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RM-3656-PR
JULY 1963

SYMPOSIUM ON THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

Edited by A. H. Peterson, G. C. Reinhardt and E. E. Conger

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is a condensation of the discussion of Unconventional Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater, a part of a RAND symposium on "The Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare," January 14-18, 1963, A. H. Peterson, Monitor.

Because the material consists of personal recollections and discussions by men who were active in the campaigns, each Memorandum in the series covering the symposium was done in a purely reportorial style, with care exercised to retain the flavor and connotations of the discussants. For the same reason, no attempt was made to resolve any implicit or explicit differences among the participants' views or between them and available published works on the same subjects.

The symposium was organized to collect relevant detailed information of these types of warfare in the hope that such information, examined with the original environments firmly in mind, would suggest lessons for current air operations. In addition, the material, when considered within the context of advanced technology, should provide some guidance for future planning and hardware development.

The symposium Memoranda are as follows:
Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare:

The Malayan Emergency, RM-3651-PR
The Philippine Huk Campaign, RM-3652-PR
The Algerian War, RM-3653-PR
Chindit Operations in Burma, RM-3654-PR
Allied Resistance to the Japanese on Luzon, World War II, RM-3655-PR
Unconventional Warfare in the Mediterranean Theater, RM-3656-PR.

The discussion leader for the subject of the present Memorandum was Brigadier General Monro MacCloskey, USAF (Ret.).
FOREWORD

To be of value in actual application, battle studies should be based upon intimate experience in modern combat, not upon historical records of general operations of troops. The individual action of the soldier remains enveloped in a cloud of dust, in narratives as in reality. Yet his battle experiences must be studied, for the conditions they reveal should be the basis of all fighting methods, past, present and future.

Where can data on these questions be found? Stories in great detail, for the smallest detail has its importance, secured from participants and witnesses who knew how to remember, are necessary in a study of the battle of today.

The number killed, the kind and character of the wounds, often tell more than the longest accounts. Sometimes they contradict them. We want to know how man fought yesterday. Under the pressure of danger, impelled by the instinct for self-preservation, did he follow, make light of, or forget the methods prescribed or recommended?

Battle Studies, Col. Ardant du Picq, (translated from the 8th edition),
Military Service Pub. Co.
Harrisburg, Pa., 1958
PARTICIPANTS IN THE DISCUSSION OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

FRANCE

French Air Force
Lt. Gen. Y. P. Ezanno

French Army
Col. L. M. J. Hounau
Col. R. Laure

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Philippine Army
Col. N. D. Valeriano (Ret.)
Lt. Col. J. M. Tinio

UNITED KINGDOM

Royal Air Force
Air Commodore P. E. Warcup, C. B. E.
Sqdrn. Ldr. A. Twigg

British Army
Lt. Col. M. W. Sutcliffe

UNITED STATES

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Maj. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, USAF
Col. D. C. Jolly

United States Air Force
Maj. Gen. J. R. Alison, USAFR
Brig. Gen. M. MacCloskey, USAF (Ret.)
Discussion Leader
Col. B. L. Anderson, USAFR
Col. R. Moon
Col. C. C. Wooten
Lt. Col. H. Aderholt

United States Army
Brig. Gen. R. W. Volckmann (Ret.)

The RAND Corporation
Rear Admiral P. A. Smith, C&GS (Ret.)
Col. G. C. Reinhardt, USA (Ret.)
A. H. Peterson, Symposium Monitor
T. E. Greene
S. T. Hosmer
G. K. Smith
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I. SPECIAL AIR MISSIONS

INTRODUCTION

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: To give you the background for our air operations in unconventional warfare in the Mediterranean Theater, I will describe the organization, equipment, training, and missions of our unit. We came into existence in March 1944 as the 885th Bomb Squadron, Heavy, Special; the only U. S. Army Air Force unit in the Mediterranean Theater that flew four-engine heavy bombers but never dropped a bomb.

Pilots and crews of these aircraft are now scattered far and wide. Diaries could not be kept. The individuals' flight records show only the date, the type of aircraft, the length of the mission, whether it was day or night, the weather, number of landings, and the designation of combat mission; that is all. Every operational flight was given a code name or number, but with the passage of time these labels have become almost meaningless even to us who flew them. The official monthly histories of the outfit contain incomplete accounts of the missions in which we were nightly engaged. We must depend upon the memory of participants for the kind of historical research we are attempting in this symposium.

First, then, a glance at the historical background of Allied headquarters for unconventional warfare, or Special Forces, as they were then called. There were two, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the U. S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This will explain the environment in which we worked, why and how Allied agents had already been placed in France, Italy, and the Balkans by the time we began operations.

In the fall of 1940, several months after Dunkirk, a group of planners gathered, in response to Prime Minister Churchill's directive, to recommend ways of helping Frenchmen "take useful action in occupied France." As a result, an organization known as Special Operations Executive was established in London, appropriately enough, not far from the legendary address of Sherlock Holmes on Baker Street.
With the collapse of organized resistance on the Continent, patriotic elements that refused to accept defeat went "underground." The tasks undertaken by the SOE included: maintaining contact with these individuals, encouraging them to sabotage industrial factories and plants, roads, railroads, and communications, establishing routes in and out of occupied Europe, arming patriots in occupied areas and instructing them in the use of weapons, and recruiting and training a Fifth Column that would go into action by order of the Allied command.

A section for each country then under Nazi domination was staffed initially at SOE headquarters. Each worked out its own strategic plans for operations, coordinated with the over-all plan. Each began to infiltrate its own agents, who sought out patriots, and with the help of the parent organization armed and supported them. These or other agents carried out every conceivable type of sabotage, so that the bombing effort of the RAF might be concentrated on Germany itself.

To find the people, men and women, who would risk their lives in this extremely dangerous undertaking was difficult. They had to be extraordinary individuals. They parachuted from airplanes and they could only hope that when they went down they would land in friendly hands. They paddled ashore from submarines in little rubber boats.

SOE established special requirements for agent selection, emphasizing bilingual perfection and knowledge of the country in which each was to work. The ability to appear as a native of that country in clothing, mannerisms, eating, sleeping, drinking, even thinking, all had to be part of an agent's make-up. He was intensively trained in forgery and lock-picking, in assembling, firing, and repairing various types of guns and other weapons, and in the use of plastic explosives. Applicants expecting to be radio operators had to be competent not only to send and receive in code but to make simple repairs and replace parts of their equipment in the dark.

During their entire training period, the students were under the closest surveillance by their instructors. Emotional instability, slips, mistakes, carelessness or slow reactions were cause for prompt rejection. Physical conditioning was added to the curriculum and actual parachute jumping performed. Final training was in security, after which the
graduated applicant was sent to SOE headquarters for assignment.

As Hitler tightened his hold on Europe, landing agents on shore via water routes became increasingly more difficult. The only way left was by air. On August 20, 1940, during the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force organized Flight 1419 to engage in special operations. A year later it was expanded to the 138th Special Duties Squadron. A second squadron, the 161st, was formed in the Spring of 1942. As a result of their activities, secret agents were already in France, Italy, and the Balkans when the United States 15th Air Force commenced similar operations from the Mediterranean Theater.

In the United States, the Office of Coordinator of Information was transferred on June 13, 1942 to the Office of War Information and was designated the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), under jurisdiction of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This agency's functions were collection and analysis of such strategic information as was required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the planning and conducting of special operations not assigned to other governmental agencies. Major General "Wild Bill" Donovan was designated director. By the end of the war, the OSS had some 12,000 personnel, including people of all types. Volunteers to OSS were trained much as I have described for the SOE.

In the fall of 1942, OSS set up an office in London to coordinate with the SOE. The British had been in business for more than two years and were reluctant to accept newcomers as full-time partners in this highly classified and specialized business. Unavoidably, OSS in London was staffed by a group of men who had not the slightest experience in handling the complicated problems of maintaining agents in an enemy occupied territory. Worse yet, OSS London ran into snags when their orders from Washington conflicted with the plans of senior United States military commanders overseas.

It had earlier been agreed that the tactical conduct of the war in Europe would rely on intelligence gathered by the British, but in May 1943 the United States insisted on an equal share of this activity. After that, OSS-SOE began work as full-time partners. A joint organization called Special Force Headquarters was staffed by SOE and OSS.
Prior to September 1943 special operations had been conducted from Mediterranean bases only on a limited scale. In response to demands from agents in occupied France, the RAF stationed a flight of 624 Squadron at Blida, 40 kilometers southwest of Algiers (Fig. 1). From October 1 to December 31, a bad weather period, this flight successfully completed only seven sorties.

**USAAF UNIT ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND MISSION**

**GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY:** I was a member of the Joint Planning Staff for the Mediterranean Theater at the time. When the RAF Squadron came to Africa, none of us knew very much about what they were doing, or what they could do. In November I made it my business to meet the outfit's commander at Blida. He took me on a nine-hour mission in a Halifax. Naturally, I learned a lot about his squadron.

