COMMUNIST PROSPECTS IN INDONESIA

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PREPARED FOR:
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND
MEMORANDUM
RM-4135-PR
NOVEMBER 1964

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This research is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Project RAND—Contract No. AF 49(638)-700 monitored by the Directorate of Development Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, Hq USAF. Views or conclusions contained in this Memorandum should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the United States Air Force.

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PREFACE

A number of experts believe that the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) has been "emasculated" or "domesticated" under the authoritarian regime established in 1959 by President Sukarno with the assistance of an erstwhile anti-Communist officer corps. The following analysis, which comes to the opposite conclusion, is based on the author's accumulated experience of Indonesian affairs (gained in part during eight field trips since 1955) and on a careful examination of publicly available Indonesian sources.

No attempt is made here to suggest policies for the United States which would reverse the current trend of Indonesian political developments or to cope otherwise with their possible consequences.

This RAND Memorandum is part of an ongoing program of research undertaken for the U.S. Air Force, concerning important developments in Indonesia.

For the reader's convenience, whenever possible references indicate English translations of Indonesian texts.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

SUMMARY

The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) is today the largest outside the Communist orbit. The road to power pursued by the leaders of the PKI does not follow either Russian or Chinese current doctrine. They rely primarily on changing the balance of political forces in Indonesia, both by mobilizing and organizing the masses and by subtle political maneuvers among the Indonesian political elites. Their hope is to be eventually accepted as the legitimate heirs of President Sukarno's authoritarian regime.

Taking full advantage of favorable circumstances, the PKI has grown since 1952 from a politically bankrupt party with only a few thousand members into a mass movement which, in June 1964, claimed three million members and some sixteen million followers in various front organizations. However exaggerated these claims may be, even conservative estimates grant the PKI the capacity to command not less than one-third of the popular vote, were elections to be held in Indonesia today.

The very size of the Communist movement in Indonesia has become its best defense. It can be argued that because of its size the PKI can no longer be suppressed, even if it were to lose the protection of President Sukarno. Furthermore, the PKI plays an increasingly important role in Indonesian society. Unlike the large Communist parties of France and Italy, which constitute powerful but isolated ideological sects, incapable of obtaining power on their own terms, the PKI already pervades many aspects of Indonesian life and is beginning to be accepted as a legitimate party of government. This process is substantially aided by
President Sukarno, who applies his considerable though not absolute authority to denounce constantly the evils of "Communist-phobia" and to advocate a government of national union based on the cooperation of nationalist, religious, and Communist political forces, a union still resisted by anti-Communist elements.

Particularly significant is the skillful and rather successful effort of the PKI to secure the good will of the Armed Forces while it continues to oppose an extension of the political and economic activities of the officer corps. The military are increasingly willing to listen to the exposition of Communist points of view. Moreover, no anti-Communist arguments are voiced openly in Indonesia today. The increasing familiarity between the Armed Forces and the PKI is facilitated by the almost complete identity of outlook between the two groups with regard to the conflict with Malaysia and to Indonesia's role in Southeast Asia.

Under the able leadership of D. N. Aidit and his associates, who have dominated the party since 1951, the PKI apparatus is gradually developing into a businesslike, well-oiled machine. Factional conflicts at the top are kept from the public eye so as to maximize the image of reliable strength that the PKI is eager to project in Indonesian society. The party apparatus is constantly engaged in ideological and operational training of cadres in order to create an efficient instrument of government.

The increasing intimacy between the PKI and President Sukarno is evidenced by the latter's 1964 Independence Day address which endorsed Communist positions on all major domestic and international issues and revealed the considerable influence that the PKI already exercises on the policies
of the Indonesian government although its three cabinet members still lack formal executive prerogatives.

The interplay in recent years between President Sukarno and the PKI suggests the existence of a political understanding pledging PKI support to Sukarno during his lifetime in exchange for a special role for the PKI as vanguard of the Indonesian revolution. The Communists seem to be using the present situation to try to establish themselves during the struggle for succession that will follow the end of the Sukarno regime as "the most deserving heirs of the national father-figure."

In the author's opinion, the longer the Sukarno regime lasts, the better are the PKI's chances of assuming power without a major struggle. If present trends continue, only unforeseeable circumstances can prevent the PKI from eventually achieving control of the Indonesian government. But, being proud and self-confident radical nationalists, the present PKI leaders are not likely to turn Indonesia into a Soviet or Chinese satellite or to create a carbon copy of other Communist regimes.
CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................................. iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................... v
SUMMARY ................................................................. vii

Section
I. THE PKI'S "ROAD TO POWER" ........................................ 1
II. THE PKI AS A MASS MOVEMENT ...................................... 17
III. THE PKI APPARATUS AND ITS INFLUENCE .................... 34
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE ..................................................... 52
I. THE PKI'S "ROAD TO POWER"

A U.S. Government annual estimate of the World Strength of Communist Party Organizations in 1963 counted 91 parties, excluding splinter groups. It estimated membership of all Communist parties at over 43 million, of which the 14 parties in Communist states account for 39 million, or 90 per cent of world membership. The largest parties outside the Communist orbit are the Indonesian and the Italian, which together account for about three-quarters of total non-Bloc membership.

In October 1961, the Italian Communist Party had claimed a membership of 1,729,000, but in 1963 it admitted a drop to 1,543,754 members. The State Department does not accept even this figure and estimates the size of the Italian Communist Party at only 1.3 million. Similarly, the State Department reduces the membership figure of the Indonesian Communist Party from a claimed 2.5 million in December 1963 to an estimated 1.9 million.\(^1\)

Unlike the Italian Communist Party, which has declined in size since April 1951, when it claimed over 2.5 million members,\(^2\) the Indonesian Communist Party is in a phase of constant expansion. On June 26, 1964, a delegation of the Central Committee of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) presented the Indonesian Government with information on the

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1Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, January 1964, p. 1.

party in accordance with Presidential Regulation No. 13 of 1960. It publicly claimed 3 million members although no exact figure was released.\(^3\) Even if the much lower State Department estimate were correct, it would still leave the PKI as the largest Communist party outside the Communist orbit.

Like the Italian Communist Party, the PKI is a creative party confident in its ability to fit Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of its country. The Italian Communist Party has been directing its appeal, under the leadership of the late Palmiro Togliatti, to the population of a politically advanced Western country. It favors the "peaceful road to socialism." In matters of doctrine, it sides with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the latter's dispute with the Communist Party of China, but at the same time it asserts its organizational independence. The PKI, however, increasingly expresses agreement with the Chinese and hostility toward the Russians, although it is striving in fact to formulate its own methods for the seizure of power, which may be less remote from the Italians' than verbal differences would lead one to believe. In both instances primary reliance is neither on parliamentary struggle nor on armed combat but on constant efforts to become accepted as parties of government. Endorsement of Soviet or Chinese arguments may have to be accounted for primarily by the nature of the audience. Apparently the Italians prefer to promise gradual changes, while the Indonesians seem to favor revolutionary sounding phraseology.

\(^3\)Harian Rakjat (People's Daily), June 27, 1964, p. 1.
The Italian Communist leader, Giuliano Pajetta, trying to explain why the views expressed by the PKI "differ markedly" from those of the Italian party, had this to say following a visit to Djakarta in April 1963:

It is hard to explain the [PKI's] prejudice against the "peaceful paths" unless it has something to do with the danger of rightists in a party that follows so skillful and prudent a policy. Quite frankly, though, if we keep in mind the political line the Indonesian comrades follow and remember that they actually operate like this, these explanations seem inadequate, and views such as theirs [appear as] a symptom and manifestation of formalism.4

One of these two largest Communist parties outside the Communist orbit exemplifies the problems facing Communism in a Western environment, the other in a non-Western environment. What the two parties have in common is the intellectual vigor and political shrewdness of their leaders who have motivated and inspired dedicated cadres able, in turn, to recruit substantial followings and thus to build up impressive mass parties. In countries such as France and India, by contrast, the sterility of the leadership seems to be reflected in parties of moderate vigor and size.

Within about thirteen years the present leaders of the PKI have succeeded in transforming a small and politically bankrupt party into one of the world's significant political movements. Their ultimate purpose, of course, is the establishment of a Communist Indonesia. The purpose of this paper is to examine how they go about it and whether they are likely to succeed.

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Successful Communist parties have followed a variety of roads to power. In many cases victory came in a different way from what had been planned. The Chairman of the PKI, D. N. Aidit, was an early advocate of the thesis that there are various roads to power for a Communist party. He stated on May 23, 1952, when Stalin was still alive:

The people of Indonesia must be oriented toward the socialist Soviet Union and not toward imperialist America. This does not mean that the state structure of the Soviet Union, that is, the Soviet system, should be followed by all nations, including Indonesia. Certainly not. On the contrary, each nation will travel its own road toward socialism, on the basis of the development of its national situation, its political situation, its economy, and its culture.  

