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JULY 1963

SYMPHOSIUM ON THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: THE PHILIPPINE HUK CAMPAIGN

Edited by A. H. Peterson, G. C. Reinhardt and E. E. Conger

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is a condensation of the discussion of the Philippine Huk Campaign, a part of a RAND symposium on "The Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare," January 14-18, 1963, A. H. Peterson, Monitor.

Because the material consists of personal recollections and discussions by men who were active in the campaigns, each Memorandum in the series covering the symposium was done in a purely reportorial style, with care exercised to retain the flavor and connotations of the discussants. For the same reason, no attempt was made to resolve any implicit or explicit differences among the participants' views or between them and available published works on the same subjects.

The symposium was organized to collect relevant detailed information of these types of warfare in the hope that such information, examined with the original environments firmly in mind, would suggest lessons for current air operations. In addition, the material, when considered within the context of advanced technology, should provide some guidance for future planning and hardware development.

The symposium Memoranda are as follows:

Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare:

- The Malayan Emergency, RM-3651-PR
- The Philippine Huk Campaign, RM-3652-PR
- The Algerian War, RM-3653-PR
- Chindit Operations in Burma, RM-3654-PR
- Allied Resistance to the Japanese on Luzon, World War II, RM-3655-PR
- Unconventional Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater, RM-3656-PR.

The discussion leader for the subject of the present Memorandum was Colonel N. D. Valeriano, PA, (Ret.).
FOREWORD

To be of value in actual application, battle studies should be based upon intimate experience in modern combat, not upon historical records of general operations of troops. The individual action of the soldier remains enveloped in a cloud of dust, in narratives as in reality. Yet his battle experiences must be studied, for the conditions they reveal should be the basis of all fighting methods, past, present and future.

Where can data on these questions be found? Stories in great detail, for the smallest detail has its importance, secured from participants and witnesses who knew how to remember, are necessary in a study of the battle of today.

The number killed, the kind and character of the wounds, often tell more than the longest accounts. Sometimes they contradict them. We want to know how man fought yesterday. Under the pressure of danger, impelled by the instinct for self-preservation, did he follow, make light of, or forget the methods prescribed or recommended?

Battle Studies, Col. Ardant du Picq, (translated from the 6th edition),
Military Service Pub. Co.
Harrisburg, Pa., 1938
PARTICIPANTS IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PHILIPPINE HUK CAMPAIGN

FRANCE

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Colonel R. Laure

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Philippine Air Force
Col. A. Jurado

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I. INTRODUCTION

COLONEL VALERIANO: We would like to present, with emphasis upon the role of the Philippine Air Force, the counterinsurgency situation in the Philippines from 1946 to 1954. The stage setting of the conflict somewhat resembles the Malayan experience we discussed yesterday; however, the political backdrop of our story is quite different.

We will recount the political aspects of our experience, especially the attitude of our government leaders, their attempts to retain political popularity with the national electorate, and how these considerations may restrain the military in the use of available air power. We have also to consider the attitude of the military high command in interpreting, sometimes necessarily interpolating, their assigned missions from top civilian echelons. In this connection we must stress the fact that in the Philippines we accepted civilian direction of our military affairs, an inheritance from 40 years of American guidance and tutelage.

The second consideration that deserves serious study on our part is the actual tactical situation. As we proceed we will describe the enhanced role of the Philippine Air Force in our counterinsurgency effort when the dissident Hukbalahaps were forced by ground action to forsake their popular bases for mountain redouts. This, I believe, will demonstrate that the intensity of air power participation in a counterinsurgency campaign will depend heavily upon the effectiveness of your ground intelligence, especially target intelligence. As a specific example to be discussed in detail later, we offer the inside story of the Philippine Air Force's ability to strike at a guerrilla mountain redoubt because of a defector's information.

BACKGROUND FOR THE HUK CAMPAIGN

For our Philippine scenario, we must go back to our military history, which is filled with guerrilla traditions. This presents a paradox in the failure of Filipinos, prior to the appearance of

*RM-3651-PR, ...The Malayan Emergency.

**Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon, the People's Anti-Japanese Army.
Magsaysay in 1950, to fight effectively as counterguerrillas. Throughout we hope to present accurately the potentials and assets of both camps, the anti-guerrillas and the guerrillas.

The Hukbalahap organizations in the field had a very rich guerrilla background. On this score I ask Colonel Anderson and General Volckmann to contribute from their experiences with the Hukbalahaps during the war years.

COLONEL ANDERSON: In early 1942, after the fall of Bataan, and after I had escaped from the Bataan Peninsula and decided to remain and get involved in guerrilla operation, one of my first missions was to try to get control of the Hukbalahaps' military organization. In May, the Huks had sent representatives into the mountains in the vicinity of Clark Field to contact Colonel Claude Thorpe, then the recognized guerrilla leader in that area, to seek American military assistance.

I was one of those selected to go back into the Candaba Swamp area of the central plains of Luzon to try to arrange with the Hukbalahap leaders for control of their military organization. We were very cordially received by many of the known leaders, Taruc, Faleo, Alejandrino, Castillo, and others who were assembled in the Candaba Swamp area. After two or three weeks of discussion with them, it became clear that they would not give us control.

It became obvious to us that their political objectives were to gain complete control of the Philippines. And it was just as obvious that they were not firm believers in what we call "democracy." There was, however, no doubt that they were definitely willing to fight the Japanese. But they insisted that their Peoples Committee had to maintain control of the military. They asked us to stay with them, to give them military advice, to help train their military units. They would not give us command power.

In fact, their political advisers, who were with every unit, were all-powerful and could overrule the military unit commanders. The political advisers spent several hours each day lecturing the troops.

*RM-3655-PR ... Allied Resistance to the Japanese on Luzon, World War II.
After these negotiations, we decided that we couldn't get control of their military organization, but we wanted to keep them from getting control of other guerrillas groups being organized at this time. However, our immediate problem was how to get away from the Huk camp with our lives. We weren't sure they would not try to hold us, or to "exterminate" us, the often used word in the Philippines, if we tried to leave.

We four American officers drew up an agreement along the lines of having Americans serve as their military advisers and chose two of us to take this agreement back to Colonel Thorpe for his approval. We insisted that was necessary, with the private understanding amongst ourselves that the two who were left would get away the best way we could. We were fortunate in that we did get away, a Colonel Petit and I.

We then went east into the Bulacan Province, and started forming our own guerrilla units. However, I would say, that despite our political and organizational differences with them, the Hukbalahaps did actively resist and harass the Japanese all throughout the war. Likewise, they also tried to get control of and did considerable fighting with non-affiliated guerrilla organizations. I consider myself fortunate that I was generally able to maintain contact and fairly good relations with them. The only time they gave me any trouble was when one of their units captured some of our men. I went down to get them released and was held prisoner myself for a few days. When the word got back to the Huk Supremo, Luis Taruc, he sent one of his field commanders to me to apologize. Since communications might have taken months instead of hours to get through, I was lucky.

Actually, I think the fairly good relations I had with them were because of their hope of getting arms, ammunition, and equipment from us. They never cooperated to the extent of contributing to our intelligence effort.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: Communist influence came into the Philippines in the thirties, although it generated no significant support until the outbreak of the war. But another movement paralleled Communist infiltration in the Philippines, the formation of the Socialist Party
as an outgrowth of tenant farmer grievances against the landowners. There were several uprisings in the Pangasinan area of the central Luzon plains around 1934.

With the outbreak of war, the Communists consolidated their efforts with the Socialist Party, particularly in the areas Colonel Anderson just described. One of their main headquarters was at Mt. Arayat.

In early 1942, Colonel Thorpe was operating above Clark Field just west of Mt. Arayat. The Huks made contact with him several times for assistance and cooperation, but he took the attitude that unless they would submit entirely to him from the very start he would have nothing to do with them.

Possibly Colonel Anderson wouldn't agree with me, but looking back, I think this was wrong. Colonel Thorpe would not recognize groups unless they placed themselves under him. With a little tact and diplomacy, the Huks probably could have accepted an over-all command authority to some extent. Whether or not they would have adhered to it after the war or during the liberation campaign, of course, is impossible to determine. I do think a different attitude should have been taken towards the Hukbalahaps; at least an effort could have been made to keep them from becoming so centralized and strong in Central Luzon.

My personal contacts with the Huks were limited to three days at Mt. Arayat, when I was trying to work my way into North Luzon. I asked the Huks to guide me and they did as far as their contacts went. I ended up in a small village with a schoolteacher who was scared to death. The Japanese were patrolling heavily and garrisoned the town itself. After three days he guided me to a road junction and that was my last physical contact with the Huks.

In hindsight, I think Colonel Thorpe's policies, not trying to gradually worm his way into the Huk organization, were in error. During 1943 and 1944, the Hukbalahap organization contacted units in North Luzon at regular intervals and offered to cooperate. We were so remote from their area of operation that this never materialized. The Huks were never a factor in North Luzon.
That would probably be borne out in the discussion, not that they didn't try but the organization in North Luzon was so unified during the war and continued to be afterward, through veterans' organizations, that Huk penetration attempts up there failed miserably.

COLONEL VALERIANO: To continue the stage setting, when inaugurated on July 4, 1946, the young Philippine Republic inherited tremendous rehabilitation and reconstruction problems. The whole country was war-ravaged. The Hukbalahap problem, political dynamite at the time, was relegated to a very low priority. Our Army had just been demobilized. We had had recent experience that showed guerrilla fighting to be very damaging not only to the innocent but also to the economy of the country.

But what I want to emphasize is that the motivation for guerrilla movements in Central Luzon was pre-war social and economic restlessness and discontent. The affected minority in this region had been subjected to injustices under almost feudalistic conditions.

The relationship between landlord and tenant farmer in the Philippines' rice granary would be unbelievable nowadays. Thus, the peasantry were attracted to an ideology that promised them a better way of life.

GEOGRAPHY OF AREA

I would now like Colonel Tinio to talk about the area of the Huk campaign.

COLONEL TINIO: The Philippines is tropical like Malaya, with only two seasons, jokingly referred to as the hot dry season and the hot wet season. The dry season extends from November to June, the rainy season from July to October.

Rainfall is influenced, of course, by the configuration of the terrain and the prevailing winds, notably the northeast monsoon bringing cold air from the north from November to February, and the southeast monsoon that prevails between July to November, bringing copious rains. This is the time when the typhoons blow.

The guerrilla stronghold was in Central Luzon (Fig. 1), predominantly flat irrigated rice lands with paddies that will hold water
as long as it is needed. Above the irrigated tracts are rolling
grassy uplands that rise into the foothills of precipitous mountains
covered by dense tropical forests.

Critical points of the terrain from a military viewpoint begin
with Mt. Arayat, a mountain about 3400 feet high right in the middle
of the Central Luzon plain. Next would be Candaba Swamp, marshy and
seasonally flooded, which extends from near Mt. Arayat south to the
mouth of the Pampanga River in Manila Bay.

Enclosing the plain are the Sierra Madre mountain range in the
east and the Zambales mountain range in the west.

In addition to the Pampanga River running north up the middle of
Huklandia from the Candaba, there are the Agno River running into
Lingayen Gulf and the Angat River, main tributary of the Pampanga.

Mt. Arayat had special significance as a haven for dissidents
during their trek from East to West or from North to South, as did
the Candaba Swamp, a source of food supply as well as a place of
refuge.

