MEMORANDUM
RM-3312-PR
NOVEMBER 1963

THE INDONESIAN DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE AND TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT

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PREPARED FOR:
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

The RAND Corporation
SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA
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This research is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Project RAND—contract No. AF 49(638)-700 monitored by the Directorate of Development Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, Hq USAF. Views or conclusions contained in this Memorandum should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the United States Air Force.

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is one product of a continuing research effort, undertaken for Air Force Project RAND, on the role of the military in Indonesia. The project also has a broader relevance in so far as it illustrates the problems of political development in the new nations. Some of the author's earlier Memoranda on Indonesia are cited at appropriate places in the text.

The Indonesian Army uses the terms "Territorial Warfare" (Perang Wilayah) and "Territorial Management" (Pembinaan Wilayah) with reference to its doctrine of national defense. The meaning of these terms is made clear in The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, a mimeographed volume issued in March 1962 by the Indonesian Army's Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) in Bandung. That document forms Part Two of this Memorandum, and Part One is the present author's introduction.

The author obtained a copy of The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare while visiting SESKOAD in May 1962 and during the following months prepared the present translation, which exemplifies a new nation's indigenous doctrinal efforts in the fields of national defense, counterinsurgency, and civil-military relations. The value of the Indonesian document seemed all the greater in that it had been prepared not for external propaganda purposes but as a genuine effort to instruct senior members of the Indonesian officer corps and other high officials of the Indonesian Government.

In September-October 1962, the author visited Indonesia again, this time as a member of the U.S. Inter-Agency Civic Action Advisory Team which developed proposals for assisting the Indonesian Armed Forces in their civic action program.
On Indonesian Armed Forces Day (October 5) the military equipment recently acquired from the Soviet Union was publicly displayed for the first time. The author found that the general mental and emotional climate in Indonesia had changed markedly since his previous visit and predicted that the Soviet military assistance program could lead to Indonesian expansionism or even to Soviet-Indonesian military cooperation in support of "national liberation movements."

Because he found it difficult to reconcile the accumulating evidence concerning an aggressive Indonesian posture in Southeast Asia with the sober and rational defense policy presented to the Indonesian officer corps at the Army Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) in Bandung, the author delayed completing this Memorandum. The continuing "policy of confrontation" against Malaysia suggests that the military power of Indonesia will markedly influence developments in Southeast Asia for some time to come. This Memorandum, therefore, is being made available to Air Force officers and other U.S. officials without further delay.
SUMMARY

The doctrine of "Territorial Warfare" and "Territorial Management" is studied at the Indonesian Army's Staff and Command School in Bandung (SESKOAD) by senior military and civilian officials. It covers more than defense policy in a purely military sense. Its full implications lead to a pattern of civil-military relations and indeed to a political philosophy which would legitimize the increasingly important role that the officer corps intends to play in all sectors of Indonesian public life.

The doctrine has its origins in the Indonesian Army's experience during its struggle for national independence in the years 1945 to 1949. At that time the commanders of military units engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Dutch forces that had reoccupied the Indonesian archipelago after World War II. As the Indonesian government had only very limited control over the country's territory and population, the military commanders were forced to assume major responsibilities in civil administration.

In the years immediately following independence, the experience of the war years was recorded in a number of books written by General Abdul Haris Nasution, who is at present Deputy First Minister for National Defense and Security, and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Yet, for practical purposes, the experience of the years of guerrilla warfare seems to have been forgotten until 1958 when the Indonesian Army decided to review its doctrine concerning external defense and counterinsurgency operations. At that time, several armed rebellions were going
on simultaneously. The rebels denied the Indonesian government control over at least one-sixth of the national territory. Some of the rebels had defied the Army for more than a decade in the mountains of West Java.

The immediate result of the labor of the 1958 Committee on Army Doctrine seems to have been the conclusion that the Armed Forces could not expect success either in defending the national territory against external aggression or in undertaking counterinsurgency operations unless they could rely on a large measure of popular support. This of course could only be expected if the military treated the population well whenever it came into direct contact with them. But beyond that, the Army argued, it could only count on popular assistance if the Indonesian government promoted political stability, economic well-being, and social justice, which would make the people feel that they had a country and a government worth supporting and fighting for. Hence, after 1958, the Army justified its concern for and involvement in all aspects of public life by appealing to a new concept of national defense -- the doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management.

The policies arising from the newly formulated doctrine led the Army to support the establishment of the authoritarian regime introduced by a decree of President Sukarno on July 5, 1959. It also resulted in the creation of a pattern of joint military-civilian administration at all levels of government, central, regional, and local.

The involvement of the military in civil affairs had been legalized initially by a state of emergency, or martial law, justified by the ongoing rebellions in various
parts of the country. This involvement, however, continued after the abrogation of the state of emergency on May 1, 1963, though in a slightly different form. The Indonesian government officially sanctioned the Armed Forces' "civic mission," that is, their participation in economic development viewed as an aspect of Territorial Management.

The Indonesian document reproduced in translation in this Memorandum represents the 1962 product of a continuing effort by the senior members of the Indonesian officer corps to formulate their own doctrine of nation-building, as a broad framework for their national defense, internal security, and economic development policies.

In so doing, the Indonesian officer corps is trying to protect its unity and integrity from the ideological conflicts of our times. As long as members of the officer corps accepted a variety of political philosophies, ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left, any involvement on their part in civil affairs raised the specter of civil war. The officer corps could best maintain its cohesion if it succeeded in eliminating ideological debates and reached consensus on matters of governmental policy. Officers would strive to be pragmatists inspired only by professional concern for national defense. The Indonesian officer corps was pushed in that direction by the need to put an end to the turbulence that marked the first decade of their country's independent existence.
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PART ONE: THE INDONESIAN DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE AND TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT: ITS ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS, by Guy J. Pauker
There is no doubt that Indonesian military and civilian agencies are today deeply involved in covert political and military activities against Malaysia. The author's earlier studies concerning the Indonesian officer corps may help explain this.² Twenty years ago the present leaders of the Indonesian Armed Forces were radical young nationalists who joined the national revolution and fought for independence. Given suitable opportunities and the weapons acquired from the Soviet Union since 1959, this group might conceivably yield to pressures for a Greater Indonesia that might eventually incorporate all Malay-speaking peoples. The British decision to complete the process of decolonization in Southeast Asia by the formation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, and President Sukarno's "confrontation policy" have added to these pressures.

The role of the military in Indonesia's aggressive foreign policy may seem to conflict with the frequently professed peaceful intentions to be found in the SESKOAD (Army Staff and Command School) document presented below. It does not conflict, however, with the underlying political motive of the doctrine of "Territorial Warfare" and "Territorial Management," namely to compete with the Communist Party of Indonesia for control of the country. On the contrary, the military may find it necessary to support President Sukarno's anti-Malaysia policy more vigorously than they would otherwise consider advisable.

at this time, in order to outbid the radical nationalism in which the Communists cloak their real intentions. The unintended consequence of this policy, of course, may be to deprive the military of their long-range goal, namely a free and prosperous Indonesia developing on non-Communist lines.

Apathetic about the economy in the years immediately after independence was achieved in December 1949, Indonesia is now increasingly concerned with economic development. This natural concern has been intensified by a protracted and increasingly burdensome economic crisis affecting particularly the wage-earning urban population. The formulation of the doctrine of "Territorial Management" gave notice of the Indonesian Army's intention to play a major role in the development of the country. To what extent this policy will be delayed or nullified by the Indonesian Government's recent foreign policy only the future can tell.

The following essay does not attempt to interpret Indonesian defense doctrine in depth, but only to provide a historical and analytical context that may help readers to formulate their own interpretations.

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2For an interpretation of Communist policy which the author still considers accurate, see Recent Communist Tactics in Indonesia, The RAND Corporation, RM-2619-RC, August 1960.

3See the present author's The Indonesian Eight-Year Over-All Development Plan, The RAND Corporation, RM-2768, June 1961.
A. THE NEED TO UNDERSTAND INDIGENOUS DOCTRINES

Intense efforts are currently being made to understand and explain the internal processes of the new nations. American researchers and policy-makers are increasingly convinced that the attempts of these nations to achieve political stability and economic growth will be more fruitful if they are based on realistic and scientific doctrines.

Occasionally one hears it said that the new nations do not have the intellectual capacity to conceptualize from the events they experience and that we have to do their thinking for them, rather than just try to understand their thinking. It is true that the emergence of numerous new states in Asia and Africa in the last two decades has not been accompanied by an impressive unfolding of indigenous political, economic, and social theories. The actions of governments or other groups in the new nations, however, are guided by systems of ideas, even if these have not been made public or explicitly articulated. A more searching effort is needed to identify the operative, if sometimes unconscious, guiding principles. If, for example, American assistance is provided for a counter-insurgency campaign or an economic development program, an understanding of indigenous doctrines becomes imperative. Without it, what is intended as cooperation may end in mutual antagonism, although this may not become apparent until a major crisis occurs, such as we have witnessed in South Vietnam.

This Memorandum is a contribution to an understanding of indigenous doctrines concerning activities in which the United States may have to operate in concert with local
governments. It presents an English translation of an Indonesian document entitled *The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare*, which was prepared in March 1962 by Indonesian Army officers in charge of instruction at their Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) in Bandung. At first sight, the document seems to deal primarily with Indonesian national defense. On closer acquaintance, it reflects a broader and more interesting doctrinal effort that aims at relating external defense and counterinsurgency operations to the nation's political and economic development. What the Indonesian Army officers responsible for the development of *The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare* are trying to do is to formulate a philosophy of government based on their own concepts of civil-military relations.

The doctrine is still unfolding, and the 1962 formulation made available here may therefore appear rather crude to the reader. Moreover, before it is refined, it may be outstripped by events, for Indonesia has experienced constant turmoil since the beginning of World War II and currently gives serious cause for concern as one of the world's potential major trouble makers. If Indonesia, propelled by a radical nationalism, now takes the road of external political and military adventure, the Army doctrine here presented may already be obsolete.

Before the present policy of "confrontation" with Malaysia gripped Indonesia, the group at SESKOAD was trying to develop a pragmatic, ideologically uncontrover-
sial doctrine that would give the Army a substantial political and governmental role in a country concentrating its efforts on internal development. In that context, the officer corps, increasingly hostile to all political
parties which they considered responsible for the country's mismanagement, was particularly antagonistic to the threatening growth of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).

But in the changed atmosphere of a country embarking on external adventure political rivalries may turn into alliances, and therefore doctrines aimed at eliminating these rivalries may become irrelevant.

In a protracted war against Malaysia, and possibly against the Western military presence in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian Army may find it less necessary to justify its political interests than it did a year ago, when Indonesia seemed to have satisfied its territorial aspirations, achieved internal security, and reached a point where major responsibilities could be transferred from military to civilian hands. At that time the officer corps, to justify its continued involvement in civil administration at all levels, and to check its major competitor in the political arena, the Communist Party, produced an interesting doctrinal innovation: defense needs necessitated the Army's involvement in politics.

It is a tragic symptom of the condition of the new nations that a rational political calculus like that reflected in The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare could be countered so easily by radical agitators such as President Sukarno and his principal lieutenants. They were able in less than a year to make "confrontation of Malaysia" a major national issue and thus to deflect attention again from domestic to external matters.

We do not know whether a new offensive doctrine is now being developed and taught in Indonesian service schools such as the Army's SESKOAD, or the new rival Staff
and Command School of the Indonesian Navy, SESKOAL, as a substitute for the defensive doctrine of the 1962 document. But we do know, as noted above, that Indonesian civilian and military authorities are now deeply engaged through a variety of instrumentalities in covert political and military operations, offensive in character, against the new neighboring country of Malaysia. Even if no precise doctrinal frame yet exists for these activities, one is bound to emerge sooner or later.

B. SIMULTANEOUS INVENTION OR CULTURAL DIFFUSION?

The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, essentially defensive in character, may no longer express accurately the thinking of a military establishment increasingly involved in aggressive activities. Yet it remains worth exploring as illustrative of an indigenous theoretical effort. Its interest is enhanced if one accepts the notion that it presents a theory, independently arrived at, which offers striking parallels with the concepts of revolutionary war developed by Chinese and other Communist strategists.

How independent, one may ask, is the Indonesian doctrine? The author checked the history of the Indonesian conception of Territorial Warfare, as well as the terminology of his translation, with a number of Indonesian Army officers during a second visit to SESKOAD in October 1962, and more recently with some Indonesian military personnel visiting the United States. Brigadier General Suwarto, Deputy Commandant of SESKOAD, who played an important role in the development of the Indonesian doctrine and who
helped the author with background information, claims that the Indonesian Army officers, at the time when they developed their ideas, had only a casual acquaintance with the views of Mao Tse-tung and were not familiar with those of Vo Nguyen Giap. Their main source of inspiration, he alleges, was their own experience during the 1945-1949 struggle for independence, and the application of common sense to that experience ten years later. In discussing external influences with the author, Indonesian officers never even mentioned Chinese or Vietnamese Communist writings until the author asked pointed questions about them. They did admit that Yugoslav doctrine, based on experiences parallel to their own, had strengthened and confirmed their views.

If the statements of the Indonesian officers are true, we have here in the field of military strategy an example of what cultural anthropologists would call "simultaneous invention": in this case, a set of ideas that were in the air at a time when national liberation movements in underdeveloped agrarian societies had to face similar problems of defense against technically and economically superior foes.

According to Brigadier General Suwarto, the only early source through which Chinese Communist doctrine concerning revolutionary war reached them was Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China, which was read avidly in 1946 by the

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5 Modern Library, New York, 1938, 1944.
young men who later became the nucleus of the Indonesian Army's General Staff. General A. H. Nasution, Indonesian Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, confirmed this in October 1962. He told the author that in 1946 he had obtained from Singapore a copy of Red Star Over China and a copy of Charles J. Rolo's Wingate's Raiders, and had found both books most useful in relation to the Indonesian struggle. Consequently he had many other young Indonesian officers read them and apply the lessons learned to their own defense problems.

It is entirely plausible that Mao Tse-tung's own writings, first published in English in 1954, were not known to the Indonesians till much later. Edgar Snow himself, in his chapter on "Tactics of Partisan Warfare," relates that when he was in Red territory in 1937 he was unable to get Mao's book on the subject. Yet it is evident that the basic principles of what the Indonesians now consider to be their own defense doctrine were expressed as early as July 1936 by Mao in his interview with Edgar Snow, published in Red Star Over China.

According to Brigadier General Suwarto, the major contribution Chinese Communist doctrine made to Indonesia's struggle for independence was the idea of industrial cooperatives, established to sustain the war effort at a time when the country's industrial centers were in enemy

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8 Ibid., pp. 90-101.
hands. He claims that in Java the nationalist fighters tried to establish such industrial cooperatives in the Surakarta (Solo) area, but that the defense doctrine itself was the result of experience rather than of the diffusion of Chinese ideas.

Whether the Indonesians failed to learn from the Chinese or merely refused to admit that they had so learned, their attitude throws some light on their feelings about Communist China. Their aloofness from the country which is considered by many in the West, the French Army for instance, as the fountainhead of revolutionary war doctrine is rather striking. There is hardly any interest in Chinese military doctrine among Indonesian officers. Until the late General Gatot Subroto, a well-known anti-Communist, led an Indonesian Army mission on an official visit to Communist China in the summer of 1957, there were no contacts with the People's Liberation Army, except through military attachés. After 1957 relations continued to be cool. Military contacts between Communist China and Indonesia seem to be limited to purely formal courtesy calls. No professional relations now seem to exist between the two armies, a situation in sharp contrast with the Indonesian Armed Forces' massive use of Soviet and Eastern European training and supply facilities.

Nevertheless, the reader of The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare will be immediately reminded of Mao Tsetung's formulation, in his famous May-June 1938 lectures, of "The Three Stages of the Protracted War":

The first stage is one of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The
second stage is one of the enemy's strategic defensive and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage is one of our strategic counteroffensive and the enemy's strategic retreat.9

The same idea is tersely expressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People's Army and Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who incidentally does not cite Mao Tse-tung:

The general law of a long revolutionary war is usually to go through three stages: defensive, equilibrium and offensive. Fundamentally, in the main directions, our Resistance War also followed this general law. . . . The Dien Bien Phu campaign in early 1954 was a big counter-offensive which ended the Resistance War with a great victory.10

Like Mao and Giap, the Indonesian General Staff considers the second stage, which they have named Phase II, particularly important in dealing with an enemy who has an initial strategic superiority. During that phase, which may vary in length, the objective is to shift the balance of power from the side of the enemy to one's own side and to obtain offensive superiority.

C. A STRATEGY FOR WEAK NATIONS

Owing to the Japanese occupation of 1942-45 and the subsequent inability of the Indonesians even to attempt

to stop the Allied landings of 1945-46, the Indonesian Armed Forces never really experienced what their doctrine now describes as Phase I: opposing an enemy, if possible by using air and naval power, before he reaches Indonesian territory, and by frontal counterattacks on land, with air and naval support, if he succeeds in landing. The confrontation with the Allies in 1945-49 took place exclusively in the strategic context of what the Indonesians would now describe as Phase II.

In private conversations with the author, Indonesian officers acknowledged that during their struggle for independence they were unable to progress beyond Phase II. At best, they achieved a stalemate which added to the political pressures that compelled the Netherlands to recognize Indonesian sovereignty on December 27, 1949.

The memory of past defensive weaknesses in Phase I may explain in part the fact that, although in Indonesia the Army is politically much more powerful than the Navy or the Air Force, and although the Minister of Defense, General A. H. Nasution, is himself an Army man, the massive arms purchases from the Soviet Union in 1959-62 were used primarily to build up the Navy and the Air Force. While this policy can be interpreted as denoting an aggressive intent -- against the Dutch before the peaceful solution of the dispute over Western New Guinea and now against the British in Malaysia -- it can also be interpreted as fully consistent with the doctrine of national defense embodied in the document presented here. Phase I of the Indonesian Armed Forces' war plans against an invader would require weapons such as those recently acquired from the Soviet Union.
Judging from the available evidence, General Nasution seems to have played a dominant role in both the intellectual development and the implementation of the Indonesian defense doctrine. Indeed, the doctrinal efforts of recent years and the recent modernization of the training and equipment of the Armed Forces in line with views expressed by him in the first years of Indonesia's independent existence suggest both his tenacity and his capacity for getting things done. As early as mid-1951, General (then Colonel) Nasution, as Army Chief of Staff, developed "The Basic Lines of the Program for and Development of the Army," in which he stated:

We need an army to guard and defend the neutrality (sovereignty) of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. We will rely only on our own forces in carrying out our independent policy. Bear in mind that any enemy who attacks us will have an organization more modern than ours, that in our geographic position as an island nation we are very weak, and that we will be unable to develop completely modern armed forces within the next ten years. Then, with spirit as our main asset we will tire out any aggressor in a long and widespread guerrilla war, a war which will finally reach a stage at which we will be stronger than they. Then we will be able to assume the offensive and expel them. Or international factors may be such that the enemy's efforts will be defeated and he will be forced to leave our territory. Guerrilla warfare cannot bring a final victory. A final decision can be reached only through an offensive carried out by a regular army.\footnote{Major General A. H. Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (The Indonesian National Army), Volume I, Jajasan Pustaka Militer, Djakarta, 1956, p. 37. Now available in English translation as Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), Department of Commerce, No. 19, 185, May 14, 1963.}
In line with these thoughts, a Five-Year Plan for the modernization of the Indonesian Army was developed and received the approval of the Indonesian cabinet in December 1951. But the policy envisaged ran into major obstruction from politicians, and hence intensified the officer corps' dislike and mistrust of the latter. This in turn led to an abortive military coup on October 17, 1952. Directed against Parliament, it was foiled by President Sukarno. Colonel Nasution lost his position as Army Chief of Staff, but was reinstated on October 27, 1955.

On July 5, 1959, President Sukarno established, with strong Army backing, the authoritarian system of government which he calls "guided democracy." In this new political environment the Army no longer faced parliamentary opposition to its development program. The Chief of Staff of the Army became concurrently Minister of National Defense and Security. In the summer of 1962 General Nasution added to his position as Minister of Defense that of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and thus asserted control over the previously independent Navy, Air Force, and Police. At the same time he yielded the position of Chief of Staff of the Army to Major General A. Jani.

The ascendancy of the Armed Forces in Indonesia was aided by the "states rights" rebellions of the PRR12 forces in Sumatra and the Permesta forces in the Celebes. There was a period of insubordination and defiance of the Central Government by a number of local military commanders, which prompted President Sukarno and Army

12 Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia).
Headquarters to proclaim martial law on March 14, 1957. Armed conflict followed the proclamation of a rival government in Padang, Sumatra, on February 15, 1958. The civil war raging in Sumatra and the Celebes, political turbulence elsewhere in the country, the rapid growth of the Communist Party in Java, and the direction of radical nationalism against the Dutch economic and cultural presence gave the Army ample justification for increasingly deep involvement in all aspects of public life. Though the officer corps found itself preoccupied with economic management and political organization, it seems also to have undertaken, during this period, a quiet but soul-searching inquiry into the root causes of some of its past military failures.

D. THE EMERGENCE OF A DOCTRINE ON COUNTERINSURGENCY

Throughout the period since independence, and even before, the Indonesian Army had been plagued by the existence of the fanatical armed bands of Darul Islam in West Java, which fought for the establishment of an Islamic theocracy. After independence the movement spread to northern Sumatra and to southern Celebes. Supported by the local population, whether out of fear or conviction, the Darul Islam movement had held the Indonesian Army at bay for almost ten years. In 1958 new rebellions of a more secular nature set regular Army units in opposition to one another.

At first the forces loyal to the Central Government successfully landed in rebel-held central Sumatra and northern Celebes and occupied the major urban centers.
But as soon as the rebel units were pushed back into the countryside, the character of operations changed: the rebels were now "like fish in water," to use Mao Tse-tung's classic simile, while the loyalist troops were like occupation forces in an enemy country. The initial victories of 1958 had only led to protracted war in hostile territory.

Amidst these difficulties, General Nasution, the Army Chief of Staff, established a Committee on Army Doctrine (Panitia Doktrin Angkatan Darat), with Lieutenant Colonel Rukminto, at that time Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, now ambassador to Pakistan, as chairman. Later, Colonel (now Brigadier General) Mokoginta replaced Rukminto, while Lieutenant Colonel (now Brigadier General) Suwarto was vice-chairman of the committee and played a major role in developing the new Army doctrine. The committee submitted its report late in 1958. This report, which the author has not seen, apparently emphasized that the Indonesian Army could only be successful, either against an external aggressor or in counterinsurgency operations, if it could rely on the wholehearted support of the civilian population, especially the peasantry. In reaching this conclusion, the Committee on Army Doctrine, according to Brigadier General Suwarto, rediscovered the Indonesian Army's own experience as guerrilla fighters who had only been able to survive and to continue harassing the technically superior Dutch because the population aided and protected them. Strange as it may seem, the lessons of those years had apparently been forgotten between 1950 and 1958. In conversations with the author in 1962, SESKOAD officers put the blame on their own past arrogance
and on the Western doctrines they had been taught, which did not distinguish between conventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations. This explanation does not seem entirely convincing, but no better one offers itself.

In fact, the guerrilla experience was not forgotten, though it may not have been applied in field operations. General Nasution was quite articulate in expounding it in the books he wrote during the 1952-55 period, when he was inactive. For example, in his book on the TNI (Indonesian National Army) he stated:

Experience has shown and the science of anti-guerrilla warfare teaches that it is impossible for an army to stamp out armed dissidents who have roots among the people through the use of force alone. It is essential that the guerrillas be separated from the people, and this can be done by satisfying various needs of the people, particularly their ideological needs. Basically then, anti-guerrilla warfare is ideological warfare.13

E. IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING OR WINDOW DRESSING?

If the Committee on Army Doctrine reported in late 1958 that internal security and external defense could not be guaranteed without popular support, one would conjecture that this may have created in the officer corps the state of mind that led to its supporting the "Return to the 1945 Constitution," as the authoritarian coup of July 5,

1959 was called, and to the massive indoctrination effort undertaken since then in the name of "Rediscovery of the National Revolution." The terms Pantja Sila and MANIPOL-USDEK, which the reader will encounter repeatedly in the SESKOAD document, are related to this propaganda effort which has saturated Indonesian society with slogans since 1959.

Pantja Sila refers to the five principles which President Sukarno offered as the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state in a famous speech on June 1, 1945. They were embodied in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, which was reinstated by presidential decree on July 5, 1959. The five principles, as officially translated into English, are: (1) belief in God; (2) nationalism; (3) humanity; (4) democracy (or sovereignty of the people); (5) social justice.\(^{14}\)

In the years preceding the 1959 change of regime, Pantja Sila was used as the shibboleth of those political groups which opposed the concept of an Islamic state. Indeed the paralysis of the Indonesian Constituent Assembly, elected in December 1955 and dissolved by the decree of July 5, 1959, was due in large measure to the ideological debate concerning the place of Islam in national polity. The concept of Pantja Sila, presented by official propaganda as "very ancient in Indonesia,"\(^{15}\) clearly has considerable appeal according to the results of a public

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\(^{14}\) MANIPOL-USDEK in Question and Answer, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, 1961 (Special Release 84), p. 33.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 34.
opinion sampling conducted by the author in Indonesia in 1957. 16

Since 1960 the Indonesian Army and allied political forces have used the Pantja Sila concept increasingly not only against religious fanaticism but also against the Communist Party. The argument is that the Communists, as adepts, espouse a philosophical and political doctrine incompatible with the first principle of the Pantja Sila. In April 1962 the Communist Party found it necessary to convene its Seventh (Extraordinary) National Congress in order to accept formally the Pantja Sila. But the ideological debate continues as the anti-Communist forces reiterate their conviction that the Communists were only guided by expediency and have not really changed their basic views.

Pantja Sila seems to be respected sincerely by the officers, who like many other articulate Indonesians, invest it with considerable emotional-symbolic meaning. This concept also probably contributes to their charismatic attachment to its formulator, President Sukarno, the early spokesman of the national revolution.

MANIPOL-USDEK is a collective name for slogans of a much more recent vintage, related to the establishment of "guided democracy" in July 1959. MANIPOL is an acronym from the Indonesian words for "Political Manifesto," as the speech made by President Sukarno on August 17, 1959, came to be known. The Provisional People's Consultative

16 See the present author's "Indonesian Images of Their National Self," Public Opinion Quarterly, November 1958. A fuller text may be found in P-1452-RC, The RAND Corporation, August 1, 1958.
Congress (MPRS), an appointed body which met in Bandung in November 1960 as part of the Sukarno regime's effort to bring into existence the institutions provided for in the 1945 Constitution, declared in its Edict No. I/1960, dated November 19, that the Political Manifesto expressed the "Broad Lines of the Policy of the State." This gave official sanction to the use of MANIPOL as the key element of the national indoctrination effort. The term is usually linked with USDEK, an acrostic which gained acceptance in 1960 as a collective name for the five guiding principles of the Political Manifesto, namely: (1) the 1945 constitution; (2) Indonesian socialism; (3) guided democracy; (4) guided economy; (5) the Indonesian national identity.

Unlike the Pantja Sila, which seem to have grown roots in the Indonesian national consciousness, MANIPOL-USDEK appears to be identified completely with the current Sukarno regime. While the officer corps pays lip service to these terms, it does so, according to the author's observations, with considerable mental reservations, sometimes even with a cynical sense of political expediency. In Indonesia today, the acceptance of MANIPOL-USDEK is considered equivalent to an expression of loyalty to President Sukarno. It can be argued that the Army's surface acceptance of Sukarno's ideology was a shrewd and wise decision designed to secure for the officer corps freedom to pursue its aims without provoking an open conflict with the President, the main spokesman and propagandist of official ideology. At any rate, the doctrine developed by the Indonesian Army is certainly more than a mere endorsement of Sukarno's pronouncements.
F. THE ARMY'S OWN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THE THIRD WAY

The essence of the overt political philosophy of the Army, as developed since 1959, seems to be contained in the notion that counterinsurgency and external defense depend on popular support, which in turn is a function of good government. Therefore the Army, though denying any political ambitions of its own, feels obliged to become involved in civil affairs to the extent necessary to ensure that the population will rally eagerly to the defense of the regime.

As explained to the author in 1962 at SESKOAD, the intention of the Army is not to establish a military regime, but to pursue "Nasution's third way," meaning constant vigilance and prodding to achieve good government, and prompt efforts to fill any vacuum in the administrative process of the country. Thus Territorial Warfare (Perang Wilayah) has come to be linked since 1959 with Territorial Management (Pembinaan Wilayah), a concept that includes the whole range of military involvements in the life of the country.

As part of this effort, the Indonesian Army's General Staff (SUAD) has added to the four classical functions of all such organizations, namely Intelligence (SUAD I), Operations (SUAD II), Personnel (SUAD III), and Logistics (SUAD IV), two additional functions of considerable importance in the context of current Indonesian Army

doctrine, namely Territorial Affairs (SUAD V) and Functional Groups (SUAD VI).

The duties of these last two sections of the Indonesian General Staff concern civil affairs and are to that extent comparable to the functions of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, in the United States Army. But in practice the role of SUAD V and SUAD VI is much more extensive, as the purpose of the Indonesian officer corps is to play a major role in the government of the country and to mobilize extensive popular support, of a political nature, behind Army policies.

SUAD V is primarily concerned with Territorial Management. The way it defines its functions will be found in Chapter VI of Book II of the SESKOAD document presented in this Memorandum.

SUAD VI activities are related to the corporatist principles developed by the Sukarno regime. As representation by political parties, which was in any case largely nominal in that politically underdeveloped society, became increasingly discredited in Indonesia after the 1955 general elections, corporatist principles were propounded by President Sukarno at least as early as February 1957. The term golongan karya, usually translated as "functional groups" or "work groups," has gained wide acceptance in Indonesian political discourse. SUAD VI aims at rallying the support of functional groups behind Army policies.

An interesting feature of the evolving pattern of civil-military relations in Indonesia arises from the

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Army's view of its role in the state. The Army aims to manipulate the functional groups of the civilian sector of society, but at the same time it considers itself a functional group in its own right. It follows that the Army must be represented in the cabinet, in Parliament, and in all other governing bodies of the state. It sees its role as guardian of the state not only as a military one but also as a much broader political one.

These views were expressed in a pamphlet of April 1961, published in "English" by the Army Information Service (PENAD), from which the following passage is quoted verbatim:

The Liberal Democracy which was practised by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia between the years 1950–1959, and which proved to be a failure, none whatsoever has been put into writing about the T.N.I.'s [Army's] role with regard to political matters. But after the return to the 1945 Constitution, a constitution which is in fact based on Guided Democracy, the T.N.I.'s role has been formulated and enjoys legal constitutional forces as well....

Besides its normal function as an apparatus for the maintenance of the National Security, the T.N.I. as a functional apparatus is responsible in bringing the Revolution safely towards its goal, and in guiding the State. This particular function is not known in Western countries....

Because of the two existing T.N.I.'s functions as mentioned above, it can be seen that it is active in all Government's fields....

It is clear, that the current role of the T.N.I. is not a military dictatorship, and the Republic of Indonesia is not a Military State according to these common views. There is no universal name and terminology which can be given to the T.N.I. But whatever it may be, one thing is
certain, that is the T.N.I.'s role in the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has contributed a great deal in achieving the goal of the Revolution.\textsuperscript{19}

Some well-informed Indonesians claim that behind closed doors the General Staff is much more explicit in its political philosophy and that those who have participated in the training programs of SESKOAD are left with the impression that the doctrine of Territorial Management is really meant to convey to the officer corps the notion that eventually they will be the government of Indonesia. If this is true, then Nasution's "third way" should perhaps be taken as a tactical expedient rather than as a basic principle, that is, as something valid only for the duration of the Sukarno regime.

G. THE DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE BECOMES OFFICIAL POLICY

By the end of 1959 the Army was giving increasing publicity to its doctrine of Territorial Warfare. For instance, in December 1959, in a speech to the cadets of the National Military Academy in Magelang,\textsuperscript{20} General Nasution explained that Indonesia's defense was based on the concept of Territorial Warfare, which relied on popular support and on the notion that "The Army Never Surrenders" but continues to fight as a guerrilla force.

\textsuperscript{19} Army Information Service, The Current Indonesian National Army's Role in the Republic of Indonesia, Djakarta, 1961, pp. 6, 7, 9, 11.

In Indonesia, unlike Western or Communist countries, no clear line could be drawn between politics and military affairs. General Nasution stressed that Indonesia's defense system was similar to that of Yugoslavia, "which is also based on defense by the people." He stated that Territorial Warfare had been successfully applied by Mao Tse-tung, whereas the Western powers did not understand it. He explained that the pattern of territorial organization required by this defense system would not be necessary "if Indonesia had a very strong military force."

In March 1960, some days after another speech by General Nasution, the Army Information Service found it necessary to issue a statement that Territorial Warfare "had by now become the doctrine of the State's defense system." As the term "might have been misinterpreted in some quarters," the Army Information Service explained in its own brand of English that Territorial Warfare was a strategic-defensive defense system as long as no strength as well as opportunity had been gathered in order to carry out strategic-offensive actions to destroy any enemy attacking the country. Both in strategic-defensive as well as in the strategic offensive actions, all potential territorial elements, such as the people, the people's economy and others, must be mobilized and effectively utilized by the territorial authorities such as the Military District Commands and other regional military authorities for supporting the combat elements.

It is not clear what were the "misunderstandings" that elicited such explanations. They may have been related to the discussions going on behind closed doors at the time concerning the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union.

Apparently the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) attacked the concept of Territorial Warfare out of fear that economy-minded elements in the Indonesian government would rely on it as an argument for curtailing massive expenditures on modern heavy military equipment.

To place this debate in context, it should be mentioned that in August 1959 the Sukarno government had created a National Planning Council (DEPERNAS) and instructed it to devise a new approach to national development. This resulted in an Eight-Year Over-All Development Plan which was approved by the Provisional People's Consultative Congress (MPRS) in its Edict No. II/1960 of December 3, 1960.

In preparation for the planning effort of DEPERNAS, the Armed Forces Staff (SAB) appointed an Ad-Hoc Committee for the Development of the Armed Forces (Panyitia Ad-Hoc Pembangunan Angkatan Perang) of which Air Force Commodore Siswadi was the chairman and Army Colonel (now Brigadier General) Suwarto the vice-chairman. The committee drafted a development program for the Armed Forces, and this was accepted by DEPERNAS and the MPRS, though the latter added some rhetorical homage to MANIFOL-USDEK. The program was not reproduced, for obvious security reasons, in the printed version of the Eight-Year Plan, though some of the general policy guidelines found their way into print. Excerpts from these appear in Chapter II of Book II of the SESKOAD document incorporated in this

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22 On the plan itself see the present author's The Indonesian Eight-Year Over-All Development Plan, The RAND Corporation, RM-2768, June 9, 1961.
Memorandum. That chapter is of particular interest as it embodies the constitutional form by which the doctrine of Territorial Warfare became official state policy. It also helps us understand in what context Indonesian policy-makers may have viewed the acquisition of air and naval equipment, such as Badger bombers and "W" class submarines, from the Soviet Union. The need for such equipment can be related to Phase 1 of the Indonesian national defense doctrine, and the weapons acquisition program of 1959-62, made possible by Soviet credits, must have been guided by the conclusions of the Ad-Hoc Committee on the Development of the Armed Forces.

What never appears in the SESKOAD document is an indication of the hypothetical enemy against whom the national defense doctrine is directed. Perhaps it could be argued that the Indonesians were acquiring in the 1960's the equipment that would have been useful to them in 1945-46 to prevent Allied landings. But this is not incompatible with the possibility that the acquisition of Soviet equipment created in 1962-63 the state of mind that led the Indonesian government to initiate the current policy of "confrontation with Malaysia."

Brigadier General Suwarto claims that the defense doctrine, which became official policy after it was endorsed by the Provisional People's Consultative Congress, was actually developed at the Army Staff and Command
School in Bandung rather than by the Ad-Hoc Committee. According to the officers of SESKOAD, the MPRS accepted the doctrine of Territorial Warfare only as a "second line of defense" to be applied if an aggressor could not be stopped in frontal war (Phase I of the Indonesian Army doctrine), whereas the officer corps regards Territorial Warfare as a concept "enveloping the whole" -- justifying the Army's total "mission" in Indonesian public life.

H. THE ARMY'S ELITIST INDOCTRINATION CAMPAIGN

Aided by the official recognition of Territorial Warfare by the MPRS at the end of 1960, the Army proceeded with its own indoctrination efforts, subtly intertwined with but clearly distinguishable in political intent from the official propaganda of the Sukarno regime. While paying constant lip service to MANIPOL-USDEK, the officer corps now emphasized Pembinaan Wilajah (Territorial Management) as the underlying principle of their governmental and administrative policy. The concept was apparently refined in cooperation with some of Indonesia's ablest, American-trained economists, such as Professors M. Sadli, Widjojo Nitisastro, and Subroto of the University of Indonesia's School of Economics.

The Army's indoctrination campaign became part of the normal activities of SESKOAD in 1962, obviously with the full endorsement of the Army General Staff. Since 1958 SESKOAD had put most Army field grade officers through special ten-month programs (Kursus "C") to fill the gaps in their formal military training. As part of
this educational effort SESKOAD had already emphasized the development of a national defense doctrine. By the end of 1960 the doctrinal effort had become a major part of SESKOAD activities.

A "First Seminar on Defense Problems" was held at SESKOAD in December 1960. It tried to develop an interpretation in depth of concepts such as "Territorial Warfare" and "Internal Security." Throughout 1961 SESKOAD had three task forces at work. The papers they prepared were discussed in a "Second Seminar on Defense Problems" held on January 3-8, 1962, in Bandung. Revised in that seminar, the papers were reproduced in mimeographed form in March 1962. They constitute Book I of The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare, reproduced below in translation, and were afterwards printed as a special issue of Karya Wira Jati, the official publication of SESKOAD.

The paper on Territorial Operations (Book I, Chapter II) was drafted by a task force under Brigadier General A. Kosasih; the paper on Territorial Logistics (Book I, Chapter III) by a task force under Colonel Soebijono; and the paper on Territorial Management (Book I, Chapter IV) by a task force under Colonel R. Abdul Kadir Prawiraatmadja.

While developing a defense doctrine, SESKOAD proceeded also to propagate it in policy-making circles. In September 1961, General Nasution inaugurated at SESKOAD an "Orientation Course on Security Problems." Brigadier General (now Major General) Sudirman, Commandant of SESKOAD, explained that the purpose of the course was to find and create a basis for the formation of a National
Defense College. Following the September 1961 course, which was attended by Army officers only, several orientation courses were held throughout 1962 for senior officials from various sectors of the Indonesian government. Inspired in part by the practice of the National War College of the United States, the Indonesian Army had decided to bring together senior civil and military officials for a period of joint training and study.

As the author was told when he visited SESKOAD in April-May 1962, the Army expected that in 1963 the state of emergency (martial law) which had prevailed since March 14, 1957, would be lifted as a result of increasingly strong pressures from political parties on President Sukarno. Fearing the loss of a legal basis for its leading role in civil affairs, the Army was trying to obviate the political consequences of being deprived of legal authority by getting a substantial number of senior civilian officials to understand the relationship between Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, hoping that this would create enough consensus between civilian and military authorities to help them close ranks.