In 1961 the present author characterized the road to socialism followed by the PKI as one of seeking to obtain power by "acclamation." Power is to be won by building up [the party's] prestige as the only solid, purposeful, disciplined, well-organized, capable political force in the country, a force to which Indonesia will turn in despair when all other possible solutions have failed. In building up this image, it is important that the PKI demonstrate its power, skill, and influence at all levels of public life.  

Developments since 1961 have strengthened the author's impression that the PKI's preferred strategy is to establish

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5 D. N. Aidit, "Menempuh Djalan Rakjat" ("Embarking on the People's Road"), speech to commemorate the 32nd anniversary of the PKI, in Pilihan Tulisan (Selected Writings), Vol. I, Djakarta, 1959 (JPRS Translation, p. 43 [Emphasis added]).

itself as Indonesia's "last hope." In an increasingly anti-Western and radical-nationalist political climate, the Communists are likely to be the major beneficiaries of a situation in which the range of options available to the Indonesian political elites has narrowed considerably. The economic stabilization program, formulated in 1963 by international experts, has been abandoned. Foreign economic assistance is not likely to be forthcoming in significant amounts as long as Indonesia maintains an aggressive posture in Southeast Asia. The concentration of the elites' attention on foreign policy, in the context of a continuous struggle against "imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism," favors an atmosphere of intolerance toward all moderate views, which are being denounced as "counterrevolutionary."

In the atmosphere of permanent excitement created by economic crisis and international conflict, the interests of the masses are neglected by the established political elites, which include the leaders of the major governmental parties, the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, and the senior members of the officer corps. Meanwhile the PKI leaders and cadres are establishing themselves as the "true friends and protectors" of the masses, and as persons of honesty, integrity, and dedication in a country where inflation has turned corruption into a way of life. In this political environment, the masses, as they become mobilized by direct Communist political action -- compounding the general impact of modernization -- are likely to provide the PKI with enough popular support to make its claim to power irresistible.

This hypothesis assumes, of course, that the established political elites, including the Armed Forces, will have lost
their will to resist a Communist take-over. Careful scrutiny of political developments in Indonesia in recent years makes this assumption increasingly plausible. Since the Sukarno regime has stifled free political debate, the Indonesian political system lacks the protection of healthy criticism. In the distorted mental environment thus created, political forces less disciplined than the PKI and lacking the appeal conferred on the PKI by participation in an international revolutionary movement are languishing both ideologically and organizationally. There is little or no evidence that the PKI's major rivals, such as the Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Moslem Nahdatul Ulama Party, are generating leaders, cadres, and mass support capable of offering the Indonesian people truly attractive alternatives.

While the PKI has less and less to fear from political competition, it also meets less resistance from the Armed Forces. The Indonesian officer corps has been and still appears, at least superficially, anti-Communist. Senior officers have opposed admission of Communists to the cabinet. Yet the will of the military to assume power in their own right has proved weak, both during the quasi-parliamentary regime before 1959 and under President Sukarno's "guided democracy." Confidence in their capacity to govern alone has never been great among the Indonesian officers. In recent years it has been undermined by the experience of assuming a substantial part of the burden of government during a worsening economic and administrative crisis.

The Sukarno regime has forced the officer corps to cooperate, however grudgingly, with the PKI, in the name of national solidarity. Since the other political parties appear less and less attractive associates and the country's
problems appear too complex for the military to tackle alone, are the officers likely to oppose indefinitely the partnership which the PKI offers them? A forecast of Indonesia's political future hinges on an accurate answer to this question.

In formulating his own answer, the author is led to assume, on the basis of mounting evidence, that the PKI expects to come to power by the default of the other elites and popular acclamation. It can hope to be acclaimed as the only political group that has not yet been given an opportunity to extricate the country from its difficulties. It can expect that its demands will ultimately be accepted by the other, demoralized political elites. A situation favoring PKI fortunes could develop during the present regime, especially if the country's endemic crisis were exacerbated by some calamity; or, more likely, it could develop in the struggle for succession that will follow the death of President Sukarno.

Conceivably, the other political parties may regain their vitality. A firmly anti-Communist group might take control of the Armed Forces, or President Sukarno might appoint in his lifetime a successor capable of rallying massive support. Then too, Sukarno, yielding to pressures from the political parties, could decree the holding of elections and thus reopen "the parliamentary road to socialism." Yet another possibility is that militant elements in the PKI, intoxicated by Chinese doctrine, will prompt the party to forego the patient course of action followed by the Aidit group since 1951 and thus plunge the country into civil war. While these possibilities cannot be ignored, none of them seems very likely to materialize.
The road to power pursued by the PKI leaders since 1951 may appear to those familiar with Communist doctrine as ultra-gradualist. But considering the circumstances faced by them, Aidit and his associates can be said to have shown skill, realism, imagination, and boldness. In their search for an "Indonesian road to socialism" they may have pioneered the new strategy of "national democracy," based on the "extension of Communist influence on the nationalist government"7 of an ex-colonial, underdeveloped country, which was adopted in December 1960 by the Moscow Conference of the Eighty-one Communist Parties.

The present strategy of the Aidit group was formulated between January 1951 and March 1954. At the end of that period the Fifth National Congress of the PKI approved a party program which, after stating that "the PKI has taken part and will continue to take a most active part in the parliamentary struggle," added that "the parliamentary struggle alone is not sufficient to achieve the goal of the formation of a government of people's democracy." At that time Indonesia was getting ready for her first general elections which were held eventually in September 1955 and established the PKI as one of the four major parties in Indonesia. It obtained 6,176,900 votes, or 16.4 per cent of all votes cast.

Aidit's scepticism concerning the "parliamentary road" was vindicated in March 1956 when, despite this electoral success, a coalition cabinet was formed that included the other three large parties but excluded the PKI. This Aidit explained as follows:

The Indonesian reactionaries, in cahoots with the foreign imperialists, never stop trying to weaken the force of the Indonesian people, especially by preventing revolutionary cooperation among Islamic, nationalist and Communist parties, as desired by the vast majority of the people and as proposed by President Sukarno. What weakens our national force is the anti-Communist, anti-unity policy of the obstinate members of the Masjumi-PSI party.  

In the summer of 1956, the PKI leaders, sadder but wiser, had reasons to be vigilant. Aaidit told the PKI:

In connection with the argument concerning the possibility of a shift to socialism via the parliamentary system as contained in the report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the question has often been put to the Communists: Can the shift to socialism in Indonesia be accomplished peacefully through the parliamentary means?...

The reply of the Communists to this last question is: It is a possibility, and one whose realization we must do all in our power to achieve. Therefore, if it were up to the Communists, the best means, the ideal means of change to the system of a people's democracy, the preparatory stage of the socialist system, would be peaceful, parliamentary means....

The question now arises: Will the other groups and parties permit the shift to a people's democracy by peaceful, parliamentary means?

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9 Ibid., pp. 48-50.
Although not expecting political miracles from parliamentarism, the PKI leaders favored the existence of a parliamentary system that had proved beneficial to the growth of their party and added to its protection by consecrating the legitimacy of political parties. At the same time the leaders had to search realistically for a more promising political strategy. Since the PKI had twice experienced, in 1926 and in 1948, the armed suppression of ineptly organized Communist rebellions, Aidit dismissed, for public consumption at least, the possibility of armed struggle: "Only the reactionaries obstinately persist in saying that the Communists see only one way to reach their goal, i.e., internal warfare." He then explained to his audience the PKI's preferred strategy:

The PKI's work is not limited solely to the parliamentary struggle, but consists also, and primarily in activity among the masses of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and all other democratic masses. Basically, the PKI's activity is to change the balance of power between the imperialists, landlords, and other compradore bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the people on the other, by arousing, mobilizing and organizing the masses.

On the surface, the political strategy of the PKI appears similar to that of the Italian Communist Party, which also emphasizes mass struggle and a progressive altering of the balance of power among classes. But whereas in Italy the emphasis seems to be on "structural changes"

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induced by the politically conscious struggle of the laboring masses, in Indonesia it is primarily on the subtle political calculus of a small elite, adept at palace intrigues and capable of patience, flexibility, imagination, and correct assessment of changing opportunities and conditions in the country. The PKI leadership can only succeed in this task if it is at liberty to pursue its aims rationally, without yielding to the emotional pressures of the party's rank and file and of the masses, and without succumbing to provocation by its enemies.

As long as the Indonesian masses were still largely quiescent and therefore unlikely to rise to the defense of the PKI, the Communist leaders, largely confined to maneuvers within the political elites, had to take constantly into account that a hostile coalition might emerge to destroy them. The primary purpose of these maneuvers was to make it possible to work on the masses and thus to create the "political reserve" that would give the PKI electoral strength in pursuit of the "parliamentary road," popular enthusiasm to help it succeed "by acclamation," or a sanctuary in case of armed struggle.

