FRANCO-SOVIEET RELATIONS TODAY

Alfred Grosser

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PREFACE

This Memorandum was written (originally in French) by Professor Alfred Grosser of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques of the University of Paris, who is a consultant to The RAND Corporation. Professor Grosser is an outstanding academic specialist on French foreign policy and international politics and a frequent contributor to Le Monde. His political views place him to the "left" of De Gaulle, and his approach to the General's management of foreign affairs, not an uncommon one with the French moderate Left, is both critical and appreciative.

In this essay, Grosser reviews the constant elements as well as the variable tactics of French policy toward the Soviet Union and its associated states since World War II. He offers a rationale for French maneuvers in Europe during the nineteen-sixties. His focus is on Franco-Soviet relations against the background of Franco-American relations, of Franco-German relations, and of French domestic affairs. The French text was completed on March 15, 1967.

An earlier study by the same author was issued by RAND under the title, "European Perceptions of American Foreign and Defense Policies," December 1965.

This Memorandum is a contribution to RAND's continuing program of research on international political and military problems, particularly as they affect the future of NATO. The author's conclusions should not be taken as the expression of a RAND consensus on the matters discussed. The French text was translated in part by Jack Gollob of Translalic Associates, in part by Elfriede Mendershausen.
The synopsis that begins on the next page was written by the project monitor, Horst Mendershausen, of RAND's Social Science Department. It puts in perspective the main argument of the study.
SYNOPSIS

Since Russia became the USSR, it has appeared to French foreign policymakers in a variety of roles: deserter of the alliance against Imperial Germany, conspirator with the Weimar Republic against the Versailles peace, ally of Hitler Germany, ally against Hitler Germany, cold war opponent, and collaborator in the reduction of American influence and in the containment of German influence in Europe. The Soviet Union has also appeared in various guises to French domestic policymakers: spiritual heir of the French revolution, inspirer of French Communism, and threat to the French middle class. The following essay by Alfred Grosser sketches some historical transitions from one role to the other and some combinations of the international and domestic aspects of Franco-Soviet relations before it turns to describing the present relationship of Gaullist France and the Soviet Union.

The return of General de Gaulle to power in the midst of the Algerian War and the construction of the Fifth Republic around him mark an important divide in French politics. But in Grosser's view, the basic development was not so much a change in French views on domestic and international affairs, as a new concentration of French policy on the enhancement of France's rank among the states of Europe, and indeed of the world.

France's postwar relations with the Soviet Union were greatly influenced by her dependence on American power and her desire to forestall any development that would permit Germany to exert pressure on France with either American or Soviet backing. As long as the forces of the
"free world" and of "world Communism" stood in unqualified opposition to one another, and as long as Soviet power threatened a weakened Western Europe, the problem of France's rank among nations was confined to the raising of her position within the Western Alliance. In the developing circumstances, the French could and did use several tactics in order to make France the pivot of East-West relations and of strengthening Western Europe, even while her policies were still predominantly aligned with those of the United States.

As the external threat of Soviet power, particularly in the Cuba and Berlin crises, came to be seen as safely checked by the United States, and as Western Europe not only regained its economic weight but also came to absorb German energies, French policy could safely turn to independence from the United States and to the pursuit of a "new cordiality" with the Soviet Union. This led to the appearance of new accents in De Gaulle's continuing effort to obtain for France a "higher rank" among the great powers and a pre-eminent position vis-à-vis her constrained German neighbor. With a power base greatly inferior to that of the two super-powers, and with an economic base inferior to West Germany's, France skillfully used American power as a lever on the Soviet Union, Soviet power to bring pressure on the United States, and both to constrain Germany. With luck she could thus make all three consent to a privileged position for France in world affairs -- a position out of proportion to France's own economic and military means.

Grosser's essay describes, in the Franco-Soviet context, some of the successes and setbacks of De Gaulle's
diplomacy along this path. In the years from 1958 to 1966, Franco-Soviet relations moved from hesitancy to an attempt at "summitry"; France then backed away from the Soviet Union, at the height of Khrushchev's truculence; finally she withdrew from the all-too-powerful American protector and moved toward a now inoffensive Soviet Union. As Grosser says: "In the eyes of General de Gaulle, ... the Soviet Union had acknowledged the superiority of the United States, and therefore there was no longer any military danger in Europe. Consequently one could loosen the Atlantic ties and approach the USSR." Difficulties of the United States and the Soviet Union in various areas and their inability to cooperate diplomatically favored the French maneuver.

In 1966, what Grosser calls "the reversal of the basis of support" took place. France left NATO and articulated a community of interests with the Soviet Union, which De Gaulle publicized during his trip through the latter country, and again on the occasion of Kosygin's visit to France. In Moscow, De Gaulle could speak up for German desires without arousing Soviet fears, since he was weakening American influence in Europe at the same time. He could leave the satisfaction of the German desire for unification to the distant future, while insisting that in the meantime West Germany accept a framework of French predominance in the West and accommodate herself to Soviet positions in the East. He managed to follow this course, moreover, without seeming to sacrifice the German partner's reasonable demands. The change of government in Bonn came to his aid. For the time being Soviet-German tension was diffused, U.S.-German links were loosened, and France's
pivotal role was enhanced. Without ceasing to be a "Western nation," France could adapt the practical meaning of "the West" in European politics to her desire for great-power rank and gain the acclaim of the Soviet leadership.

In domestic politics, however, the question continues to be: How long can the government of France concentrate the energies of Frenchmen on the problem of rank? The parliamentary elections of 1967 showed that widespread French satisfaction with the improvement of Franco-Soviet relations was not accompanied by approval of the great-power ambition that underlay De Gaulle's approach to the USSR. While quite unable to agree on substantive policies, the opposition parties came close to breaking his majority in the National Assembly. In celebrating his narrow victory, the General alluded not only to the avoidance of "chaos," but also to the forestalling of an ultimate "dictatorship to the benefit of the Soviets" (press conference of May 16, 1967). The relative success of the French Left in the elections and the significant part of the Communists in it brought home the fact that, even at a time when other powers admitted the increasing stature of France, the French public did not throw its overwhelming support behind the foreign policies and the military means that De Gaulle had chosen. Having had the satisfaction of official cordiality with the Soviet Union in a seemingly secure external environment, Frenchmen may reopen the problem of Soviet influence in France once the charismatic leader is gone.

For the time being, however, as Grosser points out, De Gaulle finds no compelling reasons, international or domestic, to change his approach to foreign policy.
During the Middle East crisis of the summer of 1967, which occurred after the manuscript had been completed, De Gaulle persisted in his policies of alignment with the Soviet Union and opposition to the United States, as well as his quest for a French-led group of Western European states, including notably a patient Federal Republic of Germany. During his visit to French-speaking parts of Canada, he even projected his leadership ambition to the Western hemisphere. The principal French party that sided with his call for a "free Quebec" were the Communists. One wonders how long the costs of these policies to French interests will be considered as justified by the benefits.
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I. THE BACKGROUND

FROM THE THIRD TO THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

We are not going to retrace the history of French politics and attitudes toward the Soviet Union since 1917 and toward the other Communist countries since 1945, although a French observer, more than any other, is inclined to emphasize the continuity in the train of events of the last half century.\(^1\) The object of this introduction is to bring out whatever in the events prior to 1958 has contributed to form the psychology and basis of action of today's leaders.

The 1917 revolution took place in an allied nation. It was followed by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. These two simple observations make it possible to define two lasting influences on French-Soviet relations: The USSR has become the political heir of Czarist Russia, whose alliances forced Germany to fight on two fronts;\(^2\) at the same time, it is capable

\(^1\) It is characteristic that André Fontaine's *L'Histoire de la guerre froide* (History of the Cold War) devotes the first volume to the period extending "From the October Revolution to the Korean War." (Fayard, Paris, 1966, 503 pp.) In September 1966, the film by A. Grosser and P. Merseburger, "Lothringer Kreuz und Roter Stern," (Cross of Lorraine and Red Star), was shown by a German television station (Third Program, North German Radio). Its theme was the history of Franco-Soviet relations and their influence on French politics since 1917. A discussion, "Chancen und Gefahren der Französischen Ostpolitik" (Chances and Dangers of French Foreign Policy in the East), with K. T. von und zu Guttenberg and Helmut Schmidt, followed. Both the German script and the following discussion may be obtained from Norddeutscher Rundfunk, Gazellenkamp, Hamburg-Lokstedt.

of reversing its own alliances or at least of abandoning its allies. Many aspects of Communist behavior did not startle Frenchmen inasmuch as the history textbooks describe similar behavior at the time of the Convention and of the Comité de Salut Public. ³ Lenin's victory had an immediate effect upon French domestic politics. The Soviet triumph enabled the revolutionary nostalgia of the French socialist movement to find a solid basis of support. On December 29, 1920, the Socialist Party decided to join the Third International to become the French Communist Party. The minority who re-established the SFIO (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière) around Leon Blum soon became more important than the French Communist Party itself in terms of electoral strength and parliamentary representation. Communist aims and practices, however, continued to divide the French socialist and labor movement. The existence of a Communist Party in France that was loyal to Moscow rather than to Paris meant that, from the Tours Convention to the present, the relations between France and the USSR have not been simple nation-to-nation relations, for they have had immediate repercussions upon the political situation in France. ⁴

To the majority of the French people and their government, Bolshevism had appeared as a threat and, since an old affective tie existed with Poland, that nation's struggle to extend eastward the border fixed by the Allies at the Curzon Line met with much sympathy and received effective French support. In May of 1919, Captain Charles de Gaulle had been detailed to the Fourth Division of the Polish Infantry, organized in France by General Joseph Hallet. Appointed as a Polish commandant, De Gaulle first became a professor of infantry tactics at the officers' school in Rembertow. When the Soviets launched an offensive toward Warsaw in June 1920, the French officers of Rembertow were attached to the fighting Polish units. Captain de Gaulle distinguished himself in the fighting above the Zbrucz River and was awarded the highest Polish military decoration, "Virtuti Militari." In January 1921, he was to receive his fourth citation in the French army, conferred upon him for his action on the Polish front. The award stated in particular: "He has been, for his Polish comrades, the model of an accomplished war officer."\(^5\)

Fighting on the Russian side was a young general who, in 1917, had been a companion of Captain de Gaulle during internment in the retaliation camp of Ingolstadt. An officer in the Czarist Army, Tukhachevskii, a future victim of the 1937 purges, "considered that his country, which

had become the home of the revolution, nevertheless remained the country he had pledged to serve during the old regime. De Gaulle, impressed by the strong personality of the future Soviet marshal, retained a vivid memory of him. For this Russian, Bolshevik Russia was still Russia. He believed the revolution would give not only a new visage to his country, possibly some new obligations, but also a vitality and a greatness it had lost. At that time De Gaulle already possessed the conviction that history, in the final analysis, was nothing but the history of nations. Was not the Polish example evidence? Although Tukhachevskii was in the Red Army, the Polish farm workers -- whose poverty De Gaulle had been able to see for himself -- had not responded to the revolutionary call of the Communists; almost all of them had acted instead like Polish patriots threatened by a foreign invasion.\(^6\)

As the fighting between Russia and Poland developed, France abandoned the idea of armed action against the Communist Revolution. This idea could in no way have been popular; the alliance of the "bourgeois" nations would have resembled the alliance of kings against the French Revolution. The USSR rapidly became a "normalized" nation, first for Germany, when the Rapallo Treaty was signed, then for the other large European nations. The Soviet government was officially recognized in January 1924, by

Great Britain, in February by Italy, and in October by France. But, it will be recalled, the United States recognized the USSR only in 1933.

The man who was to flatter himself that he had obtained and established normal relations with the USSR was Edouard Herriot, the same Edouard Herriot who was overthrown the following year (1925) because he had wanted to remain faithful to the commitments contracted with the United States for the repayment of war debts. During the following quarter of a century he was to rely sometimes on Moscow, sometimes on Washington, and sometimes on both, according to the prevailing political situation. From 1935 until his death in 1957, Herriot -- often in the mainstream of French political life, and at the forefront of Franco-Soviet relations -- was thought to epitomize the hesitations and vacillations of his party. These hesitations and vacillations, however, tended to fade whenever circumstances made it possible for him simultaneously to claim both Franco-American friendship and alliance with the USSR.

The Franco-Soviet alliance took formal shape with the Pact of Assistance signed by Pierre Laval on May 2, 1935; the result of this pact was that the French Communist Party began to recognize that rearmament for the common defense against National Socialist Germany was necessary. It was a spectacular turnaround, to which Maurice Thorez would still refer in November 1959, when he justified another reversal of policy about Algeria: "You recall how the Laval-Stalin declaration really presented a new problem for the Party; well, within forty-eight hours we reacted; the leadership adopted a position, the bills were posted
on the walls of Paris, the information meeting was held. The Party said -- you remember the poster -- 'Stalin is right.' The Communist Party's acceptance of the idea of national defense removed the last obstacle on the road to the Popular Front. While the unions reunited, Communists, Socialists, and Radicals formed an alliance. The 1936 electoral victory and the formation of the Communist-supported Blum government marked the beginning of a period of a few weeks which are among the most important in the history of twentieth-century France, both because of the events themselves and because of their significance in the political psychology of the French people. The integration of the Communist Party into "normal" political life, in conjunction with good Franco-Soviet relations, permitted social reforms of an unprecedented scale. Anti-fascism had brought about the unity of the Left, absent since 1920.

