The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe

Managing USEUCOM’s Command Structure After the Cold War

Marc Dean Millot
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Prepared for the
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense

RAND

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PREFACE

This Report documents analysis of alternative future command structures for the United States European Command (USEUCOM). It is part of ongoing analysis at RAND on USEUCOM's missions, requirements, and command structure in the post–Cold War era. A companion study, The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements for the Post–Cold War Era, RAND, R-4194-EUCOM, 1991, was prepared by colleague Richard L. Kugler. The two studies were jointly sponsored by the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States European Command.

The research that serves as the basis for this Report was conducted between October 1990 and August 1991. A draft of the Report was circulated for review in September of 1991. This final Report incorporates revisions made in February 1992 to accommodate reviewers' comments, as well as important changes that have taken place in Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the United States since the draft was circulated. The Report should be useful to U.S. and NATO defense decisionmakers and staff with an interest in the future of America's military presence in Europe, as well as students of national security strategy and military command arrangements.

This research was carried out within the International Security and Defense Strategy Program within RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
SUMMARY

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
This Report examines potential future command structures for the United States European Command (USEUCOM). It explains the factors that shape USEUCOM's command structure, identifies the likely status of those factors in the near term (1991–1995) and the possibilities beyond, develops a near-term USEUCOM command structure, assesses that structure against a set of political and military criteria, and suggests a set of alternative command structures for the longer term.

THE CURRENT COMMAND STRUCTURE
A command structure is the organization of military forces in peace and war to carry out military operations and achieve national political objectives. USEUCOM's current command structure is shown in Figure S.1. At the apex sits a four-star U.S. Army general who serves as both USEUCOM's Commander-in-Chief (USCINCEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). (SACEUR's NATO command is called Allied Command, Europe (ACE)). USCINCEUR's Deputy (DCINCEUR) is a four-star U.S. Air Force general. In times of extreme crisis, the DCINC would take on the CINC's U.S. command responsibilities so that the CINC could focus on his responsibilities as SACEUR.

Below the CINC and his deputy are the three four-star officers who serve as the Commanders-in-Chief of USEUCOM's Army, Air Force, and Navy component commands: CINC U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR); CINC U.S. Air Force, Europe (CINCUSAFE); CINC U.S. Navy, Europe (USNAVEUR). Like USCINCEUR, component commanders are "dual-hatted" as commanders in NATO's integrated command structure. CINCUSNAVEUR is also NATO's Commander-in-Chief, South (CINCSOUTH), a Major Subordinate Commander (MSC) who reports directly to SACEUR. CINCUSAFE is dual-hatted as Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (COMAAFCE), a Principal Subordinate Commander (PSC), who reports to CINCENT, a German general who is NATO's MSC for the Central Region. In his NATO role, CINCUSAREUR is Commander, Central Army Group (COMCENTAG) and also reports to CINCENT.
MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING THE COMMAND STRUCTURE

USEUCOM's command structure has been shaped by the interplay of four factors working over the past 40 years: the size and character of the U.S. military posture in Europe; the role of USEUCOM in the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) Unified Command Plan (UCP); the evolution of NATO's command structure for ACE; and the principles by which the U.S. DoD organizes military forces within a unified command.

U.S. Military Posture in Europe

The rationale for U.S. officers holding many key positions in NATO's integrated command is based in no small part on the substantial presence of U.S. forces in Europe. For much of the Cold War, the United States deployed over 300,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen and
up to 7,000 nuclear weapons within ACE. With this weighty and pervasive presence, U.S. forces played critical roles in the defense of each of ACE’s MSCs and helped to bind the Alliance’s disparate regions together. The size and nature of the American posture provided a strong rationale for an American hold on NATO’s SACEUR, CINCSOUTH, COMCENTAG, and COMAAFCE positions.

The Unified Command Plan
The UCP sets forth the U.S. military establishment’s unified and specified commands according to functional and/or regional missions. USEUCOM was among the unified commands set forth in the first UCP in 1947. As USCINCEUR, SACEUR commands all U.S. forces in Europe—including nuclear forces—subject to the direction of no higher echelon, save the Secretary of Defense and the President. The political benefits of this arrangement are obvious and add greatly to the authority and credibility of the U.S. SACEUR in any NATO forum. USEUCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) currently covers all of Europe, the Mediterranean littorals, and most of Africa. Thus, in the war with Iraq, USCINCEUR was responsible for operations to support Israel with Patriot anti-ballistic missile coverage against Iraqi Scud missiles.

NATO Command Arrangements
Alliance command arrangements determine the NATO positions U.S. officers might hold. Today’s integrated command structure is the result of both evolving perceptions of the military threats to West European security and the dynamics of alliance politics. From a military perspective, the current command structure is oriented on the collective defense of Western Europe against a massive, theater-wide Soviet and/or Warsaw Pact offensive. Politically, NATO commands are distributed among the members in consideration of military contributions to collective security, the demands of national sovereignty, and competition among Alliance members.

The United States has benefited from both the political and the military realities of NATO’s command structure. For Western Europe, America’s contribution of conventional and nuclear forces spelled the difference between independence and insecurity. This served as a strong justification for the leadership role of U.S. officers in NATO’s command structure. In addition, and despite Western Europe’s movement toward unity after World War II, European states remained rivals and somewhat jealous and distrustful of one another.
As a non-European power, the United States was perceived as a neutral party, an honest broker in intra-Alliance squabbles. By allowing the United States to hold critical leadership positions, NATO avoided potentially divisive debates among its European members.

Organizing a Unified Command

Since World War II, and after experimenting with a variety of organizational arrangements, the U.S. military has come to favor a command structure consisting of separate unified and component commands, commanders, and headquarters staffs as the preferred approach to the peacetime administration of military forces in a theater of operations, the reception and onward movement of additional forces in response to a crisis, and the conduct of combined arms operations in war. Such an arrangement leaves the unified commander free to focus on problems of campaign strategy and planning, U.S. defense relationships with states in the region, and overall force planning and resource allocation. Moreover, the arrangement avoids both the appearance and the actuality of a conflict of interest between unified and component command responsibilities. Thus, the system puts the CINC in a better position to manage the natural competition among his Army, Air Force, and Navy component commands than if he were dual-hatted as a component commander. Given the substantial U.S. military presence on the European mainland in peacetime, the complexity of defense arrangements in the region, the responsibility to reinforce Europe rapidly and massively in the event of a major crisis, and the enormity of campaign planning for a Warsaw Pact invasion, the separation of USEUCOM from the three service components has been well justified.

DEFINING CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING USEUCOM'S COMMAND STRUCTURE

Substantial American forces have been deployed to Europe since the end of World War II to deter Soviet aggression, protect vital American interests, harness German power to the cause of western democracy, and promote an international economic system based on free trade. At the same time, political and military circumstances in Europe and America set a context of constraints and opportunities within which American policy could operate. Between the goals of American policy and the circumstances of the time, criteria can be developed to assess the adequacy of the U.S. military presence in Europe. Drawing on historical experience, an assessment of near-term American and European political and military conditions, and longer term possibili-
ties, this Report focuses on "political," "military," and "hedging" criteria as they apply to potential future U.S. command structures for the region. A top-level representation of these criteria is displayed in Table S.1.

ASSESSMENT APPROACH

First, the Baseline case will be assessed against a detailed list of political and military criteria derived from the discussion above. The Baseline case consists of the following:

- U.S. Force Posture: Forward Presence (150,000 U.S. Military Personnel in Europe)
- Unified Command Plan: Current
- Unified Organization: Separate Unified and Component Commands
- ACE Command Structure: Streamlined

To apply the hedging criteria, the Baseline case will be modified by changing, in turn, the status of each major factor that shapes USEUCOM's future command structure:

- U.S. Force Posture:
  - Dual-Based Presence (100K)
  - Limited Presence (70K)
  - Symbolic Presence (40K)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>NATO Europe</th>
<th>U.S. National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Compatibility with NATO interface</td>
<td>Support for non-NATO operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Contribution to peacetime unity and effectiveness</td>
<td>Consistency with domestic realities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging</td>
<td>Compatibility with a range of alternative ACE command structures</td>
<td>Compatibility with a range of alternative U.S. force postures in Europe, UCPs, and unified command organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table S.1
Criteria for Assessing Alternative USEUCOM Command Structures
• Unified Organization:
  Subunified Command for the Southern Region
  Consolidation of Unified and Component Headquarters
  Elimination of Component Headquarters

• ACE Command Structure:
  Further Streamlined
  Rationalized
  Europeanized
  Nationalized

• Unified Command Plan:
  EUCOM Exemption
  Base Force
  SACEUR as Super-CINC

Each revised command structure will then be reexamined against the political and military criteria.

USEUCOM'S NEAR-TERM COMMAND STRUCTURE:
THE "BASELINE CASE"

As discussed above, USEUCOM’s command structure is influenced by the size and character of the American military posture in Europe, its place in the UCP, NATO’s command arrangements for ACE, and the U.S. military's approach to the organization of a unified command. Over the next three years under the “Base Force” concept, the U.S. military presence throughout Europe will decline to something on the order of 150,000 troops, enough to support a “heavy” corps in Germany, four tactical fighter wings, and a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean—a posture designed largely as insurance against a renewal of a Cold War threat to Western Europe. No changes to the current status of unified and specified commands in the UCP appear likely to affect USEUCOM during this period. NATO will “streamline” the ACE command structure, with a consolidation of subordinate commands and an overall reduction of command staffs to maintain general military functions and capabilities and to de-emphasize its previous orientation toward a theater-wide Soviet assault on Western Europe, while retaining the ability to reconstitute allied defenses.
As shown in Figure S.2, USEUCOM's existing command structure, based on separate unified and component commands, can accommodate the changes currently contemplated to occur between now and 1995. This Baseline command structure satisfies important U.S. and Allied political and military criteria. With a presence of 150,000 troops in Europe, the United States appears likely to retain important positions in the ACE chain of command, including SACEUR. This should meet American domestic political desires that the United States bear less of the burden of Allied defense, but not be marginalized on issues of European security. The posture also maintains USEUCOM's capacity to conduct limited national operations outside the NATO context, but inside the current USEUCOM AOR, with in-theater assets. At Base Force levels, EUCOM would also retain the infrastructure to support military operations in the Middle East, as it did in the war with Iraq.

In addition, the current EUCOM structure need not interfere with efforts to create a stronger "European Pillar" within NATO and

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Figure S.2—Baseline Case: USEUCOM's Near-Term Command Structure
Multinational Corps in the Main Defense Force of the Central Region, and thus contributes to peacetime solidarity and unity within the Alliance. Continued dual-hatting of SACEUR as USCINCEUR, with operational command of all U.S. forces in Europe, including nuclear forces, and a direct line to the U.S. President, supports domestic political needs and reflects the continued importance of the United States to West European security. USEUCOM’s current structure can meet U.S. obligations to either coalition defense or unilateral action, although it could not simultaneously support a Desert Shield/Storm-type operation and counter a substantial military threat from the East. The unified and component command staffs will require augmentation to accomplish the reinforcement of Europe in the face of a reconstituted Cold War threat, and small standing joint task force (JTF) cadres at various U.S. headquarters will have to be quickly expanded should any of a wide range of lesser contingencies come to pass.

Recommendation: Inform Congress and the American Public about the Implications of Radical Changes to USEUCOM for U.S. Objectives in Europe

USEUCOM must address proposals to reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe below 150,000, to revise the UCP, change NATO, or consolidate USEUCOM’s internal structure. Congress in particular needs to be informed of how their decisions on force structure, defense reorganization, and U.S. support for NATO will affect USEUCOM’s command structure and U.S. influence in Europe and of how USEUCOM’s organization and participation in NATO will affect the achievement of broader American objectives in Europe.

BEYOND THE NEAR TERM: AMERICA’S MILITARY PRESENCE, COMMAND STRUCTURE, AND INFLUENCE IN EUROPE

Assessment of the Baseline case suggests that three of the four major factors influencing the future USEUCOM command structure are interrelated. The status of the U.S. force posture in Europe, USEUCOM’s position in the UCP, and the U.S. role in NATO’s command structure are closely linked. A major change in the status of one factor creates tensions that are inconsistent with the status of at least one of the other two factors. A change in the second factor to reestablish consistency with the first creates in turn an inconsistency between the second and third factors, requiring a change in the third to reestablish consistency among all three.
At a posture of 150,000 men in Europe, the United States maintains a military presence sufficient to support the major regions in ACE and conduct large-scale high-intensity combat operations. This "Forward Presence" clearly helps justify continuing America's leadership of NATO's integrated command structure, and in particular with an American as SACEUR. As long as an American is SACEUR, it is in the U.S. interest that he be dual-hatted as USCECIN and in charge of a unified command reporting to the U.S. President, to maintain his influence in NATO fora. The continuation of USEUCOM as a unified command, in turn, justifies the allocation of sizable forces to USCECIN to enable him to carry out his assigned missions to NATO and support SACEUR. And that sizable presence provides an infrastructure and forces to justify an AOR beyond Europe and a substantial role in military operations outside the NATO context.

Thus, the status of each of these major factors reinforces the condition of the other two. Similarly, change one factor and pressures are created to revise the others. The Baseline USEUCOM command structure cannot readily accommodate further change to any one of the factors that shape it (see Figure S.3).

For example, at a posture of 100,000 men, the U.S. presence in Europe becomes confined to a few places and dependent on reinforcement from CONUS to support high-intensity operations. As a conse-

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**Figure S.3—Relationships Among the Factors Shaping USEUCOM's Command Structure**
quence, the rationale for U.S. leadership of NATO—represented by
the American claim to key positions in the Alliance command struc-
ture—begins to weaken. Similarly, because U.S. planning for any
major contingency in Europe would now focus on the problems of
marshaling and coordinating Base Force assets deployed in several
adjacent regions, arguments will be made to subordinate USEUCOM
to an Atlantic Force Super-CINC (who would command several of the
current regional unified commands). Should the United States lose
the SACEUR position, the argument to make USCINCEUR a sub-
unified command could be overwhelming. A subunified EUCOM
would very likely experience a reduction in AOR, and be assigned
forces to support a mission confined to support for NATO.

Defining the point at which its declining military presence causes the
United States to lose legitimacy as leader of Western Europe’s con-
tinental defense is a matter of judgment. The conclusion of this anal-
ysis is that the U.S. probably can continue to maintain leadership at a
level of 100,000 troops. But should the presence fall to 70,000 or be-
low, it would seem inevitable that the United States would no longer
hold the SACEUR position and that USEUCOM would become a
subunified command with an AOR more coincident with that of ACE.

Somewhere below a U.S. presence of 100,000 troops, change to the
fourth factor—internal organization of the command—must be initi-
ated. It is not possible to retain separate subunified and component
commanders and staffs with the headquarters resources available. At
postures of 40,000 to 70,000, the bulk of the manpower in Europe
would come from the U.S. Army. At 70,000, the largest component
might have to assume subunified command responsibilities.
CINCUSEUR would then be double-hatted as the subunified
commander, and his staff would be dual-assigned to support him in
both commands. At 40,000, USEUCOM might become something like
a permanent JTF, with attached service elements supported by ser-
vice commands in CONUS.

The cycle of change need not begin with a falling U.S. military pres-
ence. Should NATO eliminate the SACEUR position and return to
the regional planning framework of the Alliance prior to 1950, or turn
the position over to a European, it is difficult to imagine that U.S.
domestic support for a 100,000 to 150,000 presence in Europe could be
sustained, or that USEUCOM would remain a unified command.
Alternatively, should USEUCOM become a subunified command un-
der an Atlantic Force Super-CINC, the arguments for maintaining an
American SACEUR would be seriously weakened.
Down to a 100,000 U.S. presence, the existing arrangement of separate unified and component commands, commanders, and staffs remains viable. At or below a presence of 70,000 men, some form of headquarters consolidation is required. One approach would be to combine the unified headquarters with that of a component. A largely symbolic U.S. military presence in Europe, on the order of 40,000 men, is likely to lead USEUCOM to become a permanent JTF-like organization. Its mission would be to support an American commitment to NATO essentially limited to reconstitution of the U.S. presence in Europe should a Cold War–style threat reemerge.

**Recommendation: Develop a Cost-Benefit Analysis on the Effect of the Base Force on USEUCOM and NATO**

The most immediate issue influencing USEUCOM's command structure concerns the future U.S. military presence in Europe. Congress needs a clear appreciation of how Base Force planning will influence USEUCOM and ACE planning, force structure, and command structure. The Command's views on the advantages, costs, and risks of the Atlantic Force package and of USEUCOM's Base Force should be placed in the public record, along with USEUCOM's assessment of other proposed postures.

**Recommendation: Develop a Better Understanding of Potential USEUCOM Command Structures Given Radical Change to U.S. Force Postures, the UCP, and NATO**

This Report estimates the likely near-term status of the factors influencing USEUCOM's command structure and the relationships among those factors. It is quite possible, indeed increasingly likely, that the conditions assumed in the Baseline case will soon give way to less favorable alternatives. USEUCOM planners should develop command structure alternatives based on change to the major factors beyond the near term and should develop impact statements similar to those for the Base Force.

**Recommendation: Develop a Rank-Ordering of Positions that the United States Should Retain in Alternative NATO Command Structures**

A restructuring of NATO's command arrangements or a decline of the U.S. presence in Europe may require the United States to give up positions in the ACE command structure. USEUCOM should rank order the positions that the United States should retain if it is com-
elled to give some up. Each rank-ordering should be accompanied by USEUCOM’s perspective of the effect of such a loss on U.S. political and military objectives in NATO.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMAND STRUCTURE

U.S. and NATO plans to reduce active forces in Europe are based in part on an intention to rely on reconstitution and reinforcement. The importance of this assumption to future U.S. security interests in Europe suggests a need to review the relationships among forces, support, and command structure. An emphasis on reconstitution and reinforcement would seem to place a premium on the maintenance of a highly capable command infrastructure during a time of relative peace. Unfortunately, this is contrary to the attitudes of many. Headquarters staffs and support are often characterized as unnecessary bloat detracting from the fighting force, but command structure is the brain and nervous system of the entire force posture, and support provides its sustenance.

USCINCEUR faces a major challenge in convincing the Administration and the Congress that as its force structure declines, USEUCOM’s command structure resources should receive preferential treatment. Familiar arguments about the folly of preserving tail over tooth, headquarters and general officer positions at the expense of combat personnel, will without doubt be raised again. The essence of USCINCEUR’s response must be that without an adequate command structure, the credibility of a U.S. promise to support NATO reconstitution, as well as the U.S. ability to respond to fast-breaking regional contingencies, is in jeopardy.

Recommendation: Develop an In-Depth Rationale for Reducing Command Structure Proportionately Less than Force Structure as the Defense Budget Declines

The importance of a robust regional command structure to defense planning has been lost in the official explanation of the Base Force. USEUCOM needs to explain that “tooth-to-tail” ratios appropriate to the Cold War may not meet U.S. strategic requirements as the level of forces in Europe declines. The strategy of “Forward Presence,” with its 50-percent reduction of U.S. forces in the European theater, relies on the capacity for rapid reinforcement to maintain the credibility of American security guarantees to NATO and American influence in Europe. An effective USEUCOM command structure is essential to rapid reinforcement. This means that USEUCOM must
maintain a command structure designed for efficient peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions. This in turn requires the retention of command capabilities in addition to those necessary to merely support the peacetime presence. USEUCOM needs to develop this argument and get it into the public dialogue.

**Recommendation: Conduct In-House Gaming on Problems of Peace-to-Crisis-to-War Transitions in a Broad Spectrum of Contingencies**

With the cancellations of the WINTEREX/CIMEX and HILEX exercise series, NATO's major crisis management exercises, the Alliance is fast losing its institutional memory of peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions. USEUCOM and the U.S. defense establishment have had considerable recent experience in transition problems, but must be careful not to overlearn the lessons of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Moreover, Base Force reductions will raise a new set of transition problems, some of which will involve issues of command structure. The insight gained from a program of gaming various NATO and national contingencies would be extremely useful to the development of plans for crisis management generally. These games would be particularly helpful in considering the costs and benefits of various USEUCOM command structure options, such as those covered in this study.

**COMMAND STRUCTURE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION**

Defense officials on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly refer to the importance of the Southern Region—loosely, the AFSOUTH AOR within ACE—in future U.S. and NATO strategy. The situation presents special command structure problems worthy of serious study and review.

For the United States, the situation on the Southern Flank differs considerably from that of the Central Region. In the center, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the United States would go to war without NATO. For this reason, the NATO integrated military structure can be relied upon to plan and orchestrate the vast majority of military operations in the region that might involve U.S. forces. This is not the case in the south, where U.S. forces have been directly or indirectly involved in operations that NATO members did not join (or even opposed). A standing USEUCOM joint organization in the Southern Region may be attractive in some scenarios. There are tangible benefits to having the planning and operational command func-
tions combined in one commander and for having the planning updated continuously by those responsible for the details. On the other hand, with reductions in available headquarters staffs, USEUCOM cannot afford to spread its command resources too thin.

A primary U.S. contribution to NATO in the post–Cold War era is its capacity to reinforce Europe in time of extreme crisis. Europeans may or may not have forces sufficient to carry out the rapid reaction mission on their own. There is no doubt that, should Western Europe be threatened with aggression from some part of the former Soviet Union, the success of deterrence or defense will depend heavily on American military power. The proposed "capable corps" in Germany is one symbol of that U.S. promise; the other must be an effective command structure to support rapid reinforcement and the reconstitution of NATO's defenses. If NATO, and American leadership of NATO, are important to the United States, care must be taken to ensure that USEUCOM's support for SACEUR is not perceived by European allies as taking a back seat to U.S. "national" missions. Given the constraints on command resources, what the United States may risk by establishing any type of permanent national headquarters for the Southern Flank is its ability to support a role in NATO essential to American leadership of the Alliance.

Recommendation: Consider a Standing JTF for the Southern Region

The JTF concept, as applied in USEUCOM, has greatly matured in the past five years. What is missing is a continuing joint planning and liaison function performed by a command within the region. There is a need to study the command problem more closely to understand whether the ad hoc JTF is sufficient, whether it is necessary to move to a permanent JTF organization, or if an intermediate arrangement—perhaps a predesignated commander and dedicated planning staff—would meet USEUCOM's needs. The program of in-house gaming recommended above would provide one forum for this analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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1. INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This Report examines potential future command structures for the United States European Command (USEUCOM). It explains the factors that shape USEUCOM's command structure, identifies the likely status of those factors in the near term (1991 to 1995) and the possibilities beyond, develops a near-term USEUCOM command structure, assesses that structure against a set of political and military criteria, and suggests a set of alternative command structures for the longer term.

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FACTORS SHAPING USEUCOM'S COMMAND STRUCTURE

The Current Command Structure

A command structure is the organization of military forces in peace and war to carry out military operations and achieve national political objectives. USEUCOM's current command structure is shown in Figure 1.1. At the apex sits a four-star U.S. Army general who serves as both USEUCOM's Commander-in-Chief (USCINCEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). (SACEUR's NATO command is called Allied Command, Europe [ACE]). USCINCEUR's Deputy (DCINCEUR) is a four-star U.S. Air Force general. In times of extreme crisis, the DCINC would take on the Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) U.S. command responsibilities so that the CINC could focus on his responsibilities as SACEUR. Below them are the three four-star generals who serve as the Commanders-in-Chief of USEUCOM's Army, Air Force, and Navy component commands: CINC U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR); CINC U.S. Air Force, Europe (CINCUSAFE); CINC U.S. Navy, Europe (CINCUSNAV- EUR). Like USCINCEUR, component commanders are "dual-hatted" as commanders in NATO's integrated command structure. CINC-USNAV EUR is also NATO's Commander-in-Chief, South (CINC-SOUTH), a Major Subordinate Commander (MSC) who reports directly to SACEUR. CINCUSAFE is dual-hatted as Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (COMAAFCE), a Principal Subordinate Commander (PSC), who reports to Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Region (CINCENT), a German general who is NATO's
Figure 1.1—Major Factors Influencing USEUCOM’s Command Structure

MSC for the Central Region. In his NATO role, CINCUSAREUR is Commander, Central Army Group (COMCENTAG) and also reports to CINCENT.

Major Factors Influencing the Command Structure

USEUCOM’s command structure has been shaped by the interplay of four factors working over the past 40 years: the size and character of the U.S. military posture in Europe; the role of USEUCOM in the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Unified Command Plan (UCP); the evolution of NATO’s command structure for ACE; and the principles by which the U.S. DOD organizes military forces within a unified command.
U.S. Military Posture in Europe

The presence of substantial U.S. forces in Europe provides an important justification for the placement of American officers in key positions in NATO. By the deployment of these forces, the United States has undertaken considerable responsibilities for the defense of Western Europe. Through these positions, the United States has been able to fulfill its obligations for allied defense planning and to influence NATO's peacetime planning process. In wartime, the positions ensure that U.S. commanders would have substantial authority in operational decisions affecting American forces and national interests. This influence is an important concomitant of the U.S. commitment of its forces to the defense of Western Europe.

Neither a large U.S. military presence in Europe nor NATO's integrated command structure was originally part of the Alliance. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States kept only a small force of soldiers in Europe for occupation duties in the Axis countries. This force was not intended for European defense. The U.S. accession to the Washington or "North Atlantic" treaty in 1949 carried with it no promise to station American troops in Western Europe, only a general guarantee of West European security, backed by America's nuclear monopoly.

By 1950, Western leaders believed Western Europe was vulnerable to Soviet intimidation, or even attack. The states of Western Europe, still recovering from World War II, were unable to defend themselves. Americans were willing and able to carry a large part of the burden of European defense. In 1951, the West Europeans agreed to a reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty's defense arrangements, and the United States agreed to station four additional divisions on the continent for deterrence and defense.

A permanent organization for the continental defense of Europe replaced the loose system of regional military planning groups NATO had been moving toward after the Washington treaty. The initial step toward a new command structure was the creation of the multinational Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) along the lines of GEN Dwight Eisenhower's command headquarters in World War II. From the start, NATO's "integrated" command structure, drawing on staff from throughout the Alliance, was headed by an American Supreme Commander. Eisenhower returned to Europe to serve as the first SACEUR. Eventually, a more elaborate structure of subordinate regional commands was established in ACE.
As new subordinate commands were created, American officers were placed in critical command positions.

For most of the Cold War, the United States deployed more than 300,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen within ACE. Over four U.S. Army divisions were deployed, mainly stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Large numbers of U.S. tactical fighters were permanently located at bases in the United Kingdom (UK), FRG, Spain, Turkey, and (until 1967) France. At various times, other aircraft (reconnaissance, intelligence, strategic bomber, transport) were stationed at fields throughout Western Europe. Naval facilities in the UK, Spain, Italy, Turkey, and Greece supported up to two American carrier task forces in the Mediterranean and ballistic missile-carrying submarines dedicated to SACEUR. In addition, the United States maintained theater nuclear forces in Europe, up to 7,000 nuclear weapons and a substantial infrastructure to support reinforcement. Finally, in the North Atlantic, the United States Navy ensured Western Europe’s access to America.

With this weighty, visible, and pervasive military presence, the United States played a critical role in the conventional defense of each of Allied Command Europe’s MSCs. U.S. carrier task forces have been indispensable to NATO planning in the Northern and Southern Regions, and U.S. ground and air forces have been crucial to the success of defense in the Central Region. Extensive involvement of the United States in the defense of each region helped bind them all together into a strategically coherent defense and a politically unified coalition. The sweep of American involvement put the United States in a position to play the honest broker in disputes between neighbors and between regions within the Alliance. The critical role of the United States in continental defense was reflected in the widespread presence of American officers as NATO commanders, particularly in ACE.

It is undeniable that the American nuclear guarantee has been an important element of the U.S. role in NATO and a source of American influence in Western Europe. However, it was by placing sizable conventional forces in Europe that the United States gained West European agreement to an integrated command structure led by an American SACEUR. The contribution of U.S. conventional forces has also made appropriate the American incumbency of MSCs and PSCs at the regional level, where the United States is involved more directly with local allies, and in certain respects “competing” for NATO commands. The U.S. carrier battle group in the Mediterranean is ar-
guably the most potent force in the Southern Region and is a strong reason for the United States holding leadership as CINCSOUTH. U.S. armor and air contributions to the Central Region provide a similar rationale for American officers serving as COMAAFCE and COMCENTAG. Finally, without the stationing in Europe of American forces too substantial for a President to "write off" in the event of a Soviet attack, the American nuclear guarantee would be far less credible. An American leadership role in NATO is not entirely, but is heavily, dependent on the U.S. military posture in Europe.