The following March, at headquarters 15th Air Force, General Twining told me, "We have to organize an outfit for missions like those the RAF Special Forces Squadrons are doing—supply dropping operations in Southern France and Italy." Shortly after, I was assigned to the 15th Air Force to organize and command this squadron for the support of French and Italian underground activities. We began operations at Blida in March 1944 with eight B-24 crews and three B-17s, which had been experimental aircraft in the 15th Air Force Flight Section (Fig. 1). That was the nucleus of the 885th Bomb Squadron, Heavy, Special.

Our chain of command was a little involved. We were in the 15th Air Force for aircraft, personnel, promotions, decorations, and return home. We had one administrative channel to their headquarters to take care of our immediate requirements. We were under the 12th Air Force for gasoline and immediate supplies, repairs and all that, but our operational matters were under Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC) in Allied Forces Hq. They had direct control because of their agents in the field.

Let me explain SOE just a little bit more. SOE had three responsibilities that affected us. They planned supply dropping missions; they supplied agents for intelligence purposes; and they supplied agents to
Fig. 1 — General area of special air missions
organize resistance groups. So there were three sections in SOE with priority target requirements. They provided the RAF and us with a list of target priorities for each night in areas where the weather would allow us to fly. The RAF and we would divide these targets and then we would plan our missions.

Requests from specific places, target areas, asking for specific items came to the country sections in SPOC by radio from the field. The same channels arranged the dates for our night drops. The field agents requested a given time on a given night. The SOE's response, in addition to going out on their command channel, would generally be broadcast over BBC as well, using some such statement as "Red flowers in the forest tonight." BBC got a lot of attention those days, both from us and from the people on the ground.

In addition to our supply drops, we took in special teams, called Jed teams, for intelligence or operational assignments. A typical team included a British officer, a French radio operator, and a third field agent recruited from among the Free French in Britain or North Africa.

On call, we performed relief expeditions such as the rescue of an RAF outfit stranded in Greece. They had run out of supplies and were on the shore waiting to get picked up and taken home.

We were organized as a typical Heavy Bomb Squadron. The first crews assigned to us had been well trained in the United States under the regular training program. Later, replacements were not nearly as well qualified, many of them cast-offs from bomber groups. However, by the time they had completed our squadron training program they were sharp.

As soon as the aircraft arrived, we flew them to the Air Force Depot at El Aouina, Tunis, for modification. We got B-24s as well as B-17s. We replaced nose turrets with heavy plastic so that pilots and navigators could read their maps and look down and see where they were going. We took out the lower gun turret in the fuselage and constructed a dropping hatch for agents, packages and bundles. We put flame dampers on the engines, accepting a slight loss in power for the security gained by concealing the engine flames. We painted the aircraft black so they gave no reflection.
We installed radio altimeters. These didn't tell us what was ahead, but at least they did record our height over the ground. Later we put in the Rebeccas, and had the Eurekas on the ground in occupied France.

**TRAINING AND OPERATIONS**

**GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY:** One very important thing about our business was that we had a better chance of getting home alive than the average chap flying a heavy bomber, provided all our crew members attained and maintained superior efficiency in their own specialty. We flew alone, unescorted, depending entirely upon the pilot and crew.

I knew the RAF was already doing this and, having flown with them, took some lessons out of their notebooks. We promptly instituted our own intensive training program. Somewhat to the surprise of our RAF colleagues, not to say ourselves, we were operating 100 per cent by May.

Now, something about our training: Pilots of B-17s and B-24s had to learn to fly low and slow with a load of 6,200 to 6,500 pounds. Our dropping speed was slated for 125 to 135 miles an hours, so the pilots had to learn to fly low and slow, yet be able to get up and out of a bad place. They also had to be able to recognize light signals and terrain they were flying over.

Our training involved nine or ten hour flights over water, starting from Blida and invariably going through some frontal conditions. In the winter we often had trouble with icing conditions.

The navigator, who worked in a lighted compartment curtained off from the bombardier, had to be an expert in celestial navigation and dead reckoning. The tail gunner took drift readings by dropping flares at night. These the navigator would check against the wind forecasts. The waist gunners had the additional duty of dumping packages through the dropping hatch.

All guns were fired when outbound over water. We kept the navigation lights on until we reached a specified point over the Mediterranean because of the close scheduling and the coordination with the RAF. From there on the lights were out; no more flares were dropped. The bombardier became the eyes of our crew. Visually, he had to pick out
our initial point for the course in, relying upon mountains, rivers, towns, any features of terrain he could identify. He was probably one of the most important men on the crew. He had also to "toggle" the loads, and signal for the dispatcher (waist gunner) to put the agent or loads out.

If these crews became thoroughly proficient in their tasks of mapreading, instrument flying, and weather flying, they had a fine chance of returning home. We could avoid flak. We didn't have too much difficulty with night fighters.

By May we were in full operation. We had 12 heavy aircraft on the line and others at El Aouina for modification. Our loads in the B-17s were 16 containers in the bomb bay and eight packages in the waist. We also had bundles that were dropped out, free falls, generally boots or clothing, something that wouldn't break. The B-24s had 18 containers, 16 in the bomb bay and two in the fuselage to be pushed out the hole. They also carried six packages.

The average load was about 6,200 lb and a dispatcher plus any agents. The equipment packed in those big containers included Sten guns, ammunition, bazookas, a pack howitzer, clothing, boots, etc. We also dropped special items such as medical stores, radio kits, money, mail, and around the holidays, liquid refreshments—but not many, I might add.

The shore of the Mediterranean near Blida was an ideal location. There were the packing stations, the OSS station, the SOE station, and camps where agents could be held in security until it was their turn to go. It was an almost perfect environment in which to stage our missions.

During our operations from Blida and later, Maison Blanche, near Algiers, we lost only one airplane. Even that loss did not occur as a part of a regular operational mission. The aircraft crashed into a mountain near our base while on its return in bad weather from a search for a downed RAF airplane.

The drop points the Maquis selected were naturally chosen from their viewpoint and convenience. Often, they would pick out a valley between two mountains that had, like as not, only one opening, just a blank wall
at the other end, a cul-de-sac. The reception parties on the ground
were working people. They could not afford to attract Gestapo attention
by collecting in patrolled areas or being absent from their jobs the
next day. We had to drop within a very limited area at the time planned,
because they had to recover the load, hide the chutes and containers,
store the supplies and still get back to their homes before daylight.
This required a lot of planning and work on their part.

In France, the drop area generally was marked on the ground by
three lights in a row with a flashing letter made up of other lights at
one side. Crews had to be careful because reception areas were often
overrun by the enemy and there would be no lights. We would be over the
right location, sure of it, and some of our pilots, becoming real enthui-
siastic, would blink their navigation lights to let them know we were
there. No ground lights would come on, so we then had to fly the whole
load home.

Later we designated alternative targets for every primary target,
though maybe not the whole load was an alternate. Special loads such
as medical supplies or money were designated for one place only. The
use of alternative targets boosted both our and the RAF supply dropping
tonnage considerably.

Next we decided to begin to operate in the dark period of the moon.
Here again special training was essential. When new crews reported in,
we broke them apart, putting each man in with a trained crew. We
established a training ground outside Blida where the pilots could fly
low and slow, and find out how their airplanes would handle under
different conditions of wind and load in mountainous areas. After they
became proficient in that and the other crew members were individually
trained, we put them together and practiced first in daytime, and then
at night.

We set up day and night communication frequencies within our own
organization--manned 24 hours. All other 15th Air Force units were in
Italy, so we used a break-in system with authority to break into their
net when we needed something badly. Otherwise we communicated with our
aircraft only from our home base.
Aircraft on mission sent no messages to us except their time of crossing the coast on the way back, just a coded number plus, of course, emergency signals. From the code we would know the time, the airplane number, and whether or not the mission was successful. Every half-hour, beginning about midnight, we would broadcast the base weather. If the weather was too bad for returning aircraft to get in, we designated alternative fields for them.

We had day and night frequencies for command channels. Every airplane could signal its position. If it got in trouble, such as being chased by night fighters, as happened on a couple of occasions, it said so on the air to warn any of our other people that were in that vicinity.

We operated a little differently than the RAF. We carried plenty of fuel on board so as to not worry about running out when we got near home. Perhaps this made our work harder in the mountains. We couldn't have carried any greater load. Even if it made the work harder, at least we got them home. The RAF commander gave them what was thought the proper amount of fuel to do the job, perhaps making for easier handling of the airplane in the target areas, but the RAF lost a couple of aircraft that did not have enough fuel to return to an alternative base.

One morning the OSS said they had a very special mission that would require staging out of Bastia on Corsica. So, full of enthusiasm for such an important mission, we took off, flying along and hoping that the OSS agent at Bastia knew we were coming—we were never too sure about some of these communications. He was at the field, however. His name was Albert. That's all we knew. He had a beat-up old jalopy. We left the airmen crew to take care of the aircraft and to refuel it. We had no load and we didn't know what we were going to do.

Albert loaded us into the jalopy and drove us up to a villa hanging out over the cliffs overlooking the town. He said, "First let's have something to eat because it's too early now." So he brought out some sandwiches and coffee. Then he told us, "Now, your mission tonight is a very special one. As you know, the invasion of Southern France is contemplated."