The unity did not last long. The Communists could accuse their partners, the Radicals and Socialists, of unfaithfulness, first on the matter of the nonintervention policy in Spain, and second at the time of the Munich

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Agreement. The importance of this agreement for an understanding of the political reactions after 1945 cannot be overestimated.\footnote{See also A. Grosser, La Quatrième République et sa politique extérieure, A. Colin, Paris, 1961, p. 14; hereinafter referred to as La Quatrième République.} One particular aspect must be pointed out here: The treacherous nature of the Munich Agreement soon became apparent to the majority of the French people who had approved it with enthusiasm or, at least, with the "cowardly relief" mentioned by Leon Blum.

Hubert Beuve-Méry, chief editor of the newspaper Le Monde since its inception in 1944, was at that time a professor of the French Institute in Prague and a correspondent of the daily newspaper Le Temps. He resigned from Le Temps in protest against the paper's support of the Daladier policy. Even today, Czechoslovakia still evokes for him the memory of a major political crime that gives special rights to its victim. When the German politician Seebohm, Federal Minister of Transportation from 1949 to 1966, declared time and again that the Munich Agreement -- destroyed by Hitler himself during the occupation of Prague in 1939 -- remained in force, he was not only stating an absurdity, but also reviving the remorse many French leaders of all parties felt about Czechoslovakia.

After the abandonment of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, the German-Soviet Pact was an even more serious infidelity. The Communist Party found itself isolated for almost two years. Strong as was the indignation of the French non-Communists against the USSR over the German-Soviet Pact and the Soviet invasion of Poland, their anger was even more
evident at the time of the Soviet attack against Finland. This was due to French consciousness of guilt for having allowed the Polish ally to die without assistance, although France had entered the war to meet its treaty obligations to Poland. Perhaps this guilty conscience explains why the German-Soviet Pact and the partition of Poland were so quickly forgotten after 1941, so much so that today, when the problem of the Polish frontier is being discussed, almost no one in France cares to raise the subject of the Soviet annexation of 1939. The relative silence about the period from August 1939 to June 1941 can be best explained by a simple fact: the role of the USSR in the struggle against Hitler Germany. This fact retains its meaning in full today. To simplify, one can say that De Gaulle's phrase "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" is all the more significant since Stalingrad is thus included in Europe. One recalls the French who, in 1942, pinned small flags on maps while their future American liberators were fighting primarily against Japan and had only just established themselves in North Africa. In June of 1966 General de Gaulle wished to visit Stalingrad, which had recently become Volgograd; in the eyes of most of the French, this wish was both legitimate and significant.  

Three policy declarations by De Gaulle shed light on the negotiations that resulted in the Franco-Soviet Treaty

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9 See below, pp. 41ff., for comment on De Gaulle's 1966 trip.
of December 10, 1944. First, there was the historic vision of General de Gaulle, as he presented it on December 21, 1944, to the Consultative Assembly when asking for the ratification of the treaty:

It is a fact that within an interval of eighty years, the German will to dominate -- first cleverly contained in the formula for the unity of the Reich, as proclaimed by Bismarck, then enlarged into Pan-Germanism in the manner of William the Second, and finally expanded into Hitler's frenzied demands -- was the cause of these large scale wars, each of them, by a kind of fatal escalation, exceeding the previous one in duration and scale.

In this perpetual danger, terrible lessons have shown to Russia and to France all they gained by uniting and all they lost by dividing....

It has just now been perfectly well demonstrated how the policy of equivocations and of mistrust between Paris and Moscow in the period between the two wars and their disunity at the critical moment laid the ground for the return of the Wehrmacht to the Rhine, for the Anschluss, for the enslavement of Czechoslovakia, and for the crushing of Poland -- all enterprises which were Hitler's prelude to the invasion of France, followed a year later by the invasion of Russia.

It has also been very properly shown how the Russian effort, by inflicting irreparable damage on the German military apparatus, was the essential condition for the liberation of our national territory.

For France and for Russia, to be united is to be strong; to be divided is to be in danger.  

Second, the following statement by De Gaulle to Stalin indicates the territorial implications of the General's views about Poland's place in a postwar security system:

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After the last war [1914-1918], France had wanted a Poland capable of opposing Germany. This was the intention of French policy when, after 1918, it contributed to the re-creation of an independent Polish state.

We know what the consequences of the policy followed by Poland between the two wars have been. The policy of Beck -- and of people like him -- have deeply displeased us and seriously endangered both you and us.

We are appraising the dangers to peace and especially to the Soviet Union which would arise from the resumption by Poland of a similar policy toward defeated Germany. We know that Germany has always wanted to use Poland for a similar policy.

It is to our interest, to us the French, that conditions be created such that Germany could not do it again....

Therefore we are not at all opposed to what you, Marshal Stalin, said the other day about the western frontiers of Poland. We believe that such a solution would rule out the agreement between Germany and Poland.\footnote{De Gaulle, Mémoires, p. 368.}

Third and last, De Gaulle made plain his unwillingness to recognize the Lublin government and his desire to preserve a free Poland: "You know better than anyone else," he said to Stalin, "the disadvantage of setting up in Poland a government that public opinion would not accept."\footnote{De Gaulle, Mémoires, p. 371.}

In those days, it must not be forgotten, for General de Gaulle as well as for the vast majority of the French, "the fate of Germany [was] the principal problem of the world."\footnote{From his speech to the Consultative Assembly, November 22, 1944.}
reasons of domestic policy as well as of national security. The Communists were in the government and happy to be there. Having accepted the most critical ministries, Labor and Industrial Production, they participated in national reconstruction work. To them, the advent of the cold war appeared as such a disaster that it took an actual indictment of their delegates at the constitutive meeting of the Cominform to make the French party enter the fight against the "American imperialists" and their French "valets" from the SFIO up to General de Gaulle. 14 For the French people, outbreak of the cold war, as represented by the autumn insurrectional strikes of 1947, meant a threat of civil war. 15

At the same time there arose the dual fear of a worldwide conflict and of an assumption of power by the Communists, who had again become the enemies of the rest of the electoral body. This dual fear was the cause, to a large extent, of the triumphal success of the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF -- Gathering of the French People) launched by General de Gaulle, who, having resigned from office on January 20, 1946, had returned to politics in the spring of 1947. On July 27 he declared in Rennes: "So there we are: On our own soil, among us, some men have pledged allegiance to a foreign enterprise of domination, controlled by the leaders of a great Slavic power. They aim to attain dictatorship in our country, as their like have

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14 See also A. Grosser, La Quatrième République, pp. 103-109.

15 This atmosphere was very well described by Georgette Elgey, La République des Illusions, Fayard, Paris, 1965, pp. 323-378.
achieved elsewhere, with the support of this power." And in Algiers, on October 12: "No sooner (and at what cost!) has Hitler's attempted domination been repelled than another ambition, using the somber appeal and the convenience of action of the totalitarian system, appears to want, in turn, to spread [its power] over the world." Only two-and-a-half years separated those speeches from the Franco-Soviet Treaty. Under the Fifth Republic, fluctuations in Franco-Soviet relations were to be even more sudden.

It should be understood that such fluctuations are not necessarily felt to be shocking in France, because the majority of the French lean in the same direction at any given moment and, more important, because the two currents of opinion -- hostility toward Communism and the wish for good relations with the USSR -- remain simultaneously present even when one almost completely obliterates the other.

Until the East-West break, French interest in the nations of Eastern Europe and the Danube basin was rather limited. Bulgaria and Hungary and even Romania were simply viewed as defeated nations. However, Czechoslovakia was considered as a bridge between the East and the West, from an ideological as well as geographical point of view. In 1946, its role was thought to be rather similar to that of France. We will see later what the French government's policy toward Poland was. Especially in the view of the press, no particular policy toward these countries was

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required, except in the economic area where industrial
Western Europe and agricultural Eastern Europe were believed
to be complementary. As early as 1946, the French had no
further illusions concerning the political regimes of the
countries "liberated" or occupied by the Soviet Army. On
the one hand, they considered that except for Czechoslovakia
the states of Eastern Europe were now better off than be-
fore: "If this is liberation by the Red Army, let us rec-
ognize that it constitutes progress, but only as compared
to the past," wrote the *Pensée Socialiste* in November of
1947, whose Board of Directors included in particular Guy
Mollet. On the other hand, people were primarily sensitive
to rightist authoritarianism from which they had been
suffering and had just freed themselves. This explains
the result of a poll taken during the winter of 1946-47:
Of the people questioned, 57 percent included the USSR,
40 percent Poland, 39 percent Yugoslavia, and 86 percent
Spain among the nondemocratic regimes. 17

The decisive fact which struck French public opinion
was the "Prague coup." In a speech to the National Assembly
on March 27, 1948, Georges Bidault, Foreign Secretary and
formerly a far-sighted foe of the Munich Agreement, ex-
plained why: "This event fits in a series whose frightful
features grow worse as it gets longer and is applied more
closely to us. Its development today reaches a particularly
sensitive spot with respect to geography, politics, ethics,
and memories.... This is not the first time -- and the
previous one was not so long ago -- that a Czechoslovakian

17 *Sondages*, Vol. IX, No. 7, p. 84.
catastrophe resounded in Europe and in the world as a poignant alarm signal." Jan Masaryk's suicide and the trials and executions that multiplied in the popular democracies after 1949 gave substance to the phrase "iron curtain." To all but the Communists and a very small minority of "leftists," there were no longer any nations behind the curtain with which significant bilateral relations could be maintained -- only totalitarian regimes subject to Moscow.

The one exception was Yugoslavia. Tito's split was considered especially important by two sectors of French opinion: the Communists, for whom yesterday's superman became the incarnation of treason and the "anti-Stalin" portion of the left wing. The title of an article gives an idea of the Communists' tone: "Two Lackeys of the Imperialist Aggressors: Tito and Franco." Revenge was to be sought against the accusers of 1947 at the constitutive meeting of the Cominform and against a man who had been a hero of the internal resistance while Maurice Thorez was in Moscow. For the "anti-Stalin" portion of the French left wing, on the other hand, Tito became living proof that Marxist socialism was not necessarily linked with Soviet domination, that the revolution conducted by national forces could be successful. The revolutionary dream --

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impossible of realization in France -- was therefore incarnated in Tito as it was to be later in Fidel Castro.

It is not necessary to present here the evolution of French policy toward the USSR between the two treaties that marked the beginning and the outcome of the will for a common defense, the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the Paris Agreements of 1954. We must merely emphasize the fact that during this entire period, the French leaders, confronted with public opinion, insisted upon their will for a détente and their wish to attain Four-Power conferences. At the time of the debate over the ratification of the Paris Agreements in the Senate, in March of 1955, the decisive argument of Edgar Faure, the prime minister, was substantially that it was not by quarreling with the Germans or by breaking with the Allies that France could make itself a qualified negotiator with the eastern powers. The rejection of the agreements was bound to prevent the Anglo-Americans from negotiating with the USSR; their ratification, perhaps, would not divert the Russians from negotiation. This reasoning was all the more convincing inasmuch as Soviet policy was appreciably evolving. On March 12, Pravda asked Tito to "forget the past." On the 24th, Mr. Molotov delivered to the Austrian ambassador a note hinting at the forthcoming solution to the Austrian issue, over which the Four Powers had vainly negotiated for ten years. On the 26th, on the eve of the final vote of the French Senate, Marshal Bulganin accepted the idea of a conference of the Four Powers devoted in particular to Austria. He did not mention the Paris Agreements, which the USSR had nevertheless considered as an irremediable obstacle to a meeting of the great powers. On
May 5, 1955, the October 1954 agreements, duly ratified by the signatory nations, became effective. On the 7th, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet stated that "France [had] contracted engagements radically contradicting the basic goals of the 1944 Franco-Soviet Treaty." As a consequence, "the December 10, 1944, Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance [was] voided, having lost all reason for existence." But on May 15, the foreign ministers signed the Austrian State Treaty. And on the 26th, as an answer to a French note of the 12th, "the Soviet government [accepted] the French government's proposal as well as that of the United States and Great Britain for the organization, in the very near future, of a meeting between the heads of government of the Four Powers."

This was proof that Western unity, although an obstacle to a Franco-Soviet alliance, was not an obstacle to détente. At least, that was the French interpretation at the time. And when in May of 1956, Guy Mollet, then prime minister, and Christian Pineau, his foreign secretary, made the trip to Moscow, the communiqué spoke of an "atmosphere of friendship and warm sincerity," even if "the two governments [had] not reached an agreement on the means of settling the European issues." The "Polish Spring" was widely discussed in France as proof of a long-desired evolution.

Then came the Budapest revolt. The bloody failure of that revolt put an end to a debate in France which had lasted since 1948. While isolating the French Communist Party again, the terrible Budapest repression showed the most violent anti-Communists how utopian was the policy
of the "roll-back," or of the liberation of the popular democracies. The disillusionment was the same for the fragment of the non-Communist left wing who had believed in the possibility of a "de-Sovietization" of Central Europe as a counterpart for renunciation of the rearming of Germany. In a rare show of unanimity, everyone found himself "Gomulkist." Had not Imre Nagy brought about the Russian intervention by declaring that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact? Had not Gomulka finally won a moral victory, in spite of the terrible October crisis, simply because he agreed not to confuse de-Stalinization with de-Sovietization, and because he continued to align Polish foreign policy with that of the USSR?

