MEMORANDUM
RM-3655-PR
JULY 1963

SYMPOSIUM ON THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: ALLIED RESISTANCE TO THE JAPANESE ON LUZON, WORLD WAR II

Edited by A. H. Peterson, G. C. Reinhardt and E. E. Conger

PREPARED FOR:
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND

The RAND Corporation
SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA
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This research is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Project RAND—contract No. AF 49(638)-700 monitored by the Directorate of Development Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, Hq USAF. Views or conclusions contained in this Memorandum should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the United States Air Force.
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PREFACE


Because the material consists of personal recollections and discussions by men who were active in the campaigns, each Memorandum in the series covering the symposium was done in a purely reportorial style, with care exercised to retain the flavor and connotations of the discussants. For the same reason, no attempt was made to resolve any implicit or explicit differences among the participants' views or between them and available published works on the same subjects.

The symposium was organized to collect relevant detailed information of these types of warfare in the hope that such information, examined with the original environments firmly in mind, would suggest lessons for current air operations. In addition, the material, when considered within the context of advanced technology, should provide some guidance for future planning and hardware development.

The symposium Memoranda are as follows:

Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare:

The Malayan Emergency, RM-3651-PR
The Philippine Huk Campaign, RM-3652-PR
The Algerian War, RM-3653-PR
Chindit Operations in Burma, RM-3654-PR
Allied Resistance to the Japanese on Luzon, World War II, RM-3655-PR
Unconventional Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater, RM-3656-PR.

The discussion leader for the subject of the present Memorandum was Brigadier General M. MacCloskey, USAF (Ret.).
FOREWORD

To be of value in actual application, battle studies should be based upon intimate experience in modern combat, not upon historical records of general operations of troops. The individual action of the soldier remains enveloped in a cloud of dust, in narratives as in reality. Yet his battle experiences must be studied, for the conditions they reveal should be the basis of all fighting methods, past, present and future.

Where can data on these questions be found? Stories in great detail, for the smallest detail has its importance, secured from participants and witnesses who knew how to remember, are necessary in a study of the battle of today.

The number killed, the kind and character of the wounds, often tell more than the longest accounts. Sometimes they contradict them. We want to know how man fought yesterday. Under the pressure of danger, impelled by the instinct for self-preservation, did he follow, make light of, or forget the methods prescribed or recommended?

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PARTICIPANTS IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE ALLIED RESISTANCE TO THE JAPANESE ON LUZON, WORLD WAR II

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Col. R. Laure

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Philippine Air Force
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Philippine Army
Col. N. D. Valeriano (Ret.)
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Royal Air Force
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Squadron Ldr. A. Twigg

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Office of the Secretary of Defense
Maj. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, USAF

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Brig. Gen. M. MacCloskey (Ret.), Discussion Leader
Col. B. L. Anderson, USAFR
Lt. Col. H. C. Aderholt
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  BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS NOT ON ACTIVE DUTY
  WITH U.S. ARMED FORCES.
I. INTRODUCTION

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: I will cover briefly the background situation under which this story unfolds. On December 8, 1941 on Luzon, December 7th at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese bombed Clark Field and Camp John Hay at Baguio (see map inside front cover). That opened operations in the Philippines. Three days later the Japanese commenced landings in North Luzon. Just about the time Philippine Army troops were rushed north to contain these landings, the Japanese very cleverly staged a major landing in the northern part of Lingayen Gulf and sealed off everything that had been sent north.

The forces cut off (and in many cases widely dispersed) in North Luzon consisted of Philippine Constabulary troops, Philippine Army troops, plus one battalion of the Philippine Scouts at Baguio. This accidentally created a ready manpower pool from which to organize effective and substantial resistance forces. I would like to inject here that to my knowledge the entire defense plan of the Philippines contained no word about utilizing unconventional or guerrilla-type forces.

Initially, the forces cut off in North Luzon were very confused, as you can well imagine. But during the attempted withdrawal back to Bataan, a few individuals started organizing small resistance forces by their own zeal and initiative.

One of the initial groups assembled along the Ilocos coast was under command of a former mining engineer, Walter Cushing. He started hitting the Japanese pretty hard, bagging a general and several supply columns. At about this time Colonel John F. Horan, who commanded the Philippine Scouts in Baguio, got authority from Corregidor to organize a guerrilla regiment. He was pushed into this by both his subordinate officers and the civilian population.

Another group was organized in Nueva Vizcaya Province, primarily under Philippine Army impetus. It later became known as the 14th infantry. A Philippine Army Officer named Nakar was the real impetus behind that force. Then a Captain Praegar and a Lieutenant Jones with one troop of the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, withdrew across the Cagayan River and started guerrilla operations in the Cagayan Valley.
They were quite successful, destroying quite a few planes on Japanese air bases near Aparri and Tuguegarao.

In summary, the Luzon campaign resulted in the withdrawal of all major forces into the Bataan Peninsula, their subsequent surrender in April 1942, and the surrender of Corregidor a month later. At the time of Wainwright's surrender of the Corregidor forces, those in North Luzon were gaining cohesion, although not tied in by an over-all command of any nature. Those in contact had been taking their instructions directly from Corregidor. There was very little attempt to resupply the forces; I recall only one or two very austere resupply missions.

During the siege of Bataan, a handful of officers and men under the leadership of Colonel Thorpe had been sent up into the Zambales area, west of Clark Field, to organize guerrilla forces and operate along the Olongapo Road and the main arteries south into Bataan. This force never became very effective as far as I know. I stayed with them about three days after my escape from Bataan.

General Homma demanded that General Wainwright send his staff officers into North Luzon to direct all forces to surrender. They contacted Colonel Horan and a number of other American officers in North Luzon. Many of them walked in and surrendered, but most subordinate commanders refused to obey the order, went deeper into the bush, and remained inactive for some time.

That generally, was the picture of the early resistance forces formed purely through the leadership of individuals cut off in North Luzon.
II. REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN, NORTH LUZON

RESISTANCE OPERATIONS

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: Colonels Moses and Noble escaped after the fall of Bataan and worked their way into North Luzon. When I reached North Luzon in September 1942, I made contact with them and reported in for duty.

I had also escaped from Bataan after resistance ended there, but didn't make as good time going north. The surrender had been set up in our divisional sector for around 5 p.m. I told the division commander I was still in pretty good physical shape and would like to escape and work my way to North Luzon where I knew guerrilla activity was going on. He said, "Okay, Volckmann, I will report you missing on patrol."

The Japanese came in to take the surrender of our command post at night, with flares or bonfires burning to show the white flags. The Japanese came in, shooting everything up. I had a pre-arranged agreement with Captain Donald Blackburn; we rolled into a dry stream bed and started worming away from the command post. Three months later, after several delays from dysentery, malaria, beri-beri, and yellow jaundice, we reached North Luzon.

Moses and Noble informed me that they had managed to arrive in North Luzon not too long ahead of me, that they were taking a good, long rest, and that they had no command authority. I remonstrated with them that they were the senior officers present and I thought it behooved them to assume command. My guess was we were going to be there for some time.

At this time--the fall of 1942--the major units that had been organized were completely dispersed. There was no over-all command, and very little, if any, contact between North Luzon groups, which were intermixed with a number of questionable guerrilla commands that were merely living off the people, robbing, and the like.

In the latter part of September, ten days after my arrival, Colonels Moses and Noble sent messages out in all directions that they
had assumed command. They followed it with an order to commence an all-out offensive on October 15. That operation had many initial successes. We took over areas and held them for three and four days, disrupted the enemy communication lines, blew up bridges and made awful nuisances out of ourselves. But the Japanese weren't long in retaliating. They poured troops into North Luzon, as many as 5000 in specific areas, particularly around Baguio where I was operating and in Abra. They maintained pressure on us over the next year and a half.

What was left of the loose resistance organization crumbled. Moses and Noble withdrew into Apayao where our last remaining radio station, a great, big immobile set that had been dragged out of a mine, was in contact with the Southwest Pacific Army Headquarters.

The last message I had from Moses and Noble said they were under heavy pressure from the Japanese and were going to have to clear that area. I invited them to join me in Ifugao (a sub-province of Mountain Province), south of their location, but warned them to travel only at night, in a small party, and to tell no one where they were going. They had a habit of traveling in large groups and were rather careless about their security.

This enemy counterguerrilla effort succeeded in dispersing our forces throughout North Luzon. It resulted in the capture and death of many leaders, the torture of a large number of civilians, and the creation of the so-called Japanese Philippine Constabulary recruited from the Filipinos.

The Japanese would go into a concentration camp and say, "We will release you if you sign an oath of allegiance and join the Philippine Constabulary." Those who agreed were sent to a school and then assigned to constabulary units. This was of great concern to us because the Japanese, without the eyes and the ears of the Filipinos, were absolutely helpless, just floundering around. If these highly trained Philippine troops became dedicated to the enemy, they would be a great menace to us.

The Japanese set up an extensive intelligence system throughout North Luzon. Let me cite an example of how they operated: They would approach an appointed mayor or civilian official of a town and pad his
pockets good and heavy with money. This man, in turn, would hire a
great number of informers at nominal sums and pay a bonus for any
information of value.

In conjunction with this elaborate intelligence effort, which
became very effective, the Japanese placed garrisons in every major
city and town in North Luzon. Those garrisons maintained ten-day
patrols that frequently got into very remote areas.

I point this out as an illustration that they were not road-tied.
The North Luzon road net is extremely limited. There is one main
highway up the Cagayan Valley and another up the western coast.
East-west communications practically do not exist: Highway 4 shows
as a nice red line on the map, but it is not much of a road. A mountain
trail went across the center from Vigan to join the Cagayan Valley
road. That is a very limited road net for an area of about 30,000
square miles. Moreover, you can rule out about 10,000 sq miles along
the eastern coast as territory the enemy didn't want and we could
use in only a very limited way. It is still practically uninhabited
and carried on maps as "unexplored area," I believe.

The Japanese intelligence efforts in conjunction with their constabu-
lar y organization really put pressure on us. It was impossible to move
except at night, and we could not stay in one location more than 6
to 8 hours before the Japanese were on our tail. We could not go into
or even send a messenger through some areas, because the people were
so dominated by the Japanese that they would apprehend the runner,
tie him on a pole like a pig, and carry him to the enemy.