As he continued, we discovered that our mission, believe it or not, was to take a load of pigeons and drop them about 30 miles north of
Toulon. I looked at the copilot, the navigator, and bombardier, and we thought, "For God's sake, we are going to take a load of pigeons over to Southern France, what a mission--pigeon carriers."

But anyhow, that's what it was, a pigeon drop.

I would like to emphasize that we had successful operations dropping through a solid overcast using the Eurekas on the ground and the Rebeccas in the air. * This necessitated a good ground organization and a fairly secure one, because when we put a lot of airplanes into an area, as we did twice, there had to be more than a few people around to cart off and hide the material.

We would make two runs in practically every case. If you tried to put all these 16 or 18 containers out, the bundles and packages on one pass, you would scatter them all over hell's wide acres and the Maquis could never recover them.

With the invasion and enemy activity in Southern France ended, we moved over to Maison Blanche, southeast of Algiers, a lovely spot. It was, however, a long haul to Northern Italy. Fortunately, about a month later we were moved to Brindisi in Southern Italy. This switch meant new command channels. We went back completely under the 15th Air Force for administration, and they wanted to know all about our operations just as a matter of record. We didn't have the 12th Air Force for logistics support as in North Africa, but we did have the "Balkan Air Force," which was charged with the operation of the special operations over in the "Jugland," as we called it. We used the same type of combined operations with the RAF.

The "Balkan Air Force" consisted of four wings under a Group Captain. We laid out our operations on the same basis, and flew just as we had been doing down in Africa, and with the same amount of fine cooperation. About the middle of December the 859th Bomb Squadron, Heavy, Special, was sent from England to join our peculiar type of resupply operations. The two squadrons were combined into a group, first

*Rebecca/Eureka system--An aircraft radar homing system in which an airborne interrogator-responser (Rebecca) homes on a ground radar beacon (Eureka) that has been dropped or set up in advance. United States Air Force Dictionary.
called the 15th Special Group and later the 2641st. Similar operations were being conducted by the USAAF from England into the northern part of France.

In Italy we moved from Brindisi up to Rosignano on the 16th of March so that we could operate without such a long supply line into Northern Italy and also into Moravia, Czechoslovakia. Again our command channels changed. We were assigned to MATAF—Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force—at Florence. For administration, airplanes and what-not, we were still under 15th Air Force.

From September 1944 to April 1945, we flew 1268 sorties into Italy; delivered 4,000,000 lb of supplies, 246 agents, and quite a number of leaflets.* In the Balkans from October to March 1945, we flew 692 sorties, brought in about 3,000,000 lb of supplies, 18 agents and 100,000 lb of leaflets.** Also we made 56 sorties into Czechoslovakia.

MR. PETERSON: Can you compare your total loss rates and operational losses not due to enemy action to that for a usual type heavy bomber operation?

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: No, I can't. I don't know about the heavy bombers, but I can say this; we had only one known airplane loss to enemy action, while we lost a total of 17 airplanes.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: The most difficult portion of an airborne operation, I think you will agree, is the en route navigation.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: No question about it. We operated entirely at night except for a few operations in the Balkans.

For the psychological warfare boys we dropped tons of leaflets; "nickeling" was the code word. We even dropped a lot of leaflets on our regular missions. Frequently we would come over a city on our way home, when we were light and going all out, so we would nickel the whole town, provided it was not defended by flak.

*The RAF and the USAAF flew approximately 6700 resistance sorties into France and the Low Countries, delivering 16,000 tons of supplies, equipment, and propaganda material, and about 2000 people. The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare, Concepts Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, December 1962, p. 214.

**From Brindisi to Yugoslavia and Albania, 9211 sorties were successful out of 12,305 attempted, with remarkably low losses, 25 aircraft. Unsuccessful sorties were caused largely by weather (52 per cent), failure to find the drop zone (38 per cent), and mechanical failure (5 per cent). Ibid, p. 175.
II. FRENCH RESISTANCE

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: We will now turn the meeting over to Colonel Hounau who, with Mrs. Hounau, operated with the Maquis during World War II.

COLONEL HOUNAU: I will try to give you a very broad background about the French Resistance. Please remember that I speak from memory, and this took place 20 years ago or more.

The French Resistance began in 1940. There was a lot of resistance spirit in France, but in the beginning the efforts were not well organized. Many groups operated individually, but generally they were not working well.

One group, the Bureau from the Army, was technically good. There was an organization coming from General De Gaulle in the early days, but it had difficulties in making contact in France. There were also some political organizations, but it was only after one year that they began to be coordinated and to really function.

I think there were three phases of the French Resistance. The first one was from the beginning until the occupation of the Free Zone by the Germans. The Resistance was working in both occupied France and the Free-zone region, controlled for more than two years by the Vichy government. The second phase began 8 November 1942 when all France was occupied and from that time the Germans made life more difficult for us. This was also the time when the Germans began to draft young men for labor in Germany. That provided a good stimulus for the Resistance, in a way. Many people, especially boys, were coming to us to avoid being sent into Germany. The third phase coincided with the start of the Allied landings in June 1944. That brought on a hard fight for the Resistance and Maquis.

Personally I was in Correze. Resistance there was certainly justified by the very vivid hatred of the occupying army in that region, and the mountainous and wooded nature of the Department but also and above all by the fact that there existed at Tulle and at Brive, when the Army was dissolved, the so-called d'Armistice with its solid military tradition. This, under the leadership of young officers, could regroup
and carry on the struggle. The Military Preparatory School (later awarded the Medal of the Resistance), the Artillery Group of Tulle, as well as the Infantry Regiment of Brive, furnished the best elements of the Brigade of the Secret Army of Correze. At the liberation this Brigade comprised ten battalions and five garrison units, under the orders of the Departmental Chief Herve, whose real name was Lt. Col. Vaujour.

The zone of action assigned to the Free Corps of Tulle encompassed the city of Tulle—an important trade center because of the Manufacture d'Armes and the armament factory La Marque—and a territorial zone divided into three arrondissements (North, Central, and South) extending to the north and south of the city, each one of which was to mobilize a battalion eventually (Fig. 2).

Before the dissolution of the Army, there were in Correze, and especially in Tulle, important civilian movements of resistance—intelligence networks. Therefore, it was relatively easy to establish contact and to adopt an agreement with the civilian leaders which placed the troops under the orders of a military man while propaganda and the political domain remained the field of the civilian chief. I was the military commander, then a captain. In the beginning there were very few of us and we organized two activities: first was a very small Maquis of maybe 10 or 12 people, chiefly boys, who were very useful to us in receiving parachute drops and making contact with the British; and second, a system of escape and intelligence links with Spain.

In the beginning these two things functioned together. After we had more people in the Maquis and had built up our organization, then our intelligence, counterintelligence and escape activities were more profitable and more useful. After the landing in 1944 we had a big Maquis, 1,000 people at the end, and our links of escape and intelligence were working very well.

I can give you some examples of airborne drops which we received. The first one was at the end of 1941, in the southern part of the Free Zone. At that time there weren't many difficulties in organizing something like that, because the Gestapo was not there. It was relatively
Fig. 2 — Locale of French resistance
easy for us to get to the dropping zone, organize a dropping, and conceal the supplies.

This first dropping was near a small village, and many people were aware of it. The Mayor of the village was there and the police, everybody was there to receive the dropping, without any danger at that time. The next day everybody in the village was smoking British cigarettes. As soon as the Germans were in the Free Zone, after they occupied the rest of France, it was more difficult, quite difficult.

The first Maquis of Tulle were organized in the Monediere at the end of January 1943 (Madranges camp) in conformance with orders given to me to protect a parachute drop landing place. The effective force was about 20 men. I remember this drop very well because it was our first dangerous one with the underground. We received the announcements by radio--BBC--and the day before the dropping 12 or 14 of us went to the dropping zone. The plane arrived exactly on time, and I must say that it was a shock for us to see all these parachutes coming down, just as we had seen in the movies. We got these containers with weapons, submachine guns and revolvers, and the clothes we had asked for at that time. We were happy to receive them. They were useful to us and very helpful for our morale.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: How did you communicate with England?

COLONEL HOUNAU: Our first contact came by the diplomatic pouch through Spain along with some foreign office intelligence. Later, we were sent a radio set by the same diplomatic pouch route. It was with this radio that we made the first contact with London.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: If this radio set came in through Spain in the diplomatic pouch from England, how did you get your hands on it?

COLONEL HOUNAU: It was sent by pouch from Spain to Vichy and then--with some intelligence and connivance in the Vichy Foreign Ministry--to us. After we had made contact, we received by the pouch the announcement of the operation, the arrangements for it, the rules of the operation, and so on. They told us that we would receive an announcement by radio. After the announcement we received the first dropping.

