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JANUARY 1964

KREMLIN MOODS
Nathan Leites

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is a study of the published statements of various Bolshevik leaders, particularly Premier Khrushchev, up to the close of 1962. Parts of the study, which is now complete, have already appeared in shortened form as RM-3362-ISA, Some Examples of the "Brighter View" of East-West Relations, January 1963 (Unclassified, For Official Use Only); RM-3506-ISA, The Kremlin's Horizon, March 1963; and RM-3618-ISA, Kremlin Thoughts: Yielding Rebuffing, Provoking, Retreating, May 1963.

An analysis of the public language of the Russian leaders provides important clues to the state of mind and feelings of those in the Kremlin and hence supplements the study of Soviet actions.

The Soviet statements with which this analysis is concerned are in many instances of a sort that Bolsheviks themselves would not regard as their most important political communications, but they are nonetheless revealing of politically relevant Bolshevik feelings and moods.

The concern here is only partly with ideology. When Bolsheviks speak of their ideology, they ordinarily restrict themselves to those beliefs that are at once (1) fully conscious, (2) expressive of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, and (3) explicitly formulated for some level of communication, whether it be with the whole world listening or within the Presidium, if not in some even more private context. The beliefs analyzed here are frequently less consciously held, less derivative of official doctrine, less fully formulated.
Nor should it be supposed that these beliefs, in the author's opinion, govern the conduct of the Kremlin. Most of them are highly ambiguous -- even contradictory. For this reason alone they could not possibly determine policy.

What weight, the reader may then ask, is to be attached to them? Are we not dealing here with words that have ceased to be "operative" and are now only "ritualistic"? This is a difficult question to answer with any certainty since, to the author's knowledge, there are as yet no case studies addressed to this question. Whatever their status, these feelings and beliefs are not insignificant. Take, for instance, the materials ordered below under the rubrics "Utilize Possibilities" and "The Duty to Retreat": If Bolshevik leaders in 1962 had not had the attitudes there attributed to them, their conduct in Cuba would have been significantly different. In any given political situation and with any given set of objectives, there are usually several ways to conduct oneself that are not patently beside the mark; and moods of the sort discussed here contribute to one's choice. If we ever come to the time when Moscow's conduct can be predicted, we shall need to take explicit account of them. Nor are they made meaningless by the fact that competing proposals are constantly being broached in the Kremlin, for such proposals (or some of them) are often determined wholly or in part by attitudes of the kind discussed here.

To cite an instance, by placing missiles in Cuba did not Khrushchev violate the prohibition against being
reckless? -- a point discussed below. Even supposing that he did (in the author's view Khrushchev was acting in accord with the principles of "utilizing all possibilities" and "pushing to the limit," and would have become "adventurist" only if he had refused to withdraw), would a violation of an imperative render irrelevant an analysis of the imperative itself? A religious devotee may find himself in a state of sin, but this does not make irrelevant an analysis of his faith if one wants to predict his conduct, or even to understand him.

At many points the reader is likely to raise the question of Soviet sincerity. A statement by Khrushchev, for instance, may be viewed not so much as an expression of his state of soul, as will be suggested, but rather as a device deliberately employed by a statesman pursuing given objectives in a given situation. To choose one example among many, when Khrushchev avers to correspondents on May 11, 1960, that "I reckon myself to be among the incorrigible optimists," is it not wrong, and naive to boot, to deal with this under the heading "Uncertain Survival"? Must not the historian and the political scientist avoid tearing elements out of their context, and is not the context in this instance Khrushchev's tactic on the U-2 incident, which he is then exploiting? In fact, he goes on to say, illustrating his "incorrigible optimism," that "I view [the U-2 flight] not as a preparation for war, but as a probe," to be repelled by limited counteraction: "There they were 'probing' us, but we gave it to them on the nose." Hence, it may be said, the proper question to raise is why Khrushchev
chose this tactic rather than alleging an impending SAC strike, which would have disallowed any reference to his "optimism."

That certainly is a proper question even though it is not one treated below. But it is not the only proper question, even if one assumes that Khrushchev may not have been completely sincere. The only proof of the pudding is in the eating. Let us see how far we get by tearing events out of their contexts and attempting to discover other contexts for them -- contexts provided by this or that hypothesis in the human sciences at large (in the author's usage, often of psychoanalysis) which may appear pertinent in direct or indirect fashion.

It may be appropriate to say something about the relationship between the present study and the portrait of Bolshevism which the author attempted ten years ago (A Study of Bolshevism, 1953; Ritual of Liquidation, 1954).

As the reader will see from the frequent references to these earlier studies, the subjects which are addressed now are, on the whole, the same as those with which the author was then concerned.

The major question here is: How have Bolshevik positions on these matters or Bolshevik concern with them changed? For instance, are the Soviets still preoccupied with the question whether the present is a mere means for the future or something in its own right? And are the answers given still the same?

While the content of most of the chapters of A Study of Bolshevism is thus touched upon in the present analysis,
the two have not been related systematically, and not all that is still pertinent in the earlier portrait has been incorporated in the present study. The pages to follow thus fall short of a second version of the earlier study brought up to date.

It may be added that the focus of attention has been enlarged in one respect: It now seems relevant to pay close attention to the phrasing of Soviet feelings and beliefs. It is for this reason that the Russian words themselves are frequently quoted. One might even say that they go far toward forming a nucleus for a dictionary of Basic Bolshevik.
SUMMARY

Khrushchev's promise to bury his enemies has often been remarked in the western press. Whatever his real intentions, his pronouncements make use of a wholly typical piece of Bolshevik imagery. The Soviets have never taken the downy owl for their mournful Psyche. Theirs is grimmer stuff: the final agony, corruption, the yawning grave. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Soviet leaders continue to speak of the enemy as a rotting corpse (now or soon) that exudes bad odors, pollutes the air, and endangers the living. It thus remains imperative to bury him.

By the same token the earlier Bolshevik horror of death persists. Direct references to one's own death, to death close at hand, continue to be rare; it is more conveniently thought of as a punishment for enemies and as proof of their bankruptcy. Conversely, the present will never die, i.e., will always be remembered, on condition, however, that it abolish the past and also itself. While Lenin acquires some personal immortality, it is only by strenuous work that Khrushchev and others can subdue the fear of their impending personal annihilation.

Though the Kremlin has of course in recent years become more favorable to the Soviet consumer both in act and in word, the Bolshevik habit of treating the present simply as a means has not disappeared. There is hardly anything that should be viewed as an end in itself, but rather as a means to the full attainment of an ultimate
goal. Only Communism will bring release from this re-
requirement.

While the habitual themes concerning total dedication
to the cause continue to be sounded, there is evidence
that the Soviet leadership is abandoning the exalted image
of man and the exacting moral demands on him which previ-
ously were invoked at least within the Party. Khrushchev
himself now attempts to offer proof of his own dedication,
while admitting implicitly that ordinary human beings in
all stations and societies strive primarily for personal
gratification and aren't too interested in politics.

Bolshevik leaders continue to oppose the temptation --
obscurely perceived in oneself and distressingly apparent
in others -- to stop short of completed action. They
remain apprehensive that in the very course of an enter-
prise one's incentive or ability will collapse; or that
there will be procrastination; or even that those in
charge will content themselves with words. But at the
same time, in his enterprise against West Berlin, Khrush-
chev seems to be acting in accord with the feared dis-
position to replace action by often repeated announcements
of impending deeds, which yet do not occur.

Bolshevik leaders also continue to be concerned with
the related penchant towards an insufficient over-all
level of activity.

Extreme means may now appear somewhat less necessary
than before for defending and developing a domain already
conquered by the Party. This change may reflect not only
genuine developments -- the Party's advances -- but also
a reduction in Bolshevik drive. Becoming less intense,
Soviet leaders may become capable of perceiving that their environment is not as hostile as they once thought, that it can be manipulated with less extreme devices. Moderating to some extent their objectives, they may come to view less harsh means as adequate.

If the aggressive aspirations of older Bolshevism were to a significant extent motivated by fear of annihilation (total victory appearing as the only guarantee against an always imminent extinction), the Bolshevik drive today has probably been somewhat reduced, for fears of annihilation may on balance have lessened. True, Bolshevik leaders speak of their enemies' propensity to launching a "mad" attack, and relate this to the belief that their enemies are aging, nay, dying. But they might be hard put to name the symptoms of the West's alleged malady or to sketch the course of events that would lead to the communist parties in the West seizing power, difficulties which are likely to weaken Soviet belief in the enemy's irrationality.

Bolshevik leaders remain apprehensive of "provoking" the enemy by reckless action, particularly, of course, in the presence of nuclear weapons. They continue to stress the need for patience in trying to advance.

The Soviet Union, its leaders (and particularly Khrushchev) never tire of affirming, is not lowly any more or inferior to the West in any way; rather is it the other way around. Often, it is said, the opponent contemptuously refuses to recognize this radical change and persists in denying equality to the other side. However, the enemy will find it increasingly difficult to cling to his stubbornness in the face of the Party's power and
successes. While these themes express the Bolshevik leaders' keen sense of inferiority to the West, their sudden volte-face in the Cuban crisis when confronted with Washington's refusal to equate U.S. missiles in Turkey with Soviet missiles in Cuba indicates how well they can keep such feelings under control.

The Kremlin's urgent desire to see Communist parties come to power everywhere may have declined for a number of reasons: a worldwide triumph of Communism may be viewed as less necessary for avoiding annihilation; it now seems unlikely that a predominantly Communist world, if it comes at all, will be ruled from Moscow; the enemy's chances of survival have much improved, while the cost of war may have become intolerable to a Soviet Union bent on prosperity.

The Soviet rulers continue to stiffen themselves against their feared disposition of yielding to the enemy. In this they are determined to give the lie to the opponents' confidence that this tendency will win out.

Far from yielding, one must, whenever the relationship of forces allows, repulse the enemy. An undesirable development must be crushed at its very inception so as to prevent its malignant growth. However, Bolshevik leaders may be acquiring some capacity for perceiving that this is not in all cases the sequel if small bad objects are left alone.

If at all possible, one must not stop in an offensive before the enemy has been annihilated. A hostile remnant permitted to survive is a dangerous thing, though one is perhaps less certain about this than one used to be.
The traditional injunction, "maximal utilization of all possibilities," has lost none of its force: the Party must do what becomes increasingly beyond the enemy's capacity to do.

In other words, one must push the enemy back to the very limits of one's ability. In an older and still surviving conception it is only in the course of pushing that one can discover where that limit lies: one has reached it when one's forehead shows a bump. In a more recent view, the point is to have enough perception of what is ahead to stop just short of it. Indeed, it might even be expedient to leave unoccupied some accessible space at the front, but only, of course, in order to facilitate a future advance well beyond it. In rare cases it might now also seem advisable to draw back a bit without being "forced" to do so in order to leap forward all the more powerfully later.

Bolshevik leaders continue to believe that "beating," by acts or words, is the normal way of getting results. Inasmuch as the opponent also shares this belief, one must never complain to him, beg him, or attempt to persuade him. Yet, Soviet rulers are coming to suspect that there are occasions when being pleasant has its rewards.

Retreating, Bolsheviks continue to believe, is a normal and essential activity in politics. Far from entailing sheer loss, it is an act of preservation, and a major retreat may be a necessary condition for a capital advance. There are situations in which a refusal to retreat is merely stupid, and such stupidity is dangerous. Not to retreat may be to "yield to provocation," and at
the same time "provoke" the enemy. The ability to retreat demonstrates dedication, realism, control, flexibility, skill, farsightedness. For a retreat to be indubitably necessary, it must be preceded by the utmost effort to avoid it; and this includes public statements opposed to it. Not retreat needlessly, one should also not withdraw before the very moment after which further stubbornness becomes damaging.

Bolshevik leaders continue to insist among themselves that feelings must not influence conduct. The enemy attempts to arouse guilty feelings in the Party, but the latter foils all such maneuvers. Capable of controlling its own feelings, it makes use of any feelings which may seem expedient. While it appears inconceivable to a Bolshevik leader that he will lose control over himself, he will lay great stress on the enemy's difficulty in this regard; and when the Soviet masses react appropriately, the Soviet leaders are not above picturing them as overwhelmed by violent feelings surging beyond their control. Obviously, this is a gratifying if frightening thought. Though his own feelings continue to be viewed with some disfavor by a Bolshevik leader, he may be getting less apprehensive about their potential for damage, and even begin to entertain the idea that in certain conditions some degree of letting oneself go may be expedient.

In their efforts to develop Communism, Bolsheviks lay great stress on unity of purpose, of ideas, of people. However deplorably different things are today, they will eventually become one: the city and the countryside, the divided socialist peoples, mental and physical labor,
the Germans, in fact, all nations. But over against this mystique of unity, one must place the Soviets' emphasis on separateness, on necessary distinctions and differences: the present as opposed to the future, the diversities in conditions and the Party's methods. It is in this connection that Soviet leaders make much of flexibility to counter the tendencies of people to follow in the same old rut, whether it be in producing steel or potatoes.

From the preceding discussions it would appear that there is some slight mellowing of Bolshevik leaders: in ways which occasionally make them less trying to their opponents, but in some instances more dangerous.

While their fear of spontaneity may have somewhat declined, Bolshevik leaders continue to associate it with calamity. They fear a disposition towards being aimless, or at least careless, of not making correct and complete calculations: the fate of enemies and deviators, and an ever present danger for the leadership. Against the tendency not to perceive the unwanted, Bolsheviks stress the need for "sobriety," and proclaim the Party's monopoly on insight and foresight. While the earlier conception of how to avoid miscalculation hardly accords any importance to making contact with enemy leaders and foreign countries, contemporary Soviet rulers apparently have come to believe that such contacts are valuable for arriving at correct estimates of the opponents' intentions and perhaps also for the purpose of checking the enemy's dangerous tendency towards wishful thinking. At the same time Bolshevik leaders may now feel less of an urge to be definite in their own positions when confronting the enemy; and they
may be developing the rudiments of an ability to admit being mistaken.

The traditional Bolshevik fear of being penetrated seems largely to persist. The enemy who is sticking his nose into one's domain, who takes advantage of the tiniest opening, who tries to desecrate the holiest of holies and attempts, as it were, to peep into the bedroom, must be repulsed by closing all entrances and chinks.

While the earlier prohibition was against becoming "isolated" from rather good objects, such as the masses, the need for personal contact is now extended to personal contact with the enemy. In meeting this obligation Stalin was deficient and Khrushchev is not.

From the preceding discussions it would appear that while Soviet leaders are now more eager for contacts with their opponents, their receptivity to suggestions from outside has increased but little.
ABBREVIATIONS

K 57
N. S. Khrushchev, Za prochnyi mir i mirnoe sosushchestovanie (For a Stable Peace and Peaceful Coexistence), Moscow, 1958.

K 58
N. S. Khrushchev, K pobede v mirnom sovevnovani s kapitalizmom (Towards Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism), Moscow, 1959.

K 59 I, II
N. S. Khrushchev, Mir bez oruzhija, mir bez voin (A World without Weapons, a World without War), Vols. 1, 2, Moscow, 1960.

K 60 I, II
N. S. Khrushchev, O vneshnei politike Sovetskogo Soiuza (On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union), Vols. 1, 2, Moscow, 1961.

XXIst Congress
Vneocherednoi XXI S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, stenograficheskii otchet (Extraordinary XXI Congress of the CPSU, stenographic report), Vols. 1, 2, Moscow, 1959.

XXIIInd Congress
XXII S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, stenograficheskii otchet (XXII Congress of the CPSU, stenographic report), Vols. 1, 2, 3, Moscow, 1962.

Materials
Materialy XXII S'ezda KPSS (Materials relating to the XXII Congress of the CPSU), Moscow, 1961.

History
Istoriiia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1959.
Ritual

Study

Where a quotation is given without attribution, the words are Khrushchev's.
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I. ARE THEY RELAXING?

How intensely do present Bolshevik leaders aspire to further remake the world within their domain and outside? In the pages below several possible indicators of a lessening in their drive shall be presented and numerous others which would suggest that their ardor is not flagging.

FILTHY CORPSES

The frequency and emphasis with which the horror of the dead\(^1\) is expressed may reflect the intensity of the Bolshevik aspiration to change the status quo, the dead being associated with the past.

By this particular token, it is difficult to perceive any relaxation.

The enemy -- "capitalism," "imperialism" -- is, we are told, engaged in the protracted process of dying off (otmiranje).

But the dead are horrible.

They are rotting.

The contrast between the victors -- those who have survived in the struggle which gives the answer to the question "who-whom"? -- and the vanquished is that between the ever more active and the ever more putrefying.\(^2\) "We live and prosper," Khrushchev does not tire of repeating, when he cautions his present adversaries, "but Hitler does not exist any more (yego uzh net); he has rotted

\(^1\)Study, Ch. II.

\(^2\)See below, pp. 54ff.
Indeed, "Hitler...has long ago rotted in the earth." 4

The dead stink.

And Bolsheviks loathe bad odors. A bad smell may easily stand for any unfavorable characteristic. "I do not want to engage in propaganda," Khrushchev assures foreigners, "for usually publicity is made on behalf of merchandise which smells bad." 5 Because of the U-2 incident President Eisenhower "had fallen into an evil-smelling pit." 6 "Yes, we left the Committee of Five," Khrushchev recalls in the United Nations about a failure in disarmament negotiations, "for such foul odors were produced there that this was no place for honest people to breathe.... We are drawn to fresh air." 7 "Even when the English colonizers were chased out of India," Khrushchev recalls in 1962, "Portugal preserved its colonies there, which spread the stinking smell of colonialism," while from Hong Kong and Macao there still "issues an aroma which is in no way better than the smell given off by colonialism in Goa." Gently showing the unnamed Chinese the discrepancy between their preaching and their practice, Khrushchev admits that "because of various

3 To C. L. Sulzberger, Pravda, September 10, 1961.
4 K 57, p. 18.
7 K 60 II, pp. 474-475.
conditions, it is sometimes necessary to live, not among fragrant roses, but in the neighborhood of sweetbrier, and at other times even not far from a colonialist outhouse."\(^8\)

The feelings evoked by the dead may be similar to those directed toward feces. And any indecent action may be likened to defecating. "When Twining, who was then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force came here," Khrushchev recalls at the time of the U-2 incident, "we received him as a guest and wined and dined him. He flew away and the day after sent a high-flying plane into our country." But "only a beast can act as Twining did, a beast which may do its disgusting job at the same place where it eats."\(^9\)

Left in the open, a corpse endangers the living by polluting the air.

This it may also do, in less acknowledged fashion, by rising again to wreak destruction: a corpse may be one of those remnants (ostatok) of a bad thing which, if not annihilated, may grow back to full and frightful stature.\(^10\) Putting before the United Nations a resolution demanding an immediate end to "colonialism," Khrushchev asks "for the honor of taking a shovel to dig a deep grave for colonialism and to plant a wooden stake" above it, "so that it may never rise again"; for "according to popular tradition when one buries the devil, one must put a wooden stake on his grave so that he cannot rise from it."\(^11\)

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\(^9\) K 60 I, pp. 530-531.

\(^10\) See below, pp. 190ff.

\(^11\) K 60 II, p. 490.
Burying is thus not simply an act of pious preservation, but the disposal of filth, which one throws out (vykinut' vybrosit'), takes away (vynesti von), casts away (otbrosit'), sweeps off the rails (smetat' s rel'sov), throws into the hole destined for refuse (musornaia iama) or on the dump heap (svalka).

Putting an end to something, whether within the Party's domain or outside, is often regarded as a kind of burial. Some of the activities of Bolsheviks are thus aimed at filling "the refuse pit of history"12 or adding to its "dump heap," "dispatching (otpravit')" onto it all kinds of matter which "belong there (im tam mesto)."13 But "if some believe," Khrushchev tells the West after Cuba, that "there exists a big shovel with which one could bury (zakopat') us together with our missiles,"14 they are quite mistaken. "Let capitalism," Khrushchev concedes, "live out its epoch just like an old horse which... finally stretches out its legs and is thrown down the slope by its owner."15 "The conditions established by imperialism," he predicts, "will...go on the scrap heap (na slom) and on the dump of history."16 Indeed, the Party's task, as he puts it a few days later on a major occasion, is to "throw imperialism on the dump."17 But

12See, for example, K 58, p. 297.
13See, for example, K 57, p. 345.
15K 60 I, p. 502.
16K 60 II, p. 625.
the "anti-Party group" of 1957 was also "cast away (отбросить прочно)" by the Central Committee.\textsuperscript{18} Having "subjected to sharp criticism the mistakes in the management of agriculture," the Party "cast away from its path everything that disturbed the development of..."\textsuperscript{19} Even the transfer of Stalin's body in the fall of 1961 took on the character of disposal when it was put "into another place" never named at the Party Congress. For burying to be something other than a second destruction, it must perhaps relate to the "immortality" that is Lenin's and was Stalin's.

The destructive act of burying is "justified," first of all, by its happening, in any case, constantly: the passage of time sees the steady increase in the heap of objects "cast away by history."\textsuperscript{20}

The replacement of one social order by another is the act of burial: "capitalism buried (покоронить), interred into its grave (закопать в могилу) feudalism.... Feudalism...was buried and interred."\textsuperscript{21} So what could be more normal, Khrushchev insists, than his famous "We shall bury them?"

Not to bury is to violate a law of nature. "Everybody knows," recalls Khrushchev, "that when a man dies he is, in the end, buried. However dear he may be to the survivors, however much they may regret parting from him, life forces all to take account of real actuality: a tomb or a mausoleum is prepared for the dead one; he is carried

\textsuperscript{18} XXIst Congress. K 59 I, p. 112.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{20} See, for example, K 58, p. 437.
out of the habitations of the living. Thus it was in olden times and thus it happens in our epoch." "Why then," he asks, "must China be represented in the United Nations by that corpse...which is the clique of Chiang Kai-shek? We believe that the United Nations should have proceeded long ago as all people do with a corpse, that is, carry it away." 22

To do so is required by concern for the health of the living. "It is our duty," Khrushchev tells the United Nations about colonialism, "to put away this stinking corpse as quickly as possible and thus to purify the atmosphere." 23 "Now the remains of this doctrine," one may say about any other than one's own, "must be buried, as one buries every dead body, so that it does not infect the air by its decay." 24

In any case, what one refuses to put away by burial, nature will herself reduce to naught. "If it took as long to bury a dead body as it has thus far taken to consider the question of putting an end to the arms race," Khrushchev says, "the corpse would have disappeared long ago, and there would be nothing left to bury." 25

And then, those to be buried may have asked for it. "The late Dulles," Khrushchev recalls, "wanted all the time to throw back (otbrosit' nazad) the forces of

22 K 59 II, p. 147.
23 K 60 II, p. 422.
24 Ibid., p. 214.
25 K 60 I, p. 56.
progress." What wonder, then, that "life threw (otbrosit') him out." 26

Despite such "justifications," some uneasiness about one's propensity to destroy seems to persist. When at the National Press Club in Washington a journalist asks Khrushchev about Soviet intentions to send a man to the moon, he is displeased: "You use the rather unfortunate expression 'to throw (zabrosit') a man.' We are not getting ready to throw man, as we esteem man highly... we do not want 'to throw' in this sense; to throw is, as it were, to throw out (zabrosit' vrode kak by vybrosit'). This we don't do; human beings are extremely precious to us." 27

Having lost power, or about to lose it, a person or group readily becomes refuse, a corpse; to dispose of it is then mandatory. Chiang is regularly "cast away by his people and now a political corpse"; 28 Mobutu "is something in the nature of Wrangel, Kolchak and other similar refuse of history which our people swept away." 29

Beyond this, any enemy is likely to be viewed as filth (nechist), with the corollaries indicated above. "This is rubbish (musor) which should have been thrown away long ago" 30 which may be said about almost any unfavorably viewed object, preferably, in the past tense:

28 See, for example, K 60 I, p. 498.
29 K 60 II, p. 377.
30 Ibid., p. 453.
"We...threw them out [the "interventionists" of 1918-1920] as filth."\textsuperscript{31} It remains forever the Party's task "to wipe counter-revolutionary filth from the face of the earth."\textsuperscript{32}

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If the kind of language analyzed above is a clue, the Soviet drive to unmake and remake has scarcely diminished.

On the other hand, a sense of continuity with a past that is not that of the Party may now -- though rarely -- be expressed in ways which seem more genuine than the long-standing device of incorporating any number of respectable historical objects into the Party's eclectic pantheon. Thus Khrushchev, in Bulgaria, wanting to "underline the historical connection between our cultures," notes that "the sources of this connection go back into a thousand-year-old past. Cyril and Methodius...and their pupils in Bulgaria created the so-called Cyrillic script which the peoples of our countries are still using today."\textsuperscript{33} "In the old days," Khrushchev recalls, "officials used to say: 'A prayer to God and a service to the Tsar are never lost.' We reformulate (perefrazirovat') this and say: Good work done for the people...is always honored by us."\textsuperscript{34} Perhaps the change from the old days to the new is not so radical after all. "The structure of our Soviet Ministry of Agriculture differs little from

that of the tsarist ministry," Khrushchev blithely affirms, and even insists: "In order to prove my point, I should like to recall the structure of the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia in 1894. You will see that our Ministry of Agriculture has actually derived its structure from that period.... The question arises: In what is the structure of our Ministry different? In nothing, except in the number of officials. In the tsarist ministry, as you heard, there were three Deputy Ministers, but in our Ministry there were at one time fourteen such comrades. In the tsarist ministry there were 450 officials, and with us the staff of the Ministry in 1954 was considerably larger.... [Details to show the similarity of structure of the ministries of 1894 and 1954.] Is there a difference between these functions [of the Ministry in 1894] and the activities of our Soviet Ministry? Essentially, No!"

Only at this point does Khrushchev feel it necessary to add: "Of course, I do not have the social aspect of the matter in mind."35 Both the sense of continuity with the past, and that of the distinction between organizational form and political content are noteworthy, as there is no question here of appealing to "vestiges (perezhitok)" of the past in the minds of the masses, as the regime used to do when invoking, for instance, Alexander Nevsky. Though Khrushchev proposes that the present be made less like the past, the ease and moderation which he displays in describing the present state of affairs may indicate a relaxation of the Bolshevik striving for change.

HORRIBLE DEATH

Bolshevik absorption with the activity of transforming the world may be in part an attempt to allay the fear of death. 36 Hence it may be pertinent to ask whether there is any reason to assume that this fear may be decreasing.

Direct references to death within one's own domain tend, as before, to be avoided. When Khrushchev, explaining why the administration of agriculture should be re-organized, mentions the office to whose duties it belongs to register marriages and births, he apparently cannot bring himself to pronounce the depressing and indecent word smert'. 37

Death seems to be the punishment of the bad ones, and the proof of their "bankruptcy (proval)." Khrushchev likes to recall that Hitler is now long dead, and in 1962 he starts treating Stalin in this way: "Stalin has already died long ago." 38 "I can only note," writes Khrushchev to Macmillan in the same year, "that the author of the policy of 'brinkmanship' is already no more alive, while socialism not only did not suffer any damage after his death, but successfully speeded up its development." 39 After Cuba he recalls that "those German militarists who broke into our country" and were "occupying a rather large part of Russia's territory" at the time of

36 See Study, Ch. III.
the peace of Brest-Litovsk now "lie in the earth" — as if this were not true for most of their Soviet counterparts.

A promise of immortality is held out for the present — on condition that it abolish the past — and also itself. "The men of the future," proclaims Khrushchev on a major occasion, "will envy us, will always in their minds return to our days"\footnote{Speech of December 12, 1962. Pravda, December 13, 1962.} of rapid and good change: we shall not perish as did those who came before us. "Epochs will pass, but mankind will always remember our XXIIInd Congress,"\footnote{Speech of January 6, 1961. Kommunist, January 1961, p. 37.} affirms Pospelov, director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism; "all future generations will speak with gratitude of the XXIIInd Congress"\footnote{XXIIInd Congress, Vol. 2, p. 468.} an occasion on which it was proper to recall the XXth, but also, already, to forget the XXIst.

What is involved in such phrases is perhaps brought out more clearly by Khrushchev's preferred writer, "What are now the Egyptian pyramids?" Sholokhov dares to ask. "What are the other monuments of old? Pitiful (zhalkii) attempts of former generations to leave on the earth a monument in the history of humanity! All of this is dust and decay; all this disappears with the passage of time." When one wonders how the speaker will avoid an awkward conclusion, the denial bursts in: "But those who build communism on earth [will] by this verily create an indestructible

\footnote{Ponomarev, Ibid., p. 222.}
monument which is subject neither to time nor to the forces of nature, just as eternal as...the name of Lenin."  

Somewhat less passionately, Khrushchev dares to recall in Rumania that "even the most solid metal gets worn with time, loses its solidity" -- only to allege that "friendship between nations born in the heat of class struggles...and tempered in the fire of the struggle for the building of socialism and communism...is eternal and unbreakable."  

Lenin's eternality, to which Sholokov refers, now embraces more than his corpse and his "name." The old woman chosen to deprive Stalin of body and place at the XXIInd Congress, reports on the first Bolshevik vision: "Yesterday I took counsel (sovetovat'sia) with Il'ich. It was as he stood before me alive and said: It is disagreeable (nepriiatno) for me to be close to Stalin."  

The second presence, less vivid, as befits the sober Ilitch'ev, takes place a few months later, at the celebration of Lenin's 92nd birthday. "On the birthday of our...teacher and leader...we, as it were, report to him (dokladyvat')...about the realization of his...behests (zavet).... Marking today the 92nd anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, the Soviet people with pride say: 'Dear Vladimir Il'ich....'"  

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No doubt this development is in part a resurrection of Christian immortality in Party garments; but, restricted as it is to the equivalent of God, it may also denote a persistence among Bolsheviks of that horror of death to which Khrushchev appears to give expression when, addressing a group of young people, he deals with the end of his own life. "As to myself," he notes, "I am, one might say, already doing overtime. According to Soviet laws I have already acquired the right not to work any more." But "I feel in myself forces, a great surge of energy. How shall I spend this energy? Perhaps take it with me into the grave? [a very rarely mentioned word, when it doesn't refer to the enemy; and a rather rare indication of emphasis at the end of the phrase]. No! All forces, all energy must be devoted to work..."\(^ {48} \)-- to work for certain goals, but perhaps also to work so as to prevent the panic of an enforced idleness, with its occasions to recall the nearness of the grave. "Cast a glance at our villages and cities," asks Khrushchev. "Everywhere life is boiling (kipet') and creative work. People think not of death, but of life."\(^ {49} \) It would be awful the other way.

To the extent that the Bolsheviks' drive is an outward manifestation of an inward fear of death, there is little reason to assume that it has declined.

\(^ {48} \) Speech at the Congress of the Komsomol, April 19, 1962. Pravda, April 21, 1962.

THE PRESENT, A MEANS ONLY?

While the Kremlin has of course in recent years been more favorable to the Soviet consumer both in word and deed, the older Bolshevik habit of treating the present only as a means has not disappeared, though it has been more overlaid than before by humanitarian pretensions.

The demand not to be content with the present moment (ne dovol'stvovat'sia sevdniashnim dnen) continues to be repeated. But it has now become Khrushchev's privilege to engage in jocular affirmations of the forbidden. "Well, we shall think it over," he exclaims in Linz. "The earth is good here, the Danube is near, and you feed us well. Perhaps, if you agree, we shall stay on here for a month or two." Still, it is "work (trudovaia deiatelnost') which gives life meaning"; most every nation visited by Khrushchev receives the appellation of "the talented and work-loving...people." In fact, Khrushchev declares at the XXIInd Congress, "man is beautiful and noble" only "through his work, his deeds, through what he created and accomplished.... In work is the immortality of mankind". Without work, that antidote against the fear of death, man is but dirt to be discarded. Because "work...

50 Study, Ch. III.
51 See, for example, K 58, p. 540; speech of December 22, 1961, Pravda, December 25, 1961.
52 K 60 II, p. 135
54 Materials, p. 111.
55 See above, pp. 10ff.
56 See above, pp. 1ff.
elevates man" "we unceasingly say: work, work, work."\textsuperscript{57} Work is not only a means, but an end itself. Of course Khrushchev specifies: Only "selfless and creative work for the good of the people...gives real joy and happiness; only work secures an abundance of material and spiritual benefits." Though "I have frequently talked about this...I shall never tire of repeating it, because in this apparently simple truth there is contained great wisdom concerning the understanding of life's meaning."\textsuperscript{58}

Man is threatened by his penchant for aimlessness. "It happens," Khrushchev admits to the Party's youth, "that some young people spend their forces in vain (naprasno), squander their marvelous years on trifles (pustiachok)." But it is "precisely in one's youth" that "one must...determine oneself (opredelit'sia) in such a fashion as to live through life, as the excellent writer Nikolai Ostrovsky said, without having to be ashamed later about aimlessly lived (bestsel'no prozhitie) years." The danger, once acknowledged, must then be denied: "The ideologists of capitalism speak with envy of the high...goal-directedness (tseleustremlennost') of Soviet people."\textsuperscript{59}

"Questions of providing for the everyday necessities of life," declares Khrushchev, expressing by this very

assertion the Bolshevik preference for means over ends, "are not small matters (meloch); they are not second rank affairs." But of almost anything it is proper to say that the Party "views it not as an end in itself (samoscel'), but rather as a means (sredstvo)."

This frequently occurs in matters where westerners would expect that an instrumental view would be avoided -- at least in public. (At the same time the public language of the Soviet Union is of course full of pious words: in what follows I shall deal only with the cracks in the Bolsheviks' facade.)

Telling the Finns that the Soviet Union is not going to annex their country, Khrushchev may forget the principles of international law and morality. "We do not need your riches," he explains. "All that Finland possesses, we ourselves have abundantly. You possess forests, various useful raw materials; you have good granite. But we too have all this." Having recalled to Marshall Amer that "between our countries relations of sincere friendship and collaboration have become established," Khrushchev shows the basis of this state of affairs: "We are not interested in your riches. All that you have, we have ourselves, and what we do not have, we shall buy from you to our common advantage." "We are against war; we

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60 XXIIInd Congress. Materials, p. 76.
61 K 59 I, p. 11.
62 K 58, p. 518.
do not need war," he sums up at another occasion. 63 Communists are "people who have assumed the task of creating on earth all that man needs for a genuinely happy life," and "for the realization of this aim...[they] need peace, not war," recalls Shvernik, concluding: "This is why the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and head of the Soviet government, our dear Nikita Sergeevich, defends peace with such great energy and passion and fights for it." 64

"Ideological work," declares Khrushchev at the XXIInd Congress, "is not," as one might think, "an end in itself, but rather a most important means for the solution of the basic tasks of building Communism." 65

"Now it is already clear to all," says Furtseva about the cessation of the extreme practices attributed to Stalin, "that we would not have had the gigantic successes with which we came to the XXIInd Congress if the Party had not ended the cult of personality...had not in full measure re-established the Leninist norms of Party life, the Leninist principles of leadership in the political life of the country, in government, in economic and cultural construction." Rather than viewing this as satisfactory by itself, the speaker affirms that "this strengthened yet more the connection between the Party and the people." 66

"The further preservation in the [Lenin] mausoleum of the sarcophagus with the grave of I. V. Stalin" is, declares

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63K 58, p. 217.
64XXIInd Congress, Vol. 2, p. 221.
65Materials, p. 110.
the XXIInd Party Congress in a resolution, "not expedient (netselescobrazno)." A standard thing to say in 1962 about the "sequels to the cult of personality," now allegedly abolished, is that they "interfered (meshat') with the accelerated movement of Soviet society towards Communism," while the situation within the Party should be such as to facilitate that movement, just as "we need... a music which facilitates our forward movement."

What the Russians traditionally regard as major moral virtues continue to be frequently (though not always overtly) viewed as useful guides to conduct. Take, for instance, the injunction to treat people "with understanding (s ponimaniem)," "attentively (vnimatel'no)," "sensitively (chutko)," "with solicitude (zabotlivо)." All these virtues are still upheld, but largely with a view to their social usefulness. It is in this spirit that the Party's statute of 1961 demands that "sensitivity and attention be shown to people" and that Khrushchev addresses those present at the luncheon offered to him by 20th Century Fox: "You are not only people doing intellectual work (liudi umstvennogo truda); you are workers in the most brilliant, one may say jewel-like art, workers of subtle artistic mastery." What follows from this? "Therefore you require particular attention, tenderness and warmth, like an orchid which requires indispensable

69 Materials, p. 431.
moisture, light and warmth — a good instance of a characteristic mixture of blatant hypocrisy and serious belief. At the XXIIInd Congress Adzhubei begins by affirming the presence on Soviet soil of "an enormous (ogromnyi) number of noble (blagorodnye) souls." But then he narrates a deplorable event, which he himself presents as far from unusual: "For instance, the railway employee Fedorov, who had been awarded the Order of Lenin for faultless work, had only a few months to work until he would be entitled to a pension. But he was not permitted to work these months, because for some reason he displeased somebody, who regarded him as 'troublesome,' and he was dismissed. And now he began to bring his complaint here and there, to the Direction of the Volga Railroad, to the Ministry of Communications. (An enormous heap of letters arose.) Finally, in Moscow somebody -- somebody who read through the file carefully -- directed his letter to the Stalingrad City Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We [in Izvestiia] especially informed ourselves as to how much time it took to clear up the affair -- a few minutes, and the man was re-established in his job!" At this point it may seem that Adzhubei is judging what had happened as intrinsically bad. Not so, for he proceeds: "Why could this not have been done immediately, why had the nerves of a man to be frayed? For Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev correctly observed in his report: the productivity of work depends to a large extent on general conditions (kak u nas nalazhen byt). One can

70 K 59 II, p. 191.
also put it this way: the productivity of a man's work finally depends also on the degree to which he feels well (khoroshoe nastroenie)" -- a proposition which evokes stormy applause. Having shown his own propensity to view life as a means to an end, Adzhubei then proceeds to condemn this same propensity in others by telling a second story: "An engineer goes to Kharkov on a job. He sees near a traffic light an old blind woman, who asks him to conduct her across the street. He helps her, and talking with her he learns that the old woman is unable to get treatment in an eye clinic, that her retirement payments are not forthcoming.... She said, 'You see, I am an old woman. Who needs me (komu ia nuzhna)'?" But in the very act of opposing in others the attitude of treating human beings as mere means, Adzhubei does not avoid this penchant himself: "The officials who refused the requests of the old woman offended not only her; they also offended and insulted our Soviet power" -- and what is more, "one may say they even discredited it!" Most inexpedient!

There are even jokes about expediency. When at a conference concerned with the railways, the proposal is made to name Khrushchev an honorary railway worker, he reacts in jolly fashion: "I should like to warn you, dear friends, against being frivolous (legkost') in naming honorary railway workers. If you are going to accept unqualified personnel into your midst, you are going to lower the efficiency of transport work. Hence you should be careful. At present the railroads are working well,

and hence there may be people who will want to steal some of your cake. Allow me to express my gratitude for your good feelings and confidence. But, I repeat, be careful. That is in the interests of railway transport." \(^{72}\)

Attempts to forget about expediency in favor of morality may quickly break down. "This was perfidy (verolomstvo)," exclaims Khrushchev about the U-2 incident. "I repeat this word many times, because it is difficult to find another word which would characterize with equal truth...," what? the moral degradation? no, "the recklessness (bezrassudstvo), the adventurism (avantjuristichnost') of the leaders of the American Government." \(^{73}\)

In fact, the ability to distinguish between virtue and expediency may have declined. An old woman Party member, describing at the XXIInd Congress her resistance to the authorities during her life in prison from the thirties to the fifties, begins in the vein of the older intelligentsia: "I never thought of whether I would fare well or badly when I defended the truth." "I only thought of whether my conduct was useful (poleznii) for the Party or not (stormy prolonged applause)." \(^{74}\)

Even developments which might easily be viewed as approximations to "communism" are apt to be considered only as means for its full realization. About "drawing the broad masses of the people into the daily work of governing," Brezhnev has this to say: "Lenin taught us

\(^{73}\text{K 60 I, p. 583.}\)
\(^{74}\text{Lazurkina, Vol. 3, p. 120.}\)
that...[this] is a marvelous means (chudesnoi sredstvo) which increases our forces tenfold." 75 "We all deeply rejoice," declares a local Party leader, "in the fact that during the last years the Central Committee has taken counsel with the people about all the most important questions of the development of the country, has taken account of the people's aspirations and wishes," For "this has led to the further strengthening of the ties between the Party and the masses, has enriched the creative and organizational activity of the Central Committee itself and of the local Party organizations, and has decisively aided the successful fulfillment of the tasks which the Party put before the country." 76 "One must...keep in mind," explains Polianskii in more direct fashion, "that the heightening of the role of the local Soviets and economic organs, the extension of their rights, is not an end in itself, but a means for the more efficient development of the productive forces of the country." 77

It is only "communism" which will bring release from the requirement of viewing everything as a means; every aspect of life will be an end in itself (an aspect of the ultimate goal which is manifestly gratifying, but perhaps obscurely frightening). 78 Then, says the Party program of 1961, "work will cease to be merely a means for life and will be transformed into genuine creativity, a source of

75 XXIIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 341.
78 Study, Ch. III.
joy."  It is only then that I shall be able to trust in the good intentions of others. Meanwhile Moscow reminds Bonn: "That France and her President are courting Western Germany is not due to a particular love for her; it is merely the expression of the wish to have a strong partner, or to remain close to him." 80

If the tendency to view the present mainly as a means to the ultimate goal be an indication of the strength of the Bolshevik drive, there is little ground for assuming that a relaxation in that drive is occurring.

THE RETURN OF THE SELF

The habitual themes of dedicating oneself to the cause of communism continue.

"Among all Soviet people," according to Podgorny, "the highest aim in life is to build communism." 81 "Soviet people," affirms Demichev, "see...the meaning of their lives in the realization of the...program of building communism." 82

The life of the leaders themselves is centered around their work, that is, their faith. When asked at a press conference abroad which question he would first put to himself if he were a journalist, Khrushchev says that he would ask Khrushchev the following: Mr. Khrushchev, or Comrade Khrushchev, why do you pay little attention to

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79 Materials, p. 367.
81 XXIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 268.
82 Ibid., p. 264.
propaganda in favor of the idea of communism? And how would Khrushchev answer? He would answer: I do all in my power to conduct propaganda for the idea of communism, but apparently my powers are insufficient, and this is why you are not satisfied.... But for his part, Khrushchev does all he can to accelerate that process [of the victory of communism].''83 When a Westerner (Serge Groussard) declares, "I am not a communist," but "I had many communist comrades at the time of the Resistance and in the German camps. I still have them. The fact that they are communists and that I am not does not in any way reduce our friendship," Khrushchev objects. "I have another opinion on that account. Friendship is real and firm when people have a unity of views on events, on history, on life. If you do not share the philosophy of the Communist Party...you can maintain merely good relations with communists, but it is difficult to attain a profound friendship, as we understand it."84

One must always work: leisure is of doubtful value at best, or so one may easily feel or pretend on appropriate occasions. When "some Western statesmen express the opinion that the meeting at the summit should take place only when the main contentious questions have already been resolved," Khrushchev begs to disagree. "If the basic questions have already been resolved...then that meeting...is only for the purpose of going fishing together (and I am no angler), for listening to concerts and such things,

84 K 58, p. 156.
for the agreeable passing of time."\textsuperscript{85} (Performing the allegedly disagreeable work of spending time with foreign leaders, who may think they are at leisure, is yet another matter; see below.)

