Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil

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Part One: INTRODUCTION

The military institutions of Brazil and Peru are organizationally well developed and "professional." In both countries, for example, educational achievement is very important for advancement to senior ranks. In Brazil, promotion to the rank of general requires that an officer be a graduate of the Military Academy (AMAN), the Junior Officers' School (EsAO), and the three-year Command and General Staff School (ECEME). To enter the latter school, an officer must pass a stiff written examination, which screens out three-quarters of the applicants.* Peruvian senior officers show similar educational attainments, for 80 percent of all division generals on active duty between 1940 and 1965 had graduated in the top quarter of their military academy class.**

As for the rank structure of the military, neither Brazil nor Peru exhibits the stereotypic top-heaviness of some of the less professional Latin American armies. (In Guatemala, for example, nearly half of the officers are colonels.) In the two countries under discussion, rank distributions in field armies are roughly similar to those of the United States. In 1970, 15.3 percent of the commissioned officers in the U.S. Army were lieutenant colonels, colonels, or generals (0.37 percent of commissioned officers were generals).*** The comparable figures for Brazil in 1964 were 14.9 percent (1 percent general officers), and, for the Peruvian Army in 1960, 15.0 percent (1.3 percent general officers).****

* From Alfred Stepan's interview with General Reynaldo Mello de Almeida, Commandant of ECEME, in Rio de Janeiro, August 2, 1968.
*** Selected Manpower Statistics, Department of Defense OASD (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations, April 15, 1971, p. 29.
**** The Brazilian data were tabulated from Almanaque do Exército: 1964, published by the Brazilian Ministry of War. The Peruvian data from Einaudi's manuscript The Peruvian Military.
In addition to the organizational similarity of the two military establishments, Brazilian and Peruvian military intellectuals, and thereafter the officer corps in general, have since the 1950s been moving slowly toward a new perception of the role that the military might play in furthering economic and social development. In both countries, furthermore, the military have assumed a basically new and much more dominant role in the political system.

In both Peru and Brazil, changes in military perspectives may be said to have originated from within the military institutions themselves, and to have then been confirmed by interaction with society. New generations of officers, with training and life experiences different from those of their predecessors, and occasionally representing new institutional interests, have served as a means of internal renewal. Their careers embody the interplay between military and society. Characteristically, the changes emerged first among officers and civilians in staff schools and intelligence functions, and only later affected the form of military participation in politics.

Yet, in spite of these similarities in organization and political orientation, the Peruvian and Brazilian regimes have brought to the problems of government a basically different approach with regard to some central political issues, including those of nationalism, relations with the United States, and the strategy of political and economic development to be followed. These factors alone make the two countries particularly interesting to both the political analyst and the policymaker.

In the main body of this study, we attempt to analyze military development with particular attention to the changing perceptions of the military's roles. Peru and Brazil are similar in that they represent neither the most highly developed industrial states nor the least developed agrarian traditional societies. Per capita income is often the basic index used in comparing countries internationally. Measured by this indicator in 1965, Peru ($260) and Brazil ($270) were very similar. But their national characteristics are still sufficiently different to provide ample opportunity to examine some of the alternative military political roles found in developing countries.
Thus, Brazil is larger than the continental United States; she will shortly have one hundred million people. Though until the 1950s she seemed content to maintain a foreign policy stance geared to that of the United States, Brazil obviously has the potential for world power. Most important, perhaps, Brazil's dual economy contains in the temperate southern region around São Paulo an industrial sector capable in many ways of rivaling that of individual European countries. It is the largest industrial complex outside the Northern Hemisphere.

Peru, on the other hand, has but one-sixth the population of Brazil, spread out over a territory which, though large, is substantially smaller than Brazil's. More important, Peru's modern industrial development is both small and geographically restricted to the coastal sectors. Peru would be an underdeveloped country even if one did not take into account the Andean and Amazonian regions, whose peoples for the most part do not even speak Spanish.

These differentials and problems of national development are highlighted in Latin America by what is, comparatively speaking, a low conflict environment. Despite occasional tensions between states, Latin America is generally at peace with itself and only marginally threatened militarily by the outside world. This relatively low potential for international armed conflict has two immediate consequences for Latin American security policies. In the first place, Latin American military roles and activities cannot be easily compared to high conflict areas like Southeast Asia, or even to high potential conflict areas like what U.S. post-World War II doctrine called "forward defense areas," bordering the Soviet Union. In the second place, in the relative absence of international tensions, the actual content of national security policies is likely to reflect the domestic problems of the countries involved. In the case of Latin America, this has increasingly meant that the issues of underdevelopment and internal security have become paramount.

In the past, smaller countries frequently set their national military requirements as fractions of the military capabilities of the great powers. Thus, for example, Argentina in the 1930s could expect to maintain military forces about one-tenth the size and firepower
of those of the United States. The advent of nuclear weapons, today's sophisticated, rapidly changing and exorbitantly expensive military technologies, and the spread of social and political pressures associated with the drive for economic development have greatly complicated this picture, giving rise to a need to reassess the national security doctrine on which military requirements are based.

The emergence of new problems combined with the relative absence of more traditional defense functions thus provides many opportunities in the forging of new military doctrines, giving rise to such common questions as: Is the major threat to security internal or external? Is underdevelopment itself the greatest threat to security? If underdevelopment is a threat to security, either in itself or because of the vulnerabilities it creates, must the military play a key role in the drive for development? If so, what is the best strategy? What is the balance between development and security? Should a country aspire to becoming a world power and therefore of necessity adopt some or all of the equipment and the doctrinal characteristics of the world powers? Or is the ultimate attainment of military great-power status a false goal, which would divert resources from economic development?

Key variables in determining the outcome of such debates seem to include, in addition to the historical stability and effectiveness of the social and political systems, differing military and civilian perceptions of the main obstacles to development and of the most immediate security threats. The utility, national orientation, and internal complexity of the public and private economic sectors are frequently involved in these perceptions and help focus the potential differences in the roles and behavior of Peru and Brazil's military forces. To what extent, for instance, does the relatively high development of Brazil's private industrial sector (at least five times larger than Peru's) contribute to the generally favorable attitudes of the military toward private economic and political activity? To what extent does the more critical posture of the Peruvian military toward some U.S. investors reflect Peru's less secure economic position? Does the development strategy that the military follow, in turn, basically affect their relationships with such key civilian groups as the Church, labor, and bureaucracy?
The reader should keep in mind, of course, that the impact of socioeconomic and other national characteristics on the military forces depends on many military and political factors. These include institutional military elements, particularly the development of the officer corps (its self-perception, its education, and its interplay with enlisted personnel and with the rest of society), the changing roles of weaponry in military affairs (reflecting the requirements of different world roles), and the dependence of some forms of military potential on economic and social prerequisites.

Finally, it should not be overlooked that different types of warfare -- even at the comparatively low levels encountered in Latin America -- have important effects on the military's size, weapons, budget needs, and relative importance as a social institution. The military requirements of irregular warfare are different from those of conventional warfare. Perhaps the best contemporary illustration is Colombia, where operations against domestic guerrilla and bandit groups since 1948 led to deferring the acquisition of more expensive (and sophisticated) major weapons. These, in turn, suddenly seemed attractive (and necessary) to many Colombians after the rise in border tensions with Venezuela in 1970.*

In peacetime, however, officers tend to be concerned with the role of the military in all aspects of national life. Much of the military educational curriculum is devoted to the economic, educational, industrial, and political aspects of development and to studying the relationship of economic frustration to internal insecurity. What happens when military development is out of phase with the socioeconomic development of society? What, for example, if modern industrial military skills are present in traditional agrarian societies? Such disharmonies can be critical in national politics, largely because of their adverse effect on military perceptions of the legitimacy of nonmilitary political elites. Does the officer corps then become the source of a movement toward technology and industrialization?

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Peru's military forces exemplify tensions and division over the proper path to military and national development in a country with still relatively limited means and potential. Brazil has perhaps an additional problem. Rather more than Peru, and not unlike India, Indonesia, or Nigeria, Brazil could be said to have the regional potential to become a major world power.

In sum, therefore, the Brazilian military governments that have succeeded each other since April 1964 and the Peruvian military leaders that assumed control in October 1968 are perhaps the two most theoretically interesting military regimes of the 1960s in Latin America. In both Brazil and Peru, the military institutions are organizationally developed and "professional" by Latin American standards, as befits the national defense forces of regionally significant countries. Because of the largely nonoperational nature of the military forces of both countries, however, the self-confidence attendant upon the attainment of organizational sophistication and higher educational and bureaucratic standards within the officer corps has tended to strengthen internal military pressures for policies designed to produce greater economic development. Their respective experiences will have significant repercussions on national security doctrines for the 1970s.

From a policy viewpoint, some additional questions affected by the evolution of new military roles include whether or not Latin America can reasonably expect to develop military establishments that neither participate in politics nor seek to modernize their forces by seeking expensive sophisticated armaments. What are the consequences of the Peruvian and Brazilian "new looks" for military "professionalism" and for Latin American development? Our analysis suggests that Samuel Huntington's view of classic military professionalism as focused on external security and as sharply delimited in scope and in essence apolitical* needs to be distinguished from a new variety of military

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professionalism that is focused on the nexus of internal security and national development, which is unlimited in scope, and which by its very nature is inherently political.

The separate essays that follow explore these themes by analyzing military attitudes and threat perceptions, and by considering how national security doctrines, in turn, affect military and civilian behavior. The discussions of Peru and Brazil, though differing in a number of details, are organized along essentially similar lines. Beginning with an analysis of the changing self-images and roles of the two military institutions, they investigate military rule as it has developed in Brazil since 1964 and Peru since 1968, consider its consequences for relations between military and civilians, and finally conclude with an analysis of the organization of military demands on society, particularly as reflected in national security doctrines.

This comparative study concludes by setting forth some of the major forces at work leading to these apparently similar role changes and by seeking to account for the different implementations of new military roles. This should enable us to evaluate the supports and strains of the two military development models, and to assess the significance of the Peruvian and Brazilian experiments for the rest of Latin America.
Part Two: PERU*

Luigi R. Einaudi

*This analysis of Peru draws heavily on its author's unpublished Rand manuscript on "The Peruvian Military," especially Chapters 5 and 8, and on materials collected therefor.
I. CHANGING MILITARY ATTITUDES AND THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Events since the military coup of October 3, 1968 have focused much attention on the "Peruvian revolution."* Indeed, it appears that the Peruvian military have altered their traditional political behavior and entered a period of political activism and nationalist militance. The longer term significance of this latest intervention for either Peru or the military institutions themselves is still unclear.

To help one understand the sources of military behavior, the opening section in this treatment of Peru emphasizes the military's self-images and the ways in which these affect their attitudes toward the military institutions, civilians, politics, and the outside world. This first section concludes by examining the military's changing threat perceptions, emphasizing the interrelationship between theory (advanced education and strategic studies) and practice (the anti-guerrilla campaign of 1965 and related intelligence experiences). The second section considers the evolution of military rule and attempts to place the officer corps in its relations with civilian society. The final section of this essay on Peru considers the tensions over military doctrines and rules produced by the military's increased social-political involvement.

Traditional Roles and Self-Images

Four abstract self-conceptions, or self-identifications, are widely shared among Peru's officers; they form the basis of varying, and often conflicting, military views of Peruvian society and the outside world.

Most widespread is the self-image of the officer as sacrificing himself in a hard career whose distinguishing virtue is discipline and efficiency. It is intimately related both to the formal nature of the military itself and to the reaction of many officers to the society around them, whether measured by the relative comforts of the urban upper classes or the "lazy ineptitude" of the rural population.

*The best general attempts to synthesize the state of Peruvian society at the time of the revolution are José Matos Mar, Fernando Fuensalida, Julio Cotler, Alberto Escobar, Augusto Salazar Bondy, and Jorge Bravo Bresani, Perú: Hoy, Siglo Veintiuno, Mexico, 1971, and, in English, Carlos A. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1969.
Second, many officers see themselves as lacking in "culture," understood as the refinement of the classically educated man. This self-assessment, however, is more characteristic of older generations than of officers trained since World War II. Increased self-confidence is one of the touchstones that distinguishes officers who support recent patterns of military activism as contrasted to the more limited roles characteristic of military intervention prior to the 1960s.

Third, military men see themselves as professionals both in applied mathematics and in organization, and therefore as technical innovators whose skills are sorely needed if Peru as a whole is to develop its full potential as a modern nation. This self-conception places considerable pressure on civilians to produce results in the search for modernization or risk being displaced by military men.

Fourth, Peruvian officers consider themselves, almost by definition, the guardians of patriotism. This is understood, with differences in emphasis, as defense of the Constitution, promotion of national development, and defense of national sovereignty. Since World War II, the more traditional, "frontier-minded," military nationalism has been increasingly supplanted by a socially conscious orientation towards national development, or, as Peruvian military doctrine puts it, toward "the attainment of national potential and well-being."

We now turn to a detailed examination of each of these self-conceptions and their interaction.

Self-Sacrifice and Discipline

Discipline is, in the peacetime Peruvian Army, both a major criterion of professionalism and a protective barrier against external criticism. It is extremely difficult to unravel the threads which make the mystique of self-discipline so important a part of the self-appraisal of most officers. But the centrality of discipline to the military career is confirmed by the fact that even a maverick like Major Victor Villanueva, in looking back on his military career, could say of himself that he lacked the aptitude to be a good officer, and then define aptitude largely in terms of discipline.*

*Villanueva, probably the most widely published and articulate commentator on the Peruvian military and their society, made this
Discipline is so fundamental to the performance of military functions that its importance in military thinking is hardly surprising. Armies throughout history have invoked discipline and the rites of military hierarchy as explanation or justification for acts questioned by outsiders. That discipline should be a major criterion of professionalism, however, suggests that specific technical skills may not be as generally important to the military career in Peru as some officers might like to believe.

But for most Peruvian officers the significance of discipline lies less in its concrete military usefulness than in the fact that discipline is the one characteristic of an officer which unequivocally distinguishes him from a civilian. There are civilians who are uncultured; there are civilians who are professionals in their fields — even, perhaps, professionals in violence;* there are civilians who are patriotic. But there is no such thing as a disciplined civilian. The importance of discipline to the Peruvian officer is thus to be sought not in military tradition but in his view of his own society: impoverished, rent by social and personal antagonisms, selfish. To be adjudged lacking discipline is the major failing of an officer. Like Peru itself, he is insufficiently "militarized": a failure.

Because discipline is a virtue restricted to the military, officers who have frequent and continuing contact with civilians run the risk of contamination, of losing their discipline, and of no longer being sufficiently military in the eyes of their colleagues. Activities involving civilians must therefore constantly be evaluated by the standard that they are tolerable only "so long as they do not impair the discipline and efficiency of the armed forces." The limits on civilian contacts that follow from these views may be drawn differently according

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*The Aprista búfalos of the 1930s and 1940s, for instance, are but the most famous of the "shock squads" organized by political parties in Peru's troubled history. Cf. Grant Hilliker, The Politics of Reform in Peru: The Aprista and Other Mass Parties of Latin America, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971, pp. 107ff.
to the individual case. But these limits provide an internal check on military participation in politics. The check is clearest in the case of institutional involvement, but it applies also to individuals. An officer who becomes too involved in partisan politics always runs the risk of being transferred to inactive status (disponibilidad) by his superiors (as happened to General Bossio in 1962).

The frequently mutual mistrust dividing military from civilian in Peru may have been somewhat eroded by the increased interaction resulting from military rule since 1968, but an important implication of the dividing line between military and civilian status is that, with few exceptions, a military man remains a military man to his death. As the (typically snide and anti-military) upper class Peruvian saying has it, "it is possible to militarize a civilian, but it is impossible to civilize a military man." Where reference is made, therefore, to a "member of the Armed Forces" as in the statutes of the 1968 revolutionary government, it can apply to officers in any of the three military statuses: active, inactive, or retired. The retention of General Velasco as President of the revolutionary military government -- after his retirement from active service in 1969 -- was therefore consistent with this interpretation of the unique and permanent quality of being a "military man."

**Attitudes Toward the Military Institutions**

The attitude of most officers, particularly in the army, toward their own institutions can best be characterized as somewhat self-conscious and fiercely sensitive to criticism. There are several reasons for this defensiveness, which is deeply rooted in Peruvian society. The most important, however, is the uneven record of the military as warriors.

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*Article 4, Decreto-Ley No. 17063 del 3 de Octubre de 1968 (Estatuto del Gobierno Revolucionario). Among the handier sources for this and other key legislation until mid-1969 are the appendices to Raúl-Estuardo Cornejo, Velasco, o el proceso de una revolución, Centro Peruano de Estudios, Investigaciones, y Documentación, Lima, 1969, which also contains a laudatory biography of General Velasco by a fellow native of the northern coastal province of Piura.*
The original Peruvians, with whom most Peruvian military histories begin, were the Incas. They may have been great warriors and the leaders of an enormous empire, but they (like the Aztecs) were defeated by a handful of Spaniards. Most of their known military history is one of glorious but unsuccessful rebellions.

Later, in the early part of the nineteenth century, independence from Spain was won largely by foreign generals and armies, led by the Argentine San Martín and the Venezuelan Bolívar. In the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), although allied with Bolivia, Peru was defeated by smaller Chile, a loss which cost her dearly in both territory and nitrate wealth. And some would add that "the army" was defeated by "the people," both in the montoneros of the civil war of 1894-1895 and in the taking of the barracks at Trujillo by the Aprista búfalos in 1932.*

Defeat has not been the sole mark of Peruvian military history, of course. The gloomy record is partially offset by the victory against Spain on May 2, 1866, and, more importantly, by the relatively recent triumph over Ecuador in 1941. The Zarumilla-Marañón dispute of 1941, in which Peruvian army and air forces in three days virtually destroyed the operational effectiveness of their Ecuadorian foes,** has done much to give Peruvian officers graduating since then a greater sense of confidence than their predecessors. It is no accident that the core of the government since 1968 contains many officers from the activist "Earthquake Generation" of cadets from the class of 1941 at the Chorrillos Military Academy.

But the fact remains that the heroes of the Peruvian army are mainly the heroes of defeat: the Inca warrior Cahuíde, holding the invading Spaniards at bay and then, overcome, hurling himself to

** See David H. Zook, Jr., Zarumilla-Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute, New York, Brookman Associates, 1964, for the best documentary account of this war.
destruction from the towers of the fortress Sacsahuaman near Cuzco; and Bolognesi, dying gloriously after defending Arica to the last man against the Chileans in 1879. These defeated heroes are far more spectacular than Peru's victorious leaders, some of whom later became as celebrated for their misdeeds as they had earlier been praised for their triumphs. President Mariano Ignacio Prado, the military hero of 1866, for example, had his image permanently tarnished when he fled to France in 1879, at the outbreak of the War of the Pacific.

To some extent, of course, self-criticism is healthy and a sign of openness to new methods and higher standards. Certainly Peru's military forces are today generally conceded to be professionally on a par with those of Argentina and Brazil. But the military's defensive-ness about their history and, frequently, their institutions, has had important political consequences. The secrecy with which the military have guarded their finances since 1941 has inflated civilian speculation about wasteful, unproductive uses of military funds. If combined with expressions of uncertainty over the need for national defense in a conventional military sense, such criticism can be devastating for traditionally conceived military roles. It is the most important single factor forcing consideration of national development activities upon even the most conservative officers.

**Attitudes Toward Politics**

Military men have a powerful impulse to see politics in a fundamentally apolitical light. This contradiction is exemplified in the opening paragraph of the action program adopted in 1944 by a secret military lodge, the Comando Revolucionario de Oficiales del Ejército (CROE):

CROE has no political implications of any kind. It is a revolutionary organization of the officers of the Army who aspire to lead the country within a democratic and strictly constitutional order.*

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*Víctor Villanueva gives the complete text in the appendix to the 1956 Peruvian edition of his classic *La Tragedia de un Pueblo y un Partido*. 
The failure to realize that revolution involves politics, though a generation old, is still typical, as is CROE's stress on the need for "morality" in public life. As recently as 1970, General Velasco was proclaiming that he was a "soldier and a revolutionary, not a politician."

To say that the traditional military prescription for good government is morality, discipline, and patriotism is to be reasonably close to fundamental old-line military attitudes. There has also always been some tension, however, between these views of politics and the military's sense of inferiority in cultural and social matters. "When a general met an ambassador, he turned red in the face and trembled," said a former minister of war, one of Peru's leading military intellectuals.** Traditionally, the thought persisted that successful politics might require more than could be brought to it by the military.

Peruvian officers' attitudes toward civilians and toward politics have historically combined into a powerful dislike for civilian politicians. Their attitude toward politics, taken with the self-image of discipline and efficiency, leads some officers to believe that they are the elect and must lead the nation. Typically, however, these same attitudes also lead to another and somewhat contradictory sense of contempt for officers who "play politics" within the military, thus undermining discipline and efficiency. With these conflicting attitudes to overcome, even among their fellow officers, it is little wonder that military leaders who ultimately do assume national leadership tend to be both tactically astute and politically tough.

The military's proposed solution to these conflicts, however, has generally been typically apolitical. Officers should be better trained. The Center for Higher Military Studies (Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) -- whose directors have proudly proclaimed it to be not a "school for presidents" but definitely a "school for statesmen")

*As the president put it in a speech in Trujillo, October 11, 1969: 
"We are not politicians, professional or otherwise. We are soldiers and we are revolutionaries." (Version issued by the Oficina Nacional de Información, p. 36.)

** General José del Carmen Marín, who made this particular comment to the author in 1964, was referring mainly to the period before World War II. By the 1960s and 1970s, mainly because of the increased development of the military as an institution (partly because of Marín's own efforts as an educator and founder of CAEM), these roles were frequently reversed.
has not only improved military training, but it has retained the traditional military prescription for national health, adding only "technology." And the means by which to instill morality, discipline, patriotism, and technology remains one of the traditional panaceas of the Peruvian military: education. As with other military attitudes, the origins of this emphasis on education are to be sought in a mixture of institutional and social factors: The importance of education to the promotion process (a step that has revolutionized the military career since the 1930s) reflects, among other things, the concerns of men sensitized by the knowledge that low social standing and limited finances had during their adolescence precluded their attending civilian universities.

Even at the CAEM, however, politics in Peru, and especially good government, was still seen in the early 1960s as an imponderable fraught with difficulties and beset by devils. Bolívar's statement that he had "ploughed the sea" in trying to govern reflects a common military attitude. "So long as Peru does not have programmatic and well-organized political parties, the country will continue to be ungovernable."* This ungovernability, however, was not attributed to the traditional and well-known civilian defects alone:

The sad and desperate truth is that in Peru, the real powers are not the Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial or the Electoral, but the latifundistas, the exporters, the bankers, and the American [U.S.] investors.**

And the oligarchic and foreign devils are joined by the APRA party — "a form of national cancer," according to the same military planners.

Despite their hostility to politics and the tendency to oversimplify complicated issues for the sake of action, Peruvian military leaders have frequently demonstrated considerable flexibility and political skill. That some officers are capable of being criollo (clever and sometimes unscrupulous realists) does not, however, alter their conviction that political compromise is fundamentally a betrayal of military values.

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**Ibid., p. 92.
Attitudes Toward Peru and Her Place in the World

As the defenders of national sovereignty and their country's territorial integrity, military men tend to adopt nationalist terminology and slogans. In recent years the "frontier-minded" nationalism of men who were largely concerned with boundary disputes has been transformed into dedication to "integral" nationalism or, as it is phrased in CAEM doctrine, "the realization of national potential and national well-being."

Military men reflect the prevailing concerns at least in part because of their extensive acquaintance with all sections of their country. This knowledge, which most of Peru's Lima-bound middle and upper classes do not possess, is acquired in several ways: through the regular assignment of officers to different regions, through study tours and travel, and through the regionally diverse backgrounds among the officer corps. These experiences, together with their association with Indian conscripts, make military officers more consistent witnesses to the regional and social imbalances of Peruvian life than any other sector of Peru's elite.

