health reasons” by Leonid Sharin, first secretary of the party in Amur Oblast, who previously served as a committee member under Lapygin. Sharin is reputed to be an archconservative with respect to the ongoing reform effort in the Soviet Union. It remains to be seen what actually lay behind the decision to install him in place of Lapygin and what his selection may mean for the future prospects of the Defense and State Security committee. See Elizabeth Teague, “New Chairman for Important Parliamentary Committee,” RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 117, June 21, 1990.

service; supervising the conversion of defense industry; confirming candidates for the positions of defense minister, KGB chairman, and supreme command of the armed forces; the "study" of draft treaties; and considering the use of military contingents in fulfilling Soviet treaty obligations. In the last instance, Sturua seemed to have in mind something like the war powers prerogatives exercised by the U.S. Congress.

Then, following a detailed account of American legislative practices in the realm of defense policy, Sturua noted that the U.S. Congress's two armed services committees were "of prime interest" in offering guidelines for selective emulation by the Supreme Soviet. He noted that these committees were "far from always approving the requests of the military departments" and that they maintained as one of their chief responsibilities "increasing the return from every dollar spent on the needs of national security." Although Sturua was quick to concede that the Defense and State Security committee would eventually assume its own distinctive features as a result of differences in the Soviet political context, he emphasized that it will have to mirror its American counterparts in three important areas if it is to attain any real influence and effectiveness. These areas entailed "the degree of access to information enjoyed by the executive branch, the level of detail in which the defense budget is examined, and the quality of independent analytical backup."

Sturua further acknowledged the disproportionate percentage of the committee's membership drawn from the military-industrial community. However, he dismissed criticism of this on the ground that the committee "needs feedback from the organs of executive power in charge of defense and state security." In defending this viewpoint, he maintained: "We must be realists. A parliamentary committee which has just gained access to the 'holy of holies' of executive power for the first time could not have any other composition today." He added that any attempt to break down the barriers of secrecy surrounding the defense bureaucracy would require that the High Command acquire a measure of trust in their "opposites" in the Supreme Soviet. Toward this end, he said, "the presence of a certain amount of healthy conservatism is a guarantee that the Defense Committee will function successfully in the structure of state power."

If there was a valid concern about the adequacy of the current committee arrangement, in Sturua's view, it was that its most senior deputies occupy key positions outside the Supreme Soviet and are too burdened by their primary duties to function effectively as committee members. In what could be read as an all but blatant call for greater involvement by institute analysts in the committee's activities, Sturua
pointed out that “the informational and analytical backup available” to the membership was “inadequate to the tasks faced by the committee” and posed an “obstacle to in-depth examination of the themes under discussion at both open and, indeed, closed hearings.” He granted that such analytical backup did not require anything like the “vast army of experts” employed by the counterpart American congressional committees. But he indicated a demand for “quite a large group of associates—tens of people—preparing material for the committees and providing its members with all the information they need.” Since government agencies typically avoid any presentation of “alternatives” in their program plans, Sturua added that an important function of such committee staff assistants would be to “present the deputies with an analysis of diverse variants for accomplishing a task and express those variants in terms of cost.”

It has been institutional trends such as the expanded charter of the MFA and the formation of the Supreme Soviet’s defense committee discussed above that have set the stage and created opportunities for increased civilian involvement in the Soviet national security process. Only against this backdrop can what a RAND colleague has called the “rise of the institutchiki” be properly understood.28 By and large, the long-frustrated civilian analysts who are now reaching for real relevance in the Soviet policy arena have no intrinsic power or source of authority. Granted, there have been conspicuous exceptions, notably Georgii Arbatov and Yevgenii Primakov, both of whom have been political creatures as much as institute analysts and have long commanded special access to the top leadership. For the most part, however, those civilian defense analysts who have recently entered the public limelight owe their newfound prominence and future prospects largely to those broader developments noted above that have given them, for the first time, a bureaucratic forum and a resultant opportunity to convert their outsider status into a genuine participatory role in Soviet defense politics.

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III. MOSCOW'S ASPIRING CIVILIAN STRATEGISTS

The Soviet defense intellectual community is made up largely of members of the social science research institutes of the Academy of Sciences. Among the two dozen or more of these, the most important and well-known are the Institute of the USA and Canada, headed by Georgii Arbatov, and IMEMO, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, directed until recently by Yevgenii Primakov. Senior members of these institutes have figured prominently both in Moscow's public diplomacy effort toward the West and in the internal Soviet defense debate since Gorbachev's assumption of leadership.

This establishment, however, is by no means a product of the Gorbachev phenomenon in and of itself. On the contrary, its leading figures have been in place and in pursuit of policy relevance since the mid-1950s. What is new is the dramatic growth in the propensity of its members to voice controversial views on once-sensitive issues and in the solicitude their views have received from the Soviet press since the implementation of glasnost.

Although Moscow's international affairs specialists enjoyed a brief moment in the sun during the latter years of Khrushchev's rule, they were locked out of the policy mainstream almost entirely throughout the Brezhnev era. For nearly two decades, they were obliged either to remain silent or to show due obeisance to the party line while the Brezhnev Politburo and the High Command maintained a virtual stranglehold over Soviet defense policy.

Granted, some of the institute scholars may have wielded a marginal amount of influence with respect to arms control issues. And clearly

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1 I examined this establishment two decades ago in a seminar paper while I was a doctoral student at Harvard University. In light of the newly resurgent topicality of the subject, I have placed that paper concurrently with this study into the public domain for whatever historical background value it may offer. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, Moscow's Defense Intellectuals, The RAND Corporation, P-7545, January 1990 (originally written in January 1970).

2 Except, as noted earlier, for a few senior members who, like Georgii Arbatov, carefully cultivated the party elite and were Kremlin consultants of varying influence. A good account of the contributions made by the various social science institutes during the Khrushchev period is offered in William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations: 1956-1967, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969.

the more prominent younger specialists like Alexei Arbatov, Andrei Kokoshin, and Aleksandr Savelyev have long been quietly at work building a foundation of fluency and credibility in the field of Western strategic affairs. It is simply inconceivable that these very capable analysts could have gained their current expertise overnight or were somehow transformed from propagandists into professionals merely as a consequence of glasnost.

Nevertheless, it remains true that while many of the civilian analysts were undergoing a strong education in military-technical matters during the pre-Gorbachev era, they were largely constrained to a public diplomacy role in their open writings and in their professional dealings with Westerners. As Alexei Arbatov has recently conceded, "In the early 1970s and 1980s, the study of international disarmament policy was regarded as a means of propaganda substantiation of our foreign policy. Only when the concept of new political thinking began to be realized . . . and past mistakes were properly weighed did it become clear that what was needed was a truly scientific treatment of disarmament problems and not a doctrine serving propaganda purposes."^4

Of course, the institute community retains important public diplomacy functions notwithstanding such disclaimers. As the Kremlin's chief source of analytical enlightenment on Western thinking, it has mainly its carefully nurtured connections with foreign researchers and opinion elites to thank for its continued access at home. As one American has aptly noted of the institutjchiki, "The exposure they receive in the United States has at times been great enough to give the Soviet Union a voice in the U.S. domestic political process. Institute representatives participate as speakers at nuclear freeze rallies, make regular appearances on American television, attend academic conferences, serve as visiting fellows to U.S. university centers, sit on the editorial boards of U.S. academic journals, and contribute frequent op-ed articles for U.S. newspapers."^5


^5William C. Green, Soviet Nuclear Weapons Policy: A Research and Bibliographic Guide, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, p. 339. These institutjchiki have at least as important a public diplomacy role in Western Europe as they do in the United States. To cite a case in point, Georgii Arbatov in 1987 enticed Albrecht von Müller of the Max Planck Institute in West Germany to draft a "position paper" on conventional arms control for Soviet consideration. Müller assented and, with Andrzej Karkoszka, a Polish
Since the onset of the Gorbachev reforms, however, these scholars have also fought hard to be treated by the leadership as a source of alternative counsel on Soviet security policy. Part of the explanation for this new activism may have been Gorbachev's speech to the 27th Party Congress in 1986, which emphasized that the pursuit of Soviet security must entail not just military but also political means. Seen in hindsight, this may have been intended to signal that the Foreign Ministry under Shevardnadze would be assuming a broadened role in the formulation of Soviet military and arms control policy. It may also have been offered as a declaration empowering the civilian analytic community to assume a more vigorous role in the emerging discourse on defense.  

SELECTED VIEWS OF THE INSTITUTE ACADEMICS

A growing number of the institutchiki are proving by their writings that they have the required skills to deal with complex force posture issues. For years, these scholars were forced to make do as best they could using foreign source materials. They were also enjoined from addressing operational matters and were essentially left to write polemical books and articles masquerading as scholarship. Yet they are no less intellectually endowed than their Western counterparts. They also hold advanced degrees, are diligent researchers, and above all are policy-oriented analysts by inclination. It should only stand to reason that at a time when long-entrenched obstacles to serious defense research in the Soviet Union have begun to crumble, such individuals would briskly move in to fill the void.

defense researcher, submitted a proposal that, in due course, elicited a personal letter of appreciation from Gorbachev. In his letter, Gorbachev noted that the paper was "very close" to Soviet concepts. For more on this, see Kuri Kister, "Dominance of the Defensive: A New Proposal for Arms Control: A Position Paper Meets With Gorbachev's Favor," Suddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), February 5, 1988.

Among the most prominent senior institutchiki are Vitaly Zhurkin, the recently appointed head of the Institute of Europe; Yevgenii Primakov, formerly of IMEMO; and Georgii Arbatov, the head of the Institute of the USA and Canada. The most visible younger institute scholars are Alexei Arbatov and Andrei Kokoshin. The senior contingent also embraces a number of retired officers, including Lieutenant General Mikhail Milahtein, Major General Valentin Larionov, and Major General Vadim Makarevskii.

According to a former IMEMO department head, civilian researchers during his time were denied access to Soviet military data and were limited to discussing only foreign weapons systems. They also produced studies for the leadership solely on request and were typically instructed to stick to factual matters and refrain from offering recommendations. See Igor S. Glagolev, "The Soviet Decisionmaking Process in Arms Control Negotiations," Orbis, Winter 1978, pp. 769–770.
With their newly acquired license to speak out on controversial issues, these analysts have produced a deluge of writings over the past four years on such matters as strategic stability, the conventional balance in Europe, quantitative techniques in defense analysis, military doctrine, and arms control. They have also, for the first time, begun to comment knowledgeably on past and current Soviet military doctrinal debates, a hitherto off-limits subject for Moscow's civilian defense intelligentsia. This has been a welcome change for Western students of Soviet defense policy, who now have a rich new genre of source material to consider. Because they are not official members of the Soviet defense establishment, there remains much uncertainty about how much access these civilians enjoy. Nevertheless, they are making determined efforts to be taken seriously by Western defense experts and their own military.

The civilian analysts have portrayed an international situation in dire need of new rules. In one of their first efforts to hold out an alternative frame of reference, Academician Primakov argued that no state is any longer "capable of defending itself solely by military-technical means." He further suggested that contradictions between socialism and capitalism need not imply that international relations must be "the sphere in which the fate of the competition between the two systems will be decided." On the contrary, he pointed out, international security is everybody's concern.


10It also presents a new challenge. Because of the surge in the sophistication of many of these writings, we can no longer routinely dismiss them as propaganda. Instead, we have to treat them seriously and engage their arguments on their merits.

In a similar vein, Academician Zhurkin and two colleagues wrote that “security cannot be achieved by military means. The most efficient way of achieving it is through political decisions. Security is indivisible. It can only be equal for all or nonexistent.” This line of argument, elaborated in the Communist Party’s most authoritative journal, was unprecedented in Soviet rhetoric. It contrasted sharply with Soviet intimations throughout the Brezhnev era that the Kremlin had a natural right to absolute security, necessarily implying a state of absolute insecurity for everybody else.

Another aspect of the new civilian refrain has been a rejection of traditional strategic thought. Many of the institute analysts have now adopted the view that stability can no longer be assured by the mere existence of parity, since too many weapons exist. This guarantees, in their opinion, that any nuclear war would result in mutual disaster. In a prominent exposition of this theme, Academician Zhurkin cited “grave doubts about the ability of military-strategic parity to ensure an acceptable level of strategic stability indefinitely.” In the past, said Zhurkin, most experts felt that “the constant renewal of parity at... higher levels would ensure mutual deterrence.” Today, however, “parity’s stabilizing role is no longer absolute” in light of the mounting danger of an “apocalyptic conflict resulting from an error or a breakdown of technical systems.” For this reason, Zhurkin concluded, mutual security requires deep cuts in the arsenals of both superpowers. This theme has been plainly reflected in Gorbachev’s approach to INF and START.

The traditional Soviet line held that although a global war is not inevitable, there is “a real possibility that an imperialist aggressor might unleash one.” Under Gorbachev, academic writers are now freely conceding that the United States has no interest in starting a nuclear war. “It is hard to imagine any aims,” writes Zhurkin, “in whose name Western armies might invade the territory of the socialist states.... There are no influential political forces either in the United States or in Western Europe that would set themselves such a task.”

This absence of a NATO war incentive does not, of course, mean that the danger of war has been eliminated. On the contrary, Zhurkin points out, even though “the possibility of a premeditated nuclear

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attack is as improbable as the conscious unleashing of a large-scale war in Europe,” the mere existence of nuclear weapons in large numbers means that the chance “of an accidental, unsanctioned outbreak of a nuclear war and of a rapid, uncontrolled escalation of a crisis is increasing.” Whatever its objective merits, this argument has given Gorbachev a handy pretext for scaling back the accepted Soviet definition of the threat posed by NATO and Moscow’s resultant force posture requirements. As such, it is a major part of the rationale underlying current Soviet military and arms control policy.

THE KOKOSHIN-LARIONOV FRAMEWORK

In a related effort, a prominent civilian analyst, Andrei Kokoshin, joined with retired Major General Valentin Larionov in mid-1988 to propose a phased process by which NATO and the Warsaw Pact might accomplish a mutual build-down of conventional forces. Although it is unclear to what extent this approach reflects higher-level Soviet thinking, their article has heavily influenced Western discussions of alternative conventional arms control regimes.

Kokoshin and Larionov offered four “theoretical and schematic options” that might be successively pursued to draw down and stabilize the NATO–Warsaw Pact balance.