During the six years of martial law a pattern of government had been developed by the Army through SUAD V (Territorial Affairs). It is commonly known in Indonesia today as the Tjatur Tunggal (Four in One). Territorial Management decisions are made by a Committee of Four, which consists of the territorial military commander, the civil governor, the chief of police, and the district

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attorney. Under martial law, the military commander had chaired the committee meetings. Were martial law to be lifted, the civilian governor would replace him in the chair of the Tjatur Tunggal. If the two officials shared a common philosophy, the Army hoped that the change would not matter. Hence the Army figured that an Inter-departmental "Orientation Course on Security Problems," explaining the concept of Territorial Management, would make it possible, if it could rally the support of enough senior officials, for the Army to retain maximum influence throughout the country, despite the loss of legal authority in civil affairs. By the end of 1962 some 300 senior officials had participated in the SESKOAD courses.

I. THE DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE: OPERATIONS IN WEST JAVA

During 1962, after each Orientation Course, the Army took the whole group on a field trip through West Java to study the practical application of the concepts of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. As a guest of SESKOAD, the author participated in the field trip organized at the end of the first course, on May 17-19, 1962. He was the only foreigner present and witnessed some of the results achieved by seeking popular support for counterinsurgency operations.

In one sector of the operations against the Darul Islam, which we visited on May 18, 1962, at Mt. Galunggung, the Army was using eight infantry battalions and 3,000 civilian watchers from nearby towns and villages against some 300 Darul Islam fighters encircled on top of the
mountain. The civilian watchmen, fed and transported by the Army, spent three days and nights in parties of three, spaced at fifty-yard intervals, watching a circular road that had been cut into the side of the mountain for this operation. On a 12-km. perimeter, at the time of our visit, there were deployed 96 Army regulars, 48 members of OPR (armed village guards), and 508 civilian watchers. These forces were only used to isolate the DI band and prevent it from breaking the encirclement, while other Army units advanced into the area occupied by the rebels to engage them in combat.

A casual observer cannot really know how voluntary was the cooperation of the civilians, but the watchers, whom the Indonesians called pagar betis (fence of feet), seemed cheerful and cordial toward the military.

The campaign against the Darul Islam Army (DI-TII), which had terrorized parts of West Java for almost fourteen years, had entered its final phase. On June 4, 1962, less than a month after the field trip described above, the leader of the Darul Islam, S. M. Kartosuwirjo, was captured in the mountains of West Java, later to be court-martialed and executed.

On August 17, 1962, in his annual Independence Day address, President Sukarno said:

The accomplishments of the past three years have resulted now in almost the entire territory of the Republic of Indonesia (95 per cent of it) being freed from the rebel gangs. At the beginning of that time the rebellion of what [were] called Kartosuwirjo DI-TII gangs and the PRRI-PERMESTA rebellion, which broke out during the first year of the working cabinet, controlled one-sixth of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, with an
estimated strength of some 125,000 fighting personnel and 45,000 weapons, heavy and light. Up to the present, a total of 23,495 persons have been killed and 133,365 have returned to the fold of the Republic, while we have captured 40,317 weapons, heavy and light. We have also been able to break and defeat their subversive activities, too.

All this would not have been possible without sacrifices on our side. Up to the present the efforts to restore security have cost us 3,736 soldiers of the Armed Services and the Village Security Organizations (OKD) dead; and 6,213 of the people dead; 5,164 wounded from the Armed Services and the Village Security Organizations and 4,375 from the people.

The climax to all these efforts was the capture of Kartosuwirjo on 4 June 1962, which was followed by the gradual surrender of his followers.

This is a fact that the entire Indonesian Nation must receive with feelings of relief and joy. Feelings of relief and joy because the sufferings that the people have felt all this time have now come to an end.  

The Indonesian Army officers, with whom in May 1962 the author discussed the Army's counterinsurgency efforts, without exception attributed their success to the post-1958 doctrine, which linked military operations with Territorial Management in order to win popular support.

At the local level, the change of doctrine was reflected in a new, respectful, attitude toward the population, the avoidance of brutalities and exactions,
and participation in the social and religious life of the villagers. It is not known whether this policy played an important role in the termination of the PRRI-PERESTA rebellions in Sumatra and the Celebes in 1961, but it would seem that the liquidation of the Darul Islam movement in West Java in 1962 was aided by the doctrinal rediscovery of the role of popular support in guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

J. THE INFLUENCE OF YUGOSLAV DOCTRINE

Indonesian military leaders, when they discuss the role of moral and ideological factors in national defense, like to refer to the Yugoslav experience in World War II. Speaking before the National Planning Council in 1960, General Nasution contrasted the capitulation of the Dutch forces in Indonesia to the Japanese in 1942 with Yugoslav resistance to the Germans during the same period.  

Yugoslav doctrine has been carefully studied at SESKOAD. The officers have read the English edition of Vladimir Dedijer's *Tito Speaks* and have had Yugoslav materials translated into Indonesian.

According to Brigadier General Suwanto, the most influential Yugoslav document was an article by Lieutenant

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General Dushan Kveder entitled "'Territorial War': The New Concept of Resistance," published in the American quarterly Foreign Affairs in 1953. An Indonesian translation of this paper has been in use at SESKOAD since 1958. The basic principle of the Indonesian doctrine, namely that enemy victories need not be followed by capitulation if the national army can count on popular support, was indeed clearly expressed by Kveder:

The Liberation War in Yugoslavia showed unequivocally that manpower is fundamental to victory and should be valued above territory. No territory can be maintained if the army is lost; any territory can be regained if the army remains.

The collapse of the front need not, therefore, be followed by surrender, but only by a change from classical frontal war to mobile territorial war....

In the world as it is today, only a country which has solved its basic social and national problems to the satisfaction of the people -- or, at least, shows that it is in process of solving these problems -- can find within itself sufficient moral strength to fight in this way. A liberation movement must mobilize the people; its army must win the day-by-day support of the civilian population, especially of the peasants, for without them neither a large territorial war nor a small partisan war can be fought successfully. A territorial war is a people's war.

It may be significant that Brigadier General Ibrahim Adjie, who was given the mission of applying the doctrine

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28 Ibid., pp. 93, 97.
of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management in West Java, had been Indonesian military attaché in Belgrade before he assumed command of the Siliwangi Division and of Military Region (KODAM) VI, West Java, and brought to a successful conclusion the counterinsurgency operations against the Darul Islam. Early in 1961 Brigadier General (then Colonel) Adjie initiated operations to isolate the armed bands of the DI-TII from the population and cut them off from food supplies by driving them into isolated pockets which were then surrounded by Army units and by the pagar betis, the civilian watchers assisting the Army. Mentally as well as physically, according to Brigadier General Adjie, the rebels were isolated. Territorial Management operations, undertaken simultaneously by the Siliwangi Division, established for the first time cordial relations between the Army and the population in the area where the Darul Islam had been entrenched since 1948.

By April 1, 1962, the Siliwangi Division found it possible to proceed to final large-scale operations against the Darul Islam. Twenty infantry battalions were committed to this campaign, besides various auxiliary units. On June 4 Kartosuwirjo was captured. Between April 1 and June 16, 1962, 1,236 DI-TII fighters surrendered, 215 were killed, and 207 were captured.29 In public statements, Brigadier General Adjie attributed these successes primarily to cooperation by the local population.

Within a few days the Soviet Literary Gazette asked for permission to publish Russian translations of a

collection of poems written by members of LEKRA, the cultural auxiliary of the Communist Party of Indonesia, glorifying the deeds of the pagar betis. Without belittling the Indonesian Army openly, the Communists were obviously trying to claim as much credit as possible for the "forces of the people," and so to minimize the role of their traditional enemies in the regular army, the elite Siliwangi Division that had crushed the Communist Madiun rebellion back in 1948.

K. FROM COUNTERINSURGENCY TO CIVIC ACTION

During the period of military operations against the Darul Islam, the Siliwangi Division had developed a pattern of Territorial Management directly related to the tactical situation of the moment. Brigadier General Adjie had divided his Military Region (KODAM) into zones according to the urgency of the need for civic action. Those areas which had been controlled by the DI needed immediate assistance on a large scale, to repair or restore roads, public buildings such as schools and mosques, and even rice fields. As the Army and police had not provided security, the population of the DI areas had in past years abandoned their homes and had now to be helped to return in the wake of the Army's mopping-up operations. These remote and inaccessible parts of southern West Java were labelled "C" zones. Areas in need of some assistance but still in possession of sufficient resources to rehabilitate themselves primarily

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through local efforts were labelled "B" zones, while the
developed districts of northern West Java, where the
terrorists had done little damage, were labelled "A"
zones.

The Army's civic action program in West Java was
initially regarded as a necessary follow-up operation
directly related to the military phase of the counter-
insurgency campaign. But soon it became obvious that
civic action in West Java had much broader implications
both locally and nationally.

In the context of the doctrine of Territorial War-
fare and Territorial Management, civic action became in
the second half of 1962 a major preoccupation of the
Ministry of Defense and of the Army General Staff. The
argument was developed that if national defense policy
relied on a concept of popular resistance (perlawanan
rakjat), then community development (pembangunan desa)
was needed not only in areas stricken by the rebellions
of past years but everywhere in the country. Such
community development efforts became particularly urgent
under the specific political circumstances then prevail-
ing.

For several years the Communist Party of Indonesia
had concentrated its efforts increasingly on the rural
population. In the summer of 1962 the Communist-
controlled Barisan Tani Indonesia (Peasants' Front)
claimed 5.7 million members, a majority of whom were to
be found in East and Central Java. The areas of West
Java that had supported the Darul Islam movement were
more strongly attached to religion and had been somewhat
less susceptible to Communist penetration. But with the collapse of the DI the Army feared that the Communists would move vigorously into the political vacuum unless the Army had solutions of its own to offer to the population.

As Brigadier General Adjie explained it in September 1962, the Siliwangi Division's civic action program was due in part to military tactical considerations, in part to the recognition of a moral obligation to assist the population who had helped the Army to carry out its mission, and in part to the political desirability of curtailing Communist influence in West Java under circumstances that precluded direct action against the Communist Party. As Adjie put it, anti-Communism was not compatible with the "political etiquette" of the Sukarno regime and therefore the Army had to compete with the Communist Party without confronting it openly, although he was confident he could crush the Communist Party in West Java in 48 hours if he were permitted to use force.

At the national level even weightier considerations prevailed. With the peaceful solution, under United Nations auspices, of the dispute concerning Western New Guinea in August 1962 and the almost complete success of internal counterinsurgency efforts, the Army faced a future political situation in which it would be increasingly difficult to keep 350,000 men under arms and to claim a very substantial share of national revenue in a country already heavily encumbered by deficit financing. No major external or internal crisis was in sight.
Malaysia had not then become the major national issue into which it was made a year later. Hence it was evident that the Army would find it difficult to oppose the strong pressure of the Communist Party, foolishly supported by other political parties, to have the state of emergency (martial law) lifted, an act that would deprive the Army of the legal authority in civil affairs which it had enjoyed since March 14, 1957. A successful civil action program would help the Army to justify keeping in uniform a large number of men who would otherwise become uprooted and unemployed civilians, ready for Communist recruitment, and to put these men to work for the country's economic and social development. Such a policy could give the Army sufficient political influence and moral prestige to replace effectively the loss of legal authority that would follow the lifting of the state of emergency.

The logic of these considerations was so compelling that in a short time civic action became one of the Army's major preoccupations. Intensive efforts were made to develop a suitable doctrine for its implementation. In June 1962 Major General Achmad Jani replaced General Nasution as Chief of Staff of the Army, the latter assuming the new title of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, while remaining Minister of Defense. The development of a civic action program now involved the staffs of both officers.

At first it seemed that Major General Jani and his staff were primarily concerned with the formulation of a program which would maintain as high a level of forces
as possible and give the Army an important role in the reconstruction and development of the country, and that General Nasution, on the other hand, was more concerned with measures which would allow an orderly demobilization of servicemen, so as to reduce the military budget, for which he was responsible to the cabinet as Minister of Defense. Apparently General Nasution initially had in mind a program that would place ex-servicemen, after vocational training, in key civilian positions, so as to maximize the informal political influence of the Army through cadres that would participate in Territorial Management, in the broad sense of this term. In the fall of 1962 these two points of view were apparently reconciled and the Army’s civic action program gained momentum.

Following a brief visit to Indonesia by General Maxwell Taylor and a direct request from Generals Nasution and Jani to U.S. Ambassador Howard Jones, a U.S. Inter-Agency Civic Action Survey Team \(^{31}\) visited Indonesia in September-October 1962 and formulated proposals for U.S. assistance to the Indonesian Army’s civic action program. This led to cordial and currently still expanding American-Indonesian cooperation in the civic action field.

\(^{31}\) The Survey Team consisted of Philip W. Manhard, Department of State and CINCPAC; Lt. Col. Lyman C. Richardson, Department of the Army; Lt. Col. George C. Benson, Department of Defense; David S. Burgess, AID; George Spencer, USAID, Manila; Clyde Burns, AID; and Guy J. Pauker, Department of Defense Consultant.
L. A NEW ROLE FOR THE ARMY

By the end of 1962 the Indonesian Army was ready to extend the civic action program, with which it had experimented in West Java and to a much smaller degree in South Celebes and North Sumatra, to all Military Region Commands including the strongholds of the Communist Party of Indonesia, East and Central Java. Eventually about one-third of the Army's 140 battalions were to be engaged in civic action, another third in garrison duties, and the remaining third in training. Demobilization was to proceed slowly and to be preceded by vocational training, not only to avoid unfavorable political repercussions from disgruntled ex-servicemen, but to give the Army, eventually, increased political influence in the communities to which the ex-servicemen would return.

The timeliness, from a political point of view, of these plans became apparent in late October 1962, when President Sukarno appointed a Committee of Seventeen to make proposals for the termination of the state of emergency. The committee, which included Generals Nasution and Jani as well as the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Force, decided unanimously on November 29 to recommend that the state of emergency be lifted. 32

On December 19, 1962, in a speech at Surabaya, President Sukarno said that the emergency, though "at times very necessary,...was not popular." He then issued a decree abolishing the state of emergency as of May 1, 1963, "with the subsequent restoration of civilian rule." The

date chosen for the abrogation of martial law, which had been in effect for more than six years, was the date agreed upon with the United Nations for the transfer of administration in Western New Guinea to the Government of Indonesia. President Sukarno justified the decree of December 19 as

in accordance with the Indonesian people's desire that revolutionary people's forces be given a part in the consummation of efforts to achieve the objectives of the Indonesian revolution.33

In line with this statement, the Politbureau of the Communist Party of Indonesia, in its 1963 New Year message, greeted the abolition of the state of emergency as "a victory most significant for the people's struggle."

It is characteristic of the peculiar balance of political forces in Indonesia today that, prior to the decree abolishing the state of emergency, Sukarno had signed, on December 3, 1962, another decree (No. 371/1962) which legitimized -- within the framework of current Indonesian constitutional practice -- the new role assumed by the Army. Article I of that decree says:

1. In carrying out development projects in the fields of Production and Distribution, the Government makes use of the availability of the units of the Armed Forces, as a skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled force to assist in the implementation of said projects.

2. The use of units of the Armed Forces in carrying out Government development projects in these fields of Production and Distribution is called Operasi Karya Angkatan

Bersendjata (Work Operation of the Armed Forces).

3. The Work Operation of the Armed Forces concerns:
   a. on the Central level: national projects included in the program of the respective Departments in the fields of Production and Distribution;
   b. on the Regional level: regional and village rehabilitation and development projects as determined by the Body for the Coordination of the Development of First Level Regions.

The "Body" referred to in paragraph 3b is the Tjatur Tunggal, established in each province under the state of emergency and recognized by Presidential Decree No. 655/1961, which is to be chaired by the regional military commander or by the civilian governor depending on whether or not martial law prevails at the time.

It should be noted that, in issuing Presidential Decree No. 371/1962, Sukarno gave the Armed Forces a broader mandate vis-à-vis national development than seemed to be desired by the political forces represented in the Provisional People's Consultative Congress in December 1960 -- another indication of the ongoing political struggle.34

M. PATTERNS OF COMMUNIST OPPOSITION

The Communist Party of Indonesia, of course, has followed the developments described above with a jaundiced

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34 See the SESKOAD document reproduced in translation below, Book II, Chapter II, #413.
eye. General Nasution and other senior Army officers had told the U.S. Inter-Agency Civic Action Survey Team in October 1962 that they expected opposition from the Communist Party to the Army's civic action program. Since then, the Communist Party has indeed launched a massive campaign against what it calls SOB TANPA SOB (State of Emergency Without State of Emergency). On February 10, 1963, D.N. Aidit, the Chairman of the party's Central Committee, presented to the First Plenary Session of the Central Committee a political report entitled "Be Brave, Be Brave, Once Again Be Brave!" which was distributed as a pamphlet all over Indonesia. In it he said:

The bureaucratic capitalist circles and other reactionary circles are already vigorously preparing steps and measures to rob the People of the democracy which will become possible with the abolition of the state of emergency. For some time already, they have worked hard to create a situation of STATE OF EMERGENCY WITHOUT STATE OF EMERGENCY, among other things by way of continuing a single dictatorial rule in the name of the TJATUR TUNGGAL in the provinces, by continuing to rule over the villages through their agents, by forming bodies which grab illegally the duties of already existing civilian authorities, and so forth.35

"Bureaucratic capitalists" is the name used in recent years by the Communist Party in its attacks on the Indonesian officer corps.

In a lecture before students of the Navy's new Staff and Command School (SESKOAL) in Djakarta, on July 16, 1963, D. N. Aidit, "Berani, Berani, Sekali Lagi Berani!" ("Be Brave, Be Brave, Once Again Be Brave!") in Harian Rakjat, February 11, 1963, p. 3.
1963, Aidit attacked the Territorial Warfare doctrine as "originating in Yugoslavia where it was expounded by General Kveder in 1953." Aidit stated that the doctrine was "wrong and anti-people," that it resulted in a clash between the principle of "popular defense" and the efforts to build up modern equipment in the armed forces and that it assigned a secondary role to the people and to the Navy and Air Force. He also rejected the notion that national defense should be "based on the weakness of a state." 36 Whether such transparent efforts to create conflicts among the three services of the Armed Forces are succeeding remains to be seen.

Much more dangerous than the internal war of words is the current "confrontation of Malaysia," in which the Indonesian Army seems to play a leading role. The latter could nullify the results of the shrewd and even brilliant political conception underlying the doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management. The General Staff may very well have calculated that once the issue of Malaysia was raised the Army had to play a leading role in settling it so as not to be outbid by the Communist Party and other radical elements. But this is a dangerous game from which may spring unintended consequences. The unforeseen and uncontrollable results of present Army policy may return to haunt the officer corps.

N. CIVIC MISSION: AN ASPECT OF TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT

Meanwhile the Army's civic action program continues, as well as the political effort to gain acceptance and respect for it in Indonesian society. In February 1963 Brigadier General Sokowati, Assistant Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs (SUAD V), published a pamphlet entitled "The Indonesian National Army and Civic Mission, An Aspect of Territorial Management," which carried the texts of Presidential Decrees 371/1962 and 655/1961 and related documents, as well as prefaces by Deputy First Minister for Information Roeslan Abdulgani, Deputy First Minister for Defense A. H. Nasution, and Army Commander Major General A. Jani. Significantly, the pamphlet was published by the Department of Information of the Indonesian Government, not by the Army Information Service. In his preface Roeslan Abdulgani, one of Sukarno's senior advisors and the architect of the regime's indoctrination campaign, wrote:

We all recognize that, as a long-term target, we shall never be able to develop Indonesian socialism if its economic and financial basis continues to be unsteady. And this basis will continue to remain unsteady as long as the bottlenecks in the production and distribution sectors are not eliminated....

It is therefore the responsibility of all groups in our society who have truly accepted the PANTJA SILA and MANIPOL-USDEK to give the Armed Forces maximum assistance in their

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"Civic Action" which is moved by the spirit of their present "Civic Mission."

While in Roeslan Abdulgani the Army has gained an important ally among the top civilian political figures, it can hardly say that it has the wholehearted support of President Sukarno. In his Independence Day speech (August 17, 1963), an annual event, usually broadcast all over Indonesia, Sukarno said:

In connection with the need to give priority to increasing production I affirm here, also for the umpteenth time, that the most productive manpower is the workers and farmers. The workers and farmers are the mainstay of the Revolution! For that reason therefore efforts to increase production must not only negatively "not be hostile to the workers and farmers," but must in positive fashion develop the productive powers of the workers and farmers. Without the manpower of the workers and farmers it is not possible to increase production. Besides that, we are now also using the energies of the Armed Forces to step up that production. The Armed Forces are now being instructed also to carry out what are called "Civic Missions." With regard to these Civic Missions I have a good report in my hands from Deputy First Minister/Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Nasution, but due to lack of time, I cannot read that report here. I shall add this report as a supplement to this address.38

It may be worth noting that the report for which President Sukarno did not find time in this speech would have added only 2 pages to the 24 of his address. To an

Indonesian audience, Sukarno's passing so quickly over the Army's civic mission report could only mean that civic action did not have the President's full support. This is not the place to review the Army's achievements in the first year of its civic action program, but it seems fair to say that whatever success it has enjoyed is not due to any encouragement from President Sukarno. A fuller assessment of the Indonesian Army's domestic political efforts will have to wait until Territorial Management has had time to show more results.

Meanwhile, one can perhaps interpret the Army's effort to formulate its own doctrine of nation-building as a move to protect its unity and integrity from today's ideological conflicts. The officer corps can best maintain its cohesion if it succeeds in eliminating ideological debates and reaches a consensus on matters of governmental policy. There is a natural desire among the officers to avoid further civil war, and ideological solidarity is a principal means to that end.
PART TWO: "THE DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE,"
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. NS 1124 - 01,
INDONESIAN ARMY STAFF AND COMMAND SCHOOL,
MARCH 1962
Prefatory Note

The following document is a literal translation of a mimeographed Indonesian training manual obtained by me in Bandung in May 1962. While efforts have been made to render the Indonesian language text in readable English, style has been sacrificed for accuracy. Occasionally the rendering of Indonesian terms has proved difficult, due to the fact that Indonesian is still a fluid language and usage is neither standardized nor fully covered by dictionaries. Whenever possible, I adopted the English terms used by Indonesian officers when discussing these problems with me. From the beginning of the next page I reproduce, as exactly as possible, the contents of the Indonesian manual.
Army Staff and Command School
Bureau of Training

DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE

To Be Used Only In The Army Staff And Command School

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I. Concept of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare -- Basic Definitions.
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FOREWORD

This book contains the school draft on our Doctrine of Territorial Warfare. We are using it as a basis for discussions in the Army Staff and Command School at the present time. After the school draft has been tested adequately it will be proposed that it be established as our Doctrine, a complement to existent doctrines as well as a perfection of them. In this way an unbroken circle is established: doctrine - testing - school draft - testing - revision of old doctrine - new doctrine/complement of the old - testing - and so on.

This school draft consists of two books. Book I is a clean draft and Book II contains reference material taken from existent doctrine, decisions, and so forth, and from other background material.

Additional reference material for individual discussion problems will be provided as "supplementary material."

Army Staff and Command School, March 1962

Issued by:

Training Secretary
for
Commander, Army Staff and Command School

/ss/ Soedradjat
Lt. Col., Administration Corps, SN 10837
BOOK I

I. CONCEPT OF THE DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE.
   BASIC DEFINITIONS

1. Definition

   Territorial Warfare is a form of warfare which is total in nature. It utilizes all national forces in a total fashion, but emphasizes militant force. It relies on counteroffensive to secure the termination of warfare in such fashion as to maintain the sovereignty of the state.

2. Explanation of Terms

   (1) **Territory** means the State Territory, comprising land, sea, and air space.
   
   (2) **National forces** include the national potential in the military, political-economic-social, spiritual, and civic (or people's) fields.
   
   (3) **Total** means over-all in object, subject, and method.
   
   (4) **Militant force** means all national forces that can be directly utilized in the interests of defense.
   
   (5) **Counteroffensive** means counterattack which is not restricted to the State Territory itself.

3. Descriptive Characteristics

   (1) **Uninterrupted resistance.**
   
   (2) Carried out by large and small units acting separately and with flexibility.
(3) Under constant guidance (leadership).
(4) Strategy is to be centralized, but the implementation of operations (campaigns and combat) is to be decentralized.
(5) Time and space are utilized flexibly.
(6) No surrender.
(7) Carried out in three phases:
   a) frontal phase;
   b) containment, challenge, and consolidation phase;
   c) counteroffensive phase.
(8) Leadership in accordance with our national identity.

4. For the successful implementation of territorial warfare, attention must be given to the following:

   (1) Stabilization in the political field.
   (2) Consciousness that the Pantjasila is our only ideology and that it has but one official interpretation.
   (3) A single authoritative leadership which is constantly felt.
   (4) Complete integration of the three services (land, sea, and air) and their utilization in territorial warfare on the basis of the capability of the state.
   (5) Planned over-all development which in turn will maximize the resources for territorial warfare.
   (6) Territorial Management which will permit self-sufficiency in carrying out Territorial Warfare.

5. As long as the Pantjasila remains the only state ideology and our defense policy has the character of
non-aggressive active defense, which can be represented as fighting only when attacked, the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare can be made the defense doctrine of Indonesia both for the present and for the future.

Even though progress in the technological field has reached an optimum level, this doctrine will remain in effect in view of the fact that the waging of war with modern methods and equipment is included in the concept of Territorial Warfare.
II. CONCEPT OF THE PATTERN OF TERRITORIAL OPERATIONS.

TERRITORIAL WARFARE IS OPERATIONALLY MODERN WARFARE

FOREWORD

1. This analysis will focus primarily on the concept and characteristics of modern warfare and the nature, characteristics, and concept of territorial warfare so that it may be ascertained that the pattern of territorial warfare operations can be applied in modern warfare. Thereafter, an examination can be made as to whether there are similarities between territorial warfare and modern warfare. Before analyzing the pattern of territorial warfare operations a review will be made of the factors which influence territorial warfare.

MODERN WARFARE

2. Motive and Origins of War

Viewed from the aspect of the motive and origins of war, the motive for modern warfare is determined by ideology which appears as "truth" or as a challenge of the times. Outwardly this ideology is manifested in the psychological, social-cultural, political, and economic fields.
3. **Elements and Characteristics of Its Implementation**

Among the more obvious elements and characteristics of modern warfare are the following:

a. **Struggle for Power**

International politics, as is the case with all politics, is a struggle for power. Power is always the immediate objective regardless of what the ultimate objective may be. With power comes control over the thinking and actions of others. Since this aspiration for power is the most important element in international politics, international politics and power politics are identical.

b. **Aggressive Ideology**

The 20th century is not only a nuclear century, a century of rapid advancement in technics, technology, and communications, it is also a century in which there exists a tyranny of aggressive ideology. Aggressive ideology considers its state to be only the starting point for the launching of a "universal mission" whose ultimate objective is mastery of the entire world. Where nationalism ordinarily desires one nation for one country, no more and no less, aggressive ideology considers that its nation and its state have the right to force on the entire world their way of life, which they feel is best for all men everywhere. One form of reaction to this has been the emergence of new forces, which form the "newly emerging forces."
c. **New Technics/Technology and Innovations in All Fields**

Technological growth has made possible the mechanization of the methods of warfare together with the mass destruction of the enemy by means of a single strike delivered across long distances. Rapid progress in the field of communications and in the transportation of men and equipment has facilitated the carrying out of operations and has made them less dependent on climate, terrain, and weather. In modern warfare the influence of technology has had the following effects on military operations:

1. Fronts are not rigid in the broad sense of the term;
2. There are no definite boundaries between combat areas and rear areas;
3. Mobility, flexibility, and deployment ability are very great;
4. A system of regional defense (compartment system) has emerged.

Innovations are the result of man's intelligence and can benefit the war effort.

d. **Modern Warfare Is Total In Its Subject, Object, and Method**

1. As a result of the existence of a struggle for power, of aggressive ideology, and of new technics/technology and innovations, a situation has been created wherein the majority of the people have a feeling of total identification in their emotions and convictions with the war being carried out by their state.

2. In war all of the national potential is mobilized.
(3) Everything is staked on the struggle.
(4) The implementation of the principles of warfare is not restricted to the field of military operations; they are also applied in the political, economic, and social-cultural fields.

4. Conclusions

Modern warfare is a form of war with a conspicuously ideological motive which is manifested in the social, psychological, economic and political fields. In its preparation and implementation all potential is utilized in a total fashion, the results of new technics/technology and innovations are employed, and the principles of warfare are applied in all fields in order to achieve victory.

TERRITORIAL WARFARE

5. Territorial warfare is a form of warfare which is total in nature. It utilizes all national forces in a total fashion, but emphasizes militant force. It relies on counteroffensive to secure the termination of warfare in such fashion as to maintain the sovereignty of the state.

6. Nature of This Type of Warfare.
   a. It has an active defensive nature.
   b. It is a war of attrition.

7. Its Characteristics
   a. It is Total War Because:
      (1) Its object, subject, and method are total.
(2) All national potential is utilized in a total fashion.
(3) Resistance is uninterrupted and takes place everywhere.

b. It Is An Ideological War Because:
When Indonesia fights it is because it has been attacked. The defensive war which will be waged by the Indonesian people is also a war in defense of the Pantjasila ideology, which represents the fundamental and spiritual foundations of the Indonesian people. The side which attacks Indonesia will also be attacking the Indonesian people's right to live and to determine their own fate, as a people who constitute a "newly emerging force" and who defend the continuity of their national existence on the basis of the ideas in the Pantjasila.

c. It Is A Just War Because:
As stated above, when Indonesia fights it is because it has been attacked, because the continuity of its national existence as a free nation has been endangered. Such an attack constitutes a threat to the general welfare, to the effort to educate the life of the nation, and to the effort to participate in the establishment of a world order based on independence, lasting peace, and social justice.

d. Technics/Technology and Innovations Are Applied in All Fields
For the Indonesian nation, territorial warfare constitutes a method of defense (warfare) wherein modern equipment is utilized and applied within the limits of existent capabilities and in proportion to the present stage of technological advancement. This may still appear
as "backward" in comparison with other nations which have a higher potential, because the capability of the Indonesian state is limited. We can say that the military equipment for territorial warfare conforms as much as possible with the technological advances and new innovations in all fields.

e. Principles of Warfare

The waging of territorial warfare necessitates the application of the principles of warfare not only in the military field but also with regard to all aspects of the war effort.

8. Conclusions

In view of the similarities in the motives and origin of war, in the elements and characteristics of its implementation, and in the general concepts of modern warfare and territorial warfare, territorial warfare can be classified as modern warfare.

FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE WAGING OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE

9. The International Situation

a. General

The appearance of the "new emerging forces" beside the "old established forces" has been mentioned. Ultimately there is a struggle between them and blocs are formed. The respective sides, both as blocs and individually, have their own strategies for gaining their end objectives, until aggressive ideologies are found. Such a situation influences
Indonesia directly or indirectly and, at a certain stage, constitutes a threat to its continued existence.

b. In Particular

One of the blocs, which is led by a powerful nation, has adopted a "containment strategy" toward another bloc. The other bloc, which is led by another powerful nation, has a strategy directed at the "reliable rear" of the bloc with the "containment strategy." In this conflict of strategies Indonesia's position is constituted as:

1) A broken link in the "containment strategy."

2) A transit area toward the "reliable rear."

c. In view of the fact that no solution will be found to this dispute, and in view of the great material, technological, and military potential which lies behind the blocs, then should the conflict take the form of a decisive physical war, it would wreak widespread destruction on the sides involved and would be disastrous for all of mankind. We can probably predict that this form of war will be avoided as much as possible. Several modifications of the form of physical conflict have appeared. We know these as

(1) the cold war, and

(2) limited wars.

Nations and regions can be involved/thrust into these arenas of conflict because of their location and of the concepts they adhere to.

10. National Situation

a. Indonesia, because of its political concepts and national philosophy, is categorized as a nation which adheres to an active and independent foreign policy and
which, in defending the right to live and the right to raise the level of the development and well-being of the nation, pursues ways and means in the physical, psychological, and ideological fields which further assure its continuation as a free and sovereign nation. One of the results of this is that it is an arena of conflict for the opposing blocs in the world.

b. Following is a resume of these ways and means:

(1) In the physical field:
   Politically: active independence and non-alliance.
   Militarily: active defense and non-aggression.
   Economically: achieving economic well-being in order to create a just and prosperous society.

(2) In the psychological field:
   Defending the national identity.

(3) In the ideological field:
   Adhering to the Pantjasila as the foundation and ideology of the state.

c. We cannot deny that in pursuing these ways and means both internal and external factors are found which impede and obstruct the course followed by the Indonesian people (imperialism, neo-imperialism, compradorism, subversion, and so forth). In addition, there are still found factors which are a legacy of the former colonial policy and which result in variation in the level of national progress.

11. Geographic Situation

a. Indonesia must adhere to the compartment system in its defense policy because of its geography, islands
separated by seas and straits, and because of the capacity of its national potential.

b. Since our transportation capacity is relatively limited, sea and air transportation particularly, and since the communications systems in the various regions do not have the same capacity, especially in the islands outside Java, our mobility will be restricted.

12. Influence of Technology

The influence of technology on the waging of modern warfare constitutes a factor which must receive attention in deciding on the conduct of warfare and the conduct of military operations in territorial warfare.

13. The Potential Enemy

We cannot deny that an enemy capable of attacking Indonesia would have to be a country having a national potential greater than that of Indonesia. Be that as it may, modern warfare makes it possible for such a country to follow various alternatives in using its military forces in Indonesian territory:

a. An all-out, strategic attack on Indonesia calls for the existence of enemy military forces far superior to ours. The possibility exists that the military forces of the enemy can be broken up enroute to Indonesia and that locally their military forces would be relatively smaller than our military forces as a whole.

b. In a limited strategic attack on Indonesia the military forces of the enemy would have, locally:
(1) The same strength as our military forces as a whole.
(2) Less strength than our military forces as a whole.

CONDUCT OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE

14. General Pattern

a. Grand Strategy:
   (1) General Concept
       To utilize and develop political, economic, social, psychological, and military forces, which are closely interrelated during both war and peace, in order to guarantee national security. Grand strategy must be capable of facing all possible situations even though it is directed at achieving long-range and relatively stable objectives, and there must be flexibility in the instruments and methods used to obtain and maintain initiative.
   (2) Specific Concept
       (a) To safeguard our ideology and the social and economic systems which result from this ideology on the basis of the 1945 constitution.
       (b) In its implementation as regards specific circumstances, three situations will obtain:
           (i) Before the war: preparation for physical war including the strengthening of state security against subversion, "twilight war," and so forth.
           (ii) During the war: utilization of all fields of activity as front against the enemy with due regard to specific circumstances.
(iii) After the war: Overcoming the results of the war, which will affect all national forces, in the material and spiritual fields particularly.

b. **Instruments of Warfare**

These include physical and psychological forces in the ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and military fields.

c. **Principles of Warfare**

The universal principles of warfare are valid in territorial warfare. In addition, the following principles apply:

(a) pacification/liberation of the territory;
(b) war of attrition

d. **Economy of Force**

Economy of force is achieved in territorial warfare by placing emphasis upon struggle in a single field, namely, the resistance front. The struggle of the resistance front is supported by other national forces, according to circumstances and as directed by considerations of grand strategy.

e. **Command**

(1) **Before the War**

Command is centralized and well integrated as regards unity of mind, objective, and effort. Though integrated the armed forces perform their work independently.

(2) **During the War**

(a) Command is centralized and unified and controls both military and para-military forces.
(b) Authority is delegated and units act within the framework of a widespread compartment system.

(3) After the War

There is a gradual return from the wartime situation of centralized command and widespread delegation of authority to the pre-war situation, taking specific circumstances into account.

Considering the flexible nature of territorial warfare, authority can be delegated to the lowest (smallest) unit considered to have the necessary capability.

15. **Specific Pattern**

a. We must recognize that the enemy may have the capability to:

(1) Penetrate our territory.
(2) Control and isolate a part of our territory.
(3) Employ a nuclear striking force against certain parts of our territory.

The norms and form (size) of each of these efforts will be affected by the type of attack launched, that is, by whether it is a strategic all-out attack or a limited strategic attack.

After the enemy is in our territory local situations will exist wherein the enemy will have:

(1) Military forces superior to our forces.
(2) Military forces equal to our forces.
(3) Military forces inferior to our forces.

b. We know that Territorial Warfare is carried out in three phases. Phase II (containment, challenge, and consolidation) is particularly important because:
(1) When the enemy's military forces are locally superior to our military forces we may require a rather lengthy Phase II.

(2) When the enemy's military forces are locally equal to our military forces Phase II may be relatively short.

(3) However, when the enemy's military forces are locally inferior to our military forces it may be that we can carry out Phase II in conjunction with Phase I and Phase III.

16. Preparations and Conduct

a. General

In the preparations for and conduct of territorial warfare two fields must be covered:

(1) The para-military field.

(2) The armed forces.

b. The Para-Military Field

Preparations for and conduct of territorial warfare in this field centers on the following matters:

(1) Within the Country

(a) Cultivate loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia and a love for freedom and the fatherland based on the Pantjasila, as a firm foundation for our defense.

(b) Domestic politics must guarantee unification and national unity.

(c) Increase the well-being and happiness of the people so that they are convinced that colonization by any nation would be disastrous for Indonesia.
(d) Improve the capacity and condition of the national economy and direct it at supplying the requirements of the people and military requirements.

(2) Outside the Country

(a) Hold firm to an independent and active foreign policy.

(b) Carry out our foreign policy as strategic security, so that an enemy who attacks Indonesia will be declared an aggressor by other nations while we will be given political and material support and our armed forces will be allowed the use of foreign bases.

(c) When it becomes evident that an enemy exists who may be attacking our country, preparations should be made to undermine the enemy nation politically and economically.

c. The Armed Forces

(1) With due regard to the equilibrium of the national potential, develop our armed forces mentally, physically, and materially so that they are able to withstand/cripple the first strike by the enemy.

(2) Develop the territories while giving attention to the close integration of the armed forces and paramilitary forces in planning, preparations, and implementation. This will provide a capacity for the independent conduct of regional warfare.

(3) Prepare for and carry out the relocation of units and installations in accordance with our concept of defense.

(4) Always maintain an integrated situation in planning and implementation.
(5) Complete integration of the four armed forces (in joint operations and in territorial management).

Note: It is necessary that research and development always be pursued in military and para-military matters.

CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TERRITORIAL WARFARE

17. General Characteristics
   a. Non-rigid front.
   b. No definite boundaries between combat areas and rear areas.
   c. Mobility and dispersion.
   d. Emergence of a system of regional defense.