As the effort to mobilize and organize the masses succeeds, the PKI's political environment is being gradually transformed from an elitist to a populist one. This in itself is bound to change the "rules of the game" for determining the distribution of power. Eventually the PKI may no longer need the protection of President Sukarno. But at this moment the PKI leaders are probably still adhering to the cautious approach which Aidit explained publicly in May 1953 as follows:
The PKI uses Marxism-Leninism as a constant guide in determining the character of its policy; it also bases its decisions on the existing balance in social forces. The PKI is obliged to continuously calculate the balance in the unstable social forces in Indonesia.\footnote{D. N. Aidit, "Menudju Indonesia Baru" ("Toward a New Indonesia"), speech on May 23, 1953, to commemorate the 33rd anniversary of the PKI, in Pilihan Tulisan, Vol. I, Djakarta, 1959 (JPRS Translation, p. 88 [Emphasis added]).}

The Aidit group seems to have followed this basic intuition since January 1951, when it took control of the Politburo at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the PKI. In trying to change the balance of political forces in Indonesia, it concentrated at first on the task of seeking allies within the bourgeoisie ("the tactics of separating the national bourgeoisie from the ultra-reactionary comprador bourgeoisie").\footnote{D. N. Aidit, "Djalan Ke Demokrasi Rakjat Bagi Indonesia" ("The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia"), Report to the Fifth National Congress of the PKI, March 1954, in Pilihan Tulisan, Vol. I, Djakarta, 1959 (JPRS Translation, p. 169).} This resulted in PKI support to the Wilopo cabinet formed in March 1952 and to the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet formed in July 1953. The good will of these two cabinets controlled by the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (PNI) allowed the PKI to turn into a nationwide mass movement and to establish itself at the September 1955 elections as one of the country's four big parties.

In choosing their strategy and tactics the PKI leaders have demonstrated political wisdom particularly remarkable in a group as young as theirs. In 1951 Aidit was 28 years old, Lukman 31, and Njoto 26. While their age may have led them to believe that they could afford to wait to
succeed to the leadership of the Indonesian revolution, it is nevertheless remarkable that they were temperamentally capable of embarking on the slow and tenacious process of altering the balance of political forces in Indonesia, and that they had the sagacity to understand the futility of the "parliamentary road" in a country without the strong constitutional traditions that would guarantee the transfer of power from one group to another by the mechanical operation of parliamentary majorities.

As practiced by the Aidit group, "changing the balance of forces" is a subtle and complex operation which has involved eliminating or at least neutralizing irreconcilable enemies, creating an atmosphere in which potential enemies are at least passively resigned to accepting the transfer of power to Communist hands, inducing lukewarm friends to lend active support to the PKI, and having a party apparatus sufficiently well organized and disciplined to get an iron grip on state power once control of the government is secured. This, of course, is bound to be a slow and gradual process. The party leadership cannot know in advance when the situation will be ripe for the take-over. Whether the final phase involved the routine of popular elections, or the street demonstrations that would give party rule legitimacy "by acclamation," would depend on circumstances. In either case, resort to violence should be only sporadic and of marginal importance.

The strategy of "changing the balance of forces" in order to make the PKI ultimately acceptable as a governmental party requires infinite patience on the part of the leaders. They must not antagonize any group other than the principal target in the current phase of the party's operations. While the party has to prevent its hotheads from
giving its enemies an excuse to crush it, as happened in 1926 and 1948, it also has to generate sufficient revolutionary élan to sustain the militancy of its cadres. The PKI has had to find ways to mingle freely in Indonesian society, but without losing its separate identity. As one might expect, "patience" was the key word used by Aidit in the article he published in Pravda commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the PKI.13 Over the years, the PKI leaders have been obliged repeatedly to explain to their cadres why progress has been so slow. In December 1958, for instance, they stated:

Since the demand for a National Coalition Government is just, it will definitely become a fact. But even so this does not mean that, at this very moment, it can be realized in full. The decisive thing in this question is the balance of forces. This is why, while not abandoning the demand for a National Coalition Government, the revolutionaries must adopt a realistic attitude and must be able to recognize what sort of government can be formed at any particular time. It is from this point of view that we must analyze our attitude towards the Djuanda Cabinet.

Thus it is clear that the feasibility or otherwise of the formation of a National Coalition Government depends on the work of our Party in building the national front, in developing the progressive forces and aiming well-directed blows at the die-hard forces. The participation of Communists in the cabinet depends upon the real balance of forces at any particular time.14

Five years later, the imperturbable Aidit was still explaining the facts of political life to his party:

14 PKI, Material for the Sixth National Congress, Djakarta, December 1958, pp. 31, 32 (published in English by the PKI).
Some of our comrades are wrong who only seem to be clever at finding fault with President Sukarno in connection with the unfulfilled realization and formation of a mutual cooperation cabinet based on NASAKOM. They say President Sukarno is only talking nonsense because up to now he has not formed a mutual cooperation cabinet based on NASAKOM....

However, we are not after something which is philanthropic. Authority and power revolve around the real balance of forces. Do not expect one class to share power voluntarily with another.\(^\text{15}\)

In other words, the PKI strategy involves methodical and sustained action at all levels in Indonesian society until the PKI's enemies have been rendered helpless and the others have become willing to accept the Communists as "saviors," or at least to "give them a try." The very fact that the PKI has not made more rapid progress on the road to power despite President Sukarno's sympathy and encouragement attests to the seriousness of the obstacles it has to overcome. But the Communists have benefited immensely from the protection and support received from President Sukarno, who has banned his and their major enemies, the MASJUMI and PSI parties, prevented the Army from blocking the growth of the Communist mass movement, harangued the population against Communist-phobia, and given the PKI leaders the prestige of ministerial positions (without portfolio) and well-publicized involvement in policy formulation. Although the PKI does

\(^{15}\) D. N. Aidit, Kobarkan Semangat Banteng! (Rouse the Wild Buffalo Spirit!), Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, December 23, 1963, Djakarta, 1964 (JPRS Translation, p. 67). NASAKOM is an acronym introduced by President Sukarno in 1960 to symbolize the cooperation of Nationalist, religious, and Communist forces.
not have executive control of any departments of government at present, its influence throughout the Indonesian governmental machinery is constantly spreading due to the special assignments given by President Sukarno to the Communist members of his cabinet and to the increasing role of the National Front in which the Communists play a very active part. The balance of political forces is gradually changing in Indonesia, not only because of the skill of the PKI and the ineptitude of its opponents, but perhaps primarily because of the finger that tips the balance.

If present trends continue, the PKI is likely to obtain eventual control of the Indonesian government. But what if President Sukarno were to disappear before the PKI consolidated its gains? Would its enemies not be in a position then to destroy the party? To answer this question, it is necessary to view the current position of the PKI as a growing mass movement in Indonesian society, and to appraise the influence gained by its leaders and cadres among the political elites.
II. THE PKI AS A MASS MOVEMENT

At the beginning of 1952, the PKI claimed 7,910 members and candidate members, although Arnold C. Brackman, a veteran reporter of the Asian scene, indicated that "it was doubtful if it had half that many."\(^{16}\) A National Party Conference decided at that time to increase membership in six months to one hundred thousand. In October 1953 the then Secretary of the Central Committee of the PKI, D. N. Aidit, reported to a plenary session of the Central Committee that the plan had been over-fulfilled and that the party had now 126,671 members and candidate members.\(^{17}\) At the time of the September 1955 elections for Parliament the PKI had at least one million members, following the membership drive instituted by the Fifth National Congress held in March 1954.\(^{18}\) During the December 1963 plenary session of the Central Committee of the PKI, Chairman Aidit reported "over two and a half million members."\(^{19}\) Then, on June 15, 1964, Aidit made a statement "in the name of three million Indonesian Communists."\(^{20}\) Currently, all party references use the figure of three million.

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\(^{17}\) Departemen Agitprop, Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia, *Putusan-Putusan Sidang Pleno Central Comite Partai Komunis Indonesia (Decisions of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia)*, Djakarta, 1953, p. 45.

\(^{18}\) *Bintang Merah*, February-March 1956, p. 112.

\(^{19}\) D. N. Aidit, *Kobarkan Semangat Banteng!* (JPRS Translation, p. 62).

\(^{20}\) *Harian Rakjat*, June 17, 1964.
Similarly, on May 3, 1964, the National Committee of Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth) endorsed a proclamation of President Sukarno's "in the name of 1.5 million members." On June 15 Aidit greeted "two million members of People's Youth," and in late July People's Youth protested, "in the name of two million members," the communiqué signed by President Johnson and the Malaysian Prime Minister.  