*Option One:* Each side configures its forces to respond to an attack with an immediate strategic counteroffensive. Kokoshin and Larionov described this option as one in which each side would “strive to transfer combat operations to enemy territory and airspace as rapidly as possible.” They associated it with that “deep-rooted tradition of military thought according to which only decisive offensive operations and efforts to take the strategic initiative will lead to victory.” They further argued that it fairly describes the current military situation in Central Europe, and implied that it retains powerful adherents within the Soviet military. “Many people even today,” they pointed out, “consider [the resort to an offensive] as necessary to keep up the armed forces’ morale.” The danger posed by such operations, according to Kokoshin and Larionov, is that “the political leadership and higher military command will be prevented from keeping events under control due to a lack of time and information.” This, they concluded, “could lead to an irreversible escalation of military operations, up to and

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including the use of tactical nuclear weapons.” Current Soviet operational doctrine continues to insist that escalation to global nuclear warfare is all but inevitable once this threshold is crossed.17

Option Two: Each side renounces offensives in the initial stage of conflict and resorts only to defensive operations. This approach departs from the first one in its determination to control the level of conflict by emphasizing “the idea of deliberate defense.” Just how such a goal might be attained, according to Kokoshin and Larionov, “must be made the subject of more detailed comparative research and joint discussion by representatives of the sides.” Its inherent advantage lies in its promise of increased stability. A major drawback is that “the probability of a conventional war growing into a nuclear one . . . especially if the sides retain a capability for counteroffensive operations . . . is just as high as in the first option.”

Option Three: Each side maintains forces sufficient only to rout an attacking formation on its own territory without initiating a counteroffensive beyond its own borders. Here, the defender’s goal would simply be “the restoration of the situation that existed before the start of military operations.” In this option, according to Kokoshin and Larionov, “the concept of victory is admissible only on the operational and tactical scales, but is ruled out on a strategic scale.” The main problem “lies in defining the size of the territory that is lost . . . and whether each side will or will not agree to respond merely by restoring the status quo ante, suppressing its thirst for vengeance.”

Option Four: Each side agrees to settle for a purely defensive posture without any means for conducting offensive or counteroffensive operations. It is this configuration of opposed forces that Gorbachev’s doctrine of “defensive sufficiency” purports to seek from the current NATO—Warsaw Pact balance, and Kokoshin and Larionov sought to give it the rudiments of an operational definition. They noted that such a balance “must not possess strike aviation or weapons that are sudden in effect (such as reconnaissance-strike complexes) or that have great mobility and striking power (tank and air-assault divisions)—the principal respective advantages of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Through such an arrangement, they concluded, a true “nonoffensive defense,” in which “the concept of victory exists only on a tactical scale,” could be realized by both sides.18

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18Academician Zhurkin has described the ideal defensive force envisaged by this last option as one that cannot mount “even a local blitzkrieg,” let alone “escalate a conflict with impunity.” V. Zhurkin, “Reasonable Sufficiency—Or How to Break the Vicious Circle,” New Times, No. 40, October 12, 1987, pp. 13–15. This language is anathema to
These alternatives showed a certain disingenuousness in their intimation that such regimes are matters of simple choice unconnected to underlying political realities. Kokoshin and Larionov appeared to imply that instability and war were merely the result of unhealthy configurations of opposing forces, rather than the outgrowth of conflicting values and objectives that occasion such confrontations in the first place. Yet surely they know otherwise. Each side has amassed armaments for a larger purpose than merely having a credible combat capability. It has been these conflicting political goals that have obstructed the ready attainment of a more agreeable military balance. As Jeremy Azrael and Stephen Sestanovich pointed out at about the time the Kokoshin-Larionov article appeared, “Analysis of the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is extremely important, but it will never explain why there is a division of Europe in the first place, let alone identify the means to reunite it.”

Lately, Kokoshin has reportedly begun to concede that his framework has since been rendered irrelevant by the sweeping upheavals that have so fundamentally altered the military situation in Central Europe. Be that as it may, his article with General Larionov nevertheless stands out as a benchmark for the kind of reasoning that has made the institute analysts a presence to be reckoned with in the evolving Soviet security debate under Gorbachev. The two authors conceded the value of incrementalism when they asserted that “the complexity of implementing a genuinely nonoffensive defense must not rule out other, less stable confrontation options which nevertheless represent movement toward a maximally stable balance.” They also acknowledged that “the transition of both sides to a nonoffensive defense option is bound up with very considerable difficulties and with the need to conduct an unprecedentedly frank discussion on, and jointly resolve, many purely military issues which are becoming political issues before our very eyes.” Not the least of these was said to be the “exceptionally complicated matter” of developing an agreeable standard for “comparing the quantitative and qualitative parameters of armed forces and weapons.”

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19 Jeremy R. Azrael and Stephen Sestanovich, *Thoughts on “New Thinking,”* RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, Occasional Paper OPS-010, June 1988, p. 5. It goes without saying that this point has since been largely overtaken by the dramatic political transformations taking place in Central Europe since the fall of 1989.
In a subsequent press interview, Kokoshin suggested that the Soviet leadership will eventually "adopt the third model as its goal." This assertion may also have been overtaken by the watershed events of 1989. That fact notwithstanding, Kokoshin's and Larionov's article has established a new standard of specificity to which Westerners will henceforth have to respond in their discussions with Soviet arms control experts. This is no mean accomplishment for a genre of writing that, until recently, could be dismissed as largely uninformed academic posturing.

THE MILITARY MODELING CONTROVERSY

The foray by Kokoshin and other civilians into serious discourse on military force issues is not the only example of outside encroachment on what was once the exclusive domain of the General Staff. This emerging literature, and the broader debate over military modeling of which it is a part, offers a clear testament to the mounting struggle between the High Command and the civilian analytic community for the high ground in determining Soviet weapons procurement programs and arms control policy.

The modeling controversy epitomizes the conflict between the General Staff's continued desire to monopolize military operational data and the increasingly bold efforts of outsiders to break down those walls of institutional secrecy. Until recently, the General Staff was the sole repository of technical expertise on military capability assessment. It was also the designated developer of officially accepted techniques for the "scientific" evaluation of force effectiveness in a combat setting.


21There remains, however, a notable discrepancy between prevailing Soviet military and civilian conceptions of what "defensive emphasis" means in practical terms, irrespective of the ongoing political changes now redefining the military map in Central Europe. As Cynthia Roberts has pointed out, "The military envisions a strategy that incorporates defensive operations without abandoning the traditional emphasis on the offensive. As such, it is quite unlike the strategic concepts presently being considered in civilian academic circles." C. Roberts, "The New Realism and Old Rigidities: Gorbachev's Strategy in Perspective," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1988, p. 221.

22Last year Kokoshin further demonstrated his growing influence by testifying before a session of the House Armed Services Committee. According to a Soviet press account of that event, those Congressmen who were interested in learning more about Gorbachev's initiatives "received the information they needed firsthand" in what the committee chairman, Congressman Les Aspin, later noted was "only the second time that a Soviet representative had addressed congressional hearings." A. Blinov, "An Unusual Dialogue," Izvestia, March 13, 1989. See also A. Kokoshin, "The New Soviet Military Doctrine and Unilateral Cuts of the USSR Armed Forces," statement before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, March 10, 1989.
As such, it was the main center of military modeling activity, and one decidedly closed to civilian outsiders.

Along with the recent flourishing of Soviet commentary on the conventional balance and the associated release of Soviet data on Warsaw Pact force dispositions, several nonmilitary centers of modeling activity have arisen to compete for the attention of the political leadership. As indicated by the work of Kokoshin and Larionov, the USA and Canada Institute is one such center. General Larionov has recently proposed a method for evaluating the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance and determining appropriate force reductions to achieve a stable relationship at lower levels. As a retired officer with long-standing ties to the military science community, Larionov is an unusually qualified "outsider" to be addressing such matters. Indeed, he is something of a middleman between the General Staff and the ambitious civilians who want to climb aboard the now-fashionable military modeling bandwagon. Without question, he commands a degree of credibility in military assessment that the civilian political scientists have yet to develop. At the same time, given his consultant status at the USA Institute and his increasingly visible role in helping Kokoshin and his protégés gain stature in the eyes of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, Larionov must be viewed by military scientists on the General Staff as having at least some complicity in the mounting civilian challenge to Soviet military professionalism.

IMEMO is also developing competitive models of strategic stability in an effort to carve out a role for its members in the national security planning process. According to one account, the MFA has begun to draw upon IMEMO's models to help bolster Shevardnadze's

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23 When I was in Moscow in December 1989, Kokoshin told me that he was making a special effort to hire new staff members with quantitative and technical backgrounds and that he had recently brought aboard several appropriately trained scientists and engineers. This is a major breakthrough for the USA and Canada Institute and one that promises to enhance its competitiveness in the military assessment field considerably.

24 In his effort to improve existing "methods for qualitative-quantitative comparison of the effectiveness of various military organisms and types," Larionov concedes that his approach "does not lessen the predominant role of political and strategic decisions." Yet he proceeds to develop what he calls "coefficients of combat comparability" to allow a properly weighted assessment of the many East-West military asymmetries "on an equitable basis." Clearly he is not engaged in a detached academic exercise, but rather in a serious effort to provide useful support to ongoing Soviet force reduction planning. See Major General V. V. Larionov, "Problems of Preventing a Conventional War in Europe," Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnije otnoshenija, No. 7, July 1988, pp. 31-43.

25 The current involvement in rudimentary modeling by IMEMO and the USA Institute can be traced back to a crude strategic exchange model appended to a widely circulated report on strategic stability that Kokoshin, Alexei Arbatov, and other civilian defense commentators produced several years ago in connection with the Soviet polemic against SDI.
bureaucratic goals in the development of Soviet conventional arms reduction plans. Faced with continuing rebuffs in their efforts to gain direct access to the General Staff, at least some civilian researchers have apparently chosen to circumvent the armed forces altogether by pooling their talents and creating alternative centers of military analysis. Their motivation, obviously, is to establish some rudimentary conversancy with operational matters and thereby gain recognition as a legitimate source of countervailing expertise in the defense debate.

The emergence of competitive modeling as a new medium of strategic dialogue in the Soviet Union has increasingly put the General Staff on the defensive. Civilians are challenging the military's claim to exclusive authority in this realm with increasing bravado. One prominent computer scientist flatly asserted in this regard that the question of strategic force adequacy is "very complicated" and "cannot be solved... using military thinking..." It will not so much be military as civilian experts—mathematicians, economists, ecologists—people capable of overcoming the usual stereotypes of thinking."

As a result of this civilian onslaught, a gathering intramural debate has arisen among the General Staff's military scientists out of a dawning realization that they will have to do better if they wish to retain their preeminent standing in military balance assessment. The military is also nurturing an institutional counterweight to the civilians in the All-Union Scientific Institute for Systems Research (VNIISI). Although formally associated with the Academy of Sciences, this organization is heavily staffed by retired General Staff officers who have joined the modeling debate in an attempt to engage the other institute analysts on their own terms. One prominent member of the VNIISI staff, Vitaly Tsygichko, is a former military scientist who has written extensively on quantitative approaches to strategic and conventional balance assessment.

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26 Interview in Moscow with Vladimir Shustov of the MFA's Scientific Coordination Center by Claire Mitchell of The RAND Corporation, January 1989.
28 Further discussion and documentation of this point is offered in Donald Mahoney, "Soviet General Staff Modeling of Military Operations: The Debate in the Late 1980s," unpublished manuscript.
29 In conversations with my colleague John Hines in Moscow in December 1989, members of the VNIISI staff referred disdainfully to the social science analysts as "journalists." They also voiced mild resentment at the disproportionate visibility the latter had come to acquire under Gorbachev and felt that it was they themselves who were the true "professionals" in the scientific assessment of military power.
30 See, for example, V. Tsygichko, "An Evaluation of the Strategic Balance in Europe," APN Military Bulletin (Moscow), No. 12, June 1988, pp. 6-11.
There is little doubt that the High Command has seen the handwriting on the wall, for it has evinced growing concern about protecting its pride of place as the final authority on military-technical matters. Before Gorbachev’s arrival, the General Staff had routinely supported its program recommendations through quantitative analysis based on its own models. It had also grown very comfortable with that arrangement. Insofar as the military’s advice is now being challenged by civilian outsiders (and, evidently, increasingly ignored by the political leadership), the General Staff’s models may well need improvement if they are to meet the policy needs of the Gorbachev regime. In this respect, there seems to be a consensus among the otherwise competitive military scientists and civilians that the USSR lacks good integrative models capable of handling highly aggregated force employment problems at the strategic level. Both groups are engaged in a major effort to develop better methods of quantitative analysis as each strives to capture the inside track in the unfolding debate over the military balance.

In this respect, the Soviet defense community seems to be entering an experience much like the one the U.S. national security community underwent in the early 1960s as outside institutions like RAND and civilian experts in the McNamara Pentagon began to develop and apply rigorous techniques of operational analysis, forcing the services to come up with equally convincing ways of justifying their bureaucratic stances in the policy arena. It is too early to tell yet how this process will unfold. Clearly, however, the battle lines are being drawn and the General Staff is taking a hard look at what it must do to remain competitive with these upstart civilian challengers. “Military modeling” is rapidly becoming the new battleground in the Soviet defense debate, and the civilians have wasted little time in claiming it for their own as a means to take the lead in the shaping of future Soviet national security policy.

THE CIVILIAN ANALYSTS AND GORBACHEV’S UNILATERAL CUTS

The most radical argument put forward by the civilian analysts since Gorbachev entered office has been that the USSR should reduce its forces unilaterally, regardless of how the West might respond. This idea was first broached over a year before Gorbachev’s UN announcement in a provocative article by Academician Zhurkin and two colleagues. Seen in retrospect, that article may have been an attempt by the institutchiiki, perhaps tacitly encouraged by Gorbachev, to lay the
groundwork for a Soviet effort to match their words on doctrinal change with more tangible gestures.

Although he granted that an appropriate mix of bilateral and multilateral reductions was the “principal avenue” for assuring international security, Zhurkin pointedly added that “it would be a mistake to regard the bilateral process of reducing armaments as the only possible way.”31 He further noted some past Soviet precedents along this line, in which “substantial measures to limit and reduce armaments” were “implemented unilaterally.” And he emphasized that “despite their scale,” these measures (notably a massive troop cut by Khrushchev in 1955–58) “by no means weakened the international positions of the USSR.”