18. Characteristics of Each Phase
   In line with the considerations outlined in paragraph 15, which deals with the specific pattern of territorial warfare, in discussing the characteristics of each phase of territorial warfare we will assume that a situation exists which is most disadvantageous to us, that is, a situation wherein the enemy's military forces are locally superior to our military forces.
   a. Phase I: Opposing an Enemy Attack
      (1) Objective of Phase I:
         (i) When it has been determined that the enemy has begun to attack we can mount a counterattack.
         (ii) When the enemy succeeds in approaching Indonesian territory in order to attack, measures can be taken to weaken the enemy when he is near Indonesian territory.
(iii) When the enemy succeeds in landing, a tactical counterattack must be launched to cripple or, if possible, to destroy him.

(iv) If the counterattack is unsuccessful, there must be established a flexible system of regional defense in order to trade time and space so as to be able to draw upon utilization of the national potential for the development of a greater military power.

(2) Conduct of Operations

(i) When it is known that a certain country is preparing to attack Indonesia certain measures are to be carried out to cripple the enemy:

- counterattacks by our navy and air force against enemy troop concentrations, embarkation harbors, airfields, and industrial centers;

- destruction of the enemy's fleet by the navy and/or air force;

- raids by the army, navy, and air force, carried out either independently or as joint operations, against enemy installations which have strategic value.

The object of these attacks is to strike the enemy a blow which will force him to halt his attack or, at the least, to reduce the amount of forces involved, also to damage the enemy's preparations and, at the least, force him to postpone the mounting of his attack.

(ii) The enemy must be crippled at sea when he is enroute to Indonesia for the purpose of launching an attack. This must be carried out by the navy with air force support. It is true that not [sic] much fighting
was done at sea by carrier based aircraft during the
Second World War in the Pacific. But in keeping with the
development of sea war, air power constitutes the prime
factor in the capability to destroy enemy forces at sea.
In order to achieve strength in the air the navy must have
aircraft carriers. This will increase the air arm's
mobility and capability to destroy the enemy at sea.

From this point of view, the fact that
Indonesia is made up of thousands of islands is beneficial.
The construction of airfields on islands which control the
enemy's approach routes can make up for the lack of air-
craft carriers. Even so, in naval operations carried out
at a distance from the Indonesian islands there is still
a need for aircraft carriers, as a nucleus of strength
for war at sea.

By constructing airfields on islands which
control approach routes we can conduct continuing attacks
on the enemy. The enemy cannot knock out these airfields
because islands cannot be sunk; however, an aircraft
carrier that does not have a strong "screen" can be
destroyed easily. Our ability to defend these airfields
must be taken into account in planning their construction,
for if they are not well defended and the enemy gains
control of them they will strengthen his position.

In addition to the air power of the navy
and air force, there must be formed a naval striking force
with sufficient strength to destroy an enemy fleet or
prevent it from entering Indonesian waters. This striking
force must be protected with air power.
(iii) In the event the enemy makes a successful landing the military region command (KODAM) concerned must defend its territory and, if it has the capability, launch a counterattack to cripple and destroy the enemy in the area of penetration.

If the military region command does not have the capability to launch a counterattack, and if it is estimated that the balance of our forces outweighs that of the enemy, then the strategic reserve can be mobilized to carry out a strategic counterattack at that time. If the enemy has offensive superiority, then in principle the strategic counterattack is to be carried out in Phase III.

Counterattack will be accompanied by operations aimed at preventing enemy reinforcements from entering Indonesian territory and by the strategic bombing of enemy held areas, which will be aimed at isolating the enemy troops that have already landed.

(iv) When counterattack is not successful, the military regional commands will conduct delaying movements on a regional basis in order to gain the time necessary to make possible the greatest possible build-up of military power. This will have as its source the total capacity of the national potential and will be in anticipation of the transition to Phase II.

(v) During all three phases the State Police will perform the following functions:

v.1. the Mobile Brigade and Pioneers will be joined to the Army;
v.2. the Water Police and the Air Police will be joined to the Navy and Air Force;  
v.3. the State Security Control Service (DFKN) and Mobile Brigade Intelligence (RESMOB) will be joined to the intelligence agencies of the armed services;  
v.4. security and evacuation of the government and of the people and security in rear areas;  
v.5. security of the rear and activation of territorial management.

(vi) A résumé of the activities of the respective armed services, the police, and the people can be examined in the appended chart.

b. Phase II: Containment, Challenge and Consolidation

(1) Objective of Phase II:

The objective of Phase II is to shift the balance of power from the side of the enemy to our own side and to obtain offensive superiority. The moment when we will be able to launch a strategic counterattack (Phase III) will depend on:

(i) The amount of ready military strength which exists at the outbreak of war and the relative proportion between it and the strength of the enemy.

(ii) The ability of the national potential to increase military strength during Phase II and thereafter.

(iii) The result of the activities outlined in paragraph 16, above.

During Phase II we must mobilize the total national potential in order to achieve offensive superiority
as quickly as possible. Conversely, the enemy will attempt to deny us the opportunity to organize ourselves and achieve offensive superiority. Phase II will determine the success of Phase III. Phase II will provide the Indonesian nation with the moral strength and conviction it will need to achieve final victory against the enemy.

(2) Conduct of Operations.

(i) Avoid the destruction of our forces. Our units should not be destroyed by the enemy. Do not maintain a rigid defense and, if necessary, sacrifice space in order to preserve the wholeness of units. If the enemy executes a breakthrough, our troops should not retreat toward the rear but should withdraw toward the flanks. In this way the further the enemy penetrates our territory the more we will surround him. Resistance will be carried out in all territories using offensive and very aggressive tactics. This will be accompanied by total resistance by all the national forces which have been readied and developed in all fields. Thus, even though the enemy is successful in occupying our territory, he will be unable to control everything within it.

(ii) Development of Forces

Operations must be launched using offensive and aggressive tactics. These operations will continuously threaten the positions of the enemy and force him to concentrate his troops in large garrisons, and this will create an area of maneuver for our troops. The existence of an area of maneuver will make it possible for us to position larger troop units and these in turn will threaten the enemy garrisons. Thus, we will force
the enemy to choose between defending his present positions, with the risk that they will be destroyed by us bit by bit, or concentrating his troops in even larger garrisons.

Free areas will be established with the integration of units from the strategic reserve, units of the military region commands, and territorial/partisan units. These free areas will be very important. Preparations can be made there for the formation and organization of larger units, the securing of air force and naval bases, and the manufacture and accumulation of material, equipment, and weapons. They can serve as a base for the preparation and initiation of a counteroffensive. The establishment of these free areas must be planned ahead of time and must take into account the interests of Phase III.

In order to develop this situation infantry units must be organized in Brigades. The Brigades will be constituted as administrative and tactical commands. Mobile Battalions can be positioned in a scattered fashion in the early period of Phase II so as to avoid destruction or difficulties in the area of maneuver. Although they will be given somewhat more liberty and initiative than is customary in conventional warfare, they will not be freed from the control of the Brigade. As our capability develops it would be ideal for the basic tactical and administrative unit to be raised above the brigade level (to Division, Corps, or Army).

In Phase II emphasis is placed upon the development of ground forces.
(iii) Air Force

The role of the air force during Phase II will be limited. Its efforts will be controlled by the air superiority of the enemy. This means that, essentially, the role of the air force as an instrument of offense will have been terminated.

(iv) Navy

Remaining naval personnel will be assigned to trade and fishing fleets. They will defend logistic lines between islands, carry out mine warfare, and serve as frogmen. Remaining ships will continue the struggle and will operate from mobile bases and concealed bases. They will establish blockades, engage in hit and run warfare, and destroy commerce. Other elements will ready themselves in such bases outside the territory as can be used to join the other services in launching a counteroffensive.

(v) State Police

See sub a, (2), (v) above.

(vi) A resume of the activities of the respective armed services, of the police, and of the people can be examined in the appended chart.

c. Phase III: Counteroffensive

1) Objective of Phase III.

The objective of the counteroffensive is to cripple and destroy the enemy and to throw him out of Indonesian territory.

2) Conduct of the Counteroffensive.

Factors which influence the conduct of the counteroffensive are as follows:
(i) Time of Implementation.

The counteroffensive is launched after offensive superiority is gained by our side.

(ii) Superiority of Ground Forces.

In order to throw the enemy out of Indonesia we must possess both superiority and the ability to concentrate forces large enough to force the enemy to end the war.

(iii) Air and Sea Superiority.

If air and/or sea superiority is achieved in Phase III, the launching of a counteroffensive will further ensure the termination of hostilities.

(iv) Total Resistance by the People.

During all phases and even earlier all of the people must be prepared to engage in unremitting resistance against the enemy. The people are the basic capital in the waging of total resistance against the enemy.

The launching of a counteroffensive will be successful only if the mobilization of the total strength of the armed forces is accompanied by total resistance on the part of the people. This resistance must take place both in the areas we control and in the areas occupied by the enemy.

The launching of the counteroffensive must be coordinated centrally. The situation requires very careful coordination and planning and intense preparation. This applies also to the political field, for it may be possible to use bases in friendly nations as areas of consolidation and as bases from which our navy and air force can attack.
(v) State Police.

See sub a (2), (v) above.

(vi) A resume of the activities of the respective armed services, of the police, and of the people can be examined in the appended chart.

Conclusions

19. It can be generally concluded that:

Territorial Warfare using this pattern of territorial operations can be classified as Modern Warfare and follows the pattern of operations of modern warfare.

20. Territorial Warfare can face each threat to the continued existence of the Indonesian nation provided that it is conducted as efficiently as possible, that the preparations made take its characteristics and nature into account, and that the weaknesses of the enemy are used to strengthen our position.

21. The objective of Phase II is to shift the balance of power from the side of the enemy to our own side and to obtain offensive superiority. The moment when we will be able to launch a strategic counterattack (Phase III) will depend on:

(i) The amount of ready military strength and the effective national potential which exists at the outbreak of war and the relative proportion between them and those of the enemy.

(ii) The ability of the national potential to increase military strength during Phase II and thereafter.

(iii) The result of the activities outlined in paragraph 16 above.
During Phase II we must mobilize the total national potential in order to achieve offensive superiority as quickly as possible. Conversely, the enemy will attempt to deny us the opportunity to organize ourselves and to achieve offensive superiority.

22. In conducting Territorial Warfare operations, particularly if it appears that Phase II will be rather lengthy, it will be necessary to explore the possibility of obtaining facilities for the Navy and Air Force so that they can perform their functions during this phase and can engage in the counteroffensive during Phase III. Besides, an answer must also be sought to the problem of mounting a counteroffensive without superiority in the air and/or at sea.
CHART

CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TERRITORIAL WARFARE

Activities During Each Phase

PHASE I

Army

1. Frontal Operations.
   a. Attack.
   b. Defense.
   c. Challenge.
   d. Pursuit.


3. Tactical support to Navy and Air Force.

4. Logistic support.

5. Maintaining security of vital objects.

Navy

1. Strategic naval warfare (mine laying and amphibious, submarine, and anti-submarine warfare):
   a. Against immobile targets in enemy territory.
   b. Against mobile targets heading toward Indonesia.

2. Coastal defense in coordination with Air Force and Army.

3. Tactical support to Army (naval gunfire support).

4. Logistic support.
5. Destruction of commerce.

**Air Force**

1. Strategic air warfare
   a. Bomber offensive
   b. Air bypass operations
   c. Missile containment

2. Air Defense
   a. Warning systems/radar network
   b. Interception
   c. Missiles

3. Tactical support to Army/Navy/joint operations
   a. Close fire support
   b. Interdiction
   c. Bombing support operations
   d. Air bypass operations
   e. Maritime operations

4. Logistics
   a. Supply operations
   b. Administrative operations
   c. Search and rescue

5. Special operations

Note: A. Stress available military strength because of the time factor.

B. Fixed and/or rotary wing aircraft, with or without missiles, will be used for 3, 4, and 5.

C. Special Operations always will be controlled by Headquarters (Central or Regional).

D. Central Headquarters always will control 1 and 2.
Police

1. The Mobile Brigade and Pioneers will be joined to the Army.
2. The Water Police and Air Police will be joined to the Navy and Air Force.
3. The State Security Control Service (DPKN) and Mobile Brigade Intelligence (RESMOB) will be joined to the intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces.
4. [The police will handle] the security and evacuation of the government and people.
5. [The police will handle] the security of rear areas, including the activation of territorial management.

People

1. Active People's Defense
   a. Sabotage
   b. Informants
   c. Infiltration
   d. Messengers
   e. Partisans
2. Civil Defense (not of a specifically military nature)
   a. Air/sea warning
   b. Security
   c. Extinguishing fires
   d. Evacuation
   e. First aid
   f. Public kitchens
   g. Avoiding/reducing dangers resulting from effect of warfare.
3. Increasing our war potential by guaranteeing the maintenance of production.

4. Reducing the enemy's war potential.

5. All organizations and individuals referred to will be placed under the command of the central or regional war administrations and will be integrated into the over-all defense setup.

PHASE II

Army

1. Containment, challenge, and consolidation operations.
   a. Attack.
   b. Defense.
   c. Challenge.
   d. Pursuit.
   e. Formation and organization of larger units.
   f. Manufacture and accumulation of material, equipment, and weapons.
   g. Establishing bases for the preparation and initiation of a counteroffensive.

Navy

1. Remaining naval personnel will be assigned to trade and fishing fleets and will defend logistic lines between islands, carry out mine warfare, and serve as frogmen.

2. Remaining ships will continue the struggle. Operating from mobile bases and concealed bases they will establish blockades, engage in hit and run warfare, and destroy commerce.
3. Other elements will ready themselves to join the other services in launching a counteroffensive in such bases outside the territory as can be used.

**Air Force**

1. Its role will be to provide limited support in the form of short-range liaison in land operations.

2. This support will be limited because the efforts of the Air Force will be controlled by the air superiority of the enemy, which means that, essentially, the role of the Air Force as an instrument of offense will have been terminated.

**Police**

1. The Mobile Brigade and Pioneers will be joined to the Army.

2. The Water Police and Air Police will be joined to the Navy and Air Force.

3. The State Security Control Service and Mobile Brigade Intelligence will be joined to the intelligence agencies of the armed services.

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   PHASE III

   Army

1. Counteroffensive operations

   a. Attack
   b. Defense
   c. Challenge
   d. Pursuit

   Here b, c, and d are mentioned for economization of manpower.
Navy

1. Supports the counteroffensive by landings in accordance with its capability. The capability to launch counteroffensive landings without sea and air capability is to be doubted, in view of technological progress and innovations.

Air Force

The existence of an offensive force in the air is difficult to imagine unless in Phase II there occur situations which make it possible for the Air Force to regain its position as an offensive weapon capable of winning supremacy in the air.

Police

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III. CONCEPT OF THE PATTERN OF TERRITORIAL LOGISTICS

FOREWORD

1. In a very broad sense logistics refers to the process of totally mobilizing national productive sources and the product of other sources of materiel and manpower; it is directed at the achievement of military objectives. Broadly speaking then, the logistics process is the methods used to provide the military equipment utilized in pursuing strategic or tactical objectives. Therefore, the logistics process is made up of activities in the military and economic fields. Logistics is the bridge between the national economy and combat units.¹

There are two types of logistics:

a. Producer logistics, which is connected closely with the national economy and which, basically, is of a civil nature.

b. Consumer logistics, in which needs are determined and distribution accomplished in order to make possible the performance of military assignments; basically, this is of a military nature.

2. a. The following discussion will concentrate on consumer logistics and will deal with logistics as we

¹Admiral H. Eccles, USN, says in his book Logistics and National Defense that: "Logistics is the bridge between the national economy and the combat forces"; "Logistics has its roots in the national economy"; and "The end product of logistics lies in the operation of combat forces."
customarily know it, that is, as "an organized part of military activity in the field of administration":

(1) Planning, acquisition, movement, distribution, storage, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.
(2) Encampment, movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.
(3) Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities.
(4) Acquisition or provision of services.

b. It is evident in examining the phases of Territorial Warfare (see below, Appendix I, paragraph 1, c) that in both Phase I and Phase III the conventional, frontal type of warfare is carried out with normal logistic support. At the present time Phase II would last much longer than either Phase I or Phase III, therefore, this article will deal primarily with the handling of logistics during Phase II.

3. For definitions of:
   a. Territorial warfare
   b. Central leadership

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2This definition is taken from Army Staff and Command School lecture 11.04.01 (Basic Definitions in Military Science) and conforms to the definition used by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff: "In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: (1) design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (2) movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and (4) acquisition or furnishing of services."
c. Territorial Command

d. Military Region Command

e. Military Department Command, and

f. Military District Command

see below Appendix 1, paragraphs 1 and 3-7.

4. Background material on the handling of logistics can be found in:

a. Appendix 2, which deals with logistic problems in territorial war in Yugoslavia.

b. Appendix 3, which deals with logistic problems during Indonesia's war of independence.

**PROBLEM**

5. Recommend a system of logistics which is based, generally, on the capability of the national potential and, specifically, on the capability for self-sufficiency of the respective defense areas in Indonesia and which has the objective of providing the best possible logistic support to military elements during a state of territorial warfare.

**ESTIMATES BEARING ON THE PROBLEM**

6. The only foreign nation which would dare attack Indonesia would be one having superior armed forces, particularly, a superior navy and air force.

7. An estimate as to how operations may be executed can be found in Appendix 1, paragraph 2.
8. Shortly after the beginning of hostilities the enemy will control our air and sea space; even so, our Navy and Air Force will still possess the capability (although a limited one) to provide logistical and tactical support to combat elements on land.

9. The results of the Eight-Year National Development Plan (1961-1969) will increase Indonesia's military potential in the fields of production, industry, warfare, land, sea and air transportation, and communications; even so, within the near future (about 10 years) we still will not be able to produce most types of modern equipment.  

FACTS WHICH INFLUENCE THE PROBLEM

10. Indonesia is a maritime state composed of islands. The seas which separate the islands constitute an obstacle to inter-island transportation.

11. Fields and vegetation (dense jungle) are found on the islands. These obstruct land traffic.

12. The Indonesian climate (humidity, heat, rain) makes it necessary that special measures be taken in storing and maintaining supplies and equipment.

13. Climatic conditions can make the natural obstacles to land transportation even worse (floods, mud) and can cause a reduction in the production of basic foods.

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For a picture of the programmed results of the Development Plan see Appendix 4, Attachment A.
14. The threat posed by infectious and tropical diseases, although reduced, still requires special attention.

15. The regions differ in their capability for self-sufficiency in food production. Rice and other foods are still imported, and several regions rely on other regions for their supply of basic foods.⁴

16. Such vital and strategic materials as oil, coal, tin, rubber, and bauxite are not produced by all regions.

17. Almost all of the defense equipment held by the armed forces at the present time has been imported.

18. Difficulty will be experienced in obtaining manpower for the exploitation of raw materials and for utilization within the framework of logistic support because the population is not distributed uniformly and differs in its development and education.

19. The condition of land, sea, and air transportation is such that it cannot yet meet the need of transporting commodities from surplus to minus areas.

CONDITIONS REQUIRED OF A LOGISTICS SYSTEM
IN TERRITORIAL WARFARE

20. General Conditions

To be good a logistics system must guarantee that adequate amounts of materiel are distributed at the right

⁴See Appendix 4, Attachment B for the inter-dependency of regions.
time and place and in desirable condition to units in combat areas.

A logistics system must:

a. Supply military needs
b. Be efficient
c. Be flexible and simple to ensure mobility.
d. Installations must be located so as to be easily defended.


a. Self-sufficiency

(1) Self-sufficiency is one of the logistical bases of Territorial Warfare and must be established down to the lowest possible level. Planning and efforts to increase self-sufficiency must be undertaken at the level of the Central Leadership, this by:

(a) Establishing a storage policy before the outbreak of war.

(b) Substituting domestically produced goods for imported goods.

(c) Using damaged equipment which has been rebuilt.

(d) Aligning civil and military requirements with one another.

(e) Distributing the instruments of production.

(2) Measures similar to the following should be carried out in the regions during wartime:

See Appendix 4, Attachment A, paragraph 5.
(a) Utilization of local sources as the primary sources of supply; this will also result in savings in time and transportation equipment. Supplies and equipment can be obtained through purchases, requisition, taxes in natural produce, contributions from the people, and confiscation. There must be a maximum utilization of local sources; however, the people should under no circumstances be overburdened. Decisions on the allotment of the type and amount of commodities needed for the war and to meet the requirements of the civilian community must be established for each territory.

(b) A second basic source of supply are the goods taken from the enemy. In order to guarantee that the maximum use is made of these goods, clear and detailed instructions must be given to each commanding officer and unit. (See also Appendix 6.)

(c) Utilization of salvaged materiel.

(d) The repair of materiel in repair shops and its redistribution in the supply system.

(e) Increased production of supplies, a very important command function.

(3) Adequate stockpiling of goods unavailable in one region but obtainable in another region should be commenced before the outbreak of war. Such stockpiling should be coordinated and supervised by the Central Leadership.

(4) Implementation of the principle of territorial self-sufficiency and of the effort to remain independent of other regions or countries does not mean that the effort
to obtain supplies from outside a region or to take the enemy's supplies can be neglected. These efforts must be carried out.

The Navy and Air Force can help transport supplies both from the harbors and bases they retain control of within the country and from foreign bases. They will do everything which is within the limit of their capability and which is within the limits set by our active and independent foreign policy. In order to guarantee efficiency and integration (inter-service and civilian-military), the acquisition of supplies from foreign countries, which is done by a State Purchasing Center in peacetime, can be done by the Military Region Commands during a state of war and when communications have been interrupted, on the basis of instructions provided by the central leadership.

b. Great Mobility is Required in Territorial Warfare

As a result of tactical concepts and to permit a flexible utilization of special circumstances it is necessary that:

1. Each combat unit carry only the supplies it needs and no more. Resupply can be accomplished at supply points.

2. Logistic installations (supply points and depots) be widely disseminated and located in accordance with operational plans.

3. In Territorial Warfare military regions cannot be definitely divided into combat, communication, and interior areas. A communication area can become a combat area at any time, and vice-versa. The situation requires a simple and flexible logistics system.
(4) In keeping with the type of terrain, the most effective use be made of all transportation equipment, from the most modern to the primitive.

(5) Mobile logistic units be organized and utilized as "underway replenishment groups."

c. Great Fire Power Is Required in Territorial Warfare

Liddel Hart's statement that strength in fire power and mobility is better than superiority in numbers is applicable also to Territorial Warfare in Indonesia, where the use of units as large as a Brigade (Regimental Combat Team) is under consideration.

In order to increase fire power the following efforts are required in the field of logistics:

(1) Standardization and normalization of weapons both in the respective services and between the services, particularly the caliber of weapons.

(2) Installation of the equipment needed to produce weapons and ammunition in at least one place in each of the large islands.

(3) A decision on an adequate basic load.

d. The Planning of Territorial Warfare Operations Is Centralized But Their Implementation is Decentralized

The same principle must be followed in logistics.

This requires:

(1) A widespread and substantial intercommunications network. Particular attention must be given to the effort to maintain the continuity of inter-island communications. Also, if transportation can no longer be carried out with large ships, then an effort must be made
to change the seas from an obstacle into a means of unification through the use of improvised sea-going transport vessels (small trading fleets, fishing fleets).

(2) Widespread and flexible communications and the utilization of all types of communication equipment, both modern and improvised.

e. **Territorial Warfare Is Total Warfare By The People**

Defense by the People gives to the People increased rights and responsibilities in the effort to defend the country under the leadership of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the leadership of the Armed Forces must ensure that the potential of the People and the sources of other potential are maintained, thus permitting their maximum utilization in the defense of Indonesia, a defense which applies the concept of Territorial Warfare and which is based on the strength of the masses of the People.

In the field of logistics this means:

(1) That the mobilization of local sources must not greatly increase the burdens of the People. No distinction can be made between the People and the members of the Armed Forces in guaranteeing food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. This is necessary to prevent tension and division between the Armed Forces and the People. Close unity with the People must be maintained firmly.

(2) That the Armed Forces must not be constituted as the consumer and the People as the producer. The Armed Forces must participate in the process of production, but must do so without acting to the detriment of their basic assignments.
(3) That local manpower can be used as a labor force in logistic activities. A problem here is the unequal distribution of the population and the lack of skilled manpower. 6

(4) That in the effort to supply war needs the quotas assigned to the Armed Forces and to the masses of the People must be well balanced. All planning and implementation must be integrated.

f. Territorial Warfare Is Protracted Warfare.

Because Territorial Warfare is protracted, certain essential conditions must be met in the field of logistics. These include the following:

(1) Light weapons are required (small arms and explosives).

(2) Shrewd improvisation in the use of materiel, equipment, personnel, and methods.

(3) Generally speaking, equipment is required which is durable, of high quality, and simple in construction.

6 The unequal distribution of the population in 1959 can be seen in the following table (source: 1960 Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% of total area</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borneo</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebes</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moluccas and West Irian*</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser Sunas</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not including Dutch-occupied West Irian.
(4) Good and continuing maintenance (see also paragraph 26 below).

(5) Logistic installations must be capable of being converted, dismounted, and re-erected whenever necessary.

GUIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

22. Supply, evacuation, medical care, transportation, maintenance, and other operations are all logistic operations. Generally speaking, the universal principles of logistics are applied also in Territorial Warfare because it is a form of modern warfare and employs large and small units, and the equipment and methods of modern warfare. The differences in emphasis which do exist are the result of the special conditions and characteristics of Territorial Warfare, as analyzed in paragraph 21 above.

23. Supply Logistics

The basic factors in supply logistics are determination of need, acquisition, storage, and distribution.

a. Determination of Need

Each Military Region Command (KODAM), giving consideration to the region's capability in the areas of self-sufficiency and self-support and basing itself on the instructions of the Central Leadership, determines its supply need for goods that can be obtained in the region. For goods that cannot be obtained within the region and for various types of critical items, determination of need is made by the Central Leadership acting on the recommendations of the Military Region Command.
In determining need attention must be given to special requirements for transport equipment, communications equipment, small arms, explosives, and adequate supplies of ammunition. Control over the levels of supply as earlier established will be continued in the best way possible. A review of replacement factors and use quotas will be made at definite intervals.

b. Acquisition

Supplies which can be procured within a region will be acquired by Military District Commands (KODIMs). The acquisition of supplies which cannot be procured within the region will be handled by the Central Leadership or substitutions will be made. Central leadership will issue special instructions for the procurement of critical items, enabling them to be sent from other regions. It is anticipated that no significant difficulties will be encountered in acquiring food supplies; as regards other items, priorities must be assigned and economization and improvisation practiced.

c. Storage

(1) A general depot system is better than a branch depot system in Territorial Warfare.

(2) Each Military Region Command and Military District Command should have an adequate stockpile of reserve supplies. Each military region command must have a stockpile of critical supplies.

(3) In addition to the maintenance of adequate stockpiles, supply economy must be strictly supervised.

(4) Considering the number and widespread location of depots, supervision of supplies is very important.
(5) See paragraph 29, sub f on the management of depots.

d. Distribution

(1) The distribution factor is very important, particularly in view of the fact that our country is made up of islands, that the sources of materiel and personnel are not uniformly distributed, that there is a shortage of transportation equipment, and that natural obstacles exist. The situation will become more difficult if the enemy is successful in isolating area after area (island after island). In facing this it will be necessary to improvise transportation equipment, emphasize local procurement, maintain stockpiles, and widely distribute storage areas.

(2) Depending upon the situation, unit distribution as well as supply point distribution can be carried out.

(3) See also paragraph 29, sub f and sub g.

e. Requisitioning and Channeling Procedure

(1) The smallest administrative unit is the Battalion.

(2) Requisitions will be submitted by Battalion to Brigade and forwarded to the Military District Command (KODIM); the Military Region Command (KODAM), that is, its Administration Support Center (PUBAD), will be advised. It is desirable that this procedure be followed whenever possible.

(3) In a situation wherein the above procedure cannot be followed, the Battalion may submit requisitions
directly to the Military District Command in which it is located, advising the Brigade of the requisition.

(4) In order to facilitate the provision of supplies in an emergency, the Military Region Command, that is, its Administration Support Center, will always advise the Military District Commands of units which are or will be in their areas.

(5) If mobile logistic units are established (under the control of the Military District Command), the Brigade (or the Battalion in an emergency) will submit its requisitions to the Military District Command through these units.

24. Evacuation and Medical Care Logistics

a. Considering the fact that troops will be billeted among the people, more attention must be given to preventive hygiene; also more attention must be given to familiarizing the people with hygiene and the prevention of infectious disease.

b. Since Territorial Warfare is total in nature, the medical units of the Armed Forces and the Office of People's Health will be required to assist one another. Also, reciprocal use must be made of medical installations (hospitals, polyclinics). Priorities must be established in this matter.

c. The use of medicinal herbs in place of modern drugs must also be given attention, whenever improvisation is necessary.

d. Equipment capable of speedy movement will be used for evacuation, but if necessary all types of equipment
will be used (litters, ambulances). Air transportation, if it is still available, will be very useful.

e. The shortage of medical personnel, facilities, and drugs will require the establishment of evacuation priorities and rapidity of movement.\(^7\)

f. Since Territorial Warfare is total and modern in nature, consideration must be given to the possibility that the enemy will employ instruments of mass destruction and nuclear weapons. If this occurs, special measures will be required in the medical field.

25. **Transportation Logistics**

a. As long as modern transportation equipment is used for land, sea, and air transportation, shortages can be minimized by requisitioning civilian-owned equipment. Shortages can also be minimized by emphasizing transportation economy, that is, by determining needs carefully, by analyzing transportation capability, and by establishing priorities.\(^8\)

b. To supplement or replace modern transportation equipment when this equipment can no longer be used, attention must be given to the use of proas and small trading vessels, with or without motors, along coasts and rivers.

\(^7\)See also Appendix 4, Attachment A, paragraph 3.

\(^8\)See also Appendix 4, Attachment A, paragraph 9.
c. All types of transportation must be utilized: men, animals, and so forth.

26. Maintenance Logistics
   
a. Maintenance logistics will be facilitated and simplified if equipment and parts are standardized. Our active and independent foreign policy sometimes places limitations on the effort to standardize. Technicians are required to ensure good maintenance.

   b. Maintenance logistics is very important because it is a source of supply. Principles of maintenance which must be given attention in order to increase defense power during a protracted war are as follows:
      
      (1) Emphasis on organic maintenance
      (2) Intensification of preventive maintenance
      (3) Inspection
      (4) Supply economy
      (5) Improvisation

   c. Shortage of materiel must be compensated for by developing superior techniques for its utilization and cultivating a feeling of appreciation for equipment (particularly weapons) and an awareness of the importance of this equipment in warfare. Broad and intensive training must be given logistics personnel.

   d. Considering the mobile nature of Territorial Warfare operations and the fact that maintenance must be carried out as near to the front as possible, then it is necessary that mobile workshops be built.
27. Leadership and Other Matters
   a. Leadership

   Considering the abundance of requirements and the limits of our capability, and also the fact that the utmost fusion/mingling of military and public factors occurs in logistics, the existence of leadership which is capable of activating as effectively as possible the existent sources of manpower and materiel for warfare is an absolute necessity. In this connection, it is necessary to effect the control of industries which process strategic and vital materials either by nationalizing them or by placing them under state supervision. In view of our financial, economic and industrial capacity, it is necessary to ensure that the logistic activities of the Armed Forces are integrated so that there will be no unnecessary competition between the services in the acquisition of goods and services.

   b. Decisions must be made establishing items common to the several services, for example, ammunition, weapons, clothing, and so forth. In this way there will be uniformity, standardization, and normalization. Research and development must be carried out continuously in the field of logistics.

   c. In establishing the borders of Military Regions attention must be given to:

      (1) Vital and strategic objects which may become targets for the enemy.
      (2) Possible enemy approach routes.
      (3) The capabilities and limitations of the region in the production of goods and supplies, as compared
with that of other regions, in order to plan the effective channeling of goods and supplies from surplus to minus regions.

(4) The boundaries of administrative regions, in this case the First-Level Regions [provinces]. Although the bases for administrative division [of the state by the civil government] and regional division in the interests of defense [by the military] are not the same, it would be ideal if both divisions followed the same boundaries. Close cooperation between the commanders of Military Regions and the governors/chiefs of First-Level Regions must be initiated in peacetime.

The following advantages would be provided if civil and military regions shared the same boundaries:

(a) It would facilitate the implementation by both groups of the authority contained in the law concerning the state of danger, particularly in the matter of mobilizing sources of manpower and materiel.

(b) The autonomous nature of the [civil] region corresponds to the self-sufficient nature of the [military] region, a basis for the implementation of Territorial Warfare.

(c) Integration and adaptation in planning and building the war potential of the region would be better guaranteed.

(d) The same principles should be applied in deciding on the regional boundaries of military districts and second-level regions.

(e) The security of logistic installations and lines of communication and damage control must be
given full attention. Responsibility for this lies with the commander of the military district.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE LOGISTICS SYSTEM**

28. Division of Responsibility

a. Central Leadership

The Central Leadership plans, influences, and supervises economic livelihood during wartime. This includes:

1. Relieving economic bottlenecks, heightening work enthusiasm, and employing more intensively all means and factors of production. All of this is done to increase national production, a part of which must be used for national defense.

2. Deciding on the composition of national production, which must meet the needs of mobilization for war. Decisions must be made on the types and amounts of goods which must be produced by each region from existent sources.

3. Allocating production factors and other needed commodities to various branches of production in the regions, in order to guarantee the implementation of the foregoing.

4. Deciding on the most efficient methods of production.

5. Deciding on the distribution of nationally produced goods to regions requiring them, also, deciding on the dimensions of the requirements of the military and the civilian population.
b. **Territorial Command**

In the field of logistics the Territorial Command is responsible for the economic livelihood of the area it supervises. It is also responsible for handling the logistics of the units of the armed forces under its control in such a way that they can move with facility. The Territorial Command can transfer supervisory responsibility over the implementation of the plans of the Central Leadership, particularly in the matter of coordinating the channeling of war materiel between the regions in its area of authority.

c. **Military Region Command (KODAM)**

The Military Region Command:

1. Carries out everything decided on by the Central Leadership, on the basis of the plans and instructions of the Central Leadership.

2. Carries out the planning and implementation of the matters set forth in paragraph 28, sub a, above, for its respective Military District Commands as long as decisions on these matters are not made by the Central Leadership.

3. Provides information to the Central Leadership on the state of production and on the supply of commodities in the region, thus to facilitate the planning of production and allocation.

4. Is responsible for the logistic support of all units and defense organizations in its region.

5. Bears full responsibility for the launching of a wartime economy and for the proportional allocation to military and civilian needs in its region.
(6) Maintains supply depots and maintenance zones in the various Military Region Command Maintenance Areas (see also paragraph 29, sub d).

(7) Responsibility for the implementation of logistics is held by the Deputy Military Region Commander for administrative support, who heads an Administration Support Center (see also paragraph 29).

d. **Military Department Command (KOREM)**

The Military Department Command:

(1) Holds the same responsibility as the Military District Command; this command controls the several Military District Commands within its sphere.

(2) See also sub e below.

e. **Military District Command (KODIM)**

The Military District Command:

(1) As the basic organization and the military region command's executing organization for management, territorial control, and people's resistance, carries out the plans established by the Military Region Command.

(2) Maintains depots and maintenance facilities in the various Military District Command Maintenance Areas (see also paragraph 29, sub e).

(3) In wartime each Military District Command will be supported by an Administration Team (see also paragraph 29, sub c).

f. **Units**

The Battalion (and units at the same level) is the lowest administrative unit. Above the Battalion is the Brigade (administrative and tactical), the Division (tactical), and the Corps (tactical).
29. **Logistic Installations and Bodies**

a. **The Military Region Command (KODAM) as the Base of the Logistics System**

Considering that Territorial Warfare operations are decentralized and that the Military Region Command has been selected as the lowest-level strategic region, one which must be as self-sufficient as possible, then it is fitting that the Military Region Command be established as the base for the organization of a logistics system in Territorial Warfare.

b. **Administration Support Center**

The implementation of wartime logistics, which is based on the self-sufficiency of the Military Region Commands constitutes a responsibility of the military region command which is not a light one. One Military Region Command should be able to provide others with various commodities. The extensive mobility and area of movement of combat troops create a need for transportation. There is a wide dissemination of large numbers of logistic installations. Lines of communication are widespread, besides other limitations and deficiencies. To handle all of these matters, an Administration Support Center (PUBAD) has been established in each Military Region Command. The Administration Support Center is headed by a Deputy Military Region Commander for Administrative Support. He is responsible to the commander of the Military Region for all administrative activities (logistics and personnel) in the Military Region Command.

The advantages of this single-manager system are as follows:
(1) It reduces the span of control of the commander of the military region, enabling him to concentrate his attention on other matters.

(2) It guarantees the integration of logistic activities.

(3) It permits a more effective utilization of personnel (cross-utilization).

(4) It facilitates the achievement of uniformity in logistic procedures.

c. Administration Teams

During wartime each military district command (KODIM) will be supported by an Administration Team (TIMAD). The administration team will be responsible to the commander of the Military District in matters concerning logistics and personnel. The administration team will carry out its assignment on the basis of instructions received from the administration support center or in the name of the commander of the military region. This article deals only with the [activities of the team in the] field of logistics.

d. Military Region Command Maintenance Area

Military Region Command supply depots and maintenance zones will be established in areas that can be easily defended and are relatively secure. These Military Region Command Maintenance Areas (RAHARDAM) will contain:

(1) Depots (reserve, key, and distribution depots)

(2) Maintenance facilities (4th and 5th level)

(3) Hospitals

(4) Rest areas.
These installations will be semi-mobile and will be widely dispersed.

e. Military District Command Maintenance Area

Each military district command will establish several Military District Command Maintenance Areas (RAHHARDIM). These areas will maintain:

(1) Depots (reserve and distribution depots)
(2) Maintenance facilities (3rd level)
(3) Emergency hospitals.

These Military District Command maintenance areas need not be established if the threat of enemy attack or disadvantageous terrain conditions exist. These installations must be mobile.

f. Depots

The general depot system will be used although branch depots may be used in certain situations. The general depot system controls three types of depots:

(1) Central depots controlled by the Central Leadership and generally used for the storage of materiel whose manufacture is centrally controlled (ammunition, weapons, and so forth).

(2) Military Region Command depots. Depending upon their function, Military Region Command depots can be constituted as reserve depots, which stockpile the needs of the entire command, or as distribution depots, which provide a supply of critical items to Brigades, to Military District Command depots, or to such other units as the Deputy Regional Commander for Administrative Support may designate.
(3) Military District Command depots. Reserve depots stockpile the needs of the district command. Distribution depots allocate operational supplies within the command to organic defense units/organizations, to units assigned to the Military District Command, or to such other units as the Deputy Regional Commander for Administrative Support may designate. Generally speaking, reserve depots and key depots are located in maintenance areas and distribution depots are established in accordance with operational plans.

g. Supply Points

Brigades and Battalions maintain supply points for their subordinate units. Although these supply points are supplied by the depots of the Military District Command, this cannot be allowed to reduce the effort to obtain supplies locally.

h. Maintenance/Medical Elements in Units

Units operating independently or in conjunction with larger units maintain adequate logistic elements. Basing on the instructions of the Deputy Region Commander for Administrative Support, they limit the amount of supplies they carry to the essential amount.

