RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN INDONESIA

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SUMMARY

Indonesia enters the second decade of its independence under conditions strikingly different from those that prevailed during its first five years as a new state. The revolutionary struggle against the Dutch between 1945 and 1949 left a heritage of radical nationalism, generated conflicts within Indonesian society, and created a complex of social and political alignments -- all of which persist today throughout the archipelago.

Halfway through its first decade of independence Indonesia seemed to be headed toward democracy, in whose name the revolution had been carried out. Today the situation is far otherwise. Tensions are high, and the current trends are in the direction of military authoritarianism and possibly even totalitarianism. Applied to Indonesia today, the term "instability" refers not to a reshuffling of the elite at the social apex, but rather to the profound convulsions of a society that has not yet found itself. Martial law has been invoked. An elected parliament has been replaced by an appointed one. Civil war is going on in the form of guerrilla operations in Java, Sumatra and the Celebes. The economy is running down.

For the national tragedy that has overtaken the country the military must bear a large measure of responsibility. During the relatively brief history of the Republic, and even earlier
during the revolutionary war against the Dutch, there were repeated clashes between the officer corps and the politicians. In the struggle for power, officers played politics, while politicians dabbled in the internal affairs of the army. To make the situation even more turbulent the army itself has been plagued by almost constant in-fighting among rival officers. The part that the military plays in public life has increased considerably since 1955 and particularly since the declaration of martial law in 1957. It now shows signs of becoming dominant. Yet it is doubtful that the officer corps can be regarded as a harbinger of progress and reform. Indeed, it is coming more and more to resemble the politicians it drove from office several years ago.

Far from being united in protecting the integrity of the state, the officer corps is divided by personal jealousies, conflicting outlooks, and special interests. Busily intriguing against each other, its members appear to agree only in calling for larger military budgets and perhaps in their opposition to communism. What is worse, it has become an instrument of repression at the disposal of President Sukarno, whose personal dictatorship is likely to make social and political pressures even more explosive and better solutions more difficult if not impossible. In short, the young idealists who took up arms in
support of a national ideal fifteen years ago and are now middle-aged militarists enjoying the perquisites of office and power. In the last two or three years the military have gained important cabinet posts and several lesser ministerial positions. They are today pretty fully incorporated into an authoritarian system called "guided democracy." For the present and immediate future President Sukarno maintains his position in part by the use of clever political tactics, but even more through the weakness of the opposition.
PREFACE

This Research Memorandum constitutes one chapter in a forthcoming volume on the role of the military in underdeveloped areas. The volume consists of a number of papers originally presented at a conference held in Santa Monica in the summer of 1959, revised and brought down to date. This Memorandum is fourth in a series of papers produced by the author that deal with the emerging political structure of Indonesia. The earlier papers are Indonesian Images of their National Self (P-1452-RC); The Role of Political Organization in Indonesia (P-1514-RC); and Recent Communist Tactics in Indonesia (RM-2619-RC). These papers plus later ones to be prepared on the basis of further field work and study are intended to contribute to a proposed volume on the first decade of democracy in Indonesia.
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INTRODUCTION

As Indonesia goes into its precarious second decade, initially at least as a "guided democracy," its future depends in large part on the role of the military and the relationships of the officers' corps to the other elites and power groups in the country. The officers' corps, particularly of the Army and the Air Force, looms as one of the major sources of political power and administrative capacity in the country, along with the Communist Party and with the radical nationalists. In order to judge the probable behavior of the officers' corps, and its probable consequences for the political future of the country, it is necessary to examine its origins, its ideology, and its purposes. It is also necessary to trace the emerging pattern of civil-military relations, and to review the manner in which the officers' corps moved into national politics, crossing in 1955 the dividing line between resisting external interference in Army affairs and taking positive political action. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine the role of the Army in the restoration of the Constitution of 1945 and the consequent retrogression from a representative democracy based on a multi-party system to the rule of extra-parliamentary forces. It is here that militaism first appeared, and it is necessary to ask why, at this critical point, the army did not simply take over.
What sort of tentative balance sheet can one draw up concerning the present state of Indonesian politics? How deep do its instabilities run? What sort of a future can one predict for a society that has turned from representative to "guided" democracy, led by a father figure who is neither a political thinker nor an administrative architect but who maintains power by shrewd manipulation of divisions within and among groups? What will be the role of a military elite that is deeply divided and unsure of itself, but that includes a capable leader who may be following a sound, long-range strategy by which the Army can stabilize the country in the face of communist challenge?
ORIGINS OF THE OFFICER CORPS

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (Angkatan Perang or APRI) consist of an Army (Angkatan Darat or AD) of about 221,000 men, which has not been significantly expanded since the end of the struggle for independence in 1949, an Air Force (Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia or AURI), of about 15,000 men, which is now about seven times stronger than ten years ago, a Navy (Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia or ALRI), of about 15,000 men, ten times larger than immediately after the achievement of sovereignty, and a State Police (Polisi Negara) of about 105,000 men, which includes highly effective, militarized, mobile brigade units. The three branches of the Armed Forces and the Police were created in the last months of 1945 and are, by and large, still officered by the first generation of professional soldiers. Unlike officers of the Army and the Air Force, those of the Navy and State Police have not played an important political role in the Republic.

In a country with a total population approaching 90 million, the less than 10,000 members of the officer corps of the Armed Forces and more especially the 6,000 odd Army officers -- their number is smaller than generally assumed -- form a very important segment of the country's elite and play a considerable role in the shaping of its destinies.
The officer corps of Indonesia comes from three different sources: a small number were educated by the Dutch before 1942, a larger number were drilled by the Japanese between 1943 and 1945, while a third group began their military careers during the struggle for independence between 1945 and 1949. After 1949 some officers received professional training from the Netherlands, but since the political break with the Dutch, more than 500 Army officers have been sent to the United States, while smaller numbers of Air Force officers went to Great Britain and India and some Navy officers to various places in Western Europe. In the last two years scores of Air Force and Navy officers have been trained in Communist bloc or neutralist countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Egypt. Most officers of field rank have also been assigned, in recent years, on a rotating basis to the Staff and Command School in Bandung (SSKAD) for special courses.

Military training, in the colonial period, for services in the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) began in 1830. The KNIL included at first 600 European and 37 Indonesian officers and 12,905 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. While throughout the nineteenth century the KNIL had almost constantly to wage
"pacification" campaigns, in the twentieth century Indonesian armed resistance against Dutch rule gradually subsided, and the task of the KNIL as the ultimate guarantor of the colonial power's paramount authority became easier. By May 1940, when Hitler's armies occupied the Netherlands, the KNIL consisted of a professional corps of 1,345 officers and 37,583 troops. The personnel listed as European included, in addition to the Dutch, a large proportion of Eurasians as well as some mercenaries recruited from various parts of Germany. While a substantial number of soldiers came from the Christian parts of East Indonesia, especially the Minahassa (North Celebes) and Ambon, the number of Indonesian officers was very small and hardly any achieved field rank.

When the Dutch forces in the East Indies capitulated to the Japanese in March 1942, a few KNIL units stationed in the eastern parts of the archipelago escaped to Australia and were reorganized as a KNIL battalion. It was this battalion that later took part in the recapture from the Japanese of Tarakan in May 1945 and of Balikpapan in July 1945. Additional KNIL units were created as former KNIL members were liberated from Japanese camps after August 1945. These units played an important part, under Dutch command, in the two military actions against the Republic of Indonesia, which occurred from July 21 to
August 4, 1947, and from December 18, 1948, to August 1, 1949. The KNIL was a force of 65,000 men when it was disbanded on July 26, 1950. Some troops were incorporated into the Royal Dutch Army and sent to Europe, others into the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, while many were demobilized. It is reported that since February 1958 many of the latter have joined the Permesta forces in northern Celebes and are fighting as guerrillas in their home territory against the government in Djakarta.