But the leader's work is joyous, as all work will be under communism. Having recalled to Soviet journalists that "the strength of our press lies in the substance of what it purveys to the masses," namely, "the Leninist idea of the building of socialism and communism," Khrushchev exclaims: "Such a burden is easy to bear; it carries no weight!" When someone in the audience interrupts -- a rare occurrence -- declaring that "we carry this burden with enthusiasm," Khrushchev repeats: "Yes, we all carry this burden with enthusiasm. This burden is not heavy on us. You do not feel such a burden; it gives you wings; it summons you to action and leads you forward."\textsuperscript{86}

What a contrast to the selfishness prevailing among the "wolfish" enemy! "In the bourgeois countries," Khrushchev notes, "one says: 'my minister,' but such expressions as 'my minister,' and 'my man,' are not acceptable to us."\textsuperscript{87}

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And yet there are many indications that the Soviet leadership is abandoning the exalted image of man and the exacting moral demands that were previously invoked at least within the Party.

\textsuperscript{85} K 59 II, p. 374.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 387.
\textsuperscript{87} K 60 II, p. 219.
Affirming in 1959 that "in the process of building socialism and communism, it is not only the economy and the culture of the country that get transformed, but man himself," Khrushchev proposes "to give you but one concrete example of this." Recently, he says, "the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded the Order of Hero of Socialist Labor to Valentina Gaganova, a brigadier of a factory in the fiber-paper combine of Vishnevolsk." What was her "outstanding deed which has great significance for the further growth of the great movement towards communist relations in work?" Simply that she "became a brigadier in a backward brigade, knowing that she would for some time earn less than before." Khrushchev treats this departure from self-interest as, at first sight, mysterious: "What moved this simple Soviet working woman to make this shift in work? What motivated her to renounce voluntarily the work which gave her good pay and to go to a backward brigade where pay was significantly lower?" Now the solution: "This can only be explained by the new socialist relations between people in our country...; [under] socialism people see their own personal welfare in obtaining happiness for all human beings in the world." It was "with this conviction in mind that Valentina Gaganova went to a backward brigade in order...to prove that there are no inherently backward sectors of production, but that all depends on one's skill is using possibilities. She led the backward brigade to the front rank." And thus her sacrifice ended soon enough, though losing none of its greatness thereby: "The output of the brigade rose, thus substantially increasing the pay of the members of the brigade, including that of Valentina Gaganova." Still,
"the...deed of Gaganova became known far beyond the locality where she works; like a mighty wave, the knowledge of it spread through our entire country."\textsuperscript{88} "The old psychology of property owners cannot explain this," Khrushchev repeats later, recalling Gaganova's sacrifice: "for this young worker chose more difficult work, knowing that she would have to start with less pay."\textsuperscript{89}

Even the injunction to shun egoism -- to the earlier intelligentsia an elementary requirement for those who wanted to attain full human stature -- tends thus to appear as a counsel of perfection. "One could not listen without emotion," declares Khrushchev, "to Nadezhda Grigorevna Zaglada -- field team leader of the collective farm 'The First of May' of the raion of Cherniakhov in the oblast of Zhitomir -- that famous master in the raising of flax, corn, and other crops." For "you, my dear Nadezhda Grigorevna...showed that one must work for the welfare of the fatherland, for the victory of communism."

"There was much communist understanding in the words of Comrade Zaglada," Khrushchev repeats, "when she said that we are exerting effort not for ourselves, not for our personal enrichment, but for society, for the victory of the ideas of our Party."\textsuperscript{90} "To feel responsibility and concern not only for his own fate, but also...for the cause of the whole country" is, according to Brezhnev, "a new trait of Soviet man."\textsuperscript{91} Or it is the trait of a

\textsuperscript{88} K 59 I, pp. 430-432.
\textsuperscript{89} K 59 II, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{91} XXIIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 351.
leader such as Khrushchev: "All his boiling energy, his big heart, his enormous knowledge and colossal experience of life — all this he gives without stint to the great Leninist cause." 92

But the Party leadership can apparently not take for granted that high Party functionaries will honor the simple rule: If a Party member has been guilty of misconduct in office, his Party membership should not procure him immunity. Look how Khrushchev deals with this fine point at a plenum of the Central Committee. "It is entirely inadmissible," he advances, "that some party committees tolerate (терпимо относить) misconduct in office on the part of communists and, going even farther, sometimes even shield (выгораживать) such communists, defend them." The demonstration of this theorem follows: "It is well known that V. I. Lenin was always opposed to defending violators of the law on the ground that they were party members. He demanded the elimination of every possibility of using the position of the ruling party so as to weaken the responsibility of communists as regards the violation of Soviet laws." And now the proof of this: "That Lenin was irreconcilable towards the weakening of the responsibility of communists is shown by his note of March 18, 1922, addressed to members of the Politburo, in which he sternly condemned the attempts by Party and Soviet organizations to shield Party members who had committed criminal deeds. This note of Lenin has not been published. But it is a document of such importance and interest that I want to cite it here in full." This

Khrushchev proceeds to do, probably unaware of the difference between Lenin's ethical presuppositions and his own: Lenin, of course, was not concerned with establishing the moral rule in question; he took that for granted. He merely rages about its violation and proposes rigorous sanctions, ending with this postscript: "The height of dishonor and of villainy: the Party in power defends its own scoundrels!!" But Khrushchev concludes that "we are obliged to act according to Lenin's teaching."\(^{93}\)

Under the new dispensation the leader may find it useful to stress that he is not motivated by the search for personal gratification; it is only "the Albanian leaders" who, for their own personal interests, "try to preserve...conditions in which one can violate all norms of Party and State life without control or punishment."\(^{94}\)

As for Soviet leaders, take for instance the matter of travelling abroad. It isn't as pleasurable as one might suppose. Far from it. Where there is pleasure there is also utility, and that alone counts. "This," declares Khrushchev upon returning from Poland, "was a very good journey...I had to suffer the strength of the July sun, to go through factories and mines, through the fields of agricultural collectives, to speak several times a day to large numbers of people, to converse with the most diverse types of people. You understand, I am sure, that such voyages have nothing in common with tourism. In order to

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earn the bread which during such voyages the friendly hosts feed one, one must, as the phrase goes, perspire quite a bit, one must work hard. But this is agreeable work, my dear comrades, as there is nothing more interesting than contact with people. I will say it frankly: often during the day, I was so tired that it seemed time to take a rest. But just at that moment arrived the representatives of such and such a collective and said: 'We should very much like to meet with you, please come!' Well, how can one say No? One washes the dust off oneself, one changes clothes and goes anew to meet people. But then, when you see the joyous faces, when you talk with people, answer their questions and even get into an argument with one of your interlocutors, as often happens, then you feel new forces flowing into you. You get satisfaction as you see that you do useful work, that you don't waste time, that you acquire new friends for yourself and, what is much more important, for your country, for our common great cause, the construction of communism."

"In his report," Brezhnev recalls at the XXIIInd Congress, "Nikita Sergeevich alluded in passing to the fact that it became necessary for him (emt prishlos') to travel all over the world in the support of direct contacts with the leaders of other countries. He said that nothing could be done about it (nachevo ne podelaesh'); the situation required it." "But we and you," the speaker proceeds, "know very well the gigantic scale of this work. During the years after the XXth Congress of the C.P.S.U., Comrade

N. S. Khrushchev made 30 voyages to 18 governments of Europe, Asia and America. From Sofia to New York, from Peking to London, from Helsinki to Jakarta; the routes of these travels traversed the map of the world.  

"Behind the brief phrase 'personal contacts and travels,'" Adzhubei notes, "there stands hard work, work, one may even say, that takes everything out of man (do sed'movopo pota), work that often leaves no time for sleep or rest, that requires unceasing concentration, inventiveness, and a capacity to argue forcefully. It is work which, one may say, also requires personal courage." Hence the conclusion: "No, these are not the peregrinations of a tourist!" What might be suspected of being reprehensible self-indulgence thus turns out to be meritorious hardship: "Entertaining contacts with leaders of the capitalist world is...work which is often disagreeable, and in some cases even repulsive. It is considerably easier to put oneself into a position of self-isolation," as Stalin did. But "if you fear to stick your nose out...what kind of a fighter for the interests...of the Party are you? Self-isolation is easy, contacts are more difficult, but it is precisely contacts which are needed."

Beyond the suspicion that the leader's ostensibly political activity is really in the service of pleasure, there is the question whether he is in fact working more

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96 Vol. 1, p. 345.
98 Ibid., p. 470.
than some of his western counterparts, who are believed to take it easy. "I shall...leave, but you are staying," says Khrushchev in Varna, a city of which he has become an honorary citizen and on which he has called to fulfill its economic plan. "Hence," he jokes, "a certain division of labor results: I shall express my hopes and wishes, but it is you who will have to work so as to realize our common hopes and wishes." Now, "of course, you do not believe that I am leaving to play golf while you are going to be working. No, I am working, too, and shall be working."  

In other jocular passages Khrushchev toys with the possibility that he may not entirely view himself as just a tool of the Party. "I am permitting myself a joke, Comrades," announces Khrushchev in the same city of Varna, "but in this joke there is some truth.... If, having left, I were to read in the Bulgarian newspapers that the factories of the city of Varna were not fulfilling the plan, that her cooperatives were working less well than in other regions, how agreeable do you think it would be to hold in my hands the document by which the honorary citizenship of your city had been awarded to me? Do understand my situation and take into account the fact that my situation will be good only on condition that you will be working well."  

"Let me tell you candidly," he addresses a conference on railways, "it is better to work seven hours in a factory than to work in the Council...

100 Ibid.
of Ministers where the length of the working day has not yet been firmly limited. How many times did I tell Comrade Shvernik when he was chairman of the trade unions: 'I don't know why I am paying dues to a trade union, for you unionists don't care to limit our work.' Now he has been replaced by Comrade Grishin, but the same thing is continuing, though, it is true, to a lesser extent."

"This," Khrushchev concludes, "is of course a joke, Comrades, and you have surely understood me."101

What the leader still on the whole denies himself, he comes increasingly to accord the rest of mankind: the primacy of striving for personal gratification.

The Party's goal is more and more often described in terms of pleasure -- to make "the life of the toilers joyful and happy."102 When Khrushchev proposes to President Kennedy that Cuban bases be exchanged for Turkish ones, he finds occasion to describe his aspiration: "the increase of means by which man lives and has pleasure (naslazhdat'sia)."103

"Life is eternal," proclaims Khrushchev, "and eternal is the activity of man directed towards procuring a better life."104 While the Party aims at "our citizens" becoming "the best provided for human beings,"105 Khrushchev warns

104 K 59 I, p. 94.
105 Ibid., p. 289.
the members of the Economic Club of New York: "If the system which you represent...creates better living conditions, gives more scope to the productive forces of society than socialism does, then I will come to you and ask for a job." 106

In such contexts nobler matters seem to be forgotten; at other times they are emphatically evoked. Having observed that "everybody wants a better life," Khrushchev becomes analytic: "But what does it mean to live better? The conception of a better life is not the same for all people. By a better life, some mean not only an adequacy of material goods, but also an abundance of cultural goods, the over-all development of man, the maximum lightening of his work, his active participation in the life of society." 107

Apparently Bolshevik leaders now recognize the legitimacy of selfish considerations well beyond the acknowledged "principle of material interestedness." All they now ask is that altruistic impulses be not entirely absent, that man "work for himself and for society." 108

"To have an honest attitude towards work," Khrushchev declares at the XXIIInd Congress, "means to care...for all," including "yourself." 109 "The duty of all honest sons and daughters of their country," he tells Afro-Asian students, "is to fight not only for their own happiness, but also for that of the entire people." 110 "Work,"

106 K 59 II, p. 143.  
107 K 59 I, p. 452.  
108 K 60 I, p. 75.  
109 Materials, p. 194.  
110 K 60 II, p. 593.
notes Suslov more tersely, "has become work for oneself, for one's happiness, for the welfare of all, for the good of socialist society."\textsuperscript{111} While under "capitalism" "the main moving force" is "profit," "we are saying something else: the main moving force is everybody's conscientiousness in working for himself, for those near him, and for the whole of society."\textsuperscript{112} Within the last quarter of a century the distance between the two systems has appreciably narrowed.

In any case, for us "the welfare of society as a whole and the personal interest of each of its members in particular coincide." Given human nature -- before communism -- it is "precisely this coincidence of social and personal interests of people in our society" which furnishes "the main source for the unprecedented surge in politics and work."\textsuperscript{113}

A rational egoist will be devoted to the common good, apparently because he is thus increasing his selfish satisfactions, and because it is pleasurable to be selfish. "Human happiness," explains Serebriakova, "becomes greatest for the one who strives to make the largest number of people happy.... The more genuinely happy citizens there are in society, the more wonderful is life for each particular human being": "such is the essence of the program of the Communist Party."\textsuperscript{114} "It is not the one who obtains happiness and success only for

\textsuperscript{111}XXIst Congress, Vol. 1, p. 363.
\textsuperscript{112}K. 59 II, p. 189.
\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Pravda}, December 27, 1961.
himself who is really happy," teaches Khrushchev, "but the one who helps to obtain happiness for his whole people." 115 "Soviet people work well," he observes less solemnly, "because they know that to work for all means also to work for oneself." 116 True, "by his very nature man strives for joy, for a happy life" for himself; but "by stern experience people have convinced themselves that they cannot obtain happiness alone." 117 "Not that person," Khrushchev tells the Party's youth, "is happy who, having worked much and perhaps even well, begins to count the years or months until he can retire, and who thinks: then I shall live (pozhit')! This is a profound error... for man can only live by constructive work.... In work...[to be sure Khrushchev adds: 'for the welfare of the people'] is...the happiness of man." 118 The point is to "achieve a state of affairs in which every young person will have learned to see in the interest of the people his most important personal interest." It is then that "things will proceed in much better fashion in all sectors." 119

But at present some people "live only for their pleasure (udovol'stvie)." 120 There are even some "clever ones (ostriaki)" who "attribute to Marx's wife the following...words: Karl Marx worked for many years and created

115 K 60 II, p. 593.
116 K 60 I, p. 646.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
his great work, *Capital*. But it would have been better if he had left some capital to his children."\(^{121}\)

In concluding addresses both to foreign audiences, to whose members he wishes "success in your personal lives,"\(^{122}\) and to important Soviet citizens, Khrushchev takes cognizance of man's dominant striving for "joy," for "a happy life." Thus the graduates of the military academies receive his wishes for their "happiness in family life"\(^{123}\) -- a formula which might have struck earlier Bolsheviks as both indiscreet and degrading, as introducing the profane into the sacred.

One might even recognize -- of course, it's only a joke -- that most people don't like to spend too much time on politics. "As a citizen of your city," says Khrushchev at a mass meeting in Sofia, having received the municipal keys, "I am asking you to take account of my situation as a speaker: Here you are chanting [eternal friendship], but then you will be charging all this time to me, and say that I have spoken too long. Hence I shall count only the time it takes to deliver my text, and you will be responsible for all the time spent on chanting; so don't you accuse me of speaking too long."\(^{124}\)

The various themes analyzed make one surmise that Bolshevik leaders are becoming somewhat less dedicated


\(^{122}\)See, for example, K 59 II, p. 120.

\(^{123}\)K 60 II, p. 83.

themselves and considerably more sceptical about the possibility of arousing dedication in others.

GOING TO THE VERY END?

As has been suggested, Bolshevik energy may derive in part from an effort to lean over backward against a temptation -- obscurely perceived in oneself and distressingly apparent in others -- to stop short of completed action.

Bolsheviks still insist that they ought to act in hard fashion (tverdo), in a decisive manner (reshitel'no) so as to reach an answer (reshenie) to a question. "We were forced," says Khrushchev in a typical phrase, "to mobilize our forces...for the solution of those... problems which had not been solved, and we dealt with (spravit'sia s) that task successfully (uspeshno)." As the regime approaches the age of fifty, it still seems necessary to exalt "the spirit of doing things in a businesslike, concrete manner (dukh delovitosti, konkretnosti)," as if it could by no means be taken for granted that even senior officials of Party and government will act "fruitfully (plodotvorno)," will possess a "readiness to go to the end." One cannot recall too often that "what is projected by the Party

125 Study, Ch. VI.
127 Ibid., p. 50.
will be realized in life,"¹²⁹ that "with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the word never diverges from the deed."¹³⁰ When so much stress is being laid on this being actually the case, one may of course suspect that proper behavior in this respect is neither easy nor prevalent. When he wants to convince a Moscow audience that his long journey abroad was no junket, Khrushchev confesses that "sometimes one wants to cut the length of the journey in half, or at least to reduce it by a day or two, to return home." 'But,' he proclaims, 'we Communists have been...taught to fulfill to the end the tasks set by the party and the people.'¹³¹

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In the very course of an enterprise one's incentive or capacity to pursue it may collapse, an older Bolshevik fear which continues to be expressed. "It...happens," notes an observer, "that managers do support the undertakings of advanced workers (peredovik), that they promise them help. But then they forget everything. They do not create even the most necessary conditions for them, and as a result a good attempt perishes."¹³³

The apprehension that people -- perhaps oneself -- may show instability (neustoichivost'), vacillation

¹²⁹ See, for example, a large headline in Pravda, March 10, 1962.
¹³¹ K 60 I, pp. 228-229.
¹³² See Study, Ch. VII.
¹³³ Stepakov, Kommunist, February 1962, p. 63.
(shatanie) -- or even "dashing from one extreme to the other (sharakhanie i krainosti v krainosti)."\textsuperscript{134} -- is combatted by stress on the virtues of unshakable steadfastness (nepokolebimaia stoikost'), persistence (nastoichivost'), stubornness (upornost'), hardness (tverdost'), consequential conduct (posledovatel'nost'). The Bolshevik may express his "unshakable conviction of the indispensability of a hard...."\textsuperscript{135} He will "persistently go from one achievement to the next,"\textsuperscript{136} "showing the maximum of persistence,"\textsuperscript{137} "fighting persistently for...."\textsuperscript{138} "In the future too," Khrushchev announces, "we shall apply with the same persistence the policy of...."\textsuperscript{139} "In order to achieve...," he believes and proclaims, "one really must possess great stubornness and persistence",\textsuperscript{140} "only stuborn struggle can secure...";\textsuperscript{141} "the struggle with...requires lengthy and stuborn work." (This use of stuborn, however, does not preclude one from attributing the vice of stubornness to the "anti-Party group" in that it "stubornly denied (uporno otritsat') the....")

\textsuperscript{135} K 59 I, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 489.
\textsuperscript{139} K 57, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{140} K 50 I, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 199.
Being persistent about ustoichivost' (persistence),
the Bolshevik is sensitive to any imputation of
neustoichivost' (instability). When in the fall of 1957
a western journalist reminds Khrushchev that the recent
elimination of the "anti-Party group" and of Zhukov has
led to western talk about "the unstable (nestabil'nyi)
Soviet leadership," Khrushchev seems particularly eager
to reject this view, as to him nestabil'nost' suggests
neustoichivost' and slabost' (weakness): "Could an un-
stable, weak leadership have decided to expel Molotov
from the Central Committee -- Molotov, who before that
belonged for decades to the leadership -- or to expel
Kaganovich, Malenkov, Shepilov?" 142

The fear persists that people may cease (prekratit')
doing what is required, perform it more weakly (oslabit'),
or in fits and starts (po kampaneiski). "It often
happens," notes Khrushchev about the direction of economic
affairs on all levels, that authorities "take up either
one thing or the other (brat'sia to za odno, to za drugoe)."
Thus "at one moment Party organs concentrate their efforts
on agriculture and to some extent avert their attention
from industry...; at another moment they throw themselves
entirely into industry and weaken the leadership of agri-
culture." They forget that "one must not constantly
change projects." 143 Nor must one succumb to the "un-
founded optimism" that a certain undesirable state of

142 K 57, p. 264.
143 Speech of November 19, 1962. Pravda, November 20,
1962.
affairs "already belongs to the past," that the desired one is "already secured (obespechen)" so that "new persistent efforts are not required." The model of conduct is furnished by the big enemy, as it may always be said that "the imperialists did not cease their provocations" or "the fight." "Attention (vнимание)" and activity should be unremitting, without any intermission, reduction, cessation: postoianno, neutomimo, neuklonno, nepreklonno, neustanno, neprestanno, nepryvno, neizmenno, neuslabno. "For this," it may be said about anything, "it is indispensable to care postoianno for...," "to fight neustanno."

There is always a consideration to prove that it is "all the more (tem bolee) indispensable to continue (prodolzhat') active struggle so that..." "In the future, too, we must (nado i vpred')..." "The Party accords unremitting (neoslabnyi) attention to...," exercises "unremitting control over..."; our Parties [the Soviet and the Polish Parties], full of resolution, are not weakening in their efforts (не ослабит'..."

144 K 59 II, p. 150.
145 See Study, Ch. XVI.
146 K 58, p. 206.
147 K 59 I, p. 410.
148 K 59 II, p. 53.
149 Ibid., p. 388.
svoikh usiliy in the...fight against..."\(^{152}\) and "people in the Soviet Union will not even for a minute weaken in their efforts toward the speediest realization of this... goal."\(^{153}\) The point is always "not to lessen, but to increase the struggle against..."\(^{154}\)

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Even if one does push on, there is the disposition to procrastinate. "There are still many managers," discloses a leader, "who live according to the old proverb: 'the slower you go, the farther you get.' Because of such managers, many new machines, machine tools and other equipment lie around (valiat'sia) for years in warehouses or rust in the courtyards of factories. On August 1, 1958, the following amount of unused equipment was present in the Russian Federation: about 60,000 metallurgical machine tools, more than 15,000 pieces of equipment for forges and presses."\(^{155}\) In Khrushchev's view at the XXIInd Congress "it would be appropriate to adopt a measure forbidding the creation of new enterprises for some such period as a year, and to direct all resources which would accumulate during that period...towards the speediest completion of projects already begun."\(^{156}\) However, a year later Khrushchev has to admit that "every year the amount of unfinished construction increases."\(^{157}\)

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\(^{152}\) K 59 I, p. 485.

\(^{153}\) K 59 II, p. 430.

\(^{154}\) Suslov, Pravda, November 7, 1962.

\(^{155}\) Aristov, XXlst Congress, Vol. 1, p. 503.

\(^{156}\) Materials, p. 52.

Since the complaint "however (odnako), the fulfillment of this plan was dragged out (zatianut'sia)" remains typical, the emphasis given to the injunction "not to defer even for a single day,"158 "not to lose any time,"159 continues to make sense. "The main thing," declares a leader, "is not to defer (otkladvat') the struggle for the fulfillment of these tasks, but to begin immediately."160

While a long-term plan appears necessary so as to enhance current productivity, its existence, one fears, will foster procrastination -- a difficulty to which Khrushchev has often addressed himself since the XXIInd Congress, when the crucial time span was extended from seven years to twenty. Twenty years to build a Communist society "may seem a long time to some of you," he tells the Party's youth. "Some may even think that with so much time, it may perhaps not be necessary to make haste," an idea which requires emphatic refutation: "...all of us...must reckon with the fact of time. After all, twenty years are composed of days; and days, of minutes. In order to fulfill and over-fulfill the great tasks indicated by the Program, one must not lose one day, one hour, one minute of these twenty years."161

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158 See, for example, speech of June 24, 1961.
159 See, for example, speech of March 16, 1962. Pravda, March 17, 1962.
People -- oneself, perhaps -- may not even get as far as procrastination: they may content themselves with yearning, with dreaming, as if this were sufficient to bring about what is desired. In contrast, the communists who created the program of 1961 are, in the words of the writer most prized by the Party, "those who have embodied the dreams (mechta) and yearnings (chaianie) of the people in clearly formulated (chetko postavliat') tasks." 162

"These," one may say about any position taken by the Party, "are not abstract longings (otvechennoe mechtanie), but realistic plans based on concrete calculations." 163

Having been transformed into "tasks," "yearnings" will then become reality. The Party, directing the people, declares Khrushchev in typical fashion, "transforms into actual reality (real'naia deistvitel'nost') that which previously was merely a dream. Yes, Communists are really bold dreamers [as H. G. Wells called them shortly after the revolution]. But in their dreams they are sober realists, men of action." 164

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Or one may content oneself with words, as if this ensured an appropriate transformation of reality.

Among the earlier Bolshevik intelligentsia the tendency to take the word for the deed was opposed by those who were themselves specialists in the use of words.

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Today the opposition comes largely from those who are not intellectuals. Seizing a spade to plant evergreens in front of a restaurant in Varna, Khrushchev hands another shovel to Gromyko, and exclaims: "This isn't writing notes."

Again and again individuals and groups in the Party may become so "entranced (uvelkat'sia)" by words that they "break with (otorvat'sia or) practical questions." It is customary for leaders to discern in "several organizations of the Party" a "basic deficiency," namely "a certain break (otryv) between propaganda and agitation on the one hand and practical tasks of economic and cultural construction on the other." 166 "In the work of many party organs concerned with the management of industry," affirms another leader on the same occasion, "there is still a lack of concreteness, of goal-directedness, of the capacity to influence the work of enterprises effectively." 167 "In a series of oblast and raion a vicious style has developed," notes Khrushchev: "Much noise (chumikha) is made about assuming obligations [to produce]. There are many general declarations (razgovor) and appeals (prizvy), but little is done for the organization of production": the Party officials involved are "chatterers (bol'tun)," "word-mongers (pustozvon)." 168 "For ten months of the past year,

discloses Pravda in 1962, as it did in 1922, "the organization of the Party in the krai of the Virgin Lands made eight decisions (postanovlenie) for the preparation of cadres for mechanization. Every oblast committee of the Party of this krai made five or six decisions (reshenie) on this question." However, "the krai committee did not organize work for executing its decisions, did not establish control. As a result, the decisions, as it turned out, came to nothing."169 "Frequently," notes an observer, "one finds a Party organ which one cannot reproach for not noticing and not seizing upon this or that useful undertaking: a resolution is passed bearing the words 'approved,' 'supported,' 'for distribution' and is then sent to all Party offices. The latter in their turn make corresponding resolutions, recommending that the primary Party organizations introduce innovations [in technology], that they take them as their 'armament,' that they develop work, et cetera, et cetera. All, as it were, has been done: the resolution adopted, the innovation approved, even the measures for its application indicated." And yet, "the main thing is lacking -- organizational work and Party control, and this leads to the fact that in reality the innovations are only weakly assimilated, do not find wide acceptance."170 "The decisions of the Central Committee," proclaims Khrushchev in the summer of 1962, speaking about agriculture, "must...not only be firmly

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170 Stepakov, Kommunist, February 1962, p. 66.
enunciated (skazat'), but also executed (provodit' v zhidn); for "general talk (obshchie razgovori) on questions of agricultural production is empty (pustoe delo)."171 In the fall of the same year, however, Khrushchev had to admit that "there are among us persons in responsible positions who welcome decisions made, but show irresponsibility and impotence when it comes to translating them into life."172

People do not go beyond words because they believe in the power of mere words. Certain desirable changes, Khrushchev then finds it appropriate to recall, "will come about in the near future only if good declarations are reinforced with active deeds."173 "If the Party organizations [in the countryside] limit themselves to holding meetings on the collective and Soviet farms and to the adopting obligations [to produce]," he predicts, "it will be difficult to solve the tasks at hand."174 For "the wind of words," he recalls at the XXIIInd Congress, "does not move windmills, says the proverb."175 "It is necessary to do real work": "if one only...waves one's hands...one will suffer collapse."176 "At present," recalls an observer, "it is difficult to find managers who would not acknowledge the importance of advanced

173 K 59 II, p. 53.
175 Materials, p. 29.
experience [in production]." But, "while acknowledging this in words, many managers do not vigorously fight for the application in actual production of all that is valuable." Indeed, "Why not say it? In the opinion of some managers, it is enough to make a speech in praise of advanced workers, to agitate in favor of others imitating them, so as to regard as solved the task of the...application of innovations." 177

Hence the continued freshness of the appeal to go beyond "appeals." "At present," Khrushchev points out -- and this might be any Bolshevik present -- "concreteness and goal-orientation (tseleustremlennosti) in work are particularly necessary.... Mere general words, general appeals are worthless. Our Party brings the idea of struggle for communism to the awareness of the masses in the shape of fully determined (opredelimnnosti) tasks." 178 "The struggle to increase the production of wheat and milk," he feels he has to point out almost three years later, "does not consist of general appeals." Rather, "this is concrete work by the brigades on the farms." Hence, "what we need at present is not general talk, but the concrete solution of practical tasks which do not suffer delay." 179 "One must perceive and skillfully utilize our possibilities," he says a few months later, still talking about agriculture, "rather than limiting

177 Stepakov, Kommunist, February 1962, p. 63.
oneself to general appeals." That is, "to call for an increase in the rearing of cattle and not to perceive the real paths for the solution of this problem is to occupy oneself with general talk, with general appeals in the style of lightweight orators who say on every occasion: 'ei ei...[ellipsis noted in the text] follow me, forward!' And when you ask such an orator where one should go, following him, what one must do, and how, in order to push the cause forward, he is not going to tell you anything useful." In contrast to such "chattering (bolotovnia)," "when the Party calls upon the people to accelerate the development of agriculture, it indicates how aims can be attained and difficulties overcome." Thus, "calling for the rapid increase in cattle breeding, we say, above all, that one must create a firm fodder base consisting of corn and other valuable crops."180 "Operative efficiency (operativnost')," Khrushchev repeats later that month, "must manifest itself not in meetings, not in the writing of protocols, but in the live management of farms.... If production is headed by a person who sees his obligation in holding meetings and in writing protocols, he is going to spoil things.... The manager must remember that his task is not to write protocols...but quickly to solve questions which have come up." Khrushchev appears impressed by the possibility that managers may forget that "what is needed is operative efficiency." Hence he insists that "if the repair of machines is lagging, it is not a general directive which is needed, but the taking of

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concrete measures. If mechanization is going badly, one must not write an order, but rather send engineers and provide help on the spot."\textsuperscript{181} "It is high time," echoes an observer, "to pass from disquisitions on the usefulness of advanced experience...to live organizational work. The time for talking about the usefulness and importance of advanced experience has passed. The main thing now is to assimilate it in practice."\textsuperscript{182}

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Thus, in early 1962, words-against-words are opposed by words-against-words-against-words. But at the same time free rein is given the feared disposition to replace action by often repeated announcements of impending deeds which yet do not occur. The issue is West Berlin. "Perhaps," Khrushchev banters in the summer of 1960, one ought to time the signing of the peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic with the session of the Bundestag in West Berlin. And then all the deputies to the Bundestag would have to get their visa from Groтемohl in order to return from Berlin to Bonn."\textsuperscript{183} "You, gentlemen," he addresses the West almost a year later, to the "stormy applause" of his audience, "are not going to frighten us -- the peace treaty will be signed!"\textsuperscript{184} "We shall sign the peace treaty!" he avers a few days later. \textsuperscript{185} "Presently," he notes after one more month,

\textsuperscript{182}Stepakov, \textit{Kommunist}, February 1962, p. 66.
"we approach the moment when it will be indispensable (neobkhodimo) to conclude a peace treaty with Germany.... Of course we shall sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic."186 In fact -- a further month has passed -- "it is impossible to defer a peaceful settlement any longer. The people will not forgive any further delays."187 Hence, Khrushchev announces a few weeks later, "we have decided to end the procrastination (pokonchit' s provolochkami) in the question of the German peace treaty." That is, "the Soviet Government and the governments of the other socialist countries... have definitely decided (tverdo reshit') not to defer any longer the signing of the German peace treaty."188 As a spokesman of the regime puts it after a few more months: "The Soviet Union is filled with resolution (polen reshimosti) to conclude the German peace treaty."189 Half a year later this plenitude of resolution gives no sign yet of being about to overflow into action; but it produces more words about itself. In fact, Khrushchev dares "to announce once more that as before (po prezhnemu) the Soviet Government is filled with the resolve to do away with the remnants of the second world war." Indeed, "from the fact that the Soviet Government displays...patience...it does not follow that the solution of this question can be endlessly deferred." "They

better stop attempting to frighten us," Khrushchev advises the opponent, for "threats will not deter the socialist countries from the realization of the measures which..." 190

Another half year goes by, and Khrushchev persists in repudiating doubts, ostensibly the enemy's: "If anybody in the West hopes that the Soviet Union will renounce its resolve (otkazat' sia ot reshimosti) to conclude a German peace treaty...he is mistaken." 191

Thus the propensities most dreaded invade the souls of those who fear them most. So difficult is it to be true to the Bolshevik's mottos: "not in word, but in deed (ne na slovakh, a na dele)," "this shall be confirmed by deeds (potverzhdat' delami)," "Communists have shown by their deeds that they do not throw words to the winds." 192

Thus "the Leninist command to pursue affairs to their very end (dovodit' delo do kontsa)" 193 seems to have lost some of its force for that very minority that has tried to curb, in itself and in the population at large, a disposition towards inconclusiveness. To the extent that its attempts have been unsuccessful, the Bolshevik drive has weakened.

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THE LURE OF PASSIVITY

Related to the fear of not pursuing matters to their very end is that of permanently insufficient exertion -- another concern which was, in older Bolshevism, and still is, warded off by stressing its opposite.

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There are continuing, though infrequent, signs of apprehension about people become incapacitated for action and enfeebling others by their own melancholy. "It is not so long ago," observes an official of the composers' association, "that we heard one symphony after another written by young composers...all imbued with whining and tragedy (unylo-tragicheskie emotsii); and "in lyrical songs, whining and melancholy (unylo-melankolicheskie nastroenie) have come to prevail." The persistent emphasis on joyfulness (radost'), on things light rather than dark (iarkii, iasnyi, svetlyi), alive (zhivoi) rather than dead, points in the same direction.

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The regime is of course also concerned, as it always has been, with people's indifference.

"It is necessary," a spokesman finds it appropriate to declare, "to put an end to indifference (ravnodushie); for "that is a very great evil." "One must not (nel'zia) assume an attitude of indifference (ravnodushno otnosit'sia) towards..." is a phrase of wide and

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194 See Study, Ch. VIII.
195 Khrennikov, Pravda, March 27, 1962.
196 Stepakov, Kommunist, February 1962, p. 63.
197 K 59 I, p. 196.
frequent application. "We cannot be uninvolved (bezuchastnyi) witnesses (svidetel') of..." 198 rather than being "not-uninvolved (nebezuchastnyi)." 199 "We cannot be detached (bespristrastnyi) with regard to..." 200 "we cannot indifferently pass by (prokhodit mimo) the fact that..." 201 "we must not dismiss our problems by a wave of the hand (otmakhvat'sia)" 202 "we cannot indifferently just observe (nabliudat')" 203 an undesirable event; we must not "just stand aside (stolat' v storone)" 204 from it, becoming "observers from the sidelines (storonnyi nabliudatel')" 205 "remain passive (passivnyi)" 206 "one must not make one's peace (mirit'sia) with a situation in which..." 207 and "we do not want to foster an attitude of making one's peace (primirecheskoe otnoshenie) with..." 208 To counter these temptations the regime lays great stress on being

198 K 58, p. 214.
199 K 60 I, p. 412.
200 K 57, p. 44.
202 K 58, p. 123.
203 K 59 I, p. 298.
204 K 58, p. 214.
206 K 59 II, p. 351.
207 Ibid., p. 91.
208 Ibid., p. 113.
personally involved (vovlechenie), on being inspired (vdokhovlenie).

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Indifference breeds inaction, among other things towards indifference itself. "We have no right," affirms a leader, "to ignore such instances of indifference." Quite the contrary, "we are not going to sit and drink tea." "One must not sit with folded hands (slozha ruki) and wait"; one should not "sit sagely (smirnenko), with folded hands, and make one's peace with..." "Can we...display...inactivity (bezdeiatelnost') in the face of the aggressive strivings of...?" asks a leader (Malinovskii), and answers: "Of course not!" Indeed "we cannot be inactive (bezdeistvovat') when [hostile] forces are mobilizing..." -- and when are they not? This would be tantamount to "occupying a position of non-interference (nevmeshatel'stvo)," to "leaving things to themselves (pustit'delo na samotek)." This is "the most dangerous thing at the present time," in fact at

211 K 59 II, p. 160.
212 To C. L. Sulzberger, Pravda, September 10, 1961.
214 To C. L. Sulzberger, Pravda, September 10, 1961.
215 Kommunist, April 1962, p. 6.
217 Ibid.
any time. If in agriculture, for instance, "our possibilities are not yet being fully utilized," "the cause is... the tendency of local managers to let things shift for themselves."\(^{218}\) Even "in the socialist society the nice adjustment (sootvetstvie) between production relations and the level of development of productive forces is realized not spontaneously and by itself, but rather through planned and goal-directed activity."\(^{219}\) Recommending that disarmament be first discussed at a summit meeting, Khrushchev points out that "if one were to hope that confidence would somehow appear spontaneously in the subsequent phases of the negotiation, the ditch separating the negotiants would not only not be filled in, but would become even deeper."\(^{220}\) Never must "things...be left to themselves.... One must work incessantly...."\(^{221}\) About any "development" it may be said that "it cannot be left to itself (predostavliat samoteku); rather is it "the duty of Party organizations to intervene (vmeshivat'sia) actively into that process."\(^{222}\) To be "conscious (soznatel'nii)" is to be aware of the dangers of "spontaneity (stikhia)." Always "one must tear oneself away (virvat'sia) from spontaneity (samotek), which still in many ways hinders the development of..."\(^{223}\) -- or even


\(^{222}\) Kommunist, March 1962, p. 84.

\(^{223}\) XXIIInd Congress. Materials, p. 166.
leads to catastrophe. "If you have a small child," Khrushchev explains to a western journalist, "then naturally you want to have a good nurse so that the child does not lose his eyes [by scratching them out], does not damage his arms or is not morally crippled."²²⁴ And is not everybody who is not at the top of the communist hierarchy in some sense a child?

The do-nothings may have become convinced that the undesirable features of the present will disappear all by themselves. Hence it is always "indispensable to remember that the survivals of the past do not die off by themselves...their elimination requires stubborn and persistent...work."²²⁵ "One must not calmly (spokoino) await the moment when these...will disappear all by themselves...."²²⁶

The inactive ones also believe that things will get better and better without their doing anything about it. Hence it is essential to recall that "our great successes did not occur by themselves (priiti samo po sebe). In order to obtain (dobytsia) them, we had to...."²²⁷ They were not "served up on a platter (poluchat' nabliude)"; they were "conquered in battle (zavoevat')."²²⁸ "We cannot count on everything somehow being generated (obrazovatsia) by itself. Only energy, stubbornness...will help in removing obstacles."²²⁹ While a certain

²²⁴K 58, p. 69.
²²⁷K 60 II, p. 258.
²²⁸Ibid., p. 492.
"problem" "must be solved," a certain goal "must become a fact," "this will not happen by itself -- struggle is needed."\textsuperscript{230} It just "cannot be achieved by leaving things to themselves. Only active struggle...."\textsuperscript{231} Instead of "years of waiting," "years of work!" proposes a leader.\textsuperscript{232} Always, "it would be naive to count...on leaving things to themselves,"\textsuperscript{233} and never naive to go on saying this over and over. When a plenum of the Central Committee "uncovers enormous possibilities" in a certain domain, people must be warned that "by themselves these possibilities will lead to nothing (nichevo ne dat'), if there is no organized...."\textsuperscript{234} To every favorable forecast one must add some such formula as this": "But this does not mean that this process unfolds automatically."\textsuperscript{235}

"It is indispensable," says a leader addressing the social scientists, "to see to it (dobyvat'sa) that every student... understand with his mind and with his heart that the new and desired state of affairs will not come from somewhere outside, but will be born as a result of his efforts, his work, and only of his work."\textsuperscript{236} "Our victory," declares Khrushchev, "will not come by itself or, as they said of


\textsuperscript{231} XXIInd Congress. \textit{Materials}, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{232} Voronov, XXIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 360.

\textsuperscript{233} Suslov, XXIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 525.

\textsuperscript{234} \textit{Kommunist}, March 1962, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Kommunist}, April 1962, p. 42.

old, will not fall from heaven like manna."237 "We remember your words," write the corn-growers to Khrushchev, "that one must not, as it were, expect miracles of corn, without putting any work into it."238 "One must remember," concurs a leader, "that the fulfillment of socialist obligations [to produce] doesn't come by itself, that fulfillment must be organized."239 Indeed "it would be a mistake to assume...that the high performances of some in production can be assimilated by others all by themselves, automatically, merely on the strength of the objective possibilities which exist in the country for this."240 It would be just as untrue to hold "that one needs only to consolidate socialism for closer relations among the peoples to develop by themselves."241

What is true for such partial objectives also applies to the great goal itself -- and is indefatigably repeated. "The victory of socialism over capitalism will not come by drift (samotek), by itself, spontaneously," teaches a leader,242 repeating the point in condensed form: "The Soviet people, the builder of communism not by drift, but by its heroism in work..."243 -- as if it were rather

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238 N. Chudin, Kommunist, February 1962, p. 69.
243 Ibid.
plausible that the best way to "build" is by "drift."

"It would be wrong to believe," Khrushchev takes time out to affirm, "that one has only to mouth the slogan 'We are for Socialism!' and then can lie down in the shade beneath the tree, waiting for everything to come to pass by itself." 244 "Communism, some say, will necessarily vanquish capitalism," he elaborates; "hence let us all become members of the Communist Party and then go to Sochi or some other warm place, or gather mushrooms in the forest -- everything will happen by itself.... Let us enter the Communist Party, some people feel, and then lie on our back, as one says, and wait for the victory of Communism." "But," he then has to show, "it may happen that one rises from the spot where he was lying, that nothing will have been added."

Actually, "the people understood this long ago. When there was yet no Marxist-Leninist teaching, the people already knew this truth and said: Water does not run under a lying stone. Hence one must work!" 245 -- a precious insight not to be taken for granted. "Such persons as Comrade Zaglada are real fighters," notes Khrushchev at a conference on agriculture. For "you heard how she said here that communism won't come by itself, that one must roll up one's sleeves and work real well, that communism must be conquered by effortful, honest work. Was that not, comrades, an example of the communist attitude to work?" 246

And this attitude, the condition of "building communism," is equally essential once it has been built. "In oral and in printed propaganda," notes Khrushchev, "the future society is often envisaged...as if under communism man would neither have to sow nor to harvest, but simply to eat cake," while the truth is that "without work there cannot be a prospering society; without work human beings cannot enjoy welfare and happiness. The goods of life do not fall upon us as manna from heaven. All workers must understand this well." 247 Still, "there are people who... accept only the second part of the formula: 'according to one's needs,' and argue approximately thus: 'under Communism you will work if you feel like it, or, if you feel differently, you will roam from the far east to the west, from the west to the south, but you will in any case receive according to your needs.'" 248 No wonder is it that in current presentations of "communism" "only one thing is repeated: benefits, benefits, benefits. People may gain the impression that all this will come by itself." 249 "Do you believe, comrades, that such a situation can continue to be tolerated?" Khrushchev asks, after having described the shortcomings of agriculture in Azerbeijdzhan. "You want to eat well, and you do eat in healthy fashion, but from where shall the produce come? Is the Lord God going to send it to you? In the legends of the Bible it is said that in former times manna came down from heaven,

248 Ibid., p. 139.
but this is only a story. At the present moment, nobody who ate this heavenly manna has survived."250 "Don't put your hope in God."251 "We are not born to the accompaniment of church bells. Our socialist country was born under the fire of the Aurora"252 -- the cruiser that shelled the Winter Palace.