The Unified Command Plan

The UCP establishes the DoD’s unified and specified commands according to functional and/or regional missions. Specified commands are assigned specialized missions; for example, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) has been responsible for strategic nuclear bombardment of the Soviet Union by U.S. air and missile forces. Regional commands are delineated by geographic Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Under the UCP, CINCs of unified and specified commands are given operational command of the forces assigned to them. These CINCs report directly to the National Command Authorities (NCA). (The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) serves as the CINCs' channel of communication to the NCA.)

USEUCOM was among the unified commands established in 1947 in the first UCP. Until 1952, the command was largely a U.S. Army headquarters with only nominal authority over the U.S. Air Force in Europe. By 1963, USCINCEUR had acquired direct command of all U.S. forces in ACE, and USEUCOM became a true unified command. Its principal mission is support of SACEUR, but USEUCOM's AOR extends beyond the geographic limits of ACE to cover Eastern Europe, the Near East, and most of Africa. USEUCOM's AOR borders that of the U.S. Atlantic and Central Commands (USLANTCOM, USCENTCOM).¹

As USCINCEUR, the officer serving as SACEUR commands all U.S. forces in Europe—including nuclear forces, subject to the direction of no higher echelon except the Secretary of Defense and the President (the NCA). This dual-hatting adds greatly to the authority and credibility of the U.S. SACEUR in any NATO forum. The political benefits of this arrangement are an obvious, and important, element of American influence in Europe.

¹The precise delineation of AORs is classified.
ACE Command Arrangements

NATO's command arrangements determine the command positions U.S. officers might hold. Today's integrated NATO command structure is the result of both the general perception of military threats to Western European security and the dynamics of Alliance politics. Both factors have favored a high-profile American role in NATO's chain of command.

ACE has been one of three Major NATO Commands (MNCs), the other two being Allied Command, Channel (ACCHAN) and Allied Command, Atlantic (ACLANT). ACCHAN covers the English Channel waters and its shipping routes to ports critical to the reinforcement of Europe. It has been commanded by a British Admiral. ACLANT covers the North Atlantic and the sea lines of communication to North America. It is commanded by an American Admiral who also serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT), a unified command.

From a military perspective, the ACE command structure has been oriented on the collective defense of Western Europe against a massive, theater-wide Soviet and Warsaw Pact offensive, possibly on short warning; the political doctrine of "Forward Defense"; and the military strategy of "Flexible Response." This has led to the creation of a highly articulated command structure to coordinate the defense of Western Europe. Because the Soviet Union was presumed likely to attack across the entire breadth of the Continent, the structure is built more on geographic than functional principles. In essence, ACE divides Western Europe into a hierarchy of regional and subregional commands.

MSCs have been established for northern, central, and southern Europe: Allied Forces, North (AFNORTH), Central (AFCENT), and South (AFSOUTH). Each MSC is in turn divided into PSCs. AFCENT, for example, covers Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and has been divided into two PSCs for ground forces: the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), which covers northern Germany and the Low Countries, and the Central Army Group (CENTAG), which covers southern Germany. A similar division exists for air forces. Although AFCENT contains a PSC for Allied Air Forces in Central Europe (AAFCE), those forces are further allocated along geographic lines. The Second Allied Tactical Air Force

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2These arrangements are in the process of change. ACCHAN will be merged with ACE. Section 4 describes the merger and other changes to ACE command arrangements in greater detail.
(TWOAF) is a subordinate air command in the NORTHAG area, FOURATAF has an analogous position in the CENTAG area. These command arrangements are displayed in Figure 1.1. The other MSCs are similarly organized.

NATO command arrangements are also influenced by political relations among the members. The position of Military Committee (MC) Chairman, which has no authority in the NATO chain of command, rotates among the members. (Omar Bradley, the U.S. five-star General, was the first MC Chairman.) MNC, MSC, and PSC positions are generally not rotated; they are instead allocated among the members. These commands are distributed to reflect the individual member's military contributions to collective security in a given region and each member's need to retain some degree of sovereignty and control over its national forces. It would be pointless to deny that new positions are the subject of competition among Alliance members. However, over the long term, the allocation of positions within ACE has been quite stable.

For example, the distribution of command positions in the Central Region has reflected a balance between Germany, the front-line state, and the United Kingdom and the United States, the principal contributors of outside forces to regional defense. The MSC, CINCENT, is a German, the PSCs are Germans, Britons, and Americans. The Commander of NORTHAG (COMNORTHAG) is a British general, who is dual-hatted as CINC of the British Army on the Rhine. The Commanders of AAFCE (COMAAFCE) and CENTAG (COMCENTAG) are, as explained above, Americans. The Commander of TWOAF (COMTWOAF) is a Briton, who also serves as the CINC of the Royal Air Forces in Germany. The Commander of FOURATAF (COMFOURATAF) is a German. The arrangement has served to balance the requirements of German sovereignty and those of the Americans and British for some measure of influence and control commensurate with both their contribution to Forward Defense and the risk they assumed on Germany's behalf.

The United States has benefited from both the military and political realities of the post-war security environment in Europe. On the military side, America's contribution of conventional and nuclear forces was indispensable to the successful defense of Western Europe. As discussed above, this provided a strong justification for the leadership role of U.S. officers in the ACE command structure. Alliance politics also tended to favor Americans. Despite Western Europe's post-war movement toward unity, European states remained rivals and, at times, jealous and distrustful of one another. As a non-European
power, the United States has often been perceived as a neutral party, an honest broker in intra-Alliance disputes. The Alliance avoided potentially divisive debates among its European members—particularly over which should hold the SACEUR position—by supporting the United States as NATO's military leader.

**Principles of Organization Within a Unified Command**

Since World War II, and after experimenting with a variety of organizational arrangements, the U.S. military has come to favor a command structure consisting of separate unified and component commands, commanders, and headquarters staffs. In peacetime, the emphasis is on service components; in wartime, it is on functional components. Service components (i.e., U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy) are the preferred means for peacetime administration of military forces in a theater of operations and for the reception and onward movement of additional forces in response to a crisis. Functional components (i.e., ground forces, air forces, sea forces) are favored for the conduct of combined arms operations in war.

This arrangement leaves the unified CINC free to focus on problems of campaign strategy and planning, U.S. defense relationships with states in the region, and overall force planning and resource allocation. In peacetime, the system also puts the CINC in a better position to manage the sometimes competing interests of his Army, Air Force, and Navy component commands than if he were dual-hatted as a component commander. The arrangement avoids both the appearance and the actuality of a conflict of interest between unified and component responsibilities. In addition, this architecture has the advantage of remaining relatively unchanged in peace, crisis, and war, eliminating one potential source of disorder and delay in an already complex transition process.

The separation of USEUCOM from the three components (USAREUR, USAFE, USNAVEUR) has been well justified. All three services have maintained a substantial presence in Europe in peacetime and have important roles to play in supporting the U.S. commitment to the rapid reinforcement of Europe. Complex multilateral and bilateral defense arrangements in the region, of vital importance to the United States, demand close attention. Planning for the Cold War scenario of a Warsaw Pact invasion required the careful integration of air, land, and sea campaign planning. By maintaining a separate unified command and headquarters, USCINCEUR and his Deputy have been able to focus on these top-level managerial responsibilities.
THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND ITS UNCERTAIN INFLUENCE ON USEUCOM'S COMMAND STRUCTURE

Today, USEUCOM's command structure is the subject of serious reevaluation and debate. The Soviet Union has disintegrated, leaving a Soviet military in disarray, its ultimate disposition uncertain in the new Commonwealth of Independent States. U.S. defense requirements are less demanding than at any time since the end of World War II, and there is no strong national consensus on the future of America's European presence. The end of the Cold War era has altered European security in fundamental ways, yet the full effect of this change on U.S. defense planning is far from clear. The uncertain situation on the Continent yields a host of "first order" issues, the answers to which strongly influence the factors that in turn shape USEUCOM's command structure.

With the emergence of democratic governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; of independent governments in Romania and Bulgaria; and of the former Soviet republics as independent states, Eastern Europe can no longer be viewed as a jumping off point for attacks on Western Europe. Any army from the territories of the Commonwealth bent on attacking Western Europe would first have to fight its way through Eastern Europe. Indeed, civil war within the former Soviet Union is now of far greater concern than any attack on the West. In short, NATO's basic planning scenario—a massive Soviet invasion across the whole of Europe, very probably on short warning—is not believable.

One set of issues affecting the future USEUCOM command structure concerns Western reactions to the demise of the Soviet threat. Since the start of the Cold War, substantial U.S. conventional and nuclear forces deployed in and committed to Europe have provided America's European allies with a large margin of security against a short-warning, theater-wide Soviet offensive. It seems evident that, in the future, NATO will have a considerably longer period of time to react to a threat of invasion from the east and a less substantial opposing force than in the past. This raises the following questions: What is the rationale for a continuation of a substantial American military presence in Europe after the Cold War? What kind of defense commitments should the United States make to NATO in light of these changes in the threat? How many and what types of forces should the United States keep on the Continent? How will force structure changes affect America's hold on positions of leadership in ACE?
A second set of issues relates to policy toward the new Germany. The reunification of Germany has recreated a political and economic giant in the heart of Europe with the potential for corresponding military strength. Unified Germany may begin to fill the vacuum in Eastern Europe caused by the Soviet withdrawal. Thus, it may become a potential rival to the new Russia. And a unified Federal Republic of Germany is bound to feel less comfortable with a subordinate role to the United States in European defense policy than it did while Germany was divided. NATO was one means by which the West harnessed German power to further European peace and prosperity. To what extent should that role justify NATO in the future? And what kind of NATO is necessary to perform that role? How important to the goal of keeping Germany firmly tied to the West is NATO’s military structure? Will Germany expect to play a greater role in the ACE? How will this affect the allocation of command positions in AFCENT?

The democratization of Eastern Europe, the opening up of the Soviet political system, and the ongoing disintegration of the former Soviet Union into independent republics has ended the division of Europe into ideological and military blocs. Yet, it was in no small part the emergence of a Soviet bloc that caused Western Europe to turn to America to lead their defense, symbolized by choosing an American commander for the Allied forces in Europe (i.e., SACEUR). The end of the bloc system raises a third set of issues relevant to USEUCOM’s command arrangements: Is NATO sustainable or relevant in a Europe without a Soviet bloc? Can America maintain its leadership role? Is American retention of NATO’s SACEUR position the sine qua non of Alliance leadership?

A fourth set of problems is raised by the European Community. The acceleration of trends toward West European unity in the commercial, financial, and social spheres could soon acquire a security dimension. NATO was one element of an American intervention in West European affairs that, however much accepted and even desired in the early 1950s by a prostrate Europe, involved a certain loss of West European sovereignty. In the 1990s, can an economically, politically, and socially vital Western Europe accept less than full control over its own security policy? What will it mean for NATO if the Europeans are willing to become responsible for their own defense? What will it mean for the United States position in ACE?

Finally, the end of the Cold War and of the Soviet Union raise profound issues of America’s role in Europe and the world. Western Europe may have lost some degree of control over its security policy,
but the collective security commitments of the Atlantic Alliance "pooled" members' sovereignty in ways that limited America's freedom of action as well. By forming NATO's integrated command structure and stationing sizable forces in Europe, U.S. leaders denied themselves the possibility of remaining aloof from a major European war. America's very survival was linked to the credibility of its nuclear guarantee of Western Europe's security. Today, a growing sense in America of domestic problems that require immediate attention and substantial resources call that commitment into question. And, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Americans agree that the U.S. military must be reduced substantially. How deep a reduction is likely? What portion of the smaller force will be allocated to, and stationed in, Europe? Will America always be willing to pay the price of NATO leadership?

The answers to these questions will have a profound influence on each of the factors shaping USEUCOM's future command structure. The global U.S. force posture is in decline and with it the U.S. military presence in Europe. How far could this go, and how might it affect the U.S. role in NATO? USEUCOM's future status as a unified command has been called into question. What relationship will USCENTCOM have to the U.S. President? NATO is undergoing vast changes of strategy and doctrine, and its command structure will shrink. How will USEUCOM's NATO interface be affected? The U.S. military establishment has gradually come to favor the separation of unified and component command commanders and headquarters. Will force reductions require consolidation of those functions? Each of these issues will be addressed in this Report.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

Answers to the questions posed above that appear relevant to the near term (3 to 5 years) are becoming more or less apparent. Since 1989, the U.S. government and NATO have moved toward strategies in which

- Substantial, albeit reduced, U.S. forces would remain on the Continent,
- USEUCOM would continue to enjoy its prominent position in the U.S. defense establishment,
- The NATO posture would retain an integrated command structure with an American SACEUR, and
- USEUCOM's internal organization would remain as today.
Whether this consensus will hold or is merely a way station on the road to an entirely different framework of European security, only time will tell. (Even near-term estimates based on the current political and military situation may become irrelevant in the face of events covered in tomorrow’s newspapers or this evening’s news.) Given the dynamics of the international and U.S. domestic political environments, this “most likely” case should serve only as a baseline for analysis. American defense planners must consider a broader range of possible outcomes. Despite the considerable uncertainty as to the future, broad alternatives for the decade beyond 1995 are taking on shape and substance. Solid answers to questions about the long-term nature of the factors shaping USEUCOM’s command structure are unavailable, but the questions are well understood, and their implications for command arrangements can be assessed.

The four major factors influencing USEUCOM’s future command structure have been briefly outlined in this section, with an emphasis on how they have shaped the current arrangements. Detailed explanations of each factor and estimates of their likely near-term status are contained in Sections 2 through 5. Because the longer term outlook is unclear and even our appreciation of the near term somewhat tenuous, a set of alternatives to the near-term estimates are also sketched out for each factor in Sections 2 through 5. These sections lay the foundation for a near-term, or “Baseline,” USEUCOM command structure and some longer term alternatives.

Section 6 defines the Baseline USEUCOM command structure, grounded on the likely near-term conditions of the four influential factors. In Section 7, a set of political and military criteria, derived from American foreign policy and defense objectives and political and military conditions in Europe and the United States, is developed to determine the adequacy of any proposed USEUCOM command structure. Also included in the criteria is the ability of the command structure to accommodate a change from the near-term condition of any influential factor. Next, the Baseline case is examined in the context of these criteria.

From the findings of the assessment in Section 7, important relationships among the four factors that shape USEUCOM’s command structure are identified in Section 8. Alternative command structures are also outlined in this section, based on changes to the major factors and the influence of these changes on the relationships among the factors. In Section 9, the Report concludes with recommendations concerning issues and decisions faced by those responsible for the future of USEUCOM’s command arrangements.
2. FACTOR 1: THE U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

DOMESTIC REALITIES

In the wake of the many changes in Europe and the Soviet Union since the November 1989 demonstrations at the Berlin Wall, there has been a distinct alteration in the nature of domestic support for U.S. defense programs and overseas commitments. The end of the Soviet Union and the widespread perception of a much-reduced threat to international and American security have allowed national attention to turn to increasingly worrisome domestic problems. This tendency has been reinforced by the authoritative statements of responsible government officials that military threats to the U.S. are at an all-time low and that substantial cuts to the defense budget are now both possible and prudent.

Since 1990, there has been a growing recognition in the Pentagon that political realities will result in smaller U.S. defense budgets and a scaling back of forces by 1995. This appreciation was not fundamentally altered by the stunning success of U.S. forces in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; it has been strengthened since the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow. Defense planners continue to believe that, for the foreseeable future, Congress will lower the priority given military requirements during the Cold War and place relatively greater emphasis on domestic needs.

TOWARD A NEW U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY

In his December 5, 1990 Eisenhower Centenary Lecture to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, CJCS GEN Colin Powell, pointed to the end of an era of U.S. defense planning based on a Soviet threat. Surveying the new strategic environment, he said:

The most important emerging reality... is the demise of the Cold War. The Fulda Gap, the Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain, the Warsaw Pact, the Brezhnev Doctrine... all the military totems of the Cold War are gone. Tossed into the dustbin of history with relish—and not a little skill—by the leaders of both the East and the West. The old military context we knew so well is gone. (Powell, 1991, p. 18)

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's FY 1991 Annual Report, issued in January 1991, echoed this theme. He declared that U.S. de-
fense policy was shifting away from a strategy based on the Soviet threat of the Cold War toward a more complex strategy that must contend with security risks arising from regional instabilities:

[A] massive invasion into Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact ... has been rendered unlikely by the ongoing Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact as an effective military organization. The new strategy focuses instead on major regional threats that could harm U.S. interests, while ensuring that our forces can provide needed levels of forward presence to influence favorably the emerging security environment .... (Cheney, 1991, p. v)

If the Soviets were to ... return to a strategy of military confrontation, it would take them at least one to two years or longer to regenerate the capability for a European theater-wide offensive .... The United States would ... respond early to any such shift ... and begin to reconstitute the additional forces that would be needed. (Cheney, 1991, p. 3)

At the same time the global Soviet threat is declining, the potential for major regional threats to U.S. interests is growing. Such regional threats can arise with very little warning. (Cheney, 1991, p. 3)

Since that report was prepared, the U.S. has witnessed the end of the rival Soviet superpower and fought a major war against a new regional threat: Iraq. In his January 31, 1992, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1993 defense budget, Secretary Cheney remarked on both. He first evaluated the implications for American defense planning of the end of the Soviet Union:

It is improbable that a global conventional challenge to the U.S. and Western security will reemerge from the Eurasian heartland for years to come. Even if some new leadership in Moscow were to try to recover its lost empire in Central Europe or to threaten NATO—and I would emphasize that the renunciation of such aims by the new Russian leaders enjoys broad support—the reduction of its conventional military capabilities over the past several years would make the chances for success remote without prolonged force generation and redeployment. (Cheney, 1992, p. 11)

Drawing lessons from the war with Iraq, the Secretary went on to underline the new challenges facing defense planners:

As we learned from the Gulf War, responding to a regional crisis can mean mounting a very large military operation with little advanced notice against a well-armed and capable adversary. For this reason, we need the capability to respond quickly to unexpected contingencies. We must be prepared to operate effectively in diverse areas of the world and to cope with differences in climate, terrain, distance from the
United States, capabilities of potential adversaries, and varied levels of in-country logistic support. (Cheney, 1992, p. 25)

We must be prepared to face adversaries on their own terms, possibly involving the use of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic or cruise missiles. We may need to be able to fight earlier than we had to this time. If the use of weapons of mass destruction is threatened, we may need to win even more quickly and decisively and we would still want to retain the advantages necessary to keep our own losses as low as possible. (Cheney, 1992, p. 26)

The revised U.S. defense strategy calls for significant reductions in conventional forces. However, it continues to require maintenance of a military presence in regions of vital interest to the United States, the retention of sufficient forces in the continental United States (CONUS) to quickly respond to a major regional conflict, and a capability to rebuild U.S. defenses to Cold War levels. The core elements of the policy were summarized in the National Security Strategy of the United States, issued by the White House in August of 1991, before the failed Moscow coup:

In a world less driven by an immediate, massive threat to Europe or the danger of global war, the need to support a smaller but still crucial forward presence and to deal with regional contingencies—including possibly a limited, conventional threat to Europe—will shape how we organize, equip, train, deploy and employ our active and reserve forces. We must also have the ability to reconstitute forces, if necessary to counter any resurgent global threat. (The White House, 1991, p. 25)

In the face of competing fiscal demands and a changing but still dangerous world, we have developed a new defense strategy that provides a conceptual framework for our future forces. This new strategy will guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to defend our interests and meet our global responsibilities. It will also guide our restructuring so that our forces are appropriate to the challenges of a new era. The four fundamental demands of a new era are already clear: to ensure strategic deterrence, to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises and to retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces should this ever be needed. (The White House, 1991, p. 25)

At least in these paragraphs, a retrospective assessment of the document suggests that, in avoiding mention of the "Soviet Union," U.S. policymakers anticipated the possible disappearance of a "Soviet" military threat and determined that the new strategic framework does not depend on that threat. Administration statements since August have been essentially consistent with the White House document. In his January 31 testimony, Secretary Cheney expanded on the four el-
ements of what he termed "the regional defense strategy" (Cheney, 1992, p. 19):

- Strategic Deterrence and Defense—relying on a mix of offensive and defensive capabilities to protect the U.S. and our allies.
- Forward Presence—maintaining forward deployed or stationed forces to strengthen alliances, show our resolve, and dissuade regional challenges.
- Crisis Response—providing forces and mobility to respond to crises and to reinforce forward deployed forces.
- Reconstitution—maintaining the capability to generate wholly new forces to deter or respond to a renewed global threat.

THE "BASE FORCE"

To support the new defense strategy, DoD proposes to move to a smaller force posture by 1995. According to the Secretary's 1991 Annual Report (Cheney, 1991, p. v), this "Base Force," roughly 25 percent smaller than that of 1990, is "the lowest level to which we can safely reduce our forces and capabilities at this time." Secretary Cheney cautioned that the gradual drawdown is "based on certain assumptions about positive trends in the Soviet Union" and that "should events . . . take a dramatic turn for the worse, we may need to slow our decline to the low force levels we are now planning for the mid-1990s, or even halt our decline at more robust levels than we are currently projecting." (Cheney, 1991, p. 4)1 The plan is an effort to reduce U.S. military capability only as fast as the offensive capabilities of the former Soviet Union decline and only as quickly as the United States is assured that the new republics of the former Soviet Union (the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]) presents no immediate threat to the West.2

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1In his January 31, 1992 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1993 defense budget, General Powell reiterated the Administration's position that the changes in the Soviet Union since the Base Force was first proposed will have no effect on plans for the conventional U.S. force posture: "To meet the demands of strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution, we are restructuring our military forces to achieve the Base Force. To reiterate, the Base Force is not today's force but the force we are reducing towards in order to implement the new strategy." (Powell, 1992, pp. 8-9)

2Although the Soviet Union has disappeared, U.S. defense planners remain concerned about military threats emanating from that region. A general fear arises from uncertainty about the future of the former Soviet republics. A particular worry is the emergence of a Russian threat to Europe. In his January 31, 1992 testimony on the FY
Table 2.1 shows the Base Force by major combat units. By 1995, assuming a continuation of currently favorable international trends, defense planners intend to reduce the Army from the 1990 force of 18 active and 10 reserve divisions to 12 active and 6 reserve (with another 2 in a reconstitutable cadre status). The Air Force will drop from 24 active and 12 reserve tactical fighter wings to 15 active and 9 reserve. Following the reductions, the Navy will have 12 of its present force of 16 carriers. Not shown on the chart are U.S. Marine

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<sup>a</sup>Active/reserve/reconstitutable units.
<sup>b</sup>Active/reserve units.
<sup>c</sup>Does not include an additional carrier for flight training.

1993 defense budget Secretary Cheney addressed this directly. (Cheney, 1992, pp. 13–14)

The outcome of the transition in the FSU [former Soviet Union] remains profoundly uncertain. . . .

Unfortunately, all the elements are present for an outcome which would require us to rethink some of the assumptions upon which our current program is based:

— A disastrous economic situation that may not be repairable in time to avoid a social and political explosion. . . .

The possibility of an economic and sociopolitical train wreck which would yield a very ugly regime in Russia cannot be wished away. A collapse of the democratic experiment in the former Soviet Union could lead to:

- An authoritarian, remilitarized Russia that seeks to intimidate Eastern Europe or even reverse the process of democratization there.
- An armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine which could lead to ecological disasters, large refugee flows to the West, and a threat to the security of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia
- A breakdown of the nuclear command and control system with the resulting loss of control over some nuclear weapons.

Such outcomes would be dangerous not only for the people directly involved but for Americans as well.
forces. As required by law, the Marine Base Force will consist of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, including three divisions and three air wings, but reductions in manpower will occur over the next several years.³

USEUCOM'S BASE FORCE

As shown in Table 2.1, the conventional military posture has been grouped into three “packages,” at least for planning purposes. The “Atlantic Force” emphasizes the heavy and sophisticated air and ground units necessary to fight a Soviet-style adversary in Europe or Southwest Asia, sea control capabilities to protect lines of communication back to the U.S., and supporting air- and sealift. A “Pacific Force” is based principally on sea power, with limited air and ground elements deployed in areas traditionally of interest to U.S. defense planning. A “Contingency Force” provides the CONUS-based reserve of conventional forces to augment the forward presence, as required. A fourth package, not displayed in the table, the “Strategic Force,” will maintain America's strategic nuclear forces, the associated warning and communication capabilities, and strategic defenses, should they be deployed.

In accordance with the new defense strategy, the Atlantic Force package is designed to support four post-Cold War military missions. The first is to maintain a capability for major military operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia that are regarded as highly credible by friends and potential adversaries alike. The second mission is to demonstrate a continuing U.S. intention to meet its commitments to the NATO Alliance. The third mission, even while reducing the U.S. defense posture overall, is to keep a “forward presence” of U.S. forces in Europe and Southwest Asia sufficient to promote regional stability and carry out military operations in response to limited local contingencies. The fourth is to maintain in CONUS forces capable of sustained high-intensity combat operations against a Soviet-style adversary anywhere in the region. Elements of this CONUS-based reserve will also be available to supplement or substitute for units of the Contingency Force in the event of crises outside of the Atlantic Force's region.

Under Base Force planning, USEUCOM's forces are considered part of the Atlantic Force package. USEUCOM's Base Force is expected to

³In his January 31, 1992 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Powell confirmed the data shown in Table 2.1 and explained the Marine posture.
consist of roughly two U.S. Army divisions, three to four tactical
fighter wings, and one carrier battle group for the Mediterranean.
Including command and support, this translates into approximately
150,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe. (Powell, 1992)

At the beginning of 1990, the U.S. deployed over four divisions and
nine wings in Western Europe, for a total of over 300,000 personnel.
Thus, USEUCOM faces a planned reduction of roughly 50 percent
over the next five years, twice that of the U.S. military as a whole.
Defense planners believe that this force maintains a military capability
credible to allies and adversaries, demonstrates the U.S. commit-
ment to NATO, promotes regional stability, and is able to handle
limited local contingencies. Reinforcement for Europe will be main-
tained with CONUS-based units of the Atlantic Force. However
American defense planners assess the adequacy of the military pres-
ence proposed for Europe, USEUCOM’s Base Force represents a re-
duction of the overall emphasis of Europe in U.S. defense priorities.

Throughout the Cold War, Europe was America’s most important de-
defense commitment. Today, the status of Western Europe in U.S. de-
defense planning is undergoing profound change. General Powell stated
as much in the RUSI speech quoted earlier (Powell, 1991). First, he
argued that Western publics are “rightfully expecting major reduc-
tions in defence spending.” “They are” he went on to say, “especially
insistent on reducing or eliminating those forces and weapons that
were fielded principally to deter the now defunct Warsaw Treaty
Organization. This retrenchment . . . is already under way in the
U.S.” (p. 18) Then, after explaining U.S. reductions as a response to
a declining threat to NATO, Powell outlined Western Europe’s place
in the new U.S. defense strategy. “Europe,” he said, “is not the only
vital region that lies across the Atlantic from us. . . . In our new con-
text ‘across the Atlantic’ means more than Europe, it also includes the
Middle East and Southwest Asia.” (p. 19) However an American
might explain the Chairman’s remarks, it must have been difficult for
West Europeans in the audience not to take them as a warning that
Europe no longer holds the position of preeminence in U.S. defense
strategy that it has enjoyed during the last 40 years.

ALTERNATIVE U.S. FORCE POSTURES FOR EUROPE

Whether the status quo in NATO’s command structure can be main-
tained in the event of further U.S. troop reductions beyond Base
Force levels is a matter of debate and speculation. As described in
Section 1, the U.S. military posture in Europe has had great influence
on USEUCOM’s command structure. The size, character, and extent
of America's military presence in Europe made NATO's integrated command structure politically viable and justified the hold of USEUCOM commanders on key positions in ACE. At some level of reductions, the United States will cease to play this critical role.

As shown in Table 2.2, RAND's study of USEUCOM's future force posture indicates that the Base Force manpower level can support seven brigades deployed forward in Germany and a battalion in Italy, slightly over two tactical fighter wings at bases in the U.K. and Germany and one in the Southern Region, two to three preposition/material configuration/unit set (POMCUS) division sets, and ashore naval personnel at three bases on the Mediterranean to support deployed naval forces. In the Mediterranean (with personnel not counted against the 150,000 figure) will be a single carrier battle group and associated support ships, an afloat Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and associated amphibious shipping, three submarines, and one maritime air squadron.