The people, descendants of seafaring Malay migrants who brought
a fierce love of freedom to their new homeland, were influenced in
político-social attitudes by the closely knit family entities. Having
been subjected to Spanish domination and later to American influence,
they learned the fear of God and nurtured a love for democratic insti-
tutions. But subjection to years of tyranny and exploitation made them
receptive to agitation for a better way of living.
II. REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN

DISCUSSION

COLONEL VALERIANO: To continue the scenario, when the Republic was inaugurated the government leaders recognized the threat posed by the Hukbalahaps. In early 1946 our intelligence files listed an organization alleged to include 10 to 15,000 armed men, which we thought exaggerated. However, the loose firearms that abounded in the country suggested that the figure of 15,000 armed men was possible. Their mass support base was estimated at 250,000 active sympathizers.

The Hukbalahaps had adopted a flexible strategy to effect an interplay of their parliamentary struggle techniques on the one hand, and the armed struggle techniques on the other. About 1947 our intelligence analysis confirmed that as the Huks tried to organize the peasantry in active guerrilla warfare, their leaders in Manila sought to penetrate the government through parliamentary methods. We saw that their objective was to create a "revolutionary situation" wherein they might topple the government, by force of arms, penetration, or a combination of the two. The Huks continued to follow this flexible, resilient strategy.

COLONEL TINIO: The Communist Party in the Philippines employed two tactics, the armed struggle and the parliamentary or legal struggle. Communist strategy normally shifts from one tactic to another to exploit developments, but the Huks, realizing that their armed forces were growing and well organized, decided to launch the parliamentary and armed struggle simultaneously.

While the Hukbalahap army was actively fighting, the Communist Party carried on the legal struggle by participating in governmental affairs. They put up their own candidates in the 1946 campaign, fusing the Communist Party with disgruntled elements and other minority parties into the so-called "Democratic Alliance." They succeeded in electing six congressmen, one of them the Huk Supremo, Taruc. A concerted effort of the anti-Communist elements in Congress just managed to prevent their seating. Blocked from the legislature, the Huks
reoriented and renewed their legal struggle. This time they sought to infiltrate various government agencies, especially the executive offices, even including the armed forces. They started by leaflet campaigns, then sent out agitators. They made progress. In fact, they succeeded in placing their men in some government establishments. One of these was the Department of Foreign Affairs. They also infiltrated labor groups, student groups, and other civic organizations. They made the press one of their infiltration targets, since the press generally was sympathetic to them. Until Magsaysay, the press was generally opposed to any action by the Armed Forces.

The Hiks tried to infiltrate the Armed Forces, starting with the common soldier. Agitators pointed out the differences between the treatment of enlisted men and officers—that the officers had an easy time and were highly paid while the soldiers were underpaid and undersupplied.

They won the sympathy of some enlisted personnel and even got some arms and ammunition from a few disaffected men. Those tactics were nipped off by Magsaysay's reforms, which simultaneously weeded out the undesirables from the Armed Forces. When the morale of the Armed Forces was raised, the Communists tried to undermine the morale of other government employees. Although not done openly, the Hiks subverted some government employees.

COLONEL VALERIANO: There were many changes from 1946 to 1950. During these four years, the Hukbalahap leaders never admitted openly that they were Communists, but clung to the cover status of agrarian or social justice reformers.

The government adopted certain rigid policies as a response to Huk grand strategy. Initially, the Hukbalahap problem was given a low priority, simply waved aside as a police matter. Consequently the Philippine Constabulary, known in 1946 as the Military Police Command, was assigned the mission of liquidating the Huk's armed organizations in Central Luzon. I know of no case wherein the other civil agencies of the government wholeheartedly supported the Constabulary effort.
We should consider the Philippine experience in three phases:

The first, from 1946 to mid-1950, started with a small Huk-controlled area consisting of the four Central Luzon provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Bulacan. This area was known as Huklandia (Fig. 2). Four Philippine Constabulary field commands, each corresponding to one of the disaffected provinces, fought the Huks. Their total strength in officers and men did not exceed 3,000, against the four Hukbalahap regional commands, which Intelligence credited with a strength of about 9,000. The Hukbalahaps won this first phase because of lack of the proper appreciation of the problem by our government.

By 1950 the Huk area of control had expanded to all of Central Luzon and large areas of South Luzon, with definite signs of established bases in North Luzon and Hukbalahap agents reportedly active in the southern islands of the Archipelago (Fig. 3).

The second phase, from 1950 to 1953, is essentially the story of Ramon Magsaysay, who entered the picture as our new Defense Secretary. He introduced what proved to be the successful approach to our national problem—an integrated military-socio-economic-political strategy that eventually eliminated the threat.

The third, 1954-56, opened with the surrender of Taruc to Magsaysay in early 1954, and was essentially a mop-up of the Huk remnants.

Today's objective is to examine Philippine Air Force contributions both in the early phases of the campaign when Philippine ground forces were unsuccessful and later in the operations leading to elimination of the threat. Next I would like Colonel Tinio to describe the life of the simple villager and the armed guerrilla.

COLONEL TINIO: I start with the Declaration of Amnesty in 1948. Amnesty was proclaimed for political expediency, in order, as the Government believed, to stop the civil strife of Filipino fighting against Filipino. Politically speaking, it might have been correct, but militarily it was wrong because the Huks were able to expand and consolidate their forces while the amnesty prevailed. It was at this time that they changed their name from the People's Anti-Japanese Army
Fig. 3 — "Huklandia" — 1950
to People's Army of Liberation (Hukbang Mapagpalaya sa Bayan) nicknamed HMB, but the original label, Huk, continued to be the popular designation of the guerrillas. By the time failure of the amnesty was recognized the Huks were stronger and better organized than when it began.

Village life in that agricultural country was characterized by daily early morning trips by peasants to their farms or places of work. Farmers did not live on their respective farms but in community settlements. On the farms they maintained only a shack where they could rest during the day. At night they all returned to their homes in the barrios, the settlements, where the Hucks came by darkness to rest or get food.

While the Hucks had the people behind them and had been permitted to reorganize during the amnesty period, they were estimated to have up to 25,000 combatants, with 15,000 or more armed at the height of their strength. The mass base among the population was variously estimated up to more than 250,000 in active support. That does not account for many passive sympathizers and those that they coerced into helping them by terroristic activities. Like all guerrillas, they resorted to kidnapping, raids, and threats to get the people on their side.

COLONEL JURADO: I can tell you the reactions of some people. My father-in-law had to help the Hukbalahaps because he had no choice. The Hucks were in his vicinity; he had to contribute rice. He was forced to do it. But if the government could have done something to subdue the Hucks, he would have been all out in helping the government forces.

Later, when the tide went against the Hucks, most of the people helped the ground forces, even giving them what little food they had gathered for themselves.

COLONEL ANDERSON: Permit me to discuss the type of arms and equipment the Hukbalahaps had. That, I think, has a bearing on any type of mission.

The arms situation in the Philippines had been very carefully controlled in the past. There were very few unlicensed arms in the Philippines prior to the outbreak of the war. This blocked action by political leaders in the Philippines who worked against the Philippine Commonwealth and did not want the Americans in the country
before the war. They were not able to take any armed action against either the U.S. or the Philippine Commonwealth government, because they did not have arms or ammunition.

The events of the war gave them the opportunity to obtain arms and ammunition, which they immediately exploited. The guerrillas did the same thing as soon as they were organized. The Hukbalahaps were able to obtain rifles, pistols, in some cases machineguns, mortars, and other types of arms and equipment from people who were cut off and by combing battle areas. They obtained additional arms by purchase and robbery from the U.S. military depots established for the invasion of Japan.

Within their own circles Hukbalahap leaders even during the war indicated that they were in contact with outside sources of help, primarily Russia. They went to the extent of setting up a base on the Pacific Ocean side of Luzon to make submarine contact. I don't believe they ever did make contact.

Their source of manpower was partly from disgruntled guerrillas and guerrilla units. In some cases they picked up whole units that were afraid they were going to be prosecuted for atrocities. These chose to go back into the hills and took the men and equipment with them.

I think the main arms of the Huks were old Enfield and Springfield rifles, a certain number of carbines, some Tommyguns, a limited number of machineguns (30 caliber primarily) and a few mortars. That may have bearing on your use of air.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: The early part of the Huk campaign, as I understand it, was wholly under the Department of Interior?

COLONEL VALERIANO: That is right.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: And the Constabulary was the only force actively employed. As background, the government started to reorganize the Constabulary even before the war was over in 1945. I protested violently on the way they were going about it. They were recruiting people we wouldn't even have in our units, people who had been cooperating with the Japanese, people who had been out-and-out bandits. As a result of this hurried reorganization, the Constabulary ended
up with a lot of riffraff in it. As far as I could determine, the Constabulary did more in the early stages of this campaign to help the Hukbalahaps in Central Luzon than they did to hinder them. They treated the people worse than the Huks did.

COLONEL VALESIANO: That is right.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: That had to be overcome before there could be any progress in driving a wedge between the populace of Central Luzon and the Huks. I believe this entire picture was changed by the taking of the entire mission and operation away from the Department of Interior and putting it under the Department of Defense. Following that the Army was given a primary role in the operations, is that right?

COLONEL VALESIANO: That is right. Colonel Tinio mentioned an amnesty, declared in 1948. That was a dismal failure because the Huks took advantage of the declared truce, exploited it by reorganizing and by shifting their tactics and strategy. Only then was President Quirino convinced that the Hukbalahap threat was no longer a mere police or constabulary action, and an Army battalion was attached to the Constabulary later in 1948. About this time the Huks became overconfident, believing it would be only a matter of time before they would seize power. Because of reverses suffered by the Constabulary in the field plus the mounting public reaction to the conduct of the campaign in Central Luzon, the Huks showed signs of shifting from guerrilla tactics to the beginnings of mobile warfare in early 1949.

One provincial capital was seized by the Hukbalahaps and held for several days. When the Fifth Battalion Combat Team was bested, the Huks attacked the Philippine Army convalescent hospital base at Macabulos, Tarlac Province. In 1950, the President transferred operational responsibility from the Constabulary to the Armed Forces.

For your information, the Constabulary is an organic part of the Armed Forces, but with national police functions assigned. An officer in the Armed Forces may be assigned to duty with the Constabulary and vice versa. The officers come from the same roster and are covered by the same regulations, except that the Constabulary has peace and order functions and responsibilities not usually found in the Army, Air Force,
and the Navy. Between 1946 to 1949, officers were clothed with police powers when their military units were officially attached to the Constabulary for operations.

One cause of the Constabulary's failures from 1948 up to the time that the Army took over in 1950 was the relationship between the Constabulary troopers and the villagers. The Constabulary never had appreciated the real implications behind the Huk guerrilla movement. The Constabulary thought that they should operate just like the prewar Constabulary, performing all the police functions the local civil police forces could not perform.

In the Philippines the basic government units are the municipal governments with their own police forces supervised by the Constabulary. At the next level is the provincial government.

For example, there are 24 municipalities in the province of Pampanga. In addition to the 24 municipal police forces, two Constabulary companies are assigned under the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary.

The setup resembles that of the British in Malaya during the emergency; the Malayan district officer representing civil authority, the Philippine provincial commander representing police authority. However, there was a great difference from Malaya, where war was conducted by committees; in Huklandia, most of our civil government officials were absent from their posts of duty because of the deteriorated situation. This invariably left the provincial commanders very much on their own. Also, we did not approach the troop saturation the British had in Malaya.

The four provinces of Tarlac, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, and Pampanga were within easy commuting distance to Manila. It was a weird situation where elected officials, allegedly elected to office by popular vote, were afraid to sleep in their home towns. They would appear in their offices in the morning but before sundown would drive back to Manila from fear of the Huks. Most of these officials had been involved against the Huks during the Japanese occupation.