Most of the members of the Indonesian officer corps whose careers started in the KNIL had been non-commissioned officers under the Dutch. Men like Lieutenant General A.H. Nasution or Major General T.B. Simatupang, who attended the Dutch Royal Military Academy in Bandung before 1942, are few in number and understandably achieved dominant positions. Those like the Air Force Chief of Staff, Marshal Suryadarma, or the Deputy Minister for Defense, Major General Hidajat, who attended the Royal Military Academy in Breda, the Netherlands, are even less numerous. The only former officer of field rank in the KNIL who joined the nationalist movement, Major Urip Sumohardjo, became the first Lieutenant General and Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army. Before his death in 1948 he suffered much from the hostility of the Japanese-trained officers, who resented him because he had advanced so far in the KNIL.
Some of the Dutch-trained junior officers received additional training during the Japanese occupation of the East Indies, while others joined the anti-Japanese underground. For many more young Indonesians the years 1943-1945 marked the beginning of a military career.

A special Intelligence Branch of the General Staff of the Sixteenth Japanese Army, with headquarters in Java, known as the BEPPAN, set up an auxiliary corps -- the Barisan Pembela Tanah Air or Giyugun (Corps for the Defense of the Fatherland) -- toward the end of December 1943. The new formations commonly referred to as the PETA, consisted at first of 35 daidans which followed the organization of a Japanese battalion (daitai) but had only half the latter's number of men. A PETA battalion consisted of 522 officers and men. A few Japanese officers were attached to each battalion as instructors. In August 1944 twenty additional daidans were formed, and in November 1944 eleven more, bringing the total strength of the PETA to 66 battalions in Java. Three battalions had been formed in June 1944 in Bali. By August 1, 1945, there were 35,855 men in the PETA on Java and 1,626 in Bali.

In addition to the PETA battalions, the Japanese had recruited by August 1945 some 24,873 auxiliary soldiers in Java and 2,504 in Timor. Known as Hei-ho, these troops were
armed with rifles and used for guard duty under Japanese command.¹

Following the imperial rescript of August 15, 1945, ordering the Japanese forces to cease all hostilities the PETA was disbanded on August 19, after a farewell address by General Nagano, Commander-in-Chief of the Sixteenth Japanese Army, who told them:

It cannot be yet admitted that the Indonesians possess a real ability to fight against the powers of the world. Therefore enmity against foreigners shown openly by the Indonesians through armed organizations could not bring them happiness but rather cause calamities, especially as it is feared that atrocious [sic] atomic bombs might be used against them.

The events of the following four years showed that the Indonesians were not afraid of atomic weapons. Whether this resulted from the intensity of their nationalist feelings or from their confidence in American good will, they certainly did not avoid clashes with the Allies.

The available data on the PETA make it possible to estimate that some 70 Indonesians may have been trained as battalion commanders (daidan-cho), some 200 as company commanders (chudan-cho), some 620 as platoon commanders (shodan-cho), and perhaps

¹The figures given here are based on Japanese sources. Professor Kahin in his Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 109, writes about the PETA that "at its peak strength in the middle of 1945 it numbered about 120,000 armed men." This figure is much too high, unless it includes the para-military formations mentioned below, in which case it is too low.
2,000 as section commanders (*bundan-cho*). No Indonesians were trained for positions of field rank higher than major either by the Dutch or by the Japanese. This explains the opinion one can still hear among senior Indonesian officers that essentially they are all battalion commanders.

Numerous PETA officers later became important members of the Indonesian officer corps. These included former Army Chief of Staff Major General R. Bambang Sugeng, now Indonesian Ambassador to Japan, Brigadier Generals Sudirman, Sarbini and Suharto, former territorial commanders in East Java and Central Java, who were *chudan-cho* in 1945 and Brigadier General Achmad Jani, an important General Staff officer who was a *shodan-cho*. Few PETA battalion commanders (*daidan-cho*) became professional soldiers under the Republic since most of them were selected by the Japanese for political reasons from among older notables. The major exception was General Sudirman, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia from December 18, 1945, until his death on January 29, 1950, a former teacher whose military career started as a *daidan-cho*.

Some members of the Indonesian officer corps started their military career in para-military formations created by the Japanese, which became later the nuclei of irregular guerrilla units, the so-called lascars. They contributed much to the struggle for
independence from 1945 to 1949 but were also a source of considerable political turbulence in the young republic. These formations received military drill, but were given only bamboo spears, not firearms. By the time of the first allied landings in Java tens of thousands of young men were prepared to rally to the defense of the Republic of Indonesia following the organizational pattern introduced by the Japanese. Lines of command had been established and a measure of group spirit prevailed. But the task of shaping these units into effective components of a defense force remained a formidable one, and the military value of these groups was dubious.

The most important lascar units included the Barisan Pelopor or Suishin-tai (Pioneer Corps) of about 80,000; the Barisan Berani Mati or Jibaku-tai (Death Defying Corps) of about 50,000; the Hizbullah or Kaikyo Seinen Teishin-tai (Islamic Youth Corps) of about 50,000; the Gaku-tai (Student Corps) of about 50,000.

During the nationalist struggle for independence a group of students who had undergone intensive anti-Western indoctrination from the Japanese formed the Tentara Peladjar (Student Army) of Central Java and the TRIP of East Java and fought bravely as the Seventeenth Brigade of the National Army. After 1950, some of them, having received additional military training, were admitted into the officer corps. Many others were given an
opportunity, after demobilization, to continue their higher education in Indonesian universities or abroad.

The activist core of the Student Army has played an increasingly prominent political role since late 1956. The former leader of the Tentara Peladjar, Lt. Col. Achmadi, is an important figure in the present regime. He has been secretary general of the National Front for the liberation of West Irian (New Guinea) since November 1958; secretary of the committees on organization and programs of the new National Front being organized in 1960; and deputy minister for transmigration, cooperatives, and village community development in the presidential cabinet formed in July 1959.

The same Special Intelligence Branch of the General Staff of the Sixteenth Japanese Army (BEPPAN) that created the PETA initiated in October 1944 three training centers for Indonesian guerrilla leaders. These were known as Igo Kumu Tai. By the time of the Japanese surrender apparently a total of 150 Indonesian officers had been drilled in guerrilla tactics and returned to their homes to organize resistance movements. These officers became the hard core of the initial nationalist opposition to the return of the Allies to Java.
From the time of the British landings in September 1945 until the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by the Netherlands in December 1949, Indonesian resistance was less spontaneous than either the Japanese or the Indonesians cared to acknowledge. The Japanese, instructed by Lord Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command to maintain the status quo, asserted that all arms issued to Indonesians had been withdrawn. The Indonesians, of course, preferred not to acknowledge a Japanese contribution to their nationalist revolution -- and may indeed have resented intensely the heavy-handed Japanese occupation.

It is nevertheless certain that at least some Japanese services -- those of Admiral Mayeda -- helped the Indonesian nationalists to take over arms and that the training received in 1944 and 1945 shaped the character of the Indonesian resistance movement in the years to follow. The PETA officers who had known each other in the Japanese training centers were able to regroup themselves after the battalions created by the Imperial Army had been disbanded. They formed the first military units of the Tentara Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Army) organized by the government of the Republic of Indonesia on October 5, 1945.

Neither the Dutch nor the Japanese had been eager, for understandable reasons, to train Indonesians in the broader
aspects of military science or in the use of heavy weapons. The PETA was armed only with rifles and pistols, some light machine guns, and a small number of trench mortars. When later they captured heavier Japanese material, they were incapable of integrating it either strategically or tactically into their operations. Most of the heavy material was eventually taken away by the British forces of the Southeast Asia Command.

Consequently, throughout the years of struggle against the Dutch and indeed until communist bloc military assistance permitted the expansion of AURI and ALRI, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia consisted, for practical purposes, of infantry units, used operationally in battalion strength.
GUERRILLAS, REBELS, AND VETERANS

Driven to recognize the authority of a central government, the most disciplined and rational elements among those eager to fight the Dutch in 1945-1946 became members of the regular armed forces. The more anarchically inclined elements accepted governmental control grudgingly and then only after considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon them. The Indonesian revolution had therefore a very different character from the kind of revolutionary war fought by the Chinese or Vietnamese Communists, whose guerrilla operations were carried out under the very strict discipline of a monolithic party.