The combat forces of this "forward presence" are oriented toward the high intensity combined arms operations that would typify a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. They are also intended to be sizable enough to maintain the credibility of America's extended nuclear deterrent against any residual threat from the territories of the former Soviet Union. The forward-deployed force would have limited capabilities for lesser contingencies, but CONUS-based units from the Atlantic Force reserve would be required for large-scale or sustained operations in the European theater, or elsewhere. In addition,

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>150,000</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forward</td>
<td>Dual-Based</td>
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<td>Presence</td>
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<tr>
<th>Central Europe</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ground headquarters Basing</td>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
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<td>mode</td>
<td>Forward</td>
<td>Dual-Based</td>
<td>Forward</td>
<td>Dual-Based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forward brigades</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical fighter wings</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMCUS</td>
<td>2–3</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Southern Region</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces</td>
<td>1 Battalion</td>
<td>1 Battalion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter Wings</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval Bases</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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CONUS-based units from the Contingency Force probably would be called upon to deal with sizable non-Soviet contingencies, such as peacekeeping. A 165,000 level preferred by USEUCOM to support the forward-presence posture when this study was underway in the summer of 1991 would have supported a peacetime intelligence, communications, medical, and support infrastructure contributing to a more rapid reconstitution capability in the event of renewed large-scale threats to Western Europe. The 150,000 level offered by the Pentagon would sacrifice this to retain a less easily expanded but nonetheless “capable” forward-deployed fighting force.

Whether the proposed force of 150,000 fits with emerging domestic realities remains to be seen. It is also possible that the DoD’s preferred posture will not enjoy sustained European support. In this study, we assume that it will be acceptable in the near term. But the size and character of the U.S. military presence in Europe is likely to be a matter of continuing debate in every defense budget between now and 1995 and possibly beyond. It may also become a more controversial issue in European politics, in which case it is much less likely that a U.S. force of substantial size would remain.

RAND’s force posture analysis argues that levels below 150,000 expose NATO to certain risk in the event of war, and are probably not militarily advisable, given estimates of allied military postures against a residual of the Soviet military threat for the period to 1995 (Kugler, 1992). Nevertheless, in light of political uncertainties in Europe, America, and the former Soviet Union, neither the force posture analysis nor this study of command structure can ignore cases below 150,000. In the near term, it is quite plausible that such postures could come to pass if the DoD’s preferred posture proves unable to gain congressional support. It is possible that a domestic consensus will form around a presence of 100,000. Some would argue for an eventual U.S. presence as low as 40,000.

For the moment, the size and nature of the U.S. military presence in Europe seems to be a decision largely up to Americans. There are few indications of a widespread European desire to vastly decrease the American contribution to NATO in the near future. In the longer term, however, it is conceivable that the American military presence could be reduced because of a change in Western European attitudes toward the U.S. role in their security. Occupation forces of the former Soviet Union should be completely withdrawn from Eastern Europe and Germany by 1995. The single European market should be fully in place by that time and may have led to greater political unity within the European Community. A Russian decision not to take up
the role played by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, combined with increasing Western European integration, could lead Europeans to question the relevance of a large continuing U.S. military presence in the post-Soviet era. The same events might also cause future U.S. administrations to revise their estimates of the appropriate U.S. military posture in Europe.

Should the U.S. deployment in Europe fall below Base Force levels, the character of USEUCOM's force posture will change. The alternative postures for troop levels below Base Force planning developed in the RAND force structure analysis are designed to balance two missions: protecting reconstitution capabilities and maintaining in place some operationally meaningful level of combat presence. Historically, both capabilities have helped make America's commitment to European defense credible.

At the 100,000 level, an attempt is made to maintain the structure of the 150,000 to 165,000 force by "dual-basing" forces necessary for a corps in Germany. For the purposes of this study, dual-basing refers to an arrangement in which U.S. units are permanently stationed in the CONUS, but formally assigned to NATO, with some cadre elements and a set of equipment prepositioned on the Continent. Plans would call for these forces to be deployed to Europe in a crisis. At the 100,000 level, the U.S. corps in Germany would require augmentation to fight a war in Central Europe.

In addition, as U.S. manpower levels are reduced, ground forces and the overall support infrastructure are retained by reducing deployed Air Force units. The smaller postures become increasingly reliant on the strategic mobility of air power to ensure an adequate air presence in crisis and war.

At 70,000 men, the presence becomes quite limited from an operational perspective; only the structure of a division can be maintained. Virtually any significant contingency will require an augmentation of forces from CONUS. At the 40,000 level, the U.S. presence becomes essentially symbolic. A dual-based posture is required to maintain even a division's command and support structure.
3. FACTOR 2: THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

THE PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

The UCP defines the DoD's organization for military operations in peace and war. The document influences USEUCOM's command structure by creating unified and specified commands, determining each command's AOR and missions, and establishing each CINC's relationship to the President. The future of the European Command in the UCP has recently become a matter of some debate among defense planners. Along with the anticipated reduction of U.S. forces between 1990 and 1995, and the concept of a Base Force consisting of four force packages, has come the suggestion of parallel revisions to the Cold War structure of unified and specified commands.

The UCP is a sensitive document, not because it contains information that would be damaging to national security if it fell into the hands of an adversary, but because it is the product of an evolving and carefully wrought compromise between the DoD's various institutions. The interplay of geography; defense treaty obligations; national strategy; advancing military technology; intraservice rivalry; the unique operating characteristics of land, sea, and air forces; and the interests of the existing commands that has led to the current UCP is a study in itself.

What is important to keep in mind for the purposes of the current study is that the document is the product of a political process. Inevitably, proposals to impose an overarching design on the structure of commands that is based on some rational or internally consistent theory of national defense strategy have given way to compromise. Thus, the proposal to revise the UCP along the lines of the Base Force packages is to be viewed with some skepticism. While it may appear logical to treat force packages designed for broad national defense missions as equally coherent from an operational perspective, the theory breaks down when confronted by certain technical, political, and historical realities.

These realities affect the establishment of a single Atlantic Force Command, which would encompass the present USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USLANTCOM AORs and subordinate the current CINCs to an Atlantic Force "Super-CINC." Insofar as USEUCOM is concerned, the most important problem is that the Super-CINC would
reduce the authority of USCINCEUR and undermine his position as SACEUR.

Changes to USCINCEUR's status in the UCP may reduce SACEUR's political legitimacy. By placing forces in the USEUCOM AOR under the command of an ATLANTIC Super-CINC, a USCINCEUR dual-hatted as SACEUR would be deprived of national responsibilities and authorities important to his stature in NATO's integrated command structure. The dual-hatted USCINCEUR/SACEUR would no longer be the last link in the U.S. military chain of command before the highest political authority. His contingency and operational plans would be the responsibility of the Atlantic Force Super-CINC. As a subunified commander, USCINCEUR would not be responsible for CINC inputs to DoD planning; he would have no direct line to the President; and his nuclear planning and request authority would be subject to review by a higher echelon of military decision. A loss of USCINCEUR's power on this scale might influence the existing consensus that SACEUR should remain an American and give impetus to those who favor an end to the U.S. hold on NATO's most important military position.

ALTERNATIVE UNIFIED COMMAND PLANS

Because the difficulties in devising and implementing a new UCP are considerable, we assume that in the near term USEUCOM's current position will not change. However, the Plan has been altered with regard to command arrangements for strategic offensive forces, and further changes are quite possible in the longer term.\footnote{In his January 31, 1992 testimony to the Senate Armed Services (Powell, 1992, p. 13), GEN Powell confirmed that SAC will be eliminated as a specified command and that the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), a new unified command with operational control over all U.S. strategic forces including both SSBNs and SAC's bombers and missiles, will be activated on June 1, 1992. The change has no direct effect on USEUCOM's mission or AOR.} As the U.S. military reaches Base Force levels, consolidation of existing unified commands is likely to become an attractive option to DoD planners. U.S. general officer ranks will decline along with the forces, as will the ranks of headquarters personnel. With its 50-percent reduction in forces and the relative decline of Europe in U.S. defense planning, USEUCOM would seem an obvious candidate for command consolidation. Therefore, three alternative revisions to the current UCP are considered in this analysis.\footnote{These options were developed after consultation with USEUCOM and the Joint Staff.} The current and alternative UCPs are
described in Table 3.1. Figure 3.1 shows USEUCOM's AORs in each case.

The first alternative would exempt USEUCOM from any changes to the current UCP, except to reduce the AOR so that it would be more coincident with that of ACE. Consequently, the smaller USEUCOM would be almost exclusively focused on support for SACEUR and NATO. The Atlantic Force Command would encompass the AORs of today's Atlantic and Central Commands and at least that portion of USEUCOM's current AOR in the Near East and Africa. (The precise delineation of AORs is classified.) USCINCEUR would retain operational command of U.S. forces in Europe and a direct relationship to the NCA. In peacetime, reserves intended to support European reinforcement but based in North America as part of the Base Force's Atlantic Force package would be under the operational command of the Atlantic or Contingency Force Super-CINCs.

The second alternative parallels the Base Force concept. USEUCOM would become a subordinate unified (subunified) command under an Atlantic Forces Command. The current U.S. European, Atlantic, and Central Command CINCs would become subunified CINCs under an Atlantic Force Super-CINC, and their AORs would be redrawn. In this case, USEUCOM's AOR would consist of Europe and North Africa. The Near East might remain in USEUCOM's AOR or be transferred to USCENTCOM. With its revised AOR, even greater

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<td>Unified Command Plan: Four Alternatives</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCOM's status in UCP</td>
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<td>USCINCEUR reports to</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCEUR Dual-hatted as SACEUR?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(but SACEUR remains U.S.)</td>
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<td>USEUCOM AOR</td>
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emphasis would be placed on USEUCOM’s support for NATO and SACEUR than under the current UCP. Nevertheless, USEUCOM would continue to have missions outside of NATO and Europe. Under one variant of this option, USCINCEUR would continue to be double-hatted as SACEUR. In the other, SACEUR would remain an American, but would not be dual-hatted as USCINCEUR, and therefore not in the U.S. chain of command.

The third alternative would dual-hat the Atlantic Force Super-CINC as SACEUR. The intent of this arrangement would be to maintain SACEUR’s influence in Alliance forums as the operational commander of U.S. forces in Europe. As in the Base Force option, USEUCOM, USLANTCOM, and USCENTCOM would report to the Atlantic Force Super-CINC. The Super-CINC’s Deputy would manage the Atlantic Force Command on a day-to-day basis, much as the Deputy USCINCEUR oversees the operation of USEUCOM today. In the event of a war involving NATO, the Deputy would probably become the Atlantic force Super-CINC, while the former Super-CINC directs the Allied defense as SACEUR. Under this alternative, USEUCOM’s AOR would be confined to the European landmass, while USLANTCOM’s would extend into the Mediterranean.
4. FACTOR 3: NATO STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND COMMAND STRUCTURE

NATO's command structure influences USEUCOM's command structure by determining the role U.S officers might perform in the integrated military planning and operations of the Alliance. The NATO command structure, and in particular that of ACE, is bound to change in the wake of events in Europe since 1989. How it changes will affect the positions potentially available to American officers in the future.

In parallel with the ongoing revision of U.S. national security strategy, NATO is attempting to make the concept of collective defense relevant to European security in the post–Cold War era. The Allies are very much aware that this environment remains unsettled and could proceed in several different directions. As a result, the essential elements of a "new NATO" are only gradually becoming clear, and many important details have yet to be determined.

The forecast on NATO's command structure depends on the outcome of four trends: a changing perception of the threats to the security of NATO members in the post–Cold War era and the associated evolution of a new Alliance strategy; revisions to NATO's force posture; changes in the place of the Central Region in NATO strategy; and an emerging European defense identity.

TOWARD A NEW NATO STRATEGY

The End of the Cold War Paradigm

The most fundamental change in NATO's political environment is its members' perception of the threat to Western European security. While the extent of the Soviet threat was a matter of continuing debate in Alliance fora (with the United States in particular taking a more conservative position than most of its partners), there was consensus on its essential nature. During the Cold War, most members agreed that Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe were in excess of legitimate defense requirements or even what was needed for occupation of the satellite nations. It was generally agreed that the Soviets' capability for an invasion of Western Europe without reinforcement on very short warning justified a Western insurance policy of continuous planning for collective defense, relatively large standing armed forces, a sizable U.S. military presence on the Continent, re-
liance on U.S. nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense, and a certain degree of Western European deference to America's leadership of NATO's defense effort. The ultimate result of this consensus was an integrated military command structure designed to accomplish the coordinated defense of Western Europe, under the command of an American general.

With the London Declaration of July 6, 1990, this Cold War consensus became virtually irrelevant to Alliance planning. Given the changes in Eastern Europe since late 1989, the Allies offered to end the adversarial relationship with the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Treaty Organization. Since that time, the Warsaw Pact has fallen apart and several of its former members are attempting to join NATO. Treaties on conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic forces have been implemented or signed. Soviet forces are withdrawing from Eastern Europe, and Germany is reunified. By 1990, Alliance leaders began to state quite frequently that the Soviet Union was no longer an adversary; indeed, they looked forward to the time when they could consider it to be NATO's security partner. Even before the failed Moscow coup of August 1991, NATO planning scenarios involving Soviet attacks on Western Europe—and particularly short-warning scenarios—were fast losing their political and military credibility. In the wake of the end of the Soviet Union itself, NATO's members recognized a need to redefine the assumptions about military threats that have justified Allied force requirements and command arrangements for over 40 years. In November 1991, the Alliance announced a new "Strategic Concept" (discussed below), to replace the Cold War strategy of "Flexible Response" and to guide future NATO defense planning.

The Post-Soviet Threat: An Emerging Perspective

NATO has not entirely dismissed the territories of the former Soviet Union as a source of concern to military planners. Before the failed Moscow coup, NATO applauded the turnaround of Soviet foreign and domestic policy under President Gorbachev, but, as noted in the London Declaration, Allied leaders maintained that NATO could "not be oblivious to the fact that the Soviet Union will retain substantial military capabilities, which it is continuing to modernize and which have implications for our defense." The Defense Planning Committee's Final Communiqué of December 7, 1990, emphasized that "even in a non-adversarial relationship prudence requires NATO to counterbalance residual Soviet military capabilities."
In the aftermath of the failed coup and in spite of changes across the former Soviet empire, Soviet military capabilities remain a "yardstick" against which Alliance defense requirements are to be established. Without a military threat of some kind emanating from the former Soviet Union, it would be difficult for NATO to justify a substantial standing force, the military requirement for more than a token presence of U.S. forces on the Continent, or retention of the extensive ACE command structure. With the demise of the Soviet Union itself, a "Soviet" threat would seem to have disappeared. But given their experience in the difficulties of establishing and managing a multinational defense, NATO's members are not yet willing to dismantle the elaborate arrangements built over four decades. None will consent to bet their nation's security solely on the continued success of reform in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Two risks to NATO emanate from the territories of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union: instability caused by the political revolutions still under way in Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics, and the longer-term potential for conflict between Russia and its sister republics, or between one or more members of the Commonwealth and Eastern Europe. (While rarely mentioned explicitly, an aggressive Russia seems to be the major worry.) The civil war in Yugoslavia serves as a reminder that Europe is not yet free of the risk of war and perhaps also serves as a warning sign as to the future of the Commonwealth if complex and contentious political, economic, and security issues cannot be peacefully resolved. NATO's military planners cannot be as confident of any new planning scenario as they were in that of the Cold War, but, looking toward an uncertain future, they see a high potential for armed conflicts that would affect Western European security.

New Threats to the Southern Region

Even as the Soviet threat declines, NATO is becoming increasingly concerned about the security of its Southern Region. Western Europe will remain heavily dependent on petroleum from the Middle East and thus vitally interested in the outcome of conflicts in the region. Even "local" wars may affect Western European security more directly in the future than they have in the past. The war against Iraq exposed Turkey to the possibility of war on its southern border and even of ballistic missile attacks. Actual Scud missile strikes on Israel and Saudi Arabia gave Western European leaders a glimpse into one possible future of warfare along the Southern Flank—a future domi-
nated by missiles armed with chemical, biological, and even nuclear warheads, able to reach major European population centers.

As with the new Eastern European scenarios, the paths to war in the Middle East are numerous and unpredictable; being too specific about them may adversely affect diplomatic efforts aimed at peaceful solutions to the area’s many conflicts. But few Western defense planners argue against the possibility of another major war in the region or doubt that it could impinge on the national security of NATO’s European members. Western intervention cannot be ruled out, if not under NATO auspices, then perhaps by individual NATO members.

The force requirements to counter such threats might be considerable. For instance, a repeat of Desert Shield/Desert Storm would require the West to deploy the equivalent of over 10 divisions. And unlike scenarios generated from estimates of a regenerated Soviet-style threat from the east, which grant NATO months of warning prior to an attack, contingencies in the Southern Region could arise with little or no warning.

Emerging Trends in NATO’s Military Strategy

One thing is certain: NATO’s Cold War military strategy is dead. General John Galvin, SACEUR, explained this reality in an interview in International Defense Review published in March 1991. In his remarks, Galvin simultaneously explained and dismissed the old strategy of “Flexible Response”:

[There will not be a strategy of flexible response. Flexible response was defined as direct defense in the event of an attack. Then deliberate escalation of the level of military force in accordance with the level of attack; and the third part was general nuclear release. Now all of that has changed. First of all, a general nuclear release has become a last resort. Direct defense meant that we were face to face with a very large military force that could fall upon us practically without warning. That changes now, there will be much longer warning time. Assuming that arms control is implemented, the Soviet Union will field smaller forces, therefore we can afford smaller armed forces in the West. (Sauerwein, 1991, p. 190)

In place of a large-scale Warsaw Pact assault across the whole of Western Europe on relatively short warning, NATO military planners now see a residual military capability in the Commonwealth to conduct one major offensive in the Northern, Central, or Southern Region and a minor flanking operation in another. In the Central Region, the aggressors would almost certainly face resistance if they tried to
use Eastern Europe as the base for an attack on NATO. Given the
current status of political relations within the Commonwealth, such a
scenario seems far-fetched. On the whole, Alliance members assume
that months and perhaps even years of strategic warning would be
available to NATO before a theater-wide threat to Western Europe
could be recreated. As a result of the radical changes in Europe,
NATO expects to reduce its standing forces in line with reductions to
the former Soviet military posture. As the conventional balance be-
comes more favorable to NATO, the West’s reliance on nuclear
weapons can be greatly reduced.

Since 1990, General Galvin has argued that NATO’s reductions
should be accompanied by improvements in intratheater mobility and
the protection of a capacity to recreate the Cold War posture given a
timely response to warning. A new emphasis in NATO’s military
strategy is also being placed on the employment of forces prior to the
outbreak of hostilities, as a tool of crisis management.1 NATO has
not had much actual experience in these aspects of military power.
For example, the ACE Mobile Force (AMF), the NATO force most ap-
propriate to the crisis management mission, had never been deployed
in a real crisis before the dispatch of its air component to Turkey
during the war with Iraq.

In the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation of November 7–8,
1991, the NATO heads of state and government, meeting as the North
Atlantic Council (NAC), summarized the new “Strategic Concept.”
Following on decades of statements focused on a Soviet threat, the
declaration has a distinctly generic quality:

Our security has substantially improved: we no longer face the old
threat of a massive attack. However, prudence requires us to maintain
an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential
risks to our security which may arise from instability or tension. In an
environment of uncertainty and unpredictable challenges, our Alliance,
which provides the essential transatlantic link as demonstrated by the
significant presence of North American forces in Europe, retains an en-
during value. (p. 19)

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1Gen Hans-Henning Von Sandrart, the German officer who serves as CINCENT,
has suggested that “[p]olitically controlled crisis management might call for graduated
military options in the fields of readiness and mobilisation, and also for available,
ready forces of high flexibility, and of a multinational character, to signal solidarity.”
He went on to argue that “[t]his military element of crisis management has to become
an important part of operational art, and should receive greater prominence within our
revised NATO strategy.” (Sandrart, 1990, p. 56) General Galvin has also made much
of NATO’s potential as a crisis manager.
The Alliance will maintain its purely defensive purpose, its collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure... and for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be substantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organized for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater role within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced. ... The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies remains political: to preserve peace, and prevent war or any kind of coercion. (p. 19)

The uncertain nature of future contingencies and the diplomatic difficulties caused by trying to be specific about potential conflicts or adversaries push NATO toward military planning based on general capability requirements. One example of the direction this might take would be plans to enable the rapid redeployment of NATO's Airborne Early Warning (NAEW) aircraft from the Central to the Southern Region. Another might be plans to allow movement of an armored corps and its support from the Central to the Southern Region (or the reverse) in a few days. "Planning to capabilities," that is, developing the ability to accomplish general military tasks, has the advantage of providing the Alliance with flexibility.² But these plans beg the

²For example, Jane's Defense Weekly reports that the 1992 "Teamwork" North Atlantic naval exercise to be held in March, involving some 45,000 naval personnel, 170 ships, and 360 aircraft will emphasize allied naval operations in "harsh, cold environments in general," ("Teamwork" drops threat focus" 1992, p. 195). According to a SACLANT spokesman, the exercise "is not specifically threat oriented."

Recent articles on NATO exercises provide evidence of the political problems associated with capabilities-based planning when there is no ominous threat. Commenting on NATO's fall 1991 exercise in the January 30, 1992, Los Angeles Times ("We're Keeping Europe Safe from Ghosts," p. B7), Robert Borosage wrote:

Last fall, thousands of U.S. troops joined in annual NATO military exercises in Germany. The Germans would not allow them to use tanks; they didn't want their roads and farm lands torn up. Close air support was verboten; the Germans didn't want their windows broken or their children scared.

But troops have to do something, so the exercises went ahead anyway. The NATO forces practiced against forces coming from the South, not the East. Since Italy is south of Germany, reporters were naturally curious about the enemy's identity. The NATO spokesman replied, "It's a generic enemy. You could say they are from Generia." ... 

We [the United States] may wish to contribute to keeping peace in Europe. But this year, the President wants us to spend about $100 billion—almost one-third of our military budget—defending Europe against Generia.
question of a politically credible rationale for any particular level of NATO force requirements.

TOWARD A NEW NATO FORCE POSTURE

The emerging realities of Western European security have led to agreement on a new force posture for NATO. Three types of forces are envisioned: Reaction Forces (RF) and Main Defense Forces (MDF), both based on a multinational corps structure, and national Augmentation Forces (AF).

The RF will be available for contingencies (perhaps arising from instability in Eastern Europe or the Middle East) that may threaten NATO members' security on short warning. The RF will also play a role in the early phases of crisis management. The Immediate Reaction Force (IRF), consisting of today's AMF, will be available for deployment within 72 hours. The land portion of this force will be made up of brigade-sized units contributed by most of NATO's members. (The U.S. contributes a battalion and support.) There is also an analogous air component. Early deployment of these forces to assist a threatened member should serve as a demonstration of Allied unity and collective resolve. If conflict occurs, the IRF has a minimal combat capability.

Should the situation require it, a larger Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) will be ready to move anywhere in the ACE AOR in 5 to 7 days. The first element of the RRF to be established will be a corps-sized ground force. At some time in the future, an air component may be added. Like the AMF, the RRF will be controlled by SACEUR directly, and its planning will be coordinated by a staff at SHAPE, although a large portion of the corps will be stationed in the Central Region.

The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC) is to be commanded by a British officer with headquarters in Germany, possibly in Rheindahlen or Bielefeld (Miller, 1991). It will consist of one heavy UK division deployed in Germany and a second light division in the UK. Two additional multinational divisions will be made up of rapid reaction units earmarked by member governments. One division is expected to come from NATO's Southern Region. The United States will contribute some of the airlift necessary to give the force intratheater mobility. Consistent with the Base Force concept, the
United States may earmark combat units, such as the 82nd Airborne Division, from the CONUS-based Contingency Force.\(^3\)

The RRF should be sufficient for most foreseeable NATO contingencies other than a return of a Soviet-style threat to the Central Region or to Europe as a whole. Elements of the RRF would probably have a role to play in those scenarios as well. In peacetime, two German divisions will be stationed in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, under German national command (Schulte, 1991). Following a potential aggressor's major violation of the "matrix of treaties" established to ensure European security (such as CFE) the German national forces and command presumably would transfer to ACE, as part of AFCENT. At the same time, NATO forces would enter eastern Germany to bolster German defenses. In this scenario, the RRC might well be the first significant non-German NATO force deployed to the area.

The MDF will form the bulk of NATO's standing forces. Like the RF, the MDF will also be made up of multinational forces. National divisions will be formed into multinational corps. (The multinational corps concept is discussed below.) Given a week's preparation, MDF corps stationed in the Central Region will be ready to follow the RRC east. The MDF could consist of as many as six corps, after portions of Allied Forces, Northern Region (AFNORTH) are transferred to AFCENT (Schulte, 1991).\(^4\)

NATO intends to maintain the capacity to reconstitute the forces necessary for a theater-wide defense of Western Europe against Soviet attack. The prolonged warning period that NATO planners expect will precede any major threat to the Central Region gives the United States an opportunity to move reinforcements from CONUS to Europe and provides other NATO members with ample time to call up national reserves. This NATO AF will be drawn from national reserves constituted as national formations. Its most important ele-

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\(^3\)Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent (1992), the UK Chief of Defense Staff, suggests that forces assigned to the ACE RRC may eventually include two UK divisions: a multinational air-mobile division made up of Belgian, German, Dutch, and British units; a second multinational division with elements from Italy, Greece, and Turkey; an "unnamed U.S. division;" an Italian-Portuguese division; and smaller Spanish contributions under a cooperation agreement.

\(^4\)According to \textit{Jane's}, six multinational corps will be assigned to the MDF: One Dutch-led corps with one Dutch and two German divisions; one Belgian-led corps with one German and one U.S. brigade, and four Belgian brigades; an American corps consisting of one or two U.S. divisions, one German Division, and one brigade from Canada; two German corps with Dutch, British or American Divisions; and LANDJUT's combined Danish-German corps.
ment will be the CONUS-based heavy armor and tactical fighter units of the Atlantic Force package in the U.S. Base Force, but the AF will include the reserves of all NATO members. For example, 18 of the 1994 German Army's 28 brigades will be at half strength and assigned to AF roles (Schulte, 1991). NATO intends to keep its reconstitution capability viable by maintaining active planning, training, and exercise programs.

CHANGES TO THE CENTRAL REGION'S COMMAND STRUCTURE

The end of the Cold War has been accompanied by an expectation in NATO that the size, extent, and readiness of the integrated command structure can be reduced as Allied forces are drawn down. It is likely that some headquarters at the PSC level will be put in a cadre-like status. There will also be an overall reduction of headquarters personnel throughout ACE. However, only marginal alterations to the organizational structure of ACE appear likely. From the perspective of USEUCOM, the most significant modifications will occur in the Central Region.

AFNORTH has always been heavily dependent on reinforcements. Because many of the Soviet forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe are being redeployed to the Murmansk region, recent changes in the former Soviet Union seem unlikely to lead to any major reduction of requirements for NATO's standing forces in the North. However, ACCHAN, the smallest of the three MNCs, will be consolidated with ACE (under SACEUR's overall command), as part of AFNORTH. The channel region will be consolidated with Allied Forces, Baltic Approaches (AFCOMBALTAG) as an AFNORTH PSC. Allied Land Forces, Jutland (AFLANDJUT) will be transferred to the Central Region. CINCNORTH will continue to be a British officer (Rogers, 1991). United Kingdom, Air Forces Command (UKAIR), currently a NATO MSC in ACE, will also be disestablished, and the region will be consolidated into AFNORTH. AFNORTH may be redesignated AFNORTHWEST. Reductions in the readiness of some PSC headquarters in the region is also likely. These changes have little direct impact on USEUCOM.

The Southern Region is receiving greater attention than it ever did during the Cold War, especially in the wake of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. There are plans to create a Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), under SACEUR's direct command. This would give ACE a rapid reaction naval component and promote multinationality in the Southern Region. There have been
no calls for a major reorganization of AFSOUTH’s command structure.

Events since November 1989 have affected the Central Region in fundamental ways. As CINCENT Von Sandrart explained in his RUSI Journal article (1990), post–Cold War realities have rendered obsolete NATO’s existing plans for defense of the Central Region.