The Constabulary at that time was under-manned. When I was the provincial commander in Pampanga I had nine Constabulary companies,
(but their strength averaged only about 80 per cent of the full complement of four officers and 82 enlisted men). Yet Pampanga province was the "hotbed" of subversion.

Deterioration of the relationship between troopers and civilian population was due partly to high command decisions that soldiers and garrison commanders would live off the people because of a Constabulary logistic breakdown. The pay was often in arrears.

I support General Volckmann's statement that in some ways the Constabulary had actually, though of course indirectly, helped the Huk's cause. Magsaysay changed all that.

COLONEL WOOTEN: Was the Air Force situation comparable to that of the Constabulary regarding shortage of funds for rations, etc.?

COLONEL VALERIANO: No, the Air Force operated on organized bases with organized messes. The Constabulary had to purchase, or steal, supplies locally. People became very familiar with the word "commandeering" in the Philippines. The Armed Forces, except for the Constabulary, enjoyed the respect and regard of the people. During those bad days I can remember going to Manila in Constabulary uniform and being stoned by civilians.

The extent to which the situation had deteriorated appears in the boldness of the Huk leaders. Taruc told an American newspaperman that he had an armed force of 15,000 armed men and claimed two million inhabitants as his mass support base.* He announced his timetable leading to seizure of national power in early 1952.

Troops in the field were beginning to wonder whether there was any solution. Magsaysay came into power at the critical time.

COLONEL TINIO: Magsaysay was appointed as Secretary of National Defense, September 1, 1950. The general situation in the closing months of 1950 was indicated in a report submitted to him by the field commanders. He instituted a new, vigorous approach to the Huk problem. First, Magsaysay wanted all the armed services to be involved; he thought that this war was no monopoly of the ground forces. He felt that if the Air Force had no ground support missions, it should get

*Early in Magsaysay's term as Secretary of Defense, the government acknowledged that Taruc's figures were approximately correct. By contrast the total Philippine Army had fewer than 17,000 men and the Constabulary about 12,000 in 1950--a very lean manpower ratio for a successful counter-insurgency campaign.
busy on the psychological warfare effort in the form of pamphlet
drops and on the transport of troops in the conflict area. He had
already learned from field commanders that the L-5 was a very effective
aircraft for reconnaissance and liaison.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: Somewhere along the line after Magsaysay came
into power, there was tremendous reorientation of political and
economic actions taken in this area. I know there was a chopping up
of the large land holdings and also a resettlement program was under-
taken that I understand was very effective.

COLONEL VALERIANO: Before reviewing all the civic actions that
Magsaysay instituted to go hand in hand with the military effort, I
mention what we called the Army Attraction Program inaugurated immediately
by Magsaysay when he took charge.

First, he weeded out all the deadwood in the officer corps.
Quite a number were court-martialed for offenses committed in the past.
The poor fellows who had to face court-martial were deliberately sub-
jected to a tremendous amount of publicity, because Magsaysay wanted
to convince the general public that he was one man who would not toler-
ate in the Armed Forces officers who had forgotten their oaths as
officers and gentlemen.

He allowed specially authorized officers to give undesirable
enlisted personnel summary dishonorable discharges without compensation.
Magsaysay began selecting deserving and experienced junior officers
who had proven themselves under the Constabulary or in the Army. He
selected battalion commanders invariably between the ages of 25 to 32;
youngsters, but people who knew their jobs and knew what Magsaysay
wanted of them. To make sure that the troops would not live off the
people because of logistic breakdown, Magsaysay increased the troops' ration allowance. This relatively trivial administrative order was extremely important to us in the field during those days. It was the first direct evidence that the government had determined to support us.

The ration, increased from 30 centavos to one peso, enabled the troopers going into villages to pay for their meals and have something extra for some beer, or cigarette money to entertain villagers who would fraternize with them.
The whole picture changed in a fortnight as far as improving the attitude of the public toward the troops. Simultaneously, Magsaysay instituted changes to improve the lot of the people.

Of course, we had other good men in the government who could have done exactly what Magsaysay did. The difference is that these good men did not volunteer to President Quirino to take over the campaign leadership and try some of their ideas in the field.

The Liberal administration had been responsible for all the bunglings and the blunders committed from 1946 to 1950 and these officials were aware that they were probably committing political suicide by appointing Magsaysay, who would introduce a program contrary to their previous pacification policies. To its everlasting credit, the administration appointed him Secretary of Defense. He ordered the Army's seven Battalion Combat teams to set up tactical headquarters to facilitate their operations in the seven affected provinces, their areas of responsibility coinciding with provincial boundaries.

COLONEL TINIO: By late 1951, the Huks were about ready to stage a general uprising. They were concentrating their armed units only about 30 miles outside of Manila. They had already startedkidnapping and ambushing high government officials. One of the victims was the then Armed Forces Chief of Staff, whose party was attacked in a Manila suburb. Luckily he escaped, but his aide was killed.

By accident, or maybe it was providential, the Politburo in Manila was exposed and captured almost intact. It had been free to operate because of our democratic processes allowing free speech, free gatherings. Its capture started the ebb of the tide for the Huks.

Later, when the villages became "hot" because of military operations, the Huks stayed in the woods and resorted to meeting the farmers on the farms. When military pressures increased further, they had to move up in the mountain forests, where they established production bases. From there they intermittently sent contact men into the villages or to farm shacks, but these risked being spotted or encountering government patrols. Therefore, the Huks depended mainly upon their so-called "production" bases for sustenance.

When forced into their mountain redoubts, the Huks had to form
and simultaneously, to be ready to fight or run. Slowly their will
to fight crumbled, except for the diehards.

COLONEL CLARK: To what extent were Huk operations subject to
central direction?

GENERAL LANSDALE: I might comment on Communist organization.
There was a very well organized military control, with a closely knit
political control on top. Communications were by courier, not by radio.
Top political control was largely by intellectuals from universities,
city boys, while the military were mainly the farm boys. The intel-
lectuals went to great lengths to maintain control.

They sent the military to school; established Stalin universities
that taught the history of the Communist Party in the Philippines,
gave courses in dialectical materialism, and instituted autocritique
or self-criticism to superimpose Communist psychological discipline on
military discipline. Political officers went out with units.

The military command was also well organized and was so much in
control of the situation. The Supremo's staff was so efficient that
he had a set of law books sent up to him in the mountains, where he
learned enough to become a lawyer while he was running military operations.

A decisive event, similar to one during the Mau Mau uprising,
was the capture of the top political leaders at one government swoop.
The Communist Politburo had become careless in security, and were
captured almost in toto, with all of their documents. Most of them
did some talking on top of that, so that the Philippine government got
a pretty complete picture of the rebel organization. It was bigger
than had been thought; better organized than had been known.

COLONEL VALENTANO: During the early years, their control of
field units was relatively efficient. Activity in a particular area
depended on the regional command organizations. They had organized
regional commands almost coinciding with battalion areas on our side.
Proof of their control system appears in the city attacks they staged
in early 1950, when they attacked many points in Central and Southern
Luzon. They showed coordination, as attested by documents when the
Politburo were captured. These attacks followed a master tactical
plan evolved by the top military commanders and the Politburo.
COLONEL REINHARDT: How much weight would you give the assassination of Madam Quezon in arousing the public?

COLONEL TINIO: That was one of the biggest mistakes the Huks made. I mentioned the strong family ties that extend beyond immediate families. Mrs. Quezon was one of the best loved ladies in the Philippines at the time. When she was ambushed and murdered by the Huks, the attitude of the people changed overnight. That was the start of the decline of Huk influence, particularly among the so-called mass base. Civilians started drifting away from the Huks. Now the people realized the Huks really did not mean what they were saying.

GENERAL LANSDALE: I believe it fair to say that up until then the socialist, agrarian reform aspects of this Communist movement had the hearts and sympathies of a lot of these people. Mrs. Quezon's ambush probably killed off this willing help from the people.

But after her death, the Huks kept on recruiting and their forces did grow in size. Their so-called mass base or their support from the civilian population also grew after that, but I believe it was due to terroristic or coercive methods by the Communist guerrillas. People were helping but, like Colonel Jurado's relative, they were doing it because they had no choice. As you started to protect the people and follow through, evidently sincerely, the people then had something that they wanted to do more than help the enemy, which was to help the government.

COLONEL VALERIANO: The incident also exposed to the public, not only to the affected population but even down to Mindanao, the overall deficiency in the conduct of the campaign. The ambush of Mrs. Quezon could have been avoided if the Constabulary command in the province of Nueva Ecija had been vigilant and alert. Extra precaution and security during her presence in the province would have avoided the assassination. Actually, the ambuscaders had been stopping civilian traffic at the ambush site for two days, then came Mrs. Quezon, followed by a motor cavalcade containing the ex-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the mayor of Quezon City, several cabinet ministers and administrators during Quezon's regime. They drove into this trap.
I can state positively that in addition to the reactions of the public there was the exposure of deficiencies in the over-all approach and conduct of the campaign.

DR. KILMARX: It was mentioned that the Communist bloc supported the Huk movement. Reference was made of the Huks building a port that might have received a submarine.

What were there between the Communist Bloc and the Huk movement in the way of communications, logistic control, anything that might explain how this effort fitted into the total Communist effort in revolutionary warfare?

COLONEL TINIO: The support we know the Communist Party in the Philippines got from outside was mostly moral support. There may have been a little financial support, but there was no shipment of arms and ammunition. Some Huk propaganda asserted they had received arms, but we never acquired any evidence to verify that.

Outside financial support probably was received through the United States. We don't know that these funds originated there, but it seems they did pass through the United States.

The Huks received small amounts of propaganda materials, newspapers, publications, magazines from the outside. During the Japanese occupation, a group of local Chinese organized themselves into a Squadron 48, called the WACHI guerrillas. They operated in Southern Luzon somewhat independent of the Huks. The Chinese Communists in the Philippines never wanted to be subordinated to the Communist Party of the Philippines. Chinese in the Philippines helped the Chinese Communists, not the Philippine Communists. Some people were taken out of the Philippines for training in Moscow before the war and were leaders of Communist Party units during and after the war. None of the survivors of this group are now very active and all are under surveillance.

GENERAL LANSDALE: I think the seclusion of the Philippines was the real point of similarity with the problem in Malaya, and the dissimilarity with that today in Vietnam, or any place where Communist assistance can enter across a border.
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

COLONEL WOOTEN: Would you describe the command relationships that you had and how you communicated, for example, when you needed an air strike?

COLONEL VALERIANO: The command structure of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is not similar to yours at the Pentagon. We have an integrated Central General Staff. Right now a Navy officer is serving as J-2 of the Armed Forces; at another time it could be an Air Force officer. We completely disregard service backgrounds for command or staff assignments.

Also, the Philippine Armed Forces is a very small establishment, so that you find opposite numbers in Air, Navy, and Army Staffs come from the same class at the military academy or perhaps graduate from the same ROTC class at the University of the Philippines.

COLONEL JURADO: In 1948 the responsibility of opposing the Hukbalahaps was assigned to the Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary. Fortunately, this officer had one son who was a new pilot in the Air Force. Possibly the son had been talking to his father about what the Air Force could do. The Commanding General of the Air Force was eager and ready to help the ground forces, despite the lack of official direction from the higher-ups. Incidentally, his family had lived in Huklandia and he knew the conditions of the local populace. He assigned one ranking officer to the headquarters of the Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary.