At the time when the Fourth Republic was on the verge of collapse, however, French attitudes toward the USSR and Communism were formed much less by events in Central and Eastern Europe than by the Algerian issue and its repercussions. The Khrushchev-Mollet communiqué had already specified that "French officials have conferred with their Soviet colleagues about the issues arising in Algeria and about the policy practiced there by the French government. The Soviet ministers expressed the hope that the French government, struggling in the liberal spirit that animates it, would know how to give such an important issue the appropriate solution in the spirit of our era and the interest of the people." (The Soviet version substituted the words, "in a liberal spirit," more ambiguous than the version quoted above. It was later accepted that this was an error in translation.) At any rate the paragraph on Algeria revealed the actual purpose of Premier Mollet's
trip: to obtain the benevolent neutrality of the USSR in the purely internal affair that the Algerian drama was supposed to be. Marshal Bulganin's ultimatum at the time of the Suez expedition was considered, a few months later, to have been proof that the USSR supported Algerian nationalism, since the actual purpose of the French intervention was to overthrow those who supplied the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). For many French generals and politicians, the lesson to be drawn from the war in Indochina was simple: since Ho Chi Minh had been both a Communist and a nationalist, nationalism was everywhere an instrument of Communism. The USSR's extreme caution in the Algerian affair did not help to change this feeling; the difference in French attitudes toward the cautious USSR and toward the actual arms supplier, Czechoslovakia, was long preserved by the Algerian experience.

FRANCO-SOVIEET RELATIONS

The Concepts of General de Gaulle

France's foreign policy since 1958 cannot be explained in terms of General de Gaulle's will alone. There is a marked continuity in attitudes through the Fourth and Fifth Republics. Further, the stresses arising from the situation are often stronger than the possibilities for initiative. Finally, the attitudes of the President of the Republic himself have been changing. Nevertheless it is true

that one runs the risk of misinterpreting his action if one is not aware of his view of the world.

If a man for whom the nation represents the supreme political value can be called a nationalist, then General de Gaulle is a nationalist. This is not to imply any violent aggressiveness. It merely explains the priority he gives to foreign over domestic policy. His foreign policy centers upon the search for unity and national power. According to his firm conception of international life, the permanent and viable institution is the nation-state, not the regime and the ideology of the day. According to De Gaulle, the term "nation-state" properly belongs to a limited group of countries that excludes many of those defined as such by international law. It is obvious that the African countries do not yet qualify as nation-states. Historical antiquity is required. Countries such as China, "older than history," are especially deserving of the name. In the press conference of January 31, 1964, General de Gaulle spoke of "the regime which dominates China at the present time." That which is transitory is the regime. Nation-states, properly so called, have a position that enables them to deal with other nation-states bilaterally. In De Gaulle's view bilateral dealings are the only kind befitting nation-states, as they are also the most effective in reconciling differences of national interest. In December of 1944, when General de Gaulle was in Moscow negotiating the Franco-Soviet treaty with Stalin, Churchill telegraphed to ask, "May I be the third party?" This would have made it a triangular pact. General de Gaulle became indignant and told Stalin: "Between France and the Soviet
Union there are no matters of directly conflicting interest. With Great Britain we have always had such matters, and we always will."\textsuperscript{20}

Twenty years later, more or less, Edgar Faure stated in an interview for \textit{Le Figaro} of January 9, 1964, which appears to have been reviewed by General de Gaulle: "The fact [is] that the tensions which could exist between France and China exist no more today...." This was the very basis of De Gaulle's approach to Stalin in 1944. One must not simplify too much, however. The ideologies exist and the regimes exist. During the war, General de Gaulle often mentioned not only Germany but Hitlerian Germany. Since 1947 he has often recalled the totalitarian character of the Eastern regimes. But if those regimes must be opposed, it is as transitory entities which must be helped to evolve towards the norm, and to become once more nation-states that play their roles in international life according to their interests and their power, rather than according to an ideology. During the "ideology" period, therefore, nothing must be done to prevent a return to the free play of sovereignties after their emergence from that period.

From 1944 to 1967, this fundamental attitude has never varied. This attitude alone permits a real comprehension of the changes in attitude towards the USSR and of the rejections of Western integration. In 1947, Georges Bidault, in acknowledging the schism in the world, said that "the Europe of liberty" was replacing the "Europe of geography"

\textsuperscript{20}De Gaulle, \textit{Mémoires}, p. 378.
as the goal of French policy. General de Gaulle's position in 1947, when the RPF was formed, must be understood in this sense, although the "Europe of geography" remained the objective to which he hoped to return some day.

While the liberty faction and the totalitarian faction oppose one another, or while Soviet power threatens a weakened Western Europe, the problem of France's "rank" in the world is necessarily reduced to the determination of her position within the Western Alliance. To improve this position, either in order to increase France's influence upon the policy of the allied nations or to allow France to play a particular role toward third parties, five kinds of tactics were used, each set implying a specific attitude toward the Soviet Union. It can be said that General de Gaulle has used them all in succession and sometimes simultaneously. Here is an outline of the five French positions and their consequences:

a) France makes herself spokesman of the Europe of the Six within the Alliance, thanks to German support. The consequence: intransigence towards the USSR in return for this support.

b) France, more understanding than the United States, serves as a mediator between the two factions during the "détente" period. The consequence: firmness about the Western Alliance combined with an overture to Moscow in order to obtain a negotiation where France would play an important role (as in the example of 1960).

c) France, fearing to lose her entire role at the international level because Washington and Moscow agree without her, must harden her attitude towards both. The consequence: (very simplified) an overture to the common enemy of both, i.e., Communist China.

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21 A. Fontaine, La guerre froide, p. 373.
d) France, unable to build the Europe that would strengthen her position versus the United States, attempts to limit the danger by preventing too much German submissiveness to Washington. The consequence: improvement of the relations with the USSR in order to pressure Bonn even more than Washington.

e) France takes advantage of the change in Bonn's political attitude toward the East by turning spokesman for German good will and uses this good will in order to expedite a European development aiming at a system of interrelations largely independent of the United States.

These five tactics call for two general remarks. First, French policies are not made in an invariable setting. It is always difficult to determine what is deliberate intention and what is inevitable adaptation to changes arising from various political shifts (in the United States, in the Soviet Union, in Sino-Soviet relations, etc.). Second, however, there is a permanent, fundamental line running through General de Gaulle's policies: the will to ensure French independence. As the general stated in his Kremlin speech of June 20, 1966, "France is a Western nation." Consequently, faced with a menace emanating from the Communist world, France feels drawn to the Western nations. But in the absence of an acute menace of this kind, French independence is threatened, not by the USSR, but by the United States, precisely because France is "Western," meaning that she is engaged in economic, technological, and cultural exchanges with the super-power on the other shore of the Atlantic and not with the Soviet Union, which although geographically close is economically, technologically, and culturally distant. Good relations with the Soviet Union therefore serve in the struggle for independence from the United States.
Eight Years of Changing Relations

Soviet Tentative Efforts. During the French government's crisis of May 1958, the USSR remained cautious. The United Press had broadcast a declaration by Marshal Voroshilov saying: "We know that De Gaulle has already been a prime minister and we have the greatest respect for the struggle he led during the war, but we also have good reason to believe that under present conditions his return to office could create new difficulties for France." On May 30, Radio Moscow read out the following communiqué:

The United Press Agency has broadcast information according to which a conversation has taken place between Marshal Voroshilov and the Moscow correspondent of this agency. The press service of the Foreign Office of the USSR has been authorized to state that the information in question is an invention. The policy of the USSR regarding France as well as other nations is well known. The USSR does not interfere and does not intend to interfere in the domestic affairs of France or of any nation whatsoever. The Soviet people respect the liberty-loving French people, and want but one thing: good relations between the two countries, which are responsive to the vital interests of France, the USSR, and the work of safeguarding the peace. [The false] attribution of certain remarks to Clement Voroshilov is very likely due to someone in the West who is interested in distorting the USSR's clear position towards France in order to harm Franco-Soviet relations.

These relations, however, deteriorated for two reasons: the Lebanon affair, and the good relationship between General de Gaulle and John Foster Dulles in early July. At the same time, the French position did not seem to be a simple one, since the new head of the French government appeared to be
as independent of France's American ally as he was firm and outspoken in his answer to the Soviet note of July 19. This note contained a passage both flattering and threatening: "You, who have the wisdom conferred by military experience, well know what war is, and particularly war under present conditions." General de Gaulle answered in these terms:

"Why, for example, compare the presence of American forces in Lebanon and British forces in Jordan, summoned by the governments of those countries, after the events in Iraq, with the aggression against Poland perpetrated by Hitler in the past? (Hitler, alas, was not the only one.) Indeed, does such a comparison correspond to reality? Why mention to me the effect of a French show of force off the coast of Lebanon, since France does not participate in the action taken by the United States and Great Britain, and since the assignment of the French forces merely consists in assisting, in case of need, the French nationals? Why pretend that "the painful and difficult experience acquired by France in Algeria and at the time of the unprovoked aggression against Egypt by the Anglo-Franco-Israeli forces has left a deep impression in the hearts of the French people"? Algeria concerns only France, and the action undertaken on the Suez Canal had obviously been provoked. I myself will abstain from reciprocally insisting upon the impressions left in the soul of the Russian people by certain enterprises.

Moscow's hesitation first gave way to anger when the meeting between Adenauer and De Gaulle in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, on September 14, turned out to be a considerable success. Khrushchev openly entered the battle around the constitutional referendum of September 28, by granting an interview to Pravda. Having stated that "the
events have brutally shattered the illusions of those who, a while ago, believed that General de Gaulle wanted to and could check the fascist insurgents, put an end to the unjust Algerian Colonial War, and preserve the Republic," the Soviet leader added:

The French events can be examined only in relation to the situation in Western Europe. Since the defeat of the Axis Powers, reaction in Western Europe has striven to restore fascism under new forms. In West Germany, particularly, reaction has succeeded in winning a momentary victory. French reaction is also eager to restore the reign of fascism and terror, based on Hitler's model. But the resort of French reaction to fascism shows its great weakness. By trying to use parliamentarianism and General de Gaulle's authority to establish fascism, it only duplicates the method of the Ruhr magnates who used the Reichstag and General Hindenburg, who also was popular in his country, in order to hand power over to fascism.... Twenty years after Munich, new attempts are being made to achieve a Franco-German rapprochement intended to lead a campaign against the Eastern European countries.

Nevertheless, the day after the overwhelming victory of General de Gaulle, the Soviet attitude went through another turnabout which was to prove a lasting one.

De Gaulle, Everyone's Friend: October 1958-April 1960. The reasons for the new Soviet attitude are difficult to elucidate. Was General de Gaulle's note to Washington and London on the "Atlantic Directorate" taken as a sign of a weakening of the alliance caused by France? Did Moscow accept the "fait accompli" of the Fifth Republic? Did it suppose that De Gaulle, by his friendship with Adenauer, was decreasing the domination of the United States over the
Federal Republic? Was Moscow convinced that the General would finally apply a liberal policy in Algeria?

Whatever the reason, Franco-Soviet relations appeared quite peaceful even the day after Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin. A few events will give an idea of the situation. On November 14, 1958, the commercial agreement signed in 1956 was renewed and an exchange program for the years 1959 to 1962 was established. On December 18, a delegation of the Paris Municipal Council was received by Khrushchev. On January 2, 1959, Voroshilov and Khrushchev congratulated General de Gaulle on his election to the Presidency of the Republic. On January 15, an agreement regarding cultural exchanges was signed in Moscow. On May 25, the "Caravelle" jet aircraft was shown at the Moscow Airport. On September 11, Khrushchev received Pierre Sudreau, Minister of Construction. On October 23, he informed General de Gaulle that he accepted his invitation to visit France.

The Soviets were treating France with extraordinary tact, the most remarkable aspect of which was the Soviet silence on all the topics that might have irritated De Gaulle, particularly Algeria and the atomic bomb. In September of 1958, even while Pravda was carrying on an anti-French campaign, the Soviet government did not dare to recognize the new provisional government of the Algerian Republic, as China did. A year later, Khrushchev appeared much relieved by the new Algerian policy proclaimed by De Gaulle on September 16, 1959. When Khrushchev, on October 31, declared to the Supreme Soviet: "General de Gaulle's declaration about 'self-determination' is the most reasonable that has been made in a long time," he was simply
announcing that he was not going to cause any more trouble
to France on the colonial issue, and he hastily compelled
the French Communist Party to reverse its initial attitude
and to approve General de Gaulle's Algerian policy.

The same astonishing moderation on the part of the
Soviets could be noted with respect to the French policy
of the atomic bomb. This tolerance was all the more
remarkable because the nuclear tests in the Sahara offered
the Soviet propagandists some opportunities for agitation
among the Africans. The Soviets maintained their tolerant
attitude in spite of the obvious fact that De Gaulle was
deliberately struggling against a Russian-American agree-
ment on nuclear disarmament during the long Geneva nego-
tiations of 1959.

Khrushchev's visit to France was preceded by that of
his son-in-law Adzhubei in late December of 1959 and the
visit to Moscow of a French parliamentary delegation led
by Jacques Chaban-Delmas, President of the National Assem-
bly. The delegation stayed in the USSR from February 18
through March 7. To a Soviet speech denouncing German
militarism, Chaban-Delmas replied that France had "always
distinguished German militarism from Adenauer's government."
This statement was perhaps more important than the com-
muniqué that followed the "extensive" and "friendly" con-
versation between Chaban-Delmas and Khrushchev on March 8.