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When people are not entirely inactive, they may still be insufficiently active, dozing (drellyat') -- though the enemy is busy -- preferring comfortable calm (spokoinost', pokoi) to strenuous effort, though "science and technology are never in a state of calm."253

As to ordinary human beings, particularly outside the Party, Khrushchev is all for peace and quiet. "General and complete disarmament," he likes to point out, is required so as to satisfy mankind's desire for a "calm" life, for nights untroubled by the prospect of war, for a world in which the phrase "goodnight (spokoinoi nochi)" is not a cruel mockery. "Some," he explains to American journalists, about West Berlin, "say that it is necessary to keep the occupation forces of the western powers for the purpose of calming (uspokoenie) the population of West Berlin." However, "can the inhabitants of West Berlin be calm when American troops are there? I believe

251 Ibid., p. 523.
252 Ibid., p. 502.
that they would feel much calmer without the occupying forces." For "it is as if a trumpeter were to settle near the bedroom of an old man and were to tell him: I shall at all times play the trumpet so that you can be sure that I am not dozing, that I am not sleeping, and that you are safe. Of course the old man would toss and turn in such company and would be deprived both of sleep and of calm. For the person who wants to sleep it is necessary that things be quiet and calm and that no trumpeter disturb him." 254

But, as to the Party and the "masses" organized by it, "we must not...calmly rest (uspakaivat'sia) on what has been achieved"; 255 it is a sin "to live calmly," which is "to work, as of old, without effort." 256 Indeed, we communists are a restless (bespokoinii) people when it comes to the development of the economy." 257 "You see," notes Khrushchev with satisfaction to an audience whose economic performance he is criticizing, "apart from praising you, I put, if I may say so, some unquiet lice under your shirts." 258 The Party must never give in to the temptation to be calm, that is sluggishness, under whose dominance one "mills around (toptat'sia) as if in a charmed circle." 259

256Stepakov, Kommunist, February 1962, p. 63.
259Pravda, March 12, 1962.
To the insufficiently active all kinds of tasks appear easy, which makes it appropriate to insist that "the task is not simple (непростой),"\textsuperscript{260} that "this, too, was no easy (не легкую) walk (прогулка),"\textsuperscript{261} that "the sharp turns of history are not easy."\textsuperscript{262} "Today," observes Khrushchev at the XXIIInd Congress, "when we look back on the victorious road which we have traversed, it may appear perhaps to somebody that it was easy and simple." But "no, the period after the XXth Congress was neither easy nor simple."\textsuperscript{263} If "remarkable perspectives open up before us, this," he hastens to add, "of course does not mean that our forward movement will be easy and smooth, without effort, without difficulty."\textsuperscript{264} "We all well understand," he feels it necessary to stress when receiving Titov, "that a cosmic flight...is not a walk...but rather complicated and tense work which requires the mobilization of all the moral and physical strength of man."\textsuperscript{265} "Everybody understands well," he repeats somewhat later when inaugurating the Stalingrad dam, "that to erect such a grandiose construction is not easy. A great exertion of physical and moral forces was required."\textsuperscript{266} "It may seem to some comrades," acknowledges the leader charged with police matters, "that the

\textsuperscript{261} K 58, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{262} Il'ichev, XXIIInd Congress, Vol. 2, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{263} Materials, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., p. 170.
The unmasking of the anti-Party group was a simple and easy affair"; in fact "this was not so." 267

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Indeed, of every "task (zadacha)," as has already been seen, it may easily be said that it involves "great difficulties (bols'haya trudnost')," requires "enormous effort (ogromnie usilie)." Many of them provoke bitter resistance (ozhestochennoe sprotivlenie)." "In order to solve this task, much further work is required (nado eshche mnogo porabotat')" is likely to be said up to the very moment when it is decreed "solved." "The Party," one may thereupon recall, "labors strenuously (napriazhennyi) in order to..." 268 "Naturally, the struggle for... required, as does every struggle, effort and endurance." 269 "That is a difficult matter (eto trudnoe delo)" and "the struggle for... is not an easy affair (nelegkoe delo)" may and should thus be affirmed about almost anything; but, then, "does not everybody know that walking becomes difficult when one is climbing a mountain?" 270

Precisely for this reason the encountering of "difficulties" is also a source of satisfaction: one knows one is on the right road, and one is furnished with a test of one's worth: "You know that anybody can resolve easy tasks, but only people with a strong will and

268 History, p. 469.
269 XXIIInd Congress. Materials, p. 29.
270 K 60 I, p. 99.
clear mind can resolve difficult ones."™ "Difficult and thorny is the path of the communist movement," Khrushchev proclaims, presumably with bitter pride, on a great occasion.™

If one possesses the appropriate qualities of will and mind, the "big difficulties" to be expected "can be fully overcome (v polne prepodom)."™

This is the case for the Party to which the habit of "capitulating before difficulties (kapitulirovat' pered trudnostyami)" is alien, which continues its ascent, "surmounting (preodolevat') difficulties," whose history calls for the recurrent application of such phrases as: "But the Party did not retreat in the face of this difficulty either,"™ and "this was a complicated (slozhnyi) and difficult task. Solving (reshit') it, the Party...."™

A greater freedom in the expression of feeling™ may now permit a rare allusion to one's own distress, or that of others, in the course of "struggle": "Without... torment of the soul (dushevnie muki)," declares Khrushchev at the XXIIInd Congress, "human society cannot be purged of...": "sweat" is not enough.™

™ Ibíd., p. 246.
™ History, p. 401.
™ See below, pp. 241ff.
™ Materials, p. 112.
For all effort is "struggle (bor'ba)." "Without struggle you won't achieve anything (nichevo ne dostignush). It is necessary (nuzhno) to struggle." 278

"Not a single matter, not even one which appears on first sight as exceedingly small, moves forward without struggle, without collision (stolknovenie) of opinions, without the elimination (preodolenie) of the old which hinders the development of the new." 279

Bolsheviks must not be squeamish about this, even though the enemy pretends to be. "Some representatives of American business circles," notes Khrushchev, "have in recent conversations expressed the wish that we do not in our public utterances speak of bor'ba (struggle), but rather of sorevnovanie (competition) or of konkurentsiia (competition). In order not to damage relations, we agree to speak of sorevnovanie or even of konkurentsiia. We are thus willing to make a concession and to use the words to which the ears of our opponents are accustomed." 280

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Even when the level of activity has been satisfactory, there is the apprehension that it will not remain so. "The gradual transition to communism," "must not be understood as some kind of slowed up (zamedlenyi) movement." 281

278 K 57, p. 89.
280 K 59 i, p. 61.
281 XX1st Congress, Vol. 1, p. 94.
While the earlier fear of becoming "dizzy with success" does not seem to be expressed at present, the dread of the debilitating impact of achievement remains alive: the fear of advance engendering complacency (biagodushie). When announcing a success (uspekh), it is appropriate to add such formulae as these: "But this does not mean that (no eto ne znachit chto) we can permit ourselves to reduce our attention to possible throwbacks (retsidivy) and the fight against them". 282 "this does not mean at all that (eto sovshchem ne oznachaet chto) one can rest on one's laurels, fold one's hands, and warm oneself in the sun." 283 "It is indeed "inadmissible (nel'zia dopustit') that successes weaken our will to victory." 284 It is a characteristic of the Party that at any moment of its history "it did not rest for a moment (ni na minutu ne ostanavlivat'sia) on successes achieved"; 285 to "dwell on what has already been achieved (zaderzhivat'sia na dostignutom)" would be "stagnation (zastoy)." 286 But as "we have people who rest on what has been achieved," "the most important thing for you," Khrushchev points out to a large meeting of "the best people of the collective and Soviet farms,"

283 K 59 II, p. 53. 
"is not to settle down (uspokaivat'sia), [but] to go forward,\textsuperscript{287} which means "getting rid of (otreshit'sia or) moods of complacency (blagodushie) and self-satisfaction (samouspokoinnost').\textsuperscript{288} In truth, "the struggle for... will still require a big exertion (napriazhennie sila). It would be mistaken to flatter ourselves (obol'shchat'sia), to surrender (predavat'sia) to the illusion that from now on everything is going to be easy and simple. No, stubborn struggle is before us."\textsuperscript{289}

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What is required, then, is maximum activity at all times. After saying to foreign students of less developed countries that "we do not want much from you," Khrushchev merely demands this: "Study with full effort (staratel'no), do not lose (teriat naprasno) even a single day, utilize all possibilities so that....\textsuperscript{290}

This is what the enemy is doing in his efforts to harm the Party: "They do everything so that...,\textsuperscript{291} they "resort to every conceivable activity (iz kozhi lezut von)\textsuperscript{292} to damage the Party; "foreign intelligence is not dozing (dremat').\textsuperscript{293} "Here at the [XXIIInd


\textsuperscript{288} ibid.

\textsuperscript{289} K 60 II, p. 623.

\textsuperscript{290} ibid., p. 593.

\textsuperscript{291} To C. L. Sulzberger, \textit{Pravda}, September 10, 1961.

\textsuperscript{292} K 60 II, p. 290.

\textsuperscript{293} K 59 I, p. 129.
Congress," notes Khrushchev, "much has been said about the furious (besheyi) energy developed by...Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and others against...." 294

The need for maximum activity is constantly expressed, in the context of demands, resolves, forecasts, reports. It is a matter of "the indispensibility of applying (prilozihit') all efforts (usilia) so that...," 295 of "directing (napraviat') all efforts so as to obtain (dobit'sia)....," 296 of "applying the maximum of one's efforts (maksimum svoikh usiliii) so as to secure (obespechit')....," 297 of "displaying a maximum of energy." 298 "Every person in a position of responsibility (deiatel')...cannot but ask himself this question: Has everything been done so that...?" 299 "We are doing everything, and shall be doing everything so that..." Khrushchev answers on his part. 300 We shall be acting, "not sparing (ne zhaleia) our forces," 301 "without folding our hands (ne pokladaiia ruk)." 302

That activity may become excessive is only rarely thought of. "In formulating the seven-year plan,"

296 K 59 II, p. 74.
298 K 59 I, p. 106.
300 K 60 I, p. 321.
301 Ibid.
302 K 59 I, p. 298.
Khrushchev once confides, "we did not intend that its execution would lead to a condition of excessive strain (perenapriazhenie)." 303

But the prevailing fear is of failure (proval) as the alternative to maximum effort -- which, to a Bolshevik, may in any case appear as a necessary condition of his soul's well-being. "There is no greater happiness for us communists, and cannot be," declares a leader, "than that of work and struggle for...." 304 "The older one gets," confides Khrushchev, "the less time one still has to live, the greater becomes the wish and the striving to work, so as to succeed in doing even more, as long as the heart has not yet ceased beating in the breast" 305 -- and perhaps so that one will fear less his approaching death. 306

To the call for the maximum is joined the demand for more. "Eshche (even)" is one of the key words of Bolshevik Russian in such combinations as "even more," "even higher," "even better," "even wider," "even more fully"; beyond it there are "vse eshche," carrying the same meaning more strongly, and "vse...i..." in such combinations as "vse bolee i bolee (more and more)," "vse vishe i vishe (higher and higher)." Activities are "strengthened (usilit')," "developed (razvivat')," "unfolded (razvernut')," "reinforced (ukrepliat')," "improved

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303 K 60 I, p. 7.
306 See above, pp. 10ff.
(uluchshit')," enriched (obogashchat');" their "level (uroven', stupen')," is "heightened (povyshat', podnimat')," and they show a "further rise (dal'neishi podom, rost')." They are "enlarged (uvelichit')," "broadened (raspirit')." "We must double, triple our efforts and obtain that...." 307

A further rise is demanded, resolved, forecast, reported in matters where the previous situation was already, allegedly, so good that improvements are rather difficult to conceive. "For the period under consideration," says the leader of the Ukrainian Party at the XXIInd Congress about his domain, "it got even stronger organizationally, it became tempered in its ideas, and its mobilizing and organizing role in the struggle for... increased." 308 At the same time, according to another leader, "the Communist Party came even nearer (eshche bolee sblizit'sia) to the people," 309 and "our Party, the whole Soviet people closed ranks even more tightly (eshche tesnee) around the Central Committee," 310 which in its turn was "raising even higher the level of leadership (uroven' rukovodstva)." 311 In short, "our Party... became even more monolithic and compact (splochennyi);" 312

307K 60 I, p. 578.
311Podgorny, XXIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 271.
there "occurred a further increase in compactness (dal'neishee splochenie)." 313

"Ever more" leads to "as never before (kak nikogda)," and "never yet (nikogda eshche)." The present level is "unprecedented (nebyvalyi)," "never yet seen (nevidannyi)"; something has "grown immeasurably (neizmerimo viroslo)."

"Never before was the scope (razmakh) of...as broad as it is now." 314 "At the present time the Party is working as never before." 315

The aging Khrushchev claims that he is "working" more than Stalin, who talked with fewer people, made fewer journeys, established fewer policies, took fewer initiatives. He calls his own conduct of foreign affairs "active (aktivnyi)," "acting (deistvennyi)," possessing "dynamic force." 316 "The foreign policy of our country," observes Gromyko, "with its numerous (mnogochislennye) actions...." 317 In fact, notes another leader about the late fifties and early sixties, "there has not been an international question on which the Soviet Union has not put forwards its...proposals...." 318 That is, concurs a third one, "in these years the foreign policy activity of the Party and of the Soviet government, of our Central

314 Ibid., p. 273.
315 Suslov, ibid., p. 355.
Committee headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev attained an unprecedented scope.\textsuperscript{319} "Earlier," Khrushchev observes, "it was customary to say: history works for socialism.... In our time we can already affirm that socialism works on (na) history."\textsuperscript{320} In foreign policy the Party is "coming forward with one initiative after the other";\textsuperscript{321} in fact, in the words of a repentant member of the "anti-Party group," "the initiative in the posing and solving of the most important international questions is found in the hands of the Soviet government."\textsuperscript{322} Like Lenin, Khrushchev is "preserving for himself a continuous initiative."\textsuperscript{323}

To the demand for ever more is associated a rhetorical denial of all limitations even prior to communism, a denial which, however superficial, may not be without significance: the counterpoint to the insistence on strict accounting, with its implication of scarcity. Continuing a Russian theme which has never been totally expelled from Bolshevism, Khrushchev is given to calling a favorably viewed condition -- such as "the friendship of the peoples of all the socialist countries" -- "one of the inexhaustible sources of our bogatir-like strength",\textsuperscript{324} or one "leading to the

\textsuperscript{321}Mikoyan, XXIst Congress, Vol. 1, p. 558.
\textsuperscript{322}Pervukhin, XXIst Congress, Vol. 2, pp. 142-143.
\textsuperscript{323}XXIIInd Congress. \textit{Materials}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{324}Speech in Eastern Germany. K 58, p. 409.
discovery of inexhaustible forces of the popular masses, to the limitless (bezgranichnii) unfolding of popular creativity."

325 "As life itself is limitless (bespredelnii) in its...movement, in its manifold manifestation," proclaims Khrushchev at the XXIst Congress, "so is Marxist-Leninist theory limitless (bezgranichnii) in its development and in its enrichment by new experience." 326 The "space (prostor)" which "the liquidation of the remnants of the cult of Stalin" during the last years "opened for the creative initiative of the people" is equally "limitless." 327

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To reach a higher level of activity is, within the Bolshevik outlook, to reduce the degree to which action is hampered (tormozit'), restrained (sderzhivat'), paralyzed (skovvat'). Here insufficient activity appears not as the result of an inner lack but of an outer obstacle. And Bolsheviks, devoted to controls, express their horror of restraints.

In a major set of images -- and this is consistent with Geoffrey Gorer's hypothesis about the role of swaddling in the development of Russians -- the obstacle seems to be something pressing on (ohtesniti') the body too tightly (a disagreeable impact which befalls the

326 *Vol. 1*, p. 110.
enemy when the Party "narrow" his domain). Restraints on activity appear to be felt much as work is felt under "capitalism," according to a writer in Kommunist: "Man attempts in all sorts of ways to free himself from such work, as he attempts to free himself from tight and uncomfortable shoes." 328 "The old structure," says Khrushchev, when proposing another reorganization of something, "paralyses our actions, as it were, binds (svyazyvat') our hands." 329

Activity is reduced by strangulation (ushchemlenie) or squeezing (zazhimat'): there are "squeezers (zazhim-shchikl)" of criticism and there are those inhibiting innovations in technology: "squeezers of the new." 330 Instead of being compressed one may find oneself, as we have already seen, "bound hand and foot," 331 or confronted by a "wall across the path" one desires to traverse.

On the other hand there is the great movement of razvernut' or razvertyvat', used in the Party's characterization of the present epoch in the Soviet Union, that of a "building communism" which is razvernutoe." Here the participle-adjective means: deployed, extended, expanded, widely spread. But the image called to mind is that of unrolling (a carpet), of unfolding (a newspaper), of unwrapping (a parcel or perhaps a swaddled infant), along with the sense that the object of the movement, if living,

328 Kovalev, Kommunist, February 1962, p. 103.
will react to its liberation from constraint with joy and activity. When the "cult of the personality" was ended, recalls a leader at the XXIInd Congress, "creative forces razvernilis' colossally (po-bogatirska)." This or that reorganization, according to Khrushchev, will allow us to "stretch our shoulders (razvernut' svoi plechi)."

There is also razviazat' or razviazvat', as when "inner-Party democracy" is said at the XXIInd Congress to undergo razviazvanie: it is now being given full scope. The associated image is again that of unwrapping an object which will enjoy its freedom: untying, unbinding -- hands, for instance: razviazat' ruki, with the figurative meaning of leaving somebody free to act, giving him full scope, "the freedom of hands."

Freed of such restraints, one is confronted, to his satisfaction, by expansive vistas, by wide open spaces. Observers have often commented on the extensive and emphatic use of shirokii (broad, wide) and related words -- both in non-Bolshevik Russian and in the Party's use of the language, where such meanings as "broadminded" and "generous" are neglected in favor of words denoting scale or scope. "Inner-Party democracy," observes a leader at the XXIInd Congress, "has expanded (razvernut'sia) to its full scope (vo vsiu shir'); now "the forces of...are being broadly laid bare (shiroko raskryvat'sia)."

336 Ibid., p. 221.
Out in the wide open spaces one has prostoř, or even širokij prostoř: space, spaciousness, elbow-room; full scope, full play, full range. Thus the XXth Congress, according to a leader at the XXIInd, "opened a širokij prostoř for the development of the activity of..." 337 Before the Party, Khrushchev shows, there are "vast ranges (obshirnie prostori)" for action, even "immense (neob'iasnye)" ones." 338

In these the Party can bring to a maximum its razmakh: its sweep, the might of its stroke. One can then show "scope worthy of the government (gosudarstvennij razmakh)."

Razmakh also refers to the spread of wings, which is pertinent since, in a leader's phrase at the XXIInd Congress, "man is created for happiness as a bird is for flight." 339 The one who frees another from constraint equips him with wings (okrylit'). He enables him not only to "rise to his full height (vo ves rost star')" -- even a "question" may lead to the same result 340 -- but also to "spread (raspravlyat') his wings," or "his shoulders," as the Soviet Union did after the "cult of personality"341 and these wings are "powerful (moguchi)." 342

Then it is "easier to breathe (legche dyshat')": the weight on one's chest is reduced, it can now expand;

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one inhales more and better air; one sees farther. The end put to "the cult of personality" and to the "anti-Party group" "took off that heavy burden that had been placed upon our Party." 343 "The doors were thrust open (raspakhnut')," adds Gromyko. 344 Not only did one then "breathe more easily," as the Party "expanded (raspravit') its chest more freely (svobodnee)," one could also "see" -- "ahead," of course -- "more sharply and clearly." 345 "The far beyond (dali)," with the onset of spring, "becomes wider (shire); the horizons run into infinity (beskonechnost'), become bluer." 346 And the Party's program of 1961, according to Sholokhov at the XXIInd Congress, is "a fresh, keen wind blowing into one's face, opening before one's eye the far blue (dalekie sineiushchie dali), which calls us to it; light and easy breathes our chest." 347

The enemy inhibits one's activity, making it difficult to breathe; this he achieves by polluting the air. "In order to air (provetrit') a room well, one must open wide the windows and doors...," recalls Khrushchev in Bali. At the same time one must prevent oneself from being penetrated. 348 Now, "by what means is it at present

343 Abramov, XXIInd Congress, Vol. 2, p. 244.
344 Ibid., pp. 335-336.
346 Chudin, Kommunist, February 1962.
348 See below, pp. 282ff.
possible to purify (ochistit') the international atmosphere, poisoned by...?"\textsuperscript{349}

But, then, the enemy lives in foul air himself. "They don't have the possibility," notes Khrushchev about the children of New York upon his return from America, "of walking in fresh air, which is so indispensable to every living being." As to himself, "returning...to Moscow I took delight in the fresh vivifying air."\textsuperscript{350} 

"I remember," he confides in 1962, "that when I talked with Comrade Fidel Castro in New York I said: You know, I can't wait to leave here; the air is so close here (dukhota). It is so humid (vlazhno) that it is difficult to breathe."\textsuperscript{351}

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The aspiration towards the highest possible level of activity continues to be supported by the propensity to attribute "important significance (vazhnoe znachenie)," and preferably "enormous significance (ogromnoe znachenie)," to all kinds of events and issues, or to view that "significance" as "of the greatest (velichaishchii)," as "colossal (gromadnyi)," if not "especially colossal (особенно gromadnyi)," "historical," "decisive (reshaiushchii)," "outstanding (vydaiushchii)," and "exceptionally important (исключитel'no vazhnyi)." Indeed, it is "difficult (trudno)" or "hardly possible

\textsuperscript{349} K 60 I, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{350} K 60 II, p. 575.
(вриал возмозна)," if not clearly "impossible (невозмозно)," to "overestimate" the "role" played by such a "factor." "One can boldly say," or say "without any exaggeration" that here we have a "very great event of the contemporary epoch." For "among these matters there can be no petty details (мелочь);" 352 "here there are no petty details. Everything becomes important." 353

Any one among the matters thus evaluated may be declared to be of supreme importance: "This is now...the principal issue (самое главное)," 354 "the basic question," "the question of questions," 355 the "task" which "the Party advances as the chief, key task," on which it "lays stress (делает упор)," 356 on which it "concentrates attention," the "main danger" against which the Party "calls to battle."

Such concentration -- based on insight into the structure of the epoch -- is the necessary condition of success. "Our Party," explains a leader, "has attained outstanding successes because it...correctly ascertained the most urgent, the most essential, the most pressing task and concentrated on it the action of all forces." 357

The objective of such a "task" is "a commanding height, which must be surmounted on the path to..." 358

353 Kosygin, ibid., p. 589.
354 К 58, p. 144.
355 К 60 I, p. 58.
356 Kommunist, May 1962, p. 5.
a "nodal point." It is a "key position with whose help we can successfully solve the task of..."; above all, a "main link (glavnoe zveno)" of which we must get hold (ukhvatit'sia za) so as to move forward...the work," "that basic link by the seizure of which one can draw towards oneself (vytianut') the whole chain." "There was lifted up," recalls a leader looking back on success, "that main link in the general chain...which permitted the resolution of big problems within a short time."

As strength and skill permit the "lifting" of the "link," so does insight allow its discovery. It is indeed an essential characteristic of the Party "to be able in every new phase to find the main, decisive link in the chain of historical development." It possesses, in another leader's words, "the ability to discover in good time that central link by whose seizure it successfully solves the most important questions", it "finds at every given moment those links in the complicated chain...which play a key role."

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To sum up, there appears to have been little change in the traditional Bolshevik stress on activity: this possible indicator of the intensity of Bolshevik drive registers no significant downward movement.

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364 Kirichenko, ibid., p. 466.
THE FALLING COST OF HAPPINESS

"In politics we do not strive to utilize the current situation; our policy pursues no interested aims. We say this from a pure heart."366 Such is, to quote an extreme instance, the high tone of conventional morality frequently adopted in public by contemporary Soviet leaders, who will add that "imperialism reckons little with moral principle; it recognizes only the right of the strong."367 Thus the United States "unceremoniously plays with Germany, as if she were small change."368

It is now allegedly only the enemy who "does not balk at any means, attempting...(ne ostanavlivať'sia ni pered kakimi sredstvami chtoby...)," who "puts into operation all means (v khod puskat'vse sredstva) -- from provocation to bestial repression...."

That the vice one attributes to the enemy probably remains one's own deeply felt and prudently hidden virtue is hinted at when Khrushchev says of those Hungarian Communists who remained faithful to Moscow in 1956: "These are people...who firmly (tverdo) know that the one who wants to be a revolutionary must do everything for the victory of the cause of the working class."369 "We would be ready to meet with the very devil if a meeting with him were useful,"370 admits Khrushchev about the

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366 K 59 I, p. 126.
367 Ibid., p. 167.
368 Ibid., p. 27.
369 K 58, p. 258.
370 K 59 I, p. 201.
respectable matter of summitry; but perhaps the same attitude continues to prevail with him and his colleagues when it comes to less noble purposes.

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However, extreme means may now appear as somewhat less necessary than before for defending and developing the domain already conquered by the Party; while the opposite may be felt about the Party's victory in the West. 371

During the first half of the century the Bolshevik estimate of the human cost (after the Party's conquest of power) of achieving "communism" in a given area rose steadily, 372 a development which may have been related in several ways to the fierce drive of Bolshevism at the time. The belief that one would need (muzhno) to inflict a very great deal of human misery before establishing human happiness may have been in part one of the expressions of this drive. Its intensity was indicated by the willingness to pay the estimated price, and that willingness reinforced commitment to the total victory which alone would give it point.

As has often been noted, it is likely that during the last decade Moscow's estimate of the price in question has been falling.

Leaving aside those expressions of a more benign view of developments which are generally known, a few attitudes which have received less attention deserve attention.

371 See below, pp. 91ff. and 164ff.
372 See Study, Ch. XIV.
If one wants to get an omelet, one has to break eggs, ran a saying much in use by earlier Bolsheviks; "whoever wants to get eggs has to endure the cackling (kudakhtanie) of hens," Khrushchev is content to say.\footnote{K 59 II, p. 137.}

"Those enormous difficulties," he is fond of recalling, "which the people had to live through after the October revolution were incomparably greater than the difficulties of growth which we are experiencing now,"\footnote{Speech of May 10, 1962. \textit{Pravda}, May 11, 1962.} propaganda, to be sure, but perhaps more than that. "It is not correct," Khrushchev says in a related vein, "to view the movement towards communism simply as a path requiring uninterrupted sacrifices and privations"\footnote{Speech of March 5, 1962. \textit{Pravda}, March 6, 1962.} -- which, beyond a point, now appear neither as useful nor as indispensable. "One cannot build communism simply by producing machines and...metals. People must be able to eat well, to clothe themselves, to enjoy material and cultural conditions \textit{sic} as to housing and as to other things. This is not a revision of our general line, but a reasonable utilization of our material possibilities.... Why should we renounce that which man might receive without damage to the further development of our socialist state?\footnote{Speech of January 6, 1961. \textit{Kommunist}, January 1961, pp. 10-11.}"

During the second quarter of the century, the secret feeling, or doctrine, grew up among the Bolshevik rulers that, by virtue of a grim law, progress on the road to
"socialism" was accompanied by an increasing necessity for using violence towards the Party itself.\textsuperscript{377} Now this view is publicly rejected: "Take, for instance, artillery," explains Khrushchev. "That is a powerful weapon and it is very useful in fighting, but only if the enemy is the objective, if one fires over the heads of one's own soldiers. But if warheads fall on the heads of one's own soldiers, this shows the bad quality of the artillerymen.... We are condemning Stalin...because he took the sword out of the sheath and directed it against his own class, against his own Party."\textsuperscript{378}

Generally, the Stalinist conviction that the advent of communism must be preceded by developments in stark contrast to it seems now to be opposed by a feeling that communism may be approached more gradually and more directly. When Khrushchev proposes, in late 1962, to disregard, in a fashion, the admitted disagreements between the Soviet and the Yugoslav Parties, he calls to mind a feature of the terminal state itself: "We are deeply convinced that with the full victory of communism...the governmental frontiers that now separate people will cease to exist. The particular characteristics of nations will wither away entirely, and they will fuse into one brotherly family." Therefore, while we are "going towards this sacred goal, we must do everything to overcome disagreements if they arise between the communists of various countries."\textsuperscript{379}

\textsuperscript{377}See, for example, \textit{Ritual}.


Probably the present Bolshevik rulers assign a smaller role to extreme methods in contemporary politics than did their predecessors -- at least for the defense of their domain. While "in the capitalist world competition is widely developed," it is also true, Khrushchev discovers, that "when two competitors fight for buyers, and if a buyer finally goes to one of them, to the one who proposes cheaper and better merchandise, the other competitor does not die in consequence thereof. He is not deprived of life; he is not being physically annihilated."\textsuperscript{380} When Khrushchev in 1962 happens to apply the dread word "wreckers (vreditel')" to inefficient "bureaucrats," he hastens to add: "wreckers not in the political sense of the word, but in the sense of a lack of economy, of irresponsibility."\textsuperscript{381} Both the presumed attack and the defense against it are thus placed on a lower level.

In contrast to Stalin's "How many divisions has the Pope?" Khrushchev asserts that "those who want to reject an agreement to renounce the use of nuclear weapons dissemble when they say that such a moral condemnation cannot have any force whatever." For "a moral condemnation by the people is a strong force. It acts as a harsh (surovoyi) control and deterrent against those who intend to use nuclear weapons." In fact, "the...effectiveness of international agreements imposing moral obligations on governments is confirmed by the experience of the recent past. It is generally known that the Geneva Protocol of

\textsuperscript{380} K 59 I, p. 60.

1925, forbidding the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, played a positive role in preventing the use of these types of weapons of mass destruction in the course of the second World War. The aggressors did not dare to use these weapons which had been morally condemned by an international agreement and by world opinion."\textsuperscript{382} To be sure, even in the late Stalin era, Bolshevik leaders promoted a movement for "banning the bomb," but perhaps with lesser expectations about the constraints which such a measure might impose on the enemy.

As to more conventional legal obligations assumed by states, the traditional belief in their ineffectiveness has by no means been abandoned. "The ruling groups of America, Britain and France," the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism points out at the XXIst Congress, "naively believe that the Yugoslav leaders will always obey them, that they can be bound by...written guarantees."\textsuperscript{383} But on the other hand, a leader at the next Congress explains that if "the Communist Party and the Soviet Government decisively come out in favor of the...conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany," it is "so as to bind the hands of the revanchists."\textsuperscript{384} When Khrushchev, wanting to deny that he has retreated in Cuba in the fall of 1962, maintains that Washington's reputed pledge not to invade the island is an instrument of its...

\textsuperscript{382}K 58, p. 321.
\textsuperscript{383}Pospelov, Vol. 1, p. 535.
\textsuperscript{384}Brezhnev, XXIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 345.
security equivalent to missiles, he goes so far -- never
mind with what degree of sincerity -- as to pretend that
the choice is between war and reliance on the opponent's
words. "The critics of the peaceful settlement of the
conflict say that one cannot believe in the word of the
United States of America, that history has seen many in-
stances in which treaties were violated. Yes, history
knows such instances. But if one bases oneself only on
this, then one must admit that there is at present no
other prospect than mutual annihilation." Thus "the
advocacy of the solution of disagreements between govern-
ments by war" is not only "madness"; it is also "equivalent
(ravnosilno) to the denial of the significance of interna-
tional treaties and agreements." What the "dogmatists,"
insisting on such a denial, don't see is that "there are
reasonable norms of international relations. We must not
undermine them, but strengthen them." Even if this be a
lie, it is a novel one, as it is couched in the language
of expediency rather than in that of respectability.

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Reviewing the passages discussed in this chapter,
one will readily see that the changes in belief (to the
extent to which beliefs may be expressed) reflect develop-
ments in reality: the Party's advances. But one may also
surmise that these changes derive from a reduction in
Bolshevik drive. Becoming somewhat less intense,
Bolsheviks may more readily perceive that their environ-
ment is not as fierce as they thought, and can be
manipulated with less extreme devices. Moderating their
own objectives -- for instance Khrushchev's toward Tito --
they may come to view less harsh means as adequate.
IS SURVIVAL STILL UNCERTAIN?

The aggressiveness of the older Bolshevism was probably to a significant extent motivated by fear of annihilation: total victory appeared as the only guarantee against an always imminent extinction. 385 "In this affair," alleges a leader, attributing such a state of soul to the "anti-Party group" conducting an offensive against Khrushchev, "Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Voroshilov were guided not only by their thirst for power, but also by their fear, created by their responsibility for having tolerated illegal actions." 386 The "not only...but also..." designates a pattern of motivation which Bolshevists are likely to perceive anywhere.

Presumably the sharp increase in Soviet resources which has occurred since the war has weakened this particular factor behind the Soviet drive; and while the new nature of war in the nuclear era as well as the Kremlin's permanent inferiority in intercontinental nuclear capability have no doubt operated in favor of the earlier attitude, they may not have entirely neutralized other and favorable changes.

It became possible to promulgate at the XXIst Congress a dogma according to which "there is now in the world no force which could destroy the socialist system in the Soviet Union": "socialism has been victorious not only completely (polnosta'iu), but also definitively (okonchate'lo)," 387 or even "fully, definitively and

385 See Study, Ch. XVII.
irreversibly (bespovorotno)."388 "Communism," declares Khrushchev, "has sunk its roots thoroughly, has transformed itself into a mighty tree, and need now fear neither thunder nor storm."389 "Socialism," repeats Pravda, "is firmly based (prochno osnovat'sia) on the earth, and no hostile whirlwinds and storms can now sweep it away (amesti)."390 Already, at an earlier point in time, according to the history of the Party, "the Soviet government had shown itself...to be the most stable (prochnyi) government in the whole world."391

The Kremlin now reassures itself that an enemy bent on destroying Russia will provoke his own destruction, will call down upon himself a "crushing blow," will be "smashed (razbit', razgromit')." And this not for the first time. Where is Hitler today? Khrushchev is fond of asking, and is wont to answer: "He has long ago rotted in the earth."392 "The enemies of the Soviet system," he recalls, inaugurating a dam during the last days of Stalingrad, "prepared a grave for us under the walls of Stalingrad. But in this grave we buried our enemies with great satisfaction."393 "Do not touch us, Messrs. Imperialists," adds Malinovskii, "or it is you yourself who will fall into that abyss (propast') which you are so

388 Mikoyan, ibid., p. 543.
389 K 60 II, p. 381.
391 History, p. 573.
392 K 57, p. 18.
eagerly preparing for us, and you will burn up entirely (bez oстатка) in the nuclear hell!"394

What a contrast to the period of industrialization! "During the years of the first five year plans," recalls Khrushchev, it was a question of whether the Soviet country "would live or die...."395 "We were in a great hurry, because we knew that if we did not in an historically brief time span create our own powerful industry, our big mechanized agriculture and our qualified cadres, the imperialists...would annihilate the country in which...the working people had...seized power for the first time."396

It is with this past in mind that "one must understand and comprehend the full scientific depth, and appreciate the historical significance of the affirmation made...by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev that there is at present no force in the world which could...crush the socialist camp."397 Therefore "all Soviet citizens receive with great joy and pride the announcement of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev that...there are no such forces in the world which could destroy the Soviet Union."398

Such "joy and pride" may also be felt by the leaders when they recall that "Stalin used to say: 'When I die, you will all perish; the imperialists will strangle you.'"399 "But here we are," Khrushchev declared a few weeks after

396 K 58, pp. 416-417.
the Cuban affair, "not dying at all, but living and working." "We are even pressing on imperialism, pressing firmly, hard." 399

Personally, Khrushchev presents himself as "a man of optimistic character" 400 -- "I reckon myself among the incorrigible optimists," he pretends 401 -- implying that his character is suited to the situation, as well as representative of the people: "In the difficult years of the war Soviet people developed (vyrabortat') in themselves the high Leninist capacity (umenie) for optimism (byt optimistami)." 402

Does not the certainty of survival entail that of total victory, according to the law of the excluded middle? 403 Recalling at the XXlst Congress "the affirmation made in the report by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev that there is in the world today no force which could... crush the socialist camp," Moscow's envoy to Peking proceeds to a deduction: "In this fashion history has definitively decided on a world scale the question: who-whom (kto kovo) -- socialism or capitalism?" That is, the certainty of one's own survival "means that history has pronounced her definitive sentence of death on capitalism." From the new dogma "the working people of the capitalist

403 See Study, Ch. XVII.
countries will conclude that in their countries the victory of socialism in the present epoch is guaranteed not only theoretically, but also practically.\textsuperscript{404}

"Practically" the men in the Kremlin may also draw reassurance from the conduct of their opponents which can hardly have failed to impress them, but which they are careful not to mention in public. Just as "capitalism" does not fully utilize its potential for the production of steel, neither does it fully extend itself for reconquering the domain captured by the Party. Had the western interventionists trebled their military investment in 1918-1920; had Berlin and London together turned against Moscow in 1941; had Washington planned and executed a first strike at various moments in the nuclear age -- the Soviet regime, in the probable estimate of the Kremlin, would have perished. By now Bolshevik leaders may have come to believe that the enemy's system acts in some fashion as a brake on his destructive forces just as it does with regard to his productive ones. (Though they think they have a theory to explain the later effect, they may merely have observed the former.) Their reduced estimates of the enemy leaders' dedication and skill (see below) may make it plausible to them that the old world, while retaining vigor in defense (Korea, Berlin, Cuba), lacks ardor in offense: look at Cuba!

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Still, the older fear of annihilation has perhaps not been quite extinguished.

\textsuperscript{404}Yudin, Vol. 2, p. 328.
It may of course be objected that the various expressions of apprehension cited in the pages to follow are "just propaganda." This possibility cannot be excluded. But neither can one exclude the possibility that, in exaggerated fashion of course, they convey the concern that is felt by the Soviet rulers, whether they fully admit it to themselves or not.

To be sure, it makes a decisive difference for the estimates of Soviet leaders whether they concern themselves with a Party that has acquired power or one that has not. And yet, despite the contempt that power shows for weakness, will they remain quite unaffected by the belief (voiced by Khrushchev on an important occasion) that very recently "in some countries the question was posed as to whether the revolutionary party of the working class would live or die?" For in the CPUSA "the revisionist group of Gates was active," while "in the Communist Party of Denmark the group of Larsen conducted disruptive work." 405

"How many times," Khrushchev recalls in 1958, "did the imperialists undertake furious (beshenyi) assaults (naskok) on the Soviet Union!" 406 Though "forty years will have soon passed since the great October Revolution," he observes that same year, "during all this time the imperialists have not for one moment interrupted their efforts to destroy the world of socialism." 407

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Their basic hostility is undiminished. "The ruling groups of the western countries want to annihilate us," states Khrushchev flatly in 1958.408 He speaks of "politicians" who "harbor the...aim of extirpating socialism everywhere in the world."409 "The imperialists have never abandoned hopes for destroying the first socialist government in the world, and after that also the whole socialist camp."410 In fact, "the minds of the members of the ruling groups in the imperialist camp...work in one direction only: how to erase from the face of the earth the socialist governments and how to annihilate communism."411 "Are not the aggressive circles in the western countries putting obstacles in the way of an agreement on disarmament," he queries in 1960, "because they hope to gather their forces and to try once more to conduct policy 'from a position of strength,' by which they aspire (mechtat') to liquidate the socialist governments?"412 What might happen, he speculates that year, if the Soviet Union did not have a veto in the U.N.? "Imagine," he calls on the General Assembly, "that representatives of member states of the U.N. then conceive such an 'ideal' thought: let us decide to liquidate the socialist system in the Soviet Union!"413 For, as the Party program of

1961 has it, "the imperialist countries...do not want to reconcile themselves to the existence of the socialist world system and openly announce their...plans to liquidate the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries through war." 414 "World reaction," Khrushchev adds at the XXIIInd Congress, "more and more orients itself toward inflicting a blow on the socialist governments from without, so as to re-establish by war the dominance of capitalism in the whole world." 415 The enemy, however, may have to content himself with "slowing down (zatormozit') the development of the countries of socialism." 416 "The disruptive activities (diverzii) of the old world will continue," he predicts in 1962, "until the question 'who-whom?' [who will liquidate whom?] will have been solved, until the red flag of communism will have definitively affirmed itself across the whole globe." 417 The objective of such disruption, he explains that spring, is total: "We know...how our enemies...wait for a possibility of wiping socialism from the face of the earth.... One must remember that our enemies strove and always strive...to strangle us, if there were a possibility for this. That one must always remember, comrades!" 418 And one must also remember that "all this forces us...to be

414 Materials, p. 403.
416 Ibid.
especially vigilant (beditel'nyi)." We are obliged to observe the very greatest vigilance, to "be vigilant, always ready to repel (dat'otpor) an attack."

The enemy's destructive intent is proved by his habit of ascribing precisely such an intent to the Party. By "attributing aggressive dispositions to the Soviet Union," Khrushchev shows in 1958, "our enemies reveal their own yearning for...the establishment of world domination by the imperialist slave-drivers." As people say," observes a leader at the XXIst Congress, "to wicked Dave everybody's a knave (da zloj Natali vse liudi kanal'i)." "All this," explains Mikoyan on the same occasion, talking about western apprehensions of Soviet "dumping," "has been thought up (vydumat') by those who themselves use such illicit procedures." When "it is asserted in the United States that the Russians want to create military bases in Cuba," Khrushchev in 1960 recalls -- "forgive me for such a comparison" -- that "the people say: if a mother-in-law has been unfaithful to her husband, she will not be able to believe that her daughter-in-law will be faithful to hers." Therefore -- let things always be spelled out -- "the American imperialists, who want to have their military bases everywhere, cannot believe that the Soviet Union does not strive for military bases on

419 K 58, p. 11.
420 K 59 I, p. 345.
423 Vol. 1, p. 557.
foreign territory."\(^{424}\) Such is human nature that Khrushchev himself may not have quite disbelieved this at the moment of his saying it.

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Will the enemy's yearning to destroy us be translated into action?

As has often been pointed out, one answer of rising importance in the Kremlin is: it won't.

The arms race, it is said, is, in the West, for the cash and not for the bang. "Why," queries Khrushchev in 1958, "are the political and military leaders of certain western countries subject to seizures of war psychosis? The point is that the magnates of finance capital and the proprietors of monopolies need an aggravation of the international situation so as to accelerate continually the armaments race and thus to live off the toilers. This is the main reason for the fact that imperialist circles undertake ever new adventures.... By this they count on keeping humanity continuously on the brink of war and thus receiving enormous super-profits."\(^{425}\)

Or the arms race is to slow up the Party's advance towards "communism." The imperialist circles try to frighten the U.S.S.R., explains Khrushchev in 1957, "calculating that they will thus force the Soviet Union to spend more means on war industry, depriving it of the possibility of occupying itself with the development of the production of consumer goods for the people."\(^{426}\)

\(^{425}\) K 58, p. 556.
\(^{426}\) K 57, p. 346.
"Messrs. Imperialist," he addresses the opponent in 1960, "earlier you cherished the idea that you might perhaps succeed without 'hot' war in winning the 'cold' war; that is, that you might...force the socialist countries to spend their material resources on unproductive purposes. Forcing us into an arms race, you evidently expected not only to arrest the development of the economy, the science and the culture of the socialist countries, but even to lead them to ruin (razorenie)."427

Thus there prevails, in fact, a situation approaching stable deterrence.