There was no JOC, only an air officer who understood Air Force capabilities. When Constabulary field commanders planned their operations, they invariably asked whether the Air Force could contribute. Since this air officer was aggressive, he often induced the Constabulary to exploit the air capabilities.

Close liaison and coordination existed between these Constabulary commanders and our Air Force commanders at the fighter base. My immediate Air Force boss at the fighter base was a classmate of Colonel Valeriano at the academy. Some of the other battalion commanders were my contemporaries and we talked with complete freedom on what we could
really do to help each other. Since the Commanding General of the Constabulary was already a convinced air enthusiast, he approved maximum employment of the Air Force.

COLONEL VALERIANO: The Commanding General's enthusiasm for our Air Force support had to be very discreet because of the attitude of our top executives in the government toward the Huk problem. Stringent restrictions were imposed by the Secretary of Interior, without opposition from the Secretary of Defense. These elected officials were very conscious of public reactions from air action and feared public disapproval or condemnation of use of the Air Force to attack Huk concentrations. Remember that the Filipinos had barely emerged from a terrible war during which they had experienced bombing by the Japanese and the devastating performance of the American Air Forces in the liberation campaign.

A newspaper headline or a speech in Congress might influence the Commanding General to quietly pass the word to the subordinate commanders to suspend use of aircraft in our operations, in spite of the fact that we had just improved our air-ground liaison techniques. We achieved communications by means of light aircraft, such as were unofficially attached to my battalion. My roommate at the academy, then commanding the fighter base, wanted to help in any possible form or manner. He allowed these L-5s to be based on the air strip in front of my command post. In the absence of telephone or radio communications, these L-5s were my link with the Air Force Commander at Basa Air Base.

When we got information from the field, we briefed the pilot, who flew to Basa and briefed the base commander. Naturally, there was a relatively long reaction time. Often the air strikes would arrive too late.

Of course, there was full agreement between all the Army and Air Force officers involved in these operations and the Defense Secretary to be reticent with newspaper men about the number of casualties actually inflicted. On two occasions the Secretary ordered me to delete from my official after-action reports the actual number of dead Hiks found after air strikes.
Before Magsaysay’s time, the results of air strikes ordered or rather, allowed, by the Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary were never verified by ground troops. He didn’t want any newspapermen to discover the aftereffects of these bombings, since the Constabulary could not afford press criticism that would influence high civilian superiors.

In Magsaysay’s time, all was different. One of Magsaysay’s first orders required that every ground patrol be provided with a camera. A patrol leader who reported killing seven Huks had to produce photographs of seven dead.

This also applied to verification patrols that followed up air strikes requested by the battalion commander. The effects of the bombing or strafing had to be photographed by armed patrols.

Of course, not all the cameras functioned. Sometimes pictures had to be shot inside the jungle where there was insufficient light. So we frequently either had to bring the cadavers out with us or resort to beheading, or even the old practice of cutting off the ears and sticking a rattan through them. So many pairs of ears certified the actual casualty figures.

Magsaysay went to my command post on a particular operation to verify whether the air strike was made as scheduled. When informed that ground patrols approaching the objective could not verify the number killed because human limbs were found up in tree branches, he personally talked to that ground patrol by radio. It took nearly two days to reconstruct how many Huks were killed.

On another occasion, Magsaysay entered a cave to verify our estimated claims of having finished off something like 250 Huks. He arrived, I think, on the fourth day after the cave was captured. The smell exploded right in his face; that time he agreed to forget it and go home.

When Air Force participation was given official sanction by Magsaysay, the Air Force rigged up radio sets in panel trucks at ground unit headquarters to contact Air Force units. I think they had four trucks.
Also, the Air Force sent air liaison officers to serve on area commanders' staffs. These air staff officers visited the battalions under the area command and served not only as liaison officers but also as administrative and operations officers for the NCO pilots flying the L-5s assigned to the battalions. When an air strike was requested, let's say a patrol had come upon a concentration, the patrol would send a report by radio to battalion headquarters. Battalion headquarters in turn would immediately send an L-5 over the spot. At the same time, the battalion would alert area headquarters through the air officer, who could be in the battalion headquarters in twenty minutes. Invariably, he would get the approval, so that in half an hour you would have air action.

The ultimate in air-ground operations in the Philippines was achieved about the middle of 1952. Five battalion combat teams were conducting simultaneous operations in one area and had excellent intelligence. On his own initiative, the air commander kept one fighter squadron airborne over the area of these five battalions, so that reaction time dropped to at most 20 minutes.

The 6th Fighter Squadron was first in the air, ready on call, and as soon as it had to land the 7th Fighter Squadron relieved it. They kept this up for, I think, two days. We got to that stage of development.

COLONEL WOOTEN: If there had been competing demands for air, how would that have been decided? Who had the authority to say, "I will not honor this request but I will honor that request?"

COLONEL VALERIANO: I believe that area headquarters would be the determining authority. You would have an air staff officer assigned there.

INTELLIGENCE

COLONEL WOOTEN: How was intelligence handled? Who kept the general situation, where was it kept, and to what degree was it accessible to the various people making decisions?

COLONEL VALERIANO: Area headquarters.
COLONEL WOOTEN: That was the full central operation and there was a senior staff officer there?

COLONEL VALERIANO: Yes.

COLONEL WOOTEN: To what degree was the Air Force involved in intelligence? Did you have intelligence officers?

COLONEL JURADO: No. We didn't have any intelligence officers. The Air Force at the time was just getting oriented on the activities of the Huks. But in the headquarters of the ground forces, we didn't have intelligence officers, simply the Air Officer, radio operator, driver, and perhaps one rifleman. I was assigned as Air Officer at one time. From available intelligence as to the positions of the friendly forces and possible Huk targets, I could more or less determine whether air strikes were feasible. If so, I recommended their use to the commander; if not, which was quite often, I objected to air strikes.

GENERAL LANSDALE: You have to get down to great detail in your intelligence in this type of warfare. This was done in the Philippines. Army intelligence knew the names and the physical descriptions of almost all of the Huks in the area. They knew whether or not civilians were going to be in with them. Intelligence was collected in tremendous detail at battalion level from informant nets, local people, and patrols. All this went into card index files for order of battle intelligence. The intelligence situation maps would show units with their strengths and movements.

The Philippine Armed Forces deserve a tremendous amount of credit for the Intelligence schools and training that they had for the critical part of the campaign. There were no intelligence schools until late 1950 for what an intelligence officer does against guerrillas. This training, plus the reorganization made a vital difference. End results permitted Air, Army, or even at times, Navy forces to know positively when to go in and hit an area, and to know they were hitting the enemy, not civilians.

COLONEL VALERIANO: I recall the barrio file we used to maintain. It included dossiers not only of subversive individuals but also of all the inhabitants of all villages.
COLONEL WOOTEN: Was there a division of labor or allocation of responsibility between the police and the military, or was it just military?

GENERAL LANSDALE: The Constabulary, when the police force was trying to solve this problem, did do something of this order of battle intelligence as well as normal police work. It really wasn't effective against guerrillas. Valeriano set up an order of battle system in the Constabulary headquarters initially, in their intelligence staff. But when the Armed Forces were assigned the responsibility in 1950, they did have to start almost from scratch. Constabulary files were available. One master file was switched from Constabulary intelligence over to the Armed Forces intelligence. As battalions were assigned geographic areas to work in, they gathered some information from the local police or Constabulary, and some from the headquarters files, but this was frequently too little to work with.

In many cases, it wasn't even a basis to start a situation map. Many of the battalion intelligence officers (S-2s) had to start from scratch.

COLONEL VALERIANO: The civil affairs officers assisted our battalion S-2s in building up intelligence files.

COLONEL WOOTEN: And the police, I assume, gave you input into this, acted in the role of collectors of information and fed it into the analysis?

GENERAL LANSDALE: Partially. The provincial police often were dominated by the enemy, either ideologically or through fear, so they weren't always trustworthy. The Constabulary had gradually come to be separated from the population, operating pretty much as ground forces in company strength. Their intelligence forces dried up on them. They were fighting pretty much blind just before the Armed Forces took over. So they didn't have too much current information to pass on. They knew the names of some leaders and they had some information, but nowhere was it in the detail and depth needed.

COLONEL VALERIANO: We had a number of incidents where the provincial commander did not like to turn over whatever he had of former intelligence to the Army battalion commander. So Magsaysay ordered that the four battalion commanders in the four Hukbalahap provinces
would be not only the top military commanders of these provinces, but also the provincial commanders, in order to make intelligence files accessible from the Constabulary. As soon as that was completed, he relieved the battalion commanders of their authority over the Constabulary and reappointed the provincial commanders.

HUK RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION (EDCOR)

MR. PETERSON: Along with improvements in combating the Huks by force, such as the better organized intelligence operation, wasn't there a campaign to rehabilitate Huks who turned themselves in?

COLONEL VALERIANO: Yes, the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) was an example of President Magsaysay's doctrine of all-out force or all-out friendship that effectively stole the thunder from the Huk propaganda cry of "land for the landless." Magsaysay ordered the Army to survey idle government lands and parcel them out into family lots. He had Army engineers construct houses, veterinarians buy working animals, quartermasters furnish the agricultural implements, judge advocate general officers assist new farm tenants for proper documentation of ownership titles, and Army finance officers handy to advance enough capital to tide them over until the first harvest. This was a social civic action executed by the Armed Forces under the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

When Huk families would come down and voluntarily surrender, if intelligence cleared them from criminal action, the Army would bring them to Manila and turn them over to the Air Force or to the Navy for final movement to the EDCOR farms.

The tracts were in the far south, initially in Mindanao, which was less settled and developed. This separated them from any possible Huk re-contacts. We made sure that all war veterans who were indigent were also transported to the same area, so we would have an ex-Huk family settled next to that of a veteran. We mixed them together to help our security and also our surveillance.

GENERAL LANSDALE: The original settlements were in the Mindanao jungles. The project was run by the Army. Retired officers and men provided the cadre to help in the surveillance and settling of the first
Huk prisoners selected for rehabilitation. When the Huks first went down to Mindanao, just the men went, but as they proved themselves they could have their families join them.

This was to be their future home. They would have to work to clear the jungle and start planting. As they worked their own land and showed real enterprise, they were deemed rehabilitated and were given title to their land.

COLONEL TINIO: An Army unit invariably has a small generator, providing electricity that could be shared with the settlers. Men alone were quartered in barracks. Those with families built small shacks. As I described earlier, the farmer did not want to be isolated in a hut on his farm; at sundown, he went back to the center of the settlement. But when his farm was fully developed and he had a feeling of security, he built a bigger house and stayed on his farm, especially if roads were constructed to connect farms with the center of the village.

Enterprising individuals, sometimes at the initiative of the Army officer in charge, might find a stream that could be dammed and then they generated electricity for the whole community. That is how they had electricity, even in the isolated places. So these farms were developed on a cooperative basis.

GENERAL LANSDALE: I saw the first group of Huks to go to one of these farms in Mindanao.

Intelligence carefully screened who should go and put them aboard an LST. As they neared their destination, the Secretary of Defense flew down to ride the last part of the journey aboard their LST. I had the privilege of accompanying him. I noticed one of the youngsters among the prisoners was quite obviously forming a Communist cell among the settlers, working pretty hard at it.

