Civil-Military Relations in a Multiparty Democracy

Report of a Conference Organized by The RAND Corporation and the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs

Keith W. Crane, Steven W. Popper, Barbara A. Kliszewski
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RAND
PREFACE

This report summarizes the proceedings of a workshop on “Civil-Military Relations in a Multiparty Democracy” held in Budapest, Hungary, on February 12 and 13, 1990. The workshop was sponsored by The RAND Corporation and the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and was supported in large part by The RAND Corporation using its own funds. The workshop benefited considerably from, and added materially to, current RAND project work on Eastern Europe funded by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

The purpose of the meeting was to share American experiences in control of the armed forces with Hungarian military and political leaders. It was also designed to illuminate the potential emerging relationships between the new Hungarian civilian leadership and the military. This summary of the proceedings should be of interest to scholars concerned with civil-military relations and to security policymakers, civil and military, in Eastern Europe and the United States.
SUMMARY

PURPOSE

In Budapest on February 12–13, 1990, The RAND Corporation and the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs held a conference on “Civil-Military Relations in a Multiparty Democracy.” The workshop was precipitated by Hungarian questions about the changing role of their military. In particular, many of the emerging political parties had not yet had time to formulate national security programs. In the interim, the Hungarian military was uncertain of its role in the new political system. U.S. participants were interested in understanding the emerging national security programs and the ongoing reform of the Hungarian military as well as in joint discussions of civil-military relations.

The conference provided an occasion for members of the Hungarian opposition and military to discuss these issues with each other and their U.S. counterparts. This was one of the first opportunities, other than talks held in December during the Romanian revolution, for the military and opposition to talk with each other.

The delegations were a mixture of civilians and military (see Appendix). U.S. participants included active, retired, and reserve military officers and civilians with experience in the Pentagon, the White House, and the Congress, as well as specialists on Hungary. Hungarian participants included active-duty senior officers, leaders of the new political parties and independent movements, and experts on civil-military relations.

SESSION 1: DEFINING THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN A MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY

Problems in Transition to Multiparty Democracies

The focus of the first session was on defining a role for the military in the new political system in Hungary. The first American presentation pointed out the importance of setting up institutions that would secure and limit a role for the military. It emphasized the dangers inherent in a military deprived of prestige and without a firmly fixed role. The second American presentation focused on the process of creating an army of citizen-soldiers and the establishment of legitimacy
for armed forces that had been props for the former regime. The Hungarian presenter assured the audience that the armed forces would obey the new constitutional authority and presented no threat of a coup. However, the army needs support from the civilian authorities for its prestige and role in society.

The discussion during the first session was marked by sharp exchanges between the Hungarian military and some members of the Hungarian opposition. The military was concerned that officers who had studied in the Soviet Union, had held high party positions, or had Soviet wives would be dismissed. They argued that time spent in the Soviet Union often made officers more, not less, patriotic. They also argued that officers were tired of the army being a political issue. They noted that few officers now belonged to any political party. In the future they believed the military would be an apolitical institution.

The Role of the Military in Society

The Hungarian presentation focused on the flaws of the military in the past regime, in particular the corruption that had flourished under the former minister of defense. That minister had used army funds and soldiers to construct a number of villas and was accused of appointing a waiter a colonel. The American presentation discussed the important role reserve forces have played in keeping U.S. armed forces linked with civil society. In many ways the reserves epitomize the concept of citizen-soldier, the model for armed forces in democracies. They are also a very cost-effective way to maintain a military force, a point of importance for the Hungarian military, which has faced sharp budgetary cuts.

SESSION 2: NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND MECHANISMS

Defining National Doctrines

Past doctrines have become obsolete because of the economic and political transition in Hungary and the changes in Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact. The Hungarian military has adopted a new doctrine of "defensive defense." The armed forces are to be restructured to defend the territorial integrity of Hungary with less integration into the Warsaw Pact. National security is to be sought through international guarantees for Hungary's independence and territorial integrity. This doctrine is predicated on the absence of any Hungarian threat to or territorial claims on its neighbors.
In the United States, doctrine is the translation of military strategy into a way of conducting war. This doctrine is intricately tied to the national defense strategy enunciated by the civilian authorities through the institution of the National Security Council.

According to the Hungarian civilian discussants, a key to future support for the military will be the openness with which the military discusses its plans and needs. The military noted that the Soviet withdrawal will leave some gaps in Hungarian defenses, especially air defense, but it will also reassure Hungary's neighbors of its lack of offensive intent, because Hungarian armed forces will be incapable of mounting offensive operations.

In response to questions about changes in modernization and planning in NATO due to the transformation of Eastern Europe, U.S. participants noted that changes were underway in the United States but would not be as extensive as the Soviet drawdowns because of U.S. obligations in other parts of the world. The discussion then turned to the right of intervention. The Hungarians noted that they would not intervene militarily in defense of Hungarian minorities in other countries because of the principles of international law and their intentional lack of capability. The Americans argued that in some cases, most notably Panama, when human rights were being violated and the people wished to overthrow an oppressive regime, intervention is appropriate.

**Mechanisms**

The U.S. National Security Council and staff is a key institution for formulating and implementing U.S. national security policy. It functions as a broker between different departmental interests, but also acts as the arm of the president to ensure that policy decisions are implemented. It also serves to flag important emerging security issues for the president’s attention.

The U.S. military takes National Security Council guidelines and translates them into strategies, programs, and budgetary requests in the various services. Tasks needed to implement these strategies are assigned to the various integrated commands.

In Hungary, national security policy was formulated by the First Party Secretary and the Central Committee secretary in charge of national defense, with inputs from the minister of defense and the commander of the Hungarian armed forces. Because of the lack of knowledge, input, and control on the part of the broader body politic, this national security policy did not have popular support and led to distrust of the military. In the new system, Parliament will determine
national security policy. The military will be charged with defending
the country from external threats, inculcating patriotic values in young
men during their time as conscripts, and assisting in times of natural
catastrophes and emergencies.

Hungarian participants argued that instead of creating a national
security council in the executive branch to formulate security policy,
Hungary should form a national security committee in Parliament that
includes representatives of the military and the government.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND
PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

Civil-Military Relations

In the United States, the soldier has the same rights and obligations
as all other citizens of the country. He pays taxes and has the right to
vote and the right to the basic freedoms set forth in the Constitution.
Additionally, the U.S. military has set up a number of institutions
within itself to protect the rights of servicemen and women. These
include the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Office of the Inspec-
tor General, to which any member of the military may address a com-
plaint, and the codification of assignments and promotion through
review boards with civilian control.

In Hungary, the armed forces were divorced from the rest of society.
Because of their control over information, civil servants and officers
may be able to maintain their autonomy and subvert parliamentary
control under the new system. Parliament will have to exert control
over the armed forces through control over appointments, through a
new legal framework under which the armed forces will operate, and
through the right to question the minister of defense. Without mea-
sures like these, it will be very difficult for Parliament to maintain
effective control.

During the discussion, two of the representatives of new Hungarian
political parties forcefully argued for the elimination of the armed
forces. Because of Hungary’s size and economic constraints, the Hun-
garian armed forces will be unable to prevent potential aggressors from
invading the country. U.S. discussants argued that a country can deter
aggression by raising the costs to the aggressor; few countries or alli-
ances (including NATO) can deter through absolute denial, but deter-
rence through raising the costs has been remarkably effective. They
also argued that a country’s willingness to defend itself has important
consequences for its domestic and international image.
Discussants also pointed out the importance of establishing a system of programming, planning, and budgeting. The U.S. system was judged to be too complex for Hungary, although it provides better civilian control over programs than the West German system.

Determining Military Resource Needs

The Hungarian armed forces have faced very sharp budgetary cutbacks in recent years, cutbacks that cannot be sustained, according to the military. If the new government decides it wants to have armed forces, the Hungarian military argued that it will also have to finance them. Even adopting a doctrine of defensive defense will entail costs for conversion and the procurement of new equipment. The Hungarians will have to set up a new air defense system as the Soviets assume a smaller role. However, the military is aware that a large modernization program is currently economically and politically infeasible.

In the United States, military resource needs are determined in a very complicated, convoluted process involving congressional committees, the Department of Defense, the Office of Management and Budget, and the military services. An American speaker noted a number of “don’ts” for managing the military. These included: don’t assume a military is unnecessary; don’t get the whole legislature involved in determining the military budget, use committees; don’t attempt to micromanage the budget, rather set overall goals and guidelines; but do maintain a legislative approval process for senior appointments and promotions.

In the discussion, the Hungarian military noted that military goods producers, although not a major part of the industrial sector, are undergoing a major structural adjustment. Demand has fallen in Warsaw Pact and Third World markets. Additionally, Warsaw Pact arms trade was always conducted so that total arms trade between countries was balanced. With the decline in Hungarian purchases, other countries reduced their purchases of Hungarian-produced goods.

In the past, Hungarian doctrine was determined primarily by the Soviet Union, although there was a specific national doctrine within the overall doctrine of coalition warfare in the Pact. The Soviets also had a large influence over military procurement plans, although Hungary’s economic conditions and economic policymakers ultimately determined how much was spent on arms.
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I. SESSION 1: DEFINING THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN A MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY

PROBLEMS IN TRANSITION TO MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACIES

Presentation 1: American Civilian

A crucial element of a transition to a democratic system is civilian control of the military and the formulation of national security policy. Historically, this has been achieved by several means, but what appears most appropriate for Hungary's current situation is control through the legislature. No aspect of democratic life has proved more difficult to render free of conflict than civil-military relations. A period of transition is especially daunting because it presents unparalleled opportunities for setting precedents.

Some of the major questions to be answered in this period are: To what extent should the military be involved in the political life of the country? If the military remains apolitical, how does it protect itself from becoming a political instrument, used by one faction or another for its own purposes? How is national security policy to be formulated, and by whom, and how are these policies to be translated into doctrines and operations?

In democracies, two mechanisms guarantee the ascendancy of the civilian over the military: the budget process and the framework of laws. One strategy for achieving control emphasizes formal legal definition of parliamentary control and of the political roles the military and national security professionals in the civilian government are to play.

A second strategy cultivates an ethic of partnership among all parties, civil and military. Under this strategy, civilian control is based on the military's acceptance of a civilian definition of what the military's responsibility ought to be. The military must feel, however, that this definition is legitimate. The society must have well-defined boundaries for the exclusive exercise of power and control by the military on the one hand and by civilians on the other. The military mission should have an overwhelmingly external focus; its domestic security role should be very small. But the external focus does not imply cultural or ideological isolation; military recruitment and socialization should be based on values shared with society at large. In the U.S. system, both sides agree that there should be separate spheres of military and civil...
authority, yet it is difficult to think of any aspect of military life, including such things as promotion and military justice, in which civilians do not play a large role.

Ideally, in a period of transition the military should remain politically neutral. In practice, this is difficult to achieve. The military must make a conscious act of will to be, if not politically neutral, then politically disengaged. Restraint is needed on the civilian side as well. In the early days of a democracy, civil governments must resist temptations to rely on the military for regime support and legitimacy. Civilians must set military goals that are both feasible and attainable. It also falls upon them to uphold the prestige of the military and the material well-being of officers. Civilians must resist any urges to indulge in scapegoatism. If the military is forced to defend its own legitimacy, it is more likely to want to engage in projects tangential to its primary mission to demonstrate that it is not a drain on society and that it has an essential role to play. In such cases, even with the best of intentions, the lines between civil and military authority become blurred.

Presentation 2: Hungarian Civilian

The structure of the army is one of the many problems in this transition period. The Hungarian army was closely connected to the ruling party. Almost the entire officer corps belonged to it. The subsequent decline in the party's popularity has contributed to the Hungarian population's poor opinion of the army. The relationship between the people and the army must be improved in the future.

A second problem is the economic crisis. Every possible means of reducing the military budget is being considered. However, the limits on military budget cuts have been reached.

The transition in the armed forces that took place in the 1950s also caused problems. Many of the officers who had served in the old Royal Hungarian Army were forced to leave. Their successors were not as well schooled in either civilian or military affairs. Military prestige diminished. The future government should avoid the errors of the past and retain military experts.