CONCLUSIONS

30. The objective of logistical support in Territorial Warfare is the creation of conditions which will permit all phases of Territorial Warfare to be carried out and the achievement of final victory.
31. The system of logistics carried out in Territorial Warfare, in addition to taking into account the universal principles of logistics, is influenced by the characteristics and conditions of Territorial Warfare, namely:
   a. It must make possible maximum self-sufficiency -- this is the key to the success of logistical support.
   b. It must make extensive mobility possible.
   c. It must make abundant fire power possible.
   d. It must give attention to the communications system.
   e. It must adapt to the total nature of people's war.
   f. It must make the implementation of a protracted war possible.

32. Efforts to increase the self-sufficiency of regions will be carried out by both the Central Leadership and the regions. These efforts will include the dispersal of industry and the population, stockpiling, substitution of commodities, supply economy, correlation of civil and military requirements, renovation of materiel, and so forth. Self-sufficiency on the part of regions does not mean that efforts to expand logistical potential through foreign assistance will be terminated.

33. Close cooperation, initiated in peacetime, between the civil governments and military commands of regions will make possible the coordination of plans for regional development and plans for the mobilization of war potential.

34. The establishment of allocations to meet the needs of the civilian community will constitute an important factor in the implementation of People's Defense.
35. The Armed Forces must participate in the production process.

36. Important sources of supply are:
   a. Local sources
   b. Confiscated supplies
   c. Utilization of salvaged materiel
   d. Renovation of damaged materiel.

   When commodities cannot be obtained from these sources an effort must be made to obtain them from other sources (from outside the region).

37. Improvisation in the utilization of materiel, personnel, and methods must be encouraged, as must the effort to use modern equipment as long and as much as possible.

38. Capable leadership is an absolute necessity in overcoming/reducing logistical difficulties and limitations in Territorial Warfare and in effecting the existence of:
   a. Integration of the logistic activities of the Armed Forces.
   b. Territorial management within the framework of logistics.
   c. Maximum normalization and standardization of military equipment and materiel.
   d. Uniformity in logistical procedures.

39. In Territorial Warfare the logistics system is based on area logistics, which, in turn, is based on the land and the population of the area. The Military Region Command is the smallest area which must have the capacity to stand alone.
40. The commander of the Military Region Command, in assuming responsibility for logistics during wartime, is assisted by a Deputy Region Commander for Administrative Support, who is charged with the handling of logistical matters in the Military Region Command.

41. An administration team is assigned to each Military District Command. The team assists and is responsible to the commander of the military district for logistical matters in the Military District Command.

42. Each Military Region Command maintains several Military Region Command Maintenance areas. Each Military District Command maintains several military district command maintenance areas.

43. Depots and other logistic installations will be established throughout each region to reduce anxiety and to enhance the mobility of combat units.

44. Within the logistical framework of Territorial Warfare, a general depot system is most correct.

45. The Military District Command is responsible for the security of logistic installations and damage control.

REFERENCES:

-- Orientation Manual 100-10
-- SESKOAD notes concerning Defense Problems
-- KARYA WIRA JATI No. 1-3
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-- Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1961
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APPENDIX 1

DEFINITION OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE, ESTIMATED COURSE
OF OPERATIONS, AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. Territorial Warfare
   a. Territorial Warfare is a form of warfare which is
total in nature, which utilizes all national forces in a
total fashion, but emphasizes military force as an element
of these forces, so that through a general counteroffensive
there may be assured a termination of warfare; Territorial
Warfare has as its objective the defense of the sovereignty
of the state and of the living values of the social insti-
tutions of the Indonesian nation, which are based on the
Pantjasila.

   b. [The implementation of] this form of Territorial
Warfare means that:

      (1) Frontal warfare can be carried out because
military force is emphasized as an element of national
forces.

      (2) Guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare can be
carried out because this form of warfare is total in
nature and utilizes all national forces in a total fashion
while emphasizing military force as an element of these
forces.

      (3) The possibility of unconditional surrender
to the aggressor is precluded because this form of warfare
is total in nature.

      (4) A deterrent capability is provided to us in
facing an enemy whose equipment is superior to ours.
c. The war will pass through the following phases:

(1) Destruction of and/or defense against attacks launched by the enemy from the sea and air by means of interception and interdiction (by the Air Force), opposition to naval landings (by the Navy and Army), and delaying actions (by the Army). Land operations will be strategically and tactically defensive in nature and frontal combat will be carried out.

(2) The objective of the following phase will be to contain and challenge the enemy and to consolidate our forces. The war will be strategically defensive and tactically offensive in nature. This phase can continue for a long time, depending on the situation of the enemy and on our own situation. If this phase is successful we will move on to the final phase, a counteroffensive. If it is not successful, then this strategically defensive and tactically offensive war will become a war of attrition. Ultimately we will be victorious, however it will take a long time and there will be much suffering and great sacrifice (a "protracted war").

(3) If consolidation is successfully accomplished, a counteroffensive can be launched and the war will become strategically and tactically offensive in nature. If this is successful, our victory will be assured.

2. **Estimated Course of Operations**

a. Considering that the most important lines of communication and strategic materials are located in the western part of Indonesia (Sumatra, Java, Borneo), the eastern part of Indonesia is secondary in significance.
b. The main operation will be launched against the western part of Indonesia and will have as its objective:
   (1) Occupation of areas containing natural resources in an undamaged condition (targets: Medan, Pakanbaru, Palembang).
   (2) Occupation of a politically important area (Java), (targets: Djakarta, Bandung, Surabaja).
   (3) In carrying out the above movements a simultaneous effort will be made to:
       (a) Gain control of lines of communication.
       (b) Occupy/cripple military bases.
   (4) Possible approach routes:
       (a) South China Sea, Karimata Strait
       (b) Strait of Malacca
       (c) Tjilatjap, Sunda Strait
       (d) Lombok Strait

c. The operation against the eastern part of Indonesia will be a support operation and will be aimed at occupying/crippling military bases.
   Targets:
   (1) Tarakan area, Balikpapan, Makasar, Kupang, Menado, Morotai, Ambon.
   (2) Lombok Strait, Arafura Sea.

d. See also Attachment A to this Appendix.

3. Central Leadership

Central Leadership is the leadership which holds supreme authority in the government during peacetime and wartime. This term is used in view of the fact that as yet no regulations exist which clearly establish the structure of the central agencies which are responsible for leadership during wartime.
4. **Territorial Command**

A Territorial Command is a command established to control the total warfare carried out by several Military Region Commands. It is a strategic unit. In Indonesia there are three Territorial Commands, the Western, Central and Eastern (see also attachment A to this Appendix).

5. **Military Region Command (KODAM)**

A Military Region Command is that part of the territory of Indonesia which is the smallest strategic region capable of acting independently in carrying out military actions. The Commander of the Military Region (DANDAM) is in charge of all land, sea, and air units operating in his region, unless a decision to the contrary is made by a Higher Authority. Depending upon the relative importance of the assignments of the services (land/sea/air) in waging Territorial Warfare in the region, the commander of the military region may be an officer of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. Representatives of the services engaged in operations in the region sit on the staff of the Military Region Command.

6. **Military District Command (KODIM)**

As a subdivision of the Military Region Command, the Military District Command is constituted as the basic territorial organization for implementing matters pertaining to territorial management, territorial control, and people's resistance. What has been said above about the functions of the commander and staff of the Military Region Command can also be applied to the Military District Command and its staff.
7. **Military Department Command (KOREM)**

If necessary, a Military Department Command may be established between a Military Region Command and a Military District Command. For example, a Military Department Command might be established if the situation in the region was critical, if the region was large, and/or if there were communication difficulties. The above description of the functions of the Military Region Command and its staff can also be applied to the Military Department Command.
APPENDIX I
Attachment A

DIVISION OF INDONESIA INTO THREE TERRITORIAL COMMANDS

1. The Western Territory faces a greater possibility of attack than the Eastern Territory.

2. Each approach route should be guarded by a strategical entity (in which) political, economic, and military (factors are coordinated).

3. Regions are strategic; however, the scarcity of population must be taken into account.

4. Compare the division of Indonesia into three territories, as depicted above, with Appendix 4, attachment B (the interdependency of regions as indicated by inter-island commerce).

(Material from: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Development of the Armed Forces)
APPENDIX 2

THE PROBLEM OF LOGISTICS IN YUGOSLAV TERRITORIAL WARFARE

The conclusion can be drawn from various basic analyses prepared by Lt. Gen. Dushan Kveder, assistant chief of staff of the Yugoslav army and a person who gained experience in the war of liberation against the Germans, a war he calls a Territorial War, that in facing the attacks of the German army the Yugoslav Armed Forces never prepared themselves to carry out the Territorial Warfare they did carry out.

Even so, because of their high nationalist sentiments and love for freedom and liberty the Yugoslav people formed, on an entirely new basis, a New Liberation Army to carry out Territorial Warfare against the occupation forces. In the beginning they had only the small amounts of weapons and ammunition which had been hidden by their organization and by individuals acting on their own initiative when their Armed Forces were broken up. However, this was enough to begin operations with and proved to be of great value.

The arms and ammunition held by a regular army at the time of transition from frontal warfare to Territorial Warfare are adequate for the initial period. If Territorial Warfare is planned out ahead of time there will be an opportunity to prepare reserve materiel and store it in concealed places for a war lasting months or even years.
In Yugoslavia they built a 300,000 man army before they received one gun or one bullet from abroad. They armed themselves (their army) with weapons taken from the enemy. Only in the following phase of their war did they begin to receive assistance from abroad, and even this was not enough to meet their needs. The materiel taken in the war was their primary source of materiel until the end of the war.

Dependence on foreign sources is wrong because the amounts received will be inadequate. The main allies will have problems in supplying their own armies and they will figure that in carrying out a widespread war the number of men under arms will increase. Also, there will be a shortage of transport aircraft and airmen and the disruption wrought by enemy air attacks will be felt. The liberation movement in a future war should be prepared in such a way that it will depend on domestic sources, to as large an extent as possible.

If the war lasts for a long time it will be necessary to rearm the combat troops. If there is a shortage of ammunition for weapons with different calibers, resistance troops will be forced to use the weapons and calibers of the enemy. Weapons will be standardized in a new way, in accordance with the calibers used by the enemy. This is impossible in frontal warfare but is quite common in Territorial Warfare.

At the end of its war of liberation Yugoslavia had an army of about 53 divisions with a strength of 800,000 men and, indirectly, relied on some 10 million people. This capacity for sacrifice should be appreciated.
APPENDIX 3

THE PROBLEM OF LOGISTICS IN THE INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Unlike the people of Yugoslavia, who had a free nation and armed forces before launching their Territorial War, the people of Indonesia began their war of independence (which was essentially similar to the Territorial War of Yugoslavia) at the end of an era of colonization by the Dutch and Japanese. Compelled by a desire to respond to the call of the people's suffering, all strata of Indonesian society plunged into the task of defending the proclamation of 17 August 1945. Having as their only capital a united will to free themselves from colonialism, they created an Army which was to face all the challenges presented by the attempt to restore colonialism.

From the experience gained in the War of Independence, which lasted from 1945 until 1949, we can note the following basic facts concerning logistics:

(1) We began the war of independence without proper preparation, and it can be said that we had only bamboo spears as equipment.

(2) The early stages of the development of our Armed Forces were carried out on the basis of individual initiative.

(3) The supplies needed to continue the war were obtained, for the most part, from the stores of the people and from the enemy through the initiative of individuals
and of small units. Little was done in the way of maintaining organized and widespread supply channels.

(4) A capability to mount large-scale operations did not exist. At the end of the war we had an average of only a few cartridges for each firearm we possessed, and we needed to replace most of these weapons.

(5) Generally speaking, there was no standardization of equipment, even at the company level.

(6) We had no meaningful amount of supplies of any type.

(7) The people directly supplied the armies, which were scattered in small units.

(8) The Navy and Air Force had no ships or aircraft.

(9) It can be said that motor transport was not on our list of requirements. All movements were made on foot and transportation was accomplished with manpower.

(10) Communications, which were only general and for tactical needs, were established with messengers.

(11) It was customary for small units (about company size) not to expect logistical support from higher units; rather, higher units received logistical support from lower units. Financial support was received from higher units, but it was far from enough to meet requirements.

(12) Generally speaking, maintenance was unknown.

In spite of this, and thanks to their nationalist sentiments and love for freedom, all were united under one Armed Forces Command under the flag of the Republic of Indonesia. At the end of the War of Independence some 500,000 persons were members of the armed forces, not including those who were concerned
essentially with defense assignments, who were not
registered as members of the Armed Forces because of the
difficulty in distinguishing between militarily active
and non-active persons.
APPENDIX 4

[This page consisted of eight footnotes which -- for easier reference -- have been placed at the bottom of the pages on which they appeared.]
APPENDIX 4
ATTACHMENT A

SURVEY OF THE OVER-ALL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE LOGISTICS OF TERRITORIAL WARFARE

1. Mental/Religious/Spiritual Activities
   Increase of specialists in the fields of technics, biology, agriculture, forestry, medicine, veterinary science, and shipping.

2. Research Activities
   Research in the fields of chemistry, physics, geology/mining, metallurgy, electronics, biology, aerial survey, industry, production, estates and forestry, and communications (land, sea, air).

3. Welfare Activities

   Medicine:
   -- Increasing the number of doctors (from 1:54,000 to 1:30,000) and of medical technicians;
     -- A small general hospital in each district;
     -- Two to five polyclinics in each subdistrict;
     -- Assembly and production of drugs.
   Improvement and expansion of the drinking water supply.

4. Government Activities
   For the agricultural sector, resettlement of 250,000 persons from Java.
5. Food Production
   a. Rice
      Exports to be stopped in 1962: expected surplus of 150,928 tons.
      1962 -- plus 150,928 tons.
      1963 -- minus 142,782 tons; covered by the 1962 surplus.
      1964 -- plus 127,366 tons.
      1965 -- plus 88,700 tons.
      1966 -- plus 440,996 tons.
      1967 -- plus 1,585,458 tons.
      1968 -- plus 2,394,914 tons.
   b. Intensified cultivation of beans and corn.
   c. Irrigation.
   d. Construction of warehouses and rice granaries.
   e. Inland fisheries.

6. Clothing Production
   a. Spinning mills.
   b. Clothing production units; expected to be self-generating in 1964.

7. Industrial Production
   a. First-rate materials to meet ammunition and other type production needs.
   b. Development of electric power.
   c. Production/processing of aluminum, tin, iron, steel, and other commodities.
   d. Repair shops.
   e. Various types of factories.
   f. Shipping industry.
8. **Production of Drugs**
   a. Assembly of drugs.
   b. Production of drugs.

9. **Distribution and Communication Activities**
   **Land**
   (a) Road construction and repair, covering more than 30,000 km of various types of roads.
   (b) Bridges and ferries covering as much as 1,000 km.
   (c) Increase in the number of trucks and buses; repair shops and assembly shops.
   (d) Increase in the frequency of rail traffic.

   **Sea**
   (e) Development of ocean and river fleets; it is expected that a capacity of 260,000 dead weight tons can be achieved in 1963.
   (f) Motorization of sailing ships ("ant fleet").
   (g) Maritime security, development and improvement of harbors.

   **Air**
   (h) Improvement, extension, and construction of airfields.
   (i) Flight security.

   **Other**
   (j) Development of telegraph, telephone, and radio services.
APPENDIX 4
Attachment B
AMOUNT OF INTER-ISLAND TRADE
(Weight: x 1,000,000 kg -- 1959)
(Source: Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1960)

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<th>CENTRAL JAVA</th>
<th>EAST JAVA</th>
<th>NORTH SUMATRA</th>
<th>CENTRAL SUMATRA</th>
<th>SOUTH SUMATRA</th>
<th>WEST BORNEO</th>
<th>SOUTH AND CENTRAL BORNEO</th>
<th>SOUTH CELEBES</th>
<th>NORTH CELEBES</th>
<th>LESSER SUNDAS</th>
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NOTE: It is our responsibility to guarantee the maintenance of inter-island communication during wartime.
1. If critical items cannot be obtained in a Military District Command, a requisition can be submitted to another Military District Command depot or to a Military Region Command depot.

2. In the event a mobile logistic unit is established, requisitions will be submitted to the Military District Command through this unit.
APPENDIX 6

THE ENEMY AS A SOURCE OF LOGISTIC SUPPLY IN TERRITORIAL WARFARE

I. Philosophy

1. Basically, in Territorial Warfare logistics utilizes national sources and has two objectives, namely:
   a. to guarantee the maintenance of the combat power of our Armed Forces so that eventually they will be able to destroy the combat power of the enemy.
   b. to guarantee that the quotas assigned to the Armed Forces and to the People are balanced in such a way that tension and division will not occur between the Armed Forces and the People.

2. In view of the fact that the capacity of national sources will remain limited in the near future, the utilization of materiel captured from the enemy as a source of supply is very important.

3. Without detracting from the primary objective of fighting to destroy the enemy's combat power, the capture of enemy supplies can be established as a secondary objective.

II. Object

1. Supplies in:
   a. Enemy depots
   b. Enemy convoys
   c. Held by enemy individuals, priority being given to critical items.
2. Production equipment which we need.

III. Subject

1. Basically, each commanding officer must assume responsibility for the control/management of captured materiel.

2. The utilization and acquisition of captured materiel will be handled by:
   a. Troops and individuals of the Armed Forces.
   b. The People, in groups or individually.
   c. A combination of a and b.
   d. Military/civilian personnel who have received special training.

IV. Method

1. Special Operations
   a. Raids/attacks.
   b. Ambushes.

2. General operations.

3. Other methods.

V. Other

In order to obtain maximum results from the measures listed above, it is necessary that the Armed Forces and the People be made aware of the following matters:

1. Each seizure/capture benefits us and damages the enemy.

2. Private possession of captured enemy materiel is treason.
3. The necessity for directed training in the use of acquired enemy equipment, so that captured materiel will be handled in accordance with certain fixed procedures and that maximum results will be obtained (in intelligence, technical methods, security, and methods of utilization).
IV. CONCEPT OF THE PATTERN OF TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT

Systematics of the Total Utilization of National Forces in Territorial Management

1. FOREWORD

1. Purpose

The purpose of this study is to present the systematics of Territorial Management so that in the utilization of national forces:

a. problems can be ascertained and their existence grasped;

b. bases for their solution can be established; and

c. implementing measures can be prepared.

2. Definitions

The term Territorial Management combines two concepts:

a. Management, which includes effective planning, organization, development, utilization, and control; and

b. Territory, which includes the total area of the state in the full sense, namely

   (1) both strengths and capabilities, as well as weaknesses and inadequacies,

   (2) both in the spiritual field as well as in the material field,

   (3) both qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

3. Philosophy

Territorial Management must create and develop a social structure in Indonesian society which will be
capable of mastering conditions before, during, and after a war. It must be carried out using radical and revolutionary measures which accord with the spirit of the MANPOL and USDEK.

4. Objectives

Viewed from the aspect of its objectives, Territorial Management has two meanings. In a broad sense Territorial Management is directed at the achievement of national ideals; in a specific sense it is directed at the achievement of a potential for national defense. The objective which will be discussed in this study is the objective of Territorial Management in a specific sense, since this is a military study.

5. Limitations

This study is limited to the main lines of the war effort and places emphasis on the preparatory phase in the pre-war period. Additional special studies will be required on problems of implementation and the details of specific subjects.

6. Area Covered

a. This discussion of the total utilization of national forces in Territorial Management covers three main fields:

   (1) The spiritual field,
   (2) The material field, and
   (3) The field of war management.

   The basic duties which must be carried out and their method of implementation in the respective fields will be discussed.
b. Viewed with respect to the factor of time, Territorial Management has three main phases:
   (1) Pre-war period,
   (2) Wartime period, and
   (3) Post-war period.

II. SPIRITUAL FIELD

7. The spiritual field is the basic foundation for all national forces because everything depends on and revolves around man as the nucleus and motive factor.

8. **Basic Duties:** within the framework of achieving the objective of a maximum potential for national defense, there are two basic duties which must be carried out in the spiritual field:
   a. as regards the general public, to form, develop and heighten the defense morale of the entire Indonesian people;
   b. as regards the individual, to form, develop, and maintain a national Indonesian soldier possessing high standards.

A. Basic Duty As Regards The General Public

9. In a long and hard war (a war of attrition) this basic duty will be of more importance than in a short but gigantic war (a "big-bang war"). In applying the doctrine of Territorial Warfare and its spirit of no-surrender we must plan on a long war, even if nuclear weapons are used.
This being the case, tenacity and high defense morale on the part of the people are essential.

10. The main condition for the achievement of this defense morale is the existence of a feeling of war motivation, through which all of the people will identify their fate with the fate of the endangered nation.

11. The formation of this feeling of war motivation depends on:
   a. the strategic objectives of the enemy that may attack our nation;
   b. our own national foundations in facing the strategic objectives of the enemy; and
   c. elements opposing our national foundations.

12. We can estimate what certain of the strategic objectives of the enemy may be. Ideological expansion, to force our incorporation into their sphere of ideological influence, and which is manifested in the form of:
   a. political expansion, which forces our inclusion into the sphere of authority of their nation, and/or
   b. social-economic expansion, which forces the establishment of our nation as an area of livelihood for their surplus population, as a source of manpower and materiel for their economic system, and/or as a market for the products of their industry.

13. In facing the possibility of threats from an enemy, the people of Indonesia must necessarily feel thankful and fortunate because our national foundations and ideals have been clearly formulated, established, and authorized in the Pantjasila.
Our political ideals, a manifestation of the foundations, are:

a. Domestically, an Indonesian state which:
   (1) is independent and fully sovereign;
   (2) is constituted as a unitary republic;
   (3) stretches from Sabang to Merauke;
   (4) is based on the 1945 constitution; and
   (5) is characterized by a government which adheres to guided democracy.

b. Externally, the maintenance of world peace and friendship.

Our social-economic ideals are incorporated in Indonesian socialism, which is:

a. based on Indonesian identity and Indonesian culture; and

b. has a system of guided economy.

14. Antagonistic elements which we must face in providing indoctrination in our national ideals and foundations are as follows:

a. In the ideological field:
   (1) Individualism and liberalism;
   (2) International Communism;
   (3) Negative religious fanaticism;
   (4) Atheism;
   (5) Isolationism;
   (6) Autarchy;
   (7) Chauvinism.

b. In the political field:
   (1) Imperialism and colonialism;
(2) Federalism and separatism;
(3) Danger of dictatorship;
(4) Negative regionalism and ethno-centrism.

c. In the social-economic field:
(1) Capitalism;
(2) Feudalism;
(3) Cosmopolitanism;
(4) Negative aspects of foreign culture;
(5) Reformism;
(6) Conservativism;
(7) Cynicism;
(8) Apathy.

15. The basic methods used against these antagonistic elements, in providing indoctrination in our national ideals and foundations, will differ depending upon the social group which is the primary target:

a. For the educated upper group (the elite, the nobility, the wealthy), many of whom are found in the currents of liberalism, individualism, and feudalism, a useful method of indoctrination would be one which employed rational persuasion and was objective in nature.

b. For the common people who are faced with shortages (the have-nots), many of whom are found in the Communist ranks, the correct method of indoctrination is to support information with the proof of material advances and with the fulfillment of the primary needs of life. Very important here are measures for a social distribution of burdens. This is particularly true during wartime and in other emergencies. Basically, these measures would burden and control the well-to-do groups in society (the haves), by placing
limitations on their luxurious mode of life and collecting donations to pay for the food, clothing, and housing of people in need.

c. For the orthodox group of people, many of whom are found in fanatical religious movements, a proper method of indoctrination would be one which was aimed at broadening their viewpoints and increasing their general knowledge, including acquainting them with Latin script and technical advancement.

d. For those groups of citizens who are inspired by feelings of regional separatism and narrow ethnocentrism, a correct method of indoctrination would be one based on prudent political incentives. These would include:

(1) Provision of broad autonomy.

(2) The implementation of a personnel policy under which all persons from a region or ethnic group were eligible, particularly in the matter of filling key positions.

(3) Social-economic development which takes regional needs and interests into account and which is based on the development of the smallest types of legal communities, such as the desa, the negri, and the marga.

(4) Eliminating and avoiding policies, efforts, and actions capable of accentuating differences of opinions and quarrels which, although of a minor nature, are capable of disrupting the people (e.g., between collaborationists and anti-collaborationists or fighters and non-fighters [during the struggle for independence]).

e. For the youth, who, relatively speaking, constitute a social group which is easily influenced by the
negative aspects of foreign culture, indoctrination should place emphasis on the formation and development of a national consciousness. This should be commenced in childhood and be done through the family, the school, and through youth movements in society.

f. For the agitators, in the negative meaning of the word, and die-hards who support these antagonistic elements, forceful measures must be taken and, if necessary, they must be isolated and eliminated.

16. It is necessary to achieve the following results through these basic methods of indoctrination:

a. at best, elimination of these hostile elements so that they can be replaced with our own national ideals and foundations;

b. at least, reduction and limitation of their respective strengths and spheres of influence so that they can be supervised and controlled easily.

B. Basic Duty As Regards the Individual

17. The source of the national soldier of Indonesia is the socialist man of Indonesia, who is described in "Basic Thoughts On Indonesian Socialism Which Have Been Approved By The Provisional People's Consultative Congress" (see Appendix 1).

18. As regards the ideals of the socialist man of Indonesia, it is necessary that the national soldier of Indonesia achieve a degree of excellence in these as well as in other important characteristics.
19. A standard for superiority and excellence is found in the Saptamarga [oath taken by members of the Armed Forces], which emphasizes the following characteristics:

a. the national soldier of Indonesia, as a leader, developer, and protector of other socialist men of Indonesia, must be creative, perceptive, purposeful, and diligent;

b. the national soldier of Indonesia must serve as an example and model for other socialist men of Indonesia in the following matters:

(1) National consciousness with regard to:
-- practicing the principles of the Pantjasila in his daily life;
-- conscientiously obeying laws and official regulations;
-- respecting and honoring the flag and principles of the nation;
-- respecting and honoring officials of the state in the performance of their respective duties;
-- maintaining an awareness of the fact that we are one people and one country and are prepared to defend our country by ourselves (against foreign aggression or internal disintegration).

(2) Social consciousness with regard to:
-- maintaining and paying heed to the tranquillity and happiness of his own household and that of others;
-- abstaining from the Five Ms (women, theft, idleness, drink, opium);
-- maintaining and raising national culture and identity;
-- maintaining and supporting sanitation and public and private health;
-- preventing the exploitation of man by man in any form.

(3) Economic consciousness with regard to:
-- maintaining and protecting the natural resources of Indonesia;
-- living economically, conscious of the importance of costs;
-- maintaining a feeling of great responsibility for the property of the state and maintaining and using the materiel and buildings of the state in accordance with this feeling;
-- utilizing time and energy effectively.

c. The national soldier of Indonesia is a brave man of noble character who thinks rationally, acts wisely, and behaves respectfully.

20. Basic methods of indoctrination to be followed in giving content to the above characteristics are:

a. Thorough inculcation of these characteristics in personnel by training organizations in main units, depot units, cadre schools, cadet academies, and so forth.

b. A continuing troop information program guided centrally and implemented by each commanding officer.

c. Moral persuasion.

d. Setting examples for subordinates, this to be done particularly by officers and other cadres within the framework of military leadership.
e. Commendation of outstanding individuals.

f. Repressive measures and firm sanctions against deviators, this to take the form of sentences, social and psychological isolation, expulsion, and discharge (elimination).

III. MATERIAL FIELD

21. It must be assumed that any future war will break out suddenly. Therefore, the basic duty which must be carried out in this field is the making of preparations for the mobilization and utilization of the material strength of the state in order to achieve maximum war readiness.

War readiness has three main facets:

a. Ability to quickly and correctly mobilize the country's resources for war with the purpose of achieving military superiority during the first phase of the war.

b. Ability to maintain the required potential as long as the war continues and until peace is restored.

c. Ability to rebuild the sources of national strength, aiming at the achievement of national ideals, after the war is over ("you should win not only the war, but also the peace").

22. A diagram in Appendix 2 shows what basic efforts are carried out in establishing a state of war readiness. Three sectors are taken into consideration in discussing these efforts:

a. The population sector, as source of manpower;
b. The financial-economic sector, as source of logistics and funds; and


c. The military sector, as base of combat power.

C. The Population Sector

23. Estimate of War Requirements

a. The requirements for manpower, both in amount and type, are different in wartime and peacetime. These requirements can be divided into two main sectors:

   (1) The military sector
   (2) The civilian sector.

b. The following are used as a basis for estimating requirements in the military sector:

   (1) Effective military strength (see paragraph 34, sub b)
   (2) Reserves, which must be readied as replacements on the basis of estimated casualties.

c. The structure of the organized People's Resistance Movement (Civil Defense) is used as a basis in estimating requirements in the civil sector and consists of:

   (1) The civil government structure during wartime, including internal security agencies.
   (2) The defense structure.
   (3) The war-economy structure.
   (4) Social institutions.

24. Estimate of Capability of Available Manpower

a. The Productive Part of the Population. That part of the male population which is between 15 and 35 [sic] years of age is most effective in the war effort. The greater
this percentage of the population, the greater the war potential in manpower. That part of the population which is less than 15 years of age is of no significance in the war effort. Rather, in view of the fact that they must be cared for, raised, supervised, and educated, they constitute a factor which reduces the potential. The same thing is true for the majority of people over 56 years of age. Women have productive potential during wartime in that they can replace men who are performing jobs in rear areas.

b. Replacement of Personnel. During wartime it will be necessary to mobilize many persons in the civilian sector for combat duties. Attention must be given to the replacement of these persons so that the continuity of civil functions within the framework of the war effort will be guaranteed. Women, pensioners, veterans, students, and the handicapped can be used, within the limits of their respective abilities, as replacements. If the mobilization of these replacements is carried out effectively the number of non-productive people can be reduced.

c. Job Conversion. The work required in wartime differs in type, capacity, and intensity from that performed in peacetime. Therefore, consideration must be given to the changeover from peacetime to wartime assignments long before war breaks out. Primary attention should be given to placing each person in the type of work he performed in peacetime, or at least in a similar field of work. Preparations for job conversion can be made in the conscription program. Also, a special program should be established to convert civil jobs which are little needed or unnecessary in wartime into civil jobs vital to the war effort.
25. Expansion of Potential. Efforts must be made in peacetime to raise the potential of manpower (human investment) because many persons will be utilized (consumed) or lost in wartime and there will be little or no opportunity or possibility for replacement or expansion.

The manpower potential can be increased by:

a. Adding as wartime productive forces the elderly and those persons entering their fifteenth year, improving physical fitness (through improved health conditions, better food, an effective sports program, etc.), and increasing the number of cadre, specialists, technicians, and build-up personnel through training programs.

b. Forming a maximal military potential within the framework of an organized Civil Defense, this effort to be carried out through military conscription and compulsory training programs.

26. Division and Distribution. In order to achieve a maximum capability for mobilization, there must be effected in peacetime a division and distribution in accordance with the concept of defense.

This defense concept will require:

a. security and a slackening of anxiety,

b. assignment of military forces, and

c. supply and organization of personnel.

The security requirement will create the problem of moving the population (resettlement) from the cities into the interior and from densely populated areas to sparsely populated areas.

The requirement to assign military forces will create the problem of moving personnel from areas where
there are surplus personnel to potential areas for military operations where there are insufficient personnel.

The supply and organization of personnel requirement will create the problem of establishing priorities, for, generally speaking, the demand will exceed the supply. The establishment of these priorities will be based on our defense concept and may take the following form:

a. territorial priorities, which will establish the order of importance of the segments of a territory which must be physically defended as:

   (1) strategic operational nuclei;
   (2) guerrilla warfare bases;
   (3) bases for the formation of counterattack forces.

b. functional priorities, which will establish the order of importance of the sectors of the war effort (vital, important, necessary, unnecessary).

D. The Financial-Economic Sector

27. Estimate of Requirements. The requirement in wartime for types and amounts of goods and services is different from what it is in peacetime. In estimating this war requirement, goods and services must be divided into two basic categories:

   a. those essential to the war effort, and
   b. those not essential to the war effort.

   It is necessary that a usage index, a replacement index, and a service capacity index be established for each essential commodity and service. These will be used as a basis in estimating requirements.

This effort requires that a review be made of:

a. productive sources in each field of effort (agriculture, industry, etc.) and their normal capacities;

b. the possibility of increasing production and maintaining the economic potential through:

(1) expanding output through intensification, substitution, conversion, rationalization, standardization, and normalization;

(2) reducing investments in fields of development not connected with the war;

(3) contributions from the people for war needs;

(4) the possibility of foreign trade;

(5) efforts directed at achieving self-sufficiency in the production of vital commodities, food particularly;

(6) the possibility of conserving [or preserving] and re-using essential commodities;

(7) the possibility of reducing or eliminating unnecessary consumption.

29. Supply and Storage. Supplies of commodities must be built up by storing (stockpiling) them in peacetime, then, at a given time, these supplies can be mobilized quickly and efficiently.

The following factors must be taken into account in this effort:

a. the positions of military forces;

b. possible isolation, due to the cutting of lines of communication by the enemy;
c. dispersal to reduce anxiety about the enemy's nuclear weapons.

30. The types and amounts of goods to be stored will depend on:
   a. the policy of defense, which will be of a defensive nature for us;
   b. the war potential of countries which may become adversaries;
   c. funds obtainable as a part of the national income;
   and
d. the risk of the stores becoming obsolete.

31. Distribution. Priorities and allocations must be established for the distribution effort just as in the case of the distribution of personnel (see paragraph 26). To achieve facility in implementation during wartime, the supply, service, and maintenance system must be established on a decentralized basis at the regional level. An effective system of distribution must also be readied for the civil sector.

32. Financial Matters. Primary financial objectives are:
   a. avoiding inflation and inflationary pressures during wartime;
   b. reducing the danger of inflation at the end of the war and thereafter;
   c. dividing the burdens of the war equally among the population;
   d. preparing funds with which to provide the people with material incentives within the framework of increasing their creative power and their enthusiasm for work;
e. preparing for economic rehabilitation after the war.

33. To achieve these objectives the government can carry out four measures, namely:
   a. a tax policy which will directly reduce income/wealth and thus reduce demands in the market;
   b. a monetary policy to control the volume of money in circulation;
   c. a foreign trade policy (commercial policy) to control imports and exports;
   d. an economic policy which will control production, check civilian requirements, and so forth.

E. The Military Sector

34. Determination of Strength. The following determinations of strength must be made as a basis for estimating and planning:
   a. **Maximum Military Potential**, which depends on the following factors:
      (1) the amount and structure of the population (see paragraph 23, sub a);
      (2) the proportion between the allocations made for military needs and for civilian needs.
   b. **Effective Military Strength**, which results from estimations and calculations of the amount of strength required to maintain an effective national defense. This strength will depend on:
      (1) basic principles of defense;
(2) area, form, and geographic position of the territory of the state;
(3) geostrategical concepts;
(4) doctrine on the carrying out of operations;
(5) general concept of operations;
(6) combat administration support potential.

c. Mobilization Strength, which is the amount of strength that can be mobilized at the outbreak of war. It will depend on the following factors:
(1) preparations in peacetime;
(2) conscientious development;
(3) careful administration;
(4) logistic capability; and
(5) enemy attacks.

d. Ready Strength of the Armed Forces, which is comprised of:
(1) regulars of the Armed Forces and State Police;
(2) conscripts on active service;
(3) the reserve, which is being built up. The amount of this strength depends on the following factors:
(1) concept of carrying out operations in the face of strategic attacks;
(2) ability of military training organizations to produce trained personnel;
(3) the ability of units in the field to train conscripts;
(4) availability of funds.
The regulars of the Armed Forces are the nucleus of organized Civil Defense and provide the instructors for it. As appropriate, they perform the following assignments:

1. Effectively forming, raising, and maintaining military conscript and training conscript strength;
2. Maintaining equipment and installations;
3. Conscientiously carrying out military administration and development;
4. Maintaining and increasing combat power in accordance with modern advancements.


The following activities are included in this effort:

a. Rejuvenation and formation of regular forces to replace personnel being discharged.

b. Formation of reserve forces, which will include:
   1. Courses for reserve officers;
   2. The military conscript program;
   3. The compulsory training program;
   4. The formation and maintenance of a Women's Corps which will provide replacements to fill military jobs not connected with combat.

c. Supply of weapons, materiel, and military construction equipment. For the most part, we are still dependent on foreign nations for these things. Our efforts to fulfill our own needs must be guided by long-range plans, and these must be integrated with the Over-all Development Plan.
d. Stockpiling essential military supplies, and distributing them in conformance with security requirements and established priorities.

e. Assignment of troops on the basis of the concept of war operations.

IV. WAR MANAGEMENT

36. Conscientious management is necessary if maximum effectiveness is to be achieved in the preparation and utilization of forces in the spiritual and material fields. Therefore, the basic duty which must be carried out is to regulate the mobilization and preparations for the total utilization of national forces in order to achieve maximum war effectiveness. This basic duty will be carried out both internally, in the regulation of domestic affairs, and externally, within the framework of international relations.

37. Elements necessary to the implementation of this basic duty are as follows:

a. basic decisions in the form of principles, doctrines, and policies for use as bases, starting points, and guides in preparing the war effort;

b. continuous planning which takes into account new developments in the situation;

c. organization of a war structure;

d. leadership and command; and

e. control.
38. If we review the facts as regards these basic decisions we find that:

a. An ideal foundation exists, namely, the Pantjasila.

b. The principles of defense exist, that is, defense will be of a defensive nature, in the form of an organized People's Resistance Movement and of a militia system.

c. A geo-strategical concept does not exist. Available alternatives are:

   (1) a maritime concept (the theories of Mahan, the Jeune Ecole, the Japanese, and so on);
   (2) a continental concept (the theories of MacKinder, Spykman, Haushofer, and others);
   (3) an aero-space concept (the theories of Duhet, Seversky, Mitchell); and
   (4) a concept combining the above theories.

d. A doctrine on the implementation of warfare exists, namely, the doctrine of Territorial Warfare, and with it:

e. A general concept of operations consisting of:

   (1) a first phase which is of a frontal nature;
   (2) a second phase which consists of containment, challenge, and consolidation;
   (3) a third phase which is the counteroffensive.

39. Planning requires that estimates be made continuously in every field and sector of the war effort. Current and complete statistical material and data are required for these estimates. The following activities must be undertaken to provide these needed data.

a. improvement of the records and reports system and of the framework of state and military administration;
b. expansion, improvement, and maintenance of
statistical organizations;
c. activation, expansion, and maintenance of sci-
entific and technological activities in the field of research
and development.

40. First priority is to be given to a National Defense
Master Plan, which should be integrated with the Over-All
Development Plan. A master plan should have the following
appendices:
   a. plan for the formation of spiritual potential;
b. plan for the formation and mobilization of
manpower;
c. plan for the formation and mobilization of
logistic potential;
d. plan for the control of administration in wartime;
e. plan for wartime mobilization.

In implementing an Over-All Development Plan containing
a National Defense Master Plan and its appendices, it will be
necessary for the plan to be divided into regional develop-
ment and defense plans.