In order to have an efficient Indonesian auxiliary army to support them in case of an Allied invasion, the Japanese had permitted the strengthening of national consciousness among the native troops. By the time of the proclamation of independence, on August 17, 1945, Indonesian soldiers were fanatically nationalist and ready to defend the newly-proclaimed Republic against the landing Allied forces. But intense as this nationalism was, it lacked a rigorous ideology and was in no sense monolithic. Indeed the whole nationalist movement of Indonesia since its earliest inception after 1908 had never succeeded in creating a solid front.
As indicated above, the Japanese occupation had produced a number of militant groups with ideological differences and varying amounts of fire power at their disposal. When the Republican Government on November 3, 1945, invited the formation of political parties, the weight of these diverse groups was thrown into the balance as their leaders hastened to associate themselves with civilian political elements. Most important among these groups were the Pesindo, (Indonesian Socialist Youth), the Hizbullah (Moslem Youth Group), the Barisan Banteng (Buffalo Legion), initially loyal to the Nationalist Party (PNI), and the Lascar Rakjat (People's Army) which leaned toward the extreme left.

In January 1948, when Republican troops were ordered by the Hatta government to evacuate certain "pockets" in Java from which they waged guerrilla warfare against the Dutch, some 4,000 irregular troops, mostly from the Hizbullah and stationed in the mountains of West Java, refused to obey orders. They became the core of the Darul Islam movement, which held and is still holding the National Army at bay in parts of West Java, and expanded later into South Celebes and North Sumatra.

After May 1947 some lascar units were incorporated into the reorganized Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI (National Indonesian Army) and their officers given equivalent army ranks. Other lascar units were demobilized during the same period. Most of
these units retained an *esprit de corps* which manifested itself after 1950 in the formation of some 200 veteran organizations, when the struggle for independence was over and all irregular groups were disbanded. The most important veteran's organizations were: PERBEPSI, close to the Indonesian Communist Party and claiming 300,000 members; *Bekas Pedjuang Islam Persendjata*, close to the *Masjumi* (Moslem) Party, also claiming 300,000 members; *Ikatan Bekas Pedjuang*, close to the *Nahdatul Ulama* Party, claiming 80,000 members; *Corps Pedjuang Nasional Indonesia*, close to the Nationalist Party (PNI), claiming 20,000; *Bekas Tentara Peladjar*, members of the former Students' Army, with 15,000 members. The total number of veterans has been estimated at between 500,000 and one million. The exact figure will be known only when the current official registration has been completed.

Most veterans were unprepared for civilian life. Yet they believed they were entitled to play a special role in the newly independent country. As this expectation was not fulfilled, nor appears to be in sight more than ten years after independence, the veterans have become increasingly a political problem.

The National Army took the initiative on January 2, 1957, to merge the various veterans organizations into a Veterans' Legion, with Colonel Rudi Pirngadie as chairman. On September 9,
1957, Parliament approved a Veterans Bill concerning registration, screening, and recognition of veterans. The implementation of this legislation (Law 57/1957) started late in 1958 and continues, under Deputy Minister for Veterans Affairs, Brigadier General Sambas Atmadinata, the present chairman of the Veterans Legion.

The merger of veterans organizations into the Veterans Legion has not proceeded smoothly. In response to the recalcitrance of some of the groups, Lt. General A.H. Nasution, using his emergency powers under martial law, banned all veterans organizations except the Veterans Legion by a decree issued in November 1958.

A word of caution becomes necessary at this point. Most of the developments related above took place in Java. The course of events was significantly different elsewhere in the archipelago. Sumatra, which had little liaison with Java, was administered together with Malaya by the Seventh Imperial Japanese Army, with headquarters in Singapore. Auxiliary military organizations similar to the PETA were trained in Sumatra. From their ranks came such important officers as Colonel Barlian, former commander of South Sumatra, Colonel Sjamaun Gaharu, commander of Atjeh, and Colonel Maludin Simbolon, former commander of North Sumatra and now one of the leaders of the counter-government proclaimed
on February 15, 1958, in Padang. It can indeed be said that the
Japanese military administration left Indonesia the heritage of
two distinct armies, one based on Java, the other on Sumatra.
They fought separate revolutions between 1945 and 1949 and never
fully merged before they clashed openly in 1958. The civil war
that has raged since then between the central government and the
rebel group in Sumatra has served to polarize still further the
officers of the two armies.

In East Indonesia no PETA formations were trained, since
the Celebes, Borneo, the Moluccas and the Lesser Sundas were
administered by the Japanese Navy, from Headquarters in Macassar.
North Celebes and Ambon, strongly Christian areas, had been
traditionally recruiting grounds for the Dutch KNIL. Even after
1945, important segments of the population remained loyal to the
Netherlands. This explains in part the fact that East Indonesia,
unlike Java and Sumatra, is under-represented in the Indonesian
officer corps although some former members of an East Indonesian
guerrilla unit, the KRIS, have attained considerable standing.
The KRIS was formed during the revolutionary struggle from some
six thousand Christian refugees from the Celebes residing in
Java. Several prominent officers of that group -- among them
Colonel Ventje Sumual, former military commander of East Indonesia,
who founded, in March 1957, the Permesta movement of the Celebes --
are now fighting together with the Sumatran rebels against Djakarta.
IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS

Thus the revolutionary years 1945-1949 left Indonesia with an officer corps of heterogeneous background -- men who had developed the independence of spirit that makes first-rate guerrilla fighters but who failed to acquire the ideological indoctrination needed to discipline and unify their actions. Their fanatical nationalism did not prepare them for "revolutionary war" in Mao Tse-tung's sense, but for isolated, uncoordinated guerrilla operations.

Their struggle, however heroic, took place in an atmosphere of continuous political controversy. The military clashed repeatedly with the politicians over strategy. The politicians favored the use of diplomacy to bring the pressure of international public opinion to bear on the Dutch and thus achieve independence with a minimum of human and material sacrifices. The military insisted on an unrelenting armed struggle.

As late as August 1, 1949, General Sudirman threatened to resign his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in protest against the diplomatic negotiations with the Dutch, but finally decided that it was better "to accept the unwise policy of the government than to sacrifice the unity of the Armed Forces under my command." The bitterness of the statement speaks for itself.
Most members of the Indonesian officer corps, reacting to events as battalion commander, were unfamiliar with strategic thinking and the complex calculus it implies. They did not understand the constellation of international political forces on which the future of the Republic of Indonesia largely depended and insisted on keeping the tactical initiative against the Dutch.

Clearly, the Indonesian officer corps had not been instructed in Communist doctrines of "revolutionary war." Instead they relied on the Japanese doctrine of the "fighting spirit," which they called *semangat*. According to this notion, the warrior's élan was supposed to be more important than his technical training, the expectation being that its intensity would overcome all obstacles. The Japanese failed to produce politically sophisticated officers not only because of their understandable reluctance to train Indonesians in strategy, but also because they lacked it themselves. For these reasons they did not develop a political doctrine for the nationalist armies which emerged in Southeast Asia during the years 1942-1945 or an over-all plan for dealing with them. As for the members of the Indonesian officer corps, they may still be today -- to a greater extent than they realize -- the intellectual captives of the training they received from the Japanese.
Their preference for the "fighting spirit" may explain in part their revulsion against "scheming politicians," whom they always believed unwilling to sacrifice themselves for their country. This may also explain in part the lack of purposeful action by the officer corps today, although the proclamation of martial law on March 14, 1957, gave them a controlling influence over all aspects of Indonesian life.

Throughout its history, the Indonesian officer corps -- with some important exceptions -- seems to have had ideological affinities with the radical nationalist followers of the ex-Communist Tan Malaka. It was he who opposed any negotiations with the Netherlands, agitated for the total elimination of the economic and cultural influence of the Dutch, favored an authoritarian regime based on a national front, advocated the elimination of political parties, and espoused a form of socialism, colored by intense nationalism. His followers, expressing their views through the Murba Party, considered the international agreements which led to Indonesia's sovereignty on December 27, 1949, as just another truce in the struggle against imperialism, a truce that they were willing to tolerate only because power relations made it too risky for them to take a more aggressive posture.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in December 1957, when the first "sputnik" altered the international power balance,
these radical nationalists, together with the officer corps, seized the opportunity to take over the Dutch properties in Indonesia and to force the remaining Netherlanders out of the country, carrying on at last -- as they saw it -- the revolution interrupted in 1949.
THE PATTERN OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In the last few years, especially since late 1958, military men have played an important political role in several new countries in Asia and Africa. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, military intervention in civilian affairs has been regarded as a more or less recent "erosion of democracy." As a matter of fact the military have been an important political factor throughout the whole fifteen-year period since Indonesia proclaimed its independence.