The Hungarian army of today is different from that of 20 or 30 years ago; the officer corps contains many qualified experts willing to serve any constitutional power. They are neither able nor willing to stage a coup, nor do they wish to hinder the work of the new government. If, however, the army is attacked, it has the means to defend itself. The new government should not interfere too much in the inner problems of the military.
Presentation 3: American Civilian

The Western model of civil-military relations emerged with the modern secular nation-state in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. At this time a new political concept—citizenship—affected the military. Mass armies emerged, staffed by citizen-soldiers. The officer corps, traditionally the domain of the landed gentry, was transformed into a middle-class institution and was no longer a state within a state. The principle of subordination of the military to civilian authority was firmly established.

The role of the military is very different in developing countries. In some regions, states and military institutions were formed almost prior to the development of stable political structures, leaving military establishments to become autonomous political factors.

When the socialist bloc was established, the processes of nation building were already complete, but concepts of citizenship and democratic structures were either suppressed by the new regimes or had been at rudimentary levels. Strong military establishments were a priority but remained subordinate by design. They were subordinate internally to the monopolistic political power and externally to a hegemonic Soviet Union, and were pressed into a coercive military alliance, the Warsaw Pact. This decreased the military’s legitimacy as a national institution.

What does all this mean with respect to the transition to democracy? Obviously, the armed forces must get out from under the domination of the political powers at home. The external subordination to the Soviet Union is also rapidly becoming a thing of the past; a national defense doctrine is being developed. However, other factors present problems. First, the historical lack of legitimacy has generated a powerful antimilitary sentiment in society; the profession of officer does not enjoy high prestige. Second, the economic constraints facing the East European countries may lead to the emasculation of the military. Third, entrenched military and political elites associated with the military resist the transition. There are also problems of corruption and incompetence, and a growing cleavage between the junior and senior officer corps. Junior officers often live close to the poverty level. Finally, the potential rise of extremely nationalistic ideologies in military establishments may present problems for the transition to democracy.

Discussion

Hungarian Military: Currently, one hears slogans like “depoliticize the army,” but the armed forces as an institution form part of the
political institutional system. The army is part of political life and cannot disengage. In every political system, the armed forces must have a political character. It is impossible to have an enclave army; this would lead to the deterioration of the prestige of the armed forces. Party-political conflicts in the armed forces are impermissible. This is what should be meant by the internal depoliticization of the armed forces. Military men tend to resist participation in political life, but there are political forces that would try very actively to engage them. Since the party-state has been demolished, the armed forces are not under the control of any party; there is a vacuum.

Conflicts between political parties should never focus on the armed forces. During the elections some political arguments weaken the general situation and posture of the armed forces.

The prestige of the armed forces has declined all over Eastern Europe, due in part to the lack of competence and professional knowledge of the senior officer corps. Budget reductions have also placed an extra burden on much of the officer corps. This extra burden marked relationships between “civil society” and the military. Distorted personalities who lived under excess pressure gained prominence. On the other hand, the officer corps has been proreform for the last one and a half years. Officers have been trying to find their place in society.

Hungarian Civilian: The Hungarian military was subordinated to the Soviet military command (the Warsaw Pact command) and to a department of the Hungarian United Workers Party Central Committee. Some officers trained in the Soviet Union may have become absolutely loyal to that country, but not all: many Hungarian officers became more patriotic and highly critical of the Soviet system.

Hungary has never had a minister of defense or minister of interior on the Politburo. The political leadership curbed the role of the military and the police. Army officers disliked this situation and became more independent. They did not become members of the opposition, however, not because of differences in philosophy, but because of the discipline they had to follow.

The military has always had to keep a low political profile in Hungary. This began to change during the Romanian upheaval. Upon the initiative of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, high-ranking officers, including the minister himself, established contacts with the Romanian army. The speaker of the Ministry of Defense appeared on Hungarian television many times and performed well. For the first time, Hungarians realized that they have an army that could play a role. The role here was, by the way, to reassure the Romanian army and the Romanian government that Hungary would not use turbulence and revolution in Romania to achieve territorial changes.
**American Civilian:** In communist societies, the military has been under strong civilian (Communist Party) control. There have been few instances of military intervention in political life. This will probably hold true even as this life begins to change and becomes more chaotic. Even in the Polish case, for example, military intervention was ordered by Jaruzelski in his capacity as chairman of the Defense Council—he did not invoke martial law in his capacity of a military officer. Furthermore, martial law was implemented by special units of ZOMO, not by the regular army. The Romanian case is much closer to the general pattern we have seen in developing societies. During a period of great political disorder, no other force was able to take control, except perhaps the Securitate. The dangers of rising nationalism or potential intervention by the military are not as likely in Eastern Europe as they are in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

**Hungarian Civilian:** What are American views on the military's role in the United States? Should the armed forces be an obedient instrument in the hands of politicians, without a voice?

**American Civilian:** Military force is clearly seen as a political force to be directed by politicians. However, the competence for the conduct of military affairs resides with active-duty military officers. Therefore it is necessary to work through a process that exploits the tension between those two roles: the political authority's ultimate responsibility for the employment of military force, and the military's basic knowledge of how that force should be built and used within guidelines set by politicians.

The founding fathers made the president the commander in chief, thereby establishing clearly the principle that an elected civilian would be the leader of the military forces. The second thing they did was give Congress the power to decide how much money would be given for military forces.

The man who established most firmly the notion that the president was the leader of the military was Lincoln. He exercised the role of military commander in chief. He set the strategy and directed the movement of forces, but discovered very quickly that he needed a good general in chief who had military competence to advise him and to direct those forces.

**American Military:** A number of cases in American history demonstrate that the oath officers take to the Constitution is a very serious one. General MacArthur, one of our greatest military heroes, disagreed publicly with the president, who relieved him for it. There was no questioning of this decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; in fact, they applauded it. The military is an instrument to be used by the political leadership that is elected by the population.
**Hungarian Military:** We want Hungary to be a genuine democratic state, following the rule of law, where the armed forces will also be an integral part of a pluralistic society that sees a future for the armed forces and its professionals. There is, however, concern in the professional corps of the armed forces when they hear that those people who graduated from the Soviet Union, or those who have Soviet wives, or those who held positions in various party organizations, will no longer be needed in the new armed forces. People are concerned: their futures are at stake. The Hungarian military needs a legal basis for its functioning to be assured. The armed forces should act not as an instrument in the hands of parties, but in accordance with constitutional laws.

The government should provide legal guarantees and restore the prestige of the armed forces. The media could do much to improve the military’s prestige. But it lies within the army itself to work to improve its prestige. If both the professionals and the conscripts within the armed forces identify with society’s values, and if conscripts understand that the 18 months they spend in the army are not just a waste of time but are, in fact, an important part of their education, then the prestige of the armed forces will improve.

**THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY**

**Presentation 1: Hungarian Civilian**

An investigation is being conducted in Parliament to study internal conditions in the army. This investigation is a result of the publication of a book by Colonel Bokor, in which he revealed the corruption of the former minister of defense. The investigation found a close correlation between dictatorial social conditions and the internal conditions of the military.

A country’s problems and crises are reflected within the army. In a Soviet-type society, state control over the armed forces covers only some areas of military activity. In the former system, the army was under the control of a secretary of the Communist Party. Civilian politicians had contact only with the chief of the Political Directorate or with the first secretary in charge of the armed forces. This had negative consequences, primarily the absence of professional control at the top level. One man acted as the minister of defense for 25 years. Another consequence was the poor selection of personnel. The parliamentary investigation found generals unsuitable for their posts; it also found a case in which the minister of defense promoted a waiter to the rank of colonel.
The lack of control extended to finance. The minister did not need government permission to use funds of 200 million, later 300 million forints. Under the former minister of defense, corruption and abuse of power ran rampant in the armed forces. Even the Military Committee of Parliament did not control the army; it served the Communist Party state.

The constitution adopted by the Parliament in October 1989 allows officers to join political parties, as long as they do not hold leading positions in them. Only a few army officers are members of opposition parties. The overwhelming majority are members of the Hungarian Socialist [former Communist—Ed.] Party.

The overwhelming majority of generals and officers are competent, particularly those in the younger and median age groups. The younger officers are considerably less devoted to communism—a devotion that formerly had been obligatory. The next government will need an army with professional officers free from the defects of the previous era.

Presentation 2: American Military

The United States has a history of ambivalence toward a standing professional armed force. After independence in 1783, the need for a regular professional army was debated. The U.S. Constitution created a balance of power by dividing military authority between two of the three main branches of government. The standing U.S. armed forces of the mid to late twentieth century are a phenomenon of the postwar era and the relative power vacuum that existed immediately after 1945. Until World War II the United States had never maintained a large professional force.

Peacetime conscription ended in the early 1970s. As a result, the emphasis on reserve forces has grown. The end of the draft was concurrent with establishment of what was called the “total force policy,” established by the Department of Defense in 1973 for the purpose of integrating the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard into full support of the regular air force. Under the total force policy, the Air Force Reserve works hand in hand with the regular air force. As a result of this policy, the Air Force Reserve accepted higher-priority missions, which in turn have required more highly trained and better-equipped forces. In recent years the nation’s reserve forces have received new equipment, often concurrently with the regular forces. This is in line with a basic policy that “units which are the first to fight will be the first equipped.” Key units of the reserve forces can mobilize within 24 hours and can deploy within 72 hours.

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1 At time of publication, one dollar equaled approximately 65 forints.
Besides having current equipment, all reserve units are inspected by the regular air force and must meet the same quality performance standards. Reserve components are so integrated that when a plane lands at a base it is often difficult to tell if it is regular air force, reserve, or national guard.

The reserve is made up of a unit equipped program and an associate unit program, totaling 85 percent of the reserve strength. Under the unit equipped program, a reserve unit has and maintains its own equipment. In the associate unit program, regular air force and reserve crews are blended and share the same missions and aircraft. The reserve also includes the individual mobilization augmented program. Specialized people working in critical career fields train with units of the regular air force. The missions that best belong in the reserve forces are those not greatly needed in peacetime. Doctors, nurses, aerial port units, and security police units are logical candidates for emphasis by the reserves.

A typical reserve unit costs only 25 to 30 percent of its regular counterpart, because it has only a small cadre of full-time personnel. Cost savings are also generated because initial training is provided by the regular air force. The reserve maintains a pool of critical skills that would otherwise be prohibitively expensive. Reservists also save the government money by waiting until age 60 to receive their retirement pay.

National Guard forces are normally commanded by their respective state governors. When needed to perform missions for the federal government, guard forces are subject to primary control by the commander in chief.

The president has the authority under the War Powers Act to recall up to 200,000 reservists from all armed forces components for up to 90 days of involuntary active duty by declaring an imminent threat, with the possibility of extending that call-up for 90 days more. To go beyond 180 days, he must get approval from Congress, which alone has the power to declare war.

The changing world situation today indicates a probable reduction of active force strength and possible additional responsibilities for the reserve. It would be dangerous to depend too heavily on reserve forces, however. Reserve readiness would suffer greatly if suitable numbers of trained people did not join from the active-duty forces.

Discussion

Hungarian Civilian: Corruption and incompetence were possible in the military because of the lack of public control and open
information. The Hungarian public does not know of the professionalism of much of the military. In the absence of more openness, it will be difficult to inform the public on defense issues and it will be next to impossible to generate public support for defense reform. The military will do a disservice to national interests, let alone its own interests, if it tries to hide behind a veil of secrecy. The military has clearly seen, even if it could not publicly say so, that the Hungarian defense forces were divorced from their original, declared objective: the defense of the homeland. Important currents in military thinking are directed toward reform. But public support for defense reform will be impossible if the public does not know the purpose for which the money will be spent.

**Hungarian Military:** The military is a part of society and is touched by the same processes and changes. Some leaders of the army misused their powers, but the majority of officers are ready to accept the transition toward democracy.

The stability of the army should be properly secured in this period of transition. The political leadership should restore the dignity of the army by providing a clear definition of its role and mission, based on the security requirements of the society and country. Only if society understands the role and mission of the military can it accept that significant sums must be spent on the army.