This was the situation confronting us when Moses and Noble were
captured while trying to make their way back towards my area. They
had malaria and were holed up in a place called Luluag. They sent
a messenger to a village for food, but he was captured and tortured
by the Japanese and forced to lead them to the hideout. Moses and
Noble were captured and taken to Bontoc. Shortly, an order came out
from there over their alleged signatures, directing the rest of us
to surrender. That, we ignored.

To wind up the story on Moses and Noble, they were subsequently
taken to Baguio, then to Manila, given a mock trial and executed.
They had made a tremendous contribution to the resistance movement in North Luzon, and had always operated as a team. Their unfortunate loss was a tremendous blow to the resistance movement in North Luzon where they were very highly regarded as fine leaders. This left me the senior surviving officer in North Luzon, and I assumed command.

During this period of counterguerrilla effort, the Japanese used only limited, very ineffective air. When the very slow reconnaissance aircraft came over, we used to say, "Here comes Joe with the Maytag again." I don't know what type of planes they were, but they sounded more like outboard motors than airplane engines. We also referred to them—no offense to Californians here—as the "California National Guard."

In addition to ineffective reconnaissance through North Luzon, the enemy made some very poorly planned air strikes that usually hit some place we had left a couple of days before. Listening to the discussions of the past few days, I have been trying to recall a single casualty we ever had from enemy air in this entire period. I can't recall a single one, although a lot of civilians were killed in towns where a force had been for a few hours, probably to get supplies or something. Maybe a day later the Japanese would hit this town. That actually helped us, because it turned the civilians more against the Japanese and we received a lot more support.

The morale of the resistance forces in North Luzon was at low ebb at the time of my assumption of command. We had lost our major leaders. The civilians in many areas did not support the guerrilla forces from fear of torture and the elaborate intelligence net the Japanese had established. If there was one informer in a village that the guerrillas contacted for support, information would be relayed to the Japanese. They would round up all the inhabitants, usually behead the head man or several of the leaders, and often burn their homes and destroy their crops. This put tremendous pressure on civilians to refuse to support us.

It was necessary to reorganize the resistance forces in North Luzon. Our mission, which we usually referred to as the "lay-low" mission, had been received from Allied headquarters, Australia. It
ordered us to concentrate on collection of intelligence, organization of intelligence nets, and organization of forces throughout North Luzon, and to avoid enemy contact, whenever feasible, until further orders, arms, ammunition, and supplies were forthcoming.

Keeping this mission in mind, we organized North Luzon into what we referred to as districts. Initially there were seven districts with a commander appointed to each. He was the supreme authority in that district. Later, the districts were combined into five major districts in North Luzon. Realize that this didn't happen overnight. It took from June 1943 until late 1944 for effective organization to fully evolve.

I would like to emphasize that we never considered ourselves guerrilla forces. We adopted the title, "United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon" (USAIFIP,NL). The Japanese referred to us as bandits. The American forces referred to us as guerrillas and we referred to ourselves as regular troops.

Our slogan, "We Remained," was adopted as a counter to "I Shall Return." Our combat echelon was organized to match the five district commands developed from the original seven districts; the Fourth and Seventh Districts were combined, and the Sixth was dropped.

In each, the district commander had complete charge of all civil administration, intelligence, counterintelligence, and communications, in addition to exercising military command of all area forces, which he was directed to organize into infantry regiments.

When I say "infantry regiments," don't for a minute think of a regiment located in one bivouac area. Normally, the largest concentration was a platoon. Districts were divided into battalion areas and subdivided into company areas. The company areas were broken into platoon areas. So we had dispersion of forces, with none allowed to live in villages or towns. They were required to construct camps away from all habitation and to have at least two alternative camps available at any time. The same held true for all headquarters.

Under this plan, five infantry regiments were developed under these district commanders with a total force of 15,000 officers and men in the combat echelon. In addition to district intelligence nets,
an intelligence echelon was organized encompassing about five hundred. These were primarily special agents, which I will describe later. A service echelon of about 4500 men was developed, including a medical service that somehow set up seven field hospitals manned by Philippine Army doctors, nurses, and enlisted men, augmented by civilians.

Simultaneously, "Bolo Battalions" were created in each district to organize the civilian population and to ensure their support. These battalions were formed under the head civilian of each area. Primarily, they furnished a pool of manpower for labor and the transportation of supplies in support of the military units. They were trained to perform minor demolitions and to improvise roadblocks. Of course they were all used as informers to keep us on top of the Japanese situation. Selected individuals were further trained to become agents, with the primary mission of intelligence or counterintelligence.

In addition, a Women's Auxiliary Service (WAS) was developed in each district for first-aid work and as auxiliary hospital personnel. All field hospitals were built so that the patients, on beds built like stretchers, could be evacuated on very short notice to an alternative site. This was very important because we never knew when a hospital would be raided and have to become an empty, evacuated camp.

The WAS also provided entertainment to the troops in their area. Selected individuals were employed on intelligence missions. Some of them became very, very fine agents, sacrificing everything to get the information they were after.

In addition to intelligence organized by districts, an independent intelligence pool was needed to cross-check on information coming out of districts and to provide agents for special missions for my headquarters.

For example, Poro Point at San Fernando, La Union was a major Japanese naval base. Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters (SWPA) was extremely interested in that area, so a special agent was planted there--a timekeeper for the Japanese. In addition to keeping time he kept a very close record of everything that came into the harbor, came off the ships, and if there was on-loading, what went on the ships. Those reports came to us periodically.
Other special agents watched the Laoag Air Base, a major Japanese airfield in Ilocos Norte. We had airfield watcher stations that rendered periodic reports and could tell at any time what was on the ground, what was coming in, and what was going out. Those are just two examples. There are many others.

As soon as our intelligence and counterintelligence was developed to the point that it became efficient, we had the enemy licked. A patrol could not leave its garrison without our knowing its size, arms, who was leading (usually a Filipino), and what questions they were asking. We also had location reports on the patrols constantly.

You probably wonder--since we didn't have radios--how information got around. Each district organized a communication net of messenger routes manned by a non-commissioned officer and a group of runners at intervals of four to five hours' hiking distance and tied to nets in adjoining districts. While it took me seven days to go from Kiangan, in Ifugao, to my headquarters in Benguet just north of Baguio, across three mountain ranges, I could send a message over that same route in 48 hours. Once a "Rush" message was started, it would travel along these routes and never stop. Usually the runners went at a trot, without horses or anything else, just putting one foot in front of the other.

The people on those routes knew the terrain; they could travel day and night. They also kept well informed on the Japanese situation and developed alternative routes, so that regardless of enemy activity in the area, the set up was not compromised. The efficiency of this system was proved later when we moved as much as 70,000 lb, per shipment, of submarine supplies over these routes without a pound captured by the Japanese.

We used these same routes to pass personnel. We broke a few Americans out of the concentration camp just north of Baguio. That really made the Japanese boil. These personnel were moved over these message center routes and had no trouble at all.

Contact with Southwest Pacific was lost in March 1943 during the Japanese drive in the Apayao area that resulted in the capture of Praeger, Jones, Moses, and Noble. From March 1943 until August 1944
we had absolutely no contact, no way of sending out the fruit of our primary mission, intelligence. However, periodically, consolidated intelligence reports were sent by my headquarters to every known guerrilla organization in North Luzon that we could credit. There were a lot of them that we didn't credit. We always hoped that by some fluke one of these reports would get out to Southwest Pacific.

Apparently at least one did, because a radio team landed on the east coast of Luzon from a submarine, worked its way up into my area, and we were back on the air in August 1944 to relay messages back to SWPA Headquarters.

The whole deal was ironical. The radio was an Australian ATR-4, a dry battery set. The batteries lasted 48 hours, then went dead. The only reserve battery they had was found to be dead also. We were off the air again. The radio technicians rigged up a "Vibropak," which was run off a captured Japanese generator set up at the foot of a waterfall with an improvised water wheel. We were never off the air again.

Later we added a homemade set we had been working on for sometime, so powerful it would jump all the relay stations and communicate directly with Southwest Pacific. This led to the arrangement for further contact with submarines. We had our first supply submarine scheduled for September of 1944, but we never made contact with it. The only answer I could get was "There is some misunderstanding."

Just about eight months ago I found out what the misunderstanding was. A former Philippine Army Officer in the Southwest Pacific with the Special Recon Battalion happened to pick up my book one day in a hospital in Germany and read about this submarine that never made contact with us. He wrote me: "The misunderstanding was between the submarine and our own Air Force; it was sunk by the Air Force." The next submarine contact was made about a month later and was followed by two more.

I might inject at this point an explanation of "We Remained." For all supplies coming to us by clandestine submarine sorties, we

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had emphasized priorities for arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and communication and demolition equipment. We also requested that all submarine supplies be one-man loads, if possible, two-man loads at the most. They had to be off-loaded from the submarine by bancas and then brought ashore by cargadors. An average submarine delivery took about 50 small craft and 3500 men on the beach. The first group of cargadors would be met by an equal number at about four hours marching distance. We kept the individual loads light and made the men move fast. You can imagine our consternation then when one shipment arrived with some large crates that took four men to move. There were strict orders that nothing would be broken open at the beach.

When we finally got these crates up to the distribution point and opened them, we found such things as rubber stamps that printed "I Shall Return, MacArthur." I immediately radioed Southwest Pacific, again stressing that we would like to have arms and ammunition; we would take care of our own psychological program. In one of the mail bags used to send our consolidated intelligence reports by submarine, we put a native brass pipe filled with black tobacco. The pipe had a big bamboo tag, boldly lettered, "We Remained." That's how "We Remained" originated. Before that submarine had left the rendezvous, it was ordered to proceed to Pearl Harbor. The skipper radioed for a rendezvous at sea, which was not made so the reports all went back to Hawaii and I guess somebody in Hawaii got that brass pipe.

OPERATIONS DURING THE LIBERATION

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: The intelligence reports did get back to Southwest Pacific before the Lingayen landing, as we learned after the Sixth Army landed. In 1944 the Japanese dispositions under Yamashita were suddenly changed. Yamashita came into the Philippines very late, about October of 1944 and in November he called a large conference in Manila. Staff officers who had attended this conference crashed in our area, and as a result we obtained his defense plan. Everyone on the plane was killed, but our forces salvaged documents that, when translated, were found to outline the entire Yamashita defense plan. The gist of his plan was that he believed he could not meet the
the superior American armor and air in the central plains of North Luzon, and so he directed the defenses to pull back into more inaccessible, rugged areas where armor and air would be less effective. That is just what happened over the next month, prior to the Sixth Army's landing in January. In fact, the Sixth Army caught this shift of forces before it was completed. But this extremely valuable information had been received at SWPA, even though it had left Luzon on a submarine for Pearl Harbor, and I had been tearing my hair out thinking, "Well, there goes a lot of effort for nothing."