Nationalist concern also reflects the military's conscious distance from the cosmopolitan social and financial elite, as well as their sense of the need to "give our people something worth fighting for," and their middle-class fear of revolution should development not take place rapidly enough. In its most elementary forms, military nationalism may be an instinctive xenophobia, typified by Colonel Sánchez Cerro's refusal during the crises of 1930 to entertain any proposals from the diplomatic corps because he considered them an intolerable foreign interference in Peruvian affairs.

Considerable tension is due to a conflict within the officer corps as to the proper position to take vis-à-vis the United States. On the one hand, many Peruvian officers accept the U.S. military as the modern professional ideal. Although most officers express severe reservations about the capacity and willingness of the United States to understand their own social and political role, they look on the United States not only as the world's most accomplished military power
but as the country that from World War II to the mid-1960s was their primary ally and source of technical military standards, assistance, and training.

On the other hand, the defense of national sovereignty tends to bring the military into conflict, if not with the United States as such, then with particular U.S. interests. This may apply equally to American tuna fishers within Peru's 200-mile limit and to Standard Oil's petroleumb operations. Most Peruvian officers now appear to believe these conflicts will not cause Peru to become embroiled in the larger U.S.-Soviet conflict. The differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are generally seen not in ideological terms but as typical of the historic national conflicts between great powers, reduced since the Second World War to two superpowers. But no matter how remote the possibility, Peruvian officers believe it is important for Peru not to become directly involved in the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Until the 1960s, therefore, given the fact of U.S. power and the profits of being associated with it, most Peruvian officers considered their relationship to the United States, while unsatisfactory, still about the best attainable under the circumstances. Although verbally they often supported nationalist claims against certain U.S. interests, including the nationalization of petroleum, the military as a whole did so rather mechanically, more in deference to ultimate ideals than in hopes of their immediate realization. At the same time, where it was possible to do so without creating antagonism on the part of the United States, the military favored Peru's maintaining and expanding areas of autonomy and maneuverability vis-à-vis all foreign powers -- much the same policy that they adopt in their own relations with other groups in Peruvian society.

Since the mid-1960s, however, the decline of democratically oriented efforts at civilian-directed development in Peru, and the growing ineffectiveness of U.S. economic and military assistance to Peru, have led most officers, particularly in the army, to downgrade the importance of relations with the outside world, including the United States, in favor of tightened nationalist efforts at military-directed self-help.
The manner in which military attitudes and Peruvian politics have converged with changing threat perceptions to produce increased military activism in behalf of authoritarian nationalism is the topic of the next section.

The Motivation to Act: Threats and Threat Perception

Military leaders began to perceive national security problems as extending beyond conventional military operations in large part because many of the existing social and economic structures seemed so inefficient or unjust as to create the conditions for, and give legitimacy to, revolutionary protest and hence constitute a security threat. It was also believed by the military that these conditions were, ultimately, a threat to the military itself as an institution. The military officers in the national war college, Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), increasingly studied a wide range of social problems. These included questions of land reform, tax structure, foreign policy, and insurgency, and involved the formulation of politics and reforms the military felt necessary to ensure stability. The result was that military policy became much more closely linked to political policy than it had been in the past.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Peruvian officers increasingly saw their society as caught up in a fundamental, long-term crisis that threatened them both as military men and as members of the middle class. Land invasions, guerrilla movements, and acts of political terrorism were seen as the top of an iceberg of inexorably mounting social pressures caused by exploding populations that would, in the long run, overwhelm traditional social structures.

The guerrilla experience of 1965, though successfully controlled in military terms, underscored to the military the importance of social change. It also raised fundamental doubts about the capacity of civilian-directed efforts to achieve that change -- despite the fact that the military junta of 1962-1963 had helped install Fernando Belaúnde as President with the hope that he would prove to be a successful reformer. By 1966, military men were ready to perceive Belaúnde
as a failure, the more so as many of them envied the power and the activity of the civilian professionals around Belaúnde, many of whom were financially rewarded beyond the highest expectations of general officers yet were often far less competent.

The impotence of the Belaúnde government, together with the continuing presence of the aging and by then largely complacent Apristas, heightened the military's anger. Their frustration was continuously fed by incidents of social rejection by the pretentious "whiter" social elites of the coastal cities, and by the antimilitary arrogance of the United States, whose specific policies in support of the Alliance for Progress often appeared to many army officers as anti-Peruvian meddling.

Theoretical Perception of Threats: The Military School System and the CAEM

Military resentment of civilians, plutocrats, and foreigners was focused increasingly on organized political parties, which were viewed as hopelessly committed to an unjust social, political, and economic order. These views, together with the wider concerns over economic backwardness and social instability, gradually permeated the training and operations of two major institutions: the military schools, and the military intelligence services.

Ever since the founding of the Center for Military Instruction (CIMP) and the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM), in the first years after World War II, military education had improved and expanded to include socioeconomic concerns.* The CIMP opened in 1948; it pulled together military education under a single command, laying the basis for greatly expanded emphasis on continuing post-Academy training. The CAEM, which opened in 1950, offered a one-year course

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* A readily available (but sketchy) summary of the structure and function of military educational institutions, emphasizing the role of General José del Carmen Marín in the founding of CAEM, will be found in Luis Valdez Pallete, "Antecedentes de la nueva orientación de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Perú," Aportes, No. 19, January 1971.
largely devoted to social, economic, and political problems to a
selected group of colonels and generals. Moreover, officers were
couraged to follow specialized military or civilian courses both
in Peru and abroad, usually at government expense. Members of the
officer corps had studied military affairs in Europe and the United
States since the turn of the century, often winning recognition as
the best foreign students. In the 1950s and 1960s, Peruvian officers
studied economics under United Nations auspices with ECLA in Chile,
attempted unsuccessfully to import the Belgian Catholic sociologist
Frère L. J. Lebret to teach, and made innovative policy suggestions
to the conservative Prado government, some of whose members in turn
became concerned at "Communist" infiltration of the CAEM.

As William F. Whyte has suggested, most Peruvians do not believe
that success in life is based on merit.* In the military, however,
the emphasis on professional training and education in the promotion
process, particularly since World War II, has made its members perhaps
the most merit-oriented within the state bureaucracy, if not the
entire society. All navy and air force officers and more than 90
percent of all army officers are Academy graduates. The continuing
value of education in the Peruvian military career may be inferred
from the fact that, of the division generals on active duty between
1940 and 1965, no fewer than 80 percent had graduated in the top quarter
of their class at the Military Academy. In addition, the expansion
and improvement of advanced military training after 1945 introduced
a new element of competition into the officer corps and improved the
life chances of officers previously stymied by the promotion system's
dependence on class standing at the time of graduation from the
military academy. The final academy class standings, determined on
the basis of combined academic and discipline performances, were often
stifling to bright men who were deficient in discipline or conduct,
but who were in the 1950s and 1960s given new chances to prove them-
seves in advanced education, much as the development of the Air Force
had in the 1920s and 30s provided an outlet for energetic and talented
officers who had been "burned" in the regular army.

* William F. Whyte and Graciela Flores, Los Valores y el Crecimiento
The CAEM is probably the most important center for the development of Peruvian national security strategy. Many of the changed military perceptions have crystallized in CAEM studies and class exercises. Of the first 19 cabinet ministers after the 1968 revolution, 13 were CAEM graduates, including the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Council of Presidential Advisors (COAP). The Director of the CAEM is a general appointed by the Joint Command (Comando Conjunto) of the Armed Forces. The Director has a small staff and three departments and three directorates under him. The departments include the Deputy Director, who is in charge of administration and through whom the three directorates report, the Academic Council, made up of the heads of the directorates and selected professors and, finally, an optional body called the Consultative Council, which may be convened at the Director's discretion to study special problems. Of the directorates, the Academic Directorate is responsible for plans, academic programs, and the actual content of instruction. To it are assigned the students, mainly officers in the rank of full colonel, known as participants. The Directorate of National Strategy and Special Studies studies contemporary problems of national security, special problems, and the strategies of foreign powers, including the United States. The third Directorate, Research and Development, is concerned exclusively with the future.

CAEM courses in 1970 opened with an introductory study of methodology, sociology, and similar general principles. This was followed by the first major curriculum segment, the study of national reality.

* National planning, conceived less as general theory and more as related to immediate government policies, is carried out elsewhere, of course, primarily at the National Planning Institute (INP), originally established with mixed civilian and military personnel by the 1962 military junta. Civilian institutions, including universities and the research-oriented Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP), are important primarily through the impact on CAEM doctrine achieved through individual faculty members. The only documentary account of the CAEM and its development, unfortunately still in manuscript form, is Victor Villanueva, El CAEM y "La Revolución de la Fuerza Armada," Lima, no date [1971].

** This paragraph, like the preceding one, is partially based on an interview with General Augusto Freyre García, Director of National Strategy and Special Studies at the CAEM.
This segment of instruction was followed by the analysis of national potential, defined as constantly moving and changing. The contrast between reality and potential establishes national objectives which are to eliminate the differential between reality and potential.

National problems are of course studied from economic, social, military, and psychological viewpoints, each of which was represented in the second major part of the course, the study of national strategy. National strategy consists of the actual programs designed to attain national objectives. The final portion of the course is devoted to individual case studies. These studies, drawn up by the participants in the CAEM, benefit from the experiences not only of the military participants but of the civilian as well. Although occasional civilian students attended CAEM classes as early as 1961 and 1962, it was not until the mid- and late sixties that the numbers became significant on a routine basis. In 1971, 16 students out of 43 were civilians.

The CAEM has consistently taught, since its founding in 1950, that, in accordance with Article 213 of the Peruvian Constitution, the military must defend national sovereignty. Specifically, this is defined as an obligation to increase Peru's capacity for maneuver vis-à-vis the outside world, and particularly the United States. Recognition of the Soviet Union, coupled with some trade, is in harmony with this interpretation of the constitutional mandate. Similarly, the constitutional prescription for the maintenance of order is now interpreted at the CAEM as the need to ensure an order conducive to "national well-being," that is to say, the well-being of all Peruvians, not just of the dominant social classes.

Practical Threat Perception: Guerrillas, Intelligence Organization, and Petroleum

The military education system, as we have seen, developed some interesting doctrines, but it took the guerrilla campaign of 1965-1966 to force social theory out of the schools and into the barracks, thereby making the political immobilism and economic decline of the late 1960s a matter of urgent military concern. In the summer of 1965, two separately organized guerrilla fronts opened in the central
and southern Andes with ambushes of police units. Within a month, the outbreaks had led to the displacement of the relatively ineffective rural police by a joint military command and martial law in the affected forces. This in turn led to the discovery of other fronts still in the process of forming in other parts of the country. Within six months, despite forebodings in elite political circles about "revolution in the Andes," the military forces completely eliminated the guerrilla pockets and almost entirely wiped out the MIR leadership. And they did this without forcing a change in government, and without the prolonged suffering and mounting casualties characteristic of other cases of political violence (Guatemala and Colombia among them).*

Containment of the guerrilla threat also confirmed the military in their commitment to reform. The guerrillas had chosen for their headquarters a remote mountaintop called "Mesa Pelada" near the Convención Valley in the Province of Cuzco, where the famous Trotskyist labor organizer Hugo Blanco had successfully organized peasant unions in the early 1960s, before his capture in 1963. But the Convención Valley had also been the scene of construction of a penetration road from Colca to Amparaes by military engineer battalions, and had been the site of a pilot agrarian reform program by the military junta of 1962-1963. The failure of the region's peasants to provide significant support to the insurgents appeared in military circles to confirm the wisdom of the earlier reform policies.

The sense of success was tempered, however, by fear of a recrudescence of violence. If a handful of radicalized urban intellectuals could occupy thousands of troops for months, what would happen if popular forces and the peasantry were enlisted in future disorders?

*The official account of the campaign is Las guerrillas en el Perú y su represión (The Guerrillas in Peru and Their Repression), published by the Peruvian Ministry of War, Lima, 1966. See also Hector Béjar Rivera, Perú 1965: Apuntes sobre una experiencia guerrillera, Casa de las Americas, Havana, 1969, for an intelligent analysis by one of the few surviving leaders.
The Ministry of War's published account of the guerrilla campaign concluded that Peru had entered a period of "latent insurgency."

Nor was this a matter to be readily resolved with foreign assistance. Guerrilla war had proved the undoing of France, first in Indochina and then in Algeria. French military operations had been observed by Peruvian officers with French training and connections. Now Vietnam was proving the Achilles' heel of the United States, demonstrating the difficulties that irregular warfare could create even for the world's foremost military power. The conclusion that the fate of these two historic military mentors seemed to suggest for Peru was that internal subversion would have to be controlled by Peruvians alone, if indeed it could be controlled at all.

The "latent insurgency" dilemma appeared to open many officers to the idea that Peru needed agrarian reform combined with industrialization, or, in the more abstract language of the Ministry of War, a "General Policy of Economic and Social Development." According to this view, similar to the McNamara-Rostow thesis that violence springs from economic backwardness, conditions of injustice in the countryside needed to be removed so that the absentee landowner and his local henchmen no longer would exploit and oppress the rural peasant masses, whose marginal living conditions were making them potential recruits for future subversion and movements against military and governmental authorities.

Elimination of the latent state of subversion now became the primary objective of military action. In a formal intelligence analysis by General Mercado, the man who was to become Peru's foreign minister after the 1968 revolution, the "latent state of subversion" was defined as the presence of Communist activity exploiting national weaknesses. ** This Communist activity, which took a variety of forms --

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*Las guerrillas en el Perú y su represión, op. cit., p. 80.

military, political, economic, and social — was containable for the present. But the existence of national weaknesses continually threatened to point the balance against the forces of progress and order. National weak spots were defined, in General Mercado's remarkable statement of this theory, to cover a wide range of organizational, economic, technical, and political elements. His list of national weaknesses included fiscal crises, scarcity of trained personnel, resistance to change by privileged groups, inadequate scientific and technical development, lack of unity and coordination of efforts, absence of effective international security cooperation, lack of governmental control and communication with the rural areas, and, finally, lack of identification by the population with national political objectives. The reforms introduced by the revolutionary military government that took office less than a year after Mercado's article had appeared were largely meant to offset these weaknesses. *

But threat perceptions, fear, and antisubversive warfare were not the only wellsprings of action. Genuine compassion for the conditions of the rural population was quite common among officers who had served in rural areas during regular tours as well as during the guerrilla campaign, and who often found emotional and ideological support for such feelings in paternalist Catholic social doctrines, which stressed that every man had a right to an existence offering material and spiritual dignity. In fact, there can be little doubt that among the major intellectual and moral forces impelling the largely Catholic military to action were the progressive priests and scholars who in the 1960s helped move the hierarchy of the Church in Peru to reorient its political participation in the direction of greater social justice for all Peruvians, including the poor. **

Communists, of whatever variety, were not, however, the only enemies of order and security in Peru. Many officers, accustomed since the War

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* See the discussion below, under Military Rule and Relations with Civilians.

of the Pacific in 1879 to seeing external enemies exploit internal weaknesses, had come to believe that the United States, in alliance with Peru's "oligarchy," favored Peru's continuing in a state of under-development. This view associated the United States with Peru's vulnerability to subversion as well as to more traditional external threats. The Belaúnde government had been strongly supported by most military men as a reformist movement dedicated to national progress. Its fumbling, which some attributed to American support, only added to this theorizing, which to outsiders sometimes seems to verge on paranoia.

"Foreign interests, the oligarchy, and the decrepit politicians in their pay" was the way President Velasco was later to characterize this new subversive force, or "anti-Patria."* Although one result of studying political and social problems may be to realize their complexity, another may be to undermine the credibility of solutions advanced by political parties, thereby weakening the claim of civilian leadership to sole legitimacy. The legitimacy of civilian leadership was further eroded in Peru during the 1960s by the information collected through the increased activity of military intelligence services. The military command developed evidence of the corruption and compromises that were the daily fare of Peruvian politics. Even normal political compromise finds little acceptance in the military's values, as we have already discussed. Peruvian politics have never been very clean. Yet not every form of misconduct provokes indignation. A particularly messy smuggling scandal broke under the Belaúnde administration in early 1968. But smuggling, to military people, was sufficiently common not to be in itself cause to unseat Belaúnde. But in the context of the payment by private interests of "contributions" to political parties and leaders, of continuing inaction on basic reforms, and of Congressional privilege, it was enough to lead increasing portions of the military, including nationalist elements in the intelligence services, to side with Catholic priests and others who denounced "corruption" in government.

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*In a speech in Talara, October 9, 1969, commemorating the take-over of the International Petroleum Company. Mensaje a la nación, dirigido por el Señor General de División Presidente de la República, desde Talara, en el primer aniversario del día de la dignidad nacional, Lima, Oficina Nacional de Información, 1969, p. 7.
All of these complicated matters were involved in the explosive petroleum issue that came to a head in the proposed Talara Agreement of 1968 and provided the immediate impetus behind the overthrow of Belaunde and the installation of the government that still rules Peru today, two-and-a-half years later. This is not the place to review the petroleum affair,* except to point out that the debate over IPC became pivotal in helping to associate the United States government with the Peruvian and American private interests military officers were already increasingly perceiving to be inimical to Peruvian security and development.**

As General Arturo Cavero later explained to a group of visiting American military officers, threats to the internal security of Peru could originate in the plotting of groups opposed to peaceful revolution as well as in the efforts of groups who sought to impose revolution by violence.*** General Cavero, who is now the director of CAEM, spoke

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*Richard Goodwin described the intricate historical and legal background of the La Brea y Pariñas deposits, and the incredible ineptitude that marked the company's and Belaunde's dealings with each other in his "Letter from Peru," *The New Yorker*, May 17, 1969.

**Perhaps even more than the fishing industry (in which Peru now competes with Japan for world primacy), petroleum fits the category of a basic national resource. Contrary to some suspicions in the United States at the time that President Velasco had been irresponsible and unrepresentative, he almost certainly acted with broad military support in the IPC case. As early as February 5, 1960, the Joint Staff, over the signature of the Commanding General of the Army, publicly recorded its belief that the La Brea y Pariñas agreements were "harmful to national sovereignty." That it took nearly nine years to put belief into practice is a sign of institutional caution rather than individual recklessness. An "inside dopester" account of the political history of the petroleum issue from the Peruvian perspective, of additional interest because shortly after writing it its author moved from the conservative newspaper *El Comercio* to the directorship of the Government Information Bureau run by the presidency, is Augusto Zimmerman Zavala, *La Historia Secreta del Petroleo*, Lima, 29 August 1968.

when relations with the United States had improved from their low in early 1969, when application of the Hickenlooper Amendment seemed imminent, threatening to cut U.S. economic assistance and sugar quotas in response to the IPC nationalization. But Cavero began his remarks to the U.S. officers by pointedly quoting from General Mercado's speech before the United Nations in April of 1969:

The threat has varied over time. At first it was narrowly military in nature. Then new and subtler psychological and ideological threats arose against the security of each country. Today we face a new threat: economic aggression. Just as we fought against the violent aggression generated by guerrillas and by different forms of terrorism, so we are now fighting against economic aggression.

Cavero's U.S. military audience can have had no doubts about the direction of these remarks. Nor could they have had much doubt that the Peruvians meant what they said: in May 1969, less than a year before, Peru's military government had expelled the U.S. military missions from Peru.*

For a combination of reasons, then, many officers, particularly in the army, moved in the late 1960s toward an authoritarian preemption of what had traditionally been nationalist and left-wing positions, especially on petroleum and agrarian reform. But unlike the left, whose leaders dreamed of guerrillas or elections, the military was to impose their views under the aegis of a nationalist military dictatorship pledged to the nonviolent modernization of Peru. The following chapter analyzes the symbiosis between this new form of military intervention, Peruvian society, and the traditions of past military rule.

*The immediate cause of the expulsion was an attempt to retaliate for prior U.S. suspension of military sales (imposed in accordance with the requirements of the Pelly Act as a result of the perennial tuna disputes). The departure of the missions was also, however, delayed proof of the deterioration in both political and military relations between the two countries during the mid- and late-1960s. See Luigi R. Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations with the United States, P-4389, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, June 1970.
II. MILITARY RULE AND RELATIONS WITH CIVILIANS

The Peruvian military have traditionally played a caretaker role or at least have demonstrated few institutional pretensions to formulate national policy or to adopt innovative programs other than what might be espoused by individual military leaders. Until the mid-twentieth century, of course, military reticence was largely a reflection of institutional weakness. But despite hints during the 1940s and 1950s that a series of "military" policy preferences were emerging, the traditional "arbitral" role first showed real strain in 1962, when the military institutions as such took over the government, acting in strict accordance with the formal military chain of command. Shortly after the coup, some officers apparently became dissatisfied with the limited caretaker function assumed by the military junta. The president of the junta and a few military ministers allowed themselves a number of statements indicating policy preferences which went beyond even the most broadly defined caretaker role. In the end, however, the officers who were showing signs of exceeding the institutional consensus were shunted aside. The junta, after a cautious term, returned power to an elected civilian (Fernando Belaúnde) and retreated: the three officers who had served as co-presidents went into retirement, the armed forces to their barracks.*

We have just seen something of how the Peruvian military in the late 1950s and early 1960s increasingly perceived that their role of providing for national security did not merely entail conventional military operations. As was happening simultaneously in Brazil, security came to be seen as part of a total economic, social, psychological, and military package. Fidel Castro's victory hastened this spread in Latin America of French and other theories which saw revolutionary warfare encompassing all sectors. This in turn provided an additional stimulus to the military to formulate a counterstrategy in all sectors.

Politically, what was of central importance was the growing belief within military officer corps that the existing political institutions were incapable of implementing the social and economic policies the military now increasingly felt were necessary to insure national security.

In Peru, at least, this shift in military perceptions could take place largely unperceived by civilians because of a high degree of military autonomy and secrecy. Legal provisions regulating military relations with civilians have always been highly ambiguous. As a rule, the military have enjoyed considerable operating autonomy, reinforced by secrecy (generally extending even to other government agencies) in such matters as finances, personnel, and organization. In Peru, therefore, let alone in the United States, the analysis of Peruvian military affairs is often hampered by lack of information, a fact that contributes to civilian suspicions about military motives and activities.

Article 213, Title 12, of the Constitution of 1933 furnishes an interesting example of ambiguity in a fundamental matter. It provides that "the purpose of the Armed Forces is to guarantee the rights of the Republic, the fulfillment of the Constitution and the Laws, and the conservation of public order." Although this provision does not conform to U.S. and European constitutional traditions, similar formulas are common in Latin America, where they have often been employed by constitution drafters seeking to check potential executive abuse. Civilian governments whose popular support is declining and whose policies are under attack on grounds of constitutionality have always considered military views with great care, even before the recent rise in the military's political activity.

This ambiguity in Peru's civil-military tradition underscores the need to explore informal as well as formal patterns of the military's linkages with their society. Looking, first, at the military as rulers, we shall examine past military governments and try to identify areas outside the strictly military arena in which the military have shown a permanent institutional concern. We will then explore the links of military officers to different Peruvian social groups.

*This provision is generally cited for authority in public explanations of military coups. Cf. 3 de Octubre de 1968: ¿Por Qué?, Publicación del Comando Conjunto de la Fuerza Armada, Lima, 1968, p. [7].
The Military as Rulers*

The five successful coups of modern Peru before 1968 produced two transitional governments, two lasting governments headed by military officers, and one eleven-year government (the longest in Peruvian history) with a civilian very much in control. This last case, the result of the revolution of 1919 which put Augusto B. Leguía into office until 1930, was in no way a military government and therefore does not concern us, except as evidence that a military coup need not necessarily lead to greater military participation in government. The two coups which produced transitional military governments were the anti-Billinghurst coup of 1914, which put General Oscar Benavides in power for sixteen months, and the 1962 coup, which led to a caretaker military government that lasted a year and ten days.