In the absence of both political and military traditions and experience, the National Army had an ill-defined place and purpose in the new state. Based at first on PETA units and youth organizations, "this loosely organized army was composed of highly autonomous and virtually independent constituent units having a territorial basis and subject to varying degrees of control by the Indonesian National Committees of their respective areas, which were charged with their maintenance and supply."2

Since they were formed neither by an old-established state, nor by a ruthless monolithic party, Indonesia's armed forces were never completely subjected to strong political or governmental control. And it was this lack of control that led to an unfortunate pattern of civil-military relations in which in the first year of the Republic, and frequently thereafter, factions in the army as well as irregular military organizations played an important role in politics. Not less frequently the politicians interfered in the internal affairs of the armed forces and tried to use them in their political game.

Had the officer corps been a well-organized force standing outside the political arena, it is conceivable that it might have intervened in public affairs, only at crucial moments, decisively and purposefully. But the very fact of its continuous involvement in the struggle for power combined with its heterogeneous military and ideological background has forced the officer corps to play a different and less commendable role. Being involved in, rather than detached from, current politics, the military acquired the habit of settling for small gains, individual rewards or, at best, tactical objectives. Thus they have failed until now to close ranks and use their collective strength to create a strong and efficient government. Under these circumstances, moral deterioration and material corruption have set in.
Neither guided by strong principles of apolitical professionalism nor informed by political convictions, the Indonesian officer corps has not succeeded in assuming either the role of protector of a constitutional order or that of executor of a political program. Instead, it has drifted with the mainstream of the country's turbulent and erratic public life. This has been true throughout the history of the Republic.

In the first months of 1946, when Tan Malaka organized the Persatuan Perdjuangan, a movement against the government of Prime Minister Soetan Sjahir, it not only incorporated major military organizations, but had, according to Professor Kahin, "the outspoken backing of General Sudirman." The movement called for the abolition of political parties and opposed diplomatic negotiations "as long as the enemy is still in our country."

But while General Sudirman and other army leaders were tempted to overthrow or weaken the Sjahir Cabinet, they were not interested in a cabinet dominated by Tan Malaka, whose ultimate objective was to take Sukarno's place. Tan Malaka, together with men who are today in Sukarno's cabinet, such as Mohammed Yamin and Chaerul Saleh, was arrested in March 1946 on order of the Sjahir cabinet but was released the following June by troops of Major General Sudarsono's Third Division, who then kidnapped Prime Minister Sjahir. General Sudirman, as Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces remained neutral. Meanwhile,
Dr. Muwardi, the commander of the Barisan Banteng, one of the major irregular armed organizations supporting Tan Malaka, was arrested in May 1946 on Sjahrir's orders, but was released a few days later by General Sudirman, whose equivocal attitude during the first half of 1946 strengthened the opposition and weakened the government.

General Sudirman and other army leaders who originated in the PETA not only clashed with the Prime Minister on the strategy of the national struggle but were apparently motivated by not altogether unjustified apprehensions that Sjahrir, who was openly hostile to Japanese-trained officers, planned to replace them. As protection against a possible coup by Tan Malaka and the Persatuan Perdjuangan movement, the Sjahrir government created in 1946 the Siliwangi Division and the Mobile Police Brigade. The officers in these organizations had been trained by the Dutch rather than by the Japanese. Over these units the cabinet did not give General Sudirman control.

The political tensions of the period led, in June 1946, to the proclamation of a state of siege in all of Java. On June 8, in an effort to co-ordinate the policies of the cabinet, of the army command, and of the irregular armed organizations, a National Defense Council was established. In it General Sudirman continued to oppose Prime Minister Sjahrir. This state of affairs persisted
until the kidnapping of Sjahrir in July 1946 and his rescue by Siliwangi troops from West Java and Pesindo (Socialist Youth) units from East Java, moving against rebellious Third Division and Barisan Banteng formations, made it clear that the Republic was heading toward civil war. Then President Sukarno was finally able to convince General Sudirman to come out against a Persatuan Perdjuangan coup d'état. Tan Malaka and his most important followers were rearrested, and subsequently his direct influence on the army declined. As part of the bargain General Sudirman's own position was consolidated by a judicious distribution of the various politically antagonistic armed units throughout Republican-controlled Java. He remained a major political factor until his death in January 1950.

For two years after 1946, when the Army had been weakened by the intrigues of Tan Malaka, its politics were dominated by the activities of another politician of the extreme left, Amir Sjarifuddin. He was Minister of Defense in the Sjahrir cabinets, Prime Minister from July 1947 until January 1948 and ended up being executed by the army following the Communist Madiun rebellion of September 1948. Sjarifuddin was able to secure a substantial personal following within the officer corps. He also manipulated the politics of the irregular armed organizations which he controlled through a Fighting Bureau in the Ministry of Defense. After being
replaced as Prime Minister by Dr. Mohammed Hatta, in January 1948, Sjarifuddin organized an opposition movement, the Front Demokrasi Rakjat (People's Democratic Front—or FDR), through which Moscow-oriented Communists tried to achieve their political objectives in the Republic. In July 1948, according to documents published by Professor Kahin,\(^3\) Sjarifuddin estimated that the Front Demokrasi Rakjat controlled about thirty-five percent of the regular and irregular armed forces of the Republic, besides having influence over considerable percentages of certain other army units.

In the midst of growing political tensions, Dr. Hatta, soon after he assumed the function of prime minister, in February 1948, initiated a "rationalization program" for the armed forces, which was destined to become a major political issue for years to come. The program called for the demobilization of regular and irregular units so as to reduce the armed forces initially to 160,000 men and eventually to a well-trained, well-equipped, mobile, regular army of 57,000. These forces, operating at battalion strength, were to be prepared to carry out offensive guerrilla operations against the Dutch in case of renewed attack against the Republic. Colonel (later Lt. General) A.H. Nasution played an important role in developing the principles of reorganization, which were intended to ease the Republic's serious

budgetary difficulties. They also drew a lesson from the events of July 1947 when relatively large but disorganized Republican forces were incapable of preventing the Dutch from achieving their major territorial objectives in only two weeks.

The Hatta government's program threatened to destroy the basis of Sjarifuddin's influence within the army and was therefore strongly opposed by the FDR, which was able to rally to its support certain officers and troops facing demobilization. Some units had to be disarmed by force. The Fourth (Senopati) Division, commanded by a Communist sympathizer, Lt. Col. Suadi, rebelled against the Republic and supported the proclamation of a Communist government in the city of Madiun in Central Java in September 1948. The rebellion resulted in several weeks of heavy fighting and was finally crushed by troops of the Siliwangi Division of West Java and the Sungkono Division of East Java, ordered into action by General Sudirman, who this time was on the side of the cabinet.

The rationalization program had not been completed when the Dutch forces again attacked the Republic on December 19, 1948. The accumulated experience and trials of the preceding three years were beginning to produce results. Although the leaders of the government, including President Sukarno and Prime Minister Hatta, were captured by the Dutch, the armed forces under the
command of General Sudirman offered spirited and intense resistance until a cease-fire was agreed upon in August 1949. The fundamental estrangement between politicians and military came in this period, when negotiations between the Republic and the Netherlands, leading to the Roem-Van Royen agreement of May 7, 1949, stopped guerrilla warfare and brought independence under conditions which maintained for the following eight years the controlling economic position of Dutch capital and enterprise in Indonesia.