For one thing, "a part of the bourgeoisie sees the real danger of thermonuclear war";428 they know that "in the fire of war all their possessions will burn up, including the profits acquired in the arms race."429 "The most far-seeing representatives of the ruling classes in the capitalist countries," notes an observer, "see that a new war is not going to be, to use the expression of V. I. Lenin, an 'extremely profitable affair,' as the first and the second World War were."430

More than that, while "in the West some affirm that disarmament threatens severe consequences for the economies of the capitalist countries,...the least that can be said about such affirmations is that they are completely unproved." "In fact," reminisces Khrushchev, "I had

427K 60 II, pp. 421-422.
430Arzumanyan, Kommunist, March 1962, p. 29.
occasion to talk with many representatives of American business circles...who are confident that the industry of the United States is fully capable of handling the task of transferring the whole economy to peaceful production." 431

Above all, there is Soviet might. Recalling that ever since the emergence of the Soviet regime the "imperialists" have "not for one minute interrupted their efforts to destroy the world of socialism," Khrushchev addresses an appeal to them: "It is finally time for them to understand the true hopelessness of such calculations!" 432 Painful though such insight is bound to be for them, they should recognize that "just as nature has not granted to swine the ability to look at the sky, so the intention of the imperialists to destroy the countries of socialism is not destined to be realized." 433 His appeal, Khrushchev seems to believe, does not go entirely unheeded, or isn't really necessary: while "imperialists act like beasts of prey (khishchnik) who will fall on a human being if he weakens his attention," "if that human being shows hardness and endurance, the beasts of prey will not attack." 434 To be sure, a leader explains, the enemy "is capable of the most frightful provocations"; but "a beast of prey...always retreats when he sees before him a superior force, and now such a force exists. It is capable of bringing to its

senses any imperialist beast of prey."435 "The leaders of the western powers themselves often say," Khrushchev argues in a single outburst of candor during the days after the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, "that as long as the arsenals of governments are bursting with accumulating weapons, the security of each of them greatly depends on an equilibrium (ravnovezie) of forces. And in this there is a great deal of truth."436

"Messrs. Imperialists," Khrushchev can then say, making his contribution to stability, "be more careful (tishe na povorotakh)!" "Here" -- in the Soviet bombs of high megatonnage -- "is the strength which will be opposed to yours, here it is! ...let those who need this put it into their pipe and smoke it!"437 Even if the Soviet Union were suddenly to be encircled again, quite isolated, it would now -- what contrast to the past! -- be safe. "Take an example," Khrushchev proposes when explaining his position on the United Nations. "Even if all countries of the world were to make a decision which would not correspond to the interests of the Soviet Union and threaten its security, the Soviet Union would not recognize such a decision and would defend its right, relying on force (opirat'sia na silu)." The point is that now "we have something to rely on (u nas est' na chto operet'sia)."438

That "something" may not always have appeared as enough, a discrepancy which presumably has had highly visible consequences.

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But the Party's might will deter the enemy only to the extent that he is reasonable. How reasonable is he? How reasonable will he remain?

Does its experience predispose American business to weigh the risks of war correctly in the face of attractive defense orders? "In two world wars," Khrushchev recalls in 1962, "the United States of America was...victorious, but even then it suffered only minimal losses." In fact, "the population of the USA has not for the last hundred years suffered war on its territory"; hence "the Americans, on the whole, still recognize but imperfectly what is going to happen if war breaks out." On the other hand "American industry grew enormously on war orders, and the monopolies received fantastic profits." All this explains that "even now the American monopolists have not renounced the perspective of profiting from a new war": their experience "does not give them the possibility of correctly understanding the fateful role which they play." 440

In addition, a variety of factors create a "disposition (sklonnost')" to "recklessness (bezrassudnost')" among "some of our probable enemies." 441 "As long as capitalism exists," Khrushchev advances, "persons will

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439 See Study, Chs. XVI and XVII.
441 K 60 I, p. 38.
always be found who, 'against all reason,' will want to
go headlong into a hopeless enterprise,"442 who will be
unable to heed in good time Khrushchev's advice "to calm
down, to re-establish their psychic equilibrium."443
They will engage in conduct about which one can only say:
this is sumasbrodstvo, bezumie: an extravagant folly, a
wild and dreadful deed, an act of insanity. They will
behave as if they were madmen (bezumets, sumashedshii),
to whom one appeals, hoping against hope that they are
not, by saying: "Only madmen can..."444 and "this is a
policy of madmen."445 But then, they really may be just
that: "Among the ruling groups of a number of countries
in which the imperialists are still strong, there may be
madmen. And madmen often do not know themselves what they
do."446 In fact, "is it really possible to rely on
(poruchit'sia za) madmen?"447

The enemy's propensity for committing the wildest
folly is due to the fact that he is now in his decline
and moving towards his fall, going from old age to his
death agony. (The question of what contemporary Bolshevik
leaders may mean by this and in what sense they may be-
lieve it will be discussed below.)

First, the enemy is represented as the aging man who
disregards the decline of his powers, and follows only

442 K 59 I, p. 25.
443 Ibid., p. 206.
444 Ibid., p. 135.
445 Ibid., p. 256.
446 To western journalists, November 21, 1957. K 57,
p. 280.
447 K 57, p. 221.
his undiminished desires. (This makes him both unreasonably aggressive and unreasonably defensive: a second aspect of each of the themes to be enumerated in the pages to follow.) "Yes," Khrushchev explains, beholding this spectacle, "times are now different, but...the imperialists still have their wolfish appetite." 448

Adenauer "puts on airs (zadirat'sia) like a young cock. He doesn't count his forces and hasn't thought things through (produmat' kak sleduet)." 449 "The behavior of our enemies," observes Khrushchev at the XXIInd Congress, "is similar to that of a decrepit (driachlyi) and greedy (zhadnyi) old man whose vital forces have dried up (issiakat'), whose physical possibilities have weakened, but whose greedy (alchnyi) wishes have been preserved." 450

In contrast, the reasonable enemy is the dowager who marries young Khrushchev. "Here," he explains in upper-class Long Island, "is the heart of capitalism, but I am a communist in my heart and, evidently, we can live together on the same planet. After all, it often happens in the capitalist world that an old and rich widow marries a young man, and they live together, though evidently he does not thirst so much for the love of the widow, but he does live with her" 451 -- a possibility which intrigues Khrushchev. "Your newspapers," he tells a group of American journalists who complain that their Soviet

colleagues use little of their material, "print, for instance, that such and such a lady possesses millions and is seeking a husband of such and such an age." "We," however, "are not interested in this, and hence we do not print it."452

Second, sensing that a sober view of things would make him painfully aware of how hopeless his position is, the enemy deliberately abandons all caution. "In the West," Khrushchev notes, appearing appalled, "they announce that they are not going to reckon with anything (nì s chem ni poschitât'sia)."453

Third, the declining enemy is so replete with bad feelings towards the rising Party that he becomes actually incapable of correct perception. Emotions prevail; hence a trend towards catastrophe.454 "Mr. Dulles," Khrushchev alleges in 1958, "left the world of real facts [sic] and began to rely...on his emotions (emotsii). But emotions always remain emotions. The logic of facts is quite another matter."455 The enemy is so "blinded (osleplennyi)" with "hate (nenavist')," "resentment (ozlobienie)," and "fury (zlost')," so overwhelmed by "anger (zloba)" that he "loses the capacity of sanely (zdravo) understanding the conditions which have emerged in the world."456 "No, gentlemen," Khrushchev addresses

453 K 59 I, p. 135.
454 See below, pp. 241ff.
455 K 58, p. 84.
456 K 60 II, p. 58.
the "American imperialists," "class anger makes you... take your wishes for reality," 457 makes you lose your "good sense (zdravii rassudok)." You are like the aging parent who does not want to recognize that the time for spanking his grown children is now past. 458

In the fourth place, to the extent to which the enemy does not lose touch with reality, his dismay at the deterioration of his own position, his lack of prospects (besperspektivnost') -- while "we are looking boldly toward the future; the perspectives of history gladden us" 459 -- make him besnovat'sia: rage and rave like one possessed. "The greater the successes of the socialist system," teaches Khrushchev, "the more the bourgeoisie rages." 460 As the enemies' "hate...towards the countries of socialism beclouds their reason," "the centers of control (ederzhivaiushchie tsentri) may fail them (mogut im otkazat'), and they may unleash a...war." 461

In the fifth place, there is fear; "animal (zhivotnii) fear before the advancing march (postupatel'ni khod) of history." 462

Fear of the Party may make an enemy neglect dangers from another quarter. In the late thirties, when the

457 K 60 I, p. 622.
458 See below, pp. 137ff.
462 Pravda, October 26, 1962.
Soviet Union proposed to the West that the Nazis be stopped, it was because "the ruling groups of the bourgeois governments were...full of fear in the face of the world revolutionary movement" that they "did not accept a single one of the proposals of the Soviet Government, though [the latter's] appropriateness was evident to all." 463 A quarter of a century later "American monopoly capital, frightened by communism, finds itself in a state of psychological shock." 464

Fear may drive the enemy to suicide. This topic, distasteful to Bolsheviks, 465 is avoided by Khrushchev in 1960 when he recalls the end of Forrestal's life: "The former defense minister of the United States, Forrestal...was so frightened of an attack by us on the United States that he went insane." 466 But, then, in 1961, Khrushchev's concern with suicide is strongly expressed. Observing that if western leaders should become "afflicted by the mania of suicide, it is impossible to say what they will do (y nikh poruchit'sia nel'zja)," he conjures up a war memory. "In the first days of Hitler Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, I was a member of the Military Soviet of the Southwestern Front. As you recall, in the beginning, events did not go in our favor, and Soviet units fell into difficult conditions. On the fifth or sixth day of the war, we sent a member of the Military Soviet, General Vashugin, together with the Commander of the Front, to one

465 See Study, Ch. XVII.
466 K 60 I, p. 10.
of the tank units so as to transmit orders to it....
Upon his return Vashugin came to see me. He was in a very
depressed (tiazhelyi), lost (rasterianni) condition.
'All is lost. Everything happens as it did in France;
it is the end of everything. I am going to shoot myself,' he said. I stopped him: 'What is this! Are you mad?
Pull yourself together!' But before I could act, he had
seized a revolver and shot himself right before my eyes."
"This...case," explains Khrushchev, "happened because
this man's nerves gave way; he did not know any more what
he was doing; he lost control over himself." While "I do
not want to make a direct analogy," "in the West there
now are people who are losing the feeling of mastery over
themselves and that of self control."467

Above all, being overwhelmed by fear (perepugat'sia,
rastervat'sia) may turn a man against others, may drive
him to attempt murder. "The man who is in control of his
nerves," teaches Khrushchev, "and takes realistic account
(rasschitivat') of his forces and possibilities is not
dangerous; but dangerous is the one full of fears
(trus)."468 "Possibly Gates' action," notes Khrushchev
about the SAC alert ordered by the Secretary after the
U-2 incident, "was dictated by fear. But fearful people
are as dangerous as provocateurs: provocateurs provoke
a war, but fearful people may begin a war out of fear."469
This is what makes one apprehensive about the West. Now

468 K 60 I, p. 531.
469 Ibid., p. 570.
that "the soberly calculating representatives of the capitalist world admit that it is impossible to arrest the development of socialism," "they become nervous (nervnichat'), they rave (bezumstvovat'). In these conditions even those who do not want to unleash a war may, out of fright (s perepugu), push the decisive button."^{470}

In the sixth place, the enemy is the man stricken with a fatal and galloping illness: why not try the most desperate (otchailiannvi) and dreadful kind of surgery? "The final liquidation of capitalist elements in the USSR," recalls the history of the Party, "could not but call forth the desperate resistance of the remnants of the dying...classes."^{471} "War," explains Khrushchev, "is the last means of people in despair. Just as a person whose organism is afflicted with an incurable illness welcomes any remedy, agrees to any operation in the hope of saving his life, just so imperialists are ready to resort to war as a final means."^{472} "As a person suffering from a grave illness is ready to adopt any means in order to prolong his life," he repeats, "so does capitalism -- an organism afflicted by an incurable illness -- cling to such means as the arms race, the preparation of war, H-bombs, military blocs, all in order to...prolong its existence."^{473}

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470 K 60 II, p. 54.
471 History, p. 456.
472 K 58, p. 463.
473 Ibid., p. 446.
In the seventh place, the horror of impending death may be reduced by dragging others down with oneself. There is, finds an observer in 1962, "the tendency to 'bang the door' before leaving the historical scene, to harm as much as possible, to play dirty tricks on people, to accompany one's own ruin with mass killings of the population of the earth."\(^{474}\) There are "forces," Khrushchev asserts after the Cuban crisis, "which...calculate in this fashion: if we must die, then let us die, as one says, with music, even if it be the music of exploding atomic bombs."\(^{475}\)

In the eighth place, there is, during the agony itself, "the panicky fear of the monopolists, losing control of their actions."\(^{476}\) The dying (umiraiushchii) enemy begins to display beshenstvo, the frenzy of a dog afflicted with rabies.\(^{477}\) These are "the death convulsions (predsmertnie knovul'sii)." At that moment, according to Malinovskii at the XXIInd Congress, "capitalism threatens mankind with fearful disasters."\(^{478}\)

Such are the horrors of the enemy's old age. But in his speech at the XXIInd Congress Kochetov recalls the verse of Maiakovskii, "which has been read these days by Nikita Sergeevich: Let us reach a hundred (do sta rasti)


\(^{476}\) K 59 I, p. 488.

\(^{477}\) See, for example, Satiukov, XXIInd Congress, Vol. 2, p. 349.

\(^{478}\) Ibid., p. 109.
without growing old (bez starosti). "479 Perhaps Khrushchev obscurely feels that the way to perform this feat is to identify himself with youth, his own "camp (lager)," and thus to remove himself as far as possible from the senescent and dying oldsters on the other side. Presumably this is a more effective device than the one which Khrushchev recalls after having, at the plenum of the Central Committee in the late winter of 1962, "listened with great attention and interest... to... Comrade Kavun, Chairman of the collective farm 'The XXIIInd Party Congress' in the oblast of Vinnitsa": "This remarkable leader is 33 years old, but last year he said that he was 33. Young people always act that way; they try to add to their years. He was only going on 33, but he already said: 33. But old people decide the other way: ...Tomorrow he will be 70, but today he is going to tell you that he is 69."480

How dangerous is the enemy's propensity towards recklessness? Asked by Nixon whether the Soviets feared West Germany, Khrushchev recalls having answered: "We do not.... A strong man does not fear a mad dog, but he doesn't want to be bitten by it."481 But does Khrushchev really believe that powerful muscles are an effective antidote to rabies? "The imperialists," Khrushchev exclaims, "want to frighten the Soviet people! Surely because they have been frightened themselves by our... development..., it is that which frightens you, Messrs.

481 K 59 I, p. 500.
Imperialists!"482 May it not also be his own apprehension which makes him attribute an anxious state of mind to his opponent, as well as ascribe to that opponent the intent to induce fear?

* * *

But what, precisely, are this "old age" and this "mortal illness" of the enemy which create his proclivity towards being dangerously unreasonable?

If one were to raise this question for the Bolshevik leadership succeeding Stalin in 1953, it would perhaps not be too difficult to answer; but 1962 may be more puzzling in this regard. The older answers are still copiously given by academicians, but very much less repeated by top leaders.

In 1953 those in power had been in positions of influence in the thirties, when most non-communists agreed with all communists that "capitalism" was in serious trouble. But today it is exceedingly rare to find Bolshevik leaders predicting that another Great Depression is going to befall the enemy in the not too remote future, that the "nature" of "capitalism" entails "economic crises" of great and increasing severity.

In 1953 a trend towards the "pauperization" of the "masses," in an "absolute" or "relative" sense, probably appeared evident, as well as its consequence, a steady "sharpening of the class struggle." Today, these themes are seldom heard in the public utterances of Bolshevik leaders; and it seems improbable that they would want to

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hide a persistence of such beliefs. To be sure, Khrushchev may quote figures to show that strikes are spreading in the West; he may note that under "capitalism" "the material progress of society does not only not liquidate social differences, but on the contrary increases social inequality, sharpens contradictions between the exploited ones and the exploiters." 483 By now such affirmations give the impression of coming from a vanished past.

In 1953 the presence of the American "hegemony" in the West already tended to counteract the traditional communist belief that "contradictions" within the enemy camp would lead to wars resulting in major losses to that camp as a whole. But World War II was sufficiently recent, and Russia sufficiently affected by the two great explosions of the century to sustain the Bolshevik belief that the enemy would continue to destroy himself. Today, this theme, too, has been reduced to minor status. (Why, if it still appeared plausible?) When Khrushchev occasionally reinvokes "the further sharpening of the struggle between capitalist countries for" -- a classical triad -- "foreign markets, sources of raw materials and spheres of capital investment," 484 the sudden and sporadic appearance of this theme in the midst of a protracted absence only serves to remind at least the analyst that times have changed. In the early sixties the "specific weight" of Western Europe is increasing at the expense of the United States within the western economy: but

483 K 58, p. 148.
484 ibid., p. 55.
Bolshevik stress on this point hardly leads to a forecast of another war for the "redistribution" of the enemies' world. "The striving of the monopolies towards union," says Khrushchev after his Cuban-retreat, when comfort was sorely needed, "is inevitably accompanied by an acute sharpening of the contradictions, tensions, conflicts between the imperialists."[^485] But he does not add, "war between the imperialists," as he surely would have a quarter of a century earlier.

As to war between the Soviet Union and the West, it now carries too great risks for its forecast to serve as a basis from which comfortably to derive the enemy's downfall.

The attempt to kill the opponent being now too dangerous, it is more essential than ever that he die a natural death; but this may presently be a much less likely prospect.

In the past, when the enemy got into better shape, Bolsheviks used to talk about the "stabilization of capitalism," usually qualified by the word "temporary." Today this habit has been discontinued. Perhaps Bolshevik leaders do not dare to add the adjective, and fear that "stabilization," by itself, would sound all too convincing.

Instead they talk, though not often, about the "general crisis of capitalism." They cite examples enough, but empty the word "crisis" of its usual meaning by referring to the new environment in which the West has

to live rather than to developments within it. First, there is the expansion of the "socialist camp," and the decline of the enemy's. One contrasts 1917 and the present, avoiding any reminder that almost all advances were made in the course or aftermath of war, a conjunction which may now be discouraging. Second, the progress of this "camp" towards "socialism" and "communism." Third, the West's loss of its colonies and "semi-colonies." According to classical Bolshevik belief this development should lead to an economic catastrophe for "imperialism," either now or when "neo-colonialism" will have gone the way of its crude predecessor. This gratifying prospect is seldom mentioned. All that remains is that, as a result of several factors, the role that "imperialism" plays in world production is expected to continue to lessen -- through remaining, however, a major one for any foreseeable future.

In one important respect the underdeveloped areas have taken the place of the West in the Bolshevik view of the world. Bolsheviks now believe that the CPUAR can seize power in Cairo in much the same way that was once thought feasible for the CPUK's coming to power in London twenty-five years ago. They may have learned to be more reticent in the public disclosure of the several "stages" into which such a process is divided -- one gets accustomed to delays and setbacks -- but then there are also windfalls, as in Cuba. When Khrushchev, after the crisis in the fall of 1962, speaks of those who are inspired by "the peaceful work of our people," he includes, in second place, "the working people in the capitalist
countries." His first thoughts are for "the millions who have thrown off the yoke of colonial slavery, or are still fighting for national independence."\textsuperscript{486}

There may be thus no difficulty in sketching how the enemy -- deprived of his "hinterland" and facing an adverse camp "overtaking" him in "economy and culture" -- will be strictly confined to Western Europe and North America.

But where to go from there? From Lenin to Khrushchev it has been admitted that once the enemy's major centers have been defeated, minor elements may surrender without a last-ditch resistance. But to what extent is it plausible to view the entire West in the image of Luxembourg, or even Brussels, suing for peace after Bonn and Paris have been conquered?

Thus Bolshevik leaders may, for the first time in the history of their Party, be somewhat at a loss in filling in, be it in the broadest of strokes, the schema leading to their big enemy's liquidation.

It is this very difficulty which may in part account for the strident fashion in which Moscow denies a traditional belief now attributed to Peking. "Socialism," one repeats endlessly, "does not need wars for the spreading of its ideals."\textsuperscript{487} But except for the awkward example of Cuba has not the "spreading (raspostranenie)" always occurred during the final stages and aftermats of world


\textsuperscript{487} See, for example, Kozlov, speech at the congress of the Italian Communist Party. \textit{Pravda}, December 4, 1962.
wars? "Perhaps," says Khrushchev, after Cuba, the new "left" has never understood the possibility of the "victory of socialism without war." But how convinced of this "possibility" is Khrushchev himself?

The very fact of "revolution" in a highly developed country may come to be sensed as something extraordinary. "For the first time in history," a Soviet leader declares in Prague about the events of 1948, "a socialist revolution was victorious in a country whose economic level was high already under capitalism. By this a crushing blow was given to the phantasies of bourgeois ideology trying to persuade the people that a socialist revolution is possible only in countries with a weakly developed economy."

However, one may ask, what about Khrushchev's perhaps most frequently employed and most strident theme: as the East outperforms the West, the common man in the West will choose the "system" responsible for the East's superiority?

That this is in fact Khrushchev's major argument only underlines a point suggested above: having abandoned their past contention that the West is not viable, Bolshevik leaders now maintain only that it is less efficient. While there are huge unused capacities for producing steel in the United States, all material resources are employed in the Soviet Union. While there are always millions of unemployed in America, there are none under "socialism."


\footnote{489} Brezhnev, \textit{Pravda}, December 6, 1962.
"Socialist" economies grow about three times as fast as those of the old system.

This, one concludes, spells the doom of that system. The average human being is coolly shopping for as many of the good things of life as he can possibly get. Like any consumer he informs himself of the comparative yields of the several social systems offered in the market and chooses the one he considers the best.

This might be more convincing than it perhaps is to Khrushchev were he an American. As it is, the conception of human nature implied in his key argument -- to which he has had to resort because previous and less awkward arguments became implausible -- is at variance with a certain view strongly held by Bolsheviks.

When Bolshevism arose at the beginning of the century, it had first of all to contend with the apathy of the workers, with what Lassalle had earlier characterized as the "cursed lack of demands" of the masses. Marx took it for granted that the "proletariat" would in time come to recognize what was good for it, that is, would develop a "class consciousness." Lenin maintained that it was incapable of doing so, and therefore needed the support of "professional revolutionaries," drawn at least in part from the "intelligentsia." Bolsheviks have always felt, and probably still feel, that ordinary human beings will behave in radically new ways only if their situation becomes intolerable, only if they are forced to: a service which "capitalism" in its earlier image was sure

490 See below, pp. 192ff.
to render the Party, and precisely that with which it seems to oblige no more.

Khrushchev himself still appears as much concerned with the avoidance of hunger as with the acquisition of durables. "Marx," he points out in 1962, selecting a congenial variant of "historical materialism," "accomplished a revolutionary overturn in science, in the understanding of world history by pointing to the evident fact that human beings must first eat, drink, have lodgings, that they must work before they occupy themselves with politics, philosophy, religion."491 "Agriculture," he demonstrates, "should always and every day be the first question, the main question, just as the question of feeding (pitanie) is that for every human being."492 The excellence of the Soviet system is shown by the fact that members of "our intelligentsia" often "consult physicians because they want to lose excess weight." "That," notes Khrushchev, "is not a bad indicator."493 "I told him," discloses Khrushchev in San Francisco about the mayor facing an election, "that I have not yet decided for whom I would vote if I had such a possibility. I shall think it over and perhaps tell you at the end of the dinner, depending on the quality of the dinner.494 The Party labors "so that spiritual life may develop, so that people can feed themselves (pitatsia) well and pleasurably."495

493 K 59 II, p. 192.
494 Ibid., p. 233.
In view of all this it appears possible that in the minds of Bolshevik leaders, the "old age" of the enemy is at present manifested chiefly by the slowing up of his economic growth; and that they are at a loss to indicate current or imminent symptoms of his "fatal illness" or "final agony."

A belief hard to illustrate is, however, not necessarily one that is fading. On the contrary, the act of adherence to it may become more fervent, at least for a time, as it seems less grounded in reality. Several factors may be converging to maintain in the sixties the Bolshevik leaders' belief in the enemy's decline and death, even in the absence of ready evidence.

First, it is a belief which need not call for costly or risky action; and does not do so in the Kremlin's present view -- quite the contrary.

Second, as long as it is enunciated in abstract or metaphoric terms, it remains plausible to those who have for decades believed in "capitalism" as a system "rent" by "insoluble contradictions," latent, if not manifest, and bound to become manifest in time; to those who believe that every "social order" "buries" its predecessor in due time so that "coexistence" cannot be but temporary.

Third, to doubt the grave state of the enemy's health is to doubt the central tenet of one's faith: the universal coming of communism (though adherence to that tenet may be weakening). In view of the present technology of weapons, the spread of communism by the Soviet army,

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496 See below, pp. 164ff.
on the model of 1940-1945, appears as too risky; the
seizure of power by a local communist party in a domestic
situation which is not critical may still seem a "blan-
quist" "adventure" doomed to fail. The enemy has to be
near natural death for violence to play its role as a
midwife to extinction: it isn't murder, only euthanasia
on behalf of the survivors. 497

In the fourth place, the enemy's death derives its
plausibility by extrapolating the rate of one's own
growth: compare 1962 with 1917; then project to 2007....

Thus, for a time, older Bolshevik leaders, shaped by
an era when the symptoms of the enemy's fatal illness
were readily perceived, may maintain their old diagnosis.
But unless new evidence appears to confirm it, their
successors are less likely to do so.

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The Kremlin's possible concern about western lack of
realism and western deficiency in control over feelings
may also be related to the fact that contemporary Bolshevik
leaders are taking a less favorable view of their opponents'
stature than did their predecessors. 498

But while this makes the enemy appear more dangerous --
in the ways described above -- it also makes him seem
weaker.

How dedicated are western leaders really to the
interests of their "class?" "Rockefeller," surmises
Khrushchev after his American voyage in a novel type of

497 See above, pp. 84ff.
498 See Study, Ch. XVI.
public analysis by Bolsheviks, "clearly wants to ride into the White House on the cold war horse in order to experience the comforts (udobstvo) of the presidential chair (kreslo).... He wants to build his personal welfare (blagopoluchie) and career at the expense of a terrible danger...to all mankind." 499

And how intelligent are enemy leaders? "I observed him," Khrushchev is fond of recalling about Eisenhower after the breakdown of the "summit" in 1960 (and this context may make one wonder to what extent he is expressing pique) "in 1955 at the Geneva Conference, and I was ashamed for the President.... Dulles was sitting to the right of the President. When the President had to speak, Dulles wrote him a note. For the sake of propriety, the President might at least have turned away and acquainted himself with the note, but he took it, read it, and put it away. Then, when he had to speak again, he took the next note, which had again been prepared by Dulles." Khrushchev professes not only contemptuous pity, but also fear; while he is convinced that his opponent "won't harm children" -- hence the offer made to Eisenhower of a job as a director of a Soviet children's home "if he wants to work here" -- "it is dangerous for such a person to lead a government because he may make such a mess (nalomat' takie drova) that you can't sort things out (razberet') afterwards." 500 "I should like to tell the

representative of the USA this story," Khrushchev begins a few months later in the General Assembly. "Two passengers rode in a train. This was in Russia during the revolution of 1905. The passengers conversed. This was a third class car, and opposite them there were sitting people who listened to their conversation. One said to the other: but the Tsar is a durak (fool).

"The gendarme who was sitting in the other half of the car heard this, came by and asked: who says the Tsar is a durak?

"The passenger answered: I said it, Mr. Gendarme.

"The gendarme became indignant: How do you dare to say that our Tsar is a durak?

"I beg your pardon, answered the passenger. I said that the German Tsar is a durak.

"The gendarme then cried out: I know our Tsar -- if there is a durak, then it is our Tsar!" "I do not want," Khrushchev concludes with rare restraint, "to add anything to this story." What a boon to have a durak as one's counterpart -- at least for some years -- and what a worry!

But still, a boon.

"I am saying this because I know him," declares Khrushchev in giving his low opinion of the enemy leader's stature. The new estimate, Khrushchev hints, is one of the advantages reaped from his being more active than his


predecessor, who observed -- received and traveled -- less. The **dogmatiki** and **sektanty** of today -- in Peking, in the anti-Party group, in Albania and elsewhere -- are surely viewed by Khrushchev as nearer to Stalin than to himself in this respect: they have not had the opportunity or the capacity to revise traditional estimates in the light of fresh experience. As a result they "overestimate (pereotsenivat' ), exaggerate (preuvelichit' ) the possibilities of imperialism."\(^{504}\)

Possibly Khrushchev holds that these would-be revolutionaries, charging him with a right deviation, err in fact by idealizing the enemy, thereby becoming his "appendage (pridatok)."\(^{505}\)

Or is that one's own fate, as one falls for the enemy's simulation of stupidity? Did Eisenhower not manage to "deceive" Khrushchev at Camp David? Who was the real **durak** there? Such are Bolshevik doubts.

* * *

When one strikes a balance of the various tendencies discussed in this section, it would seem that Bolshevik fears of annihilation have declined, which presumably decreases the urgency of total victory as an antidote against extinction.

\(^{503}\) See above, pp. 54ff.

\(^{504}\) Inozentsev, **Pravda**, January 17, 1962.

\(^{505}\) See **Study**, Ch. XII.
THE ABYSS OF RECKLESSNESS

The possibility of one's own recklessness\(^{506}\) is just as frightening as that of the enemy's,\(^{507}\) though for obvious reasons less mentioned in public. Conversely, the "madness" of the enemy may well be a deliberate exaggeration.

Still, the extreme dangers to oneself associated with the possibility of "madness" winning out, be it for a moment, in the enemy camp, raise further apprehensions of "provoking" the opponent. On this, Bolshevik leaders, understandably, are mute in public; and so they are about a powerful theme of earlier Bolshevism\(^{508}\) which is unlikely to have vanished, though it may have been weakened (as contemporary Soviet leaders seem less given to anxiety than their predecessors): the apprehension that all one's loving care bestowed on a cherished object -- the Party, the Soviet Union -- may only result in harming, even in killing it; hence the accent on "carefully safeguarding (berezhno khranit')," on "protecting (oberegat')."

But the classic Bolshevik requirement of caution (ostorozhnost') has been applied by Khrushchev to the new fact of nuclear weapons so as to enunciate a well known point which -- and this is less recognized -- stands in contrast to certain earlier tenets charged with much feeling. Whereas Bolshevism, as other variants of

\(^{506}\) See Study, Ch. XX.
\(^{507}\) See above, pp. 91ff.
\(^{508}\) See Ritual, Chs. 2, 4, 11.
Marxism, used to deny the existence of any "common interest" whatsoever in a "class society," Khrushchev discovers (for *Foreign Affairs*) the presence of one such bond in the world of today, because "on the scale of contemporary technology our planet is not so large; it has even become...crowded." From this follows an unusual assimilation of the supremely political to the humbly non-political: "If it is important in everyday life in a thickly settled locality to manage normal relations with one's neighbors, it is" -- by implication, a novel feature of the mid-20th century -- "even more indispensable...to do so in the relations between governments. Your neighbor may please you or may not please you. You are not obliged to become friends with him and visit him. However, you live side by side, and what is there to do if neither you nor he wants to leave your habitat and move to another city? Even more so in relations between governments. It will be unreasonable to assume that it should be possible to make life so unbearable for one's neighbor that he will decide to move, say, to Mars or to Venus. Or the other way around." Thus, "whether you like your neighbor or whether you don't like him, there is nothing to be done about it; it is necessary somehow to come to terms with him" because "our planet is one."\(^{509}\)

In earlier Bolshevism, such a statement would have been viewed as an affirmation of "bourgeois ideology." Thus Khrushchev's succinct thesis (this time for the XXIst Congress) that "we live on one planet which, with the

\(^{509}\) K 59 II, pp. 44-45.
present development of technology, has rather limited
dimensions, and hence one must be cautious,"\textsuperscript{510}
represents
a major change. This becomes more obvious when Khrushchev
points to the common physical environment of all mankind
in a fashion alien to his tradition in which such sordid
details were never mentioned: "We must," he tells Mac-
millan, "start from the fact that we live under different
systems, but on one planet breathing the same air, benefi-
ting from the...warmth of the same sun."\textsuperscript{511} In that same
year he goes so far (to be sure, at the White House) as
to bracket together "all peoples inhabiting our common
mother earth, who has bestowed her gifts so parsimonious-
ly,"\textsuperscript{512} so far, indeed (again as Macmillan's host), as to
pretend that he is just another inhabitant of "our re-
markable planet."\textsuperscript{513} "Which side was victorious, who won?
he asks after the Cuban crisis, and answers: "Here one
can say that reason won, that the cause of peace and of
the security of the peoples won" -- a good instance of
the Bolshevik rhetoric, carrying little conviction.
Asking the supreme Soviet to "imagine for a moment what
might have happened if we had behaved like thickheaded
politicians and refused mutual concessions," he explains:
"The situation might have been similar to one described
in a tale. Two goats met on a little bridge above an
abyss. Pressing against each other with their foreheads,
\footnotesize{
\textsuperscript{510} K 59 I, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{511} Ibid., p. 95.
\textsuperscript{512} K 59 II, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{513} K 59 I, p. 95.
}
they refused to give each other the right of way. As is known, they both tumbled into the abyss. Is it reasonable for human beings to behave in this way?" 514 Thus it seems pertinent to draw not only upon characteristics of "classes," but also upon those of the species.

In what sense, it may be asked, is his use of these ostensibly anti-Marxist allegations different from the wholesale adoption by communist parties in and out of power, ever since 1935, of such older shibboleths as "sovereignty" and "the inviolability of treaties?" The point then was to persuade others by using their own words. The point now is that while Khrushchev makes a statement which was used by his opponents before he took it up, he now puts it in his own words. Lying or not, he is quite himself.

* * *

Such innovations apart, the requirement of caution is repeated in conventional fashion. "There are facts and conditions," it is appropriate to say, "which force (внуздат) us to approach these questions with great caution"; 515 if one should act with "Leninist hardness," one should also exercise "Leninist prudence (осмотрительность)." 516 "Sometimes it is necessary in politics to apply the rule of gradualness (постепенность) in a transition (переход), to solve questions in several stages (этапа)." 517 Frequently one may say: "Here, evidently,

515 K 58, p. 6.
517 K 58, p. 255.
one will have to exercise great patience (terpenie),"518 "great endurance (vyderzhka)."519 "In international affairs," Khrushchev informs a western correspondent, "one must show endurance and patience."520

As a matter of fact, "I have lots of patience (terpenie u menia est),"521 and we have all the time we need. "Don't hurry, the wind does not blow into your face."522 "There is no reason for us to make haste in this matter (odnako nam speshit' s erim delom nekuda); we shall wait."523

A certain advance is not going to occur soon? All right, it will come about later! "I shall not try to divine when that time will arrive, but we are not in a hurry. We shall wait."524 "I can't tell you when this will happen, but we are convinced that it will. Is it possible for us to wait? It is."525 "If it doesn't happen soon, we shall wait until conditions have ripened."526 Thus, in 1959, "we are confident that the conference of the heads of government will occur.... If the conference

519 Ibid., p. 38.
521 K 59 I, p. 188.
522 Ibid., p. 177.
523 K 58, p. 405.
524 K 59 I, p. 316.
525 Ibid., p. 329.
526 Ibid., p. 330.
is not going to be called together today, it will necessarily come about after some time."\textsuperscript{527} When that conference occurs and breaks up, Khrushchev perseveres: "The Soviet government is deeply convinced that, if not the present government of the United States, then the next one, and if not the next one, then a third will understand...."\textsuperscript{528} "I believe," he adds in less formal fashion, "that the Americans will show wisdom and choose a worthy President. If, however, they were to elect an unworthy one with whom it would be difficult to reach agreement...well, what of it, we will put up with it further, and wait for another election. If even then a President were to be elected who would not understand that peaceful coexistence is indispensable, we would put up with this again. Why should we make haste?"\textsuperscript{529} "Whether Mr. Brandt will arrive at an arrangement with the government of the German Democratic Republic or not," Khrushchev declares somewhat later, "has no importance whatsoever. If he doesn't, then some (kakoi libo) other mayor will."\textsuperscript{530} "The French waged war in Vietnam for seven years," recalls Khrushchev in 1962. "Perhaps the Americans will wage war there even longer. But one can say one thing: they will be forced to leave.... One may even say, not that they will leave, but that they will be

\textsuperscript{527} Ibid., p. 410.
\textsuperscript{528} Statement of May 16, 1960. K 60 I, p. 552.
\textsuperscript{529} Press conference of May 18, 1960. K 60 I, p. 568.
made to leave.... This is only a question of time."531
Recalling, in a polemic against "dogmatism," that Goa
remained a colony for numerous years after the British
left India, Khrushchev explains that "her government
[India's] showed patience for several years and tolerated
(mirit'sia) this fact; then they threw the colonialists
out. Did they act correctly? Of course they acted
correctly." "Similarly," Khrushchev pursues slyly,
"nobody is going to condemn the Chinese People's Republic
for the fact that splinters of colonialism [Hong Kong,
Macao] remain untouched." "Indeed, it would be incorrect
to push China into actions which it views as untimely";
for "if the government of the Chinese People's Republic
tolerates Macao and Hong Kong, there must be weighty
reason for this." And "is this a retreat (otstuplenie)
from Marxism-Leninism? Not at all. This signifies that
the government of the Chinese People's Republic takes
account of the real situation, of the real possibilities.
Does this conduct stem from the fact that the Chinese
have a less hostile (obostrenny) relation to colonialism
than the Indians, that they show higher patience with
Salazar than India? No, our Chinese friends have the same
hate towards colonialism as any other revolutionaries.
But, clearly, they are basing themselves on their own
conditions, on their understanding of these conditions,
and show patience. Can we then condemn them for this,
and affirm that they are retreating from Marxism-Leninism?
No, this would be silly."532

532 Speech of December 12, 1962. Pravda, December 13,
1962.
Time is working for us: "We shall patiently wait for better times, and [for] events [to] develop in such a fashion that these better times will undoubtedly come."\textsuperscript{533} "It will ripen" if the Party deploys maximum activity.\textsuperscript{534} "Sending this message," Khrushchev writes to Macmillan on arms control in 1962, "I am asking myself what your reaction is going to be. Are you going to accept our proposals? Let me tell you candidly that I do not believe that you will.... Evidently the time is not yet ripe.... But this does not mean that we shall weaken in our efforts in the struggle for.... No, we shall continue to fight. Finally, the people will understand that.... But for this, time is needed, and patience is needed.... As far as time is concerned, we shall try to hasten its flow. We shall not be sitting with folded arms and passively wait; we shall make all efforts in favor of...."\textsuperscript{535} But always, Bolsheviks tell themselves, "we must clearly see that the struggle for...will be a protracted one."\textsuperscript{536}

That the Party is better able to wait than its enemy is both a cause and an effect of its rise on the one hand and of the enemy's decline on the other. "We are moving up (zhizn' idet v goru).... Why then shouldn't we be patient? A man loses patience when the water comes up to his neck; he has already reached the limit of his

\textsuperscript{533} K 58, p. 179.
\textsuperscript{534} See above, pp. 54ff.
\textsuperscript{536} K 59 II, p. 341.
patience (*emu uzhe ne do terpenia*). I think there is no need to point my finger at anybody."537

* * *

Behind the praise of patience is the apprehension of the damages which one will inflict on oneself if one lacks it. At the least, "if you make haste, you'll be a laughing stock (*pospeshish, liudei nasweshish*),"538 or: "If one admits haste, this may lead to undesirable consequences."539 "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," Khrushchev recalls in 1961, "said that in questions of economy" -- but is Khrushchev not also thinking of Berlin? -- "one must not act by sudden swoops (*naskok*), 'in Red Army fashion....' What is needed there is a cautious, considered (*vdumchivyi*) approach without haste nor precipitation (*speshka ili toroplivost*)."540

The fear of having ventured too far out may express itself in an emphatic reaction against the enemy's affirmation that this is what has occurred. Take Khrushchev's reaction in the spring of 1960 to a speech by Dillon which contained this theme. "Dillon," recalls Khrushchev, "issuing, as it were, a warning about the foreign policy of the Soviet Government, announced that Khrushchev allegedly 'is walking on very thin ice.' By this he wanted to say that in his opinion the policy of the Soviet Government might collapse (*provalit'sia*)."

538 *K 59 I*, p. 265.
Here the enemy has touched a sensitive point: "I believe, and you will agree, that this concern of Mr. Dillon's on behalf of our policy is, to say the least, inappropriate. Don't worry about our policy, gentlemen. We are not walking on thin ice; we are rather standing on monolithic granite, which nobody is capable of overturning. The immovable basis of the foreign policy of the Soviet Government is...." As frequently, denial has to be re-enforced by projection: "And when it comes to talking about thin ice, just look at your own feet, Mr. Dillon: on what are you standing? Our policy...is fated to continue to gather strength...but the policy of the United States...is doomed to ruin.... The people will stand up against such a policy, and that will signify its real collapse (proval)."\(^{541}\) The retort can end; the dread word has been detached from oneself and attached to the enemy.

* * *

Contemporary Soviet leaders may be somewhat less given to anxiety than their predecessors; and the increase in their resources may make a certain forward move appear less risky. On the other hand there are the perils deriving from the new military technology: Moscow's chronic inferiority to Washington in the ability to deliver nuclear weapons on the opponent's territory and the dangers entailed by the disorders of an aging and dying opponent.\(^{542}\) A balanced conclusion seems difficult to draw on the basis of the data considered here.


\(^{542}\)See above, pp. 91ff.
STILL INFERIOR?

The Soviet Union, the people, I myself -- we are not lowly any more; nor are we now inferior to the West and its rulers: such is a theme of Khrushchev's, pronounced with seeming passion. If one assumes that he is not sincere, it is still likely that his choice of pretense is influenced by his own unrecognized feelings as well as by those he attributes to his audiences. When Khrushchev speaks in this vein, one may surmise that such problems as his agricultural difficulties or his nuclear limitations are not absent from his mind: such distressing discrepancies between aspiration and performance call for compensation by claims of -- at least -- equality with the West.

Look, he will say, how we have risen: "Many times we repeat the inspired words of the proletarian hymn, The International: 'Who was nothing shall be everything.' And in reality everyone sitting here feels to some degree the reality of these words."543 Look at myself: "I was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union not because of the fortune of my father nor because I studied in various educational establishments," explains Khrushchev abroad. "My universities were those of Gorky: life itself was my teacher. During my childhood I had to work for a landowner and then in a mine, in factories.... My father was a miner, my grandfather a serf, and now I, his grandchild, have become Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and not

543 K 59 I, p. 437.
of any old government, but of one of the greatest
countries in the world."\textsuperscript{544}

Are we ashamed of ourselves? No, we are filled with
pride (\textit{gordost'}); it is the enemies who are contemptible
\textit{(prezrennyi)}.