Before long, such calls for Soviet unilateral action were being widely echoed by the military’s civilian critics. Almost invariably, these interventions stressed that the USSR possessed enough asymmetrical force advantages that it could easily afford such an approach.32 Predictably, this line of argument prompted strong opposition from the High Command, whose leaders were unambiguous in rejecting such heresy. The most outspoken reply came from the commander of the Air Defense Forces, General Ivan Tretyak, who cited the earlier unilateral troop cut by Khrushchev as a case in point and had this to say about it: “As a professional military man, I’ll tell you that the step was rash one, it dealt a terrible blow to our defense capability and at our officer personnel... To be honest, we are still feeling this. Therefore, any changes in our army should be considered a thousand times over before they are decided upon. Temporary benefits are a great lure. But I repeat once again—the most important thing is to have a reliable defense... We

32 For example, shortly before Gorbachev’s unilateral troop cut announcement, a prominent economist noted how the USSR had sustained considerable self-inflicted damage “by the priority given to the military principle.” This writer pointed out that in attempting to repeat everything the United States did in force development, “in a number of cases, we not only ‘repeated’ but actually moved ahead—as we did, for instance, in tanks.” S. Blagovolin, “The Strength and Impotence of Military Power: Is an Armed Clash Between East and West Realistic in Our Time?” Izvestia, November 18, 1988. By the spring of 1989, once the idea of unilateral Soviet initiatives had been blessed by Gorbachev, it was common for civilians to assert flatly that “our military machine is so huge that even a series of unilateral reductions will not turn us into a second-rate power... We must not be constantly looking around at the West. The time has come for us to act, proceeding above all from our own internal political and economic interests.” Interview with Oleg Bykov, corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, by A. Kuvshinnikov, “Changes Are the Guarantee of Stability,” Izvestia, March 29, 1989.
must have as much force as is necessary to guarantee reliably the security of the USSR and our allies.\textsuperscript{33}

At first, it seemed that the civilian proponents of unilateralism were well ahead of Gorbachev on the issue and were merely using glasnost to engage in personal advocacy. When Gorbachev finally announced his decision in December 1988 to effect a unilateral drawdown of 500,000 men, with associated reductions in tanks and fighter aircraft, however, it became clear that the Soviet leader had, from the beginning, been indulging these arguments with his own plans in mind, however indeterminate they may have been at the time, for a truly radical break with Moscow's traditional approach to security planning.

Typical of the initial suggestions along this line was a remark by Lev Semeiko during a roundtable on conceivable variants of "reasonable sufficiency." Semeiko stopped short of advocacy and merely acknowledged that "such actions, even if unilateral, would demonstrate that the given side adheres to a defensive military doctrine."\textsuperscript{34} A more direct call for unilateral cuts was voiced by the dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov in a speech in Washington less than a month before Gorbachev's troop-reduction announcement. "The size of the Soviet military," declared Sakharov, "is greater than that of any three Western countries combined. . . . The best thing . . . for the Soviet side to do would be a unilateral reduction of military forces. . . . A large-scale cutback would in no way jeopardize the security of the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{35}

Considering that Academician Sakharov was, by that time, an outspoken activist with little remaining claim to establishment status in the defense arena, it is doubtful that his statement was in any way connected to Gorbachev's subsequent announcement. Yet the fact that such calls for unilateral cuts could persist for so long in the face of rising military displeasure bore strong testimony to the widening gap between Gorbachev and the High Command. It also reflected the unprecedented latitude for free expression that the civilians have acquired since Gorbachev's rise to power.


\textsuperscript{34}Abridged transcript of a discussion among members of the Public Commission on Disarmament Problems of the Soviet Peace Committee, \textit{XX Vek i mir}, No. 12, December 1987, pp. 2-9.

IV. MOUNTING CIVILIAN CRITICISM OF THE ARMED FORCES

A different type of contrariness has come from civilians less tied to the defense community per se and more interested in taking advantage of glasnost to vent opinions antithetical to mainstream military views. The editor of Ogonyok, Vitaly Korotich, for example, spoke contemptuously of what he called those “bureaucrats struggling to maintain their privileges, conservatives shunning reforms, and managers afraid of responsibilities” who threaten perestroika with “the frightening weapon of sabotage, which is very easy in our system.” With remarkable candor even allowing for glasnost, he warned that “restructuring is not a choice but a necessity. If it fails, the Soviet Union will become a third-world country, which would be extremely dangerous to world peace, considering its huge military capability. To keep the nation united, Gorbachev’s hypothetical successors would in fact have to return to Stalin and invent external enemies. This new USSR would be an angry and hungry country prepared to attack anyone.”1

Related criticism has been voiced against errors and misjudgments of the past that have led to the current Soviet economic and security predicament. One observer noted how overblown rhetoric like Khrushchev’s famous “we will bury you” phrase prompted understandable Western disbelief in the leadership’s claims to be “peace-loving.”2 This writer granted the possible objections of his “fellow countrymen . . . who fear that a renunciation of the class struggle in the world arena would lead to a betrayal of revolutionary principles.” Yet he insisted that “until socialism demonstrates its superiority to capitalism in all spheres of public life,” it would be absurd to “expect a mass struggle for socialism to be launched in the capitalist countries.” He added that a key failure of Soviet foreign policy after World War II was its lack of “a genuine interest in diminishing international

1Interview by Livio Caputo, Corriere della Sera (Milan), March 6, 1989, p. 5. Korotich, editor of Ogonyok since 1986, is typical of the new generation of critically minded Soviet journalists who have flourished under Gorbachev. In an article commissioned by Time, he remarked that “we are learning to say out loud words we were afraid to voice for decades. In the past, it was difficult for Ogonyok to decide to publish just a one-sentence reference to the need for public control over the Soviet military and the KGB. Now we publish everything that we can vouch for, which is how it should be.” Vitaly Korotich, “Typing Out the Fear,” Time, April 10, 1989, p. 124
tension. . . . Stalin needed this kind of tension to support his authoritarian and repressive power within the country and to spread it to other socialist countries."

One of the many developments prompted by glasnost that could return to haunt Gorbachev has been the increasingly rampant military-bashing allowed in the Soviet press since he assumed office. A growing number of civilians, some with agendas of their own, have published venomous attacks on the armed forces and past decisions made in their name. An unnamed Soviet academic attending a conference in Berlin gave an early indication of things to come when he remarked that Soviet defense policy "is no longer a sacred cow but a subject open to criticism." He went on to say that the USSR is proceeding with "a thoroughgoing reevaluation of its military posture," even if this "does not sit well with a good many people," clearly meaning the High Command.5

Another critical refrain scored the "uncontrolled military spending" that has allegedly accounted for the many Soviet economic problems that have lately come home to roost. Fedor Burlatskii, for example, observed that during the military buildup under Brezhnev "the people's living standard declined to one of the lowest among the industrially developed states."4 Burlatskii portrayed the diversion of Soviet resources into defense production as a cause of "twenty years of wasted opportunities" in scientific and technological development: "The technological revolution that had begun in the world passed us by. We did not even notice it, but continued to talk about traditional scientific and technical progress." He even deprecated Moscow's successful campaign to achieve nuclear parity, almost universally acknowledged to be the main factor behind the USSR's global acceptance as a superpower: "True, we achieved military parity with the biggest industrial power of the modern world. But at what cost? At the cost of an increasing technological laggardness in all other spheres of the economy, the further disruption of agriculture, the failure to create a modern service sphere, and the people's living standard frozen at a low level."6


5It might be noted in passing that Marshal Ogarkov, although for quite different reasons, also foresaw this looming problem during his tenure as chief of the General Staff. Ogarkov's concern was reflected most pointedly in his frequent refrain that excessive investment in strategic forces had caused the Soviet military to take a back seat to the United States and NATO when it came to high-technology precision-strike conventional weapons. For more on this, see Rose E. Gottemoeller, Conflict and Consensus in the Soviet Armed Forces, The RAND Corporation, R-3759-AF, October 1989, especially pp. 9–21.
Some civilians have directed more pointed attacks against the High Command. The deputy director of TASS, for example, spoke with open disdain for "the old generals" who oppose perestroika because they "have gotten used to a way of life which they are unwilling to give up." Critics have also lambasted specific military policy choices, such as the decision to field the SS-20 IRBM. Vyacheslav Dashichev, for example, suggested that the SS-20 was deployed "above all because of an exaggerated concept of the danger we were facing," even though "it was not realistic with regard to our economic possibilities...." A different criticism of the SS-20 was voiced by a writer who noted that its net result was a counterdeployment of American missiles in Europe "that were strategic as far as our country was concerned. The SS-20s... were incapable of reaching U.S. territory, while the Pershing II and cruise missiles could have reached our territory in a matter of minutes."

A revealing exchange between the intellectual establishment and the military in 1987 offered telling evidence that the new thinking and glasnost have, in the words of one analyst, become "two-edged swords" warranting special leadership caution. A prominent Belorussian scholar, Ales Adamovich, wrote a provocative essay that rejected the legitimacy of Soviet nuclear retaliation even after an American first strike. As Adamovich argued, "We don't want to take part in the destruction of mankind, not with a first, not with a second, not with any further strike,... There are no military men more courageous than those who... give their military expertise to the antiwar movement."

This statement prompted a riposte the following month from Colonel General Volkogonov, at the time the deputy head of the Main Political Administration of the armed forces. In a lecture delivered at a writer's plenum, Volkogonov suggested that the "pathos of the artist"

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6Quoted in Wulf Lapins, "The Russians Are Coming—Or Are They?" Truppenpraxis (Bonn), June 1988, pp. 246–251.


8G. Dadyants, "The Echo of the Saryozek Explosions," Sotsialistitcheskaia industriia, August 17, 1988, p. 5. The author conceded, however, that this reproach should properly "be addressed not to our military for having started the siting of the missiles, but rather to the politicians who failed at that time to take advantage of the opportunity for a peaceful solution."


reflected in Adamovich's *cri de coeur* indicated a disturbing undercurrent of pacifism. He also warned that "pacifism and the battle for peace are not one and the same."\textsuperscript{11}

According to a RAND colleague, Volkogonov's presence at this conference seemed to reflect "an attempt by the top leadership to establish a boundary for the new thinking and to put up a warning sign for those who are considering crossing it."\textsuperscript{12} Volkogonov was not, however, to have the last word. Adamovich replied that the concept of deterrence was a hopeless relic of "old thinking" and that retaliation was unnecessary, since any attacker would fatally incur the radiation effects of his own strike. His speech all but advocated unilateral Soviet nuclear disarmament.

This increasingly bold assault against the military and its values could not have occurred without Gorbachev's backing. Yet the resulting cacophony indicates that the Soviet leader has not done very well at managing the discourse he has unleashed. Some remarks have been little more than gratuitous potshots from disaffected intellectuals who have long harbored personal animosity toward the military and its special privileges. Others, closer to the mainstream, embody a sufficient diversity of views to make it hard to connect them to higher-level thinking.\textsuperscript{13} At the same time, Gorbachev has ample ground for concern about the opportunities for malicious mischief that his policy of *glasnost* has created. As much as his long-term goals may be supported by this groundswell of discordant opinion, he will need to walk a careful path to avoid alienating the armed forces irretrievably.


\textsuperscript{12} Eugene Rumer, "Soviet Writers Clash Over Morality of Nuclear Deterrence," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 299/87, July 13, 1987. Volkogonov was later queried about his "polemics with a well-known Soviet writer" and asked to explain his principal difference with Adamovich. Volkogonov replied that Adamovich's "ideas and utterances on the problem boil down to the following: 'Survival at any price.' He thinks that there is no need for a deterring capability... According to his logic, we should not stop even at unilateral disarmament... One should not give in to such intellectual confusion... As long as there is no political mechanism for preventing war... we have to rely on a military mechanism." "The Army of a New World," *Argumenty i fakty*, reprinted in *Asia and Africa Today* (Moscow), No. 1, January 1988, pp. 20–25.

\textsuperscript{13} As pointed out by my colleague Sally Stoecker, the search for a clear understanding of what Gorbachev's new doctrine implies for Soviet force posture, defense spending, operational tactics, and other facets of military affairs "has been frustrated not only by varying interpretations of the concept in the Soviet press, but also by the open admission of Soviet scholars who declare, 'even we don't know what it means.'" Sally W. Stoecker, "Soviet Writers Begin to Clarify 'Defensive Defense,'" *International Defense Review*, October 1988, p. 1244.
V. MILITARY REACTIONS TO THE NEW CIVILIAN ROLE

By and large, the Soviet military has appeared to be grudgingly supportive of perestroika, insofar as Gorbachev’s reform effort has sought to bolster those sectors of the economy that promise to affect long-term military performance. Defense Minister Yazov himself has frequently railed against “inertia” in military practice, and scores of articles have appeared in the military press on the need to reduce waste and inefficiency, seek greater value from existing assets, and so on.\(^1\) The Cessna incident of May 1987, which prompted a wholesale shakeup of the High Command, merely punctuated the felt need for firmer measures to enhance the organizational effectiveness of the armed forces.\(^2\) Although the generals are uncomfortable with some of the language of Gorbachev’s policies, they have a natural incentive to support that aspect of perestroika that promises to enhance the combat capabilities of the armed forces. They also have good reason to endorse Gorbachev’s call for a shift toward defensive emphasis, insofar as that approach promises a satisfactory answer to ongoing developments in Western conventional arms technology.

Recent trends in American and NATO conventional weapons development have given the High Command an eminently practical reason to take a searching look at the merits of a defensive operational doctrine.\(^3\) Because of the enhanced counteroffensive potential that these trends imply, especially for enemy armor and tactical air forces,

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\(^1\)According to an informed account in early 1988, Yazov was said to be conducting “a delicate juggling act” in seeking to “reconcile a conservative generation of Soviet war veterans and those Soviets who want to extend Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform program to the military.” See Gary Lee, “Yazov’s Delicate Job: Blending Reforms and Military,” *New York Times*, March 16, 1988. Although it has become increasingly clear since then that Yazov’s first loyalties are to the military profession, this remains an apt characterization of his stewardship at the Defense Ministry.