Let me give a rough idea of how the Japanese organized. They pulled away from the most probable landing beaches in North Luzon, back into the Rosario area, then put heavy concentrations in depth at the Balete Pass area. In the San Fernando area, the so-called Hiashi defenses were organized with a reserve division, the 19th, at Naguilian, under a very able commander named Osaki.

Another probable landing area was Vigan, where the Japanese initially landed on North Luzon, and where the defenses were now organized under General Eraki. There was a small defense area centered around the Laoag Airfield. Heavy defenses were put into place in the Aparri area, including the airfield and the port. At this time, Yamashita moved his headquarters to Baguio.

In addition to these major units, strong garrisons and supply, and service troops were dispersed along all lines of communication.

Our pre-D-Day operations were planned in great detail and our guerrilla forces deployed to meet these operations. Our objectives were primarily to destroy all the small garrisons in between centers of defense, to disrupt lines of communications, to destroy all bridges that connected organizations, to attack any supply movements, to destroy anything the enemy could use for transportation, and to prevent any small units or messengers from moving between centers of resistance.

Four days prior to the landing at Lingayen Gulf on January 9, we received a message to begin operations. Roads outside strongly organized areas in the entire coastal area were denied to the Japanese. Not a single truck was able to move up and down the Ilocos Coast. All the bridges were destroyed; coconut palms and other trees were
dropped across the road. We cut the road from Naguilian to Baguio several times, although we were never able to keep it out very long at a time. The Cagayan Valley Road was more difficult to destroy. We could knock it out, a bridge or something like that for a short time, but due to the dry season it was easy to negotiate around the bridge abutment and go on.

A little sidelight on intelligence. Prior to the Lingayen landing, one of the hardest decisions I ever had to make was to take the responsibility for the radio message: "There will be no, repeat, no opposition on the beaches." After I got Yamashita's defense plan, it was verified by the withdrawal of troops from Lingayen Gulf. Moreover, we cleared all the mines from Lingayen Gulf without any trouble. However, Sixth Army would not take a chance of any resistance on the beaches and proceeded to clobber the shore thoroughly to soften it up.

Other intelligence concerned the main Japanese naval base on North Luzon, in the San Fernando-Poro Point area. We had reports twice daily on every ship in that harbor. That was the intelligence that recommended air strikes on San Fernando.

The U.S. Forces bombed San Fernando harbor heavily and destroyed a lot of Japanese shipping. We reported the out-loading of U.S. prisoners from San Fernando, the last load on December 18. However, something went wrong and our Air Forces bombed those ships and we lost a lot of American personnel en route to Formosa. As soon as the pre-D-Day missions were carried out, the 121st Infantry in the (La Union) area was directed to Bangar to press the Japanese toward San Fernando, clearing all small detachments. That was accomplished in about 30 days. We had the Japanese tightly compressed in the San Fernando area, an area known as the Hiashi defense.

All small garrisons were attacked and destroyed. Then the forces that had been used to destroy detachments were gradually consolidated into larger units that would start harassing the main centers of Japanese defense.

Now, I would like to go back to shortly after the U.S. landing. I was ordered to designate a rendezvous point where they would pick me up by PT boat and bring me to General Krueger at Sixth Army. After
I had waited three days and three nights on the beach, the PT boat finally got up enough nerve to come in to pick me up. I arrived at Dagupan and found General Krueger's command post on the exact site where I had started the war, my regimental command post on beach defense of the Lingayen Gulf. After a day and a half at Sixth Army Headquarters, I was directed to report to Admiral Royall, who commanded the Transport Command, and then to visit the 308th Bomb Wing, commanded by General Hutchinson.

At the 308th I ran into Johnny Alison, who was A-3 of the Bomb Wing. His story this morning unfolds a lot of things and helps to explain why I got such wonderful cooperation and understanding from the 308th. Here was the gentleman who had just gone through the whole thing in Burma on an unconventional basis, to a large degree on a shoestring. I think he had a very profound understanding of what we were up against in North Luzon.

In the campaign of liberation in that region, USAFIP,NL did a great deal to clear much of North Luzon. General Araki's independent brigade was wiped out by our guerrilla forces; less than a thousand men escaped with General Araki, and he was wounded. The Hiashi defenses were destroyed by the 121st Infantry of the USAFIP,NL in conjunction with a tremendous amount of air support. That was a tough nut to crack. The Japanese turned 90-mm guns pointblank on us. We thought our own Navy was shelling us at first. Laoag-Vigan was cleared by our 15th Infantry. We left a small security party there and the 15th was brought down into Bessang Pass with the 121st. The 6th Infantry was brought up also to make the final assault on Bessang Pass, termed the back door to the Yamashita pocket.

The 11th Infantry, under Colonel Blackburn, attacked Aparri. They got a tremendous amount of air support and one battery of 155s that were worked up to him around the coast after the Ilocos Road had been opened. They took Aparri, seized the airport south of the town, secured it, filled in all the holes and ran the carabaos off before the 511th Airborne Battalion was dropped on the airfield. They

*RM-3654-PR...Chindit Operations in Burma.*
didn't tell the 511th that the airfield was secured. Some of the battalion was untested and this drop into an area that they didn't know was secured was a good test for them. One of the worst enemies of an air drop, ground winds, hit about 25 miles an hour that day. The battalion suffered 20 per cent casualties on the drop. It was the same experience with gliders, they were all over the place. It was pretty messy.

The 511th linked up with Blackburn's units and spearheaded the attack down the Cagayan valley to join up with the 37th Division coming up from the south. That sealed the Yamashita pocket from the east.

That was in June. The previous month three regiments, the 66th, the 121st, and the 15th, had been assembled in Suyo on Highway 4 and given the mission of taking 5,000-foot Bessang Pass. The Japanese had moved in General Osaki's 19th (Toro) Division to defend it. That was probably the most conventional, large-size operation we undertook. It started on an intensive scale about the middle of May. Finally the pass fell to us on the 14th of June. We suffered something like 1500 casualties in that operation alone.

It's important to note that although there were more than 120,000 Japanese troops in North Luzon, the total American force employed at one time in this area, other than air, was two U.S. divisions, one into the Baguio area and one up the Cagayan Valley. So a total Japanese force of over 120,000—I think personally it was closer to 150,000—was pretty badly licked in that area by the time the armistice came, 15 August 1945.

I have often said that the Philippine people did more for me than I would ever expect an American to do. I had some of the finest Philippine Army officers that you could ask for. I often think I had a large part of the cream of the crop. My G-3 later became chief of staff of the Philippine Army; one of my regimental commanders reached the top as G-2 of the Army and later Secretary of Defense under President Magsaysay, just to name a couple.

I had fine Philippine Army officers and only a handful of Americans. There were about one hundred Americans in North Luzon when I arrived there.
By the time of the landing, three years later, there were fifteen of us left. So the real backbone of the organization was capable Philippine personnel. They did a fine job.

AIR ACTION

Mobile Air Control

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: To help our operations, we put VHF radios into L-5 planes, along with sets that could communicate with our ground troops. We equipped three planes that way for mobile air control. It was then only a question of getting them into some area behind the lines where we could use them.

Having foreseen this possibility, we had developed 17 air strips throughout North Luzon. After obtaining light planes with VHF plus a ground communication capability, we were in business. In addition, an air-ground party of one officer and three men with VHF equipment was brought up by sea to my rear echelon CP in the Luna area. Their radio communications equipment was mounted in a jeep.

The air-ground party actually was used very little to direct strikes. The way we operated was as follows: This ground station at the CP would contact the air and tell the flights to report to an L-5 in the area, who then would direct the air strikes either by talking them into the targets or by dropping smoke grenades and directing from that reference point.

The procedure worked very successfully. Our guerrillas had no artillery to speak of—a little captured Japanese artillery and a few pack 75s flown in from some abandoned island in the Southwest Pacific. We had to resort to close air support instead.

The way that support functioned was so simple it is hard to make people believe it today. Philippine Army officers who had never used air support—for example, platoon leaders—had no trouble at all. If there was a question of clearly identifying a position on the ground, they would roll out some panels. The L-5 would come in, having been briefed on the situation as best he could at the rear echelon. He would talk to that platoon leader before the strike came in. Thus that
pilot in the L-5 was not only briefed on the general situation, but also knew the detailed situation that existed at the moment on the ground. He planned the air strike, which way for the aircraft to pull out after they dropped their loads, and which way to make their strafing runs. It was really simple.

I recall only one bad accident in all this close air support. A P-38 with a 500-lb bomb pulled out the wrong way with a bomb that hung up and then released, wiping out a platoon. Outside of that one, I can't recall a single incident of close support where we had any trouble at all.

It is an eerie feeling to be operating behind the enemy lines with a lot of air flying around all over the place. A few mishaps occurred on deep strikes where we couldn't establish the tight control by liaison planes. Our air promptly knocked out a barge base that we had worked pretty hard to put in and got one of my field hospitals. They almost got my rear headquarters one day, but as soon as we saw them start coming down, we got on the VHF in time to call the strike off. Those mishaps were finally resolved by declaring a restricted area, where nothing could be dropped unless directed or preplanned. There were no front lines in North Luzon for a long time; our forces were on all sides of the Japanese and they were on all sides of us. You couldn't draw lines on the map and say you can bomb ahead of this line or behind this line because lines just didn't exist. The situation was very fluid, but it stabilized more as the operation went on. However, we had very few slip-ups, considering the complicated ground situation.

One time we needed to drop a message to a regimental commander in Ifugao and, as I had spent eight months in that area and knew every trail, I said I would go along with them and drop it right on his head. We took off from Luna, and had to go up to about 12,000 feet to get over the three mountains that were souped in. We came down through a hole in the clouds, and I couldn't recognize anything on the ground. Just about that time the pilot, Jackson, said, "We are getting low on gas; you had better make up your mind where we are. Let's land on that gravel road." So, we landed and started to roll towards a group of houses.
By that time I was leaning out the cockpit window and saw people scurrying around like a bunch of rabbits. As we got a little closer, I noticed they were Japanese, so I reached for the mike, and of course it wasn't on the hook but down in the bottom of the cockpit some place. I finally found it and yelled, "Jackson, Japs." On went the power, around we spun and by that time we were right among the enemy. They could have reached out and grabbed the wings, but they didn't. We got airborne, taking a few holes but no casualties. Airborne again I picked up a river I recognized. We had drifted way north, but we got the message dropped. I was a long time living down the one-man airborne invasion.