General de Gaulle's concern to appear in Moscow as the
spokesman for the Federal Republic and, at the same time,
for France showed through the words of one of his faithful
lieutenants.

This attitude was maintained by General de Gaulle and
his ministers during Khrushchev's stay in France from
March 23 to April 3, 1960. In several speeches the head of the Soviet government tried to play on anti-Germanism. In Reims, particularly, in answering a toast of Louis Jacquinot, Minister of State, he said: "Your speech has been so diplomatic that I do not know if, according to you, the Germans came to your country as aggressors or as guests." And he added: "In Europe, no one will stand up in favor of war if a solid friendship exists between France and the Soviet Union...." But he did not obtain anything more than the following statement from General de Gaulle, which is remarkable both for its thesis of the unity of the whole of Europe and for its implied refusal to reconstitute the wartime alliance:

Russia and France, two very ancient and very young nations, daughters of the same mother, Europe, two peoples whose deep soul was molded in the same civilization and who at all times felt a particular inclination for one another, two states that have neither any disputed territory nor any offense to avenge between them, and which were allies when twice during this century this continent found itself threatened by an ambition beyond measure, an ambition that has since then disappeared.

The New York Times thus summed up the trip:  

What he came back with from Paris -- the agreements on cultural exchange and peaceful atomic cooperation and the vague talk about future expanded Franco-Soviet trade -- proved small indeed compared with the anticipations his domestic propaganda had aroused.... President de Gaulle's stature cannot help but be

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increased by the steadfast way in which he conducted himself in the face of Khrushchev's alternation of the carrot and the stick....

When he met De Gaulle, it now seems clear, Khrushchev met his match....

As soon as Khrushchev left, De Gaulle visited Great Britain and the United States. The statement in his Westminster speech of April 5 which received most notice dealt with Germany. He appeared to be pleading the cause of the German Federal Republic before Great Britain when he declared: "France wants peace, not to widen separations and not to aggravate wounds, including the ones suffered by the German people, who yesterday were our enemy, but who today are a necessary element to the West and our common ally." But far more important was the speech to the American Congress on April 25. This speech was the most complete statement that General de Gaulle had ever given of his vision of the most desirable evolution of worldwide politics. Not only did he refer in it to the "whole of Europe and America, her daughter" (which, if we put this together with the passage of the speech delivered to Khrushchev, makes the United States the sister of the USSR and of France), not only did he state that "France had chosen to be on the side of the free nations," he also made the following statements:

I declare that Federal Germany by incorporating herself as she does into Western Europe is performing the greatest possible service to coexistence. For it is due to the organization of a Western European ensemble, opposite the bloc built by the Soviets, that a balance between two zones that are comparable in population and in resources can be established from the Atlantic to the Urals.
Only such a balance can possibly enable the old continent some day to reconcile its two factions, to find peace within itself, to give a new start to its civilization, and finally—in conjunction with America—to help in all serenity with the development of the destitute masses, bringing the peoples of Africa to full awakening.

Just before the summit conference, General de Gaulle had achieved a genuine diplomatic masterpiece. His country was the staunch ally of the United States, good friend of Great Britain, respected interlocutor of the Soviet Union, and sponsor of the Four Power reunion, at which De Gaulle would be, at the same time, the spokesman of the Federal Republic of Germany.

**A Period of Tension: May 1960-Summer of 1963.** A few days later, the structure was destroyed. Arriving in Paris on May 14, Khrushchev left on the 19th after the conference of the Four Powers had failed before actually beginning. Was it because of the U-2 affair? It does not seem so. Among the motives that determined Khrushchev's attitudes, the German issue played a primary role. Like the two other Western leaders, General de Gaulle had mis-calculated.

The President of the Fifth Republic had been, from the start, less favorable to the idea of a "summit reunion" than the leaders of the Fourth Republic. Undoubtedly he was susceptible to the same argument as they. In a period of tension, France was internally torn and internationally diminished, both because she was forced to seek American protection and because she appeared less reliable than the Federal Republic in American eyes. On the other hand,
détente -- especially if it were to find expression in a
Four-Power reunion -- would find the French government less
exposed to the attacks of the Communist Party and France
considered as one of the great powers. However -- and this
was undoubtedly the main point of the Adenauer-De Gaulle
understanding -- the General was reserved about any nego-
tiations on Germany since they could only end with two types
of results: either the absence of concrete decisions, or
unilateral Western concessions. For, on the three pending
issues (frontiers, East Germany, and Berlin), any change
in the status quo would have represented a Soviet success.
In the spring of 1960, De Gaulle appears to have judged
that the absence of decisions was acceptable to Khrushchev,
as representing some progress; if they separated without
having taken any important decision, but with the firm
intention of meeting again regularly in order to make very
small advances, they might eventually transform the clash
between the two blocs into a less aggressive form of compe-
tition. Khrushchev, however, attacked in Moscow and above
all in Peking for his "leniency," could not permit himself
to return empty-handed from Paris.

This misjudgment partly explains General de Gaulle's
firmness before Khrushchev during the troubled days in
Paris. Partly only, because the firmness was already there
and the failure did not modify the policy. The televised
speech of May 31 proved it. The prospects for the future
were not modified in it. The Atlantic Alliance was "pres-
ently necessary to the security of France and of the other
free nations of our continent" so that "sheltered by this
shield" Western Europe would be built, a Western Europe
whose goal remained dual: "The nostalgia aroused in each
of the nations [actually this held true for France only -- another miscalculation of General de Gaulle] by Europe's relative decline in the face of the new great empires unites them in the feeling that together they will recover their former greatness...." On the other hand, "on our old continent, the organization of a Western grouping, at least equivalent to that existing in the East, will some day allow the establishment of European understanding between the Atlantic and the Urals, without any risk to the independence and the freedom of each, and making allowance for the likely evolution of the regimes. Then the whole of Europe, ceasing to be split in two by outdated ambitions and ideologies, will again become the chief center of civilization."

The answer came from Moscow in the form of an article in Izvestia published on June 4, which marked the beginning of a long period of tension:

The French government does not have the courage to take a stand against the United States; the dirty Algerian War ties its hands and its conscience. De Gaulle does not wish to hurt his American ally who arrives at the summit not with a diplomatic briefcase, but with a knife in his hand.... Nevertheless, the inconsistency and the contradictions of General de Gaulle's declarations are constantly apparent.... As for that little Europe for which the President of the Republic makes propaganda, it cannot lessen, but on the contrary, can only reinforce the international contradictions. In spite of what General de Gaulle says on the importance of France's will in this European assembly, it is Adenauer and his American allies and protectors who dictate their will in it. The flirtation with Adenauer is De Gaulle's greatest and most tragic mistake.... The words on East-West coexistence provide a vivid example of De Gaulle's inconsistency wherein he demands that the
Western group become the equal of the Eastern one, which leads to the opposition rather than the cooperation of both factions.... France must not go on playing footman to the Trans-Atlantic coach. There are compliments that make dirty stains upon those who receive them; such are those from Eisenhower to Macmillan and De Gaulle for their attitude in Paris.

The same style was used on several occasions during the year 1960. After Michel Debré's speech to the National Assembly on July 25, TASS compared the Premier's declarations on May 31st with those made by French leaders on the eve of World War II, and blamed him for "embellishing the policy of the West German militarists." Added to this were violent reproaches for the support France was to give Belgium in the Congo. On October 21, in his long speech delivered in the Lenin Stadium, Khrushchev asked why France must be considered a great power and not Indonesia. An imperialist power, France had been fighting against Algeria for six years without being able to demonstrate her "grandeur." He added, "we have recognized the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic de facto, and I would like to renew this declaration." The policy remained cautious; other nations had recognized the GPRA de jure.

On the French side, answers were given in the same tone. On December 1, Maurice Schumann, President of the National Assembly Commission of Foreign Affairs, read a message from the Premier at the conference of the NATO parliamentarians stating that, "In a world and at a time when, unceasingly, the West must defend itself against the subversion organized by the totalitarian imperialists,
it is essential that information which permits us to combat the opponent's propaganda be made more effective."

Tension continued until 1963, and at times was aggravated by three issues: Algeria, atomic affairs, and Germany. On November 16, 1961, a thousand students -- principally Africans from Patrice Lumumba University -- conducted a public demonstration in front of the French Embassy in Moscow. Windows were broken. Police drove the demonstrators back and the Soviet government expressed its regrets, but the cries of "Long live independent Algeria...," "Release the Algerian prisoners," and even "Hang De Gaulle," corresponded well enough to the style of the Soviet press of the time. Even then Soviet policy remained cautious. The "de jure" recognition of the GPRA came only just after the Evian agreement. It was General de Gaulle who decided to see hostility in this gesture, though the Soviet government could not really afford to keep out of the race for the favor of an Algeria on its way to independence. On March 27, a Soviet government declaration wondered about the sharpness of the French reaction expressed in the recall of the French Ambassador: "The French government has not understood or has not appreciated as it should have the good intention of the Soviet government which wants its friendly relations with France to be reinforced by all means." Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov was recalled in turn. "The most Gaullist of ambassadors," to use the expression often used by his colleagues and by the press (had he not regularly kept in touch with General de Gaulle during the last years of the Fourth Republic?), went home as early as July 26. At Orly airport, when questioned about future prospects, he declared: "I have been in France
for a little more than nine years and I have always wished, and now wish, for good relations. But this also depends on the other side."

French nuclear policy was subject to much Soviet criticism during this same period. At the time of the Geneva Conference on the Nuclear Test Ban, Semyon Tsarapkin, head of the Soviet delegation, insisted on several occasions on "the unilateral advantage to NATO" that the French tests would represent. On May 27, in an interview granted to the Neues Deutschland (the organ of the East German Communist Party), he declared: "If the United States and Great Britain do not undertake efforts to restrain their French partner, all our Geneva discussion will become aimless." When the negotiations succeeded and when General de Gaulle refused to sign the Moscow Treaty, there was considerable severity. On August 25, 1963, Pravda stated that the General's international policy served the interests of the most aggressive anti-Soviet imperialist groups in the West. The newspaper added:

It is not without reason that the Gaullist press happily welcomes, as similar to its own, the position of the Chinese leaders towards the treaty, and has not concealed its hope to see them -- by secessionist activities -- bring their aid to the plans directed against the socialist camp.... Almost all public declarations made by the President of the Republic during these past eighteen months have been marked by speculation on the Soviet threat. The Fifth Republic leaders want above all to create a myth, namely that someone threatens France and Western Europe, without which the modern version of the "guns before butter" slogan could not be justified.
But above all, it was France's German policy that provoked sharp reaction in Moscow. Even before the building of the Berlin Wall, the firmness of General de Gaulle's declarations about the fate of the city led Pravda on July 21 to compare "Monsieur de Gaulle" with Mussolini. After the signing and at the time of the ratification of the Franco-German Treaty of January 22, 1963, two Soviet notes of protest were delivered, one on February 5, the other on May 19. The French answer of March 30 spoke a bit ironically of the emotion that a country as powerful as the USSR was showing towards the threat that the treaty represented. But even if the second note still referred to France as a "folding screen for the Federal Republic militarists," it was less harsh than the first one, which had called the text a "war treaty" and declared: "Access of the Bundeswehr to nuclear arms would be considered by the USSR as a threat to its vital interests and would oblige the USSR immediately to take the necessary measures." This was because the situation had already evolved between February and May: Franco-German solidarity was appearing less solid.

This solidarity had been manifested in early February 1963 in a minor incident which created a big stir at the time. While preparing a broadcast on the twentieth anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, a team of the French government radio-television network, Radio-Télédiffusion Française, (RTF), was received on January 29 by Khrushchev and then later by Marshal Malinovskii. On February 7, on the eve of the broadcast, the French canceled the program because declarations of both Russians "did not comply with the terms of the agreement between the RTF and the Soviet
authorities" according to which the broadcast must not contain any polemics. "At the time of the recording," it was said, "Chairman Khrushchev and Marshal Malinovskii had added some declarations to their accounts that were violently hostile to the Federal Republic of Germany, its policy, and the Franco-German rapprochement." As the RTF had promised not to make any cuts in the interviews, the Minister of Information decided to cancel the entire broadcast. 23

In the tension between Paris and Moscow which marked these three years, two different elements must be distinguished. On the one hand, General de Gaulle was considered an enemy because he aligned himself with his Western allies in periods of crisis. This was especially true at the time of the Paris failure of May 1960, of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, and, above all, of the Cuban crisis in October 1962. On the other hand, tension did not decrease when relations improved between Washington and Moscow, or after Kennedy took office, or at the time of the Moscow Treaty in 1963. In these circumstances General de Gaulle appeared to fear a "New Yalta," and kept his distance from both the "Super-Greats." But his double detachment presupposed that France was not the only one to fear the effects of appeasement; in other words, it presupposed that the Federal Republic was supporting the French leader's policy.