I thought, "Ye gods, how did this man pass the intelligence screening? Here is a real diehard. We are transplanting the Communist movement to a southern island where it hasn't yet reached—and doing it at Philippine government expense." I called Magsaysay's attention to this. He was concerned, and had a long talk with this youngster, who was about 18 years old, talking to him about his mother and father and sisters in his home town.
He said he felt the lad ought to be given a chance. But Magsaysay warned him that if he misbehaved again, as he obviously had been doing, he would be sent back up north.

This lad was amazed at the tropics, which were quite different from the northern island where he had grown up. The fruit looked larger, the trees were bigger, the bananas, corn, papayas, and mangos bigger and more luscious, and he wanted to stay.

We let him stay and later flew him back to his home area where his former guerrilla squadron was still active. He risked his life by standing up and talking to them, but he proved his point. He was so excited at a chance to own land that he talked to his home folks with tears streaming down his eyes. He said he was the first person in his family of tenant farmers who was ever going to own his own land. He wouldn't let those dirty Communists take it away from him. He became a free-enterprise man one thousand per cent.

After about a year we had a group of visitors, including some from the Malay campaign and some U.S. correspondents. They watched the way the ex-Huks worked with Army veterans and retired personnel, as friends and part of a going community. The visitors then concluded, "these people certainly couldn't ever have been hard-core Communists!"

I pointed out this lad and they talked to him; then they accused me of having one of my propaganda agents planted among these people; the lad was selling them so on the merits of the project. He had swung all the way over and was actively concerned that the Communists should ever take this dream away from him and his friends.

Later, Huks came in to surrender, saying, "I want my farm." This became a quid pro quo to surrender. Of course, there weren't farms ready for all these folks, but they were acquired.

The British officers from Malaya complained to me because there were electric lights in these new settlements that were being hacked out of the virgin jungle. They said that the Chinese being resettled in Malaya had heard that all the Philippine resettled people had electric lights, and this was prompting them to ask for electric lights in the "new villages" of Malaya.

COLONEL CLARK: What is the present state of those resettlement areas? Have they prospered?
COLONEL VALERIANO: Very much so. The first EDCOR farm in Mindanao, according to Colonel Tinio, is one of the most progressive spots in the Coronadel valley. Others were eventually opened up in Luzon as part of our consolidation phase, and are also growing communities. That is where we have the least concern now.

COLONEL TINIO: I was stationed in Mindanao in 1960 and I visited all three farms. One had been turned over to the civilian authorities. They, the ex-Huks, were already independent and paying taxes regularly. Another farm was in the process of being turned over to civilian authorities and the third one was still in the development stage.

As an experiment, some former dissidents who wanted to return to Luzon were sent back. Out of about fifty people that went back, all but one returned to Mindanao. They said employment difficulties, land exhaustion, and fear of reprisals from former comrades made life in Luzon unattractive. They even invited their distant relatives to go with them back to Mindanao.

An EDCOR project in Isabela province, Luzon, is progressing similarly. It is in the process of being turned over to civilian administration. While the ex-Huks are farming, they are given lessons on how to run a government in the democratic way, under supervision of Army personnel. The Army commanding officer is an agriculturist. He allocates the land, then he teaches the people how to cultivate it by modern methods. At the start, the settlers practiced "bayanihan," mutual-help labor on a voluntary basis. When one needs to plant his farm, all the others come and help. When it is your turn, all will help you.

During their off hours, they hold meetings, elect their own head men, their councilors, and other local officials. When a problem comes up, it is decided by these chosen representatives. The area is incorporated in the civilian government when it has repaid the Army for all expenses in establishing, developing, and maintaining the project.

Then the settlers get titles of the land they had worked on.

GENERAL LANSDALE: I think there are useful lessons here. The fact that the Armed Forces were undertaking to help people establish their own farms was bigger than the project itself.
The genesis of the EDCOR project was actually in a prison compound when some of the Huk inmates asked for useful work. It began with carpenters, making furniture for the compound. The Army found some woodworking things, saws, and some machinery. Huk prisoners who were carpenters volunteered, and three or four of them started a small shop, using the Army tools, right next to the prison compound. Later, the Army bought the chairs and tables for camps, offices, and quarters. These workers attracted other prisoners. The enterprise was a success. They paid for the equipment and soon had their own business. Suddenly the Army discovered that it had a free enterprise going where prisoners were making money while still prisoners.

With the public land available and EDCOR under way, it was logical to integrate this carpenter shop idea into the resettlement program. It was worked out by a small group of operations officers in an effort similar to our World War II OPD. This kind of social development program was supported fully by Magsaysay when he was president. It is still going on.

Things like these programs grow up logically. If you are alert, you will find similar opportunities.
III. AIR ACTION

AIR MISSIONS

Close Support

COLONEL JURADO: The mission of the Philippine Air Force in 1946 was, in general, close cooperation and support of the ground forces. This was primarily because of the type of equipment then in the Philippine Air Force. We had only a transport squadron of C-47s and one squadron of mixed L-5s and L-4s, used by the Constabulary for administrative flights and some minor reconnaissance missions.

Late in 1947, the Air Force received some Mustangs, T-6s, and T-13s. This definitely changed the mission to prompt and sustained operations in air defense of specific areas and ground support. We had to limit the air defense mission to designated areas because of the limited number of operational bases. We had only two at the time. Our fighter squadrons were stationed at Basa Field, about 60 miles north-northwest of Manila. The other base was at Lipa, Batangas, about 60 air miles south of Manila.

Our supply and maintenance depots were just outside of Manila. Air Force headquarters was in Camp Murphy. Incidentally, the headquarters of the Constabulary and that of the Armed Forces of the Philippines were all located in Camp Murphy.

The strength of the Philippine Air Force in 1948 was close to 4000 officers and men. The training of our pilots qualified them to fly the type of equipment that the Air Force had at the time. Many Philippine pilots had been sent to the States as early as 1945, so when combat aircraft arrived in the Philippines, we had pilots qualified to fly them.

Although the state of training, organization, and capabilities of the Air Force could have contributed materially to the support of the Constabulary during the early part of the campaign, Air Force headquarters had no appreciable knowledge of actual requirements of the pacification campaign. The government attitude was such that we did
not know what was really going on. We did not know the objectives and aims of the Hukbalahaps. We did not know their *modus operandi* in the field. Occasionally the Hусs fired machineguns at our ground security forces just outside our fighter base in Pampanga, but because they did not direct any fire at us, we did nothing about it.

By the latter part of 1948, when orders came from Armed Forces GHQ, the prevalent types of air attack missions were strafing or bombing concentrations of Hусs identified by ground force intelligence.

No priorities were defined for air missions, except for the limited numbers of C-47s and L-5s. The needs of the ground forces for air strikes were slight at the time. With two fighter-bomber squadrons available, requests for air strikes from field commanders invariably were approved.

Another probable reason we could meet ground force requests was the proximity of our bases to the strike areas. From time to time, areas around Mt. Arayat and the Candaba Swamp were declared a restricted area. The Air Force had been told several times there were no friendly ground troops there. It had also been broadcast to the people that they should not be in that area, so anyone there was to be considered a Huk. It took only about five minutes flight from our base at Basa to reach the assigned operational areas.

**COLONEL VALERIANO:** Employment of the Air Force in the early years of the campaign was very limited because the Hусs operated from popular bases in developed areas in Huklandia. Under Magsaysay's leadership, we were able not only to isolate the armed guerrillas from the civilians, but actually to cause disruption and disaffection within guerrilla organizations. This forced Huk armed elements to abandon the central plains of Luzon for mountain bases. The Philippine Air Force was a busy service during the later stages of our counterinsurgency effort. Naturally the targets offered were very mobile. Moreover, in the later phases, the terrain was so rugged that strafing or bombing missions against designated targets were difficult. By the time we enjoyed intelligence superiority over the Hukbalahaps, we actually had people walking out of these Huk mountain bases, reporting to us exactly where these targets were.
A source of supply had been immediately available to the guerrillas in the populated area bases, but as they retreated further into the mountains their food supply depended on what they could produce out of little clearings that they themselves made, largely root crops, which grow very easily in the Philippines. We used aircraft to spot these "production bases."

We deliberately refrained from spraying the production bases with chemicals, as the British did. We had chemicals available but we preferred to fly agricultural experts over these areas so they could determine the approximate harvest time; then just before harvest, we destroyed these bases by ground action. In only two or three cases we used incendiary bombs stockpiled with the Air Force. Also the (USAF) 13th Air Force gave us some clandestine support in this matter.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: You have mentioned air strikes against concentrations of Huks. What types of aircraft munitions did you use on these concentrations? What types would you recommend, looking back on your experience, and what are your thoughts on napalm?

COLONEL VALERIANO: I personally requested napalm, but Magsaysay thought that was not the way to kill Huks. By the time Magsaysay became active in the field the Korean War broke out. Consequently, many requests, especially those for equipment like napalm and helicopters, were not fulfilled for us because the priority went to Korea. I would have liked to use napalm in some places, especially during the dry season.

COLONEL JURADO: The Air Force used 50 caliber machine guns, and standard antipersonnel bombs up to 100 lb which was the biggest bomb we had.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: Do you think 50 caliber is too large?

COLONEL JURADO: We did not have any 30 caliber machineguns in our aircraft. They probably would have done just as well, better because the aircraft could carry more ammunition.

COLONEL VALERIANO: The lightest antipersonnel bombs that you can have have proved by experience to be the best.

One L-5 pilot, a very imaginative NCO, had requisitioned through us, not through his Air Force supply, some 50-mm mortar shells. He
then had one of our ordnance men work on these shells so they would explode when they hit something hard. This pilot always had about six of them under his seat, and he dropped them if he found anything suspicious.¹

Captured Hukbalahaps were unanimous in stating that every time they saw an L-5, they could not be sure whether it presaged a large scale ground attack or the L-5 was simply going to harass until it ran out of 50-mm mortar shells.

GENERAL LANSDALE: I might put in some comment. First of all, I agree with Colonel Valeriano that Korea took precedence in Magsaysay's first months as Secretary of Defense when military action against the Huks was at its maximum. The weapons were going to Korea instead of coming into the Philippines. Later, they got into the Philippines, but by that time the war was pretty well won against the Huks. Meanwhile, it became a question of finding substitutes. There was a small research staff in the Philippine Armed Forces that did its best to make napalm and produce a napalm bomb. I remember, contrary to what you said, Val, that Magsaysay very definitely desired to use napalm against concentrations.

COLONEL VALERIANO: I didn't know this.

GENERAL LANSDALE: The enemy was then largely in fairly open areas in grasslands, in the foothills, and the Candaba Swamp. You could see a grouping of anywhere from ten to several hundred Huks, and that presented a target. Antipersonnel weapons were needed, and very quickly. The small R&D staff made some napalm bombs. We had the disheartening experience of seeing them delivered accurately and then just bounce. Nothing else happened. If some guy was standing in the way, he got hit, but we couldn't detonate the bomb. We finally tried dumping an inflammable mixture, mostly kerosene, out of a C-47, then firing into it with rifle tracer ammo. That I don't recommend. It was a desperate attempt to do something.

As an aside, on the 100-lb bomb, I recall a time Colonel Valeriano had a very definite target, a concentration of Huks backed up into the Biak-na-bato Caves. They knocked out artillery or anything else
brought to the mouth of the cave, which opened into a gully. Val
couldn't get his firepower to deliver anything inside the cave itself.

This led to a suggestion which to this day I am sorry didn't
work out: to bring a fire engine siren and mount it with batteries in
the mouth of the cave and turn the siren on full blast. I wanted to
see if vibrations and noise could drive those people out. Valeriano's
troops worked all night getting the siren, borrowed from a fire engine
in the local town, up to the mouth of the cave. At dawn just before
the siren could be turned on, the Philippine Air Force came over,
bombing the top of the mountain where this cave was located. By a
complete fluke, one bomb went skittering down a sort of chimney in the
rock and blasted the Huks in the cave. Those that were left alive
came out and surrendered.