[The unification of Germany and the free elections in Czechoslovakia mean that the Central Region’s Eastern boundaries have lost their front line character—though we must recall the Soviet forward presence [in eastern Germany]. Therefore, the Layer Cake would no longer have been forward in Germany or, in the South, would have been aligned against a democratic state which is seeking friendly ties with the West. A retention of the Layer Cake in these conditions would not only have been militarily inefficient, but also would have sent the wrong political signals, thereby reducing NATO's credibility. (p. 54)]

No revision of NATO policy for defense of the Central Region has been agreed upon; neither have possible changes to the AFCENT’s command structure been openly discussed in great detail. But the need for both is well appreciated by NATO’s military leaders. Von Sandrart (1990) calls for “an operational concept beyond the Layer Cake,” which will take into account these new political realities and satisfy a demanding set of defense planning objectives:

[To retain the fully integrated, collective, multinational approach to the NATO force structure (to include all the Central Region nations’ armed forces, even at reduced levels); to offer a graduated system of military options for political use in crisis management; to provide the required minimum level of forces . . . to meet any military risk at the correct time and in the most cost-effective way; to have sufficient operational mobility and flexibility to meet possible commitments both within and outside our Region; and to assure that our military arrangements are politically and publicly acceptable and in accord with arms control treaties and environmental requirements. (p. 57)]

Three forces are at work to alter AFCENT’s command structure:

- German unification, which changes the nature of military operations to defend that ally;
- The concept of the Central Region as a central reserve for NATO, where specialized capabilities, the bulk of RRF, and possibly even MDF are held for Northern and Southern Flank contingencies;
- The organization of MDF in the region into multinational corps, creating a new level of headquarters in the ACE command structure.
Defending Unified Germany

Under the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany signed in Moscow in September 1990 (Final Settlement), no non-German forces may be deployed in the territory formerly controlled by the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Final Settlement is quite explicit in its prohibition of non-German forces on the territories of the former GDR: "Foreign armed forces . . . may not be stationed in that part of Germany or deployed there." As noted earlier, current German defense plans appear to call for the permanent stationing of a two-division German corps in eastern Germany. In peacetime, the force would remain under German national command.

Despite the treaty's strict prohibition, Allied forces would have to move into eastern Germany in the event of a renewed threat to the Federal Republic or risk the loss of that territory. The precise circumstances under which NATO members would regard the Final Settlement's prohibition to be invalid have yet to be agreed upon by NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC). Presumably, the DPC would authorize movement in response to some serious violation of the matrix of treaties limiting the military activities of the former Soviet Union or its successor states, but the subject may be too sensitive to address in the context of peacetime contingency planning. It is quite possible that this forward movement would have to be implemented on very short notice, and late in a crisis.

AFCENT planners must assume that non-German NATO forces would enter eastern Germany at some point. Presumably before the outbreak of hostilities, NATO forces would move from their bases in western Germany, cross the old inter-German border, and take up defensive positions in eastern Germany. The RRC would almost certainly be the first of these forces to move east, followed by multina-

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5Article 5, paragraph 3 of the treaty reads in full:

Following the completion of the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from the territory of the present German Democratic Republic and of Berlin, units of German armed forces assigned to military alliance structures in the same way as those in the rest of German territory may also be stationed in that part of Germany, but without nuclear weapon carriers. This does not apply to conventional weapon systems which may have other capabilities in addition to conventional ones but which in that part of Germany are equipped for a conventional role and designated only for such. Foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons or their carriers will not be stationed in that part of Germany or deployed there. (p. 57)
tional MDF corps as they became available. Should circumstances require, the AF’s national reserves would also be called up. Mobilization and deployment plans, such as the U.S. Army’s Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) and the U.S. Air Force’s CRESTED CAP, would be initiated. The complex process of reinforcement, reception, and onward movement in support of NATO’s General Defense Plan (GDP) would begin.

Today’s NORTHAG and CENTAG PSCs, the parallel allocation of AFCENT’s airspace to TWOAFAF and FOURAFAF, and the assignment of national forces to defend predesignated sectors in the layer cake along the old inter-German border are inappropriate to the defense of unified Germany. The operational requirements of the crisis scenario described above and sketched in Figure 4.1 suggest a regional command structure built along functional lines rather than geography.

The Final Settlement and General Von Sandrart’s comments about NATO’s relations with a democratic Czechoslovakia imply the need for a Federal Republic Border Command for eastern Germany and the border with Czechoslovakia, which would transfer to NATO and come under CINCENT’s command at some point in a crisis. The Border Force Commander (COMBORDER) might be given operational control over the RRC when it deploys east to establish a reinforced screening force. The readiness and forward movement of NATO’s multinational corps, and control of ground operations in the defensive battle, would be the responsibility of the Commander of the MDF (COMMDFD).

Figure 4.1—Defending Unified Germany
AFCENT's consolidated tactical air forces and the Central Region's air campaign would be directed by the COMAAFCE.

This functional arrangement would maintain a high degree of flexibility in operations and promote the efficient use of AFCENT's combat assets in the uncertain circumstances of Central European war scenarios. It would also meet political expectations that NATO's command structure can be streamlined in the region that has benefited most from the transformation of the Soviet military threat. NORTHAG, CENTAG and the two ATAFs—four PSCs—would be replaced by two, one for ground forces, one for air forces.6 (The German Border Command would not count in the NATO totals.) Finally, in theory, reorganization of AFCENT's command structure would allow those countries holding positions in the current structure to continue to hold NATO commands. A German would remain CINCENT. The UK would exchange COMNORTHAG for RRC Commander. The American COMCENTAG could become COMMDFS; the U.S. officer serving as COMAAFCE could remain in that position.

Under this functional organization, support might remain a national responsibility, rather than a NATO mission. Thus, AF movement could continue to be handled by the intricate process of bilateral civil-military cooperation. However, the existing complexities of national support might become completely unmanageable when national forces are no longer given predesignated sectors to defend or are no longer deployed forward near their wartime positions. If forces committed to AFCENT must deploy and fight as multinational formations in a fluid campaign emphasizing movement, a far greater degree of coordination will be required for successful logistics than was necessary in the past.

A more efficient approach might be to make support a task for the integrated command structure. In this case, an AF Commander (COMAF) managing an integrated support infrastructure could marshal national ground force reinforcements, coordinate their onward movement, synchronize transportation, direct logistics, and control AFCENT's rear area. (The option would be especially attractive if NATO were to achieve greater interoperability and standardization.) COMAF might also maintain in cadre status the headquarters neces-

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6Air Marshall Sir Andrew Wilson, Commander of TWOATAF and of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Germany, recently suggested that AFCENT will be reorganized along these lines. According to a report in Jane's Defense Weekly, he stated that NORTHAG and CENTAG will be merged to form Land Forces, Central Region (LANDCENT). TWOATAF and FOURATAF would be consolidated to form Air Forces, Central Region (AIRCENT). (Schulte, 1992)
sary to command NATO armies and air forces formed during reinforcement. This would reduce the span of control problem otherwise facing AFCENT’s single land force commander. Integrated support may be required for the successful defense of unified Germany.

**AFCENT as NATO’s Central Reserve**

The DPC Final Communique of December 7, 1990, stated that NATO’s “future force posture will be based on smaller, more mobile and flexible forces, able to respond to aggression from any quarter.” This position was underscored in the November 1991 Rome Declaration quoted above. In a recent discussion of NATO’s future force requirements, NATO MC Chairman General Vigleik Eide of Norway suggested that the Central Region might serve as a strategic reserve for ACE. NATO’s emerging force posture, he said, “should be so flexible that we could go not only from North America to the flanks but also from the center to the flanks if needed.”

In remarks to the SHAPE Officers Association on October 13, 1990, in Mons, Belgium, General Galvin expanded on this concept. NATO, he noted,

is going to use smaller units on the same geography, so there has got to be an element there of high mobility. And not only tactical mobility, but operational mobility, and even strategic mobility. Clearly, we might have to move units not just intra-region but inter-region. To maintain parity... NATO divisions will have to be highly mobile since they are scattered all the way from Norway to Turkey. (Galvin, 1990, p. 3)

[Having] the kind of mobility in which we might take a corps out of the Central Region and put it in the Southern Region, or vice versa is an enormous change from where we are right now. But... we are going to have a much smaller force... That will be a weakening factor—certainly not a strengthening one—unless we are able to move air, sea, and ground forces from one region to another. We must also be able to move them strategically as they come in as reinforcements. (Galvin, 1990, p. 6)

Although the planned reduction of Alliance forces is concentrated in the Central Region, the bulk of the Allies’ standing ground strength and their only standing multinational ground forces will remain in AFCENT. NATO’s IRF and RRF; specialized capabilities, such as AWACS and air defense; and support are also based there. Aside from the CONUS-based portion of the U.S. Atlantic Force package and CONUS-based Contingency Forces, AFCENT will be the central reserve for ACE in the event of a threat to the Northern or Southern Regions (see Figure 4.2).
Allied forces able to counter the kind of determined attack on Germany envisioned during the Cold War are doubly valuable (and perhaps more easily justified in political fora) if they can also be used to reinforce NATO's flanks. But for the Central Region forces to have a credible reinforcement capability, AFCENT must make support for intratheater mobility an important mission. An AFCENT command organized along functional lines could be a highly appropriate means of institutionalizing the concept of the Central Region as central reserve. COMAF could serve as the planner and coordinator for reinforcement of AFNORTH or AFSOUTH from AFCENT.

Multinational Corps

Over the next several years, NATO will be moving to a smaller presence in the Central Region based on multinational corps. Multinationality serves a mixture of military and political objectives. These were summarized by General Galvin in a talk to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London in February of 1991:

First of all, multinationality will assist us in maintaining sufficient forces as our overall manpower level falls. Second, multinationality means solidarity. It means a lot of flags in one place. And solidarity means deterrence. Third, we have all looked for standardization and multinationality helps do that for us. Fourth, multinationality is politically acceptable. It means that stationed forces will not be looked upon as occupation or merely national forces. They will be truly interna-
tional. Finally, multinationality will also help with burden sharing. It increases the interdependence among NATO nations that is so important to us. I don't think we want to see a renationalization of military forces. . . . It's important to budgets because we can do more with an integrated force. By combining our efforts we can build the same capabilities throughout NATO's multinational forces.

Multinational corps imply a new level of headquarters in AFCENT’s integrated command structure. The corps stationed in the Central Region today are national formations. Their national headquarters come under NATO command following decisions made in the home countries' capitals. Corps made up of divisions from several nations require a certain degree of multinationalization at headquarters. Some alternative arrangements for multinational corps headquarters are shown in Figure 4.3.

Under the “integrated” composition, multinational headquarters staffs would be made up of officers from the nations contributing units to the corps. This is the case in LANDJUT today, with its combined Danish-German staff and its alternating commander.

A second alternative is the “framework” or “leading nation” composition. According to General Galvin, “that means a nation would provide at least one division plus the corps headquarters and the major

Figure 4.3—Alternative Compositions of Corps Headquarters
corps support troops—that is the corps artillery, signal, cavalry, engineers, and logistics.” An example of this approach exists today in CENTAG. The U.S. 7th Corps provides two and Germany one of the three divisions of a corps-sized force responsible for defending a section of the inter-German border. Liaison officers from the German division are attached to the American corps headquarters.

A third approach to multinational headquarters is the “international” composition. Here, headquarters staff could potentially come from any member state regardless of its contribution of forces to a particular corps. The closest examples are the SHAPE staff in Mons and the International Military Staff (IMS) at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

The integrated staff may be instituted in instances where several of AFCENT's smaller participants must pool forces to form a corps. As in the case of German-Danish arrangements in LANDJUT, integration helps satisfy the smaller members' need to maintain some degree of sovereignty and control over their national forces. If LANDJUT is transferred to AFCENT, the German-Danish multinational corps will keep this arrangement. The Low Countries may also find this approach advantageous in the corps they join.

The international approach is not under serious consideration at the present time. International headquarters might become attractive and feasible if the units that make up the multinational corps become highly standardized. This is something senior NATO commanders seem to desire as a means of recapturing combat power lost by force reductions. A multinational force using the same weapons systems is likely to operate more efficiently than one where the forces of each nation are armed with different equipment. In the remarks quoted above, General Galvin implied a belief that multinationality will help NATO move in the direction of standardization.7

7In his RUSI Journal article CINCENT, Von Sandrart argued that progress along these lines is essential:

Interoperability and standardisation form a major subject area. While some useful progress has been made among our air forces, the situation in the land forces is still disappointing, throughout almost all areas. Unless we make major steps forward in this field, the concept of greater multinational integration, which is both militarily desirable and the study of which has been tasked by our politicians, will only remain a fashionable catchword. This aspect merits the strongest emphasis. We must . . . do better in this crucial field, especially in the general areas of C3I, logistics, training and major weapons systems, or at least their major components. Without success here, multinational forces will lead to inefficient use of manpower and additional costs and effort. (Sandrart, 1990, p. 58)
In the near term, the framework composition will predominate for the MDF. The RRC's headquarters will probably also adopt the framework model. Units of the AF would retain their national character, to include national corps headquarters.

A EUROPEAN DEFENSE IDENTITY: NATO AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

There is general agreement among those NATO members that are also signatories of the Brussels treaty that the Western European Union (WEU) is the most appropriate vehicle for both the much-discussed “European Pillar” of NATO and the development of a “European defense identity” (EDI).\(^8\) At the present time, the French, and to some extent the Germans, tend to emphasize the long-range prospects for an EDI. This approach is consistent with their proposals that the European Community include the goal of a common defense policy in the forthcoming treaty on political union and in a defense policy review in 1996. The implication is that the WEU would become a part of the European Community, where it eventually might supplant NATO.

The British, along with the Italians, on the other hand, focus more on the concept of a European pillar within NATO. They argue that the WEU could serve as a forum for Western Europe under the Washington treaty’s framework of “Atlantic” defense. In their view, this would foster a more equal balance of burden-sharing and leadership between Europe and America, while retaining the American guarantee of Western European security.

The WEU’s future remains uncertain, but it does not appear likely that it will replace NATO any time soon. Even the strongest advocates of an EDI recognize it would take many years to replace NATO's command arrangements or America's military contributions to European defense. But the urge among Western Europeans for a greater say in defense policies affecting their security is strong, and it seems that they will make greater use of the WEU to coordinate and express their common policies.

Debate continues in Western Europe about NATO's role in “out of area” operations. The November 1991 Rome Declaration noted that “Alliance security must take account of the global context” and recognized the existence of “risks of a wider nature, including proliferation

\(^8\)The WEU currently consists of France, Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain.
of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage, which can affect Alliance security interests.” The allies also reaffirmed “the importance of arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of our efforts including our response to such risks.” It remains to be seen precisely what these statements mean.

NATO’s European members have found it possible to consent to the defense of each other’s home territory, but most have proved unwilling to commit themselves to multilateral security arrangements beyond the Continent. Nevertheless, several European allies have found the NATO experience to be of great utility in recent “non-NATO” operations. The common experience of naval exercises held under NATO’s auspices eased the problem of coordinating the Persian Gulf naval patrols managed by the WEU during the Iran-Iraq War. The NATO experience also served well in the naval quarantine following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and during Operation Desert Storm.

If Western Europeans could agree to act together in future non-NATO operations, they would almost certainly use NATO’s doctrine, operational concepts, and procedures to coordinate their activities. There is presently some agreement within the WEU on the potential utility of a European Reaction Force (ERF) for non-NATO contingencies.

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9 Article 4 reads in full: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” The consultative provisions of Article 4 should be contrasted with the requirements of Article 5, the principal collective security provision: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

In this regard, it is also interesting to compare Article 5 with Article VI of the 1948 Brussels Treaty, as amended. WEU members have agreed: “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will . . . afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.”

10 The war with Iraq is instructive in this regard. For example, in its report on British military operations, Preliminary Lessons of ‘Operation Granby,’ the House of Commons Defense Committee found that “NATO practices and procedures enabled an ad hoc alliance of NATO national forces to fight together out-of-area as a coherent unit.” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 17, 1991, p. 261.

11 For example, in March 1991, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, stating that “Europe will not be complete without its security and defense dimension,” proposed a “European military capability which could in certain circumstances, operate independently” of NATO. Hurd opposed the WEU becoming part of the European
such a non-NATO European force did come to pass, there would be some overlap of dedicated national forces, and perhaps command arrangements, with NATO's RRF.\textsuperscript{12} Figure 4.4 displays a notional dual-hatting of commanders for the two forces and dual assignment of national units.

To the extent that the RRF is made up of European combat units, it is likely that its headquarters will be European as well. Assuming a leading-nation composition, British officers will predominate in the

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\caption{Potential Relationships Between NATO's RRF and WEU's ERF}
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Community, but favored formation of the independent capability under WEU auspices. See Palmer (1991, p. 12).

\textsuperscript{12}This seems to be the British position, as Chief of Defense Staff Field Marshall Vincent explained in his International Defense Review article on the ERC (Vincent, 1992, p. 31):

Essentially we see enhancements to European Defense arrangements being developed in alignment, not in competition, with NATO. It follows that we do not foresee separate forces being earmarked solely to a European Reaction Force, which would be a highly inefficient use of our limited military resources. Rather we envisage that our contribution to an ERF would be drawn as appropriate from those forces assigned to NATO for deployment in the NATO area. We accept then the need to develop such an ERF capability, under agreed command and collective planning arrangements, that is separable, but not separate from our NATO force structures, with the forces concerned being dual-assigned for both possibilities.
headquarters of NATO's RRC. A European RRF commander might be dual-hatted as ERF commander to coordinate WEU and NATO planning and avoid unnecessary confusion during operations. To minimize a duplication of effort, NATO's RRF headquarters might also serve as the ERF's, or an ERF planning cell might be attached to the RRF's staff.¹³

Whatever the extent of U.S. participation in NATO's RRF, American forces and support would not be a formal part of any ERF plans or operations. However, if the United States and the WEU were engaged in a non-NATO contingency, NATO rules and procedures would almost certainly be employed to coordinate their combined operations. In the near term, it is difficult to conceive of how the West Europeans could carry out a Desert Shield/Desert Storm-type of operation without American airlift, satellite intelligence, or specialized support.

French forces allocated to the ERF will not become formally involved in RRF plans or operations, but the ERF might be a way for NATO and the United States to engage France more closely in the area of rapid reaction and out-of-area operations without the need for France to participate in NATO's command structure. Rhetoric aside, France has cooperated with its NATO partners on matters essential to Western European security, however much it has avoided NATO's integrated command arrangements. As a signatory to the Washington (North Atlantic) and Brussels (West European Union) Treaties, France is obliged to come to the defense of her European allies. Throughout the Cold War, France deployed forces in Germany to make that promise credible. Few Western defense planners doubt that France would have fought alongside her allies in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe.

French-NATO and U.S.-WEU cooperation could conceivably involve prior contingency planning. For example, in the event of a renewed threat to unified Germany, French forces dedicated to the WEU's ERF might plan to move into eastern Germany alongside units of NATO's RRF under a common European commander. On the other hand, American forces earmarked for the RRF might be attached to components of the ERF, just as some U.S. units were placed under

¹³British Foreign Secretary Hurd has suggested consideration of just such an overlap. Addressing a Berlin press conference on December 10, 1990, he stated: "I believe, therefore, that there is scope for revitalising the Western European Union... It is worth studying and discussing the idea of a Rapid Reaction Force with a strong European Component available at short notice for any part of the NATO area, and elements of such a force could have a potential role, under the auspices of the WEU, outside of Europe." (Quoted in Chichester, 1991, p. 40)
French command during Desert Storm, even though the U.S. would necessarily dominate any major out-of-area operation.

Debate within the WEU over command arrangements and ties to NATO's reaction forces have slowed progress toward an ERF. And the ERF has become a part of the debate within the WEU over Western Europe's long-term security relationship with NATO and the United States. The establishment of a permanent cell for contingency planning under WEU auspices does appear to be possible. However, it does not now seem likely that an ERF will be formed in the near future.

ALTERNATIVE COMMAND STRUCTURES FOR ACE

In the near term, the command structure for ACE appears likely to undergo only marginal change. There is clearly a political requirement for a reduction of NATO headquarters and headquarters staff. Whatever new command structure is adopted, the integrated staffs of ACE will be reduced. SACEUR will remain an American, but the European allies are likely to take a somewhat greater role in their own defense. Within NATO, this will be reflected in the RRC, which will have a British commander and predominantly European forces. The NATO-WEU relationship will also evolve, but there will be no European military force outside of NATO.

The ACE command structure will accommodate the rapid reaction concept by creating new subordinate command elements under SACEUR's direct authority for the RRF and STANAVFORMED. After the consolidation of ACCHAN into AFNORTH, and the transfer of LANDJUT to AFCENT, no major changes are expected at the MSC level. Within each MSC, headquarters will be reduced in size, and some PSCs will be eliminated or placed in cadre status. In addition, the emphasis in Alliance policy on multinational forces will create a new echelon of command within NATO's integrated military structure at the corps level, although these multinational corps headquarters will not employ international staffs.

The most significant near-term alterations to the ACE command structure will occur in the Central Region. Expectations of a reduction in the number of NATO headquarters, the actual reduction of forces in the region, and the operational requirements of defending unified Germany will push AFCENT's command structure toward a "streamlining" along functional lines, as shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5—A Streamlined ACE Command Structure

Possible directions for the ACE command structure beyond the near term are displayed in Table 4.1. Of course, further streamlining of the present structure is possible. Three other alternatives also seem possible: a functional "rationalization" of the command structure, a (gradual) "Europeanization," and "nationalization"—a return to the structure NATO was moving toward immediately after the Washington Treaty was signed.

A streamlining of ACE could continue. This approach would emphasize the possibilities for further reductions to NATO's command structure and closer integration at the corps level. MSCs might be functionalized to the extent that some PSCs might be replaced with air and land commanders like those of AFCENT. However, the overall organization of ACE would remain predominately geographic, in that reinforcement, transportation and logistics would continue to be national responsibilities. Plans and operations in these areas would remain a matter of bilateral relations between host nations and those members supplying outside forces.

A further streamlining might see a consolidation of AFNORTH and AFCENT into a single MSC or an extension of the single-air-commander concept for the Central Region to all of ACE. Another streamlining option would be to consolidate NATO's Atlantic and European MNCs into a single command. Rationalization might also
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<th>Nationalized</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rationale for NATO</td>
<td>Stability, deterrence, defense against a range of threats</td>
<td>Stability, deterrence, defense against a range of threats</td>
<td>Stability, deterrence, defense against a range of threats</td>
<td>Insurance against a renewed Soviet threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. role</td>
<td>Alliance leadership</td>
<td>Alliance partnership with stronger European partner</td>
<td>Shifting leadership and burden to European Allies</td>
<td>Loose partnership with European Allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of organization</td>
<td>Geographic</td>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Coordinating groups for regional planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR an American?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No SACEUR, MSCs only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of corps</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
<td>Multinational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of European pillar</td>
<td>WEU to coordinate European non-NATO operations</td>
<td>WEU to manage European reaction force in non-NATO operations</td>
<td>Parallel European security organization for non-NATO operations</td>
<td>European defense identity responsible for European defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
be continued by further integration at the corps level. For example, the multinational corps headquarters could be organized as international staffs, just as the International Military Staff in Brussels and the MNC, MSC, and PSC staffs are today.

A second way in which rationalization might be extended would be to create a more "Atlantic" NATO force through standardization. Generals Galvin and Von Sandrart have argued that this would create a more effective combat capability and is necessary as Western forces are reduced. Member states might continue to equip the bulk of their forces as they choose but a (growing) proportion of units allocated to NATO could be equipped with the common weapons and support systems. In an interview appearing in the June 29, 1991, issue of Jane's Defense Weekly, General Galvin suggested another step in this direction, arguing that those national units in the multinational corps added to those of the nation making up the bulk of the corps "are going to have to learn the operational techniques of the corps to which they belong." It may not be too far a leap from this to development of a standard "Atlantic" doctrine for the multinational forces of the RRF and MDF.

Cutting back the existing structure involves the simplest response to NATO's shift from Cold War planning assumptions. Politically, it is probably the easiest option. As memories of the Soviet threat fade, NATO's force posture seems likely to decline and with it the integrated command structure. By avoiding concrete discussion on the requirements of reconstitution and mobility missions and sidestepping debate over potential out-of-area missions, NATO's peacetime unity will be maintained. But mere streamlining contains a real danger that high-minded statements about reconstitution, intratheater mobility, and consultation on "risks of a wider nature" will not be translated into meaningful command arrangements. Carried out in the absence of concrete measures to deal with new military threats, streamlining may only help NATO to become a hollow alliance. At some point, a streamlining of NATO's integrated command structure may become tantamount to a deinstitutionalization of the Alliance itself.

A second possibility is that the near-term emphasis in AFCENT on functional commands could be extended to a "rationalization" of the entire ACE structure. In this approach, reinforcement, transportation, and selected logistics would become a NATO responsibility. A first step toward a rationalized structure is shown in Figure 4.6. A COMAF, located in the Central Region, would become responsible for
Figure 4.6—A Rationalized NATO Command Structure

maintaining the capability to reinforce Germany in the event of a serious Soviet threat. As experience and proficiency were gained in this operation, COMAF's responsibilities might be expanded to support the concept of the Central Region as NATO's central reserve. Eventually, COMAF could become responsible for intratheater transportation, maintaining cadre staffs for the NATO armies of a reconstituted collective defense posture, and reinforcement planning.

Under rationalization, the geographic command structure would continue at the MSC level and probably the PSC level as well. The size of NATO's command staffs might continue to be reduced overall by maintaining the geographic headquarters in cadre status. Efforts to rationalize the Alliance in the face of change would indicate a view that credible military capabilities make NATO a stabilizing force in the European security equation.

An ERF under WEU auspices would be responsible for Western European operations outside the NATO context. NATO would continue to be the primary vehicle for the collective defense of Western Europe against direct attack. The ERF would become Western Europe's means of conducting collective operations out of area. Non-NATO operations might be undertaken in concert with U.S. forces or without American military assistance. In either case, the ERF would probably use procedures and practices developed in NATO.
For the purposes of this study, the long-run viability of either streamlining or rationalization presumes a continuation of an American as SACEUR and an American hold on critical command positions across NATO's integrated structure, however much smaller those ranks become. Both alternatives also suggest that, despite four decades of integration, Western Europeans will still consider U.S. leadership to be a necessary ingredient of their collective security and that Americans will continue to accept the responsibilities of leadership. They would seem to require that the WEU and ERF not develop into the principal defense establishment of a United Europe.

In the near term, the balance of authority in NATO will shift in the direction of a closer equilibrium between the United States and Western Europe, but no one expects the United States to withdraw from NATO, be expelled, or become a junior partner. However, it is by no means obvious that this balance will hold indefinitely. With the end of the Soviet Union, the military threat from the east could easily continue to decline—in reality and/or in the general perception. Europeans might gradually consider the U.S. defense commitment less important to their national interests than full political unity. They might come to see NATO, the vehicle by which the American commitment is expressed, as an obstacle to European unity. The Americans might find the defense of Europe to be less important to their national security than domestic renewal. Americans may tire of efforts to convince its allies that American leadership of NATO is crucial to the security of Western Europe, should such efforts become necessary.

But neither is it obvious that the near-term equilibrium cannot hold. Even the strongest supporters of European political union recognize the obstacles to a common defense policy and the risks of reducing reliance on American armed forces. Western Europe's current efforts toward monetary union and a single market by 1994 have revealed the political difficulties of giving up sovereignty. German reunification and the need to grant Eastern Europe some form of associate status in the European Community may slow the unification process further. For all its faults, NATO has allowed its members to pool their defense resources without ceding their ability to decide matters of war and peace. Reliance on U.S. military power and diplomacy has allowed Western Europe to defer this ultimate question of unity for decades. With so many other problems of political and economic unification still remaining, Europeans may be prepared to defer the matter of national security indefinitely, or at least for another decade.
At the moment, there are two broad alternatives to streamlining or rationalization, with their assumption that America will continue to lead NATO. The first is a “Europeanization” of the rationalized command structure; the second is a “Nationalization” of NATO—a return to the pre-1950 concept of organization. Both mean the end of an American SACEUR, but each has very different implications for the U.S. role in NATO and the role of NATO in European security.

In a Europeanized command structure, U.S. leadership would give way to the Europeans. This alternative assumes that Western Europeans would find NATO’s pooling of resources and its accommodation to national independence preferable to a single European defense policy. It also assumes that they would hope to maintain the Atlantic Alliance as something more than a piece of paper. But it also presumes that Western Europeans would insist on directing the peacetime planning and wartime operations of collective defense in Europe.

The process of change might start at the PSC level and work its way up to at least the ACE MNC, or it might be confined to the SACEUR position. Given a European desire to keep the United States in NATO and the predominance of the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic, the Atlantic and European MNCs could remain separate, and an American would retain the SACLANT position. The Europeanized ACE might then become the European Pillar of NATO, with ACLANT as its American counterpart.

Under this arrangement, a security organization parallel to NATO would serve as the European forum for all non-NATO military operations. These might include operations in Eastern Europe, where a NATO intervention might cause the Soviet successor states some concern. They might also involve operations in other regions under a coalition managed by an American commander using NATO procedures and protocols.