23 On the significance of this incident for the statutes of the RTF, see F. Goguel and A. Grosser, La Politique en France, A. Colin, Paris, 1964, p. 154.
The Reversal of the Bases of Support. As a matter of fact, the main cause of the rapprochement -- slow until late 1964, more obvious and accelerated in 1965 -- between General de Gaulle and the Soviet Union is to be found in the failure of his German policy. It is difficult to say exactly when the General realized his mistake, i.e., that it was the Federal Republic, much more than Great Britain, which was then the United States' "Trojan Horse" in Europe. At any rate, his realization occurred before Ludwig Erhard came into office, when the Bundestag unanimously voted a resolution intended to be used as a preamble to the law authorizing the ratification of the Franco-German Treaty.\textsuperscript{24} The text, apparently innocuous, showed in fact that the Federal Republic did not intend to follow General de Gaulle.

The 1963 failure marked the turning point in the foreign policy of the Fifth Republic, inasmuch as the idea of an independent Europe with a Franco-German basis constituted a clear intermediate objective on the road to the final objective, namely the enhancement of France's rank in world politics, particularly versus the United States. Once this intermediate objective appeared out of reach, no other precise objective immediately presented itself. This first resulted in the replacement of a strongly articulated policy by a set of attitudes which did not take the place of precise action. The overture to

\textsuperscript{24} The assumption became certainty when General de Gaulle said, at his press conference of October 28, 1966: "While, instead of applying our bilateral treaty, they were proceeding under the unilateral preamble which changed the entire meaning and which they themselves had added, events took a different turn..."
Peking and the call for unification of the Latin peoples during De Gaulle's trip to South America in 1964 seem to have been attempts to find an alternate policy. But French influence in Latin America was no trump card, and the recognition of Mao Tse Tung's China did not bring the expected satisfactions. The only remaining course, therefore, was rapprochement with the USSR. The rapprochement was facilitated by a series of convergent factors which we shall have to examine more closely.

The Soviet Union, too, considered a rapprochement beneficial. Its reaction to the French recognition of China was surprisingly understanding, considering that this move could have been construed to be as anti-Soviet as it was anti-American. Izvestia denied what "some newspapers" had called the Soviet dissatisfaction with an event which, on the contrary, perfectly satisfied the wishes of the USSR.

The Eastern European countries as a group, for their part, were looking for Western contacts.

The war in Vietnam was growing more and more important, involving the United States and also China; it enabled the USSR and France jointly to play the role of conciliatory and mediating powers.

Finally, in the eyes of General de Gaulle, the Cuban affair had greatly changed the balance of power in the world. As he saw it, the Soviet Union had acknowledged the superiority of the United States, and therefore there was no longer any military danger in Europe. Consequently one could loosen the Atlantic ties and approach the USSR.

It is unnecessary to describe in detail the Franco-Soviet contacts since 1964. In January of that year,
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Minister of Finance, visited
the Soviet Union, while Constantin Rudnev, Vice-President
of the Soviet Council, came to France, where he was followed
in February by a Soviet parliamentary mission led by
Nicolas Podgorny, then Secretary of the CPSU. Then came
Edgar Faure's trip to Moscow; his stay in Peking opened
the way to recognition of Communist China. From that
moment on, trips and contacts on the political, economic,
and cultural levels became increasingly frequent. After
Gromyko's visit to Paris, on April 30, 1965, the most
prominent event was Couve de Murville's stay in Moscow
in late October. All these were climaxed in 1966 by De
Gaulle's week in the Soviet Union, and Kosygin's stay in
France. What is the meaning of this new kind of "entente
cordiale"?
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW CORDIALITY

BILATERAL RELATIONS

Since December 1965, when General de Gaulle was re-elected President of the Republic for another term of seven years, he has changed, if not the direction, at least the pace of French foreign policy. His spectacular decisions concerning NATO were followed by actions continually emphasizing improvement of Franco-Soviet relations. Before analyzing the substance of the various economic and political relations between the two countries in this period, it will be useful to describe the political climate surrounding the two great diplomatic journeys of 1966.

De Gaulle in the USSR, Kosygin in France

Since his return to power in 1958, De Gaulle has travelled much; he had already made one trip to the Soviet Union in 1944. The spectacular aspect of his trip in 1966 was not so much the fact that he personally undertook the journey, or his destination; what was unusual was the length of his absence from home (June 20 to July 1), the choice of itinerary (Novosibirsk, in addition to European Russia); his concentration on the Soviet Union itself, with no visits to other capitals of the "popular democracies," particularly Warsaw, and the special reception accorded him by the Soviet leaders. It would be a mistake either to evaluate his journey only in terms of the meager clues

\[25\] An excellent map of all the trips undertaken from 1958 to the tour of the Far East appears in Der Spiegel of August 29, 1966.
contained in the long Franco-Soviet declaration of June 30
or to judge its significance only in the light of the two
agreements concluded the same day: one referring to space
research, the other to scientific, technical, and economic
cooperation. Of course, the skeptic may ask, "Limelight
for the President -- but what else?" and may conclude,
"Good atmosphere, meager results," "Much ado about very
little," and "Excellent climate but empty setting." Such a skeptic, however, would miss the full implication
of the event.

Up to a point the results were somewhat negative.
In his negotiations with the leaders of the USSR, De Gaulle
exhibited great firmness, and both he and the Russians
often repeated themselves, especially on the German ques-
tion. "They played their record, I played mine," the
General is reported to have said. The most vivid as well
as the most complete account of the trip was given by a
German journalist, who stressed the irony in General

29 Témoignage Chrétien (left wing Catholic), July 6,
1966. The long article by Bernard Feron, by the way, is
one of the best accounts of the tour.
31 Peter Scholl-Latour, Im Sog des Generals; Von Abidjan
nach Moskau (In the Wake of the General; from Abidjan to
A remarkable book but heavy reading, by the head of the
German television office in Paris. The trip to the USSR
is described, pp. 318-356.
de Gaulle's remarks to different speakers during the negotiations: "I thank you, Mr. President, for your report which did not contain anything new to us"; "Thank you, Mr. President, for the reiteration of your position."

This firmness, bordering at times on a dialogue of the deaf ("we talk détente -- they answer security," Couve de Murville is reported to have said),\(^{32}\) was intended to reassure the Western allies, especially the Federal Republic to which the Stalingrad visit must have been a painful reminder.

Scholl-Latour reports that a French journalist who wanted information about the confidential talks was told by the foreign minister: "It's always the same thing." André Fontaine's answer to this is reported to have been "For eight years, I have been given this same reply over and over again. It's always the same thing: and today we are in Novosibirsk." Perhaps, in Novosibirsk, General de Gaulle discovered that the USSR by no means ends at the Urals. In any case, both he and his entourage found themselves in a new world that was both accessible and technically advanced (the ease with which the various correspondents were able to communicate with their respective capitals came as a surprise). For the inhabitants of Leningrad and especially for the people in the Siberian cities, there was symbolic significance in the fact that a capitalist head of state was welcomed as a friend; a head of state, moreover, whose religious conviction and need to express it were so strong that he attended mass in the only Catholic church in Leningrad. L'Humanité

\(^{32}\)Carrefour, July 6, 1966.
proclaimed: "Cordial reception for the President of France";\textsuperscript{33} but this was not the France of the Communist Party or of the proletariat, who had been the only "friends" in the eyes of the USSR during the years of the cold war. The attitude of the French correspondents, moreover, probably demonstrated to a number of Soviet citizens what freedom of speech really means and how refreshing it can be to show disrespect toward one's own head of state, no matter how eminent.\textsuperscript{34}

During his entire trip, President de Gaulle used language that was both cordial and politically prudent, even if the theme was familiar. His toast at the Kremlin, on June 20, may serve as an example:\textsuperscript{35}

France is not content with this rigid confrontation of two organized camps. Without ceasing to be pre-eminently a country of freedom and a Western nation, she would like to see the evil charm broken; and she would like to see, at least in her own case, that a start is made toward the establishment of new relations with the so-called "Eastern" European countries, relations with a view toward détente, accord, and cooperation.... Without denying in any way the vital role which the United States must play in the pacification and transformation of the world,

\textsuperscript{33}L'Humanité, June 21, 1966.

\textsuperscript{34}See the amusing and significant anecdotes recounted by Scholl-Latour, pp. 353-354.

\textsuperscript{35}The complete text of the speeches and agreements was published by Le voyage en U.R.S.S. du Général de Gaulle, Président de la République, Documentation Française, No. 176/IP, July 25, 1966, 23 pp.
France considers the re-establishment of Europe as a fertile entity...the first prerequisite toward this end. Moreover, mutual understanding among the states which have until now been antagonistic toward each other is primarily a European problem, in the French view. This is true for those intellectual and substantive exchanges which promote common progress. It is also true for the settlement which will some day decide the fate of the whole of Germany and the security of our continent.

At Moscow University, at Academgorod (Novosibirsk), and on Soviet television, the dominant theme was technical and cultural collaboration based on two assumptions: development as it exists in the two countries and equality of the two nations. Equality or illusion of equality, it is clear that the trip as a whole meant a marvelous gratification of French self-esteem. This gratification, moreover, had definite political value: While one of the superpowers forever insists on its economic, military, and technological superiority, the other is ready to speak to France as an equal, even if the cold facts prove the inequality of resources and potential.

"Much cordiality -- meager substance,"36 "The mountain of friendly demonstrations...gave birth in the end to little more than a political mouse."37 Comments upon Kosygin's visit to France (December 1 to 9, 1966) show that it too met with skepticism. However, it differed from De Gaulle's Soviet journey in two aspects of opposite tendency: First, Kosygin's visit was less spectacular.

Certainly, he was well received in Lyon and in Toulouse, as he had been in Paris. He spoke to students and to television audiences. He visited factories and other technical installations. He was honored by the presence of General and Mme. de Gaulle at a reception given at the embassy of the USSR, a gesture that the General had not made toward Kennedy and Khrushchev. But the event was more noteworthy for its uniqueness than for its cordiality; the sober language and gestures of the Communist leader did not match the sense of ceremony which has always been Charles de Gaulle's.

Second, political coverage of Kosygin's visit was much more extensive than De Gaulle's, especially in the German press (as we shall see farther on), largely because of the new political situation in Bonn. Although the commentators were unanimous in finding the long, final communiqué rather empty, a majority of them emphasized that this same text was very important by virtue of what it omitted. 38

Economy and Technology

Alluding to the example of the Franco-German treaty of 1963, an opposition newspaper quoted Disraeli in connection with the declaration signed in Moscow: "Words are only words; I judge a treaty only after at least one year has passed since I concluded it." 39 It does seem however that

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38 Cf. the excellent preliminary account by André Fontaine, "D'un M. K. à l'autre" (From one Mr. K. to Another), Le Monde, December 1, 1966, and the final editorials "Kosygin Learns to Say "oui!"" New York Times, December 12, 1966, and "Bilan d'une visite" (Account of a Visit), by Roger Massip, Le Figaro, December 10, 1966.

in economic and technological matters, Franco-Soviet developments since 1965 were real enough and have been accelerated by the Moscow accords. One correspondent wrote after Kosygin's departure:

"Basically, however, no progress. All afternoon Thursday, the experts made no headway on the draft of the communiqué. The French were anxious to act as faithful allies of the West Germans, the Russians as faithful allies of the East Germans. It was difficult to find formulations admitting of the interpretation that some progress had been made since the Moscow trip by the President of the Republic, in June.

The same journalist went on to develop at length an idea which, although perhaps open to question, is undoubtedly attractive to Frenchmen:

The real meaning of the trip lay elsewhere: it came to the fore in the fervor with which this man, who had come from the cold, spoke of cooperation between France and the Soviet Union. General de Gaulle, his cabinet ministers, the professors from the Sorbonne, the engineers from Sud-Aviation, Berliet, Alsthom, Rhodiacéta, and Air Liquide, all heard Mr. Kosygin repeat over and over again: "We must work together!"...

Mr. Kosygin apparently spoke from the bottom of his heart when he announced the following maxim at the Sorbonne, a maxim which amounted to a confession: "Any isolation finds expression, sooner or later, in retardation of growth and loss of power." Privately, he was even more explicit: the shifting over from heavy industry to industry in general was

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Marc Ullmann, "M. Kossyguine s'est montré un grand réaliste" (Kosygin Proved to be a Great Realist), L'Express, December 12, 1966.
beset by innumerable technical and administrative difficulties.

But what can France do about this? Mr. Vladimir Kirilin, Vice-Premier of the USSR, answered this question in detail when asked by Mr. Michel Debré. The Russians, he said, are interested in any computer which might simplify the management of enterprises, in new drilling techniques, in desalination of sea water, oceanography, electric purification of metals, manufacture of synthetic textiles, agricultural research, the establishment of food industries....

The list of French needs to which the USSR can answer is dramatically shorter. In a word, it is limited to fundamental research, an area where Russian advances are very tangible. How can we satisfy our partners since, on the one hand, they do not possess foreign currency, and on the other, French industry isn't exactly the world's least expensive?

The experience of the past, moreover, has not been any too promising. Messrs. Debré and Kirilin are frankly agreed on this point. Russia has her caviar and her furs. This is little enough, if we are speaking in terms of a vast import program. It is especially little to permit buying at high prices and to take up the offers of French industrialists who, in many cases, are only looking for supplementary markets in the East and do not make the effort to meet foreign competition.

It was decided, therefore, to create something tangible; in this case, it was a "Great Commission" with the purpose of attuning the economies, French and Soviet, to each other. And if everything went well, common working committees were to be established by industrial sectors; it was even planned to create internship in French and Russian enterprises in order to familiarize the executives and technicians with their respective problems.