This budding activity developed rapidly. Numerous officers, non-commissioned officers, and men remaining in residence at Tulle after
the dissolution of the Artillery group entered into the organization and brought their assistance—in liaison, and in propaganda, which became very active. Already important quantities of materiel of all kinds had been stolen from the Germans (telephonic equipment, clothing, portable armament, infantry munitions). M. Grande, brewer at Tulle, agreed to stock this materiel in huge warehouses to which no one else had access. A great part was saved until 1944.

We in the Maquis received six or seven different droppings. Those were successful, although there were casualties. There was an unsuccessful operation but it was in a Communist Maquis band. I don't know exactly how it happened, but the German Gestapo knew of it and were on the spot at the time. It was a very bad thing.

Later, we received a team of two people, a British officer and a French officer, with a radio set. With their help the liaison was better organized. We began to have sophisticated operations and droppings, especially after the Allied landing when the Maquis was larger.

From February to April 1943 the contacts multiplied with other organizations, and an important route of escape via Spain led to the installation of several "letter boxes," one of which received a visit by the Gestapo. At the same time I effected liaisons in Paris and sent another officer to Marseilles to find new intelligence networks.

This intensive recruitment necessitated a new organization as well as financial aid for the rebels and caused supply problems.

But the activity led the Gestapo to become very active in Tulle; many young people were compelled to join the Maquis to avoid arrest. Many non-commissioned officers, then inactive, were invited to enter the La Marque factory, then working for the Germans. I myself became an engineer there and established a workshop which provided false identity cards. Living in the town with a normal town job, I could command my Maquis, which was small at that time, and could command my escape organizations.

The action of the Garde Mobile Republican also became formidable. Their raids against the Maquis often led to bloody attacks with losses on both sides. In July 1943 the Madranges camp was attacked by them, but inconclusively since the terrain permitted easy retreat into the Monedieres Mountains.
Simultaneously with the building up of the Maquis and the clandestine units, the search for information became very important. Our network came to extend over all the central and west region and particularly over Correze and Haute-Vienne. Support in radio materiel and agents came from Tulle. Later a network was established in the city itself under the direction of a reserve captain who was a city engineer. Useful information was collected on the enemy garrison, on the manufacture of the German K3 gun by La Manufacture, and on the work schedule of the La Marque factory.

Personnel recruiting was doing very well, although there were problems such as clothing for the Maquisards, armament, money, and means of transport. All these led to the execution of attacks, first in Haute-Vienne on a factory of La Croizille working for the Germans (November 1943), then on La Manufacture, Tulle (December 24, 1943), and the Sidec at Tulle (January 6, 1944). All these expeditions had the same object—to procure arms, gasoline, means of transport. As an example, the December raid, under my command, netted six automatic rifles, five machineguns, four submachine guns, 30 rifles, 200 pairs of shoes, a truck, an ambulance, a sidecar, and a touring car.

Let me cite an example of our methods, the sabotage of a factory. There was a factory in the town of Tulle which was working on a gun for the Germans. Our objectives were to sabotage the factory and to take weapons which would be useful to us. With some people from the Maquis and from the town we staged the operation on Christmas night of 1942.

It turned out to be very easy and successful. I was at that time an engineer in this factory, in charge of the factory security. Three days before the operation I received the lieutenant of the Maquis in the factory, and I showed him how to cut the wire of the telephone and what to take and what to do. It was done just like that.

But the Resistance was not always so fortunate. It was a time of terrible repression. The Maquis were repeatedly attacked and lost men and materiel. Several groups were pursued and dispersed, unable to re-form for several months.

The G.M.R. became frightened and excitable. In one town they machinegunned a civilian car, killing several persons, including a woman just out of the hospital.
Many of my superiors and colleagues were captured and killed. In the spring of 1944 I was warned just in time to make my escape from the Gestapo, but our caches of arms remained undiscovered, and our funds enabled the organization to aid distressed families of casualties and escapees.

I saw that by May our organization was ready although we were still short of equipment. The last days of May were hard indeed around Correze. Both the militia and the Gestapo constantly harassed everyone, not merely suspects. Police raids by the reinforced garrisons were frequent, especially in Tulle and Brive, rightly considered resistance centers.

An official system of pillage began, seizing machinery, tools, and equipment from the factories for shipment to Germany. However, sabotage and demolitions prevented most of these convoys from reaching their destination.

News of the Allied invasion began the third phase of the Resistance. The Vichy militia evacuated Tulle, were ordered to Limoges. They escaped the Maquis by agreeing to join us and then running away. The German garrison left in Tulle, only 60 men, surrendered.

Soon strong German columns approached from the south. On the night of June 8 Tulle was occupied in force and sharp skirmishes took place around the city. The fighting caused large numbers of youths to rush into the woods to join the Maquis, so many we could not assimilate or equip them. Yet it was impossible to order them back to their homes where the SS squads could shoot them.

At this critical period we began to receive the air drops we so badly needed. At the end of June 1944 we received a big drop, a whole section of people, a lieutenant and some 12 or 14 men with him, also food for us. Since they didn't know the country well, it was finally decided that they should work with us, not undertake a specific job on their own.

The last drop was on the 14th of July 1944, Bastille Day. We received a big drop during the daytime from something like 40 or 44 Liberators. That was a major operation. We received a lot of equipment which we greatly needed. At that time Tulle was occupied by about 1000
Germans, something like a large battalion, armed with guns and machine-guns. We were only about 300 in the Maquis, and we were very afraid of them. We learned later that they were afraid of us, also.

However, it took nearly a month and a lot of fighting, mostly ambushes by Resistance units of any German columns that attempted to move out of town, before Tulle surrendered on August 7. I arranged to contact the German colonel the night before, and he agreed to surrender with his whole force, nearly 1000 men.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: Was Madame Hounau helping in these operations?

COLONEL HOUNAU: Yes, she helped in making intelligence contacts in the town, and things like that. One of our lieutenants was captured by the Germans and imprisoned in a French prison with some German control. My wife took a specific contact to speak with him and to help him escape. There was some intelligence in the prison. Everything was organized and the escape was successful.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: Where did you put all these containers and the parachutes?

COLONEL HOUNAU: Before we became powerful in the Maquis, we were obliged to organize a dropping in a zone which was not under our control. We had to choose a zone and to be there, and the Germans could come at any time. It was difficult. The peasants helped us a great deal. It was extremely dangerous for them, certainly more than for us, because we gave the peasants the containers as soon as the dropping was finished. Each peasant would hide a few on his farm somewhere. After the drop we would go away but he had to stay there with all the weapons, waiting for us to call for them. These peasants were very gallant, courageous, and helpful.

In the beginning, we used air dropped weapons for special small operations, for sabotage or for short operations which were made either by people of the Maquis or people of the underground in the towns. We kept these weapons at home.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: In training with Special Forces the requirement is often stated that airdrops be made within two minutes of a given time. The reason given is that security is so tight. I haven't found that to
to be the case. I feel the airplane should go on and fly over even if
it is not on schedule. If the people on the ground are insecure, they
need not signal that they will receive the drop. What were the time
requirements for your operations?

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: We would allow about 30 minutes.

COLONEL HOUNAU: Sometimes we waited more than 30 minutes for the
dropping. Theoretically it was 20 or 30. We did not like, of course,
to wait too long but we understood very well.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: I don't think it is at all realistic to say
plus or minus two minutes. I feel you can't cut it that fine because
there are too many imponderables in a long flight.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: That's the reason I bring it up. Of course,
with the navigation equipment we have for training missions in this
country we are able to do it. I have found that in tactical operations,
when they start firing up ahead, you detour.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: How do you coordinate your time that close?

I didn't even have a watch for three years.*

LT. COLONEL SUTCLIFFE: Did it not depend on the type of operation?
In some areas time was unlimited. In one instance I spent 16 nights in
a row waiting for one drop. The time was immaterial. We knew there was
a drop coming, and we had to be ready for it.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: It will vary with every drop, depending on the
situation on the ground as well as the situation in the air.

COMMODORE WARCUP: These metal containers must have been an awful
embarrassment. I wonder if we have thought of making them of 3-ply,
plywood, that sort of thing, so you could burn them?

COLONEL ADERHOLT: We were using a plastic container somewhat similar
to your metal containers. You can't eat it, you can't sleep in it,
and you can't take it to bed with you. You are in a hell of a fix.
So we now use a piece of thin plywood, which can be burned.

I have read of numerous exfiltration operations from the southwestern area of France. Did you ever have anyone carried out by aircraft? I know there were night landings in France.

*RM-3655-PR, ... Allied Resistance to the Japanese on Luzon,
World War II.
COLONEL HOUNAU: Yes, we had some night landings. There was liaison and they sent me near to Chateauroux and I waited for four days and it did not come. There was another time when I waited five or six days in Normandy and it did not come. It was near the 6th of June.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: I would like to say that the British in that theater developed this technique and were very good at it. Most of our present-day thinking follows the techniques that you people developed. I don't think we got involved until right at the end of the war, is that right?

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: That's right.

COMMODORE WARCUP: They even used Hudsons in those landings.