We also have to set up a system of governmental controls to determine the main outlines of cooperation between the army and the state. The security of the army greatly depends on delineating this framework so that the army does not have to fear unfavorable repercussions. I think it would be wrong if, in the period of democratic transition, labels were to be attached to the army. People have to be judged on an individual basis.

There was a statement that members of the army who were trained in the Soviet Union do not sympathize with the Soviet Union, while those who were not may sympathize with the Soviet Union to a greater extent. The overwhelming majority of officers are patriots, and are ready to defend their homeland. But to be able to do this, society must provide adequate assistance and support.

**Hungarian Civilian:** One hundred fifty years ago, during the Hungarian revolution of 1848, all officers were trained according to Austrian strategy and doctrine in foreign academies. They had been indoctrinated to serve the emperor, but after the outbreak of the revolution, their loyalties quickly changed.

How much are the principles of democracy reflected in the structure and behavior of an army? The army is based on a command system, best resembling democratic centralism, a communist principle. How is this problem solved in the United States?
**American Civilian:** There is an understood willingness by a serviceman to be bound by rules that do not apply to the vast majority of his fellow citizens. Yet the military is bound by the legal environment. No soldier is required to obey an order that violates U.S. law or U.S.-ratified international law. Informally, the military spends a good deal of time discussing issues at all unit levels to ensure that junior officers and enlisted men understand the missions they are asked to perform. In fact, the U.S. army is notorious for a great deal of discussion at the unit level. It has been demonstrated on many occasions that its soldiers are capable of providing “the last full measure of devotion” to their country when they understand the reason they are being asked to fight. When soldiers are used as cannon fodder, there have been many instances of varied performance.

**American Civilian:** One aspect of individual rights is the right of individuals to serve or not to serve in the military. The standard in the United States has become the right of anyone to serve regardless of ethnic, national, or racial background, or gender, although not all questions have been settled with regard to the last category. The military has historically provided upward mobility for disadvantaged minorities. The right to serve of anyone qualified to serve has much to do with the right of individuals to do as they wish in a free society.

The right of an individual not to serve in the military is also a very important problem for democratic theory. Since the eighteenth century, the right to refuse to serve on grounds of moral choice has been expanded gradually, from membership in three or four traditionally pacifist Protestant sects, to conscientious objection based on traditional religious belief, regardless of religion, to conscientious objection based on moral or ethical principles, to selective conscientious objection (e.g., objection to serving with nuclear weapons). Conscientious objectors are not significant in terms of numbers, but how they are treated has a great deal to do with who is on top in a society, the person or the organizing power center.

**Hungarian Civilian:** The recent past plays a major role in society’s assessment of the military in Eastern Europe. The Polish army is the only army in the socialist countries that preserved a large degree of popularity and respect. The role of the military in martial law under General Jaruzelski damaged this respect, even though special units played the dirty roles. I think this will prove a fleeting phenomenon. The Polish army will serve the nation and the nation does not have too many questions about that.

The Czechoslovak Legions played a major role in the establishment of Czechoslovakia during World War I. But the prestige of the Czech army, high in the interwar period, fell drastically because its role in the
Munich crisis and during 1968 left an impression in Czech and Slovak society that their army, although professionally well trained, did not play its expected role. The Czechoslovak army will soon return to serve the national cause, but it will not have the same respect that the Polish army has.

The Romanian army, contrary to the views of some very ill-informed Hungarians, is professionally good. Those Hungarians who fought it in World War I, like my grandparents, knew that. The army was quite loyal, subordinated to the political leadership, and fought equally well whatever side it was expected to fight on. In World War II it fought very well against the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1944 and together with the Soviet Union after that. The Romanian army was apparently loyal to the dictatorship of Ceaucescu. It changed sides very quickly last December, however, and actually, in this case, took the initiative. A spontaneous revolt in Timisoara was followed by a military coup that had probably been already planned. Whatever role the army played in serving Ceaucescu, it redeemed itself by the heroic behavior against often superior, better-equipped Securitate forces. The Romanian society will continue to respect its army. Whether that army will succumb to a nationalist tradition, which is certainly strong in Romania, or will continue to defend a pluralistic, democratic order, which I am quite sure many people in the army genuinely support, is an open question.

The Hungarian army was one of the most subservient to Soviet influence during the Stalinist period. As a result, Hungarian society did not perceive the army as serving the national interest. People who were old enough to live during the 1956 revolution also know, however, that the Hungarian army then took up the national cause. After the restoration of the Soviet-type system, the army came under even closer control than in some other communist countries. This is another reason for its low prestige. In the past decades, the Hungarian armed forces exhibited a strong professionalism and an obvious ability and willingness to serve national interests. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, from the beginning of the restoration of political life in Hungary, supported the idea of a strong army. The other opposition parties, which were not so keen on that (there were some pacifist tendencies), have come to accept that view.

American Military: There are many laws and regulations and constraints that the American military must follow. The lowest private in the American army can cause a general to have to go to court. The bottom line is that the tenets of our democracy are also embedded in our military.
II. SESSION 2: NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND MECHANISMS

DEFINING NATIONAL DOCTRINES

Presentation 1: Hungarian Military

Army operations are determined by concepts of national security. Previously, the concept of national security could not be precisely defined because in the state-party system of issuing direct orders there was no need. Also, in the Brezhnev era national security as a subject was shifted to the background in the Warsaw Pact. Defense policy in this country was conducted by determining the upper limit of resources that could be spent for military purposes.

What were the consequences of the absence of a national security policy? An image of a political enemy was created. The security of the alliance, that is, the security of the different nations belonging to the Pact, was considered the focal point of security. Internal domestic pressures on resources determined the growth of the military.

How can we interpret the concept of national security today? We are striving for an institutionalized system of domestic and international guarantees. These would secure national independence and territorial integrity based on a constitution. They would also guarantee our borders, air space, national territory, and national values, and provide security to the population.

Obviously, we have to respond to external political, economic, and technological pressures. We have to defend our country against natural and social catastrophes, including crises that may occur in the vicinity of our borders. During the current peaceful transition there is something of a political vacuum. There are no responses to questions about a national concept of defense. The security system has not yet been chosen.

Several concepts of security exist, including coalitions based on mutually opposing military blocs, the typical concept in Europe. In this case the basis of our national security policy would be membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Another view considers the defense of the social system a major component of security. Other views focus on protecting the interests of Hungarian people living in the Carpathian basin. Obviously, the most suitable approach is a policy of defense of the constitutional order of Hungary and national security.
What hazards and what threats to our country's interests face us in the near future? Despite the crisis in the military blocs, the military arsenals that have been programmed against one another and the distribution of targets still exist. The blocs are an objective threat in Europe. However, they appear to be undergoing rearrangement.

Another threat is an overemphasis on restructuring. We also have to assess the restructuring of Europe, including the German question, when we try to survey possible national security problems. When dangers to national security occur, we have to determine the attitude, behavior, and approach that the country concerned follows when assessing this problem. We have to identify possible partners. The best system of security after the dissolution of military blocs in Europe would involve collective guaranteed security implemented on a mutual basis.

Changing security policy is an adventurous enterprise to embark on during a transition to a multiparty democracy. Without a national security policy it is impossible to create a military doctrine, to initiate a reform of the military, or to negotiate the needed levels of budgetary resources. This is not a matter of legislation; it is not a problem of Parliament. It is a long-term problem, a long-term exercise. It requires that principles be worked out during the transition between the political parties. Policy cannot depend on rounds of elections. Professionals working in this area have to aim at achieving a consensus.

A policy needs to be formulated, in particular, because of the deployment of Soviet troops in Hungary, the phasing of their withdrawal, the need to formulate a defensive doctrine and restructure the armed forces in accordance with it, and the need for new systems for the training of cadres and officers.

Doctrine has two aspects, political and military; the political aspect is decisive. We would like to expand doctrine to contain the military steps necessary to avoid war. It should also be enlarged to include forms of behavior and attitudes of the military aimed at avoiding conflict. Doctrine is not a document, but a system of official views. It provides a concept of war and a purpose to defense. In our case it is clearly defensive, focusing on changes in force structures and in the methods of application, as well as training.

Presentation 2: American Military

Strategy is the art and science of employing resources to secure national objectives. Doctrine is a set of principles that guide the employment of military forces; it is authoritative in nature but leaves
room for judgment in its application. One national objective, the desire to provide security for the nation, was established by the president and Congress. The defense establishment develops a national defense strategy to secure that objective. The concept of deterrence is an example of defense strategy. Next, military strategy is formulated based upon the national defense strategy and then translated into military doctrine. Forward deployment of forces is an example of military strategy, and our concept of Air-Land Battle is an example of military doctrine.

The key to understanding the development of national security policy in the United States is an appreciation for the foundation of the process, the Constitution. The Constitution defines the legal responsibilities and relationships of the three branches of the government and establishes a clear separation of power between them. The Constitution establishes the subordination of the military to civilian authority. The military is required to swear an oath of allegiance to the Constitution.

The president is responsible for establishing national interests and objectives and translating them into national strategies that will sustain the nation’s interests. The president’s national security strategy is developed by the National Security Council, composed of the president, vice president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, and advisors such as the head of the CIA and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This body issues the national security policy directives used by the defense community to develop defense strategy, planning guidance, military strategy, and warfighting doctrine.

The president is commander in chief of the armed forces, but his power is not absolute and he must collaborate closely and continually with Congress. Even though Congress is not a formal player in the process of developing national security strategy, it confirms national interests and strategies through its power to raise and maintain armed forces. It also authorizes and appropriates funding for the execution of national strategies.

The Defense Department is led by the secretary of defense, a statutory member of the National Security Council. He is responsible for translating policy into defense strategy and planning guidance. A few examples of these defense strategies are deterrence, flexible response, strong alliances, strategic mobility, and strategic reserves. The Joint Chiefs of Staff translate these defense strategies into national military strategy and joint warfighting doctrine. The service secretaries and chiefs convert the National Military Strategy and War Fighting Commander-in-Chief’s Planning Guidance to employment doctrine for their respective services.
The democratic system affects this structure and process at every juncture. At each level there must be agreement by Congress and ultimately the people. The secretary of defense must gain congressional support for his defense strategy, just as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service secretaries and chiefs must convince Congress of the soundness of their military strategy and doctrine to obtain resources.

In a democracy, the development of national security strategy is primarily a political process. Fundamental decisions are reached by consensus. This is a time-consuming process, often frustrating to military officers who are more familiar with the decisive progression of tactical command and staff actions, and often not governed by hard and fast rules. It may change with the arrival of new leaders in the executive branch or in the Congress. However, the process has produced surprisingly stable policy for the United States and has always been grounded in the will of the people.

Presentation 3: Hungarian Military

During the last one and a half years, Hungarian security thinking has undergone a crucial shift. That shift is the result of several factors. First, it was recognized that not only nuclear, but also conventional war has become infeasible in Europe. War would have intolerable consequences. A second factor is the specific situation of Hungary within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Hungary is not exposed to the danger of a direct ground attack; the neutral or nonaligned countries neighboring Hungary have no desire to attack the country. The feeling of threat is withering away. Some of our former ultraconservative allies have ceased to exist because of recent changes. Third, over the last two years, social changes have greatly influenced military security thinking. Fourth, the critical economic situation has caused us to reassess the maintenance of the military. Fifth, since 1987 we have been able to observe a shift in doctrine in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the result of the new security and military thinking. Sixth, Hungary does not have any territorial claims on any of its neighboring countries. Anyone who doubts this should recall the revolution in Romania in December 1989 and how Hungary reacted to that series of events.

Our new military doctrine will be a defensive one. The political and military sides are in complete harmony about this. During the former absence of harmony, the political side declared peace the intention, but Hungary had military capacity. That capacity did not represent any particular offensive intention, but it was inconsistent with the country’s declared political policy. That caused a reasonable amount of
anxiety, probably not in NATO members, but in Hungary's neutral neighbors.