Close Support

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: I venture to say, although I do not have the figures here, that our units in North Luzon used more air support, both preplanned and close air strike, than was used in any other area of Luzon. I know we used an awful lot. We developed the technique to such a degree that we did not hesitate to drop 500-lb bombs 50 yards in front of our troops' fox holes. The closest air support missions I have ever seen were those flown in front of our guerrilla forces, with very fine results. Every type of weapon you can think of was used, including napalm. The enemy were like a bunch of gophers—you had to dig them out. They used caves wherever they could. We'd slap a napalm bomb into the mouth of a cave and the enemy inside would all suffocate. Bombs up to a 1000 lbs were used, mostly on preplanned missions, and 500-lb bombs were common.

Strafing was used intensively. We used a technique in which first bombs would be dropped, second the strafing runs made and, finally the flight commander would give a predetermined signal—wobbling his wings or something like that—to signify the last run. As soon as that ended, the ground troops would come out of the foxholes and rush the Japanese position. They tried to catch the enemy with their heads still down or in the caves. That worked very effectively. These operations would not have been possible had it not been for this extremely highly developed close air support that was practically unlimited upon call.
In summary, air-ground cooperation was developed to a higher degree in North Luzon than I have even seen it in any conventional operation. The success of those operations with the few troops that we had proved you can do one hell of a lot with a little if you have the right teamwork and the air support to go with it.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: I would like to have your and General Alison's opinion on why this particular close support unit apparently performed better than other similar Air Force units. Was it orientation and prior training?

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: We used to rotate the pilots up with the ground forces every so often. Air crews would come up to observe, but not to take part, and they got a real feel for ground operations.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: Were these the only Air Force units that were approaching the problem in that manner?

GENERAL ALISON: Let me comment on that. By this time I was the Director of Operations of the 5th Air Force, which was operating all over the Philippines. Everybody knows all about close air support, but you don't really develop good techniques until you have a lot of practice. We got a tremendous amount of practice in the Philippines. We had a large number of fighter-bombers, P-51s, P-47s, P-38s. They were doing missions all the way along the China Coast. Then we spent some time, up to a week, doing nothing but putting tonnage down in front of the troops. I would say all the fighter units became extremely good in close support operations.

General Whitehead was a believer in tonnage, in using big bombs when really we could have used little ones. He said, "We want to let them know they are in a war." Often we overdid it, but I am sure it was quite impressive and demoralizing as far as the Japanese were concerned.

General Whitehead was particularly enchanted with the use of napalm when he arrived in the theater. There was a hill the infantry had a great deal of difficulty with and hadn't been able to take. We assembled, I think, about 160 fighters with napalm. The P-38s carried 165-gallon tanks and the P-51s had smaller tanks. We had this strike all planned, timed, and coordinated. The fighters came in and we
didn't get one-third of them on the hill before the black smoke from
the napalm so obscured the valley that we had to call off the rest.

When the smoke cleared, the infantry took the hill without a
casualty, because this came as a tremendous surprise to the enemy.
They were completely unprepared for napalm, which is a fearsome thing.

General Whitehead believed in making his officers go out and
learn what the troops were doing. I will never forget when he made
me operate the tower at Clark Field for two days. He wouldn't let
me down out of the tower. The way traffic was going did not suit
him. I wanted out of that tower, and you can be sure that after two
days we had that traffic problem straightened out. I also went up
to the front and spent quite a bit of time with the infantry, watching
the controllers direct the fire, so I would have a better feel for it.

You ask whether these outfits were any better than anyone else—
I doubt that they were. They just had a lot of practice, and when you
practice you develop your techniques. Each time you run a mission
you get your coordination a little bit better. The guys know what is
expected of them. I do think that we carried out our mission with a
high degree of success in the Philippines, running sometimes as many
as 5 and 6 sorties per day with the P-51s.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: Another example of air support: Initially,
all China- or Formosa-bound planes that ran into bad weather would
bring their bomb loads back and dump them in the China Sea before they
landed at Lingayen. I thought, "That is a hell of a waste of good
equipment," so I asked that they all report in to our ground station
on the way back, and we'd tell them where to drop their bombs. This
also accounted for a tremendous amount of air support in North Luzon.

Normally, we wouldn't use these in close support. We would have
preplanned targets plotted in advance so as to have immediate targets
available. That proved very successful.

In return, we rendered some service to both air arms, Navy and
Army. We had detailed instructions sent to Southwest Pacific even
before the landings on Luzon. Any pilot that had to bail out or was
shot down was to avoid towns or villages, and just to keep moving;
not stop any more than he had to, because he would eventually contact
somebody who was friendly.
One Navy aircraft, with two pilots, went into the bay at San Fernando, La Union. One pilot started toward Poro Point. He swam right into the hands of the Japanese, and was executed. The other swam the other way. We went out on a raft and got him. One Air Corps pilot, Lieutenant Smith, was shot down twice. We got him both times. We rescued a lot of Navy pilots. They were all very grateful, and when we got them ready to go on the submarine they would say, "Name anything you wish and we will see that you get it." I would say, "The next time either you or your buddies fly over here drop me one pair of shoes." I never got them. Shoes were a very valuable item in those days.

Air Rescue

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: The area around Laoag and Laoag Airfield, Ilocos Norte, was cleared by the 15th Infantry. The 308th Bomb Wing flew up engineer equipment and put the field back in shape. They flew air rescue missions out of Laoag for three months before the area was even recognized as being secure, it was that far behind the lines.

A few explanations had to be made to Fifth Air Force as to why we were operating an airfield in enemy territory, but we were losing a lot of planes going to China and Formosa out of Lingayen, which made this air rescue operation very important.

Everything didn't work well, however. The PT boats based in Lingayen could not make it around the north coast of Luzon. They requested that we put in a fuel base at Santiago Cove. We cleared that area; they brought in barges and it became operational the next day. That evening our own air came over and took it right out of the bay. One pilot was sleeping at the briefing, I guess.

GENERAL ALISON: No comment. I don't even remember that.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: That's the kind of thing you like to forget.

Air Supply

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: The 14th Infantry in their operation north of Balete Pass, and the 11th Infantry in North Cagayan Valley had to be
supplied totally by air. The 11th went into the Tuao area, widened a
gravel road a little bit, filled in the holes, and developed an air strip.
As I recall, it was about 5000 feet long. I went up there one day
and it looked like the 308th Bomb Wing had moved in. Apparently,
pilots liked souvenirs and a change in chow, so they would fly in.
Both sides of that runway were parked, wingtip to wingtip, with planes
of every description. We finally had to put out an order they couldn't
land there except in an emergency, but a lot of them still came. It
probably gave them a break in the monotony.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: Where did you get all the fuel for the
planes coming in there?

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: We brought it in by sea for the planes we
operated ourselves in the Laoag area. We flew some gas into Tuao.

GENERAL ALISON: It takes very little fuel to operate L-5s and
they had C-47 strips all through the central part. As soon as I
could, I flew a C-47 in there. I saw both Russ and Don Blackburn
there. There was a pretty good strip there for C-47s. We could take
all the supplies we wanted to into places like that.

Evacuation and Liaison

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: In addition to the three air control L-5s,
we had about 12 planes we used for evacuation and liaison work, and
also some L-4s for similar missions, not evacuation but liaison.
These planes were very effective because casualties became heavier as
the operation became more conventional. The field hospitals couldn't
hold the patients, so three of them were finally consolidated into a
3000-bed base hospital at Bangar. Casualties were flown back there;
those they couldn't handle were flown on down to Lingayen where they
went into an American base hospital. This was a very important morale
factor. Without proper medical support, you are going to have a rough
time maintaining the morale of the guerrilla forces. A major factor
in guerrillas not wanting to stand and fight is fear of taking excessive
casualties, because they normally don't have any way to handle them.
That can break your back in a hurry. But the medical support rendered
by the L-5s was tremendous. It saved a lot of lives.
Air Commando Groups

GENERAL ALISON: Colonel Aderholt might like to know that the Second Air Commando Group moved in to Laoag Airfield for support when that area cleared. I didn't tell you how this Second Air Commando Group was formed. Just about a month after Wingate's operation started in Burma, I got two messages simultaneously. One was to report to General Eisenhower in London and the other was to report to General Arnold in Washington. I delayed two days en route in England. They wanted to know about problems we had with gliders. This was just before they were going to cross the channel.

Then I went to Washington and found General Arnold very excited. Admiral Mountbatten had used air mobility to tremendous advantage during the Japanese attack on Imphal where their losses were so severe. The Admiral wanted additional air transport units sent to Burma, presumably to move forces on down and take Southern Burma. I think they had given up doing it by sea by this time. He couldn't get the amphibious equipment because it was all earmarked for the European operation, so he wanted to substitute airborne equipment.

By this time the aircraft factories were beginning to turn out the airplanes. General Arnold wired Mountbatten that they were going to send 400 C-46s. By now our First Air Commando operation had received a lot of publicity, because it was colorful and because our leader, Phil Cochran, was a very colorful individual. Newspaper people liked to write about Phil and they had indulged themselves. Everybody thought, "This is real fine." So General Arnold said, "I want you to monitor the organization of four additional Air Commando units. I have already started two and have chosen one commander. You get together with the personnel and materiel people from my office."

I asked, "General, what are you going to do with them?"

He said, "We are going to send them over to Burma and we are really going to take the place. Admiral Mountbatten is going to supply the ground troops."

*Now assigned to the USAF First Air Commando Group, SAWC.

**RM-3654-PR, ...Chindit Operations in Burma.
By this time I had become well aware of the internal differences of opinion among the British themselves. General Wingate believed that General Slim or his superior, it might have been Gifford, was not going to invade Burma. He was convinced that this would not take place and he had impressed it on us pretty strongly. So I suggested to General Arnold that he get a specific commitment from the British Army in India. I said, "I really don't know but I would suggest that you check this thoroughly before you organize four more Air Commando Groups, each with an attached combat cargo group of four squadrons (25 C-46s each). Air Transport has really proven its worth, but we still can't afford to waste it."

Well, he got so disturbed that he wired India to have Cochran sent back. When Phil arrived, he was convinced that the British Indian Army was going to maintain largely a holding operation in India.