COLONEL HOUNAU: Some of my friends were successful in these operations. Sometimes we used an electric lamp to give a code letter during the landing or dropping, but generally we used cigarettes in a line. We did not like to have to use that electric light. It was not because we didn't have the possibility to do it. It was because we preferred to use something else.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: One reception team was overly enthusiastic. They had a truck so they turned a searchlight right straight up in the air at us. We took that as a signal that the enemy had arrived, so we took off. I was told later that they waited for us to come back, but we didn't return that night.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: I have been told that it was quite difficult to get from the town to the area to prepare for the drop and then to clean up the drop zone after the drop.

COLONEL HOUNAU: During the early days of the Maquis there was no problem. We did what we wanted in this area. The problem developed at the time when we were expanding and using people of the town. It was extremely difficult, at first, for the town people to get to the drop zone at a specific time. Generally we took as few people as possible, 10 or 12 was usually enough. We preferred to use peasants on the spot. We would choose the dropping zone where we had the possibility of collecting peasants there. Generally we knew well in advance of the operation that was planned. We waited for the word from BBC before telling the other people the operation was tonight.
We had to prepare a way to get to the dropping zone without being seen, because there was a curfew at that time. Nobody could go into the street after 9 o'clock at night without meeting a patrol. It was very difficult.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: How did you organize this group?

COLONEL HOUNAU: Generally there was a time appointed to do this kind of operation. Only a few hours ahead of time we told the team that there was an operation tonight. We told them where it was and showed them routes so that they would not go together.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: What was the German reaction? What measures did they take?

COLONEL HOUNAU: They could tell from the noise of the aircraft what was happening. Sometimes they organized patrols and tried to find the people who were taking part. They would be on the spot then. But nothing happened to us. Something happened in some communities, but it was more due to indiscretion.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: That's the reason I was curious about the delivering aircraft making two passes over the drop zone.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: It wasn't quite that way. We didn't just circle around twice. We would fly off and come back, and it was 10 or 15 minutes between our appearances over the drop zone.

COLONEL HOUNAU: Once we were involved in a bombing operation. We gave information through Intelligence links that there was the possibility of bombing a factory which was north of our Maquis area. We told them to bomb this factory because it was working for the Germans and working on one piece which was essential for a gun.

We were asked to send the exact coordinates for the factory. The operation was done the way we wanted it, with Mosquito bombers. It was very successful. The bombs fell inside the factory. Normally we did not work on this kind of thing.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: What air actions did the Germans take at night to identify drop zones and put firepower on them?

COLONEL HOUNAU: There were very few operations, perhaps seven or eight during the whole time, when the Germans had adequate airpower. The big operations happened only when the Maquis had control of a big
area, and at that time the Germans were in severe difficulties, such as during the Allied landing when they had no aircraft to send against us.

The escape links were interesting also. They were organized very early in 1942, and for that we were in contact with London. We asked what kind of people they would like to have escape. They told us they wanted French specialists, pilots and people like that. There were many people in France who would like to escape, and we had to choose. We organized to have contact with people who would like to escape, to select among them, and to put those chosen in the links of escape. The contact was most difficult and most dangerous because sometimes we received people who were sent by the Germans.

When we had chosen somebody to escape, he had to go somewhere with a password, during the night. Then, he would have to take the train to go to another place, Bordeaux, for example. After this he had to contact somebody else, to tell a word, and then find somebody to guide him through the mountains. There was a whole organization. The problem was to tie together the contacts between the links of escape. It was very important to have many links, and that these links be independent.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: Did you have problems in arranging documentation for the people escaping?

COLONEL HOUNAU: The documentation was very easy because of the complicity of many people in the prefectory. It was no problem to fix cards for bread, for food and everything. We gave them documentation necessary to go through, to travel.

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: It certainly brings out the necessity for having the local inhabitants on your side.

COLONEL HOUNAU: That's the general idea. It's absolutely necessary to have everybody to help you.

COLONEL ADERHOLT: Few Americans spoke French. I often wondered what would happen to me if they documented me and I were asked my name.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: Were the Germans able to put in agents to expose these nets among you?

COLONEL HOUNAU: That happened once in the Maquis. They sent a recruit to come in with us. This man did not look very well, and after some time we understood that he was sent by the Germans. Fortunately we
understood that very early and we had time to break contact with the Germans.

GENERAL ALISON: The Germans could have one of their own men parachute out of a plane in an RAF uniform and say, "I'm an RAF flyer from such and such a base flying such and such an airplane. I was forced to jump." That could compromise your net.

COMMODORE WARCUP: I don't know if it happened that way but certain nets were certainly compromised.

COLONEL HOUNAU: Some Intelligence networks were deeply penetrated by the Germans, such as one network in Bordeaux. There were many casualties but it did not happen too often. They could not find agents to do that. They tried, but not so often as you would think.
III. ALLIED SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLAV GUERRILLAS

GENERAL MAC CLOSKEY: Colonel Sutcliffe will now explain his activities with the Resistance forces in the Balkans.

COLONEL SUTCLIFFE: I will describe the background to the operations that were going on in the Balkans, the organization of the Allied Resistance there, the air operations, and then in hindsight, one or two of the things that perhaps could have been done a little better.

I think most people are familiar with many of the operations. For instance, Fitzroy Maclean's book* has been fairly widely read. As already pointed out, these events took place a long time ago, and many of the things I would like to remember I can't. As we went along today I jotted down items sparked off by things others have said.

The Balkans--Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and up into Hungary--were and always have been an absolute sea of intrigue. After the First World War, Yugoslavia (Land of the South Slavs) was set up under a slightly unhappy rule of the King of Serbia. The country has been a caldron of trouble ever since. Therefore the people are fairly tough, inured to a certain amount of cruelty and hardship. This has bred the sort of person ideally suited to a partisan war. The problems that made this war such a hotbed also invite comparison with current situations where efforts are being made to unite peoples of different nationalities and background.

Naturally I have to deal with the area I was in, on the bend in the Danube where that river flows south from Hungary. It's in a small state called Slavonia, in the northern part of Croatia. It was quite a long hop from Brindisi, Italy for the air crews who had to do our supply drops (Fig. 3).

Yugoslavia had an unhappy rule. The Serbian king of Yugoslavia was assassinated in Marseilles in 1932, I think by a Fascist organization that supported the Germans when they invaded the Balkans in 1941. War had already struck the Balkans before 1941. Greece had put up a good fight against the Italians when Mussolini tried to gobble

*Escape to Adventure, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1951.
Fig. 3 — Area of Yugoslavia guerrilla action
up little Albania, but Yugoslavia clung to neutrality. Then the Germans invaded and the people compelled the government to resist. Mihailovitch, Chief of Staff of the Royal Yugoslav Army, took the field, fought the German invaders and put on a very good show. Marshal Tito and his force didn't come onto the scene, with the many underground movements in that war, until after the Nazi invasion of Russia.

The International Brigade in Spain had been organized by many people from Yugoslavia, including Marshal Tito.

So, of course, when the need arose for a partisan movement or liberation fight against the Germans, the seed was in Communist hands. They had the underground channels ready to make contacts and all sorts of plans set up. One would have hoped that the two forces--Tito's and Mihailovitch's--would have combined to form a single fighting force. They were all fighting for Yugoslavia, essentially. Even Marshal Tito, who always was a Communist, did say at the time, "Let us put aside political aims of the day and fight against the common invader. At the end of the war we will try and sort out who does what."

Unfortunately, this didn't work for reasons too complicated to get into here. The fact remains there was a civil war as well as a fight against the Germans. There was Marshal Tito's partisan force, basically a Communist organization. There was Mihailovitch who had the remnants of the old Royal Yugoslav Army. There was the Fascist Ustasi, fighting on the side of the Germans. And of course there was the invading German Army.

The German Army's Group E, in the Balkans, numbered about 16 divisions, roughly equal to the German Army in Italy in 1944. Therefore, it was worthwhile for the Allies to put quite a considerable effort into supporting Marshal Tito, who eventually became the dominant figure in Yugoslavia. His forces were more effective. They had an inspiration to fight because they were Communists, (you know the way it is now in the Far East). They were fighting for an ideal and had won considerable success against Mihailovitch in their three-sided fight.
The first information of forces actively fighting against the Germans came back from escaping POWs and airmen. If you will remember, there were strategic targets, such as Ploesti and Vienna, on the other side of our area. A lot of airmen were escaping, some making their way back by devious means to the Dalmatia Islands and getting back to Allied lines.

There was one force, whose activities I won't go into, but it was talked about quite a lot for its help to the Resistance fighters and to aviators attempting to get back. Gradually quite a lot of information reached London and Cairo about the activities in the Balkans.

**ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED RESISTANCE**

**COLONEL SUTCLIFFE:** The growth of the Allied missions started in 1943 with the dropping of one British team into Yugoslavia. Then during the next year or so we organized some 16 or 17 missions in different parts of that country and followed this up with 8 or 9 more in 1944.

I think at best we had about 30 separate missions, each 2 to 5 men. A typical team would consist of 2 officers and 2 radio operators.