\(^2\)Colonel General Volkogonov, then-deputy chief of the armed forces’ Main Political Administration, expressed this sentiment shortly after the Cessna episode: “The current renovation in the army and navy is not a smooth process. . . . We felt this with particular acuteness after the violation of Soviet airspace by the West German pilot. The plane was spotted when it was only approaching the Soviet border and, technically, it was quite easy to cut the flight short. But because of carelessness, irresponsibility, and indecision on the part of some officers at all levels, everything happened as it did.” “The Army of a New World,” *Asia and Africa Today*, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 20–25.

the Soviets now find themselves confronted with the prospect of a significant battlefield threat to defend against should a war occur in Central Europe. Indeed, the current Soviet military interest in defensive doctrine has not been prompted by Gorbachev at all. Rather, it can be traced back to the early 1980s, when Marshal Ogarkov first identified an emerging challenge to existing Soviet strategy as a result of NATO’s rapidly developing capabilities in the realm of what the Soviets call “reconnaissance-strike” weaponry. As Chris Donnelly has noted, this trend “threatens the whole Soviet concept of war with obsolescence.”

Viewed in this light, the political mileage the Soviets have sought in the West from their avowed shift to a “defensive emphasis” has mainly been a case of Moscow’s striving to make a virtue of necessity.

The High Command is well aware that the USSR cannot continue to compete with the West without a strong industrial base and high-technology infrastructure. In this area too, the military’s arguments for shoring up the domestic economy long predate Gorbachev’s rise and confirm that the generals needed little convincing. For his own part, Gorbachev has repeatedly stated that a major reason for perestroika has been to ensure Moscow’s continued prospects in the technological competition. This partly accounts for his declaration at the 19th All-Union Party Conference that the Soviet defense effort must shift from continued accumulation of numerical strength to a new emphasis on “qualitative parameters” in force development.

Accommodating to these requirements has presented a tough challenge for Yazov and Moiseyev, who face the daunting task of assuring that the baby is not thrown out with the bathwater. This has been apparent in the lukewarm support they have given the new military doctrine in their public statements since it was first announced in 1987. Such heel-dragging was also implied in an important book on operational art by a group of faculty members at the General Staff Academy, which reads as though it were written in virtual indifference to the new line. Only at the end does the book even acknowledge the

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5Defense Minister Yazov amplified on Gorbachev’s statement by noting that “emphasis on quantitative indicators is becoming not only increasingly costly, but less effective in both military-political terms and purely military terms.” Yazov also complained that Soviet military thought “is often still fettered by passivity, stereotyped thinking, and a lack of competition between ideas and opinions.” He called for a “final destruction of the braking mechanisms which still persist in the armed forces.” Army General D. T. Yazov, “The Qualitative Parameters of Defense Building,” Krasnaia zvezda, August 9, 1988.
6Marshal Akhromeyev admitted during his visit to the United States in 1988 that Gorbachev took the lead in formulating the new doctrine and that although the major decisions were all made collectively, the military played a subordinate role. See Walter Pincus, “Soviet Pledges Military Changes,” Washington Post, July 13, 1988.
“new thinking,” but in a brief epilogue so out of character with everything preceding it as to suggest that it was appended after the fact in perfunctory obeisance to the new rhetoric.7

A similar attempt to have things both ways was evident in a statement by the first deputy chief of the General Staff, General Lobov, that although “we say we will protect our motherland through defensive actions, this does not mean that in the process . . . of defending our state, there will not be some offensive actions within this defense. It is only natural that these will occur as a type of combat action.”8 Perhaps the most unambiguous expression of the High Command’s reluctance to let go of its familiar doctrinal catechism is in the following assertion by a Soviet military scientist that “the essence of the defense consists of . . . creating favorable conditions for a transition to the offensive. . . . The defense . . . is rightfully considered a type of combined arms battle, subordinate to the interests of the offense.”9 The implied message here is that whatever the politicians may say, Soviet strategy remains decidedly unchanged when it comes to how the armed forces will be employed in case of war.

For the most part, however, the High Command has fallen into stride with perestroika out of a reluctant recognition that in the long run, its institutional interests stand to be served. For the General Staff, at least, the choice implied by perestroika is not so much guns or butter as it is “guns today vs. better guns tomorrow.”10 Insofar as it can remain confident that Gorbachev’s assurances include a promise that such rewards will be forthcoming, the military can probably be counted on to continue supporting his reforms.

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7Colonel General F. Gaivoronskii (ed.), Evolutsiia voennogo iskusstva: etapy, tendentsii, printsipy (The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles), Voennizdat, Moscow, 1987. Taken in isolation, this example might be easily explained away as a straightforward reflection of book publication lead times, coupled with a natural slowness on the part of the military to adapt to Gorbachev’s “new thinking” during its initial and still uncertain stages. However, the High Command has continued to show little enthusiasm for the idea of a “defensive-only” orientation whenever the issue departs from vague declaratory policy to specific force-employment considerations at the operational level.

8Roundtable discussion on “Studio 9” program, Moscow television service, October 15, 1988.

9Colonel G. Ionin, “The Foundations of the Modern Defensive Battle,” Voenniy vestnik, No. 3, March 1988, pp. 18–21. A variation on this view was expressed in the remark of another military scientist that “the defensive nature of [Soviet] doctrine in no way means that we are to reduce our vigilance and military preparedness . . . . We must be prepared for victory on both a tactical and an operational level without any reservations and while considering the employment of any type of weapon. Without this, an attack, a battle, a fight, or an operation will be lost even before it begins.” Vice Admiral V. Kostev, “Our Military Doctrine in Light of New Political Thinking,” Kommunist vooru- shenykh sid, No. 17, September 1987, pp. 9–15.

The idea that such belt-tightening is required to assure a healthy military posture was neatly summed up in this remark by General Moiseyev: “Hitherto, we operated on the principle that savings can be effected everywhere except in defense. . . . Today’s tasks of military development must be solved with greater consideration for all statewide problems. . . . Briefly speaking, it is necessary to be able to effect savings also in defense. . . .” Moiseyev expressly singled out the “expedited introduction of the latest technologies” by the United States and its allies, which threatens to “require the Soviet Union to expend a great deal more time and resources on countering them.” In light of this challenge, he defended the leadership’s “stipulations about the transition of Soviet military development to qualitative parameters” and underscored the indispensability of such an approach “to maintain an undiminished level of combat readiness” at a time of mounting economic stringency.\(^\text{11}\) This crucial link between perestroika and the ongoing revolution in Soviet operational art has not been fully appreciated in the Western debate over Soviet defense policy.

Where the military has dug in its heels has been with regard to Gorbachev’s defense budget cuts and unilateral force reductions. Its unhappiness has been especially evident in the High Command’s increasing impatience with the advocacy of these measures by civilians who, in the military’s view, lack the professionalism and technical competence to render such judgments responsibly. There have been numerous signs of a military backlash against this unwelcome meddling in defense matters by what the High Command regards, with open disdain, as a pack of self-promoting academic dilettantes.

Such an attitude explains the sharp military reply to the suggestions of some institute analysts in 1987 that the USSR could safely undertake a unilateral drawdown of its conventional weapons and manpower. It is also apparent in the mounting military unwillingness to sit idly in the face of continued civilian criticism of the armed forces as an institution. The military’s responses, moreover, have by no means been mild protests. On the contrary, they have been sufficiently acute to suggest that although the High Command may be a grudging partner in perestroika today, its leaders could be driven to become “the steel tip of a counterreform coalition” should Gorbachev’s domestic political standing begin to falter.\(^\text{12}\)

\[^\text{11}\text{General M. A. Moiseyev, “From the Positions of a Defensive Doctrine,” Krasnaia zvezda, February 10, 1988.}\]
REAR-GUARD DISCONTENT OVER GORBACHEV'S TROOP CUTS

The bristling reaction by the Soviet air defense commander, General Tretyak, to the suggestion that the USSR should unilaterally reduce its forces was noted earlier as an example of the military's growing agitation over the increasing boldness of the defense intellectuals. This was not, however, the military's first response to that proposal. Marshal Akhromeyev himself had previously indicated the emerging stance of the General Staff when he remarked that "defensive adequacy cannot be viewed one-sidedly, irrespective of the balance of armed forces taking shape. It would... be a mistake to regard it as one-sided disarmament and unilateral reduction of our defense efforts."

Although Gorbachev's 1988 UN announcement took the West by surprise, it is apparent in hindsight that the planning for this decision had been going on for some time beforehand. To what extent those institute civilians who had taken such a prominent lead in popularizing the idea were actually brought into high-level discussions on the issue is impossible to say from the available evidence. That such discussions were under way with a clear military awareness of what lay in store, however, seems certain from the numerous military pronouncements that openly warned of the dangers inherent in any such move.

In an interview in the summer of 1988, for example, General Lobov made a special point to say: "We withdrew 1000 tanks and 20,000 soldiers from the GDR in 1980. This move remained without a response from the other side. Why should we repeat this now? Unilateral measures only lead to a situation in which the existing asymmetry is even more to our detriment." More notably, Marshal Akhromeyev

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13Tretyak underscored his reasons for this view several months later when he noted that "although hopeful signs about the healthy recovery of the international situation have appeared and a warming in the political atmosphere in the world has occurred, we, speaking Lenin's language, are obliged to keep our powder dry." Interview with General I. Tretyak, "Vigilantly Guarding the Skies at Home," Kommunist voloschenikh sti, No. 5, March 1988, p. 65.


15Interview by Csava Pó (Jó), "We Should Deal With the Issue of Arms Limitation Prudently," Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), August 31, 1988. Lobov was in Hungary to participate with Soviet and Western civilian analysts in a conference on conventional arms control. When asked what he expected from the conference, Lobov politely replied: "The fact that there are not only professional military men among the participants in this conference is very useful, because people who are dealing with the issues on the agenda of this meeting in their work on a daily basis tend to think a little in stereotypes. Thus, it is worth listening to the positions of a broad circle of experts." However, according to an account of Lobov's later discussions with his American counterpart at the conference, Army Lieutenant General George Stotzer, "both generals seemed to be stunned at how out of touch the civilian strategists of both camps were with operational
also continued to voice his reservations about the idea right up to the eve of Gorbachev's UN announcement. In a short article published in a Swedish newspaper only a week before Gorbachev's speech, Akhromeyev conceded the merits of "a respectful attitude toward divergent views and unconventional proposals" in the pursuit of Soviet security. He went on, however, to cite the persistence of Western efforts to invest in a "policy of strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union" and thus to "frighten it and force it to make one-sided concessions."

Similarly, as though he already knew about Gorbachev's impending revelation, Akhromeyev made the following statement to a Hungarian newspaper only the day before: "Errors in evaluating the likely nature of aggression and in forecasting the possible results of such an aggression are always dangerous and, especially given the defensive nature of our strategy, may entail serious consequences." This had the effect of putting him in a position to say "I told you so" should the "positive processes" in the East-West relationship ultimately fail to bear fruit.

Once Gorbachev's UN announcement ended the first round of internal debate over the unilateral force reduction issue, the military followed party discipline and expressed its support for the decision, at least publicly. There were numerous indications of military uneasiness, however, over what will happen when a half-million of its servicemen, including a large number of officers, are summarily thrust into a hostile civilian environment, with its woefully inadequate employment market and housing situation. There have also been numerous letters from junior officers, undoubtedly endorsed by the military leadership, warning of the challenge that the troop cut decision has presented to the Soviet soldier: "No one," wrote one captain at the Lenin Military-Political Academy, "is relieving us military men of the responsibility for maintaining the country's defense capability."

This writer, like many others, implied that the blame will lie elsewhere if the armed forces should ever come up short in fulfilling their duty as a result of this decision. There could be no better testament to the military's entrenched objection to Gorbachev's troop cut, however, than the surprise stepdown of Marshal Akhromeyev as Chief of the General Staff immediately after the Soviet leader's announcement.

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THE RESIGNATION OF MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV

The day after Gorbachev unveiled his force reduction decision, the Foreign Ministry's spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov, remarked at a press conference that Marshal Akhromeyev would be vacating his General Staff post and moving over to become a personal adviser to Gorbachev on military matters. This prompted a flurry of speculation over what occasioned this event and who might succeed Akhromeyev. A week later, the Soviet press routinely announced that Colonel General Mikhail Moiseyev, hitherto unheard of in the West, had been named the new Chief of the General Staff. In language reminiscent of that used to describe Marshal Ogarkov's departure from the same post five years earlier, the announcement noted that Akhromeyev had been "relieved" of his duties "in connection with a transfer to other work."20

The immediate conclusion drawn by many observers in the West, the present author included, was that Marshal Akhromeyev had resigned in protest over the unilateral troop cut.21 In several interviews the following month, however, Akhromeyev went to unusual lengths to deny that this had been so. In one exchange, he stressed that Gorbachev's decision was "perfectly correct and justified from both political and military viewpoints" and that it "was thoroughly considered from the military point of view."22 In another, he added that the decision was "the result of a large amount of analytical work, including that done by the military," and that "the leadership of the General Staff naturally took part in the work together with others from the very outset."23

In a third interview, Akhromeyev added an element of personal preference and expressly denied Western rumors that his resignation "happened as a result of a difference between the military and political leadership" in the USSR. Said Akhromeyev: "There are people in the West who will always try to combine incompatibles. Even on an absolutely white canvas, they always try to find some sort of spots. . . . The range of the Chief of the General Staff is diverse and complex. It entails 14–15 hours of work each day and great stress. And I am 66.

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Like any other man's, my strength is limited. The time finally arrived when I realized that such stress would be too great for me. . . . I asked to be relieved of my job. My application was accepted. At the same time, I was given an executive post. I'm very grateful for the confidence and will try to be as useful as I can."

In his new role as a counselor to Gorbachev, Akhromeyev appears to have gained even greater access and influence than he enjoyed while he was at the General Staff. This makes for a strong temptation to take his account of the reasons for his stepdown at face value. Harry Gelman, for example, has written that "Akhromeyev's retirement on grounds of health had been expected for some time," even though "the timing and manner of the regime's announcement of his departure from the General Staff was apparently intended to convey the impression that it was a consequence of the force reduction decision."

Yet there was scant evidence on the eve of Akhromeyev's stepdown that he was having any particular difficulty with the demands of his job. Not only that, he remains fully engaged in national security planning in his current incarnation as a Gorbachev adviser and Supreme Soviet deputy. Most important, he had repeatedly gone on record for more than a year before Gorbachev's troop cut announcement as being opposed in principle to any such one-sided concessions. Taken together, these considerations suggest that the timing of Akhromeyev's resignation could not have been coincidental. True enough, there had been rumors circulating in Moscow for some time that Akhromeyev was ready for a change of pace. But the fact that his resignation was announced on the same day as Gorbachev's address, and by a Foreign Ministry spokesman at that, adds further evidence that the event was directly tied to the unilateral force reduction issue.