One foundation of military doctrine should be a realistic assessment of the threat. Such an objective assessment was the basis for carrying out the Hungarian military reform at the end of last year. The assessment declared that there is no military or political reason for stationing Soviet troops in Hungary. The new Hungarian national military doctrine is embodied in this military reform. We have started to implement a substantial reduction in forces and significant restructuring. We have adopted a regional principle.

Carrying through the military reform will not increase our capacity to attack. On the contrary, our capacity to attack will decline. We share the goal to end the unequal distribution of military forces throughout Europe. Our force reduction exceeds similar efforts in allied forces and, we hope, sets an example. We can gradually comply with the rules and descriptions stipulated by the forthcoming CFE agreement in Vienna.

Discussion

Hungarian Civilian: Suppose Soviet troops are withdrawn from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, even from Poland and East Germany. What kind of changes do you foresee in the development of U.S. military doctrine? A broad military modernization program has been initiated in NATO. I have heard some news, mostly private announcements in the newspapers, that this modernization program is already outdated because of the recent changes in Eastern Europe. Are policy discussions taking place on this subject on the official military level, either in the Pentagon or at NATO headquarters?

American Military: My understanding is that there is a review going on right now as to our national security policy in light of the changes. Personally I do not see a lot of change in the policy. I think that change in that particular policy might come in the degree and in how we implement it. It will affect our modernization through a reduction in resources and from a reassessment of the threat.

American Military: Our military might is structured and designed to counter any threat that might face the United States. We see the threat from a Warsaw Treaty Organization going down. Americans eagerly anticipate an immediate peace dividend. But there is still a great deal of volatility and uncertainty in the world.

Our military is designed to support all of our national interests. Those vis-à-vis the Warsaw Treaty Organization are only part of U.S. national interests. We consider ourselves a worldwide power, and
therefore our interests are worldwide. They require a military designed to defend all those interests around the world. Besides NATO we have treaty obligations with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and other countries, all of which impose certain obligations and responsibilities upon our military.

**Hungarian Civilian:** I have no difficulties with having or continuing to have a doctrine. But much depends on the meaning of the doctrine and the operational implication of continuing to have one. If we perceive the doctrine as having few political guidelines and a big military side, I believe we may have difficulties in handling our security policy issues. If the political guidelines are accessible and open to the public and understandable, but the military side of the doctrine is closed off from the taxpayer and from the political parties, the policy will not have public support.

**Hungarian Civilian:** If we have a security policy based on national interest and we try to derive from this security policy military doctrine, operational plans, etc., there will be some inertia, of course. How much inertia is there in the American system when it is confronted with extremely rapid changes? What lessons can be drawn about the speed and extent of change possible in the basic understanding of your national interests from the changes during the Nixon administration?

**American Civilian:** There is a lot of inertia in very large bureaucracies like those in the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department, and the Congress, and a complex political system with many checks and balances. Those bodies will continue to move along their current paths until perturbed by an external force. Historically, that force has come from the president. He has a tremendous amount of power, if he chooses to use it. There is naturally much confusion, at this juncture in history, over when and how the president will bring that force to bear because the world has changed.

**American Civilian:** There is more inertia in our system when the threat is increasing and the arguments are over increasing the defense budget than there will be when the threat is perceived to have declined. There is a feeling that a peace dividend of fairly great magnitude should be forthcoming relatively soon. The problem for the Congress is to try to project what the situation is likely to be nearly a year ahead. That is very difficult, particularly when there is such turbulence in world affairs.

**American Military:** We have not given enough attention in this conference to the fact of the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States. This is fundamental to the shaping of the future U.S. security policies. Any changes that the United States
chooses to make in its security policy must be weighed against what could happen to bring the United States into confrontation with the Soviet Union. If conditions have changed to the point that direct confrontation and the possibility of nuclear threats have diminished, U.S. force levels can be reduced significantly. The United States has to weigh very carefully what changes in security policy and force levels mean with regard to increasing or decreasing the probabilities of nuclear war. This is what makes the United States so slow to make changes. The United States will continue to approach this matter very deliberately and very cautiously before it determines what changes it should make and still preserve nuclear deterrence. The same applies to NATO.

**Hungarian Civilian:** Although the hardware, and this is particularly important in the context of strategic nuclear forces, is in place in the Warsaw Pact (even given the unilateral reductions), it is important that we see the threat in Europe in context. The current military structures have become obsolete, irrelevant, or painfully anachronistic for both alliances in Europe. For example, the state of war with the West—in the ideological and political sense—is over in Hungary. In light of the imminent changes and reductions on the Warsaw Treaty side, we question the legitimacy and the continued maintenance of NATO’s battle order. The Italian foreign minister said recently in Vienna that there is now a new asymmetry, the asymmetry between the existing security structures and the political developments in Europe. The changes to be introduced in military structures, force sizing, etc., should accommodate themselves to these changes.

**American Civilian:** Obviously the biggest uncertainty at the moment is the future of the Soviet Union. It makes a big difference whether the Soviet Union remains a state with considerable military power in the Western Military Districts that can threaten Europe, or unravels as a country or survives as a looser federation.

There has always been a political asymmetry between the alliances in terms of legitimacy and cohesion. The Warsaw Pact may indeed not have much of a future. That does not automatically mean that NATO should also be dismantled. We are moving away from a phase of ideological conflict and the arms control paradigm. We are moving back into an age when U.S. policymakers will be thinking more in geopolitical terms, of worldwide American commitments, and the best allocation of resources.

**American Military:** I would urge my American interlocutors to go back and spread the word that at a time when the threat has diminished, it is one thing to look at the numbers and the hardware, it is another to get inside the heads of the men who have been planning the
policy and who have been operating the military. High-level visits from our general officer corps and from our senior defense officials will allow them to understand firsthand that the Hungarians are adopting a defensive defense. We see it in the field; they have shown us in exercises. An understanding of this is necessary to change the inertia.

**American Civilian:** Hungary does not face a significant, acute conventional threat, yet is in a unique position in Central Europe. It has large numbers of conationalists in neighboring countries, some of whom may be facing considerable instability. Does assistance, perhaps protection of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries, enter into the security considerations of the new Hungarian national doctrine, and if so, how? One could easily imagine a situation in which Yugoslavia breaks up in a violent way, and a conflict between Serbs and Croats puts the large Hungarian minority in Voivodina in the middle. The Romanian situation, of course, is also a possible source of concern. If the new Hungarian doctrine takes into consideration the protection of Hungarian minorities, is it really feasible to have a doctrine that is strictly defensive?

**Hungarian Military:** This question is not a new one. On December 20, 1989, several people raised this question in Hungary. In the streets, not in the Parliament building, politicians demanded that the Romanian revolution no longer be assessed as a Romanian matter. Some argued that the Hungarian army should intervene.

The army forms a part of the system of political institutions. However, if the armed forces are to serve the purposes of defense, they must be equipped and trained to implement a doctrine of defensive defense. Intervention cannot be part of their obligation, not in domestic political processes nor external events. However, to have dignity as a country, both the quality and the role of the armed forces are important. Obviously, if there is a crisis near our borders, the armed forces have duties to attend to and obligations to meet. If in one of the countries the military takes over, or if a civil war breaks out, or impermissible means are used to oppress nationalities, then due measures to defend Hungary's borders have to be taken. However, irredentism did a great deal of harm to this country. We have to take very seriously the international consensus that frontiers cannot be violated.

**American Civilian:** To what degree is public opinion playing a role in the Hungarian foreign policy debate? Which foreign policy issues are major themes in the current election campaign? Where do the differences lie?

**Hungarian Civilian:** At the moment, the Hungarian public is not very divided on foreign policy or security issues. The current leadership is pursuing aims corresponding to 90 percent of the political
philosophy of all the parties. Public opinion will certainly be a problem if serious situations threaten Hungarian minorities abroad. But I underline and fully share the opinion that, for political or strategic reasons, nothing could be done militarily if anything should happen to Hungarian minorities in other countries. Only diplomatic and political assistance could be provided.

Hungary would like to have all Soviet troops withdrawn, the air force as well as the army. Every single Soviet soldier should leave Hungary. Some days ago the Hungarian chief of staff was asked about Soviet withdrawals, and he said that Hungary's air force is in poor shape; we have very old planes and are very happy that they do not fall out of the sky during exercises. If the Soviets withdraw their airplanes, they will also be withdrawing their antiaircraft missiles. Then we will not have a complete air defense. He said that this, unfortunately, will be the case for the next couple of years.

This is a very serious situation for the Hungarian armed forces because they have been integrated into the Warsaw Pact—in other words, into the Soviet army. If the Soviets withdraw, our armed forces will be incomplete for a while. Fortunately, our neighbors who might have been feeling a threat from Hungary because they have Hungarian minorities are reassured by our absence of military capability. We are certainly not afraid because of our lack of military capability.

Hungarian Military: For the moment we are not in a position to prepare ourselves for any military defense of Hungarian minorities in other countries. The protection of Hungarians in neighboring countries could be done more efficiently through foreign policy.

Questions of doctrine are, however, important for security. Similar to the problem of restructuring the army in general, doctrine has to be reshaped. To do so, we must ask: What kind of threats are likely? What kind of an army should we have and what purposes should this army serve?

Due to its membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Soviet forces have been stationed in Hungary. The process of withdrawal will be started soon. If conflict among the big powers had occurred, Hungary would have been exposed primarily to air attack because it has no direct land connection with the other alliance. Therefore, air defense has been and remains very important. Aircraft and air defense are the most costly branch of the Hungarian armed forces. Extensive modernization is not realistic. Therefore we have to search for security in other ways.

Future doctrine will have to be based on the fact that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Hungary. The role played by Hungary within the Warsaw Treaty Organization will have to be changed. In my view,
we will fulfill our obligations under the treaty if we guarantee the security of the borders of the Soviet Union from our direction by stating that Hungary will prohibit the launching of any action from our territory that would threaten the Soviet Union.

When constructing a new army, we have to base ourselves on our new security policy and the threats that may emerge here in the Carpathian basin. In the long run we cannot exclude the possibility of the emergence of controversies with our neighbors.

What should we expect from our armed forces? Should they defend our borders or express the determined intention of our nation to face any aggression and not give its independence away cheaply? Considering the neighboring countries, the first alternative is unrealistic. To oppose a big power would not be sensible, it would cause superfluous bloodshed. We would have to proceed in the second direction, that is, we need a force equipped with modern weapons with a capability that expresses our intention to defend our country in a clear-cut manner.

**Hungarian Civilian:** What lengths are permissible in the defense of democracy and human rights? The United States has intervened twice in the 1980s, once in Grenada and once in Panama. Does military power justify intervention even in the name of democracy, human rights, or the protection of the lives of U.S. citizens? Is there any similarity between this attitude and the one in the question of whether Hungary should have a policy of protecting Hungarian minorities in other countries, if necessary, by military means?

**American Civilian:** It very much depends on the context. It is one thing to intervene for the purposes of grabbing territory or installing a friendly political regime, as in 1968 in Prague. It is a different question if it is done to save lives or to protect a minority subject to serious threat. In raising the issue of the defense of Hungarian minorities, I did not have in mind irredentism or changing of borders. I imagined a situation in which a new Antonescu or Ceaucescu of the right emerges and uses threats against the Hungarian minority to derive legitimacy through extreme chauvinism. For the Hungarian military to not at least try to help, with international backing, will mean losing any legitimacy it has among its own people as a national institution. The question of feasibility or the circumstances is important, but those who formulate the new national military doctrine will have to face this issue. In Yugoslavia, for example, assistance may be needed simply to save lives. This would not be a question of intervention for political purposes.

**Hungarian Civilian:** Who is to judge whether a given government has a realistic assessment of a crisis in which human lives are exposed to such a degree of danger that it is necessary to intervene, and by this
intervention escalate the confrontation? In a continent like Europe, security of the individual countries must be guaranteed in one form or another. We are very keen to listen to the descriptions of U.S. decisionmaking mechanisms. However, there is a major difference in size between the two countries. There is also a difference in environment, a different geostrategic situation as far as the perception of the dangers is concerned. When it comes to American decisionmaking, generally speaking, international analysis is of importance, but it does not have the priority it does in a small country. Would we have to just sit calmly and do nothing if minorities or other people are killed in other countries? No. A collective, mutual security system of guarantees should be established that would be valid for all the principles laid down in Helsinki, not only military concerns. There should be a community in Europe capable of handling not only crises. Confidence-building measures are very important because they are procedures for a future system of collective security. There are also existing international guarantees that bind the signatories to protect human rights. It is not feasible for us to include a commitment and responsibility into the formulation of doctrine based on a worst-case scenario. That would just escalate confrontation.