Now it is we who are big, and getting bigger, while
some enemies are already nothing (\textit{nichtozhnyi}), and all
others are on the way to becoming just that. "In the
light of these enormous (\textit{ogromnyi}) achievements," says,
in standard fashion, a leader at the XXIst Congress, re-
calling progress since the XXth, "how pitiful (\textit{zhalkii})
and insignificant (\textit{nichtozhnyi}) appears the anti-Party
group!"\textsuperscript{545} "In the light of the enormous achievements of
our party, repeats another leader on that occasion, "how
petty (\textit{melkii}) and pitiful do they look, Malenkov, Kaganov-
ich, Molotov, Bulganin and Shepilov!"\textsuperscript{546} At the next
congress one still employs, in talking of the same
deviators, the formula of "their insignificance (\textit{nichtozhestvo})
in the face of the greatness (\textit{velichie}) of the Party's
achievements."\textsuperscript{547} Where is Hitler now? is, we know, a
question that Khrushchev likes to ask. The Albanian
leaders' aspirations "to become pillars of the interna-
tional communist movement" are "the vain attempts (\textit{potugi})
of a frog. You well remember how in a well known tale a

\textsuperscript{544} K 60 II, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{545} Khvorostukhin, Vol. 1, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{546} Arisov, \textit{ibid.}, p. 498.
frog wanted to be nothing less than an ox. Everybody knows how this ended: the frog burst, and only a puddle remained."\textsuperscript{548}

It is so pleasant to regard the enemy as no longer powerful (moshchnyij), as even almost non-existent, that one must guard oneself against doing so. Having, on an important occasion, described the changing relationship of forces in favor of the "socialist camp," Khrushchev adds: "This does not mean that imperialism is now a 'negligible (nichtozhnyij) quantity' which one can leave out of account."\textsuperscript{549}

Far from being beggars, as the enemy thinks, we have achieved comfortable autarky: we don't need their pittance. "I did not come to the United States with a long arm in order to sink my hand into your banks," explains Khrushchev to the Americans. "That belongs to you. Our own property is quite enough for us." Also, "I shall not keep my hat in such a position that everybody can throw what he finds it possible to throw into it." In fact, "I deliberately did not take with me anybody from the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, so that nobody could think that I have come with a long arm to rich Uncle Sam."\textsuperscript{550} That is, "I have come to the United States not as a person asking for something (prositel')"; for "I represent the great Soviet Government."\textsuperscript{551}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[550] \textit{K 59 II}, pp. 99-100.
\item[551] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 142.
\end{footnotes}
conducted a successful experiment," Khrushchev confides in Austria the year after: "We have neither pounds sterling nor dollars, and we get along without them. That way we even live excellently."552

We are not savages, nor animals, as land-owners and factory bosses used to think: we create in orderly fashion rather than wildly destroying. When we do destroy, it is for the sake of construction that we eliminate the noxious. "Our enemies," recalls Khrushchev at the XXIIInd Congress, "viewed us communists as destroyers (razrushitel'), as incapable of construction and creation. Yes, we did destroy...the social order of exploitation. But we did this in order to construct upon the soil, thus cleansed of the filth (griaz i merzost') of capitalism, a new... order.... In the history of humanity communists are thus the greatest constructive (sozidatel'nyi) force."553 "The working class of the Soviet Union...has shown," Khrushchev does not tire of pointing out, "that it is a creative class (klass-tvorets), a class which is the creator (sozidatel') of the most advanced socio-economic structure."554

It is the enemy who is an animal. "Through the savage yells (dikie krik) of rage (ozloblenie) emitted by our enemies one hears their animal fear (zhivotnyi strakh) of..." observes the Director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the XXIIInd Congress.555

552 K 60 II, p. 103.
553 Materials, p. 123.
554 Speech of December 9, 1961.
One may be sensitive to anything which might in some fashion make one an animal. When, at the XXIIInd Congress, an agricultural machine named K K Kn 2 is mentioned, Khrushchev (who is really Kh) interrupts: "Once I read in a paper an article in which the names given to our agricultural machines were justly criticized. Try to pronounce and to understand those 'K Kh 2,' 'K Kh K,' and the devil knows what others! What kind of dog (sobachii) language is being forced upon (naviazyvat') us here! Give them a human name (nazovite po-chelovecheski), so that it be clear what kind of machine it is."  

Not clumsy and stupid, we are skillful and intelligent. "The great victories of the Soviet people," Khrushchev shows at the XXIIInd Congress, "have dissipated, as if it were smoke, the legend of the incapacity (nesposobnost') of the working masses for constructive creation, for the direction of the government. These victories have convincingly shown that...coachmen and cooks, taking power into their hands, are capable (sposobnyi) of directing the government better and more intelligently, of developing the economy, science and culture more speedily than, for instance, the members of the Russian Council of Ministers had done -- dukes, counts, capitalists and land-owners."  

But has all this really been shown "convincingly?" "It is a matter of our honor, of our pride," Khrushchev has to insist

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556 Vol. 1, p. 513.
557 Materials, p. 119.
somewhat later, "to show our capacity (sobosobnost'), our ability (umenie), and to solve the task of sharply increasing...."

"Are we really (neuzhele my) ...less capable than the Americans?" he has had to ask earlier.

"Are we really (razye my) less capable than they (khuzhe ikh umeem) in tilling the earth, in breeding cows, in milking them, in feeding swine and producing good jellied meat, or in preparing hot meat?" When this is greeted with "laughter in the hall," he insists: "But why then (tak pochemu) must we produce less than they?"

Now we are not uneducated any more, but highly cultured. As to his own past, Khrushchev of course attempts to glory in the lack of education entailed by his proletarian origin. "I was educated," he flaunts shortly after having been defeated by Harvard, "in the 'university' of the mines. This was for the working man some kind of Cambridge, the 'university' of the deprived people in Russia. My father happened to get there, and I passed through this 'university' in childhood and youth." But his bad feelings about being "uncultured" show through. "I admit," Khrushchev declares to a meeting of teachers, "that, appearing before you, I am anxious (volnovat'sia) all the time, because I know my deficiencies in the pronunciation of certain words; for I find myself before such severe judges." But he can, and does, insist,
often and at length, that in the Soviet Union "among people occupied with physical labor the number of persons with middle [secondary] and higher education has significantly grown. Before the Revolution there were no persons among the workers and peasants with middle education, to say nothing at all of higher, but now...."562 "Those same workers and working women, peasants and peasant women, whom the aristocrats viewed as black bones (chernaia kost’)," he exults in 1962, "have in fact (na dele) shown their capacities in science, technology, in art, in culture."563 One might suspect that Khrushchev finds it particularly irritating when "enemies are crowing (karkat’) that new difficulties would arise for us from the fact that in the Soviet Union the number of persons receiving middle and higher education is rising every year. Hence, it is alleged, they will necessarily come out against communism and strive for a 'free'... society."564

Considering all these achievements, are we really illegitimate? Not at all. "Don't be frightened by our country," Khrushchev tells the French, "but rather become imbued (proniknut'sia) with the consciousness of the fact that we are legitimate children."565 It is the enemy who is tainted by illegitimacy. Whenever the United States,
having committed an evil deed, proceeds to deny it, Khrushchev is likely to compare it to an unwed mother who claims, despite the presence of numerous children, that she is still a virgin. "But what can be done about it? The girl gives birth, and the fact of birth has been registered."

We are not small children any more -- if not already adults, at least hefty adolescents. "You are older than we," Khrushchev addresses the "imperialists," "but socialism is now, as it were, a child whose muscles have developed to such an extent that he is ready to compete with capitalism."

No more lowly, we have all become princes. "Some have announced" abroad, Khrushchev discloses, "that Gagarin is a direct descendant of the ducal family of the Gagarins." "What a sign of the times!" he comments: "Now the remnants of the former Russian upper classes (byvshie) are not above taking advantage of (primazat'sia k) the glory of the working man." But in truth the Soviet Union is "the tsardom of the working people" while "tsarist Russia does not exist any more." Khrushchev has become increasingly given to speak of "His Highness (Ego Velichestvo) the People," "His Highness the Working Class of the Soviet Union."

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566 K 60 II, p. 507.
569 See, for example, speech of March 16, 1962. Pravda, March 17, 1962.
570 See, for example, speech of August 11, 1961. Pravda, August 12, 1961.
But the enemy refuses to acknowledge these changes, enormous though they be. Though "times are now different," "the imperialists' attitude (podkhod) has remained the old one." "They try to approach the Soviet Union with the old yardstick"; they "maintain the attitude towards us they had earlier when they called Russia a country of bast-shoes (lapot')."571 "The monopolists," Khrushchev repeats in 1962, "want to calculate according to their old conceptions: They say 'the Soviet Union is still the old Russia of bast-shoes; we did not recognize her for sixteen years after the October revolution.'"572

Does this show that we have not really raised ourselves to a radically higher level? Of course not. What it shows is the enemy's senile blindness. Because "the imperialists look at us in the same fashion as they looked at Russia a hundred or fifty years ago," "we are telling them -- 'You, gentlemen, haven't noticed (zametit') us....'"573 "It is necessary finally to understand," Khrushchev calls on the other side, "that the Soviet country has now become different (stala inoi), the world has changed (stal drugim), and the relationship of forces and of arms has become different."574 "Even those who make a noise here," exclaims Khrushchev to an unruly audience of journalists abroad, "should understand with

whom they are dealing. I am the representative of the
great Soviet people, under whose leadership...."575
"Gentlemen," he tells the West, "those times when you
attacked the Crimea already belong to the past."576

But though that moment be a hundred years removed in
physical time, is it not much less distant within Khrush-
chev's soul? The "imperialists" are like the father who
denies that his son has grown up. "Such views on con-
temporary Albania," says Khrushchev about western con-
ceptions of that country's backwardness, "are hopelessly
out of date." But, "thus it often happens with un-
intelligent old people when they imagine a person as he
was as a child. However, in the meantime this person
has grown up."577 "Some political figures in the West,"
he notes, "would like to have the negotiations [on
Berlin] center around the consolidation or 'improvement'
of the occupation regime in West Berlin." Khrushchev
appears amazed: "Strange people! One might believe that
they are in a state of lethargic sleep and that they still
consider the Soviet Union as the kind of power it was
during the first years of the Soviet regime." However,
"it is already long ago that we exchanged childish shorts
(detskie trusiki) for paternal pants (otsovske
shtany)."578

575 K 60 I, p. 561.
576 Speech of August 11, 1961. Pravda, August 12,
1961.
577 K 59 I, p. 364.
578 Speech of December 9, 1961. Pravda, December 10,
1961.
Demonstrably erroneous though it may be, much though it may indicate the enemy's deterioration, his persisting belief in his superiority remains impressive, depressing, infuriating. "When I was in the United States of America," recalls Khrushchev, "I told American businessmen more than once: 'How self-confident you are! How highly you think of yourself and how you underestimate others!'" 579

How the enemy takes it for granted that all is permitted to him, and to him only! "The United States of America," notes Khrushchev after the U-2 incident and the American refusal to apologize for it, "committed an aggressive act, but they are not accustomed to anybody making observations to them about anything, demanding an answer of them." 580 In fact, "I remember conversations in Paris with a delegation from the International Women's Congress which had recently been held in Copenhagen. Some delegates, while condemning the aggressive actions of the American government, asked at the same time: perhaps one ought to have agreed to the holding of the summit meeting even without receiving apologies from the American government. One of the delegates said: 'To express an apology is terrible for the American government.' As if any other government might proffer apologies, but as if this were difficult for the American government and as if I ought to understand its position. 'Arrogance

579 K 59 II, p. 342.
580 K 60 I, p. 603.
(spes') is strongly developed among them,' one delegate said. I answered: 'This is true, but it is precisely that arrogance which needs to be brought down (sbit')."581

A year later, this matter seems to have lost little of its vividness. "In 1960 in Paris," Khrushchev recalls, "Mr. Macmillan tried to persuade me to sit down at the negotiating table with Eisenhower, who had committed an unworthy act towards our country. Macmillan said: 'Do understand, Mr. Khrushchev, this is a great country; it can't apologize.' I answered: 'Allow me, we too are a great country; we require an apology.'"582

How natural it is for the enemy to forbid my doing something which he allows himself without any compunction! October 26, 1962, Khrushchev pleads with President Kennedy that Turkey equals Cuba; his supplication goes unheard. Having in 1959 attributed to the West a proposal of a test ban by virtue of which foreign personnel would enter the Soviet Union, but no Soviet citizens would control the West, Khrushchev then exclaims -- possibly with feeling, even though he is lying: "These proposals of the western powers show how much contempt (neuvazhenie) they have for our government and our people."583 "Imagine," says the foreign ministry of Moscow to that of Bonn, "that Frankfurt-am-Main had been divided for whatever reasons, and that another state

581 Ibid., pp. 625-626.
583 K 59 I, p. 122.
order had been formed on one part of the territory of the city, that...an occupation regime hostile to the Federal Republic were to exist there. Would the Federal Republic be a passive onlooker to this, or would it use all possibilities in order to find some...solution which secured its interests in due fashion? The answer is evident. No, the Federal Republic would not tolerate this." Now "why do the governments of the western powers and the Federal Republic want to refuse the German Democratic Republic what they certainly would not refuse themselves?"\textsuperscript{584}

"Here are journalists from the bourgeois countries," Khrushchev observes at a meeting in Moscow. "They will of course now write that Khrushchev calls for world revolution, for world communism, and that therefore peaceful coexistence is impossible, and so forth. Write what you wish, gentlemen. But you desire the victory of world capitalism. Then why do you want to deprive (lishit') me of the right to propagandize for world communism? Where is the equality of conditions here (gde zhe ravnie usloviia)?\textsuperscript{585}

But there can be no equality of conditions, as the West is the father or teacher who takes it for granted that he enjoys rights superior to those of the child. "They want to treat us like a boy," declares Khrushchev about the West's attitude to the Soviet Union, "in the

matter of the peace treaty with Eastern Germany." "Sit still, they say, put your hands on the desk, don't dare take a pen to sign a peace treaty." However, "when you wanted a peace treaty with Japan, you disregarded (ne poschitat'sias) us and signed it. Now that we are telling you a peace treaty must be signed with Germany, we are told: 'Don't you dare, or you will have your ears boxed.'"586

Probably Khrushchev is saying what he knows to be untrue: he must have understood that the West is not trying to prevent him from seizing his pen for the purpose mentioned. But this does not preclude his using his own strong feeling to support the lie. When he insists that "we, too, are human beings (liudi)"; "we, too, are a strong government." "We must mutually spare our self-esteem (shchadit samoliubie)," and, finally, "we shall sign the treaty because we are just as strong as you." When Khrushchev says all this, there may be speaking, despite all the pretense, the oppressed child, the oppressed man of the common people (narod), the member of a nation and the subject of a state that has (among other and opposite reactions) been despised and has despised itself.

He and other Bolshevik leaders just cannot forget this past of contempt, nor do they perhaps feel, deep down, that this is just a past: very little provocation is needed to arouse a sharp sense of being treated as an inferior.

While on the one hand tsarism is viewed as having actually presented the Party with a legacy of backwardness, former western conceptions of Russian retardation are treated as an expression of the West's eternal contempt. "For decades bourgeois propaganda presented...the Soviet people, in so many words, as a 'race of uneducated peasants.'"^587 "There was a time when people abroad, but also some within the country, spoke about us with disdain (prenebrezhenie)."^588 This was "illiterate Russia about whom some talked with contempt (nevazhenie), considering her a barbarous country."^589

The West, the Russian upper classes and -- who knows? -- some among the Party intelligentsia, predicted, or at least felt, that Russians, and particular Russian workers and peasants, would never rise from their low state. "How many self-important (nadutyi) 'theoreticians' were there not," Khrushchev recalls, "who predicted that bast-shoe Russia was not capable of becoming a tremendous industrial power!"^590 "For many decades the bourgeois aristocracy [sic] said with contempt that the working people...would not be able to make the heights of science, of technology, of culture their own, would not be capable of leading the government and society."^591 Having failed to overthrow

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589 Ibid.
the young Soviet power, "the leaders of the capitalist world began to calculate in the following way: ...let us give these stubborn workers and illiterate peasants time...to direct affairs by themselves. They will not be able to manage successfully the complicated business of directing a country...they will suffocate, they will not endure all the economic and political difficulties which will assail them." 592

In fact, we were laughed at, mocked. "When Vladimir Il'ich announced [in 1917] that the Communist Party was ready to assume the direction of the country," Khrushchev recalls at the XXIIInd Congress, "the bourgeois press of Russia mocked (izdevat'sia) us and laughed (nasmekhat'sia) at us. This is what the monarchist paper Novoe vremia then wrote: 'Let us assume for a moment that the Communists will be victorious. Who will then govern us? Perhaps cooks? Or firemen? Grooms, coachmen? Or perhaps nursemaids will run to attend the Council of Ministers in intervals between the washing of swaddling clothes? What is this? Who are these leaders of government? Grooms, nursemaids, coachmen -- these are, according to the idea of Communists, apparently called to rule the country. Will it be thus? No!'" 593

To ridicule people is to "lower their human dignity (unizhat' ikh chelovecheskoe dostoinstvo)". 594 an offense apt to rankle.

592 K 59 I, p. 163.
593 Materials, p. 119.
When Khrushchev announces that he is going to show how he and his audience have ceased being objects of contempt, we may actually find him insisting again on how they were and, perhaps -- in his feeling, if not his conscious thought -- still are. "The United States of America," he begins with glee in 1961, "is at present really going through an extremely painful (muchitel'nyi) period of their development when a big revision of values (pereotsenka tsemnostei) is taking place. You should feel with them (voidite v ikh polozhenie), though it is of course difficult for you to do that, as it is for me. Only actors quickly and convincingly transform themselves now into kings, and then into proletarians. Well, feel with a king or some prince: he is accustomed to riches, accustomed to people bowing before him; nobody has the right to look into his eyes, one must bow one's head and look only at his trousers or shoes. American imperialism,...like such a king or prince, is accustomed to everybody bowing before it and fearing it. Suddenly the Soviet Union appeared. Our little ruble (rublishko) was at first rather weak, but then it got stronger, more virile (vozmuzhat') and became dearer than the dollar.... We created a powerful industry, a developed agriculture, raised the level of science and culture." One would now expect to hear how painful it is for the United States to adapt to these developments. However, Khrushchev pursues in the opposite vein: "But the imperialists look at us as they looked at Russia a hundred or fifty years ago.... We are telling the imperialists -- 'You, gentlemen, haven't noticed us,' and we add to this, as the Ukrainians
say...." At this point Khrushchev returns to the contrary theme which he probably intended to develop in the first place, for the Ukrainians ask: "How is it that your eyes are popping out in astonishment?" But then he returns to his subject of western contempt. "In this [sic] there is a loss of the sense of reality on the part of the imperialists...." And now again, for the conclusion, back to the initial point: '"...and [sic] at present there is going on [among the imperialists] an extremely painful rethinking of many phenomena.'

The distress felt about the enemy's contempt may be mitigated by recalling how wrong the forecasts turned out to be which he has derived from his low estimate of the Party and of Russia, and how disastrous the actions based on them. They mocked us? Now we mock them! "Seizing power from the Tsar, the capitalists and the landowners," Khrushchev recalls, "we defended it successfully in the fire of the civil war, though we were then bare-footed and in tatters. How many strategists were there then who predicted the imminent defeat of what they called 'the armies of the barefooted ones!' But where are these woe-strategists today?" At that time, Khrushchev reminds the XXIInd Congress, "bourgeois parties, politicians and ideologists...shouted with one voice that the 'Bolshevik experiment' was doomed to failure. Churchill predicted 'the full decline of all forms of life in Russia,' 'a full collapse...of socialist and communist theory.' At

present we could ask Mr. Churchill: 'Who has suffered a collapse? Our country, which, in its economy, stood last among the major countries of the world, has now become the second industrial power.... But Great Britain, which was then the first power of the world, has irretrievably lost her position.'

During the last war, notes Malinovskii, "the enemies of the Soviet Union consorted themselves with the...hope...that the Soviet Army would not hold fast against the strongest army of the capitalist world, the army of Hitler Germany. But history, as is well known, cruelly laughed (zlo posmeiat'sia) at all those who built their adventurist strategy on the basis of such political calculations." "All see," declares Khrushchev in 1962, "how the Soviet Union has grown up and what it has become, the former Tsarist Russia of bast shoes, the illiterate peasant country mocked by the rest of the world. The Soviet Union has given the imperialists hell (pokazat' kuzkinu mat')."

The decrepit parent whose contempt prevents him from perceiving that his child has grown up still threatens beatings; the child announces that if the parent is foolish enough to act on his contempt, he will hit back, and use his superior strength. "You know," Khrushchev reminds French trade union leaders in 1960, "that things like this happen: a father may strive to teach his son by force. But if that father is not going to take account

597 Materials, p. 123.
of reality, it may happen that the son himself, in the end, will frighten such a father and tell him -- "What do you think you are doing, father?" "We are telling the imperialists," declares Khrushchev in the following year: "Understand that you have now placed yourself in the position of some aged (старый) parents (дед), a father (папаша) or a mother (мамаша). Their little son (сынок) has already made the change from short to long trousers, and their daughter is already wearing curls. These children already want to be treated as adults, but the parents still want to twitch their braids or pull their ears. To some extent this is the attitude taken towards us. They still want to teach us: 'You mustn't do that.' 'Don't you dare.' 'If you do that, you'll get a box on the ear.' To such threats we can answer: 'We won't box your ears, but rather give you a beating on some other spot!' "The imperialists," Khrushchev repeats at the XXIIInd Congress, "don't like the fact that socialist countries grow and develop. They would like to limit (ограничить) us, to teach us like children how we should live in the world.... They cannot bring themselves to accept the fact that we are now so much grown up that not only are we not going to school any more, but that we can even teach others a lot.... They are displeased, they threaten us with a switch. But if they come at us with a switch, then we shall use a hoe."
Even when wisely abstaining from seizing a switch, the enemy adopts a "high-handed attitude (besstreremnomoe otnoshenie)," thus "rude behavior (shagii)," 604 "manifesting disrespect (proiavliat' neuvazhie)." 605 "In the capitalist world," observes Khrushchev, "one reckons as follows: those who are rich are also clever, and those who are poor are also stupid. But the monopolists of the United States of America are really rich and strong and hence they are not accustomed to talk to anybody on a footing of equality (na ravnoi noge). They are accustomed to assassinate the ones and to buy off the others." 606 Take even one of the few Americans who became respectable, the farmer Roswell Garst: on his first visit "he conducted himself with the haughty grandeur (nadmennoe velichie) of the American. He said, 'I shall teach the Russians.'" 607

Such an attitude may be all the more displeasing as it evokes a hidden disposition to submit, which in its turn exacerbates the opposite reaction dominating in consciousness. 608 Having alleged that "the imperialists look at us in the same fashion as they looked at Russia a hundred or fifty years ago," Khrushchev asks: "And

603 K 59 I, p. 487.
604 Ibid.
605 Ibid., p. 401.
608 See below, pp. 171ff.
what shall we do in that situation (a nam chto)?" Here is what first comes to his mind: "Run towards them (begat') and say 'What is your pleasure (chevo izvolite)?'"  

All the more intense the demand: "Don't wound (ushchemliat') our self-esteem (samoliubie)!!" Treat us as equals! "When President Kennedy talked with me in Vienna, he insisted (podcherknut'): 'But we are a great country.' And I answered him: 'True, but, Mr. President, the Soviet Union is also a great country!'"  

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But perhaps the enemy is already unable to deny this; perhaps we have crowned our achievements by forcing him to replace contempt by acceptable attitudes towards us -- such is a complacent, even exultant mood of Bolshevik leaders alternating or mingling with the bitterness which has been described. "The times when people abroad ridiculed (vysmeivat') our plans have vanished into the past (ushlo v proshloe)," proclaims Khrushchev. "Those in the capitalist countries who affirm that the working people are incapable of directing the government are dying out."  "When I stood in the Washington airport, about to leave America," Khrushchev recalls shortly after

610 K 59 II, p. 112.  
612 K 59 I, p. 294.  
613 K 58, p. 395.
that moment, "a salute...was rendered in honor of our Fatherland.... After the first volley I thought: this is for Karl Marx! the second for Friedrich Engels! the third for Vladimir Il'ich Lenin! the fourth for His Highness the working class, the working people!... And thus volley after volley was fired in honor of our Fatherland, of its people. Not too bad (неплохо), comrades, not too bad! You know, if it were not for the big successes achieved by our country...there would be no such volleys.... We, the Soviet people, lifted, as one says, Mother (матьшка) Russia from backwardness to such a height, glorified (просталить) her greatness." 614

"His Highness, the working class...of all socialist countries," he repeats later, "has created governments with which the imperialists have to (надо) count; they have to assume an attitude of respect (с уважением относится) towards the peoples of the socialist countries, towards their interests." 615

While the enemy's "prestige (представитель)" has "never been as low as it is today," the "authority (авторитет)" of the Soviet Union has "risen to unprecedented heights." 616 That "today nobody in the capitalist countries doubts the reality of Soviet economic plans" is, for Mikoyan, "a big achievement": "the authority of our country has increased." 617

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614 K 59 II, p. 333.
617 XXIst Congress, Vol. 1, p. 556.
Earlier the enemy managed or pretended "not to notice (ne zametit') us: now he is anxiously attentive to us. "Yesterday our country elected deputies for its supreme organ of power," observes Pravda. "One might think (kazalos' by) that this is an internal affair of the Soviet people. But our country has by now already acquired such a weight (ves), it exercises such an influence on the course of history that the most important events in its life acquire significance for the whole world. The speech of N. S. Khrushchev [of March 16, 1962] is being commented upon and discussed, studied and analyzed."618

More than that, the enemy is now respectfully afraid of us. "Recently," Adzhubei tells the XXIIInd Congress, "Soviet journalists, and I among them, had occasion to (prishlos') converse with President Kennedy. Only think, comrades, the President of the United States, of such a rich and, I would say, a still arrogant (nadmennyi) power, was calculating with pencil in hand when we would surpass (peregoniat') them. Suppose somebody had told American Presidents of the twenties that already in the sixties their successors would calculate the balance of economic competition with the Soviet Union and be worried that Russia -- of which they then took no account in calculations concerning the world scene (ne brat' v mirovoi raschet) -- might equal (dogoniat') and overtake (peregoniat') the United States. Surely they would have condemned (prezritel'no) anybody predicting such a thing.
as at least a dreamer (fantazer). But for Kennedy this is already no dream, but a worry, and what a worry!"  

There remains the irritating fact that the West is, as Adzhubei notes, "still arrogant." In order to subdue the fear of being despised by the certainty of being admired, it is necessary to think of the world at large rather than about that tiny fraction of its several billions, the western upper classes. "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," recalls Iudin at the XXIst Congress, "answering the reproaches (uprek) of enemies that our country is uncultured and backward, said: 'Wait, gentlemen, leave us a little time, and then we shall see who is backward and who advanced (peredovoi)." This time has now come, and all honest people (vse chestnie liudi) in the world recognize our Soviet country as the most advanced and the most cultured."  

Today "the whole world" looks "with wonder (izumlenie)" at the Soviet Union, is "astonished (porazhat'sia)" by it. More than that, young Adzhubei sees "all of mankind," "enthusiastic (voskhishchenny)," "render a tribute of love and respect" to it, while young Shelepin evokes the excitement of some Russian intellectuals in the 1840's: "There now has been realized the great prophecy of our genius-like countryman Belinskii who, many years ago, wrote that he envied his grandchildren and great-grandchildren who were

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620 Ibid., p. 326.
fated a hundred years later to see Russia at the head of the cultivated (obrazovannyi) world, dispensing laws, science and art and receiving the reverent (blagogoveinnyi) tribute of respect (uvazhenie) from the whole of enlightened (prosveshchennyi) humanity." So much uvazhenie do we receive: the counteroffensive against outer and inner neuvazhenie is being conducted vigorously. Far from being an unusual display of self-satisfaction, it becomes habitual to say: "...calling forth the respect of the working people of all countries, our country...."

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Thus, while the self-esteem of contemporary Bolshevik leaders is enhanced by their achievements, it is rendered more precarious for the phase in which persons of lower class origin and little education, such as Khrushchev, have great influence; Khrushchev's successors may be less touchy. At the same time the enhanced discrepancy between the alleged western contempt and the actual status of the Soviet Union makes the attitude imputed to the West even more painful. These are factors strengthening one's wish to "give the imperialists hell"; but it is of course far from certain that such feelings will influence policy in direct and massive fashion.

They did not in the Cuban crisis, though that affair must have exacerbated them.

While the Kremlin might not have decided to send missiles to the island if that move had not appeared useful on military grounds, it probably also served the purpose of reducing other kinds of inequality between Moscow and Washington. What the Americans had always taken for granted they could do in Turkey, the Soviets were, finally, going to practice in Cuba, adding one more proof to the contention that "socialism has come out (vyditi) on the world arena." 625

And then Washington denied Moscow that particular equality: after so many imaginary slights a quite real one.

"One must take account of the fact," Khrushchev had informed American journalists a few months earlier, "that we are not Thailand or another small government. We possess precisely the same means with which we are threatened. And the one who threatens us is going to receive precisely what he is preparing for us." 626

From Monday to Saturday, from the 22nd to the 27th of October, Soviet leaders must have been moved to act on such previous announcements, expressed freely when they were but means of pressing the opponent. It is probable, however, that the men in the Kremlin -- or at least most of them for most of the time -- had their feelings under control: believing that acting on sentiment, dangerous at any time, is catastrophic when history is taking a

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"sharp turn," Khrushchev maintained his advocacy of equality, changing a demand into a plea, until what he must have viewed as a late moment. Then he offered to remove the tarpaulin for alongside inspectors, this despite the presumable strength of his reaction to becoming "Thailand." He became it -- for the moment -- the better to bury the enemy later.

ARE THEY RELAXING?

Despite the Cuban affair, it cannot be excluded that they are relaxing, to some limited extent: limited, to be sure, since Khrushchev can still speak of it as a sin "to manifest liberalism." 628

"All relationships," Nikita Sergeevich teaches David Susskind, "however tense with conflict (obostrenie) they may be, lose their sharpness (ostrota) with time." After all, "however stormy the ocean may be, sooner or later there comes a calm. There is always a stillness after the storm", 629 -- and rough weather after the calm?

He isn't the slightest bit sincere? Perfectly possible. But one chooses one's way of lying. Usually there are many possibilities. The one selected may express more of one's feelings than one admits to oneself. Of course, when Khrushchev declares to the Supreme Soviet that nobody lost over Cuba, that reason won, and that the

627 See below, pp. 241ff.
Soviet government attained all the objectives it had set itself on that occasion, there is no reason to believe that he is speaking his real mind. But the same may not quite be the case when he chooses an image such as the one just quoted.

"We announce," declares the aging Khrushchev on Stalin's unmentioned birthday and shortly after the regime became forty years old, "that we are at present just as courageous (bodri) and young (vuni), as we were courageous and young in the days when we went forward to victory in the Great October, just as much as in the days when we fought on the fronts of the Civil War and of the Great Fatherland War." In fact, "we have preserved the great revolutionary elan (poryv)" -- a contention which would be more convincing if it came from one's opponent.

The "great elan" of earlier Bolsheviks was one in which all action served three values, without a conflict among them being conceivable: it was good, it was necessary for survival, it was profitable as to power. For the human condition to be splendidly transformed, the power of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (TsK VKP (B)) had to be brought to a maximum; but this was equally required to reduce the chance of being annihilated. In addition, total victory seemed certain.

The last five years, the era of Khrushchev, may have seen this strong combination of beliefs disintegrate.

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630 K 57, p. 342.
First, the fear of being annihilated may have declined. Hegemony over the world may not be felt any more as quite so essential to bare survival.\footnote{See above, pp. 91ff.}

Second, until the middle fifties, the conversion of the world to communism may have appeared as entailing, in a first and not too brief phase, Moscow's hegemony over the world: the good required the agreeable. Now the Bolshevik leadership, at grips with Peking, may have lost belief in such a happy coincidence. Probably, in 1962, Khrushchev did not particularly like the Czechoslovak leader Novotny to liquidate his rival Barak, and even less Castro to eliminate the Communist Escalante; but he viewed it as expedient, if not as inevitable, to tolerate such acts. How much, then, will he hope to exercise control over a Communist Washington? It seems likely that Khrushchev has relinquished what may have been Stalin's belief in Moscow's becoming a Third Rome.

In addition, the disappearance of "capitalism" in its major centers may seem much less probable;\footnote{Ibid.} it might be assured but only at the prohibitive cost of war.

Now the good -- converting the unbelievers or applauding their self-conversion -- stands rather alone, half-abandoned by the necessary, the probable, the not too expensive, and the selfishly gratifying. From all we know about Bolsheviks, that is not a comfortable position for the good to be in.
When, towards the end of 1962, Khrushchev for the first time makes public his views on "dogmatism" -- Peking -- he views as its essence the assertion that war between the two camps is a necessary condition for the destruction of the enemy, and he goes to great lengths in denying this. Behind his insistence on the enemy's disappearance by other means, there may be a feeling which Khrushchev himself might not dare to face: if the conversion of the West to communism did, in fact, require war, it would exact to high a price for the Soviet Union to pay. Having recalled that there are "imperialist forces which...reason this way: if we must die, then let us die, as the saying goes, to music, even though it be the music of exploding atomic bombs," Khrushchev pursues: "We...have no mind to die, be it with music or without music.... Why should we ask for an invitation from the devil (zachem nam naprashivat'sia k chertu v gosti)? As the saying goes, why should we speed on to the other world? After all, nobody has yet returned to report that conditions are better there than on earth." And thereupon he recounts a recent conversation with a woman worker in Moscow. He asks about her living conditions, and they turn out to be quite satisfactory. "So, life is possible (zhit mozhno)?" he proposes at the end, and she assents: "It is possible, Comrade Khrushchev. All of us have only one worry, one great wish -- that there should be no war." "This woman," Khrushchev adds, "expressed the mood of the working people," and understandably so: "In forty-five years we have traversed an enormous distance, and now our stride has become even
longer -- what previously took us five years, now requires but months. This being the case, do we have something for which to care (dorozhit)? Of course we do!" 633 We have as much to lose as the resources of the Soviet Union.

From these recent words we may turn back to earlier avowals of aversion to violence, and ask ourselves whether they might already have foreshadowed the view that the preservation of the enemy is less disadvantageous than the attempt to kill him outright, if this be the only means of terminating his existence. Looking back at the intervention in Hungary, Khrushchev assures his victims in 1958 that "our hand does not tremble." 634 He also confides to West German journalists that "if the triumph of communism were obtained by aggressive war, by the extermination of people, then I myself would be against communism." 635 Like the 19th century Russian intelligentsia who argued that the establishment of universal harmony does not justify the torment of a single child, Khrushchev asserts that "we hold it to be criminal to build the welfare of some people on the unhappiness and the suffering of others." Borrowing again from an earlier age, Khrushchev announces that "considerations involving all humanity (obschechelovecheskie soobrazhenia)" guide the Soviet Union, whereas the United States is guided by "egoistic calculations" to conduct a war at its allies'
expense. And all this at a Party Congress!⁶³⁶ "You remember, comrades," Khrushchev recalls three years later, thinking perhaps both about Stalin and war, "Pushkin's tragedy Mozart and Salieri. Mozart says that genius and evil-doing (zlodeistvo) are incompatible. Hence his words fall deeply into the soul of Salieri. The latter considered himself an excellent musician, but after having poisoned Mozart, he realized that he was not a genius, as he had been able to commit a bad deed. Similarly, in political life, genius and evil-doing are incompatible."⁶³⁷

Presenting the enemy as senile, the aging Khrushchev seems concerned to establish that the enemy's impending demise will be natural death, not murder, and this despite the Party's vigorous activity. That "capitalism is in its decline and goes towards its fall...does not mean that it has already lain down and stretched out its legs." Rather "it is necessary to work a good deal so as to lead it to such a state." Still, "this outcome is inevitable, as inevitable as the death of any living organism."⁶³⁸ "The capitalist system," he observes, "is nearing the end of the span allotted to it (otzhivat'svoi vek). The old woman is groaning, moaning, snapping; nothing is right for her. As one says among the people: 'For an old woman, even the stove is bumpy.'"⁶³⁹ To call for the death of an organism of such decrepitude is not murderous, but natural.

⁶³⁸ K 58, p. 236.
⁶³⁹ K 60 II, p. 42.
But might not the insistence that murder could not possibly be called for, conceal, more or less consciously, an unwillingness to attempt such a dangerous act?
II. ARE THEY MELLOWING?

Are there changes in the code of Bolshevik conduct towards opponents which might predispose contemporary Soviet leaders to a less harsh posture? And are they perhaps at the same time becoming more sensitive to western harshness, more appreciative of its avoidance?

TEMPTING SUBMISSION

"One cannot say," notes a local Party leader at the XXIst Congress, "that the...members of the anti-Party group have drawn the correct conclusions from the resolution of the Party's Central Committee." "For instance," he pursues, "Comrade Shepilov continues to slander...the Soviet intelligentsia: he affirms that instability ('neustoichivost') is inherent in the intelligentsia, and that he, too, 'as a Russian intellectual,' is not exempt from that instability." ¹ But does Khrushchev wholly disagree with Shepilov? And what about the "people (narod)," Khrushchev's own milieu? He himself recalls to mind the "Russian merchants" who "put mustard on the lips of their lackeys, and the lackeys said 'thanks' and bowed low (nisko klaniat'sia)."² How much of this penchant remains?³

Speaking bitterly of the inclination to give the enemy all he wants -- "going to bow before him (idti na poklon),"⁴ "capitulating (kapitulirovat')" to him --

²K 60 I, pp. 556-557.
³See Study, Ch. XVIII.
⁴K 58, p. 81.
Khrushchev insists that he will never engage in such conduct. "We are not taking our hats off to you." ⁵ "You are going to wait in vain (ne dozhdat'sia) for a situation in which we will lie prone (rasplastat'sia) before you and surrender (gdat'sia) to your mercy (milost')." ⁶ "Is it for us," Khrushchev asks, "to bend our back, to make the enemy an obeisance (klaniat'sia)? Whoever would do this, or even merely think of this, that person is no son of his people, no hero of his people. He is crawling like a snake, rather than flying like an eagle." ⁷

A related disposition is simply to suffer the enemy's attack (mirit'sia), to agree with it (soglasit'sia), or perhaps even to enjoy it. Khrushchev may express his apprehension about such Russian tendencies by supposing that the enemy will take them for granted: "The imperialists are accustomed to act [towards the Soviet Union] as did Russian merchants of old" with their mustard. ⁸ Or Khrushchev may attribute the disposition he fears to the enemy himself. "With what eyes," he asks, after the first explanation of the U-2 flight offered by the United States has been refuted, "can the authors of these explanations look out on the world after their exposure?" Don't worry, they won't feel too badly: "We know what kinds of eyes imperialists have. As the saying goes, one spits into

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⁶K 58, p. 261.
⁷Ibid., p. 223.
⁸K 60 I, pp. 556-557.
their eye, and they affirm that it's God's dew." But Khrushchev himself is preoccupied with Christ's turning the other cheek. "When one tries to kick (liagnut') us," he maintains in 1958, "we cannot conduct ourselves as if we did not notice anything. No, gentlemen (gospoda khoroshie), you must know that we shall not follow the biblical saying: if one strikes you on the left cheek, you should offer the right one. No, we prefer to act differently -- if one strikes us once, then we shall strike twice." Twice is better than once as insurance against being struck at all. "We cannot and shall not," he announces in 1959, "act according to the commandment which says: if they hit you on the left cheek, tender the right one. We shall act in human fashion (po-chelovecheski), and when they hit us on the left cheek, we shall give them such a repulse (otpor) that they will thereupon lose the inclination to do this." "In many matters," he confides when abroad, "I am in agreement with Christ in whose name not a few views (polozhenie) acceptable to us, if I may say so, have become widespread (rasprostraniat'). But I am not in agreement with him when he says: if your left cheek is hit, offer the right one. I hold another principle: if I am hit on the left, then I shall deliver such a blow on the right that the head of the aggressor won't

9 Ibid., p. 542.
10 K 58, p. 256.
11 K 59 II, pp. 386-387.
stay on his shoulders." "Now," Khrushchev concludes, "you see in what my disagreement with Christ consists."\textsuperscript{12}

The enemy, however, remains appallingly confident that the temptation to submit to him will win out. "Mr. Eisenhower," Khrushchev notes in 1957, "tries in a number of cases to treat us as if we were his satellites, ready to submit to him in everything."\textsuperscript{13} "Maybe," he suggests in 1959, "the western powers have fallen victim to their own self-confidence: they may believe themselves to be so strong that they are capable of imposing (naviazat') any (liube) conditions on other governments."\textsuperscript{14} Thus a speech by Dillon in the spring of 1960 "was perhaps simply a manifestation of the pugnaciousness (drazhlivost') of this diplomat, who imagined that if pressure were applied before negotiations began [the Paris summit], then it would make the other side more compliant (stat' ustrachivee)."\textsuperscript{15}

In an even more disturbing fashion the enemy counts on the Party to help (pomogat') in its own undoing. Such calculations sometimes prove correct in relations between enemies: "Formerly Germany attempted to subjugate France by war, and now the French political leaders themselves help the Western Germans aiming at a revanche to realize their aspirations."\textsuperscript{16} As to the Soviet Union, the western

\textsuperscript{12}K 60 I, p. 325.
\textsuperscript{13}To James Reston, K 57, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{14}K 59 I, p. 409.
\textsuperscript{15}K 60 I, p. 417.
\textsuperscript{16}K 59 I, p. 344.
powers "want us to go so far as to help them in the realization of these...intents (zamysly)." "Isn't that a bit thick (ne zhirno li budet)?" adds Khrushchev. But, precisely, perhaps he feels that this calculation will merely in fact turn out to be wrong -- hopefully -- rather than being patently silly, an indication of the opponent's madness. "Evidently," observes Khrushchev on another occasion about the enemy, "they count on... success in imposing their will on us and on our lending (okazat') them assistance (sodeistvie) in this." Having explained at the XXIIInd Congress that the western powers "cling" to their occupation rights in West Berlin because "they desire to have their armed forces there" and wish to "keep their centers of intelligence," Khrushchev notes: "And they even want us to collaborate with them in this!" "Who," he exclaims, "do these gentlemen think we are (za kogo nas prinimaiut)? Do they really believe that everything is permitted to them, that they can force us to act counter to our vital interests?" Though Khrushchev may clearly know in his conscious mind that this is not so, he talks as if, according to his more obscure feelings, it might be true that everything is still permitted to the surviving masters; as if the former serfs might continue to act counter to their interests: a

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17 Ibid., p. 75.
18 See above, pp. 91ff.
19 K 59 I, p. 111.
21 See above, pp. 137ff.
situation to which Khrushchev often returns, as if it were not quite improbable. "If the socialist countries," he says about "the utilization of the United Nations by the...imperialist powers," "were to reconcile themselves to this and to remain silent, then the leaders of these countries would simply show themselves to be persons in a state of bankruptcy (nesostoiatel'nye liudi), incapable of appraising the situation in a realistic fashion and of drawing the appropriate consequences from it."\(^ {22} \)

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In the face of such apprehensions, one proclaims: We shall never yield. "If," declares Khrushchev about certain speeches of enemy leaders, "they were made for the purpose of exercising pressure (nachim) on us, this was of course doomed to failure (proval), because the Soviet Government and the Soviet people do not succumb (poddat'sia) to pressure."\(^ {23} \) Attributing to the opponent the intent of "extorting unilateral concessions from the Soviet Union" at an impending conference, Khrushchev assures foe and, perhaps, friend that "nothing will come of it." "Let those," he insists, "who cherish such plans know that they will see them accomplished as seldom as they will ever see their ears."\(^ {24} \) If only the act of yielding were equally unfeasible, depended equally little on the soul with its potential for instability! That the


\(^{23}\) K 60 I, p. 607.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 503.
West's aspirations to deal with Moscow "from a position of strength" evoke such intense bad feelings may in part be due to what Bolshevik leaders take to be an implied reliance on their "lack of steadfastness (neustichivost')."