SOBSI, the Federation of Labor Unions led by PKI Politburo member Njono, was claiming 1,561,757 members in 1952 and 2,732,909 by the end of 1959. At the time of its sixteenth anniversary on November 29, 1962, SOBSI claimed no less than 3.1 million members, and at its Fourth National Congress, which opened in Djakarta on September 17, 1964, the figure quoted was "more than 3.5 million."  

Women play an important role in Indonesian public life. Aware of this, the PKI has concentrated since about 1959 both on increasing the percentage of women among party members and on expanding the Communist front organization for women known as GERWANI. In October 1962 GERWANI claimed 1,125,000 members. By February 1963 the figure quoted was 1.5 million, and since February 1964 there have been several references in the party press to 1.75 million members.  

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24 Harian Rakjat, October 17, 1962; February 7, 1963; February 13, June 1, June 11, 1964.
The most impressive figures claimed by the PKI are those marking the growth of Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), the Indonesian Farmers' Front. At the time of the Fifth National Congress of the PKI in March 1954, the decision was made to intensify revolutionary work among the peasants. Aidit stated at that time:

We cannot possibly speak of a real, broad and strong united front until the peasants have been drawn into it because, in our country, the peasants comprise more than 70 per cent of the population. The non-participation of the peasants means the non-participation of the majority of the Indonesian people and this is a very great weakness in our united national front. As yet, only about 7 per cent of the peasants are organized. This is a very small amount. Because of this, the primary task of the Communists is to draw the peasants into the united national front.25

Figures about the growth of BTI were given by its General Chairman, Asmu, in November 1963. At the time of its Fourth National Congress in September 1953, BTI had allegedly 800,000 members. At the time of its Fifth National Congress in September 1957, it had 3,390,286. By the time of its Sixth National Congress in July 1962, it had 5,654,974 members. By August 1963 BTI claimed 7,099,103 members; in April 1964, 7.5 million members; and at the BTI National Conference held in Djakarta in September 1964 BTI

claimed emphatically 8.5 million members. The last figure was used by President Sukarno himself in addressing the delegates, who held their deliberations at the Istana Negara, Sukarno's own State Palace. The symbolism of this event is not likely to escape the peasant masses.

The reliability of the figures quoted above is extremely difficult to assess. Of course these millions are not indoctrinated Communists. But the usefulness to the PKI of a massive recruitment effort is obvious. While membership figures appearing in the party press may have been inflated in order to create a "bandwagon effect," even conservative estimates reveal the PKI as a formidable factor in present-day Indonesia. Whatever the true figures may be, the very fact that the PKI and its front organizations can claim constant gains in membership reflects the growing strength of the Communist movement in Indonesia. The growth of the PKI also underlines dramatically the lack of meaningful alternatives available to the Indonesian masses today. The Communists are filling a political vacuum.

In 1954 43 million Indonesians were registered to vote, under an electoral law that gave the franchise to all citizens who were either over 18 or married. A crude estimate, assuming a low population growth of only 2 per cent per year, indicates that for 1964 the corresponding figure could be 52.5 million registered voters. If, in order to reduce double counting, one assumes that all members of the PKI and of Pemuda Rakjat are also members of at least one of the front organizations and if one accepts PKI figures

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26 Harian Rakjat, November 27, 1963; April 13, 1964; September 7 and 8, 1964.
at face value, it would appear that up to 14 million persons or more than one-quarter of all potential voters are linked organizationally to the PKI. To this figure one would have to add those over whom PKI and front organization members have direct influence. The conclusion is inescapable that the PKI should be able to mobilize a very substantial fraction of the population for political purposes.

In 1955 only one-sixth of those who voted for the PKI were party members, a proportion comparable to that which prevailed in France in the 1946-1951 period when the Communist Party obtained from 28.4 to 26.5 per cent of the total votes cast, but when only between one-seventh and one-sixth of all Communist voters were party members.\(^{27}\) Obviously the six to one ratio is no longer relevant to present-day Indonesian conditions. With 3 million PKI members and 2 million members of People's Youth, such a ratio would point to a potential Communist electoral strength of 30 million out of 52.5 million. Aidit does not claim that much. In a speech on May 4, 1964, he said, "Should there be general elections, it can be proved that the number of Marxist followers will not be less than one-third."\(^{28}\) This confirms what the author learned when he last visited Djakarta in November 1963. Conservative estimates credited the PKI with 9 million followers and granted it the capacity to command 30 per cent of the popular vote, counting only persons affiliated directly or indirectly with the Communist movement.


\(^{28}\) Harian Rakjat, May 6, 1964.
The very size of the PKI has become its best defense. The author believes, Indonesian political culture being what it is, that the present Indonesian political elites are not likely to stomach the harsh measures that would be necessary to destroy the PKI now that it has millions of followers. Even after the Madiun rebellion of September 1948 the Communists were ostracized only temporarily. The summary execution of some of their leaders by the Army in that period was primarily the result of the panic created by the Dutch armed attack on the Republic. In August 1951, the MASJUMI-controlled Sukiman cabinet arrested some 2,000 Communists and other radicals but released them after a few months without pressing charges. Today the only political figure who could still turn the tide against the PKI, namely President Sukarno himself, is not likely to want to do so.

Were the Communists to lose Sukarno as a protector, it seems doubtful that other national leaders would emerge in the near future capable of rallying Indonesia's dispersed and demoralized anti-Communist forces. Furthermore, these forces would probably lack the ruthlessness that made it possible for the Nazis to suppress the Communist Party of Germany a few weeks after the elections of March 5, 1933, in which the latter still won 5 million votes or almost 13 per cent of the total. 29 The enemies of the PKI, including the remnants of various right-wing rebellions, the suppressed political parties, and certain elements in the Armed Forces are weaker than the Nazis not only in numbers and in mass support but also in unity, discipline, and leadership.

Whether the PKI itself is stronger today than the Communist Party of Germany was in 1933 is more difficult to assess. Little is known about the militancy of PKI cadres, members, and sympathizers. Opportunities to test their revolutionary fervor have been lacking. Should one assume that, in a country which 20 years ago experienced a war of national liberation, latent militancy is still high and that the PKI would fight for its existence? There is no public evidence that the PKI is either storing weapons or training paramilitary forces. But not all revolutions elsewhere have been won by forces militarily trained and equipped in advance. In any case, all visible efforts of the PKI leaders are focused on making armed struggle unnecessary in their quest for power. They are building up a mass movement, not combat units.

This raises another question which is occasionally voiced in discussing the prospects of Communism in Indonesia: Is the PKI not likely to remain permanently in opposition, like the Italian Communist Party which won 25.3 per cent of the votes in the April 1963 elections, or like the French Communist Party which won 21.8 per cent of the votes in November 1962? The author believes that the experience of Western Europe is not applicable to Indonesia. In Italy and France, Communism is the way of life for a very powerful but isolated minority group that is unlikely ever to come to power on its own terms, or even to share power with groups whose world views sharply conflict with its own.

Unlike Western Europe with its "black and white" ways of thinking, Indonesia is a country characterized by

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30 Department of State, World Strength, pp. 12, 14.
syncretistic thought patterns. This is well illustrated at the very top of the social pyramid by President Sukarno himself who claims to be at the same time a nationalist, a Marxist, and a religious man, and who would like to see these ideological streams merge in a torrent of national solidarity. Accordingly, he is waging a persistent campaign to overcome what he calls "Communist-phobia" and to have PKI members accepted in all sectors of national life.

Sukarno's efforts will probably succeed as they are compatible with Indonesian national character. While ethnic, religious, and regional particularisms are strong in Indonesia, the national culture seems to favor tolerance and the acceptance of logically conflicting views. Consequently, the Communists are not, as in the West, an isolated sect living by their own lights and segregated from the rest of the population. On the contrary, they pervade Indonesian society. Some years ago (and perhaps more recently) Communist and anti-Communist members of Parliament could be seen drinking coffee together; Communist and anti-Communist newspaper editors were personal friends and even roommates. Ideological divisions are bridged by family ties as well as by social relations. For instance, Politburo member Sakirman and the Chief of Indonesian Army Intelligence, Major General S. Parman, are brothers.

There are, therefore, no sharp cultural or social barriers opposing the penetration of the PKI into the total fabric of Indonesian society, except for the resistance of the Western-thinking Islamic modernists and Socialists, whose political parties, the MASJUMI and the PSI, were banned in 1960. Unlike the politically and culturally isolated Communist parties of Italy and France, the PKI is
increasingly accepted and active in Indonesian society at large. A few years ago the PKI seemed to be primarily a Javanese party. Since 1958 it has made progress in the other islands although the precise measure of its diffusion is difficult to assess.

Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto, the three most important leaders of the PKI, have ministerial rank without portfolio, and the *Harian Rakjat* never fails to mention these titles which add to the national stature and prestige of the party. In the regional and local administration of the country, the PKI is represented on the various appointed bodies. At the bottom of the political and administrative structure, PKI representatives have access to all significant activities as participants in Sukarno's National Front. Their position is constantly improving. On March 16, 1964, the President issued instructions\(^{31}\) that the local policymaking bodies, known as *Tjatur Tunggal* (Four in One), consisting of the military commander, the police chief, the civil governor and the district attorney, should become the *Pantja Tunggal* (Five in One) by including a representative of the National Front. This order gave the PKI access to the local power centers.

It is difficult to assess accurately the extent of the Communists' penetration into various sectors of Indonesian social life. A few years ago their presence in the bureaucracy, the Armed Forces, and educational institutions was minimal. In the last year their influence in all these bodies seems to be on the rise. Among students, for whom

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Communism until recently had little appeal, the influence of the PKI is increasing.

The PKI is also trying hard to establish itself as a cultural force and as a patron of arts and letters. Through the Institute for People's Culture (LEKRA), it tries to influence and support all forms of cultural activities. On July 7, 1963, the party organ *Harian Rakjat* started publishing a Sunday issue devoted to cultural matters. In the countryside it appears that the PKI and its front organizations provide the only entertainment and information available to the masses, who have no direct access to newspapers, radio, movies, or travel. It is even argued that the success of Communist membership drives is due largely to the attraction of party-sponsored activities to which a membership card represents an admission ticket.

The PKI's efforts to mobilize the peasantry and rally its support is another testimony to the Aidit leadership's ability. Until the Communists, perhaps emulating their Chinese comrades, turned their attention to the villages, the rest of Indonesian society ignored them. In the field of agrarian policy, the best that can be said for the Indonesian governments since independence is that they stopped the exactions of the colonial administration. But they treated the peasants as objects, not as subjects, of politics. The PKI's appeal to the peasants is based not exclusively on obvious agrarian grievances, but also on recognition of their human dignity and cultural importance in the national community.

In the first half of 1964 Aidit personally led research teams studying the situation of the Javanese peasants. The first teams went into the villages of West Java in
February 1964, and Aidit discussed the results in a lengthy report published in May.\(^{32}\) In April and May 1964 the research was extended to East and Central Java.\(^{33}\) No other Indonesian parties have undertaken similar efforts. Indeed, the Indonesian authorities themselves are probably less well informed about the problems of the Indonesian peasantry (72 per cent of the nation) than the Communists. Besides studying rural affairs, the Communists are also carrying out their own civic action program, in competition with similar Army efforts.

Equally shrewd is the PKI's handling of its relations with the military. It is obviously trying to prepare the ground for circumstances under which the Army might give up its opposition to the Communists and accept a genuine partnership, rather than the shotgun wedding which President Sukarno has failed so far to bring about. On the one hand, the PKI voices firm opposition to the idea of military dictatorship and attacks those members of the officer corps who, since 1958, have played an important role in the economic enterprises taken over from the Dutch (see below). On the other hand PKI leaders never fail to stress the principle of D wasting Dangkat Dan Ber sendjata Dand Rak jat (Unity of Armed Forces and People).\(^{34}\)


\(^{33}\) Aidit described this research program in a speech on July 28, 1964, published in Harian Rak jat on August 1, 1964. Thirty-three hundred PKI and BTI cadres studied villages in 124 typical subdistricts in Java, using the "3 Togethers" method: work together, sleep together, and eat together with the peasants.

\(^{34}\) E.g. Aidit, speech of April 29, 1964, at the Naval
In the weeks preceding the abolition of the parliamentary regime, the PKI was clearly concerned about the danger of a military dictatorship. On May 23, 1959, Aidit stated:

If it proves impossible to prevent a military dictatorship, that is if nevertheless one is set up, our task is to resist it, and we are convinced that in the end we shall be victorious because the people do not like military dictatorships.... There has never yet been nor will there ever be, anything to prove that a military dictatorship can save the people and further advance world development.35

Even stronger have been the PKI's attacks on the role of the officer corps in the economic life of the country. In a statement of the Politburo dated July 8, 1960, which was immediately suppressed by the military authorities, the PKI applied the Chinese Communist term "bureaucratic capitalists" to the officers-turned-managers of former Dutch enterprises:

These enterprises are controlled by certain cliques who, in addition to not being competent to run them, are adopting a worse attitude towards the workers than the foreign employers did. The domination of these cliques has brought into being a bourgeois group that is in control of State apparatus and is using it for their own economic interests, they have brought into being bureaucratic capitalists who in addition to suppressing the workers are also suppressing the national bourgeoisie, and there is already proof

Academy in Surabaya, Harian Rakjat, May 9, 1964. See also the PKI pamphlets PKI dan AD, PKI dan AURI, PKI dan ALRI, PKI dan Polisi published in 1963.

35 Review of Indonesia (published in English by the PKI), June-July 1959, Supplement, pp. 4, 5.
that they are becoming a channel through which the imperialists are continuing with their policy of exploitation and extortion.36

The PKI has also carried on relentlessly its effort to reduce the administrative role of the military. Throughout 1962 it continued to press for the abolition of martial law.37 When President Sukarno finally decreed on December 19, 1962, the lifting of the state of emergency "in order that revolutionary people's forces be given a part in the consummation of efforts to achieve the objectives of the Indonesian revolution," this was greeted by the Politburo in its 1963 New Year Message as a "victory most significant for the people's struggle for the enlargement of democratic rights and the improvement of living conditions."38 Then, anticipating maneuvers on the part of the military to continue to exert, informally, the authority they had enjoyed under martial law, Aidit warned in his Political Report of February 10, 1963, to the First Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee:

The bureaucrat capitalists and the other reactionaries are doing everything in their power to prepare a series of plans and measures to rob the people of the democracy they will obtain with the lifting of the state of emergency. They have


been working for a long time to create a situation of "SOB without SOB."\textsuperscript{39}

Unlike the July 8, 1960, attack on the Army, this one was not suppressed, although the military's emergency powers expired only on May 1, 1963, nearly three months after Aidit's report.

While attacking "bureaucratic capitalism" and militarism, the PKI has carefully kept open the possibility of an alliance with the Armed Forces. As early as July 1956, in his General Report to a Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Aidit had said:

> Although the reactionaries have tried hard to change their composition and spirit, the majority of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia still have the spirit of the 1945 August Revolution.... For this reason, it is difficult to imagine that the Armed Forces as a whole could now be made a tool for oppressing the people: on the contrary, it is proper for the people to want the TNI and other Indonesian Armed Forces to be protectors of the people.\textsuperscript{40}

On February 11, 1957, Aidit had stated in the course of a debate in Parliament:

> It is an open secret that in the general elections for Parliament as well as for the Constituent Assembly, more than 80 per cent of the Armed Forces voted for the democratic parties and 30 per cent of their votes went to the PKI. The PSI and MASJUMI received less than 20 per cent,

\textsuperscript{39} D. N. Aidit, \textit{Dare, Dare and Dare Again!} Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1963, p. 8. This is the first PKI document circulated by the Communist Party of China in English translation. SOB are the initials by which one refers to martial law in Indonesia since Dutch colonial days.

\textsuperscript{40} Aidit, \textit{Pilihan Tulisan}, Vol. II (JPRS Translation, p. 35).
fewer even than the PKI or the PNI individually. The PSI, which is influential among the high-ranking officers, ranks fifth in the Armed Forces. While the MASJUMI, because of its pro-DI policy, ranks sixth. 41

Today, more than seven years later, it is anybody's guess what the true situation is in the Armed Forces. It seems hard to believe that an Army living among a population of which up to 15 per cent is affiliated with Communist organizations has remained completely impervious to the Communist appeal, especially in a period when the PKI projects the image of being in the forefront of militant, radical nationalism. During the campaign for West Irian, and even more so in the current "confrontation" with Malaysia, the military must have been given much food for thought by the almost complete identity of outlook between themselves and the PKI with regard to Indonesia's role in Southeast Asia.

Significantly, since 1962 Aidit and other PKI leaders have been invited repeatedly to address the Staff and Command Schools of Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Police Academy. 42 These invitations initially may have been the result of orders from the President, but now that the ice has been broken, Communist access to the officer corps is bound in time to influence some of the military.

41 Ibid., p. 80 [Emphasis added].
42 Harian Rakjat published on July 2, 1963, and on July 7 and 8, 1964, the full texts of Aidit's speeches at the Army's SESKOAD; on July 17 and 18, 1963, the full text of a speech at the Navy's SESKOAL; on March 23 and 24, 1964, the full text of a speech at the Air Force's SESKOAU; on February 28, 1963, the full text of a speech at the Police Academy.
Seeking military support should be one of the PKI's major targets. It would be naive to assume that a group of men as shrewd and patient as Aidit and his associates could hope to proceed far on the road to power without securing if not the cooperation at least the neutrality of the Armed Forces. In this respect trends seem to be in the PKI's favor. The most militantly anti-Communist officers were eliminated from the armed services before and during the 1958-1960 rebellion. Many of the senior officers, loyal to the Sukarno regime but known for their anti-Communist views, have been gradually deprived of command positions since 1960. It can be expected that by the time the PKI is ready to assume power the Armed Forces will have lost the will and ability to resist such an assumption.