**Hungarian Civilian:** From a humanitarian point of view, everybody agrees it should have been imperative to save the Armenians' lives in the recent Azeri-Armenian conflict and to stop pogroms. Would the United States, however, be willing to intervene militarily if Armenians are slaughtered, and the Soviets do nothing and the whole nation is endangered by the situation? What justifies an attack against a sovereign nation, even if it acts unacceptably toward a minority? Or should UN peacekeeping forces be used, or some other usually inadequate means? Should we insist on keeping nonintervention as a strategy?

**American Civilian:** I find myself caught between a sense of national interest in the case of the United States and a very strong personal belief in international order and international law. There is obviously an important tension here. If it is left to each individual nation to decide for itself when it will abide by international law and international resolutions, this is a prescription to return to international anarchy. I personally believe that it would be wrong to use the criterion that the United States quite frankly used in both Grenada and Panama, which is that the populations wanted the intervention. There is no doubt about that in both cases. The downside is that each action undermined the principle of nonintervention. I was also quite disturbed by Secretary Baker's suggestion that the Soviet Union ought to intervene in Romania. The United States spent 30 years trying to
keep the Soviet Union from intervening in other countries. It would be far better for the international community to strengthen international bodies, such as UN peacekeeping forces, rather than leave it to each individual nation to decide when and under what conditions it will abide by international law.

**American Civilian**: It is much more difficult to come to decisions about interventions with the needed degree of secrecy in a parliamentary democracy than in one with a strong executive branch. In the U.S. interventions, Congress as a whole was notified after the fact. Consultations beforehand were limited to probably no more than a dozen or so of the top leadership of the legislative branch. Consequently, I think Hungary will find the potential to intervene a less substantial problem than it might appear at first glance.

**American Civilian**: Historically, UN peacekeeping forces have only been used to provide a buffer. They have always required agreement of the parties before the mechanism went into place. It is an entirely new issue to talk about the use of international forces to intervene on behalf of injured parties (Armenians subject to pogroms, Hungarian minorities in Romania, etc.) against the will of the sovereign state in which that problem is occurring.

**American Civilian**: The problem is that there is no effective international framework to deal with questions which are, in fact, questions of moral imperative. As long as such a framework does not exist, there will be situations in which international legalisms would have to be judged against the extermination of people. The moral imperative should take precedence. The absence of an effective international system forced the United States to intervene in Panama.

**American Civilian**: The surge of patriotism in Eastern Europe is understandable. But it is important to understand, particularly in Western Europe, that many governments have spent four decades trying to defuse nationalism and to create transnational institutions. The surge of nationalist feeling in Eastern Europe is quite clearly a cause of concern for some people in the West. The future of Western economic and political support will be tied to the mitigation of ethnic problems in Eastern Europe.

**MECHANISMS**

**Presentation 1: American Civilian**

U.S. national security policy is generated in the National Security Council but coordinated by the National Security staff. It is useful to understand the difference between the council and the staff. The NSC
issues national security decision memoranda to the bureaucracy that forms the basis of national security policy.

The process of implementing these policies is coordinated out of the office of the president through the special assistant for national security affairs and his staff. His power derives from his personal closeness to the president—normally he briefs the president every morning—and his ability to set the agenda for the policy process. He often chairs interagency meetings, decides what issues should be discussed and what issues should be brought to the attention of the president, and is in charge of implementing decisions.

The National Security staff is in the office of the president. It works under the direction of the special assistant for national security affairs. Most people using the words National Security Council are referring to the staff and the work it does rather than the body itself. The staff varies in size, usually 35 or 40 people, but was as large as 90 under Kissinger. The staff is drawn primarily from the various bureaucracies. Only exceptionally does it include people from the outside. The 80 to 85 percent of the staff coming from the government bureaucracy includes representatives from the military, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Usually these people stay two or three years and then return to their original organizations with better insight into the process of coordinating national security policy.

The real role of the staff is to coordinate and streamline the foreign policy process. It is a management tool. It integrates the positions of the various bureaucracies, presents the president with options, and identifies issues to be brought to his attention. It often acts informally as the president's eyes and ears, keeping him from being surprised by emerging issues. It is also very much involved in trying to ensure that the president's decisions are implemented.

The president decides how he wants the staff to work. The process has depended on whether the president is personally engaged in foreign policy. Those presidents, such as Kennedy, Nixon, and to some extent Bush, who have been heavily engaged in the policy process have tended to want a strong national security advisor and an influential NSC staff.

There have been times of tension between the national security advisor and the secretary of state. The national security advisor's job is to coordinate policy. He is not officially a cabinet member. His power, while substantial, is derivative: he is seen as speaking for the president. Active national security advisors, particularly Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, were often criticized for becoming advocates of a policy rather than managers of it.
In the initial Reagan period, the role of the national security advisor and his staff was downgraded to avoid tensions. The State Department was the driving force behind foreign policy and even chaired interagency meetings. Those meetings should have been chaired by the national security advisor, who should act as someone above the other players. By the end of the period, power had begun to flow back to the NSC staff. In fact, the staff engaged in activities far beyond its statutory power. After the Iran-Contra period, under Frank Carlucci, the staff functioned much more as it was initially designed to do, and has continued to do so in the Bush period.

**Presentation 2: Hungarian Military**

The old principles and mechanisms of national security policy have become obsolete, and the new principles and mechanisms have yet to be established. Under the old system, national security policy was formulated by a small group headed by the First Party Secretary in his capacity as president of the Defense Council, and in the Central Committee of the party by the secretary of the Central Committee in charge of national defense, with perhaps the addition of the commander in chief of the armed forces and the minister of defense.

In the process of democratic and peaceful transformation, the Hungarian armed forces have the task of defending the republic's borders against external dangers, maintaining internal order, and protecting the property of citizens, if there are major natural catastrophes.

Over the last four and a half decades the Hungarian People's Army functioned under the tutelage of the one-party system. Against the background of the new political thinking, the historical role has collided with the attitudes of society toward the armed forces and the ideas of peace and war. The enemy image, based on an obsolete ideology, distrust and suspicion, has been changed fundamentally. Subsequently, national defense policy has to be established on a new basis.

The defense force has to be adjusted to the new requirements. It will be smaller in numbers and armaments, and the command structure, strategic and operational principles, and training will have to change. New policy should reflect the fact that national defense represents the commitment, devotion, and efforts of the people and of the nation as a whole. It is related to the territorial sovereignty and independence of the country, to the defense and the protection of its economic, political, and cultural values. National defense policy must make clear that the national armed forces are an instrument in the hands of the democratic power under appropriate and strict social control. Only Parliament is entitled to make decisions concerning the use of the armed forces.
The composition of the new government and national defense policy will become known only after the elections. When shaping the new system of national defense, the armed forces are not indifferent to the role they play nor the weight they carry in the elections. Military men will express their support of the political party program that gives the most explicit plan for emerging from the economic crisis and articulates the most realistic defense policy. The military expects the new national defense policy to express the wishes of the entire society as well as those of the military. We must avoid the patterns used over the last decades.

It is necessary to lay down precisely the tasks that are to be accomplished by the armed forces in the defense of society and the promotion of social programs. It is necessary to emphasize those tasks related to national defense policy and national military doctrine. It is necessary to see the geostrategic situation of the country properly. We must also have a correct understanding of the economic, political, and other forces in this country when we define the tasks of the armed forces. In the new Hungarian defense policy, and also in military doctrine, it is necessary to reject any kind of war, especially nuclear war, in an unequivocal way as a potential means of settling problems. This includes intervention.

Presentation 3: American Military

The single most important law on national security is the National Security Act of 1947, which has been amended several times. That act created the National Security Council and unified the separate military departments under one centralized authority, the civilian secretary of defense, who is the president's principal advisor on all defense matters. The operational chain of command runs from the president to the secretary of defense and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the third group established by the National Security Act, to our operating forces. The Joint Chiefs have no command authority but are in effect a channel of communications from the president and the secretary of defense to the operational forces. We have two types of operational forces. The first consists of eight unified commands, which have forces from two or more of the services (the army, navy, or the air force) and which are responsible for certain geographical areas; for example, the United States European Command is responsible for all U.S. military activities conducted in Europe. The second type of operational force is the specified command, which normally has forces from one service and accomplishes a particular function throughout the world, like the Strategic Air Command. The U.S. military structure also consists of three
military departments or services: the army, navy, and air force. Each department is headed by a civilian secretary who supervises a four-star officer and his staff. The military departments are not in the operational chain of command. Their functions are to organize, to train and to equip those forces assigned to operational commands.

The president has the initiative on national security policies, but relies on the secretary of defense to design the master plan to use U.S. military capabilities to achieve the national interest. The secretary of defense gets his advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once the requirements are approved by the Congress, the military department conducts the necessary research to acquire and develop the system.

Each year the secretary of defense must submit a written report to Congress describing the president’s plan for securing the defense of America’s principles and interests. The report is unclassified and available to the public. This plan reviews defense policies, outlines defense resource requirements, and describes major defense programs. The Congress holds hearings at which expert witnesses provide testimony on this plan and other military issues. These witnesses could include the secretary of defense, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, representatives of the military departments, commanders of the operating forces, and individuals who have reputations for being experts, military or civilian. The opportunity to testify before Congress is a major way for military officials to justify the need for military resources.

Members of the U.S. military have most of the same rights and duties of their civilian counterparts. They have the right to join political parties and engage in some political activities, but are prohibited from holding public office. Political affiliation is not important to their careers because promotions and jobs are based on merit. The American military takes pride in the fact that it is an apolitical institution and that there has never been a military coup in the more than 200 years of the republic.

Discussion

American Military: Under the Hatch Act of 1939, we are specifically prohibited from exercising our political rights while in uniform or in any way utilizing our government office to further our personal political objectives.

Hungarian Civilian: What is the attitude of the Hungarian military toward political parties?

Hungarian Military: Soldiers as individuals will decide which movements or parties they support by voting for them in the elections. The national army will not support any political parties or movements as an organization.
Hungarian Civilian: There is a need for national consensus on the key issues of security and defense policy. I do not know how much time the next government will have to shape that consensus, but I believe it is urgent. The agreement in Vienna on the reduction of conventional forces is imminent. The final numbers for Hungary will give us the number of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other hardware that should be sufficient for self-defense. I see the chances for a national consensus on the key issues of a security and defense policy as fairly good, provided the parties forge a consensus rather than accentuate their other differences. Given the domestic developments in Hungary, the international environment, geopolitics, and financial constraints, the range of good choices for national defense and security policy is fairly narrow. We have no real alternatives. Of course, one can imagine different shades or different emphases, but essentially all trends point in one direction: defensive defense. The completion of the defense reform that has already started demands a clear-cut definition by political decisionmakers of the function and mission of the Hungarian armed forces.

American Military: As Hungary develops its national policy, what role does the representative of the Warsaw Pact, the four-star Soviet general (and his staff) sitting in the Ministry of Defense, continue to play? What assurances do those of us sitting in NATO without this four-star type of representation in our capitals have that the policies you develop will in fact truly be national and not reflective of Soviet interests? [No Hungarian answer was forthcoming—Ed.]

Hungarian Civilian: The government that will be appointed by the freely elected Parliament will establish a national security policy. The use of military force needs the permission of the Parliament, which implies a consensus among the political parties represented.