... the entire lesson to be learned from Mr. Kosygin's visit can be summarized in one sentence: The Soviet Union realizes that, if she pursues the road of isolation, there will soon
be only one great power in the world, the United States.

There is a great deal of satisfaction for the French in this last statement. Since the USSR is considered "super-great" in technology, every Soviet initiative recognizing the value of French technology is highly appreciated, all the more so since the feeling exists, in this regard, that France is scorned or at least dismissed as insignificant by the United States, the other "super-great." When the USSR adopts the French system of color television, when Mikoyan congratulates De Gaulle on the launching of the first French satellite ("We are particularly pleased to salute this remarkable achievement by France in view of the agreement reached by our two countries to cooperate in the field of space research"), many a leader and many a French citizen feels that France is taken more seriously in Moscow than in Washington.

A number of facts, however, should be included in the balance sheet of Franco-Soviet contacts. Trade between France and the Soviet Union represents only a very small part of French foreign commerce and is only of moderate interest to French industrialists. It is characteristic that, in an interview given to business executives and economic advisers, Couve de Murville had to

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42 A good general presentation may be found in Jean-Paul Dessertine, "Les exportations françaises 1961-1965" (French Exports 1961-1965), Tendances, October 1966. See also "Le commerce franco-soviétique" (Franco-Soviet Trade), Moniteur du Commerce International, June 29, 1966, pp. 2573-2589.
answer a whole series of questions on the Kennedy Round, on the creation of a European corporate law, and on gold, but there was only one question concerning trade with the East.\textsuperscript{43} Finally, the Federal Republic, whatever her political relations with the USSR may be, has better prospects of engaging in economic exchanges with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{44} French trade with the USSR amounts to about one-twentieth of French trade with the Federal Republic. The USSR and all the East European countries taken together buy less from France than does Spain alone. Even if we add French exports to China, the total amounts to less than that of French exports to the Netherlands.

Still, the Eastern countries, and in particular the Soviet Union, are now believed to be important customers of the machinery industry and of agriculture, the two sectors of the French economy that must look for markets abroad. The following three tables will suggest the recent development and the present order of magnitude of that trade.\textsuperscript{45} The political intent appears to be to boost the

\textsuperscript{43} The complete text of the very interesting and lengthy discussion, "Maurice Couve de Murville expose la politique étrangère de la France" (Maurice Couve de Murville Explains French Foreign Policy) may be found in \textit{Entreprise}, November 17, 1966.

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Matthias Schmitt, "Die Deutsch-Sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, Stand und Perspektiven" (German-Soviet Trade Relations, Status and Perspectives), \textit{Europa-Archiv}, January 10, 1967, pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{45} Details in Paul Fabra, "Les pays socialistes sont maintenant des clients importants pour notre industrie d'équipement et notre agriculture" (The Socialist Countries are now Important Customers of our Machinery, Industry and Agriculture), \textit{Le Monde}, February 12 and 13, 1967.
INTERNATIONAL EQUIPMENT ORDERS PLACED IN FRANCE

(in millions of francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Czecho-</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Rumania</th>
<th>Yugoslavia</th>
<th>Total Eastern Nations</th>
<th>Mainland China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,952</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Amounts do not include financing costs.

FRENCH IMPORTS FROM AND EXPORTS TO Communist COUNTRIES, 1965 AND 1966

(in millions of francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe Total</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland China Total</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## THE LARGEST INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT ORDERS
### PLACED WITH FRENCH INDUSTRY IN 1966
(in millions of francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Powdered milk factories</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ammonium nitrate plant (Speichim)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellulose plant (Persons et Whittepoire)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catalytic cracking plant</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy stamping equipment for auto bodies (Chausson);</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moskwitch plant (Renault)</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Synthetic glycerine plant (Sorice-C.M.P.A.)</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Automobile assembly plant (Renault)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tire plant (Kléber-Colombes)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>Synthetic textile fiber plant</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Fertilizer plant</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Machine tools for electric engine plant (Compagnie Electro-Magnétique)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Automobile assembly plant (Renault)</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Synthetic fiber plant</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Fertilizer plant</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland China</td>
<td>Six hundred trucks (Berliet)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Only orders of no less than 25 million francs in value are included.
less than spectacular development of trade by a process of economic and technical cooperation. To this end the agreements of June 1966 provided for two commissions.

The "little commission" on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation met in Moscow from January 10 to 14, 1967. Its second session was scheduled to be held in Paris in May. At the first meeting the commission authorized Franco-Soviet working groups on patents and licenses, on standards, and on weights and measures. It also approved an exchange program of scientific research personnel and technical information missions for 1967, which represented a noticeable increase over 1966. Already in October 1966, when Alain Peyrefitte, Scientific Research Minister, had been in Moscow, five areas of common interest had been envisaged (oceanography, biology and medical research, oil drilling, mathematical management of businesses, and agricultural technology). To these were added another area of common endeavor, conservation, pollution, and desalination of water.

The "little commission" was presided over by two high functionaries; the "great commission," meeting for the first time in Paris from January 26 to 31, was chaired by Economics Minister Debré and Vice-Premier Kirilin of the USSR, who is also president of the National Committee for Science and Technology. According to Debré, "the aim of the Great Commission was to take stock of what had so far been achieved, to assign work programs to the specialized agencies, to take note of new areas suited to cooperation between the two countries, and to submit to the governments
a certain number of directives that would serve as guidelines for their efforts." Included among the points under discussion was the delivery to the USSR of two Renault automobile assembly lines, which meant doubling the volume of orders already given to the French firm; the purchase by France of 30,000 tons of raw cotton in exchange for exports to the USSR of an equivalent amount of consumer goods; the probable call on French engineers to collaborate in the construction of the tide-driven power plant in Murmansk, which is presently in the project stage; and the delivery, by France, of a pilot plant for the manufacture of television tubes. Negotiations are under way for construction, in the USSR, of facilities capable of mass-producing color TV sets by 1968/1969. Still, the most spectacular gesture was the creation of a Franco-Soviet Chamber of Commerce, the first such arrangement the USSR has been willing to make with a Western country.

It is almost certain that the execution of these plans will lag behind the intentions; but the political design is evident, and the change of atmosphere as well. Many other areas, too numerous to mention, have also profited from this new atmosphere; one of these is cultural affairs. Two examples must suffice: the cooperative agreement between the French and Soviet national radio and television networks (televised commentaries direct from Moscow to

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47 The most optimistic forecast can be found in the Communist daily L'Humanité, June 14, 15, and 17, 1966 (Max Léon, "La coopération franco-soviétique").
Paris and from Paris to Moscow, exchange of televised news reports, etc.); and the January 1967 meeting in Paris of Soviet and French history teachers for the purpose of studying textbooks used in the two countries. (This followed similar meetings between French teachers and those of other countries; indeed, a very precise agreement between German and French teachers dates as far back as 1951.)

Political Relations

How important economic relations are to the French government was demonstrated by the choice of the new ambassador in 1966: After twelve years as head of the economic affairs department of the Quai d'Orsay, Olivier Wormser was certainly entitled to a large embassy and he obviously wanted it; it is significant that the French government sent such a man to Moscow -- a man whose competence and talent as a negotiator have always been admired by the five partner nations in Brussels and by the Hallstein Commission. It is by no means certain that the Soviet government attached as much importance to economic and technical relations as France did. When Wormser presented his credentials on November 5, 1966, Podgorny talked "European security" and the ambassador replied in terms of "cooperation."

The central theme of Franco-Soviet relations is now becoming clear. For France, these relations are quite possibly a goal in themselves: the great accession of prestige attributed to the international tours, the
possession of a "green telephone line,"* elevation to atomic-power status in the eyes of one of the two super-powers -- all these are already appreciable accomplishments. For the Soviet Union, the gain is indirect. Improved relations with France hardly add to Moscow's prestige, but they provide a welcome instrument for putting pressure on Germany and the United States. Such indirect gains, of course, also interest General de Gaulle. In order to understand the full import of the new political ties linking France and the Soviet Union, therefore, we must look at these relations in a larger setting.

EASTERN EUROPE

Franco-Soviet relations could be disturbed by France's relations with the other Eastern European countries. As a matter of fact, De Gaulle's political decisions had to be made -- as were those of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic -- on the basis of a simple theoretical choice: Is it better to give priority to relations with the USSR at the risk of perpetuating the Soviet hold over the other Communist states, or should one aim at loosening the East bloc by aiding Rumania and others in their efforts toward greater independence at the risk of Soviet displeasure? The second alternative would have been the logical one for the man who had caused France

*Actually a teletype connection by way of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Switzerland, by-passing East Germany. It may be recalled that the "hot line" from Moscow to Washington goes by way of Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and England.
to leave NATO and thus to set an example of bloc-dissolution, and who seems to want a Western Europe capable of counter-balancing the two great powers.

After a period of ambiguity and hesitation, the first alternative was given priority. This was symbolically expressed in the French President's visit to the USSR. At the time of his trip to South America in 1964, there had been talk of a series of visits to Eastern Europe which would have paralleled this tour: a proclamation of the value of national independence in the Soviet domain after a similar proclamation in the "game preserves" of the United States. The General stopped in Warsaw neither on his way to Moscow nor on his way back; but later he accepted invitations to visit Warsaw and Bucharest in 1967. It seems that Couve de Murville, when he visited Romania in April 1966, exposed himself to rather spirited criticism from the Romanian leaders who felt that France was staking too much on the USSR and would thus sacrifice her policy of independence for the small states of the Warsaw bloc.

Further on, we shall have occasion to examine the outlook for Europe which is implicit in France's choice of alternatives and to explore the attendant difficulties. Here it will be sufficient to point out that efforts to "improve relations" with the Eastern countries have not been neglected. Some aspects of these developments will now be considered.

Couve de Murville's visit to Bulgaria, from April 28 to 30, 1966, paralleled that of the Bulgarian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Bachev, to France at the end of November 1964. Starting with a trip by a French parliamentary delegation in September 1958, and the Bulgarian return
visit in December 1959, a series of cultural, technical,* and trade agreements were made. In February 1965, Bulgarian Vice-Premier Todorov was received by De Gaulle. In October 1966, Jivkov, head of the Bulgarian government, visited France.

Return to normal relations with Czechoslovakia proceeded rapidly from 1964 on, even though the previous "privileged" ties with that country had never been re-established after the Stalinist period 48 and the Czech reaction to the Franco-German treaty had been so spirited that French troop movements at the Czech frontier were alleged to have been caused by it. 49 In June 1965, Louis Joxe, minister in the Pompidou government, signed two important agreements in Prague: one concerning long-term trade prospects, the other regarding scientific and technical collaboration. 50 The visit to Paris by the Hungarian Foreign Secretary, Janos Peter, in January 1965, symbolized the improvement of relations between Paris and Budapest, less than ten years after the Hungarian revolution. 51

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*Such as the accord of May 20, 1965, between the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.


50 See the announcement by Joxe in Le Monde, July 2, 1965.

51 The newsletter published by the Hungarian Press and Information Office (326 Rue Saint-Jacques, Paris 5) shows
Old linguistic ties with Romania were re-established: in 1959, 80 percent of the Romanian high school students chose French as a second foreign language, Russian being compulsory. Since the abolition of Russian as a requirement, 65 percent of the young Romanians have been choosing French as the first foreign language. Maurer's visit to France in July 1964 was more spectacular than visits by other Eastern leaders. He was received at the Elysée with considerable pomp and had a long private conversation with De Gaulle (facilitated by the fact that, like most Romanian leaders of the old generation, Maurer speaks very good French). Maurer stayed in France for some sightseeing and held a great many meetings with French leaders. It was understood from the start, however, that neither side would allow the visit to take on the aspect of a meeting of "independents" within their respective blocs. Before Maurer's arrival, an officially inspired Agence France-Presse dispatch stated on July 25: "French governmental circles are anxious to avoid anything which might give the impression that President Maurer's visit is directed against the USSR. Romania has adopted an attitude of detachment toward Moscow. She refuses to align herself with Moscow or Peking in the conflict which divides them. She does, however, belong to the socialist camp, and no one in Paris has any notion of making her leave it."

the development of cultural and economic exchanges between France and Hungary.

52 See the discussion of Franco-Romanian relations by the Romanian Ambassador in _Le Monde_, January 29, 1966.

53 See also the excellent series of articles on Franco-Romanian relations by Jean Schwoebel, _Le Monde_, November 26, 27, and 28, 1964.
Relations with Poland are unusual in two respects. First, there is the tradition of an exceptionally solid friendship; secondly, the German problem plays a much more important role in Franco-Polish relations than it does in relations between France and any other Eastern European country, including Czechoslovakia.

One need only recall Chopin and Madame Curie to indicate the sentimental aspect of Franco-Polish relations. The existence in France of a Polish minority, particularly in the mines of the North and of the Pas-de-Calais, constitutes another important element. The "Polish spring" of 1956, while transforming Polish contacts with all Western countries, particularly affected Franco-Polish relations. A certain number of Polish socialists who had fled Stalinist Poland and settled in France now returned to their country. This was true, for instance, of C. Bobrowski who, after working in Paris on the economic problems of Eastern Europe, returned to Poland to head the planning commission. The contacts between French and Polish "planners" in the years that followed were evidence of a common interest in the field of economic policy. Poland, moreover, is a Catholic

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54 See also Robert Charles Richter, French Policy and Attitudes Toward Poland 1944-1964 (unpublished doctoral dissertation), New York University, 1965, 254 pp. Among published sources of information, one of the most useful is the French language periodical Hebdomadaire Polonais, published in Warsaw. There are analogous publications in German, English, Spanish, Russian, and Czech. To these must be added the publications of the Agence Polonaise de Presse, Matériaux et Documents and Cahiers Polonais.
country, and a large section of the French Catholic community is passionately interested in the new relations between church and state developed since Gomulka's return. Many French Catholics are more willing than their German, Italian, or Belgian counterparts to accept the notion that the Roman Catholic church should not be tied to any particular social system. 