Professor Kahin, who was in Indonesia at the time, noted that the backing of Tan Malaka's nationalist Communist Partai Murba increased significantly as a result of the widespread dissatisfaction with the Roem-Van Royen Agreement, which was also strongly resented by the Republican troops, particularly those who had to evacuate their guerrilla strongholds.
THE OFFICER CORPS' MOVEMENT INTO POLITICS

To recapitulate, Indonesia's armed forces had fought intensely, under chaotic conditions, in the last ten weeks of 1945 against Japanese troops carrying out the orders of Lord Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command, and against newly landed British and Dutch troops. Isolated actions continued during 1946 and 1947, without central direction and often at cross-purposes with the diplomatic efforts of the government. Their efforts against the first major Dutch attack, in July 1947, were largely unsuccessful, but from December 1948 till August 1949, they offered vigorous resistance to the second major Dutch military effort. These shared experiences and organizational efforts created an esprit de corps among Indonesian officers. This bond was further strengthened during 1950, when the Army played a major role in transforming the Federal Republic of Indonesia (consisting of the original Republic proclaimed on August 17, 1945, and fifteen federal states and autonomous areas created and supported by the Dutch) into the unitary Republic of Indonesia. The unification of the country involved armed intervention in various parts of the archipelago, especially in the Celebes in April 1950, and heavy fighting in Amboina in late 1950.

The officer corps had therefore good reason to consider itself an important factor in the creation of the new state.
The military felt strongly that they were not only executive agents but "shareholders" of the corporate body, the Republic of Indonesia. Developments between 1950 and 1952 only strengthened their already deeply ingrained lack of confidence in the ability of the politicians to "manage" the corporate body, the Indonesian state.

The conflict between the military and the politicians again came to a head in the famous affair of October 17, 1952, an event too complex to disentangle in a few paragraphs, especially as none of the protagonists are yet fully prepared to dispel the many smokescreens beclouding deeds and motivations. Briefly, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel A.H. Nasution, and other key figures in the Army and the Ministry of Defense with identical or parallel interests, wanted to take advantage of the urgent need for budgetary retrenchments, unsolved since 1948, to pension off elements which did not meet the standards of a professional army -- as they conceived it. This would have affected many who had entered the Army directly from the guerrilla movement or who, for reasons of intellect and temperament, invoked the supremacy of the "fighting spirit" of the PETA over technical proficiency.

The opposition to the reduction in the Armed forces was supported by pressures from President Sukarno. It was able to have a motion adopted in Parliament which amounted to an expression
of non-confidence in the leadership and organization of the Defense Ministry and Armed Forces, namely Sultan Hamengku Buwono, Mr. Ali Budiardjo, Major General T.B. Simatupang, and Colonel A.H. Nasution who supported the retrenchment program. The next morning, October 17, 1952, several thousand persons demonstrated in the streets of Djakarta, asking for the dissolution of Parliament. Swelling crowds assembled in front of the presidential palace, while several tanks and armored cars stood idle, their guns trained on the palace. President Sukarno soothed the crowd, promised elections as early as possible, but refused to dissolve Parliament "as this would mean to ask me to become a dictator."
The crowds dispersed.

Having demonstrated his hold on the masses, President Sukarno was now in a strong position for receiving a delegation of senior Army officers, who attributed the country's political instability to the largely appointed, unrepresentative Provisional Parliament. Whether they asked the President to assume dictatorial powers in order to rid the country of politicians is still controversial. In any case, Sukarno refused to yield to any of their demands.

If one discounts President Sukarno's commitment to parliamentary democracy, a plausible assumption in the light of his earlier and later actions, one is led to the conclusion that he
was trying to avoid becoming the captive of a military junta, for him to manipulate which would have been even more difficult than the party system. His image of himself, then as now, was probably that of the leader of a broad mass movement, responding directly to his oratorical appeal. Though working for the disruption of the party system, he was not prepared to let the military take over, wanting rather to become, himself, the unchallenged national leader of Indonesia.

As to the officers, they failed to achieve their purpose not only because the President was able to intimidate them by his magnetic hold on the masses, but also -- perhaps primarily -- because of the lack of consensus and discipline among themselves. Not only was the officer corps divided among those who favored professionalism and those who believed in the "fighting spirit," but unity and purposefulness were lacking among the protagonists of professionalism. To illustrate, while Colonel Nasution, Chief of Staff of the Army, was being hostile to Parliament and inclining toward an authoritarian and militaristic outlook, Major General Simatupang, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, was arguing against a military dictatorship. Other officers close to these two leaders of the Army acted at cross-purposes during the October 17 affair, albeit in ways which, in their judgment, would have furthered the interests of their groups as a whole.
If one keeps in mind the character of the Indonesian officers as independent battalion commanders, lacking the training and habit of acting in accordance with broad strategic plans worked out by a general staff, their guerrilla-type political activities become understandable. This basic assumption has to be kept in mind in explaining the political actions of various senior officers in the years after 1952, including the repeated rebellions dating from 1956 in Sumatra and the Celebes.
TOWARD CIVIL WAR

On December 5, 1952, Colonel Nasution was suspended as Chief of Staff of the Army, whereupon he proceeded to organize a political party, the IPKI. An officer representing an almost diametrically opposed view, Colonel Bambang Sugeng, a former PETA officer, became Chief of Staff of the Army. During the latter's tenure of office, an effort was made to re-establish the unity of the Army, divided since the October 17 affair. In February 1955, a meeting was held in Djogjakarta, to which 289 senior officers were invited. In a highly emotional atmosphere the officers visited the graves of General Sudirman and Lt. Gen. Urip, their leaders during the revolution. A statement read there proclaimed the following:

We are not yet able to offer you incense in the form of a free, secure, prosperous and calm Indonesia. We are only able to offer you our promise that we shall follow the path of your souls' greatness, of your great sacrifice and that we will take care of the gift which is your legacy.

Obviously ashamed of their country's condition five years after independence, the participants signed a solemn pledge to maintain unity and solidarity within the Army. This pledge which came to be known as the "Djogja Charter," expressed the officer corps' quest for unity, professionalism, and political non-interference
in military affairs, especially with regard to senior appointments.

Four months after the meeting in Djogjakarta another affair involving the Army rocked Indonesia. Realizing that he could not carry out the mandate of the officer corps, Major General Bambang Sugeng resigned as Chief of Staff on May 11, 1955. This became a test case for the willingness of the politicians to abstain henceforth from a personnel policy based on political considerations. The cabinet chose as successor a relatively junior and controversial officer, Colonel Bambang Utojo, who was unacceptable to the Army.

On June 27, 1955, when Bambang Utojo, promoted to Major General, was officially to be installed as the politicians' choice for the position of Chief of Staff, the Army boycotted the ceremony on orders from the Acting Chief of Staff, Colonel Z. Lubis. In a letter to the cabinet, Colonel Lubis refused to surrender authority to Major General Utojo and asserted that he was supported in this decision by all the territorial commanders. The latter, along with the territorial General Staff officers, then met in Djakarta and issued a statement on July 2, requesting that, in the interests of subordinating the Army to the Government, a clear dividing line should be drawn between political responsibility and technical responsibility, in making the
appointments. The next day a meeting of the Indonesian Officers' Association (IPRI), of which Colonel Rudi Pirngadie was chairman, requested that Major General Utojo be removed and replaced by a Chief of Staff selected on the basis of seniority and ability, a request which if carried out, would make Colonels A.H. Nasution, M. Simbolon, Gatot Subroto and Z. Lubis the most eligible candidates.

In spite of the fact that the Minister of Defense, Iwa Kusumasumantri, the main culprit in playing politics with the Army, resigned, the cabinet of Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo fell on July 24. President Sukarno, establishing a pattern of leaving the country at the height of a political crisis, went on a pilgrimage to Mecca, leaving the Vice President Hatta to handle the situation. On October 27, the new cabinet of B. Harahap, appointed Colonel A.H. Nasution Chief of Staff of the Army and promoted him to Major General.

The June 27, 1955, affair can be considered to be the dividing line between the period when the Army was mainly concerned with resisting political interference in its internal affairs and the period when it began to play an active role in politics. In the summer of 1955 an important group of senior Army officers decided that the parliamentary system was definitely not suitable for Indonesia and considered a coup d'état. But in view of the fact
that the first national elections had been scheduled for September 1955, they decided to wait and to re-examine the situation in the summer of 1956. Their guiding consideration in postponing the coup was the fear that they might stand accused of destroying the chances of constitutional democracy in Indonesia. Therefore, they limited themselves to maneuvers leading to the downfall of the Ali cabinet. When the general condition of the country continued to deteriorate after the new Parliament started to function in 1956 and Dr. Ali had returned to power, this same group of officers made their move.