The Air Force did make air strikes when a jungle or mountain camp
was found. They did, I recall, a very fine job bombing the Huk top
military command headquarters, which incidentally happened to be partly
on U. S. Air Force property.

COLONEL VALERIANO: This operation took place on the 13th Air
Force bombing range. That was precisely where the Huks had been hiding,
in a mountain base. Our operations against that base involved five
battalion combat teams, closing in from all directions. The battalion
combat team stationed in Zambales had to cross the mountains. The
battalions from Central Luzon were ordered to close in from the north
and south, and to cover the eastern side. Prior to the order for the
assault troops to move in, the Air Force bombed the base site and did
great damage to the structures. When it came to casualties, I don't
think we killed more than ten Huks in this particular operation.
Somehow or other, they sensed that a large force was moving in and they
vacated before the airplanes started bombing it. But you see, the
whole operation was well publicized. As a matter of fact, there were
many criticisms because of the few casualties in such expensive
operations.

On the other hand, the people all over the affected area were
impressed that this time all the Armed Forces, including the Air Force,
were involved and that we were throwing everything we had against
the Huks.
So the psychological value was tremendous. This signaled mass surrenders. Civilians on their own started hog-tying Huk couriers or foragers who appeared in the villages to ask for food. After this operation, the tactical picture swung completely to our side in Huklandia.

MR. HOSMER: When you used air as a close support weapon, how did the Huks react?

COLONEL VALERIANO: They were frightened, because they knew that this arm can be fast and deliver a terrific punch. It was also a reason that they no longer formed in large groups. As a result, their indoctrination or rally activities were reduced practically to a minimum.

Reconnaissance

COLONEL VALERIANO: The Constabulary, the Army, and the Air Force had to resort to a series of improvisations to circumvent equipment shortages and the restrictions imposed by the nature of the struggle.

Early in the campaign the Huks would roam around their popular bases, sometimes concentrating for their psychological indoctrination programs or other reasons. They would, for example, take over a village and gather all the civilians—men, women, and children—and expound communism.

Instead of pursuing the Huk concentrations, we used the easier way of locating and tracking them through close liaison between ground spotters and L-5 pilots.

COLONEL TINIO: We tried to pinpoint the known or suspected dissident concentrations for planned operations. In other words, the Huks were allowed to roam freely until they felt it safe to concentrate, perhaps for instruction, training, or the issue of orders. Many times this would be in Huk-dominated areas where no outside civilians or military patrols could penetrate.

The inadequacy of ground-to-air communications made it necessary for the aircraft pilot and ground spotter to improvise a signal code. The pilot in the air would read signals set up by the ground agent,
involving the relative positions of normal farm implements and details. Figure 4 illustrates a farm whose owner had been secretly recruited and trained to work as a ground spotter for us. In this particular case, the well was the reference point. The plow showed the direction of the Huks. The number of hay stacks told the armed strength of the enemy concentration. The open gate indicated that they were emplaced for an immediate action; closed it would signal their unreadiness for action.

As pilots' radio reports came in, they would be plotted on a large map of the area. The plot from three or more of these agents in an area would reveal the position of the Huk concentration. With this information a battalion commander could plan proper action.

An aircraft could then fly to the area to verify the information or could lead an air or ground raid to encircle, harass, or attack the concentration.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: Did you have any air-ground communication?

COLONEL TINIO: Only between the L-5 and battalion headquarters.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: Also, what type of photographic capability did you have, and how long did it take to process film from the L-5?

COLONEL JURADO: We had a fairly good photo laboratory. Our handicap actually was photo interpretation. When shots were taken like this, there was appreciable time in processing and interpretation of the shots.

COLONEL VALERIANO: We developed this air-ground intelligence technique into standard operating procedures. In my battalion, we required L-5s to fly an early morning flight, a noon flight and a flight just before sunset. The battalion area was small, so it took only about half an hour for the L-5 to cover it. There was good radio communication between battalion headquarters and the pilot.

Ground spotter agents were assigned code numbers. A typical radio message will read something like this:

"22-B--Positive, azimuth, 210 degrees, 200 armed Huks, disposition, inactive."

You may ask how this particular ground spotter would learn about this concentration. Remember that in this situation the Huks were
Message:

Enemy concentration at 330°, 200, active
Disposition: open gate

Fig. 4—A ground spotter's farm
operating from popular bases, and our ground spotter, being well identified as a loyal supporter for the Huk cause, may have been alerted to contribute to a meal for these people in the concentration. Maybe he was even told where to deliver his contribution, invariably close to the concentration site. In any case, the local gossip would give the ground spotter a relatively good idea of the location.

Of course, the reports collected would sometimes come up with a preposterous collection of readings. These ground spotters were poorly educated, some of them illiterate. But being residents, they knew their immediate areas. In the Philippines, even a clump of woods is identified with a name. For instance, "pulong bayabas" it means a fruit grove, a mango grove, or a bamboo grove.

The daily flight reports might also give great differences as to the number of people in the reported concentration. One ground spotter might report 50 men, another 200, and a third 300. We based our estimates on the averages of all reports.

With three flights daily by the L-5, it was possible for us to keep track of a reported concentration. Often we would deliberately leave it alone for as long as four days, by which time we could establish with reasonable accuracy the route of the Huk concentration for the next day. This was where we would organize an ambush. There we would use the Air Force to help us place our troops properly, especially if this area was under vegetation. No matter how well versed you are in map reading, when you are on the ground it is very hard to identify your exact location on any map. But with an L-5 you can pinpoint your location on the map and on the ground.

This air-ground intelligence liaison method is one of the techniques developed by our infantrymen, but the idea came from our L-5 pilots.

COMMODORE WARCUP: One presumes there must have been a lot of little farm hamlets. Did the pilot have difficulty in picking out the right one?

COLONEL JURADO: The villages could be easily identified, because the area where the Huks were apt to be operating was not very large and there were enough clear identification marks like roads, rivers, and towns.
COMMODORE WARCUP: That would identify villages. It is my impression you had to identify one hut or one very small farm.

COLONEL VALERIANO: Our method of recruiting ground spotters simplified that. After covering an area, our ground patrols would report certain residents felt to be loyal if protected and given opportunities.

Since these were terrorized areas, we would deliberately put the prospective agents under arrest on some pretext and bring them to headquarters and there quietly recruit them. If we felt that one fellow was willing to help us secretly—which was most often the case if he could be guaranteed that he would not be exposed—we gave him all the necessary instructions.

When our ground patrols visited these places, to be friendly with the local people and to find out what was going on locally, our L-5 pilot would accompany a patrol and talk with the recruited spotter in his house. Right there on the spot this man would be instructed that the well was the point of reference, that the plow leaned against the fence relative to the zero point would indicate the direction of the concentration, etc.

Notice that the signals agreed upon were of a nature that blended with the environment. Not even his neighbors could associate the act of leaning his plow or stockpiling haystacks with sending a signal.

MR. PETERSON: Did you have any system of rewards for agents of this type?

COLONEL VALERIANO: Oh, yes. A number of them were decorated by the government, aside from monetary rewards. A surprising number requested armored car rides inside Manila, which gave me some trouble.

GENERAL LANSDALE: I would like to comment on another type of air support in the Philippines, that of taking Filipino informants up in the air to try and spot Huk headquarters. At least two major operations resulted from this source but were credited to other sources for security reasons. An informant usually rode in the open doorway of a C-47 with an intelligence officer. He would trace on the map, step by step, where he had gone.
Two of the largest concentrations of Huks were located by informants who had never been up in the air before. Everything looked quite different, but finally they spotted the terrain from the air. This was an invaluable tactical intelligence technique.

COLONEL VALERIANO: One of my patrols in surveillance of a mountain base called Talaguio picked up a Hukbalahap defector on his way out of camp. He claimed he was on his way to surrender. We took his word for it, treated him well, and encouraged him to talk about this so-called mountain base.

First, I think, we required him to draw a sketch of the guerrilla base. He drew a big shack, which turned out to be the lecture hall, and small living quarters around the main shack. He said this base was practically under jungle foliage. I had already alerted the fighter base at Bassa and this defector was flown over the area in an L-5. He was able to recognize this base from the air. It took him one whole day, in spite of the fact that he had come from that mountain base.

The pilot flew to the fighter base and explained it to the fighter pilots, but they couldn’t locate it on the map. Further, we had no way, such as smoke bombs, for the L-5 pilot to mark the target for the fighter aircraft.

What they did was to fly together to the target, the L-5 leading and the fighter planes higher. The L-5 flew around the target like a pylon— that is how I remember this word "pylon"— and the fighters attacked that point.

This place was reported to be frequented by the two top-ranking Huk leaders in my area. I accompanied the ground patrol that went into the area later. It took us two days to get there. We counted something like 27 bodies there, from what we could reconstruct of them. The bombs had burst all over the place, not really on the target, which was more or less on a ledge. The bombs had hit one exit trail and, luckily, caught the Huks as they were trying to escape.

Guerrillas in these jungle areas would have two pathways into a camp for better security. Any attempt of our patrols to penetrate other than by these two pathways could easily be detected, even at night, by the noise in pushing through the vines and the shrubbery.
The survivors of that camp joined up with those from another mountain base about five or six miles north, and fled. They lost their self-confidence, lost everything, just followed the flood of refugees, and eventually were bottled up in the Biak-na-bato Caves. It was one of the most successful air strikes that I have personally experienced, using aircraft in areas where it took days for ground troops to even approach.

COLONEL TINIO: I would like to add two small items on the role of air. One has to do with reconnaissance, but it is more what we call tracking. Even though the climate in the Philippines is hot, the whole countryside is covered with dew early in the morning. The Huk's on the move in the dark hours of the morning would leave tracks in the dew on the grass. An L-5 pilot flying early in the morning could easily see these tracks leading from the inhabited areas into the jungles or the forest. By this way, we could tell if there had been any movement towards or away from the village.

Another item is that sometimes contacts had to be made by the use of air. If you had an important operative in the jungle with reports to make, you could contact him at a designated point by airplane. The L-5, or the helicopter, could drop down, receive the report and fly back to headquarters. Or, if a Huk leader wanted to negotiate, arrangements could be made and a government contact man flown to the spot for negotiatory talks with the Huk. I know of two instances where this was used.

Transport

COLONEL VALERIANO: The transport missions assigned to air units in the Philippine counterinsurgency campaign were somewhat parallel to those in Malaya.

First, there were many examples of helicopters picking up wounded and taking them to the base hospital in Manila within an hour. We were all aware of the effects of these rapid evacuations on the morale of the soldier.

There were only a limited number of transport missions in moving troops over the area of operations in Luzon and other parts of the
country, because of limitations in transport capabilities.

The Air Force airlifted less than fifty per cent of the Huks from Luzon to be resettled through the EDCOR. Most Huk families were carried by the Navy. The psychological value of publicity on the employment of military equipment and facilities in the movement of these families was high.

GENERAL LANSDALE: There was considerable air resupply as you pushed the enemy out of the lowlands and up into the mountains and the jungles. Some of the long range patrol activities could not have taken place without regular air resupply.

COLONEL JURADO: We dropped some supplies from C-47s in support of the ground forces so that they did not have to come back for their provisions.