On the governmental plane, the high point was the trip to France by Joseph Cyrankiewicz in September 1965. Following it, Couve de Murville visited Warsaw in May 1966, and Foreign Secretary Adam Rapacki came to Paris in January 1967. In his welcoming address, his French counterpart was able to say: "The visit which you are now paying us takes its place in a series of many which, over a period of two years, have been exchanged between our countries and have strikingly illustrated the profound changes in Franco-Polish relations since the postwar eclipse. As these visits followed one upon the other, the nature of the relationship changed completely, almost without our noticing it. Today, as you arrive here, these relations have again become wholly normal and are moreover developing to our mutual satisfaction on all levels, be they political, economic, cultural, or technical. In this context and in this atmosphere, we have become accustomed to discussing together the great problems which are of

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We cannot develop this question here although it is most important for the understanding of Franco-Polish relations. It is treated in the chapter on Catholics in A. Grosser, La Quatrième République and in A. Coutrot and F. Dreyfus, Les forces religieuses dans la vie publique en France, A. Colin, Paris, 1966.
interest to both of us; foremost of these are of course the problems of Europe. For our mutual benefit, we shall once more engage in this dialogue."

The problems of Europe are first of all the problems of Germany. It is significant that Rapacki, in his statement to the diplomatic press on January 27, in Paris, did not refer to -- and indeed did not have to refer to -- the Paris-Moscow-Warsaw triangle. Instead, he dwelt extensively on the German problem as a whole: unification, the Oder-Neisse line, East Germany, relations between the socialist countries and the Federal Republic. The tenor and atmosphere were no longer the same as on the occasion of Cyran-kiewicz' visit. In September 1965, relations between Paris and Bonn had been strained, and Franco-Polish cordiality had an air of measured but unquestioned defiance toward the Federal Republic. In 1967, there was agreement among both parties that De Gaulle had become the advocate of German goodwill in his dealings with Poland.\footnote{See, for instance, the editorial entitled "Polens Aengste" in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 28, 1967.} The Poles, who had long been gratified by the General's attitude concerning their Eastern frontier, were now clashing with him over an issue they consider fundamental: recognition of the GDR, which was so firmly rejected by De Gaulle, first in Moscow and again when Kosygin visited Paris. It is remarkable that the Warsaw leaders have become the chief East European advocates for the same Walter Ulbricht who assisted the USSR in its attempt to strangle Gomulka's Poland in 1956 and who has always refused to "Gomulkanize"
the GDR. There is no doubt that Franco-Polish relations are bedeviled by the problem of the two Germanys.

The Special Case of Ulbricht's Germany

The firm stand which De Gaulle has taken against recognition of East Germany contrasts with a distinct trend in French public opinion.

The very variations and uncertainties of the terminology already denote awkwardness. Communist or not, Romania is Romania and Poland is Poland, if only because there is only one Romania and one Poland. In any case, the term "Central Germany" (Mitteldeutschland), though incomprehensible to most Frenchman is nonetheless part of the official terminology of the Federal Republic. It is hard to imagine who in France does not see Poland as starting at the Oder-Neisse line. Perhaps this holds true for all the other Western countries, where no map reflects the direction desired by Bonn. For a time, the initials DDR were customary. They skirted the difficulty since they did not correspond to any French words and were preceded by "so-called" or were themselves put in quotation marks. Increasingly, however, only two terms are used: East Germany and German Democratic Republic or GDR (in French, RDA). Legally, one should speak of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand, and of East Germany on the other, since only the former constitutes a state in the eyes of the French government. In daily references, be it in the press or in discussions, the tendency is rather toward a sort of egalitarian equilibrium: One contrasts GFR and GDR, East Germany and West Germany, Federal Germany and Democratic Germany or Communist Germany.
This equilibrium does not exclude a clear distinction between the two Germanys, especially since the raising of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which did more to bring out the totalitarian aspect of the Ulbricht regime than any anti-Communist propaganda. Nevertheless, two factors speak for a kind of de facto recognition of the GDR. In the first place, everyone agrees that the best way to promote a liberalization of the regime is by multiplying contacts and breaking through the "iron curtain." The official explanation that the Allied Travel Office's refusal to grant visas to citizens of the GDR is a response to the Berlin Wall seems even more implausible. In the second place, why not accept a de facto situation in Germany as elsewhere? After the Budapest repression, did we break with the Kadar government and cease to recognize Hungary?

This reasoning is particularly prevalent in sports circles -- in France as in other countries. In October 1965, the International Olympic Committee, presided over by Avery Brundage of the United States, decided that henceforth there would be two German teams at the Olympic games. An editorial by L'Equipe entitled "Wisdom" and devoted to this decision, expressed a point of view often voiced in that newspaper: 57

It seems that the decision of the CIO [International Olympic Committee] regarding the two Germanys was badly received in Bonn. This indignation is hard to understand, considering that Avery Brundage and his colleagues took care not to forestall the peace treaty -- and the reunification of Germany -- by recognizing, for instance, East Germany as a nation.

It has been the CIO's policy to admit any territory which, in actual practice, enjoys

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57 L'Equipe, October 14, 1965.
autonomy in sports, and that could not be denied in the case of East Germany.

The CIO nevertheless decided in Madrid that Germany, in 1968, would constitute a single delegation made up of two teams, with a single flag and a single anthem. This was a concession to the French position, designed to avoid embarrassment at Grenoble, the French government having supported this candidacy (a single German team) when it accepted the CIO regulations extant at that date, that is in February 1964....

Bonn's dissatisfaction therefore appears to be purely a matter of form, since the CIO, after waiting for twelve years for a development which still has not occurred, acted on the level, not of politics, but of sports. Its action, by the way, will benefit German sports doubly until the signing of a peace treaty permits reconsideration of this problem.

The GDR is making great efforts to bring about a normalization of relations with France -- a normalization which requires, as a first stage, the acceptance by the French of the existing situation. The two French language publications published in East Berlin, the illustrated RDA Revue and the bulletin, Echo d'Allemagne, stress in each issue the sovereignty of an East German state. However, their contents are so awkward in their extreme propaganda pitch that they hardly serve to make the GDR better known and accepted in France.

A much more intelligent and efficient activity is pursued by "Echanges Franco-Allemands," a French "association for cultural exchanges with the Germany of today."

Created in 1958, this organization publishes an information

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58 L'Echo d'Allemagne, Wallstrasse 76 102, Berlin, a monthly journal.
bulletin in Paris and arranges many trips to the GDR. Its National Committee comprises about 150 personalities -- journalists, professors, union leaders, politicians -- some of whom are Communists and fellow-travelers and many simply liberal leftists. In about fifteen Departments, there are local committees, organized regionally and directed by a Department committee.

Such a campaign exists not only in France; one finds similar associations and programs elsewhere, notably in Belgium and Italy. However, one may well wonder whether the psychological aspects of the French situation are not unique. We are dealing with an image of the two Germanys prevalent among quite a few French intellectuals. Some among these who have fought against Nazism accept the notion that the Federal Republic is heir to the middle-class Germany which allowed Hitler to rise to power, while the GDR continues the liberal and "leftist" German tradition which goes from Heine to Brecht by way of Heinrich Mann. Each time -- and unfortunately that means often -- the guilty past of a West German high official, judge, or professor is uncovered, the GDR scores a point in France. It matters little that only the Federal Republic pays reparations to the victims of Nazism and to Israel. It matters relatively little that there is no freedom in East Germany. Through the transformation of its economic and social structures, particularly through the "democratization" of education, it is believed to have done more to destroy the germs of a new Nazism than

the Federal Republic. As we shall see later on, there is
disagreement about East Germany between the Communist Party
and the Federation of the Left. Still, a statement by
François Mitterrand at a public debate on the Federation's
foreign policy on November 29, 1966, in which he gave his
"personal" endorsement to the recognition of the GDR, was
by no means considered shocking.

On the governmental plane, however, the Fifth Republic
on the whole has been even firmer than the Fourth in its will
to support the Federal Republic about East Germany. The
doctrine expressed by the "Big Three" in the London declara-
tion of 1954 has never been disavowed. De Gaulle has always
reassured Bonn. Thus, following the recognition of Communist
China in 1964, all French diplomatic missions were instructed
to inform the governments to which they were accredited that
this recognition did not in any way alter France's attitude
toward the German question. At least once, however, De Gaulle
did use the problem of the GDR as a means of bringing pres-
sure on the Federal Republic. In a December 31, 1963, speech
in which he wished the French people a happy new year, he
mentioned "Pankow" among the capitals of totalitarian Commu-
nist regimes. Totalitarian, but nevertheless the seat of a
regime! That was after his initial difficulties with
Chancellor Erhard. Almost immediately the Frankfurter
Allgemeine ran an alarmed editorial. Starting with the trip
to Moscow, however, these fears abated -- all the more since
the Gaullist politicians have taken an even more rigid atti-

dude than before. 60

60A complete account of its two-day workshop held in
October 1966 by the association Echanges Franco-Allemands
will be published in the spring by Presses Universitaires
What is the reason for the firmness of the President of the Republic? Should one not assume that the status of Ulbricht's Germany might be used as a drawing card in dealings with Poland and, especially, with the USSR? But in what context? No real advantage is discernible that could outweigh the major unfortunate result of a more flexible attitude -- the shattering deterioration of relations with Bonn. Moreover, De Gaulle has other reasons for not wishing to recognize the GDR. In the first place, the recognition of both German states would intensify Europe's division, which is exactly what he wants to avoid. Secondly, we must ask whether the definite abandonment of the reunification policy might not push the Federal Republic into demanding a rank commensurate with its economic strength. At present the hope of reunification induces it to accept a power status so inferior to France's that even its industrial superiority over France cannot redress the balance.

The New Triangle Paris-Bonn-Moscow

Germany's Role in Franco-Soviet Relations. Theoretically De Gaulle's position was a rather uncomfortable one. He was only welcome in Moscow if he brought German concessions with him. Bonn would only recognize him as its spokesman de France. In particular, it will contain the contributions of Messrs. Léon Hamon and René Capitant, intellectual leaders of the left wing of the U.N.R. (The entire debate that followed the introductory statements by Georges Castellan on East Germany and by Alfred Grosser on the Federal Republic may be of interest.) The pro-government Paris-Presse was the only non-Communist daily newspaper which gave ample space to the leaders of the GDR (see the interviews with Foreign Minister Otto Winzer and the foreign trade director Gerhard Schramm), November 1 and 2, 1966.
if he represented German intransigence in Moscow. In practice, a noticeable change has come about so that today French diplomacy, although it cannot alter basic conditions, is able to play a well defined role in dealing with the German question and in German-Soviet relations.

It is, of course, wholly natural and legitimate that the German problem enters into any exchange between French and Soviet leaders. Both the USSR and France claim the rights which the Four Powers assumed in 1945. Neither the East nor the West has ever wavered with regard to the validity of the quadripartite system. After six years of threatening a separate peace treaty with the GDR, the Soviet Union, on the contrary, finally signed the "Friendship Treaty" of June 12, 1964, which explicitly states in Article 9 that the rights and obligations of the Potsdam agreement are to be maintained in the GDR. And the Franco-German agreement on stationing of French troops, itemized in an exchange of letters between Couve de Murville and Willy Brandt of December 1966, is based on the convention of October 23, 1954, defining relations between the three powers and the German Federal Republic. This convention, in turn, goes back to the maintenance of the sovereignty of the three powers toward the German problem as a whole. For many years, the political-judicial situation had even given rise to the constant inclination of French leaders to bring up the German problem, preferably in a quadripartite setting: If Germany is on the agenda, France is one of the great powers. (Accordingly, the Federal Republic has always been apprehensive of meetings of the greats because of the danger that it might once more be treated as a passive object.)
In Franco-Soviet dialogue -- outside the framework of the Four -- the basic question is, of course, whether the French leaders should side with the USSR about Germany; or whether they should side with the Federal Republic in dealing with the most intransigent of its conquerors; or whether they should try to aim at an advantage elsewhere by making concessions concerning Germany to the Soviets. This third alternative does not seem ever to have been chosen, even if there were American and German suspicions to this effect, especially with Bidault in 1953-54 -- a "global deal" involving the European Defense Community (EDC) and Indochina -- and Mollet, on the occasion of his trip to Moscow in 1956. For De Gaulle, in any case, the prestige gained by the egalitarian character of his conversations with the USSR would in no way compensate for the loss of a German partner without whom a political development of Europe agreeable to France would be impossible.