41. The war organization effort requires that decisions
be made regarding:
   a. the structure of the government during wartime;
b. the structure of the military defense sector;
c. the structure of the civilian defense sector;
d. a firm division of duties;
e. basic procedures, including work relations and
coordination.
42. Leadership. Good preparations and planning will be useless if they are not utilized in the manner desired. Therefore, personnel who are capable, honest, and steadfast, who possess the spirit of leadership, are required in this field. The key to the success of Territorial Management, which is a prerequisite for the formation of a national defense potential, lies in the selection of personnel who will head up the activities in the various fields and at each echelon. This factor must also be given attention in the personnel retooling program.

In carrying out leadership and command, the following matters must be considered:

a. determination of authority and responsibility;
b. channels of command; and
c. vertical and horizontal decentralization (staffing).

43. The following kinds of control are required in wartime:

a. spiritual control (for the people's defense morale and calmness during a war of nerves);
b. social-economic control, which includes:
   (1) allocation of strategic materials and determination of priorities;
   (2) cost control;
   (3) wage control;
   (4) price control;
   (5) control of manpower;
   (6) control of quotas for consumers;
   (7) control of industrial input and output.
c. judicial control, both preventive and repressive.
d. defense command control.
V. CONCLUSIONS

43. The specific objective of Territorial Management is to achieve and maintain a national defense potential before, during and after a war.

44. Three national fields are to be considered:
   a. The *spiritual* field, in which there are two basic duties:
      (1) as regards the general public, to form, heighten, and maintain the defense morale of the people;
      (2) as regards the individual, to form a national soldier of Indonesia who possesses high standards.
   b. The *material* field. The basic duty in this field is the making of preparations for the mobilization and utilization of the material strengths of the state in order to achieve maximum war readiness.
   c. The field of *war management*. The basic duty in this field is to regulate the mobilization and preparation for the total utilization of national forces in order to achieve maximum war effectiveness, both internally and externally.

45. a. Decisions on the following matters will constitute basic steps toward the solution of problems:
   (1) What major requirements are necessary in accomplishing these basic duties?
   (2) What base/capital do we now have?
   (3) What hostile factors must we face?
   (4) What structure do we want?
   (5) What basic efforts must we carry out?
b. Appendix 4, "Outline of Scope of Territorial Management," provides a schematic outline of the material covered in this study.

c. In extension of this study, separate studies will be required to provide an analysis of the basic steps referred to above.
APPENDIX 1

The ideals of the socialist man of Indonesia present a picture of a man who bases his creative powers, sentiments, purposefulness, and work on the following foundations:

a. Indonesian identity and culture.
b. The spirit of a complete patriot.
c. The principles of the Pantjasila.
d. The spirit of gotong-rojong (mutual cooperation).
e. The spirit of the pioneer (individual ability and creative power).
f. Morality and nobility of character.
g. Simplicity and honesty.
h. Responsibilities take precedence over rights.
i. The public interest takes precedence over individual interests.
j. Willingness to sacrifice and live economically.
k. The principles of guided democracy.
l. The principles of guided economy.
m. Discipline.
n. Ability to appreciate the value of time.
o. Rational and economic thinking.
p. Hard work for the purposes of development.
APPENDIX 2

DIAGRAM OF THE MAIN STEPS IN WAR-READINESS PLANNING

NATIONAL STRATEGY

SOCIAL-ECONOMIC STRATEGY

- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND INTERNAL SECURITY
- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTIVITIES DEALING WITH THE SUPPLY OF MANPOWER, MATERIAL, AND SERVICES
- REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTIVITIES IN THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL FIELDS

EQUILIBRATION

BALANCED AND TIME-PHASED MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING AND GUARANTEING A STATE OF WAR READINESS

EQUILIBRATION

ESTIMATE OF SOURCES OF STRENGTH AND NATIONAL POTENTIAL IN MANPOWER AND MATERIAL

CONSCIENTIOUS COMPARISONS

ESTABLISHMENT OF PRODUCTION PROGRAMS WHICH ARE CONSTANTLY ADAPTABLE TO CHANGES IN SITUATION AND NEED

MILITARY STRATEGY

- REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMY
- REQUIREMENTS OF THE NAVY
- REQUIREMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE

EQUILIBRATION

BALANCED AND TIME-PHASED MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING AND GUARANTEING A STATE OF WAR READINESS

TENTATIVE ESTIMATES OF TOTAL REQUIREMENTS, WHICH ARE TIME-PHASED, BALANCED, AND ADAPTABLE TO VARIOUS MODES OF UTILIZATION
APPENDIX 3

DIAGRAM OF THE FORMATION OF MILITARY MANPOWER
## Appendix IV (a)
### Outline of Scope of Territorial Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Foundation</th>
<th>Base/Capital</th>
<th>Challenging Factors</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Basic Support</th>
<th>Primary Requirements</th>
<th>Basic Duties</th>
<th>Objective</th>
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<td><strong>National Strength</strong></td>
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<td>Thinking and Planning Organization, Information, and Personnel, Using National, Material, Political, and Developmental Incentives and Also Regards Education and Elimination</td>
<td>War Motivation ('Call of People's Salvation')</td>
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<td>Strong Defense of the People</td>
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<td>Land</td>
<td>Ideological Conflicts, Political Conflicts, Social-Economic Conflicts, and Military/Political Conflicts</td>
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<td>Indonesian National Soldier with High Moral Standards</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
<td>Mental Attitude as a Result of Civilization</td>
<td>Substitution of a New Generation</td>
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<td>Correct and National Defense Potential</td>
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<td>Marion Education</td>
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<td>Geography</td>
<td>Education and Training, and Retention of Population</td>
<td>Increasing Production</td>
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<td>Internal</td>
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<td>Clean and Fine Direction</td>
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<td>Maximum Efficiency</td>
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**Note:** The table provides an outline of the scope of territorial management, detailing various aspects such as ideological conflicts, political conflicts, social-economic conflicts, and national security. Each section is further broken down into specific challenges and support requirements, with a focus on the objective of strong defense of the people. The table also highlights the importance of education, training, and mobilization in achieving these objectives.
### APPENDIX IV (b)

#### OUTLINE OF SCOPE OF TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT

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<th>FOUNDATION</th>
<th>BASIC/CAPITAL</th>
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**National Strength**

- Spirit of the 1945 revolution
- Confidence in the ability and tenacity of the people
- Self-reliance
- Free spirit of the new generation
- Unusual distribution of population
- Terrorism from the enemies
- Generation of fear
- Growth of specialization
- Low health standards

**Challenging Factors**

- Theological conflicts
- Political conflicts
- Social-economic conflicts
- Mental attitude as a result of colonization

**Structure**

- Central planning & advisory bodies
- Local planning & advisory bodies
- Central directing & controlling bodies
- Local directing & controlling bodies
- Central coordinating bodies
- Local coordinating bodies
BOOK II

I. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

by Lt. Col. Sutopo Juwono

I. Foreword

With this document the writer hopes to encourage readers to make a joint and more intensive study of Research and Development and thereby share a common viewpoint on the subject.

In order to solve any problem we must have adequate knowledge of the problem and of the matters we are questioning. Only after we have established our problem in its true proportions can we attempt to seek its solution.

An attempt will be made to answer three questions within this framework in the following paragraphs.

a. What is the purpose of Research and Development?

b. What problems are found in Research and Development and how far must their solution be carried?

c. How shall we solve these problems?

It is hoped that by answering these questions the what, why, how, who, and where of the basic problems can also be solved.

II. Necessary Definitions

Before going any further it would be best to look into the matter of terminology, for without a common language we will not reach the same appreciation of a subject.
1. Research and Development hereafter will be abbreviated in this document as Litbang.* Research and Development is a term used to identify continuous activities concerned with the planning, research, development, trial, testing, and integration of doctrines (including techniques and work systems), organization, and new equipment and is undertaken in order that maximum efficiency may be achieved in the continued growth of the Army.

A definition contained in Directive 0-5, "Functions and Fields of Management," part III, paragraph 6, sub h, dated 5 August 1958, states that: Development includes all continuous activities, work, and efforts concerned with research, planning, organization, and application for the improvement of doctrines, organization, and methods and is undertaken in order that maximum efficiency may be achieved in the continued growth of the Army.

The changes made in the definition by the writer are intended to place emphasis on the integration of doctrine and organization and to add the element of equipment, which cannot be omitted in the developmental growth of the Army.

2. Combat Research and Development is a term used to identify planning, research, development, trial, testing, and integration of doctrines, organization, and new equipment for producing maximum combat efficiency in Army troops.

3. Equipment Research and Development is a term used to identify planning, research, development, trial,

*Acronym from Indonesian words.
and initial testing of equipment (including weapons) to meet the conceptual needs of future operations.

4. Doctrines are principles and policies which are applicable to a subject, which have been developed on the basis of experience or theory and which represent the best available thought. A doctrine provides guidance but is not rigidly binding in practice.

If we open an English dictionary to find the meaning of doctrine we will see that the word is broadly defined, for example, Webster's "New World Dictionary" says that doctrine is: "1. Something taught, teachings. 2. Something taught as the principles or creed of a religion, political party, etc.; tenet or tenets; belief; dogma. Doctrine refers to a theory based on carefully worked out principles and taught or advocated by its adherents (scientific or social doctrines); dogma refers to a belief or opinion that is set down by authority as true and indisputable, and usually connotes arbitrariness, arrogance, etc. (religious dogma); tenet emphasizes the maintenance or defense, rather than the teaching, of a principle (the tenets of a political party); precept refers to an injunction or dogma intended as a rule of action or conduct (to teach by example rather than by precept)." [This definition was given in English.]

Thus, doctrine covers not only scientific or social doctrines, but also tenets, beliefs, dogmas, and precepts. Such a broad definition, which covers both propositions which can be reached only through conviction as well as teachings which must be adhered to rigidly, cannot be
wholly accepted in military circles. Therefore, we will use as basic definition of doctrine its meaning as "scientific or social doctrine," but without eliminating its subjective elements. Thus, the term doctrine covers both theory, or more correctly, principles which have been developed on the basis of theory, and policies, which have been developed in connection with theory and on the basis of experience. Therefore, within military doctrine there is a fusion of the objective elements of military science and of subjective elements, that is, the policies of those who adhere to that military doctrine.

III. What is Research and Development? Why Research and Development?

If we employ the basic definitions of research and development contained in Part II, paragraph 1, of this document and in Directive 0-5 we will obtain a clearer picture of Research and Development. We will find that:

1. Research and Development is an activity for the implementation of one of the primary functions of the army.

2. This activity is continuous.

3. The objective of Research and Development is the achievement of maximum efficiency in the continued growth of the Army.

A clear objective is essential to any activity. In this instance the objective is maximum efficiency in the continued growth of the Army. But this is too abstract! It would be best for us to make it clearer.
When an organization is formed and developed it is for the purpose of achieving a certain objective. Within this framework the organization is given a basic assignment. Let us see what is the basic assignment of the Army. Returning to Directive 0-5 we find that:

a. The Army, as one segment of the Armed Forces, has the basic assignment of carrying out a part of the general defense in order to protect the interests of the Republic of Indonesia (Provisional Constitution, article 125, paragraph 1), in accordance with the principles of the state, and based on the general policy of the government (Law 29, articles 4, 13, 15).

b. and so forth.

According to Directive 0-5, in performing this basic assignment the Army has certain primary functions, namely:

a. Military strength
b. Combat
c. Administration
d. International responsibility
e. Territorial
f. People's resistance
g. Military government
h. Development

Perhaps, even after turning to Directive 0-5, we still have not obtained a clear picture, even though the area covered has been further delimited. It would be best for us to define further these boundaries by asking: within the framework of this basic assignment, what is meant by "carrying out a part of the general defense?" What role can the Army play? In answering these questions
it would be best for us to adopt as our basic viewpoint the classic concept of these matters, which in the writer's opinion is still applicable at the present time:

The role of the Army in war is to defeat the ground troops of the enemy and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.

Thus, we can say that the essential role of the Army is the combat role.

This allows us also to give a more concrete answer to the original problem concerning the objective of the growth of our Army.

Actually efficiency, which is the objective of Research and Development, is the combat efficiency of the Army. Therefore, this Research and Development is Combat Research and Development.

IV. What Is the Importance of Research and Development to Us?

We are preparing ourselves not for a past war but for a future war. Even though this is a simple and natural statement we will find, upon giving it earnest consideration, that it contains a deeper truth. An example of the vital effect of an erroneous understanding of the realities of future war is provided in the quick collapse of France during the Second World War. Frenchmen, in order to solve the problem of the stagnation of battlefields during the 4-year period of the First World War, were overly engrossed in their studies of the past war in the period preceding the Second World War.
Other men sought the solution to the problem by making defense positions fluid, by perfecting techniques of combat mobility. But Frenchmen chose to perfect their defense positions with firepower and massive fortifications. Technically they were successful in their construction of the fortress, for the Maginot Line stood proudly. But its creators never imagined how effective it would be.

The basic error made by the French leaders in the period before the Second World War was their inability to understand and appreciate the fact that a mobile war was being born. History proves that various factors can benefit a defending side. The Soviet army, in not too long a time, was able to develop a doctrine of defense which was decisive against the quick-moving armies of Hitler, which earlier had met with brilliant success in the fields of Poland and France. In the eastern war, defense positions which were bypassed by Panzer columns did not surrender but continued to resist and formed flexible defense pockets. What we now know as mobile defense was carried out here for the first time in modern warfare, and with decisive results.

We referred above to the effect of an incorrect appreciation of future war. The same thing can happen to us. If we were forced into war in the near future, would Territorial Warfare be the correct form of defense for us? This question can be answered only after the conclusion of a future war.

The question as to whether we should base our doctrine on nuclear warfare or on conventional warfare must be
answered conscientiously. Even so, accuracy in calculating the nature of a future war and preparation for the possibility of war are not the same. Efficient and factual combat readiness is what is needed, the maximum combat readiness that lies within our capability at any given moment.

In all of this we still must find a break-down of form, method, and equipment, and this activity is included in what we call Research and Development.

V. How Is Research and Development Carried Out?

1. In order to answer this question we must first decide what subject we are to examine and then how this examination will be carried out. It would be best if we returned for a moment to Combat Research and Development. The target here is apparent: the combat efficiency of the Army in a future war. The matter which requires clarification is what fields must be explored in order to reach this target.

Four fields can be mentioned here:

a. The field of doctrine, which covers both strategy and more restricted subjects (tactics, procedures, and so forth).

b. The field of organization, from the national level down to the rifle squad.

c. The field of personnel.

d. The field of materiel (equipment and weapons).
After determining the fields we must work in, we must also know the amount of interrelation between one field and another. Does one of the four fields occupy a guiding position? It is obvious that the fields are closely interrelated. Combat efficiency is a manifestation of the efficiency in the four fields. This means that we cannot develop the fields one by one and independently of each other. I bring this matter up because such tendencies are found among us.

Methods of approach must conform to one guiding factor which is applicable to all Research and Development activities. The respective fields must be studied scientifically (the objective element), at the same time attention must be given to considerations which arise because of the subjective requirements of Army policy. As regards the guiding factor, at the strategy level (military) it can be clearly seen that strategic concepts or doctrines (military) will become the guiding factor in the Army program, which includes Research and Development activities. Even so, in formulating strategic concepts at the present time, all countries must take into account as a decisive factor in their considerations the existence of nuclear weapons, regardless of whether or not they have such weapons.

In times past the majority of armies attempted to adapt new weapons to their tactical doctrines and organization during peacetime. Germany was an exception. Before the Second World War it had developed organizational concepts and doctrines and special tactics which
enabled it to utilize fully new weapons and equipment, namely, the airplane and the tank. Now it is apparent that what was once an exception is considered to be a necessity. This is because of the rapidity of technological development, which exerts a decisive influence on both present and future forms of warfare and methods of combat.

It would be dangerous for us to look to the past in peacetime, to be too closely bound by old (fixed) concepts and doctrines. We must look to the future in our concepts and doctrines and must be flexible in facing the dynamics of the present day world. By the same token, Research and Development is an activity which is not only continuous, but must have the ability to move speedily and efficiently.

We can establish certain conclusions as to what we must examine and develop and as to the characteristics of this activity:

1. Combat Research and Development covers the fields of doctrine, organization, personnel and materiel, all of which are closely interrelated.
2. Research and Development screens scientific objectives for our subjective needs.
3. Research and Development is a continuous activity and must be capable of moving speedily and efficiently.
4. The guiding factor in Combat Research and Development is the strategic concept and doctrine (military), taking into account the special influence, at all levels, of rapid technological advancement.
2. We can use these characteristics of Combat Research and Development as a base in deciding what agencies in the Army will be connected with this activity, their degree of coordination, and what approaches can be used in solving problems.

   a. **Agencies engaged in Combat Research and Development**

      In view of the various fields of activity covered, the following agencies will be concerned with Combat Research and Development activities.

      (1) Army Training Institutions and Commands.
      (2) Central Headquarters of Combat Arms.
      (3) Inspectorates General of the Army.
      (4) Army Institutions and Offices.

   b. **Research and Development activities in the fields of personnel and doctrine, and the function of the Army training program**

      In the personnel field, Research and Development activities place more emphasis upon the quality of personnel than upon the quantity of personnel, and this fact is manifested in the functions of the Army training institutions.

      The dynamics in the development of doctrine at the present time make Research and Development the life blood of the instruction given in Army training institutions. The theory that doctrine is only an extension of instruction has become obsolete. The cooperation between instruction and Research and Development has become so close at the present time that, as a matter of
course, the main training bodies have two basic assignments: instruction and Research and Development.

c. **Armed Forces as users and Technical Services as suppliers of equipment**

We customarily distinguish between a field army's combat elements and administrative support or supply elements. We tend to divide responsibilities into operations and supply, distinguishing between the users and suppliers of equipment. But we know of another system, that used by the Soviet army, in which both functions are centralized in the respective services. Artillery units are responsible not only for the carrying out of operations, they must also supply their shells.

Each method has its positive and negative aspects and is bound to the military and logistics systems followed and developed in the respective countries. We use the first method. Directive 0-5, part VI, **Bases of Materiel Management**, explains that Research and Development is one of the methods used to develop equipment.

As a consequence of the separation of the user from the supplier of equipment, it is necessary that there be close coordination between them at all levels of Equipment Research and Development. It would be ideal if the Equipment Research and Development Program could be handled on the basis of the requirements arising as a result of new operational, organizational, and materiel concepts developed by Combat Research and Development. Combat Research and Development could establish long-range targets for materiel on the basis
of these new concepts and Equipment Research and Development could change them in accordance with the requirement for material.

Unfortunately, this ideal order cannot always be observed. Rapid breakthroughs in scientific knowledge (as pointed out in the above discussion of the guiding factor) create needs and require that the Combat Research and Development Program be accelerated in order to develop doctrines for the use and organization of new equipment. For us, the occurrence of such a situation is affected by another factor. At the present time we are forced to accept various types of equipment, our productive capacity being what it is, and the greater part of our Armed Forces is still dependent on foreign production. Thus, the ebb and flow of international politics and our ability to control our own foreign policy are very decisive factors.

The users and suppliers of equipment can cooperate closely in matters such as:

(1) Deciding on the military characteristics of a piece of equipment, including the operational and physical characteristics required.

(2) Conducting trials of the equipment in Research and Development Experimental Centers.

(3) Carrying out tests, both "service tests" and "user tests," under the supervision of a board in which both the Armed Services and Technical Services concerned are represented.
d. The Inspectorates General of the Army

The organization of the Inspectorates General will not be discussed here, as this is outside the scope of this study.

In view of the present development of the concept of Territorial Warfare, a doctrine whose objective is to integrate the national potential outside the Army (or Armed Forces) with the Army, so as to promote combat efficiency, it is obvious that Research and Development has broad responsibilities.

According to part III, paragraph 7, of Directive 0-5, the Inspectorate General for General Supervision is in charge of staff supervision, planning, and policy as regards the main functions in the field of management and growth. The statement has been made elsewhere in this study that the objective of Research and Development was the achievement of maximum efficiency in the continued growth of the Army. This being the case, Research and Development must be included in the above-mentioned field of management and growth and be under the staff supervision of the Inspectorate General for General Supervision.

This is one solution, but there are significant weaknesses in it. Paragraph 7 of Directive 0-5 also calls for:

1. A division of higher responsibility and a separation between those matters of management and growth that concern goals external to the Army and those concerning goals of the Army.
(2) The positioning of the Inspectorate General for General Supervision (in the field of management and growth concerning goals of the Army) as a staff executive body coordinated by the General Staff (which, note well, is composed of G1, 2, 3, and 4).

These weaknesses can be very damaging to Research and Development, which should be controlled by a small and centralized staff in order to accelerate the efficient development and growth of the Army. Another alternative would be to separate the growth of the Army from Research and Development. This would mean that Research and Development would not be a part of the staff responsibility of the Inspectorate General for General Supervision and would require the formal establishment of separate instrumentalities for these activities.

The writer is of the opinion that changes and improvements will be required in Directive 0-5 with respect to these matters regardless of the route taken.

e. Guidance and cooperation between Research and Development elements

Mention has been made of the connection between Research and Development and training bodies and of the cooperation between Research and Development elements in the Armed Forces and in the Technical Services, or more clearly, of the direct connection between Combat Research and Development and Equipment Research and Development. Since Research and Development is a continuous process, and in order to make possible a maximum of cooperation, Research and Development elements are functional in nature and adhere to a single system.
Primary responsibility for a specific field of Research and Development is assigned to a Research and Development element depending upon its particular field, the level it has reached in the steps of development, its position in the development timetable, and so forth. This must be done to ensure that there will be no conflict in the carrying out of assignments, however, it can only be done when unity exists in the guidance and coordination of the respective programs. Following are diagrams of the Research and Development system which has been recommended (diagrams 1 and 2).

Just as there is a relationship between tactics, military strategy, and defense policy, so there is also a relationship between the various stages of combat Research and Development. Research and Development in all our Armed Forces is a problem for which a solution is urgently required.

A systematic arrangement from top to bottom would have an influence on the system used in approaching Research and Development problems. This can be seen in diagram 3 which shows the steps in Research and Development. Steps 1 through 3 arc the same for Research and Development activities in the fields of doctrine, organization, and equipment. The product of the 10th step is combat efficiency, the objective of Research and Development.

f. Research and Development time period

Looking at the steps in development in diagram 3, we see that in developing a concept we must reckon from the minimum level of the development of a
provisional concept (5th step) to the achievement of the final product (10th step). We can figure that this will take at least 3 years. Large projects, for example, those concerned with the development of equipment, will probably take from 5 to 10 years. (The National Planning Council has adopted an 8-year cycle.)

We can distinguish between Research and Development activities on the basis of the time period involved. Current Research and Development has a lead time of up to 3 years and future Research and Development has a lead time of from 3 to 10 or more years. Current Research and Development can also be referred to as short-range Research and Development, while future Research and Development can also be referred to as long-range Research and Development.

Current Research and Development will be oriented primarily along the lines of present capability, that is, basically its only goal will be to perfect doctrine, organization, and equipment now on hand. Future Research and Development will be directed primarily at objectives based on requirements.

Since time goes on, these time periods will also go on, therefore, the transition between these time periods must be carried out smoothly. This can be done if close and reciprocal relations are maintained during their implementation. These time periods are shown in diagram 4.
g. **Staff Responsibility for Research and Development at High Levels**

There are several workable solutions to the problem of staff responsibility. The problem is which one do we value and what policy do we follow in Research and Development activities? One of these solutions has been mentioned in paragraph g. above, namely, an approach to Research and Development as part of the Army's growth management. Other alternatives are as follows:

1. To assign staff responsibility to the Army General Staff, where it would be placed in the hands of one or more of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff.

2. To assign staff responsibility to the Army General Staff and to place it in the hands of a newly-created Assistant Chief of Staff for Research and Development.

3. To assign staff responsibility for Research and Development to the Deputy Army Chief of Staff I.

There is another basic problem which requires clarification, namely, the distinction between the General Staff which is established at the military-operations level and the staff of the Department of the Army which is active at the military-policy level.

We have pointed out several problems and various alternative solutions. Although all of the solutions are workable, further study will be required to determine which is the best. Diagrams 1 and 2 in this
study have been drawn up on the basis of the solution which we feel to be the best, namely, the assignment of responsibility to the Deputy Army Chief of Staff I.

IV. Conclusions

Following are some of the conclusions which can be reached after a perusal of this study.

(1) It is necessary that a uniform appreciation of Research and Development exists in our ranks.

(2) Within the framework of achieving the objectives of Army development, there is an increasingly urgent need for a solution to the problem of Research and Development, one of the primary functions of the Army.

(3) Combat Research and Development is the essential part of Research and Development in the Army. Its implementation requires that a Combat Research and Development system be organized, this system to include all Research and Development elements in the Army. Combat Research and Development includes Equipment Research and Development.

(4) Centralized control and decentralized implementation are required in Research and Development.
DIAGRAM 3

STEPS IN COMBAT AND EQUIPMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

1. DEPICTION OF TERRITORIAL AND PEOPLES RESISTANCE FIELD

2. DETERMINING TYPES OF COMBAT

3. DETERMINING THE CAPABILITIES WE MUST POSSESS IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT OPERATION

4. DRAFTING DEVELOPMENTAL DOCTRINES FOR OBJECTIVES

5. DRAFTING PROVISIONAL TECHNIQUES, WORKING METHODS & TACTICAL DOCTRINES

6. EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD

7. TESTING BY TROOPS

8. DRAWING UP FIELD MANUALS AND TRAINING GUIDES

9. DRAFTING DEVELOPMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR OBJECTIVES

10. DRAFTING DEVELOPMENTAL EQUIPMENT FOR OBJECTIVES

* = Equipment Research and Development Activities

* = Occasionally Only, Step 5 After Step 6
II. EXPLANATION OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY

(Extract from Appendix A of the Provisional People's Consultative Congress Edict No. II of 1960)

1. As a consequence of the form and nature of the security and defense of the Republic of Indonesia, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia participate in the settlement of the demands of the national revolution in their respective fields.

2. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia will restore security within the shortest possible time.

The Defense and Security Organization

1. The organization of national defense and security in all corners of the land is regulated in a Basic Defense/Security Law.

2. The President, as Supreme Commander, has complete authority over the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.

3. The organization of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, the nucleus of over-all people's defense, is regulated by law.

4. The State Police is a revolutionary instrument for the maintenance of internal security. The position and duties of the State Police are regulated in a Basic Law on Police Matters.
5. The Supreme Court/Army Supreme Court, including the Attorney General/Judge Advocate General, are revolutionary instruments that occupy the position of assistants to the President. The position and duties of the Supreme Court/Army Supreme Court and the Attorney General/Judge Advocate General are regulated by law.

Development of the Armed Forces and State Police

1. The development of the Armed Forces and State Police of the Republic of Indonesia must be in conformance with the principles of national policy, the basis of the policy for national defense, and the form of national defense.

2. a. In the mental field, members of the Armed Forces and State Police should be thoroughly indoctrinated in the Pantjasila and in the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia and its Commentary, which contain the main line of national policy, and in the President's Instruction on Development and his speeches titled "The March of Our Revolution" and "To Build the World Anew," which contain the main line of development policy and the guides to their implementation.

   b. Efforts to improve spiritual life should be undertaken in the various services, cognizance being taken of the various religions.

3. The policy of financing the development of the Armed Forces and State Police should be based on the principle of equilibrium between the services, and between the field of defense and security and other fields, and consideration should be given to the financial capability of the state.
The Armed Forces and State Police in the Production Process

The Armed Forces and State Police of the Republic of Indonesia participate in the production process without acting to the detriment of their primary assignments.

Problem of Legislation

With the reinstitution of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and with the establishment of the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia and its Commentary as the main lines of national policy, all legislation which deals with defense and security must be completely reviewed.

PART 30
SECURITY AND DEFENSE

The Main Line of Development in the Field of Security and Defense

403. Evaluation of the Armed Forces by the Security Council or National Defense Council

The development of the Armed Forces cannot be carried out on the basis of a single strategic evaluation, rather it must be carried out on the basis of continuous strategic evaluations. Hereafter, this planning must be carried out at the level of the Security Council or National Defense Council, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Basic fundamentals, factors which require consideration,
and efforts which can be undertaken are presented below.

404. **Legislation**

   a. Various laws, government ordinances, and other legal regulations which deal with defense and security are based on the Provisional Constitution. With the reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution and the establishment of the Political Manifesto and its Commentary, the President's Instruction on Development and his speeches titled "The March of Our Revolution" and "To Build The World Anew" as the main lines of national and development policy and as the guides to their implementation, the adaptation of these laws and regulations has become necessary. Attention must be given to the order of the problems regulated, so that hereafter there will be a uniform sequence of legislation which conforms to a specific plan and system.

   b. This requires a Basic Defense Law, one which will provide fundamental decisions on the concept of defense, cover both defense policy and defense organization, and serve as a foundation for subsequent legislation on the duties, authority, and organization of the Armed Forces and State Police of the Republic of Indonesia.

   c. The Basic Defense Law must contain:

      1. The National Objective, which is taken from the 1945 Constitution and the Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia. Our National Objective is an Indonesian state which is free, united, sovereign, just, and prosperous. All groups in our society are obligated to work for or participate in the effort to achieve our
National Objective. Even so, they cannot act independently. They must be organized officially, semi-officially, and unofficially, the purpose of this being to have everything that is done to achieve our National Objective carried out in a regulated, coordinated, and efficient fashion, and on the basis of clear and firm duties and responsibilities. This is why representatives of the various people's groups have been included in a number of organizations; some are in the Provisional People's Consultative Congress, some are in Parliament, some are in the Government, some are in the Supreme Advisory Council, and some are in the National Front.

The duties and responsibilities of the institutions and apparatus of the state are clear and firm. The Armed Forces are a functional group. Members of the Armed Forces sit in these various institutions as representatives of the Armed Forces functional group. They share in the responsibility of the institution in which they sit and they carry out their duties within the framework of their responsibility to that institution. But, the Armed Forces as an organization, or more correctly, as an instrument of national authority and not as a functional group, are situated in the field of government. The primary role of the Armed Forces in the field of government is that of security, that of providing security to the effort to establish and perpetuate the National Objective.

The Armed Forces perform their security role against all dangers which threaten the effort to achieve our National Objective, both those from abroad, in which case security takes the form of national defense, and those
from within, in which case security takes the form of internal security.

Our Armed Services consist of the Armed Forces and the State Police of the Republic of Indonesia. Internal security is the main assignment of the State Police and national defense is the main assignment of the Armed Forces.

2. The philosophical basis of the State, the Pantjasila, as the spiritual foundation of national defense.

3. The objective of defense, which conforms to the level and objective of our national struggle.

4. The Indonesian nation's view of war.

5. The fundamentals of our defense policy and nature of our defense.

6. Basic decisions on the instruments which maintain national security, on the types and respective assignments of the Armed Forces.

7. Basic decisions on the mobilization and call-up of manpower (volunteers, military conscripts, general defense conscripts, training conscripts, preliminary training for people's defense, demobilization, veterans, disabled veterans, and heroes).

8. Basic decisions on the preparation and utilization of the national potential (other than manpower) for national defense requirements.

9. Basic decisions on the assignments and authority held by the instruments for the maintenance of national security during peacetime and wartime.
d. Military justice must be regulated through legislation which accords with the situations.

e. The various aspects of civil defense, a component part of national defense, must be regulated by law.

f. As regards the State Police, the Basic Law on Defense should contain the following sentence: "Their assignment, authority, and responsibilities, leadership and organization, personnel and equipment, and their working relationship with other authorities are regulated in the Basic Law on Police Matters."

g. The President has the supreme responsibility for defense because domestic policy, foreign policy, and military policy all are integrated in defense policy. Therefore, the President must sit as Chairman/Member of the organization which formulates our defense policy, the National Security Council/National Defense Council. Other members are officials of the state whose assignments and responsibilities are closely connected with the formulation and implementation of defense policy.

It must be emphasized that it is essential that attention be given to the principle of mutual help in organizing the membership of any organization, and this is particularly true when a very vital organization is concerned. The men who are gathered together to formulate a policy are ultimately responsible for the execution of that policy. As executors they will loyally carry out all instructions they receive because these instructions are based on the policy they formulated.

h. The following should be regulated by laws or government ordinances or should be brought into conformance with existent legislation:

2. Organization and functions of the Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy.

3. Organization of the Armed Forces.
4. Military regulars (volunteers).
5. Military conscripts.
6. General defense conscripts.
7. Training conscripts.
8. People's Defense Preliminary Training (P3R)
9. Demobilization.
10. Veterans.
11. Disabled veterans.
14. Other rights of members of the Armed Forces.
15. State of danger [martial law] and the organization and functions of the Supreme War Administration.
16. The Control of Materiel Regulation (Regeling Materieel Beheer), which is connected with the Indonesian Accountability Law (Indonesische Comptabiliteits Wet) and the Indonesian Industrial Law (Indonesische Bedrijven Wet).
17. Regulation of Civil Affairs: organization, functions, and working methods.
19. Other laws and government ordinances required for the regulation of problems caused by the Basic Defense Law.
20. A welfare law for the members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
405. **Basis for the Development of the Armed Forces and State Police**

Facts which influence the problem:

a. The existence of two processes of "stabilization" in the world, which greatly influence international political life.

b. Indonesia's interest in defending national independence and initiating planned economic development while maintaining its active and independent policy.

c. The nature of the peace-loving Indonesian nation, which is summed up in the Pãntjasila, and the very strategic geographic position of Indonesia.

d. The process of isolation which is being continued against the political forces which oppose the Political Manifesto within the country.

e. Destructive activities and economic instability resulting from counterrevolutionary and subversive revolts.

f. The influence of colonization on political, economic, and cultural life.

g. Internal security and defense are closely interrelated and Indonesia must prepare itself to carry out both functions at one time.

h. These factors compel Indonesia to carry out a defense policy of active defense and an independent and active foreign policy.

i. In carrying out its independent and active policy Indonesia actively participates in the effort to achieve and maintain world peace.
406. **Concept of Defense**

a. We have a policy of active defense, meaning that it is not aggressive. Our view of war reflects the principles of the Pantjasila, that is, the Indonesian nation is peace loving and wants friendship with all nations; it does not want war. Indonesia will go to war only when everything possible has been done to prevent war and when there is no other way to settle a dispute with another nation, therefore, when Indonesia is compelled to resist in the national interest.

The spirit of the Indonesian revolution and the view of the Indonesian nation toward war being what they are, our defense policy must necessarily be inspired by a spirit of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, be actively defensive in nature, and reject participation in military alliances.

If we are forced to go to war we will certainly be faced with a modern type war. Modern war is a test of the total strength of a nation. It necessitates the mobilization of all the sources of national strength and of all the elements of the nation's war potential.

From this it is evident that the destruction of the enemy's troops on the field of combat, troops which constitute only one element of the enemy's war potential, is no guarantee of victory. We must be able to destroy the entire war effort of the enemy. Therefore, primary emphasis must be placed upon the development of modern Armed Forces, which possess a strategic offensive element which can be launched against the enemy's supporting elements in his own territory. The possession of a
strategic offensive element will provide important support to our diplomacy and will serve to deter the enemy from starting a war.

Furthermore, our defense concept must not impair the assignments now being carried out by the Armed Forces, namely, the restoration of internal security and the struggle for West Irian; rather, it must be capable of hastening the completion of these efforts. Finally, in formulating our defense concept attention should be given to the characteristics of our nation: if forced into a war it will never surrender but will resist with all the manpower and materiel that can be mobilized until final victory is won.

b. The war potential of a nation is composed of its national spirit, its industrial and economic strength, its Armed Forces, its capacity for scientific research and development, and its manpower. It is apparent that the Armed Forces constitute only one element in the war potential of a nation. Nevertheless, they are the most active instrument of the Government in exerting direct physical pressure on the enemy. Also, when compared to the actions of other instruments which aim at the achievement of the National Objective, the actions of the Armed Forces are the most conspicuous. Therefore, the Armed Forces must necessarily press their requirement for manpower and materiel.

It has been stated that the Armed Forces are the most active instrument in national defense. Even so, national spirit is the foremost element in the war potential of a nation. Once the national spirit for
continued resistance against the enemy is broken, whatever the reason, the enemy is in a position to achieve his aims easily.

National spirit has its source in the ideology of the state. Therefore, indoctrination in the ideology of the state is most essential, namely the Pantjasila, the Political Manifesto, the President's Instructions on Development, "The March of Our Revolution," and "To Build The World Anew," for the Indonesian people generally, together with indoctrination in the Soldier's Oath for the members of the Armed Forces. The purpose of this is to insure that should Indonesia be forced into a war the People and the Armed Forces would never surrender, regardless of the situation, and would work with the men and materiel available to them for victory.

The five elements in the war potential of a nation constitute a harmonious entity. This means that the development of the Armed Forces must be harmonized with the development of the other elements in the war potential of the nation. Therefore, the following efforts must be undertaken in conjunction with the development of the Armed Forces and of the national spirit:

Development of industrial and economic strength, so as to become non-dependent in meeting the various material needs of the Armed Forces and of the People. In this connection, during the first stage of over-all development foundations must be laid for industrial development, which will meet the requirements of the Armed Forces.

Development of the field of scientific research and development. This is important to both the Armed Forces
and to industry. In this connection, such scientific research and development institutions as are important to the Armed Forces must be established during the first stage of over-all development.

Development of manpower, that is, providing training and instruction in order to obtain trained personnel to meet the various requirements of the Armed Forces in particular and of the state in general. In connection with the manpower factor, mention must be made of the need for a proportional allocation of manpower for all activities of the state, both in peacetime and in wartime.

c. If a country attacks us, our best policy is to prevent its forces from entering our nation. It would be better yet if we could attack them in their own territory and strike them there, destroying them at home, but at the present time we do not have this capability.

d. If the enemy is moving toward our nation, it would be best to destroy him enroute, thus preventing him from landing in our country. It is possible that this too cannot be done at the present time.

e. In view of the size of our country, it will be impossible to defend each place in Indonesia against the enemy if he succeeds in landing here. After the enemy enters an area, we will mobilize land, sea, and air forces against that area and destroy him there. In order to carry out a movement of this type we must control the air and sea routes to the area.

f. If we are unsuccessful in the measures referred to in paragraph e. we must fall back on the doctrine we now practice, that of Territorial Warfare.
407. **Organization of the Armed Forces and of the State Police**

a. Indonesia's military strength must be organized in keeping with the requirement of facing and destroying all possible aggression.

b. The following points must be considered in organizing our military strength:
   1. An active and independent foreign policy.
   2. A defense policy which calls for active defense.
   3. A defense based on our own strength.
   4. Indonesia is now in the midst of settling the demands of its national revolution.
   5. Indonesia still lags in its rate of economic advancement, in industry particularly.
   6. Our defense must have the characteristics of a people's defense.
   7. Indonesia's geographic position.
   8. The existence of important strategic targets in thinly settled areas outside Java.

c. Due to the above factors and within the framework of our policy of active defense, Indonesia needs Armed Forces of the type which must be taken into account by each potential aggressor, not because of their power to repulse him but because of their ability to contain and eventually destroy him.

d. Nevertheless, this does not reduce the duty of the services to organize offensive strength, the Navy and Air Force particularly, since the correct system of defense for our air and sea areas is attack.
408. **Conditions for the Implementation of the Defense Policy of the Republic of Indonesia**

a. **Requirements Based on an Evaluation of Geographic Characteristics:**

1. Improvement of the system and organization of land, sea, and air transportation, thus to reduce isolation in peacetime and to maintain communication open as long as possible in emergencies and in wartime.