In the Nationalized structure, NATO’s integrated commands would be dissolved. (Figure 4.7 displays the consequences of nationalization for ACE.) The Alliance would return to the military arrangements it was beginning to adopt after the Washington Treaty was signed. SHAPE and the position of SACEUR would be eliminated. SACEUR’s responsibilities would be divided among the former MSCs, the Military Committee, and the MC Chairman. Regional planning would be handled at the MSC level. Overall force goals and reconsti-
tution and reinforcement plans would be coordinated in the DPC. In Europeanization, some would argue that the United States would be "marginalized" as a factor in European security; under nationalization, NATO itself would be marginalized and American's formerly continental influence diffused to the regional level.

In this case, NATO would essentially serve as a loose partnership between regional actors in Europe and the United States and a low-cost insurance policy against the return of a military threat of Cold War dimensions. A European Defense Organization, probably part of a more unified European Community, would take on the day-to-day business of collective defense once held by NATO. It would also manage any European out-of-area operation.

\[14\] In this scheme, the MNC status of ACLANT might be downgraded. SACLANT would become NATO's CINCLANT (not to be confused with USCINCLANT), an MSC.
5. FACTOR 4: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A UNIFIED COMMAND

The future of USEUCOM's command structure is strongly influenced by the U.S. defense establishment's preference to organize military operations along "unified" lines. A unified command calls for separate component commands for U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy forces in a region, managed by an independent commander directly responsible to the president (reporting through, but not to, the CJCS). Interservice competition, Alliance politics, and domestic pressures to achieve "economies" in command structure to protect force posture—especially in times of peace—make it difficult to achieve this ideal form. What has proven even more difficult over time is gaining true unity of effort, given service interests. USEUCOM's history is a prime example of how these factors have acted upon the structures of U.S. unified commands. The factors of historic interest are likely to continue to influence both the internal organization of USEUCOM and the unified commander's attempts to maintain unity of effort.

THE WARTIME EXPERIENCE

The concept of a unified command structure is the product of lessons first learned during World War II and proven in wartime experience since. Prior to that time, U.S. military campaigns generally did not involve lengthy, complex combined-arms operations. Moreover, when air forces first became an operational entity, they were at most an adjunct to warfare on sea and land. Consequently, the U.S. Navy was delegated responsibility to lead predominantly maritime operations; the Army was given that leadership role during ground wars. The Army and Navy were to cooperate in the coordination of their respective activities. With World War II, the Pearl Harbor debacle, and the first signs of what would become a separate Air Force and a larger and more autonomous Marine Corps, came a host of command interface problems. Unified command became the solution.

World War II involved several long campaigns fought on a global scale. Many technological and industrial innovations, too numerous to discuss here, occurred. From the organizational perspective, the most significant innovation may have been the modernization of air power and the emergence of the air force as a separate combat arm. Air power had an independent, "strategic" effect on campaigns and could spell the difference between victory and defeat on the battle-
field. It was the predominant combat element in engagements between fleets. But air power also erased what has been the more or less tidy distinction between land and sea on which previous American wartime organizations had relied. Land-based Army aircraft could destroy naval targets well outside the range of coastal artillery. Carrier-based Navy aircraft could support ground-force operations deep into enemy territory and outside the reach of naval bombardment. With war being fought across entire continents and oceans, land, air, and sea operations become inextricably intertwined. Some way to unify these combined arms operations was required.

In the European theater, the problems of combined operations planning were managed by a Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, and a "combined" staff of Allied officers at his headquarters, SHAPE. The arrangement was prompted by a need to coordinate the contributions of Allies in the war, but it also served as the primary mechanism for orchestrating a theater-wide combined arms campaign across Western Europe, from the amphibious invasions of Italy and Normandy to the fall of Berlin.

COMPELLING INFLUENCES

In the United States, the failure of Army-Navy cooperation, which contributed to the debacle at Pearl Harbor, and the wartime experience of Allied coordination paved the way for a gradual acceptance by the highest levels of the U.S. military of an echelon of command independent of the services to coordinate air, ground, and sea operations. This "unified" command structure, designed for war-fighting, now coexists with a Service command structure responsible for the peacetime development, training, administration, and support of Army, Air Force, and Navy units. Thus, air, ground, and sea component commanders are simultaneously responsible to their unified commanders for joint war planning and to their Air Force, Army, and Navy Service Chiefs as commanders in their service chain of command.

Since the first UCP, promulgated in 1947, U.S. global military command arrangements have undergone frequent change, and the command structure has been in a nearly constant process of adjustment. To a large extent, it is a history of efforts to fulfill the unified command concept. The initial UCP created so-called unified commands for the Far East, the Pacific (PACOM), Alaska, Europe (EUCOM), the Atlantic (LANTCOM), and the Caribbean, and specified commands for strategic air (SAC) and naval forces in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (USNELM). In 1951, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) was established as a specified command.
At this point, the newly created "unified" commands were made up primarily of forces drawn from a single service. The European Command, for example, consisted almost entirely of U.S. Army units. Naval missions in the European theater were CINCNELM's responsibility. Air missions were CINCUSAFE's. In 1951, when General Eisenhower was appointed the first SACEUR, he insisted on having all U.S. forces in Europe placed under his operational command. Such command authority was vested in General Eisenhower in a letter from President Truman. In 1952, at Eisenhower's urging, the JCS requested that SACEUR assume the position of U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (U.S. CINCEUR; the designation has since become USCEUR). General Eisenhower's replacement, GEN Matthew B. Ridgeway, assumed the dual-hatted post in 1952. He and his successors lobbied hard to bring all U.S. forces in Europe under their direct control. In 1952, U.S. air forces were brought under CINCEUR's operational command; in 1956, USAFE was reduced to a component command within USEUCOM. In 1963, USNELM was eliminated and its functions reallocated. The eastern Atlantic AOR was merged with LANTCOM. The Mediterranean AOR was made the responsibility of U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), a service component under CINCEUR's operational command. USEUCOM was now a unified command of U.S. forces in the European region in fact as well as name.¹

The unified command structure has evolved with and sometimes overlaps the command structure of regional alliances. During the Cold War, the U.S. was instrumental in creating a global network of collective security arrangements to contain the spread of Soviet influence. Each of these alliances was anchored on American military power and led by U.S. commanders. Many of these alliances no longer exist. Today, U.S. unified commanders are "dual-hatted" as combined commanders in NATO and the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). A subunified commander in USPACOM is quadruple-hatted, holding a subunified command in USPACOM and the U.S. Army, combined U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK), and U.N. commands in South Korea.

Interservice differences also influence the unified command structure. Just as the allocation of NATO command positions is influenced by politics within the alliance, with each member trying to maintain its

¹This brief history is based on Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Washington, GPO), 1985, pp. 275–290. General Eisenhower's role was described by GEN Andrew Goodpaster in communications with the author.
“fair share,” each unified command’s key general officer billets are allocated among the services according to arrangements that have evolved over time. For example, today the USCINCEUR position is considered an Army position. His deputy is from the Air Force.

Despite the trend toward real unification, a layering and overlap of component, unified, and combined commands have continued. The inevitable result is incompletely defined interfaces among the CJCS and the Joint Staff, the services, and the unified commanders. The UCP, the Unified Action Armed Forces document promulgated by the JCS, and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provide a framework of ground rules for the interaction of these groups, but current practice might best be described as a fragile bundle of compromises among sometimes-competing organizations.

In addition, Congress and, to some extent, the Secretary’s civilian OSD staff have tended to view command structure as a necessary evil or more often “fat” in the U.S. defense posture. Pressures are always present to reduce headquarters strength and general officer billets overall. The pressures become particularly strong in peacetime or when defense budgets must be reduced.

These factors have had an effect on the organization of individual unified commands. During much of the Cold War, commanders of unified commands dominated by a single service were often dual-hatted as a component commander. The dual-hatted CINC was served by a single “composite” staff. The historical experience of these consolidated commands has been mixed. It has performed peacetime administrative functions adequately but has not worked well in managing combined arms operations and has had particular problems with the management of Navy, Air Force, and Marine air operations. Such staffs worked reasonably well in World War II because the Air Force was not yet an independent service and because a single service dominated each theater of operations. The Pacific war was a maritime operation; the campaign in Europe was mostly a classic ground war. But by most accounts, the composite staff did not work well in either Vietnam or Korea, the major wars involving U.S. forces between 1945 and the end of the Cold War.²

²See, for example, Winnefeld and Johnson (1991).
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ORGANIZING A UNIFIED COMMAND

Under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the unified CINC has authority to prescribe the chain of command for forces under his operational command, organize subordinate commands, assign command functions to subordinate commanders, employ forces to carry out assigned missions, and coordinate peacetime administration. A considerable reservoir of doctrine and practice exists for the CINC to draw upon in his effort to organize his command. A range of organizational approaches are available to the CINC: service component commands, functional component commands, subordinate unified (subunified) commands, and joint task forces. CINCs may also choose to exercise direct operational command of specific forces. In deciding among these options, the CINC is guided by the principle of “unity of operations” and its requirements for integrated operations and unity of effort and by military doctrines for joint operations. He must consider the mission to be accomplished, the capabilities of the services and forces involved, the location and nature of operations, and the adversary's forces. Of course, most new CINC's must also deal with the arrangements in place when they assume command. While the UCP has changed over time, and the overall command structure has been in a constant state of adjustment to those changes, individual commands tend to have considerable longevity. USEUCOM, for example, has existed in some form since 1946.

Service component commands carry out service functions in the field, such as internal administration, training, intelligence, and logistics. It is from service component commands that the forces that carry out military operations are ultimately drawn. In wartime, service components may take on functional component responsibilities, and this has generally been the case. Component commanders are responsible for recommendations to the CINC on the proper employment of their forces. Normally, the component commander will be responsible for planning and coordinating operations within his functional area based on force apportionments and military objectives handed down from the CINC. The CINC may also choose to plan operations and direct execution at the unified headquarters, drawing on the component commander for advice in the planning phase and delegating operational control over the component's forces to the component commander during operations. USEUCOM has been organized in this way to deal with the Soviet threat of the Cold War, although in such a war,
U.S. forces would fight under NATO's ACE command structure. Component commanders are selected with the concurrence of the CINC.

Subunified commands are unified commands reporting to the CINC, with responsibilities for unified operations in some distinct region of the CINC's larger AOR. The overall philosophy of the subunified organization remains one of unified command. Subunified commanders are delegated the CINC's authority in their regions and exercise operational command through a set of options like those available to the CINC of a unified command. USPACOM, with its far flung AOR, its politically and geographically distinct regions, and its role in several separate alliance arrangements, is to some extent organized along these lines. In a UCP consistent with the Base Force packages, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and the present USLANTCOM would become subunified commands under the operational command of the Atlantic Force Super-CINC. Subunified commanders are selected with the CINC's concurrence.

The JTF is generally an approach used to organize operations of limited duration or to achieve a limited objective that requires a close integration of effort but not the centralized control of logistics. In such cases, the JTF commander is granted operational control of subordinate forces to accomplish the assigned operational mission. The JTF is dissolved when its mission is accomplished. Like the component commander, the JTF commander is responsible for recommendations on the employment of forces under his control. Like the subunified commander, he may be directly responsible for the forces of more than one service. But the JTF commander's discretion during operations is limited by the guidelines established in plans approved by the CINC or by the subunified commander he reports to. The JTF has been the organizational method of choice in recent limited contingencies in the Caribbean, North Africa, and the Middle East. It is the approach USEUCOM has taken in the several operations associated with the recent war in Iraq. JTF commanders are generally selected by the CINC.

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3This provides one explanation for the dual-hatting of U.S. component commanders as NATO commanders. Under NATO command arrangements for the Cold War, during hostilities, CINCUSAREUR would carry out his functional role as COMCENHAG, managing the ground war in Southern Germany (where most U.S. ground forces have been deployed), while CINCUSAFE would assume his role as the Central Region's functional air commander, COMAACPCE. CINCUSNAVEUR would become the Southern Region's NATO Commander, which is not a functional role, but the region's defense is arguably a matter centered on the coordination of maritime power.
Dual-hatting of a component commander as unified commander and the consolidation of component and unified headquarters staffs is rarely a preferred approach to the organization of a unified command. But there are circumstances where the approach may become necessary and acceptable. The first situation is when available headquarters resources are insufficient to support a separate unified staff. The problems of consolidation are preferable to those of two completely overtaxed staffs. The second is when the consolidated headquarters encompasses a single component whose mission and size clearly dominates the command. In this instance, the need to balance components is less compelling. Consolidation may be acceptable if it does not unduly interfere with the consolidated staff’s ongoing relations with host nations and subordinates on matters of concern to the unified and component organizations. For example, consolidation may not harm important ties where the geography of the unified and consolidated component commands’ day-to-day working relationships roughly coincide. Finally, consolidation may be acceptable where it has a minimal impact on peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions, perhaps because the plausible military threats to the region in question are quite limited.

THE FUTURE OF UNIFIED COMMAND AT USEUCOM

With the overall reductions of U.S. military manpower will come a decline in general officer billets, particularly at the three- and four-star levels. This will be accompanied by, and perhaps accelerate, a decline in headquarters staff. It is not apparent now precisely how these cuts will affect USEUCOM. General officer reductions may be allocated proportionately across the unified and specified commands, in proportion to their force reductions in the Base Force, or each individual command’s organization might be subjected to detailed review. In the first case, USEUCOM would receive roughly a 25-percent cut; in the second case, 50 percent. If a more detailed review is done, the dual-hatting of USEUCOM commanders as NATO commanders, and the importance of NATO to U.S. foreign and defense policy, might mean USEUCOM will take less of a cut. Alternatively, general officer positions could be reduced overall and reallocated in the context of more sweeping changes to the UCP. The creation of an Atlantic Force Command and Super-CINC would be accompanied by change in the new subunified commands’ AORs and organizations. In this scenario, the new USEUCOM could end up with considerably fewer general officers.
In the near term, some combination of the first and third alternatives seems most likely. USEUCOM will have fewer general officers, roughly in proportion to the cuts overall, but may be cut somewhat less than other commands to maintain rank in the NATO command structure.\textsuperscript{4} Headquarters staff are more likely to be reduced in proportion with Base Force allocations.

Between today and 1995, however, USEUCOM seems unlikely to move away from the present form of internal organization. For example, it probably will not become the subunified command of an Atlantic Force Command during this period. Despite reductions in manpower, all three Service component commands will remain in Europe. There has been no discussion of dual-hatting USCINCUEUR as a component commander or of consolidating the unified headquarters with that of a component command. The practice of forming JTFs to deal with contingencies less than an invasion of Europe will be continued. In this regard, there may be some predesignation of JTF commanders and the formation of “on call” command cells at USEUCOM headquarters as part of an effort to pay more attention to contingencies beyond the Cold War threat.

In the longer term, the shape of USEUCOM’s internal command arrangements are less apparent. The existing alternative means of organizing a unified command are not likely to change. After 1995, USEUCOM’s internal command arrangements could evolve in several directions. As discussed earlier, USEUCOM may become a subunified command under an Atlantic Force Super-CINC, but this is of limited importance to the internal organization of USEUCOM, because the range of alternative approaches for organizing a subunified command differ little from those of the unified command.

Should U.S. forces in Europe not fall below the 150,000 level anticipated in the near term, it is likely that the existing command arrangements will remain unchanged, although the use of JTFs will probably expand, and some may be grafted onto the existing structure to meet the requirements of the lesser contingencies U.S. national strategy now contemplates in the Middle East. But should the U.S. presence in Europe fall below Base Force levels for reasons of U.S. or Alliance politics, pressures to change the basic nature of USEUCOM’s

\textsuperscript{4}At USEUCOM’s request, this study does not examine the specific implications of general officer reductions for such issues as the level of component command positions in USEUCOM.
unified command structure will mount. At some level of reduction, a consolidation of the existing command structure would be unavoidable.
6. THE BASELINE USEUCOM COMMAND STRUCTURE

In the near term, USEUCOM's command structure will be shaped by a U.S. military presence in Europe of approximately 150,000 personnel, the current UCP, a streamlined NATO command structure, and retention of the current internal organization, consisting of separate unified and component commands. This Baseline case is described in detail below and shown in Figures 6.1 through 6.3.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN UNIFIED AND COMPONENT COMMANDS

In the near term, given a troop strength of 150,000, it seems unlikely that the current arrangement of separate unified and component commanders and headquarters staffs will change (see Figure 6.1). As

![Diagram of Baseline USEUCOM Command Structure]

Figure 6.1—Baseline Case: Unified and NATO Command Relationships

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long as SACEUR remains an American, and USCINCEUR is double-hatted as SACEUR, the unified commander is unlikely to be given direct responsibility for a component command. However, command functions will probably be consolidated at echelons below the component commander. (A representative approach is described below.) It is also possible that some service component commanders will be downgraded in rank, as the force sizes of individual components decline.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN UNIFIED AND NATO COMMANDS

The practice of dual-hatting USEUCOM component commanders as NATO MNCs, MSCs, and PSCs is not likely to be abandoned in the near term (see Figure 6.1). With the reductions to Base Force manpower levels will come a decline in the number of U.S. general officers, so the predisposition toward dual-hatting will probably increase. This tendency is bound to be reinforced to the extent that American policymakers believe that dual-hatting provides the United States with influence in NATO.

There is also every indication that, in the near term, NATO's European members expect Americans to hold leadership roles throughout the integrated command structure. This is certainly the case with SACEUR and CINCSOUTH, positions unlikely to be affected in the near term by changes to NATO's command arrangements.

The fates of CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE as NATO commanders are slightly more problematic. Today's command arrangements in the Central Region were developed in response to the Soviet threat to West Germany during the Cold War. Until AFCENT's command arrangements are changed, CINCUSAREUR will remain COMCENTAG, and CINCUSAFE will remain COMAFCOE; both NATO positions are PSCs reporting to CINCENT. However, if AFCENT were to be reorganized along functional lines to accommodate the defense of unified Germany and the expected reductions to the number and manpower levels of NATO headquarters, the United States would still be in a strong position to claim PSC positions for CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE.

CINCUSAREUR could serve as COMMDF. The Germans will undoubtedly retain the CINCENT position; the only other potential rival is the British, who will probably give up COMNORTHAG to command the RRC. An American can fairly claim the critical role as MDF
commander, because, after the Germans, the United States will have the largest ground force presence in Germany in peace or war.

In an AFCENT reorganized along functional lines, CINCUSAFE could continue to hold the PSC position for air on the basis of two arguments. First, under virtually any scenario of war in Central Europe involving NATO and successors to the Soviet Union, the role of U.S. air power will be a deciding factor. Despite the considerable drawdown of its assets in Central Europe to achieve Base Force levels, the United States will maintain NATO's largest air force (although not the largest deployed in NATO Europe). American aircraft, unlike U.S. ground forces, can begin to return to Europe from bases in CONUS literally within hours. Second, the U.S. Air Force is uniquely positioned in Europe to support the idea of AFCENT as a reserve for the flanks insofar as air assets are concerned. Even at Base Force levels, the United States will retain air bases in the Southern and Central Regions and in the UK. The U.S. Air Force has a long history of European-wide air operations.

CONSOLIDATION OF HEADQUARTERS FUNCTIONS

This analysis assumes that, by 1995, all U.S. headquarters staffs, including USCENTUR, will be at approximately one-half their 1990 levels. This includes military, civilian, and foreign-hire personnel assigned to staff support duties. These cuts do not require a consolidation of unified and component command headquarters, but some consolidation can be expected within the components. This study does not examine in detail the options that might be considered. (The figures do not display intermediate echelons of command for the components.)

1 For the purposes of examining the USEUCOM command structure's ability to transition from peace-to-crisis-to-war in Section 7 of this study, we assume the following streamlining of headquarters in the U.S. component commands:

• For USAFE: One numbered Air Force separate from, but possibly colocated with, CINCUSAFE in Ramstein.

1This study does not specifically address options to alter the command structure within component commands below the level of component headquarters. A "strawman" consolidation of component headquarters functions is described solely for the purpose of examining peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions.

2These assumptions are not recommendations. Rather, they are intended to provide one reasonable basis for an analysis of USEUCOM's unified command structure. The reader is invited to make alternative streamlining assumptions while following the analytic structure offered in this Report.
• **For USAREUR:** A consolidation of the 7th Army with CINCUS-AREUR headquarters, and the in-place corps command. The commander of the U.S. Army corps remaining in Germany would command one of NATO's multinational corps in the MDF. One U.S. division is attached to a German-led U.S.-German multinational corps. Considerable streamlining of the U.S. Army support structure would have taken place—resulting in a great reliance on reserves for combat service support.

• **For USNAVEUR:** Termination of the CINCNAVEUR headquarters in London, with the staff moved to Naples. Elimination of the Commanders of Naval Activities in the UK (COMNAVACTSUK) and Mediterranean (COMNAVACTSMED) headquarters, with their functions assumed by CINCUSNAVEUR. The Commander, Fleet Air in the Mediterranean (COMFAIRMED), double-hatted as Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station (CO, NAS) Sigonella, reports to COMSIXFLT.³

**USEUCOM—MULTINATIONAL CORPS RELATIONSHIPS**

In this Baseline case, the U.S. corps commander would be dual-hatted as one of NATO's multinational corps commanders in the MDF. From the perspective of the U.S. Army service component command, elements of three divisions would be supported by one U.S. corps. In accordance with the "leading nation/framework" approach to the composition of multinational headquarters, the headquarters of the U.S. corps would simultaneously serve as the multinational corps headquarters. In its NATO capacity, the headquarters would contain liaison officers from a German division attached to the corps (see Figure 6.2). One division from the U.S. corps would be attached to a German-led multinational corps, also organized along leading nation principles. Although the U.S. division would come under German command in crisis and war, the U.S. corps would be responsible for the division's peacetime housekeeping.

³Consolidation of CINCUSNAVEUR and COMSIXTHFLT is less practicable because of the former's range of NATO duties ashore and the latter's national duties afloat. COMSIXTHFLT's NATO duties as Commander, Strike Force South, while important, are discharged mainly in exercises and liaison visits.
USEUCOM ORGANIZATION FOR REINFORCEMENT AND CONTINGENCIES

The "Forward Presence" force posture of some 150,000 men assumed for this Baseline command structure is optimized to deter, and if necessary defend against, a substantial combined arms threat to Central Europe. It is also designed to reassure America's European allies that reductions to Base Force troop levels will not leave the United States shorn of either a formidable combat capability in Europe or the ability to make good on its promise to reinforce Europe in an extreme crisis. But reductions from the 1990 level of over 300,000 troops cannot be accomplished without sacrificing some capabilities the United States previously had in Europe or might wish to develop if resources were less constrained.

Two command structure problems follow from these constraints (see Figure 6.3). First, should the United States be required to reinforce Europe (formerly in accordance with USEUCOM Operations Plan
4102), new headquarters would have to be grafted onto the command structure already in place. At Base Force levels, sufficient manpower does not exist to maintain more than the barest of cadre staffs for major additional combat formations. Depending on the scenario, considerable demands would be placed on the echelon immediately below the component headquarters to support the force expansion. In some scenarios, component and unified headquarters would also have to grow, perhaps rapidly, and perhaps by 50 percent or more. At the 165,000 level preferred by USEUCOM for the “Forward Presence” force posture option when this study was under way in the spring and summer of 1991, critical support functions, such as intelligence, medicine, and communications, would have been protected from reductions. At the 150,000 level proposed by the Pentagon, these support functions would have to be augmented for war, placing additional demands on command staffs. In either case, the capability of USEUCOM to support NATO's reconstitution mission with U.S. augmentation forces will depend strongly on USEUCOM's capacity to quickly and effectively expand its command staffs.
Second, the U.S. forces to be deployed in Europe are designed for the high-intensity, heavy-combat operations that would have typified a war with the Soviet Union. They will not be optimized to deal with "lesser" contingencies involving peacekeeping or disaster relief. Although some such capability will be inherent in the force permanently deployed to Europe, the bulk of units appropriate to these lesser operations will reside in CONUS as the Contingency Force. Should U.S. forces become engaged in "off-design" operations under NATO's auspices, they would perform according to plans and respond to directives from NATO commanders at some level of the ACE command structure, placing relatively low demands on the U.S. command structure. Where U.S. forces become involved in lesser contingencies inside the USEUCOM AOR but outside the NATO framework, they will operate under the command of predesignated JTF commanders reporting directly to DCINCEUR, following contingency plans developed under USEUCOM's guidance and coordination, and approved by USCINCEUR.

USEUCOM AND THE EUROPEAN PILLAR

In the near term, the WEU is the only organization remotely able to serve as NATO's European Pillar. Ties between NATO's RRF and a WEU ERF might involve USEUCOM, insofar as U.S. forces were allocated to the RRC or, more important, to the extent U.S. transportation and support capabilities were critical to the RRF's mobility. Although its members are groping for a way to make the concept of a pillar less rhetorical and more concrete, the WEU is unlikely to agree on an ERF soon. As a consequence, there will be no overlap of WEU and ACE rapid reaction forces or command structures in the next several years. Thus, USEUCOM will have no command relationships—indirect or otherwise—with the WEU (see Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4—Baseline Case: USEUCOM's Relationship to the WEU
7. ASSESSING THE BASELINE CASE

DEFINING CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING USEUCOM’S COMMAND STRUCTURE

The U.S. deploys military forces overseas to further its own national interests. The United States learned in two devastating wars that it could not afford to be isolated from European politics or removed from the regional military balance. Substantial American forces have been deployed to Europe since the end of World War II to deter Soviet aggression, protect vital American interests, harness German power to the cause of western democracy, and promote an international economic system based on free trade.¹

During the Cold War era, the U.S. military presence in Europe promoted these political and military objectives in some obvious respects and in some ways that were more subtle. At the same time, political and military circumstances in Europe and America set a context of constraints and opportunities within which American policy could operate. Criteria can be developed to assess the adequacy of the U.S. military presence in Europe by looking to these objectives and circumstances. Drawing on historical experience, an assessment of near-term American and European political and military conditions, and longer term possibilities, this study focuses on the criteria as they apply to potential future U.S. command structures for the region. The criteria selected for this study are designated “military,” “political,” and “hedging.” A top-level representation of these criteria is displayed in Table 7.1.

MILITARY CRITERIA

It is readily apparent that the pervasive presence of American military power in Europe promoted collective defense on a continental scale. The 1948 Treaty of Brussels joined only a few of the Western European nations in a common defense.² The 1949 Washington Treaty joined the Brussels powers with the United States and

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¹For a discussion of U.S. security objectives and strategy in Europe during the Cold War and beyond see Millot (1991).
²France, Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Italy and Germany joined in 1954, Portugal and Spain in 1986.
Table 7.1
Criteria for Assessing Alternative USEUCOM Command Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>NATO Europe</th>
<th>U.S. National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Compatibility with NATO interface</td>
<td>Support for non-NATO operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contribution to peacetime unity and effectiveness</td>
<td>Consistency with domestic realities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging</td>
<td>Compatibility with a range of alternative ACE command structures</td>
<td>Compatibility with a range of alternative U.S. force postures in Europe, UCPs, and unified command organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canada. The difference between the two treaties was America and U.S. military power. NATO ultimately joined the defensive capacities of 14 European powers and Canada with those of the United States. With the deployment of American military power, NATO quickly superseded the WEU as a forum for Western European defense planning, and NATO has remained paramount up to the present.

The formation of NATO, in turn, allowed the United States to plan its own defense against Soviet attack far forward of North America. The forward deployment of American forces in Europe has also given Washington the ability to respond to threats from other quarters in regions far removed from bases in the U.S. Thus, one set of criteria for assessing USEUCOM command structures is essentially military.

Collective Defense: Compatibility with the NATO Interface

A key aspect of any assessment of the military adequacy of the USEUCOM command structure concerns the extent to which it promotes the effective command of U.S. forces in Europe as part of NATO's collective defense. In the past 45 years, this first criterion has focused exclusively on a war with a Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union. Would the command structure promote a timely recognition of an oncoming Soviet attack? Would it ensure the rapid reinforcement of Europe by U.S. forces? Could it support the American contribution to a continental defense of Europe? Was it capable of supporting an American nuclear response? These were the issues defense planners considered throughout the Cold War.

Assuming a continuation of currently favorable military trends in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the Cold War questions seem likely to yield to a more diverse set of concerns. Questions
about the capacity of the command structure to promote a timely recognition of a threat to Europe from the territories of the former Soviet Union will remain, along with an interest in reinforcement. Presumably, NATO's statements about reconstitution will be backed with serious planning and exercises until such time as the former Soviet Union can safely be considered a true security partner.