In 1914, the coup was essentially negative or preventive; once Billinghurst was deposed, the objective had been achieved. Benavides, who had been chief of the nascent general staff but not commander-in-chief, merely acted as chief of state until a convention of political parties could agree on a new civilian president. He did not bring military officers into the administration, and made no effort to become a politician. This first Benavides government is a prototype for civilian manipulation of power behind a military façade.

The revolution of 1930 (which ultimately was to bring General Benavides to power again) and the revolution of 1948 (which began an eight-year rule by General Odría) were very different, though both resulted in lengthy "military" rule.

General Benavides became enough of a politician during his second occupancy of the presidency (1933-1939) to remain in office, but not enough of one to lose his military allegiances and loyalty. In a country where the scope of government was still relatively limited, and in

* Military rule, as distinct from military interventions and coups, is an infrequently discussed subject. The most important treatment of military rule in Peru is provided (from a generally socialist perspective) by retired army major Victor Villanueva, El Militarismo en el Perú, Empresa Gráfica Scheuch, Lima, 1962. A brief summary of the individual coups themselves is provided by the retired military historian Gen. Felipe de la Barra, Objetivo: Palacio de Gobierno (Historia de los "golpes" militares en el Perú), Lima, 1967.
which the politically articulate were largely agreed on the need for a breathing spell from violent partisan strife, Benavides behaved like a conservative autocrat. He directed civil government with an occasional technocratic touch, and the military with a strong emphasis on rationalized promotion procedures as the basis of professionalism.*

General Odría, on the other hand, rapidly opted for conversion from officer to politician. Unlike Benavides, who had had the reputation of being the best soldier of his generation, Odría was better known for his personal courage (which was unquestioned) than for his brains. After he had broken with his initial civilian allies, moreover, Odría's position seemed to be based largely on his extensive use of the police and generous exploitation of Peru's rising foreign exchange revenues, received in the wake of the Korean War. Not until long after military pressures directed at the corruption of his regime forced him to step down, when a new election approached in 1962, was it realized that, as had happened contemporaneously in Colombia with Rojas Pinilla and in Venezuela with Pérez Jiménez, the public works prosperity of his regime had gained him considerable political capital among the urban working class and the slum dwellers.

This rapid review of military interventions prior to 1968 suggests that on those occasions the military were not particularly well qualified or anxious to govern on more than a brief caretaker basis. In or out of power, however, the military did play an important role in mediating between civilian political factions. They also made a limited contribution to development. Before analyzing events since 1968, let us briefly spell out the nature of military interests in what we could call areas of permanent institutional concern.

Although explicitly political activities have played a less and less prominent part in the lives of individual officers, the areas of continuing institutional concern and interest have steadily expanded in both variety and depth, to the point where today they involve most aspects of public life to some degree.

*Benavides' political skill is amply demonstrated by the fact that Peruvians still disagree on whether he ever really wanted to be president -- this, of a man whose two stays in the Casa de Pizarro totaled nearly eight years, and who also engineered the APRA-Bustamente coalition in 1945 after having placed Prado in office in 1939!
Preservation of Institutional Autonomy. The major continuing concern of the Peruvian military, as of any large bureaucracy, is institutional preservation and solidarity. It has mainly expressed itself in efforts to insulate the military against external interference. In essence, this policy began after 1895 with the attempt to professionalize the army in accordance with President Piérola's maxim "no tocar al ejército" (don't touch the army).

Beginning with the presidency of General Oscar Benavides, in 1914, autonomy meant the habitual naming of a military officer, rather than a civilian, to the post of defense minister. After a decline of military influence during the dictatorship of Augusto Leguía (1919-1930), Benavides reinstituted the policy of military autonomy during his second presidency, from 1933 to 1939, and it was further strengthened in 1941 by the imposition of broad secrecy regulations. In the 1950s, when the minister came to be viewed as the senior service officer, virtually independent of civilian selection or control, the military succeeded in steadily enlarging the areas of institutional autonomy and freedom from external control.

Institutional preservation remains an important concern of the Peruvian military today. A greater social awareness on the part of most officers in the 1960s has led to a rather ambiguous attempt to combine the historic "survival through autonomy" strategy we have just described with one of "survival through leadership of change." Realization that the military is "not an island" could lead to considerably greater radical involvement in politics than military conservatives would like.

Control and Development of Remote Areas. Frontier provinces where the possibility of border conflicts exists have traditionally been another important military concern. The northern province of Tumbes and the Amazonian province of Iquitos, for example, were initially largely under military administration. The army and navy provided health, sanitation, and other facilities incidental to the stationing of troops and to the consolidation of national territory. These, and the air transport services later furnished by the air force, were the first such facilities for the local population in those remote and underpopulated areas.
Since the 1920s, the doctrine of the frontier has come to include all remote areas. Military topographers and engineers in the 1930s and 1940s planned road nets for them, which initially were justified as strategic communication links for external defense. As they were actually built, during the 1960s, the roads were increasingly seen as means of access and economic development for areas where conditions of labor supply, security, or health were such that private enterprise could not operate efficiently.

National Planning and Development. De facto military government of remote areas set a precedent for the greater military participation in studies and projects on national development which began in the mid-1950s. The CAEM assigned the primary responsibility for national development to the state, strongly implying the need for extensive military participation.

In 1958, the CAEM published a proposal for the development of the Central Selva.* The study on which the proposal was based was the first systematic military effort to develop cost estimates for a specific development program. More important, it seriously proposed that a large geographic territory be put under exclusively military administration for the purpose of conducting a controlled experiment in agricultural and industrial development. This proposal was successfully sidetracked by the civilian prime minister, Pedro Beltrán, in favor of an A. D. Little research project.** Beltrán's innocuous substitute was less dangerous to established civilian elites, but it earned Beltrán considerable military enmity.

In 1962, however, the military junta founded the National Planning Institute, with a highly competent colonel at its head. Until the mid-1960s, many in the military were chary of military civic action and extensive military commitments to development programs. In the early 1960s, the army nonetheless sent ten officers to study agricultural

* Centro de Altos Estudios Militares, El Desarrollo de La Selva Central, Chorrillos, 1958.
cooperatives in Israel, and it was rare to find a traveling inspection committee or commission that did not include at least one military officer. Since 1968, the National Planning Institute has been at the heart of government policy.

Education. The Ministry of Education was founded in 1936, when General Benavides named his close associate General Ernesto Montagne Marckholz as the first Minister of Public Education. Since then a number of officers have held the ministry, including General Juan Mendoza Rodríguez during the presidency of General Manuel A. Odría (1948-1956), and General Ernesto Montagne Sánchez (son of the original minister) under President Belaúnde in 1964-1965.

Military interest in education is thus of long standing. It derives partly from an appreciation of the importance of education to social advancement, often based on personal experience, and partly from the recognition that the educational system can serve the establishment of a broad base of instruction for national development and defense and the reinforcement of nationalist values generally.

Under the senior General Montagne, a number of basic reforms were introduced to control and "Peruvianize" private secondary education by establishing curriculum requirements (minimal standards for the study of Peruvian history, etc.) and controlling the nationality of teachers and the languages of instruction. In 1939, Montagne reorganized and extended the program of "pre-military instruction," designed to provide secondary and university students with a basic military education and to expand the study of Peruvian history, geography, and the "defense of nationalism."

When General Mendoza became Minister of Education, in 1948, he had already participated with Generals Marín and Romero Pardo in the creation of a militarized secondary school, the Colegio Militar Leoncio Prado. This school, which was operated under the Ministry of War, was

*See, for example, the long-range development strategy statement prepared by the Institute: Estrategia del Desarrollo Nacional a Largo Plazo. Resumen. Texto Aprobado por el Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social en su primera sesión, celebrada el día martes 19 de noviembre de 1968, Instituto Nacional de Planificación, Lima, Peru, 1968.
dedicated not only to providing an opportunity for young men to become acquainted early with the military vocation but also, as Romero Pardo put it in an interview, to "transmitting military values of honor, duty, and discipline to future civilian leaders."

General Mendoza, who like most military men had experienced the difficulty of acquiring a secondary education, concentrated his efforts as Minister of Education on modernizing technical equipment, building new schools, and otherwise easing the bottleneck in secondary education.* His choice of priorities was roundly denounced by university students, whose educational needs Mendoza's policies largely ignored, as they also ignored primary education for the Indian population.

Foreign Policy. Although foreign policy has been a traditional concern of the military because of its closeness to the national defense mission, the military have had little to do with either the formulation or the execution of foreign policy. By 1970, only seven officers had held the portfolio of foreign affairs, fewer than had headed any other long-established ministry.

In part, this limited role probably reflects the limited latitude of Peru in foreign policy. It also reflects, however, the traditional self-consciousness and sense of inferiority of most army officers in the face of the complexities and aristocratic pomp of diplomacy. The most important military foreign ministers prior to the naming of Army General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín in 1968 had been navy men: Admiral Federico Díaz Dulantó and Admiral Luis Enrique Llosa G.P. Both were better connected in cosmopolitan social and political circles than most high-ranking army officers.

Military nationalism, once rather narrowly frontier-minded, began after World War II to be concerned with the broader issues of national sovereignty and development. The more traditional defense of territorial sovereignty began in the late 1950s to be supplemented by the defense of natural resources, particularly petroleum. In 1960, the Commander of the Comando Conjunto formally concluded a staff exercise with

a written statement to the President of the Republic declaring the contracts held by the International Petroleum Company (IPC) to be harmful to Peruvian sovereignty.*

Until 1968, the military's conservatism and their ambivalence toward the United States, the political tormentor but military benefactor, prevented them from taking action. But by 1968, both the military's sense of inferiority and the support of the United States had declined to the point of encouraging, first, the advocacy of an independent foreign policy and, finally, the "nationalist internationalism" of the Revolutionary Military Government headed by General Velasco.**

Support of Government Administration. The armed services have traditionally supplied an important number of aides to the President of the Republic and to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies; since 1968 they also assign officers to work on loan in the "civilian" ministries. These various positions, not infrequently given to outstanding junior and field-grade officers, sometimes serve as a means of coordination between the agencies concerned. With individual exceptions, however, they also seem to be the political channels of communication between the military services and the specific office to which the officer is assigned. Since 1968, this pattern has been supplemented by effective policy control through the militarized Council of Ministers, as coordinated by the Presidential Advisory Group (COAP).

Although the army is generally the dominant service, all three military services are fiercely independent and are only loosely coordinated by a small joint command (Comando Conjunto). All operate under similar internal regulations, and each is under the command of its senior active-duty officer. Since 1968, these three officers, the commanding generals of the army, navy, and air force, choose the president of the Revolutionary Government and countersign all his acts.

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* See above, pp. 20 and 30n.

** Military attitudes toward the United States, and some aspects of conflicts over arms purchases and doctrine are also reviewed in Luigi R. Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations with the United States, P-4389, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, June 1970.
The Military and Society

Military men, as we have seen, traditionally set themselves apart from civilians. More, they sometimes have seemed to consider civilians with a mixture of suspicion and contempt. In general social terms, most officers distinguish among three broad classes of civilians: the "oligarchy," the "middle class," and the "people," this last category including a subgroup, the "Indians."

The military's self-identification today, particularly in the army, is largely with the middle class. Officers often discuss military ranks in class terms, with company-grade or junior officers considered equivalent to lower-middle class, majors and lieutenant colonels corresponding to middle-middle, and colonels and generals identified with the upper-middle class. Navy and air force officers tend rather to identify themselves with middle- to upper-middle class groups.

The "oligarchy," in contrast, is the focus of resentments and feelings of inferiority, and is most often held responsible both for military defeats and for lack of national development. The explanation of much of today's military activism may be found in the desire to demonstrate freedom, finally, from the social groups who historically dominated Peru, all the while despising the military. They are now being repaid in kind, for the military, in the much quoted 1962 phrase of General Bossio, have tired of being considered "the watchdogs of the oligarchy."

The "people," on the other hand, are the great positive symbol for the military, as they are also for radical politicians. In the military view, however, the people, while often exploited, are lacking in discipline, skills, and leadership, and will therefore need guidance and protection for a long time to come. This conception could be likened to the elitist Leninist view of the need for an organized revolutionary vanguard without the ultimate goal of either egalitarianism or, necessarily, freedom. Ironically, the guerrilla campaigns of 1965 may have in this respect contributed to weakening long-standing civil-military differences, as officers became more concerned with the need to allow change, and civilian intellectuals and progressives became less optimistic about bringing it about in a democratic fashion.
As a result of the actual experience of governing which has frequently forced improvisation under pressure, the military now seems to be further broadening its ties to civilian sectors. Both in the ministries and among entrepreneurs and even civilian professionals some of the traditional barriers of distrust and suspicion are collapsing. We begin our review of military relations with civilians by considering military relations with the upper classes, perhaps the key to understanding military involvement in politics today.

Relations with the Upper Classes

The "oligarchy," however defined, could always be characterized as ambivalently hostile toward the military, particularly the army, long before the 1968 revolution systematically abrogated its privileges.*

The social and cultural gulf that separates most of the upper classes from the military often breeds contempt, only partly checked by the hope that the military may act as an ultimate brake on social upheaval and chaos. The cost and dangers of military autonomy to the oligarchy are both considerable. Indeed, the 1968 revolution suggests that the military may have decided to sacrifice the upper class for the sake of development.

That there is almost a complete lack of contact between the military and the social and financial elite of Peru is clear. Of the 630 men who in 1963 belonged to the boards of directors and top management of the 86 largest business enterprises in Peru,** only 4 were military men, and in fact the only ones, as far as can be determined, ever to have served in the military. Of these four, one retired general and one retired

*For an interesting analysis that identifies "the oligarchy" as white-skinned psychological foreigners living in a conquered country and therefore prevented by their racist prejudices from understanding or relating effectively to the generally darker and "popular" military officers, see Manuel D'Ornelles Suárez, "Militares y oligarquía en el Perú," Mundo Nuevo, No. 43, January 1970. D'Ornelles subtly adds that for all their increasing progressivism, many officers remain essentially middle-class in outlook, fearful of displacement by mass groups under revolutionary leadership whether by the older and more conservative Apristas or by the newer Castro-like variety.

**As listed in the Banco del Crédito's Vademecum del Inversionista, Lima, 1964.
colonel were presidential appointees on the boards of semipublic corporations; another was an active-duty colonel serving as an adviser to the board of an explosives manufacturing company. Peruvian officers, in part because state enterprise has not been extensive in Peru, have had relatively little experience in economic management. This means that their perception of private business problems and potentials is more limited than, for example, that of their opposites in Argentina and Brazil who for many years have been involved in various kinds of state-owned or managed business organizations.

This divorce between the military and financial-industrial circles, rather surprisingly, holds true also in large agriculture. None of the 51 members of the board of the National Agrarian Society in 1963 was a military man, although one had a brother who was an army officer. Similarly, fewer than 1 percent of the members of the exclusive Club Nacional are military officers. Indeed, the history of the Club Nacional provides a valuable insight into the changing nature of the Peruvian upper classes and their relations with the military.

The Club Nacional has steadily increased its membership in recent decades, becoming in the process less socially exclusive and more open to wealth. Nevertheless, it no longer plays the role in Peruvian life that it played until 1930 and, though in modified form, for some years thereafter. It was only in the early 1950s, in fact, that General Odría finally spoiled the Club’s virtual territorial inviolability by using a police raid to break up a meeting of the elite opposition, some of whose members fled across rooftops to avoid arrest.

**The Strategy of Personal Cooptation of Military Officers.** In 1914 and again in 1930, individual military officers were coopted into the Club Nacional during periods of crisis. This amounted to a "personal," or individual, strategy for dealing with military power. Prominent, promising, and even such potentially hostile officers as Colonel Sánchez Cerro were brought into the Club, where they could be exposed to the "correct" people, views, and politics. So long as the officer corps remained strongly subject to personal influence and prestige, this kind of strategy could, and often did, work.

As the officer corps expanded and became increasingly bureaucratic, however, such a strategy could be expected to work less well. Indeed,
there is no evidence that it has been formally attempted since 1930. Only a mere handful of officers have been admitted to the Club since then, and generally not for political reasons. Conversely, even when a political conspiracy deeply involved leading members of the Club Nacional, as in the preparations for the Odría coup of 1948, no effort was made to coopt the chief military conspirators or even their (perhaps more acceptable) civilian allies.

The development of impersonal military leadership that brought about these changes was due partly to the sheer growth of the officer corps (which has more than doubled since 1940 alone); partly to the professional criteria for promotion introduced at the turn of the century but systematically adhered to only with the advent of the second Benavides administration in 1933; and partly to a growing sophistication and resistance to personal blandishments among officers, whose social consciousness was receiving more and more institutional support.

The civilian elites therefore resorted to a new, less personal strategy in seeking to minimize the dangers to their interests represented by the greater institutionalization of the military. This strategy could be characterized as an attempt to secure a mutual guarantee of neutrality and noninterference supplemented by the payment of good salaries and benefits to the officer corps. In effect, the military were to be allowed to develop along increasingly autonomous lines under the shield of the secrecy about military activities initially imposed in 1941, on the occasion of the conflict with Ecuador, and maintained since. In return, they were to stick to their own job and not interfere with that of business.

While supporting the military as a potential brake on revolution, this strategy sought to enlist the military's institutional self-interest in defense of the status quo. The conservative press lost no opportunity in the late 1950s and the 1960s to play on the military's fears of overextending themselves and prejudicing their institutional position. Simultaneously, in an effort at collective financial persuasion, elite political leaders supported improved military benefits, particularly upon retirement, so as to give officers a greater stake in the status quo. Cynics claim unfairly that the relative decline of military remuneration during the decade of the 1960s was a chief source of military radicalism leading to the failure in 1968 of the "oligarchic" strategy.
If extended to groups other than the military elite, similar strategies of "group" or "class" rather than "individual" cooption could bring about not only the further dilution of elite control but also an increasing pluralism in political life. Peruvian politics would thus cease to revolve around a coopting elite willing to make personal concessions and would move instead toward a more "modern" competitive system. Despite their authoritarianism, the military "revolutionaries" of 1968 may also be contributing to such an outcome by seeking to give the working classes a stake in the system -- but at the expense of the social elites who originated this tactic for dealing with the military, and lost.

Relations with the Middle Classes

It is difficult to find clear-cut attitudes toward the military among middle-class groups. Public and private employees envy the military's retirement benefits and special privileges. Some intellectuals and students react negatively to any group as closely linked to authority as is the military, while others are favorably disposed precisely because the army represents authority and force. Some professionals and most politicians frequently see the military as a competing and therefore hostile group, yet they recognize in them also potential allies and are constantly looking for ways to enlist their support. Members of the professions often are contemptuous of the military as professionals, yet equally often are overawed by military efficiency.

Occasionally, one finds among the middle class some uncompromisingly antimilitary attitudes. The clearest such view that the author encountered was expressed as follows by a young lawyer-politician, himself the son of an air force general:

The military is best characterized by egotism, arrogance, ignorance, and abuse. . . . We should do all we can to keep the military ignorant. If we educate them, if we motivate them, then in addition to their power they will have an insatiable ambition. You see, education may be fine in the long run, but if in the meanwhile it merely adds a certain amount of arrogance and half-knowledge to the abusiveness and ignorance which they already have, then they will wind up completely asphyxiating us. . . .
More common is the mixture of attitudes revealed in rapid succession in a single statement by a journalist:

Can you imagine the military bureaucracy our country has? Why, we have a division of generals alone. And what for? What this country needs is for this money to be spent on development. But we'll never get rid of the military, they're much too powerful and nobody will ever dare cut the budget. . . . I'll give you five reasons why Peru needs a large military establishment: Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. . . . Democracy is more than a matter of elections. If I were a Chilean, and if the Chilean Communists win next Sunday's election, I would go on my knees — yes, on my knees — to the military to ask them to pull a coup.

Middle-class civilians typically are torn between these contradictory attitudes. Some also reveal the dilemma between their liberal values and their experiences with the military.

The last military dictatorship [the speaker was referring to the junta of 1962-63] didn't seem like a dictatorship at all. You couldn't feel it. There was freedom of the press, freedom of assembly. People gathered and could talk like you and me in this restaurant as if nothing had happened.

This statement supports the best generalization that can be made about middle-class groups in relation to the military: Their attitudes are likely to be ambivalent and their behavior pragmatic.

Relations with the Petite Bourgeoisie

One sector within the middle classes with which the military's relations have improved dramatically during the decade of the sixties is the petite bourgeoisie of the small and medium entrepreneurs. Both groups, although generally treated with contempt by Peru's traditional ruling classes, have been increasing in numbers and importance since World War II. Many children of officers, who previously would have followed a military career, have chosen to move into the middle classes, often as professionals, sometimes as managers and entrepreneurs. Since the mid-1950s, also, virtually for the first time in modern Peruvian history, some officers have resigned their commissions to enter business, generally utilizing their technical skills learned in military service.
To this change in Peru's own social structure must be added the shared apprehensions over the role of the United States. For many Peruvian entrepreneurs, this translates into fear of the competition of American firms and their subsidiaries. The experience of the Belaunde regime, furthermore, convinced both military and civilian elements that dependence on the United States Government and its public assistance programs, viewed initially as a potential counterweight to American private interests, was in fact a delusion, particularly if it was allowed to replace Peruvian initiatives. In both groups, therefore, a strong sense of nationalism, directed against both plutocrats and foreigners, became increasingly evident in the late sixties. Nonetheless, civil-military suspicions remain. Peruvian entrepreneurs are particularly fearful that the military's authoritarianism and their emphasis on an expanded role for the state may stifle Peruvian private enterprise quite as much as does foreign competition.

We noted earlier that most military men are considered, and generally consider themselves, as belonging to the middle class. Given the dependence of most of the middle class either on a powerful private employer or on the government payroll, it is sometimes argued, therefore, that the military are potentially the most independent and politically effective exponents of middle-class interests.* This is an interesting perspective, and it certainly applies to those occasions when military attitudes coincide clearly with dominant middle-class opinion (as, for instance, in the coup of 1962).

But the behavior of the military clearly has other determinants as well. This has become increasingly evident in the policies of the military since 1968. Some are related to social position (anger at "plutocrats" and "oligarchs," or paternalism toward Indian recruits). Others derive from the very isolation and institutional autonomy presumed to give the military their capacity for independent action in defense of "class" interest. It is simply not analytically useful to take a group such as the "middle class" (which is manifestly not a single class at

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*The most useful statement of this view is by the Argentine José Nun in his *Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup*, Politics of Modernization Series, No. 7, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1969.
all in a political sense) and then, to escape the difficulties created by its diversity, to identify a single component as somehow "representa-
tive." The military generally do relate to the middle class. But we must look to the total Peruvian social condition before we can under-
stand military attitudes in full.

Relations with Non-Indian Provincial Classes

Peruvian life has become increasingly centralized ever since the 1920s and the government of President Leguía, reputed to be "the best mayor Lima ever had." The mainstream has thus been away from the small towns which traditionally provide large numbers of army cadets. These men, in their political behavior, now tend to reflect regional as well as social resentments, for the additional burden of being "provincial" — that is, uncultured and unsophisticated — is hard to bear. To qualify for the officer corps, they have had to complete most, if not all, of a secondary education before entering military service. Socially, they often come from the "respectable" ranks of the urban working class or even from the provincial middle and lower-middle classes. But among Lima "society" they are often treated virtually as though they were Indian.

General Juan Velasco, President of the revolutionary military gov-
ernment since 1968, represents this special environment and outlook.* Born, like many of his fellow officers, of lower-middle-class provincial parents, he entered the army as an ordinary soldier and used that opportu-

nity to improve his life chances, eventually to gain admission to the military academy, win an officer's commission through graduation and thereby achieve the social status of a gentleman.**

* The provincial theme runs throughout the biography of Velasco cited above by Cornejo, a fellow Piurano, from Piura, the province in which is located the Talara oil field.