Almost surely Akhromeyev was not fired by Gorbachev. He was a far too capable and valued member of the defense establishment for that to have occurred. There is ample ground on which to speculate, however, that Akhromeyev lost a major policy battle to Gorbachev and his protégés over the troop cut and, out of a sense of injured professionalism, felt an obligation to tender his resignation rather than remain on as chief of staff and be responsible for implementing a decision he could not support in good faith. Note again that his stepdown

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was publicized on the same day as Gorbachev’s announcement of the troop cut. Recall also that he had publicly questioned the advisability of unilateral cuts at precisely the time the idea was being debated within the Soviet government. Akhromeyev has admitted that “the decision was prepared very carefully over several months” and that “the question arose as early as the summer of 1988”—in a process in which he was surely a pivotal player. This has led Sergei Zamascikov to conclude that Akhromeyev “could not persuade his boss to change his mind on this subject. In this interpretation at least, he had no alternative as an honest soldier but to tender his resignation. . . . As a reward for his honesty (the alternative would have been to remain in office and attempt to sabotage the implementation), Akhromeyev has been retained as Gorbachev’s personal adviser.”

This assessment takes on added credence in light of subsequent complaints by Shevardnadze about General Staff obstructionism with regard to the troop reduction. It is further strengthened by the fact that in General Moiseyev, Gorbachev picked a military chief who lacked the stature or authority of Akhromeyev and could be counted on to be a loyal supporter of perestroika. If this analysis is correct, it bears witness to a marked improvement in the civility of Soviet leadership politics under Gorbachev. That is, it shows that a conscientious professional can lose out in a high-stakes policy dispute without also relinquishing his good name or his career as a valued servant of the state.

Even if this assessment reaches beyond the facts and the actual story was more as Akhromeyev would have us believe, the High Command nevertheless failed to stop a policy steamroller associated not just with Gorbachev personally, but with an unprecedented incursion by civilians into a realm traditionally treated by the party as an exclusive domain of the military. In his public demeanor, Akhromeyev seems to have accepted this with equanimity. Nevertheless, battle lines were clearly drawn in an October 1989 television interview in which

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27 The official date of Akhromeyev’s retirement and Moiseyev’s appointment was December 2, 1988. However, the Foreign Ministry’s spokesman, Gennady Gerasimov, waited until December 7, the day Gorbachev announced his unilateral troop cut at the United Nations, to report the change of command.


the former military chief found himself pitted against a civilian economist from the USA and Canada Institute. In this interview, Akhromeyev admitted that he had opposed Gorbachev’s troop cut decision and was a reluctant supporter of the new approach to defense. He also treated the civilian with a studied brusqueness that seemed to reflect the general mood of the military as it has been put increasingly off balance by these aspiring defense professionals. The fact that Shevardnadze has sought to establish himself as the overall coordinator of Soviet security policy and that a group of outside observers under the direction of Andrei Kokoshin has been established to oversee the implementation of Gorbachev’s directives can only add to the High Command’s awareness that it is playing under new rules in its struggle for continued access and influence.

MILITARY RESPONSES TO CIVILIAN CRITICISM

As one might expect, the High Command has neared the end of its rope with the unprecedented criticism it has been forced to endure as a result of the new freedoms of expression granted by glasnost. It is one thing to have been saddled with such an objectionable decision as the troop reduction. Even Brezhnev, after all, earned the enmity of his military leaders as a consequence of his doctrinal tinkering, his weak attempts at unilaterality, and the defense budget cuts he imposed toward the end of his incumbency. Although the military has been plainly unhappy with Gorbachev’s announced force reductions, it has conducted itself with professional deportment by showing due obedience to the policy, even if it has been less than enthusiastic in its support.

It is quite another thing, however, for the High Command to have been so openly challenged on its own turf by civilian outsiders as the principal source of defense expertise. There is little question that Gorbachev has encouraged these analysts to support his initiatives and

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30 Vremya program, Moscow television service, October 9, 1989.
31 According to Kokoshin, the main task of his commission will be to monitor the troop reductions and help assure that the soldiers returning to civilian life will have adequate schools and housing for their families. See R. Jeffrey Smith, “Soviet Analyst Predicts Military Production Cut,” Washington Post, May 10, 1989. By his own admission (see his interview with Yelena Agapova, “Our Man in Congress,” Krasnaia zvezda, September 15, 1989), Kokoshin is trying to downplay Soviet press efforts to compare him with senior American civilian security advisers. He also appears to be striving to build solid working relations with the General Staff and has avoided the sort of confrontational style adopted by other aspiring defense intellectuals, notably Alexei Arbatov.
reform proposals. This raises the question of how long the General Staff, as the net loser, will continue to tolerate the interlopers before drawing the line forcefully against further incursions into its professional domain.

Increasingly since 1987, military spokesmen have closed ranks and mounted a lively defense against these upstart challenges to their authority and credibility. The High Command’s indignation was powerfully reflected in an essay by a well-known civilian supporter, Aleksandr Prokhanov. That article began by noting the popular argument that the army “is a threatening, awesome force that has led to the militarization of the world, to the militarization of history, to the militarization of life.” It further acknowledged the prevalent view that “because of its inflexible, conservative, closed nature,” the Soviet military “is the source of all that is stagnant and conservative, of everything that rejects the new thinking, perestroika, and experimental models of behavior for the nation and the state.” Finally, it noted the allegation that the army has “become lazy in recent years” and is guilty of “having lost its combat know-how and of therefore failing to cope with its military obligations, . . . of frequently not knowing what it is doing, . . . for being in a rut, for lagging in large measure behind modern military doctrine.” As examples, the author cited the Rust affair, the Korean airliner shootdown, and the unimpressive record of Soviet combat performance in Afghanistan.

In responding to this rash of criticism, Prokhanov conceded that the military was obliged to accept accountability for its shortcomings. However, he reminded his readers that the Soviet army “has helped us survive as a sovereign society that has not been thrashed by the mighty Western civilizations” and, in so doing, “has performed its mission.” Considering the many sacrifices the armed forces have made in the name of the Soviet state, Prokhanov bridled at how “liberals” were conspiring to give military men, particularly the Afghan veterans, “an inferiority complex, to make them into social victims on the altar of an unnecessary and terrible slaughter.”

In an emotional defense of the solemn duty of Soviet citizens to honor their fighting men, Prokhanov then said: “God forbid, if a crisis should arise, the state will need people who have been tested and who are willing to sacrifice themselves. I do not think that the peace-minded youth—the rockers, the breakers, the punks—will be ready to sacrifice themselves to save the Fatherland. If the time comes to sweat blood, they may not be ready to do so. Therefore, the Afghan veteran

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who is prepared for sacrifice must be cared for, cherished, tended, and surrounded with ideological and social concern and special treatment.” Why? Because any challenge to Soviet security in the future “cannot be met by the Union of Writers, nor by a superliterature dreamed up by pacifically-minded writers, nor by informal youth groups, nor by rock groups singing peace songs, but only by the defense industry, only by the army.”

This hot-tempered foray into the growing contest between the military and its critics was unusual in its stridency. It was also unrepresentative of the generally measured tone the High Command has struck in its effort to stand up for its interests and prerogatives. As a romantic exaltation of martial values in defense of the Soviet state, Prokhanov’s essay was of a piece with the resurgent Russian nationalism championed by such reactionary groups as Pamyat in response to the perceived excesses prompted by glasnost. Yet it clearly reflected broader military sentiment, and its appearance in a prominent literary forum indicated that the High Command was and is still capable of looking after itself.

At a more subdued level, there have been similar expressions of military displeasure over the mounting disrespect heaped upon it by the media. For example, Colonel General (now General of the Army) Makhmut Gareyev, a leading military scientist and deputy chief of the General Staff, noted how “some press organs” were “beginning to call into question” the continued existence of an external threat to Soviet security. Gareyev cautioned that although Soviet military personnel are “sincerely committed to the ideas of peace and the prevention of war,” the “harsh reality is that along with positive changes in the international situation, the military preparations of the imperialist states must be reckoned with . . . without forgetting for a moment that massive professional armies stand against us.”34 He then complained about numerous “instances of unobjective coverage of individual aspects of the activity of the troops and fleets, a biased approach to individual cases, and distorted interpretations of them.” Finally, Gareyev insisted that a line needed to be drawn against the increasing public demands for the release of classified defense information. While noting that “many censorship restrictions on tactics and certain types of military hardware have been lifted,” he said that “this process has

its limits, because much information that constitutes state and military secrets cannot be revealed in the interests of ensuring the country’s reliable defense capability.”

The military’s reaction to general sniping by critics empowered to speak out under glasnost has mainly presented a sense of injured pride and resigned exasperation over such treatment. By contrast, its response to the defense intellectuals who have sought high policy influence at the General Staff’s expense has been both specific and sharp. Not only has the High Command shown an abiding distaste for being lectured to by amateurs, it is clearly determined to protect the inviolability of what it considers its rightful prerogatives in the formulation of Soviet defense policy. On numerous occasions, senior officers have written or talked about these civilian pretenders in a manner suggesting that it regards them, in effect, as boys trying to accomplish a man’s job.

In one of the first such military rebukes, Major General Yuri Lebedev noted in 1988 how the “discussions held last year among scientific and public circles in the USSR demonstrated the inadequate training of political scientists in questions of military doctrine, an inclination to draw rash conclusions at times, and a lack of the professionalism which is so necessary for the analysis of military-political problems.” He added that “this can be explained partly by poor specialized training and partly by the fact that some of the people drawn into the discussion—current affairs commentators, academics in related professions (economists, geographers, and even linguists), journalists, and writers—had only a very vague notion of the subject under discussion.”

A similar attack on the civilian analysts was made by the head of the armed forces’ Main Political Administration, Army General Alexei Lizichev, who observed that “our social scientists are failing to keep up

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35Such a reaction is exemplified in a remark by the ground forces commander, General Varennikov, that although the High Command was “grateful to those who, sincerely wishing to help, put forward constructive criticisms” of the military, “concern is caused by instances of the tendentious presentation of certain materials in the mass media, which leads to the growth of a negative attitude toward service in the armed forces among young people.” Army General V. Varennikov, “Our Army Has One Honorable Function,” Krasnaya zvezda, June 15, 1988.

36Major General Yu. Lebedev and A. Podberezhkin, “Military Doctrine and International Security,” Kommunist, No. 13, September 1988, pp. 110–119. The appearance of this counterattack in the party’s leading theoretical journal gave it considerable added stature and suggested that the military has clear allies in the party on this issue. These two writers also took a swipe at the unilateral reduction proposal that was being aired in the Soviet press by that time: “Neither the revision of basic tenets of military doctrine nor concrete steps in the military-technological field can rest on the desire and readiness of only one side. . . . The potential for such unilateral action is fairly limited. . . .”
with the pace of change both in our country and in the countries of our friends and allies.” Lizichev also complained about how “attempts to erode Marxist-Leninist teachings on war and the army and Leninist tenets about the role of the armed forces and defense of the socialist fatherland have become more frequent.”

In the summer of 1989, the gloves finally came off in what bore every sign of an escalating name-calling contest between the military and the civilian analysts. Two military authors directly rebutted an article by two instituchiki who had advocated radical cuts in Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Noting how the civilians had suggested that “more than 95 percent” of the USSR’s nuclear warheads “can be liquidated unilaterally without harming our security,” the military respondents replied that this only took into account those forces required to assure “unacceptable damage” against any attacker. They also said it failed to consider that superior enemy forces could help undermine “political pressure and blackmail” and “the necessity of having at least minimum reserves to counter the possibility of scientific and engineering breakthroughs.” Using these errors as examples, the military writers cited the indispensability of “profound research, rather than the dubious arguments used by the authors, such as ‘as we see it,’ ‘in our opinion,’ ‘apparently,’ . . . and others.” Such “profound” analysis, which the authors implied only military professionals are fully capable of providing, offers the only acceptable basis “for determining the composition of strategic attack weapons, the strategy for their combat employment, and conditions for disarmament.”

A similar ad hominem riposte occurred later that summer when Marshal Akhromeyev was queried about the Soviet position on mobile ICBMs during his appearance before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. When confronted by one of the members with a statement that Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov had recently expressed his support for a mutual ban on such missiles, Akhromeyev tartly replied that this view was “the personal opinion of Mr. Karpov” and did not represent official Soviet policy.

General Moiseyev likewise weighed in along these lines in a reply to an angry letter to the MPA’s journal from a hardline conservative

37Speech at the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, Moscow television service, June 6, 1989.
named Nina Koldayeva. In her letter, which may have been solicited by the journal in the first place to provide Moisseyev a pretext for speaking out, Koldayeva complained of an insufficiently high level of public debate over the unilateral troop reduction issue. She then asked why the expert opinions of Soviet military leaders were so little publicized, while “the views of Academician G. A. Arbatov are given a very wide presentation.” Citing Arbatov’s alleged “incompetence in military matters” and the “extent to which the man lacks any concept of the country’s painful issues,” she finally wrote: “How can it be that you, as literate, honorable, and courageous people, professionals performing a difficult service, hardened, and still enjoying enormous support among the people, cannot stand up for yourselves? Why is your voice so weak?”

In his reply, Moisseyev first granted that the letter was, as the writer admitted, “somewhat excessively emotional.” Then, having taken the high road, he said: “I myself am frequently surprised by the way in which many authors discuss the problems of the army hastily and incompetently and try to impose their own point of view as the ultimate truth.” Conceding that “I would be committing a severe sin against the truth if I said to you that among the military . . . there was a complete unanimity of views on questions of reorganizing the armed forces,” Moisseyev nevertheless stated bluntly: “I agree with you entirely, Nina Petrovna, that for the most part the formation of public opinion on defense questions among the civilian audience is unfortunately still not being dealt with by professionals. . . . Today, ‘military theorists,’ whose notion of the life of the armed forces is at best derived from a few cinema films and a few books they have read, are eager to share (and do share) their sensational revelations and ‘unbiased’ evaluations with an audience of many thousands, many millions of Soviet viewers, listeners, and readers. Many of them have not only not . . . performed the sacred duty of a USSR citizen in the ranks of the armed forces, but even flaunt this fact. They declare that it is precisely this circumstance which allows them to look at the army ‘with fresh eyes,’ ‘without prejudice,’ ‘unblinking,’ and so forth. This is, of course, an absurdity, if not a lie.”

