Evaluation of the Social Impact Bond
Lessons from planning and early implementation at HMP Peterborough

At a time when government finances are stretched there is growing interest in finding new ways to fund public services and improve social outcomes.

Under a “Social Impact Bond” (SIB) funding is obtained from private, non-government investors and is used to pay for public services—for example, to reduce reoffending or to improve health outcomes. If these SIB-funded services succeed in improving outcomes amongst their target group this should result in savings to government—from reduced demand on services such as prisons and hospitals—as well as wider benefits to society. As part of a SIB, the government agrees to pay a proportion of these savings back to the investors as a return on their investment. If outcomes do not improve, investors do not receive a return.

RAND Europe was commissioned by the UK Ministry of Justice to evaluate the world’s first SIB. Implemented in a prison in Peterborough in the east of England, it aims to reduce reoffending by prisoners who have served short custodial sentences (of less than 12 months). RAND Europe’s evaluation will be conducted over the lifetime of the Peterborough SIB—potentially until 2018. It looks in detail at how the SIB operates and at the services it delivers to offenders on release from HMP Peterborough.

The first report from RAND Europe’s evaluation, published in May 2011, identifies early lessons from the SIB. In doing so it informs the development of other payment-by-results pilots under consideration by the Ministry of Justice, other government departments and other countries. The report is based on the findings from interviews with individuals from the organisations involved in the development and implementation of the SIB at Peterborough.

The evaluation
Outcome measures

Outcome measures in the Peterborough SIB aim to:

- allow change in reconviction events to be attributed to the SIB-funded intervention
- reduce incentives for providers to “cherry-pick” and work with offenders who are the easiest to engage
- ensure statistical significance (that changes identified in reconviction events are more likely to be due to the SIB-funded interventions than due to chance)

The development of a methodologically robust outcome measure, which had the confidence of all stakeholders, was a time-consuming and analytically complex process. Those involved in future SIBs and payment-by-results arrangements may wish to take into account the time and skills needed to develop robust outcome measures.

Payment model

Working out what the Ministry of Justice and the Big Lottery Fund would pay for reduced reconviction amongst Peterborough cohort
demanded considerable analytical resources. It relied upon the availability of Ministry of Justice data about the cost of reconviction events. These calculations are central to whether the SIB represents value for money for government. Those developing new SIBs and other payment-by-results mechanisms may wish to consider the extent to which similar cost data are available.

The ability of the SIB model to lead to identifiable savings for government is yet to be tested. This could only occur if the SIB model was implemented on a larger scale. Future SIBs may face the challenge of sharing outcome payments across central and local government departments or other agencies. In the Peterborough SIB only the Ministry of Justice (supported by the Big Lottery Fund) will contribute to outcome payments. However, other departments, for example Health or Work and Pensions, could still potentially benefit through the provision of SIB-funded services.

**Investment**

Social Finance readily secured the necessary investment in the Peterborough SIB. There appeared to be a strong appetite for “mission-aligned” investment.

Investors’ motivations included the desire to support an innovative funding mechanism, to support offender rehabilitation and to encourage smaller providers. Future SIBs and payment-by-results pilots may consider how to similarly attract investment.

The evidence RAND collected suggests that the Peterborough pilot has attracted new funding, but future SIBs and payment-by-results pilots should monitor whether funding is diverted from existing spending – checking “additionality” of funding.

**Further reading**

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and
decisionmaking through research and analysis.

This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public
service of the RAND Corporation.

Support RAND

Browse Reports & Bookstore
Make a charitable contribution

For More Information

Visit RAND at www.rand.org
Explore RAND Europe
View document details

Research Brief

This product is part of the RAND Corporation research brief series. RAND research briefs pres-
et policy-oriented summaries of individual published, peer-reviewed documents or of a body of
published work.

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice
appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is
provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to
a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright
law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research
documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see
RAND Permissions.