** The majority of Peru's general officers in modern times have done service in the ranks. Like Velasco, many were the graduates or near-graduates of provincial secondary schools, who spent a year or two "boning up" at special classes before entering the military academy. Before military education (and the inevitable higher entrance require-
ments) improved, there were cases of men entering the army with only a few years of primary school and rising virtually to the top. But, though the officer corps remains remarkably representative of the literate adult male population, this extreme social mobility is now impossible.
The social inferiority implicitly assigned to lower-class provincial Peruvians by the dominant Spanish culture of the Lima elite creates genuine social anger: The provincial escapee is infuriated at being reduced to lower-class status by the pseudoaristocratic snobs that abound even in the middle classes in Lima. Men like Velasco, though not themselves Indians nor even from the most marginal sectors of the population, are in practice likely to show resentment toward those who regard them as inferior that is sharper and more powerful than would be shown by the genuinely lower-class or "Indian" population.

It is one of the strengths of Peru today that many officers of humble background, though still ambivalent, are no longer ashamed of their origins, and no longer seek to forget their provinces of origin. As President Velasco himself said in a speech in his birthplace in Piura, it is time "to honor my people, the proud and copper-skinned people from whom I come."*

Relations with the Urban Lower Classes

Among the urban lower classes, the reaction to the military is generally favorable. This sympathy is often confined to symbolic appreciations, for it is limited by lack of contact, as even those officers with lower-class backgrounds are dissociated from the daily life of the lower classes. The military, however, remain associated with patriotic sentiments for members of the lower classes to a greater extent than among the more cynical upper and middle classes. Many lower-class persons share with the military an appreciation of popular Peruvian culture (the coastal Marinera and mountain Humno dances, for example, are popular in both groups), and have a sense of social solidarity with the enlisted cadres and lower-ranking military officers, which the former reciprocate and the latter often ignore.

Lower-class individuals, like some officers and radical intellectuals, are often not averse to forceful solutions to political problems. At the same time, the urban lower classes and their children frequently seem to find both satisfaction and opportunity in the military's emphasis on education, public works, and gradual progress.

*"Al pueblo cobrizo y alto de donde yo he surgido." Speech of 8 October 1969, according to page 13 of the text issued by the National Information Office.
Relations with the Indian Peasant Population

Definition. By purely racial criteria, it is possible to find persons who are largely "Indian" in most walks of Peruvian life. This is perhaps truest for the army officer corps. Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, whose personal audacity brought him to the presidency of Peru in 1930, was part Indian and part Negro, a racial admixture known in Peru as mambó.

It is more useful, therefore, to understand the term "Indian" as referring to a peasant of Indian culture. In the 1940 census, 46 percent of the population was classified as "Indian." There is no census category for "peasants of Indian culture," but one can arrive at an estimate by looking at two separate figures: 35 percent of the total population spoke no Spanish at all (of these, more than 90 percent spoke only Quechua, and the remainder spoke Aymará); and 34 percent of the economically active male population were engaged in "unskilled" agricultural tasks. If we assume, probably justifiably, that there is virtually a one-to-one relationship between these two groups, and if we bear in mind the high degree of coincidence between these social, economic, and cultural characteristics and the racial quality of being an Indian, we may think of Peru's "Indian" as meaning a peasant of Quechua culture. In doing so, we are thinking of approximately one-third of the population, the truly "forgotten people" of modern Peru.

Military Conscription. The Indian peasant has learned through long and bitter experience to fear authority, whether public or private. He has therefore adopted a personal strategy of sullen passivity, often mistaken — and meant to be so mistaken, since it leads to lessened demands — for laziness or stupidity. In dealing with the military, this strategy takes the form of avoidance, or the minimum cooperation necessary to return to a state of avoidance! The Indian serves as a conscript when he must (and indeed, he has been the leading conscript throughout Peru's history); otherwise he has few dealings with the military.

In the past, the Indian dreaded and feared the military as he did all other forms of authority, and perhaps more so because he was more likely to come into contact with the conscription system than with most other governmental authorities. The traditional picture of predawn
raids on peaceful villages to lead away all able-bodied men, roped or chained to each other, to serve in the army is not a pleasant one. The most tragic wailing songs of the Quechua musical heritage originated in the abuses suffered in military service.*

Although isolated cases of this kind have been reported into the early decades of the twentieth century, the situation began to change with the assertion of central authority and relative social and political peace following the conclusion of the civil war of 1894-1895. It took a generation for this change to be felt sufficiently within the Indian community to affect attitudes, but by the 1930s, conscription apparently was no longer looked upon with the same dread. The chants sung at conscription time changed from the funereal dirges of the past to laments at separation from family and hearth. Though still subject to mistreatment, the Indian was no longer cannon fodder.

Impact of Military Service. The effect of modern military service on Indian conscripts is virtually impossible to judge. Since the turn of the century, the military have had the assigned function of bringing literacy to conscripts. In 1928, the Ministry of War attempted to recruit civilian teachers for the purpose: most officers evidently felt it was beneath their dignity to teach Indians to read and write. But the proposal fell through when the Ministry of War asked the Ministry of Education to pay the salaries of the teachers so assigned.

Even under these unpromising conditions, the Indian conscript probably was learning something during his military service. He most certainly learned to speak Spanish if he had not known it before. He often traveled. Some of the flourishing new communities on the fringes of the jungle regions of Peru which hold so much promise for the future are directly traceable to the settlement by former Indian conscripts who had come to know these regions while on active service in "frontier defense." But on the whole, until after the Second World War, military service probably served primarily to reinforce the resigned hostility of the Indian toward the system.

*The analyses developed in this and subsequent paragraphs owe much to a visit made by the author to military units in Cuzco in 1964, and to discussions then and since with the late José María Argüedas and Oscar Núñez del Prado, as well as to the writings of Richard Patch, José Matos Mar, and William Foote Whyte.
Considerably greater emphasis has been given to the welfare of the Indian conscript in recent years. This is probably the result of gradual changes in the attitudes of the officer corps toward the Indians, as well as those of the Indians themselves. Officers interviewed by the author in the early sixties remarked frequently that the Indian conscript had "changed," that the process of "civilizing" was no longer as important as in the past, and that the army, for example, could entrust conscripts with complicated equipment, whether tanks or the Engineers' new bulldozers, after a very short time.

But the changed treatment of the Indian is partly also the result of fear. There is a general belief within the officer corps that, unless one treats the Indian conscript well while he is in service and then attempts to find a place in society for him when he is through, the army, through its military training, may be creating the cadres of a future Indian revolutionary movement. Propaganda claiming that the Indian land invasion movements in Cuzco in the early 1960s had been organized in military fashion increased awareness of the problem.*

Whatever the reasons, however, both officers and conscripts indicate that the time is past when officers would often treat the Indian with indiscriminate brutality. Successful performance in literacy training functions was made a major item in the inspection of infantry units under the revised (1960) Army Inspection Code. Failure of a conscript to satisfy the inspecting officer that he is making adequate progress can lead to loss of points on the efficiency rating of the junior officer responsible.

Even so, it is difficult to estimate the effect of one-and-a-half hours' daily instruction for two years on previously illiterate Indians. The army claims officially that it teaches six thousand conscripts a year to read and write. There is no way to measure this claim precisely. But if the military's claims about their own performance are as acceptable as census statistics, then military service is making a substantial contribution to the spread of literacy. Together with the census

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*The most solid journalistic account of the land invasions of this period is Hugo Neira, Cuzco: Tierra y Muerte (Reportaje al Sur), Problemas de Hoy, Lima, 1964.
statistics, the army's claim makes it reasonable to assume that something on the order of 5 percent of all Peruvian males over seventeen who are literate may have learned to read and write in the army. Were it not for the fact that we have defined Indians as illiterate, the percentage would be much higher among Indians. Clearly, many, if not most, "ex-Indians" owe that status to the army.

There is some evidence to suggest that Indian peasants who serve in the army do in significant numbers cease to be peasants.* Interestingly, the slum populations of Lima, largely made up of lower-class and "ex-Indian" migrants from the provinces, have been quite friendly to the political candidacies of military officers, voting overwhelmingly for General Odría for President in both 1962 and 1963.

In addition to improved literacy and vocational training, the army also devotes considerable attention to indoctrinating conscripts in their rights and obligations under the Peruvian constitution and law. Although the official rationale for this aspect of the training program is that it serves the double purpose of citizenship training and countering subversive activities, this program could have considerable impact in spreading political consciousness and increasing the demands made upon the political system. As in other cases, however, it is extremely difficult to estimate the actual effects of such programs without extensive field investigations. On matters concerning the Indian population in particular, there are few knowledgeable persons, with the exception of a handful of anthropologists, and fewer facts.

The military clearly provides one of the major points of contact between Andean Indian society and Peruvian coastal society. Even in

*In a 1965 census of heads of family living in the slums of Lima, approximately 5 percent (766 out of 17,426) of the heads of family who had been born in the provinces gave "military service" as their reason for migrating from the provinces to Lima. Although this seems low at first glance, it is the first specific reason given. (The other reasons cited were, in order, economic, social, and educational opportunities.) It is therefore probably safe to assume that those who answered "military service" were men who had moved directly to Lima during their military service and had simply stayed there. We can only speculate what part their military service played, directly or through word-of-mouth communication of experiences, in spreading the perception of the educational, social, and economic opportunities to be found in Lima.
the apparently unlikely event that the net impression of the military
formed by the Indian ex-soldier is negative, the social function of mili-
tary service may be positive in improving the former conscript's life
opportunities. Peruvian society seems thus far to have shown that it
can assimilate the urbanized son of the Indian.*

The apparent failure of the 1965 guerrillas to awaken sympathies
among the Indian population suggests that, at least for the present,
the unassimilated Indian populations are also not easily radicalized.
Above all, of course, they are not easily touched by outsiders. In 1963-
1965, when a company of the 3rd Peruvian Engineer Battalion first went
into the Lares area on a road-building mission, the inhabitants of
Amparaes, the village near which they set up their encampment, reacted
very sharply. As many as 50 percent of the population simply left,
deserting the village and moving into the higher Andes, where they knew
they would not be bothered. They took with them their cattle, their
children, their possessions.

The military, however, were on their best behavior. Six months of
determined effort by the engineering captain commanding the company ap-
parently convinced the people of Amparaes, through example, through dis-
cipline, and through persuasion, that the military were not going to con-
script them into forced labor on the road, that they were not going to
steal cattle or do other damage without paying adequate indemnization,
and that they were going to leave the women relatively alone. Once this
was established and the unit started to give medical assistance and free
transportation and actually to build the road, the Indian peasant's at-
titudes changed -- at least enough to permit those who had left to return.**

*This conclusion seems in harmony with much recent anthropological
literature. See William Mangin, ed., Peasants in Cities: Readings in
the Anthropology of Urbanization, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1970.

** That the Indians' passive resistance to authority is capable of
change under certain circumstances is further indicated by the experi-
ence in the Lima slums, which suggests that the revolutionary potential
of the Indian population can be limited by reforms. Rural Indians who
move to Lima and wind up in the slums are not filled with the desperate
political ideas that radical literature often attributes to them, and
they tend gradually to shed their rural suspicions. Where the military
have engaged in slum renewal projects, for example, the engineers have
generally been well received, and better received in the older than in
the newer slums. An effective form of military slum action near Lima
Evaluating the role of the army in relation to the Indian and the role of the Indian in Peruvian society is thus extremely difficult. On the whole, the army appears to have a functioning relationship with the Indian population. The significance of this fact can only be understood if one realizes that upper-class Peruvians, and even most lower-class sons of Indians or ex-Indians who have escaped their past, seem to be lacking not only in communication with the Indian population but also in sympathy.

Among urban civilians one often hears it said that it is necessary to apply either the "American solution" (kill the Indians) or the "European solution" (deport all Indians to the jungle and encourage the immigration of Europeans). These attitudes are not found among army officers, most of whom have genuine respect for the Indian soldiers that they have worked with, for their qualities of loyalty, hard work, and willingness to learn. Though attitudes differ and their feelings tend to be strongly tinged with paternalism, most army officers are thus reasonably well disposed toward the segment of the population most divorced from the mainstream of Peruvian life. Militarily, the military prefer political to violent solutions to the plight of the Indian. Ideologically, the military seem clearly committed to a "Peruvian solution" that would integrate the Indian into the nation.*

Conclusion: The Social Independence of the Military

It is clear, then, that the officer corps has in this century never been identical with Peru's social and financial elite. Its members do not belong to the most exclusive social clubs nor sit on the boards of directors of the largest corporations nor do these have much dealings with the military. At the other end of the social scale, Indian peasants has been the provision of water through tank trucks (maintained by the army for desert operations) to those slums that are without water and often victimized by water speculators.

* For a highly traditionalist outlook see Felipe de la Barra, El Indio Peruano en las Etapas de la Conquista y Frente a la República: Ensayo Histórico-Militar-Sociológico y con Proposiciones para la Solución del Problema Indio Peruano, Talleres Gráficos del Servicio de Prensa, Propaganda y Publicaciones Militares, Lima, Peru, 1948. A more practical sign that some officers understood the sources of power in rural Peru was the water reform that accompanied the 1969 agrarian reform: Ley General de Aguas, Decreto — Ley No. 17752, 24 July 1969, Lima, Peru.
have been largely excluded from the officer corps by the educational prerequisites and the height requirements of the Military Academy and by the chasm that separates them from national life in Peru.

In the broad range between the oligarchy with its "Forty Families" and the Indian peasant masses, a shift has taken place in recent decades within the officer corps away from the whitish upper-middle classes and toward the darker lower classes. It has been away from the coastal urban centers and particularly Lima, and toward the rural provincial towns of the interior. And the shift has been felt throughout the officer corps: Fifty-six percent of the men who attained the rank of general in the army between 1955 and 1965 were born either in the central highlands (sierra) or in the Amazon jungles (selva), whereas, according to the author's calculations, 94 percent of the directors of Peru's largest corporations in the same period were born in Lima or elsewhere on the coast. This separation is further accentuated by the fact that many generals, including as we have seen President Velasco, gained admission to the Military Academy only after service in the ranks. *

One political consequence of the social position of the officer corps is that most officers experience a sense of exclusion or frustration in their relations with the top elite. They do not come from it, and cannot expect to rise into it during even the most successful military career. They therefore tend to be hostile to what they themselves often call "the plutocracy." Second, the officer corps is sufficiently distinct from the masses to feel no particular identification with them either, with the possible exception of a paternalistic regard for the Indian. In both respects, the military reveal their apartness, not to say isolation, from important sectors of Peruvian society. The growth of middle class groups and identity among the military officer corps has somewhat lessened this sense of isolation, but the links are still fragile. The 1968 coup suggests in fact that the army officer corps has chosen to avoid a middle ground and is seeking to align itself with one sector, the "people," against the other, the "oligarchy." The

*The only major exception to these generalizations arises from the fact that the post-World War II requirement that officers be Academy graduates has eliminated a number of clearly lower class officers, largely concentrated in the company grades, who had received direct commissions after being ordinary soldiers.
implications of this choice for the military institutions and doctrine are discussed in the conclusion.
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF THE MILITARY

The capacity to act demonstrated by the 1968 coup and in subsequent events derives from a new military self-confidence, both personal and institutional. We shall begin by considering the bases of this strength, and then attempt to evaluate the consequences of the military establishment's changing activities for military doctrines and organization.

The Growth of Institutional Capacity

The differences between French and American military missions and their training suggest some of the basic personal and institutional differences between the Peruvian military before World War II and the armed forces which today control Peru's revolutionary government. The prewar French missions were generally composed of individually contracted officers. Selected, outstanding Peruvian officers were given military training in intensive doses, sometimes serving actual tours of duty (Étages) in the French army. On their return to Peru after two or more years, they used their training and the prestige it gave them to build highly effective careers in an institution where the quality of the officer corps had not been refined by intense competition. United States military training, in contrast, though more recent, provided orientation tours and brief technical courses lasting weeks or months to large numbers of officers of given military specialties and ranks. Moreover, the U.S. missions were larger and more impersonal than the French.

These quantitative and qualitative differences were sharpened by the rapid evolution of military technology. Shifting world environments, changing military doctrines, and heightened educational standards have rendered it difficult to base a career on a single technical course. The doubling of the Peruvian army officer corps that took place during and after the 1941 conflict with Ecuador and as a result of World War II led to still another, structural change: Whereas in 1940 all of Peru's general officers had had some foreign training, by the 1960s this was true of only about half. Those who stayed home brought
pressure on their more traveled colleagues to "institutionalize" their training by sharing it with their fellow officers.

Improved military education also broadened officers' concerns and promoted a new interest in governmental affairs and a sense of technical and political leadership. Incomplete data even suggest a positive correlation between military education and political activism: ever since the opening of the Military Academy, the more advanced the education of a particular officer, the more likely he has been to participate actively in national politics when compared with his less-trained fellow officers.

But professionalization has also contributed to the bureaucratization of the military, to the reinforcement of hierarchical relationships, and to underscoring the importance of preserving the profession and the institution from excessive individual adventurism. Generals, not colonels, take command of coups in Peru, and not since Colonel Sánchez Cerro had himself promoted at 43 in 1932 has there been a general under 46 years of age or a colonel who succeeded in a coup.

The greater self-confidence induced by better technical training and discipline also enabled the institution to meet the problem of the individual political sellout. Officers who felt that under the governments of Colonel Sánchez Cerro and General Odría the military had been limited in their attempts at reform by their inability to resist the personal blandishments of representatives of "the system" now believe that institutional strength provides a guarantee of political responsibility and capacity. As one member of the government installed in 1968 put it,

Sánchez Cerro was alone. I am but one of 40. And behind us come generations of still better-trained officers ready to carry on should we falter.*

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*General José Graham Hurtado, Chief of the Council of Presidential Advisors (COAP) and Commanding General of the Center of Military Instruction (CIMP), in an interview with the author in Santa Monica, California, August 27, 1970. A summary of General Graham's forceful and humanist views is provided by his *Filosofía de la Revolución Peruana*, Conferencia pronunciada por el General de Brigada E.P. José Graham Hurtado, Jefe del Comité de Asesoramiento de la Presidencia de la República, 14 Abril 1971, Lima, Perú: Oficina Nacional de Información.
The Limits on the Political Role of the Military

As a result of these changes, with the 1968 revolution the military shifted from the role of temporary warden to that of policymaker. Clearly, the role of policymaker (or even merely of policy-supporter) is more complicated than that of a simple warden or arbiter who acts sporadically in a limited sphere. If the powers of the state are to be expanded and used to direct national development (as most officers now believe), the problems for which the state is responsible become much more complicated and may require continuous intervention or participation of a relatively sophisticated variety.

These complexities place some strain on any attempt to order military rule. Under the statute governing the revolutionary government, the commanding generals of all three services must unanimously agree on the officer who is to be President and must unanimously countersign all decrees issued by the revolutionary government. This requirement ensures the military establishment's control over general government policy. But because the President is free to choose his own advisers, the military institutions as such are relieved of the daily execution of government policies.

This attempt to separate the military institution from partisan politics -- and from the actual government itself -- is an essential trait of the Peruvian experiment. In the military governments of Brazil and Argentina, the military institutions have no regularized control over government policies. In Peru, the President, as we have noted, may be a retired officer -- but the commanding generals of the armed services must be officers on active duty. They are chosen by the separate services according to the internal regulations of each service. They must therefore rotate regularly, whereas the President remains in office as long as he has the unanimous support of the incumbent commanders. This stability gives the President some personal power. But the structure also ensures the continuing vitality and constant renewal of the military institutions, even as they assume the overall responsibility for national policies.

To determine long-term military attitudes toward policy, the historic precedents that the military forces, as permanently established
bureaucracies, may be expected to follow are important. Our earlier analysis suggests these longer term institutional concerns in Peru have included, since before the 1968 coup: 1) institutional autonomy and survival, 2) public order and the control of remote areas, 3) foreign policy and boundary questions, and, particularly in the last decade, 4) national development, including under that rubric education, industrialization, control of strategic materials (petroleum, telecommunications), and general national planning and support for central government authority and administration.

The internal political diversity of the armed forces in Peru, as in all moderately developed countries, over the long run may inhibit the adoption of consistent development policies. The very bureaucratic complexity of the military allows the development of some diversity. But it also acts as an internal self-regulating mechanism inhibiting policies whose effects, directly or indirectly, might threaten to increase internal diversity to the point of endangering the viability of the military institutions themselves. The military profession and institutions must be preserved from excessive political adventurism. No single partisan clique can normally control the military for long, even in the name of progress. Should the military officer corps produce individual leaders whose personal vision of the struggle for development exceeds institutionally established limits, such men will have to resign, be replaced, or in practice cease to be military officers, becoming instead what Peru's current leaders denounce almost daily, "politicians," while the military institutions withdraw to a less partisan posture.

For the military institutions themselves, therefore, the longer run consequences of any attempt to assert a dominant military role in the political search for development are likely to include a return to quarters. The return may come later rather than sooner in some cases, and may be as ultimately transient as the attempt to assert the enlarged role. But it is inevitable.

For the country as a whole, and in the shorter run, the consequences of changes in military participation in government are likely to be determined by the nature of the civil-military coalition in power. It is to the identification of that coalition and its characteristics,
rather than to considerations of "military" or "civilian" dominance in themselves, that political-military reporting and analysis should be directed. The military cannot rule by themselves in the long run without effectively calling upon skilled civilians for support.

The prominent Peruvian political sociologist, Carlos Delgado, has recently written that the sharp dividing line prevalent in the past between the military and civilian served the interests of the status quo by making of the military "apolitical" preservers of order.* Delgado suggests that today the essential touchstone should be not that between military and civilian but that between opponents and supporters of the revolutionary process. Any attempt to create a "civilian front" opposed to the military government, argues Delgado, is therefore a reactionary measure contrary to Peru's interests. Delgado is of course defending the government, which he currently advises, but the very fact that he is doing so reveals the erosion of civilian as well as military resistance to increased military participation in politics.

This does not mean that civil-military differences have been overcome. Skeptics are commonly found among officers of an older generation (like Villanueva) and among civilian intellectuals (consider Cotler's brilliant essays**) who question the changes in military attitudes, attributing them almost exclusively to a defensive reflex. This skepticism stems partly from a continuing sharp distinction between military and civilian based on past experiences. But it also suggests a lack of contact with the enthusiasm and drive of the new generation of Peruvian officers, many of whom are fully caught up in the effervescence of contemporary Peruvian intellectual controversies.***

But there are substantive differences as well, as this essay has

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**Julio Cotler, Crisis Política y Populismo Militar en el Perú, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, Peru, October 1969.

continuously demonstrated. Military preference for hierarchy and authoritarianism run counter to the more liberal and participatory attitudes of many intellectuals and politicians. Officers are generally more favorably disposed to state intervention than most middle and upper class civilians. Statism is acceptable to the lower classes but the upper and middle classes prefer caretaker military and transactional civilian regimes.

Attitudes among both military and civilian leaders evolve with time and experience. The political process may lead to a desire to change the form of military participation in government. So the dilemma remains: How is it possible to rule without prejudicing the longer run nonpartisan and nonpolitical stance of the military?

One way of preserving the military institutions from the snares of politics has been to avoid expanding the size of the officer corps despite the growing demands of government. Many active-duty generals therefore now hold both government posts and line assignments. Keeping the officer corps down to its prerevolutionary size is seen as a means of inhibiting the growth of personal and institutional interests in continued military rule as a means of ensuring a continued expansion of the officer corps. This attempt to separate the military institution from the play of daily politics is unlikely to succeed entirely, of course. But its existence is revealing in considering the future roles and missions of the armed forces. Uncertainty over their sociopolitical role (beyond their present commitment to providing overall leadership) underscores for the military the importance of preserving their traditional military functions, including conventional external defense missions, as a further guarantee that the institution could extricate itself from partisan politics should it become necessary.