Maybe the British Army was absolutely right. I don't know how much their taking Southern Burma would have contributed to shortening the war. It looked, though, since things were going so well in the Pacific that maybe our resources should be put out there. So General Arnold took Colonel Cochran and me to the ranking British officer in Washington, General Dill, and told us to explain what we had said.

We said, "Our opinions are not based on our own observations. The internal differences within your own forces in that part of the world caused us to suggest to General Arnold that there be a firm commitment from the British before these air groups are organized."

It took a tremendous amount of resources to put one of these Air Commando Groups together. The first time you do something like this you do it on a very austere basis. The second time you know what you are doing, and you want a little more.

General Dill said he would find out, and on his recommendation only two additional groups were formed. The Third Air Commando Group and the Third Combat Cargo moved to India; the Second Air Commando Group and the Second Combat Cargo moved to New Guinea. I went with the Second, with the objective of planning an airborne invasion of the Island of Mindanao. Native Filipino groups were operating there. This never materialized. Mindanao was bypassed; the schedule was
stepped up by at least six weeks and we went into Leyte. By that time, the Second Combat Cargo and the Second Air Commando were integrated as regular units into the Fifth Air Force. They still kept their unique organization, but they worked right alongside regular units. The fighter pilots of the Second Air Commando Group were all volunteers, all very experienced personnel, and extremely good at close support.

But as far as I could see, there were other outfits in the Philippines that were just as good, and they had plenty of practice.
III. REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN, CENTRAL LUZON

RESISTANCE OPERATIONS

COLONEL ANDERSON: Gentlemen, I don't think it is necessary to say that anybody who was on Bataan knows what air superiority means and how valuable it is. I was on Bataan, at Air Force Headquarters. After the surrender I escaped and tried to reach our forces, hopefully in Mindanao or if necessary, on down in Australia.

I first met General Volckmann while escaping from Bataan. We went into the Pampanga Plains and the Zambales Mountains north of Bataan. After some time we made contact with Colonel Thorpe. That was my start in the guerrilla organization. As in General Volckmann's case, there was absolutely no preplanning for any guerrilla type of operation.

In fact, our first thought was to get back to our forces and not have anything to do with such an organization. However, the loyalty, the will, and the desire of the Filipinos convinced us that we should stay and try to help them do the job they wanted to do. At least, that was my experience.

We were not out there to start a guerrilla organization. My first mission, as assigned by Colonel Thorpe, was an attempt to get control of the Hukbalahap military organization.* This failed. Next I went over into East Central Luzon and started forming guerrilla units. We tried to maintain contact with Colonel Thorpe, since he was the senior American commander, but had to operate on our own after he was captured and killed.

At that point, we were a little bit wrong in our timetable. We estimated we wouldn't have time to reach Australia before our forces would return to the Philippines, perhaps by December of 1942 or January of 1943. This was another reason we decided to remain in the Philippines with the objective of harassing the enemy as much as possible and keeping some enemy troops tied up.

We were able to harass the Japanese to a limited degree with arms salvaged from battlefronts. The Japanese did not use airpower, other

*RM-3652-PR, ...The Philippine Huk Campaign.
than occasional reconnaissance flights, against us during 1942 and early 1943, probably because they didn't think we were capable of doing much damage to them and because our mobile outfits didn't offer suitable targets. Then the Japanese, through brutality to the Philippine people, forced us to abandon harassment. We tried various means of keeping them from retaliaiting against the helpless, unarmed, unprotected civilians, but none worked. We went into a period of organizing, training, equipping, and the collection of intelligence.

During this period the Japanese knew we were there, and sent out patrols to get us. After some initial difficulty, we were able to assemble enough men and enough equipment to force the enemy to move in large groups. Then it was comparatively easy to keep track of their patrols and to ambush or avoid them. I always said, and still maintain that anybody who got caught in the Philippine jungles as a result of enemy action deserved to be caught.

We continued on the intelligence work and organization and training during late 1943 and early 1944. The Japanese used very limited air against us. They sent out planes that would fly over the area we were in, without taking any offensive action against us; they might have been recon flights. Occasionally they dropped a few bombs or maybe strafed a house that they thought we might be in, but usually we were long gone before they got there. I don't think they dropped a bomb within a kilometer of any of our assembled units. They killed a few civilians and, as General Volckmann said, that helped keep the Filipinos loyal to us.

The first concentrated enemy air action against us was in 1944, after we had established submarine contact. The first submarines brought in weather observers, weather equipment, and coast watchers. We put the weather equipment into Central Luzon, and the weather information was to be used for air strikes on that area. We sent out weather reports twice daily from mid-1944 through the time our forces landed at Lingayen Gulf.

We were also told to set up a plan for rescuing pilots who were forced down in the area. The rescue project instructions were sent to us in top secret code and could not be disseminated. So we dispersed
personnel for other reasons, such as intelligence or to man aircraft observation stations. They often did not know that they were going to rescue pilots. Safe zones were designated and marked on the silk maps that naval pilots carried.

Thanks again to the loyalty and bravery of the Filipinos, pilots were pulled out of North Manila Bay right under the noses of the Japanese. They were pulled out of Laguna de Bay and Lake Taal, and, initially returned to a submarine contact point. Later, seaplanes picked them up at selected places and flew them out. Still later, they remained with our units until U.S. forces invaded Central Luzon.

The Central Luzon area, as I am sure you know, includes Clark Field and Manila Bay. We emphasized intelligence, which was very important, really our main mission.

We did what we could for the civilian internees and prisoners of war. We maintained contact with the several thousand Americans interned in Santo Tomas University in Manila and in Los Banos. To show you how fast the high command could respond, at one time it was thought they had diphtheria in Santo Tomas. In less than two weeks they had more serum than they could use. It was flown out from the States, sent in to us by submarine, and put in there.

The success of the pilot rescue operations, I think, is well known. Prior to the landing on Luzon in January 1945, around 35 naval air crews were rescued from Central Luzon and evacuated. Others were rescued and returned to the forces overland or when the forces came into the area.

The submarine was our first source of outside supply and was used until the battle of the Philippine Sea prohibited them from operating in that area, to avoid being sunk by our own aircraft.

Our next source of supply was air drops. The initial air supplies were free-dropped. I don't mind saying that free-dropping of supplies in the way it was done then was a waste of money and effort. The supplies were widely scattered and often damaged beyond our repair capabilities.

COLONEL TINIO: Two incidents that we might want to credit to the guerrillas were the liberation of internees from two concentration camps.
One was when the Americans were liberated from Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, by Army Rangers, with the help of the Lapong Guerrillas. The other one was in Los Banos, accomplished by the 115th Airborne with the help of the guerrillas in Southern Luzon.

COLONEL ANDERSON: One of the things I forgot to mention previously is that we did have contact with many high Philippine Government officials in the Manila area. Some of them were identified with the puppet government, but in most cases there was no question about their loyalty to us, and they were actively supplying valuable information. In fact, our big plan, the one that I had always hoped would work, failed. You probably remember when the Japanese forced the Philippines to declare war on the United States. We tried to capitalize on this and were in contact with the puppet president, Jose P. Laurel, at the time. We tried to force the Japanese to arm the Philippine troops, knowing that we would have full control of these troops and that any arms or ammunition the enemy might furnish them would be effectively turned against the Japanese at the proper time. I must admit the Japanese outsmarted us here, as they did not give more than a token amount of arms to the Filipinos.

I would like to add a bit on the general situation by saying that probably my biggest job throughout the enemy occupation was to find enough work for all the volunteers. There was absolutely no problem in getting people to do any type of a job. Nobody ever refused an assignment.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: How many Americans were involved?

COLONEL ANDERSON: In all of the Philippines? That would be very difficult to say. At the time our forces landed at Luzon, in my area there were nine American military personnel. I think there were probably many more Americans involved in guerrilla operations in Mindanao than any place else.

Mindanao was an entirely different situation from what we had. There the Japanese had control of about ten per cent of the area, and the guerrillas the rest. In Luzon it was just about reversed: The Japanese had control of 80 to 90 per cent and we had ten. There were Americans that held out in Leyte and other islands. The total number
I couldn't even estimate.

OPERATIONS DURING LIBERATION

COLONEL ANDERSON: When the liberation period came, my headquarters were located at the mouth of the Masanga River. This was also our main submarine contact point. We had other contact points out at Polillo Island and elsewhere, but we didn't have to use them.

At the Masanga River contact point, an unexplored area on all maps, the Japanese garrisons were at least 15 kilometers from us on either side. There were no roads. So it wasn't too difficult to secure the area; in fact, it was almost secure by itself.

Our first objective with the guerrilla forces during the liberation period was to cross the channel and secure the southern port of Polillo Island. This was readily done because there were only a few Japanese on the island. The few that did escape into the jungles were not a serious threat.

Our next contact with the outside was by seaplane. The seaplanes were sent in to bring supplies and evacuate sick and wounded, as well as a few Japanese prisoners.

Our next move was to go down and secure Alabat Island. On the northern tip of the island there was a pre-war air strip that was only slightly damaged by Japanese bombs. It was easy to fill the craters, cut the underbrush, and reopen a clear strip suitable for C-47s. Supply and evacuation operations were conducted from there.

DR. KILMARK: Would you elaborate a bit about the intelligence aspects? You pointed out this was one of your primary missions. I would like to know how the intelligence requirements were placed upon you, the methods you used and your success in getting the necessary data for the air operations and operations in direct support of the landing.

COLONEL ANDERSON: We continued to organize and train our forces after we had stopped harassing the Japanese because of their brutal retaliation against the civilians. Keep in mind that we had no contact with the outside forces during 1942, 1943, and early 1944. During this period we developed an intelligence organization and collected a lot
of intelligence information that couldn't be used because we couldn't get it to where it would be of value.

However, after we established radio contact with SWPA in 1944 we developed a very extensive intelligence coverage of Central Luzon. We operated a bit differently than in other areas in that no effort was made to consolidate all friendly forces under one command. It was my personal opinion that it was unwise to consolidate all the forces under my command, because of the confusion that would result from my capture or extermination. Also, there were many guerrilla organizations formed by Filipino leaders that were capable of independent action, and that seemed highly desirable.

I believe there were a hundred or so organizations in all, but at least 15 or 20 in this area were good, legitimate guerrilla organizations willing to work with me. My effort was to coordinate with them. I even refused petitions from those who wanted to come under my direct command. I would say, "No, you maintain your command; I will work with you and supply you to the best of my ability."