The point is all the more sensitive as the Bolsheviks' own code requires them to retreat to any extent rendered necessary by the enemy's "position of strength." Before the decision is made, before the enemy's advantage has become indisputable, there is always a question whether a concession -- to use the Kremlin's private language, now violated in sanctimonious public speech -- is forbidden ustupat' (yielding) or required otsrupat' (retreating). The difference in evaluation is as fine and as crucial as that in the language. (About the violation just noted: after Cuba, Khrushchev claims that he has made "reasonable" ustupki, but that there has been no otsuplenie.)

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One steels oneself against the temptation to yield by recourse to a variety of themes.

In public, one may permit feelings to intrude. "We cannot," declares Khrushchev at the time of the U-2 incident, "reconcile ourselves (mirit'sia) to offense (oskorblenie); we have our pride and our dignity. We represent a mighty socialist government." In the past, when we were weak like children, it might have been necessary for us to retreat before an

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25 See Study, Ch. XIX, and pp. 231ff. below.
26 K 60 I, pp. 556-557.
enemy attack; to do so now, when we have become strong adults, would be yielding. If the enemy, "perhaps," "pursues the goal of bringing pressure to bear on us, of obtaining something from the Soviet Union by extortion," he overlooks that "we have already outgrown the age in which one yields (poddavat'sia) to such an approach."27 Recalling on American television that David Susskind has proposed arbitration by the U.N. in a matter at issue between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that "we have seen a good instance of U.N. arbitration in the Congo," Khrushchev adds: "But we are not the Congo. We are the Soviet Union."28 "A group of governments of the imperialist camp," Khrushchev explains to the General Assembly itself, "exploit the apparatus of the Secretariat of the U.N. in their interests. They have used it against the Congo. They may try to use it against us. Against the Congo it was possible to use it, for this young government does not have forces. But against us it is not possible to use it, for we do have forces."29

And never again shall we lack them, from false morality or true stupidity. "We should not," Khrushchev tells a foreign journalist, "like to resemble the lamb facing the wolf without defense." "We do not," he insists, "like to be in the position of the lamb."30 "We would

27 K 59 I, p. 263.
28 K 60 II, p. 449.
29 Ibid., pp. 512-513.
30 K 57, p. 93.
not," he repeats later, "like to be simpletons (prostak) whom one could take with naked hands.”

Nor shall we permit fear to overwhelm us: a major objective of the enemy. "We have strong nerves"; hence "let the American imperialists who want to influence us by frightening us (deistvovat' metodami zapugivaniia) look in other countries for other people who yield to fright; they will have no influence on us." In fact, "it is impossible to make us bend (sognut' nas)."

It is you yourself who are frightened! While "the imperialists have more than once attempted to frighten (zapugat') us," though "we are not susceptible to fear (my ne izpuglivykh)," "it is not we who tremble (drozhit'), but it is rather the capitalist world which trembles before...the world of socialism." Speaking at a publicly owned steel mill in Austria which has developed a new industrial process, Khrushchev indicates that "if you want to, we shall give you an order for converters of the type you have created." Thereupon, the editors of Khrushchev's speeches tell us, the Austrian Vice Chancellor Bruno Pitterman "hands N. S. Khrushchev a piece of paper, as if he were asking him to sign such an order. N. S. Khrushchev wants to take the paper, but Pitterman hides it in his pocket," and Khrushchev exclaims: "You wanted

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31 K 58, p. 537.
32 See below, pp. 241ff.
33 K 60 I, p. 571.
34 Ibid., p. 560.
35 K 58, p. 535.
to frighten (ispugat') me? You thought perhaps that I would be frightened (strusit'), and that I would not sign? But what has happened is (a vykhodit) that you yourself have become frightened (ispugat'sia) and are even hiding the paper in your pocket!" 36 The Bolshevik fear of being frightened is expressed even more clearly when Khrushchev declares at a press conference abroad: "If I avoided a question, then one would say the whole world over... that I was frightened (poboiat'sia)." Therefore "I am forced (vynuzhdn) to answer all questions which are put to me, not avoiding any." 37

As little as one can frighten us, can one fool us or persuade us. 38 Noting that in 1961 "some political figures in the West want to center the negotiations [concerning Berlin] on the question of the consolidation or 'improvement' of the occupation regime in West Berlin," Khrushchev exclaims: "Do they really believe that they will persuade (ugovorit') us to accept such an unenviable role?" 39 If the Soviet Government had not resumed nuclear testing, writes Khrushchev to John Bernal, "this would have signified that we would voluntarily have agreed (soglasit'sia dobrovol'no) to the defense of the socialist countries being weaker than that of the imperialists. We would have shown ourselves to be unreasonable (nerazumnyi) leaders of government, falling under the influence

36 K 60 II, p. 138.
37 Ibid., p. 169.
38 See below, pp. 212ff.
(podpadat' pod vliianie) of people who did not understand the clever imperialist diplomacy.... We would have yielded to the pressure of forces, among them those who sincerely desire disarmament but do not understand that...."

Any needless lack of retaliation as well as any unnecessary concession tend to be felt by Bolsheviks as "capitulation." Having explained, sometime after the U-2 incident and the breakup of the summit meeting, that "to have sat down at the table...without having received hard guarantees that the aggression would not be repeated, and that the guilty ones would be punished, would have signified entering upon the path of tolerance (popustitel' stvo) towards the aggressor," Khrushchev adds: "It would have meant bowing one's head (sklonit' golovu) before the American military clique." But "the Soviet Union has never bent its back (gmut' spinu) before anybody, and does not intend to do so." When after the U-2 incident "the United States announced a right, a governmental policy of espionage flights over the territories of other governments," Khrushchev declares later, "what was there for us to do?" Not to "repulse (dat' otpor) such flights," Khrushchev says, would have been "to surrender (sдават'sia)." After Eisenhower had announced that there would be no more U-2 flights for the rest of year, "we were told: 'What do you want? You got satisfaction!'" "But," Khrushchev replies, "this is the manner of a

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40 Pravda, November 26, 1961.
41 K 60 II, pp. 120-121.
42 Ibid., p. 502.
lackey (lakeiskii maner). If the lord (barin) gives the lackey a smack on his mug, and then gives him a fiver, the lackey will immediately say: Thanks, at your service, my benefactor!"\(^{43}\)

The equation between concession and capitulation may assume more tangible shape. Envisaging, in 1957, the possibility that at a summit "certain participants were to strive to obtain some political concessions (ustupka) from us," Khrushchev explains: "By political concessions they would almost (chut li) understand the liquidation of Soviet society in the U.S.S.R., as well as the liquidation of the social-economic conquests which have been accomplished in the countries of people's democracy."\(^{44}\) To be sure, Khrushchev does not believe that; but that he feels it expedient to say so may be due to his feeling that "yielding" (ustupat', a verb related to the ustupki -- concessions -- of which Khrushchev is speaking) and "surrendering" are one and the same. "To accept the current proposals of the western powers on..." one may say in many a situation, "would mean (to to oznachalo by) a full capitulation (kapituliat'sia)...to their demands," continues Khrushchev.\(^{45}\) "To accept the conditions of the imperialist governments" on almost any issue, "means," it can be said without feeling absurd, "to put oneself at their mercy (sdat'sia na ikh milost')."\(^{46}\)

\(^{43}\) K 60 I, pp. 612-613.
\(^{44}\) K 57, p. 329.
\(^{45}\) K 59 I, p. 123.
If this can almost always be said, it will be said only if, and as long as, one has decided on other grounds to refuse the demands in question. And if one has not? That will be discussed below.

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To the extent to which Bolshevik harshness in dealing with the West is related to a fear of yielding to it, the themes surveyed in this section scarcely give grounds for assuming that Bolsheviks have changed.

INSTANT REPULSE

Far from yielding, the Party must repulse the enemy's attack whenever the relationship of forces allows it. 47

Passivity in the face of attack or pressure is "impossible." "I view it as impossible (ja schitaiu nevozmozhnym) to remain silent when..."; 48 "I cannot leave without an answer the..." 49

The "repulse (otpor)" should, if feasible, be "decisive (reshitel'nyi)," "crushing (sokrushitel'nyi)," "annihilating (unichtozhitel'nyi)." "To every pressure," alleges Khrushchev in 1960, "we respond by a decisive repulse." 50

"Every provocation," he maintains, "should be met (parirovat')"; 51 none is too small. "I am ready,"

47 See Study, Ch. XVII, and pp. 231ff. below.
48 K 59 II, p. 194.
49 Ibid., p. 414.
50 K 60 I, p. 609.
51 K 60 II, p. 208.
Khrushchev announces at a press conference abroad, "to answer bad questions with a counter-attack."\textsuperscript{52} "Once," he recalls after a trip beyond the border, "when we were traveling through Austria in a bus, there stood at the side of the road near a car an aged couple. Evidently they were tourists from Western Germany of whom there are many in Austria. When the man saw me, he showed me a fairly heavy fist. I considered (schitat') that I must (nado) answer him, that I must not pass by without paying attention to this. I also showed him my fist."\textsuperscript{53}

When something undesirable appears, it is essential to exterminate it right away, though it be tiny.\textsuperscript{54} One must "mercilessly cut off (peresekat') the smallest attempts to...,"\textsuperscript{55} "cut off (peresech') the development of such tendencies,"\textsuperscript{56} "cut them off at the root (v korne podrezat'),"\textsuperscript{57} "root out (iskoreniat') the smallest relapse (retsidiiv)."\textsuperscript{58}

If one fails to do so, catastrophe impends; or so at least one is always free to allege without feeling absurd: "It is clear to everybody (komu ne iasno) that this is only the beginning. Those who entered upon the

\textsuperscript{52} K 60 I, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{53} K 60 II, pp. 182-183.
\textsuperscript{54} See Study, Ch. XVIII.
\textsuperscript{55} History, p. 462.
\textsuperscript{56} K 57, p. 197.
\textsuperscript{57} K 58, p. 486.
\textsuperscript{58} Il'ichev, Pravda, December 27, 1961.
path of... are not going to stop at the half-way mark (ostanovit'sia na poldoroge)." 59 "One can assume," observes Khrushchev in 1958 in a rare implicit self-criticism, "that when our parties did not overtly react to the decision of the Yugoslav leadership not to participate in the conference of Communist and Workers' Parties [in the fall of 1957], when we limited ourselves to drawing the appropriate conclusions from this for ourselves -- when this took place, the Yugoslav leaders decided to start overtly attacking the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of China, all Communist and Workers' Parties." 60 "Think of what would have happened," explains Khrushchev, "if we had sat down to negotiate" on May 16, 1960, in Paris "without having received an apology from the United States. This would have signified that we recognize the legality of the espionage flights over the Soviet Union. To what would this have led (k chemu by eto privelo)? The aggressors would have wanted to bend (sognat') us. But if we had bent our back, they would immediately have thrown (nabrosit') a saddle on us, and then they would have set themselves on top of us and begun to drive us on (pogoniat')." And, of course, "this is what they wanted" in the first place. 61 If the Soviet Union renounced the conclusion of a peace treaty with Eastern Germany, Khrushchev predicts in 1961, the western powers "would view this as a strategic

59 K 57, p. 165.
60 K 58, pp. 426-427.
61 K 60 I, p. 626.
breakthrough, and they would immediately enlarge the scope of their demands. They would ask for the liquidation of the socialist structure in the German Democratic Republic. Now "if they were to obtain this, then, of course, they would put before themselves the task of tearing out of Poland and Czechoslovakia those areas which were returned to them by the Potsdam agreement." Again, "if the western powers were to succeed in this..., then they would come forward with their main aspiration -- the liquidation of socialism in all countries of the socialist camp." And "that is why one must not defer the solution of the question concerning the peace treaty."62 "It is well known," writes Khrushchev to Bertrand Russell two days after the outbreak of the Cuban crisis, and the same number of days before his retreat, "that if one tries to appease a bandit by first giving him one's purse, then one's coat and so forth, the bandit is not going to be more charitable because of this. He is not going to stop exercising banditry. On the contrary, he will become even more insolent."63 Thus, the enemy is as much wedded to the principle of pursuit as is the Party.64

About any rare, but undesirable, events one may say with a leader at the XXIIInd Congress: "To be sure, there are pitifully few (nichtozhno malo) of them, but if the illness is not cut short in its inception (zarodyshe),

64 See below, pp. 190ff.
it may become dangerous."65 "One might say that these are details, small things (meloch)," Khrushchev may admit about something disapproved, but only to add: "...if such occurrences are not...swept away in good time, they may begin to hinder our development in serious fashion."66 Thus "I recently read a letter in a newspaper according to which there are people who feed bread to cattle. Speculators do this. If one doesn't fight such occurrences, the feeding of bread to cattle may increase."67 About a "danger" which, it must be admitted, is, at the present moment, not the "main" one,68 it can always be said that "if no consequential fight is waged against it, it can also become the main danger."69

Some bad objects do not even have to grow in order to become all-destructive. Having spoken at length about "anti-social" elements at a congress of the Party's youth, Khrushchev adds: "Some guests who are present here at the Congress might think that if Khrushchev concentrates attention on such questions, it must be a matter of a fearful evil, of rust (rzhavchina) eating at Soviet society. No, comrades! But every metallurgist knows that rust spoils metal, makes machines unusable. There must be no spots of rust on metal, and the appearance of

68 See above, pp. 54ff.
even a small spot means that the machine's precision in work will be lost. In order not to let this happen, the metal parts to be kept in working condition must regularly be wiped with an oiled cloth so that no rust develops."  

How favorable is the course of events when counteraction is applied right at the start! "I believe," says Khrushchev about the prospects of a test ban shortly after the U-2 incident, "that the American imperialists have begun to see better, because they have been rubbing their eyes.... An agreement on this question becomes possible."  

"Gentlemen," he addresses foreign journalists, "you have all had mothers, for otherwise you would not have arrived in this world. I well remember my mother."  

Now, "my mother rarely had the possibility of buying cream. But once when it happened that there was cream on our table, the cat lapped it up. My mother took the cat by the ears, pulled it about, and dipped its nose into the remaining cream. Then she pulled it about once more, and pushed its nose into the cream once again. Thus she taught the cat who had gone where he was not permitted to."  

Later, "around the mine where I grew up, when a cat was caught which had gone into the pigeon loft, it was seized by the tail and thrown to the ground. After this the cat understood better the lesson it had been taught."  

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71 K 60 I, p. 562.
72 Ibid., pp. 563-566.
Thus it would not seem that the classic Bolshevik injunction discussed in this section has lost any of its force. And yet, Bolshevik leaders may have increased their capacity for perceiving that a small undesirable object will not always grow to enormous size if left to itself. Starting to discuss Yugoslavia in late 1962, Khrushchev is conventional. "It is natural," he recalls, "that every communist party...strives to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism in creative fashion to the concrete...conditions of its country." But then the discourse becomes novel: "It is understandable that [between communist parties] there can...be no full coincidence (sovpadenie) in the understanding of all questions.... Differences in the understanding (raznoe tolkovanie) of concrete questions regarding the construction of socialism, differences in approach (raznii podkhod) towards this or that question are not excluded." Indeed, "if we," the Soviet Party and the Yugoslav Party, "have as yet no common understanding on some questions, this does not at all mean that we must build our relations on the remnants (ostatki) of disagreements." To be sure, "we are told [by the "dogmatists"] that it would be harmful to have good governmental and economic relations with the Yugoslavs until such time as some ideological divergences with the Communist Union of Yugoslavia will have been entirely eliminated (preodolet' do kontsa)." But, "this is simply stupid"; "even the imperialists strive to overcome and to smooth out (sglazhivat') their contradictions."73 The

changes implied here are striking. For in the Bolshevik tradition ostati (remnants) is a dread word, activating precisely the here rejected requirement of preodolet' do kontsa (to eliminate entirely); and sglazhivat' (to smooth out) is a contemptible and enfeebling petty-bourgeois tendency. The only legitimate differences, in space and time, between communist parties were, in the previous view, not genuine divergences at all, as Khrushchev now to some extent acknowledges, but merely varying applications of identical views to different conditions: a diversity on which unanimity was required. It is this which may now be qualified.

FULL LIQUIDATION

Once one has counterattacked and "reached one line (rubezh)" previously held by the enemy, "one must go farther" -- as would the enemy (which, precisely, makes it essential to repulse immediately).

When the enemy has already been reduced to a "remnant (ostatok)," one has to go still farther: one must "finish off (pokonchit's) remnants," "smash them to the end (razgromit' do kontsa)," "eradicate (vykorchevyvat') without residues" any hostile object, "remove from a healthy body any splinter (zanoza) left in it." The status quo in West Berlin is a "remnant" of the war, Khrushchev's principal image supporting his demand for

74 K 59 I, p. 350.
76 K 59 II, p. 409.
"freeing (izbavlenie)" the world of it. But also, "to solve this question...means to find...the sick tooth, to extract it"; "this question has remained a tick which has not been extracted from a healthy body." \(^7\)

For a remnant permitted to survive is a dangerous thing, just as a nascent and still small bad object. \(^8\) Remnants "do not simply live out (dozhiyvai') their days in passive fashion." \(^9\) "One can't be sure," maintains Khrushchev about the late war's "residues" in Germany, "that such residues won't fertilize the roots for a new war. I well understand the meaning of fertilization in agriculture, but I am against such a development in politics." \(^10\) When Khrushchev faces hostile newsmen abroad, he likens them to former Nazis whom we did "not finish off (ne dobity nam) at Stalingrad," "residues of the Fascist invaders whom we have not finished off," \(^11\) and who then, of course, suddenly emerge as a threat.

In this atmosphere it is surprising to hear that a small object may be harmless, though obnoxious; however, we have already met such surprises before. \(^12\) "But is a fly," Khrushchev asks just once, "able to do any damage whatsoever to an elephant?" \(^13\) Still, can one really be sure it's not carrying a fatal disease?

\(^8\) See above, pp. 183ff.
\(^9\) K 57, p. 136.
\(^10\) K 59 II, p. 91.
\(^11\) K 60 I, pp. 560-561.
\(^12\) See above, pp. 183ff.
\(^13\) K 57, p. 34.
UTILIZE POSSIBILITIES

Just as traditional stress is maintained on maximum activity, so is it also on making the best of "possibilities (vozmozhnosti)" for advances or "reserves (rezervy)."85

The masses are apt not to perceive the full extent of such possibilities. "The people," writes Khrushchev to Macmillan in 1962, "have not yet fully recognized their possibilities." As to the case at hand, "they have not yet understood that they are capable of forcing governments to ban nuclear tests."86

The Party, of course, knows which areas hide in their depths (rait' v sebe) as yet unknown possibilities. Thus the first secretary of the composers' association is sure in 1962 that "enormous possibilities which have not yet been laid bare are contained (slozhen) in the art of colonial and semi-colonial countries."87

The Party seeks out (iziskat') such possibilities, brings them to light (vyivliat'), uncovers them (raskryt'), lays them bare (vskryvat'). Thus in October 1961 "the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union...uncovers new possibilities,"88 while in the regional conferences on agriculture in November and December "large

84 See above, pp. 54ff.
85 See Study, Ch. I.
87 Khrennikov, Pravda, March 27, 1962.
88 Kommunist, March 1962, p. 4.
reserves of production in the collective and Soviet farms were laid bare."  

Having discovered possibilities, the Party determines and "indicates the paths for utilizing these possibilities" -- quite apart from its ability to create (sozdat') and to open (otkryvat') possibilities. It even creates possibilities of the second order. "The building of communism," one may say, "opens (otkryvat') an unprecedented scope (prostor) for the fuller and all-sided uncovering (raskrytie) and bringing-to-light (vyiavlenie) of all...possibilities...".  

And then comes the transformation of the potential into the actual: "the conditions for" a certain advance "are present; it is only necessary (nuzhno) to utilize them." By all available means (vsemerno) the Party does everything (vse delat') to utilize (ispol'zovat'), exhaust (ischepat') existing (imeishchiisia u nas) possibilities; to fully (polnost'ju) mobilize (mobilizirovat'), bring into action (prevet' v deistvie) and lift (podnyat') reserves, means (sredstva) and forces (sly).  

This requirement continues to be stressed. "It is the foremost task of the socialist countries," declares Khrushchev on an important occasion, "to utilize the

90 Kommunist, March 1962, p. 4.
92 K 57, p. 77.
possibilities inherent in socialism."93 Thus the Declaration of Communist and Workers' Parties in the fall of 1960 "is oriented toward the maximal utilization of revolutionary possibilities."94

Just as the good things of life (blaga) won't become available without work,95 possibilities all by themselves will not bear any yield. "As to the objectively favorable prerequisites (predposyki) which are coming into existence" without regard to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, Gromyko notes at the XXIst Congress, "it is of course necessary (nado) to utilize them skillfully (umelo) and thereby "not allow (ne dopuskat') them to remain hidden (ostavat'sia pod spudom)."96

To be sure, "for these possibilities to become realities," Khrushchev recalls at the XXIInd Congress, "a great effort must be made."97 "There is a real possibility," he shows, "of bringing the purchase of wheat in the Russian Federation to 2,500,000,000 lbs. or to 2,600,000,000 lbs." However, "these calculations refer to possibilities," and "for them to become realities it is necessary to fight perseveringly (nastoiichivo) and stubbornly."98

94 Ibid., p. 27.
95 See above, pp. 54ff.
96 Vol. 1, p. 313.
97 Materials, p. 50.
Often this isn't done, and realization lags behind possibilities: "The oblast of Saratov makes poor use of its great possibilities" is a typical headline in Pravda. Equally characteristic is this declaration: "The Party has criticized and will continue to criticize those who are far from fully utilizing their possibilities." Observing a "non-utilization (neispol'zovanie) of possibilities," the Party will pass stark judgment: "existing possibilities are still insufficiently (eshche nedostatochno) utilized." "The enormous possibilities were badly utilized"; "existing possibilities are far from exhausted"; "everything has not yet been done to bring all forces...into action." Hence the demand for "better utilization," for a "fuller" one. Of almost any Party meeting it may be said that it "elaborated (razrabortat') a concrete program for the fuller utilization of the enormous possibilities...."

In contrast, the enemy is increasingly incapable of doing this for himself. "It is precisely the monopoly capital of the United States of America," explains Khrushchev, "that manifests an incapacity to utilize

101 K 58, p. 279.
102 K 60 I, p. 407.
103 K 58, p. 153.
existing productive forces." 106 "The Soviet people," he
announces abroad, "are ready to compete with the capitalist
countries, showing an example of the better utilization of
possibilities." 107 They had better be, according to
Suslov, or they will fail: "The victory of socialism
over capitalism...will depend on our ability to use the
advantages of the socialist...order." 108

A "raising" of the "level of leadership" is thus
characterized by an improvement in the matter at hand.
"Just as within the country our Party boldly discovers
and puts into the service of the building of communism
gigantic reserves which till recently were left unutilized,
just so in the domain of foreign policy," observes Gromyko
about Khrushchev at the XXIInd Congress, "there was put
into use an invisible, but completely real zone of virgin
soil." 109

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While what used to be called the main fire of the
Party is directed against the insufficient utilization of
possibilities, their exaggeration or neglect continues to
provide the Party with the opportunity to talk solemnly
about "carefully (tshchatel'no) weighing (vzvesit')...reserves and possibilities." 110 During "the period of

106 Speech of January 6, 1961. Kommunist, January
107 K 60 I, p. 333.
108 Speech of February 4, 1962. Pravda, February 5,
1962.
the cult of personality," Khrushchev reminisces, "plans could not always be fulfilled with the available...possibilities"; in contrast the current seven year plan "was established with a fuller taking into account of the possibilities and reserves of the country. Our Party... indicated a fully realistic (realnii) plan...with more reasonable proportions among the various branches of production, based on existing resources and possibilities." 111

The traditional polemic against mere "will (volia)," against "concocting (vydumat')," against the belief in "miracles" and the dominance of "desires (zhelanie)" continues, though in a low key. "There are no such miracles in nature,"112 Bolsheviks are fond of saying about certain estimates and objectives with which they disagree. "We must constantly learn from V. I. Lenin," Khrushchev reminds the XXIInd Congress, "how to work with people as they are. One must not be subjectivist in politics; one must not act according to the rule: 'What I want I can create.'"113 "In the building of socialism and communism," Khrushchev informs Gardner Cowles, "one must be guided not by subjective desires, but by objective possibilities,"114 for "desires are one thing and possibilities another."115 "The objectives of our Party," he


112 K 59 I, p. 46.

113 Materials, p. 83.


points out, "are dictated not by the subjective desires of these or those individuals, but by...."  

What exists does so not because of "desires." "Such processes," one may say about almost any, "emerge not by the will or desire of these or those individuals (не по воле i желании тех ли иних)." "It is not we who concocted these (не ми видямали этим)...; rather they resulted (сложится) in the course of... development." "Mere subjective desire is not enough (мало)," declares Khrushchev at the XXIIInd Congress. For something to happen, "desire by itself is insufficient, however ardent it may be," a leader points out. "The experience of the postwar period," the Moscow foreign office reminds its colleagues in Bonn, "suggests an important conclusion: whether it pleases one or not, the existence of particular states and their political system does not depend merely on our wishes." If "there exists in our country only one political party," says Pravda, this is "not because of some whim (прихот'?)", but because of the strength of the laws (закономенность) of the class struggle...of the strength of the particular historical development." "The dictatorship of the proletariat," recalls an observer referring to the recent emergence of an "all-popular

117 K 59 I, p. 33.
118 Ibid., p. 43.
121 December 20, 1961.
government" in the Soviet Union, "has ceased to be indispensible not because this was announced from the rostrum of the XXIInd Congress"; and "the state withers away not because communists 'want that (rak khotiat).'" 122

Desire is therefore powerless against the law of events. Too bad for the enemy who is trying to oppose that law with which the Party's aim is in happy consonance. "Whatever they may do (chto by ne delali)," one will say about opponents, "they are unable to (oni ne mogut)..." Theirs is a "ridiculous (smekhotvornyi) pretension," because "the mighty stream of history cannot be made to flow backward." 123 "There are," Moscow teaches Bonn, "inner laws of development which no bloc, no state, however great its power, is capable of modifying." 124

History does not ask you what your desires are: "History does not ask whether you want this or don't." 125

History acts by itself, "not depending on will (nezavisimo ot voli)." 126 For "there exist objective laws (zakonomernost') of social development." 127 As Khrushchev points out to Hans Thirring, "the laws of the development of human society...have the same force as the laws of nature in the sense that they act objectively." 128

125 K 57, p. 110.
126 K 59 I, p. 488.
127 Ibid., p. 32.
Thus nothing is accidental (случайный). Or rather, one will call accidental only a bad thing in a good place -- as when Khrushchev, at the XXIIInd Congress, speaks of the Party "being purged of those who accidentally had gotten (попал)' into its ranks." Going to the other extreme, one may also pretend to view as an accident what not even one's opponent would so consider. "A short time ago," writes Khrushchev to Kennedy and Macmillan, stressing the danger of accidental war, "it was stated in the press that the great American writer Hemingway lost his life when the hunting gun he was cleaning accidentally went off." The dominant quality of events is that they are ineluctable (неизбежный).

What is not, "is not and cannot be (нет и быть не может)."

What is, must be. Certain phenomena "exist, and cannot not exist (не могут не существовать)," for "such is the nature (такова природа) of..." Even under communism, not only will man work, but "it will be impossible for man not to work (не может не трудиться)," declares the Party's Program of 1961.

That which is not necessary is also impossible. Recalling, at the XXIInd Congress, the Yugoslav leaders'
claim "that they are allegedly guided by the theory of the possibility of building socialism in one country," Yudin points out that they forget a difference between the twenties and the fifties: "the presence of a world system of socialism." This, the reader may expect, makes it preferable to "build socialism" within this "world system" rather than by oneself. Not so: the Yugoslavs, Yudin affirms, "do not want to acknowledge the fact that in the presence of a world system of socialism it has already become impossible to build socialism in isolation in one country."134

* * *

In a world of necessities, action -- which appears free when one contrasts it with passivity135 -- is under severe constraint. It is subject to the powerful (vlastnyi), insistent (nastoiatel'nyi) demands (trebovanie) of forces by which it is dictated (prodiktovannyi). The Soviet economy, Kozlov points out at the XXIst Congress, develops according to a plan worked out "in accordance with the requirements of objective economic laws."136 Of a character in a novel that is "one of the incontestable successes of our recent literature," a critic observes in Kommunist that "in him all is truthful; all his words and acts are motivated by his character"; and, he adds, "his character, by the conditions in which he lives."137

135 See above, pp. 54ff.
137 Metchenko, Kommunist, March 1962, p. 86.
Similarly, the Party adopts "conclusions dictated by the situation (obstanovka) such as it has come to exist (skladayuschee)." 138 It "resolves" the "questions put forward (vydvigat') by our reality (deistvitel'nost')," 139 or "insistently (nastroitel'no) put forward by life itself." 140 The Party's actions derive from "the powerful demand of life"; 141 they are "dictated (diktat'sia) by life itself." 142

Anything the Party does, it is indispensable (neobkhodimo) to do. "In these conditions the appearance of...has become possible and indispensable." 143 "One can and one must (mozhno i nuzhno) create..." 144 "Can we put the question in this way?" asks Khrushchev, and answers: "I think that not only can we do so, but we must." 145

Having pointed out to President Kennedy that "our social order is the most just (spravedlivy)' of all known social orders," Khrushchev pursues: "The sooner people understand the necessity (neobkhodimost') of the transition

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138 K 58, p. 53.
140 Aristov, ibid., p. 500.
141 K 59 II, p. 346.
142 K 60 I, p. 54.
143 Podgorny, XXIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 268.
144 K 59 I, p. 30.
to such a system, the quicker will humanity establish a really just society."\textsuperscript{146}

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From the themes discussed in this section it would appear that the Bolshevik's demand on himself and on his comrades to utilize to the hilt all possibilities for advance has not become less stringent.

\textbf{PUSHING TO THE LIMIT?}

There are yet other ways of talking about the matters discussed in the previous section.

"We Bolsheviks are greedy (zhadnyi) people," proclaims Khrushchev: "What we have attained today seems already little to us." Of course he is talking merely about the good things of life: "We want tomorrow to be better than today."\textsuperscript{147}

As for the oppressive uses of power, such things belong only to the enemy. "The merciless suppression of the weak...by the strong" is, Khrushchev notes, "the wolfish law of capitalism where the strong devour the weak."\textsuperscript{148} "Some," he observes during his visit to the United States, "have even announced that Khrushchev is about to divide the world with Eisenhower." Now "persons who think that way look at all events as bandits (razboinik) would. They calculate in their own fashion: since you

\textsuperscript{147} K 58, p. 265.
\textsuperscript{148} K 59 I, p. 337.
are strong, seize all that you are able to seize!" But "we are persons of a quite different morality."^149 The enemies, Khrushchev points out later, "believing themselves to be stronger, act on the following principle: the weak complain about the strong, the strong pay no attention and continue their insolent (naglyi) activities."^150 "The imperialists," he recalls in 1962, "reckon only with force. They are not guided by humanitarian (gumannii) considerations."^151

* * *

No advance, however small, is to be neglected.^152 "The government of the United States," affirms Khrushchev, "pushes into every space (sovatsia vezde) wherever it possibly can."^153 One wonders whether his insight derives only from observing the opponent.

How small is the small, both when it is bad^154 and when it is good? "In the...process of the construction of communism," teaches Khrushchev, "there are...no insignificant (nezachitel'nyi) matters. Even in the smallest sector of the building of communism, a task fulfilled often possesses a decisive significance for our whole work."^155

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^149 K 59 II, p. 251.
^150 K 60 I, p. 495.
^152 See above, pp. 192ff.
^153 K 60 II, p. 217.
^154 See above, pp. 183ff. and 190ff.
And even the smallest departure from the injunction to push to the limit may appear as significant, however much that departure may be indicated in a particular situation. "There are three billion people in the world," recalls Khrushchev when arguing for the "troika" in the General Assembly. "The socialist countries represent more than one billion. This is more than one-third." Hence, Khrushchev seems to imply, they are entitled to, say, seven representatives in a body of twenty. However, "we are not petty (melochnyi) people, and we shall not insist that this matter be weighed on a jeweler's scales. We are content with one-third."\footnote{156}

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It is only in the course of insisting, that is pushing, that one can discover where the limit lies.\footnote{157} At the XXIInd Congress a leader recalls "the popular wisdom of the Urals": "The mountain in the way shows the strength of the man." "Only by climbing," he explains, "only by conquering line (rubezh) after line shall we know our strength."\footnote{158}

In earlier Bolshevism one knows one has reached the limit when one's forehead has become bloody from pushing against it. The method has not been abandoned. "Everybody knows," explains Khrushchev at an Indian steel plant, "that in any affair one's own experience is very convincing.

\footnote{156}{K 60 II, p. 431.}
\footnote{157}{See Study, Ch. I.}
\footnote{158}{Kirilenko, Vol. 2, p. 236.}
Once a man has gotten himself a bump on the forehead (shishka na lбу), he understands what's what. 159

But in this matter conceptions seem to be changing. While in certain respects Khrushchev wants to rely more on observation than did his predecessors, 160 here he desires to rely more on prudence or discretion. When he speaks of "a person who does not recognize (uzнат') what is good and what is bad as long as he has not hit his forehead and produced a bump," 161 he seems to imply that this is behavior to be expected of the "masses," but unworthy of the Party. The point is to have enough perception of what is ahead to stop just short of the wall. (To increase one's perception, as Myron Rush has pointed out, one may engage in reconnaissance operations.) 162

This is all the more important (as Myron Rush has also noted) because of the enemy's increasing propensity to folly, 163 and hence of the heightened need to avoid "provoking" him. 164

The deteriorating enemy is less and less capable of the kind of foresight here involved. "Just as a mortally wounded beast of prey" -- not excelling in intelligence -- "does not want to let go of its victim and torments it with its claws, as long as it still has any force, just

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159 K 60 I, p. 106.
160 See below, pp. 260ff.
161 K 59 II, p. 326.
162 See below, pp. 287ff.
163 See above, pp. 91ff.
164 See above, pp. 127ff.
so," Khrushchev writes to Nehru, "are the Belgian colonizers and their NATO accomplices incapable of reconciling themselves to the fact that...the Congo...is now standing on its own feet."

Khrushchev may then call upon the enemy to try to be less unreasonable -- in his own interest. "Sooner or later," he predicts, when talking to C. L. Sulzberger about his proposal of a "troika" for the United Nations, "this will be done, as the period of United States dominance in the United Nations is nearing its end. The most reasonable (razumnii) thing for the United States to do would be to recognize the changed situation, and to come forward themselves with the correct solution. This would show foresight about the direction in which events are developing." On the other hand, "if the United States is going to oppose the normalization of the situation in the United Nations, it will be held against the United States, and their prestige will suffer."

As a matter of fact, enemies are sometimes capable of acting reasonably. "Now," notes Khrushchev at the XXIIInd Congress, "the colonizers, feeling that their reign is nearing its end, try to hide their dismay (delat' khoroshuiu minu pri plokhoi igre). They announce that they are leaving the colonies of their own free will.... But who does not know that they take this step knowing that they would in any case be thrown out with shame?"

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166 Pravda, September 10, 1961.
Still, "the most farsighted among the colonizers succeed in leaving, as it were, five minutes before getting the boot (pinok), to put it simply":167 they act exactly as the Party should.168

If one should in any case avoid brusque contact with the wall ahead, might it not also in some circumstances be expedient to leave unoccupied some space in front of one temporarily, of course, and only in order to facilitate future advance going well beyond it? Might it not even on occasion be useful to draw back a bit, in order to leap forward all the more powerfully later?

To earlier Bolshevism the idea of giving without receiving was repugnant: this was "yielding."169

Look at the enemy, setting the rules of the game: "The capitalists don't give anything for nothing, as this would contradict the very essence of capitalism."170

To behave according to any other rule is to run towards disaster by the progressive surrender of one's possessions. Once one has begun to give, will one stop? "There is no such fool," Moscow then reassures itself and teaches Bonn, "who would give endlessly, receiving nothing for it."171

167 Materials, pp. 18-19.
168 See below, pp. 241ff.
169 See above, pp. 171ff.
170 K 57, pp. 29-30.
Khrushchev -- of course, it's all a joke -- is even watchful not to be a loser in his social relations with enemy leaders. "Gentlemen," he tells the General Assembly, when he is attacking the General Secretary, "if I were to speak personally of Mr. Hammarskjold, I would not be antagonistic toward him. I have met him and we have had a very amiable conversation." However, there is a little matter: "I believe that Mr. Hammarskjold owes me a debt, for he was our guest on the Black Sea. Then I drove him around, and he has not furnished me with work in return (otrabortat'); he has not paid me in the same coin." 172

On the other hand, receiving Gardner Cowles, Khrushchev explains that "to some degree I am in your debt. For it was on your initiative that our people were first invited to visit America and to become acquainted with your agriculture.... I reckon (schitat') that I have now in some degree repaid my debt to you." 173

At the same time Khrushchev has begun to chide the opponent for his alleged insistence on not losing in any transaction. Having noted that "Adenauer and Brentano say -- 'With the Soviet Union one must negotiate in this fashion: concession for concession,'" Khrushchev pretends revulsion. "But this is the way of merchants!" He goes on by denying on his part, and attributing to others, the use of a device habitually employed by Soviet negotiators: "When we worked out our proposals [at a conference of foreign ministers], we did not approach this question as

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172K 60 II, p. 512.
merchants, who first ask for a very high price and then haggle, selling their merchandise at a price considerably lower than that which they named in the beginning."\textsuperscript{174}

"Do not treat politics, Mr. Chancellor," he calls on Adenauer, "in the manner of a shopkeeper in a grocery store."\textsuperscript{175}

At first sight this may seem just another instance of the Bolshevik habit of denying and imputing to others important characteristics of oneself,\textsuperscript{176} and this is no doubt a factor in Khrushchev's behavior. However, at the same time, he may be trying to deal with the fact that he has come to see the usefulness of occasionally giving even without immediately asking for something in return, and that he has acted on this new insight on several occasions. What he has done is forbidden by an older rule from which he may now attempt, in part, to liberate himself by attributing it to the enemy, and, to boot, by associating it with the "petty bourgeoisie."\textsuperscript{177}

Then it becomes easier for him to use his unilateral concessions so as to confound those who "accuse us of aggressive intentions": "If we had them, we should in no case have given up our advantageous positions in Austria." Or, "take the question of our base in Finland. What government harboring aggressive intentions would have

\textsuperscript{174}K 59 I, p. 341.
\textsuperscript{175}Ibid., p. 71.
\textsuperscript{176}See Ritual, Note to Ch. 26.
\textsuperscript{177}See Study, Ch. XVI.
allowed itself to renounce voluntarily its rights to a base, rights established by an international treaty?" 178
One of the new calculations is made public when Khrushchev recalls that "at the initiative of the Soviet government an agreement on frontier questions was concluded between the Soviet Union and Iran"; that "by this agreement quarrels of a hundred and fifty years standing were liquidated"; that "the frontier was made more precise, and this mainly at the expense of the Soviet Union."
Why this? "Our country is big; its territory, immense. We felt that it would not be appropriate for us to be stingy, that it would be better to concede a little so as to acquire friends. To do so is, as one says, more precious than to have an additional fiver in the pocket." 179

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Thus it would seem that the Bolshevik fear of yielding has, after all, declined, and the insistence on "utilizing possibilities" weakened. Perhaps this has occurred not only because of changes in the balance of power, but also because of some changes in the men at the top (a line of speculation which I shall not pursue here). In any case, contemporary Soviet leaders probably feel less constrained to push forward into any possibly accessible space without regard for delayed and indirect consequences. They may even have gained for themselves some slight liberty to concede without an immediate concession in return.

178K 58, p. 131.
179K 59 I, p. 128.
IS A BEATING ALL THE ENEMY NEEDS?

All actions in history, even those of the Party, are in some way forced (vyruzhden). They occur because, in the given conditions, there is for the actors "no other way out (drugovo vykhoda net)." Having publicly wondered whether he has been barred from Disneyland because it contains missile sites, Khrushchev explains: "I have spoken in the United States many times already, and not once did I have recourse to the word 'weapon' or 'missile.' And if I spoke about this today, you must understand that I had no other way out."

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The "masses" -- perhaps everybody beneath the top -- are forced by conditions; they act decisively when these have become "intolerable (nevynosimyi)." It was, Khrushchev recalls in 1962, "the conditions of material life" which "pushed (tolkat') the peoples onto the road of...."

In addition, the authorities may be pushing: Khrushchev is satisfied with the effectiveness of this approach. "This," he may say about any matter, "must be, as the saying goes, rubbed into the noses of those concerned." Recalling the U-2 flight of April 9, 1960 -- "We saw it, but our anti-aircraft people did not shoot it down" -- Khrushchev reveals to the General Assembly that "for this

180 See Study, Ch. I, and pp. 192ff. above.
181 K 59 II, p. 204.
182 Speech of March 5, 1962. Pravda, March 6, 1962. See also pp. 91ff. above.
the guilty were severely punished." Also, "we told the military in charge of the matter that if they repeated such a mistake, they would be even more severely punished." The Americans, however, then "understood the situation in this fashion: 'On April 9 our plane was not shot down; hence let us repeat the provocation.'" So they "sent another plane on May 1st." But "this time our anti-aircraft people made all efforts (postarat'sia) to atone for their sin, and they shot it down." In consequence, "we thanked them for this, and removed the blame from them."184 "The criticism made of the Ukrainian comrades," Khrushchev notes at the XXIInd Congress, "has been harsh (surovyi), but just. It was correctly (pravil'no) taken and correctly understood." That is, "this criticism shook people up (vstriakhnut'), and they showed what they were capable of."185 As a matter of fact, in the immediate future "it will be necessary to do some shaking up, as one says, of somebody somewhere."186 It all goes to show the validity of a law whose original formulation by Marx in 1859 ("das gesellschaftliche Sein bedingt das Bewusstsein") Khrushchev never quotes, but whose punning Russian variant of a hundred years later he loves to recite, provoking "applause": We often say: bytie (conditions of existence) determine consciousness, but then we may note, joking, that 'bitie (beating)' helps consciousness".187 from Marx to Muscovy!

184K 60 II, p. 506.
185Materials, p. 64.
186Ibid., p. 66.
187Ibid., p. 64.
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The enemy is acquainted with that law, and tries to apply it against the Party. "The point" of the U-2 flight of May 1, 1960, just before the summit, explains Khrushchev at the time, "is to exercise pressure (nazhat') on us." The enemy "attempts to bend our knees and our back by way of pressure (nazhim)...; by pressure he wants to obtain (dobytsia) a decision favorable to him."188 As to the summit itself, the western powers "think of coming together only for the purpose of...extorting (vymogat') from the Soviet Union some kind of concessions (ustupka)."189 During the weeks preceding the conference, "evidently President Eisenhower, Herter, Nixon, and particularly Allen Dulles, contorted their faces into a smile, anticipating the meeting of the heads of governments in Paris, when Eisenhower would look at Khrushchev and think: here you are trying to persuade us, but United States planes are flying above the territory of the Soviet Union. You could do nothing, and nevertheless you came to Paris. Hence you cannot be so demanding in trying to get agreement on disarmament, on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and other questions."190 In such fashion the enemy "attempted to force (zastavit') us to be more pliant."191 Feeling -- or pretending to feel -- abused by David Susskind on television, Khrushchev addresses him thus: "Don't you try to knock me down

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188 K 60 I, p. 499.
189 Ibid., p. 503.
190 Ibid., pp. 583-584.
191 Ibid., p. 622.
(vy menia ne sbivaite). And don't you press me (vy na menia ne davite). It is almost always possible to feel or allege that one is being given an "ultimatum" (while denying those delivered by oneself). "We are almost (chut') being given an ultimatum," Khrushchev writes to Macmillan in the spring of 1962 about the American position on a test ban: "Admit our spies to your territory, or the United States of America will proceed to a set of tests in the atmosphere."