But in the aftermath of the failed Moscow coup of August 1991, and as the former Soviet armed forces shrink and fractionate, it seems inevitable that Alliance planners will be less and less worried about the threat of a determined assault on NATO's members from the east. NATO's concern seems bound to shift from the Cold War scenario of a massive theater-wide attack to smaller wars born of instability in Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Middle East. Coping with this uncertainty, with its potential for crisis and conflict, seems likely to become NATO's near-term security problem. So, to the revised list of questions about the USEUCOM command structure's capacity to support a collective response to the emergence of a Soviet-style threat must be added some that focus on these lesser contingencies. Does the command structure facilitate NATO's rapid reaction mission? Can it promote strategic flexibility and mobility in the European theater? Considering the new and wide range of potentially threatening situations, the ability of the USEUCOM command structure to promote the effective command of U.S. forces in Europe as part of NATO's collective defense may become a more demanding criterion than in the past.

**Unilateral Action: Support for Non-NATO Operations**

The second military criterion involves the U.S. capacity to act independent of NATO. Does the USEUCOM command structure promote the effective command of U.S. forces in unilateral or other operations initiated without DPC approval? Is the U.S. command structure sufficiently separated from NATO's to permit a minimum of disruption to either chain of command? European allies have become sensitive to the use of U.S. facilities in their countries as bases for non-NATO military operations. Is the USEUCOM command structure sufficiently separated from NATO that an outsider could determine whether USEUCOM forces were directed by the U.S. chain of command and not through NATO? How vulnerable is the command structure to the decision of an ally to deny the United States the use of USEUCOM headquarters stationed in its country to carry out or support U.S. military operations elsewhere?
Given reductions to America's global military posture, any given U.S. unified command may be called upon to control a diverse set of U.S. forces not normally stationed within its AOR in response to a fast-breaking crisis. In the case of USEUCOM, reinforcements from CONUS or even from another command will be required to counter all but the most minor regional contingencies. A crisis or war in an adjacent CINC's AOR will nevertheless draw heavily on USEUCOM's resources, even as the command must continue to be prepared for its own regional flare-ups. Do USEUCOM command arrangements promote cooperation and mutual support between USCINCEUR and the adjacent U.S. unified commands? These aspects of command are likely to become complex in the post–Cold War era, as the U.S. is required to employ its leaner Base Force to maximum efficiency.

POLITICAL CRITERIA

Contribution to NATO's Peacetime Unity and Effectiveness

A second set of criteria for evaluating the USEUCOM command structure is essentially political. As with the military criteria discussed above, a distinction should be drawn between the NATO and national political arenas. The first political criterion involves NATO. Although the day-to-day business of the USEUCOM command structure involves military matters, the interactions between U.S. officers and their European counterparts are part of the larger fabric of American foreign policy. In NATO's highest military councils, by participation in the integrated command structure, and through working relationships with host nations' civil and military officials, USEUCOM's command structure is an instrument of representation supporting American interests in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, the military commitment to Europe was an important factor in the U.S. relationship with Europe, helping to maintain European cooperation on a broad array of political and economic matters of importance to Washington. The contacts and associations that flow from American leadership of ACE have been a concrete aspect of the leverage in European politics that the U.S. has gained by its critical role in Continental defense.

The nature of these affiliations and the leverage they have given American leaders in their relations with Europe have become more complex over time. American and, more important, European leaders always realized that the U.S. military presence in Europe produced benefits of great value to America. Europe may have been utterly dependent on the United States in the 1950s and even much of the
1960s but the balance of influence has since changed. During the 1970s and 1980s, American leaders expended a considerable amount of effort to convince the NATO Allies of the credibility and, at times, even the relevance of the American commitment to Western European security concerns. To maintain its leadership role and preserve its overall influence in Europe, the United States has had to make the peacetime solidarity of the Alliance an important objective of American foreign policy. This has meant that the United States has been compelled to accommodate its own preferences on NATO matters to the Allies' particular security and foreign policy interests to some degree. It has also required the United States to see that its personnel in Europe behave as good “citizens” of their locality, responding to local employment, health, and environmental concerns and attempting to fit into the local culture. Consequently, the USEUCOM command structure must not offend Western European expectations of America's proper role in NATO and Europe. At the local level, the command structure should present a profile that satisfies the public expectations of cities, towns, and regions hosting American command facilities.

Today, then, the political criterion as applied to NATO is the extent to which the USEUCOM command structure promotes Alliance unity and solidarity with the United States. Does the USEUCOM command structure meet our allies' expectations about the U.S. role in NATO's command structure and NATO as a whole? Does it coincide with their conceptions of Europe's role? Is it consistent with host nations' views of the U.S. military presence in their countries? Does it fit with their expectations that the Allies' overall military presence in Europe should shrink as memories of the Soviet threat disappear?

**Domestic Political Realities**

It is hardly news to those involved in NATO affairs that America's Cold War consensus—supporting a substantial military presence in Europe—has steadily eroded. This is not to say that support has been lost, but that it is more difficult to obtain and that it permits less ambitious plans than were possible during the Cold War. At least since the defeat of the Mansfield Amendment in 1971 and then the passage of the Nunn Amendment (placing a cap of roughly 300,000 on U.S. military personnel in Europe), proposals to reduce U.S. deployments in Europe have been closely scrutinized and sharply debated in the Congress. Command structure, along with support, has been a particular target of proposed reductions, not only because such cuts are consistent with a general reduction in forces, but also because com-
mand structure is frequently the target of those who consider non-combat units to be excess "fat" in the defense establishment. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the expectation of a "peace dividend," and the widely held perception of severe domestic problems, the pressures to radically reduce USEUCOM will almost certainly grow.

To some extent, this desire for a reduced American presence in Europe, expressed by members of Congress and many candidates for the 1992 presidential elections, has been answered by the Bush Administration's Base Force, which will reduce command structure, as well as force structure and support. But Base Force reductions give rise to a new set of domestic political requirements. First, proposed reductions to the U.S. military posture in Europe must prove satisfactory to Congress, in the sense that these cuts are commensurate with the demise of the Cold War threat. There are those who favor reductions well beyond those scheduled. The Administration's proposals are seen by this group as a starting point for negotiations leading ultimately to an even lower figure.

At some level, cuts to the U.S. military presence in Europe are likely to cause the loss of American leadership positions in NATO. A strong reductionist sentiment in the United States can only prompt Europeans to doubt America's commitment to their defense at the very time when a demise of immediate threats and the process of European economic integration combine to make "European" defense options seem attractive and viable. This is in no way disturbing to many who favor U.S. reductions. Indeed, they would argue that the goal of U.S. reductions is precisely that end—to make Europe responsible for its own defense.

The end of American leadership of NATO's military structure is highly disturbing to others, however. Most in this group are concerned that America would lose the influence in Europe that made expenditures for European defense worthwhile. They believe that the United States must maintain both the positions of leadership in NATO and a military role in collective defense that gives real meaning to that leadership. This leads to a second requirement: The American presence in Europe must be sufficient to maintain U.S. leadership in the Alliance. Should the United States fail to maintain that position, this group's support for the U.S. military contribution to NATO is likely to wane. Ironically, at some level, those who are generally pushing for reductions are likely to be joined by those who would otherwise oppose them.
A final domestic political requirement is that United States military in Europe retain the capacity for independent action. This is a sentiment held by members of both groups above, although the former would probably emphasize the desire not to be dragged into military adventures by our allies, while the latter is concerned more with the ability of the United States to unilaterally employ the forces deployed in Europe. Both sentiments point in the direction of a U.S. national command structure in Europe which is distinct and separate from NATO's integrated command arrangements.

Domestic political criteria are simple to state in the abstract but difficult to determine concretely or with any great precision. It is likely that battles over the size of the U.S. presence in Europe will be fought in every defense budget between now and 1995 (and beyond). The USEUCOM command structure must accommodate domestic desires for a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe, including its command structure. But it must also satisfy a somewhat contradictory imperative that American officers retain critical NATO missions and key positions in NATO's integrated command structure. It must also maintain U.S. independence from NATO.

HEDGING CRITERIA

The Baseline case described in Section 6 reflects a "best assessment" of current affairs as they relate to the likely near-term future of the major factors influencing USEUCOM's command structure. Given the dynamism of the international and domestic political environments, this Report suggests that analysts should have little confidence in any projections beyond 1995, they should not be highly confident that their current appreciation of near-term conditions will remain unaffected by events or trends that emerge in the next few years. Therefore, it is prudent to examine the ability of the Baseline command structure to accommodate change in any one of the factors shaping its future. That is, the Baseline should be examined for its capacity to adjust to a U.S. military presence in Europe as low as 40,000 troops and to a range of UCPs, its ability to interface with several different Allied command arrangements, and its compatibility with alternative means of organizing within a unified command. To the extent possible, the future USEUCOM command structure should be sufficiently robust to deal with a wide range of potential changes to these factors.
ASSESSMENT APPROACH

The assessment approach is outlined in Table 7.2. First, the Baseline case will be assessed against a detailed list of political and military criteria derived from the discussion above. To apply the hedging criteria, the Baseline case will be modified by responding, in turn, to more radical changes in the status of each major factor that shapes USEUCOM's future command structure. Each revised command structure will then be reexamined against the political and military criteria.

MILITARY CRITERIA: COMPATIBILITY WITH NATO INTERFACE

As outlined in Table 7.3, the Baseline command structure is, on the whole, compatible with U.S. obligations to NATO. The independent unified command enables the U.S. to support NATO operations throughout ACE. USEUCOM will remain staffed, organized, and equipped to synchronize U.S. national indications and warning (I&W), alert, and nuclear operations with those of NATO. However, reductions of headquarters personnel will reduce the level of support that USEUCOM will be able to offer ACE.

Support for NATO will be particularly difficult in the event of a renewed threat to Western Europe from the territories of the former Soviet Union. Any major reinforcement from CONUS will require substantial prior augmentation of headquarters staffs at unified and component commands, for expanded support commands, for the echelons immediately below the component commanders, for Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS), and of cadres for the arriving reinforcements.

In smaller U.S. unilateral operations, the JTF approach will leave the NATO interface intact with only limited disruptions, but, as discussed below, any major U.S. unilateral operation out of area will require a substantial augmentation of headquarters staff to fulfill U.S. obligations to NATO.

MILITARY CRITERIA: SUPPORT FOR NON-NATO OPERATIONS

The Baseline command structure is able to support unilateral U.S. military operations, but not without substantial augmentation in a major crisis (see Table 7.4). The separate U.S. command structure in
Table 7.2
Assessment Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps in the Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Baseline case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. force posture:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forward presence (150,000 U.S. military personnel in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified command plan:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified organization:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>separate unified and component commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE command structure: streamlining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Baseline case modified by changing each factor sequentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. force posture:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-based presence (100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited presence (70,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic presence (40,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified command plan:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM exemption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR as super-CINC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE command structure:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further streamlined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified organization:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation of unified and component headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination of component headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subunified command for the Southern Region</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Europe, independent of NATO's integrated command structure, provides a mechanism for the discharge of national command functions, but the reductions of headquarters staff make this more difficult. Command staff reductions also mean that U.S. national operations will impair the command's ability to support NATO.

Across-the-board reductions of the U.S. force posture under Base Force planning increase the importance of command structure. Both NATO and U.S. national strategy are evolving in directions that place greater demands on the command's planning, operations, intelligence, logistics, and security assistance functions than in the past. The scenarios for crisis and conflict are far more numerous and complex than they were in the Cold War. More contingencies must be planned for with fewer resources.
### Table 7.3
**Military Criteria: Compatibility with NATO Interface**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Assessment of Baseline Command Structure</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM command structure staffed, organized, and equipped to synchronize with NATO activities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Independent USEUCOM command structure enables support for NATO operations, but reductions in staff will reduce command capabilities overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indications and warning</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Major reinforcement of Europe will require substantial augmentation of command staff at unified and component headquarters, for expanded support commands, and host nation support, for arriving U.S. reinforcement units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert systems</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support effective peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipate possible NATO contingencies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage timely response to NAC/DPC decisions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate reception and forward movement of forces deployed from CONUS</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage host nation support arrangements</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate support from other CINCs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage de-escalation</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimize disruption of NATO interface during U.S. Non-NATO operations</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>JTF approach leaves NATO links structurally intact but major out-of-area deployment will disrupt interface</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ability of the Baseline command structure to handle peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions in a range of scenarios is examined in a related RAND study. The results are summarized here and expanded upon in the subsection on transitions below.

---

Table 7.4
Military Criteria: Support for Non-NATO Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Assessment of Baseline Command Structure</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide for discharge of U.S. responsibilities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Independent USEUCOM command structure enables discharge, but cutbacks of command staff will reduce command capabilities overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Staff augmentation required for major operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security assistance</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Major contingencies may require forces from CONUS and “on-call” JTF arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support effective peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Major reinforcement of Europe to counterattack against FRG or to “backfill” for large U.S. force deployed outside FRG will require substantial augmentation of command staff required at unified and component headquarters and for arriving U.S. reinforcement units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipate possible contingencies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage timely response to NCA directions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate reception and movement of forces deployed from CONUS</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct non-NATO operations within theater</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate deployment of forces to other CINCs</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate support for other CINCs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage de-escalation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimize disruption of NATO interface during non-NATO operations</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>JTF approach leaves NATO links intact, but major out-of-area deployment will disrupt interface</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predesignation of JTF commanders and the prior development of plans at USEUCOM headquarters should be adequate for contingen-
cies less serious than a Cold War–style threat to Germany or an operation similar to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The JTF approach would also leave the USEUCOM interface with NATO structurally intact. However, because the U.S. Forward-Presence force posture is optimized for intense operations akin to Desert Storm or a like conflict in Central Europe, lesser contingencies may well require units from the CONUS-based Contingency Force. Assuming the development of appropriate procedures and predesignated liaison with contingency force headquarters, proper training and exercising, and that no other requirements are placed on it by simultaneous crises, the USEUCOM headquarters staff should be able to manage the interface with these units.

Major U.S. operations on the scale of Desert Shield/Desert Storm outside of NATO would place the greatest stress on the Baseline command structure. Potentially, this case is even more demanding than the return of a Soviet-style threat to Europe. Should the U.S. corps in Europe be deployed out of area, the USEUCOM command structure—or parts of it—would be responsible for the simultaneous management of three difficult operations. First, if the United States were to maintain its commitment to a forward presence in Europe, the USEUCOM headquarters staff remaining behind would have to manage at least some “backfilling” of Europe from forces in CONUS. Second, they would have to manage the process of redeploying forces out of area and providing support to those forces. (Even if no USEUCOM units were deployed, the command could be responsible for substantial rear-area support.) Finally, the Army corps headquarters and some headquarters elements of USAE would be removed from Europe and would have to prepare to fight in a new region. At the same time, command personnel of U.S. forces arriving in Europe to replace the departing forces would have to become familiar with plans and procedures unique to the NATO environment, especially management of the U.S.-led multinational corps. This transition of command elements in and out of Europe would be complicated.

It is doubtful that any one of these requirements could be met without a substantial augmentation of the USEUCOM command staffs. And even with an increase in staff, the quality of USEUCOM’s interface with NATO would suffer.

A SPECIAL FOCUS ON PEACE-TO-CRISIS-TO-WAR TRANSITIONS

This subsection examines how the Baseline command structure might function during transitions from peace to crisis and war. A common
failing of command structure analysis is inadequate attention to the
dynamics of military operations. A focus on functions, “wiring dia-
grams,” and organizational theory tends to emphasize static models of
structural adequacy at the expense of understanding the effects of the
changing contexts that lie at the heart of international relations and
military operations. To capture the influence of these dynamics, the
approach taken in this Report is to examine USEUCOM’s command
structure in the context of several plausible political-military scenar-
ios. While scenario-based analysis does not provide a complete as-
sessment of command arrangements in peace-to-crisis-to-war transi-
tions, it does raise many of the relevant questions that can lead to
important answers. This subsection (summarized in Table 7.5) de-
scribes the highlights of a separate study linking the command
structure analysis with RAND’s parallel examination of future
USEUCOM force postures.4

Four scenarios are examined:

1. Regeneration of a Soviet threat to Central Europe
2. Deployment of USEUCOM forces to support USCINCENT
3. Direct U.S. military support to Israel
4. Deployment of NATO forces to reinforce Turkey.

**Force Structure Assumptions**

The Baseline case assumes the United States has transitioned to the
Base Force by 1995. There is a U.S. Army corps headquarters in
Germany, with two divisions and associated combat and combat
service support. Three USAF tactical fighter wings are distributed
between Germany and the UK. A fourth is based in Italy. A single
carrier battle group and associated support ships, an afloat MEU and
associated amphibious shipping, three submarines, and one maritime
air squadron are stationed in the Mediterranean.

These forces are backed up by earmarked reinforcements, including
the following:

- Five active, five reserve, and two reconstitutable Army divisions in
CONUS

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4See Appendix B, “USEUCOM Command Arrangements During Transitions from
Peace to Crisis to War,” in Kugler (1992). Kugler and the present author acknowledge
the collection of unpublished analyses of transitions by RAND colleague James
Winnefeld for the discussion of the subject in their own reports.
Table 7.5
Military Criteria: Peace-to-Crisis-to-War Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regeneration of the Soviet threat to Central Europe (U.S. part of a NATO response)</td>
<td>Case not applicable</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>In-place U.S. unified, component, and below-component headquarters make rapid reinforcement possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of USEUCOM forces to support U.S. CINCENT (unilateral U.S. action)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Double-hatting of U.S. component commanders is disruptive during transitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct military support for Israel (unilateral U.S. action)</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Command staff reductions place a premium on realistic training and exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement of Turkey (U.S. part of NATO response)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>U.S. must plan for “backfill” operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Planning and operations would benefit from permanent JTF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USEUCOM focus on regional conflict risks disruption of NATO interface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USEUCOM command of operation may be inconsistent with European views of appropriate role of U.S. headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. national command structure must expand in crisis to provide logistical support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NATO command structure in Turkey is probably not adequate for major operation—depends on U.S. command structure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Eight active and seven reserve USAF tactical fighter or composite wings, also in CONUS
• Four carrier battle groups in the Atlantic.

These reinforcements are supported by two POMCUS division sets in Germany and parts of two U.S. Marine brigade sets afloat in maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPS) usually moored in Turkish waters. One Marine brigade set is prepositioned in Norway.

Scenario 1: Regeneration of the Soviet Threat

The retention of separate unified and component headquarters provides the structure necessary to support the rapid reinforcement of Europe; what may be lacking is adequate levels of personnel. Headquarters staffs manned at 50 percent of 1990 levels and faced with a fourfold expansion of the U.S. force structure in a brief period (perhaps as little as 60 days) are inadequate to the demands of rapid reinforcement. The USEUCOM and component staffs are the essential “glue” that holds together the U.S. reinforcement effort. Competent, properly sized staffs are the sine qua non of rapid, smooth, and effective force expansion. Efficient peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions will depend on prior augmentation of U.S. headquarters personnel. This places a great premium on realistic training and regular exercise of headquarters operations in such contingencies.

The practice of dual-hatting U.S. component commanders as NATO MSCs and PSCs offers certain peacetime efficiencies and gives the U.S. leadership responsibilities in wartime (which satisfy one of the requirements for domestic support of a large U.S. military presence in Europe). Command of U.S. forces in Europe also gives American NATO commanders a degree of stature and authority that is important to U.S. leadership during military operations. However, the arrangement imposes major penalties during peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions. When national and NATO “hats” must be split (e.g., because of workload, headquarters location, and conflicts among command responsibilities), opportunities for confusion and mistakes abound. Unless the transfer of authority from the peacetime U.S. component commander to his crisis or wartime replacement is well planned, there is great potential for significant disruptions of reinforcement operations.

It is most unlikely that additional U.S. general officers (and staff support) will be made available to end the practice of dual-hatting. Moreover, the peacetime benefits of the present arrangement are too substantial to forgo by giving up the MSC and PSC positions.
Therefore, as with the problem of U.S. force expansion discussed above, a great premium is placed on peacetime training and the exercise of transition plans.

Scenario 2: Deployment of USEUCOM Forces to USCENTCOM

Most of the problems inherent in this scenario were encountered and resolved during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. However, that contingency (like most) may be unique, and the "lessons learned" may not apply to a return engagement. It is possible that a future Desert Storm could spill over into the Mediterranean. In that case, JTFs might be needed not only in Turkey and Israel but also in the Mediterranean.

If a future Desert Shield/Desert Storm required the use of the Army corps and tactical fighter wings in Europe, it might become necessary to backfill for the departing units with units from the United States (perhaps from the Guard and Reserve). There could be major disruption of NATO forces if U.S. forces with multinational commitments in Europe were redeployed to the Middle East without plans for replacement with CONUS units.

Scenario 3: Direct U.S. Military Support for Israel

The current U.S. component-based organization is not well positioned or staffed to plan and conduct joint operations within USEUCOM but outside of NATO's integrated command. Increased reliance must be placed on the JTF structure, as during Operations EL DORADO CANYON, PROVEN FORCE, and PROVIDE COMFORT. Furthermore, unilateral American operations are potentially inconsistent with European views of the proper role of USEUCOM. A major U.S. national operation in USEUCOM's AOR—such as support for Israel—might cause Europeans to question the propriety of an American who serves as SACEUR simultaneously directing unilateral U.S. combat operations in or close to ACE.

Most future USEUCOM-directed national operations will probably be within NATO's AFSOUTH AOR, the Near East, or North Africa. Unless USCINCEUR and his staff are prepared to do the operational planning, it will be necessary to establish JTFs. Since it is helpful to have the same staff that conducts operations do the planning, a standing, or "on-call" U.S. JTF may be an attractive command structure option for USEUCOM. This organization could be located in the Southern Region or at USEUCOM headquarters.
Scenario 4: NATO Reinforces Turkey

Although NATO has a standing command structure in Turkey, CINCSOUTH is probably not up to the demands that a major reinforcement and combat operation would place on NATO's command and control. It is likely that U.S. national command nodes would have to act as executive agents for some elements of the NATO structure. For example, it is problematic whether NATO's Commander, Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (COMSIXATAF) is equipped, staffed, and supported to direct a major air campaign and the air defense of Turkey. Similarly, it is not clear that AFSOUTH's Commander of Naval Forces (COMNAVSOUTH), an Italian officer stationed in Naples, is adequately supported to direct the naval defense and support of Turkey.

Moving major elements of the RRC to Turkey could be a logistical nightmare. Since logistic support is currently a national responsibility, each nation contributing RRC elements would have to put a logistics support structure in place (or contribute to an as yet undefined NATO logistics support organization). During Desert Shield/Desert Storm this was less of a problem because few NATO states had significant forces in the Gulf, and the large U.S. support structure was able to provide some theater support to the forces of other coalition states. That situation would not fit this scenario, but it is nevertheless likely that NATO would depend heavily on the U.S. command structure in the region.

Observations

Two major lessons stand out from this brief examination of peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions. First, the importance of existing headquarters at the theater and component levels becomes even greater after a force drawdown justified on the ability to rapidly reinforce. Headquarters should not be reduced merely because of reductions to forces, but only after an analysis of the command's missions. Mobility and reconstitution lie at the center of USEUCOM's post–Cold War missions. On-site headquarters, properly sized, staffed, and supported, make timely redeployment and reinforcement possible.

Second, the Southern Region will require some special attention in both NATO and national planning and command structure arrangements. The existing arrangements are (understandably) structured to respond to a Soviet threat. For the most part, they are poorly located, structured, and resourced to handle a non-Soviet threat or one
that requires the movement of sizable NATO forces from the center to the flank.

Both U.S. and NATO command structures performed adequately in most cases in this analysis. The principal difficulties were those posed by a major force expansion, major force deployments to remote parts of ACE or beyond the ACE AOR, and the double-hatting of national and NATO commanders. While all these difficulties would be faced in a contingency with the forces and command structures of today, they become more pronounced with the structures and capabilities of the Baseline case. As U.S. and NATO forces and the command structure are reduced, operational flexibility decreases correspondingly. The result is a shrinking force and command structure built around what is arguably the least likely threat—a major invasion from the east. Ways must be found to protect flexibility as the command structure declines.

POLITICAL CRITERIA: CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S PEACETIME UNITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

The Baseline command structure also supports the requirements of Allied unity and effectiveness in peace, as highlighted in Table 7.6. The fact that the RRC will be led by a European is an important factor in the acceptability of the Baseline command structure to our European allies. European command of most of the Central Region's multinational corps also helps to satisfy a European desire for a higher profile in NATO. The American role in ACE portrayed in the Baseline is consistent with at least the near-term expectations of Europeans regarding the relative balance of U.S. and Europe in NATO's leadership. It is also consistent with an expectation that NATO's command structure can shrink.

Today, as long as Europeans hold important NATO command slots, U.S. allies are generally satisfied with a U.S. officer as SACEUR. Washington shows that it considers the defense of Europe to be of high priority in U.S. defense policy by maintaining 150,000 troops on the Continent, by continuing USEUCOM as a unified command in the UCP, and by dual-hatting its USEUCOM as SACEUR. While some Allied governments may want the U.S. to give up the top command slot regardless of these actions, the majority of the Allies are more likely to be reassured by this demonstration of America's commitment to their security.
### Table 7.6
**Political Criteria: Contribution to NATO's Peacetime Unity and Effectiveness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Assessment of Baseline Command Structure</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compatible with increased role for Europe in leadership of the Alliance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>U.S. role does not appear incompatible with Allies' near-term expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European officers in key command and staff slots</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Europeans retain positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At SHAPE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Europeans retain positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As MSCs and PSCs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>European (UK) to command RRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As commanders of major NATO combat formations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Europeans to command multinational corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatible with emerging European defense identity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Immediate response increasingly a European responsibility (through AMP and RRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retains European control of European forces committed out of area</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No formal mechanism yet, but possibility of movement toward supervision of European participation in non-NATO operations through WEU ERF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits reductions of ACE command structure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Overall reduction of ACE command personnel, consolidation of PSCs in AFCENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent with host nations' views of appropriate U.S. military posture and the presence of U.S. headquarters</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Substantial reduction of U.S. headquarters, etc., in FRG compatible with German expectations No substantial limits yet on USEU-COM out-of-area activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The European desire for a higher profile in NATO leadership is now directed at the RRF and should be at least temporarily satisfied by the designation of a British officer as the RRC’s commander. This arrangement is consistent with the new importance of the rapid-reaction mission in NATO strategy and the European’s leading role in contributions to the RRF.

The European allies’ lead in the RRF is also supportive of their desire to make the concept of a European Pillar more concrete. To the extent that it may spur the creation of a parallel ERF in the future, the RRF provides Europe with a means of retaining control over European forces that might take part in a non-NATO operation (for
example, by means of a common staff or through a dual-hatted commander. The organization of European RRF in a collective enterprise provides Europeans with a mechanism for working with the U.S. as an equal in out-of-area operations. At least in the near term, the formation of the RRF may provide a common ground for those allies who wish in the long run to move toward a truly European defense identity and those that hope to maintain NATO as the principal mechanism of collective defense. Thus, for the time being, formation of the European-led RRF within NATO may avoid what might become a divisive debate over NATO's future that could only harm U.S. interests in Europe.

Reorganization of the Central Region allows NATO to meet two potentially inconsistent political requirements—an increase in the role of Europeans in NATO's military leadership and a reduction in NATO's commands—without challenging America's position in the integrated command structure. In the Baseline case, NATO streamlining reduces the number of AFCENT PSCs from five to two. At the same time, the framework composition allows NATO to consider multinational corps headquarters to be "national" for some purposes (e.g., peacetime administration) and "integrated" for others (e.g., contingency planning and wartime operations). Therefore, the Alliance will be able to claim both an increase in European participation in NATO and a reduction of headquarters in the Central Region, and the United States need not lose any command positions in AFCENT.

The downsizing of the U.S. command structure in Europe does not appear to be inconsistent with host nation's views of the appropriate local U.S. military presence. The Baseline command structure's principal headquarters are located in countries that are generally supportive of U.S. foreign and military policies. On the whole, host nations' concerns are directed more at U.S. forces and their influence on the everyday quality of life than at the outward manifestations of USEUCOM's command structure (i.e., the headquarters and other command-related facilities). Attitudes toward U.S. forces are mixed. Local interests enjoy the economic benefits of American forces but dislike the ways in which military vehicles interfere with domestic traffic on local roads, airways, and sea lanes. They also dislike the noise of low-flying aircraft and the damage done by heavy vehicles during NATO exercises, and they fear the possibility of a nuclear weapon accident. These concerns have an indirect effect on attitudes toward command structure. Downsizing of the U.S. military presence in Europe goes some way in meeting local desires for a less intrusive U.S. posture. On the whole, the local desire for economic benefit
tends to favor continuation of the relatively unobtrusive command facil-
ities.