In the intelligence setup, I had five separate groups reporting in the very important Manila area. Around Clark Field we had three separate groups reporting to us. All of the intelligence collection work was done by Filipinos, except for the coast watchers and weather observers. Coast watchers were sent in by submarine with radios and other equipment. We used guerrilla forces to move them into desired locations and to take care of them. In many cases Filipinos were assigned to work for the Japanese in the port area, Clark Field and other key places. Filipinos were able to establish contacts inside the civilian internment and POW camps, and would take messages and even supplies back and forth.

GENERAL LANSDALE: This is a side note. Didn't you encounter one Huk outfit down the coast?

COLONEL ANDERSON: Yes. That outfit, under Commander Batuc, captured some of our men. I went down to get them released and found myself in their clutches for a couple of days, but I talked my way out of it. Later, the Huk leader, Taruc, forced Batuc to come back and
apologize to me.* There was very little Huk activity along the coast. Inland around the Caliraya Dam and on the western side of Laguna de Bay they became quite strong.

AIR ACTION

COLONEL ANDERSON: The first action against the enemy where air-power was used was at the mouth of the Tiguian River. U. S. Cavalry forces were pushing across the mountains from the central plains. Off the coast we had four naval gunboats assigned to our guerrilla forces, and my command post was on the gunboat with the best cook. There were several hundred Japanese in this area, primarily because we had sunk their ships from under them in Manila Bay. When our forces started moving in Luzon, the Japanese naval personnel were instructed to proceed to Palanan Bay where they hoped to be picked up by submarines or ships.

Guerrilla forces on the shore knew they were in this general area and we were able to spot their exact location from the naval gunboats. We did shell the area with three-in., 50-caliber, and 20-mm guns from the gunboats, but in order to be sure they were wiped out before the cavalry attempted to cross the river, we called for bombers. Several tons of bombs, including napalm, were well placed on the area. The area was also strafed by fighters.

The strafing may not have been necessary, but the fighter pilots in the area wanted to participate, so we put a couple of colored smoke shells into the area and let them have at it. Five-hundred lb demolition bombs, anti-personnel bombs, and napalm were all used. While no one bothered to count the number of enemy killed in the area, there were only a few snipers left when the cavalry crossed the river.

There was no further enemy resistance in this area until the cavalry was about a kilometer north of Puerto Real. At this point, the enemy

*RM-3652-PR, ... The Philippine Huk Campaign.
did dig in again and we again called in the bombers and later the fighters for close air support. Both bombers and fighters were used to a minimum however, as we didn't want to risk killing any more civilians than necessary.

Air strikes, by both bombers and fighters, were used again after the enemy had dug in on the north bank of the Agos River. There were no civilians in this area and many bombs were dropped. My guerrilla forces blocked the escape route along the coast to the north, containing the enemy forces in this area, and it was there that Japanese Admiral Furusi surrendered to us.

Aside from the previously mentioned use of airpower against the enemy, it was used occasionally when small pockets of resistance were found along the coast. We would put guerrilla forces ashore some distance from the pocket, surround it to cut off escape routes, and then use naval gunboat fire and airpower to rout the enemy. The French would call this a netting operation, but whatever you call it, it must have been quite uncomfortable for the enemy.

We also used the bombers again on Polillo Island. The remaining Japanese finally assembled at an old fort on the eastern side of the island. The fort had been rebuilt with coconut logs and whatever else there was available in the area. We had guerrilla troops on three sides of the fort, and then called in bombers with napalm and high explosive bombs. The bombing was very effective.

We did use light aircraft (L-4s and L-5s) to a limited extent for liaison, evacuation of wounded, and reconnaissance. We also used light aircraft for evacuation of key Filipino leaders and their families and Americans from behind enemy lines to our forces. An example was the evacuation of General Romulo's family from the Mt. Banahao area to Lingayen Gulf.

There were no airdrops to internees or POWs or in the vicinity of the places they were located because everything moved so fast after the landing at Lingayen that it was not necessary.

When the incoming forces were moving through the central plains from Lingayen to Manila the guerrilla troops were pulled back off the roads and railroads to keep the Japanese from escaping into the jungles.
After the incoming regular forces moved south of the location of guerrilla units, the guerrilla units would report to and be attached to the regular unit.

One point I failed to mention was preparation for the landings on Luzon. Feints at Marinduque Island off Southern Luzon and Batangas in the same vicinity were made to try to convince the enemy that our main force would land on Southern Luzon. This strategy worked fairly well, as several thousand Japanese troops were moved from Central Luzon to the south of Manila. Two days prior to the scheduled landing at Lingayen we started blowing the road and railroad bridges south of Manila so the enemy troops could not return north. Guerrillas and demolition experts that had been sent in by submarine worked on the targets at night and then cleared the area by daylight so the bombers could go to work on the same targets.

To sum it up, I think I have covered practically everything that we had to do with air. We could talk for a long time about some of the other activities, but we did not have the use of air to the extent that General Volckmann did. I would name intelligence as probably number one among our actual accomplishments. I will never forget General MacArthur saying it was no problem to handle the enemy when they knew where he was, how many there were, and what equipment he had; and this type of information made it comparatively easy to return to Luzon.

Probably our second most important accomplishment was the rescue of naval pilots and airmen. They had been flying where, if they went down, they were done. It would take a long time to tell you how happy they really were when they got into a place like Luzon where the people were friendly and organized so that they were soon back with their units. In some crash landings off the east coast of Luzon we got them off the plane before it sank. Some didn't even get wet. I think that was a very important morale factor. The third ranking accomplishment was the assistance to POWs and civilian internees.

As to the number of Japanese that had to be kept on Luzon because of guerrilla activity, that is difficult to say, but I am sure our operations held a lot of troops on Luzon that would have been used
elsewhere. Also, the guerrillas helped keep the Japanese from winning the support and loyalty of the Filipinos.
IV. Hindsight on the Campaign

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: I would like to highlight the Japanese failures in their actions against our guerrilla forces. First, the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, followed by their political and economic policies, tended to drive a wedge between Japanese authority and the people. In this type of warfare, the military, political, and economic policies must be designed to get the support of the population, even if only their passive support.

The Japanese had a tendency, even in their lower echelons, to treat the Filipinos as so much mud under their feet. Their gruesome executions and torture drove the people away from them and destroyed any inclination for the people to support the Japanese. They did that in the early part of the war, which was to our advantage. Although we had some trouble with informers and spies, a high percentage of the people in North Luzon were extremely loyal and supported us in every possible way.

For any guerrilla effort, unconventional warfare effort, or insurgency resistance effort, you must get the support of the population. That support can often be obtained voluntarily, but what you can't get voluntarily you have to induce through various means, such as simple psychology. For another portion you are going to have to resort to force and intimidation to get support.

I cite one example. As a result of Colonel Horan's surrender, the Bontoc area became solidly anti-American and pro-Japanese in a very short time, under the leadership of Filipinos working under the Japanese. Horan had been strongly supported for years by the people up there, without in turn killing many, if any, enemy troops. Conditions became so bad, as I mentioned, that you couldn't even send a runner through without having him apprehended.

We had to have that area. We sent a unit in there against one village. The people got word by the bamboo telegraph that this force was coming in and of course they evacuated. Every house was burned to the ground, the crops were destroyed. Nothing was left standing. That was the only example that had to be made in that area. In a
very short time we had their support. I cite that as one instance of means you have to resort to for support.

The second failure of the Japanese was that they lost the battle of intelligence. In any guerrilla or counterguerrilla operation, the side that comes up with the best intelligence and counterintelligence has the upper hand, regardless of weapons. Until that trend can be reversed, they are going to be on top.

Next, the Japanese failed to keep us from getting external support. This is very important. A guerrilla can do so much with so little. Even a trickle of external support, moral as well as equipment, raises the will of people conducting resistance operations to a tremendous height. I will never forget the day the first submarine came in. We could just feel a ripple go through the military forces and the civilian population throughout North Luzon. From that day on, nothing could hold those people down, as long as that external support was coming in.

I know of no case where resistance has been effectively subdued where there was sustained support from an external source, particularly a resistance movement in conjunction with any regular conventional operation. I could not help but reflect yesterday when the French gave their very fine account of the Algerian War. They said they got the enemy forces down to 12,000 and they were pretty happy about it. Even then, if there had been any external support from the outside, those 12,000 could have been a pretty bad hornets nest for a long time.

So it is absolutely essential to a counterinsurgency effort, first, to drive a wedge between the civilians and the guerrillas; next destroy the guerrilla forces; and third, equally important, eliminate the external support. If you fail in any one of those three, you are just going to be dragging around for one hell of a long time and not accomplish much. In terms of our day-to-day problems, I have often predicted that we are going to be dragging around in

*RM-3653-PR, ... The Algerian War.*
South Vietnam for a good many years unless we find some way to cut off that external support that is trickling into South Vietnam.

Another very vivid lesson that I think I learned from the Japanese was their failure to maintain sustained operations against us. It was a very good break for us that about the time that we started our reorganization, they had a complete change of the Japanese forces in North Luzon and replaced experienced commanders and troops by green forces. That was one of the best things that could have happened for us. The forces that had been in there knew the ground like the palms of their hands. They patrolled it constantly.

Suddenly the Japanese high command upset the whole show and replaced them. This makes my point that in counterinsurgency or counterguerrilla operations, it is very important to maintain continuity of force in specified sectors as long as you possibly can. When turnover is unavoidable, make a gradual replacement that will not disrupt the entire area.

GENERAL ALISON: A comment on that. From many of the articles that I have read, guerrilla warfare is just an extension of warfare by another means. The sooner the guerrilla can step up the scale of warfare to larger units, the sooner he is going to be effective, just as guerrilla warfare is most effective when pursued in conjunction with the activities of a regular military establishment.

Talking to Donald Blackburn, I understand that the Japanese were forced to take those experienced troops out of Northern Luzon when the United States began to put on pressure in the Southwest Pacific. Once they took them out, you got your break.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: That is right. When they had to relieve troops who knew every trail in the country and to replace them with green troops, a lot of us could proceed much more rapidly.

COLONEL ANDERSON: One of their other weaknesses was their failure to follow through. They frequently hit knockout punches, then withdrew. Follow-up action is probably the most important part of any effort to wipe out guerrilla forces—don't give them time to regroup. For some reason or other they often would have a well-organized plan, come in and effectively hit us, but then they would disappear.
GENERAL LANSDALE: What were the most successful things that the Japanese did? Were any of their tactics or tricks especially successful against guerrillas?