2. Maintenance of the effort to achieve maximum self-sufficiency through land reform and other programs.

3. Uniform distribution of the population.

b. **Efforts to Strengthen Indonesia's Position as Regards the Supply of Food and Other Vital and Strategic Materials:**

1. Achieving national and territorial self-sufficiency in food production, thus to meet the needs of consumers and to create a surplus to be stored for emergencies and for wartime.

2. Conducting studies for the improvement of the techniques and system of stockpiling and the preservation of surplus food.

3. Discovery and exploitation of new sources of minerals and the rehabilitation, modernization, and expansion of existent sources.

4. Assignment of priorities for the processing of vital raw materials for tin, bauxite, petroleum, and other state-owned industries.

5. Reviewing the nationalization and position of foreign firms that exploit mineral deposits and manage estates which produce vital commodities, thus to prevent difficulties which would affect the interests of national defense.

6. Improvement of the system of distribution and control (nationalization) of vital transportation by
the state; most of the transportation of oil (tanker fleets) is still in the hands of foreign enterprises.

c. Efforts Required in the Field of Industry:
   1. An effort aimed at national self-sufficiency in the field of industry, concerning:
      a) Automatic equipment.
      b) Army, Navy, and Air Force equipment.
      c) Facilities for the maintenance and repair of the above equipment.
      d) Weapons.
      e) Communication equipment.
      f) Drugs, chemicals, and so forth.

   2. In line with this effort aimed at national self-sufficiency and in support of the above projects, attention is required in the following development sectors:
      a) Projects for increasing the amount of electrical power, as an economical source of power.
      b) Projects for the processing of iron ore, bauxite, tin, and other important commodities.

   d. Efforts in the Fields of Transportation and Communication:
      1. Rehabilitation, modernization, and expansion of harbors, repair shops, docks, and airfields must be undertaken to handle increasing requirements.

      2. Construction of airfields, harbors, and road networks, particularly in areas outside Java.

      3. In deciding upon types of land, sea, and air transportation and communication equipment, priority must be given to those types which can be most easily converted to serve defense needs.
4. The interests of defense must also be considered in building technical facilities, opening road networks, and so on. At times it will be necessary to open new communication routes with certain areas. Viewed from an economic aspect these may not be profitable, viewed from the aspect of defense they will have a vital meaning.

5. Guidance of small-scale commercial shipping, in which vessels constructed in Madura, Makasar, Bandjarmasin, and elsewhere in Indonesia are used, will greatly assist coastal and inter-island sailing. This fact will be particularly evident when free sea communications can no longer be maintained, since few formalities are required for these ships and they can employ various formations.

6. In order to simplify the maintenance, care, and repair of this equipment the principle of maximum standardization should be observed to the extent possible, since this is an important factor in wartime and in emergency situations.

e. Efforts in the Field of Telecommunication:

1. Modernization of the telecommunications system and equipment must be continued so that peacetime, emergency, and wartime needs can be fully served.

2. Remote areas that are important as national defense outposts must be included in a telecommunications network even though they may have little economic importance.

3. Old regulations on the use of telecommunications equipment by private persons must be reviewed so
that security can be better guaranteed (channels, types and levels of frequencies).

4. Within this framework, the system under which terminals are used constitutes an effort to compel the sending of communications through centralized channels.

5. An increase in the number of mobile listening posts and the use of modern equipment to counterbalance the use of VHF and UHF equipment will facilitate the control of message security.

6. The development of industries capable of producing telecommunication equipment for our own needs will free us from dependence on foreign countries. Standardization must be aimed at in the production of this equipment.

f. Efforts in the Mental and Physical Fields:

1. Land reform must be carried out in the effort to achieve prosperity and well-being, as intended by the food and clothing program.

2. A broad effort must be made to raise the level of education and training so that the people can more easily follow and understand national policies in which they are concerned.

3. An intensive effort must be made to eliminate disease and improve the physical condition of the people.

4. Guidance and information must be given the people in the effort to improve their health.

5. The resettlement effort must be perfected. This will provide the people with a better life and will
help overcome the manpower shortage in thinly settled areas.

6. An effort to improve spiritual life must be made in each of the services and by the various recognized religions. Places of worship can be built for the persons of various faiths. Also, religious leaders should be consulted in connection with the participation of the people in defense and security matters.

7. Preparations and planning for demobilization must be undertaken even before the pertinent laws or regulations are drafted, and the principle of transferring the persons demobilized into the field of development should be observed.

409. Organization of the Army
   a. Basic Organization:
      1. A militia army composed of: a volunteer army (regulars) supported by people's resistance troops.
      2. Function: to face all possible aggression.
      3. A strong command organization with great control capability.
      4. Modern organization, training, and supply of troops (ready strength, mobile).
   b. Military Strategy (general decisions).
      1. In facing all possible aggression the strategic assignment of the Army is:
         a) Against foreign subversive activities: to support other instruments of the state.
         b) Against guerrilla activities: when these cannot be overcome by other instruments of the state, to carry out anti-guerrilla warfare.
c) Against armed revolt: to send expeditions to suppress it.

2. In facing open attack the strategic assignment of the Army is:

   Against a limited attack:
   a) To protect against strategic attacks.
   b) To destroy or contain enemy troops who have been successful in landing.

3. In limited warfare and general warfare:
   a) To protect against strategic attacks.
   b) To maintain its own strength and to weaken the enemy, thus making possible a counteroffensive which will free our territory.

4. Three-Phase Implementation:
   a) Frontal Phase (combat, protection and preparation to last in time and space until transition to the Territorial Warfare phase).
   b) Territorial Warfare phase.
   c) General Counteroffensive Phase.

C. Operations and Organization:

1. Regular or Conventional Operations.
   a) Expeditions to put down armed revolts.
   b) Defense against strategic attacks.
   c) Attacking an enemy making a limited attack.
   d) Delaying actions during the first phase of a limited war.
   e) Tactical attacks within the framework of Territorial Warfare.
f) Attack or defense within the framework of a general counteroffensive.

2. Special Operations:
   a) Anti-guerrilla warfare.
   b) Riot control.
   c) Mobilization of manpower to oppose foreign subversive activities.

3. Organization.
   a) Command organization:
      A strong command organization with great command capability based on the geographical situation of the state, in which the sea is a primary factor.
   b) Organization of troops:
      Main units are organized in accordance with need; emphasis should be placed on mobility and the "administrative tail" should be as small as possible.

410. Organization of the Navy
   a. Geographic Factors:
      1. Indonesia is an archipelago composed of thousands of islands.
      2. Its seas are the most difficult in the world.
      3. Military factors which surround Indonesia.
   b. Thesis Concerning Attack from Abroad:
      1. Enemy reconnaissance will come from the sea.
      2. The initial attack will come from the air.
      3. The main attack of their armed forces will come from the sea.
      4. They will aim at certain military objectives and seize certain beaches and debarkation areas.
5. During land warfare most of the enemy's logistical support will come by sea; urgently needed commodities will come by air.

6. The government must use the sea in maintaining inter-island contact.
   c. Defense Thesis:
      1. Destroy the enemy's sources of military equipment through naval and air attacks.
      2. Destroy/reduce the potential of the enemy while he is en route to Indonesia.
      3. Attack the enemy in his own territory with naval and air units.
      4. Make retaliatory landings or coastal raids.
      5. Military operations by the Indonesian Navy during a state of emergency:
         a) Counterattacks from bases in friendly states.
         b) Guaranteeing the communication lines between the central government and the islands in the archipelago.
         c) Guerrilla warfare at sea (Q ships, mine warfare, destruction of commerce).
   d. Fields of Development:
      1. A commercial/sailing fleet.
      2. A fleet to guarantee the security of commercial sailing.
      3. War fleets and landing units (Navy and Marines).
   e. Guide and develop all government bodies and services that have a maritime function (maritime doctrine)
and carry out indoctrination in the Political Manifesto, the President's Instructions on Development, and his "The March of Our Revolution" and "To Build the World Anew" speeches.

f. 5-Year Plan
   1. Restoration of Indonesian Navy bases and stations.
   2. Increase in the number of Navy technicians.
   3. Increase in the strength of units and perfection of their capabilities.
   4. Improvement of social guarantees, particularly the housing of naval personnel.

  g. An effort will be made to put the Indonesian Navy on a self-supporting basis, particularly as regards those of its material needs that are not too difficult to fill.

  h. Expand research and development activities.

  i. The Maritime Territorial Defense Plan and the Organization of Indonesian Naval Strength.

   1. Maritime territorial defense is based on the thesis that the best system of defense is attack, therefore, a main battle fleet will be built.

   2. For the primary assignment:
      a) A main fleet (main striking force) composed of strategic offensive units.
      b) A domestic fleet to cope with domestic situations and establish the authority of the government over all national waters.
This fleet is a tactical fleet and is made up of medium-size patrol boats capable of crossing all Indonesian waters.

c) Strong units of Marines.

3. In order to control the maritime territory of Indonesia, whose waters are very broad and difficult, it is necessary to develop two fleet units, an Eastern Fleet and a Western Fleet. It is anticipated that by so doing the territorial waters assigned to each fleet will not be too extensive and can be better controlled. Two main naval bases will be developed, one for the Eastern Fleet and one for the Western Fleet.

4. It is necessary to develop a mosquito fleet for use in shallow, confined, and difficult waters. This will be made up of small, fast, and dangerous fleet units (motor torpedo boats, coastal vessels, and adequate harbors).

5. For logistics assignments:
   a) A logistics fleet composed of oil tankers, transports, and other support vessels.
   b) Facilities for the storage of certain commodities.

6. For maintenance and development assignments:
   a) Stations at certain naval bases.
   b) Shipyards for the construction of naval ships.
   c) Construction units (battalions) at certain naval bases.

7. For other duties:
   a) A Coastal Patrol Command to assist the police in their work and to ensure the enforcement of
financial and trade regulations (prevent smuggling).

b) A sea-disaster rescue unit.

c) A hydrographic fleet.

d) A national maritime industry must be developed quickly in the interests of:

1) National defense.

2) National unity.

3) Government sovereignty over all Indonesian waters.

411. **Organization of the Air Force**

a. The organization plan for Air Force strength must be based on a defense policy established by the top defense leadership.

b. This plan does not take into account an attack by the enemy in which intercontinental, intermediate range, and short-range ballistic missiles are employed.

c. The strength of national air power must be manifested in the organization of the Air Force and must be fully supported and assisted by:

1. Civil aviation, coordinated as the Civil Air Reserve Fleet.

2. Persons who are air-conscious and who constitute a source of manpower useful to aviation.

3. The aircraft industry.

4. The mining industry (oil, aluminum, steel pipe, and so forth).

d. Organization.

There are four levels of responsibility and authority:
1. The Department of the Air Force: authority and responsibility for policy.

2. Air Force Staff: supervision and control of the Indonesian Air Force as one of the Armed Forces.


4. Air Force units.

e. Organization of Forces.

1. In order to maintain air superiority the Indonesian Air Force must have units for the following assignments:

   a) Air defense.
   b) Strategic.
   c) Tactical.
   d) Logistics and transportation.

2. Units are also needed for the following assignments:

   a) Training (preparation of materiel).
   b) Technical (preparation of materiel).
   c) Defense of air bases.

3. Air Defense Command:

   a) Function: intercept and break up or destroy each enemy attack before it reaches its target.
   b) Structure:

       1) Early warning system.
       2) Interceptor squadrons.
       3) Antiaircraft units.
       4) The people must participate in the preparations undertaken to face the enemy in a Civil Air Defense organization.

4. Strategic Air Unit for Strategic Attacks on Enemy Territory:
a) Function: paralyze the enemy's war potential through strategic attacks on his territory.

b) A Strategic Air Unit composed of the following is required:

1) Strategic bomber and reconnaissance squadron.

2) Air refueling squadron.

3) Long-range escort fighter squadron.

5. Tactical Air Fleet Command:

a) Function: provide the Army and Navy with tactical support in combat areas.

b) The structure of the Tactical Air Fleet Command is composed of:

1) Reconnaissance fighter-bomber squadron.

2) Tactical reconnaissance-bomber squadron.

3) Liaison/utility squadron.

4) Maritime and search and rescue squadron.

6. Air Transport Command:

a) Function: maintain air transportation to meet logistical needs and to increase the mobility of the Armed Forces. If necessary, assistance can be given in maintaining air communications, particularly when areas that are difficult to reach and are not a part of the civil aviation network are concerned.

b) The Air Transport Command is composed of:

1) Heavy transport squadron.

2) Medium transport squadron.

3) Light transport squadron.
4) Helicopter squadron.

5) Fast air communication squadron (for high military and government officials).

7. Aerial survey and air photography squadron (for military requirements and national development).

8. Training Command.
   a) Function: train Air Force personnel (both ground and air).
   b) Composed of:
      1) Air training unit.
      2) Technical training unit.
      3) Administrative training unit.
   c) Provides indoctrination in the Political Manifesto, The President's Instructions on Development, and his "March of Our Revolution" and "To Build the World Anew" speeches.

9. The leadership of the Indonesian Air Force is formed at the Air Force Academy and the Air Force Staff College. Special courses are also given.

    a) Function: acquisition, maintenance, storage, and readying of Air Force materiel.
    b) The Technical and Materiel Command is composed of:

   1) Acquisition of materiel depot.
   2) Maintenance of materiel depot.
   3) Storage of materiel depot.
   4) Research and development depot.

11. Air Base Defense Unit:
    a) Function: base defense.
b) Composed of:
   1) Base defense troops.
   2) Anti-aircraft troops.
   3) Anti-atomic, biological, and chemical warfare troops.
   4) Airborne troops.

12. Coordination.
   a) The organization plan of the Armed Forces must be approved and coordinated by the Government.
   b) A National Defense Council must be formed.
   c) Coordination of the three services will be accomplished through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attention must be given to the social benefits for Air Force personnel, EM and NCOs particularly (housing, barracks, medical, pensions).

412. **Organization of the State Police**
   a. Organization.
      1. From a constitutional aspect:
         a) The Police occupy a position between civilian and military authorities.
         b) The Police are given a position among the other agencies which is proportional to their functions and services.
      2. From the aspect of national administration:
         In personnel matters and everything concerned therewith, Police personnel occupy a position between civilian and military personnel.
      3. Activities.
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General: perfecting the activities of operating units.

Specific:

a) Perfecting the organization, assignment, and equipment of operating units.
b) Perfecting training (vocation, skills, and character).
c) Controlling border areas to prevent smuggling.
d) Perfecting studies in the field of criminology.
e) Perfecting laboratory work.
f) Security follow-up operations in areas now controlled by the military.

b. Personnel.

1. General

In keeping with the present needs of the revolution, striving to fill important posts with capable, talented, true, and progressive personnel so that the change in spirit in Police ranks can be better felt by the people.

2. Specific

a) Deciding on structure (assignment, distribution of rank) in accordance with present needs.
b) Achieving a 700 : 1 ratio between the population and the Police.
c) Accommodating decisions on personnel matters to the needs of the revolution and basing them on the Political Manifesto.
d) While observing humanitarian principles, attempting to find a place for personnel who are unable to
adapt themselves to the new nature of the State Police on the basis of the Political Manifesto and the President's Instructions on Development.

e) Increasing the enthusiasm for work and improving the appearance of personnel.
(Translator's note: In the original, point b. is entitled Weapons, although the text refers to Personnel matters. Obviously, point c. was inadvertently left out of the original document.)

d. Training.

1. General:

Making up the personnel shortage with persons who have good skills and characters, in keeping with the present development effort.

2. Specific:

a) Adapting the training effort to the needs recognized by the Personnel Affairs Bureau at State Police Headquarters.

b) Improving the training equipment used at all levels (from the Police Academy on down).

c) Aside from training in technical subjects, more attention will be given to training in morality and in all aspects of national consciousness and to indoctrination in the Political Manifesto, the President's Instructions on Development, and his "The March of Our Revolution" and "To Build the World Anew" speeches.

e. Welfare.

1. Make a maximum effort to meet the daily needs of personnel.

2. Perfect efforts now being carried out.
3. Attempt to establish a polyclinic, under its own head nurse, in each district.

4. Train police personnel as nurses.

5. Establish a Mother and Child Health Agency in each district.

6. Supply regions with drugs and improve methods of acquisition.

7. Supply recreation and sports equipment to personnel, particularly those living in barracks.

   f. Mental.

   1. Indoctrination.

   2. Indoctrination in the Political Manifesto.

   3. Guided Democracy and Indonesian Socialism.

   4. Significance of the Return to the 1945 Constitution.

Note: The Police Development Project is included in the projects in the field of Government of the 8-Year Development Plan.

413. Participation of the Armed Forces and the State Police in the Production Process

Generally speaking, the Armed Forces and the State Police are now engaged in production activities. Their role and activity in the field of production bring them closer to the people in this process of national development, in industrialization and the implementation of land reform particularly.

Even so, care must be taken to see that the functions given the Armed Forces and the State Police in the production sector do not exceed their capacities. The functions of these services in the fields of defense and security
must be carried out efficiently and must take priority over the effort to render support in the field of production.

The contribution of the Armed Forces and the State Police in the production sector must be aimed primarily at the attainment of self-sufficiency as regards their own needs. Society may be assisted when personnel are available and when functions assigned to them in the production sector do not act to the detriment of their regular functions. It would be best for this assistance to be provided in fields of work which do not require personnel with special abilities, or the operation of special equipment by personnel with special skills.

414. Possible Productive Activities on the Part of the Air Force
   a. Air transportation and communication (particularly in areas not covered by the civil aviation network).
   b. Aerial surveys and air photography for development projects.
   c. Eradication of malaria and plant disease.
   d. Assistance during natural disasters (search and rescue squadron).
   e. Increasing the production of sea and inland fisheries.

415. Possible Productive Activities on the Part of the Navy
   a. The Navy can assist in the spiritual field by:
      1. Cultivating the Pantjasila ideology in all corners of the country and providing indoctrination in the
Political Manifesto, the President's Instructions on Development, and his "The March of Our Revolution" and "To Build the World Anew" speeches.

2. Restoring the now-obsured maritime spirit of our ancestors.

3. Realizing that "At Sea We Are Victorious" is not just the motto of the Navy but is a national motto, since only by controlling the sea can the nation and the people be victorious.

b. The Navy can assist in the economic field by:

1. Seeing that all economic regulations are honored and obeyed at sea and in the harbors.

2. If the situation so compels, a naval logistic fleet can be mobilized to facilitate distribution.

c. In the maintenance and development field:

1. Maintaining government vessels and commercial vessels if the capability of naval stations is increased to the point where they can handle the maintenance of the materiel of the Navy, the government fleet, and the commercial fleet.

2. Providing suggestions and instructions on the utilization and receipt of maritime materiel.

3. If the capability of naval stations is increased, building harbor vessels.

d. In the field of research and development the Navy can assist in:

1. All natural research in the seas and oceans.

2. All ethnological research on remote islands.

e. The Navy can assist in activities in which the people are concerned by:

1. Promoting fishing activities.
2. Guaranteeing the security of commercial shipping and fishing, sweeping mines, and so forth.

3. Seeing that all buoys, lights, and similar equipment are in good operating condition so that Indonesian territorial waters are truly safe.

4. Supervising general elections on remote and distant islands.

5. Helping chiefs of regions with the supervision of their island areas.

f. Naval units can be sent to foreign countries as state envoys ("grey ambassadors").

g. In the regions the Navy is a symbol of the authority of the central government.

h. Without having to carry out military operations to foreign nations, a Navy is a barometer of the strategic strength of the country.

i. The Navy can provide assistance in the event of a maritime or harbor disaster, if it has the proper equipment (sea-air rescue). Fireboats can be used to put out harbor and shipboard fires.
III. BASIC THOUGHTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ARMED SERVICES

Staff Study by the Deputy Army Chief of Staff I

First Staff Study

I. Foreword

The problem of the development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia is an old one, one which has existed since the sovereignty of the state of the Republic of Indonesia was recognized. It has been the subject of discussions within the respective services and between them, however, there still has not been found a firm foundation upon which a more far-reaching consideration can be based.

It is obvious, perhaps, that the development of the Armed Forces cannot be carried out independently. The solving of this problem and the implementation of the solution will constitute one part of the development of the state as a whole and will be based on the potentialities and capabilities that exist within the state.

In reviewing the progress made in the development of the Armed Forces we see that harmony does not exist among the principal authorities of the respective services or in their integrated relationship within the over-all development of the state. This is because of the lack of unanimity of opinion, particularly as regards the role of the Armed Forces as one aspect of National Strength, which is mobilized to achieve the National Objective.
In this discussion of basic thoughts on the development of the Armed Forces, we will try to present a picture of the correct position of the Armed Forces in their role in the process of achieving the National Objective and as a part of the National Strength.

II. National Objective

After the sovereignty of the state of the Republic of Indonesia was recognized the Indonesian people's aggressive spirit, for the winning of independence and the liberation of the areas held by the Dutch, was transformed into a desire to defend what had been achieved.

As a matter of course, the effort to defend the things that had been achieved concerns more than this problem alone. It must have an objective, a National Objective, namely, the establishment of happiness, well-being, peace, and freedom in the Indonesian society and state.

It is essential that we protect our effort to achieve this National Objective. In so doing, our aim is to permit the smooth and orderly execution of the measures carried out within this effort, thus enabling it to be completed within the shortest possible time and with the greatest possible results.

Ideological principles, a source of spiritual strength, are needed to achieve the National Objective against threats from any and all quarters. These principles are contained in the Pantjasila: Belief in Almighty God, Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy, and Social Justice.
III. National Strength

In our effort to achieve our National Objective, just as in our daily efforts to achieve various objectives, it is essential that we have a firm foundation. This foundation is our National Strength, which can be mobilized for the achievement of the National Objective and for its protection.

National Strength is the fusion of political, economic, social, and military forces, all of which, in their overall relationship to one another, and both functionally and potentially, are given a binding agent, a strengthening element, in the ideological principles mentioned above.

The existence of National Strength is clearly evident when we look back on the history of our struggle and on the stages or levels within it, stages which the President has called:

1. 1945-1950, the stage of physical revolution,
2. 1950-1955, the stage of survival,
3. 1956-, the stage in which we want to enter a period of social-economic revolution.

However, in the initial phase of the third stage, a stage we also know as the completion of the national revolution, our National Strength disintegrated to a point where it was felt necessary to reorganize and restructure it.

IV. General View of Security

Indonesia follows an active and independent foreign policy both as protection of the ideological principles
referred to above, and in order to render secure the reorganization and restructuring of the National Strength and to develop, mobilize, and utilize it thereafter in the effort to achieve the National Objective.

Indonesia holds to an active and independent policy because of the following factors:

1. The influence of the contest between two great blocs, which both attempt to include other nations within their respective spheres of influence. Indonesia is not ignored in these attempts.

2. The desire of the Indonesian nation for a peaceful atmosphere in international relations (peaceful coexistence).

3. Social-economic conditions in Indonesia: the Indonesian nation wants to complete its independence in this field so that it can concentrate its power for national development wherever it is needed.

4. The geographic position of Indonesia: if one bloc succeeds in drawing Indonesia into it, the other bloc will consider this a challenge.

There is another aspect to the implementation of this independent policy -- the Indonesian nation, as a result of its peace-loving nature, cannot sidestep its obligation to actively participate in efforts to achieve and maintain world peace.

In this connection, the implementation of this independent policy is not based upon a power policy because of:
1. The moral foundations of the nation.
2. Limited capabilities.
3. The lack of geographical, ethnological, and religious homogeneity with neighboring countries.

The implementation of this independent policy, both as a method to safeguard domestic activities and as an effort to achieve and maintain world peace, cannot be carried out perfectly because political tensions and social and economic instability are found within the nation. These constitute a fertile breeding-ground for internal disruption and are the result of:

1. the existence of various conflicting political tendencies within the nation;
2. the uneven distribution of the population, both racially and regionally; and
3. the lack of uniformity in the level of advancement and well-being of the people.

Also, we must recognize that as a result of the division of Indonesia during the era of colonization bad psychological influences continue to exist. Employing a policy of "divide and conquer" the colonizers used the people to maintain their colonization.

The state leadership has taken drastic steps to prevent the continuation of this instability. The 1945 Constitution, which covers both the structure of the nation and spiritual factors, has been
reinstituted, guided democracy and guided economy are being carried out, the political party system has been simplified, and so on. These steps are measures which have been taken to reorganize and restructure the National Strength. We also know this process as "retooling" in all fields.

We are also familiar with the Political Manifesto of August 1959. This was announced by the President and has been accepted as national policy. Essentially, this national policy is the road we must follow in mobilizing, developing, and utilizing the national strength for the achievement of the National Objective. It outlines the scope of the movement and establishes boundaries for the activities of the various forces that make up the National Strength.

V. Relationship Between the Mobilization and Security of National Strength

The final result of the reorganization and restructuring of the National Strength must be the attainment of a harmonious and balanced relationship between the forces that make up this National Strength, so that the process of achieving the National Objective can be carried out in the shortest possible time and with the best possible results.

We will encounter two phases of security in this effort, namely:
1. Rendering secure the reorganization and restructuring of the National Strength.

2. Rendering secure the process of achieving the National Objective.

Like it or not, since they are so closely connected with one another we must deal with both phases at the same time.

In mobilizing forces for the maintenance of security we must, mindful of the condition of our "economic backbone," give our attention to the following matters:

1. That part of the National Strength which is mobilized for security functions should be as small as possible and the utilization of non-physical factors should be emphasized,

2. By so doing, the largest possible part of the National Strength can be mobilized as the primary force in the process of achieving the National Objective.

It is perhaps obvious that in this way the principle of an "economical use of means" can be observed in mobilization.

VI. Defense As One Facet of Security

Earlier we spoke of the tensions which have appeared and indicated that they constitute a fertile breeding-ground for the internal disruption of the state. Also,
geopolitical and geostrategical factors place Indonesia in the position of a target in the contest between the two great blocs in the world, a contest which could result in war. In the case of Indonesia, such a war could take the form of cold war, limited attack, limited war, and/or general war.

Therefore, these tensions can constitute a significant factor within the state and can be constituted as an element in the cold war between the two blocs. A parallelism is evident between these factors and the effort to draw us into a bloc, a situation which could be developed and become an element in the attempt to gain supremacy over the opposing bloc.

This is why our internal security and national defense are closely interrelated. The result is that Indonesia must prepare itself to handle both problems at the same time.

Perhaps it can now be understood that our choice of an independent policy, both as one of the best methods of rendering secure the reorganization and restructuring of National Strength and its mobilization, development, and utilization as well as in the effort to actively participate in the establishment of peace in the world, also compels us to carry out a defensive policy. This means that Indonesia wants to settle its disputes peacefully and that it considers the use of force to be the last resort in the settlement of a dispute. Therefore, Indonesia will go to war only when it is attacked.
VII. The Position of the Armed Forces in Relation to the Mobilization and Security of the National Strength and As Seen from the Angle of Their Views Toward War

We can conclude from the foregoing analysis that our Armed Forces occupy the following position within the framework of the effort to achieve the National Objective:

1. They are a part of the National Strength which is mobilized for the achievement of the National Objective.

2. As part of the forces mobilized to render secure the process of achieving this objective the least possible amount of Armed Forces is to be used and emphasis is to be placed on the use of non-physical factors.

The above definition of position, which sums up the assignment and nature of the Armed Forces, conforms to the definitions of the assignment of the Armed Forces and to the nature of national defense as embodied in our laws:

1. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia are entrusted with the protection of the interests of the State of the Republic of Indonesia (Provisional Constitution, article 125, paragraph 1).

2. The national defense of the Republic of Indonesia has the character of an orderly People's Defense and is carried out under the leadership of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Law No 29 of 1954, concerning National Defense).

In order to carry out the above assignment the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia must prepare themselves to face all forms of war which may endanger and violate
the interests of the Republic of Indonesia and, when necessary, to organize military forces to check and suppress cold-war activities (maintenance of internal security) and to face out-right attack.

In organizing military forces the following basic factors must be considered:

1. Indonesia carries out an independent policy and a defensive policy, therefore it must base its defense upon its own strength.

2. Indonesia does not appear as a primary enemy in the contest between the two blocs.

3. At its present level of economic advancement, in the field of industry particularly, Indonesia is grouped with the underdeveloped nations, thus, its productive capacity is still very limited.

4. Due to Indonesia's level of industrial progress, urbanization is still in its initial stages, therefore, there are no significant targets for strategic thermonuclear weapons.

5. The sea separates Indonesia from neighboring countries.

Looking at the above factors, we can conclude that the organization of military forces, seen from its physical aspect, cannot be based on an evaluation of the specific strength of a specific enemy we will face. Rather, it must be based on the capabilities of an indefinite enemy, and consideration must be given to the following estimates:

1. The strength of an indefinite enemy who would openly attack Indonesia will be of a higher quality (technical equipment) than that of our Armed Forces.
2. This being the case, when the armed forces of the enemy attack they cannot be prevented from entering Indonesian territory.

Therefore, within the framework of its defensive policy, Indonesia needs Armed Forces of a type which will compel each potential aggressor to give them earnest consideration, not because of their power to repulse him but because of their power to challenge him afterwards.

We are perhaps aware that in the mobilization of the National Strength to achieve the National Objective, the physical mobilization of the Armed Forces is for the sole purpose of providing security against disturbances which are faced physically. And, as regards technical equipment, we are aware of the limitations of this mobilization.

However, we are also aware that the Armed Forces are one of the components of our National Strength and that they are committed as a primary force in the effort to achieve the National Objective. In this connection then, it is no doubt correct for the Armed Forces to have the position of a functional group.

In view of the positioning of the Armed Forces as a functional group, it is to be hoped that their members, as a result of being mobilized as "physical individuals," will not only be able to render specific services having material and concrete (productive) results, but will also, as a result of being mobilized as "human individuals," be able to render service in the spiritual field.

The position of the Armed Forces as a part of the National Strength would both be stabilized and made more dynamic if there were a harmonious merging of the mobilization of the Armed Forces as a physical force, for their security function, and their commitment as a functional group.
VIII. Conclusions

1. In the effort of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia to stabilize and make more dynamic their position as a part of the National Strength, an effort which must be carried out in conjunction with their development effort, it is very necessary that attention be given to the implementation of the following basic activities:

   a. Stabilizing conditions within their own organizations (reorganization and restructuring).

   b. Making possible a productive mobilization of the Armed Forces for the needs of national development by:

      (1) mobilizing their personnel for direct participation in development;

      (2) mobilizing the production apparatus they control to meet needs over and above their own requirements.

   c. Carrying ahead their own physical-technical development while bearing the following points in mind:

      (1) the technical development of the armed forces of a possible enemy must serve to stimulate the technical development of our own Armed Forces;

      (2) the technical development of the Armed Forces must

           (a) parallel the technical development taking place in the Indonesian society and state;

           (b) catalyze and have a positive influence on the technical development taking place in the Indonesian society and state.
2. On the basis of the estimate that Indonesia, within the framework of its defense policy, needs Armed Forces of a type which will compel each potential aggressor to give them earnest consideration not because of their power to repulse him but because of their power to challenge him on our territory, then these Armed Forces must be a "ready force" whose organization is based on a strategic military evaluation of their methods of combat. This "ready force":

a. contains elements from the three services in a balanced fashion;

b. has the ability to handle internal security;

c. must be constituted as a nucleus and be flexible in form so as to enable its technical-physical development, should emphasis be shifted at a later date from strength which has to be used to challenge the enemy after he invades us to strength which can be used to repulse the enemy.

IX. Conclusion

A formulation of thoughts on strategic military evaluations and problems in the spiritual field will be drawn up separately after these basic thoughts on the development of the Armed Forces are accepted as a basic guide by the three services.

Djakarta, 15 March 1960
IV. TERRITORIAL WARFARE INDOCTRINATION
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

A lecture on the solution of problems of Territorial Warfare given by Brig Gen A. Jani at the Advanced Officers Course B II on 12 September 1960.

A. Bases for the Organization of Military Strength Within the Framework of the Effort to Achieve the National Objective

1. National Objective

1.1 The Indonesian nation proclaimed the independent state of the Republic of Indonesia and has and will struggle to the limit of its ability to defend its independence and to achieve a certain specific objective, one which is customarily referred to as its National Objective.

1.2 The National Objective of our nation is formulated in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution as: "A free, united, sovereign, just, and prosperous Indonesian state".

1.3 As of the present moment the desired National Objective has not been achieved. Our nation has gone through the stage of physical revolution (1945-1950) and the stage of survival (1950-1955) and has been in the stage of social-economic revolution since 1956. It is to be hoped that this stage will see the completion of our national revolution and the achievement of the National Objective.
2. **National Strength**

2.1 A certain National Strength is required for the achievement of this National Objective. This National Strength is used in carrying out the effort to realize the National Objective and in rendering secure both this effort and the following effort, that of maintaining the realization of the National Objective.

2.2 The National Strength is composed of both ideal and material elements and within it are fused all of the national forces in the ideological, political, economic, social, and military fields.

2.3 This National Strength is gathered together in a receptacle which is the independent state of the Republic of Indonesia. This state, according to the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, is based on the Pantjasila, that is, the principles of Belief in God, Humanitarianism, People's Sovereignty, and Social Justice.

2.4 In view of the progress of the times and Indonesia's geographical situation, two aspects of our National Strength cannot be ignored, namely, national strength at sea and national strength in the air.

2.5 The organization, control, and mobilization of our National Strength is now being perfected so that maximum efficiency may be achieved and the effort to perfectly realize our National Objective facilitated. This is known as the "retooling" campaign. It is being carried out in all fields, is based on USDEK (1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, Indonesian Identity), and will be followed by planned over-all development.
3. **The Role of the Armed Forces in the Effort to Achieve the National Objective**

3.1 The Armed Forces, as one of the component parts of the National Strength, have a role in the effort to achieve the National Objective. In this role they have a harmonious and balanced relationship with the other component parts of the National Strength.

3.2 The main role of the Armed Forces is to render secure both the effort to realize the National Objective and the effort to maintain the realization of the National Objective.

3.3 This security role is carried out by the Armed Forces against anything which threatens these efforts. It takes the form of an internal security assignment if the threat is from within and the form of a national defense assignment if the threat is from abroad.

3.4 The Armed Forces hold to the Soldier's Oath in their performance of this role. This oath has seven paragraphs and is of an ideological, patriotic, ethical, and doctrinal nature. One of its doctrines is very important and of great significance, namely, the doctrine which declares that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia **DO NOT SURRENDER**.

3.5 The Armed Forces can be assigned other roles in addition to their primary role. These are assigned by the state leadership after giving consideration to the situation and needs of the state at any given time, for instance, during a national emergency.
4. **Factors Which Influence the Role of the Armed Forces**

4.1 The conflict between two great blocs, a conflict based on ideological principles, has an influence on other nations, that is, they are attracted to one or another of the blocs. Indonesia, due primarily to its geographical position, does not escape this influence.

4.2 Since Indonesia constitutes one of the targets in this conflict, the ideological principles referred to in paragraph 7-d [sic] have an even more important meaning for the country.

4.3 Indonesia observes a policy of independence in the conflict between the two blocs. The factors which influence Indonesia in carrying out this policy are:

4.3.1 The nature of the Indonesian nation. This nature is summed up in the Pantjasila and it is because of this nature that Indonesia wants to live in an atmosphere wherein international relations are peaceful (peaceful coexistence).

4.3.2 The social-economic situation in Indonesia. The Indonesian nation wants to complete its independence and to do this it must concentrate its forces for the task of national development. Therefore, Indonesia could not possibly take part in a war between the two blocs, a war which could break out at any time.

4.3.3 The geographical position of Indonesia (see the appended geo-strategical evaluation of Indonesia). Due to its geographical position, if Indonesia is drawn into one of the blocs this will constitute a challenge to the other bloc. The dispute between the two blocs will be accentuated and the threat of war will arise, and Indonesia certainly will be involved.
4.3.4 The domestic political situation. Various political tendencies which oppose one another and attempt to counterbalance one another are found in the country. Therefore, each government must necessarily be politically independent. Also, the political instability in the country requires the full attention of each government.

4.4 Indonesia, in carrying out this independent policy and as a peace-loving nation, cannot sidestep its obligation to actively participate in efforts to achieve and maintain world peace.

This independent policy is not based on "power politics" because of:

4.4.1 The moral foundations of the nation.
4.4.2 Limited capabilities.
4.4.3 The lack of geographical, ethnological, or religious continuity with neighboring nations.

B. Basic Principles of the Development Policy for the Armed Forces

1. With the above analysis we can now draw certain conclusions, conclusions which must be used as a foundation in considering the basic principles of the development policy for the Armed Forces (see the appendix, "A General View of War").

1.1 The Indonesian Nation's View of War.

1.1.1 War is the last resort in the settlement of a dispute and will have to be forced on the peace-loving Indonesian nation.

1.1.2 The Indonesian nation is not aggressive and will go to war only if it is attacked.
1.1.3 If there is war, the Indonesian nation WILL NOT SURRENDER.

1.2 Basic Defense Policy

Considering that the Pantjasila is the basis of the state and that we carry out an active and independent policy, then our basic defense policy is:

1.2.1 Defensive in nature.

1.2.2 Based on the principle of nonalliance.

1.3 Concept of Defense

1.3.1 Our policy is a policy of defense and not a policy of aggression, therefore, we will not launch the initial attack.

1.3.2 If we are attacked by another nation our best move will be to prevent the enemy from entering our country. It would be even better to strike the enemy in his own country, or even destroy him there.

1.3.3 If the enemy is moving toward our country our best move will be to destroy him enroute and thus prevent him from landing here.

1.3.4 Suppose that the enemy is able to effect a landing in our country, for it will be impossible for us to defend every place in Indonesia because of the terrain and the length of the coastline. If the enemy is able to enter one part of the country our best response will be to quickly mobilize a land, sea, and air force, go to the area, and destroy the enemy there. It is obvious that in carrying out an operation of this type we must control the sea and air along the route to the area and in the area.

1.3.5 Supposing that the operation referred to above is not successful, our Armed Forces must continue
their struggle using any and all means, because they do not surrender. In this case, frontal resistance will change to total resistance and will be carried out by the Armed Forces together with all the people. The objective will be to continually damage the enemy in all fields so that he will be unable to achieve his objectives.

2.1 On the basis of the above facts, it is necessary to formulate:

2.1.1 Mental principles which the Armed Forces can hold to in defending the country.

2.1.2 The capabilities required of the Armed Forces.

2.1.3 The development objective of the Armed Forces.

2.2 Mental Principles

In defending the independence of the state with all available forces, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia will fight until final victory is achieved, even if the enemy occupies all of the territory of our nation. In carrying out this struggle each service will fight continuously and will be employed in accordance with its particular nature and abilities.