Another way to preserve the military institutions from the partisan political arena is to develop a military doctrine that reflects sufficient civilian and military consensus to provide some assurance of stability. Do more traditionally defined territorial defense concerns provide a basis for such a doctrine?

**International Position of the Peruvian Military**

The Peruvian military are relatively underdeveloped if measured in terms of armaments or size; but they are more modern in the training
and in the outlook of the officer corps. In this, as in other characteristics, Peru's armed forces reflect the unevenness of Peruvian development, in which modernity and feudalism exist side by side.

This complexity is evident when one asks whether there is a need for territorial defense forces. Most U.S. observers are not impressed by the seriousness of the conventional external military threat that Chile or Ecuador poses to Peru's territorial integrity. Most Peruvians, civilian as well as military, though they differ on the details, agree on the need to maintain military institutions for the defense of national sovereignty.

Peru has participated in two of Latin America's last four major conflicts. Aside from the Chaco War of 1932-1935 between Bolivia and Paraguay, and the Honduras-El Salvador conflict of 1969, Peruvian troops fought Colombia in 1932 and Ecuador in 1941. Both these wars involved relatively undeveloped and unpopulated border territories generally believed to have great future potential. In the eyes of Peruvians, these past conflicts are sufficient argument for military preparedness even in the absence of clear and present foreign threats. Peru's defeat at the hands of Chile in the War of the Pacific, generally attributed to profligacy and the neglect of military needs in the 1870s, strengthens, more than might be the case in more successful or powerful countries, the desire to maintain military forces in readiness against the possibility of conflict with neighboring states.

Peruvians recall, moreover, that their historic legal claims in the boundary dispute with Ecuador were not accepted internationally until after Peru won the Zarumilla campaign of 1941. The association of might with right in the 1942 Rio Protocol, which sealed Ecuador's defeat and legalized or formalized the outcome of the war, implies to them that the inter-American system is not an adequate alternative to military preparedness.*

*An incident at the Rio Conference in 1942 serves as a poignant reminder of the continuing importance of military power to an equitable international order. When the Ecuadorian foreign minister complained (somewhat guilefully, for Ecuador's army no longer existed as an operational force since Peru's decisive military victory) that his country had depended on the principles of international law and Pan Americanism in its conflict with Peru, an unnamed Latin American delegate replied that those principles "exist to solve problems. You
This external defense requirement does not necessarily mean that Peru must be equal to her neighbors weapon for weapon, regiment for regiment; the need for military power must clearly relate to the likelihood of its use, and these are relatively peaceful times. Yet most wars have not been anticipated. And past history makes potential instability in Chile a natural concern to the Peruvian military. Also, most of today's Peruvian senior officers were youths during the Colombian conflict and lieutenants at the time of the conflict with Ecuador. They find it difficult to conceive of themselves as lacking an external defense function.

The feasibility of maintaining military forces is severely tested, nonetheless, by their costliness. Modern armaments are increasingly expensive. Military aircraft and naval vessels produced in the industrial nations require massive capital outlays that tax Peruvian resources, even if bought only in token quantities and with little or no electronic support systems. These rising armament costs are particularly hard to bear in times of rising social consciousness and popular demands for competing investments. Yet not to make certain acquisitions may seem, particularly for the air and sea services, tantamount to surrendering even the option to develop modern capacities at a later date.

The acquisition of weapons systems is still a major problem for countries that do not produce their own. Peru must depend on what is available elsewhere, often at exorbitant cost and with uncertainty as to future supplies. For these reasons also, the kind of military chauvinism that calls for the precise matching of neighboring military forces is not only expensive but impossible. Peru seems, therefore, to have opted for a policy of maintaining a general balance. Chile, for example, has a highly developed navy; Peru, in response, attempts to keep her air force (which is of greater peaceful use in the opening up of her internal frontiers) at operational levels sufficient to

offset Chile's naval excellence (which similarly has the greater peacetime benefits, given Chile's geography).

Most officers view Peru's external situation as one in which war is unlikely for another generation. Unlikely, however, does not mean impossible. The outcome of Peru's own conflict with Ecuador in 1941, though favorable to Peru, nonetheless demonstrates the foolhardiness of depending on others in case of actual conflict. Foreign military relations can play a variety of roles in this regard. Foreign assistance can reduce the economic drain and furnish a link to future modernization, though at the risk of some political costs. In addition, Peru has traditionally resorted to ties with some powers to balance others. The United States plays some role in this regard, as do Argentina and Venezuela, offsetting the five other countries with which Peru has common borders.

Continued acquisitions of modern aircraft (jets and helicopters) or anti-aircraft (missiles) weapons and other "sophisticated" equipment however, may or may not be justified in given instances: In themselves, apart from abnormal quantities, equipment purchases are probably neither avoidable nor a useful criterion of the political nature of the military forces in question. We cannot expect military services to overlook their own needs in the modernization of their countries. U.S. opposition to Latin American military expenditures for sophisticated modern armaments during the mid-1960s opened the way to the return of European arms salesmen. The Soviet Union appears to have identified this as a potential opportunity to drive a further wedge between some Latin American military forces and the United States. This tactic is foreshadowed by a recent Russian analysis of U.S. policy in the 1960s:

The USA hopes to keep under strict control the armies of the Latin American countries by limiting their weapon procurements, the more so since the aspirations of Peru and of other Latin American countries to acquire the latest weapons conflict with the Pentagon plans of deforming the functions of the Latin American armed forces and turning them into weapons for the struggle against the people's activities within the countries. This entails a corresponding structural reorganization of the armed forces and of the specific nature of their
armaments... That is why the USA so painfully reacted to Peru's purchase of combat aircraft from Western Europe.*

The secrecy that governs military plans, particularly in such delicate matters as armaments, human resources, and contingency planning, makes it difficult for anyone to trace procurement conflicts and related armaments disputes. It does appear, however, that the Peruvian military are prepared to place improvement of their own human capital ahead of new weapons acquisitions. Three-fourths or more of military budgets are spent on personnel costs. It also seems that the responsibilities of government are limiting military expenditures for costly weaponry. The air force purchase of French Mirages took place in 1967, while the civilian president, Belaunde, was still in office. The Peruvian navy, which had ambitions already then, delayed major reequipment purchases into the 1970s. The Soviet Union is not likely to find Peru a major market.

When General Graham, the chief of the Council of Presidential Advisors, visited the Pentagon in August 1970, he was asked by a U.S. officer if Peru had completed its military modernization program. General Graham laughed and asked whether the United States had stopped modernizing its forces. This recognition of the relativity of military power to technological change should not, however, obscure the fact that countries like Peru cannot relate their military power either in fact or in theory to that of the United States. Only a generation ago, a good Peruvian colonel was, theoretically at least, interchangeable with a European or an American colonel. They spoke the same technical language. The differences between them were merely functions of the relatively greater firepower, and the reservoir of resources, at the disposal of the more powerful country. The advent of nuclear warfare, and the increasing technological gap between large and small powers that followed upon it, were fatal to this self-conception of the Peruvian officer.

Peru's modern experience suggests that Peruvian officers, in the army if not in the air force and navy, can no longer consider themselves

merely as appendages of a larger military system, behaving according to universal "military" rules. What, then, is the mission of the Peruvian military?

National Security: Defense Plus Development?

If, as is taught in the CAEM, the fundamental goal of the state is to provide for the well-being of the nation, and if the armed forces are its instrument for carrying out its policy, then the armed forces' basic mission is to support social well-being, the ultimate goal of the state. By this definition, as we have seen earlier, national defense involves, not merely the organization and means for the defense of the country against external armed aggression, but everything necessary to ensure the national well-being. Thus, the military's first priority might no longer be tanks or cannon, but rather equipment such as road levelers and tractors, and experts in public administration and finance, to enable them to contribute to the well-being and the development of the country.

Can we conclude, from the 1968 coup, that the Peruvian military establishment has made an explicit decision to reorient itself and its mission to the attainment of national development? The record demonstrates that all elements of such a change of function have in fact been considered. That there has for some time been an institutional basis for such a shift in priorities is suggested by the fact that, since 1960, Peru's army officers have included more engineers than cavalrymen. The result, however, has been a compromise: Since 1968, the military has devoted primary institutional energies to providing the leadership for government. But they have also retained the more traditional missions of military defense.

Thus, at a time when concern for the nexus between security and development was already acute, the Director of the CAEM could declare that:

In Peru, as in most Latin American countries where the danger of conventional war is remote, and despite the fact that we are already engaged by subversive warfare, Total Defense can
nonetheless be practiced almost entirely in military terms.*

The retention of a focus on "military defense" even when promoting development gives the military something of an institutional "out" should the time come to retire from active political control of the state. If they were to project a public image of exclusive commitment to national development, the completion of specific tasks, or a retreat from active political participation for other reasons, would threaten to leave the military with nothing to do; there would be no barracks left to which to return. As it is, the civil affairs office of the Army General Staff is careful to point out that the tank trucks providing water for the slums were actually procured for logistical operations in Peru's coastal deserts.

The diversion of military energies to development may over time lead to some reduction in the attention to conventional national defense functions. Partly, this takes place because it is difficult to concentrate fully on frontier defense, for example, at a time, say, when foreign debt rollover is the primary governmental issue. Also, however, a change in perspective accompanies the assumption of responsible power: There is no longer anyone else to blame for failure. Thus, the military command in Peru is very much aware that there is no civilian president or other political buffer left to absorb criticism for expenditures forced upon him by the process of military modernization.

The practical result of the pressures toward development is likely to be a slowdown rather than the abandonment of conventional military procurement actions. Military periodicals will be the first to reveal any new doctrines designed to synthesize the different functions of the military.** One possible development may be efforts at regional or subregional cooperation on security matters, possibly paralleling economic integration efforts.

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* General Carlos Giral Morzan, opening the 1966 academic year at CAEM, in March 1966. The author is deeply indebted to the late General Giral for many discussions of these problems.

** See Luigi Einaudi and Herbert Goldhamer, An Annotated Bibliography of Latin American Military Periodicals, RM-4890-RC, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, December 1965, for a list of military journals.
Peru in the 1970s is clearly seeking to evolve its own doctrines, military and political, in harmony with its national characteristics and developmental needs. But Peru also cannot afford to ignore the military advances that are taking place elsewhere. Military leaders, whatever their commitment to national development, feel that they cannot risk overlooking their military needs in the modernization of the country.
Part Three: BRAZIL*

Alfred C. Stepan III

I. CHANGING MILITARY HORIZONS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNAL THREAT

Traditional Roles and Self-Images

The accession of military governments in Brazil in 1964 and Peru in 1968 marked the end of traditional roles for the military in politics and the emergence of new ones. Traditionally, the two military institutions had been similar in their self-image, although the Peruvian had been the one more directly involved in controlling the government, whereas the Brazilian military had played essentially a stabilizing, albeit important, role from the background.

Until 1964, the political role of the Brazilian military was that of o poder moderador, in which it acted as a "moderator" between competing civilian political factions. The military had sanction to overthrow the elected President, but not to assume political power. This traditional role was not self-designated; to a significant degree, it had acquired legitimacy in constituent assembly debates and in the constitutions of 1891, 1934, and 1946, each of which contained the same two key clauses pertaining to the role of the military.* The first stated that the military was a permanent, national institution specifically charged with the tasks of maintaining law and order in the country and of guaranteeing the normal functioning of the three constitutional powers, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The second clause made the military obedient to the executive, but stated, significantly, that they should obey only "within the limits of the law" (dentro os limites da lei). This in effect authorized the military to give only discretionary obedience to the President, depending on their judgment as to the "legality" of the presidential order in question.

The constitutional obligation of the military to ensure the proper functioning and balance of the three branches of government meant that, in any clash between the President and the legislature, civilians appealed to the military to carry out their constitutional obligation to defend

* Cf. Article 14 in the Constitution of 1891; Article 162 in the Constitution of 1934; and Articles 176-178 in the Constitution of 1946.
the prerogatives of the Congress. Thus, in the civil-military crises of 1930, 1945, 1954, and 1964, leading Brazilian politicians and numerous editorials made repeated appeals to the military to perform its moderator role by either restraining or overthrowing the President.* In 1954, for example, after the assassination attempt on Carlos Lacerda, then a vitriolic journalist, and after corruption and financial scandals had been unearthed, many civilians representing the political elite felt that it was time for President Vargas to resign. The message communicated to the military by the newspapers was that the circumstances warranted military "supervision" of the transfer of authority from the President to Vice President Café Filho. The Diário de Notícias, a moderate newspaper, stated simply on August 20, 1954:

The armed forces are invited to mediate as the sentinels of law and the guardians of the constitution, of tranquillity and the progress of the country.

The coup took place four days later. A week or so earlier, the same newspaper had indicated precisely the task that it expected the armed forces to perform:

From the conduct of the supreme directors and leaders of the land, sea, and air forces ought to result clearly the road to follow, within the limits of a strictly constitutional solution. This is the transference of the government to the Vice President of the Republic.

It was traditionally understood in Brazil that military authority to overthrow a president did not imply the right to assume power. The distinction between the legitimacy of military intervention and the illegitimacy of military rule seems to have escaped many foreign observers. But it was clearly made and observed by all the major actors in the Brazilian political system. For example, not a single editorial examined in the weeks before the coups of 1945, 1954, and 1964,

or before the coup attempts of 1955 and 1961, ever explicitly asked
the military to assume power,* although dozens of editorials demanded
that the military intervene to remove or check the executive. The
argument often advanced from the civilian viewpoint at those times was
that military action against the President could be trusted exactly
because the military knew and respected the traditional limitations
on military intervention that prevented them from assuming the powers
of government.

In a characteristic editorial, the conservative newspaper *O Globo*,
in August 1954, attempted to allay any civilian doubts as to what would
happen if the military were to force Vargas to resign. Pointing out
that the military had always refrained from usurping the power of
government from civilian hands, it promised that in this case, too,
they would guarantee a "judicial, constitutional state." The editorial
therefore sanctioned the military's intervention to remove the President,
but emphasized once again that the rules of the game prohibited the
assumption of political power by the military:

The great test of the political maturity reached by our
military classes was that of the October 29, 1945, overthrow
of Vargas, in which they gave the world a rare example of
the respect for civilian political institutions and lack
of self-interest by giving power to the judicial organs.
Today we can be certain that the appearance of a military
condottiere would not be possible. . . . If tomorrow the
President of the Republic were to leave the presidential
palace of his own free will, as most Brazilians would
prefer, or if he were to leave through coercion, as may
in fact happen, Brazil would nonetheless continue to
enjoy a judicial, constitutional state.**

Two attitudes on the part of the military themselves supported
this traditional concept of their role in Brazilian politics: their

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*The closest to such a request was Carlos Lacerda's demand in
*Tribuna da Imprensa* for a "regime of exception" in 1955. This, how-
ever, could have been a regime led by civilians and backed by the
military. In 1964 the owner of the *Estado de São Paulo* was known
to want a military regime to assume power, but this was never stated
in an editorial.

relatively high confidence in the ability of civilians to rule, and, conversely, a low confidence in their own political aptitude. The economic boom of the 1950s played a very important part in reinforcing military confidence in civilian leadership and in the basic direction of the economy. Being a period of little domestic conflict and low elite fear of subversion, the mid-1950s in Brazil saw the unfolding of a dominant civilian development ideology that emphasized nationalism, mass mobilization, and the public sector.*

In this atmosphere the military could see little need and justification for military rule. In 1955, the movement to prevent the inauguration of Kubitschek and Goulart failed partly because rejection of the election results would have led to a civil-military government, and many military officers questioned the legitimacy of such a regime. An important spokesman for this view was General Castello Branco. On September 19, 1955, in an address to the Superior War College, he strongly questioned both the capacity of the military to form such a "regime of exception" and the legitimacy of their doing so:

There are those who argue that the best way for the military to participate in the recuperation of the country is to intervene and take control of the government. The most sincere argue that this is necessary in the face of the incapacity of the political institutions to resolve the problems of the nation.

Do the armed forces really have the political capacity to learn the solutions to the political and administrative problems of the nation? ... The armed forces cannot, if they are true to their tradition, make Brazil into another South American "República." If we adopt this regime, it will enter by force, will only be maintained by force, and will go out by force.**

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**The typescript of the address, "Os Meios Militares na Recuperação Moral do País," is in the Arquivo do Marechal H.A. Castello Branco in the Library of the Command and General Staff School (Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército, ECEME) in Rio de Janeiro.
Yet, by 1964, the military in Brazil had decided to inaugurate such a "regime of exception," making it the first military government of the twentieth century in Brazil. How did this reversal of all that General Castello Branco had argued for in 1955 come about?

A major contributing factor was the decline in the economy and the effect of this decline on perspectives for the future. During most of the 1950s, the GNP growth rate had been one of the highest in the world. In 1962, however, it began to fall off sharply, and in 1963 there was an actual decline in the per capita GNP (see Fig. 1). Just as important in changing the political climate was the fact that inflation, which had always been chronic, became acute after 1961: Prices rose by over 50 percent in 1962 and 75 percent in 1963; they were rising at a rate of over 140 percent in the three-month period before the collapse of the Goulart government in 1964 (see Fig. 2).

This sharp rise in prices set off increasingly bitter rounds of wage struggles and thus deepened the hostility of the middle classes toward labor and government. Many of those who felt that their middle-class salaries could not keep pace with inflation blamed labor strikes for pushing costs up, and the government for yielding to labor. The combination of the negative per capita growth rate in 1963 and soaring inflation turned the Kubitschek multiple sum game of Brazilian politics into a zero sum game in which each major labor gain due to a strike was perceived as a loss to other groups.

The military were deeply and ambivalently involved in the inflation-strike-inflation syndrome. The strikes engendered increasing violence, and the armed forces were repeatedly called upon to protect strikers against hostile state governments or employers; in some cases, they were ordered to stop the strike. The belief grew among military officers that the government's encouragement of strikes and the granting of large pay increases contributed to inflation, violence, and the erosion of their own status and salaries. Increasingly, military journals complained about inflation and the threat it presented. Characteristically,

*See, for example, "Inflação e Salários," Revista do Clube Militar, No. 163, 1963, pp. 10-11; and "O 'Affaire' Vencimentos," ibid., pp. 8-9.
Fig. 1 — Percentage change in real per capita GNP
1957 - 1963

Fig. 2 — Cost of living price index
1957 - 1963

Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics;
Supplement to 1966/1967 Issues: Fig. 1, p. 28; Fig. 2, p. 27
their articles attempted to document the decline in military take-home pay by comparisons with that of other groups, especially labor unions.*

The political significance of their reaction to inflation was particularly great because the military gradually came to identify the labor unions and the politics of mass mobilization as the most culpable factors. In one of the more important documents of the military Revolution of April 1964, *Documento LEXX,** the militant trade unions, with their "Communist" allies, were blamed for creating the inflation, which was thought to be demoralizing the army:

The armed forces lament the underhanded processes of demoralization which threaten them as a result of the damaging relationship between unions and Communists -- which even some government authorities refer to as a Fifth Army.

As a result of demagogic and anarchic wage policies, a new and privileged group has been created in society at great cost to many other people. Due to galloping inflation and insufficient salary adjustments, new deprivations and abuses have been imposed upon the military.***

A sense of crisis in the economic system was intensified by some indications that the industrialization process was not just temporarily slowing but was facing the possibility of a secular decline. The argument was raised that the import substitution which had been a vital ingredient of Brazil's rapid industrialization in the 1950s was approaching the "exhaustion" point in the early 1960s. Also, Brazil's export stagnation contributed to serious foreign exchange difficulties and constraints on imports. The economic model of the 1950s was widely believed to be bankrupt, but, while the economic system seemed threatened, Brazil was on a wave of rising expectations. The left, in particular, was in a euphoric mood partly based on the success of the

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* See the detailed article by Capitão de Corveta, José Augusto Didier Barbosa Vianna, "Vencimentos dos Militares," *Boletim do Clube Naval*, No. 176, 1963, pp. 121-134. In fact, however, labor's real take home pay did not even keep up with inflation in this period.

** Significantly, *LEXX* stands for *Lealdade ao Exército* (loyalty to the army). The document dates from late January or early February 1964.

*** *Documento LEXX.*
Castro revolution in Cuba. Peasant leagues grew, urban labor strikes increased greatly, enlisted men questioned discipline, and even two small rebellions broke out among enlisted men.

As the political party system became more and more fragmented, several of the presidents, including Quadros and Coulart, maintained that they could not rule Brazil effectively without a basic change in the political system.

The resignation of President Quadros in 1961 after less than seven months in office, the accelerating inflation, the sharp decline in the rate of economic growth, and the growing advocacy of the tactics of violence caused the military to lose some of their confidence in civilians as political rulers. Moreover, powerful civilians on the left and on the right were declaring the Brazilian regime unworkable. Whereas in the past, when the military overthrew a particular government, the power had passed to other civilian groups, in 1964 that pattern of civil-military relations had lost its viability. The civilian population itself widely doubted the regime, and the military no longer trusted civilians to be able to solve the basic structural problems facing Brazil.

Given these general socioeconomic trends, the military felt increasingly that the economic and political crisis was contributing to a security crisis and that they themselves might have to assume a much bigger role in the policy process. A somewhat similar military "role expansion" was occurring in Peru. Before examining the case of Brazil in greater detail, therefore, it may be worthwhile to try to determine what were some of the factors that the situation in the two countries had in common.

The military institutions of Peru and Brazil in the late 1950s and early 1960s increasingly perceived their role of providing for national security as entailing more than conventional military operations. Security came to be seen as part of a large economic, social, psychological, and military package. Fidel Castro's victory contributed to the spread in Latin America of French and United States and other theories which saw revolutionary warfare as encompassing all sectors. This in turn added to the military's incentive to formulate counter-strategies.
The Role of Education in the Changing Military Outlook:  
The Escola Superior de Guerra in Brazil and Its Threat Perception

In Brazil, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a significant group of military intellectuals began to feel that they themselves possessed the doctrines, cadre, and power necessary for the solution of problems of development. Much of this new confidence was rooted in the greatly expanded political, social, and economic content of military education, which found its highest and most formal expression in the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), established by presidential decree under Dutra on August 20, 1949.* In 1963, the ESG's charter defined its mission as that of preparing "civilians and the military to perform executive and advisory functions especially in those organs responsible for the formulation, development, planning, and execution of the politics of national security."** That national security was considered to concern a wide range of affairs is indicated by the names of the seven academic divisions: (1) Political Affairs, (2) Psychological-Social Affairs, (3) Economic Affairs, (4) Military Affairs, (5) Logistical and Mobilization Affairs, (6) Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and (7) Doctrine and Coordination.***

By 1966, the ESG had graduated men from many of the key sectors of the political and economic power structure: 599 were military officers, but 224 came from private industry and commerce, 200 from the major ministries, 97 from decentralized government agencies, and 39 from the federal congress; 23 were federal and state judges, and 107 included a variety of professionals such as professors, economists, writers, medical doctors, and Catholic clergy.****

* For a heavily documented short history of the ESG written by General Augusto Fragoso while he was commandant of the school, see "A Escola Superior de Guerra (Origem - Finalidade - Evolução), in Segurança & Desenvolvimento: Revista da Associação dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra, Vol. 18, No. 132, 1969, pp. 7-40.
** Decree No. 53,080 of December 4, 1963, Chapter 2, Section 4.
*** Ibid., Chapter 5, Section 1.
The basic threat perception formula developed by the ESG in the mid-fifties and early sixties was that of the interrelationship of national security and national development. Modern warfare, whether conventional, as in World War II, or revolutionary, as in Indochina, was said to involve the will, unity, and productive capacity of the entire nation; those charged with the formulation and implementation of national security policies, therefore, could no longer restrict their attention to frontier protection or other conventional uses of the army. National security, according to the ESG, was to a great extent a matter of rationally maximizing the output of the economy and minimizing all sources of cleavage and disunity within the country. Consequently, the stress was on the need for strong government and planning. General Golbery, often called the "father" of the ESG, and its chief theoretician, once said that in developing countries such as Brazil "the planning of national security is an imperative of the hour in which we live . . . for us in the underdeveloped countries . . . planning assumes aspects of another order which puts everything else in relief."**

Another key theme was that such countries were under great internal pressures, not only because of their own underdevelopment, but also because of the worldwide ideological conflict, which had deep ramifications for their domestic security. From the beginning, the ESG was anti-Communist and committed in the Cold War. As the emphasis of the Cold War shifted from atomic to revolutionary warfare, the school became the ideological center for counterrevolutionary strategy in Brazil. Since communism was the enemy, the United States, as the major

* An insight into the very wide scope of what the ESG considered to be the field of national security can be gained from the special issue of the Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, No. 20, January 1966, devoted to a discussion of segurança nacional (national security) by writers closely associated with the school. An attempt to summarize the thought of the ESG was made by the ex-director of the Army Library, General Umberto Peregrino, in "O Pensamento da Escola Superior de Guerra," Cadernos Brasileiros, No. 38, November-December 1966, pp. 29-38.