While the belief in the enemy's malevolence thus prevails in Bolshevik consciousness, there are also certain formulae in which it is appropriate to deny the enemy's good will: as if its presence were on some level plausible. "Of course," observes Khrushchev at the opening of an Italian fair in Moscow about the trade between the Soviet Union and Italy, "one must look at things in a realistic fashion, and understand that it is not a matter here of the magnanimity (velikodushie) of communists or of capitalists, but of the fact that commerce between our countries is a mutually advantageous operation. If Italian businessmen furnish us with good machines which we need, they do this not for the sake of our beautiful communist eyes, but because this is advantageous to them."

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192 K 60 II, p. 463.
Facing the enemy, one must not complain -- to him, to bystanders, to oneself -- about his attacks. "Please note," Khrushchev insists in the General Assembly when bringing up the U-2 flights, "that this is not a complaint (zhaloba) of the Soviet Union. No, we are not complaining (zhalovat'sia)." For "the Soviet Union is sufficiently strong to defend the interests of its country unilaterally."\(^{195}\)

Nor are we begging. Bolshevik discipline will prevent one's acting on the obscure penchant to do so. "We are not asking for anything from you";\(^{196}\) "I am not about to assume here the role of one asking for favors (prositel')."\(^{197}\) "We are not begging (vyprashivat') for peace from the United States";\(^{198}\) "we are here," in the General Assembly, "not begging for something," but rather "as representatives of a great country."\(^{199}\) Let "nobody have illusions about this: the USSR is not begging for anything from anybody" is a sentence appropriate for almost any occasion.\(^{200}\)

So pressing does the inclination to beg seem to be that a variety of themes are marshalled to contain it.

To beg is to increase the chance of the enemy's falling upon us. Explaining why the Soviet Union needs bombs "of 50 to 100 megatons and more," Khrushchev observes that "if we went to the imperialists with a cross and with

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195 K 60 II, p. 494.
197 Ibid., p. 132.
198 K 60 II, p. 224.
199 Ibid., p. 404.
200 See, for example, Pravda, May 3, 1962.
prayers and, going down on our knees, called on them to be humane, they would laugh at us; they would see in this only our weakness and their strength."  

In the best of cases begging is futile; the belief in its power, a superstition. While "we want peace," "to strive for peace does not mean to beg (vyprashivat') for it": "Peace must be conquered (nado zavoevat')." "The possibility of preventing war," Khrushchev repeats on an important occasion, "is not something granted (darovannyi) from above. It can be secured only through active goal-directed struggle." "It is not by prayers (odnimi molityami) that imperialist circles can be talked into (ugovarit')" less hostile behavior. "When we speak of the possibility of preventing a world war, we are not" -- whatever Peking may say -- "resorting (pribegat') to an exorcism (zaklinanie) of war by prayers." "What could you do with a bandit (razboinik)," Khrushchev asks in 1962, "if he were threatening you with a knife? Would you go on your knees and implore his mercy, addressing him with prayers?" This "will not save you. The bandit will slaughter you in any case."  

202 K 60 I, p. 501.  
204 Pravda, November 26, 1961.  
But even if one could obtain advantages by begging, those we don't want! When Eisenhower announces in Paris that there will be no more U-2 flights for the rest of his term, and when Khrushchev is being urged to be content with this concession, he objects to the lack of an admission that it has been forced upon the United States by Soviet strength. "From the declaration of President Eisenhower it appears," Khrushchev notes, "that the decision of the question as to whether American military aircraft will fly over the USSR or not depends on him alone." This reduces to naught the fact that there are going to be no further flights that year. "Look at his self-confidence! Now he announces that they are not going to fly. What magnanimity!" And what falsehood: "Of course President Eisenhower can decide whether to send planes or not. But it is another matter whether they can fly over our territory or not. We are deciding that, and deciding it in quite definite fashion -- we shall shoot down such aircraft, and shall decisively strike at the bases from which they fly, as well as at those who created those bases and in fact dispose of them." "Thus" -- and this is the rebellious muzhik's point to be proved to the imperturbable barin -- "it is not a question of a 'gracious gift (darovanie milosti) of President Eisenhower's to the Soviet Union." 207 "That decision," Khrushchev returns to the matter somewhat later, "was announced not as a renunciation of the aggressive policy

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207K 60 I, p. 557.
of intruding into the airspace of our country and as a
condemnation of that policy, but as some kind of grace
(kak nekakaia milost') proffered (darovannyia) to the
Soviet Union by the American President." However, "we do
not want to accept pittances (podachka) from the hands of
the imperialists. We do not need their 'gracious
(milostivyi)' assurances that they temporarily put an
end to espionage flights over our territory. We are
sufficiently strong to defend our sovereignty."208 When
the enemy "bestows a gift of grace (darit' milost'),"
the Party will not cease answering: "We do not need
pittances, and as to gifts from the imperialists, we have
not accepted them, we do not accept them, and we shall
never accept them."209

Neither complaining nor begging, the Party inhibits
any inclinations to persuade. "Well, what remains for us
to do?" Khrushchev may ask bitterly, having noted the
enemy's hostile behavior: "Perhaps persuade them...with
sweet words (dobrenkie slovechki)?"210

Persuasion is infeasible when it is a matter of
who-will-destroy-whom. "It is after all impossible,"
Khrushchev points out in 1962, "to persuade (ugovorit')
a tiger to begin to feed on herbs; he cannot do that....
It is impossible to persuade a monopolist, a capitalist,...
that communism is better than capitalism. What does this
mean -- to persuade him of that? This means to persuade

208 Ib id., p. 613.
209 K 60 II, p. 61.
210 K 58, p. 239.
him to renounce his capital, so that the enterprises he calls his own become the property of the people, and working people can call them theirs.\textsuperscript{211} The "dogmatists" are wrong, Ponomarev points out, in attributing to the "Marxists-Leninists" a belief in the possibility of effectively using "persuasion (ugovarivanie)" with regard to "the imperialists."\textsuperscript{212}

What shall one then do? The answer is furnished by the answer to another question: "Why do bourgeois politicians acknowledge the idea of peaceful coexistence?" And the reader already knows why: "It is said that the conditions of existence (bytie) determine consciousness (soznanie). Some also say in exaggerated fashion: 'Beatings (bitie) determine consciousness.' I believe that both affirmations are correct. The point is that in the given 'conditions of existence' some were helped by 'beatings.'\textsuperscript{213} "Our successes forced (zastavit') them to..."; "they cannot but (ne mogut ne) acknowledge..."; certain desirable policies "must be imposed (ikh nado naviazat')" on enemies.

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One way of administering a beating to the enemy, without high risk, is with words.

Mildly, one may apply the principle of repetition. "In my speech," Khrushchev may threaten, "I have...very

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Pravda}, November 18, 1962.
\textsuperscript{213} K 59 II, p. 381.
little that is new." But, "as is well known, repetition is the mother of learning." 214 "Perhaps," he admits, "I am repeating myself, but this is a question to which we will have to return more than once, until we obtain (dobytsja) a correct understanding of the question by the interested sides." 215 "I repeat this for the nth time," he may declare with yet more frankness, "and, if necessary, I shall not cease repeating it until even the most resistant ones have accepted this simple truth." 216

If this be hard on the target, don't think it's easy on the practitioner. Noting that "I am repeating this well-known truth," Khrushchev announces that, "I shall be repeating it as long as my forces suffice." 217 "I repeat --," he begins on another occasion, and interrupts himself: "I have already a corn on my tongue from repeating this." 218

And, after all, the enemy is perhaps being only slightly more punished in this particular fashion than the Party itself. "We can underline again and again (eshche i eshche raz) that..." a leader will normally say at a Party Congress, 219 an occasion at which it is appropriate to explain "why we give thanks, again and again, to the Central Committee and personally to

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214 K 59 I, p. 146.
215 Ibid., p. 69.
216 Ibid., p. 112.
218 K 59 II, p. 203.
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev for...." Khrushchev, on his part, illustrates a proclivity which needs little documentation when he speaks of "ideational principles," "antagonistic contradictions," "potential possibilities," and, of course, "fatal inevitability."

But is the Bolshevik free not to repeat if reality itself does? It is "the enormous achievements of the Soviet government" themselves which "confirm again and again the correctness of the Party's general line." The very "victories" of the Soviet power "confirm again and again...."

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Beyond repetition, there is rudeness. The propensity to apply it anywhere persists. In Khrushchev's case it permits him to glory in his "lack of culture" rather than being ashamed of it. Arguing for quicker technological progress in the operation of the railways, Khrushchev shows in 1962 that, as to the issuing of tickets, "it is possible to build a machine which will not only not accept false money, but is even capable of

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221 K 59 II, p. 401.
222 K 58, p. 401.
223 Ibid., p. 146.
226 See Study, Ch. XVIII.
227 See above, pp. 137ff.
saying something appropriate (chteto podkhodiashchie) to the person who tries to put false money into it." 228

If a Bolshevik leader is rude, he has a characteristic way of handling his opponent's unfavorable reaction to it: far from being surprised by it, I intended it to happen; far from being distressed, I am delighted; far from having been shown to be in the wrong, I am proved right. When, at a press conference abroad, some of those present express their disapproval in what appears to him inappropriate fashion, Khrushchev seems at first overwhelmed with humiliation and anger. But he quickly proceeds to transform what befalls him into what he chooses to bring about. "These angry cries," he affirms, "gladden me, because they bear witness to the rage (jarost') of the enemies of our sacred cause." It is they who lose control, not I. And then his stock theme for this situation: "I remember the words of the great German, August Bebel, who said that when the enemies of the working class scold (rugat') you, this means that you are on the right path." "Gentlemen!" he insists, "I do not want to hide my pleasure from you -- I like to fight (drat'sia) with the enemies of the working class. It is agreeable for me to hear how the lackeys of imperialism rave (besnovat'sia)." 229

"Gentlemen," he repeats later that year in the General Assembly, "I am exceedingly gladdened by what the representative of Great Britain said, who criticized me sharply for my position. It gives me great satisfaction.

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229 K 60 I, pp. 561-562.
that the colonizers view me as an enemy of the colonial system. This is a great reward for me, and I pride myself in it. I greatly like the words spoken by August Bebel... who said: If the bourgeoisie praises you, Bebel, ask yourself what stupid thing you have done for which they praise you. But if the bourgeoisie scolds you, this means that you serve...the proletariat well!"  

"As one says in the East," he tells Asians and Africans, "the enemy's rage is the highest approval."  

"If my words are disagreeable (неприятны) to some," he explains in the General Assembly, "this means that I have achieved my aim -- this is what I wanted!"

"Последствовало (it worked)!": one may cry out with triumph and relief when rudeness appears to have achieved its objective. When speeches in the General Assembly of 1960 "offended the dignity" of certain member states, Adzhubei recalls at the XXIIInd Congress, the "socialist" delegations "arranged an obstruction." "When the fists with which the delegates of the socialist camp pounded on their desks...got tired, other means were found."

"N. S. Khrushchev...at one point...took off his shoe and began to pound with it on the desk." What was the effect? "Immediately it became clear to all: We are decidedly against what goes on; we do not want to listen to such speeches!" When "the representative of the Philippines climbed on to the rostrum and said that...," "immediately

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230 K 60 II, p. 487.
231 K 58, p. 522.
232 K 60 II, p. 474.
he was answered and repulsed. The Philippine received what he deserved: the name of 'toady of imperialism.'

And what was the effect of this? "At the end of the following day this Philippine came up to the rostrum again, pale, and began with an excuse." Hence Adzhubei can conclude: "So it worked!" 233

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But is rudeness really that useful?

Khrushchev seems to be better aware than his predecessors that one's acts may boomerang. For instance, he seems more aware that a kiss may administer death. "When I as a communist," he proclaims at the opening of an Italian fair in Moscow, "laud a bourgeois statesman, I do not know whether this will be useful to him or not." But then the older directness seizes him: "Though this fair is a private matter, nevertheless Mr. Fanfani... has clearly not taken that position which is being adopted in similar cases by many short-sighted leaders of NATO countries. He has rather, to some extent, taken a neutralist position." Immediately, however, Khrushchev senses his mistake: "I don't know, perhaps I have overdone things by saying good words about Mr. Fanfani." 234

To turn from being sweet to being rude, if Khrushchev can be rude when occasions of high tension call for it, he is, in circumstances of less manifest hostility, in the habit of asking his audiences' forgiveness, in advance, for any involuntary offense he may commit. "If on occasion," he may say, "I accidentally use an

inappropriate word, please ask me to clarify my meaning." 235 "Today," declares Khrushchev on a spring day of 1962 in Varna, "I looked at your city...but when I looked at Varna, I did not yet know that I would be awarded the title of honorary citizen. If I had known it...I would have looked not only at what is usually shown; rather I would have tried to look also at what one does not show a guest but what I, as an honorary citizen, need to look at." And then he hastens to add: "If I am permitting myself this joke, it is that I am counting on your correct understanding of your fellow citizen. And if something I say does not please you, then, I think, you will forgive me as a young citizen of your city of Varna." 236 Significantly, Khrushchev's treatment, on the spot, of his conflict with Romulo is different from that suggested in his son-in-law's tale. "I had a brush (nemnogo zadet'sia) with the representative of the Philippines, and he had a brush with me," Khrushchev tells the General Assembly. "I am a young parliamentarian, and he an old one; let us learn from each other." 237 Khrushchev seems to express the hope, and to strengthen it by being nice, that the target of his rudeness won't mind too much: perhaps it would not be useful after all if he did. Adzhubei himself suggests that there could be too much of a good thing. When "comrade N. S. Khrushchev...took off a shoe and began to pound with it on the desk," he "posed the shoe in such a fashion (in front of our

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235 K 59 II, p. 89.
237 K 60 II, p. 513.
delegation there sat the delegation of Fascist Spain) that the tip of the shoe was almost set against the neck of the Fascist minister of foreign affairs, but not fully so." Thus was "diplomatic suppleness (gibkost') shown!" In fact, according to this young Bolshevik, a "combination of firmness and suppleness in the execution of foreign policy" is a special talent of Khrushchev's. Khrushchev has indeed discovered what it should have been easy enough to see: being nice to the West might change the balance of power, or at least of resolution, in the East's favor. "Why," he asks in 1958, "do the imperialist circles not want to negotiate [at the summit] and reach an agreement with us?" It is because "they fear that an agreement with the Soviet Union and with the other countries of the socialist camp would undermine the very basis of imperialist propaganda, which affirms that the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp want to conquer the whole world by arms." But if this "basis" were "undermined," "the whole system of...pacts created by the imperialists would begin to disintegrate," for "the legend of 'the Communist threat' is, as it were, the main thread connecting the entire system of military pacts." "The aggressive circles in the capitalist governments," Khrushchev shows again in 1959, "greatly fear the weakening of international tension. Until now they frightened their people with the threat of a military

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239 Ibid., pp. 470-471.
240 K 58, p. 449.
attack by the socialist countries. They fear that when their people come to learn the truth about the peace-loving policy of the socialist countries and come to understand that nobody is threatening them, they will come out against the arms race and the 'cold war.' The people may then question the purpose of all the military alliances and blocs of the imperialist governments. And hence these blocs may disintegrate, since they were created out of the fear that the countries of socialism allegedly desired to conquer the capitalist countries.\textsuperscript{241} "It becomes ever more evident," Khrushchev declares more succinctly at the XXIInd Congress, "that the...imperialist leaders fear a reduction of international tension, because it is precisely in conditions of tension that they find it easier to put together war-like blocs, to maintain in the people a fear of an alleged menace on the part of the socialist countries."\textsuperscript{242}

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Why has it been so difficult for Bolsheviks to perceive the West's vulnerability? And why has Khrushchev himself not seen fit to use more consistently the weapon he discovered? A decade ago the author suggested that Bolsheviks found manifestly bad relations with enemies more comfortable than superficially good ones. Being approved by an enemy carried the connotation of being "kissed" and "embraced" by him.\textsuperscript{243}

\textsuperscript{241}K 59 II, p. 339.
\textsuperscript{242}Materials, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{243}See Study, Ch. XVII.
It may now be less feared, for reasons which are not entirely clear. The leaders who now occupy the place of old Bolsheviks may have less intense obscure strivings of the sort which psychoanalysts call unconscious passive homosexuality, and they may be less appalled by them.

Be this as it may, the unfavorable image of being kissed and embraced by a contented enemy whose "appendage (pridatok)" one has become has greatly decreased in frequency and emphasis of use with regard to deviators or social-democrats; it will now rarely be applied to relations between various sectors of the big enemy, as when Khrushchev envisages what the western powers may still be capable of doing for Adenauer once the famous peace treaty is concluded: "Let them then embrace and kiss him; the German Democratic Republic will let nobody through to Berlin without its permission!"\textsuperscript{244}

On the other hand, they have become less reticent about love between good men. "How not thank the chief creator of the Program -- our Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev!" exclaims the regime's great writer, Sholokhov, at the XXIInd Congress. "I should like to use warmer words, dear Nikita Sergeevich, but my personal friendship with you, my high respect for you, you understand, somehow restrain me; they act in this case as a real hindrance. And then, you do know that manly affectionate friendship ('druzheskaia liubov') is often somewhat taciturn." So the writer turns to another writer to express his feelings:

\textsuperscript{244}K 60 II, p. 16.
"When one thinks of the Party, of friends and comrades in the Party, words of Gogol involuntarily come to mind. You recall that in the story 'Taras Bulba' the old Taras addresses himself thus to his comrades before the battle near the city of Dubno: 'There is nothing more sacred than comradeship. The father loves his children, the mother loves her children, the children love mother and father. But that is not the same thing (no eto ne to), my brothers: the animal too loves his children. But to become related (porodnit'sia rodstvom) by the soul and not by blood, of that only man (chelovek) is capable.'" Man here seems to be male: "We Communists are related by the idea of Marx-Engels-Lenin...and for us there is nothing more sacred than Party comradeship. We too love our children, our wives, but as Taras said: 'That is not the same thing, brothers!' And let neither our children nor our wives be offended by this. Nothing can be done about it; they will simply have to accept the fact just as it is. But at this point I begin to hesitate... [ellipsis noted in the text]. It is clear, most of all our wives will be offended by the fact that the bonds of Party comradeship are for us holier than those which unite us with them. Surely I have committed some thoughtless action and possibly even an inadvertence by arbitrarily speaking of our wives. For Taras did not say anything about them. And now...it is clear to me that I shall have today to suffer a blow from within the family. However, I am not scared." At this point Khrushchev interrupts his friend: "Mikhail Aleksandrovich, if your wife, Mariia Petrovna, permits it, I offer to support you
so as to soften...the blow, in case a blow were to be
directed against you from that side." And Sholokhov
continues: "However (odnako) I am not scared because I
firmly believe in your deep sympathy, dear married
brothers and comrades. And -- armed with that sympathy --
'I am ready even for the most severe trials which may await
me at home!'" 245

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The classical Bolshevik beliefs in the uses of
harshness towards the enemy survive, but they are now
opposed by the suspicion that less overt hostility may
on occasion be even more useful.

THE DUTY TO RETREAT

Retreating, Bolsheviks probably continue to be-
lieve, 246 is a normal and essential activity in politics,
just as much as advancing, particularly when it is not
even a matter of temporarily relinquishing possessions of
long standing, but merely of withdrawing after only a
brief occupation of an objective reached in an advance:
the case of Cuba.

Deciding upon a retreat does not necessarily imply,
to a Bolshevik, that his previous conduct has been at
fault: even with a correct "line," recurrent setbacks
are to be expected. For "life," as Khrushchev recalls
in 1960, "demonstrates ever anew that the struggle for...
does not develop in a straight, invariably ascending line.

246 See Study, Ch. XIX.
This is a complicated and contradictory process."247 "History," he explains at the XXIInd Congress, "does not develop along a straight line; it makes gigantic breaks, zigzags and turns."248 More directly: "We have not always marched on an even road. We have had ups (podem'i) and downs (sryvi); there were difficulties."249 For "in a fight (kogda deresh'sia), one is not only dealing out blows, one also receives them."250 Ours is "the path of glorious victories and temporary defeats."251

The bad use of stubbornness (upornichat') is to cling to a position from which one should retreat; but one must stubbornly (uporno) try again to advance after having retreated, never "making one's peace (primirit'sia)" with defeat.

So far from entailing sheer loss, to retreat is "to find a way out of a difficult situation."252 Retreating is an act of preservation. "In the interest of the preservation...of the great conquests of socialism," Khrushchev explains after Cuba, "we are ready to adopt, and we do adopt reasonable political compromises."253

A major retreat may be a necessary condition of a capital advance. After Cuba Khrushchev looks back to the

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247 K 60 II, p. 205.
248 Materials, p. 4.
249 K 60 I, p. 217.
250 XXIInd Congress. Materials, p. 29.
winter of 1918. "Though the Germans at the time occupied a rather large part of Russian territory," he recalls, "V. I. Lenin and our whole country were striving for an end to the war and for a peace treaty with the Germans. In order to sign the treaty at Brest, a delegation was sent, headed by Trotsky, who then also called himself a Marxist. But...he broke up...the peace negotiations with the Germans and left Brest. Then Vladimir Ilich was forced to send Chicherin, and the peace treaty was signed. History has confirmed the correctness...of the forecasts of V. I. Lenin. It has shown that the path indicated by Lenin and defended in the struggle against pseudo-revolutionaries was the only reasonable...one. Of course the peace of Brest was a temporary concession (уступка) to German imperialism. But what was the final result (что получилось в конечном счете)? Who yielded (уступить!) to whom? Today the banner of Marxism-Leninism flies not only over the entire territory of the Soviet Union, but...also over that of the German Democratic Republic. However, those German militarists who broke into our country lie in the earth. Now you can judge who was right. The Leninist approach to the solution of such complicated questions triumphed."

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There are situations in which a refusal to retreat, far from being "principled," is merely stupid. "Now let us imagine for a moment," Khrushchev proposes to the Supreme Soviet after Cuba, "what might have happened if

254 Ibid.
we had adopted the line of thickheaded (тverdolobyi) politicians and refused mutual concessions.\textsuperscript{255}

Such stupidity is dangerous. When, for instance, one refuses to withdraw from a recent advance, though an unfavorable situation has arisen in its course, one transforms what was a required "utilization" of apparent "possibilities"\textsuperscript{256} into an act of "adventurism."

Not to retreat may be to "yield to provocation (пoddavat'sia provokatsii)," a dreaded possibility;\textsuperscript{257} that is, one may permit one's conduct to be determined not by the objective, but by the stimuli issuing from the (hostile) environment. One should disregard what the enemy has done to one before, should focus on how he will respond to what one does to him now: "Everything must be thought through (все надо продумать)." "The Soviet government," Khrushchev assures Bertrand Russell and, perhaps, himself, the day after the American "quarantine" around Cuba had been established, "will not let itself be provoked by the...actions of the United States of America"\textsuperscript{258} -- an argument which Khrushchev is likely to have used towards those of his colleagues who favored resistance. "We must not yield to provocation," repeats Brezhnev somewhat later in Prague. "We look at matters in realistic fashion (реально)."\textsuperscript{259}

\textsuperscript{255}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{256}See above, pp. 192ff.
\textsuperscript{257}See Study, Ch. XII.
Not to retreat may at the same time entail "provoking" the enemy, a grave point less eligible for public mention. Khrushchev may have argued for retreat in Cuba by showing that not to retreat meant "provoking" the Strategic Air Command to a first strike. "Is it not clear," he recalls later, "that if we had taken up an uncompromising position, we would merely have helped the camp of the 'mad (beshenye)' ones to utilize the situation so as to...unleash a world war?"

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So far from being selfish, retreating may reaffirm one's dedication: the willingness to engage in abhorrent acts for the sake of one's objectives.

Far from being governed by emotions, retreating may prove one's capacity "to make those decisions which correspond to the real situation." Those in favor of continuing the 'cold war' fall upon Mansfield," notes Khrushchev in 1959, when the Senator makes a proposal on Berlin which is in part acceptable to Moscow, "and accuse him of making a concession to the Soviet Union." However, "I should like to ask: What does he concede to us? Nobody concedes anything to us. He simply calculates soberly and sanely." "There was a time," Khrushchev recalls in 1961, "when the American Secretary of State Dulles brandished thermonuclear bombs and followed a policy of a 'position of strength' with regard to the

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261 Ibid.
262 K 59 I, p. 85.
socialist countries." "That," to be sure, "was barefaced atomic blackmail," but, still, "it had to be reckoned with at the time because we did not possess sufficient means of retaliation."\textsuperscript{263}

Far from involving a loss of one's head, retreating may demonstrate one's perfect control. A proper retreat is not passive, but active. According to a headline in \textit{Pravda} on October 30, 1962, the Soviet government was then "decisively liquidating the danger of war." "Our country, our Party," alleges Khrushchev after Cuba, "can be proud of the results of its decisive actions (reshitel'nie deist'via) in these dangerous days."\textsuperscript{264} This is one of many statements in which a Bolshevik leader may at the same time be lying and speak his mind. Kosygin, on the 45th anniversary of the Soviet power, speaks of "the measures taken by the Soviet government to liquidate the conflict [over Cuba]."\textsuperscript{265} On October 30 a headline in \textit{Pravda} speaks of "accomplishing (zavershit') the liquidation of the dangerous conflict." Earlier in the year, Khrushchev, citing the retreat to the NEP in 1921, explains that such "decisive measures" are not only "sober" but also "bold."\textsuperscript{266}

Instead of being due to one's weakness, retreat may be imposed by the complicated nature (slozhnost') of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{265} November 6, 1962. \textit{Pravda}, November 7, 1962.
\end{itemize}
situations and tasks: "The struggle with capitalism is a complicated struggle." 267

Also, instead of weakness, retreating may manifest flexibility. For instance, while advancing, one must continuously examine the new situation created by the opponent's reactions. At every moment one must determine anew whether to continue pressing the advance, to stop or to retreat. All courses of action -- between transforming an initially limited advance into an all-out offensive and retreating even behind the starting point of the advance -- must be equally available. A petty and selfish attachment to the completion and preservation of an advance, exactly as it was planned, must not become an obstacle against going a great deal farther -- or much less far.

Not weakness, but great skill may be shown in a retreat. "The foreign policy of the government and its diplomatic activity," Khrushchev teaches after Cuba, "require of the political leaders of the Party and of the governmental personnel of the socialist countries...high political art (iskusstvo) so as to take those decisions which...." 268

Far from being solely a response to immediate and unfavorable circumstances, retreating may be an act of farsightedness: designed to facilitate one's future overwhelming victory.

Far from being a reaction favorable to the enemy, retreating is in the service of his speediest annihilation.

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"One of these days," Khrushchev recalls after Cuba, "the British minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Home, spoke of 'certain indications that after the sobering Cuban affair the Russians may revise their role in international society,' that is, that they will begin to make concessions to NATO on all issues (vo vsem ustupat')." However, "to such gentlemen," including, of course, Adenauer, "one can say this: Perhaps you think that under pressure from you we shall undertake the obligation to remove missiles from the Soviet Union, or that we shall be frightened by threats of bombardment? Let me tell you straight away, gentlemen, that if you are going to base your policy on such calculations, you will miscalculate (proschitat'sia) cruelly!"269 Similarly, Khrushchev points out during the Cuban crisis that it is fatal to give in to a bandit's first demand; a few days later he agrees to along-side inspection of returning missiles. That is, for a retreat to be indubitably necessary (nuzhno), it must be preceded by the utmost effort to avoid it, and this effort includes public statements opposed to it. Thus one's own resolution may be enhanced and that of the enemy reduced; also, one furnishes evidence of having explored whether withdrawal should not be avoided after all. The point is not that intransigent words will always be followed by retreat; it is merely that they will not always be followed by intransigence, and that retreat is apt to be preceded by bluster.

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269 Ibid.
Not retreating needlessly, one should also not withdraw before the very moment after which further stubbornness becomes damaging. For the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk between the Germans and the Soviet government, in the winter of 1918, Lenin decided that "we would hold out until the Germans presented us with an ultimatum, and... when the ultimatum was presented, we would yield." Khrushchev may have made such a decision on October 23, 1962. Around October 26 he may have been provided with the new datum which, according to his decision, entailed yielding.

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As the instance cited a few lines above recalls, Lenin was rather frank about retreating. Khrushchev shares Stalin's view\(^\text{271}\) that most disagreeable aspects of life should never be admitted in public. Reporting on Cuba to the country, he declares loudly and long that there has been no retreat: the missiles have been removed because of the attainment of all the objectives for which they had been installed. Then he talks about something else. And then, in another context -- a discussion of "dogmatism" -- he recalls February 1918, Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet power's most flagrant retreat before that of October 1962. It is a rare thing for a Soviet leader to reminisce about Brest in public; it may be the first time that Khrushchev has done so. And then he adds: "The point is of course not that there is any analogy between the peace of Brest and

\(^\text{270}\) Quoted in Study, p. 497.

\(^\text{271}\) See Ritual, passim.
the settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean Sea."\textsuperscript{272} Bolsheviks still fail to see that one may protest too much.

Adding to the respectability of their facade, Soviet leaders in retreat now feign delight about "mutual concessions (\textit{ustupka})" -- "concessions to reason and peace" -- and "reasonable compromise."\textsuperscript{273}

As to outright denial of the fact of retreat, it may be seriously believed -- by a rule of translation similar to that applied in the so-called Moscow trials.\textsuperscript{274} As we have seen above, a retreat may be viewed as the necessary condition of an advance; hence it may be heralded as one itself. Thus Khrushchev in the summer of 1962, after having pungently illustrated the concessions made to "capitalism" when NEP was introduced in 1921, and having recalled, by implication, how utterly these concessions were revoked a short while later: "Was the New Economic Policy a retreat (\textit{otstuplenie})? Now it is clear to everybody that this was an offensive (\textit{nastuplenie}) waged by socialism against capitalism! Such were the decisive measures taken by V. I. Lenin, reorganizing the army of the fighters for socialism before a new offensive. It is this bold and sober approach to the making (\textit{vyrabotka}) of politics that we must learn from V. I. Lenin."\textsuperscript{275}

\textsuperscript{274}See \textit{Ritual}.
HOW DANGEROUS ARE ONE'S OWN EMOTIONS?

The enemy's ever more intense emotions and his decreasing control over them create the major remaining risk for the survival of the Party's "camp." 276

As to the Party itself, the classical Bolshevik insistence on preventing feelings from influencing conduct 277 is maintained. "If one grants an outlet (dat' vykhod) to feelings" 278 in politics, one puts oneself in danger. When one "yields to moods (poddavit'sia nastroeniam)," 279 when "nerves fail (nervy sdaiut)," 280 one risks "losing one's head" quite literally.

In controlling one's feelings, the Party combines "principles" with a "business-like" approach. "The pronouncements and letters of Party members and non-Party people," discloses Khrushchev at the XXIIInd Congress, about the draft of the new program, "are full of elevated thoughts and feelings." In fact, "many among them should more correctly be called poems, so much are they inspired and emotional." On the other hand, within the competent offices of the Party "the examination of the draft program was conducted in a manner oriented on principle (printsipial'no) and in business-like fashion (poddelovomu)." 281 One must not be "guided by feeling alone,"

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276 See above, pp. 91ff.
277 See Study, Ch. V.
279 K 58, p. 416.
280 XXIIInd Congress. Materials, p. 224.
281 Materials, p. 211.
Khrushchev teaches; "calculation is needed (raschety nuzhny)."\textsuperscript{282}

The Party knows this and, in contrast to the deteriorating enemy, acts accordingly. "We have strong nerves," Khrushchev likes to announce; "we will compete with anyone as to the strength of nerves."\textsuperscript{283} Immune to the pressure of unpleasant feelings, the Party is equally capable of resisting agreeable ones: it does not permit itself to be "carried away (uvlekat'sia)." The Party keeps calm, equally removed from sluggish indifference (ravnodushie)\textsuperscript{284} and from trembling excitement (volnenie) or exasperation (razdrazhenie). While Khrushchev asks Walter Reuther to "calm down," for "you are trembling with fever,"\textsuperscript{285} a leader observes at the XXIInd Congress that "never has the foreign policy of the Soviet Union been so active [which is the opposite of bad calm (spokoinost')] and at the same time so calm (spokoinyi) as in our days."\textsuperscript{286}

The enemy attempts to arouse painful feelings in the Party so as to cause it to waste its energy or to lose its self-control. The Party knows this, and foils such maneuvers.

Bolsheviks thus try not to permit themselves to be like Russian intellectuals, who are apt "to take everything

\textsuperscript{284} See above, pp. 54ff.
\textsuperscript{286} Brezhnev, Vol. 1, p. 345.
as a personal offense." \textsuperscript{287} They try not to resemble those writers who, Sholokhov observes at the XXIInd Congress, "are people of most delicate (\textit{ronchaishii}) emotions, or, to speak more simply, spoiled and capricious people. If you don't smile at one of them the way he prefers it, if you do not agree with the other..., and if you look at the third in a certain fashion, they take offense, and the offense they feel is mortal (\textit{krovnyi})." \textsuperscript{288}

Nor should Bolsheviks allow themselves to fall into the trap of becoming exasperated (\textit{razdrazhennyi}). Rather should they say to themselves and to the enemy when such an attempt is made: "Such questions are being put forward for the purpose of arousing exasperation!" \textsuperscript{289} Or "we are not like bulls that, teased by a red flag, throw themselves at their tormentors." "We...have strong nerves." \textsuperscript{290}

Thus, the classic Bolshevik fear of being "provoked" into inexpedient attack on the enemy\textsuperscript{291} persists. It is still an effective and expedient device for Bolsheviks to maintain that "if we enter on this path, it will signify being led by (\textit{idti na povodu u})" the enemy: "it will fulfill his desires." \textsuperscript{292} (The word \textit{provokat'sia} is now used in connection with any undesirable behavior whatsoever.)

\textsuperscript{287} \textit{Pravda}, January 27, 1962.
\textsuperscript{288} Vol. 2, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{289} K 58, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{290} K 60 II, p. 472.
\textsuperscript{291} See above, pp. 127ff. and 231ff.
\textsuperscript{292} K 60 II, p. 59.
"We shall not yield to provocation (poddavat'sia na provokatsii)," but rather "steadfastly execute the policy we have chosen." 293 "We stand above (stat' vyshe) all your provocations." 294 "We shall not permit ourselves to be inveigled (vovlech')," 295 but rather "continue with assurance on our own path." 296 "Nobody will succeed in turning us away (svernut') from the path of...," 297 in pushing us into (tolkat') another and fatal one: "In the whole world there is no force" that could do that, 298 just as there is none capable of annihilating the Soviet domain -- claims whose stridence expresses perhaps less than serenity. "Let the dogs (mos'ka) bark," Khrushchev declares, "the Indian elephant [it used to be the caravan, but Khrushchev is speaking in Calcutta] will pursue his way on the path he has selected." 299

Thus the requirement of repulsing any enemy attack 300 is qualified by that of not yielding to "provocations" and not being diverted from one's chosen course. "The revanchists in Bonn," Khrushchev surmises at one point, "apparently want to provoke us (provotsirovat') into

293 K 59 I, p. 489.
294 Ibid.
295 K 60 I, p. 423.
296 K 59 I, p. 489.
297 XXIInd Congress. Materials, p. 47.
299 K 60 I, pp. 184-185.
300 See above, pp. 183ff.
giving them a sharp response (otvetnaia rezkost'). They should like us to help them to sharpen (obostrit') the 'cold war' again." But, "gentlemen, when you take this road, nothing but failure awaits you."301

Capable of controlling the feelings it may have, the Party numbers among its strategems the expression of any feelings that may seem expedient. While in the past the belief seems to have prevailed that one ought to be either quite pleasant or highly disagreeable in any given circumstance, one now admits mixtures of attitudes which the enemy will call contradictory. Thus Khrushchev, discussing in 1958 the "activity of the leaders of the Yugoslav Union of Communists," begins by "sternly condemning" their "undermining" and "divisive" actions: they "harm." Their position "objectively plays into the hands of the wishes and attempts" of the enemy "who -- and this is no accident -- comes out on their side." In fact, they "are falling away from the position of the working class to that of its enemies." So much for the Yugoslav Party. Now "as to the domain of government (linia gossudarstvennaia), we shall strive to develop friendly (druzhestvennyi) relations with Yugoslavia." For "after the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia [in 1955]...many positive results were attained." Indeed, "we can note with satisfaction that on many major questions... our positions often coincide. We express the hope that our countries will continue to unite their efforts...."302

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301 K 59 II, p. 386.
302 K 58, pp. 564-565.
To a Bolshevik leader it appears inconceivable that he will lose control of himself, possibly just because he dreads it so much. "The means which are present in Cuba and which worry you," explains Khrushchev succinctly to President Kennedy on October 27, 1962, "are in the hands of Soviet officers. Hence any accidental use of these means... is excluded".\(^303\) -- again, perhaps, one of the many Bolshevik statements in which serious belief and obvious rhetoric blend.

In a similar vein the enemy's difficulty of keeping himself under control is stressed: "One must put strait-jackets (smiritelnaja rubashka) on those who rave."\(^304\)

But when the "masses" are presented as reacting appropriately, the frightening and gratifying idea of violent feelings surging without control is invoked. "The storm of the peoples' wrath is raging on all continents" begins Pravda's editorial on October 26, 1962.

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While his own feelings continue to be viewed with some disfavor by a Bolshevik leader, he seems to be less apprehensive about their potential for damage than were his predecessors.

Khrushchev may pretend that he has difficulties in controlling his feelings: a possibility too dangerous and too disgraceful to admit in the past. "I am a human being, and I have human feelings," he alleges after the

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\(^{303}\) Pravda, October 28, 1962.

\(^{304}\) Ponomarev, Pravda, November 18, 1962.
U-2 incident. "You must understand," he appeals to journalists, bracketing the rulers together with the masses whose character they used to oppose, 305 "that we Russian, Soviet people wear our hearts upon our sleeves (u nas dusha na raspashku) -- when we have a good time, we have a good time (guliat' tak guliat'); when we strike, we strike. How then can I now call upon our people [in the case of a visit by Eisenhower] to come out and to greet him...? People will say...." 306

Khrushchev may even acknowledge failure -- to be sure, minor -- in control. When, at the National Press Club in Washington on September 16, 1959, he explains that he is going to Peking after his visit to the United States to celebrate the 10th anniversary of Communist China, he says: "...on October 1, 1959, ten years will have elapsed since the conquest of power by the Americans... [ellipsis noted in the text]. You see, you see right away -- this is what Khrushchev is thinking about; we have caught him in the act...[ellipsis noted in the text], the conquest of power by the Chinese working class and the laboring peasantry of China." 307

Bolshevik leaders may now also admit or pretend that they have mixed feelings about a policy of their own. "In those days," Khrushchev recalls in Hungary in the spring of 1958, looking back to the fall of 1956, "there arose before us, the leaders of the Communist Party of

305 See Study, passim.
306 K 60 I, p. 541.
307 K 59 II, p. 102.
the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Government, a difficult question -- what to do (kak nam byt)?... Believe me, we found it difficult to decide." 308 "The Soviet government did not find it easy to make this decision," Khrushchev tells the General Assembly about the Soviet Union leaving the Ten National conference on disarmament in 1960. 309 "Weighing all the reasons for and against this, the Soviet government, with an aching heart (shchemiashchoe chuvstvo), with pain (bol') in the heart, was forced to resume nuclear testing." 310

Older Bolsheviks feared and resolved to combat the penchant towards volnovat'sia, falling into a state of excitement, of agitation, of upset, the state of volnenie. But today's leaders make at least ceremonial use of words to designate noble emotions. Thus, being agreeable in the course of his travels at home and abroad, Khrushchev continuously applies to encounters the word volnuiushchii (extremely moving), 311 declares himself vzyvolnovan (deeply moved), acknowledges that his hosts have succeeded in vzyvolnovat' (moving) him -- all words that to earlier Bolsheviks connoted reduced efficacy. "Such conversations are very agreeable and also move in a human way (po chelovecheski)." 312 "It is always with great volnenie

308 K 58, pp. 213-214.
309 K 60 II, p. 317.
312 K 60 I, p. 220.
(emotion) that we attend..."; 313 "I want to share with you the impressions which have moved us to the depth of our soul." 314 When speaking, the Bolshevik leader admits his emotion, though perfunctorily: "One cannot without emotion speak of..."; 315 "one cannot without deep emotion read..." 316 Even the man commonly regarded in 1961-1962 as the leader of those most suspicious of emotional displays characterizes Khrushchev's concluding words at the XXIIInd Congress as "full of the human emotion of the soul (dushevnoe chelovecheskoe volnenie)...," adding however: "...and of clarity (jasnost')." 317 Everybody, finally, is deeply moved. "It is difficult," alleges a leader in the late winter of 1962, "to express in words the emotion and the great surge (pod' em) which a Soviet man experiences when..." 318 "Soviet people," affirms another, "are at present moved (vzvolnovan) by great events," for "the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party has just now ended its work." 319 To be sure, by such ceremonial use the dangerous word vzvolnovan is, for the moment at least, rendered harmless and perhaps ridiculous; but an unwitting tribute may also be paid to

313 K 60 II, p. 35.
314 K 60 I, p. 214.
315 K 60 II, p. 184.
316 K 59 II, p. 309.
the penchant, so sternly opposed by older Bolshevism, to volnovat'sia. To be in that state may even become a virtue, as when Khrushchev depicts bureaucrats "who do not get excited (volnovat sebia)" about their work. Khrushchev may now admit that he is concerned, not only with the economy of the country, but also with that of his soul. "I must say in all sincerity," he declares at a meeting in Moscow following, as it usually does, his return from a journey abroad, "that every time I speak here I feel much emotion (volnenie)." "Every time, when we return from a voyage abroad," he explains, "we hasten to reach you right upon our arrival at the airport. We furnish an account to you; immediately one feels easier and, as the phrase goes, one sleeps more quietly." However, "this time we returned from France to Moscow on a Sunday, and it was already evening. Naturally, we did not propose to have a meeting held on Sunday when people rest. But this did not make things easier for us, as we thus had to go through twenty-four hours of additional emotion (volnenie)."

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Bolshevik leaders are thus perhaps becoming less afraid of their own feelings and begin to entertain the idea that letting themselves go in a certain measure will not result in severe damage, that it may even be expedient. To the extent that their harshness towards opponents is related to the constraints they impose upon themselves, this development may promise some mellowing.

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321 See above, pp. 23ff. and 54ff.
322 K 60 I, p. 380.
DIVERSITY AGAINST SAMENESS

Bolsheviks not only remain averse in many contexts to the idea of separateness\(^{323}\) -- though addicted to separateness so as to prevent oneself from being penetrated by the enemy -- they also in numerous ways dislike differences.

An individual object, of whatever sort, is characteristically seen as just a member of a class, even though the object is by itself not only most important, but also the only one pertinent in a given context. "The all-sided development of relations with Western Germany," Khrushchev tells the East German "parliament" in 1957, "will...contribute...to the solution of such a task as the unification of Germany."\(^{324}\) Even this particular "task" is just a member of the class of "tasks." "Our will, our energy," affirms Khrushchev in 1962, "are increased tenfold by such a great force as the compactness and the unity of the people of the socialist countries."\(^{325}\)

Behind a variety of appearances Bolsheviks like to perceive a sameness of substance. "We need," explains Khrushchev, "good vision to perceive, behind the many events which occur on the historical surface, the most important thing...the social class essence of these manifestations."\(^{326}\)

Whereas differences imply separateness, sameness implies oneness. "What we have before us," teaches

\(^{323}\)See below, pp. 287ff.
\(^{324}\)K 57, p. 155. Emphasis supplied.
\(^{326}\)K 59 I, p. 482.
Khrushchev, "are not separate (отдел'ны) facts, but a clearly expressed common tendency." 327

In the development towards communism both differences and separateness decrease and then disappear.