Colonel Z. Lubis, deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, and Colonel A. Kawilarang, territorial commander of West Java, initiated in the second half of 1956 a number of unsuccessful moves against the cabinet, which cast serious doubt on the capacity of these officers to plot successfully. Several senior officers were arrested. Then the plotter's efforts shifted to Sumatra and the Celebes, where between December 1956 and March 1957 they formed several Revolutionary Councils with the support of those local interests who were dissatisfied with the economic and administrative policies of the central government in Djakarta. The conflict reached a climax in February 1958, when the rebel officers, who had been joined by some of the most prominent members of the leading Moslem opposition party, the Masjumi,
proclaimed a counter-government, the *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia). Thus began the civil war that is still going on today in several parts of Sumatra and the Celebes.

The underlying reasons for the course of events in the last four years are not easy to ascertain. Colonels M. Simbolon, and Z. Lubis, who were on opposite sides in the October affair of 1952 and who were rival candidates for the position of Chief of Staff in June 1955, are today fighting together in Sumatra. While both are Sumatran Bataks, Colonel Lubis is a Moslem as is Lt. Gen. Nasution, while Colonel Simbolon is a Christian. In the Celebes, Colonel A. Kawilarang, a strong supporter of the October affair, and Colonel J. Warouw, one of its most energetic opponents, are now comrades-in-arms in the struggle against Djakarta.

Leaving aside the ever present factor of personal ambitions, the most obvious explanation would be that all these senior officers, and their junior commanders in Sumatra and the Celebes, are now fighting for the "states' rights" of their respective provinces. According to the P.R.R.I., at the height of the civil war at least 30 rebel battalions were operating in guerrilla formations in Sumatra and 17 in the Celebes. The rebel officers were at last espousing a cause of wider popular appeal than the problem of relations of the Army with the Government. All these groups
are united by a strong anti-communist and religious outlook, their common enmity to President Sukarno and probably to Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Nasution, and a desire to live in a decentralized, federal republic.
THE SEEDS OF MILITARISM

The senior officers who remained loyal to the government in Djakarta and the radical nationalist followers of Tan Malaka, who had been ignored or even ostracized during the first decade of Indonesia's independent existence, have converged in giving political support to the cabinet formed by President Sukarno on July 9, 1959. Political developments in the Republic have run full circle, and power is now in the hands of the extra-parliamentary forces opposed to representative democracy based on a multi-party system.

On July 5, 1959, President Sukarno re-enacted by decree the Constitution of 1945, which provided for a presidential form of government. The decision to return to the 1945 Constitution had been announced by the Djuanda cabinet on February 20, 1959. This decision was made following a two-day conference, held on February 11 - 12, at which the problem of political stability in Indonesia was discussed. It was attended by the senior officers of the General Staff and the territorial commanders of the Indonesian National Army. Between February and July the government struggled without success to obtain the support of the political parties represented in the Constituent Assembly elected in December 1955 for the acceptance of the 1945 Constitution. When these efforts
failed, Lieutenant General A.H. Nasution, in his capacity as Central War Administrator under martial law, issued a decree banning political activities. His objective was to stabilize the situation until President Sukarno's return from a 67-day tour around the world on June 29. With celerity unusual for Indonesia a new cabinet was formed on July 9, and junior positions in the government were filled three days later. The Army received two of the nine positions in the inner cabinet and five of the twenty-five junior ministerial posts. An Indonesian Air Force officer was also included in the new cabinet, while the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and the Navy and the Chief of the State Police became ministers ex-officio. Thus members of the Armed Forces came to occupy one-quarter of all posts in the new Indonesian cabinet, a significant development in view of the fact that only two Army officers had been in the preceding cabinet, formed in April 1957 with Ing. Djuanda as Prime Minister. No representatives of the Army had been included in the preceding sixteen cabinets formed since 1945, and altogether only four or five persons with any military background had ever been cabinet members.

The most significant development following the shake-up was the appointment of Lieutenant General Nasution as Minister for Security and Defense, who, as a member of the inner cabinet, was to co-ordinate the Departments of Defense, Justice, Police, and
Veterans Affairs while maintaining his position as Chief of Staff of the Army. For the first time, a military person and, even more important, an Army officer on active service became Minister of Defense.

The only other powerful group in the cabinet, balancing the military, were the radical nationalists associated in the first years of the Republic with Tan Malaka, who were members of the radical national Murba Party or at least temperamentally and ideologically close to that group. On March 5, 1960, President Sukarno dissolved the Parliament elected on September 29, 1955. On June 25, 1960, an appointed Parliament, including fifteen Army officers and twenty Air Force, Navy and Police officers, was installed. The officer corps has now been incorporated into the new authoritarian system, described as "democracy with leadership" or "guided democracy." Its representatives have taken an oath of loyalty to a Parliament that was told by the President, when he installed it on June 25, 1960, that it should not make decisions by majority vote but refer to him issues on which unanimity could not be reached.
THE "MISSION" OF THE OFFICER CORPS

The questions, central to an understanding of Indonesian politics today are: Why did the officer corps not take over? Why do they seem to settle for short-run personal advantages in a country on the verge of collapse? What happened to the "mission" of the officer corps?

A prominent and knowledgeable senior officer, who acted for several years as the official spokesman of the Army, wrote in April 1960:

Although the Army, with its strong leadership, organizational structure, and moral authority, has attained a considerable position, from which it has control over the mass movements in the social organization as well as over the administration of the country, yet, unlike Burma and Pakistan, where the Army took over power suddenly and assumed full control immediately, such a development will not occur in Indonesia.

The reasons for this conclusion are based on the following observations:

1. The senior members of the officer corps of the Indonesian National Army, who were the product of the struggle for independence, have to consider themselves as a united group, during this period of transition, in order to save the country from further disintegration caused by internal political quarrels, which already several times have led to an armed clash. They must also consider themselves as a united group in order to save the country from being subservient to any kind of foreign power.
2. Their primary consideration has been the thought that they do not wish to be accused by history of having destroyed the progress of democracy, or of having deprived the Indonesian nation of the opportunity to develop as a constitutional democracy, compatible with the politically advanced countries of the world.

3. Taking into account the heterogeneous background of the senior army officers with their respective individual political views, any potential military dictatorship will be doomed to failure by the internal controversy within the Army itself.

4. The position of President Sukarno in the constellation of Indonesian power is a safeguard against any Army dictatorship.4

The argument that the officer corps does not wish to be accused by history of having destroyed the progress of democracy was indeed voiced in the secret consultations held among the officers who discussed a possible coup before the 1955 elections. Now that the progress of democracy has been arrested by President Sukarno, such scruples seem less convincing, unless one assumes that the officer corps really confuses the new "guided democracy" with real democracy. But the explanation is too simple to be acceptable.

4Colonel Rudi Pirngadie, The Problem of the Government and The Army in Indonesia (Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, April, 1960), pp. 101-103.
The argument concerning the dominant position of President Sukarno in the constellation of Indonesian power also needs fuller examination. President Sukarno is indeed an orator of magnetic power and a masterful political tactician. What is more, he is a man of great charm and vigor. He has history on his side as one of the early and vigorous exponents of the nationalist movement. Circumstances dating back at least to the beginning of the Japanese occupation in 1942 have made him the symbol of the Republic of Indonesia. But at the age of 59 he has not shown that he is either a major political thinker or an able administrator. He was neither the strategist of the revolution, nor the architect of a viable new state. His dominant position is to be explained largely by the weakness and confusion of the other political forces active on the Indonesian scene.

Basic cultural factors should also be taken into account. Some argue that Indonesian culture is strongly "shame-oriented." To feel malu (ashamed, bashful) is peculiarly meaningful and unpleasant to Indonesians. Repeatedly, in the short history of the Republic, prominent figures have been kidnapped by their opponents, not in order to be mistreated or eliminated, but to be shamed into doing what their opponents wanted. Others prefer to emphasize the fact that in a peasant society people are "conformity-oriented." They have a high affiliation-need, like to
please each other, and do not like to hurt others' feelings.