** General Golbery do Couto e Silva, Planejamento Estratégico, Biblioteca do Exército Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1955, p. 28. Most of this book had its origin in lectures originally given at the ESG. The book is one of the major sources for the ideology of the ESG.
anti-Communist country, was a natural ally. In early 1959, General
Golbery argued that indirect warfare was a much more real threat to
Latin America than any direct attack from outside:

What is certain is that the greater probability today is limited
warfare, localized conflict, and above all indirect Communist
aggression, which capitalizes on local discontents, the frustra-
tions of misery and hunger, and just nationalist anxieties. . . .
Latin America now faces threats more real than at any other time,
threats which could result in insurrection, outbursts attempting
(though not openly) to implant . . . a government favorable to
the Communist ideology, and constituting a grave and urgent
danger to the unity and security of the Americas and the Western
world.*

The threat was so great, and there was such an urgent need for strong
planning of a strategic nature, Golbery argued, that in times of severe
crisis

. . . the area of politics is permeated . . . by adverse pressures,
creating a form of universalization of the factors of security,
enlarging the area of strategy [politics of national security] **
to the point where it almost absorbs all the national activities.

From this threat perception there followed an argument that the
many components of national security were closely interrelated and
required total national planning. The ESG set about the study of all
phases of Brazilian political, economic, and social life. High-level
civilian technocrats, colonels, and low-ranking generals studied infla-
tion, agrarian reform, banking reform, voting systems, transportation,
and education, as well as guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare.
In many of their studies, some of the fundamental aspects of Brazilian
social and economic organizations were severely challenged as needing
change if Brazil was to grow economically and maintain internal security.
Initially, these critiques seemed academic, and the influence of the

* General Golbery do Couto e Silva, Geopolítica do Brasil, José
Olympio, Rio de Janeiro, 1967, pp. 198-199 (from a chapter originally
written in 1959). This book also is based on ESG lectures. The
developments in the Cuban revolution in late 1960 and 1961 increased
the ESG fear of the "Communist threat."

ESC's doctrine within the military was not pervasive. But by the early 1960s, as the Brazilian crisis deepened, the ESG's emphasis on the need for a total development strategy to combat internal subversion found an increasingly receptive audience in the military. Much of its doctrine was adapted at the Command and General Staff School (Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército, ECEME). Whereas the 1956 curriculum of the ECEME had included no lectures on counterguerrilla warfare, internal security, or communism, courses in all these subjects were offered from 1961 on. By 1968, the curriculum provided 222 hours on internal security, 129 hours on irregular warfare, and only 21 hours on the classical topic of territorial defense. Many of the ideas of the ESG on the threat of subversion were also disseminated in popularized form in the monthly newsletter (Boletim de Informações) from the General Staff to troop commanders.*

The sense of systemic crisis and, especially, the radicalization of politics between 1961 and 1964 made the internal warfare doctrines of the ESG appear to many military men much more relevant and urgent than they had seemed in the period of rapid economic growth and relative political peace from 1956 to 1958. Although the majority of army officers did not espouse ESG ideas concerning the utility of a strong private sector, or share its distrust of "emotional nationalism" and its view that the containment of domestic communism called for aggressive anti-Communist alliances abroad, these differences were glossed over as the military began to close ranks in defense of their institution against what they saw as an immediate security threat. Only later, after the first military government had been formed, did these disagreements between the ESG officers within and the majority of officers outside the government become an issue.

Yet despite the subsequent disputes over specific ESG policies, the important point is that many of the doctrines of internal warfare, *Copies of the Boletim de Informações are on open file at the Army Library in Rio de Janeiro. Before October 1961 its format was that of a very straightforward review of professional topics and routine surveys of international news. Thereafter, it came much closer to the framework and terminology of the ESG, and most significantly began to deal with the question of the threat to internal security presented by communism.
formulated at the ESG and institutionalized in the ESG-influenced government of Castello Branco, permeated all major military groups in Brazil and were accepted as basic new facts of political and military life. The central idea formulated at the ESG was that development and security issues were inseparable. Even when differences over specific policies developed between the Castello Branco and the Costa e Silva government, almost all military officers agreed that, since agrarian, fiscal, and educational problems were intrinsic to the security of the nation, it was legitimate and necessary for military men to concern themselves with these areas. From this premise came the steady broadening of military jurisdiction over Brazilian life after the military assumed power in 1964. The fact that by 1968-1970 the economy had recovered from its stagnation and had one of the fastest growth rates in Latin America reinforced the military's confidence in their ability to guide the economy. Paradoxically, the growing presence of urban guerrillas in 1969-1970 did not weaken that confidence but merely reinforced their concern with internal warfare.

*One aspect of this general definition of what constitutes security areas was the creation in Brazil after the revolution of the Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI), a combination CIA and FBI, whose director was given cabinet rank. General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the chief ideologist of the Superior War College, was the first director. The second director was General Garrastazú Médici, and the experience he gained in this post was one of the most powerful arguments in favor of his selection by the military "electoral college" to be the third president of the Revolution. In 1968 and 1969 national security laws were passed that greatly increased the role of the SNI and other intelligence units. Since 1968 every ministry has an SNI representative, who is responsible for ensuring that all policy decisions of the ministry give full consideration to national security issues.

It is important to realize that the SNI officials are not a permanent corps. Precisely because the SNI is so powerful politically, each new military president since 1964 has appointed men to the key intelligence posts who closely reflect his own specific personal and political views. The first director, Golbery do Couto e Silva, was, like the then President, Castello Branco, closely identified with the ESG and with the policy of active participation with the United States in hemispheric and anti-Communist policies. The second director of the SNI, Garrastazú Médici, was, like President Costa e Silva, under whom he was appointed, unassociated with the ESG and a native of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. All key SNI officials, however, have been concerned with the security ramifications of almost all phases of Brazilian society.
II. MILITARY RULE AND RELATIONS WITH CIVILIANS

How has the military's conception of their new role of providing the nexus between security and national development affected their relationship with civilians? In what areas have military and civilian attitudes over development policies coincided, and where have they diverged, since the military assumed control in 1964?

A very important variable that affects the governing style and coalition potential of military governments concerns the nature of the pre-coup environment. What and whom did the military fear most? Which groups had their expectations (realistic or not) most sharply reversed when the military assumed power?

Clearly, in March 1964 the Brazilian military most feared chaos and communism. They felt the need for a strong government to check inflation and subversion. Given this vision of societal disintegration, they perceived virtually all groups engaged in mobilization and confrontation politics as potentially dangerous. Concern centered on peasant leagues, adult literacy campaigns (like the Basic Education Movement -- MEB) whose goal it was to make people critically aware of their situation, student movements, and trade unions that were pushing strike levels to new highs.

This widely shared concern over the danger of communism and internal warfare has contributed to the antimobilization strategy of the three military governments. Only a handful of significant strikes have broken out since 1964, a radical reversal of the previous pattern. Student movements and peasant leagues have been either broken up or tightly controlled. Thus, all civilian groups (including important Church organizations) that define "development" as intrinsically related to political participation, critical awareness (conscientização), and mass mobilization have found themselves in basic philosophical conflict with the military.

In the area of electoral politics, the civil-military conflict initially was not very intense. In the opening months of the first revolutionary government, many military leaders and key civilian politicians thought that there was sufficient complementarity of
goals, skills, and interests to allow electoral politics to play a central part in the political structure that the military leaders were attempting to build. However, this area of agreement has progressively narrowed. More and more, the military regime has come to see civilian political prerogatives — such as freedom of speech, the right to attack the government, and congressional refusal to sanction further purges — as hindering it in its attempts to combat subversion or establish priorities for development. Most important, since the Brazilian military establishment itself is divided over development policies, political campaigns such as the gubernatorial election of October 1965 have exacerbated conflict within the military.

The two major crises of the military regime since 1964 (the crisis of October 1965 and that of December 1968) both revolved around the authoritarian nationalists' attack on what they saw as congressional reluctance to pass needed antisuession measures. The desire of more liberal military leaders to maintain some democratic forms, such as local elections, and to leave the way open for a return to civilian rule has been a constant source of intramilitary tension. The authoritarian nationalists feel that any return to civilian rule before the social structure of Brazil has been basically changed will only result in the return to power of the old-guard politicians, both left and right. In both 1965 and 1968, the internal military crisis was resolved only when the incumbent president, a military man, agreed to curtail the range of political prerogatives open to the civilian politicians. Thus, the first seven years of military rule have seen the military progressively restrict the arena in which they consider electoral politics and open political competition compatible with their own style of political leadership and their institutional capability to tolerate dissent.

When we look beyond mobilization politics and electoral politics, we can delineate areas of potential or actual congruence in the goals or attitudes of important civilian and military groups.

The aggressively pro-American and pro-foreign-capital stance of Castello Branco and Roberto Campos was the policy most in conflict with the aims of civilian nationalists. As we have seen, it was not
a deeply rooted or widely shared aspect of Brazilian military thought and was susceptible to change. Indeed, both the second and the third military governments have been somewhat more nationalist. The point to underscore is that, while many military men differ from civilians in political aims and style with regard to mobilization or open elections, there are many who are quite at ease with nationalism. To the extent that they find it desirable or expedient to win civilian allies, they will move further in the nationalist direction. Indeed, this is a key aspect of the appeal and the formula of the authoritarian-nationalist wing within the Brazilian military.

This is not a policy without costs to the military government, however, for it could upset the uneasy, but de facto mutually supportive, relationships that now exist between the military and members of the industrial-agricultural private sectors, many of whom are fearful of a Peruvian form of nationalism. This is an unusual coalition, because it does not have roots either in a common class origin or even in shared emotional attitudes.

Analysis of the socioeconomic origins of the Brazilian army officers reveals that they do not come from either of the major economic elites, the fazendeiros (large landowners) or the São Paulo industrialists. Of the 1,031 cadets who entered the Brazilian army academy between 1941 and 1943, only 39 (3.88 percent) were sons of fazendeiros. For the 1962-1966 cadets, the figure was down to 0.5 percent.* In 1964, of the 89 army line generals on active duty for whom data are available, only 3 were born in São Paulo, the industrial center of Brazil.

In their attitudes, many military men share a visceral populist distrust of "all fortunes acquired by shady business deals."** By and large, Brazilian army officers come from the lower middle classes, and their life style is much more austere than that of the Brazilian industrialists. They tend to be strong supporters of nationalized

*Based on the author's study of the cadet record of the Brazilian military academy, by permission of the commandant of the academy.

** This is the language of the second goal of the Frente Patriótico Civil-Militar, discussed below, pp. 113ff. But General Albuquerque Lima and other military nationalists have expressed similar views.
industries such as Petrobrás, and to resent the possibility that foreign capital could play a controlling role in the Brazilian economy. In regard to the agricultural sector, military officers frequently criticize the inefficiency, and sometimes the aristocratic way of life, of the fazendeiros.

For all these differences in socioeconomic origin, attitudes, and life styles, the fact remains that the military leaders and the industrial and agricultural elites have many common enemies and goals. Both groups are generally opposed to the mobilization politics and "high" wage demands of peasant leagues and trade unions. Both are frightened by and want to suppress the anti-system movements of urban and rural guerrillas.

Besides shared enemies they share some goals. The size, complexity, and economic importance of the Brazilian private sector have made military leaders hesitant to assume a great degree of direct control in this sector. At the same time, precisely because the private sector is so crucial to the economy, they acknowledge that the military revolution cannot be successful unless the private sector prospers. There is thus a basic congruence in goals, and since 1968 this symbiotic relationship has increased. The very high growth rate of the private sector is now viewed by the military as justifying their stewardship, and they hope that the "trickle-down" effect of economic growth will win them political support. The private sector, in turn, despite some conflicts with and fear of the military, sees military strength as a necessary bulwark against the guerrilla threat and "exorbitant" wage demands. The alliance between the military and the private sector has held since 1968, but it is by no means stable or permanent. There are numerous possible points of tension. What will happen if there is a prolonged economic decline? What if business leaders come to see military authoritarianism not as a cure for urban activity but as a cause? And what if groups both within the military and among the industrialists begin to feel threatened by the growing role of foreign capital in key Brazilian industries?
Doubt over the answers to these questions is likely to provide many an uncertain moment in the decade of the 1970s. An insight into potential developments may be derived from analysis of the nature and origins of specific policy differences within military governments in Brazil.

The Conflict Within the Military Over Development Strategy

In 1963-1964, the Brazilian military developed an internal agreement on anti-Communism, anticorruption, opposition to mobilization politics, and the desire for economic growth. This consensus, coupled with the feeling that the military organization was threatened, led to the overthrow of President João Goulart's government in 1964. But could the unity of the Brazilian military elite survive the demands of carrying out a consistent policy once they were in power? It remained to be seen whether the consensus extended to such hard questions as these: Should private foreign capital be used to help overcome investment and technological shortages in Brazil, or should the government lean toward a more nationalist and autarkic policy? How could the superficial agreement on communism be translated into policy? Did an effective strategy call for the military to become more nationalistic and incorporate the Communists' strongest programmatic points, or did it call for the kind of aggressive anti-Communism that involved an internationalistic foreign policy and alliance with the United States? What should the military government do once in power? Should there be a "tutelary democracy" preparing the way for an eventual return to democratic government, or should the military seize the opportunity and radically restructure the political and economic system of the country? Should political purging be minimal, or should it be a major means of political control?

The future stability of policy turned to a large extent upon how the first government of the Revolution, headed by President Castello Branco, answered these questions. Whether the second government of the Revolution, under Costa e Silva, accepted and honored the policy decisions of the first depended on the degree to which the military
as a whole shared the orientations of the first government. The
Castello Branco government of 1964-1967 instituted many new policies.*
Four of its chief characteristics were: (1) an active, anti-Communist
foreign policy based on the interdependence of the free world; (2) a
preference for a semi-free-enterprise economic system supported and
guided by a strong central government; (3) a dislike and distrust of
"irrational nationalism" and an emphasis on "realistic and technical"
solutions; and (4) an intellectual commitment to democracy that
accepted the practical necessity of temporary tutelage. What were
some of the specific policies that flowed from these general beliefs
and attitudes?

The foreign policy of the Castello Branco government was rooted
in a Cold War perspective, which its leader once described as follows:

... in the present context of a bi-polar power
confrontation with a radical political and ideological
divorce between the two respective centers, the pres-
ervation of independence presupposes the acceptance of
a degree of interdependence, whether in the military,
economic, or political fields.

In the Brazilian case, in foreign policy [we]
cannot forget that we have made a basic option which
stems from cultural and political fidelity to the
Western democratic system.

The interests of Brazil coincide, in many cases,
in concentric circles with Latin America, the American
continent, and the Western community.**

Given this orientation, the trend toward neutralism of the Quadros
and Goulart governments had to be reversed, because neutralism was

*The purpose here is not to discuss these policies in detail --
to do so would require another study -- but to look at basic attitudes
and beliefs behind these policies. A first attempt to describe these
policies is Max G. Manwaring's "The Military in Brazilian Politics"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science,
University of Illinois, 1968), Chapter 8, "Economic and Social Policy
of the Revolutionary Government," and Chapter 9, "Political Reform
and Military Policy."

**From a speech by Castello Branco at the Brazilian Foreign
Ministry, July 31, 1964, printed in the Foreign Ministry's A Política
da Revolução Brasileira, 1966 (no pagination).
"emotionally immature" and a "flight from international reality."*

The United States, as a strong anti-Communist force, was seen as an ally, and nationalistic criticisms of the United States within Brazil were treated as virtually equivalent to subversion and a threat to Brazilian national security.

These beliefs -- classic ESG doctrine -- led the Castello Branco government to seek political, economic, and military partnership with the United States. The feeling of shared interests was warmly reciprocated by United States officials, and as a result the U.S. AID mission grew from a mere holding action in the last months of the Goulart government to the largest such mission in the world after Vietnam and India during the tenure of Castello Branco. This identification of interests also explains why Brazil sent the largest foreign contingent to the Dominican Republic in 1965, and led the campaign for the initiation of an inter-American peacekeeping force. **

Domestically, in the field of economics, the Castello Branco government favored strong and rational planning to strengthen the mixed free-enterprise system, the elimination of inflation by government control of the cost-push wage spiral, and the elimination of the inflationary demand-pull created by government deficits. It was thought that some nationalized industries operating at a deficit could be handled better by the private sector. Loide, the coastal shipping company, for example, was sold for these reasons. *** Negotiations were also started to sell the largely nationalized truck-manufacturing

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*Ibid.


A characteristically strong defense of the economic policy and democratic intention of the Brazilian government and of the high level of U.S. aid is given by former U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Lincoln Gordon to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 89th Congress, 2d session, February 7, 1966.

*** Interview with Marshal Juarez Távora, formerly Minister of Transportation in the Castello Branco government, in Rio de Janeiro, October 8, 1968.
company Fábrica Nacional de Motores. Foreign private capital was welcomed to help develop Brazil's potential, and the previous prohibition on foreign development of Brazil's huge but unexploited iron-ore deposits was lifted.

Fiscal reforms based on tax procedure were the Castello Branco government's preferred solution to the problems of creating revenue, redistributing wealth, and increasing production. The Land Reform Statute of 1964 was typical. The suppression of most of the peasant leagues had shored up the position of the large landowners by removing pressures for more fundamental reforms, but the Castello Branco government nonetheless hoped to modernize the agrarian sector through tax mechanisms. Having first conducted a carefully executed land-use study, it then levied tax assessments based on maximum potential productivity. The move was designed to force landowners either to be more productive or to sell their lands. With most of these reforms, time and continuity were essential before the policies could show dividends.

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* The company was sold eventually to Alfa-Romeo of Italy.

** Some, but not all, members of the cabinet wanted to allow private and foreign capital a role in the development of oil, traditionally the exclusive domain of the nationalized oil monopoly, Petrobrás. Nationalist sentiment in Brazil and in the armed forces was so strong, however, that the government eventually decided not to push the matter but left it an open question for future consideration.


***** Much of this analysis of the economic policy is based on interviews with Minister of Planning and Coordination Roberto Campos. The development plan is contained in Programa de Ação Econômica do Governo 1964-1966. The Berkeley/U.S. AID team of advisers to the Planning Ministry from 1964 to 1968 analyze the economic policy in Howard Ellis (ed.), The Economy of Brazil, University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1969.
The government persistently attacked what it called "pseudo-nationalism." In Castello Branco's words, to the extent that nationalism is manipulated by certain groups to avoid competition and maintain market position; is used to impede the importation of external technology, to maintain mineral resources imprisoned in the soil for which there is no [domestic] exploitation capital, [or] is manipulated by the alienated left to impede the strengthening of the capitalist economic system and the democratic institutions of the West, nationalism comes to be highly negative, not only from the viewpoint of economic development but of national security.*

Government ministers constantly admonished the people that they ought not to be ufano (full of unrealistic confidence or pride) merely because Brazil was rich in resources. Roberto Campos and Castello Branco both argued that resources were worthless unless exploited.

Along with this socially austere and technological approach to problems went the reluctance to make promises or claim that reforms would yield returns quickly. Even his closest associates complained that Castello Branco seemed to feel that any attempt to win the support of the people for his plans was a form of demagoguery.**

The Castello Branco government, as we have said, was intellectually committed to democracy as a form of government. Its members accepted the necessity of temporary "tutelage," and they tended to see political debate as an "obstacle" rather than an intrinsic part of the process of democracy. Nonetheless, they believed their goal to be the "ideal" democracy.*** Despite pressure from the "hard line"

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* Speech at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, op. cit.

** Although this point was made in interviews by various ex-ministers of the Castello Branco government, their loyalty to Castello Branco is still such that they asked not to be quoted by name.

*** On the basis of conversations with a number of ex-members of that government and an analysis of their writing, the author believes that their concept of democracy was too "ideal," including, as it did, a very high degree of consensus, little political conflict, and an informed citizenry who would be immune to demagogic appeals of politicians.
officers for more thorough purges, Castello Branco wanted to keep Congress open and to maintain strict time limits on the exceptional powers granted him by the First Institutional Act. The commitment to a return to democracy was sufficiently strong that the government planned to hold direct gubernatorial elections in 1965, despite the risks to which this would expose the military government.

An argument often advanced in favor of military regimes is that plans for economic development can be systematically implemented over time because of the unity and strength of the military. The success of most of the policy decisions of the 1964-1967 Castello Branco government was contingent upon the long-range effects of its tax and fiscal reforms. These reforms were not dramatic, but they could be expected to yield results, provided they were supported by the succeeding regime. However, the second government of the Revolution, headed by President Costa e Silva, did not provide this support, and many of the decisions of the Castello Branco government were reversed. Indeed, Castello Branco's key economic planner, Roberto Campos, was the source of a constant stream of newspaper articles lamenting the policy reversals. The leader of the Berkeley/U.S. AID Advisory Group to the Planning Commission of the Brazilian government commented on the extent of these reversals, which he attributed to Costa e Silva's desire to win popularity by relaxing the austerity policies of the first military government as well as to basic differences between his and Castello Branco's political and economic ideas:

... the rate of inflation, which had reached its zenith in the first quarter of 1964 at an annual rate of 140 percent, declined to 35 percent annually by March 1967. However, the incoming government of Costa e Silva pro-claimed a policy of "humanizing" economic policy. Early in 1968, the Director of the Internal Revenue Service, who was intent upon "cracking down" on corporate and large-income tax evaders, was dismissed; and in February the President of the Banco Central, apparently deploiring the financial policies of the government, resigned.
Currently, it is reported that, having recently been reduced to the vanishing point, the official federal budget deficit threatens to reach 10 percent.*

In the crucial area of land reform, the lack of policy continuity effectively destroyed the careful, if very moderate, Land Reform Statute of 1964. As the essence of this statute was to compel the large landowners, through high tax assessments, either to increase productivity or sell their land, it would have required both time and steady pressure from the tax collection agencies for the policy to succeed. The Costa e Silva government took the teeth out of the law by not adjusting delinquent taxes upward to reflect inflation. The first president of the Agrarian Reform Institute complained in 1968 that "the Agrarian Reform is semi-paralyzed because of lack of funds and lack of interest."**

In place of the active internationalism of the ex-FEB and ESG officers who were the backbone of the Castello Branco government, Costa e Silva appealed to nationalism, and relations with the United States began to experience tension at numerous points. Brazil ceased to support the idea of an inter-American peacekeeping force. And, while Castello Branco's government had been cautiously cool toward signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Costa e Silva government turned refusal to sign into a heated nationalist issue.