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: During their strong counterguerrilla offensive in our area, the most effective things the Japanese did were their sustained operation, maintaining pressure on us at all times and keeping us on the move, plus their establishment of intelligence and counterintelligence on a very substantial scale. These, in conjunction with the utilization of the Philippine Constabulary organization, made them a real threat.

As I mentioned before, until we could reverse the intelligence picture—that is, until our intelligence and counterintelligence gained the upper hand—we were almost helpless against the Japanese. Once that was reversed, they were helpless against us. I can't overemphasize that the most important factor either in guerrilla or counterguerrilla operations is intelligence.

COLONEL ANDERSON: The most effective actions the Japanese took against us were the small sneak patrols. They were wicked. They got in on us occasionally, within shooting distance. As soon as we were able to force them to go to larger patrols, there was no particular problem. A large force was comparatively easy to watch, and even easier to ambush and get away from.

They tried to use Filipinos to spy for them. In some cases they even sent some of our own agents to spy on us. We had a hard time thinking up good stories to send back. Generally speaking, if they weren't our own men when they arrived, they were when they left.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: One of the cleverest things I saw the Japanese pull was at Laoag Airfield. We couldn't organize that area for a long time. Every time we sent a detachment in there, it would run into a guerrilla band already organized in that area. The first thing we know, our detachment would become lost in action, and we would never hear anything more about it. That happened about half a dozen times over a period of a few months. Finally we sent a strong detachment up there under an American to contact this guerrilla organization. He suspected they were working for the Japanese, and that was exactly
right. They were representing themselves as the guerrilla organization in that area, living like guerrillas, fighting like guerrillas, but they were there to protect the security of the Laoag Airfield.

Out man set a trap for them at a meeting, and told them all to surrender and lay down their arms. A few of them tried to escape and were shot. That broke up the whole thing and the area opened up wide. It was a real nut to crack until we found out what was going on.

GENERAL LANSDALE: On the political-psychological aspect, were any Japanese from California or the Philippines working with the occupying forces a special hazard to you?

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: Very much so. The Japanese preparations for the invasion of the Philippines were very good from an intelligence and agent point of view. They had a large number of military professionals in the Philippines posing as civilians when the war broke out. For example, in the Lasod sawmill area the foreman was a Japanese captain. As soon as the war broke out, he put on a uniform and he chased my tail around that area for about three months.

He knew every trail like the palm of his hand. He knew the people, and he had me holed up in the rain forest for ten solid days. The only thing I had to eat was cold kemotes. I said he could have that, and I got out.

The enemy employed people like that throughout the islands. There was a great influx of Japanese prior to the war. I had a regiment on beach defense in the Lingayen Gulf, and as soon as war started, my positions and my artillery were outlined every night by red flares. The only way I could prevent it was to declare that the zone had to be free of all civilians between sundown and sunup. Even then it was impossible to control completely because of the swamps and rivers. They would slide around in bancas and we just couldn't catch them.

COLONEL VALERIANO: I would like to ask General Volckmann and Colonel Anderson whether they know of any incident where the Japanese had been able to make use of a Caucasian, maybe a German or an Italian, to pose as an American?

COLONEL ANDERSON: We had that happen twice; that is, twice the Japanese used Germans in an effort to get us. The first time, they
sent two Germans dressed as American Army officers into the hills to try to get us. They made the mistake of dressing the two in new khaki uniforms. One German still lives in Manila; the other has been dead for years. The second time, they sent two Germans to pose as senior American officers with alleged orders from General MacArthur to take over command of our units. Fortunately our intelligence was far too good for such tricks. We allowed them to reach our area, but then they developed lead poisoning.
V. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT FUTURE OPERATIONS

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: From my own point of view, the lack of external support severely restricted our capabilities. I don't know why we were not supplied by air prior to the Liberation; it could have been done very easily in conjunction with the Navy strikes. We could have obtained supplies that way, easier than grappling 35 tons at a crack off a submarine, which took a tremendous amount of manpower, time, and effort.

Submarine rendezvous had to be staged with the Japanese garrison five kilometers on either side, enemy patrol boats going up and down the coast, and land patrols expected at any time. We had to organize an area like that for security as well as use 3500 cargadors and 50 bancas to ply between the submarine and the shore. It was a pretty tough operation, one that would not have been needed if we had had aerial resupply.

That brings me to another subject, what it takes in the way of numbers of forces in an area to keep down effective resistance and guerrilla forces. This is something I have given a lot of thought, not only in regard to this situation, but concerning every resistance movement I know about.

The factors vary with terrain, of course, but let's say from six to 20 men per square mile. It takes a tremendous amount of manpower to patrol effectively and even start to own the ground you stand on, let alone to oppose guerrilla forces. It is going to take tremendous manpower in any area for counterinsurgency operations.

DR. KILMARX: I would like to pose a question as to how to win the loyalty of the people. I am trying to identify factors applicable to the Philippines that aren't a result of their unique history in accounting for their loyal support. You mentioned an area of Luzon where the Japanese were successful in winning over the people after a Colonel Horan ceased to be active there. You mentioned the stick method you used on the village to get them back on our side. Is there some object lesson from this experience that you might want to isolate?
GENERAL VOLCKMANN: In the areas where the Japanese got cooperation it was usually by winning over the support of the local leader. In this particular area it happened to be the governor of Mountain Province, Dr. Clapp. Surprisingly enough, he had been reared and educated by missionaries who gave him his Americanized name. How the enemy put the pressure on him to get his cooperation to the extent they did, I will never be able to understand. I wish I knew.

We contacted Dr. Clapp, and it was made perfectly clear that he was unwilling to cooperate with us. We also found evidence that he was responsible for the capture of our last remaining radio station and of Major Jones and Captain Praeger.

I think, by and large, the people that were won over to support the Japanese in the Philippines followed the path of least resistance. Their pockets were padded heavily. They were provided with food, a major item at that time. In a few cases the individuals actually didn't think that the Americans were coming back. In others, the Japanese convinced them they had the situation well in hand, that the Americans could not come back. I knew some well-educated people who defected. I am convinced they believed that the Americans just wouldn't be able to come back. I must say at times I was wondering myself. The years went by one after another, and I got awfully tired of hearing about some of those little islands down there in the South Pacific.

COLONEL ANDERSON: I want to adjust a couple of points. First, we had very little trouble with the Filipinos cooperating outright with the Japanese. In mid-1944, when SWPA asked for my estimate of loyalties in the areas under our observations, I told them 97 per cent of the people had never wavered; about two per cent were on the fence; and a maximum of one per cent had willingly worked with the Japanese. Those that actively worked with the Japanese, with rare exceptions, did so because the Japanese held their families and threatened to annihilate them. Because of the close family ties, the most effective way of forcing a Filipino to work with the Japanese was to hold his family.

Another method for maintaining loyalties was the use of leaflets, magazines, and similar items sent in by submarines. We burned most of these types of propaganda items. They were not necessary, we had the loyalty of the people. Secondly, possession of these items was very dangerous. Anybody caught with a leaflet was sure to be beheaded.
The most effective weapon to keep the people loyal and also to let them know we actually had outside contact was medicine. If I had it to do over, I certainly would put medicine very high on the priority list, because there was a lot of sickness and no medicine. By putting medicine into the area and widely dispersing it, as we did, we could save lives and make lifelong friends. Also, we had trouble with guerrilla units fighting among themselves, and I didn't want to give these units arms and ammunition that might be used to kill Filipinos. I would give them medicine for distribution in their areas. That was the most effective psychological war weapon sent in by submarine, as far as I am concerned.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: The psychological weapon I found to be most effective in North Luzon was the daily publication of the San Francisco News. That was put out at dictation speed, taken down and distributed through our communication nets to every corner of Luzon. It was read to the barrio lieutenants, to everyone. We didn't publish a great number, but we saw that they were widely dispersed. We hit an area with this in the Philippines and it went out over the bamboo telegraph.

COLONEL VALENTIANO: I also want to respond to your question. To my knowledge there were two distinct organizations in the Philippines during the occupation years that we were afraid of. These were called the Kalibapi and the Makapilo. The Kalibapi was headed by the late Minig Tjilo, the type of man who really believed that Americans would never come back. He started off in a very big way. What really scared me when I was in occupied Manila was that a lot of paroled Bataan veterans were interested in the idea. One of this group became a provincial commander of the Japanese Constabulary, and organized a native spear army. The Japanese feared to arm the Filipinos with real weapons, so this officer, who was very much a native, organized home defense units armed with spears. It caused a lot of trouble for the guerrilla units of Devoso and Martin, and was responsible for the capture of Colonel Strong.

The Kalibapi started organizing rallies. They pulled the same stunt that we did with the Huks. They would move into a barrio and request the town officials to gather the people. They would have personalities like Ricarte. For the information of this panel, General
Ricarte was one of the few Filipino revolutionary generals who fought against the Americans and never took allegiance to the United States. He was supported in exile in Japan and returned with the Japanese occupation forces.

The trouble with this movement was that Ricarte allowed himself to be seen frequently with a military staff. Newspaper coverage of a political rally would show him standing with Japanese officers all around him.

The Makapíló was a peasant movement that had some very legitimate grievances against the prewar government and also against the presence of American groups in the Philippines. Although they had never affiliated themselves with the Huk, they had almost the same grievances. The Japanese, recognizing the value of the Makapíló group that lived in San Jose Del Monte just north of Manila, maintained a big garrison there to prevent molestation by other Japanese, Hukbalahaps, or guerrillas. The Japanese maintained two clandestine bases for training Philippine spies there.

But as soon as the Filipinos around this area felt that the pressure was on the Japanese, especially right after the Leyte landing, and while the guerrillas in the mountains were getting busy, the Filipinos attacked these towns and liquidated every identified Makapíló.

COLONEL ANDERSON: One thing I would like to mention in connection with psychological war activities is, never use language on any of the leaflets that cannot be easily read and understood by the people you are trying to reach. We had the experience of the Japanese dropping leaflets with pictures of Filipino mothers with children in arms, crying and wanting to attract the soldier to come back home. In English down below they said, "This war is not against the Filipino; hang your gun over your shoulder with the barrel down and walk out and you will be immediately returned to your family."

They were attractive leaflets, by the way. At the bottom they had a line with some writing in Japanese. I don't know who was smart enough to think of this, but the minute the enemy started dropping these leaflets, the word was out that the Japanese writing said, "This man is no good to either side. Shoot him on sight." It was quite effective.
COLONEL ADERHOLT: I have a question I think very important to us in the First Air Commando organization. One of our primary missions is to train people from these underdeveloped countries to assist themselves in developing their own air capability. You have a lot of experience with foreign peoples, and I have been exposed to some that we have trained. I would like to know why foreign forces that we have trained, and considered combat ready, have made such poor showings in many instances.