2.3 Capabilities Required of the Armed Forces.

In order to carry out this assignment the Armed Forces must have a minimum capability, namely, a capability to challenge an invader which an aggressor will have to take into account, and a maximum capability, namely, a capability to repulse the enemy and thus possibly to prevent a critical war.
2.4 Objective of Development

We must develop modern Armed Forces strong enough to prevent an enemy from entering and occupying our territory. The effort to develop modern Armed Forces strong enough to repulse the enemy will require no little time since it must be carried out in conjunction with the effort to develop our national industry and it must be carried out in stages. The present 5-year Development Plan of the Armed Forces is the first stage in the long-range development plan of the Armed Forces, and the long-range plan is part of the national development plan.


3.1 In developing the kind of Armed Forces we aspire to, we must take into account the possibility that a war may break out before their development is completed. Facing this possibility we must draft a concept of defense which is based on the manpower and materiel available at this time. Therefore, we must draft a short-range concept of defense which is based on the amounts of manpower and materiel that are available within this short-range period.

3.2 In view of our present capabilities we have no other course than to plan, as our short-range concept of defense, a strategy which is defensive in character. In carrying out this defense strategy we must utilize all of the national potential and in the defense activity itself the three services must be employed in a manner which is in keeping with their particular natures.

3.3 In this concept we envisage the defense effort as being carried out totally in all fields and being comprised of the following three phases:
3.3.1 Phase I is the phase of frontal combat. Its objective is

3.3.1.1 To destroy or drive back the enemy in decisive battles.

3.3.1.2 Tactical operations are carried out to disrupt the enemy's order of battle, to delay his movements, to gain time and space, and, if necessary, to guarantee the continuity of Phase II.

3.3.2 If we are unable to defeat the enemy in the first phase and if he succeeds in occupying all of our territory we shift to Phase II. In this phase we continue to oppose the enemy's forces and to consolidate our own forces, thus to guarantee the continued independence (survival) of the state and the people.

3.3.2.1 Tactical operations, and if possible a few tactical-defensive operations, are carried out to damage the enemy as much as possible and to maintain the wholeness of our own forces.

3.3.2.2 Our forces are consolidated, built up, and developed for the transition to Phase III. During Phase II the three services carry out operations appropriate to their particular natures and abilities.

3.3.3 In Phase III we launch a counter-offensive.

4. Short-Range Development of the Armed Forces

4.1 In order to carry out this short-range concept of defense we must have Armed Forces whose minimum strength must be built up in the 5-year period beginning January 1961. In building them up the force planning, administration, logistics and personnel needed to support
the implementation of the types of operations referred to above will be carried out.

4.2 Armed Forces which have this minimum strength will constitute the foundation and capital for the development of the type of Armed Forces which are our aspiration.

C. **Concept of Military Strategy and the Function of the Armed Forces**

1. We know from the discussion of the short-range concept of defense that our defense will be based on a defensive strategy, that it will have three phases, that the three services will carry out assignments which accord with their respective abilities, but with a certain amount of integration.

2. Since it is possible that enemy action may take the form of an extension of the cold war (which in Indonesia is connected with the problem of internal security), we can understand that internal security and defense cannot be separated one from the other.

3. The effect of this is seen in the assignments given the Armed Forces, namely:
   3.1 To face internal security problems.
   3.2 To face open attack.

4. The strategic functions of the Armed Forces are as follows:
   4.1 In the cold war:
      4.1.1 To support other instruments of the state in nonmilitary actions.
4.1.2 To carry out antiguerrilla warfare whenever guerrilla warfare mounts to a level at which it cannot be handled by the other instruments of the state.

4.1.3 To send expeditions to put down armed revolts.

4.2 Against open attack:

4.2.1 To mount an offensive against enemy targets, both stationary and mobile, after it is ascertained that the enemy intends to attack (offensive operations within the framework of a defensive strategy).

4.2.2 To maintain an active defense against strategic attacks (defensive operations).

4.2.3 To destroy or contain the enemy when he succeeds in entering/landing in our territory.

4.2.4 To launch a counteroffensive against the enemy.

D. Operational Assignments

1. Against Open Attack the following assignments are carried out, in Phases I, II and III:

Phases I:

1.1 The Air Force

1.1.1 Mounts air offensives against stationary targets in the form of military bases, concentrations, or sources of supply in enemy territory, in order to destroy or cripple them.

1.1.2 Mounts offensive operations against mobile targets en route to Indonesia in order to destroy, cripple, or delay them.

1.1.3 Maintains an active air defense by using a warning system and aircraft/guided missiles in coordination with the Army, Navy, and Civil Defense.
1.1.4 Provides tactical support to the Army and Navy in order to facilitate the operations of both services.

1.1.5 Provides logistical support to the Army and Navy both in the administrative and/or tactical transfer of troops and in the supply of critical equipment and supplies.

1.2 The Navy

1.2.1 Mounts naval offensives against stationary targets in the form of military bases, concentrations, or sources of supply within range of the sea in enemy territory in order to destroy or cripple them.

1.2.2 Mounts offensive operations against mobile targets which are enroute to Indonesia and within range of the sea in order to destroy, cripple, or delay them.

1.2.3 Maintains an active defense of coasts and waterways in coordination with the Air Force and Army, particularly in order to protect bases and harbors.

1.2.4 Provides tactical support (naval gunfire support) to the Army.

1.2.5 Provides logistical support to the Army and Air Force both in the administrative and/or tactical transfer of troops and in the supply of critical equipment and supplies.

1.2.6 Destroys commerce (guerre de course).

1.3 The Army

1.3.1 Carries out frontal operations against landings made by the enemy from the air and the sea. These take the form of:
1.3.1.1 Attacks to destroy/cripple the enemy.

1.3.1.2 Defensive action to prevent the forward movement of the enemy.

1.3.1.3 Containing and delaying the enemy's advance.

1.3.2 In coordination with the Navy and Air Force, maintains an air defense using antiaircraft guns.

1.3.3 Supports the Air Force and Navy in the defense of their military installations.

1.3.4 Provides general logistical support to the Navy and Air Force.

Phase II:

1.1. The Air Force

1.1.1 From bases in areas which we still control:

1.1.1.1 Provides tactical and logistical support to the Army and Navy.

1.1.1.2 Assists the Army and Navy in maintaining and implementing the command function.

1.1.2 From extraterritorial bases, when necessary and possible:

1.1.2.1 Mounts offensive operations against military bases and sources of supply in enemy territory and/or in Indonesian territory occupied by the enemy and against the enemy's lines of command and logistics in order to destroy/cripple them.

1.1.2.2 Transports critical supplies and materiel.

1.1.3 Consolidates its own organization and helps establish the conditions which will enable the Army and Navy to consolidate their organizations.
1.2 The Navy

1.2.1 From bases in areas which we still control:

1.2.1.1 Provides continuous tactical support (naval gunfire support) and logistical support to the Army and Air Force.

1.2.1.2 Assists the Army and Air Force in maintaining and implementing the command function.

1.2.2 From extraterritorial bases, when necessary and possible:

1.2.2.1 Mounts offensive operations against military bases and sources of supply in enemy territory and/or in Indonesian territory occupied by the enemy.

1.2.2.2 Attacks the enemy's lines of command and logistics in order to destroy/cripple them.

1.2.2.3 Transports critical supplies and materiel.

1.2.2.4 Destroys commerce.

1.2.3 Consolidates its own organization and helps establish the conditions which will enable the Army and Air Force to consolidate their organizations.

1.3 The Army

1.3.1 Carries out regular and irregular operations with large and small units. Emphasis is placed on attack.

1.3.2 Consolidates its own organization and helps establish the conditions which will enable the Navy and Air Force to consolidate their organizations.

Phase III:

1.1 This phase is preceded by an integrated consolidation of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
1.2 In this phase emphasis is placed on the mounting of a joint counteroffensive against the enemy by the three services. The counteroffensive is frontal in nature and large units are employed in it.

1.3 The three services cooperate in establishing the conditions and providing the support which will make this operation possible.

2. Against Cold War:

2.1 The Army carries out:

2.1.1 Riot control operations.

2.1.2 Regular operations carried out by expeditions sent to put down armed revolts.

2.1.3 Territorial operations, carried out within the framework of antiguerrilla warfare and aimed at breaking the strength of the enemy and consolidating our own strength.

2.2 The Navy and Air Force provide tactical and logistical support as needed.

E. Our Plan

1. Regions which constitute strategic targets for the enemy must be able to carry out independently all phases of defense, following the concept outlined above. We have made these regions Military Region Commands (KODAMs) and have taken geographic, ethnological, economic, historical, and other factors into account in establishing their boundaries.

2. The commander of the KODAM must be given the authority which will enable him to carry out effectively this assignment, namely:
1.1 The authority to manage the territory (this includes organizing, preparing, and utilizing all territorial potential so that the territory becomes the base for and the source of all resistance activities, both military and nonmilitary, carried out within it.

1.2 The authority to train, form, employ, and maintain combat units within the framework of total defense/resistance within the territory.

3. Three types of organizations have been established for the implementation of this authority. They are:

2.1 A territorial organization, namely, the Military District Commands (KODIMs).

2.2 A training and forming organization, namely, the Infantry Training Regiments (RININF).

2.3 A combat organization formed of combat units.

4. The KODIM exercises the authority for Territorial Management in part of the territory of the KODAM. Also, in order to facilitate the performance of its assignment, the KODIM covers the second-level region (regency). The KODIM, as part of its Territorial Management authority, has the authority to use combat elements and/or units placed under its orders as organizational units in the People's Resistance effort. Since this is an assignment which calls for rather extensive experience, officers who have commanded battalions are selected to command KODIMs.

5. In keeping with the tradition of our Army, which sprang up from the regions at the beginning of the revolution, an infantry training regiment has been established in each KODAM. The infantry training regiment trains NCOs and EM, forms units, and maintains traditional ties between the Army and the local society, thus hardening the firm unity that is required by our concept of defense.
6. In organizing our combat units we must not prepare for "the last war." We must use the time and opportunities which exist in the best possible way. We must produce a form of Territorial Warfare for future use, one wherein combat is carried out in a coordinated fashion by as large units as possible (battalions, brigades, divisions, etc.) We cannot hope to carry out Phase III of our defense in an effective manner if we do not have such large units. Even though our defense is based on an ability to wage Territorial Warfare, the organization of our units must be raised from the battalion level to the brigade, group, and higher levels. By so doing, and if war does not break out for 10 or 15 years, we will reach a stage at which we can easily increase our ability to wage frontal warfare, in proportion with the level of development of our industrial potential.

7. Another echelon, in the form of a Military Department Command (KOREM), can be established in regions where many difficulties are encountered in the direct command of KODIMs by a KODAM. These difficulties may be due to the number of KODIMs within the region or to the problem of communications (the remote locations of various KODIMs).

Territorial Management and Territorial Warfare authority over a part of the territory of a KODAM is then delegated to the KOREM. The boundaries of the KOREM must be established carefully and must be flexible, since the KOREM will handle the Territorial Management of several KODIMs and must provide an adequate area for the movement of large combat units (brigade and larger). KOREMs are established only if they are urgently needed.
8. Interregional Commands (KOANDAs) comprised of several KODAMs have been formed, to reduce the span of control of the Army Chief of Staff. These are commanded by Territorial Deputy Army Chiefs of Staff, who have the authority of the Army Chief of Staff in the areas under their command.

F. Implementation

1. It is obvious that the plan explained above cannot be implemented in a short time, particularly in view of the fact that the restoration of security is our primary short-range duty. Therefore, each step forward must be considered thoroughly, so that the development effort proceeds regularly and accords with the capabilities of our personnel and logistics. Even though the principles have been set down in Directive 0-5, their implementation must be considered and discussed intensively.

2. The headquarters of KODAMs must be organized in the first stage as elements for development management, following the provisions of Directive 0-5. At this stage no organizational change is made in units lower than the KODAM. Infantry regiments, military districts, and the rest remain as they are except for those infantry regiments and sub-territories already transformed into KODAMs (the Provisional Sub-Territory has had its name changed to Sub-Military Region).

3. Infantry Training Regiments are formed at the same time as the headquarters of the KODAMs. In this way training and forming organizations, one of the most important elements in development, exist at the outset.
4. KODIMs and all of their subsidiary organization are formed in the next stage. It is obvious that this will entail a great deal of work, particularly in the personnel field.

5. Later, KOREMs, brigades, groups, and other organizations will be formed where they are needed. In this way the coordination of the territorial management by the KODIMs and the command of battalions can be transferred to the KOREMs and to the brigades, groups, and the like, without a hiatus when the sub-military regions and infantry regiments are eliminated.

Djakarta, 10 September 1960

DEPUTY ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF II

Achmad Jani
Brig. Gen., Indonesian Army
V. OUR MILITARY POLICY

by

General A. H. Nasution

This lecture was presented to "C" Course III students, and term II - class I students of the Army Staff and Command School, officers of the Army Staff and Command School, and invited officers of the Instruction and Training Command on 7 August 1961 at the Army Staff and Command School in Bandung. This document has not been reviewed by the speaker.

Foreword by Brig Gen Sudirman, Commander of the Army Staff and Command School

Your Excellency the Minister of National Security, Commanders, Students, and Officers. When we look at the subjects which have been presented in this course from the first semester up to this month's semester we must recognize that emphasis has been placed on techniques, on the universal principles which lie within the purview of this gathering, that is, within the purview of my role here. These are the universal techniques employed by staff officers. They deal with the operations of infantry divisions, armored divisions, airborne divisions, and other large units. Emphasis will be placed on these techniques once again during this semester.

Even so, here and there we have tried to develop things we can handle with our own resources. Witness the beginning of map training, in which we use our own maps.
These maps were not available when the first classes were organized. We also try to provide the type of training which is of use in our own terrain in these units.

Your Excellency, since it is said that the field of defense and our own doctrine will be covered in this coming semester perhaps it can also be said that techniques will not be emphasized this semester. However, we must take the universal principles and techniques which have been presented in past semesters and develop them and decide how to utilize them in our own defense effort, in other words, we must decide how to unite them with our own doctrine.

Last semester outside personnel presented lectures on complementary subjects. In the coming semester these outside personnel, whom we call guest speakers, will lecture along one line, on one topic. They will help answer the question, "Who, what, when, how, and why do we organize our defense and how do we expand it?"

It is to be hoped that a basic guidance, an understanding, will be provided in the coming semester. The results of the semester will be appraised from this basis. The work of the semester, the work which can be done, which can be produced, by this course will have been improved if it is a good appraisal.

Your Excellency, in the past it has been hoped that guest speakers in lecturing on defense, would provide such guidance on defense problems, as the course has the right to expect. Therefore, now, before beginning this semester, before the guest speakers begin their lectures, this school, this course, will work to see that its needs are met.
Perhaps the efforts undertaken by the school to meet the needs of "C" Course can fulfill our hopes, can help the students to raise our national standards. If this course generates self-respect within this institution, regardless of its deficiencies, then the school can say that the course has a different value, has more value than a similar course in a foreign country. Still, I do not think that in the coming semester we should accept comrades who had taken similar courses abroad.

The building up of this school must be intensified and contributions from students encouraged, because it is important to improve the work of the school and draft a doctrine for this course. The school wonders if it is not time to reduce the number of students being sent abroad or if they should be sent only for specialized training, such as armored or airborne. If there are still other opinions, and here is His Excellency the Minister as Army Chief of Staff, would it not be best for officers who have studied these subjects abroad to discuss them in this school and this course and thus complement the training offered in this semester.

This ends my introductory remarks. I now invite His Excellency the Minister to begin his lecture.

Lecture by General A. H. Nasution, the Minister of National Security

Students, each year in this course I must present an explanation of our military policy. First, however, I would like to present several explanations of a general nature.
By policy, men generally mean a method of endeavor capable of producing maximum results within a given situation. This is what we aim at in formulating our military policy, so that we can achieve the best possible results for our nation in all of its aspects.

In discussing military policy in times past we have been forced to leave domestic problems out of the discussion. We have studied the experiences of other nations and how they face problems and we have had the opportunity to train in other countries. This has had a certain influence on our ways of thinking and more than that, the guides they use we often apply in deciding on the lines of our policy.

Now we are fortunate in having reached a stage wherein our national problems, the problems of our society, are better defined than they were in times past. Of necessity our military policy is only one part of our national policy and, this being the case, it must have its source in our national policy. Our national policy deals with our efforts to base ourselves on our national concepts in achieving our national ideals. Therefore, I say that we are very fortunate that in this matter we have advanced to this stage.

We know that our national problems, our national foundation, our national ideals, even the road we are to follow from the foundation to the national ideals have been delineated in a document we call the Political Manifesto. This being the case, when we discuss our military policy we must first discuss our national policy, or, generally speaking, our national ideals. The main lines of our national policy, which aims at the achievement of our national ideals, have been established. Our military policy, our cultural policy, our foreign policy, and all of
the other policies we carry out are all parts of an overall policy aimed at the achievement of our national ideals.

This policy shapes dynamic activities, but a country must also have what we call a static policy. This means that we must have a governmental structure composed of systems which are based on legislation and tradition, and we must have specific frameworks within which we can work. Our country and our people have a governmental structure, nationalistic concepts, and a tradition of struggle. We must work within these frameworks in striving for our ideals and we must not modify our desires, as is being done in some countries.

This is where we are now and I say that we are very fortunate that emphasis is being placed on certain points in our national policy at this time and that within the framework of our working methods in the state and in society we are moving with more purpose. Thus, it is easier for us to define the military field, even though it is only one part of all of these efforts.

With these general explanations I think that we can now view more concretely the problems in our situation in Indonesia at the present time. Therefore, let us review our national policy and the framework of our governmental structure, which provide us with the lines along which we must work.

I. Concerning Our National Policy.

Another guest speaker has been given the assignment of discussing this subject, however, I think it would be best to briefly formulate the subject in my own way so that
we can establish more clearly the criteria for our field, the military field.

I turn to a subject I have frequently lectured on, the meaning of the Return to the 1945 Constitution. I always refer to this with the phrase used by the President, "The Rediscovery of our Revolution," meaning our return to the basis and objective of the 1945 Proclamation. It is obvious from what we read in the Political Manifesto that we can find the basis and objective of our revolution in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution.

In analyzing the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution we find that it deals with three basic subjects:

First, anticolonialism, since we believe that colonialism must be eliminated everywhere.

Second, we find here the objective of our revolution, an objective which the Political Manifesto breaks down into three general objectives:

1. The formation of a unitary state from Sabang to Merauke, which provides us with an organizational framework for our struggle.

2. The building of a just and prosperous society, or Indonesian Socialism, within this state.

3. With friendship toward all nations, we want to take part in the creating of a lasting world peace, and in order to do this we carry out an active and independent policy.

These three general objectives are presented in other words in the Preamble to the Constitution, which summarizes our revolution. I do not think it is necessary to discuss them here since this would only delay things. These three general objectives are the second basic subject in the Preamble; there is a third important subject.
Third, the Pantjasila, which is our philosophy or our foundation and which contains the following principles:

- Belief in God,
- Humanitarianism,
- Nationalism,
- People's Sovereignty,
- Social Justice.

These principles frequently are placed in an incorrect order. I still see many articles which begin with belief in God, then Nationalism, then Humanitarianism and then the others. However when we look at the original, and view the problem in perspective, it is apparent that Humanitarianism comes before Nationalism and that these are followed by People's Sovereignty and Social Justice.

Generally speaking, I think that the Objective and Basis of our Revolution are now clear. The President, in his wisdom, has established them in the Political Manifesto, which has been sanctioned by the People's Consultative Congress. It would be more correct for us to refer to this document as Our National Policy, since it is based on the philosophy described above and aims at the national ideals we decided on when we proclaimed our independence.

I have said that our state provides our people with an organizational framework in their struggle to achieve the ideals of our revolution. It is obvious that our state is an instrument, and, as the President said, "We are all instruments and this state is the place in which we instruments are located." The state is regulated by a governmental structure which is based upon our concept
of nationalism, and we all work within its framework. However, it is not enough simply to work within this organizational framework. Like every other nation whose working methods are similar to ours, that is, who are also carrying out a revolution, we have social forces in our society that must be organized in support of our ideals. This is why we are forming what we call a National Front.

When we returned to the 1945 Constitution we had a great many opposing parties, mass organizations, and other groups. Now, as a new concept, we have organized a social force, a National Front. It is hoped that the National Front will lead the social forces in supporting the implementation of the Political Manifesto within the organizational framework of our state.

Thus there are two organizations, the state on the one hand and the National Front on the other. When we look at the socialist nations we see that they organize their social forces under the monopoly of a single party, as in Russia, or as a league of various types of parties, as in other socialist states. Essentially, their objective is to consolidate these social forces in support of the implementation of a revolutionary program.

I have spoken of the organization of our state, which is based on those concepts of nationalism which are applicable to us. I would like to mention one aspect of this organization, one measure which has been of great significance, namely, the abandonment of the "Trias-Politica," the separation of powers. §

I bring this matter up because in the past we looked on the separation of powers as a dogma which we could not ignore, basing our ideas on the political science of
western nations. Now we have left the separation of powers, a dogma which had its source in the tumult of the French Revolution. This revolution was a reaction against the feudal and imperial absolutism under which the public was oppressed. The public reacted by revolting. They wanted to prevent a similar concentration of power in the future, power which could again be used to oppress them. From this arose the concept of separation of powers.

I must emphasize that in abandoning the separation of powers we are not losing the concepts which are included. We still have executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Let us take the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as an example. He, the highest official in the judicial branch, becomes a minister, becomes a member of the highest executive body, the cabinet, and later he becomes a member of the People's Consultative Congress, the highest legislative body. This does not mean that the concept of three branches has been lost. Rather, he must know when to act as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, when to act as a minister, and when to act as a legislator. The concept has not been lost, but the method of separation has been nullified.

It is understandable that this separation was made in the French Revolution as a reaction to the misery entailed in the system of absolutism. Men undertook to guarantee that there would be no recurrence of this system. But for us, and for many nations whose working methods parallel ours, the problem is a different one. For us it is more important to concentrate all forces and thus strengthen the effort to achieve our objective.
To this concept I must add a concept we have developed ourselves, that of Guided Democracy. It is often said that the element of guidance in the concept of Guided Democracy resides in its guided objective and its guided foundation, and I think that this is true. It is also said that Guided Democracy is the implementation of a concept contained in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, the concept of achieving consensus through consultation. This is certainly also true, and it provides us with a line to follow.

Entailed in the President's concept of the implementation of Guided Democracy is another very concrete concept, the concept of functional groups. Why is this concept important? Because in thinking about the challenge inherent in the ideals of Guided Democracy, and with this concept of guidance and this method of consultation, we believe that it is no longer necessary to have various parties and ideologies. We have in our Pantjasila and in our revolutionary ideals, one basis and objective for our revolution, one national mission. There is no need for anything else. The principles and objectives parties adhered to in the past are no longer necessary, and since they are no longer necessary, our society can be divided along the lines of its work in the revolution.

The work and services which society performs encourage us to divide it on a functional or work basis. At this time a concept of four basic groups has developed:

1. The material development functional group, which is composed of workers, peasants, businessmen, cooperatives, and other factors concerned with material development.
2. The spiritual development functional group, which is concerned with the development of the spirit of our people and is composed of young people, women, artists, intellectuals, educators, and journalists.

3. The ecclesiastical functional group is an additional functional group, one connected with the principle of belief in God. It is composed of the Moslem, Protestant, Catholic, and Bali Hindu clergy, groups now active in our society.

4. The Armed Forces functional group, which is composed of the military (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the Police, Veterans, and People's Defense Organization (OPR).

This is the grouping which is applied to functional groups. This grouping has an Indonesian nature, that is, it reflects our situation. You can see other groupings in other nations, for example, in the People's Republic of China the intellectuals, peasants, workers, and military are grouped separately. Our grouping is especially adapted to the situations and requirements of our environment.

I have brought this matter up in connection with what we have been talking about, our governmental structure. Our governmental structure is based on our national traditions and concepts and provides us with a framework for our working methods, for the implementation of the activities in our program of revolution. In this connection then, we can now see that we the military have two functions:

1. Our function as an instrument of the state; this is our primary function and one found in all nations.

2. Our function as a functional group.

Thus, we have two functions.
I would also like to speak of the concept of guidance. In Presidential Decision No. 7, which deals with political parties, we see this concept of guidance translated into concrete forms. This decision affirms that a political organization is not permitted to have a basis other than the present basis of our state, that it is not permitted to have an objective other than the present objective of our state, and that it is not permitted to have a program calling for a change in either. This is stated very firmly in the decision.

In connection with all of this, I think that it is very important that we understand a certain matter. I refer to mental retooling, the retooling of our thinking, the adapting of our mental processes, the adapting of our ways of thinking to the concepts I have explained.

Prior to our return to the 1945 Constitution our concepts were quite different from what they are now. After the Presidential decree announcing the return to the 1945 Constitution was issued, new concepts began to emerge. This is why it is important for us to carry out a retooling. It is not easy to change ways of thinking, particularly for older persons who have had much experience in the old governmental structure. This is why mental retooling is carried out. A retooling of our thinking is very important to us in confronting the problems which face us today, something which would be difficult to do with our old methods of thinking.

I take as an example the position occupied by the Army at an earlier time -- I am thinking of the time that I returned as Chief of Staff in 1955. One of the things emphasized in an order issued by the prime minister at
that time was the termination of politicizing by the military. The military was to be no more than a technical instrument of the government. As an instrument of the state we certainly tried to carry this out, however we were not successful. Now we can no longer speak of the termination of political activity because this concept has lost its meaning, in fact it is meaningless in the sense of political action by the Army, precisely because we are at present acting in a political setting.

At the time the retooling committee was revising the basic law on government employees, its first draft of the new law dealt with the de-politicizing of government personnel. I stated then that the basic law, the present law, must declare that government employees supported and defended the ideology and policy of the state. The first draft had only stated that government employees must avoid anything of a political nature.

We see here that what is meant by achieving political consciousness is that while restrictions are placed on political parties, we must become politically conscious, conscious of the basis and objective of the state and of the program of the state. Furthermore, as the Commander in Chief said in a speech, we must support and defend the policy of the state and the viewpoint of the state with a flaming spirit and must never compromise. I want to stress this concept because we can see, both in public society and in military society, that it is not yet being sufficiently taken into account.

These are the main lines which I have wanted to describe. I will just say that our military policy must have its source in our national policy and that our national policy is based on our Pantjasila.
The state of the world, the country, and society being what it is, we must strive to achieve the national ideals which are contained in the Preamble to our 1945 Constitution and which have been formulated and are presented in detail in the Political Manifesto.

Having completed this general analysis, let us now examine the Political Manifesto in detail as it relates to our military policy. I will not discuss the Political Manifesto as a whole but will explain our requirements within the context of the Manifesto. In the Political Manifesto we find a long-range program and a short-range program. Thus in pushing off from our foundation toward our objective we have a program. This program is divided into two parts, a long-range program and a short-range program.

The short-range program is the program of the present Kerdja Cabinet. It calls for the provision of fair amounts of food and clothing, the establishment of security, and the continuation of the struggle for West Irian. These three matters are very important to us in carrying out our revolution.

I do not intend to explore these three subjects in detail, however, I do want to say as regards the matter of food and clothing that it is not expected to provide these in abundant supply. An abundant supply of food, clothing, and other requirements will be a part of the long-range program. In the short-range program we will undertake to achieve only the minimum needs which will enable us to continue our struggle.

The short-range program calls for 100 kg of rice per person per year. This is the minimum amount required by a
man and he still has many other needs. Also, 8 meters of textiles per person is the minimum annual amount needed to continue our struggle. This will not create a just and prosperous society.

Security refers to the situation within the state. Our administrative apparatus, from the center down to the lowest authority, must have security so that it can carry out its work in an orderly fashion. Our economy and our activities in the social, cultural, and other fields must have security so that we can carry out our struggle in all fields of life. In order to establish security we must deal with what we now call dissident movements, which have their source in revolt, subversion, and all the rest. The restoration of security is an absolute necessity if we are to carry out all the activities of government in an uninterrupted manner.

A program has been formulated in this connection. I do not intend to go into the security program in detail, however, I should like to note that coincident with the progress in the restoration of security there has appeared much adverse reaction to the security policy now being carried out. I think that since I am here in our highest training institution it would be best for me to analyze this matter a little further, and I will take this opportunity to do so.

The Political Manifesto clearly states that we will not negotiate or compromise. No compromise means that we will not recognize rebels as a state, as a government, or as an army. However, we also say, on the one hand, that we will mobilize all of our forces to eradicate them and, on the other hand, that "anyone who consciously wants to return to the lap of the republic is genuinely needed."
We must examine this matter. Why has this kind of policy emerged? During the period in which our government was controlled by liberalism, many parties governed, and succeeded one another in the government. Policy changed accordingly. During that period one group firmly declared, "do not use force, use the road of peace," sometimes calling it the road of negotiation, or the political road. One group in our society firmly demanded that we "call them and negotiate." The first call was made during the period of the Natsir cabinet but was not successful; other calls were made at local and regional levels.

Another group in our society has always maintained that the problem "should be settled with force," "settled with law," meaning that force and law should be used so that the law would be strengthened. I think that both of these groups had good intentions. However, if we were to follow one or the other of these two concepts in our short-range program it would take so much time and require so much equipment and money and so much personnel that we would not be able to restore security within the short-range period of 3 years.

We can also see that not much was accomplished from the time the Dutch left in early 1950 until 1959 when the 1945 Constitution was reinstituted. Now, in realizing our policy, which is aimed at the achievement of maximum results, we must restore security within a period of 3 years. To achieve this goal we must use the largest possible forces and the best possible methods in eradicating the dissidents. At the same time we must leave the door open for those who want to return to the lap of the republic.
Each year we see a large number of them destroyed and a large number of them returning voluntarily to the lap of the republic. By voluntarily I mean that they are not forced to return on the field of combat but that they are forced to return by their situation. The success of our operations restricts their area of activity and some of them, losing hope, return to the lap of the republic while others remain obstinate and continue their activities. Therefore, those who return to society are not prompted by sincere motives but by the success of our operations.

In this connection, those who have a genuine desire to return to the lap of the republic have been offered amnesty and help in re-establishing themselves as useful members of society within the shortest possible time. Much of the adverse reaction to the security policy has arisen over this point. One may ask why they are given amnesty when they have committed a crime. One may ask why they are helped and given jobs when many men who did not revolt still are unable to find a proper place in society. Many reasons can be given, but as I have said, in the situation we now face we must restore security within 3 years and this is the only road we have to follow.

We have a definite objective, security in 3 years. This is the basic objective and all other matters, the legal aspect, the emotional aspect, and everything else, must be subordinated to this objective. We must not change our minds and begin to stress the importance of some of the subordinated elements. If we do, we shall have lost our objective, the objective of restoring security throughout Indonesia within a period of 3 years.
We are now facing the final stages of this problem and many difficulties have arisen as regards its disposition. I have seen agitational concepts of a destructive nature in the commissioned ranks in various parts of our army. To use a certain group as an example, once when I was in Minahasa I saw our men get information in such a way that orders were not obeyed. Former dissidents were given information in such a way that they would not obey, they would not go aboard ship because they were afraid that they would be arrested or some other bad thing would happen when they were at sea or in Java. These difficulties have agitational actions as their source.

I want to use this opportunity to brief you on the many problems we are now facing. I have just discussed the second point of the short-range program. I refer to these programs, as I just mentioned that our State Policy has its source in our National Policy. At present, for a three year period our National Policy calls for food and clothing, for security, and then for the struggle for West Irian. These three matters determine the duties of the military during this period.

In the field of food and clothing, the duty of the military is to render assistance. There are times when we are over zealous in this matter. A military officer should not make food and clothing work his basic duty. We must be guided by National Policy and render assistance in the duties it calls for. We can read in the Political Manifesto that in addition to performing our basic duty, that of providing security, we must devote more time and energy to the work of supporting the production, distribution, and other fields. We must support them positively
and we must support them negatively. By negatively I mean that we must not obstruct them. There are those who do obstruct them. For example, one military leader sabotaged Operation Prosperity because he felt he was not involved in it. Obviously, he was not conscious of the fact that military policy has its source in National Policy.

Therefore, we must render full assistance. Negatively speaking we must not obstruct, and positively speaking we must support. At the same time we must not neglect our basic duty, security.

The security problem, item number 2 in the 3-year plan, is a basic problem for our military agencies. We can understand that the Army Staff and Command School, the Instruction and Training Command, and other training bodies may at times have to make sacrifices because of security requirements. When we need training equipment we take their equipment and send it to troops and other units to meet their requirements.

All of this is based on our National Policy. We cannot change this fact because we rely on it and we accept it, nor can we who are gathered here think that on our home ground we are more important. These matters prove that our military policy has its source in our National Policy.

The same thing holds true when I say that we have organized our security policy for a total restoration of security within a 3-year period. I can understand that a commander may not want to accept a former corporal who became a rebel, especially if he does not know why the man returned, as a second lieutenant in the militia.
But this creates a difficult problem and therefore he must subordinate his own wishes to our policy for restoring security within a 3-year period as formulated. In carrying out our duties we must handle our own wishes in a special way, and we must not let subordinate matters be grouped with the fundamental matters which we have established on the basis of our national policy.

The problem of West Irian is included in the short-range program. I want to affirm right here that nothing is said in this program about regaining West Irian within this 3-year period. Many have misunderstood this, however, the program clearly states that "the struggle will be continued." The program is clear as regards food and clothing. It calls for a fair supply of food and clothing within 3 years and for adequate security within 3 years. It also says that the struggle for West Irian "will be continued." It would be too arrogant of us to decide to regain West Irian within 3 years. The decision on West Irian has been made for us. Therefore, I say that our basic duty within this 3-year period is to restore security, and to render assistance in other fields, in the field of food and clothing and in the West Irian problem.

The West Irian problem has not yet become a basic problem. An example of the approach used toward this problem is found in the approach of the commander of a military region near there. Recognizing that West Irian is not the basic problem he does not provide special security for this single matter. The training bodies I mentioned earlier provide a similar example. When their training is considered of first importance it is struggled for, however Army Headquarters may at any time assign some
of their equipment to operational units. It is understood that this is done in regulating our national program.

The same thing is true for West Irian, from now until the end of 1962 the restoration of security will be the number-one problem. Even so, there is one factor that we cannot ignore and that is the present world situation, the situation within and without our country. We cannot count on this situation remaining favorable to us. We would like to have the world situation provide us with the 3 years we need to restore internal security and then with the time we need to settle the West Irian problem. However, there are many external factors that are beyond our control and therefore we cannot completely count on restoring security in 3 years and then turning to the West Irian problem. Also, other things besides our level of security must be taken into account in making decisions on the West Irian problem. Some things must be speeded up. I often note that there are two interests to be served, those of the Commanders of the Military Regions, who must organize and equip operational units, and those of the Army General Reserve, which needs men and materiel. If sole emphasis could be placed on the restoration of security, the interests of the Army General Reserve would be served. However, we cannot dictate the terms of the situation and therefore we are more or less forced to organize units within the framework of the struggle for West Irian.

I would like to comment on our present position and on the stages we will encounter in the struggle for West Irian. Between 1950 and, if I am not mistaken, 1957 we submitted motions to the United Nations asking the UN to mediate in negotiations between the two sides on settling
the problem of sovereignty over West Irian. These motions failed, because we could not achieve a two-thirds majority, the amount required for a decision in the UN.

After these efforts failed we shifted our policy to what we call a confrontation of forces. There was also a confrontation of forces in 1950, and this is a logical procedure because all diplomatic activity must be based on strength. A diplomatic effort which is not supported by strength will be ignored, but a diplomatic effort that is supported by strength must be respected. Therefore, this is a logical procedure. Even so, it does not constitute a change. The only change has been that we have shifted from the passive recognition of a principle to its conscious implementation. Our objective must be a confrontation of political, economic, and military forces and not just military force.

Politically we must organize a stronger force within the nation, and this can be done with the return to the 1945 Constitution. Our foreign policy aims at increasing the number of friends we have abroad, and this is being done as more nations become free, at reducing the number of opponents we have abroad by reaching an understanding with those who are doubtful or closer to the Dutch, and at isolating the Dutch in the face of their allies.

In the economic field we are improving our economy so that we will have a good economic foundation for this struggle. At the same time we are attempting to disrupt the Dutch economy in West Irian. The improving of our economy and the damaging of the Dutch economy are very important matters. After studying these matters I can see that we have benefited, because we have our own firms,
however the Dutch have worked hard, apparently because they were furious, and are now enjoying a rate of economic progress as they never experienced before. Intervention in West Irian has decreased because of the disturbed situation there, still we have had results from our economic confrontation.

Confrontation in the military field must mean that men are made to understand that we have the ability to take West Irian if the road of peace cannot be followed. Having the military capability to take West Irian is of utmost importance to us.

When we evaluate the present status of the West Irian problem we see that in the political field we have reached a position which can be described as a deadlock. This deadlock is due, in part, to Indonesia's attitude. We believe that the Dutch must recognize our sovereignty, and we are not prepared to contact or negotiate with the Dutch until they do recognize our sovereignty. The President has affirmed a number of times that we will not negotiate until our sovereignty is recognized. This is the line we cannot cross.

On the Dutch side, except for the Communist Party of the Netherlands, all men are of the opinion that Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian cannot be recognized before negotiations begin. Even so, I have noted great progress in their thinking, for in many of the powerful parties in the Netherlands the idea has emerged that the best solution to the problem would be to return West Irian to Indonesia. We can see this in the analyses made by the leaders of the Catholic, PVD, and Christian parties, many more of whom are now analyzing the situation.
In the past they felt that there was no need to analyze the problem because they believed that Indonesia did not have the ability to face the problem. They carried out an icebox policy, they put the problem in the icebox -- this can no longer be doubted. Now that we have built up our strength they must open the icebox. Now they open the icebox because it is dangerous to keep the problem in the icebox.

They are forced to examine the problem, to seek the best solution for the Netherlands and for West Irian particularly, for both of them. They consider the possibility of West Irian remaining a Dutch colony -- they know that it cannot become free and independent because its political, economic, and military capabilities are too small -- and as a source of international security in the western Pacific. The Netherlands knows that Indonesia will continue to be active in the matter of West Irian and as a member of NATO, which confronts the Communist bloc, sees that the problem benefits the Communist side and damages the anti-Communist side. And as a member of NATO, they feel this keenly.

Also, from an economic aspect, if West Irian is to be capable of becoming a free nation it must be given continuous support. We see this in their analyses of various matters. For example, one of their major parties gave a professor the assignment of studying this problem for the party. Originally this professor opposed the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia, however, his conclusion was that such a transfer would be the best answer to the problem. Another man was appointed to head a technical delegation to the UN. Before leaving and on board ship he studied the problem thoroughly. Arriving in America he decided that
it would be best for West Irian to be transferred to Indonesia. He was removed from the delegation.

Thus we see that all alternatives are being explored, or blocked out, in the effort to arrive at a concept. However, even with this progress they still feel that the nation would be making a mistake if sovereignty were transferred prior to negotiations. This is the line that cannot be crossed, this is the political deadlock.