Why did this reversal of policies occur? What does it show us about the supposed unity of military governments? Did these policy differences reflect specific career experiences in the officer corps? And, if so, were the career experiences of the key members of the Castello Branco government atypical?


** Interview with Paulo Assis Ribeiro, Rio de Janeiro.
The Atypical Careers of Castello Branco's Inner Circle

Some policy changes undoubtedly were due to civilian pressure. The Costa e Silva government obtained support from the land and coffee elites by not pressing land reform measures, and it also won temporary respite from the hostility of the nationalist left by softening the pro-American policies of its predecessor. Nonetheless, a significant number of changes can be accounted for by real differences between the members of the two governments, and specifically by the career experience of the core of officers at the heart of Castello Branco's government. Their unusual experience helped shape political attitudes and beliefs that were often quite different from those of fellow officers, and these differences explain in large measure the lack of political continuity, and the reversal of specific policies by the government of Costa e Silva.

To determine the special features, if any, of the group of officers in the first government, the author studied available accounts of the discussions and disputes involved in the formulation of major new policies, and interviewed many participants, both civilian and military. To establish which officers had most strongly backed, or had helped formulate, the new policies of 1964, he drew up a list of 25 who might be classified as the "core group" of officers in the Castello Branco government. Next, he submitted a questionnaire to two cabinet members whose own membership in the core group was beyond dispute, and asked these participant-observers to make their own, separate evaluations of the officers whom they considered the strongest contributors and supporters of the internal and external policies of the Castello Branco government. The lists were then compared.

Of the 102 line generals on active duty listed in the 1964 Officers' Register, ten had been assigned to the core group by both informants.* The same ten also appeared on the author's list of

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*Each had listed three or four additional names that the other had not included.
25. After separate consultation with both participant-observers, the author added the names of eight men who were not active-duty generals at the time of the coup: Four were retired generals in 1964, and four were colonels at the time (who advanced to general between 1964 and 1967). These eight officers shared the broad characteristics of the ten generals on active duty who formed the core group, and formal analysis was therefore restricted to the latter, making it possible to compare them with the 92 other active-duty generals.

To collect information on socioeconomic and career patterns for this universe of 102 generals, the author used mainly a variety of printed or mimeographed material, all of it a matter of public record,* though some of it of transient character. From these sources alone he was able to obtain complete data for all 102 generals on about 20 different variables concerning military careers and experiences, including branch of service, schools attended (Brazilian and foreign), dates of all promotions, academic achievements, and place of birth. Father's occupation was available in only about 40 percent of the cases.

When the core group of ten generals supporting the Castello Branco government of 1964 was compared with the 92 other generals completing the universe of 102, and also with the pro-Goulart subgroup of 20 generals who were purged after the 1964 Revolution,

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*Some of the more important of these sources were: Annual Officers' Registers (Almanaques), publicly printed each year, containing lists of names, ranks, honors, promotions, and schools of all officers on active duty; the Ministry of the Army's biographical data sheets, usually released to the press upon an officer's promotion to general or appointment to a major command; the list, published by the Commandant of the Expeditionary Force, of all the participants in the Expeditionary Force to Italy in World War II (checked against the Officers' Register lists of medals received for participation with this force); and newspaper archives of the Jornal do Brasil and O Estado de São Paulo, which contained special biographies, normally compiled whenever a military officer received a promotion to general or became politically prominent. In addition, of course, the author drew on his interviews with participants, reinforced by newspaper accounts of political events, to supplement knowledge on the political positions of the officers concerned.
several striking differences in their career patterns and experiences emerged. * The variables associated most highly with membership in the core group were: participation in World War II, membership on the permanent staff of the Higher War College of Brazil (the ESC), attendance at foreign schools, leading the graduating class at one of the three major army schools, and service in the most technically advanced branches of the army. These correlations are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.

Association is not, of course, the same as causation, and the real task of any elite analysis is to determine the significance, if any, of such correlations. ** In the case of the Brazilian core group studied, what meaning did they have for the exercise and retention of power? What ideas and attitudes, if any, were created by these experiences? Furthermore, if many of the ideas of the Castello Branco officers were rooted in atypical career patterns rather than in military-wide sentiment, was it not predictable that, if the military rulers abided by their decision to limit the presidential term, Castello Branco would have great difficulty in controlling the succession and ensuring continuity of his policies? This was the author's working hypothesis.

To determine the significance of a career experience such as participation in World War II or membership on the permanent staff of the Superior War College, the writer conducted interviews and examined relevant archives. It became clear that the four distinctive characteristics and orientations of the Castello Branco government discussed earlier were rooted in the special cluster of these career experiences found to correlate highly with support of membership in the Castello Branco government. The concept of "cluster" is important, because the experiences were interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Five of the ten generals of the core group had participated in World War II.

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*Since we are dealing with an entire universe of fair size rather than with a sample, the question of representativeness does not arise.

** A very valid criticism of much elite analysis is that it has been very weak precisely at this step. For a review and critique of the literature, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When, and How," World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, July 1966, pp. 690-717.
Table 1
CAREER PATTERN CORRELATES OF CASTELLO BRANCO CORE GROUP COMPARED WITH ALL OTHER LINE GENERALS ON ACTIVE DUTY, JANUARY 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Member FEB</th>
<th>Attended ESG</th>
<th>Ever Member Permanent Staff ESG</th>
<th>Graduated First in Class</th>
<th>Attended Mil. Sch. Abroad</th>
<th>Attended Mil. Sch. U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core group</td>
<td>60 (10)</td>
<td>90 (10)</td>
<td>70 (10)</td>
<td>100 (10)</td>
<td>100 (10)</td>
<td>80 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other line generals</td>
<td>29.3 (92)</td>
<td>62.4 (92)</td>
<td>13.1 (84) ^a</td>
<td>32.6 (92)</td>
<td>23.9 (92)</td>
<td>21.7 (92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^a For 8 of the 92, no information was available for this variable.
Table 2
CAREER PATTERN CORRELATES OF CASTELLO BRANCO CORE GROUP COMPARED WITH PRO-GOULART GENERALS PURGED AFTER 1964 REVOLUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Member FEB</th>
<th>Attended ESG</th>
<th>Ever Member Permanent Staff ESG</th>
<th>Graduated First in Class</th>
<th>Attended Mil. Sch. Abroad</th>
<th>Attended Mil. Sch. U.S.A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%   N</td>
<td>%   N</td>
<td>%   N</td>
<td>%   N</td>
<td>%   N</td>
<td>%   N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castello Branco core group</td>
<td>60 (10)</td>
<td>90 (10)</td>
<td>70 (10)</td>
<td>100 (10)</td>
<td>100 (10)</td>
<td>80 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Goulart purged generals</td>
<td>25 (20)</td>
<td>50 (20)</td>
<td>17.6 (17) ^a</td>
<td>20 (20)</td>
<td>20 (20)</td>
<td>20 (20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^aFor 3 of the 20, no information was available for this variable.
in the FEB, been on the permanent staff of the Superior War College, attended foreign schools, and graduated first in one of the three major service schools. In the remainder of the universe, only one of the 92 generals had done all four. The odds of such a proportional difference occurring by chance are one in a thousand.*

Significance of Career Experiences

The FEB Experience. The value that officers placed on interdependence in foreign policy, the fear of excessive nationalism, the belief that Brazil could profit through a close relationship with the United States, the deep distrust of emotional appeals, the idea that capitalism was capable of creating a physically powerful nation, and the belief that democracy was a more "civilized" style of politics were strengthened, or indeed had been largely created, by participation in the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy during World War II. Six of the generals in the core group had been in the FEB.

The only ground combat unit from Latin America to take part in the war, the FEB saw heavy action and received the surrender of an entire German division. There is no doubt that this joining with Allied troops in combat was a powerful social experience for Brazilian officers. Using Karl Mannheim's concept of political generations, we can say that the shared, and in many ways upsetting, FEB experience contributed to a "characteristic mode of thought" and behavior, new "integrative attitudes," and "collective strivings."** In conversation

*This is using the "Z" test for comparing differences in proportions. For the "Z" test see Paul G. Hoel, Introduction to Mathematical Statistics, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1962, pp. 149-150.


The best description of the FEB is in Lt. Col. Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco, O Brasil na II Grande Guerra, Biblioteca de Exército Editora, Rio de Janeiro, 1960. The FEB Commandant has also written an account which lists all the members of the FEB. See Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes, A F.E.B. Pelo Seu Comandante, Instituto Progresso Editorial, São Paulo, 1947.
with these army officers, two themes recurred. One was that the 
Brazilian contingent had been favorably impressed with the technical 
achievements and ability of the United States and with the utility of 
cooperation.* Thus, the ex-FEB officers tended to be less fearful of 
cooperation with the United States after World War II. One prominent 
general remarked:

In the War, the United States had to give us everything: 
food, clothes, equipment. After the War, we were less 
afraid of United States imperialism than other officers 
because we saw that the United States really helped us 
without strings attached.**

Another general said:

The attitude of FEB members was important for opening the 
country to foreign investment because they feared the 
United States less . . . the FEB members wanted very 
rapid development in Brazil.

The FEB was not only important because of going to 
Italy. Possibly even more important, the FEB members 
got to the United States and saw at first hand a great 
democratic industrial power. It was an opening of hori-
zons. I went and it made a great impact; for me it was 
absolutely apparent that a free enterprise had been 
successful in creating a great industrial power.***

The second theme that runs through the writings and conversations 
of ex-FEB members was the profound dislike of anything that seemed to

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* The FEB members, however, are by no means completely uncritical 
of the United States. For example, both in their writings and con-
versations they frequently express their moral and human disgust with 
the federally sanctioned racism displayed in the segregated units of 
the U.S. military in World War II. An ex-FEB officer has written a 
book criticizing the haughty attitudes of U.S. commanders and the 
inferior quality of equipment given to the Brazilians by the United 
States. See Marshal Lima Brayner, A Verdade Sôbre FEB, Editôra 

** Interview with the commanding general of the Third Infantry 
Division, General Edson de Figueiredo, at Santa Maria, Rio Grande do 
Sul, September 24, 1968.

*** Interview with General Golbery do Couto e Silva, in Rio de 
Janeiro, October 8, 1968.
them to be narrow, unrealistic, emotional nationalism. Castello Branco had been the operations officer of the Brazilian division in Italy. In his archives are numerous notes and handwritten lectures criticizing the "false optimism" and "irrational nationalism" in Brazil, and in various places he points out that participation in World War II has made the Brazilian army face up to its inadequacies and overcome them through hard work. Roberto Campos, when asked if he felt that the officers who participated in FEB had any special view of Brazilian development, was very explicit:

FEB had a great impact on Castello and others. The contact with logistics in an underdeveloped country made them cool and objective. Castello grasped the difference between verbalization of power and real power. Castello was impressed by the complete failure of Italy and Mussolini, a failure which he considered an example of verbalization not backed by real power.

Campos believed that their war experience has had a definite impact on the governing style of those ex-FEB members who were in the government between 1964 and 1967, and that it set them apart from most of the other military officers:

Castello, Cordeiro de Farias, Mamede, Lyra Tavares all grasped that for the country to be powerful it needed organization, technology, and industry. This

*From conversations with former FEB members it appears that what they describe as their realistic internationalism and concern with fighting communism abroad comes from their perception in Italy that war physically and morally destroys the country in which it is fought. Therefore, they say, they are more concerned than those who did not participate in the FEB with helping in the fight against communism abroad, so as not to have to face that fight in their own country.

**In a particularly interesting section of his archives, Castello Branco notes that the first combat performance of the FEB was so poor that the American commanding general asked the Brazilian staff if they felt that the Brazil unit had any offensive capacity. After a bitter and agonizing night of reflection, the answer was they would have it after more hard training. Given such realistic and "hard" training, Castello said, the Brazilian troops improved immensely and were equal to the Americans. Arquivo do Marechal H. A. Castello Branco, General Staff School (ECME), Rio de Janeiro.
sense of reality decreased the propensity to use images and demagoguery as a form of political communication.*

It is interesting to note that a book published by the reservists who had fought with the FEB in Italy contains the same themes: unfavorable comparisons of Brazilian levels of organization and development with those of the United States, the idealization of democracy, and statements such as the following:

It is not enough to be brave, to have high political national resources, not enough to have moral reasons. To profit by these resources we must have organization and discipline. We ought to expound in Brazil this idea of organization and discipline in order that the work of utilizing our resources and national possibilities be productive and efficient. By reminding the people of this nation of this idea, we can combat another illusion common in our land, the false patriotism that is content to exalt the grandeur of Brazil but . . . through failure to organize, does not profit by it.

Finally, in the ten months we lived in Italy, we could appreciate in all its implications the tragic condition that a nation is reduced to when it is deprived of its basic liberties and allows an authoritarian regime to govern.**

The ESG Experience. Another major experience of the core group of officers in the 1964-1967 government was having attended the Superior War College (ESG) and, even more important, having been appointed to its permanent teaching and research staff. The six core supporters who participated in the FEB later went on to the War College, and all but one became permanent staff members.

There is a specific link between the FEB and the ESG. The artillery commander of the FEB, and its most politically experienced

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and visible member after the war, was General Cordeiro de Farias.*

In 1948 he was given the task of preparing a report on the establishment of a Superior War College, and in 1950 he became the newly-founded school's first commandant. He himself saw a direct relationship between the two institutions:

The impact of the FEB was such that we came back to Brazil looking for models of government that would work — order, planning, rational financing. We did not find this model in Brazil at this stage, but we decided to seek ways to find the route in the long run. The ESG was one way to this, and the ESG grew out of the FEB experience.**

From 1950 until the Revolution of 1964, the emerging ideology of the ESG fleshed out and formalized many of the ideas associated with the FEB. As we have seen, these ideas contributed to the military's belief in their own competence to handle questions of national development. To the general FEB ideal of the perfect democracy the ESG added the practical belief that the central organs of government and planning must be strengthened and made rational.

The most influential school of development ideology in Brazil in the 1950s emphasized nationalism and the public sector.*** The ESG, under the impact of its FEB experience, cared more about efficiency and productivity, and argued that, because of the scarcity of capital in Brazil, the private sector should be used to develop Brazil's potential most rapidly.

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* In the Castello Branco cabinet he was Minister for Coordination of Regional Agencies.

** Interviews with Marshal Cordeiro de Farias, in Rio de Janeiro, September 16 and 17, 1968.

Such a favorable view of the role of the private sector is unusual in Brazilian, and more broadly in Latin American, military thinking. With obvious exceptions (the Argentine, Venezuelan and Mexican militaries), the Latin American military have relatively poor links with the private sector. Important sectors of military opinion favor statism and tend to view the profit motive with distrust and distaste. The FEB members' impression of the American economic system as conducive both to military power and to national development had been a very atypical experience. Their openness to the private sector was reinforced at the ESG, where over half the students were civilians, many of whom were associated with large industrial, commercial, or financial enterprises. To the author's knowledge, the extent of this institutionalized relationship between the military and the private sector was, and is, unique in Latin America. The relationship was strengthened between the late 1950s and the Revolution of 1964 by a shared fear of a growing Communist threat in Brazil.

The atypical nature of the Castello Branco group's experiences in this regard is underscored by the fact that in the early 1950s, in the great dispute over the establishment of the nationalized oil monopoly, Petrobrás, which the majority of the military favored, no prominent member of the ESG permanent staff championed the idea. Indeed, the commandant of the ESG at the time, General Juarez Távora, was an outspoken advocate of the policy of allowing private and foreign companies some role in developing oil resources. *

With the advent of nuclear weapons and the Cold War, the old FEB idea of the usefulness of cooperation with the United States became formalized as the necessity for an "interdependent" foreign policy. Finally, we may note that, in his penultimate address as President, Castello Branco spoke of the ESG as a unique example of "anticipation

*His position as he publicly expressed it from 1947 to 1954 is contained in his Petróleo para o Brasil, Livraria José Olympio Editôra, Rio de Janeiro, 1955.
of ideas," and said that the school's doctrines of national security and development had been incorporated by his government into Brazilian laws, organizations, and constitution.*

**The Intellectualism of the Castello Branco Group.** Two other distinctive features of the core group behind the Castello Branco government have less specific policy implications, but they do reinforce the picture of a distinctive career pattern. The first is that of outstanding academic achievement: While only 33 percent of the other 92 generals had graduated first in their class, 100 percent of the core group had done so. The intellectualism of the latter was reflected also in their overrepresentation in the technically advanced artillery branch of the army, and their underrepresentation in the two traditional line branches, the infantry and cavalry.

The second distinctive feature of the core group was that all its members had attended foreign schools, 80 percent of them schools in the United States. Although the importance of this statistic is not quite clear, it compares significantly with the 24 percent of the generals not in the core group who had attended foreign schools. Certainly, the data do not support the contention that U.S. military training of Latin American officers inculcates apolitical professional values in the officers. *Prima facie*, it could be argued that the dislike of emotional nationalism, as well as the actively anti-Communist and openly pro-American stance, of the 1964-1967 Castello Branco government was a result of, or was related to, their American training. There can be no doubt that a major goal of much -- some would say, all -- American-sponsored training is to contribute to such attitudes.

*See Correio da Manhã, March 14, 1967. For the above analysis of the ESG, the author has drawn, in addition to public sources, on various personal interviews, including those with Marshals Cordeiro de Farias and Juarez Távora, the first two commandants of the school, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the major political thinker of the school, and Roberto Campos, who was a frequent lecturer and the most influential economic thinker of the ESG.*
In most of the FEB officers who went on to found the ESG, American schooling probably reinforced these existing attitudes, rather than created them. Einaudi's study of the Peruvian military similarly suggests that the total career experience and national situations predominate over any attitudes deriving exclusively from U.S. training; it points out, for example, that a high percentage of the members of the nationalist junta installed in October 1968 (which established relations with the Soviet Union, nationalized a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and discontinued the U.S. military advisory mission) had attended American schools.*

It is probably safe to say that many of the top officers in both Peru and Brazil who had gone to U.S. schools were familiar with the considerable body of American and French writing on counterrevolutionary warfare and that they developed a desire for the military's mission to include a more active role in the economic and political fields. Thus, American and foreign schooling seems to correlate with activism. In both Peru and Brazil, this "role expansion" was an integral part of the deepening involvement in the development process.**

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III. THE INSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF THE MILITARY

The development of military demands in Brazil in the future is likely to continue to be fundamentally affected by two elements: the internal diversity of the officer corps and Brazil's potential for world-power status. The first of these is illustrated in the pages that follow by discussion of the complexities attendant upon the attempt by the Castello Branco group to control their successors in the management of national policies. The second is illustrated by the emergence of a strong civil-military consensus on Brazil's international position, based on the potential for world-power status.

The Inability to Control Succession

There is no doubt that the group of officers supporting Castello Branco's government were atypical in their career experiences and thus in their attitudes on questions of political development. They evidently knew that their attitudes were not widely shared in the military as a whole, for, at the time of succession, foreseeing a strong possibility that their policies would be changed, they were almost unanimous in urging Castello Branco to remain in office to ensure survival of his policies. Castello Branco refused, on the grounds that the greatest evil in Brazilian politics was that of continuismo.* And he proved unable to control the selection of his successor, since none of his choices for the presidency -- all officers from the core group or civilians with similar ideas -- was acceptable to the officers at large.

Why was Castello Branco powerless to ensure either the selection of his successor or the continuity of his policies? Clearly, the fact that his government's economic liberalism, a philosophy most closely associated with the Escola Superior de Guerra, was not a popular ideology either among civilians or within the officer corps

*From interviews with various members of the government.
was extremely important. In the early 1950s, as mentioned earlier, many of the officers outside the inner circles of the government were socialized into national politics in the great controversy over the establishment of the national oil monopoly, Petrobrás, with the majority of officers strongly backing Petrobrás, while the ESG was lukewarm toward the idea. In their stand on nationalism, also, the officers around Castello Branco represented a minority opinion within the military; it was the aspect of his government most intensely hated by civilian nationalists.

One of the basic arguments advanced in the several parts of this Report is that the military is a complex, politically heterogeneous institution. Thus, any one group, especially a group holding minority views, can win wide acceptance of its ideas only if it engages in effective political persuasion. An "apolitical" style of leadership cannot survive in a political institution. Castello Branco's distaste for political persuasion was thus a liability not only in his relations with the civilian public but also in relation to his fellow officers. His unwillingness to present a forceful case for his ideas eroded his influence within the military.

The rejection of his policies was hastened by the fact that the military felt a collective responsibility for the government. Some of the policies that the civilian nationalists opposed most strongly were those that sprang from the ESG's policy of economic liberalism, such as the granting of the iron-ore concession to private U.S. capital. Because the military as an institution felt that it was incurring increasing political costs by backing Castello Branco's policies, the officers outside the government, using "plebiscitary" pressure, in effect voted a "new look" into office with the second government of the Revolution, under the leadership of General Costa e Silva.

Although full information about the most influential members of the second military government is lacking, it is clear that, in addition to Costa e Silva himself, the following men were near the top in its first year: Minister of Interior General Albuquerque Lima; the commanding general of the politically crucial First Army, headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, General Syseno Sarmento; Chief of the Military Household
and Secretary-General of the National Security Council General Jayme Portella; and the chief of the National Intelligence Service (SNI), General Emílio Garrastazu Médici. These men owed their positions in the second government to the fact that, symbolically and actually, they represented the opposite of the ideas and career patterns of the core group of officers in the 1964–1967 government.

The major opponents within the Brazilian military of the "liberal internationalist" group of officers typified by Castello Branco were originally called "hard-liners" (Linha dura); a more accurate term would be "authoritarian nationalists." They were not an entirely fixed group, but one whose sentiments swelled and receded according to the political pressures of the day. By and large (though not exclusively) they belonged to those who had not been influenced either by the ideas of the FEB or by the policies developed by the permanent staff of the ESG.

Whereas the key members of the Castello Branco government had been deeply marked by the FEB experience, only one of the five key officers under Costa e Silva had been in Italy. Whereas each of the former had graduated at the head of his class from his service school, this was true of only one out of five in the second government. And only one of the key officers in the latter had been on the permanent staff of the ESG. Also, the Costa e Silva officers had few wartime or academic links with the United States. In fact, these officers came to power in response to the more nationalist demands of the junior officers, who were dissatisfied with the achievements of the first military government, and because of the desire of the military in general to be more "popular." The authoritarian nationalists were the key force behind the near-coup against Castello Branco in October 1965 and that of December 1968. In both these crises, resolved only by the incumbent government's hardening of its policies toward civilians, the driving force behind the authoritarian nationalists was provided by the mid-level officers, who articulated their feelings through troop commands, especially through the Vila Militar, the major military base in Rio de Janeiro. Among military schools, the only one
that could be described as a center of authoritarian nationalism was the Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais (EsAO), the Junior Officers' School in Rio de Janeiro.

Although his government did not directly represent or put into effect the beliefs of the junior authoritarian nationalists, Costa e Silva emerged as a leader because he was thought to be sympathetic to their somewhat inarticulate but nonetheless powerful sentiment in favor of a more militantly nationalistic government with a less pro-American stance. Given this relation between the Costa e Silva government and the authoritarian nationalist officers, it is well to try to understand some of their views. Because Brazil has been under military rule since 1964, few programmatic statements of the aims and desires of the authoritarian nationalists have been released to the public. However, if one looks at some of the programs they circulated before the Revolution of 1964, one realizes how few of their goals have been met since then, and indeed how fundamentally they differed from the initial goals of the first government of the Revolution under the liberal internationalists and Castello Branco.

The following, for example, is a manifesto entitled "The Ten Commandments of the Law of the People," by the Frente Patriótica Civil-Militar, which in the 1960s reputedly had the support of such prominent figures as ex-Naval Minister Sylvio Heck, General José Alberto Bittencourt, and the Estado de São Paulo's leading columnist, Oliveira Ferreira. Its goals, or "commandments," were:

1) Dissolution of Congress in order to restructure the popular democratic base of the country by a new Constituent Assembly.