COLONEL VALERIANO: The Huks tried in 1952 to cultivate a legend similar to that of Hitler's "Austrian redoubt." They wanted to convince people in the lowlands, already free of Huk influence and terrorism, that the Hukbalahap organization would remain intact in this so-called redoubt. They talked about its impregnability. On direct orders from the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, we penetrated the whole area of the Sierra Madre mountain range—no roads, rugged terrain, jungles, etc.

I had then two battalion combat teams, the 7th and the 16th. I had the 16th brought to the town of Infanta by motor and transported to the Umiram River by Navy transports. The 7th, the only motorized battalion combat team in the Armed Forces, went by motor and linked up with the 16th.

We marched by platoon columns, leaving what we called stay-behind parties, volunteer teams of three or four men who joined the operation in full uniform but who shed their uniforms upon reaching their assigned stations. There they operated patrol bases equipped with radio sets and lived like the Negrito mountain people.

We made the trip slowly, spending much of our time surveying for possible landing and drop zones for our two L-5s' resupply missions. It took us 72 days. We penetrated areas never penetrated before by Army units bigger than a platoon. We found many friends of General Volckmann
and also Colonel Anderson's aborigines. In this period of 72 days none of my troops—squad or platoon—missed a meal. Yet all we had were two L-5s. We assigned phase lines where ground units could be found and the L-5s would come in and drop supplies, all free drops, incidentally. The Philippine Army was not lavish with parachute equipment. All that we did was mark relatively open spaces as drop zones. All units down to squads had signal panels. We disregarded U.S. Army signal tables and improvised our own to suit our particular situation.

One thing that intrigued some of our colleagues at Fort Bragg was a technique of free drops my men developed. In the Philippines a favorite pastime is a game called "sipa," volleyball in which a rattan ball is kicked across a net. Some of our more imaginative supply people experimented by weaving rattan into a big ball around a box padded with hay or straw to soften the impact. Some of my officers would swear on official oath they were able to receive fresh eggs by this method, especially if these rattan balls fell on foliage.

Just north of the village of Boso-Boso there was an old air strip constructed during the liberation campaign. With a little labor we cleared it and used that as a supply head. An L-5 could load a company's supplies at one time. Actually, one L-5 took care of five companies of one battalion. The L-5 started flying as early as 7:30 and was through by about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

MR. HOSMER: How many trips were there a day for an L-5?

COLONEL VALERIANO: I would guess it to be five trips. We broke all regulations. I remember that as a rule of thumb, it was a 500-lb load.

COMMODORE WARCUP: Who pushed it out, the pilot?

COLONEL VALERIANO: The pilot took out the rear seat and made other alterations in the plane. When he pulled a lever, the whole floor would tilt and spill everything out one side.

GENERAL LANSDALE: A really significant role that air played in the Huk campaign was that of permitting the real leader, the man who could have his say with the military and also reach the top councils of the Philippine government—the Secretary of National Defense—to get around the country and make his personal presence felt not only in the military units but also among the civilian population.
Just by being available, seeing things for himself, and talking to people, he convinced everyone that "The government cares what happens." This was so different from seeing a uniformed man with a gun as the only evidence of the government.

Usually, he had STOL aircraft, a liaison type or a Piper Cub that could put into a cornfield or land on a dirt road up in the provinces. This permitted him to walk into the area on a surprise visit and check up on the troops or the town, wherever he felt that trouble might be coming up. I know that the effects of this were quite electrifying. The armed forces never knew when the boss was going to show up and catch them loafing, rather than out patrolling. The civilian population felt that here was a Cabinet member who had the ear of the President. A mayor, a councilman, or a political officer out in the locality who was doing the wrong thing felt that someone was looking over his shoulder and would jump on him hard. This was particularly true of the employees of the national government.

Magsaysay went to great lengths initially to make these visits real surprises. He would tell his staff that he was going to point A; instead he would go for point B. Everybody in point A had something really nice put together in a hurry to show him. He wouldn't show up there, but some other place.

A post office clerk once told me that he was afraid to steal stamps out of the drawer any more because this guy in Defense--mind you, Magsaysay had nothing to do with the postal system--might suddenly show up behind him. He thought this was great. This was the little man's view of the big man.

COLONEL VALERIANO: I will now cover the use of aircraft during rallies or mass meetings organized by our civil affairs officers in Huklandia.

In illustration, my civil affairs officer organized a rally and arranged for Secretary Magsaysay and ranking officers of the Armed Forces to attend by helicopter. It was planned for just before Christmas and included an enlisted man dressed like Santa Claus. The civil affairs office was authorized 2000 pesos from the office of the Secretary of Defense to buy gifts for children considered special targets of our Army Attraction Program.
Unfortunately the project fell through from lack of helicopters. One helicopter was involved in the fighting in Southern Luzon and the other one was deadlined. But we should think of the potential effects of this Santa Claus supplied by the Armed Forces dropping down and getting friendly with the kids, who may eventually be recruited to our side.

Many times we would need immediate transportation for ex-Huks to attend rallies set up by the civil affairs office. The ex-Huks would be taken by helicopter to one meeting, and then within an hour would be flown to participate in another mass rally.

GENERAL LANDSALE: We did manage to squeeze out enough parachutes from the Korean war to organize one airborne battalion in the Philippine Army. I came back to Washington to get them personally when I was with JUSMAG.

We managed to recruit and train one airborne battalion, and got very fine support from the Air Force in transporting it. It was never employed as airborne, simply because the staff worried too much about recovering parachutes afterwards from the drop zones. They wanted 100 per cent recovery, which we in operations could sometimes guarantee, but it didn't seem to fit in with a normal, regular staff concept of the way of using airborne. So, we finally reassigned this Philippine airborne battalion to become a ground combat battalion.

**Psychological Warfare**

**COLONEL VALERIANO:** We have already discussed the psychological effects from different kinds of close support and air transport missions. However, an improvisation in the field of psychological warfare began one afternoon when General Lansdale showed up in my area lugging a Navy beachmaster's electric megaphone. He asked me to test this with my L-5, and the results were very satisfactory.

Later on, one of our patrols had an encounter with the Huks. A quick checkup in our intelligence files gave us the names of the enemy squadron commander, vice-commander, supply officer, intelligence officer, and others in the unit.
We ordered the L-5 to fly over the fire fight and, although under fire, the man with the loud hailer called the individual Huks by name to ask them to stop fighting, and told the vice-commander there was an Army rifle company behind his position. Then before the L-5 flew away, he made a parting remark: 'Thank you very much, friend down below. By your information we have been able to contact your friends. Be very careful, I hope you have not exposed yourself unnecessarily.'

Because of this broadcast the Huks began to suspect each other of being the spy planted by the Army.

GENERAL LANSDALE: Using order of battle intelligence to call people by name, then thanking a mythical informer in their ranks frequently caused as many casualties to the enemy as a fire fight. As the enemy withdrew, he would hold kangaroo courts. He may have suspected several informants and might summarily execute them.

COLONEL VALERIANO: Aircraft were also used to drop propaganda leaflets. We used the L-5 over areas that the Huk propaganda claimed the Army couldn't penetrate or over suspected enemy hideouts, so that the Huks found them in places that they thought would be inaccessible to the Army. Naturally they would start doubting their leaders' claims, because there was no way of telling whether these things were planted there by aircraft or by ground patrols. One type of leaflet was the "eye" (Fig. 5).

GENERAL LANSDALE: The idea was taken from the stylized eye at the outer entrance to Egyptian tombs, put there to keep thieves and desecrators of tombs away. The Japanese also had frequently used a concealed informer to look at suspects in their counterguerrilla work during their occupation of the Philippines. This was called the "magic eye" in the Philippines. Hence, the "eye" indicated "You are being watched, your movements are known," as a warning and a psychological alerting of the people that they couldn't get away with whatever they were doing.

COLONEL VALERIANO: We have no actual records of this resulting in the killing of Huks, but certainly it demoralized them significantly. I know of many cases wherein Huks that stumbled onto this magic eye
Fig. 5 — The "Eye" leaflet
would suddenly show up at headquarters with their personal belongings and voluntarily surrender. In these cases it was not planted by aircraft but clandestinely by our intelligence operatives.

GENERAL LANSDALE: Didn't you normally put it on houses, particularly where you suspected people? This said that they were under surveillance, even when they weren't.

COLONEL VALERIANO: Yes, I remember a sergeant in the town of Arayat. We practically ordered to continue his courtship of a schoolteacher who, intelligence reports indicated, was the contact of all the Huks in the area. We convinced the sergeant that it would not cost him anything to put the eye leaflet on the school desks. The schoolteacher would normally be the first one to open the schoolhouse for classes every morning.

The sergeant sneaked inside and planted leaflets all over the schoolhouse. There was no writing on the sheet. We were never connected with it. We made sure that the target would not know that we were responsible. Believing that she had been "fingered" for liquidation by the Huks, the teacher ran to us and confessed everything she knew about the Huk organization in the locality. When we asked her why she wanted to surrender, she showed us the same leaflets the sergeant had put out.

Counterair

SQUADRON LEADER TWIGG: Did the Huks at any time become educated to your use of the aircraft and did they ever take any action to try to stop you using the air?

COLONEL VALERIANO: There was normally heavy air traffic in Central Luzon, including USAF sorties from nearby Clark Air Force Base and commercial air flights. Also, our early use of L-5s for reconnaissance, administrative flights, liaison missions and whatnot made the Huks accept the presence of the plane as not often preceding a government ground action, large or small.

In the use of L-5s to get signals from the ground, our procedure was very specific; the flight patterns were so irregular that our friends down below were not connected with any aircraft flights.
The presence of these L-5s during the period did not make the Huk wise to our air-ground intelligence liaison system.

GENERAL LANSDALE: I don't recall any Huk action against the air at any time. Do any of you recall that?

COLONEL VALERIANO: We intercepted several Huk documents, giving specific instructions on how to camouflage their huts and explaining that the leaves had to be replaced frequently to be hidden from the air. The Huks were quite nomadic and often built small lean-tos covered with leaves.

One document cautioned them that the Armed Forces were photographing the areas. Another warned that as soon as they observed local ground and air activities they should either get out of there quickly or hide where they could be relatively protected from strafing or bombings. I have never known of Huks digging foxholes, but they were told that they should take advantage of natural depressions in the ground.

COMMENTS ON THE VALUE OF AIR ACTION

GENERAL LANSDALE: The Air Force role during much of the height of the Huk campaign emphasized reconnaissance and air supply. Perhaps the most important thing, looking back on it today, was getting the real commander of the Philippine Armed Forces, Secretary of National Defense Magsaysay, around very quickly to visit the troops who were in combat. His presence there, his leadership, his inspection and the swift follow-through of the staffs in getting the troops what they needed were most important.

It wasn't until later that the Air Force really came into its combat role, simply because the targets were not so easily identified and were not concentrations. It was largely up to the ground forces to get into the targets and hit them.

In short, the Air Force was trying like hell all the time, and often didn't have the means to do what they would have liked to do.

COLONEL JURADO: I recognize that the ground forces made the decisive effort in the armed struggle. The Air Force contribution was significant, however. Without it, the ground forces would have had a much more difficult task.
COLONEL VALERIANO: I have seen the effect of the right use of airpower, and have always contended that it is not solely a matter of inflicting casualties. The psychological uplift that the Philippine people experienced when they saw that the government was determined to use every available source of power against the Huks was something that we cannot measure in terms of casualty numbers.