As part of the PKI's strategy to make Communism acceptable to Indonesian society, an interesting recent departure was the proposal made at its First National Conference in July 1964 to study the development of religion in Indonesia "as a basis for better NASAKOM cooperation." 43 The PKI had already prepared the ground for a flexible attitude toward religion by amending at its Seventh (Extraordinary) National Congress held in April 1962 the Preamble to the PKI Constitution of 1959, so as to include the following paragraph:

The PKI accepts and defends the 1945 Constitution which contains the Pantja Sila in its Preamble

43 Harian Rakjat, July 6, 1964, p. 2. Aidit stated recently (Harian Rakjat, August 20, 1964) that there are more Moslems in the PKI than in one of the smaller Moslem parties.
as the basic principles of the State, aimed at building a just and prosperous society in accordance with Indonesian national identity.\textsuperscript{44}

The \textit{Pantja Sila} makes "Belief in One God" one of the Five Basic Principles of the Republic. By proclaiming its allegiance to the \textit{Pantja Sila} as requested by Presidential Decisions No. 7/1959 and No. 13/1960, the PKI made the first step towards overcoming the hostility of religious groups. Currently the PKI is prepared to go much further. On September 27, 1964, addressing the mass rally concluding the Fourth National Congress of SOBSI in Djakarta, Aidit warned Communists not to be anti-religious. He asked his audience to report immediately to party officials any Communist conducting anti-religious campaigns and promised that the offender would be promptly expelled from the party.\textsuperscript{45}

Parenthetically, it is interesting that the two largest Communist parties outside the Bloc attempt to overcome religious opposition. In formulating Theses for its Tenth Congress in September 1962, the Italian Communist Party proclaimed that "aspirations for a socialist society can be fostered in men holding religious beliefs."

\textsuperscript{44} Madju Terus! Dokumen-Dokumen Kongres Nasional KE-VII (Luarbiasa) PKI (Carry On! Documents of the Seventh (Extraordinary) PKI National Congress), Djakarta, 1963, p. 319. The title of the volume is based on President Sukarno's exhortation to the PKI in addressing the closing session of that congress.

\textsuperscript{45} Antara News Agency, Djakarta, September 28, 1964.
III. THE PKI APPARATUS AND ITS INFLUENCE

In planning the conquest of power, the PKI leaders have to concern themselves not only with the pursuit of correct strategy and tactics and with the development of a mass movement, but also with the formation of able and militant cadres capable of formulating and implementing meaningful policies at all levels. To this end, the PKI initiated its First Three Year Plan on August 17, 1956. At the time of the Sixth National Congress in September 1959, the PKI claimed that 270,000 cadres and activists had graduated from party schools or had finished a party course. A Second Three Year Plan was completed in April 1963 but seems to have encountered some difficulties in imposing true party discipline on members, especially with regard to payment of dues.

A "Four Year Plan for Culture, Ideology, and Organization" was initiated on August 17, 1963, aiming at increases in membership and intensified indoctrination. The PKI has understood the intense thirst for education of the Indonesian people and offers education not only at the level of People's Universities (Universitas Rakjat) teaching Marxism and Economics in major cities such as Djakarta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Medan, but also in party organized schools at senior and junior high school level, and even down to courses at elementary-school

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47 Harian Rakjat, August 19, 1963.
level in the villages. One of the party's goals is that at the end of the Four Year Plan older members will be literate. In addition, the PKI is organizing regional training centers for all cadres. These offer theoretical discussions on matters of ideology and practical research on the economic and social problems of the region. The Plan aims also at doubling membership during the four year period and collecting sufficient dues to be able to equip all party organizations adequately.

The PKI leaders attribute great importance to ideological training. Aidit explained on the 39th anniversary of the PKI, during the First Three Year Plan:

Party cadres cannot possibly thoroughly understand the general line and policy of the Party if they do not understand the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. They cannot possibly understand thoroughly why, for example, the nature of the Indonesian revolution at the present time is not socialist but bourgeois-democratic, why the PKI supports President Sukarno's Concept, why it supports the idea of "guided democracy" and the idea of "back to the 1945 Constitution" if they do not understand Marxist-Leninist philosophy. They can say that the Party's general and political line is good and correct but they cannot explain why.48

How successful the effort to train cadres has been is naturally not easy to ascertain. What is apparent to an outside observer is the presence in party circles of an intellectual ferment that is lacking elsewhere. The PKI press contributes substantial materials to the discussion of Indonesia's problems at a time when the general level

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of political discourse in Indonesia is very low, due in part of course to the fact that all voices hostile to the Sukarno regime have been silenced.

In the past Communist strength was based almost exclusively on Java which in 1955 gave the PKI 88.6 per cent of its parliamentary vote.\textsuperscript{49} In 1958, at the time of the "states rights" rebellions in Sumatra and the Celebes, which had strong anti-Communist overtones, it was widely assumed that a Communist take-over in Djakarta would lead to the secession of the Outer Islands and thus to the starvation of over-populated Java. (Since then Java's economic situation has continued to deteriorate, to the point where Aidit felt compelled to advise the National Conference of BTI on September 10, 1964, to "turn rats into food for the peasants, as Bung Karno and I have already enjoyed rat meat.")\textsuperscript{50}

The PKI leaders are unlikely to seek power in Djakarta without being reasonably certain that they can draw on the economic resources of the Outer Islands. Consequently, the PKI will have to secure the cooperation of the Armed Forces against possible secessions and make major efforts to gain political support in the Outer Islands. Reliable information about the real political situation in various parts of the Indonesian archipelage is scarce, but there are indications that the PKI and its front organizations are making progress while the other political forces, with some exceptions in South Celebes and Atjeh, are not more vigorous than on Java.

\textsuperscript{49}Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, mimeo., Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{50}Harian Rakjat, September 11, 1964, p. 1.
The organizational structure developed by the PKI for the purpose of extending its influence throughout the Indonesian archipelago has as its principal bodies the Greater Regional Committees identified as CDB (Comite Daerah Besar), CPB (Comite Pulau Besar), and CDR (Comite Djakarta Raya), known before 1957 as Provcom (Provincial Committees) and totalling currently 27 units. At the second level are the CS or Section Committees responsible for regencies (Kabupaten) and larger towns, and the CSS responsible for districts (Ketjamatatan) and smaller towns. Each of these bodies has an executive committee and a conference. Below the CSS are the RC or Resort Committees, based territorially (villages, urban sectors) or institutionally (factories, mines, offices, schools), which have less than 100 party members and are the basic organizations of the PKI to which the cells (GRUP) are responsible.

In his December 1963 Political Report Aidit announced that "only West Irian is still without a PKI Greater Regional Committee in view of the fact that guided democracy in this area has not yet progressed and parties are still prohibited from forming." He then stated that Section Committees exist in 93 per cent of regencies and larger towns, Subsection Committees in 83 per cent of districts and smaller towns, and Resort Committees in 62 per cent of all villages or their equivalents. 51

In this period of deep and bitter controversies among and within Communist parties, the PKI leadership has carefully avoided public schism in order to project an image of

51 D. N. Aidit, Kobarkan Semangat Banteng! (JPRS Translation, p. 70).
reliable strength. For more than ten years, following the consolidation of the Aidit leadership at the October 1953 Plenary Session of the Central Committee, there has been no public indication of factionalism. Only recently, at the First National Conference of the PKI, on July 3, 1964, has Aidit indicated that problems did exist, when he told his comrades:

The internal contradictions in the Party cannot be avoided but must be faced, taken care of and terminated. In settling in the right way the Party's internal contradictions, the skill and quality of the leadership increases. Bringing to an end the internal contradictions of the Party is an absolute condition for increasing the ability of the Party to terminate external contradictions.52

Following this National Conference, the Central Committee of the PKI was expanded. Whether this represented a quiet balancing of contending factions or the continuation of an earlier tendency to promote the most able cadres to top positions cannot be determined. In any case, no purges have taken place and the remarkable stability at the top of the PKI hierarchy has continued. Of 14 men who were Central Committee members in January 1951, 11 were still on the Central Committee by 1961; one, Bachtarudin, had died, and two, Alimin and Tan Ling Djie, had been dropped from the Central Committee but not expelled from the party.53

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52 D. N. Aidit, "Dengan Semangat Banteng Merah Mengkonsolidasi Organisasi Komunis Jang Besar" ("With the Spirit of the Red Buffalo Consolidate the Big Communist Organization"), in Harian Rakjat, July 6, 1964, p. 3.
The Central Committee and the other executive organs of the PKI usually contain a number of secret members. But so far as is known, the composition of these bodies has hardly varied since September 1959, when the Sixth National Congress installed a greatly enlarged Central Committee. Earlier the names of only 18 Central Committee members were known. In 1959 this body was expanded to 35, to which were added 11 candidate members. About half of the new Central Committee members and 10 of the candidate members were from the Outer Islands — a visible effort to reduce the proportion of Javanese and to give balanced representation to other regions and ethnic groups.