During the transition period, the national roundtable, which was organized last June between the ruling Communist Party and the opposition, set up a subcommittee on how to avoid martial law. The main issue in the subcommittee was the abolition of the Workers' Militia. The opposition considered it to be a Communist Party army for internal affairs. We did not have talks about the role of the military or the police. After the events in Romania in December, where we think the Hungarian military played a positive role, the Ministry of Defense invited the opposition parties for talks. Unfortunately, we discovered a scandal in January: the Secret Service, which is subordinate only to the Ministry of the Interior, was found still to be wire-tapping and spying on the opposition parties. This made us quite nervous. We think the civil service and the military should be politically neutral. As individuals they can of course vote, but as members of the civil and military service they must serve the aims of the government.
Hungarian Civilian: Shaping a new national security policy was presented earlier this morning as a long-term process. I do not believe we have much time, nor do I believe that it should take much time, because we have a good chance at arriving at a national consensus.

Hungarian Military: I would like to talk about a new approach to security mechanisms. We have a president. He is not a very strong president, as in the United States, but he is the commander in chief of the armed forces, and after Parliament decides that force may be used, he decides how the army will be employed. Parliament and its Defense Committee have the responsibility to verify the actions of the armed forces and to provide resources necessary for them. The task of the government and the Ministry of Defense is to elaborate the conditions for the existence of the armed forces, their development, training, etc. But where is the role for experts? Where is the place for a Hungarian national security council? Because a national security council solely for the president or solely for the government will not be an effective body.

Parliament has a Defense Committee. In the new era of many parties, an interparty body of experts, including representatives from the Ministry of Defense, Parliament, and the armed forces, is necessary. Such a body could start work before the election. We do not have much time to develop a consensus, and I think that the first policy concerns of the new government will not be security problems.

Hungarian Civilian: All the responsible parties of the opposition and the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party agree that a national consensus on security policy is necessary, but finding it will not be a simple task. We have no real alternatives. We must organize an army, capable of defense, but absolutely unable to make any offensive plans. I think everybody agrees. So it is possible to organize an expert committee on security policy now.

But the common people feel they are in a very great economic crisis. They are not interested in maintaining an army sufficient to be a deterrent against an attack. The common people are interested in reducing the military budget as much as possible. It is a conflict between reason and wish. There is also a danger from irresponsible parties seeking votes. Some claim we do not need armed forces because they are useless and expensive; others claim we should intervene to regain former territories, a nationalistic tendency that surfaced during the Romanian revolution. With the help of the armed forces, all responsible parties must avoid these two traps. The parties must restrain themselves before and during the elections from taking any demagogic positions, either antimilitarist or irredentist.
Hungarian Civilian: A national consensus is a bit mythical. One of the failures of the previous regime was that it never permitted a national public debate on foreign policy and security objectives. Before defining the national consensus, we must first carry through this debate.

American Civilian: The reality of the U.S. system is enormously different from the theory that you have been hearing. As one example, early in the Reagan administration the standing instructions from Secretary of Defense Weinberger to members of the Defense Department were that no member of any working group involved in NSC activities at any level other than that of the secretary of defense himself was allowed to compromise in the slightest on the Defense Department's position. Consequently, no issue ever got settled at a lower level unless all of the other parties were prepared to accede to the Defense Department's view. Otherwise the issue just escalated through the various secretarial levels until it reached the level of the secretary of defense and the secretary of state in front of the president.
III. RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Presentation 1: American Military

All individuals in the armed forces are required upon entry to take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution. There are also laws prohibiting politicians from actively campaigning on a military installation and prohibiting commanders from soliciting contributions to support a politician.

We do not execute military missions based on the principle of democratic rule, of course, but all of the rights and privileges that a citizen enjoys in society are normally accorded military personnel.

The code of law that governs the military, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is written by the Congress. That law protects the individual's rights, prescribes the methods by which individuals are disciplined, and establishes a court, the Court of Military Appeals, above the military structure, staffed by civilian jurists appointed by the president. This court is completely free of any military influence. When a military court administers serious punishment, the case automatically goes to the Court of Military Appeals for review. There is also a legal structure within the military not only to support a commander's needs, but to support the legal needs of the individual by providing free legal counsel. An individual may petition Congress, as frequently happens.

The secretary of defense has a civilian inspector general staff with the authority to investigate any matter within the military establishment they so choose. At each level of command there is also an inspector general staff. An individual may enter a complaint at any level of command and do so anonymously. The inspector general must investigate that complaint and render an opinion as to its validity. If it is valid, he must then recommend action to be taken to correct the problem. There is also a "hotline" at every echelon of command to the secretary of defense level. Any individual may pick up a telephone to register a complaint about any matter and do so anonymously. The system has matured to the point where abuses are virtually nonexistent.
The system of promotions, assignments, and selection for advanced training must also operate in accordance with the principle that all individuals are to be given equal opportunity based on their ability or merit. By law, as well as by regulation, all promotion recommendations are made by a board. In the case of officers, a board of officers makes the recommendation. In the case of enlisted personnel, promotion decisions are made on the basis of objective testing, written examinations, as well as promotion board input. A general may make written recommendations based upon personal knowledge, but has no authority to promote anyone. By the same token, once the board completes its work and recommends individuals for promotion, a commander cannot remove an individual from the promotion list. Only the president of the United States has that authority. In the case of officers who have the rank of colonel or below, the president has delegated the authority to promote individuals to the civilian secretaries of the services, not to general officers.

Assignments are made on the basis of the needs of the service. A commander may not arbitrarily assign a serviceman to some location. There has to be a valid need matching his skills. Similarly, selection of officers for higher-level training is done by a board that looks at all officers eligible for that training. It selects according to merit. It is important in a democratic society to have a system of laws and regulations that preserves the integrity of its systems for promotion, assignment, and selection for advanced training to prepare for higher levels of command.

Our military operates with a high degree of openness. There is a close working relationship between the military leadership of an installation and the civilian leadership in its local community. We tell them what our mission is, we allow them to meet our people and see the equipment we operate, and we expose them to our operations. We are constantly running student or teacher groups through our bases. This keeps the public informed about the military and breeds confidence in our professionalism. Invariably, the military ranks near the top in opinion polls measuring which institutions are most respected. The public has high regard for the integrity of our system of managing, controlling, training, and promoting people, as well as our system of checks and balances to keep the military a politically neutral force. A free and open press with full access to military activities is fundamental to preserving the integrity of the military.

The basic role of the military in Hungary will obviously be the defense of the homeland. Some of you may say it is not worth the effort. I would submit that your military force is a reflection of the
will and commitment of your people to the integrity of Hungary as an independent nation. As such, it serves an important symbolic role and I would hope that you would keep that in mind.

Presentation 2: Hungarian Civilian

Between the two world wars, effective parliamentary control of the Hungarian armed forces was a fiction. The armed forces were subordinated to the rulers and, during the last 40 years, to the power of the Communist Party. This placed the army in an exceptional position. It was impossible to touch. The need to change the system makes it necessary to create a new relationship between the army and civil society. Parliamentary control needs to be applied within the framework of an institutionalized system.

During modernization such institutions will emerge. However, we wonder whether the professional experts within the armed forces will make a sham of its civilian supervision. Guided by their own organizational interests, they treat the internal mechanism of the armed forces as a confidential matter, hiding it from the eyes of outsiders.

Parliament can exercise control only if it is given access to information about the technology and the workings of the given service. If such information is not available, Parliament can act only by threatening to reject measures it deems unacceptable, facing the military bureaucracy as an opponent. The Parliament is unable to act as a directive force if the military will not give Parliament the information indispensable for control.

Minimal parliamentary control involves the selection of department directors by the committees. Views and opinions of the representatives of the political parties will collide. If need be, they can turn to their own experts for recommendations and suggestions. The ensuing public debate will contribute to the fulfillment of parliamentary control.

The law itself, including the Constitution and the Law on Defense, is a primary technique of control. A second source is the Standing Military Committee, which employs experts to monitor the activities of the armed forces on a continuing basis and asks for reports and holds hearings as needed. A third source of control is ad hoc parliamentary committees, while a fourth is the right of any member to address the minister of defense during the session of Parliament. The acceptability of the minister’s answers are determined by vote. The Parliament can, if it deems necessary, withdraw confidence from the minister of defense.
Discussion

American Civilian: Most Western countries now operate using a programming, planning, and budgeting system similar to the one introduced by Secretary of Defense McNamara. The critical issue has been to reconcile the balance of power between civilian authorities and military authorities in making resource allocation decisions. In both the United States and Germany this has been done through decisions about the size and quality of the staffs that support the authorities, the access of those staffs to information about military programmatic matters (e.g., the technical feasibility of programs, time span, and cost), and the ability of the authorities, or their staff, to conduct independent analyses.

The planning process is usually the province of civilian authorities, with advice from the military. The programming process, that is, the building of the individual and overall programs, is normally the province of the military, with advice and review by the civil authorities. Budgeting is generally viewed as a housekeeping activity to make sure programs fit into the budget, but much of the action happens here.

In the United States the civil authorities are principally the secretary of defense and his staff. It is a large staff with access to much information, although the holders of the programs, the military services, do have the ability to withhold information from it at times. Withholding information is an important element of the balance of power.

In the American organization, the military services are the next important actors. The staff of the civilian secretary of the service tends to be small. The secretaries rely on the service chiefs of staff and their large staffs. A German military service has no civilian head. However, the military head and his large staff have no ability to conduct independent analysis.

In the United States the highest-level military institution is the unified military organization (the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and its staff, which tends to be small. Its access to information is also limited by what the military services provide. It has only a limited ability to conduct independent analysis.

U.S. civil authorities have a good deal of power, although the key information is still held by the military services. The struggle is very often over this information and the deployment of analysis to support arguments about allocation of funds.

In West Germany the staff of the minister of defense is very small, has essentially no independent access to information, and, unlike its U.S. counterpart, cannot conduct any independent analysis. It is in
many ways a very weak civil authority. The most important actor is
the Führungstab, but it has its own difficulties in handling the
independent military services, which have full access to information.

In a country thinking about changing its system, three questions are
important: Who will have the staffs of size and quality? How will
information be provided, especially information on the cost of pro-
grams? Who will conduct the independent analysis of the relative
worth of programs or changes to them?

American Civilian: The American system has many advantages,
but the creation of such large staffs at so many levels has created an
operation so unwieldy as to have difficulties adjusting to rapid change.
Most of the important decisions are made in the budgeting process,
where in theory one should be simply making sure that cost numbers
are accurate and that the final design fits into the overall cost.
Increasingly, decisions are being made by the civilian and military
comptrollers who keep track of the amounts of money being spent, not
by the political or the military authorities at senior levels.

The German system has many advantages as well. If I were to
advise the Germans, I would say they should give the minister a larger
staff and more independent analytic capacity so that he can engage in
a true dialogue with the military. The German system has some flaws
in the ability of the minister and his staff to provide political guidance.

Hungarian Civilian: Both the German and American systems are
inapplicable in Hungary because we do not have that many defense
issues. In the Hungarian system it would be necessary to collect a
body of a few people without regard to party affiliation, an independent
consulting committee.

Hungarian Military: The first Research Institute of the Ministry
of Defense will be established as of March 1, 1990, and will advise
other governmental institutions to aid the government and the new
minister of defense.

Hungarian Military: Until 1983–84, official documents directed
military historians to adapt Soviet military findings to Hungarian con-
ditions. We need to set up an institution to liberate Hungarian mili-
tary thinking. The new research institute should not implement tasks
given to it by the Ministry of Defense. It should analyze changing con-
ditions and work out proposals for possible solutions. It should not be
made a service for politics. The orders of the minister can be imple-
mented by his staff.

We should try a Hungarian path, rather than a German or American
path. The most outstanding role will be played by the Parliament.
The Parliament, however, has to become capable of making political
decisions, because the military cannot and should not be responsible
for this. We cannot provide a staff of experts for every member of Parliament. The Parliament should have confidence in the staff of the minister, and should exercise political control over it; if necessary, it should intervene based on expert advice, but it should not set up a parallel organization of military experts to supervise the military.

American Civilian: One thing that has always struck me as I travel through Eastern and Western Europe is the total separation between civilian experts on security issues and the military. In part this reflects the academic training and the role of intellectuals. But how will Hungary integrate civilian knowledge of security affairs into national security policy?