2) Confiscation of all fortunes acquired by shady business deals, embezzlement, administrative frauds, or any other illicit means, and canceling of the political rights of all involved.

3) Distribution to the peasants of all uncultivated lands, with the obligation of immediate cultivation, and with direct financial and technical assistance guaranteed.

4) Energetic combatting of the high cost of living and inflation by the intervention of the state in the means of production and distribution, and the lifting of taxes on the basic necessities of life.
5) Unification and "disbureaucratization" of social welfare and the guarantee of medical and hospital care to all workers, including rural workers.

6) Abolition of all forms of government intervention in trade unions.

7) Preferential concern for the solution to the problems of the north and the northeast and other underdeveloped areas of the country in all national development plans.

8) Defense and development of PETROBRAS and of the great state industries. Control of the remission of profits abroad, and the requirement that profits be reinvested in the development of the country.

9) Extension of free primary, secondary, technical, and higher education by the state for the training of indigent students.

10) The pursuit of an independent foreign policy opposed to all forms of totalitarianism and imperialism, respect for the rights of self-determination, and condemnation of the monstrous arms race in accordance with the democratic and Christian principles of Brazil.*

For several reasons, the reformist elements of the authoritarian nationalist group (and the Manifesto quoted above represents but one of several factions within it) did not come to the fore in the Costa e Silva government itself, nor in the succession struggle of September-October 1969. One reason was that, as military government wore on, opposition to the principle of military government grew more intense, and with the rise of urban guerrilla activity, authoritarian nationalists became more preoccupied with repressive measures and less concerned with social reform. A second reason may well be that the great size of the industrial sector in Brazil, and the complicated web of interest-group politics, made Brazilian society too developed and complex for a military Nasserism even of a Peruvian variety. Still, in the "succession" crisis of September-October 1969 caused by President Costa e Silva's illness, the senior officers were barely able to carry the day and install their candidate in the presidency. Upon the military's

unconstitutional refusal to allow the civilian vice-president to assume the presidency, a bitter conflict had developed within the military, which involved intense political campaigning among officers, even polling of officer opinion down to battalion level, and the issuance of numerous manifestos. After a month-and-a-half, the military, threatened by the specter of internal fragmentation, finally closed ranks behind the choice of the senior generals. The traditional military tendency to resolve conflicts on the basis of seniority prevailed, and a four-star general was elected.

No detailed account of these events exists. However, it appears that General Emílio Garrastazú Médici was chosen in the "military electoral college," because (1) he was a four-star general and thus could wield military as well as political authority; (2) he was a close personal and political associate of President Costa e Silva and this softened the image of illegitimate succession; (3) he was not a radical nationalist and was thus acceptable to the São Paulo and international financial community, which had expressed worry over the candidacy of the nationalist Lt. General Alfonso Albuquerque Lima, whose choice for the presidency they feared might lead the country down the same road as Peru; (4) he was not associated with the Escola Superior de Guerra, which was anathema to civilian and military nationalists. Thus, notwithstanding the common image of military rule as one of bold and unified direction, it appears that political diversity within the Brazilian military made it necessary to choose a cautious individual as head of state so as to preserve a minimum of military unity. As befits the balance of forces responsible for his selection, President Médici to date has appeared to follow the middle course between the authoritarian nationalist position and that of the Escola Superior de Guerra.

While the size and complexity of the Brazilian private sector (among other factors) would seem to weigh against the assumption of power by the military's authoritarian nationalists (who currently are further inhibited by the economic boom of 1969-1971), it is nonetheless important to speculate about the political style they might follow if they did assume power. The military radicals' desire for
control of government would tend to conflict with a resumption of open democratic electoral campaigns, but it would be compatible with a military-populist plebiscitary style of politics. As regards mobilization, their preference for order and unity would probably make the military radicals resistant to the proliferation of autonomous lower-class mass-action groups, but favorably disposed toward mass parades. We shall return to this question in Part IV.

International Position of the Brazilian Military

The Brazilian military's perception of their legitimate budgetary requirements is a mix of foreign and domestic factors on which, despite occasional tensions created by the costliness of even minimal modern armaments, there is probably greater agreement among both military and civilian leaders than is the case in Peru.

Because of Brazil's large area and population and growing industrial base, the military and many of the Brazilian people see her as a future world power. In anticipation of or "apprenticeship" for this status, Brazil has participated in more overseas military operations than any other Latin American country; a combat division fought in Italy in World War II; Brazilians manned a United Nations "peacekeeping brigade" in Suez for many years; the first commander of the United Nations Air Force in the Congo was a Brazilian; and, of course, Brazil sent the largest Latin American contingent to the Dominican Republic in 1965.*

Because of Brazilian participation in World War II and the Dominican Republic (the latter at the urgent request of the United States), Brazil naturally would reject any U.S. suggestion that it had no legitimate overseas military function. In the eyes of the Brazilian military, their past history has shown, and their future experience is likely to confirm, that Brazil should maintain an operational inventory of most modern weapons used in conventional warfare.

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The domestic political power of the military combined with the nationalism of Brazilian civilians who want Brazil to be a future big power has meant that there has traditionally been very little public outcry for Brazil to reduce her military expenditures. Indeed, since 1964 military expenditures have gone up, and Brazil has refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Neither occurrence has produced significant internal opposition.

In interviews, most Brazilian military officers justify the increase in military expenditures on the grounds that the major part of the budget is for personnel, that the standard of living of the military had fallen sharply before they came to power in 1964, and that recent military pay increases are just restoring them to mid-1950s levels vis-à-vis their civilian peers. They appear to see no contradiction between military demands for higher pay and the military goal of economic growth. They argue that adequate salaries contribute to military morale and hence national security, and that national security is the precondition for economic growth.

The Brazilian government's refusal to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty should not be interpreted as having been dictated solely by militarists eager to get the bomb. Civilian nationalist sentiment strongly supported the military government's stand. It has been, among civilian nationalists, the single most popular government policy since the first military government came to power. Also, there are almost no significant critics on the left. Indeed, the radical Bishop Dom Helder Câmara, one of the military's severest critics, has argued in articles, and in speeches in France, that it is a moral and economic imperative for Brazil to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The strong coalition in support of developing atomic energy in Brazil is due to the widespread perception that the country's vast size and rich resources give it great potential. It is further strengthened by a special sense of guilt about not yet having developed this potential. The coexistence of a very sophisticated industrial sector (including numerous highly-trained nuclear physicists) with conditions of abysmal poverty makes the possibility of harnessing
the atom for rapid development all the more appealing. * In the face
of proddings from the big powers interested in having Brazil sign the
NPT, Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto said that Brazil refused to be
dependent upon the developed countries for the transfer of nuclear
technology or to foreclose the possibility of accelerating her growth
by peaceful uses of the atom. Brazil, he argued, "could not continue
being subjected to a new type of subordination -- space-age colonialism." **

For the reasons enumerated, the most likely prospect for the
foreseeable future is that Brazil will neither reduce her arms purchases
nor be a signatory to a treaty that she sees as curtailing her right
to develop an atomic technology.

Military Government in Brazil: An Interim Assessment

Military government, rationalized by many in 1964 as a temporary
expedient, has now lasted more than seven years -- and some serious
analysts talk about military dominance lasting for the remainder of
the century. Brazil's is today probably the most controversial regime
in Latin America. Its defendants point to gains in controlling infla-
tion and in rationalizing bureaucracies and the tax structure. Since
1968, the GNP has been growing at an impressive rate of around nine
percent a year.

Any evaluation of recent military rule in Brazil, however, must
consider the social and political aspects of development as well as the
economic ones. Even the government's figures reveal that the workers
have borne the brunt of the stabilization campaign since 1964. Military-
induced economic development has also involved weakening of peasant
leagues and trade unions. *** The military government's clash with
intellectuals has caused a substantial brain drain. The major internal

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* For a full discussion of the Brazilian position in regard to the
NPT see C. E. Zoppo, Technology, Politics, and Proliferation, Arms


*** Adult literacy campaigns, initially considered suspect and
demobilized, recovered somewhat (though without the critical element
of political consciousness that had previously characterized the MEB)
with the creation in September 1970 of MOBRAL (Brazilian Movement for
Alphabetization) under auspices of the Ministry of Education.
military conflicts of October 1965, November-December 1968, and September-October 1969 have repeatedly smashed even the military-sponsored attempts at political institution-building. Finally, there is the question of the deterioration of the mode of political conflict in Brazil. Given authoritarian military domination of Brazilian political life, a wing of the anti-regime forces has come to feel that violence is a legitimate political response. Increasingly well-documented reports indicated during 1970 that some sectors of the Brazilian military and police forces considered torture of civilians to be a legitimate counter-weapon. This growth of violence received considerable international attention, and was explicitly deplored by the Pope.*

A classic defense of military regimes is that they bring stability and peace. Yet many of Brazil's warmest friends have been extremely disturbed by the "un-Brazilian" institutionalization and routinization of violence on the left and the right that has characterized Brazilian politics in the last few years.

*For an insight into the passionate debate about the question of torture in Brazil and the U.S. role, see Ralph Della Cava, "Torture in Brazil," Commonweal, XCII (April 24, 1970), pp. 135-141, and the answer by Lincoln Gordon, the former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, in the Commonweal issue of August 7, 1970.
Part Four: CONCLUSION

Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan III
In both Peru and Brazil, the key to changed military perspectives and expanded military participation in politics was similar: The military institutions came to see existing social and economic structures as security threats because these structures were either so inefficient or so unjust that they created the conditions for, and gave legitimacy to, revolutionary protest. In both countries, the officer corps believed that these conditions were ultimately a threat to the military institution itself. In their leading war colleges — the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) in Brazil and the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) in Peru — military men increasingly turned to a wide range of social problems, such as land reform, tax structure, foreign policy, and insurgency, as well as to the formulation of policies and reforms that the military thought necessary to ensure stability. The result was that military policy became much more closely linked to political policy than it had been in the past. For in both military establishments the conviction was spreading that the existing political institutions were incapable of implementing the social and economic policies which the officer corps now thought necessary to military security.

At the same time that their concern for development was growing, the military in Peru and Brazil, as in the United States, reacted to the fear of revolution by significantly increasing the level of military expertise in counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine. By this standard, the military rapidly became more "professional." A working hypothesis in much academic literature and a rationale sometimes used for certain U.S. military assistance programs is that "professionalism" contributes to lessened political involvement on the military's part, and to their concentration on exclusively military affairs. Logic, however, suggests that to the extent that military expertise, or professionalism, is increased in the areas of counterinsurgency, nation-building, and multisector development planning, the military would tend to become more rather than less involved in politics. This is certainly what happened in Brazil and Peru.*

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*A thorough and brilliant analysis of some psychological and political implications of the military ideology of total counterrevolutionary
Changes in military political roles were closely related in both countries to expanded military education, which in the eyes of the military increased their relative capability (and hence legitimacy) when compared to civilian leadership elements. New generations of officers, with training and life experiences different from those of their predecessors, and, occasionally, representing new institutional interests, served as a means of internal renewal. Characteristically, the changes emerged first among officers and civilians assigned to staff schools and to intelligence functions, and only later affected the military's participation in politics. In both Peru and Brazil, changes in military perspectives may thus be said to have originated from within the military institutions themselves, and to have then been confirmed by the latter's interaction with society.

Our analyses of Peru and Brazil also suggest that the military tend to become increasingly involved in politics in periods of social stress that accompany pressures for rapid economic growth at what might be called the middle levels of development. It is precisely in those countries that have broken the cycle of tradition and are actively seeking still higher levels of development that the military's perceptions of suitable paths to development are likely to diverge most sharply from those of many civilians. The indispensable social function of force is particularly evident during the crises over legitimacy which frequently accompany the break from tradition, when coercion is often seen to be necessary to preserve order in the face of the conflicting and often violent claims of opposing groups. Military force is thus presented as an alternative to chaos, whether in defense


In the early 1960s, the Indonesian army's Staff and Command School also formulated a development and security doctrine, much of which was implemented when the military assumed power in 1965. For the doctrine and an insightful analysis, see Guy J. Pauker, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, The Rand Corporation, RM-3312-PR, November 1963.
of a ruling group or to replace it with another. In addition, heightened military activism may also correspond to a desire to limit popular consumption so as to increase investment and to silence political opposition to the accompanying austerity.

Some of the most significant elements that contributed to the shift from the "moderator" or "arbiter" patterns of civil-military relations to direct military rule in Brazil and Peru during the 1960s are in one degree or another in existence, or coming into existence, in other Latin American countries. These include, though frequently in varying combinations, substantial growth in popular political demands; the apparent ineffectiveness of parliamentary and other liberal democratic forms of government when faced with the need to industrialize increasingly modernized societies; the growth of the military's concern about internal security threats, frequently identified as the result of an inefficient, corrupt, and unjust middle- and upper-class parliamentary and social system; the belief that traditional military roles centering on the preservation of order do not contribute to the solution of the problems of development; and the growth of confidence among the military that their superior war colleges and advanced nonmilitary training have, for the first time, produced a cadre of specialists in support of development programs superior to those of bankrupt, and therefore no longer legitimate, professional politicians.

Although the Brazilian and Peruvian militaries to date have had only mixed success in their new roles, the mode of military involvement in Latin American politics generally may be shifting increasingly from that of "systems maintenance" to that of "systems transformation."** The current effort at structural change led by the Peruvian military,

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for example, is clearly more systematic and thorough than previous military reform attempts. To what extent could it be said that the Brazilian and Peruvian experience is relevant for other Latin American countries? Will similar patterns of civil-military relations emerge elsewhere? Despite the very real differences among the countries of Latin America, the area as a whole has undergone certain common political experiences: the unifying dictators of the mid-nineteenth century, the authoritarian reformist regimes of the 1930s, and the military governments of the early 1950s. Are basic similarities in social and economic structures, world trade, and political atmosphere, likely to contribute to what one might call a Latin American "demonstration effect," and lead to a general continental resurgence of military nationalism and support for structural reform?

In speculating about the future course of other Latin American countries, it seems that Peru provides a more politically sympathetic model than Brazil. The initial pro-United States internationalism of the Brazilian regime will probably not be imitated elsewhere. A key source of pro-Americanism among the Brazilian military — the World War II experience of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) that fought in Italy side by side with American troops — is not shared by any other country in the Latin American hemisphere. The Peruvian path, in contrast, has been explicitly acknowledged as a model by factional leaders in other countries, including Argentina as well as Bolivia. Even in Brazil, the Peruvian experience is so much in the air that, although in 1969 a leader of the authoritarian nationalist wing of the military, General Alfonso Albuquerque Lima, felt it necessary to deny publicly that he had sent a personal emissary to observe the Peruvian military, by 1971 the Brazilian military seemed intent on carving out its own brand of nationalism, including the defense of a claim to a 200-mile jurisdiction over territorial waters similar to those previously advanced by Peru. Given the declining state of the Alliance

Chicago, Ill., 1964, not so much because the Latin American countries were not new nations, but because Latin American military establishments were much less concerned with efforts at system change and modernization than were those of the new nations. He observed that the system-level changes we had described in Brazil made it a "new nation" in this sense, even though Brazil was an "old" nation in independent status and even "developed" in parts of its modern industrial sector.
for Progress, could Peru become for the decade of the 1970s something akin to what Cuba was for the 1960s — that is, a nationalist model for other countries, with military radicalism, rather than communism, the keynote?

This discussion of possible demonstration or "domino" effect of military radicalism has thus far overlooked differences between Peru and Brazil that are sufficiently great to raise doubt as to whether we are in fact dealing with a single model. The national security doctrines developed in the higher war colleges of Brazil and Peru both stress the nexus of development and security, but the absence of an immediate security threat when the military actually assumed power in Peru in 1968 has contributed to the Peruvian emphasis on development, whereas the Brazilian military have emphasized security issues, and have often countered terror with terror, even while seeking development. In Peru, on the other hand, the brief and effective military campaign of 1965-1966 against rural guerrilla forces assumes historical significance largely because of the impetus it gave to the military's interest in changing a political system which they associated with guerrilla violence and with the failure of development programs.

In domestic politics, inflation and attempts to unionize sergeants contributed an anti-labor bias to the Brazilian revolution of 1964. Their antipathy to the "populist demagogy" of Vargas gives the Brazilian military a reactively austere and almost aristocratic style. In Peru, in contrast, the dominant military leaders consider the upper-class landowners, the urban middle-class politicians, and their foreign allies as the greatest obstructions to long-term development and security, and are not above engaging in almost Vargas-like populist rhetoric to enlist popular support. The Peruvian land reform was aimed as much at eliminating upper-class political and economic power as it was at modernizing the agrarian sector.

In the international policy sphere, the Brazilian military experience of World War II in the FEB, the intense anti-Communism after 1963, the fear that the labor unions would infiltrate the noncommissioned officer corps, and the soaring inflation all contributed to a pro-American, pro-private capital (foreign and domestic), anti-labor bias in the first government of the Brazilian regime. Peru experienced
many similar tensions, but the circumstances in which they occurred were very different and have led to striking disparities between the two regimes. The United States' refusal to sell supersonic military aircraft to the Peruvian Air Force in 1965-1967, and the small allocation of funds from the Alliance for Progress, became sources of anti-Americanism among Peruvian officers, who came to share suspicions of the United States that previously had been confined primarily to civilian intellectual circles. This sense of "breach of alliance" united many Peruvian officers and civilians in bitterness at what they considered virtual betrayal by the United States, which broke off diplomatic relations after the 1962 coup, and maintained an initially cool attitude toward the 1968 government. In Brazil, in contrast, President Lyndon Johnson's public endorsement of the 1964 revolution while it was still in progress has continued to associate the United States with many of the successes -- and excesses -- of the Brazilian military government.*

These contrasts between Peru and Brazil suggest that the fact of military dominance in two countries does not necessarily imply common policies. As we have seen in our analysis of Brazil, which has had three different military presidents since 1964, military dominance need not even imply stability of policy in one country. As a natural consequence of the fact of military power, civilian politicians have for the most part historically joined in competing for military favor. One result is that today, despite greater emphasis on military roles and power, there are still built into the military institutions themselves a whole series of potential coalitions in formation with different civilian elements. Should the activities resulting from these political alliances take on an overly partisan cast, or should military policies be unsuccessful, they would be subject to change lest institutional unity be threatened. But the fact that the military institutions can "field more than one team" of senior officers to manage the affairs of state, implies some capacity for change and adaptation to new circumstances, even while maintaining basic concerns.

*A sensitive recent essay by Thomas G. Sanders attempts to place Brazil in contemporary Latin American perspective: *Institutionalizing Brazil's Conservative Revolution*, American University Field Staff Reports, East Coast South American series, Vol. 15, No. 5, December 1970.
Indeed, if one were to speculate about potential policies in those Latin American countries where the military will come to power in the 1970s, it would appear that many different positions could emerge on economic issues. The military is an institutional rather than a class elite, in the sense that the power and prestige of officers derives from membership in the military institution rather than from inherited position or other social relations. It would therefore be possible for the military to restrict the privileges of the middle and upper classes if they felt that these classes contributed to internal disruption or impeded development. Peruvian military support for agrarian and industrial reforms, when compared with more orthodox Brazilian policies, suggests that a wide range of possible positions on economic issues is available to a military regime.

Much the same diversity may be expected in political rhetoric, although there will probably be less variation among military regimes on matters of political organization. With regard to participation, for instance, the desire of military radicals for control, and their suspicion of professional politicians, tend to conflict with democratic electoral campaigns, and would be more congruent with a plebiscitary style of politics. As regards mobilization, the preference of military radicals for order and unity would probably make them resistant to the proliferation of autonomous, lower-class mass-action groups, but favorably disposed toward disciplined mass parades. A natural military style in Catholic Latin America might therefore be a populist variant of nationalist socialism, "corporativism," or, to use Kalman Silvert's phrase "Mediterranean authoritarianism."

It is illusory, however, to attempt to label Latin American phenomena, military or political, with phrases imported from the

*In our recurrent dialogues, our colleague Richard Maullin has insistently underscored the importance for Latin America today of those political movements, often associated with military leaders, which manipulate the symbols of social grievance and of nationality and culture in an essentially populist manner. For an earlier formulation of this idea, see a joint study by L. Einaudi, R. Maullin, and A. Stepan, Latin American Security Issues, The Rand Corporation, P-4109, April 1969, particularly pages 15-16.
experience of other lands or eras, just as it is too early to estimate how successful military attempts at system transformation will be. Compared with most of Africa and Asia, Latin America has achieved a much greater degree of urbanization and industrialization, and must reckon with much more powerful social groups such as labor, intellectuals, industrialists, and other representatives of middle-class interests. Hence, the control and transformation of Latin American social systems by the military will prove a politically more complicated task than military rule of less-developed social structures.

Brazil's large and relatively modern public and private economic sectors, for example, virtually require that military leaders maintain effective working relations with civilian professionals and industrialists to supplement even the expanded skills of the military themselves. From this viewpoint, there is today considerable agreement among military and civilian elites in Brazil that industrialization is important as a prelude to the emergence of Brazil as a highly developed world power. But this consensus could shatter over methods. Certainly in Peru military goals of social justice and rapid development are not shared with as much conviction by many civilian leaders. Peru, with its smaller modern economic sector, seems a more likely candidate for successful military rule than Brazil although this may be counterbalanced by Peruvian officers' relative lack of experience in economic matters.

As noted earlier, our case studies of Peru and Brazil suggest a tendency toward increased military involvement in politics in periods of social stress and troubled economic growth. They also suggest that the range of national security doctrines is greatest in a country characterized by a dualistic economy -- partly modern industrial and partly prescientific agricultural -- and by wide differences in the cultural styles of urban and rural populations. In the past decade, national security doctrines (and to a lesser extent practice) in both Peru and Brazil have made the lessening of these internal differences an important goal of security policies.

Viewed regionally, although the growing concern for internal security may have initially in the 1960s contributed to a decline in
the more conventional forms of "frontier-minded" military nationalisms, the effect of the international environment of the 1970s may well be to restore an awareness of the more traditional aspects of "power politics" among the Latin American countries themselves. Domestic fears of violent subversion may, depending of course on perceptions of the international repercussions and of the extent of external encouragement, of the subversive activities, contribute to increased cooperation among Latin American countries themselves. Unstable conditions in Bolivia, urban guerrilla movements in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, tensions between Venezuela and Colombia, and the election of the Popular Unity government presided over by the Socialist Salvador Allende in Chile are all recent examples of situations that have occasioned regional concern and attempts at balancing among nations and security forces. But the lowered political and military profile of the United States in Latin America, and the increase in Russian diplomatic, economic, and military activities are similarly likely to contribute to heightened Latin American interest in regional conflict environments and in the national characteristics, aspirations, and fears of their individual countries.

Much the same ambiguity between newer internal-security and older territorial-security concerns is revealed by a consideration of economic prospects. Integration, particularly at a subregional level (as in the Andean Group or the Central American Common Market), has made some headway, thereby underscoring national interdependence. But the process of integration also brings national rivalries to the forefront through questions of economic competition and expansion. Together with population movements across national boundaries, this could once again lead to the kind of bilateral tensions that historically are closely associated with the control of sparsely settled but potentially rich border territories.

The mutual interactions and national security policies of individual Latin American countries are thus an important, although largely neglected, topic for research. The neglect is understandable, given Latin American policies of secrecy and the disinclination of the United States to become involved in tensions among its neighbors and
allies. But no one would maintain that Britain and Germany, or France and Italy, had the same interests as Portugal and Spain. We hope this essay has demonstrated that, in considering countries of Latin America in the 1970s, a comparable assertion would be just as untenable.