When Taruc surrendered in 1954, I asked him in a series of secret talks how he felt about patrol actions. He gave me a very cynical smile. But when I asked him how he felt when I started using my artillery, or how he felt when there were planes flying over his hideouts, or when the Air Forces would start strafing or bombing his mountain bases or his so-called "training schools" or "universities" in the Sierra Madre, he reacted immediately, "Oh, they didn't bother us," but my deductions were exactly the opposite.

When I recall, in the nine years of fighting in Huklandia, all those incidents where they were hit hard by the artillery or by the Air Force, I remember that the Huks afterward invariably avoided these areas. I don't know whether our American guerrilla leaders will agree, but my experience has been that the guerrillas tend to avoid a place where they have been hit hard.

MR. PETERSON: I wonder if Colonel Reinhardt has been able to accomplish a summary.

COLONEL REINHARDT: I hope that my summary expresses my admiration for the remarkable achievement described here today. The Huk campaign is important for study as an aspect of the Cold War in which we are still engaged.

As in Malaya, our side won. The Philippine Republic achieved that victory almost devoid of outside aid, since Americans were very busy in Korea at that time. A successful strategy was developed, embellished by a variety of ingenious improvisations, and accomplished under very difficult conditions. Wisely, a large civic action role was given to the armed forces, who in turn conscientiously followed the civil authority.

All this seems to me in the best traditions of a true people's republic. I intentionally use the term the Communists subvert to show
that it is a fine term when used honestly.

There seem to be some general lessons:

First is the extreme importance of integrated government action in the early stages of such an emergency, to avoid requiring a much greater effort later. Apparently, our Philippine allies learned that one the hard way. Our own example does not provide it in war after war.

Second, the democratic processes of government often handicap military operations, when leaders are timid, or for political reasons, reluctant to act effectively.

Third, despite those handicaps, leadership, as typified by Magsaysay, can gain victory through these same democratic processes. Two examples were the integrated intelligence and the success of civic action in Huk resettlement. From this leadership sprang a unified national effort which, as we know, means victory in every kind of war.

The ability to perform air-ground operations without a JOC, the intimate association of flying personnel with their ground colleagues, and their work together enabled an Air Force consisting of a limited number of L-5s, C-47s, and Mustangs to be put to its best use.

Bombardment and ground attack were important, if infrequent. Reconnaissance from the air contributed significantly to intelligence. Air transport was used in many roles, from the L-5 supplying an isolated company to bringing the Secretary of Defense to inspect small posts. Psychological warfare was skillfully used. There was no need for counterair, air defense, or interdiction.
IV. HINDSIGHT ON AIR OPERATIONS

COLONEL VALENTIANO: I would like to ask our air officer for ideas on the type of aircraft that might be designed as a "work horse" for the Air Forces in counterinsurgency situations such as our Philippine campaign.

COLONEL JURADO: During the air activities against the dissidents in the Philippines we were perfectly happy with the Mustang fighter. Possibly we would have preferred an airplane with space for a copilot to aid in target identification. And, of course, the endurance of the plane has to be considered. We were fortunate that our bases were very close to the area of operation.

COLONEL VALENTIANO: How about night aircraft? Do you have anything to suggest as to aircraft that can do a combination of missions--reconnaissance, transport, air supply, and others?

COLONEL JURADO: I believe the U. S. Army has now developed quite a number of aircraft with these capabilities, the Caribou, for instance. Helicopters will go into various types of warfare.

COLONEL VALENTIANO: I would like the Air Force to concentrate on the antipersonnel bombs. Heavy bombs have some justification, but light antipersonnel bombs are more important when fighting guerrillas. In my experience with ground troops, we would have liked the air support units to be armed with light bombs such as the 25-pound antipersonnel bomb.

I would have liked heavy bombs when we cornered Huk forces in the Biak-na-bato Caves. Actually, in the bombing in this particular operation, the Hucks suffered mainly from concussion and the very fortunate accident of one dropping right through the fault in the roof of the cave.

Smoke bombs should be available for aircraft like the L-5 to mark targets.

COLONEL CLARK: Smoke rockets would serve the same purpose.

* The Caribou is a product of DeHaviland of Canada, Ltd. Ed.
COLONEL VALERIANO: That would be much better. We also wanted napalm. I did not know how the Secretary regarded them. I thought from the success the Philippine Air Force attained in the bombings that he was afraid napalm would be overdoing it.

GENERAL LANSDALE: Magsaysay was afraid that napalm might be used in populated areas and kill innocent bystanders. The Philippine Constabulary had previously been accused of shelling a town just because a few enemies were seen there. He didn't want to be open to charges of killing the innocent.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: Did they have many incidents of air strikes doing that?

GENERAL LANSDALE: No. But there was no hesitation at all when the target was out in an open area, a long way from villages or the civilian population. Magsaysay had a very clear understanding of the war's objective, to win the people away from the other side over to the Philippine government's side. You don't do that by killing people's innocent relatives. You don't make war where it will hurt the people you are trying to win over; you try to strike an identified enemy.
V. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT FUTURE OPERATIONS

GENERAL LANSDALE: Magsaysay's example suggests we should think hard about the use of air in getting top leaders out to the field. Magsaysay, as the Secretary of Defense, would get out into combat areas by air. This would have an effect not only in the field, but also later in cabinet meetings at the very top of government, where in dealing with statistics, costs, and budgets that make up the big picture, he could tell what was wrong, or right, because he had seen it. So he spoke with more authority, translating what was happening out in the field into the top levels of government in a most healthy fashion.

I know this is something needed in Vietnam and doubtless in many other places. It can be possible only by air, particularly when guerrilla ambushes infest the roads. You can't risk irreplaceable people by continuously putting them in dangerous situations. Also, this conserves time and lets the top people get out. They have to be sold on this means of getting around.

I know of no other way than by air to get real contact at all echelons, from the top of the government on out to the farmer in a guerrilla area. To develop this to a high art would be a very important role for military STOL aircraft. I would like to see aircraft available and top levels of government intimately in contact with the villages, to convince the people of the government's sincerity and interest in their welfare.

This is an invaluable "X" factor that we in the military do naturally. Civilians usually don't understand this feature of leadership. We shouldn't miss this particular development as we think of air power in little wars. I think it made the difference in the Philippines.

MR. PETERSON: Colonel Valeriano, would you add to this?

COLONEL VALERIANO: I think that is about all we can offer here. However, in behalf of my group I would like to tell you that we enjoyed this and we hope to be of further service to you and the United States.
Appendix

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS NOT ON ACTIVE DUTY WITH
U. S. ARMED FORCES

Colonel Bernard L. Anderson, USAFR, was a staff officer of the Far East Air Force on Bataan prior to the war. Following surrender to the Japanese, Anderson escaped and began guerrilla operations, commanding the U.S.-Filipino guerrilla forces in Central and Southern Luzon from June 1942 until the liberation. He remained on duty in the Philippines until 1948, when he became an executive in a Philippine industry. Among the American and Philippine awards he holds are the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, and the Philippine Republic's Legion of Honor, degree of Commander.

Colonel Agustín L. Jurado, PAF, is a veteran of 15 years of combat on Luzon, beginning in December 1941 and extending through the anti-Muk campaign. He is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy (1938), Flying School (1939), U.S. Air Command and Staff School (1952), and Strategic Intelligence Course (1957). He is a former Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3, Philippine Armed Forces, and is currently the Armed Forces Attaché in Washington. Among his awards are the Distinguished Unit Badge with two Oak Leaf Clusters (United States), and the Presidential Citation Badge (Republic of the Philippines).

Major General Edward G. Lansdale,* USAF, served two tours of duty in the Philippines. In 1945-48 he was on duty at Headquarters, AFWESPAC, and from 1950 to 1953 he was with JUSMAG as adviser to Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay. He is currently Assistant (Special Operations) to the United States Secretary of Defense.

Colonel René Laure, French Army, commanded the brigade (operational and administrative control) of Adrar in the Western Sahara (1957 and 1958) and the brigade of Bone in Eastern Algeria in 1959. He is a graduate of the Ecole Speciale Militaire, Saint-Cyr, and of the Army

*General Lansdale, although on active duty, is included here because of his experience in counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippines.
War College. During World War II he was in charge of the "Indochina Section" in "Force 136," Calcutta, and later, assumed command of guerrilla forces in Upper Laos. He has served 25 years overseas, in Africa and Asia. He is assigned to the French Delegation to NATO in Washington.

Brigadier General Monro MacCloskey, USAF (Ret.), organized and commanded the first U.S. AAF Heavy Bomber Squadron (and later Group) to engage in night supply dropping operations behind enemy lines in Northern Italy, the Balkans, and Southern Europe from bases in North Africa and Italy. He has served as Chief of the Reserve and National Guard Division in Air Force Headquarters and, upon graduation from the National War College in 1948, was named Chief of the Air Intelligence Policy Division, USAF Headquarters. He was Air Attaché in Paris from 1949 to 1952, after which he was appointed Commander of the Air Resupply and Communications Service of the Military Air Transport Service. Prior to his retirement he commanded the 28th Air Division. Among decorations awarded to him by the United States, France, and Morocco, are the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Legion of Merit, the French Legion of Honor, Degrees of Commander and Officer, and Croix de Guerre with Gold Stars and with Palms.

Lieutenant Colonel Jose M. Tinio, PA, headed the Special Projects Division of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency from its inception in 1949 and subsequently became Deputy Coordinator of the NICA. He is a graduate of the University of the Philippines, and began his military career with the ROTC at the University. He escaped from the Bataan Death March and became the intelligence officer of the I Corps, President Quezon's own Guerrillas. After the anti-Huk campaign, he served as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Philippine Army. He has completed several intelligence courses in the Philippines and the United States, and is currently serving with the Philippine Embassy in Washington. Among his decorations are the Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster (United States), Anti-dissident Campaign Ribbon and Military Merit Medal (Philippines), and the Legion of Honor (Vietnam).
Squadron Leader A. Twigg, RAF, was a Flight Commander on No. 33 Fighter Squadron in Malaya during 1950 and 1951. Since then his duties have included tours with the joint Helicopter Experimental Unit and, as Commanding Officer, with No. 225 Helicopter Squadron. He is presently serving on the RAF staff of the British Defence Staffs, Washington.

Colonel Napoleon D. Valeriano, PA, commanded the 7th Battalion Combat Team in its very effective operations against the Huks, and subsequently became military assistant to President Magsaysay. He is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy and the U.S. Cavalry School. He served with the guerrillas on Luzon during World War II. He has also been Commander of the Presidential Guards Battalion, Secretary to the Philippine National Security Council, National Security Coordinator for the Philippines, and Philippine Military Representative to the SEATO Secretariat. He is coauthor of Counter-guerrilla Operations: Lessons from the Philippines.

Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann, USA (Ret.), commanded the U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon, from 1942 through the liberation in 1945. He is a West Point graduate, and was in command of the 11th Infantry (Philippine Army). He escaped from Bataan after the surrender and joined the guerrilla forces, rising to their command in North Luzon. After World War II he attended the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College. After graduation he became Assistant Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. He is the author of Field Manual 31-20, Combatting Guerrilla Forces, and Field Manual 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Forces, as well as the book, We Remained, which is his account of three years behind the enemy lines in the Philippines. He holds the Distinguished Service Cross.

Air Commodore P. E. Warcup, C.B.E., RAF, commanded the RAF at Kuala Lumpur, 1957-59. He is a graduate of the RAF College, Cranwell, the Joint Services Staff College, and the Imperial Defence College. He was an RAF test pilot at the outbreak of World War II, and was a prisoner of war in Germany from 1940 to 1945. He is currently the Assistant Commandant, RAF Staff College.