American Civilian: A former undersecretary of defense for policy used to say “policy is glittering generalities until we get the programs right.” Civilians can write general policy statements but much work has to be done to turn them into programs and budgets for the national armed forces. This requires knowledge of costs, technical people, and frequently complex analysis. Institutes that produce “glittering generalities” but do not know much about programming ultimately will not affect policy.

Hungarian Military: In our country, and I think in every socialist country, the military experts were always military men and political experts were always civilians. This was a great problem. In Hungary, political experts should study in the Military Academy. Military men should also be able to study in the universities.

Hungarian Military: Many of us have worked at the Institute for International Affairs and in civilian institutions of military sciences. At the Military Academy there are special courses to train leading personalities for state, economic, and political life.

Hungarian Military: The armed forces cannot live without the accomplishments of civilian research. If military men want to be professional, they must be aware of civilian expertise and knowledge. Lately, we have introduced a new military educational system at the secondary level. We still have the old system at the Technical University and at the University of Economics, where defense issues are analyzed through economics.

American Military: In each service there are three levels of programs for military education: basic military training at the level of captain; a broader secondary level that focuses on command functions, and staff training at the level of major or lieutenant colonel; and then the service War College at the level of lieutenant colonel or colonel. In addition, there is the national structure of defense education under the National Defense University. Recent legislation reflects a rethinking of how these schools operate and has led to an Armed Forces Staff
College at a more junior level. The traditional nine-month course will be shortened, but potentially extended by a course at either the National War College or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, again at about the colonel level. Congress believes that individual services think too much in terms of their own separate interests. The object of these changes is to create more of a joint service concept to insure that officers promoted to senior levels have some common education.

**American Military:** Our army is much better today because we have also adopted an education system for noncommissioned officers.

**American Military:** In the air force we are trying to match the training that an officer receives with the functions he performs. The lower level does not deal in grand strategy, but in how to communicate better and how to manage small groups. The third level is where differentiation between technical skills and strategic skills begins. At the National War College officers look at strategy, doctrine, and national security policy.

**Hungarian Civilian:** My party thinks that it will be almost impossible for Hungary to create an army that bases its strategy on deterrence. Deterrence means we would have a strategic force with warheads capable of counteracting threats through considerable destructive capability.

War on the territory of this country is impermissible. Military operations in a country like this would mean total destruction. Either we have an army that excludes this possibility through deterrence, or we should consider not having an army at all. Military operations in a country like this would mean that the country would be totally destroyed. Pacifist thinking is part of our concept.

Supposing there is an army, it should be tasked with defending us against external attacks, not to play a police role. We would like an army inside a military alliance because outside an alliance it would be likely to take on police functions if civil disturbance occurs and the police forces prove insufficient to avert it. This should not be built into the army’s mission.

The situation and image of the armed forces is changing. The military of the 1930s tends to reappear on the scene like a ghost. In the 1930s the officer corps had great prestige; it was a highly respected element of society. The armed forces represented a national institution, both internally and externally. The armed forces, by their own rituals and by playing a certain part in the present processes, try to contribute to national prestige. This is not what we need today. We need a more civilian army. Over the last 30 years, Hungarian military officers have become more civilian. During the Horthy regime, military officers
always wore their uniforms when visiting friends or at social functions. Today military officers have social prestige comparable to that of engineers.

A consensus on Hungarian security policy and the role of the army is not impossible, but this is primarily a foreign policy issue and not an issue that should be tackled by the current government.

Hungarian Civilian: Theoretically, there is no fundamental difference between the thesis of the Alliance of Free Democrats and that of the Democratic Forum. Although Hungary could not maintain a powerful army, the Democratic Forum does not accept that if we cannot have a powerful army, we should not have one at all. The army is part of national consciousness and ideology. In case of attack or intrusion, we must have a military force, and this force must be as strong as our economic and other possibilities make possible.

Hungarian Military: Who would guarantee the security of our country if there were no armed forces? To what extent could we contribute to the security of others? If others guarantee our security, what would they like as a trade-off? How would we know if their guarantees are authentic? Finally, we will be unable to plan sensibly for the size and configuration of our armed forces until we establish a national security policy.

American Civilian: There are a number of models of small country defense doctrines and establishments. Essentially they all deal with the defense of neutral countries. There are also geographic differences that have to be taken into consideration. The type of force structure you would like to have, which of course means the discussion of weapons systems, is very much tied to economics. Are Hungarian policymakers discussing a conscript or a professional army? A reduction to 60,000 men means the army cannot absorb the available number of conscripts, if universal conscription remains in force. Choices between a standing army, territorial militia, and reserves have all kinds of implications.

DETERMINING MILITARY RESOURCE NEEDS

Presentation 1: Hungarian Military

The army sells goods and services to the civilian sector because the defense budget is insufficient. This cannot fit into the future image of our army. In the past we have been obliged to defend ourselves continually. We argued that the tasks given to the army are real ones and tried to prove the economic efficiency of investment in the military. Now we think the time is ripe for the parties, the government, and the
Parliament to decide whether armed forces are needed. If they decide affirmatively, they should allocate the means necessary for maintenance, training, and operation. They should not debate on the size of the funds to be allocated. They should also, however, determine whether the resources used are proportionate to the results achieved as prescribed in military policy and doctrine. They must define goals and tasks. They must determine the meaning of neutrality or adherence to a military alliance. We should exchange views on concepts of an enemy and try to determine whether we have an enemy.

Let us stand the question on its head. Even if we do not have enemies, could we defend ourselves? We have to possess this capability as a society. Do we have a national consciousness, do we have a culture, do we have a past, traditions? What is dictated by our culture? It is the politicians' task to decide. We are the professionals who provide this service.

Because we have not had any answer to the questions of national security policy, it is difficult to tell whether we want a territorial defense, what kind of an organization we would like in the armed forces, how much should be spent on them, what steps should be taken, and how these steps can be made feasible. Once the decision on national security policy is made, I can answer all these questions. Now I can only talk about things that are available today and what kind of obligations we have to recognize.

Discussion

American Civilian: You cannot go into the details of what kind of an army you want to have until you know whether the politicians want you to have an army. But is it not the current task of the military to formulate alternative models so the political leadership will have an idea of costs?

Hungarian Military: Given the social and political situation in Hungary, it is clear that the major political parties cannot prepare themselves in a decent manner on military policy because they do not have enough information. Therefore, we recently sat together with military experts from all the parties and gave them detailed information about military doctrine, military technology, economic needs, military structure, and our views regarding all the above. We did not keep any secrets; we thought it was in our interest that they should have all the information they need when they are in the position of decisionmaking. In the previous political system, state and party leaders were trained so that they would have the information they needed about the armed forces and military policy. We suggested that
the new government and Parliament should ask for this service, which we are willing to organize for them.

Hungarian Civilian: We are considering the possibility of neutrality, but we do not think that our situation compares with the armies of other neutral countries in Europe. Conditions for the army in Austria are better. Switzerland practices a passive defense. Obviously, in the case of Hungary we cannot consider this possibility. The example of Finland may be close to us. Its neighbor is the Soviet Union, against which a small country cannot defend itself. We do not expect an attack from the other side.

Presentation 2: American Civilian

I am reluctant to try to offer positive advice on establishing effective civilian control over the military, but will convey some lessons learned from the U.S. experience. I will give a list of don’ts intended to help shape your thoughts as you grapple with different circumstances.

My first don’t is: Don’t assume that you will not need an armed force. Even Switzerland and other neutral countries have come to the conclusion that there is a role for military forces. Some Hungarian speakers have argued Hungary could not possibly afford military forces sufficient to deny potential opponents the ability to win. But if one were to insist that military forces only make sense if they possess the ability to deny, then the Warsaw Pact would have won its conflict with NATO by default. For many years SACEUR stated that if the Warsaw Pact were to have attacked in full force conventionally, within “days not weeks” NATO’s conventional defense capabilities would have failed. Yet the alliance deterred for 40 years by raising the costs to the potential aggressor.

My second don’t is: Don’t try to list everything that the military is expected to do or allowed to do. It will be very difficult to specify a whole range of contingencies in which force may be used. It is easier to list the things you do not want the military to do without prior approval by the civilian authorities.

My third don’t is: Don’t involve the new legislators in military planning. There is a big difference between legislators regulating brain surgery and performing it. Legislators have to convey to the military what it is they should do and the objectives for the use of military forces. It is up to the military to draw up the most cost-effective plan it can and present it to the legislature. The legislature has to decide whether it is affordable. If it is not, then the plans have to be scaled back. If it is, the legislature may still examine whether there are cheaper ways to do the same job. It is at that level of activity that
legislators should get involved, not in military planning. We civilians, however good and clever, and however long we may have labored in this area, do not have the expertise to perform that function.

My next don't is: Don't have the entire Parliament review and oversee the military. No legislator can be expected to be proficient in the whole range of activities confronting the state. Therefore it is appropriate to form specialized groups, committees, that look after the details. Only 10 to 20 percent of the 100 members of the Senate sit on the Senate Armed Services Committees. Those members can look in greater detail at proposals from the defense establishment. To the extent that committees have been carefully staffed and broadly based, the other members of the legislature tend to defer to the consensus advice of those groups. Don't make that committee a one-party committee; it has to be broadly based. The incorporation of a broad diversity of views is very important to the functioning of the legislative process.

Don't get bogged down in the detail of the military budget. The U.S. defense budget is presented in 2400 separate budget items that add up to 300 billion dollars. Last year the Defense Department gave the committee over 30,000 pages of back-up material to justify the budget. No one staff member, no one legislator read even a fraction of that material. The legislative oversight process has to focus on progress toward the broad objectives and not be an exercise in accounting or in determining whether the military strategies make sense.

Don't do one-year budgeting. You must take a long-term perspective. In the United States, after we have finished with a year's budget, we throw the five-year plan away. The next year we draft another five-year plan, usually bearing no relationship to the previous year's plan. The effect this has on sensible planning and expenditures is to generate inefficiencies so staggering that we could probably fund the Hungarian defense effort just out of what we waste in our own budget process.

My next don't is perhaps one less for the legislature than for the military: Don't hesitate to look for opportunities to cooperate with other countries in the development of weapons as well as doctrines. Five years ago, even the United States decided it could no longer afford to go it alone in all areas, and set aside a portion of our defense budget that could only be spent on cooperative projects.

Finally, don't despair. There are many ways to ensure a professional and largely nonpartisan military and to exercise the kind of control you are thinking about. Chief among them is the power of the purse: you would be surprised at the attention you will get by holding the money closely. A second element is ratification of key military
assignments and promotions for the officer corps. This ensures an element of nonpartisan behavior. If the entire legislature passes upon the qualifications of the officers, they know they cannot afford to play particular favorites. I would like to add that until someone has decided what resources are available, it is very difficult for the military to provide contingency planning.

Discussion

Hungarian Military: A military budget is part of the state budget. Parliament plays a role in military policy because it approves the budget. It has to understand the contents of the budget to decide whether it corresponds to the requirements of defense economic policy, which is determined by defense doctrine. Obviously, control and supervision have to be rather strict.

The military budget becomes transformed into orders given to firms that produce the equipment and weapons needed by the military. We can imagine a continuous line of planning and implementation connecting the sphere of politics and that of the army. Three points are fixed: the definition of requirements in principle, the definition of the resources to cover needs, and implementation, the phase when all requirements and needs are met.

Until last year the management of political life, practically and theoretically, was under the authority of the ruling party. When it came to matters of coalition, fundamental questions of principle were the responsibility of the Warsaw Treaty Organization; the leading group in the coalition of united military forces made these decisions.

The Political Committee or the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party had the tasks of interpreting these decisions by comparing them with national doctrine and requirements and of controlling the process. The Defense Committee was organized with the participation of some members of the Hungarian Parliament. This committee only supervised the implementation of tasks scheduled for a specific year. The Parliament did not contribute to working out the principles of defense policy or the details of the military budget. Plans covered five years, but we also only really planned for a single year. Introducing new equipment requires a period of at least five years for spreading the costs and introducing associated facilities. For example, the MiG 29 fighter costs $24 million. We need to replace our current type, the MiG 23. However, it is impossible to replace just one aircraft; we have to exchange at least 12 and provide new ground services and pilot training. Now, 12 times $24 million multiplied by today's exchange rate of dollars equals 18 billion forints. The 1990 defense
budget is 31 billion forints; so you can easily see we cannot make such a purchase in a single year.