These liaison officers, BLOs as they were called--British liaison officers--were equally likely to be American liaison officers. I was a captain at the time and the little mission that I had included my officer assistant, an American sergeant radio operator, and a British corporal who was the other operator. Those were the four of us.

When we first went in, none of us could speak the language very well. The American sergeant had come from the country as a small boy and he could speak a little. I had a guide to basic Serbo-Croat and knew a few words. Language is one of the great problems. In the rest of Europe it's not so difficult because there are ways and means of getting people who can speak the languages, but in the Balkans it was very difficult.

Of course, in Yugoslavia there was not the problem a Caucasian would have in Vietnam for instance. In Yugoslavia most of us looked somewhat like the local inhabitants.
The BLO team aims were first, to organize supplies of arms, ammunition, food, clothing, medical necessities, explosives, and all the items for a force that is cut off from all normal supplies; second, to get information home on the general organization, the composition of enemy forces in the area, and on any suitable local bombing targets; and third, to aid escaping airmen and prisoners.

Another role was a daily report on the weather. Reports in laymen's language from several scattered points were of considerable assistance to the Air Force. We would say, "The sky is completely covered"; or, "The sky is three-quarters clear," or some other equally basic thing. If he has a number of these coming in from various places, a weatherman can very quickly piece together a basic picture--how far fronts have moved and what the sky cover is in many localities, etc. This proved to be quite effective in helping out both the supply dropping operations and the bombing operations.

Now, let's just say a couple of words about the training of the people for these operations. Of course, the main way of going in was by parachute. A few teams went in by boats obtained from fishermen over in Brindisi or down south or in the islands, but it was mostly parachute dropping. So we had to teach people how to use parachutes. Originally our school was in Lebanon, it was moved to Brindisi later. Our school took three days to train a parachutist. In three days a man could be taught how to get out of an airplane and fall and not do too much damage to himself. In three or four weeks he could be taught enough to hurt himself. Then, in longer training, maybe four or five months, he could be made a proper parachutist. Most of us did only three or four days, during which we made four or five drops. Then a night drop was the sixth, and we were fully-qualified parachutists and got our parachute pay!

Having become basically a parachutist, the next thing was to learn from your fellow Air Force officers some details on the requirements for drop zones (DZs) and how to select and mark a landing strip. I would stress the need for agents to understand the problems of the air.

Since those days, I have had several thousand hours of flying in different types of airplanes so I see it all in hindsight, but at the
time I often wouldn't believe all the problems airmen gave for not reaching a DZ on time. I wondered why they kept circling around those mountains. If only I knew then what I know now I could have been of much more help to the crews of the aircraft.

In the school one learned a certain amount about the weapons that were available in that country and a certain amount about the people. In this sort of activity, it is important to know the background of the people, their temperament and their way of life, because it makes a great difference in the value you can be to them. All of that takes time. If you can get people who know the language, and who study the country and its history, then they can be of much more value when they get to the country.

AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Colonel Sutcliffe: The types of aircraft supporting us at first were Halifax four engine bombers. Originally, their bases were near Cairo, but in 1943 they moved to Southern Italy to be nearer their DZs. There were also DC-3s operated by American and by British crews, and the Liberators, which moved, as you know, from North Africa over to Italy. And a number of Wellingsons had come out after being phased out of bombing operations from England. They proved to be quite useful aircraft all over again. Then there were the British Lysanders and also a small group of B-25 Mitchells operating under an American colonel to do daylight pick-up operations, when possible.

Whether it is better to do daylight operations or night operations I think is easily resolved. If you can do daylight operations, you do. They are more accurate, they are easier, and have fewer losses. The problem, of course, is the amount of enemy opposition. In our case the training area for the German Air Force was at Lake Balaton in Hungary. As the Allied offensive operations in 1943 and 1944 got fairly intensive in the more northern areas, even more of the German training was done down there. It became difficult for our people to try to do daylight operations, so they changed nearly all the operations to night.

The next question is whether to land or drop. Again it's always better to land, if you can. From the ground point of view, if you drop
you lose payload because of parachutes, inaccurate drops, etc. Of course, there are problems for landing: Is the strip going to be suitable? Is it going to be well marked? Is it going to have the ruts filled in?

Again with hindsight, I think of the American DC-3s from Bari and Brindisi landing three or four in turn at night at a strip I had hastily marked out. I wish I had had my present knowledge then. Competence at selection and marking of a landing strip is most important. However, this is only a matter of learning--one doesn't have to be a pilot. One needn't be, in my opinion, a member of any particular service, but he must know air operations and methods of marking DZs.

Maps of our area were fantastically inaccurate. The most effective way to indicate a DZ location was by bearing and distance from a large town. This wasn't too difficult, and was the way we nearly always did it. My area was between the Drava River on the north, and the Sava on the south. The main railway to Belgrade ran between these two large rivers, so there were very clear ground features for flyers, but there were no navigation aids.

Today's equipment would make flying over that type of terrain much easier. In those days the chaps had to fly this long distance, through all the mountains, and then pick up a pinpoint landmark and perhaps get shot up over German-occupied towns. Four-fifths of the area was covered with clouds, except in the winter when it was very cold and fairly clear. It was really quite remarkable that pilots could find their positions.

Our only hope was to try to pick out a good area, to mark the DZ properly, and also to try to indicate it with fires on the peaks of the surrounding hills. We could never make the partisans understand why they should climb to the top of a hill to light a fire in the middle of the night, but the air crews appreciated those fires because they made the run-ins much safer. The marking of the DZ itself normally was done by an agreed pattern, a letter made up of so many fires.

At certain times when we would get interference from German aircraft we simply set up torches, again in the pattern of a letter. Again we also had the Rebecca-Eureka system, and in some cases it worked quite well.
Terrain had a considerable influence, and as the DZ was normally in the middle of a mountain area, the Rebecca-Eureka wasn't too useful. We had another very helpful navigation aid, a short range ground-to-air VHF radio. These conditions are different today, with many improved aids available.

One would also try to give, in a message requesting a drop, information on where the German positions were and on other local hazards. Normally one's requests for a drop would state the requirements in order of priority. This varied, depending on where you were. If your team happened to be dropped in the Montenegro Mountains your requirement during winter was for clothes and food, in summer for weapons and ammunition. The only unusual drop that I ever requested was for about five tons of salt to feed the local population during the winter of 1944. You can imagine the number of salt bags that we received, in free drops. The remainder were the sort of thing you expect a partisan force to need, such as weapons and ammunition.

Agents would parachute in weighing maybe 12 or 13 stone * and come out 6 or 9 months later weighing 9 or 10 stone, saying they would never go back, to the same area anyway.

The weapons the partisan forces had included some of Italian, German, British, and American manufacture. What a job for a quartermaster to try to supply ammunition for all those different weapons. It happened all the time, however, and in a request one would have to specify a variety of calibers of ammunition. Explosives were important to us especially because we were on the railway line that supplied the German Army group in the Balkans.

I wonder how many people would like to sit in a DZ at night while bales of boots whistled down upon them. I would get over to one side, but we couldn't dissuade partisans who were so enthusiastic about getting the supplies. They would always be right out there; remarkably, I heard of only one chap getting hit by a bag of boots. It plowed him into the ground.

I would like to go on to the landing operations. We never had any

*1 stone = 14 lb.
four engine aircraft landing. As the war went on over the years, the partisans collected a very large number of wounded people in the hills, and had no means of getting them out. It was a guerrilla type of war in which the Germans were "entitled" to shoot anyone they found, which they did on many occasions.

The partisans' operations became less effective with so many wounded to look after. So one of the great priorities was to open up strips and get aircraft to land and take away casualties. This was of sufficient importance that an entire partisan force was committed for a particular period to holding an area where a landing strip would be opened up. Night landings were the rule for the entire force supplying us during the early summer of 1944. Night after night DC-3s would come in. We admired these crews tremendously, the way they took fantastic risks to land on these hastily prepared, undrained strips.

It wasn't long before the Germans caught on to what was happening. They wanted to disrupt as much as they could the evacuation of wounded, prisoners of war, and airmen, especially since every sortie that came in to pick them up also brought us a load of supplies.

You may remember, by reading in more recent times, that in 1944 there was consideration to diverting the course of the war, from fighting up the spine of Italy to making a major landing in the Balkans and driving north. I think Mr. Churchill regrets very much to this day that it wasn't done. The course of history in this part of Europe might well have been changed.

We were in no position to ask for close support air strikes. The best we could do was to give a general trend on enemy activities and potential targets.* The sort of target information we could provide would be, for example, that normally there was considerable troop movement on such and such bridges over the Sava. Air Force bombers were diverted to this type of target when weather prevented attack of major targets. Bombers did, in fact, take out most of the bridges on the rivers.

*Targets were nominated by the guerrillas and transmitted through the Allied liaison officers with the guerrillas. Bridges, viaducts, and rail junctions too heavily defended to be attacked by guerrillas were usually nominated. The Role of Airpower in Guerrilla Warfare, Concepts Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, December 1962, p. 176.
There was little the enemy could do about our DZs for night drops. We repeatedly moved the DZs, and those markings visible the following day would be those for the strips that we already used. Still, these German fliers in training along Lake Balaton learned to bomb our strips. The enemy would keep up continual bombing on the strips we had used for night landings. Often we would have to cancel night landings just hours before they were scheduled, or even shine a red light to wave off the chaps coming in to land. This was unfortunate.