Of more direct effect on the USEUCOM command structure is the de-
sire of the German government to reclaim certain facilities com-
manded by U.S. occupation forces in the aftermath of World War II. 
This appears to be a problem because local German governments de-
sire to use the facilities, particularly those on prime real estate, to 
satisfy demands for space in crowded urban areas, but there may also 
be a component of German pride and nationalism. At present, it ap-
ppears that much progress can be made by the U.S. to satisfy all these 
desires as USEUCOM's forces and command structure shrink, al-
though there are clearly problems of implementation, especially in 
the environmental area. There is also the long-term issue of 
Germany's attitude toward the direction of U.S. military relations 
and operations outside of Europe from American headquarters in 
Germany. But, for the moment, European domestic politics do not 
seem likely to impinge directly on the USEUCOM command struc-
ture.

POLITICAL CRITERIA: CONSISTENCY WITH U.S.
DOMESTIC REALITIES

At present, the Baseline command structure appears to meet 
American domestic political criteria (see Table 7.7). USEUCOM's 
command structure is being slimmed down along with the U.S. mili-
tary posture in Europe, but the United States continues to hold the 
key positions in ACE, and the United States remains capable of act-
ing independently of NATO. The principal uncertainty is whether the 
Administration's plans to reduce the overall presence in Europe to 
Base Force levels will satisfy a majority in Congress or whether a 
lower number, perhaps 100,000 personnel, will be approved.

The American military contribution to critical NATO missions is re-
lected in the role of American officers in the Baseline command struc-
ture. SACEUR continues to be an American, as does the SHAPE 
Chief of Staff. The CINCSOUTH, COMMDF, and COMAARFCE posi-
tions are also held by U.S. officers. An American serves as a multi-
national corps commander in the MDF, a position commensurate with 
the deployment of a corps-sized ground force in the Central Region.

The 50-percent reduction in headquarters staff and the consolidation 
of headquarters functions within the component commands satisfies 
the requirement to reduce costs. Reducing the command structure in
### Table 7.7

**Political Criteria: Consistency with Domestic Realities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Assessment of Baseline Command Structure</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintains important U.S. role in ACE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>United States maintains leadership of ACE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. officers in key command and staff slots</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>United States supplies SACEUR, SHAPE COS, COMMDF, COMAOFCE, CINCSOUTH, and one multinational corps commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As MNC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At SHAPE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As MSCs and PSCs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As commanders of major NATO combat formations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. forces assigned critical missions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>U.S. remains crucial to successful defense of Central Region against determined attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits United States to reduce costs of European defense</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Overall reduction of U.S. command staff personnel in headquarters in ACE, USEUCOM, components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintains U.S. freedom of action in non-NATO operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>USEUCOM command structure sufficiently independent of NATO command structure; Headquarters of U.S.-FRG multinational corps remain &quot;American&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Europe will never yield savings close to those from major reductions in forces and support; however, given an attitude that characterizes command structure as fat, the Base Force for Europe must include some downsizing of USEUCOM’s command structure.

By retaining a U.S. unified command separate from NATO’s integrated command, the U.S. continues to enjoy the freedom of action to pursue non-NATO operations within the USEUCOM AOR. Under the leading-nation composition, the U.S. corps headquarters does double duty as headquarters for the U.S.-led multinational corps in Germany. Consequently, the flexibility of the U.S. corps to support national operations is not substantially impaired by its multinational designation.

However, the dual mission of the U.S. corps headquarters might make redeployment of the corps from Germany (for example, to support an out-of-area operation on the order of Desert Shield/Desert
Storm) politically awkward because of the gap it would leave in NATO's MDF and in the AFCENT command structure. Assuming arrangements could be made in NATO to recognize the legitimacy of temporary redeployments for national reasons (or, alternatively, that the issue could remain suitably vague and the contingency never arise), this potentiality probably would not present an insurmountable obstacle to U.S. domestic support.

**HEDGING CRITERIA: COMPATIBILITY WITH ALTERNATIVE U.S. FORCE POSTURES**

While the Baseline command structure can accommodate a U.S. military presence in Europe of 100,000 men organized as a dual-based presence, substantial modifications must be made at 70,000 or below (see Table 7.8). As the American military posture in Europe declines, it becomes ever more difficult to provide substantial combat forces and a credible reinforcement infrastructure, maintain the American military's historic role in tying together NATO's continental defense, or continue today's unified command structure. The 100,000 posture makes the U.S. even more reliant on staff augmentation to support any a major contingency and leaves the command structure less able to support its NATO obligations during a unilateral U.S. operation. However, it arguably keeps sufficient forces in Europe to justify a skeletal version of the Baseline structure (see Figure 7.1).

Nevertheless, at a troop strength of 100,000 men, U.S. positions of leadership in the NATO command structure could be placed in jeopardy, particularly if the U.S. cuts were undertaken unilaterally and not as part of a NATO-wide plan of deeper troop reductions. The U.S. military contribution to important NATO missions would fall relative to the in-place forces of its European allies. America would begin to lose its claim to critical NATO command positions.

As long as the United States is able to maintain a carrier task force in the Mediterranean, the United States should be able to continue to serve as the catalyst of Southern Region defense, and CINCUSNAVEUR should continue to serve as CINCSOUTH. In the Central Region, however, the combat capability of the United States would drop significantly with a 100,000 posture. U.S. ground forces in Germany would not be significantly larger than that of other members in the region. The United States would probably hold onto the COMMDF position, as the Europeans would be unlikely to increase their ground presence in response to American reductions. American
Table 7.8
Hedging Criteria: Compatibility with Alternative U.S. Force Postures and Unified Command Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Assessment of Baseline Command Structure</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate further reductions of U.S. military presence in Europe</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Below 100,000, existing USEUCOM command structure is not viable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual-based presence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Below 100,000, U.S. loses important arguments for critical NATO command positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited presence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Below 100,000, consolidation of command functions and headquarters becomes necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic presence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Below 100,000, rationale for making USEUCOM a subunified command becomes strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate different UCPs</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Super-CINC concept creates a new layer of command of dubious efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USEUCOM exemption</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Reduction of USEUCOM AOR reduces demands on headquarters staff, allows greater emphasis on support for NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Force</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>USCINCEUR's subordinate status greatly reduces his influence as SACEUR and U.S. influence in NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR as Atlantic super-CINC</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Separation of SACEUR and USCINCEUR &quot;hats&quot; further reduces U.S. influence Creates awkward chain of command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>May be incompatible with European perception of appropriate USEUCOM role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

leadership of a multinational corps would become harder to justify with just four U.S. brigades deployed forward in Europe. The loss of three brigades from the Baseline's seven could force the United States to choose between participating in a German-led multinational corps and maintaining a capable U.S. corps in the theater. With less than two tactical fighter wings in AFCENT, CINCUSAFE probably could not remain COMAAFCE. The United States would still retain a thin European-wide military presence, and the skeletal command and
Figure 7.1—Baseline Case Modified by Reduction of U.S. Force Posture to 100,000 Men (Shaded areas refer to relationships affected by changes made to the Baseline case.)

support structure might still give credence to the promise of timely U.S. reinforcements. SACEUR would probably remain an American on the basis of this bare continental presence and the surviving infrastructure to back up the promise of reinforcement in time of extreme crisis. However, other things being equal, the European consensus supporting this would probably be less solid than if the United States were at 150,000.

Below 100,000 the U.S. force posture in Europe begins to take on a token character (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3). At 70,000 men, the United States would deploy only 2.5 brigades and 1.5 wings in Europe; at 40,000, just half a brigade and half a wing. These levels clearly do not leave the United States with sufficient forces in Europe to tie together NATO's disparate regions. Nor can they serve to justify America's leadership of Western European defense. Somewhere be-
low 100,000 troops, American claims to leadership become almost entirely dependent on America's promise to reinforce Europe and U.S. strategic nuclear guarantees. However, neither claim seems very credible, because the U.S. support infrastructure would have been dismantled, and the U.S. forces remaining in Europe would constitute only a limited commitment of U.S. prestige and power to European security. A token presence is unlikely to be highly reassuring to America's allies or a sufficient reason for them to continue to defer to American leadership on matters of European defense policy.

Even if the U.S. were to draw down its forces in Europe in proportion with its allies, as the absolute size of the U.S. posture declines, the United States loses its highly visible presence across Western Europe. In these circumstances, it seems likely that the United States could not continue to hold the SACEUR slot. The United States would probably also lose its PSC positions in AFCENT. It could retain the
CINCSOUTH position, because naval forces would not be greatly affected by the reductions. An American might also keep command for the very reason that NATO’s smaller members are being given command of multinational corps today—to give the United States an incentive to stay in the Central Region.

Below 70,000, the present unified organization is probably not sustainable. To retain even the token U.S. force, the USEUCOM command structure would have to be consolidated. As the largest component, USAREUR headquarters probably would be combined with that of the unified command. More important, if a European were to become SACEUR because of U.S. force reductions, USEUCOM would lose much of the rationale for its position as a separate unified command. A strong argument could be made to make USEUCOM a subunified command under an Atlantic Force Super-CINC.
HEDGING CRITERIA: COMPATIBILITY WITH ALTERNATIVE UCPs

The Baseline command structure is affected by the UCP in fundamental ways. USCINCEUR is either a unified commander reporting directly to the President and the Secretary of Defense, or he is a sub-unified commander responsible to a higher echelon of military command. Of less, but hardly trivial, importance is the UCP's delineation of the USEUCOM AOR.

The Baseline command structure is compatible with a UCP that exempts USEUCOM from a Base Force approach to unified command, even if the EUCOM AOR is reduced so as to be more like that of ACE (see Figure 7.4). This arrangement leaves USCINCEUR's position vis-à-vis both the U.S. President and the allies unchanged. A reduced AOR would tend to make USEUCOM even more focused on support for SACEUR. This might marginally improve the command's ability to support NATO operations over the Baseline case.

NATO command structure: Streamlined
UCP: EUCOM exemption
U.S. force posture: Forward presence
Principles of organization: Separate unified commander and staff

Figure 7.4—Baseline Case Modified by Exempting USEUCOM from Change to UCP (Shaded areas refer to relationships affected by changes made to the Baseline case.)
The Baseline does not fit well with either the Base Force approach to the UCP (Figures 7.5 and 7.6), or an approach that dual-hats the Atlantic Force Super-CINC as SACEUR (see Figure 7.7). The Atlantic Force package of the Base Force may be a useful way to conceptualize U.S. force requirements in the post–Cold War era. However, given manpower levels around 150,000 in Europe and an American SACEUR, an Atlantic Super-CINC offers few political or military benefits. Both approaches would tend to undermine the U.S. claim on the SACEUR billet.

If USEUCOM were to become a subunified command under a Base Force UCP and if USCENTCOM continued to be dual-hatted as SACEUR, the United States would lose considerable influence in NATO. It is by no means clear that USCENTCOM’s position would continue to be compatible with NATO’s peacetime unity and effectiveness. First, the current arrangement gives Europeans some as-

**Figure 7.5**—Baseline Case Modified by Making USEUCOM a Subunified Command of the Atlantic Force (Shaded areas refer to relationships affected by changes made to the Baseline case.)
surmise that their perspective and concerns can be transmitted within the U.S. military chain of command directly to the President. In the same vein, when SACEUR talks to Europeans today, they know that he speaks with authority for U.S. forces in Europe. An Atlantic Super-CINC will necessarily adopt a broader and, hence, different perspective from a U.S. commander primarily responsible for the collective defense of Europe. The authority and credibility of a SACEUR subordinate as USCINCEUR to a higher level of U.S. national military command can only suffer in the eyes of Europeans. A U.S. SACEUR independent of the unified command structure, operating entirely outside the formal U.S. national chain of command, with no direct command of U.S. forces in Europe, would suffer an equally significant loss of prestige and influence within NATO.
Second, Europe has tended to resist U.S. suggestions that NATO assume a formalized out of area role. A command structure that subordinates a dual-hatted American SACEUR/USCINCEUR to an Atlantic Force Super-CINC may raise concerns among America's European allies. They have resisted American efforts to formalize an out-of-area mission for NATO and may perceive the U.S. change in command structure as a U.S. effort to push NATO in that direction by a unilateral change to the organization of internal U.S. defense arrangements. That perception might cause more Europeans to question the value of an American SACEUR.

If the Atlantic Force Super-CINC were to become SACEUR, as in Figure 7.7, the issue of SACEUR's formal authority would be solved, but the adverse out-of-area connotations would be exacerbated. The

![Diagram of NATO command structure](image)

**Figure 7.7—Baseline Case Modified by Making USEUCOM a Subunified Command and the Atlantic Force Super-CINC SACEUR (Shaded areas refer to relationships affected by changes made to the Baseline case.)**
Super-CINC would command U.S. forces and Europe and report directly to the President. His prestige and authority might be considered superior to that of USCINCEUR today because the Super-CINC’s command would encompass the territory and forces of three current unified commands. That same fact might also be perceived to imply an American view of NATO’s out-of-area role at odds with European tendencies.

In addition, management problems could easily arise from the fact that the Deputy Super-CINC would command forces in the Atlantic Force AOR on a day-to-day basis, while the Super-CINC assumed his SACEUR responsibilities (and probably those of SACLANT as well). Today, the DCINCEUR sometimes finds it difficult to exercise oversight of component commanders who believe they are directly responsible only to the CINC, and who prefer to deal with USCINCEUR even when he is at SHAPE headquarters. At times, the Atlantic Deputy is likely to find his relationship with the suprime aviation USCINCEUR and the component commanders at least equally troublesome.

Even from a military standpoint, it is difficult to see the advantages of the Super-CINC with 150,000 men in Europe. The extra layer of command offers no obvious operational efficiencies. What functions would the Atlantic Forces command perform that are now accomplished by the Joint Staff or USEUCOM, and why? Indeed, this intermediate echelon seems to make the chain of command more cumbersome in crisis and war.

The Super-CINC concept is far more consistent with a U.S. presence in Europe below 100,000. At token levels of U.S. forces in Europe, mission requirements for European contingencies would emphasize the coordination of military assets within the Atlantic Force. A Super-CINC’s headquarters is arguably a more appropriate locus for this operation than either the small USEUCOM headquarters or the Joint Staff of the JCS.

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5Interviews and discussions during the course of this research have suggested that the extent of this problem waxes and wanes with the personalities holding senior command and staff positions at SHAPE, USEUCOM, and component command headquarters. It appears that the management problems arising from dual-hatting commanders with separate staffs serving each role can be mitigated, but not eliminated.
HEDGING CRITERIA: COMPATIBILITY WITH
ALTERNATIVE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURES

Although, within a broad range of change to NATO's command arrangements, the Baseline command structure continues to satisfy the national and NATO military criteria and political criteria of Allied unity, the interface of altered NATO command structures with USEUCOM's often results in a failure to satisfy U.S. domestic political criteria. As summarized in Table 7.9, most changes to NATO's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Assessment of Baseline Command Structure</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate further streamlining</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. likely to lose NATO positions; may be incompatible with U.S. domestic support for 150,000 presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of NATO multinational corps headquarters staffs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Would tend to inhibit U.S. freedom of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Atlanticized&quot; NATO corps (standardized equipment for NATO-dedicated forces)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Would tend to deny U.S. option to employ forces dedicated to NATO in unilateral operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate alternative NATO command structures</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>U.S. command structure could accommodate, but alternative structures may be incompatible with U.S. domestic support for 150,000 presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalized</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Potential for U.S. to hold COMAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanized</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Loss of leading role in Alliance incompatible with U.S. domestic support for 150,000 presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalized</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Demise of integrated command structure incompatible with U.S. domestic support for 150,000 presence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
command arrangements are incompatible with U.S. domestic support for a 150,000-man presence in Europe.

A further streamlining of the ACE command structure, as in Figure 7.11, and a consequent reduction in NATO command positions might not be resisted in principle, but in practice the United States would probably lose PSC slots in AFCENT. The U.S. government might be willing to accept this arrangement in the interest of allied unity, but American domestic support for the U.S. presence would probably suffer. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that some in Congress would threaten to reduce the U.S. presence if the U.S. were to lose additional NATO command positions. The result would be damaging to the peacetime unity and effectiveness of the Alliance.

Further streamlining of the Baseline's streamlined NATO command structure (as shown in Figure 7.8) could tend to inhibit U.S. freedom

Figure 7.8—Baseline Case Modified by Further Streamlining of NATO Command Structure (Shaded areas refer to relationships affected by changes made to the Baseline case.)
of action. Unless the U.S. could retain a separate national corps headquarters, a gradual integration of multinational corps headquarters staffs (see Figure 7.9) would make it more difficult for the U.S. to use its corps in Europe for out-of-area operations. This, and any other proposal to make national forces in the MDF more "Atlantic" (not to be confused with the Atlantic Force package of the U.S. Base Force or its UCP analog)—for example, through the standardization of MDF units' equipment—would probably be met with resistance at home. U.S. military units designed to perform as an Atlantic NATO force are necessarily less flexible in meeting America's other global commitments. While Atlanticization on a large scale would not be consistent with U.S. domestic support for a 150,000 presence, a token U.S. contribution to an Atlantic NATO force might be accepted in the interest of maintaining healthy U.S.-European relations.

A "rationalization" of NATO's command structure might prove compatible with U.S. domestic expectations (see Figure 7.10). A reorganization along functional lines would promote an allocation of NATO command positions on the basis of functional specialization, in addition to the more traditional factors of geography and the contribution

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**Figure 7.9**—Baseline Case Modified by Integration of Multinational Corps Headquarters (Shaded areas refer to relationship affected by changes made to the Baseline case.)
of standing forces in NATO's individual regions. The reinforcement and intratheater mobility missions of the Augmentation Force proposed earlier in this Report would coincide well with the military assets the U.S. could continue to contribute to the Alliance. First, in the event of a return of a Soviet-style threat from the east, American forces reinforcing Europe from CONUS would remain critical to the defense of NATO in general and the Central Region in particular. Second, U.S. forces remaining in Germany will be able to transfer out of the region, as they did for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. They could just as easily move to Turkey as to Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Finally, U.S. transportation assets will remain indispensable to the strategic mobility of NATO's forces until the Europeans develop their own. Continued access to U.S. transport may encourage them not to duplicate the capabilities and remain in a defense partnership with the United States to take advantage of these assets. This arrangement could become advantageous to the United States if its military presence in Europe dropped to 100,000. Even if the United States lacked a sufficient combat force in Germany to maintain the
COMMDF position, the United States would have a strong claim on command of the AF.

A “Europeanization” or “nationalization” of NATO’s command structure is completely incompatible with a 150,000 U.S. military presence. In either case, loss of the SACEUR position would cause U.S. domestic support for NATO to decline substantially. A gradual “takeover” of ACE by the Europeans might leave NATO intact, with the United States in control of the Atlantic MNC, CINCSOUTH, and PSCs in AFCENT and command of a multinational corps (see Figure 7.11). Handled properly, Europeanization might even leave a sizable U.S. military presence in Europe, something like the dual-based posture of 100,000 men, for example, although far smaller U.S. postures are easily foreseeable.

Nationalization, on the other hand, would seem to lead directly to a token U.S. presence in Europe (see Figure 7.12). It is possible that an American commander would remain at the top of something like an integrated command in the Southern Region, because the United

NATO command structure: Europeanized
UCP: Current
U.S. force posture: Forward presence
Principles of organization: Separate unified commander and staff

Figure 7.11—Baseline Case Modified by a Europeanization of NATO’s Command Structure (Shaded areas refer to relationships affected by changes made to the Baseline case.)
States might remain a catalyst in that area’s defense. But in the Central and Northern Regions, the United States would play a peripheral role, confined to what would likely become an ever-more-sterile paper exercise on reinforcement planning in the event that NATO’s Cold War posture needed to be reconstituted to counter some new threat on the order of the former Soviet Union. In the case of NATO’s nationalization, a European Defense Organization, outside of NATO and in the European Community, would handle the lesser contingencies. In either case, the United States would become a minor player in European security planning.

**HEDGING CRITERIA: COMPATIBILITY WITH ALTERNATIVE UNIFIED COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS**

The Baseline cannot easily accommodate major changes to the internal organization of USEUCOM (see Table 7.10). At 150,000 person-
Table 7.10

Hedging Criteria: Compatibility with Alternative Unified Command Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Assessment of Baseline Command Structure</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate the elimination of component command headquarters</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Reduces U.S. peace-to-crisis-to-war transition capabilities for most scenarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unnecessary at 100,000 to 150,000 U.S. presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>May be required below 100,000 U.S. presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate a consolidation of unified headquarters with a component command's headquarters</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Reduces U.S. peace-to-crisis-to-war transition capabilities for most scenarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Contrary to principles of unified command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unnecessary at 100,000 to 150,000 U.S. presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>May be required below 100,000 U.S. presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate a subunified command for the Southern Region</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Improves U.S. capacity for non-NATO operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Militarily useful in large-scale or sustained NATO or non-NATO operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Draw on limited command staff resources reduces U.S. ability to support central region responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Possibly inconsistent with European views of USEUCOM's role in Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

nel in Europe, consolidations of U.S. unified and component headquarters (Figure 7.13), or the elimination of components (Figure 7.14), would have a very negative impact on transition and warfighting capabilities.

The consolidation of unified and component commanders and headquarters staffs shown in Figure 7.8 would place intolerable demands on USCINCEUR. He would simply be unable to handle the full range of his new responsibilities. The CINC already relies heavily on the DCINC to manage the day-to-day affairs of the unified command, so that the CINC can act as SACEUR. As was discussed above, this delegation can lead to management problems with the components. A triple-hatted CINC would have to delegate authority to manage the component to yet another deputy. In the end, each command would
require the day-to-day attention of a high-ranking general officer. Command arrangements would become even more confused if the deputy in charge of a component were also to serve as a NATO PSC. During transitions, the transfer of authority might be a complicated and cumbersome process, prone to serious errors.

Political reasons require that USEUCOM be subjected to the sometimes awkward arrangement of the DCINC as day-to-day manager. Dual-hatting enables the American SACEUR to speak as the commander of U.S. forces in Europe. No compelling political argument exists for dual-hatting the CINC as a component commander at a U.S. presence of 150,000 troops in Europe. The component command would be better managed by placing the officer proposed as the CINC’s delegate in actual command of the component. This establishes clean lines of authority and responsibility and promotes efficient unified command relationships. The same general rationale argues against a consolidation of headquarters staffs.
At the 150,000 level, elimination of component headquarters (Figure 7.15) might easily have the practical effect of limiting the U.S. commitment to Europe to the forces actually deployed there. The component command structure makes rapid reinforcement feasible. Without it, too much reinforcement planning would take place in service commands in CONUS. Under these conditions, it is very likely that the plans would gradually become divorced from the evolving realities of Western Europe’s transportation and host-nation support infrastructure. Moreover, the American officers holding NATO MSC and PSC positions would lose direct command of U.S. forces and become isolated from the U.S. national chain of command and the defense planning process. Like an American SACEUR who did not have command of American forces in Europe, these U.S. officers holding NATO subordinate command positions would likely suffer a loss of influence and prestige in dealings with their allied counterparts.
However, some form of U.S. headquarters consolidation or streamlining would become necessary and even appropriate at troop levels below 100,000. Either of the options discussed above may be worth considering if the United States were to limit its European forces to between 40,000 and 70,000.

A permanent subunified command for the Southern Region has been under consideration by the USEUCOM staff (see Figure 7.15). Located in Italy or Turkey, this organization would provide the command locus in future contingencies similar to PROVIDE COMFORT, PROVEN FORCE, and EL DORADO CANYON. RAND's assessment of the Baseline case in peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions, described above, concluded that ad hoc JTFs were adequate to deal with all but one contingency: direct U.S. support for an Israel engaged in a major war. The assessment also noted the political problems caused if
SACEUR, acting as USCINCEUR, were to be perceived as responsible for command of that operation. A permanent subunified command for the Southern Region would seem to expand the number of opportunities for Europeans to consider the conflict of interest between the responsibilities of SACEUR and USCINCEUR.

Relationships between the subunified U.S. commander and neighboring NATO and U.S. commanders might also prove difficult to sort out. NATO operations on the Southern Flank would take place under CINCSOUTH's command. Would CINCUSNAVEUR, who already serves as NATO's CINCSOUTH, be triple-hatted as COMUSSOUTH, the U.S. subunified commander? That would seem to overload the U.S. officer, exacerbate the appearance of a possible conflict of interest with U.S. commanders dual hatted within NATO's integrated command, and create coordination problems between the subunified commander and other component commanders. Appointing an entirely new U.S. officer as COMUSSOUTH runs counter to the implications of declining U.S. general officer ranks and headquarters personnel in USEUCOM and inserts a new player in the unified structure. How would the subunified commander relate to USEUCOM's existing component commanders? On first impression, the subunified command seems to offer few military benefits and many political and operational liabilities. However, given the likelihood that, in the post-Cold War, post-Soviet, era, the serious military threats in the USEUCOM AOR will arise from the Middle East and given the history of U.S. unilateral activity in the region, the possibilities for more permanent U.S. headquarters arrangements in the Southern Region should be analyzed carefully.

SUMMARY

The Baseline case is compatible with the political and military criteria defined in this section. It ensures that the U.S. can support its obligations to NATO military activities and carry out national missions. It moves toward accommodating American domestic desires for a reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe, while preserving U.S. leadership of NATO and the capacity for independent action. It also satisfies the expectations of NATO that the U.S. will remain committed to European security and the accommodation of European desires to play more concrete roles in Alliance leadership. Assessment of the Baseline against the hedging criteria indicates that it can accommodate marginal change to the factors that influence
USEUCOM's command structure. Nevertheless, the Baseline is not resilient in the face of more fundamental, yet plausible, changes to the U.S. force posture, the UCP, NATO's command structure, or approaches to USEUCOM's internal organization.
8. ALTERNATIVE USEUCOM COMMAND STRUCTURES

PRINCIPAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING USEUCOM'S COMMAND STRUCTURE

Assessment of the Baseline case suggests that three of the four major factors influencing the future USEUCOM command structure are interrelated. The status of the U.S. force posture in Europe, the UCP, and NATO's command structure are closely linked. Changes to any one of these factors from their status in the Baseline are likely to set in motion forces that will tend to alter the two remaining factors.

At a posture of 150,000 men in Europe, the United States maintains a presence sufficient to cover the major regions in ACE and conduct large-scale, high-intensity combat operations. This forward presence clearly helps justify continuing America's leadership of NATO's integrated command structure and, in particular, the U.S. SACEUR. As long as an American is SACEUR, it is in the U.S. interest that he be dual-hatted as USCINCEUR and in charge of a unified command. The continuation of USEUCOM as a unified command justifies and presupposes the allocation of a sizable force to USCINCEUR to enable him to carry out his assigned missions to NATO and support SACEUR. Thus, each of these major factors reinforces the condition of the other two.

Similarly, changing one factor creates pressure to revise the others (see Figure 8.1). A major change in the condition of one factor creates tensions that are inconsistent with the status of at least one of the other two factors. A change in the second factor to reestablish consistency with the first creates in turn an inconsistency between the second and third factors, requiring a change in the third to reestablish equilibrium among all three.

At a posture of 100,000 men, the U.S. presence in Europe is confined to a few places and is dependent on reinforcement from CONUS to support high-intensity operations. The rationale for U.S. leadership of NATO begins to weaken as well. Similarly, because any major contingency would now require the marshaling and coordination of assets outside of USEUCOM, the arguments for making USEUCOM a sub-
Figure 8.1—Relationships Among the Factors Shaping USEUCOM’s Command Structure

unified command under an Atlantic Force Super-CINC become stronger. Should the United States lose the SACEUR position, the argument for subunified status could be overwhelming.

Defining the point at which its declining military presence causes the United States to lose legitimacy as leader of Western Europe’s continental defense is a matter of judgment. The conclusion of this analysis is that the United States probably can continue to maintain leadership at 100,000 men. But should the presence fall to 70,000 or below, it would seem inevitable that the United States would no longer hold the SACEUR position and that USEUCOM would become a subunified command with an AOR more coincident with that of ACE.

Somewhere below a 100,000 U.S. presence, change to the fourth major factor influencing the future USEUCOM command structure—internal organization of the command—must be initiated. It is not possible to retain separate unified (or subunified) and component commanders and staffs with the headquarters resources that would be available. At postures of 40,000 to 70,000, the bulk of the manpower in Europe would come from the U.S. Army. At 70,000, the largest component might have to assume subunified command responsibilities. CINCUSAREUR would then be double-hatted as the subunified commander and his staff dual-assigned to support him in both com-
mands. At 40,000, USEUCOM might become something like a JTF, with attached service elements supported by service commands in CONUS.

The cycle of change need not begin with a falling U.S. military presence. It could be set in motion by revisions to the NATO command structure beyond those contemplated under the Baseline case. Further streamlining, including an integration of multinational corps headquarters or an Atlanticization of the corps themselves through standardization, would probably erode U.S. domestic support for the 150,000 posture. At some level of U.S. reductions, the related issues of American leadership in NATO and USEUCOM as a subunified command would be raised, although domestic support probably could be sustained for 100,000 men; at that level, SACEUR might well remain an American.