Batista's troops were trained by our MAAG, yet Castro was openly contemptuous of them. The North Koreans outfought South Koreans, although we equipped the hell out of the ROKs. The VC, the Pathet Lao, who is no more or less than a brother to the Lao Army type, are more examples. I am not pointing at armies only, we have had similar experience with our air missions. Where do we fail?

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: Let's start out talking in general terms. I can assure you I don't have all the answers but I want to cite one case that may lead you to some speculation on your own. A submarine came in with a complement of liaison officers from Southwest Pacific and some demolition experts. I had two men among those demolition experts, one a big, roly-poly, jolly fellow, and the other a wiry type.

I kept them around my headquarters for four days trying to assess where I could place them to get the most out of them. I never misjudged two individuals so badly in my life. I placed the smaller man over in Nueva Vizcaya, the toughest area. He was half-Indian and American-Canadian. He failed horribly, for one reason: he kept himself too aloof. He wouldn't mix with the people. The big, heavy-set guy, who I think they had trouble pushing out of the submarine conning tower, turned out to be most capable. He got more accomplished than I ever dreamed he would, because he got along with the people.

I think that is a very important factor. You just don't send any American out and expect him to do a job for you. It takes a special type of individual to do it.

GENERAL LANSDALE: I might comment briefly. This is the second seminar that I have joined at RAND where this point has been raised. The last time was with officers from about five or six countries. They
started answering very much as General Volckmann has. I feel the same way. None of us has ever been able to sit down and analyze precisely how you pick officers who, like that big chap, have this extra something. But that is where you have to start.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: We are taking some action along those lines in our command, by psychological tests. There are a lot of things we can do, and I was quite interested to get the reactions here. I know it was the same problem all the way back.

COLONEL ANDERSON: The matter of personal background and selection of personnel, such as the areas where they come from, i.e., rural or urban, is of paramount importance. Many of the Filipinos trained in specialties and sent in by submarine had lived many years in the United States and thought they were better than people in the Islands. In many areas personnel raised in the city cracked up when faced with the rigors and suspected dangers of jungle life. This personnel study is very interesting and important and should be pursued at length at a later date.

GENERAL ALISON: I would like to comment briefly because I think this subject is critical. We have been talking all around it. I must admit I get emotionally involved on this subject. You can wear yourself out trying to pick specific individuals. I think the problem is a lot bigger than that. I think it involves national objectives spelled out so all of us know where we are going. We have been concentrating our attention upon effective means of military accomplishment. But there is a revolutionary movement afoot in the world today. Until we find a formula of understanding that fact, when our military men go in they will be frustrated in their attempts to win a victory. We talked about the enhanced morale of the Filipino troops when they were again physically connected to the United States. You can look at that in reverse. What would be the morale effect on guerrillas in South Vietnam if we hit North Vietnam? Suddenly, the pressure would be off in the south. These tactics are beyond our scope here.

We must have political objectives compatible with our own aspirations and those of the people we are trying to help. When we get this political objective, we can develop a plan. Then we can go out and
procure the material to implement this plan. Anybody that tells me that Mao Tse-Tung can out-guerrilla us is just talking. But Mao certainly can out-guerrilla us if we are going through some mental process to proscribe our forces from victory. I believe that any force in the world will fight and fight well if given the proper incentives to fight. We have had some that would fight.

General Stilwell showed in Burma he could make real first-class fighting units out of Chinese troops. We have only to look at Formosa; look at the quality of that air force. After we got with it in South Korea we had a pretty respectable army. Look what the Filipinos did after the war—they licked the Huk problem. We have allies that will fight, but we are afraid to arm them because we are afraid that they might fight.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: We tie their hands, just as you have said. We can't expect them to fight when we tie their hands with policies that prevent them from carrying out an objective.

COLONEL REINHARDT: I have watched Yanks go to three wars and the differences have startled, even frightened me. In the World War I they were going to make the world safe for democracy. That may sound corny to people now, but they believed it. I have tried over and over again to find out why in World War II the tune was, "When do we go home?" and in Korea, "What the hell is a police action?" I believe there is a direct connection between those reactions and our national policy, or lack of it during those conflicts. I strongly endorse General Alison's remarks.

MR. PETERSON: That subject deserves an entire symposium of its own.
Appendix

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS NOT ON ACTIVE DUTY WITH
U.S. ARMED FORCES

Major General John R. Alison, USAFR, was the deputy commander of
the Number 1 Air Commando Force, which supported the Chindit Forces in
Burma in 1944. He received his commission in the Air Corps Reserve
in 1937, served with U.S. missions in England and the Soviet Union,
and commanded a fighter squadron under General Claire Chennault in
China before helping to organize the Air Commandos. Following the
Burma campaign, he took part in the Luzon and Okinawa campaigns. His
current Reserve assignment is as Assistant to the Commander, 15th Air
Force. A former Assistant Secretary of Commerce, General Alison is
an Air Force Association Past President, and a Vice President of the
Northrop Corporation.

Colonel Bernard L. Anderson, USAFR, was a staff officer of the
Far East Air Force on Bataan prior to the war. Following surrender to
the Japanese, Anderson escaped and began guerrilla operations, command-
ing the U.S.-Filipino guerrilla forces in Central and Southern Luzon
from June 1942 until the liberation. He remained on duty in the
Philippines until 1948, when he became an executive in a Philippine
industry. Among the American and Philippine awards he holds are the
Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, and the Philippine
Republic's Legion of Honor, degree of Commander.

Colonel Augusto L. Jurado, PAF, is a veteran of 15 years of combat
on Luzon, beginning in December 1941 and extending through the anti-
Huk campaign. He is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy
(1938), Flying School (1939), U.S. Air Command and Staff School (1952),
and Strategic Intelligence Course (1957). He is a former Assistant
Chief of Staff, J-3, Philippine Armed Forces, and is currently the
Armed Forces Attache in Washington. Among his awards are the Distingui-
ished Unit Badge with two Oak Leaf Clusters (United States) and the
Presidential Citation Badge (Republic of the Philippines).
Major General Edward G. Lansdale, * USAF, served two tours of duty in the Philippines. In 1945-48 he was on duty at Headquarters, AFWESPAC, and from 1950 to 1953 he was with JUSMAG as adviser to Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay. He is currently Assistant (Special Operations) to the United States Secretary of Defense.

Colonel René Laure, French Army, commanded the brigade (operational and administrative control) of Adrar in the Western Sahara (1957 and 1958) and the brigade of Bone in Eastern Algeria in 1959. He is a graduate of the École Speciale Militaire, Saint-Cyr, and of the Army War College. During World War II he was in charge of the "Indochina Section" in "Force 136," Calcutta, and later, assumed command of guerrilla forces in Upper Laos. He has served 25 years overseas, in Africa and Asia. He is assigned to the French Delegation to NATO in Washington.

Brigadier General Monro MacCloskey, USAF (Ret.), organized and commanded the first U.S. AAF Heavy Bomber Squadron (and later Group) to engage in night supply dropping operations behind enemy lines in Northern Italy, the Balkans, and Southern Europe from bases in North Africa and Italy. He has served as Chief of the Reserve and National Guard Division in Air Force Headquarters, and, upon graduation from the National War College in 1948, was named Chief of the Air Intelligence Policy Division, USAF Headquarters. He was Air Attaché in Paris from 1949 to 1952, after which he was appointed Commander of the Air Resupply and Communications Service of the Military Air Transport Service. Prior to his retirement he commanded the 28th Air Division. Among decorations awarded to him by the United States, France, and Morocco are the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Legion of Merit, the French Legion of Honor, Degrees of Commander and Officer, and Croix de Guerre with Gold Stars and with Palms.

Lieutenant Colonel Jose M. Tinio, PA, headed the Special Projects Division of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency from its inception in 1949 and subsequently became Deputy Coordinator of the NICA. He is a graduate of the University of the Philippines, and began

*General Lansdale, although on active duty, is included here because of his experience in counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippines.
his military career with the ROTC at the University. He escaped from
the Bataan Death March and became the intelligence officer of the I
Corps, President Quezon's own Guerrillas. After the anti-Huk campaign,
he served as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters,
Philippine Army. He has completed several intelligence courses in the
Philippines and the United States, and is currently serving with the
Philippine Embassy in Washington. Among his decorations are the
Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster (United States), Anti-dissident
Campaign Ribbon and Military Merit Medal (Philippines), and the Legion
of Honor (Vietnam).

Squadron Leader A. Twigg, RAF, was a Flight Commander on No. 33
Fighter Squadron in Malaya during 1950 and 1951. Since then his duties
have included tours with the joint Helicopter Experimental Unit and,
as Commanding Officer, with No. 225 Helicopter Squadron. He is
presently serving on the RAF staff of the British Defence Staffs,
Washington.

Colonel Napoleon D. Valeriano, PA, commanded the 7th Battalion
Combat Team in its very effective operations against the Huks, and
subsequently became military assistant to President Magsaysay. He is
a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy and the U.S. Cavalry
School. He served with the guerrillas on Luzon during World War II.
He has also been Commander of the Presidential Guards Battalion,
Secretary to the Philippine National Security Council, National Security
Coordinator for the Philippines, and Philippine Military Representative
to the SEATO Secretariat. He is coauthor of Counter-guerrilla Operations:
Lessons from the Philippines.

Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann, USA (Ret.), commanded the
U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon, from 1942 through
the liberation in 1945. He is a West Point graduate, and was in command
of the 11th Infantry (Philippine Army). He escaped from Bataan after
the surrender and joined the guerrilla forces, rising to their command
in North Luzon. After World War II he attended the Armed Forces Staff
College and the National War College. After graduation he became
Assistant Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. He is the author
of Field Manual 31-20, *Combatting Guerrilla Forces*, and Field Manual 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Forces*, as well as the book, *We Remained*, which is his account of three years behind the enemy lines in the Philippines. He holds the Distinguished Service Cross.

**Air Commodore P. E. Warcup, C.B.E., RAF**, commanded the RAF at Kuala Lumpur, 1957-59. He is a graduate of the RAF College, Cranwell, the Joint Services Staff College, and the Imperial Defence College. He was an RAF test pilot at the outbreak of World War II, and was a prisoner of war in Germany from 1940 to 1945. He is currently the Assistant Commandant, RAF Staff College.