The next enemy interference was with night intruder aircraft. Somebody asked if the enemy night fighters interfered too much. I think the priority on German night fighters was higher in Central Europe than in our area at the time. After all, we were not in a major theater of the war, and if German night fighters were available, other than in training, they were moved up north. But we did get some, and that put an end to the massive evacuations from our strips. The enemy night fighters would come over for a complete week; they would pinpoint all our strips, and then they would wait. We had no method of warning our aircraft that there were night fighters about. All we could do was maybe to put up a smoke signal to warn our aircraft away. We had aircraft shot down on every single strip and this closed the entire operation. It never reopened.

If we guaranteed a good strip, the Mitchells sometimes would come over with a fairly strong Mustang fighter escort to make a pickup in a daylight operation. This had to be confined mainly to bringing out some important people or picking up downed air crews.

The old German Fieseler Storch was a most unpleasant little reconnaissance airplane that would come around to locate the partisan forces. It had a light machine gun that made life pretty unpleasant. You can hide from an airplane that is going fast but you can't hide from an airplane that can fly in tight circles above you at 50 knots. Also, those pilots frequently had bags of grenades that they emptied upon the man on the ground. My only casualty, other than my extra radio man who died from disease, was from this Storch catching us in the open.
I do have a little story. A local partisan commander was charged with helping keep our strip in good condition. After the Germans had dropped some delayed action bombs on it, I asked him, "Would you please get some of these bombs moved?"

My knowledge of bomb disposal was nil, except I had an idea the best thing was to put on an explosive charge and then run. I was horrified to see a couple of these strapping great partisan chaps pick up a couple of bombs and walk off with them under their arms. That was their bomb disposal unit. We just warned them and left them to it.

The enemy also showered us with leaflets—for which we often suggested other uses.

HINDSIGHT ON THE RESISTANCE

COLONEL SUTCLIFFE: In hindsight the results of the Resistance were to hold 16 German divisions in the Balkans, as many of the enemy as there were in Italy. It doesn't take many partisans to keep down a very large force of organized troops, and I think perhaps it paid off. It would have been far better had our partisan forces been organized into a more cohesive force, instead of having a civil war as well as an external war going on.

From our own point of view I think there were far too many different organizations involved in related tasks in one area. You can only have one over-all controlling headquarters, not half a dozen. One of the great lessons of the war from the point of view of Resistance groups is that it doesn't take one organization for Intelligence, another to manage escape and evasion, a separate one to run supply missions, etc. It takes just one organization, and then these operations can be controlled that much better.

The other thing that is so important is that the people who go to these areas have sound training in all the different aspects of their mission and of the local area. It's impossible, of course, to get one man who knows all about air operations, weapons, supply, and also speaks the language. If he did know all this, he would be too old to do the basic thing of jumping out of an airplane to get there. But the more the man knows before he gets there, the better it is.
GENERAL VOLCKMANN: I came up with a conclusion that the civilian population in the Balkans probably sustained a greater loss of life and property than in any other area that I have read about. Still, they maintained a tremendous impetus of effective force. Did you come away with that?

COLONEL SUTCLIFFE: Very true. There were 16 million people in Yugoslavia when the war started; there were 15 million when the war ended. A small number went away or were captured and taken out, but nearly a 15th of the entire population was killed. This is unprecedented. But, the problem was that they had a civil war as well as an external war.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: There was a tremendous destruction of property too.

COLONEL SUTCLIFFE: It was quite horrid. The day the war ended, I was trying to rejoin the British Army, which was then going into Austria. It was quite impossible because we were having a small battle about who owned a particular bit of ground (Trieste). The Italian people said they owned it from the old days; the new regime in Yugoslavia and also the British and the Americans were saying, "We are going in, stand aside." I was on the wrong side, so I had to make a hasty retreat down to Belgrade.

GENERAL VOLCKMANN: I think there is an awful lot of soft thinking today that you have to protect the civilian population, you can't let them sustain casualties, and so forth. But every time you make a statement like that, you have to really back away and take another look because here is an example where the civilian population took a terrific pounding, not only from the standpoint of life but from the standpoint of property itself, and still continued to maintain an effective fight.

COLONEL SUTCLIFFE: The biggest casualty rate in Belgrade, for instance, was at the time the Germans invaded in 1942 and the American Air Force came over and bombed the railway stations and one or two other places. This alienated the population considerably against Americans at the time. But the same applied really all over Europe during the war. If there is a war going on, I think it is a big problem as to who accepts what.
COLONEL HOUNAU: In France it was a little different because there wasn't a civil war, but the casualties among the civilian population were heavy from deportation, people killed by the Germans, and so on. A point not to be forgotten when you are involved in subversive activity to aid conventional warfare, it's very efficient, very useful, but for the civilian population it can be very costly.

In France the activity of the Communist people was of a different type because their aim was different. Their aim, as you know, was to get up a political organization to take the power, and they did not try to avoid casualties. Sometimes they welcomed casualties because it was an opportunity for them to do what they wanted.

If you are careful in selecting subversive activities, you can avoid a good part of the civilian casualties. If you make guerrilla and small operations only on the road, out of the towns, the casualties are fewer. Here is an example of what happened in the interior.

When the Allies landed on the 6th of June, we received orders not to try to capture a town, but to make harassments on the roads. The Communists took the undefended town and killed 20 or 30 Germans there at the time. Soon after, a Panzer division came from the south and, of course, meted out very heavy punishment and a lot of people were deported. In this kind of war, you must be very careful for the civilian population, and it's possible to do it.

MR. PETERSON: What were the most useful things that air did for you in this type of activity?

COLONEL SUTCLIFFE: I think what they did was the basic requirement. They did the supply, they did the evacuation where possible, they did air strikes, they did a certain amount of propaganda.

I think the very fact that they were able to evacuate a large part of all the casualties from the Balkans, including Marshal Tito's casualties, did much to help good will and to maintain the enthusiasm for the Allied cause. The Allies, the American officers, all of us who were there were absolutely on top of the world during the week that this evacuation was going on. We could have had anything we wanted because our popularity was so tremendous.
COLONEL ADERHOLT: From the pilot's viewpoint, the most difficult of all the operations I have known were the night landings. I know it was quite difficult in that country for the ground people to find landing zones of the size required for the C-47 and similar aircraft. I am concerned because today, pointing to counterinsurgency in the underdeveloped areas and after 20 years in trying to go straight up and straight down, we still have not appreciably improved our capability.

I throw this out because today we are in a state of development that can produce aircraft and put them in the Air Commando group that can operate up to 10,000 feet and can work out of airfields of 100 to 150 meters with proper training. We have neglected this field and have gone to a very expensive form of mobility.

Don't get me wrong. The chopper is essential and in certain types of operations cannot be replaced. But when we think of the total number of insurgency-threatened countries, and we multiply the bill, in men and materials, in trying to teach indigenous people who are not technically minded to maintain and operate these vehicles, we go right back to a simple airplane. But we can provide mobility. We have had very fine results in light aircraft, several built overseas and one built in this country.

I would just like to ask the Colonel, to make it a matter of record, if you had had an airplane with the range and a lift capability of one ton or 6 or 7 people that could have operated from fields of 150 meters with relatively clear approaches, would this not have been a boon to your operations?

COLONEL SUTCLIFFE: I prefer not to get chained down to something that I think is far more involved than that simple question. Your statement really said too much, I think. You can't compare helicopter operations with these long-range transport operations. They have totally separate roles.

I do think there has been advance in slow aircraft. For Malaya we produced a very fine airplane, the Pioneer, to answer a particular problem, and subsequently the Twin Pioneer that operated in Kenya. Other developments have been the Canadian Caribou and the German Dornier.
These airplanes are available. When you get to longer range you need bigger airplanes. To give you a specific answer, yes, of course, if you have a STOL airplane you can find 10 times more strips.

Colonel Adenholt: I have noticed throughout this Symposium the general satisfaction of all the unconventional warfare ground forces with the type of support given by air. In contrast there were many complaints on airborne operations. I point out that where we have given special training we haven't had this problem. In the airborne field, where we take a pilot that had 10 missions across the board and try to adapt him to a large complex airborne operation, we sometimes ended up many miles from the DZ. I think this should be recognized.

General Volckmann: One thing pointed out in all the discussions around this table is the need to break the communications barrier between the delivering and the receiving forces. I experienced the same frustration when I wasn't allowed to communicate with the submarines. The barrier is supposed to be for security reasons but I say we sometimes carry these security precautions so far that we lose more than we would by opening up a little bit.

Colonel Sutcliffe: Rather than its being a matter of adequate security, I think communications just hadn't been designed at the time. Most all of the special operations did have communications as time went on. Today there are all sorts and means of communications.

General Volckmann: I didn't have this problem with air, but I was not allowed to communicate with the submarines.