Indonesian culture has also a strongly deferential attitude toward the senior person in any hierarchy or social structure. Commanding officers, top bureaucrats, teachers, irrespective of age, are called bapak (father) by their subordinates or followers. Westernized Indonesians deplore this attitude, which they call bapakism and regard it as a weakness of their society.

In the early phase of the struggle for independence and the egalitarian spirit which it generated, President Sukarno and other national leaders were called Bung (brother). As years went by, Sukarno shrewdly requested not to be called Bung Karno but Bapak Presiden. In recent years even this form of address came to be considered too familiar and it is now expected that he be referred to as His Noble Excellency the President and Supreme Commander.

It is conceivable that the attitude of the officer corps toward President Sukarno is the combined effect of malu and bapakism, the shame of turning against the father figure which is the symbol of the state. However tenuous, this explanation seems more meaningful in the Indonesian context than a devotion to constitutional principles which are, after all, the President's own formulations, not even legitimized by plebiscte. If President Sukarno is "a safeguard against any Army dictatorship," it is only because the
Army is unwilling to challenge him.

If the reluctance of the military to assume full responsibility cannot be explained by devotion to constitutionalism, neither can it be understood in terms of a solidarity of interests which would give the Army advantages under President Sukarno's regime that it could not otherwise enjoy. Indeed, it can be argued that President Sukarno forces the Army to accept a situation which is not completely to its liking. The radical nationalist group has become the Army's major rival within the cabinet in competing for control of the economic sector and shaping the cultural life of the country. Carefully balancing off one group against the other, President Sukarno sees to it that neither becomes dominant.

Even more disturbing to the Army is the fact that President Sukarno uses the Communist Party of Indonesia as a countervailing power. Though not in the cabinet, the Communists are handsomely represented on all other major governing bodies and are increasingly paired with the military in local government. Most senior Army officers are opposed to Communism, for ideological, religious, and nationalist reasons. Yet they tolerate the present position of the Communist Party apparently out of deference to President Sukarno's wishes.

This reduces Colonel Pirngadie's argument to his first and third observations. The essence of what he says is that the
officer corps recognizes that it should act as a united group but that internal divisions make consensus impossible.

Important in any political system, consensus is a particularly compelling notion in Indonesian culture, which lacks the habit of decision-making by majority vote but relies on slow and subtle consultation (musjawarah) out of which is expected to emerge the sense of the meeting (mufakat). The Indonesian elites have hoped, ever since independence that this method of decision-making originating, apparently, in the village communities of old, can be applied by the major instrumentalities of the modern state, including the cabinet. The officer corps has tried repeatedly to achieve mufakat with no better luck than elsewhere in the Republic.

The most plausible explanation of why the Indonesian officer corps has not acted, until now, as a true reform movement is probably found in their lack of self-confidence, generated by internal divisions. Furthermore, to the extent to which they are still dominated by the belief that "fighting spirit" is more important than rational thinking, the Indonesian military may still think that the present radical nationalist regime is capable of solving Indonesia's problems.
A TENTATIVE BALANCE SHEET

Indonesia thus enters the second decade of its independent existence under conditions strikingly different from those prevailing in the first years of this new state. The recognition of sovereignty was granted by the Netherlands, on December 27, 1949, after four years of Dutch efforts to re-establish, directly or indirectly, colonial control. The years of revolutionary struggle have left a heritage of radical nationalism, have generated intense conflicts within Indonesian society and have created complex social groupings and alignments in the archipelago.

The trends evolving from the first years of the new state are still difficult to interpret. But they indicate already that developments in the early formative years of a new state do not necessarily shape the future in a predictable fashion. Half-way through its first decade of independent existence Indonesia seemed to be headed toward democracy. Political activities were unrestricted, beyond the norms of more mature systems, so that even subversion and rebellion were tolerated. The press enjoyed a freedom which was used to the point of license. The individual felt that he lived in a free society. The rural masses experienced governments less inclined to interfere in their lives than any that had preceded them for generations. Low pressure characterized all aspects of public
life in Indonesia, thus giving meaning to the slogan MERDEKA (Freedom) in the name of which the struggle for independence had been fought. Today the opposite situation prevails. Tensions are high and current trends point in the direction of militarist authoritarianism and possible radical totalitarianism.

In the current Indonesian situation the term "instability" denotes not a tendency toward superficial change among the political elite at the top of the social pyramid, but the profound convulsions of a society which has not yet found its identity and faces great difficulties in shaping its specific character. Political oscillations of increasing amplitude have led to the establishment of a personal dictatorship backed by the military. This coalition of forces may seem to bring to a temporary halt the motions of the body politic, but far from solving basic problems, it is likely to make the underlying pressures more explosive and the formulation of solutions of lasting value more difficult or even impossible.

In addition to setting the stage for national tragedy the military play an important role both as scenario-writers and as actors. Indeed, without their participation, developments would very probably have been substantially different. Whether for the better, in the form of a healthier and more promising
political system based on parties, or for the worse, as a com-
munist take-over, it is difficult to say. Instead of safeguarding
and promoting a process of growth in the direction of a stable
and prosperous society the military has become deeply involved
in Indonesia's current misfortunes.

A few years ago some observers had high hopes concerning
the wholesome role of the officer corps in a new and inexperienced
political system such as Indonesia's. It was argued\textsuperscript{5} that the
officer corps of Indonesia, and of some other countries in South-
east Asia, were the product of an unusual process of natural
selection and included some of the new countries' best human
material, men with above-average qualities of leadership and
patriotism as well as a commitment to moral values. In these
respects they compared favorably in most cases with the politi-
cians who had become the major beneficiaries of nationalist
revolutions.

One was tempted to conclude that such men, acting as a
group, having the advantages of organization, discipline and
dedication were fit to give their country the guidance, direc-
tion, and inspiration necessary for constructive development,

\textsuperscript{5} Cf. my articles "The Role of Political Organizations in
Indonesia," \textit{Far Eastern Survey}, September 1958; and "Southeast
Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," \textit{World Politics},
April 1959.
as well as to exercise the control necessary in an immature
democratic society facing the danger of communist subversion.

Today such optimism seems less justified although it should
not yet be discarded completely. While the role of the military
in the public life of Indonesia has increased considerably since
martial law was introduced on March 14, 1957, and shows signs of
becoming dominant, it is open to doubt that the military are
harbingers of progress. Portents of surprisingly rapid growth
of militarism cannot be dismissed lightly. Yet the officers
have not assumed full responsibility. As they displace the
civilian political elite who became discredited during the first
decade of Indonesia's independent existence, the military appear
less and less different from the politicians whose positions they
now occupy. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, plus ça change.... Is
the Indonesian officer corps to be commended for not establishing
a military dictatorship, for continuing to subordinate itself
to the civilian authority of President Sukarno? Their leaders
may tell themselves at present that, unlike their opposite
numbers in some other countries, they have shown considerable
restraint in not using the means of coercion at their disposal
to destroy the democratic-republican regime of their country.
But in reality this regime has already been destroyed by the
events of the last few years. An elected parliament has been
dismissed and replaced by an appointed body of men, the composition of which is determined at best by the power relations within a small clique. Martial law is used to control the public life of the country. Civil war has become endemic, albeit in the form of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations. In all this the officer corps plays a major role. But it does not use its capabilities for reform and progress. It accepts the role of partners or even instruments of a group of emotional, radical nationalists and shares in the benefits of power without serving, as far as can be seen, the interests of the people of Indonesia.

The rather disenchanted reflections of the preceding paragraphs need factual justification. This is easily available to observers of the Indonesian scene:

(1) Far from being united in carrying out the mission of protecting the integrity of the state for the creation of which they fought some fifteen years ago, and purposeful in guiding its future development, the officer corps of Indonesia, is deeply divided, within the branches of the armed forces as well as among them, by personal jealousies, conflicting outlooks, and special interests. Whether in the open conflict of civil war or in the intrigues and manipulations taking place within the military establishment controlled by Djakarta, much of the energy of the Indonesian officer corps is wasted in the pursuit
of personal ambitions. The struggle among the officers inflicts
untold damage on society as a whole.