A difference such as that between "high and relatively low incomes" will be "steadily (неуклонно) reduced." 328

As to separateness, such "frontiers" as those between the Union Republics within the Soviet Union will "more and more lose their previous significance." 329 "With the approach to communism," foresees Khrushchev, "the ties (связь) between branches of production and economic regions of the country become ever closer," 330 and so does the "intercourse (общение) between nations." 331

Finally, differences are erased (стират'). "The differences between city and countryside will disappear (исчезнут)," the Program of 1961 continues to prophesy, 332 and there will also be an "elimination (устранение) of the essential differences between mental and physical labor." 333 Sameness arrives: there will be social "homogeneity (однородность)," 334 "community (общность) in the economic and ideological domain," 335 a predominance of

327 Ibid., p. 40.
329 Ibid., p. 405.
332 Ibid., p. 366.
333 Ibid., p. 413.
335 Ibid.
"common traits." "All men will stand in the same (odinakovyi) relation to the means of production." 336

With sameness comes unity: there will be a merging (sliianie) of previously separate elements into a single (edinyi) stream (potok). Thus "collective farm property" and "all-popular (obshchenarodnyi)" property will merge into "a single type of communist property." 337

The end is thus sameness plus oneness. "All nations," predicts the Program of 1961, "will be united into one family by common...interests; together they will go to a single goal." 338 "Life will be built on a single basis, and the...demands of each people will be satisfied in equal fashion (v ravnoi mere)." 339 There will be a "single culture for all humanity (obshchechelovecheskii)." 340 "We are deeply convinced," says Khrushchev in late 1962, justifying a more favorable attitude towards the Yugoslav Party, "that after the full victory of communism...there will be no state frontiers which now separate (razdeliat') people; the distinguishing characteristics (obosoblennost') of nations will have fully withered away, and nations will fuse (slit'sia) in one family like brothers." 341

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336 Ibid.
337 Ibid., p. 377.
338 Ibid., p. 405.
339 Ibid.
340 Ibid., p. 407.
On the other hand, Bolsheviks exalt certain differences and separations in the present.

Just as there is a "main link" in a "chain" of events, so the present moment is often alleged to be exceptionally (neobychnoye) important. "One can say with full confidence," says a leader, "that the present plenum of the Central Committee will play a particularly eminent role."

"We must," asserts Pravda about music, "lead a resolute battle against stereotypes...." The same holds for all politically relevent conduct (and what conduct is not?): the Party differentiates at a given moment, if conditions require, and varies when conditions change.

The Party's arsenal of ways and means is all-inclusive. "The conclusions of the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," teaches Khrushchev, "orient communist parties...towards the mastery of all forms of struggle.... Lenin taught communists to be ready to use one or the other form of struggle according to the situation." "Success in the struggle of the working class," declares the Program of 1961, "will depend on the degree to which it and its Party master all forms [italics in the text] of the struggle -- the peaceful ones

342 See above, pp. 54ff.
344 March 29, 1962.
345 See Study, Ch. VII.
346 See above, pp. 84ff.
and those which are not peaceful, the parliamentary ones
and those which are not parliamentary."\textsuperscript{348}

At a given moment in time, the "diversity
(raznoobrazie)" and "peculiarity. (osobennost')" of
conditions require that "strict account (strogo uchityvat')"
be taken of them by applying to each situation the partic-
cular conduct which is most suited. "Given the enormous
variety of concrete conditions in the countries whose
people have lifted themselves to independent historical
creativity," Khrushchev says about the new nations, "it
is inevitable that a variety of forms will emerge for
solving the tasks of making social progress."\textsuperscript{349}

Avoiding the "worship" of any particular means, the
Party must, in the words of the Program of 1961, be
"ready to change in the quickest and most unexpected
fashion from one form of struggle to the other."\textsuperscript{350}
"The Party," declares Kozlov at one of the numerous
occasions when this or that set of offices is being re-
organized, "refashions (perestraivat') the work of its
organs in accord with the new tasks. And that is natural,
as organizational forms must always secure the success of
the general line."\textsuperscript{351}

As conditions change radically, so must means.
"There was a time," Khrushchev recalls in the fall of

\textsuperscript{348} \textit{Materials}, p. 349.
\textsuperscript{349} Speech of January 6, 1961. \textit{Kommunist}, January
1961, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Materials}, p. 349.
\textsuperscript{351} \textit{Pravda}, December 4, 1962.
1962, "when a state's power was determined by the magnitude of its production of metal. In its time this yardstick was correct. But now...it is already insufficient. Chemistry furnishes materials which are cheaper, more durable and more accessible." Thus, "the production of steel is, as it were, a well-trodden and deeply rutted road; here even a blind horse will not turn aside because then the wheels would break. But some persons in responsible positions have put on blinkers made of steel; they look at things and behave in the way in which they have been taught. Materials have come up which exceed steel and are cheaper, but they continue to shout: Steel! Steel!" 352 Just so, certain collective farms, in the presence of new and superior kinds of fodder, continue "to cultivate potatoes as basic fodder. Why do they behave that way? This is not the result of consciousness (sознание); this is letting oneself go (самотек). Such a collective farm behaves in this fashion because it is accustomed to the potato, because father did the same." 353

Hence to the quality of "being principled (принципа'ност')" one must add that of "suppleness (гибкост')," a term whose importance has increased with Khrushchev. Eliminating the "anti-Party group," "our Party," according to Gromyko at the XXIst Congress, "cleared the way for a more...supple...policy." 354

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To be supple is to "utilize possibilities" fully. "It would be bad," Khrushchev observes on an important occasion, if communists "did not observe the emerging new possibilities, did not find new methods and forms." "To utilize the new possibilities which the contemporary epoch opens up" requires acting in a new way.

This is what the "dogmatists" and "sectarians" are incapable of doing. They "mechanically repeat" themselves in a fashion appropriate to vanished conditions. Showing "lack of nimbleness (nepovorotlivost')," they are "prisoners" of the old, to which they "stubbornly cling," not seeing that it has "outlived" itself. They are incapable of "cutting themselves off (otrezat'sia)" from the past. They "break away (otyrvat'sia) from life," "lose the feeling for the new," "not wishing to see the changes which are occurring." As a result, "dogmatism and sectarianism are," according to the Program of 1961, "a hindrance...in the utilization of newly emerging possibilities."

Against such constraints Bolsheviks call up the great Russian images of liberation: "Dogmatists," declares a leader at the XXIInd Congress, "will remain

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355 See above, pp. 192ff.
357 Ibid., p. 6.
358 K 60 II, pp. 62-63.
359 K 57, p. 158.
360 Materials, p. 351.
361 See above, pp. 54ff.
dogmatists, but living life (zhivaia zhizn') with its... feeling (chuvstvo) for the new...erupts (vyryvat'sia) like a fresh spring wind into the wide open window."362

The wind will blow more powerfully yet. "The forms of transition to communism," predicts Khrushchev, "will become ever more diverse (raznoobraznie)."363

But later, maximal diversity will be replaced by sameness-in-oneness. "The path towards the gradual merging of the nations," explains the first secretary of the composers' association in classical fashion, after having stressed the national diversity of Soviet music, "proceeds through the maximal unfolding of all that is valuable in each national culture."364

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From the themes discussed in this section it would appear that the Bolshevik requirement of flexibility is stressed even more than in the preceding era.

ARE THEY MELLOWING?

Slightly, it would appear; in ways all of which make Bolsheviks -- on occasion -- less trying to their opponents, but sometimes more dangerous.

Possibly the changes in tactics are more limited than those in some basic orientations discussed in the

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364 Khrennikov, Pravda, March 27, 1962.
preceding chapter. Or change may be, as it were, running in the other direction. Stalin, in 1949, refrained from reconquering Yugoslavia, presumably because he feared "provoking" Washington. No such qualms deterred Khrushchev with regard to Cuba in 1962.

Still, Bolshevik leaders may now feel less obliged to push forward to the very limits of feasibility, regardless of delayed and indirect consequences. They may slowly and with relapses be discovering the profits of gentleness, as well as the advantages of unilateral concessions in some junctures: aspects of a heightened flexibility enjoined upon them. Less afraid, perhaps, of their own feelings, they may in part be replacing the cold harshness that goes with their traditional self-constraint by some permissiveness towards their own "spontaneity."
III. ARE THEY OPENING?

Are Bolshevik leaders coming to assign a higher role to contacts with their western counterparts as a means of reducing the chance of miscalculation and of reaching agreement on contentious issues?

THE FEAR OF MISCALCULATING

While their fear of spontaneity (stikhliinost') may have somewhat declined,\(^1\) Bolshevik leaders continue to associate it with calamity. "For thousands of years," declares Khrushchev at the XXIIInd Congress, accenting a Marxist theme in usual Bolshevik fashion, "people have suffered from the spontaneous action of the laws of society, have been its pitiful playthings (zhalkaia igrushka)." On the other hand, "under socialism people not only know the objective laws, they even exercise control over them."\(^2\) That is, "our Party will liberate man from the bond of spontaneity (stikhia)."\(^3\) Thus, for instance, according to the Program of 1961, "the dependence (zavisimost') of agriculture on the spontaneity of nature will be noticeably reduced" in the near future "and then brought to a minimum" under communism.\(^4\) In fact, "the liberation of agriculture from the harmful influence of the spontaneous forces of nature" is a major goal.\(^5\)

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\(^1\)See above, pp. 241ff.
\(^2\)Materials, p. 127.
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 165.
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 377.
\(^5\)Ibid., p. 379.
Bolsheviks fear a penchant for aimlessness, which might lead them to the same sorry condition of the slum dwellers of New York, who find themselves, according to an observer quoted by Suslov, without "any kind of order and aim in life." To ward off such disaster, the Party insists on "striving towards goals (tseleustremitel'nost') in all our work," on "activity directed towards a goal (tselenapravlenniaa deiatel'nost')," on "knowing where and how to go (vesti delo)." "Moving toward a fully definite (vpolne opredelenyi) goal" the Party "now poses such a task as ... takes a course (priniat' kurs) towards ...."

It isn't easy. "The Party organizations in the oblast," says the boss of Omsk at the XXIst Congress, "strive to make political propaganda goal-directed (tseleustrelennyi)...."

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Though one may have a goal, one may still fail to take sufficient pains in attempting to reach it. Bolsheviks continue to fear the disposition to be "lightminded

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6 See Study, Ch. IV.
8 K 59 I, p. 51.
9 Materials, p. 424.
11 K 59 I, p. 487.
(legkomysslennoy), to show "carelessness (bezzabotnost')," to "approach this matter without having thought sufficiently about it (neobdumanno)...without having thought it through (neprodumanno)," "to deal with the question in insufficient depth (nedostatochno gluboko)," "to approach this in a manner which is not very serious (ne ochen seriozno podkhodi)," Against such penchants the Party insists on "having a serious attitude (seriozno otnosit'sia) towards...," on "thoroughly weighing all...," on "taking account of (uchityvat')," on "evaluating (rastsenivat')," on schitat': making considered estimates. "He thinks everything through, he weighs (vzvesit') everything," says Khrushchev with approval about his American friend, Mr. Garst. 13

When one has done all that, one "stands on the position (stoiat ne pozitsii) that..."; one has "diagnosed (opredeliat')" the essential aspects of the situation.

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It is here that the enemy commits errors; and this is why his enterprises end in failure (proval, a word suggesting a structure collapsing).

Bolsheviks stress that they do so end and will continue to end in failure. "This policy has suffered a complete failure," "invariably suffers failure after failure," will "end with the usual (ocherednoi) failure," will "inevitably fail if one stubbornly persists in it," and is "doomed (obrechen) to failure," even to "scandalous failure." "This idea has already suffered collapse

(krakh), and the one who put it forward has already rotted in the earth."\textsuperscript{14} All "adventurists" will "land (okazat'sia) there where they ought to be (gde imi padlezhnyt byt').\textsuperscript{15} "They did not succeed (im ne udalos') in..."; "they got no results (nichego ne vyshlo) earlier, and they won't get any this time."\textsuperscript{16} They entertained "vain hopes," for "such a recipe cannot yield positive results."\textsuperscript{17} "It didn't turn out (ne vyshlo): life laughed at....\textsuperscript{18} So "what has now remained of this policy?" The answer is: "nothing."\textsuperscript{19} And "you will succeed in this as little as you will in looking at your ears without a mirror."\textsuperscript{20}

The enemy's failures are due to the fact that his calculations are wrong; thus his policy goes cruelly awry (zhestoko proschitat'sia). "The policy of...did not confirm the calculations (raschet) of those who initiated it"; \textsuperscript{21} "they thought that...but what came (chtto vyshlo) of this?"\textsuperscript{22} "They thought that...but you know what became (chtto poluchilos') of this";\textsuperscript{23} "such a policy did

\textsuperscript{14} K 59 I, p. 434.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 121.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 158.
\textsuperscript{18} K 58, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{19} K 59 I, p. 285.
\textsuperscript{20} K 57, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{21} K 59 I, p. 232.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 166.
not yield those results on which its initiators counter; in fact, "what remained of these prophesies?" In short, "such a policy...went bankrupt (obankrotit'sia)."

But is this a danger to which only the overt enemy is exposed? No, indeed: it is also the deviator's tragedy. "They obtained results the very opposite of those they counted on." This judgment, pronounced on the Yugoslav leaders by the director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the XXIst Congress, manifestly imputes bad motives to them; but the same point may be made when, less publicly, intent is less impugned. "They had more than a little (ne malo) in their record that was good," Khrushchev admits to Gardner Cowles about Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov. However, this matters little since "they understood the situation incorrectly; they evaluated the perspectives wrongly." Every "conscious" leader -- and lack of "consciousness" disqualifies for leadership -- must fear the possibility of making false calculations, which will result in impairment or ruin of what he should "guard (berech', khranit') as the apple of his eye." One does not talk

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24 Ibid., p. 153.
25 Ibid., p. 20.
26 Ibid., p. 153.
27 See Ritual, passim.
30 K 58, p. 224.
about this, certainly not in public. At a rare occasion
the apprehension that one might be "making (dopustit')
a mistake in one's calculations"31 may find mild ex-
pression, as when Khrushchev, on American television,
answers David Susskind's request for written answers to
more questions: "I should like you to state more precisely
the form in which you wish to receive my answers to your
supplementary questions -- in the form of a sound record-
ing for radio broadcasting? I should like to know whether
I may be working in vain (naprasno), that afterwards only
mice will attack my work."32

When the enemy points out that the Party is not
above miscalculations, the very familiarity and dread of
the idea make for a vigorous rebuff. When President
Kennedy, on June 4, 1961, in Vienna, "warned" Khrushchev
"of the danger of miscalculation," "Mr. Khrushchev,"
according to a correspondent, "not only did not accept
this argument, but added that he did not like the word
'miscalculation' which he said was a misleading 'western
word.'"33

A western word which, it is alleged, is much less
misleading when applied to the West: the Party attributes
to the opponent tendencies it is resolved to inhibit in
itself.

A kind of false calculation of which Bolshevik
leaders may be particularly afraid, and whose commission

32 K 60 II, p. 527.
by the enemy they stress, is "breaking (otorvat'sia, otryv) with reality." "These gentlemen," Khrushchev loves to say about opponents, "evidently suffer from an absence of the feeling for reality (chuvstvo real'nosti)," they "go away (ukhodit') from actuality (deistvitel'-nost')"; they "put questions in an unreal way." But this leads to failure, and increases the severity of damage for those "who in the face of evident failure... remain stubborn (uporstvovat' po svoem)." The wages of error is death. "This is not a policy," comments a leader on the West in 1962; "this is shortsightedness," and "one may recall here the proverb: 'If the blind lead the blind, both will fall into the abyss (propast')." This fate inevitably awaits those who cannot see the real world clearly (prozret')."

For the word is powerless against the fact. "If a maiden who has given birth to a child wants to continue to consider herself a maiden," says Khrushchev, talking about guilty America pretending to purity, "and even if she requests of a court that she be recognized as such, this will not change the situation. Even if a court were to recognize this particular kind of maiden, it could not really make her a maiden again." "You will never get

34K 59 I, p. 401.
35K 58, p. 52.
36K 59 I, p. 71.
37K 59 II, p. 60.
39K 59 II, p. 139.
away from these facts"; \textsuperscript{40} "there is nowhere to go to get away from this."

However, reality has a way of imposing itself by bringing catastrophe to the man who misjudges it. "But this is just the point," explains Khrushchev. "Not everybody appraises correctly what he sees, just as not everybody can look at the sky and see the sun as it really is." \textsuperscript{41}

The Party resolves to do all it can to "avoid mistakes in the appraisal (otsenka) of the situation." \textsuperscript{42}

Urging the enemy "not to go against reality" \textsuperscript{43} -- a type of appeal made in a context to be discussed below -- the Party is presumably also speaking to itself: "If one has not lost the capacity for realistic thought (real'no myslit'), one cannot be diverted (otvlech'sia) from the reality which exists." \textsuperscript{44} "I say this," Khrushchev maintains about a certain position of his, "on the basis of an all-sided analysis of the relationship of forces in the world." Now "it does happen that a man is carried away (uvlech'sia) and takes his own conceptions (predstavlenie)...for actuality." But "far from doing this, I analyze the situation that has come to exist (slozhir'sia) in the world." \textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{40} K 59 I, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{41} K 57, p. 115.
\textsuperscript{42} K 59 I, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{43} K 59 II, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{44} K 57, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{45} K 60 I, p. 188.
Bolsheviks continue to proclaim the necessity of arriving at estimates conforming to reality with such solemnity and frequency that one suspects that they have serious troubles with their estimates. For example, there is the injunction to view the world soberly (trezvo): "We are looking at the situation soberly,"46 "evaluating (otsenivat') it soberly." "This is what the situation is like if one looks at it soberly, and we communists always look soberly on life,"47 neutralizing all factors, as Gromyko puts it after Cuba, "which hinder (meshat') one in looking soberly at things."48 There is also the theme that "one must reckon (schitat'sia) with the fact that...," that this fact "exists independently of our wishes and attitude (otnoshenie) towards it." Hence "we must reckon with that which is";49 "this is an indisputable (neprelozhnyi) fact with which it is indispensable to reckon";50 "it is indispensable to reckon with concrete reality, with the world as it is";51 "one must reckon with what practically has come to exist."52 At the basis of all action not issuing in disaster is "a precise account (uchet) of forces"; "it behooves (sledovat') one

46 K 59 I, p. 194.
49 K 57, p. 33.
50 Ibid., p. 153.
51 K 60 II, p. 552.
to take into account (учесть') all that exists, to act "on the basis of an account of real actuality." 

"All that," one will often say, "must be taken into account (учитывать')." 

"We must acknowledge (признать') this fact," teaches Khrushchev, "as we acknowledge every morning that the sun is rising." 

One must therefore not turn away from what is unpleasant. "This, one must not forget (об этом нельзя забывать')," is a traditional demand. "The question is: can Marxists just pass over (проигнорировать) these facts?" And the answer: "Of course not." 

"We have no right to just pass by (пройти мимо)..." 

"One must not let oneself be diverted (отвлечься) from such disagreeable facts as..." 

Nor should one "ignore (игнорировать) the fact that..."; "we cannot ignore this danger." 

"One must not shut one's eyes (закрыть глаза) to the fact that..." 

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55. Ibid., p. 95. 
56. Ibid., p. 42. 
57. Ibid., p. 381. 
59. Ibid., p. 91. 
60. To C. L. Sulzberger, Pravda, September 10, 1961. 
61. K 58, p. 158.
consciously want to close his eyes to actuality."^62 is everyone who wants to survive.

By the same token, the Party also eschews "illusions." "We do not beguile (reshit') ourselves with the illusion that..."; "it would be naive to believe that...."

Thus, in the face of several temptations the Party must manage to stay clear of errors in calculation.

It assures itself and the enemy that "there is no doubt whatsoever (net nekakogo somnenia)" about the correctness of its estimates: "We have every reason (u nas est' vse osnovanie) to believe that..."; "it is perfectly evident (sovershennno ochevidno) that..."; "one can firmly say (mozhno tvero skazat') that...," or even "with full definiteness (so vsei opredelitelnost'iu)"; "one cannot but arrive at the conclusion (nel'zia ne priiti k vyvodu) that..." since certain events "convincingly show (ubediteln'no pokazat') that...," or even "irrefutably prove (neopoverzhimo dokazyvat') that...."

The Party has a monopoly on insight: it "knows how to size up the situation correctly (umet' pravil'no razobrat'sia v obstanovke)"; it "carries (vnesti) clarity (jasnost') into the real state of affairs."^63 It may always say later: "It was clear that...," and "our Party knew that...." Predicting that "all human beings on earth will eternally be grateful" to the Soviet people, Khrushchev indicates that the accomplishment that will provoke this reaction is the fact of "having deeply

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^62 K 59 II, p. 137.
^63 K 59 I, p. 64.
recognized the correctness of the teaching of Marxism-Leninism..." on "the development of society." 64 "The Party," declares the Program of 1961, conducts a struggle with the aim that all toilers...deeply understand the course and perspectives of world development, correctly grasp the nature of events within the country and on the international scene." 65 That such phrases obviously fall short of describing reality does not lessen their significance as a token of the value of insight, or whatever passes for it, with Bolshevik leaders.

An essential superiority of the Party is its extraordinary capacity for foresight. "The Party...looks with sharp vision into the future (zor'ko vsmatrivat'sia v gradushchee)," says the Program of 1961, 66 while Khrushchev, at the XXIInd Congress makes explicit an aspect of the Twenty-Year Plan: "Only think, comrades, to what heights Soviet man has risen, for he is capable of tracing the development of society for such a considerable historical period!" 67 The enemy, on the other hand, must be content with "putting his stake (delat' stavku)" on this or that uncertain prognosis -- "Our adversaries...are putting their major stake on...." 68 That is -- if they are capable of making a forecast at all. While at the XXIInd Congress the Party is forecasting for a much longer period than ever

64 K 60 I, p. 208.
65 Materials, p. 409.
66 Ibid., p. 423.
67 Ibid., p. 136.
68 K 59 I, p. 376.
before, "the bourgeoisie," Khrushchev points out on this occasion, "are unable to say anything about the future, are unable to plan, not just for twenty years, but even for one year." They are reduced to such shifts as "hysterical invocations, and a fruitless reading of tea leaves." In any case, these "prophets" will turn out to be "unlucky."

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From correct estimates one "works out (vyrobhat')" a correct "line"; one "draws the only correct conclusion (vyvod) from all this." In fact, one always "must draw the indispensable conclusions from this"; "politics... must be logical and consequential." The line takes account of "the concrete conditions of struggle," makes one "stand on the basis of realistic (real'nyi) politics, corresponding to the given historical moment." It furnishes a "correct solution (pravil'noe reshenie)" of "questions (voprosy)," "indicating the paths (opredeliat' puti)" by which to "solve" them.

There is only one such line, indicating "the only correct course"; "there is no other path."

Its monopoly on the capacity to discover this line justifies the Party's claim to dominance. It "is not

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70. K 60 II, p. 68.
72. K 57, p. 120.
74. Ibid., p. 71.
75. Ibid., p. 28.
only boundlessly dedicated to the cause of communism," but "it also professes the capacity to lead the country on the right course."

The application of the line leads to the realization of its objectives. "If the Party takes up any matter (vziat'sia za kakoe-libo delo)," a leader can affirm in 1962, "then it will...surely (obiazateln'o) lead it to victory." "In our country's foreign policy," explains Gromyko at the XXIInd Congress, "with its numerous actions, we have, figuratively, missiles of short range and of long range. But in contrast to real missiles which, as Comrade Malinovskii told us, are more accurate on distant objectives, foreign policy missiles are as accurate on near as they are on far objectives." For "these weapons...are based on correct calculations, and the builder of these weapons, our...Central Committee, accomplishes his business well." Khrushchev says about the twin cosmonauts what he would like to say about agriculture: "They have been put on a previously calculated orbit in a precisely foreseen time."

Finally, then, the conduct of this entire "business" stands vindicated: "...and these calculations were fully verified (opravdat'sia)"; "the correctness of the

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76 Pravda, December 20, 1961.
77 See above, pp. 38ff.
81 K 60 I, p. 7.
conclusions was fully confirmed (potverzhdat') by life"; "life showed convincingly (ubeditel'no pokazat') that..."; "it was proved in practice (na dele dokazat') that..."; and "the best verification (proverka) of the correctness of our course...is our successes in...".82

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The classical conception of the struggle against miscalculation, as the preceding pages imply, does not accord an important role to contacts with enemy leaders.

But Khrushchev has been introducing several innovations that do.

Earlier Bolshevik leaders relied primarily on the analysis of information collected by subordinates or furnished by the enemy himself. In Adzhubei's mocking words at the XXIIInd Congress, they used to "sit at home in their study, turning a globe and planning (opredeliat') on it the world's development."83 Now Khrushchev puts the accent on "acquaintance (oznakomlenie) with live (zhivyi) reality"84 by the leaders themselves. When a journalist in the train between Lille and Rouen asks him: "In Lille you went quickly through a factory. What did you succeed in seeing?" Khrushchev answers: "I saw all. One must know how to see what one has (sleduet) to see."85

82 K 59 I, p. 44.
84 Brezhnev, XXIIInd Congress, Vol. 1, p. 346.
85 K 60 I, p. 326.
Previous leaders observed too little. "The persons who directed agriculture," reveals a speaker at the XXIst Congress, "did not travel anywhere, did not associate (obshchat'sia) with people, did not take counsel with them, did not see those processes which were occurring in...."\(^{86}\) In short, according to a speaker at the XXIInd Congress, previous leaders "did not know life; for decades they did not travel anywhere."\(^{87}\) The leaders of the "anti-Party group," according to another witness, chief editor of Pravda, lived "in their offices (kabinet)" and forgot "how to talk (razgovarivat') with the people.... For years Stalin remained silent, he travelled nowhere, talked (besedovat') with no one." When Khrushchev adopted a new style, they demurred. "Why, they asked, are these journeys around the country necessary? What are these conferences (soveshchanie) and meetings (vstrecha) for...?"\(^{88}\) No doubt the same questions were raised about Khrushchev's journeys abroad, and received the same answers: to "associate" with enemy leaders -- among other activities abroad -- to "talk" with them, to have "conferences" and "meetings" with them. All these are essential for reconnaissace, that is for arriving at those correct estimates from which follows the correct line.

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And what about the improved comprehension of the Party's position which enemy leaders might get from contacts with their communist counterparts? The author has found no evidence that this consideration has become important in the Kremlin. For it is not so much that position which the opponent is likely to distort as the actual relationship of forces.\textsuperscript{89}

Insofar as he does, is it possible to persuade him of that and thus to change his plans?

While Bolsheviks continue to insist that one can't \textit{ugovarivat'} the enemy (induce him by talk to change his designs),\textsuperscript{90} they may be beginning to see a faint possibility of this kind. This is suggested by a theme that has recently become prominent: one calls upon the opponent to accept one's estimate of the relationship of forces -- and hence one's demands. (Note the similarity with the logic of Marxism, by which the desirability of "socialism" is derived from its "historical necessity.")

Our demands, the campaign starts, follow from reality itself. "We base ourselves (\textit{iskhodit'} iz) on real facts," declares Khrushchev when presenting his proposals, "and want to make relationships between all countries accord (\textit{privesti v sootvetstvii}) with that which exists."\textsuperscript{91}

In fact, "we reckoned, and we now reckon, that our proposal is wholly acceptable because it is based on a stock-taking

\textsuperscript{89}See above, pp. 91ff.
\textsuperscript{90}See above, pp. 212ff.
(uchet) of the real situation in..." 92 Hence, "let us all acknowledge (davajte zhe priznaem) the really existing situation and base ourselves on it." 93

On the other hand, the opponents' demands "go against reality." As Khrushchev points out to them, "this does not correspond to (sotvetstvovat') reality and is (javliat'sia) just a conception born of a wish (zhelanoe predstavlenie)." 94 Having agreed with Senator Mansfield's proposal on West Berlin, Khrushchev merely observes: "It is true that further on Mansfield loses the feeling of reality: he demands that the status of the free city be extended...to democratic Berlin." 95

One may then gently chide westerners for permitting themselves to live with an impaired sense of reality, or impatiently ask them to stop their nonsense. Noting that "Mr. Adenauer is an aged and experienced person," Khrushchev pretends amazement: "How can he then not take into account that...?" 96 "Isn't it high time, though (ne pora li, odnako), to look at things soberly..." 97 "to stop basing one's calculations on illusions..." 98 "to throw away your vain dreams." 99 Indeed, "wake up, pinch yourself in a sensitive spot if

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92 K 59 I, pp. 110-111.
93 K 59 II, p. 63.
94 K 59 I, p. 63.
97 K 59 II, p. 60.
98 K 59 I, p. 63.
99 Ibid., p. 71.
it is difficult for you to keep from dozing.""100 "We would desire," Khrushchev declares wistfully, "that the leaders of America and Britain show wisdom, an understanding of the changed conditions in the world," and, he adds, "that they remove their armed forces from the Lebanon and Jordan."101 For "the sooner illusions and feelings in the policy of the western powers are replaced by reality and good sense," he notes nicely, "the better will it be for all."102 It isn't a matter of Soviet desires; it is just a question of being sober (trezvyj). "We should like to hope that the leaders of the United States of America will...look on things in a more sober fashion,"103 for "with people...standing on...more sober positions it might be possible to reach agreement."104

To be sure, these themes are useful, first of all, for putting pressure on the West, but they may indicate an emerging suspicion that contacts with western leaders may be useful -- especially if one can talk to them from what can be made to appear as a position of strength. Of course one cannot persuade them to act against their interests, but rather that these very interests require them to retreat in view of the new relationship of forces. "One must hope (nadeiat'sia) that earlier or later the ruling groups of the western countries will be forced (byt')

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100 K 60 II, p. 474.
101 K 58, p. 464.
102 Ibid., pp. 510-511.
103 Ibid., p. 316.
104 K 59 I, p. 85.
vyuzhdene) to appraise the situation and the relationship of forces in the world in a realistic fashion."^105

But if it is only a "hope" that the facts themselves will be strong enough for the job, perhaps one should furnish them some aid?

* * *

While Bolshevik leaders may thus entertain a somewhat heightened estimate of the possibility of modifying their opponents' positions through contacts, they may themselves come to such meetings with their minds just slightly more open than their predecessors. The Bolshevik requirement of having at all moments a precise and complete (though, in definite ways, flexible) position is by no means dead, but it may be weakening. Khrushchev may now publicly admit -- perhaps one of the privileges of the supreme ruler -- that he is still thinking things over. "The contractual agreements" between agricultural units and the government, he will now say, "must provide for the sale of the products of the collective and Soviet farms for the current year and for the following two or three years, and perhaps even for a longer period. We must think about this (eto nado obdumati)."^106 "We shall think about this (nad etim my podumam)," he discloses about another matter on the same occasion. In fact, "it is for this that the plenum has convened."^107 This is

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^105 K 58, p. 391.
^107 Ibid.
something new within the Party which perhaps somewhat increases the chance of less definiteness in dealing with enemies, but it is also another step back towards what earlier Bolsheviks considered a Russian vice.  

Khrushchev is already capable of admitting ignorance on details to the enemy himself. When in 1957 a British journalist, having heard Khrushchev's prediction of the time when the Soviet economy will overtake the American, asks him "by what date...the Soviet Union intends to reach the British standard of living," Khrushchev responds in novel fashion: "Please forgive me. By your question you have created a rather difficult situation for me," for "I do not at this moment have at my disposal the data indispensable for a comparison between our level of production and that of Britain." More than that, "I must confess that I have not thought about the question as to when our country will be able to equal Britain in various branches of production." When, in 1957 again, a western journalist asks Khrushchev for the precise number of men in the Soviet armed forces after a "unilateral reduction," Khrushchev once more admits ignorance: "I did not know that you would put this question. In the program which you presented, this question did not appear, and hence I did not ask our Minister of Defense what the number of men in the armed forces is, and it is difficult for me to name the precise figures."

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108 See Study, Ch. IV.
109 K 57, p. 334.
110 Ibid., p. 62.
If Bolshevik leaders have been interested in contacts chiefly so as to contribute to the correction of their opponents' optimism, they have now come to admit publicly the possibility of being mistaken themselves: a novel theme, though it concerns as yet but trivia and may not be very sincere. "I should like...to ask you for indulgence," Khrushchev addresses a press conference, "in case I make a mistake in speaking, if I express myself incorrectly. This can happen because every one of you can think beforehand about the question he is going to raise, whereas I have to answer immediately." 111 Announcing the rise in food prices in the spring of 1962, Khrushchev clearly implies that major mistakes in planning have been committed, without naming any culprits, that is, without disclaiming responsibility.

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Thus several themes make one surmise that Bolshevik leaders are coming to assign some importance to contacts with their western counterparts in their struggle against their own miscalculations and -- sometimes -- those of their opponents.

111K 59 II, p. 80.
THE HORROR OF BEING PENETrATED

That Bolshevik leaders continue to refuse westerners certain kinds of access to their domain needs no further documentation, and it has often been shown that they have solid reasons for it.

However, an inspection of their language suggests that they may be motivated by considerations other than expediency. Their talk of being penetrated, for example, evokes aspects of life more intimate than those called up by the usual metaphors of politics.

When trying to penetrate (pronikat'), the enemy is described as slinking (krast'sia), "wriggling like a worm into...(prolezt')," or, by an equally significant substitution, effecting an entrance by means of his nose. "Why are you sticking your nose into our kitchen garden?" Khrushchev is fond of asking the other side (for instance, on American television). "Don't push your snout into our...garden." "On July 1st," Khrushchev announces in 1960, "an American military airplane in the Barents Sea...violated the frontier of the Soviet Union near the Cape of Holy Nose (Sviatoi Nos)." Khrushchev, though his published puns are rare, can't resist: "They absolutely needed that Holy Nose. And thus near that nose they poked their nose into our domain.

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112 See Study, Ch. XI.
113 K 60 II, p. 452.
Indeed, there is no intimacy that the enemy is not most eager to smell out. Having noted to an American journalist at a press conference that "you want to know the command structure of the Soviet armed forces" which "is a secret of our country," Khrushchev observes: "You Americans are always drawn to where you can smell those odors of which you are normally unaware."\textsuperscript{116}

Taking advantage of every tiny opening -- a chink (shchelka), a loophole (lazeika), a key-hole -- the enemy insinuates himself. "International inspection," Khrushchev shows, "opens a loophole for intelligence."\textsuperscript{117}

The enemy wants to desecrate the holiest of holies. "What does control [as demanded by the West in case of disarmament] mean?" asks Khrushchev. "It means to open all doors, to let foreign inspectors and controllers into such places that are regarded as holy by the people of the country in question." Now "in every church, in any case in every orthodox church, there is a certain space near the altar into which only a priest may enter. Other persons, even the faithful ones, may not go there. Similarly, every country has its altar, its holy places, where not even all friends are admitted, or only the closest ones who have merited such confidence." ("I deliberately adopt ecclesiastic terminology," Khrushchev explains, "because our western partners like to refer to the Bible and to use its language.")\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{116}K 60 II, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{118}K 58, p. 451.
But the enemy is even more interested in the profane than in the sacred. He wants to pry into the secret parts of the home "to which a housewife does not admit any... visitors."¹¹⁹ You wish to look into the bedroom when the neighbor draws the curtain," Khrushchev tells the West;¹²⁰ you desire to "crawl into a strange bedroom when the door is locked," indulging your "taste for looking through key-holes."¹²¹

The political equivalent of such intimate apprehensions is expressed by Khrushchev when, on American television, David Susskind advances what to Khrushchev seems the western proposal of "control" without "disarmament." "We are," Khrushchev assures him, "for control and for inspection." But, in the case of the western proposal, "what is to be controlled? If there is no disarmament, there is nothing to control. Do you by any chance want to control the work of our government?"¹²²

Unlike the enemy's, the Bolshevik's impulse to pry is under the reliable control of the Party, which holds up a model to its opponent. "With this key," Khrushchev promises, having been given that of the city of Pittsburgh, "I shall open only those doors which you will allow me to open; I shall not take a single step without permission."¹²³ "I said," Khrushchev recalls upon his return to the

¹²⁰ K 57, p. 65.
¹²¹ K 59 II, p. 113.
¹²² K 60 II, p. 462.
¹²³ K 59 II, p. 245.
Soviet Union, "I accept this key as a symbol of trust. But you do not need to worry. I promise you that this key shall never be used without the permission of the host." 124 While "Soviet scientists have made it possible for the whole world to become acquainted with the concealed secrets of that celestial beauty," the moon, "they will of course be looked at only with the permission of the moon." For "we are not in the habit of looking where we are not allowed to." 125

* * *

There is some reason to expect that the same factors that reduce Bolshevik attachment to rudeness should weaken the fear of being penetrated; and, of course, the actual barriers erected against foreigners have been somewhat lowered. However, as the preceding pages imply, this has not caused much of a change in publicly expressed beliefs.

Still, in 1959 Khrushchev expresses some novel views. Advocating a development project in Albania near the Greek border, he mentions his hosts' objection: "Some told me that this spot is really very near the border, that the Greeks will see everything that is done on that lake." He refutes the objection: "Well all right, let them look..." 126

Hinting that he has penetrated the enemy's secret -- the dealings between Teheran and Washington -- Khrushchev

124 Ibid., p. 301.
125 Ibid., p. 378.
126 K 59 I, p. 366.
also intimates that one can't really prevent himself from being penetrated, given ordinary human nature (which, by implication, is impervious to Bolshevik requirements). "You know," he explains, "how secrets are kept.... Some secrets are kept at the most a week or two, but afterwards almost everyone comes to know about them. Everybody who is in possession of a secret has close friends to whom he can confide even his most intimate secrets. But every such confidant has his own close friends. He, too, wants to communicate to those close to him matters which are told 'confidentially,' 'only to you personally and nobody else.' The person who receives such a confidence gives it in turn to his friend, and in this fashion the whole world comes to know about the secret in question. There is nothing unusual in this; it was always that way and will always be that way. Somebody believes he is speaking secretly, and in fact others know literally everything about it."¹²⁷ Thus, as to "the third parties who have desired to bring about a deterioration in the relations between the USSR and the UAR," "we know something about these efforts." In fact, "when we and President Nasser meet, I shall be able to tell him...what advice he has received from whom, and what precisely he has been advised to do." For "secrets of this kind come to the knowledge of those from whom they are supposed to be withheld as I have already described." Indeed, "I believe that some of secrets are spread abroad, to be sure, just like these

¹²⁷Ibid., pp. 128-129.
Khrushchev seems to be content with a favorable balance of mutual penetration.

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Three years later, however; he has returned to the traditional view that preventing all and any penetration is both feasible and imperative. "We have ten million Party members," Khrushchev recalls when discussing how illegal conduct on the part of officials could be prevented altogether, "twenty million members of the Komsomol, sixty-six million members of trade unions. If we brought all these forces into motion, if we utilized them for purposes of control, then even a mosquito could not fly without being noticed." Earlier in the year Khrushchev had alleged that the Soviets' anti-missile weapon could "hit a fly in space." It can be done, and must be: let us "hermetically (naglukho) close all entrances (khod) and chinks to...""

THE EASE OF CONTACT

To keep from being penetrated by the enemy, the Party must avoid becoming "isolated" from the rest of the world, just as it must eschew "breaking with reality." "Locking oneself up in a narrow circle (zamknut'sia v

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128 Ibid., pp. 130-131.
132 See above, pp. 260ff.
uskom kryugu" produces a "separation (otryv) from life," a "break (razryv)" with it which entails grave dangers.

It is the enemy who attempts to "sever the Party's ties (rvat'sviaz)" with many sectors of the world outside its domain, while the Party's motto is, on numerous occasions, to work "not in separation from..., but in close connection with...(ne v otryve, a v tesnoi sviazi)," "reinforcing (ukrepliat') one's ties with...."

Fearing an obscure disposition towards breaking precious ties, one assures oneself that they are "unbreakable (nerazryvnyi)." Of all kinds of phenomena it may be said that "they are all links in one chain,"\textsuperscript{133} that "they are all closely connected among themselves," in fact "inseparable (neotdelimy, bezrazdel'nyi)." "The Program" of the Party adopted in 1961, Kosygin recalls, "discloses three basic aspects of the building of communism which are indissolubly connected with each other."

* * *

In earlier Bolshevism the prohibition against isolation was mainly expressed with regard to such worthy objects as the "masses." "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin," recalls Khrushchev in late 1962, "went into the villages.... He went to see people, he went to the peasants, wanted to see them, to hear them rather than to judge their moods from reports. He spoke at meetings. Lenin wanted not simply to talk in factories, but to see how people lived; he

\textsuperscript{133} K 58, p. 510.

wanted to know and to feel the mood of the workers."
But "where did Stalin go? Once he went to the factory
called 'Dynamo,' and this only because the struggle with
the Trotskyites and with the Zinovievites was going on.
After this he did not visit factories. All his travels
were to his country place and to the Kremlin. The Kremlin
was barred to visitors. Stalin was afraid of going around
the city; he was afraid of people. This man shut himself
up in an armored case. Why did Stalin act in this way?
He did not experience the need to communicate with the
masses; he isolated himself from the peasants and from
the workers."\textsuperscript{135}

Now Khrushchev extends the requirement of personal
contact to the main enemy -- another regard in which
Stalin was deficient. "He contests," says Mikoyan at the
XXIInd Congress about Molotov, "the usefulness of the
personal encounters of the leaders of the Party and govern-
ment with the leaders of capitalist countries, regarding
this as sheer infatuation (uvlechenie), to be explained
by excessive faith in personal contacts and conversations."\textsuperscript{136}
To be sure, notes Adzhubei at the XXIInd Congress, "enter-
taining contacts with leaders of the capitalist world is
work which is...often disagreeable and sometimes simply
repulsive." "It is considerably easier to put oneself
into a position of isolation (\textit{samoizolatsia})," but "if
you fear to stick out (\textit{vytunit}) your nose...then what
kind of a fighter for the interests...of the Party are

\textsuperscript{135}\textit{Speech of November 19, 1962. Pravda}, November 20,
1962.

\textsuperscript{136}Vol. 1, p. 448.
"Isolation is easy, and contacts are more difficult, but it is precisely contacts which are needed." That is, while the Bolshevik's dread of the enemy's nose being stuck into him remains high, his eagerness to stick his own into the enemy has increased.

Once sure of their willingness to contact the other side, Bolshevik leaders give no sign of believing that it is difficult to do so.

ARE THEY OPENING?

Just as they are mellowing: slightly -- perhaps even less (if such an undefined expression of quantity may be used to convey the writer's feeling) -- and in ways by which the West is likely to be reassured without always good cause. As has often been pointed out, we should be even more alarmed.

Bolshevik leaders are more eager for contacts with the West, but largely for purposes of better reconnaissance -- and, of course, propaganda. The advantages thus accruing to them are probably not offset by a possible slight increase in their receptivity to Western positions. All in all, they seem to retain much of their traditional dread of being penetrated.

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138 See above, pp. 292ff.