General Mac Closkey: We were just receiving some S-band phone equipment at the end of the war. We dropped people with S-phones in DZs and talked to them from the airplane. Colonel Reinhardt, in your role as rapporteur, can you give us a summary of the discussions today?

Colonel Reinhardt: The work of Allied Special Forces in World War II fits into the pattern of operations now referred to as unconventional warfare. Much that was learned in that field in the Mediterranean Theater is susceptible to broader application, after allowance for conditions such as terrain, weather, and the nature of the partisan groups involved.
Unusual but by no means impossible demands were placed upon air-power...for supply, introduction of agents, and evacuation. Bombing attacks, a corollary task, awaited success in the partisans' intelligence efforts, often their dominant mission. Another partisan mission, tying down regular troops of the enemy, was especially effective in Yugoslavia. In France and, as we learned yesterday, in the Philippines,* the emphasis was put on the intelligence mission instead of attacks upon enemy troops, to protect the population from the occupying armies. The quick shift to harassing attacks on the enemy troops was timed for the expected linkup with friendly conventional armies.

From today's discussion, I suggest six points:

1. The value of prehostility planning and organization to an indigenous underground movement

2. Special requirements in the selection and training of agents and liaison personnel, and in particular, greater understanding by the people on the ground of the characteristics, requirements, and problems of air operations

3. Intensive, specialized training for air units assigned to support missions

4. Urgent need for unified direction and control of all types of Special Operations (unconventional warfare)

5. The impact of special operations upon the local population, and

6. In summary, unconventional warfare is often a useful auxiliary to conventional forces, and not an independent campaign in itself.

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*RM-3655-PR, ...Allied Resistance to the Japanese on Luzon, World War II.
Appendix

BIOMETRIC SKETCHES OF PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS NOT ON ACTIVE DUTY WITH
U.S. ARMED FORCES

Major General John R. Alison, USAFR, was the deputy commander of
the Number 1 Air Commando Force, which supported the Chindit Forces in
Burma in 1944. He received his commission in the Air Corps Reserve
in 1937, served with U.S. missions in England and the Soviet Union,
and commanded a fighter squadron under General Claire Chennault in
China before helping to organize the Air Commandos. Following the
Burma Campaign, he took part in the Luzon and Okinawa Campaigns. His
current Reserve assignment is as Assistant to the Commander, 15th Air
Force. A former Assistant Secretary of Commerce, General Alison is an
Air Force Association Past President, and a Vice President of the
Northrop Corporation.

Colonel Bernard L. Anderson, USAFR, was a staff officer of the
Far East Air Force on Bataan prior to the war. Following surrender to
the Japanese, Anderson escaped and began guerrilla operations, command-
ing the U.S.-Filipino guerrilla forces in Central and Southern Luzon
from June 1942 until the liberation. He remained on duty in the
Philippines until 1948, when he became an executive in a Philippine
industry. Among the American and Philippine awards he holds are the
Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, and the Philippine
Republic's Legion of Honor, degree of Commander.

Lieutenant General Yves Paul Ezanno, French Air Force, was
Commanding Officer of the 2nd Tactical Air Group in Algeria, conducting
the air operations of the "Plan Challe" from July 1957 until April
1959. He was an instructor at the Pilot Training School, Saint-Cyr,
when on the French Armistice Day in 1940 he flew a liaison aircraft
to England and joined the Free French Forces there. He flew against
the Afrika Korps (1941-42), later was transferred to England, attached
to the RAF, and given command of the 198th RAF Fighter Squadron (1944).
He was shot down in the Netherlands in October, 1944, but returned to
Allied lines despite enemy fire. He had also served in both Indochina and Korea prior to his command in Algeria. He was Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training at the Allied Air Force Headquarters (AIRCENT) before being assigned as Deputy to the French Representative to the NATO Standing Group in Washington.

Colonel Leonard M. J. Hounau, French Army, founded an underground Commando group near Tulle and later was the Deputy Commander of an Intelligence and Escape network during the occupation of France, in World War II. He is a graduate of the Ecole Polytechnique and of the National Defense Institute. He escaped from a POW camp in Germany in July 1940 and returned to France to set up the underground unit. He served as Military Attache in Prague from 1954 to 1958 and is currently assigned to the French Delegation to NATO in Washington.

Major General Edward G. Lansdale, * USAF, served two tours of duty in the Philippines. In 1945-48 he was on duty at Headquarters, AFWESPAC, and from 1950 to 1953 he was with JUSMAG as adviser to Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay. He is currently Assistant (Special Operations) to the United States Secretary of Defense.

Colonel Rene Laure, French Army, commanded the brigade (operational and administrative control) of Adrar in the Western Sahara (1957 and 1958) and the brigade of Bone in Eastern Algeria in 1959. He is a graduate of the Ecole Speciale Militaire, Saint-Cyr, and of the Army War College. During World War II he was in charge of the "Indochina Section" in "Force 136," Calcutta, and later, assumed command of guerrilla forces in Upper Laos. He has served 25 years overseas, in Africa and Asia. He is assigned to the French Delegation to NATO in Washington.

Brigadier General Monro MacCloskey, USAF (Ret.), organized and commanded the first U.S. AAF Heavy Bomber Squadron (and later Group) to engage in night supply dropping operations behind enemy lines in Northern Italy, the Balkans, and Southern Europe from bases in North Africa and Italy. He has served as Chief of the Reserve and National

*General Lansdale, although on active duty, is included here because of his experience in counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippines.
Guard Division in Air Force Headquarters and, upon graduation from
the National War College in 1948, was named Chief of the Air Intelligence
Policy Division, USAF Headquarters. He was Air Attache in Paris from
1949 to 1952, after which he was appointed Commander of the Air Resupply
and Communications Service of the Military Air Transport Service.
Prior to his retirement he commanded the 28th Air Division. Among
decorations awarded to him by the United States, France, and Morocco
are the Silver Star, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Legion of
Merit, the French Legion of Honor, Degrees of Commander and Officer,
and Croix de Guerre with Gold Stars and with Palms.

Lieutenant Colonel M. W. Sutcliffe, British Army Air Corps, was
a ground liaison officer in jungle operations in Malaya, 1952-53, his
third campaign in guerrilla warfare. He was commissioned in the Royal
Irish Fusiliers in 1942, fought in North Africa and Italy until June
1944. Then he was assigned to the Military Mission in Yugoslavia, and
served with Tito's Partisans until the end of World War II. Following
this, he served with British Mandate Forces in Palestine. He is
currently assigned to the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker,
Alabama.

Lieutenant Colonel Jose M. Tinio, PA, headed the Special Projects
Division of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency from its
inception in 1949 and subsequently became Deputy Coordinator of the
NICA. He is a graduate of the University of the Philippines, and
began his military career with the ROTC at the University. He escaped
from the Bataan Death March and became the intelligence officer of
the I Corps, President Quezon's own Guerrillas. After the anti-Huk
campaign, he served as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters,
Philippine Army. He has completed several intelligence courses in
the Philippines and the United States, and is currently serving with
the Philippine Embassy in Washington. Among his decorations are the
Purple Heart with Oak Leaf Cluster (United States), Anti-dissident
Campaign Ribbon and Military Merit Medal (Philippines), and the Legion
of Honor (Vietnam).
Squadron Leader A. Twigg, RAF, was a Flight Commander on No. 33 Fighter Squadron in Malaya during 1950 and 1951. Since then his duties have included tours with the joint Helicopter Experimental Unit and, as Commanding Officer, with No. 225 Helicopter Squadron. He is presently serving on the RAF staff of the British Defence staffs, Washington.

Colonel Napoleon D. Valeriano, PA, commanded the 7th Battalion Combat Team in its very effective operations against the Huks, and subsequently became military assistant to President Magsaysay. He is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy and the U.S. Cavalry School. He served with the guerrillas on Luzon during World War II. He has also been Commander of the Presidential Guards Battalion, Secretary to the Philippine National Security Council, National Security Coordinator for the Philippines, and Philippine Military Representative to the SEATO Secretariat. He is coauthor of Counter-guerrilla Operations: Lessons from the Philippines.

Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann, USA (Ret.), commanded the U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon, from 1942 through the liberation in 1945. He is a West Point graduate, and was in command of the 11th Infantry (Philippine Army). He escaped from Bataan after the surrender and joined the guerrilla forces, rising to their command in North Luzon. After World War II he attended the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College. After graduation he became Assistant Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division. He is the author of Field Manual 31-20, Combatting Guerrilla Forces, and Field Manual 31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Forces, as well as the book, We Remained, which is his account of three years behind the enemy lines in the Philippines. He holds the Distinguished Service Cross.

Air Commodore P. E. Warcup, C.B.E., RAF, commanded the RAF at Kuala Lumpur, 1957-59. He is a graduate of the RAF College, Cranwell, the Joint Services Staff College, and the Imperial Defence College. He was an RAF test pilot at the outbreak of World War II, and was a prisoner of war in Germany from 1940 to 1945. He is currently the Assistant Commandant, RAF Staff College.