40Army General M. A. Moisseyev, “Once More About the Prestige of the Army,” Kommunist vooruzykh sil, No. 13, July 1989, pp. 3–14. Moisseyev also indicated the military’s opposition to sharing information of an operational nature with civilian outsiders when he observed that although the previous threshold of secrecy “was lowered with the direct, even paramount participation of the Ministry of Defense in determining its limits, . . . this process has corresponding limits since, in the interest of ensuring a reliable defense capability, many data which constitute state and military secrets cannot be released unilaterally. . . . After all, an army whose every secret is known to its opponent is no longer a reliable defense capability.”
The clear message in these military responses to growing civilian encroachments on national security planning seemed to be that beyond a point, such analysts were out of their depth and had no business poking their noses into Soviet force structure discussions. A subsequent round in this escalating contest set a new tone of stridency, perhaps reflecting a growing military awareness that at least some civilian experts were establishing ever more solid footholds in the defense policy arena.

In an article entitled “On Sufficiency of Defense and an Insufficiency of Competence,” Major General Liubimov of the General Staff Academy unfolded a diatribe against an earlier article by Alexei Arbatov that was downright nasty in its treatment of the civilian analyst. Several months earlier, Arbatov had gone considerably further than any of his previous writings in laying down what Harry Gelman has called “the most detailed argument and blueprint for radical Soviet unilateral force reduction ever published in the Soviet Union.”

Casting caution to the wind, Arbatov argued, among other things, for a significant reduction in Soviet air defenses; for abandoning the Moscow ABM; for cutting back by some two-thirds Soviet ground forces in the forward area; for drastically lowering the number of Soviet tactical aircraft; for trimming back the Soviet Navy to its former role of providing only coastal defense; and for imposing draconian measures to end the costly practice of deploying redundant weapons.

Whatever its motivation, Arbatov’s message seemed calculated to infuriate the General Staff. Not insignificantly, his article appeared in the Foreign Ministry’s monthly journal, which has become a house organ for civilian critics of the armed forces, as well as a vital instrument in Shevardnadze’s personal campaign to wrest the national security portfolio from the Defense Ministry.

General Liubimov either elected or was chosen to fire the return volley, and he did so in a manner revealing the full displeasure of the High Command. After being turned down by International Affairs in an effort to get a reply to Arbatov published there, Liubimov turned to the MPA, which promptly gave him a platform in Kommunist vooruzhenyh sil. Although more angry than analytical and rather undistinguished in its substantive content, Liubimov’s article seemed to constitute vivid proof that Arbatov has finally burned his bridges with the General Staff. Barring a dramatic

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change in his point of view, or at least in his manner of conveying it, the aspiring civilian strategist will be hard put to count on anything but military opposition to his continued quest for influence over Soviet defense planning.\textsuperscript{43} Liubimov's article also sent a warning to other civilians who might wish to cultivate a dialogue with the High Command to show proper respect for military expertise and due appreciation of their own limitations.

Those civilians like Alexei Arbatov who have made a point of publicly savaging the Soviet military have almost certainly bet their careers on the continued success of Gorbachev's political reform effort. These people appear almost uninterested in a cooperative dialogue with the armed forces and show every sign of competing for influence at the military's expense. Whether the High Command can successfully weather this attempt to undermine its traditional power base remains to be seen. But it is clear that the military now knows it is on the defensive in seeking the ear of Gorbachev and his allies. The High Command may even have concluded that it will have to engage its civilian challengers on their own terms if it is to retain a significant voice in the Soviet defense debate. In the meantime, almost surely at least some in the armed forces and elsewhere in the security bureaucracy have quietly begun to take names with a view toward settling scores if and when Gorbachev's domestic fortunes begin to wane.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY'S POSITION}

Before considering the extent to which civilian academics have actually gained influence and leverage in Soviet defense matters, we should point out that the General Staff and the services have not been the

\textsuperscript{43}Arbatov did reply to Liubimov, however, in a commentary that sought to rise above ad hominem polemics. Among other things, Arbatov noted how the title of Liubimov's article pointedly reflected "his style and taste" and then reiterated his own view that the problems facing Soviet defense planners have become "so complicated ... that the process of choosing the correct path demands ... a more democratic process of decisionmaking and more extensive consideration of extra-departmental [i.e., research institute] approaches and evaluations." Alexei Arbatov, "A Conversation to the Point Is More Useful," \textit{Kommunist Vooruzhenykh Sil}, No. 22, November 1989, pp. 17–21.

\textsuperscript{44}One can imagine a Soviet military feeling about this onslaught of civilian outsiders closely akin to a similar view voiced over two decades ago by a retired USAF Chief of Staff regarding the infusion of Defense Secretary McNamara's "whiz kids" into senior Pentagon slots: "In common with many other military men, active and retired, I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional defense intellectuals who have been brought into this nation's capital. I don't believe a lot of these over-confident, sometimes arrogant young professors, mathematicians, and other theorists have sufficient worldliness of motivation to stand up to the kind of enemy we face." General Thomas D. White, "Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals," \textit{Saturday Evening Post}, May 4, 1963, pp. 10–12.
only sources of disaffection over this assault on their professional expertise. Increasingly, certain vocal segments of the party have indicated a need to protect the military against the more flagrant abuses it has suffered since the start of Gorbachev's reforms. At about the time civilian criticism of the military had reached full swing in the summer of 1988, Yegor Ligachev, Gorbachev's leading opponent on the right, gave a speech that took fundamental issue with Shevardnadze's (and, by implication, Gorbachev's) vision of the proper course of Soviet external policy.

Among other things, Ligachev emphasized the continued "class character" of international relations. He also opposed any "artificial slowing down of the social and national liberation struggle." John Van Oudenaren has described this broadside as "more in line with the kinds of statements associated with Brezhnev-era ideologists such as Suslov and Ponomarev than with military hardliners such as Marshal Ogar- kov." He has also seen "no convincing evidence to prove that Ligachev's complaints reflected specifically military views." Nevertheless, the underlying sentiment seemed to be that there are limits beyond which would-be reformers cannot run roughshod over traditional Soviet security values without challenge.

That such an outlook goes beyond merely Ligachev and his allies was strongly indicated in a major announcement that appeared during the Congress of People's Deputies in the summer of 1989. The Soviet press reported a zapiska, or memorandum, issued by the Central Committee warning the media against printing unfairly biased or negative reportage on the armed forces. This zapiska was accompanied by a declaration from the Secretariat stating the latter's concurrence with the memorandum and admonishing Soviet editors to take due notice.

Of course, this resolution was but one more counterpoint in a continuing struggle between the military and its competitors for a controlling voice in Soviet defense affairs. It is by no means clear that the zapiska will be heeded. Yet its promulgation clearly indicates that "strong opposition to the continued savaging of the Soviet military in the Soviet press exists within the Party and the military establishment." It also suggests that the competition between the High Command and the civilian foreign policy elite for the lead role in shaping

44Pravda, August 6, 1988.
45Van Oudenaren, Shevardnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy.
Soviet defense policy remains unsettled. Perhaps most important, it confirms that Gorbachev faces limits beyond which he cannot safely go in alienating the military leadership, even one of his own choosing.
VI. ASSESSING THE EXTENT OF CIVILIAN INFLUENCE

The unusual prominence so far accorded to the new civilian contenders in the ongoing defense debate indicates that they command at least the indirect patronage of Gorbachev. The academics, in particular, probably enjoy the day-to-day protection of Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gorbachev’s closest associate on the Politburo and a former director of IMEMO. According to one informed Western account, “It is difficult to overestimate the significance of Yakovlev’s position,” including his role as “a critical link between the analytical community and the political leadership.”¹ Once banished by Brezhnev to a ten-year exile as the Soviet ambassador to Canada for his maverick inclinations, Yakovlev was brought back to Moscow by Gorbachev in May 1983, first to head IMEMO and then to join the ranks of the Politburo. His responsibilities now include overseeing the implementation of Soviet national security policy. This means, among other things, managing the restructuring of the armed forces and the integration of military policy into broader Soviet foreign and economic policy.²

Ultimately, the professional and political fortunes of these intellectuals, most notably whether they will advance from the status of ambitious outsiders to that of accredited insiders with real authority, will depend heavily on Gorbachev’s personal prospects. For the moment, however, they seem to have secured an unprecedented opportunity to bask in the limelight of domestic and foreign attention. They also appear reasonably well insulated from attempts at retribution by the various targets of their criticism.

²For amplification on these points, see Bill Keller, “Moscow’s Other Mastermind,” New York Times Magazine, February 19, 1989, pp. 30–33, 40–43. As a testament to Yakovlev’s special influence over what gets published in the media, the following recollection by Yevgenii Yevtushenko of a struggle he once had with the chief Soviet censor, Pavel Romanov, is revealing. According to Yevtushenko, after appealing to Yakovlev, the latter called Romanov and said: “Comrade Romanov, what is this fuss again with Yevtushenko?” Encountering resistance, Yakovlev added: “Look, if I call you, it means this is not only my opinion. Do you understand me? I think it will be better if you publish.” Yevtushenko then remarked: “I know for sure that some editors still send their sharpest manuscripts to Yakovlev for approval... And I know he has sent envelopes back without opening them, saying, ‘You are paid to make these decisions’” (p. 42).
INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND ACCESS

Some of the civilian analysts claim to be influential players already, or at least have so convinced some Americans. On the basis of such assurances, one observer wrote that "in 1987, the departments of military affairs in two institutes on international relations that advise the leadership were upgraded and began to receive classified military data; they were asked to evaluate the policies and proposals of the military establishment." 3

Convincing proof of this remains elusive. To begin with, if those individuals really enjoyed meaningful access to classified data and commanded freedom of movement within the inner circles of Soviet defense planning, one would think that such perquisites would be reflected in the writings of the institutchiki. Yet the civilian researchers continue to complain about the asymmetry of information, whereby Western defense analysts enjoy access to detailed data on Soviet forces provided by their own governments while Soviet scholars must suffer the humiliation of having to rely on foreign materials for comparable data. 4

A particularly exasperated comment of this sort was offered by State Prize laureate Oleg Mamalyga during an interview on the problems involved with converting the Soviet defense industry to civilian production: "A wall stands between the defense people and the civilians, as I and my colleagues call ourselves. We cannot see each other. And until we break down that wall, there will be no dialogue between us and we shall not look at common problems together. . . . After a year, the Americans declassify their defense technology and pass it into the civilian sector. . . . And here our citizens have to reinvent the wheel, when


4This raises an important question about what kind of data it would take to make the access "meaningful." As for the sort of information the military has come to make publicly available since Gorbachev's arrival in office, the institutchiki remain at a substantial loss compared to their Western counterparts. When it comes to information that these analysts would be obliged to treat as classified within their own system, there is obviously little we can say with confidence. In the United States, there are both distinct levels of classification and compartments of information within each level, the contents of which are made available to cleared individuals on a strict "need to know" basis. Undoubtedly the Soviet system is at least as exclusionary, particularly when it comes to classified access by outsiders who have not been privy to any such information until very recently. Although there is no way we can tell what level of access to Soviet military-technical data such institutchiki as Kokoshin and Arbatov enjoy, the point that matters is that in the Soviet Union, probably even more than in the United States, merely having a security clearance and a claim to "classified access" says very little, in and of itself, about the nature and sensitivity of the information involved.
in the defense industry they made a bicycle long ago. They cannot even get access to the technical documentation. What nonsense!  

Relatedly, Mikhail Nosov of the Institute of the USA and Canada lamented to a Japanese reporter that “it is difficult to build a basis of trust in a situation in which the people of both sides do not know each other and what meets the eye is only Soviet military power.” Because of this, he said, “the USSR should publish its own data on military capability,” since “otherwise even Soviet researchers will have to rely on Western data on Soviet military power.” Complaints like this suggest that it remains too early to tell whether Moscow’s civilian experts are much better positioned to be taken seriously as sources of informed insight today than they were before the advent of Gorbachev. At best, it seems clear that they remain engaged only at the margins of Soviet defense policy.

As noted at the outset, a development some Western scholars have latched upon as a harbinger of expanded civilian involvement in Soviet security planning was the establishment of a Scientific Coordination Center in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1986 under the direction of Vladimir Shustov. This enterprise is subordinated to the MFA’s Directorate of Policy Planning headed by Lev Mendelevich, a national-security outsider himself who has been vigorously seeking an expanded role under Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. Through this vehicle, outside experts like Kokoshin and Alexei Arbatov, as well as representatives from the General Staff, the KGB, and other institutions such as the Central Committee, are periodically invited to attend informal roundtables with Foreign Ministry officials to discuss such matters as the changing security environment, Soviet-American relations, and alternative arms control strategies.

Military guests at these discussions, however, tend to be arms control spokesmen from General Chervov’s directorate on the General Staff or MFA officers with a political rather than operational or technical focus. Shustov also invites foreign visitors on occasion, including arms control specialists, businessmen, and former government leaders,


\[6\] Interview in Tokyo Shimbun, September 3, 1988. A similar complaint about excessive military compartmentation of technical data was voiced by the deputy editor of the journal SSHA, who implied that “more news of military-political issues be made available and that this unnatural state of affairs where foreigners know more about our military affairs... than we be corrected.” A. V. Nikoforov, “Peaceful Coexistence and the New Thinking,” SSHA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya, No. 12, December 1987, pp. 3–10.

\[7\] Shustov has elaborated on his view of the link between the institute analysts and Soviet policymaking in his “Diplomacy and Science,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, No. 3, March 1990, pp. 15–26.
to offer presentations and answer questions. It is not clear how often these discussions occur, but nearly every issue of the MFA’s biweekly bulletin refers to such a session and lists the subjects discussed. The minutes of the seminars are not published, possibly indicating their policy sensitivity in the eyes of the MFA.

The significance of this arrangement for the institutchiki is that it has at least partly lifted the shroud from the day-to-day policy activities of senior MFA officials. It has also given the academics their first real foot in the door of government. Some of the more prominent institute analysts have served as technical advisers on Soviet arms control and international security delegations. For example, Andrei Kokoshin accompanied President Gorbachev to the Malta summit in 1989, and both Alexei Arbatov and Aleksandr Savelyev have occupied IMEMO “slots” on the Soviet START and CFE delegations in Geneva.\(^8\)

This is not surprising since the MFA has, from the outset, been the institutional vanguard of Gorbachev’s initiatives in the realm of security policy. There is no evidence yet, however, that similar close connections are available to the civilian analysts in the concerned departments of the Defense Ministry or the General Staff. Such access will be essential before the institutchiki can claim full insider status in Soviet defense planning. As matters stand, the relationship between the institutes and the General Staff seems, for the most part, to be a one-way street. In this regard, IMEMO’s Aleksandr Savelyev has openly lamented the fact that “we get requests from our ‘Pentagon’ for spravki [reports], but we get little feedback. The marshals regard us as incompetent. They ask: How can civilians know about serious military affairs?”\(^9\)

Beyond that, participation by institute scholars in the MFA seminars is, by all accounts, on a by-invitation basis only. There is no sign of any significant host reciprocity by way of privileged information in return for the academics’ advice and counsel. In particular, there is no indication that academic invitees are given access to classified data on Soviet military programs and capabilities. And there is not a hint that this involvement of the institutchiki involves a participatory role in MFA planning.