A 1964 survey indicated that with very few exceptions the 46 members and candidate members of the 1959 Central Committee had either maintained their positions or received promotions. On July 6, 1964, the Central Committee was enlarged at its Third Plenary Session, following the National Conference of July 3-5. All 11 candidate members were promoted to full members, and 5 new full members were appointed as well as 5 new candidate members. At the same time 3 new members were added to the Secretariat, 2 to the Control Commission, and 3 to the Verification Committee. Only the 7-man Politburo remained unchanged. Nobody has been dropped from either Politburo or Secretariat, thus enhancing the image of stability projected by the party for over a decade. 54

The old Politburo of 5 overt members (Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, Sudisman, and Sakirman) was established in the 1951-1953 period and was expanded to 7 at the First Plenum

of the Central Committee on February 12, 1963, by promoting candidate members Jusuf Adjitorop and Njono to full membership and adding Anwar Sanusi and Rewang as new candidate members. At the same time the PKI Secretariat was expanded from 7 members in 1959 to 8 in 1962, and then to 10 in February 1963: Sudisman, Jusuf Adjitorop, Peris Pardede, Anwar Kadir, Karel Supit, Anwar Sanusi, Djokosudjono, Siswojo, Nursuhud, and M. Zaelani. Finally, Njono, Ruslan Kamaluddin, and Tjugito were added to the Secretariat in July 1964.

The political apparatus managed by these men is defined in the constitution of the PKI in the classic language of "democratic centralism" which provides for elected bodies, periodic accountability, strict discipline, and absolute compliance of lower bodies with the decisions of higher bodies. The statutory locus of ultimate power is the National Congress, which has met, since the proclamation of Indonesian independence, in 1947, 1954, 1959, and 1962. As in other Communist parties, however, policy is actually made at the top and is expressed primarily in the political reports of Chairman Aidit and of other Politburo members to National Congresses, National Conferences, and Plenary Sessions of the Central Committee, as well as in the numerous speeches of the PKI leaders to an increasingly wide variety of audiences. Through this stream of oratory, covering topics from Communist ethics to the issues of the day, the PKI leaders are becoming well-known national figures.

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56 E.g. Aidit's speech on Communist ethics to the Christian University Satya Watjana, full text in Harian Rakjat, November 23, 26, and 27, 1962.
Successful in gradually changing the balance of forces in Indonesia, in building up a mass movement, in creating a strong party of cadres, and in establishing themselves as national figures, Aidit and his closest associates are also active now in the pursuit of legitimate authority in Indonesian society, so as to maximize the PKI's chances in the struggle for power that may occur at the end of the Sukarno regime.

A comprehensive analysis of the sources of legitimacy in contemporary Indonesia would have to appraise the impact of old Southeast Asian concepts of divine kingship, of Western notions of constitutionalism and democracy, and of the mysterious workings of charismatic forces. For present purposes it will suffice to recognize that President Sukarno has become, in recent years, the fountainhead of legitimacy in Indonesia, drawing his own strength from all the above-mentioned sources. As the principal national spokesman and leader for over 22 years and as a prominent nationalist agitator for almost four decades, Sukarno has established himself as a unique figure in Indonesian society. Proclaimed President for life, with enthusiastic Communist support, at the May 1963 session of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, 57 Sukarno, at the age of 63, may still be fated to govern Indonesia for many years. The longer his regime lasts, the better in the present author's opinion are the PKI's chances of assuming the succession without a major struggle.

As time goes on, the older generation of Sukarno's

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opponents loses political prestige and influence and, possibly, even the will to continue the struggle. Evidence is lacking that a new generation of national leaders is rising to assert political positions sharply in contrast with those of the present regime. Within the officially accepted spectrum of political groupings, the Communists are today the most vigorous, though not the only, contenders for Sukarno's succession. They may find themselves challenged by various radical nationalist politicians and military leaders. But if, besides drawing on the support of their mass movement and on the individual prestige of their leaders, the Communists also succeed in appearing as Sukarno's true political heirs, their chances will naturally be improved. Sukarno has not stated publicly that he views the PKI leaders as his heirs, but this image is gradually being built up through a subtle interplay between the President and the Communists.

Past relations between Sukarno and the PKI lend themselves to fascinating speculation. At the time of the Madiun rebellion in September 1948, Sukarno had to ask the Indonesian people in an emergency radio broadcast to choose between PKI leader Musso and himself. In 1951 Sukarno was still attacked by the PKI as a false and demagogic Marxist, playing a primary role in the Madiun Affair and selling the country in the Round Table Conference Agreement.

At the end of the Sixth National Congress of the PKI

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in September 1959, the holding of which he made possible despite Army opposition, Sukarno addressed the party in an hour-long nationally broadcast speech in which he stated that "from the time of his youth till the present he had always cherished feelings of close friendship with the PKI."\textsuperscript{60} Aidit, answering him on that occasion, waxed lyrical:

We, who are obliged by the Party to study the history of the Party and the struggle of the Indonesian people, know just how close are the spiritual ties between the PKI and Bung Karno. It was none other than Bung Karno, still then very young, who warmly welcomed the heroic 1926 rebellion.\textsuperscript{61}

Whatever the true relationship between President Sukarno and the Communist movement may have been in the 30 years before 1956, the past 8 years have been characterized by the President's increasingly close cooperation with the PKI domestically, and with the Communist Bloc internationally. Since 1956 numerous exchanges of visits have taken place between Indonesian officials and those of Communist countries. The possible impact of the frequent appearance of Sukarno in the company of foreign Communist dignitaries is suggested by the fact that Voroshilov's state visit to Indonesia in the summer of 1957 was interpreted by many observers as contributing to the increase by 34 per cent over 1955 of the electoral strength of the PKI in the regional elections held at that time.

Today opinion in Indonesia is being conditioned to

\textsuperscript{60}Review of Indonesia, November-December 1959, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{61}Review of Indonesia, September-October,1959, p. 12.
accept Communism by the huge and still expanding Soviet military aid program, by the well-publicized diplomatic support given by the Communist Bloc to Indonesia in its campaigns for West New Guinea and against the Federation of Malaysia, and by governmental manipulation of the Indonesian press. Whereas attacks on the United States, labeled "Enemy No. One" by the PKI, and on other Western countries are daily routine, no criticism of Communist countries appears in Indonesia. In the absence of elections since 1957 and of any public opinion surveys, the precise domestic impact of the Sukarno regime's relations with the Communist world cannot be assessed, but Indonesians derive much pride from the modern weapons, the economic projects, or the Djakarta stadium acquired with credits from the Soviet Union.

It is far from clear how the present relationship between Sukarno and the Aidit group developed. It is conceivable that initially the PKI leaders solicited only protection against their enemies in exchange for their support, and then took advantage of their increasing intimacy with the President to try to convince him that they were the logical heirs of his regime. But it is also possible that, sometime after the 1955 elections had revealed to the President the PKI's potential as a revolutionary mass party, a secret understanding was reached pledging PKI support to Sukarno during his lifetime in exchange for a special role for the Communists as vanguard of the Indonesian revolution. After February 1957 the PKI mobilized mass support for Sukarno's "guided democracy." Following the creation of the new regime, in July 1959, Aidit, as chairman of a committee of the Republic's Supreme Advisory Council, played an important role in shaping the character of the emerging state ideology.
A comparison between the President's Independence Day addresses of 1959 and 1960 suggests significant increase in Communist influence in the intervening period.