As for the nations around us, all of the Communist bloc nations support our claim completely. The nations which follow a neutral policy and all anticolonial nations also support our claim. Generally speaking, these nations are assisted by the western nations. In assisting them they can consciously ignore this policy, however, they are subject to a stronger influence. As allies of the Netherlands they cannot leave their comrade in the hole. This is the determining fact, and it governs how far our diplomacy can move them. Thus, as I said, in reviewing these developments we can see that we have reached a deadlock in the political field.

Now to go on to the military field. In this confrontation we must possess the strength which will enable us to take West Irian by force. Knowing this, the Dutch have given the West Irian problem more thought, have taken it out of the icebox. There are two aspects to our efforts along this line. On the one hand we can activate internal forces, our unofficial army. We can engage in infiltration and launch many movements and other activities as we are now doing. However, all those who actively bear arms will not be official members of our Armed Forces. On the other
hand, our Armed Forces can invade the area with the intention of taking it.

Thus two types of activity can be undertaken. The first will take a long time and requires many preparations and much hard work. Also, as is now the case, for every two men one must be sacrificed. Obviously this is not right. The second is a military invasion with large-scale land, sea, and air operations. This will be aimed at quickly gaining control of areas and locations and will have a decisive influence on the settlement of the West Irian problem. This requires that we evaluate the military strength of the enemy.

I want to explore this matter further because it will become of utmost importance in our military assignment in the time to come, and because it will characterize and give content to our subsequent military program. In this connection then, we must evaluate our enemy and his development.

In the first stage the enemy will have forces in the area. In the second stage these forces will be increased with forces brought from his country. In a recent statement to the press I said that the Netherlands has a military strength, a territorial strength, of one army corps composed of six divisions which they now have ready within the NATO alliance. More important than this however is their air and naval strength. We have read and we can see from the earlier situation in the eastern part of Indonesia that air and naval operations are truly decisive.

The air strength they now have does not present too grave a situation, however, the situation becomes much more grave when we add to this strength the strength they
have prepared with the assistance of NATO. I have already announced and you are familiar with their definite strength. We know that they have one carrier, 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, and 6 submarines. However, they also have, if I am not mistaken, an air strength of 6 tactical squadrons and a smaller amount of fighters. To this will be added antiaircraft batteries and they have been given a license to build F-104s. These are now being used and will be included in the NATO alliance.

They cannot possibly move all of these forces, since some of them are in the NATO alliance, the land forces primarily. However, they can move the majority of them. Most of their air and naval strength is not active in NATO, it is merely a part of NATO's potential. Thus, it is still fully controlled by their own minister of defense.

We can see that these forces can be brought to and use the bases in West Irian, as long as these bases still exist. If we cannot eliminate these bases they will bring their forces there and we will be subject to air and naval operations. We must figure that every area in Indonesia can be attacked from the air and from the sea, for example, the air base in Bandung, the naval base in Surabaja, and our capital. Furthermore, at the present time Kemajoran is our only bomber base and it certainly can be directly threatened. Our naval bases can also be threatened, for we have not been able to develop an adequate antisubmarine defense against the 6 Dutch submarines. We can also count on inter-island communications, both by air and by sea, being disrupted. We must look at all of these things realistically.
A third force which can be added to their military strength is that of intervention, the intervention of their allies. In my visit to Australia and several western nations I saw that there was a possibility of intervention if war threatened. I concluded this because certainly they would not answer if I asked, "Will you help the Dutch?" Certainly they would not answer, that is logical. They will make many preparations, but the British and Australian governments both said that they did not have a military treaty which compelled them to help the Dutch in the West Irian problem. That is what they said. Even so, if a military problem does arise they are free to act.

We can see that there is a definite possibility that intervention will occur and we must explore the dimensions of this possibility. I estimate that there is less than a 50 per cent chance of official intervention. There are groups within their society which are for intervention, but a sufficiently large amount of other groups do not approve of intervention for various reasons. Even so, I estimate that there is better than a 50 per cent chance of unofficial intervention.

This is nothing new to us since there was intervention of this type during the time of the PRRI and PERMESTA. I give as an example the fact that the PERMESTA Air Force actually was an instrument of intervention. It was clear from Pope's notebook that he was a member of the armed forces of a certain country. Also concerning Pakan Baru, for four consecutive days an American representative urged our Ministry of Foreign Affairs to allow a part of their fleet, namely, a PAN LINE helicopter [sic], to come to
Pakan Baru to safeguard their property and citizens. Supposing they did come in? Clearly this would have been intervention. Therefore, we hastened to occupy the area and thus end the controversy. So the problem of intervention is nothing new to us.

I also felt my understanding of intervention had been increased after I met with President Nasser. He told me that when they were at war with Israel, French aircraft participated in attacks on them. A clear case of intervention. They knew precisely that the Israeli Air Force had only 60 aircraft, however, several hundred aircraft attacked Egypt. The Israeli aircraft were the same type as the French aircraft, since they had been purchased from France. Part of the French Air Force, coming from French bases and carrying Israeli markings, participated in the attacks.

When the Egyptian fleet left Alexandria, they were surrounded by a great French fleet as soon as they left territorial waters and thus were not free to fight. It would certainly have been difficult for them to attack the French fleet because their fleet was much smaller. When they wanted to attack Haifa, this fleet ran between the Egyptian fleet and the Haifa fleet and they were unable to fire. Unfortunately, one Egyptian destroyer was hit. It sank, even though it was not fired upon heavily. Another example from our own experience, when our destroyer Gadjah Mada was on the way to Padang we saw a submarine and other craft. This is a fact.

I think that there is a very great possibility that unofficial intervention will occur, particularly in view of the fact that colonialism is one everywhere. This is a
military problem which we must face. I do not bring this up to alarm you, but to acquaint you with the realities of the problems we will face in the time to come.

The government will have to make the problem of West Irian a military responsibility as we calculate already that we have reached a political deadlock. I do not think that there is a possibility that this deadlock can be broken since only two roads can be followed, negotiation or war. Negotiations are deadlocked; one says transfer and then negotiate, the other says negotiate first. Obviously, we can not unite these two viewpoints. Therefore, as a military man I feel that we are deadlocked.

The other road is the military road. As I said, the military road can be followed in two ways: the unofficial way [guerilla warfare], and the official way [invasion of West Irian]. The unofficial way will take a long time. It is possible that the official way will be quicker, but we will have to organize the forces, air and naval forces particularly, which can provide us with this possibility. We have established time periods for this, however, I will not explain them here.

As I have said, the future stages in the West Irian problem will be the most important feature of our military policy, exclusive of our short-range program which I have just explained. I can say that one item has been added to the government's short-range program, that which we call retooling. I think you have heard enough about this that I do not need to explain it. However, many military people believe that retooling does not affect the military. This matter is based upon our national policy and therefore it must affect all of us.
We can tell from the objectives of the government's short-range program and from each of the items in the program whether the military have duties to fulfill either as an instrument of the state or as a functional group.

I have neglected to distinguish between the terms instrument of the state and functional group.

Many men ask if it is not dangerous for the Army, which is an instrument of the state, and possesses weapons, to serve as a functional group and participate in the making of national policy, to participate in legislative assemblies and governmental bodies while functioning as an instrument of the state. These questions are heard many times, mostly from politicians, but also in military circles.

We must look at this problem within the overall framework of our governmental structure, which is based on our national traditions and concepts. I have said that we are developing the concept of Guided Democracy. Conceptually, a Guided Democracy is comprised of functional groups, and the Armed Forces are one of these functional groups. One can read this determination in the President's 1959 speech to the Constituent Assembly.

Aside from that, we have a tradition of military groups participating in the guidance of the state during difficult times. Also, in times past conflicting opinions arose within the military. We know comrades who wanted to bring us a military dictatorship, or military junta. We no longer discuss this matter, but many of us discussed it formerly. We also know many who inclined to the western system of governmental structure, in which the military are nothing more than an instrument. At last we have reached this final concept, this middle road in which the military also
are constituted as a functional group. Obviously, there is no place here for a military junta to monopolize power. Rather, the military work with other functional and political groups to build the state. Nor is there a place for the other extreme wherein we are nothing more than an instrument, for we exist as a functional group in both legislative and executive bodies. Seen from the aspect of our governmental structure, this is already an accomplished fact, seen from the aspect of our domestic difficulties it will create equilibrium.

This is how we look as a functional group: we participate in all of these bodies. However there is a matter that must be given consideration. I just gave an example of this in discussing the separation of powers. I said that the chief justice of the Supreme Court must know when he is acting as the chief justice, when he is acting as a minister, and when he is acting as a member of the People's Consultative Congress. Take the attorney general for example, the chief prosecutor before the Supreme Court. If he cannot make this distinction when he is participating in a meeting of the People's Consultative Congress and debating with another member, if, for example, he forgets that he is also a member of the People's Consultative Congress, then he may say, "I am the Attorney General. Be careful later on." This could happen even though it might be only the result of being human. Still, he must distinguish between the seats he is occupying at any given time.

I can validly apply my own formulation to us, namely, that as a functional group we work with other functional and political groups and jointly regulate national policy, policy in the regions, and policy in the regional
subdivisions. This matter has an over-all quality that affects both the government, which executes policy, and the legislative assemblies, which draft legislation.

As an instrument of the state we are the executors of policy, whereas as members of legislative assemblies we are formulators of policy. To illustrate, a member of the People's Consultative Congress, the commandant of Central Java for example, participates in the formulation of an over-all policy. In the People's Consultative Congress he participates in the formulation of an over-all policy. As commandant he executes this policy and in executing it he may definitely agree with what the People's Consultative Congress or Parliament decided. However, it is also possible that he may not agree. Then he may say "I don't agree" and sabotage it. If he does so then it is obvious that he cannot distinguish between his two seats, for as an executor, he must carry out the policies which are decided on at a higher level. This distinction must be made.

Therefore, when men say that there is danger in this we must admit that a danger does exist. However, viewing this from the point of view of our consciousness, I think that our internal harmony will guarantee the well-being of all of us.

In carrying out our national programs, we must always maintain the view that our military assignments under our military policy are based solely on our national policy. And as I said, we can be thankful that this national policy has now been defined. With the existence of the government's short-range program we can tell what our assignment will be as a military instrument carrying out military policy. We must support our national policy during this 3-year period
by assisting the food and clothing effort, restoring security, and continuing the struggle for West Irian. Other matters must be given second priority, even though they continue to be an objective.

When this 3-year period is over our military problem, West Irian, may of itself exclude those who emphasize matters connected with our personal careers, who come up with various types of theories on how to improve and perfect our military careers, saying that we must do this in such and such a year and have this school in such and such a year. This assignment requires personnel who are not so inclined. The assignment is clear, and military planning, logistics, and other matters must be accommodated to it. We must concentrate on the main problem. We must not see only our own sector. We must not sacrifice the main problem simply to perfect our own sector. For example, in the field of logistics we don't think along the lines of territorial self-sufficiency. In the matter of requirements, when an area has sufficient materiel and commodities there is no need for further imports. Yet when we build, a barracks say, we always think it would be better to use imported concrete and other materials, even though these are in short supply.

When we look at these things from the point of view of the territories, we must accommodate our efforts to the materials available in the region. But we do see the statistical results of the defense effort from the center, from Djakarta, the credits and the supplies from abroad. Logistics personnel in the regions, having studied in America or who knows where, sometimes are alarmed and apprehensive when we say that something is wrong. I do not
intend to acquire that learning. I understand that we are beginning to retool to our own concepts. Go ahead with technical efforts, but don't feel offended over these matters.

Now to go on to the long-range program. We can say that the long-range program, which was drawn up by the National Planning Council and sanctioned by the People's Consultative Congress, must be carried out after the short-range program is completed. We are optimistic about this program, but there are those who are pessimistic. The problems of the optimists and pessimists must have been worked out in the People's Consultative Congress, which presented us with data which we must implement.

In this connection, and as the document states, the Eight-Year Development Plan is the first stage of a long-range program and the objective of this program is the building of a just and prosperous society. Thus we see that a just and prosperous society, or social-economic development, has been given first priority. The military are mentioned here and there in the document, but here too social-economic development is stressed. As military men we would like to say that military development is more important, however the government must necessarily emphasize the development of a just and prosperous society. Therefore, social-economic development, which is comprised of some 300 development projects, must be carried out.

Certainly the military will have a part in long-range development. We can find military development discussed in the decision of the National Planning Council, although it has been left blank (not been published) to prevent interference from outside the military. Even so, we can
see that there are three types of development which we must undertake.

1. The development of state policy toward the Armed Forces, that is, the development of the constitutional position of the Armed Forces. Examples are the laws on defense, on the structure of the Supreme War Administration, on the state of danger, and other laws, all of which are fixed regulations.

2. The development of military industry and of personnel, that is, the development of industries which will produce the type of personnel needed for defense. We can see that there are many interrelated factors in this matter and that with the implementation of development in the civil field alone we cannot meet our needs. As for needs, one factory will need the sulphuric acid produced by another factory, and an aircraft factory will need the products put out by various types of civil factories. By building many industries and by developing technical personnel in the fields of these industries, we will be indirectly preparing to meet defense needs. There is a definite defense need for certain types of factories, weapons factories for example. This type of development will enable us to organize our military strength.

3. Development in the field of military policy, that is, organizing our military strength in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In so doing, part of our military strength will have a mobile nature and part will be assigned to territorial, regional, and air defense.

When we study the speech I made before the National Planning Council on behalf of the three services we will again encounter these elements.
We have a picture of this development, but it has not yet been given shape in a firmly established program of the government, therefore, it has not yet been settled. Even so, we have established a priority within the framework of this large-scale development and this priority is based on the struggle for West Irian.

We have established a priority which we consider to be necessary in settling the problem of West Irian and we have established it within the framework of the development we hope to experience in our Armed Forces. We can say that up to now the development of our Armed Forces has been oriented primarily toward the security program of the cabinet, but before long this program of development will be aimed at the development of a priority program which will make possible the settlement of the problem of West Irian. When that problem is settled we will commence a long-range development program, while safeguarding the security and sovereignty of our country.

As I have said, we must all be conscious of the fact that the government has weighed our field against other fields and has decided that emphasis must be placed on a policy of social and economic development in the future.

I don't think it is necessary for me to explain the development effort any further, for I would only be discussing the details of fields which must necessarily be explained by other speakers.

I would like to close my talk with the following conclusions.

1. In formulating our military policy we must look upon it as being only one field, one sphere, one main
feature of our National Policy, which we are fortunate to have.

2. In carrying it out, we are bound by governmental structure and tradition. Our country has its own governmental structure and tradition and these determine our role and working methods. We cannot think about how other nations do things as we read their books; we cannot. We work within the specific frameworks which have been given to us.

It is clear from my talk that our short-range program, our national program under our National Policy, clearly enumerates the things that we must do. Here we find the duties the military are to perform, both as an instrument of the state and as a functional group, at this time. Subsequent stages will also be formulated in our national program, and the military must draw from this program. We cannot act independently of the program.

We are faced with an obligation to accommodate, also to retool our methods of thinking and working. Generally speaking, we must accommodate ourselves, we must accommodate our Army, we must accommodate our Armed Forces to a framework which aims at integrating us into the national community. We cannot act independently in this matter.

As one of the old members of our Armed Forces, I think it is fitting for me to explain where we stand in this situation, in this dynamically transitional situation. We, an instrument of the state, have a political function as a functional group, and, as a matter of course, face many difficulties which are unknown in other nations. In this connection, and in connection with the fact that we are readying a potential both in a political way as well
as in society and in the instruments of the state, as a matter of course we present a target from all directions. However, if we are always conscious of what is the basic problem which we face, we can maintain ourselves. It is especially important that those of us who have the job of building up the Armed Forces, who head training bodies, who head commands, who are members of the Supreme Advisory Council, or who are in any other field, know what our real duty is. Wherever we are we remain a part of one unit, the great Indonesian Army. Do not present a target by working against one another or creating difficulties for one another in carrying out our present security policy. These concepts are being presented in the indoctrinations we are currently providing.

As I said, I will not go into details, for this is the job of other speakers. However, to supplement my talk, I will ask that you all read the speech I presented to the National Planning Council, particularly the part on the Political Manifesto; the Political Manifesto also will be discussed by other speakers. The part on the security field can be read to supplement my remarks on this topic.

That's all and thank you.
VI. BASIC THOUGHTS ON TERRITORIAL MANAGEMENT
by
The Department of the Army
Inspectorate General
for Territorial Affairs
and People's Resistance

Foreword
1. Territorial Management is a consequence of the method of warfare to which we adhere, namely, Territorial Warfare. Territorial Management is made up of efforts aimed primarily at readying the potential of a territory and everything within it for the implementation of Territorial Warfare and also at improving security and the national defense.

2. Territorial Management is a prominent element in the national defense of the Republic of Indonesia and it is a main factor in the organization of a strong territorial defense. Orderly preparations for Territorial Management must be made in peace time.

Definitions
3. Inherent in the word Management is the concept of an over-all managerial function, that is, managerial activities covering a broad administrative scope and including: leading/policy making, planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, operating/executing, reporting, and control [in English in the original text].

4. The word Territory means a part of the surface of the earth which is comprised of land, sea, and air space, and to which definite boundaries have been assigned by a state in carrying out the process of government.

5. Consequently, Territorial Management is the application of managerial functions to the administration of a
territory for the purpose of achieving a certain objective or reaching a specific goal. Territorial Management, in a national defense sense, is a technical term used for the control and supervision of activities which build up the territory in the field of defense/territorial warfare and as one part of one element of the national defense effort.

Objective

6. The objective of Territorial Management is to supply continuously the support needed in the defense effort, in maintaining the spirit and will of the people/nation to fight and resist, in maintaining our capability to continue to resist the enemy, and in rehabilitation activities in all fields of life, by thoroughly preparing a national territory during peacetime, during wartime, and after a war.

7. For the achievement of the objective of Territorial Management, one has to make efforts to accomplish the National Objective. The political, economic, social, psychological, and military efforts of our authorities must therefore be guided by National Policy.

8. Objective of Control in the Political and Psychological Fields:

The objective of control in these fields is to strengthen the people's moral-defense power. This is accomplished by indoctrinating them in the ideology of the Pantjasila and by achieving political stability. Conscious indoctrination in the Pantjasila will provide a powerful defense against the penetration of foreign ideologies, ideologies which are raging in the international world at this time and whose areas of influence are increasing. The infiltration of these foreign ideologies into the body of
the people can endanger the well-being of the state and the unity of the people.

The establishment of political stability means that efforts must be undertaken to rediscover our national identity and to answer the call of the suffering people. Dynamic political stability aims at achieving the ideals of the Indonesian Revolution, therefore, it can be said that the control of this stability is aimed at safeguarding the principles of our national ideology (USDEK).

Defense power in the political and psychological fields is the basic objective of this effort.

9. **Objective of Control in the Economic Field:**

The logistics of Territorial Warfare are rooted in the national economy.

The objective of control in this field is the safeguarding of national economic development plans, the mobilization of manpower for development efforts, and an increase in the efforts aimed at the achievement of a self-sufficient society.

Rehabilitation efforts in this field should be aimed at restoring economic livelihood within the shortest possible time after a war. A healthy national economy provides a firm foundation for national defense and can also provide the conditions needed to strengthen national consciousness. When the daily needs of the people are adequately and equally met, the defense power of the people is directly strengthened.

10. **Objective of Control in the Social Field**

    Tradition, culture, education, and social welfare are all involved in this matter. Social control, in which custom and traditional methods and channels are employed,
is aimed at maintaining national unity in the form of a national self, so that the harmonious union of the hundreds of ethnic groups who are constituted as a single entity, namely, the Indonesian people inspired by the Pantjasila, can be maintained.

Education and culture will help lay the mental, moral, and spiritual foundation of the people. The strength and defense power of the people does not reside solely in their numbers, physical ability, and intelligence, rather the ethical and mental outlook of the people and their morale are a very important source of their defense power.

Culture is a unifying element used to protect the national identity, which would otherwise be torn apart by the present ideological struggles.

The objective of education is to increase the knowledge of the people and create skills and abilities which can be used to stabilize their social and cultural life and to increase their ability to defend against alien attacks.

11. **Objective of Control in the Military Field**

Control in the military field aims at preparing society to be a source which can supply adequate numbers of skilled people and as a base from which the personnel requirements of our combat troops can be met. It also aims at preparing the territories as bases for the implementation of Territorial Warfare, this to be accomplished by improving the capabilities of the territories and their population so that they can render material and operational support and assistance to our combat troops.

Measures will also be taken to protect the people and serve their needs so that they can go on with their daily
life even though they are subjected to enemy air attacks. These measures, which are aimed at rehabilitation and at reducing and preventing damage, are of four types:

First: preventive measures,
Second: protective measures,
Third: control measures,
Fourth: restoration measures.

Preparations and planning are required to implement these measures. Also various kinds of bodies must be organized for fire prevention, air raid warning, air raid shelters, extinguishing lights, emergency transportation and communication, first aid, evacuation, repair work, and other functions.

Functions

12. The main objectives of Territorial Management are territory, manpower, materiel, and organization and procedure. The following functions are to be carried out:

First: development and control of the territory;
Second: control of manpower,
Third: development and control of materiel,
Fourth: development and control of organization and procedure.

13. Territory covers all efforts, work, and activities connected with the planning, organization, mobilization, and utilization of the territorial potential in carrying out Territorial Warfare. This includes the development and control of the territory, political, economic, social and cultural control, and the control of public opinion.

14. Manpower covers all efforts, work, and activities connected with the planning, expansion, organization, and
preparatory utilization of the manpower potential in meeting defense requirements in particular as well as those of the state in general.

15. **Materiel** covers all efforts, work, and activities connected with the planning, organization, and preparatory utilization of territorial logistics in supplying a regulated people's defense effort, within the framework of the national supply effort.

16. **Organization and Procedure** covers all continuing efforts, work, and activities connected with the study, planning, and preparatory utilization of the apparatus of the state/government and of procedures employed to guarantee stability in the government and the economy during peacetime and during the existence of a state of emergency or war.

**Basic Activities**

17. **Activities in Territorial Control**: The territories are the source of our potential and provide the arena in which our "living instruments" operate. The territories themselves, as "dead instruments," must be thoroughly studied, if correct and efficient use is to be made of them. The activity of becoming familiar with the geology and geography of a territory and the taking of regulatory and supervisory measures with respect to the potential which exists in the territory accords with the principles of Territorial Warfare and is called Territorial Control.

In view of our potential and capability in the military, political, economic, and social fields, we are faced with the fact that within the framework of national defense we
must organize as strategic compartments the areas in which territorial warfare will be carried out. Strategic compartments must have the ability to wage war independently as long as a state of war exists in the country. In organizing these strategic compartments, attention must be given to the following matters:

a. Area
In order to carry out territorial development and control efficiently, we must first be familiar with the geography and geology of the area. Passive measures undertaken in this regard would include the making of geographical and geological maps, so that the importance of the area to defense and other efforts could be evaluated. Active measures would include the use of "living instruments," which greatly affects or changes the geographical and geological nature of the terrain (exploitation).

Territorial development, including the development of village communities, is an activity undertaken to achieve a specific objective, namely, the creation of a strategic compartment. This is characteristic of Territorial Warfare. The construction of giant projects in territorial development must be followed quickly by community development.

The study, investigation, exploitation, and administration of natural resources are very useful in the development and control of a territory. Requirements and capabilities will be the primary determinants in the development of an area and will also be used in estimating the size of the defense apparatus required in the area. The "economy of forces" principle can be realized by observing these points.
b. Political Field:
In the political field, control is aimed at ensuring stability in State, Government, and Society. Stability in this field will facilitate the various strategic measures carried out within the framework of national defense.

(1) Society
Society is composed of various groups each of which has its own desires, characteristics, and view of life. There must be harmony in the expression of these desires if they are to be coordinated and integrated successfully.

Man or society is greatly influenced by the surrounding situation, and if society does not have a direction in which it can move, the situation will become very confused. Society has a potential which is of great significance, in Territorial Warfare particularly. Thus, it is obvious that a confused situation in society weakens this potential. Efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation in society should encourage constructive thinking, vigilance, national integrity, and active participation in the national defense effort. The control of potential groups and of functional groups existing in society can facilitate these efforts.

(2) Government
The instruments of government are a very important factor in Territorial Management and their position in the national defense effort has a vital meaning. Political manipulation for the sole purpose of winning a position cannot be permitted because this will greatly and directly endanger the state, the region, and the people. Progressiveness and initiative are greatly needed in the instruments
of government if there is to be a guided strengthening of the potential in the regions.

c. **Economic Field**

The economic field includes the problem of national finance and that of the circulation of money in society. The national economy is a source of supply for the defense effort, and the national finances are the source from which the defense effort is financed. If national economic life is not regulated it will have a great influence on our strategic measures, particularly in the field of supply and cost financing. In carrying out thoroughly planned warfare, evaluations of national abilities and capabilities are influenced by the material and financial position and processes of the state. Thus, the control function in the economic and financial fields is an important one.

Efforts undertaken to change, study, develop, and control this field have the following objectives:

1. A daily economic life which is stable and which will ensure the possession of economic defense power by the state and the people.

2. Rapid advancement of the national economy which is reflected in the prosperity of the people.

3. Avoidance of crises and deficiencies in the economic life of the people.

d. **Social Field**

The well-being of a people, the welfare of the society within a country, influences the mental outlook of the people. Social welfare has both a physical and a spiritual significance, and it is necessary that both of these factors be stabilized. Certain penetrations into the non-material culture, for example, can upset the
political and economic situation and vice versa. Efforts which are undertaken to raise the level of prosperity and welfare must be in accordance with the food and clothing program and the implementation of land reform. Also, it is very important that a broad effort be made to raise the level of knowledge and education, so that society can more easily follow and understand national policy. The field of education and culture functions as a helper in the work of laying the mental, moral, and spiritual foundations of the people. Practical training must be balanced with spiritual training since both are of use in stabilizing the social and cultural life of the people.

Unemployment, theft, prostitution, beggary, the refugee problem and similar matters are symptomatic of deviations in the social life of the people. These are deviations from a regulated social life and efforts must be made to eliminate them. Also, deviation from our national ideals in the field of culture must be corrected. If this is done the foundation of our society will guarantee that the measures which are undertaken in the economic, political, military, and all other fields will be concordant.

18. Activities in Manpower Control

Manpower constitutes an important element in the accomplishment of all the activities undertaken by the state in various fields. Consideration must always be given to its proportional allocation for the needs of all state activities, both in peacetime and in wartime. In national defense, manpower is one of the elements of the war potential and is divided into two parts: the manpower directly needed for defense and the manpower indirectly needed for defense. In
deciding on the need for manpower, a distinction can be made between numerical needs and qualitative needs.

a. **Size of the Population:**

Numerical needs require that the activity of assigning manpower for the requirements of defense be undertaken. As a result the population may be shifted and more widely distributed. This will necessitate the carrying out of the following efforts.

(1) The more efficient regulation of population administration. This will make available control data on the amounts of manpower in the regions.

(2) Maximum efforts in the assignment and re-assignment of the population in each region. This is a measure aimed at creating regions which will function as strategic compartments.

(3) Planning the expansion or reduction of the population in each region in conformance with the effort to perfect the resettlement activity. This measure is aimed at achieving a uniform population density in the various regions.

In this regard, statistical and census activity and other forms of population administration are of very great significance in manpower management.

b. **Quality of the Population**

In meeting qualitative needs, efforts are aimed at improving the mental and ideological outlook of the population and at raising their spiritual level and the level of their knowledge, skills, and abilities. In this way a trained, tenacious, and skilled defense force can be established.
(1) **Mental and Ideological Outlook:**

The minimum objective is to establish immunity against the penetration of foreign ideologies capable of creating disruption, revolt, and subversion. The maximum objective is to have a citizenry which is conscious of national interests and inspired by the Pantjasila and USDEK, thus constituting an element with potential in national defense and development.

(2) **Spiritual Level and Knowledge:**

Efforts in this field are aimed at:

- Promoting spiritual life based on religion thus to help form an USDEK-inspired Indonesian man, while keeping under control destructive trends.
- Developing an intelligent, able, and skilled citizenry for various jobs in the field of defense and development.

Eliminating those symptoms of deviation in the orderly life of society which are capable of disturbing the public order.

In building up and developing manpower it will be necessary to perfect and expand training institutions, mass educational institutions, and similar organizations.

c. **Mobilization**

In keeping with the nature of our national defense, which is a people's defense, mobilization is aimed at filling the need for a defense force. This defense force is formed of the following groups:

(1) The Armed Forces, which are the nucleus of national defense. The Armed Forces are composed of:
- Volunteer military personnel (professionals)
- Conscripted military personnel (militia)

(2) The People's Militia, which is a supporting and reserve force in defense and which directly participates in defense at certain times.

In order to facilitate the mobilization of forces some thought must be given to preparations and certain measures must be taken:

(1) What guides should be followed in deciding on reserve forces and how large a reserve do combat troops require to maintain war strength?

(2) What view should be taken of that part of the labor force which, although not directly involved in defense, has an important meaning within the framework of national defense, for example, the persons working in vital enterprises and in war industries particularly, which must consistently turn out their needed production?

(3) How should the reserve be set up and what measures should be taken when strikes occur in order to guarantee the continued flow of war production?

(4) How should service time be regulated and how late should military training and the duty of bearing arms be entered into? This matter must be decided in order to insure continued balance in the productivity of the citizenry and efficient regulation of the combat potential and to prevent imbalance and disorder in the field of crop cultivation.

(5) The family, as the basis of society, also is a part of the defense community. Thought must be given to the handling of the family so that the morale of persons assigned to combat or other duties is not shaken or reduced.
d. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction:

Intensive thought must also be given to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the persons who are mobilized. This type of rehabilitation has two targets, a mental target and a physical target. Mental rehabilitation aims at conditioning persons to a normal environment. Physical rehabilitation aims at training persons in physical skills so that they can become a productive force in the field of development. Personnel rehabilitation is carried out in line with and at the same time as rehabilitation in other fields, for example, rehabilitation of the structure of government, of daily economic life, and of regions, all of which aim at the consolidation and stabilization of the territory as a whole.

e. Administration and Supervision:

Administration of the population is very necessary in the effort to control and manage manpower. In this matter adjustments to the population groups in society are possible, according to their social and political importance.

Implicit in the word supervision is the prevention and repression of such groups as have a tendency to:

(1) Undermine national vigilance.
(2) Sabotage efforts to build up the mental strength of the people in facing national difficulties.
(3) Spread a Quisling spirit in the nation.

19. Control of Materiel:

The management and control of materiel are a part of the management of the national economy and its control during wartime. The management of materiel has the following objectives:
(1) In Peacetime:
Within the framework of the effort to
manage the peacetime economy, to build up supplies of goods,
commodities, and equipment needed in wartime and of goods,
commodities, and equipment needed for the welfare of the people.

(2) In Wartime:
Within the framework of the effort to
control the wartime economy, to build up supplies of goods,
commodities, and equipment needed by the Armed Forces and
the people by terminating the production of luxury goods
and converting these sectors of production to the production
of goods, commodities, drugs, and medical equipment which
are needed in wartime.

Since the economy and logistical supply are inseparable,
a logistics system will be used in the development of materiel.
A general classification, such as is used in the logistics
system, will be used in classifying goods, commodities,
and equipment. Luxury goods do not present a problem,
since they are required by only a part of the people and
their production can be terminated in time of war or emer-
gency.

The systems followed in production, distribution, and
storage are basic problems in the build-up of materiel.

Since these requirements must be accommodated to the
national defense effort, which is based on a system of
territorial defense and territorial warfare, attention must
be given to the following efforts in satisfying them:

a. Requirements Based on an Evaluation of Ge-
ographic Characteristics:
(1) Improvement of the system and organization of land, sea, and air transportation, thus to reduce isolation in peacetime and to maintain communications as long as possible in emergencies and in wartime.

(2) Maintenance of the effort to achieve maximum self-sufficiency through land reform and other programs.

(3) Uniform distribution of the population.

b. Efforts to Strengthen the Defense Position, as Regards the Supply of Food and of Vital and Strategic Materials:

(1) Achieving national and territorial self-sufficiency in food production, thus to meet the needs of consumers and to create a surplus to be stored for wartime and emergencies.

(2) Conducting studies for the improvement of the technique and system of stockpiling and preservation of surplus food.

(3) Discovery and exploitation of new sources of minerals and the rehabilitation, modernization, and expansion of existent sources.

(4) Assigning priority to the processing of such vital raw materials as tin, bauxite, and petroleum for industry.

(5) Improving the system of distribution and controlling vital transportation, oil transportation for example.

c. Efforts Required in the Field of Industry:

(1) An effort aimed at national self-sufficiency in the field of industry, with regard to:

- Automatic equipment,
- Land, sea, and air transport equipment,
- Communication equipment,
- Weapons,
- Drugs and chemicals,
- Facilities for the maintenance and repair of the above equipment,
- Miscellaneous.

(2) In line with this effort aimed at national self-sufficiency and in support of the above projects, development sectors which also require attention are:

- Projects for increasing the amount of electrical power, as an economical source of power,
- Projects for the processing of iron ore, bauxite, tin and other important commodities.

d. Efforts in the Fields of Transportation and Communications:

(1) Rehabilitation, modernization, and expansion of harbors, workshops, docks, and airfields must be undertaken to handle increasing requirements.

(2) Construction of new airfields and harbors and of road networks, particularly in underdeveloped areas.

(3) In deciding upon types of land, sea, and air transportation and communications equipment, priority must be given to those types which can be most easily coordinated in actual usage.

(4) The interests of defense must also be considered in building technical facilities, opening road networks, and so on.

(5) Promotion of small-scale commercial shipping in which locally constructed vessels are used will
greatly assist coastal and inter-island sailing. This fact will be particularly evident when free sea communications can no longer be maintained. These vessels can then be used for infiltration, as few formalities are required for their employment.

(6) In order to simplify the maintenance, care, and repair of this equipment, the principle of maximum standardization should be observed to the extent possible, since this is an important factor in wartime and in emergency situations.

e. Efforts in the Field of Telecommunications:

(1) Modernization of the telecommunications system and equipment must be continued so that peacetime, emergency, and wartime needs can be fully served.

(2) Remote areas that are important as national defense outposts must be included in the telecommunications network, even though they may have little economic importance.

(3) The development of industries capable of producing telecommunications equipment for our own needs will free us from dependence on foreign countries. Consideration must be given to the production of this equipment, and standardization must be aimed at in its production.

Measures Connected with the Control of Materiel:

There are several types of materiel control measures: in peacetime they are concerned with the preparation of materiel, in wartime they are concerned with the utilization of materiel, and after a war they are concerned with the rehabilitation of materiel.

a. Measures in Peacetime:
(1) Besides the effort to develop the country on a compartmental basis, an effort is also made to establish the entire country as a single effective logistical unit, complete with the production apparatus for the logistical installations it needs.

(2) Direct or indirect development of food, mining, and industrial production.

(3) Planning the dispersal and evacuation of the means of production and reserves in a state of war or emergency ( arsenals, main repair shops, central warehouses and the like may be replaced by smaller, dispersed units, which will retain the ability to service requirements).

(4) Planning a system of wartime distribution and the transformation of peacetime industry and agriculture into wartime industry and agriculture.

(5) Planning for the periodic transfer of military supplies into civilian hands, thus to prevent the destruction of the supplies and to overcome civil emergencies.

(6) Joint utilization of the economic, technical, financial, and construction personnel and organizations of military and civil groups and the exchanging of new ideas between military and civil groups.

b. Measures in Wartime:

(1) Transformation of the peacetime economy into a wartime economy.

(2) Dispersal of the strategic reserve to handle territorial defense.

(3) Manage both the central transport system and local or regional transport systems for handling territorial defense.
(4) Consolidation of the hospitalization and local or regional evacuation systems.

(5) Emergency control and management of the distribution system in a state of war or emergency.

(6) Supervision and safeguarding of the continuity of the wartime economy as it affects both military interests and civil interests, thus to maintain psychological stability both in military ranks and in society generally.

(7) Emergency exploration and exploitation during a state of war, thus to facilitate the maintenance of supplies for the public.

c. Measures After a War:

These measures are aimed at rehabilitating an economy disorganized by war and at improving daily economic life:

(1) Rehabilitation of the system under which the goods, commodities, and equipment needed by the people are distributed, thus to restore a normal situation.

(2) Rehabilitation of private and national firms which produce food and basic commodities, so that the needs of the people can be quickly met.

(3) Other efforts aimed at normalizing economic conditions disrupted by war.

20. Control in the Field of Organization and Procedures:

The effort to manage and control organizational matters aims at guaranteeing stability in the apparatus of the state and of the government, as this is important to the continuity of the government, of the economy, and of the defense effort. Efforts to develop progressiveness and initiative in the instruments of government are very necessary in order to strengthen the potential in the territories.
These efforts are directed at:

b. Preventing a vacuum in government.
c. Directing activities toward specific targets.
d. Bringing the instruments of government, as the guiding element, closer to the people they lead.

If stability is to be guaranteed, procedures and working methods must be established for use in peacetime, wartime, and in emergencies between the state apparatus and the public. In establishing procedures and working methods for the civilian and military apparatus it is found that three periods or situations exist, namely:

a. Peacetime,
b. Wartime,
c. Emergencies.

The working methods employed in each of these three situations have different characteristics. A security disturbance caused by an enemy from within or without the nation, one in which military forces are used to restore security, will call for civil and military working methods and procedures different from those used during peacetime.

The drafting of a plan for emergency government is also included in organization management. This is for a situation in which the national government in the center and in the regions is unable to function normally because of the existence of a state of war or emergency. Plans must also be laid for the evacuation of the government during a state of war or emergency.

Survey and research should be a continuous process and must be carried out if work efficiency is to be
achieved. The material acquired in this work can be used in reorganizing, reforming, and retooling the national apparatus.

Management of communications and information media will greatly assist the effort to manage the national organizational structure. Also, in order to facilitate general administration and to implement the process of government, it will be necessary to launch a high-intensity news-communication campaign, using the mails, telephone, telegraph, radio, and other electronic equipment.

21. Military Organizations and Their Function in Territorial Management

Military organizations which have been especially assigned to the activity of Territorial Management are usually referred to as territorial organizations or military government organizations and act as supervisory organizations during a state of danger or state of emergency. In the Army the Territorial Management Organization is called the Inspectorate General for Territorial Affairs and People's Resistance. It engages in the following activities:

a. Military government and military support.
b. Economic and social/cultural activities.
c. People's Defense and Protection of the Community.
d. Logistic support in territorial management or territorial logistics.
e. Social relations.
f. Territorial reporting.
g. Rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The nature of the activities and function of this territorial organization are as follows:
(1) Supports civil organizations.
(2) Supports the local army commander or operation commander.
(3) In unusual circumstances (defense crisis) it can function as a full territorial-command organization.

22. Leadership in Territorial Management:
An ability to direct society, governmental affairs, and local combat is required of the leadership in Territorial Management. Each Territorial Management officer must possess a capability for social leadership and combat leadership in order to direct:

a. Territorial development (the masses, the economy, social affairs),

b. National resistance (physical and psychological)

Final Word:
This paper presents the main features of the activity of Territorial Management. A detailing of these activities, as guide to implementation, will have to be accomplished separately.