\(^8\)Other opportunities for institute members to participate in government include term employment opportunities in some of the ministries and in Soviet embassies around the world. The Soviet Embassy in Washington has several members of the Institute of the USA and Canada on its staff. These individuals are not interns. They shoulder line responsibilities, such as coordinating Soviet-American academic exchanges. There is no evidence, however, that the Defense Ministry makes such positions available.

\(^9\)Quoted in Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Inside Gorbachev’s Think Tank,” World Monitor, August 1989, p. 36.
Indeed, a key objective of the Foreign Ministry in lending these civilians a governmental forum is to make headway in the interagency battle for control over national security policy by showing the Defense Ministry that it is cultivating its own nexus of "alternative" strategic thought. Insofar as the MFA has acquired a larger role in the integration of Soviet security and arms control planning, one can rightly speak of increased civilian influence at the expense of the armed forces. This by no means, however, automatically equates to increased civilian academic influence.

All in all, what Alfred Meyer wrote on this subject over two decades ago remains largely true today. We still do not know "precisely how much, how often, and under what circumstances the men of the Party Presidium [now Politburo], the Secretariat, or the Central Committee consult experts in various fields. We do not know the channels through which such consultation takes place, the directness of access professionals have to the top politicians, or precisely what kind of experts do, and do not, have access."\(^\text{10}\) Since the advent of glasnost, of course, this has become an increasingly researchable subject, as the next section will indicate. For the most part, however, hard answers about the impact of the academics on Soviet policy under Gorbachev remain elusive.

**AMBITIONS AND GOALS OF THE DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS**

Many of the civilian specialists who have begun to speak out on defense matters have expressed a clear vision of their proper role in the Soviet defense process. Some, particularly the younger and more aggressive institute researchers, appear less driven by any particular policy orientation than by a strong career-oriented desire to broaden the arena of defense policymaking and to stake out a more influential place for themselves in it. Those most obviously on a fast track radiate an astonishing degree of self-assurance in their newfound visibility and status. Andrei Kokoshin, for one, responded to a question about how to understand the contrapuntal rhetoric emanating from Soviet military writers by dismissing those writers as being politically irrelevant: "You must distinguish between our military philosophers, who occupy themselves with these doctrinal matters, and our military professionals, who are interested only in operational concepts. I would

caution you not to attach too much weight to the pronouncements of
the military philosophers.\textsuperscript{11}

Relatedly, when asked whether his own articles had been incorpo-
rated into the General Staff Academy’s curriculum, Kokoshin
answered: “Not yet.” He allowed, though, that they had been “widely
discussed” and that this had been made possible because “our military
men are now more open-minded than they used to be.” As evidence,
Kokoshin pointed with pride to a recent article on stability that he had
written for \textit{Krasnaia zvezda}—“the first time an article of this type has
appeared in our military press.”\textsuperscript{12}

In a similar vein, Alexei Arbatov was sharply derisive of what he
termed “political lyric poetry”—the stock in trade of most instrutikamik
prior to Gorbachev’s arrival—and called for “professional analysis of a
multitude of specific issues.”\textsuperscript{13} In particular, he defended the need for
a “scientific basis for actual steps pertaining to the strengthening of
security,” since “as soon as one switches from abstract argument to
specific means and methods . . . it is necessary to speak at the same
time about strategy, weapons systems, and the material content of the
balance, parity, equal security, stability, and other concepts.”

Arbatov argued for an interdisciplinary approach combining politi-
cal, strategic, economic, and technical considerations and offering
independent counsel from outside the armed forces. He rejected hollow
phrase-mongering and exhorted would-be defense professionals to
acquire the expertise that this challenge presents: “It is here where
serious scientific analysis and a firm theoretical foundation are more
important than anywhere. However, it should not consist of polished
words suitable for all occasions and handsome in their infallibility and
uselessness, but be based on both a knowledge of the most intricate
specifics . . . and on broad conceptual thinking, taking as a starting
point the new philosophy of security.”

Arbatov was frank to admit that he and his colleagues face an uphill
climb in establishing the needed credibility for this pursuit: “Are the
representatives of our academic community always on a par with these
demands at the present time? Not always and in all things. . . . The

\textsuperscript{11}“Rethinking Victory,” \textit{Detente}, pp. 17-18. In an aside, Kokoshin referred to a
younger colleague, Vladimir Zubok, who has recently begun to study the development of
Soviet military doctrine under Khrushchev. The most prominent defense intellectuals
like Kokoshin are busy building a network of protégés aimed at exploiting the increased
opportunities for research on military topics made possible by glasnost.

\textsuperscript{12}These defense intellectuals are having to walk a fine line in seeking to ingratiate
themselves with the military while retaining their independence. One can imagine how
such remarks by Kokoshin would rankle as much as please his military readers.

\textsuperscript{13}A. Arbatov, “Deep Cuts in Strategic Arms,” \textit{Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye
otnoshenia}, No. 4, April 1988, pp. 10-22.
years of stagnation, estrangement from practice, artificial isolation, and self-isolation have taken their toll in this sphere. This applies to one extent or another to the science of international politics as a whole and, most, to its political-military and arms control schools. Theoretical thought in this sphere was for many years covered by dense extraneous propaganda features and began to lose its capacity for independent, critical analysis."

Arbatov also conceded that "this has not gone unnoticed in the West." In an indication of his touchiness on this score, he quoted a remark by Stephen Meyer that Soviet civilian academics should not be taken seriously by Western analysts because they lack inside information and are mainly propagandists. Although Arbatov rejected this comment as "an insulting opinion . . . expressing the author's personal malevolence," he allowed with chagrin that it contained "unfortunately . . . an element of truth." He added, however, that it was unfairly "indiscriminate and inapplicable to many Soviet scientists," who, alleged Arbatov, "are involved in close interaction with practical departments with far more important matters than pure propaganda."

Whether such "close interaction" involves any sharing of classified data or substantive dialogue beyond casual banter cannot be known on the strength of Arbatov's assertion. Nevertheless, Arbatov granted that the prevailing lot of the defense-intellectual community was in need of major change if any progress is to be made: "A significant expansion of the publication of our own information, facts, and evaluations," he insisted, is an absolute sine qua non. Otherwise, he said, any academic attempt to contribute usefully to the defense debate would be "condemned to oned-sidedness and isolation from real life."

A NEW VOICE FROM THE KGB

Political scientists are not the only Soviet advocates of increased information availability. To note a particular case in point, one Vladimir Rubanov, billed as a "department head" in the KGB's "Scientific

14Meyer's exact words were that "these writers have little information beyond that published daily in Western newspapers, journals, and books (which are the 'classified' sources to which they have access). Moreover, as academics of the state, it is explicitly their job to justify state policy, to place it in the proper—that is, best—political and ideological light." Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Perspectives on the Paths to Nuclear War," in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (eds.), Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War, Norton, New York, 1985, p. 169. That comment was an accurate depiction of the Soviet institute analysts at the time it was written. The situation has changed dramatically, however, since the arrival of Gorbachev.
Research Institute,” has written a powerful argument for the release of much now-classified military data. Rubanov began by acknowledging that the existing system for protecting Soviet secrets “developed under complex historical conditions.” He added, however, that despite some “cosmetic work done at the turn of the sixties to purge the most odious and arcaic forms,” this system “increasingly fell behind the needs of social progress . . . [and] still contains elements of sluggishness and irrationality.” Because of this, Rubanov said, there has arisen “the need for a comprehensive, in-depth study and wide-scale discussion of . . . the extent to which the system for safeguarding state and military secrets is appropriate to the social relations which it reflects.” He also noted that “there has been no constructive official reaction to the expanding public need for such information.”

In a compelling indictment of the military’s exploitation of classification rules to preserve its institutional dominance over defense issues, Rubanov portrayed this “cult of secrecy” as “a method of maintaining faith in the infallibility of bureaucratic thinking,” which “provides opportunities for the unchecked and irresponsible exercise of power for departmental or narrow group interests.” As an illustration, he noted “numerous examples of military secrets being divulged to foreign partners in arms reduction talks in a more efficient and uncompromising manner than is the case when . . . officials . . . talk to the press on domestic political issues.”

Rubanov then asked: “What kind of


16Another civilian outsider echoed this critique and called for a healing solution rather than continued bureaucratic trench warfare: “Fastidiously brushing aside the opinions of ‘outsiders’ is a typical departmental stance. What can ‘they’ understand about our problems, people say. . . . We all inherited a sad legacy from past times. . . . In short, the departments existed only for their own benefit. We lived a long time in this ant world. It is not so easy to come to one’s senses and return to normal. All of us, both military and civilian, are now making considerable efforts to do this. And there is no need to offend one another in the process. Ultimately we share the same true strategic interest. . . .” Albert Plutnik, “The Military Lesson: A Citizen’s Polemical Notes on Restructuring in the Army,” Izvestiya, March 21, 1989.

17This remark is reminiscent of the scene during SALT I when then-General Ogarkov of the Soviet delegation admonished Ambassador Gerard Smith for describing the technical details of Soviet ICBMs to his obviously untutored Soviet civilian counterpart, Vladimir Semenov. As reported by John Newhouse, Ogarkov “took aside a U.S. delegate and said there was no reason why the Americans should disclose their knowledge of Russian military matters to civilian members of his delegation. Such information, said Ogarkov,
confidence can there be when secret data of a military-political and military-economic nature is divulged during negotiations and is then widely publicized by the Western mass information media, yet is far from always made available to our public; when Soviet scientists are obliged to consult foreign sources for information about various spheres of our own life? It turns out that certain ‘state interests’ are being defended against Soviet citizens rather than an external threat.”

Leaving aside how much of this “secret data” actually comes from Soviet negotiators rather than from periodic Western intelligence disclosures, Rubanov makes a telling point with regard to the poor credibility that has long afflicted Soviet foreign affairs commentators: “For a long time, our diplomats, experts, and international affairs journalists did not accept the data published in Western publications . . . but were . . . forced to rely on them due to the clear lack of Soviet data and calculations. As a result, bourgeois political science effectively monopolized the elaboration of military-political problems.”

Rubanov urged that the Soviet security community replace routine classification with what he called “a presumption of nonsecrecy,” not merely on the premise that sunlight is the best disinfectant, but in the broader interest of enhancing Soviet security: “There is a widespread conviction among scientists all over the world that the traditional coercive methods of preserving information are incapable of defending the main wealth of any country—its ability to invent new things. At the same time, state institutions frequently protect their knowledge so jealously that they forget about the knowledge itself, and only the protection remains.” He said that Academician Sagdeyev had identified “ill-considered routine restrictions” as “one of the reasons for the loss of momentum in the development of Soviet science.”

There was a self-serving aspect of Rubanov’s assault on the secrecy mindset in its casual presumption of the superiority of Soviet military data over Western data. This may have been intended to help bolster the Soviet position in the confrontation that will inevitably come as Gorbachev makes good on his promise to release more data about Soviet force dispositions and the two sides begin arguing over whose facts and figures are more accurate.18 Nevertheless, it directly


18The order-of-battle data that make up the core of Moscow’s position on the state of the military balance in Europe were first reported in “Statement of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee ‘On the Correlation of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Alliance Force Strengths and Armaments in Europe and Adjoining Waters,” Pravda, January 30, 1989. For a summary of the highlights, see Michael Dobbs, “Warsaw Pact Sees Parity With West,” Washington Post, January 31, 1989. Even before the release of these numbers, Soviet commentators in the wake of Gorbachev’s unilateral force reduc-
challenged one of the most entrenched bureaucratic protective mechanisms of the Soviet military. The fact that it appeared in the party’s most authoritative journal and was written by an author openly identified with the KGB suggests that it was closely tied to Gorbachev’s determination to break the military’s monopoly over defense information and to broaden the base of participation in the Soviet strategic debate.

SHIFTS IN THE LOCUS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

A notable feature of Gorbachev’s leadership style as he has worked to secure his domestic footing against the forces of “stagnation” in Soviet politics has been his campaign to siphon off power from its traditional stronghold in the party and concentrate it instead in the Supreme Soviet, in the key government bureaucracies, and in himself as the leader of the Soviet state. In the process, he has emasculated the Central Committee Secretariat, isolated the Politburo from day-to-day matters of governance, and, in so doing, has sought to neutralize the main bastion of internal opposition to his reform efforts.19 Beyond that, he has seemed bent on consigning the party to political limbo, if not irrelevance, by empowering those agencies with action responsibilities to play a more vigorous role in formulating domestic and foreign policy, much along the lines of a secular Western state.20 His effort to promote greater involvement in policy deliberations by the civilian defense experts and thus help break the High Command’s long-standing monopoly on defense matters has been centrally tied to this broader campaign to disperse power and authority within the Soviet system.


20This may at least partly explain the origins of a rumor in early 1990 that Gorbachev had resigned as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Although it is unlikely that the Soviet leader would willingly undertake such a risky move just to threaten his detractors within the apparatus, it is entirely plausible that he would have an incentive to cultivate popular speculation along those lines as a means of punctuating his disdain for the party bureaucracy and his willingness to disassociate himself from it in the course of fulfilling his responsibilities of national stewardship. On the rumor itself, see Dan Fisher, “Gorbachev Denies He’ll Quit as Leader of Party,” Los Angeles Times, February 1, 1990.
As an adjunct of his effort to destroy the institutional closure of the armed forces and open up new avenues for participation in Soviet security affairs, Gorbachev has infiltrated military representatives throughout the foreign policy and arms control establishment in addition to providing broadened opportunities for civilian experts. Two notable examples have been the appointment of Lieutenant General Viktor Starodubov as military adviser to the International Department of the Central Committee and the posting of Lieutenant General Konstantin Mikhailov to a similar position in the Foreign Ministry. Starodubov was previously an arms control specialist on the General Staff and served on the Soviet SALT and INF delegations. Mikhailov, also a transfer from the General Staff, is working as a deputy to Viktor Karpov, the former head of the Soviet START delegation and now chief of the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate in the MFA.