Whatever the chain of events may have been, it is quite clear that some of the major political guidelines of the regime that took shape after 1957 appear to have been drawn several years earlier by the PKI. For instance, the concept of a NASAKOM cabinet, which Sukarno made into a national issue at the beginning of his campaign for "guided democracy" in February 1957, and for which he has pleaded ever since, has the specific purpose of bringing the PKI into the government. The idea, without the acronym later devised by Sukarno, originated in a decision of the Central Committee of the PKI taken in November 1954:

Cooperation between the Party and the Communist masses and the Nationalist and Islamic parties and masses is not something which is to last only until the forthcoming elections have been held, as Nationalist and Islamic leaders often declare. We favour cooperation after the elections as well, regardless of who wins. This is in keeping with the slogan of our Republic, Bhineka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity).[62]

At that time the PKI made no reference to the fact that in 1926 Sukarno had published in Suluh Indonesia Muda an article entitled, "Nationalism, Islamism, and Marxism," urging cooperation between the major currents in Indonesian politics. [63] Only since October 1962 has the PKI given

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[63] Ir. Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi (Under the
publicity to that forgotten text, which it reprinted in pamphlet form in 1963. Now Aidit argues that the NASAKOM concept "created by Sukarno in 1926," his Pantja Sila formulated in June 1945, the 1945 Constitution, re-established by decree on July 5, 1959, and the Political Manifesto (MANIPOL) which outlined on August 17, 1959, the basic principles of the new regime of "guided democracy," are "part of one unit which cannot be separated in the efforts of the Indonesian people to finish the national-democratic revolution and proceed toward Socialism."64 In other words, participation of the Communists in the government of Indonesia is an essential component of the political tradition gradually revealed by the national prophet Sukarno.

President Sukarno has succeeded in creating in Indonesia a political symbolism that pervades the country's public life. It is entirely possible that this verbal superstructure will persist for some time after his death. The magic power of words is particularly great in a country deeply imbued with mysticism. The PKI leaders, by treating the President's formulations with quasi-theological reverence and making him the object of their "cult of personality," are showing shrewd political judgment concerning their long-term interests. In the last couple of years, the speeches of Aidit and of other PKI leaders appear more and more

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64 Lectures at the GERWANI Training Center, October 23 and 27, 1962, on "Marxism in Practice," Harian Rakjat, October 29, 1962.
generously adorned with quotations from "The Great Leader of the Revolution," as Sukarno has been called since 1960. This not only satisfies the President's boundless vanity but also helps convince the masses that the Communists are his true disciples and, therefore, also his most deserving political heirs.

It can be expected that the PKI, in the period of transition following Sukarno's death, will present him as a father-figure whose ideological legacy they are anxious to honor as good Indonesian patriots. However insincere such a maneuver may be, the prospect of it may well appeal to the President, not only because it now mobilizes the Communist propaganda machinery on his behalf but also because it promises him the political immortality which he so obviously seeks.

By accident or design, the PKI leaders can use their doctrine to convince Sukarno both of the sincerity of their current cooperation with him and of his future place in their history books. As early as October 1953 the Aidit group formulated a PKI program, afterwards ratified by the Fifth National Congress in March 1954, which provides a suitable basis for a political alliance with Sukarno. In arguing for "a government of the people's democracy," the 1954 PKI Program said that this government will be a government of a united national front, formed on the basis of the alliance of workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class. Taking into account the country's backwardness, the Communist Party of Indonesia considers that this government must not be a government of the dictatorship of the proletariat but a government of the dictatorship of the people. This government will effect not socialist but
democratic reforms. It will be a government capable of uniting all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces....65

With only minor juggling of concepts, the PKI should have found it relatively easy to convince Sukarno that this indispensable stage of the "anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution" must be led by him as head of a NASAKOM or united national front government. This argument must have carried even greater conviction after Premier Khrushchev's visit to Indonesia in February 1960 and the Soviet Union's massive aid commitments, and especially after the Declaration of Representatives of the Eighty-one Communist Parties, meeting in Moscow in November-December 1960, pledged support to "independent national democracies," a category which Sukarno could take to include the political system he wants to create:

The Communist parties are working actively for a consistent completion of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution, for the establishment of national democracies, for a radical improvement in the living standard of the people.66

Aidit and his party group show considerable intellectual resourcefulness and political sophistication in the way they handle their relations with the President. By developing in all their public statements the thesis that Indonesia's economic ills are the result of "the remnants of imperialism and feudalism,"67 the Communist leaders imply the blamelessness of the Sukarno regime, but at the same time build up

65 Quoted in Problems of the Indonesian Revolution, p. 94 [Emphasis added].
67 D. N. Aidit, "DEKON Dan Sjarat-Sjarat Pelaksanaannja"
their own claim to power as the only group truly capable of coping with these hostile forces. PKI public statements strengthen Sukarno's self-confident belief that he is not the cause of the country's suffering, but a necessary stage in the Marxist dialectic of history. The latter feeling was clearly reflected in Sukarno's Independence Day address for 1964, entitled "A Year of Dangerous Living." In a country still deeply imbued with magic-mystical thinking, one should not underestimate the impact on the masses of statements such as this:

Please do not think that Sukarno is a clairvoyant person. Do not think that Sukarno is in the possession of some magic power! No! Whenever I predict this or that, my prediction is based on my knowledge of the objective laws of the history of society. If there is any magic in my possession, it is because I know the Mandate of the Suffering of the People, because I know conditions, and because I know a science which is efficacious, namely Marxism. 68

Many Indonesians constantly search for magical formulas that will secure them happiness, health, wealth, or

68 "A Year of Dangerous Living," address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, August 17, 1964, English translation by Antara News Agency, Djakarta, p. 10 [Emphasis added]. The speech was distributed in pamphlet form as a supplement to Harian Rakjat of August 19, 1964. Its Indonesian title is "Tahum Ber-Vivere Pericoloso," a slightly ungrammatical reminiscence of Mussolini's slogan inspired, in turn, by Nietzsche. In accordance with current Indonesian practice, this year's address is to be referred to by the acronym TAVIP, joining MANIPOL (1959), DJAREK (1960), RESOPIM (1961), TAKEM (1962) and GESURI (1963).
power. To be told by their President that his success is due to the science of Marxism should be worth a great deal to the PKI. But the like-mindedness between Sukarno and the PKI, evinced by the above address, goes further than general endorsement of the "science of Marxism" by the President. He follows the PKI in sorting political groups as die-hards, middle-of-the-roaders, and progressives, and describes the Indonesian revolution in classic Communist terms: a national-democratic stage to be followed by a socialist stage. His 1964 Independence Day address endorses Communist positions on all major domestic and international issues raised in Indonesia during the preceding year. The achievements in which Sukarno takes pride are without exception goals also advocated by the PKI. Positions taken by the President in current national debates conform to the stand publicly expressed several months earlier by the PKI. Detailed scrutiny of current policies of the Sukarno regime suggests that the PKI, despite its lack of formal executive prerogatives, has already considerable influence on the policies of the Sukarno government.

In view of this situation, the proud and self-reliant posture of the PKI both at home and vis-à-vis the international Communist movement becomes understandable. In his Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Central Committee held in Djakarta in December 1963, Aidit discussed the question whether Communist parties "can be successful without assistance from socialist countries." He answered:

If Lenin and the great October socialist revolution teach us anything, they teach that if the people are united and in complete accord to struggle and to gain ultimate victory, not only will the imperialists be thrown out but also the capitalist
system can be destroyed. The Soviet Union was established by Lenin and the proletariat without aid from socialist states, because the Soviet Union was the very first socialist state.69

In the same speech Aidit also said:

Among the Communist groups in other countries, there have also been people who have not been so enthusiastic concerning the PKI's independent attitude. In fact some brotherly countries have charged the PKI with being "nationalistic." They look upon the slogan "Give an Indonesian Image to Marxism-Leninism" as a slogan which is in contradiction with Marxism-Leninism.... Supposing Marx, Engels, and Lenin were still alive: would they be angered [by] or partial to the fact that certain Communist Parties have reformulated their teachings in powerful and creative ways?70

These are not the words of Soviet or Chinese puppets but of a new breed of radically nationalist Communist leaders, much more likely to be accepted in their own societies than the Comintern agents of earlier days. The odds are that under these leaders the PKI will come to power in Indonesia. But by the same odds they are not likely either to turn their country into a satellite or to create a carbon copy of previous Communist regimes.

69 D. N. Aidit, Kobarkan Semangkat Banteng! (JPRS Translation, pp. 45, 46 [Emphasis added]).

70 Ibid. (JPRS Translation, p. 59). The PKI leaders again showed their wisdom on August 10, 1964, when the Agitprop Department of the Central Committee of the PKI announced in Harian Rakjat the initiation of a "movement to eradicate the disease of self-satisfaction" from the party and warned: "Self-satisfaction is the mother of retreat and defeat. Humility is the mother of progress and victory."
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

1. Ruth McVey's *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* is scheduled for early publication by Cornell University Press. This is an important study of the early history of the PKI, up to 1927.

2. Donald Hindley's *The Communist Party of Indonesia* is scheduled for publication by the University of California Press. This is a detailed account of the first decade (1951-1961) of the PKI under the leadership of the Aidit group.


4. Students of Indonesian Communism will also be interested in the following recent contributions:

5. The U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), publishes translations of important PKI documents. Its serial publication, "Translations on South and East Asia," includes selections from Harian Rakjat and various PKI periodicals.