(2) Instead of carrying out a control function in a yet
unstable political system, providing the tutelage which is
indispensable to a new country, the officer corps of Indonesia
has become an instrument of repression at the disposal of
President Sukarno. It is helping him maintain a controlling
position based, not on legitimate authority, but on carefully
nurtured and manipulated confusion and on the inherent weakness
of a system incapable, so far, of producing meaningful and
acceptable governmental alternatives.

(3) A self-denying group of young revolutionaries, modest
and egalitarian in spirit, who took to arms and uniforms for
the sake of a nationalist ideal, are now turning into middle-
aged militarists, enjoying the perquisites of office, symbols
of status, and benefits of power. After years of restraint when
promotions were slow but tolerated as necessary under the cir-
cumstances of a poor country, officers are now promoted rapidly
and special benefits are more and more widely bestowed upon them
-- and this in a country whose economic conditions are deterio-
rating with catastrophic rapidity.

(4) Men who fought well with a medley of arms of non-
descript origin are now spending a very substantial proportion
of national resources for the acquisition of modern arms, which may satisfy their vanity and possibly provide a better means for internal coercion but add little to the international security of their country. The argument of a persistent Dutch threat from Western New Guinea cannot be taken seriously. The Netherlands are not going to try to reconquer the empire lost after World War II. Not in this day and age.

These developments suggest that the revolutionary officer corps of Indonesia is becoming a militarist elite. It controls the country or at least participates in its government, not to fulfill a mission, not to realize an ideal, but for selfish advantage as a pseudo-political party which gradually eliminates other political parties.
THE FUTURE

Developments in a militarist direction have been rapid, but it is premature to say that the trend is irreversible. Perhaps overnight the General Staff or some younger members of the officer corps of Indonesia will strike, sweep their house clean, and rededicate themselves to higher purposes. In the absence of reliable instruments for the assessment of human motivations, one has to rely on circumstantial evidence. It may turn out later that current developments were only the preparatory phase, however slow and confused, of a struggle with deeper meaning. But for the time being, an optimistic interpretation does not seem justified.

Much hinges on the intentions of Lieutenant General Nasution. His opponents are ready to argue that he is an ambitious and opportunistic officer who, having been outmaneuvered in October 1952 by President Sukarno, took advantage of favorable circumstances three years later to become again Chief of Staff of the Army, determined to keep this position and advance his career. If so, then he is only a professional soldier /a good one, as his strategy against the rebellion in Sumatra and the Celebes showed in the early months of 1958. He is willing to serve the Chief of State and his government faithfully and reap
a professional soldier's normal rewards in terms of prestige, promotions, and power.

But it is also possible, following a different line of reasoning, to argue that Lieutenant General Nasution is pursuing a long-range political strategy of much broader scope. He spent the three years he was barred from active service in analyzing the problems of Indonesian society. He may have reached the conclusion that the political guerrilla tactics of the other senior officers with political interests and ambitions were wrong, that for a vast majority of the Indonesian nation President Sukarno is the living symbol of the Republic and any direct political attack on him is doomed to fail. Being seventeen years younger than Sukarno, Nasution may have decided to wait until succession to the presidency becomes possible in ways that would be accepted as legitimate by the Indonesian people.

Furthermore, Nasution may have reached the conclusion, shared by some of his colleagues, that the officer corps is not yet capable of governing Indonesia. A direct attempt to make the Army a tighter professional organization failed in the early years of the Republic, leading to the October 17, 1952 affair. The following years showed that most commanders, having the mentality of independent, locally-rooted guerrilla leaders, were not amenable to the centralized direction of a
General Staff and tended toward war-lordism. It would have been reasonable to conclude that such an army could not become the instrument of government of a poorly integrated archipelago.

Taking advantage of a variety of circumstances, Nasution -- if this attempt to read his mind has merit -- is now engaged in making the Indonesian Army into the organization which could eventually stabilize and develop the country. A pattern seems to emerge:

1. The proclamation of martial law on March 14, 1957 gave the officer corps vast responsibilities for civilian affairs.

2. The take-over of Dutch properties in December 1957, as well as control of the economic life of the country at large, gave the officer corps additional responsibilities and the opportunity to acquire managerial experience.

3. The formation of a National Front for the Liberation of West Irian in January 1958, with the Army Chief of Staff as general chairman and the territorial commanders as local chairmen, provided the officer corps with the task of organizing and directing a political mass-movement.

4. The military campaigns against the rebellion in Sumatra and the Celebes, since February 1958, strengthened the discipline of the Army, improved the training of officers and troops, and
forced the government to make resources available for the increase and modernization of its equipment.

5. Numerous conferences of territorial commanders, held frequently in the last four years under Lieutenant General Nasution's leadership, create the habit of joint examination of military, political, economic and social problems and of policy-making by the senior officers.

6. Finally, the return to the Constitution of 1945, initiated by the Army, provided the institutional framework for a strong executive and eliminated the parliamentary system and the controlling influence of politicians, while coping with the danger of growing communist influence without a frontal attack on the PKI.

It can of course be argued that this interpretation of Lieutenant General Nasution's long-term plans is too neat, that the logic of the situation forced the Army to make one move at a time without long-term planning, in response to events over which the officer corps had no control. But if Nasution's failure on October 17, 1952, taught him the value of long-range strategic planning in politics, his time-table may be such as to make it difficult to see the total pattern.
The Army may well give itself several years for the completion of this operation. In April 1958 when most observers agreed that the Communist Party was likely to gain a major victory in the elections set for the following year, Brigadier General Dja'tikusumo told the press:

The nation now needs a non-party government, backed by the Army, with elections suspended for six years.

Fifteen months later, such a government was formed, to be in office -- according to the Constitution of 1945 -- until 1964.

Supported by the officer corps during its first year, that government has been unable to solve any of the country's basic problems. Polarization of political forces is now increasing, with the Army as the rallying point of anti-communist elements, although the Communist Party of Indonesia continues to make advances, gaining more and more positions in the top echelons of central and local government. At the time of this writing, a sharp public exchange is taking place between the General Staff and the PKI. On July 8, 1960, the Politburo of the Indonesian Communist Party issued a statement reviewing the achievements of the Presidential cabinet after one year. Referring to the administration by Army officers of the enterprises taken over from the Dutch in December 1957, the Politburo said:
The masses of the workers had hoped that the take-over would be used to serve the people and improve the workers' living conditions. These hopes were not realized at all. The fact was that these enterprises were placed under the control of certain groups whose attitude toward the workers was even worse than those of foreign bosses.

The influential elements of these groups formed among themselves a group of bourgeoisie which controlled and made use of the state apparatus to serve their economic interests; they also created among themselves bureaucratic capitalists who oppressed both the working class and the national bourgeoisie and proved themselves to be the medium which was creating conditions for the imperialists to continue their policy of exploitation and extortion.

In this statement the Communist Party of Indonesia is openly declaring the officer corps an "enemy of the people," to use Mao Tse-tung's terminology, an integral part of the "comprador" class opposed to the "national bourgeoisie." The reasons for this are clearly given in the same statement.

Referring to the lack of success of the operations against the various rebel groups of the right and extreme right, the Politburo declared:

The fundamental mistakes which brought about the stagnation of the security question were that officials responsible for security did not spend the greater part of their energy and thought on eliminating counterrevolutionary rebel cliques, but on preventing the development of revolutionary and democratic movements, especially on suppressing the progressive movements led by the Communist Party, and the struggle against the people and the Communist Party was, as usual, regarded as the fundamental one.
On July 18, 1960, Lieutenant General Nasution retorted, saying that "the Indonesian government's policies were supported by the majority of the people and were opposed by the minority including the rebels and the communist party." Significantly, the PKI was classed with the pro-Western rebel groups as exponents of a minority position. This not-too veiled threat was made explicit the following day when members of the Politburo were summoned before the military authorities of Djakarta to account for the statement of July 8 which, according to an Army spokesman, "had given rise to uneasiness and commotion in wide circles of society, which might lessen the government's authority."

Indonesia is in flux and no conclusion is possible today concerning the future political role of the military in that country. Before 1964, when the term of the present cabinet should normally expire, many of the comments made above may have been invalidated.