The decisionmaking mechanism used prior to 1989 has undergone significant changes. The state-party control institutions have been eliminated. National interests and economic realities have been placed in the forefront regarding the Warsaw Pact. This is something decisively new. Hungarian defense policy is now supervised by the Military Committee of Parliament. Supervision exercised by the Parliament has real content. The actual forms of supervision will have to be worked out in the future. This will be an urgent task of the new government.

In the past, budget planning was formulated in long-term plans for 10 to 15 years and medium-term plans for five years, which were broken down into one-year plans. This planning covered trade, services, production, etc. The basis for planning was not economic, but a set of central instructions and commands covering not only domestic purchases but also foreign trade in defense goods.

In a modern army, the ratio of development expenditures to maintenance expenditures should be 40 percent to 60 percent. This proportion has been significantly changed in recent years. In 1990, 93 percent of our budget will be spent on operations and maintenance, and 7 percent on procurement and development. Such a proportion can no longer be sustained. Moreover, 56 percent of operations and maintenance expenditures are related to personnel, that is, food supply, clothing, wages, etc. Obviously, this proportion has to be changed if the military reforms are to be successfully implemented. While maintaining the operative capability of our army and defense, and reducing the number of staff, we would like to raise the share represented by procurement to a healthy level again. How we will be able to achieve this next year, I cannot tell.

**American Military:** Please describe the income that your military derives from services provided. This is a very different situation from the U.S. model, where whatever services we provide and whatever money comes back does not go into our defense budget directly, but goes into the big pot from which we then ultimately get a share.

**Hungarian Military:** We have established firms within the different formations of our armed forces to earn revenue and fill the gaps in the budget. There is a difference of five billion forints between the state budget and the expenditures of the armed forces. We have to make this up through productive work. This is not income for military men, but is something we have to do if we want to pay our soldiers at all.
We have nothing to feel proud about concerning wages. Commanders of a battalion are around 28 to 30 years old, at an age when they probably have a wife and one or two small children. Their wives probably support themselves through child care allowances because they stay at home and look after the children. This battalion commander has problems with everyday expenses. The first level at which officers have enough money to support themselves and their families is that of brigade commander. A pilot who recently died in a crash had a monthly salary of 16,000 forints. He left behind three children. If you compare his salary with the value of the aircraft, you find that he was inexpensive, but very highly qualified.

American Civilian: Does Hungary want to build its own equipment or will it want to continue to import? If so, from whom? Have you thought about diversifying to assure security of supply or do you want to continue relying primarily on your old suppliers? Have you thought of export controls?

Hungarian Military: We have developed arms in Hungary. The development has been limited primarily to communications equipment. Our highly trained engineering staff could produce equipment capable of matching world standards. The end products do not always comply with world standards, however, because they have to be built from components. To get access to components and modern parts is a difficult matter because of the COCOM list and other limits and restrictions in the field of commerce and trade.

Export controls have been regulated by the Council of Ministers. This had been handled secretly but is now communicated to the public. Only certain enterprises have the right to export arms, and the export conditions are extremely strict. They are not permitted to export arms to terrorists, to crisis zones, to countries that would wish to use the arms in national or international conflicts. In addition, we ask the trader to supply us with a certificate of the final customer or user to guarantee that the arms will not get into the hands of X or Y. This permit is issued by the minister of trade and commerce by a resolution of the Council of Ministers. There is a supervising committee, headed by the head of the defense office, and the representatives of the concerned departments and ministries take part.

So far, the countries of the Warsaw Pact have produced arms for themselves. We procured arms from the Soviet Union because it was not an expedient matter to produce arms for ourselves.

The future depends on how things develop in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and whether we can resolve the issue of guarantees for arms procurement, because it is necessary to have assured supplies of spare parts. It is possible to procure arms only from those countries with whom we have a guarantee of a safe supply.
American Military: Did the decision to restructure your military forces and move away from the previous central command authority—the Warsaw Pact command structure in which the Soviet Union plays the paramount role—come about because the Soviet Union agreed, or was it something Hungary did unilaterally?

Hungarian Military: Even before the recent turn of events we made unilateral decisions. The degree of our dependence on the Soviet Union was not of the kind suggested by the question. We had and we now have a national doctrine and a coalition doctrine composed of the different national doctrines. Decisions on the procurement of arms were determined primarily by economics. It would not have been expedient for every country of the Pact to produce arms. Specialization in technical matters has been shared out; industrial culture and expertise have been important determinants. Of course, the Soviets were the main producers of arms and armaments.

Hungary always balanced its arms trade, buying the same amount of arms technology as we sold to the others. I think this was not a bad business deal. Our decisions were related primarily to domestic military technical developments. The Soviet Union frequently did not want those weapons and products, although they were of a higher technological level than the Soviets themselves could produce. Therefore we exported them to both East and West, wherever we could find customers. In the last few years we have made fairly large sums of money through exports. Recently, we have produced more military equipment than was absolutely necessary. With the process of détente, military goods exports and imports declined. We have to make more workers redundant, which presents human problems. We also have to close down some factories and plants. Loss-making enterprises do not pay tax. I would like the state budget to have proper revenue because I get my resources allocated from it.

Hungarian Military: The military blocs in Europe have specific features: for the first time, integrated military forces were created in peacetime. These armed forces have operated under uniform command on both the Western and Eastern sides. This has meant that development of military equipment had to be coordinated, because interoperability is needed for integration. Aside from guaranteeing the peace, coalitions also made it possible for the smaller countries not to be autarkic. Ground and air forces were developed in Hungary. However, these benefits demanded a very high political price.

We can also see the negative consequences of the bloc system. For example, theoreticians on the command level arrived in Hungary in the beginning of the 1980s and told us we needed 1000 tanks. The Hungarian leadership swallowed hard and said we need only 93 and then
said we are in a position to order only 75. If we had not had this kind of resistance, we would have had to spend our resources in a different way. But the condition of Hungary's air force might have been much better.

**American Military:** Do you envision discussing trading stockpiles of equipment or closing down arms industries with the Czechs or Poles, or is this going to have to be a CEMA/Warsaw Pact decision?

**Hungarian Military:** I do not ask you about how these things happen in NATO. May I tell you, however, that research, development, and procurement in the Pact occurs on the basis of recommendations. Recommendations were coordinated by each country in terms of its production potential, facilities, and the structure of its armed forces. The armed forces of any one member are quite different from another's. Even though they belong to the same military alliance, each country struggles with different problems. Once all these aspects were coordinated, it was possible to balance capacity utilization between the different countries. The major burden of adjustment was borne by the country having the most extensive military industry, the Soviet Union. Since we bartered for a given type of equipment with our own military goods production, sometimes we had to accept equipment from the Soviet Union that they did not need any longer. In general, however, the stronger helped the weaker. We did not have any potential in the development of arms. Everyone worked in this area based on his own decisions and conditions. The Poles developed tanks, the Hungarians telecommunication equipment, and Czechoslovakia, where the machine industry is more developed, used those facilities.

The most important country was the Soviet Union. Basic equipment was developed there. Missiles were not developed in any of the other socialist countries; all of them were imported from the Soviet Union. But the same could not be said about aircraft; the Romanians used British, American imports, that is, the Boeing aircraft license had to be purchased from somewhere, didn't it? Logically there were some links, but these links were not obligatory. These links developed during a long process of coordination. Eventually, the needs of the army collided with economic realities, so actual implementation was achieved on a significantly lower level.

**American Civilian:** Is the decline of the Hungarian defense industry, over a number of years, and especially over the past year, an effort to go into what the Soviets call conversion to civilian production, or is it a question of not being able to sell to the Hungarian army and perhaps to East bloc allies, the traditional market? Do you plan for Hungarian defense industries to compete on Western markets and in Third World countries?
**Hungarian Military:** The deterioration of the national economy forced the government to move in this direction. Subsidies and the means for development were reduced through a series of decisions without due foundation and without due consideration of the full consequences. This happened at a time when restructuring and reducing staff of the army were not realistic issues. There was no other choice than to reduce expenditures while maintaining numbers. Because we did not purchase military equipment from our socialist partners, because of our lack of resources, they did not purchase equipment from us, because they do not pay for these imports in cash.

Substantial sums have been cut from the budget approved for 1989–90. The Hungarian military equipment purchases were therefore also reduced. We could only export products of approximately the same value to our Warsaw Pact allies. We attempted to sell equipment, but you are rather strong competitors, so we had difficulty on the world market.

**Hungarian Civilian:** The general framework for military doctrine and setting security policy was simply not determined by the Hungarian government. Whenever Marshall Kulikov came to Hungary, there was always a fear he would demand something more. It was not a question of refusing altogether, but rather of how much we could bargain him down.

The significant decreases in military spending and forces were partially a consequence of Soviet decisions to cut back. When they made their first unilateral disarmament announcement, there was a general expectation among the Soviets that the East European countries would follow. The process evolved and gained a more independent character. The process started by Soviet initiatives, but was taken over by independent Hungarian initiatives.
Appendix

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AND AGENDA

HUNGARIAN PARTICIPANTS

Major General József Bíró, Chief of Main Directorate for Operation of the General Staff, Hungarian People’s Army, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Colonel Péter Déak, Military Adviser, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
Péter Hardi, Director, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
Lieutenant Colonel Endre Javor, Deputy Head of Department for International Affairs and Security Policy, Ministry of Defense
Major General Karoly Janza, Head of Department of Economics, Ministry of Defense
Géza Jeszenszky, Dean of Social Sciences Faculty, Economics University, Hungarian Democratic Forum
Major General Lajos Kondor, Deputy Chief of Main Directorate of Air Defense and Aviation, Hungarian People’s Army
István Kőrmendy, Counselor, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Colonel Tibor Kőszegvári, Deputy Director, Military, Political, and Strategic Research Institute, Hungarian People’s Army
László Kupa, Lawyer, Independent Lawyers Forum
László Lang, Deputy Director, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
Major General Csaba Liszkai, Head of Office, Ministry of Defense
Ernő Raffay, Member of Parliament, Hungarian Democratic Forum
Gyula Rzásó, Senior Research Associate, Institute of Military History, Hungarian Democratic Forum
Miklós Szabó, Historian, Institute of History, Alliance of Free Democrats
Colonel György Szentesi, Head of Department for International Affairs and Security Policy, Ministry of Defense
László Tolnay, Head of Department, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
Magdolna Toth Nagy, Scientific Secretary, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Rapporteur
Andras Vágvölgyi, Alliance of Young Democrats
László Valki, Head of Department for International Law, University of Law

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS
Alexander Alexiev, Political Science Department, The RAND Corporation
Colonel Ruth Anderson, Military Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Hungary
Ronald Asmus, Political Science Department, The RAND Corporation
Keith Crane, Economics & Statistics Department, The RAND Corporation
Roland Eggleston, Representative of Radio Free Europe, Hungary
Major General Richard Freytag, U.S. Air Reserves
William Hoehn, Senate Armed Services Committee
Barbara Kliszewski, Political Science Department, The RAND Corporation, Rapporteur
Steven Larrabee, Institute for East-West Security Studies
Major General Richard O’Lear, U.S. Air Force
Steven Popper, Economics & Statistics Department, The RAND Corporation
General Robert H. Reed, ret., U.S. Air Force, former commander of SHAPE
Ms. Enid C. B. Schoettle, Program Director, The Ford Foundation
Lieutenant General George R. Stotser, Commanding General, Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas
James Thomson, President, The RAND Corporation

AGENDA

February 12, Monday afternoon
Session 1: Defining the Military’s Role in a Multiparty Democracy
   a) Problems in Transition to Multiparty Democracies
   b) The Role of the Military in Society

February 13, Tuesday
Session 2: National Security Policy and Mechanisms
   a) Defining National Doctrines
   b) Mechanisms

Session 3: Resource Allocation and Parliamentary Control
   a) Civil-Military Relations
   b) Determining Military Resource Needs