A rationalized NATO structure would probably be compatible with a U.S. troop strength as low as 100,000. A Europeanization or nationalization of the NATO command structure would almost certainly lead to a reduction of the U.S. force posture and, in turn, a subunified status for USEUCOM. Either would push U.S. deployments in the direction of tokenism. Nevertheless, the U.S. military presence in Europe could fall to 40,000 to 70,000 or even lower. At such levels, the U.S. would consider Europe a limited military commitment and could be expected to make USEUCOM a subunified command under the Atlantic Super-CINC. Moreover, the remaining posture would be too small to justify separate subunified and component commanders and staffs.

Changes to the UCP could also initiate the process. Should USEUCOM be made a subunified command, the goal of maintaining an American SACEUR would be in jeopardy. A subordinate US-CINCEUR would lose authority as SACEUR. A SACEUR separated from the U.S. command structure would have little credibility. Making the Super-CINC SACEUR would raise the out-of-area problem in ways that could only harm U.S. long-term interests in Europe. Any of these options can only make proposals for a European SACEUR, a Europeanized NATO command structure, or a European Defense Organization with a consequent nationalization of NATO more attractive to U.S. allies. Loss of the SACEUR slot or further change to NATO's command arrangements would, in turn, cause American support for anything beyond a token presence to decline precipitously.
ALTERNATIVE USEUCOM COMMAND STRUCTURES

The above discussion suggests that a 100,000-man U.S. military presence in Europe approaches an imprecise, but important, breakpoint in terms of the U.S. role in NATO and of USEUCOM's place in the UCP. At that level, the United States probably would continue to hold the key leadership positions in a rationalized NATO command structure, but the alternative arrangement of Europeanization begins to acquire plausibility. From the U.S. perspective, the rationalization option begins to look attractive. At the 100,000 level, the current place of USEUCOM in the UCP is probably sustainable, but alternative UCPs also begin to look more credible.

Levels below 100,000 are not consistent with either the role played by the United States in NATO today or the present position of USEUCOM in the UCP. NATO would almost certainly move in the direction of Europeanization or nationalization. The UCP is bound to be revised along Base Force lines.

Five alternatives to the Baseline command structure appear to maintain a "sensible" if rough balance among the U.S. posture, the UCP, and NATO's command structure (Figure 8.2). They are sensible, in that, if the conditions of any one factor were to depart from those of the Baseline, the alternatives represent stable conditions under which the USEUCOM command structure could operate. They are also sensible from an analytic standpoint, in that they provide a plausible roadmap of the command's potential future and a basis for long-range planning.

Three of these alternative cases cover the critical 100,000 force level. Case 2 (Figure 8.3) differs from the Baseline only insofar as the U.S. force level has been reduced and that the reduction of air units in USACE results in a loss of the COMAFCE PSC. It would lead to no major change in the USEUCOM's command relationships to NATO or the U.S. president.

On the whole, this command structure's performance differs only marginally from the Baseline against the assessment criteria defined in Section 7. The dual-based presence yields a command structure that has greater difficulties supporting either national or NATO operations. This tends to weaken both America's leadership role in NATO and European support for U.S. leadership. However, no clear line exists between U.S. postures of 150,000 and 100,000 men that identifies when either the political or military criteria cannot be met.
Figure 8.2—Alternative USEUCOM Command Structures

NATO command structure: Streamlined
UCP: Current
U.S. force posture: Dual-based presence
Principles of organization: Separated unified commander and staff

Figure 8.3—Alternative Command Structure 2
Case 3 differs from the previous alternative, in that the status of USEUCOM has been exempted from any revisions to the UCP (Figure 8.4). EUCOM's AOR is reduced by eliminating sub-Saharan Africa. Americans would retain their hold on NATO command positions largely on the basis of U.S. promises to reinforce in time of crisis, made credible with the infrastructure a 100,000-person presence allows. This command structure performs roughly the same as the Baseline and Case 2. With a reduced headquarters staff, Case 3 is less capable of supporting either NATO or national missions than the Baseline, but this is balanced to some extent by the reduced AOR (which relieves USCINCEUR of responsibilities below the Sahara). (At a U.S. troop strength of 100,000, the United States might also take advantage of a rationalized NATO command structure, to capitalize on America's vital role in NATO reconstitution and intratheater mobility. In this variation of Case 3, CINCUSAREUR would give up the COMMDF position and take on the role of COMAF, to preserve a strong U.S. role in NATO's integrated command in AFCENT.)

Figure 8.4—Alternative Command Structure 3
Case 4 involves momentous changes to USEUCOM’s command structure (Figure 8.5). The most important is the loss of the SACEUR position to a European. In addition, the United States would give up the COMAAFCE slot, and CINCUSAREUR would be switched from the “warfighter” COMMDF position to the reconstitution role as COMAF. USEUCOM would become a subunified command under the Atlantic Force Super-CINC, with a reduced AOR. This command structure does not perform as well against the assessment criteria as those above. The U.S. role and profile in NATO is severely reduced. It is conceivable that the U.S. role could be consistent with a European desire for equality in leadership of NATO, particularly if an American continues to fill the SACLANT position. U.S. domestic support for NATO is likely to be lower than the Baseline or Cases 2 or 3. By holding the SACLANT MNC, the CINCSOUTH MSC, and the COMAF PSC, domestic support may be sufficient to keep 100,000 Americans in Europe, but it is bound to be precarious. From a military perspective, the command structure would perform roughly as the above cases, although the dual-hatted CINCUSAREUR/COMAF

NATO command structure: Europeanized
UOP: Base force
U.S. force posture: Dual-based presence
Principles of organization: Separate unified commander and staff

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 8.5—Alternative Command Structure 4**
would be severely stressed in any scenario that called for a rapid reconstitution of NATO.

In Cases 5 and 6, the U.S. presence in Europe moves in the direction of tokenism, and the U.S. becomes more of an "over the horizon" factor in the European military balance. In Case 5 (Figure 8.6), with a European presence of 70,000, the United States might be able to justify retention of a multinational corps command, but even the AFmission is likely to be assumed by a European (on the theory that virtually the entire reception structure for any U.S. forces returning to ACE would be Europeanized). In Case 6 (Figure 8.7), at 40,000, the United States might lose command of the multinational corps. In either case, USEUCOM would become a subunified command. Other changes to the USEUCOM command structure would be required to accommodate the substantial reduction in headquarters personnel. CINCUSAREUR would be dual-hatted as USCINCEUR, and his headquarters staff would serve him in both roles. At the 40,000 level, the command might take on the attributes of a permanent JTF, with the sole mission of planning for a return of U.S. forces to Europe.

NATO command structure: Europeanized
UCP: Base force/revised
U.S. force posture: Limited presence
Principles of organization: Unified/component consolidation

![Figure 8.6—Alternative Command Structure 5](image)
Dual-hatting of a component commander as unified commander or the consolidation of command functions is almost never a preferred approach to the organization of a unified command, but circumstances make it necessary in Cases 5 and 6. Available headquarters resources are insufficient to support a separate unified staff. The consolidated headquarters encompasses the component whose mission and size clearly dominate. In Case 5, consolidation does not remove the consolidated staff far from its present locations in Germany and thus creates only minor disruptions to the interface with host nations and subordinates. Consolidation will not make the peace-to-crisis-to-war transition any less difficult, but the posture presumably rests on an assumption that NATO will have a period of months and even years to respond to warning of a renewed Soviet-style threat from the east and that the Europeans can handle lesser contingencies without U.S. assistance.

If NATO is Europeanized, as in Case 5, the U.S. should retain the CINCSOUTH position in ACE, as long as it keeps a carrier task force in the Mediterranean. However, given reductions to USEUCOM
headquarters staff, some economies could result from an extension of the LANTFLT AOR into the Mediterranean, taking USCINCNAVEUR out of the USEUCOM chain of command.

If the European Defense Organization includes those Western European nations that are not now part of the European Community (such as Turkey), it is likely that its southern flank commander would be dual-hatted as NATO's CINCSOUTH. If not, a nationalization of NATO might still leave the United States with the CINCSOUTH position. Even if CINCSOUTH were to remain an American, his NATO staff might be small and confined to the coordination of reconstitution planning. Or the staff might not even exist; reconstitution planning might be the sole function of the NATO International Military Staff supporting the Military Committee at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Thus, in Case 6, the U.S. headquarters in Europe might have a JTF-like quality, focused solely on plans for a return of U.S. forces to Europe. The limited number of forces attached to the JTF would be supported from CONUS.

These cases obviously perform poorly against the assessment criteria. Militarily, the USEUCOM command structures are almost entirely dependent on a very early response to warning and an extremely timely expansion of headquarters in almost any threatening contingency. From the political standpoint, Cases 5 and 6 are dangerously close to a mutual disengagement of the U.S. and a United Europe. Domestic American support may be maintainable for the limited ground presence and low-profile role of the United States in ACE implied by a token commitment of American power to Europe. It is at least equally likely that domestic support for any U.S. presence would continue to erode. Either case would suggest a Europe ever less interested in the United States as a security partner and an America increasingly divorced from the problems of European security. Should such arrangements come to pass, one hopes they would be the product of a more tranquil European security environment.

**ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVES**

The command alternatives discussed above rely on an assumption that the United States will continue to base its conventional contribution to NATO on the heavy armored units and air support necessary to fight an intensive mechanized war, whether those forces are in-place or deployable to Europe on relatively short notice. As the Cold War threat fades, the United States may prefer to base its role in European security on specialized military and support capabilities that its allies could only match at great cost. Four such capabilities
come to mind: military intelligence, to include reconnaissance, surveillance, analysis, and dissemination; air defense, especially ballistic missile defense; strategic mobility, particularly airlift; and, finally, nuclear deterrence forces. The U.S. command arrangements for such capabilities in Europe and the U.S. military interface with NATO or some other European defense organization might look quite different from the command structures outlined above. Coalition defense operations have generally been led by those states that contribute the bulk of the fighting forces, so it is questionable whether the United States could maintain its current role in NATO's integrated command on the basis of these supporting capabilities. However, by contributing capabilities that have become indispensable to modern warfare, the United States might be able to maintain significant influence in Europe with a modest military presence. USEUCOM command structure alternatives based on this approach are worthy of further study should the U.S. presence drop to 70,000 or below.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

USEUCOM’S NEAR-TERM COMMAND STRUCTURE: THE BASELINE CASE

The USEUCOM command structure is shaped by four factors: the size and character of American forces deployed in Europe; USEUCOM’s place in the UCP; the NATO command arrangements for ACE; and the U.S. military’s preference to organize unified commands with separate unified and component commanders, headquarters, and staffs. By 1995, under the Base Force concept, the U.S. military presence throughout Europe will decline to approximately 150,000 troops, enough to support an armored corps in Germany, four tactical fighter wings, and a carrier task force in the Mediterranean. Insofar as USEUCOM is concerned, no changes to the current status of unified and specified commands in the UCP appears likely during this period. At the same time, NATO will streamline its integrated military command, reflecting a new emphasis on general military functions and capabilities rather than an exclusive orientation toward a theater-wide assault on Western Europe. USEUCOM’s existing command structure, based on separate unified and component commands, can accommodate the changes currently contemplated in these factors between now and 1995, while continuing to satisfy important U.S. and Allied political and military criteria.

With a presence of approximately 150,000 troops in Europe, the U.S. appears likely to retain important positions in the ACE chain of command and a critical role in European defense. The current USEUCOM structure is consistent with efforts to create a stronger European Pillar within NATO and multinational corps in the MDF of the Central Region, and thus contributes to peacetime solidarity and unity within the Alliance. Continued dual-hatting of SACEUR as USCINCEUR, with operational command of all U.S. forces in Europe, including nuclear forces, and a direct line to the U.S. president, supports domestic political needs and reflects the continued importance of Western Europe in U.S. defense planning. At the same time, there would seem to be sufficient probability of American domestic support for a 150,000-troop presence in Europe to warrant this as the primary basis for U.S. force planning. The posture represents a real reduction in the cost of defending Europe; maintains U.S. influence in NATO, which retains great importance as a source of U.S. influence; and pro-
vides the capacity to command limited national operations outside the NATO context.

From a military perspective, USEUCOM's current structure can meet U.S. obligations to either coalition defense or unilateral action, although it could not simultaneously support a Desert Shield/Storm-type operation and a major European crisis. The unified and component command staffs will require rapid augmentation to accomplish the reinforcement of Europe in the face of a Soviet-style threat, and small standing JTF cadres under the direction of USEUCOM headquarters will have to be quickly expanded should any of a wide range of lesser contingencies come to pass.

Recommendation: Inform Congress and the American Public About the Implications of Radical Changes to USEUCOM for U.S. Objectives in Europe

A rationale for USEUCOM's command structure based on its contribution to national military and political objectives should be developed for presentation to Congress and the public. USEUCOM must understand fully the implications of proposals to reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe below 150,000; to revise the UCP; change NATO; or consolidate USEUCOM's internal structure. Such decisions need to be placed in a broad context, and their relationships to other aspects of defense planning and foreign policy need to be made clear. Congress in particular needs to be informed about how their decisions on force structure, defense reorganization, and U.S. support for NATO will influence USEUCOM's command structure and about how USEUCOM's organization and participation in NATO will affect the achievement of broader American objectives in Europe.

BEYOND THE NEAR TERM: AMERICA'S MILITARY PRESENCE, COMMAND STRUCTURE, AND INFLUENCE IN EUROPE

A major question affecting USEUCOM's future is the extent to which the decline of Europe in U.S. defense priorities will affect the ability of the U.S. to retain critical commands in ACE. It will also affect the broader question of the U.S. role in European politics during the post-Soviet era. Of the factors influencing USEUCOM's future command structure, the most important one within America's control in the near term is the size and nature of its military presence in Europe. The level of forces ultimately decided upon and the way reductions are handled will have an enormous impact on American influence in
Europe for many years to come. *American political and military authorities should prepare themselves for the time the current rationale for U.S. leadership of NATO's command structure, born of the Cold War, becomes unsupportable in the eyes of European allies.* A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces in Europe may increase the prospects for that outcome.

American claims of NATO's continued relevance must be backed up with more than mere rhetoric. *If a U.S.-led NATO is to remain an important instrument of European security, the U.S. must contribute military power equal to its aspirations for leadership.* By 1995, while the U.S. defense establishment as a whole will drop from its 1990 level by 25 percent, USEUCOM's force structure will be cut in half. Nothing at present indicates that this will cause Europeans to propose that America's leadership of ACE should give way to a new arrangement in the near term. Allied forces are also being reduced and in rough proportion to those of the United States. Today, proportionality in NATO's force reductions seems to suggest only proportionate reductions in NATO's command positions; there is no European consensus behind a change in America's current role. Today, the United States continues to be seen as a binding force in European defense. *But if the U.S. cuts its European presence too far, it risks its ability to lead an Atlantic alliance.*

During the Cold War, the adequacy and relevance of American military forces in Europe were measured first in terms of the extent to which they were considered necessary to deter a Soviet aggressor; second, by the degree of reassurance they provided our European allies; and third, to a much lesser extent, the confidence they instilled in American leaders of the U.S. ability to meet its defense commitments.¹ Given the lack of an obvious adversary to deter in Europe,² the basis of our military presence should come to depend more on the reassurance it offers our allies in an unstable Europe and the confi-

¹These themes are developed in Millot (1991).
²Even the residual fear of a Russian threat may soon be discredited as a factor in Western defense planning. Consider the first paragraph of the Joint Declaration signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on February 1, 1992, on Principles to Guide U.S.-Russian Relations: "Russia and the United States do not regard each other as potential adversaries. From now on, the relationship will be characterized by friendship and partnership founded on mutual trust and respect and a common commitment to democracy and economic freedom."

In his January 31, 1992, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Cheney, after warning of the possibility of "an authoritarian, militarized Russia," (p. 13) suggested the prospect of joint U.S.-Soviet military operations: "We could well imagine that in a crisis like Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm years from now, we will have not merely political, but military support from Russia." (p. 14)
dence it provides American leaders in their ability to shape the European security environment in ways that are beneficial to the United States. On these bases, American leaders should be careful in their treatment of proposals to reduce the U.S. military posture in Europe to avoid initiating or exacerbating a Western European debate over the reliability of the United States as a security partner. This is not to say that reductions on the order of those planned under the Base Force are unwise—far from it; these reductions underscore Washington’s recognition of the possibilities for a more peaceful Europe. But U.S. military power still has a role to play in assisting Europe toward that goal.

The geopolitical balance of the Cold War has been decisively altered in favor of the West, yet at least for the moment, NATO’s European members do not consider the Alliance to be irrelevant. Western European governments still consider the insurance policy of collective security to be a prudent hedge against potential threats to their region. Forces of the former Soviet Union will not be completely removed from Eastern Europe until 1994, and the residual military capabilities of Russia will remain formidable. They recognize that, in the event of a reversal of currently favorable trends in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the promise of U.S. reinforcements could be essential to Western European security.

In addition, Western European allies seem to believe that potential threats from the Middle East and instability throughout Eastern Europe justify the retention of NATO even if the Soviet threat has been transformed or eliminated. Few suggest the European Community can substitute for NATO any time soon. Even if it could act decisively, European leaders recognize that the Community could not duplicate NATO’s integrated military structure and common procedures overnight. Finally, it is an open secret that many in Western Europe have seen NATO as a way to channel and restrain the power of unified Germany in Central Europe. At present, NATO exists as a steadying influence in a turbulent period, a stable defense arrangement on which security ties can be built among the United States, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the republics of the former Soviet Union to achieve a more peaceful Europe. In short, the status quo arrangement—an American-led NATO—provides a useful mechanism for meeting a diverse set of Western European security concerns.

American leaders have argued strenuously that NATO should remain the primary forum for Western policy on European defense and, on the whole, Western Europeans have not disagreed. Consequently, al-
though Western Europeans expect to begin taking on a greater role in management of the Alliance, America's leadership of NATO is still viewed favorably. This was reaffirmed by the NATO's foreign ministers in their meeting of May 28-29, 1991, when it was agreed that SACEUR should remain an American.

It is undoubtably true that American influence in Europe is not solely a matter of U.S. troop levels—the nature of external threats and the extent of Western European political unity and self-confidence are at least equally important. And U.S. influence in Europe may not depend on America's leadership of NATO. European-American political, cultural, economic, and security relations are broad and deep. In the future, a substitute for the enormous political leverage that U.S. leadership of NATO has given America in its relationship with Europe will have to be found and, with foresight, probably can be found. In the long term, it may turn out that the United States can leave only a token force in Europe without placing its influence or the security of Western Europe at risk. The successors to the Soviet Union may reject the expansionist urges of the Soviet state and surmount the instability they evince today. Eastern Europe may get through the troubled times it surely faces in the near future without providing the spark for the third continental war in this century.

But the long term is not here yet. Acting as if it is by prematurely reducing U.S. forces in Europe to the point of tokenism may even make it more difficult to achieve that desirable future of a tranquil Europe. For nearly four decades, a large and pervasive American military presence on the continent has helped achieve stability in Europe. Political realities in Europe, the former Soviet Union, and America indicate that significant reductions in the U.S. military presence are necessary and desirable. These political changes do not, however, call for an abandonment of the continent. America should remain a stabilizing factor in Europe, and that means the reduction of forces should not become yet another destabilizing influence in an already fluid and unpredictable European security environment. U.S. troop reductions should not be so large as to precipitate a crisis of confidence in Western Europe or encourage revanchist tendencies that may develop anywhere in the former Soviet Union.

The precise number of U.S. troops in Europe below which the United States will lose its claim to the leadership of Western European defense, but above which the United States will maintain its hold, cannot be forecast. Estimates of that level are a matter of judgment. At
150,000, the United States retains significant forces in the Central and Southern Regions and the infrastructure necessary to make its promise of reinforcement credible. Somewhere in the vicinity of 100,000 troops, arguments that the U.S. presence is insufficient to justify retaining Americans as PSCs in AFCENT and even SACEUR begin to gather force. At that level, it becomes conceivable that USEUCOM might become a subunified command. By 70,000, the United States loses any claim to NATO leadership based on its actual military presence. It relies on increasingly less credible promises to reinforce Europe and extend its nuclear guarantee—and on the possibility that Western Europeans will be ready, willing, or able to replace an American SACEUR. At 40,000, the U.S. role in European defense is clearly symbolic.

Recommendation: Develop a Cost-Benefit Statement on the Effect of the Base Force on USEUCOM and NATO

The most immediate debate influencing USEUCOM’s future command structure concerns the U.S. military presence in Europe. Congress needs a clear appreciation of how Base Force planning will influence USEUCOM and ACE planning, force structure, and command structure. The Command’s views on the advantages, costs, and risks of the Atlantic Force package and of USEUCOM’s Base Force should be placed in the public record, along with USEUCOM’s assessment of other proposed postures.

BEYOND THE NEAR TERM

Down to a 100,000 U.S. presence, the existing arrangement of separate unified and component commands, commanders, and staffs remains viable. At or below a presence of 70,000 men, some form of headquarters consolidation is required. One approach would be to combine the unified headquarters with that of a component. Experience weighs heavily against such a step, however. An increasingly symbolic U.S. military presence in Europe is likely to lead USEUCOM to become a permanent JTF-like organization. Its mission would be to support an American commitment to NATO largely limited to reconstitution of the U.S. presence in Europe should a serious adversary emerge from the east to threaten a Europe otherwise able to handle its own defense.
Recommendation: Develop a Better Understanding of Potential USEUCOM Command Structures Given Radical Change to U.S. Force Postures, the UCP, and NATO

This Report estimated the likely near-term status of the factors influencing USEUCOM's command structure and the relationships among those factors. It is quite possible that the conditions assumed in the Baseline case will give way to less favorable alternatives. As a first step toward understanding these possible future environments, USEUCOM planners should develop the six alternatives outlined in the section above and develop impact statements similar to those recommended for the Base Force. It should also consider USEUCOM command structures based primarily on the U.S. contribution of specialized military capabilities to NATO. Such long-range planning will not only prepare USEUCOM for possibilities that are all too real, it will provide the insights and arguments necessary for the command to influence the future.

Recommendation: Develop a Rank Ordering of Positions That the U.S. Should Retain in Alternative NATO Command Structures

A restructuring of NATO's command arrangements or a decline of the U.S. presence in Europe may require the United States to give up positions in the ACE command structure. USEUCOM should rank-order the positions that the United States should retain if NATO continues to streamline the command structure or moves in the direction of rationalization, Europeanization, or nationalization. Each rank-ordering should be accompanied by a rationale based on U.S. political and military objectives in NATO.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMAND STRUCTURE

U.S. and NATO plans to reduce active forces in Europe are based in part on an intention to rely on reconstitution and reinforcement. The importance of this assumption to future U.S. security interests in Europe suggests the need for a review of the relationships among forces, support, and command structure in USEUCOM. Reconstitution and reinforcement would seem to place a premium on the maintenance of a highly capable command infrastructure during a time of relative peace. Unfortunately, this is contrary to both history and the attitudes of many today. Headquarters staffs and support are often characterized as unnecessary bloat detracting from the
fighting force, but command structure is the brain and nervous system of the entire force posture, while support provides its sustenance.

A "brain dead" military posture cannot be effective. With a U.S. force posture based on the concept of forward presence, the U.S. command structure must be very smart indeed. It must be capable of anticipating regional contingencies born of uncertain political and military environments that could erupt on short warning. The command structure must be able to tailor and orchestrate a variety of disparate forces to meet these contingencies, when some of these forces may be rapidly deployed to the theater without a long history of prior experience in the theater. To take advantage of U.S. rapid-deployment capabilities the command structure must incorporate extensive and well-worked relationships with the defense establishments of regional allies and potential host countries.

In today's world, an intelligent, effective command structure cannot be built overnight. It takes time to establish the technical, operational and political aspects of command arrangements overseas and get them functional in their unique regional environment. The plans that command staffs develop and the operations they oversee require ongoing contact with personnel on the scene. An existing combined staff structure (e.g., NATO) needs to be used on a daily basis if U.S. joint and service operations are to be adequately integrated.

USCINCEUR faces a major challenge in convincing the Administration and the Congress that, as its force structure declines, USEUCOM's command structure should be reduced proportionately less. Familiar arguments about the folly of preserving tail over tooth—headquarters and general officer positions at the expense of combat personnel—will without doubt be raised again. The essence of USCINCEUR's response must be that the credibility of a U.S. commitment to support NATO reconstitution and the U.S. ability to respond to fast-breaking regional contingencies will be placed in jeopardy without an adequate command structure.

Recommendation: Develop an In-Depth Rationale for Reducing Command Structure Proportionately Less Than Force Structure as the Defense Budget Declines

The importance of a robust regional command structure to defense planning has been lost in the official explanation of the Base Force. USEUCOM needs to explain that "tooth-to-tail" ratios appropriate to the Cold War may not meet U.S. strategic requirements as the level of forces in Europe declines. The policy of "forward presence," with its
50-percent reduction of U.S. forces in the European theater, relies on the capacity for rapid reinforcement to maintain the credibility of American security guarantees to NATO and American influence in Europe. An effective USEUCOM command structure is essential to rapid reinforcement. This means that USEUCOM must maintain a peacetime command structure designed for efficient peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions. This in turn requires the retention of command capabilities in addition to those necessary to merely support the peacetime presence. USEUCOM needs to develop this argument and get it into the public dialogue.

**Recommendation: Conduct In-House Gaming on Problems of Peace-to-Crisis-to-War Transitions in a Broad Spectrum of Contingencies**

With the cancellations of the WINTEX/CIMEX and HILEX exercise series, NATO's major crisis management exercises, the Alliance is fast losing its institutional memory of peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions. USEUCOM and the U.S. defense establishment have had considerable recent experience in transition problems, but must be careful not to overlearn the lessons of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Moreover, Base Force reductions will raise a new set of transition problems, some of which will involve issues of command structure. The insight gained from a program of gaming various NATO and national contingencies would be extremely useful to the development of plans for crisis management generally. These games would be particularly helpful in considering the costs and benefits of various command structure options, such as those covered in this study.

**COMMAND STRUCTURE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION**

Defense officials on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly refer to the importance of the Southern Region—loosely, the AFSOUTH AOR within ACE—in any future U.S. and NATO strategy. The situation presents special command structure problems worthy of serious study and review.

For the United States, the situation on the Southern Flank differs considerably from that of the Central Region. In the center, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the United States would go to war without NATO. For this reason, the NATO integrated military structure can be relied upon to plan and orchestrate the vast majority of military operations in the region that might involve U.S. forces.
This is not the case in the south, where U.S. forces have been directly or indirectly involved in operations that NATO members did not join (or even opposed). In some scenarios, a standing USEUCOM joint organization in the Southern Region may be attractive. There are tangible benefits to having the planning and operational command functions combined in one commander and for having the planning updated continuously by those responsible for the details. On the other hand, with reductions in available headquarters staffs, USEUCOM cannot afford to spread its command resources too thin.

Given the constraints on USEUCOM command resources, what the U.S. risks by establishing any type of permanent national headquarters for the Southern Flank is its ability to support a role in NATO essential to American leadership of the Alliance. The U.S. capacity to reinforce Europe in an extreme crisis could be the primary American contribution to NATO in the post–Cold War era. Europeans may be capable of handling lesser crises with their own forces, if they can muster the political will to do so. However, there is still little doubt that, should Western Europe be threatened by a Soviet-style adversary from the east with substantial conventional forces backed by a superpower's nuclear arsenal, the success of deterrence or defense will depend on the promise of American military might. The proposed “capable corps” in Germany is one symbol of that U.S. promise; the other must be an effective command structure to support rapid reinforcement and the reconstitution of NATO's defenses. If NATO, and U.S. leadership of NATO, are important to the United States, care must be taken to ensure that USEUCOM's support for SACEUR is not perceived by European allies as taking a back seat to “national” missions.

**Recommendation:** Consider a Standing JTF for the Southern Region

The JTF concept, as applied in USEUCOM, has greatly matured in the past five years, starting with EL DORADO CANYON, extending through the Liberian rescue operations in mid-1990, and to Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the subsequent related operations conducted in 1991. What is missing is a continuing joint planning and liaison function performed by a command within the region. There is a need to study the command problem more closely to understand whether the ad hoc JTF is sufficient, whether it is necessary to move to a permanent JTF or subunified organization, or whether an intermediate arrangement—perhaps a predesignated commander and dedicated
planning staff—would meet USEUCOM's needs. The program of in-house gaming recommended above would provide one forum for this analysis.
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