Some observers have suggested that this development is merely an extension of Gorbachev’s larger effort to integrate the military more fully with the rest of the national security bureaucracy. It could just as well, however, reflect a desire on his part to purchase military support for his new thinking by giving the High Command a quid pro quo for his having unleashed the civilians. As Dale Herspring has noted, although there is little denying the “possibility of conflict and resentment over the greater civilian involvement in areas that had been dominated by the military,” one must remember that “this is a two-way road which may reflect the closer relationship between Akhromeyev, Yazov, and Gorbachev on national security matters in general.”

Gorbachev’s choice to succeed Yazov could be a civilian. Short of that, some from among this community, almost certainly including Kokoshin and Alexei Arbatov, already enjoy security clearances and the rudiments of bureaucratic “insider” status, at least with regard to the elaboration of Soviet arms control strategies.

The future of this trend is uncertain and remains heavily bound up with the broader outlook for Gorbachev’s reform efforts. For the moment, however, the Soviet academic community has sensed an opening and is pursuing it with determination. Their spirit was passionately reflected in this injunction of Academician Sagdeyev: “Full of the noble pathos of renewal, we are boldly crushing everything that in the sad time of stagnation got in our way, and we’re not keeping quiet about its direct culprits.”

A more measured expression of the same feeling was contained in Georgii Arbatov’s remark that “some time ago, we established a system that was by no means best for our security—the bad tradition of keeping everything concerning defense, the army, and weapons top secret. . . . Now the time when defense issues were above criticism is coming to an end. I think this can only benefit the people, their armed forces, and the state.”

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22One rumor circulating in Moscow has identified Oleg Baklanov, a Central Committee secretary with defense industry responsibilities, as a possible candidate to replace Yazov. See R. Jeffrey Smith, “Soviet Military Fought Cuts,” Washington Post, December 9, 1988. More recently, Yazov himself has indicated that he could be replaced by a civilian appointee. As he remarked at a press conference on the last day of his first visit to the United States, “I don’t believe a minister of defense must have the proficiency and the stamina to drop from a plane with a parachute. A minister of defense is more a political analyst and a politician.” Quoted in Melissa Healy, “Future Soviet Defense Chief May Be Civilian, Yazov Says,” Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1989.


24Interview by Captain Second Rank V. Kocherov, “Disarmament and Security,” Krasnaia zvezda, December 31, 1988. A similar view has been expressed by Yevgenii Velikhov, vice president of the Academy of Sciences and recently appointed member of the Central Committee: “The Soviet Union has no monopoly whatsoever on the new way of thinking,” he observes, “or the only accurate understanding of the laws of the nuclear age.” Yet both superpowers harbor “zealous guardians of the old style of thinking,” which has prompted “a real struggle of opinions” requiring “the rejection of many ordinary stereotypes and dogmas in our perception of international problems and in the political, ideological, and military areas.” “A Call for Change,” Kommunist, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 51-53.
VII. CONCLUSIONS

Gorbachev has unleashed some powerful forces within the Soviet defense arena. By his expansion of the number of players, the availability of relevant military data, the license to hold forth on controversial issues, and the resultant diversity of inputs into the defense debate, he appears to be seeking a fundamental change in the structure of defense decisionmaking by imbuing it with real institutional and even political pluralism.¹ In response to this broadened license to participate in the national security process, some civilian bureaucrats have come to show remarkable bravado in their public attitudes toward their military colleagues. One example was the condescending remark ventured by a Gorbachev aide during the Soviet president’s visit to New York in December 1988 when asked by a reporter why there were no military men on Gorbachev’s delegation. “We’ve got Yakovlev,” the adviser smugly replied. “He’s a reserve officer.”²

One should take care, however, not to conclude from this still-nascent trend that the Soviet style of security planning is invariably headed toward convergence with our own. As Stephen Larrabee has warned, even though the role of civilians in the Soviet defense debate has expanded under Gorbachev’s leadership, “they do not yet constitute the type of institutionalized defense and arms control counter-elite that exists in the United States. Their involvement is to a large extent ad hoc and often depends more on personal relationships than on formal channels.”³

¹A qualification is in order here concerning the point about increased civilian access to military data. Without question, as a result of glasnost there has been a marked increase in the amount of technical detail about the Soviet armed forces released to the Soviet media. For example, the Soviet military now openly identifies many of its weapons by their proper technical designations, and there have been similar revelations about the organizational structure of the High Command and the location of at least some Soviet missile installations (see, respectively, V. Litovkin, “Secrets Without Secrets,” Izvestia, February 22, 1990, and L. Kolpakov, “Glasnost-90: The Secret Costs a Ruble,” Vecherniaia Moskva, January 31, 1990). There is still nothing available to the analytic community that even remotely resembles the U.S. Defense Department’s annual posture statement, however. Even those members of the Supreme Soviet’s Committee on Defense and State Security who are authorized classified access to military data report a persistent reluctance on the part of the High Command to share detailed information on its programs and plans.


Indeed, it remains far from certain that any such convergence is even in the cards. The recent rise of civilian involvement in the Soviet defense debate has been much more a *political* than an institutional phenomenon. As such, it remains inseparably linked to Gorbachev’s personal inclinations and should not be regarded, at least yet, as a natural outgrowth of the heightened pluralism in Soviet foreign and defense policy formulation. As one alternative, Sergei Zamascikov has suggested that “the greater prominence of arms control in Soviet military doctrine” has naturally made “the USA and Canada Institute, the World Economy Institute (IMEMO), and the USSR Academy of Sciences in general more important as Soviet spokesmen on this subject in the West.”

These analysts are counters in a higher-level contest for the control of the defense agenda between Gorbachev and the old-school national security establishment. Increasingly, one can see positions being marked out on both sides.

To note just one indicator, it is hardly by accident that the current access enjoyed by the civilian defense analysts is through the Foreign Ministry rather than the Defense Ministry. Among the many plausible explanations for the recent growth in the visibility and prominence of Moscow’s defense intellectuals is their role as supporting players in a bureaucratic tug-of-war between Shevardnadze and the High Command.

Although the present encroachment of civilian influence in Soviet defense planning remains formative and of uncertain outcome, it nevertheless warrants scrutiny as a trend with important implications for the East-West relationship. As one assessment has noted, the continuing erosion of the High Command’s monopoly on defense-related information and expertise “offers promise to any Western effort to influence security perceptions in the Soviet Union in a positive direc-

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5In a related civilian affront to a once-sacred point of military doctrinal principle, Vadim Zgadlin, deputy head of the Central Committee’s International Department, remarked at a Moscow press briefing in 1988 that prior to the advent of Gorbachev, Soviet strategy suffered a fundamental contradiction: “While we rejected nuclear war and struggled to prevent it, we nevertheless based our policy on the possibility of winning it. From this arose a confrontational approach to nonconfrontational situations, a military response rather than a political one, and a number of purely propaganda exercises.” Quoted in Michael Parks, “Soviets Admit Foreign Policy, Defense Errors,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 26, 1988. For more on this steady erosion of the military’s former monopoly on public discussion of security matters, see Jeffrey Checkel, “Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ and the Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy,” *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 429/88, September 29, 1988.
tion." The progressive institutionalization of a multiple-advocacy system in Soviet strategic policy formulation would increase the likelihood that issues other than narrow military-technical and service-specific considerations will begin to govern Soviet defense resource apportionment. This might, in turn, allow for greater integration of military planning into broader Soviet domestic and foreign policy calculations. Although such a development would by no means assure an easing of the East-West competition in and of itself, it would certainly heighten the prospect for a moderation in the terms and modalities of that competition. To that extent, it is a trend that should be encouraged by the United States.

The main pitfall for the West to avoid is conjuring up a fait accompli in its own planning by concluding prematurely that what remains an unfinished quest for increased civilian involvement in Soviet defense planning has already become an established fact. Although there is good reason to be encouraged by the recent signs of progress toward increased civilianization of the Soviet defense policy process, we must weigh what these civilians are saying against other, perhaps equally important, opposing views expressed from other quarters—and not just among the services. As Brent Scowcroft cautioned shortly after Gorbachev's troop reduction announcement at the United Nations in December 1988, "there may be, as in the saying, light at the end of the tunnel. But I think it depends partly on how we behave whether the light is the sun or an oncoming locomotive."

Beyond that, analysis of civilian involvement in the Soviet defense debate must remain closely attentive to the specifics of the various protagonists, such as their institutional affiliation, their personal interests and motivations, their relative access and authoritativeness, and their most senior contacts and patrons within the leadership. It must also allow for the possibility that official statements that happen to coincide

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7 Such a decisionmaking system was first elaborated in Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, September 1972, pp. 751-785.

8 I would reserve judgment, however, about the appropriateness of American specialists' going beyond this to collaborate actively and openly with Moscow's budding civilian defense analysts in their intramural effort to build legitimacy and leverage within their own system. I have in mind particularly the article coauthored by Jack Snyder of Columbia University and Andrei Kortunov of the USA and Canada Institute, "The French Syndrome on Soviet Soil," Novoe vremya, No. 44, 1989, pp. 18-20, which pleads the case for the Soviet Union to develop a cadre of "civilian strategists" to hold the line against various undesirable tendencies of its military establishment.

with known views of the defense intellectuals may be as much a result of happenstance as of causality. Those in the leadership responsible for the prevailing vector of Soviet policy almost certainly have motivations larger than simply the enfranchisement and nurturing of the defense intelligentsia.  

As has been the case throughout their two-decade-old history, the defense intellectuals’ ties to the policy apparatus have been largely personal rather than institutional, and their influence has been entirely at the indulgence of the ruling elite. Stephen Meyer has, I believe correctly, rejected the notion that these civilian analysts are in any way “the engines of the new political thinking.” Instead, he has portrayed their recent rise to prominence as “a byproduct—a consequence—of Gorbachev’s new political thinking” and has suggested that they have good grounds to be concerned “about his continued willingness to let them play in defense politics.”

There is no denying that many of the civilian analysts are transmitting on the same frequency as Gorbachev. Yet this begs the question of their political influence and access. Clearly Gorbachev is using these people to advance his personal interests, to add supportive voices to the internal debate over strategy, and to act as lightning rods for counter-criticism from the military and other conservatives. Except for a few cases involving “old school ties” between some well-connected IMEMO staffers and their former bosses Yakovlev and Primakov, however, it is highly unlikely that this equates, at least yet, to anything like a routine channel of access intended to enable the civilian analysts to bring their views and talents directly to bear on the top leadership.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently opened its doors to selected invitees from among the institutional academics. Yet in evaluating this, we must remember that the MFA is pitted in a bureaucratic adversary relationship with the Defense Ministry and the General Staff for control over the direction and content of Soviet security planning. It is within the latter two organizations that the operational and technical details of Soviet defense policy continue to be worked out. And there is no sign yet that civilians have been welcomed into that closed arena—or are likely to be in the foreseeable future. Should

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10A revealing perspective in this regard was offered by a veteran American journalist with long experience in the Soviet Union who returned to Moscow for an on-the-scenes look at perestroika and its standing in the eyes of the man in the street: “Not even the dissidents are much involved in the reforms. For all they did to draw attention to Soviet abuses, they probably had extremely little influence on Gorbachev—who, my friends agreed, launched his program, and will stop it, for his reasons.” George Feifer, “The New God Will Fail,” Harper’s, October 1988, p. 45.

the defense intellectuals nevertheless consolidate their gains and become a credible countervailing influence on Soviet defense policy, a plausible response by the services—echoing what happened in the United States when McNamara brought his civilian systems analysts into the Pentagon in 1961—might well be to accept the challenge, cast aside their old ways, and acquire the vocabulary and needed skills to compete with these civilians on their own terms.12

Either way, the developments etched out above plainly attest to Gorbachev’s effort to force a maturation on the Soviet system from above. Some would argue that this effort is bound to fail sooner or later on the ground that communist systems are inherently unformable.13 Whatever the case, as Samuel Huntington pointed out two decades ago, “just as economic development depends, in some measure, on the relationship between investment and consumption, political order depends in part on the relation between the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new social forces into politics.”14 Such a process is clearly reflected in the broadened civilian involvement in Soviet defense politics that has unfolded since Gorbachev’s arrival. As such, it represents a major step forward in Soviet political modernization.

Over the long haul, of course, there is no assurance that Gorbachev himself will successfully weather the profound forces that currently threaten the disintegration of the Soviet state. Alternatives to perestroika have been vocally articulated across a wide spectrum of Soviet opinion, and there are darker scenarios of the Soviet future that range from a reversion to political stasis and degeneration (possibly even leading to civil war) to the establishment of a military-bureaucratic praetorian guard, with unknown and possibly grave consequences for international security. Should Gorbachev eventually fall by the wayside in this or any other manner, it goes without saying that the trends discussed above could end up becoming a passing anomaly in Soviet history.

12 As a former USAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis, Brigadier General Richard E. Carr, has observed in this regard, the current Air Force studies and analysis directorate “owes its existence” to a concern that arose over a “possible bias of the Systems Analysis Office” that was established and staffed by civilians almost three decades ago under McNamara. “Amidst the analytic ferment of the early 1960s,” he pointed out, “the Air Force concluded that analysis was far too important to be left entirely to the systems analysts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In 1965 it expanded its own analytic resources and created our office.” Quoted in Thomas E. Anger (ed.), Analysis and National Security Policy, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, 1988, p. 105.

13 A strong case for this viewpoint is advanced in Alex Alexiev, “Unrest Reaches Moscow as Communism Unravels,” Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1990.

For the moment, however, it is irrelevant whether the civilian contenders for influence in the Soviet defense arena are accepted by the military or, as increasingly seems to be the case, are regarded by them as entrenched adversaries to be resisted with every measure available. The fact is that Gorbachev has consciously sought to broaden the base of participation in Soviet defense politics and thus enrich the quality and breadth of inputs into Soviet security planning. Those defense intellectuals and other civilians who have spent years waiting patiently for this moment have been quick to identify and seize opportunities to enter the fray as a result. Their ultimate success, if it occurs, may or may not mean an end to the historic competition between the Soviet Union and the West. It will, however, guarantee that any relationship that eventually emerges will entail a more cosmopolitan Soviet adversary and a major alteration in the geopolitical challenge it represents.