However, there is no reason why he cannot hope for a solution that seeks to combine the first two alternatives. After all, the German problem is a multiple one. On two aspects of the problem, the USSR and De Gaulle are in agreement; in the first case, the agreement is of long standing, but in the second case, it is more recent. If Great Britain had adopted De Gaulle's position on the Oder-Neisse Line, less excitement would have been generated in the Federal Republic by the communiqué of February 12, 1967, announcing the results of the Wilson/Kosygin talks in London. Not only did the General never leave any doubt about his acceptance of the Polish frontier in his talks.
with Stalin in December 1944, but he was careful to point to the definitive character of the present frontier in his press conference of March 25, 1959, an attitude which makes it possible for him not to upset his German partners while at the same time pleasing the USSR and Poland. Since a decision had been announced unilaterally, it was completely unnecessary to repeat it in a bilateral communiqué. It is better policy not to make such a pronouncement as a concession but to appear, instead, as the statesman and realist who is attempting to bring the German ally to his senses without offending him.

De Gaulle's attitude toward German acquisition of atomic weapons seems to have been less consistent. For a long time, he had left the door open for a European "force de frappe." But as we shall see later, his firm position, taken no later than the February 1965 press conference, was that any positive development between the two Europes is necessarily founded on guarantees given by the Federal Republic to its neighbors in security matters. This implies a precise statute with regard to nuclear weapons. It appears certain that he expressed his agreement with the USSR on this point in Moscow, as well as in his Paris talks with Kosygin.

France's firm stand on the status of Berlin and on not recognizing the GDR has been unchanging. Already in 1956, Mollet and Khrushchev had stated that their fundamental disagreement was exactly on these issues. All the

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same, it is as difficult in 1967 as it was in 1956 to make a clear distinction between what the French leaders view as their preferred policy and what they are saying simply because they must not offend the ally in Bonn. (The same difficulty exists with regard to British and American leaders.) Thus, De Gaulle has never defined what should be Berlin's juridical and political status in a Europe such as he envisages. In any case, the essence of his attitude is perfectly clear: Good relations with the Federal Republic are a necessary component of his policy -- when Bonn's point of view coincides with his own.

The Soviet Union's Role in Franco-German Relations. 62

As usual, General de Gaulle has very clearly expressed his thinking in an apparently commonplace text, his toast to Chancellor Erhard when they met in Bonn on July 22, 1966.

It is inconceivable that Europe and, consequently, the world can really make progress and find peace if Germany and France are not in agreement, as we wanted them to be when we concluded our treaty in the name of both countries.

This was a platitude, but necessary. With regard to joint action, he had just said:

It is understandable, after all that has happened to us in the course of history, that France and Germany are slightly intimidated in the face of the new perspectives confronting

62 The substance and development of Franco-German relations are discussed in A. Grosser, French Foreign Policy; Die Zeit carried an account by the same author, "In Washington scheiden sich die Geister" (A Parting of the Ways in Washington), January 13, 1967.
them. I think also that we have, both individually and together, what it takes to overcome this timidity, to look squarely at the new roads opening before us, and to decide to follow them together.

I am speaking, you understand, of our Europe. I intend to speak of what seems possible now and what has not been possible for a long time: a Europe which shall find itself little by little, first in the détente, then in the entente, and finally in cooperation; a Europe which shall again be whole and in which a whole Germany would again play an essential role. One goes with the other: Europe in its entirety, and Germany in her entirety.

In his reply, however, Chancellor Erhard in effect only emphasized the negative aspect of French action toward the East: French respect for the basic views of the Federal Republic:

I should not like to let this opportunity go by without expressing once more the gratitude of the German people for the attitude which you have taken on the occasion of your trip to Moscow, when you rejected the concept of the existence of two German states and consequently refused recognition of the "Soviet Zone of Occupation." This action was of invaluable assistance to the defense of our right to be the only representatives of Germany and not to acknowledge the artificial creation which is the Zone.

I told you last January in Paris that we were looking forward to your trip to Moscow with hope and interest, and without apprehension. The German people have confidence in you and you have justified this trust.

Only with the formation of the Kiesinger government did a change in content and tone come about. Schroeder's East European policy had been "open" enough. The establishment of trade missions in Warsaw, Bucharest, and
Budapest in March, October, and November 1963, and in Sofia in March 1964, were the first steps in a development that logically led up to the German-Romanian communiqué of February 3, 1967, in which the agreement to exchange ambassadors was announced. But in effect, two important changes had occurred in the meantime.

The first concerns the Bonn-Paris-East European triangle. Exaggerating and distorting a bit, one may define the innovations of the Kiesinger cabinet as follows: In the past, Schroeder wanted to imitate General de Gaulle's Eastern European policy and to use it against him, while Strauss insisted on conducting together with the General a policy other than the General's. Today there is agreement among the Christian Democrats to pursue the General's policy with him. Even the Socialists have in large part abandoned their anti-Gaullism, as outlined in the proposed program which they submitted to their partners of the Great Coalition at the beginning of their negotiations with them: "France has gained in importance and influence.... The Franco-German Friendship Treaty must be put to full use."

The second, more radical change occurred within German policy itself. This was perfectly described by the editorial writer of the Süddeutsche Zeitung in an article entitled: "Looking Eastward with De Gaulle."

If one considers how vehemently De Gaulle turned against the principles of Adenauer's early policy -- integration in the West, but renunciation of an active bilateral East European policy -- Adenauer's almost unconditional political liking for De Gaulle becomes something of an enigma. As late as the early sixties, the so-called Gaullists of the CDU/CSU saw De Gaulle
as representing the utmost "harshness" toward the countries of the East Bloc, as opposed to Kennedy's presumed tendency toward a "softer" approach. Meanwhile, De Gaulle has long since outdistanced the American proponents of an open East policy on the "left." The General has become the spearhead of East European policy, and President Johnson's remarks concerning a policy of reconciliation, on October 7, 1966, were completely in line with De Gaulle's thinking. What a long and arduous road it was that had led from Adenauer's stubborn thesis, "First military integration in the West, then insistence on free elections" to the complete reversal of this concept by De Gaulle: first renunciation of military integration, then -- as the conclusion of a long process of détente with the East -- perhaps the solution of the German question.63

Chancellor Kiesinger's press conference of January 16, 1967, after his return from Paris, is characteristic in this respect: 64

We have provided for full exploitation of the Franco-German Treaty. It goes without saying that even if I have used the phrase, "the treaty has been revived," this does not mean that we are still living in the days of Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises or the Reims Cathedral, but that the world has meanwhile changed. Yet, in agreement with my French partner in the dialogue, I have found that there is a constant in this ever changing universe; and this constant is the need for Franco-German collaboration....

It is true that we both want to overcome, as best we can, the longstanding and hostile opposition of two hostile blocs in Europe: France, because she needs and wants peace in Europe for the sake of her own development, and we for the

64 Complete text in Bulletin des Presse und Informationssamtes der Bundesregierung, January 18, 1967.
same reason and because we believe that only such a development can provide an opportunity for the solution of the German question. In this area, we can arrive at regular consultation, at some harmonization, at mutual assistance in our relations with our Eastern neighbors, including, of course, the Soviet Union in the first place. We were clearly agreed that no attempt should be made to play individual Eastern states against the Soviet Union.

Perhaps this was the most remarkable result of the De Gaulle-Kiesinger talk. For the first time in a century, a French government and a German government encouraged each other toward a policy of rapprochement with the East, apparently unafraid of either a new Rapallo or a new Laval-Stalin or De Gaulle-Stalin Pact.

To be sure, it is very difficult to foresee what the German reaction would be if this policy should fail, if the rigidity of the GDR should continue to be supported by Poland and, above all, by the USSR. For the time being, the results are satisfactory for both partners. De Gaulle has German support for his East European policy, and the Federal Republic, for the first time in many years, believes that its German opponent is on the defensive and that the Communist countries are divided on the German problem. At the end of 1966, an American commentator could still write: "One hard fact of European Realpolitik remains: simultaneous friendship with Bonn and Moscow is an impracticality."65 Yet, at the moment, De Gaulle seems to have achieved this impossibility.

65 *Newsweek*, December 19, 1966.
SECURITY AND STRATEGY

It must be pointed out that this twofold cordiality is part of a total concept which demands rather stringent sacrifices of the Federal Republic. Surely such a concept has rarely been set forth with so pronounced a mixture of optimistic prophecy and almost cynical realism as in the press conference of February 4, 1965.

Real peace and, even more, fruitful relations between East and West, will not be established so long as the German anomalies, the concern they cause, and the suffering they entail, continue. Recognizing the importance of keeping the problem before the conscience of the nation, it is nonetheless clear that, unless there is fighting so that one or the other imposes its solution, this matter will not be settled by the direct confrontation of ideologies and forces of the two camps today rivaling each other in the world. What must be done will not be done except, some day, by the understanding and combined action of the European peoples. For those peoples to envisage first examining together, then settling in common, and lastly guaranteeing

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conjointly the solution to a question which is essentially that of their continent is the only way to cause the reappearance of, and the only link to keep, Europe in a state of equilibrium....

Certainly, the success of such a vast and difficult undertaking implies many conditions.... It must be recognized, first of all by Germany, that any settlement of which she would be the subject would necessarily imply a settlement of her frontiers and of her armament in agreement with all her neighbors, those on the East and those on the West. The six nations which, let us hope, are in the process of establishing the economic community of Western Europe, must succeed in organizing themselves in the political domain as well as in that of defense, in order to make a new equilibrium possible on our continent. Europe, the mother of modern civilization, must establish herself from the Atlantic to the Urals in harmony and cooperation with a view to the development of her vast resources and so as to play, in conjunction with America, her daughter, the role which falls to her in the progress of two billion men who desperately need it. What a role Germany could play in this world ambition of the rejuvenated old continent!

This is not the place to bring up again the question of the frontiers; we must now examine the security aspect. The German problem will be solved only if a solution for European security is found, and it is for this reason that Germany's neighbors to the East must be participants in a system of guarantees which would impose special conditions on the German state. For the moment, let us not go into the question of whether this state would necessarily be a unified Germany or a "confederation" (a long term solution which no longer appears totally unacceptable to the leaders of the Federal Republic). If our assumptions are correct, it will not be enough in the future for the Germans to give up armaments and independent strategic decisions;
they will have to renounce *en bloc* all aspirations that cause concern to their neighbors, starting with atomic weapons. Could Germany accept such a permanent loss of sovereignty and prestige? Perhaps, if reunification were assured. But what if we are talking about a *Vorleistung*, a price to be paid in advance without real assurance of a return concession? The current debate in the Federal Republic on the non-proliferation treaty emphasizes security rather than status, but that is partly because preoccupation with security is more honorable. 67 There is also the problem of the Europe of the Six, as old as the beginnings of the European Defense Community. How is it possible to reconcile the concept of a Western Europe, integrated and in the process of becoming a unified power, with that of a Germany bound by special statute? This question must be answered if the German question is to be resolved.

De Gaulle's comments on the defense of the Six and arms control for Germany by means of an East-West accord hold out no other solution to this difficulty than French domination of the common defense. For France is the only nuclear power in the group. Possibly this concept was inspired by national considerations which might explain, in part, why the General insisted on reunification. If all hope of reunification should vanish, the Federal Republic, mindful of its economic power, might demand equal status.

67 See, for instance, the article by Ambassador Wilhelm Crewe, "Der Atomclub wird geschlossen" (The Nuclear Club is Closing), *Die Zeit*, February 10, 1967, or Theo Sommer's résumé "'Ja aber' zur Atomsperrre" (Nuclear Ban? Yes, but), *Die Zeit*, February 3, 1967.
Hope of reunification induces it to accept military sacrifices. And even if reunification should come to pass, Greater Germany, with her large population and industrial importance, would still not outrank France, since she would be subject to a system of controls. De Gaulle's concept, therefore, is in the French national interest. Even so, it is not necessarily contrary to the German national interest. In addition, it is certainly not displeasing to the Soviet Union.

Another sizable stumbling block leads us to re-examine this reasoning. The problem of European security is not simply the Eastern European countries' fear of Germany. It is also the problem of equilibrium between the camps, which arose as a result of the war. Here again, as we have seen on the political plane, the basic dilemma is simple and apparently insurmountable. Either the European security system includes Europe without the USSR, which is unacceptable to Moscow, or the system does include the USSR and is dominated by the Soviet Union to the extent that it excludes the United States. The long declaration by the Warsaw Pact countries, published in Bucharest on July 8, 1966, asserts: "The European states are capable of solving the problems of their relations without any foreign interference...." It calls for "concomitant abolition of existing military alliances" and the "convocation of a general European conference with a view to examining problems concerning the guarantee of European security and establishing a general European system of cooperation."

The first impression is that such a text, while strictly unacceptable to the Federal Republic, appears to
be close to De Gaulle's own thinking. In point of fact, however, it reveals why Couve de Murville complained, as we have seen earlier, of Russian insistence that security questions be considered. The French leaders know very well that the Atlantic alliance and the American commitment -- integrated or not -- can guarantee Western European security not only against an improbable attack, but also against the state of uncertainty that would result from the overwhelming superiority of the USSR in a Europe where only France, or France and Britain, would possess nuclear weapons. Politically, the solution set forth in the Bucharest declaration is infinitely appealing to De Gaulle. Strategically, however, it is impractical.

In the long run, of course, it is possible that Western Europe might become strong enough to counterbalance the USSR. But this is a grandiose vision rather than a realistic hypothesis, even if we disregard the new conflict situations to which it would give rise. Would such a Europe not constitute a new bloc within the "Europe of the Détente"? Would such a Europe not have to rely on exactly that German military potential which the "Europe of the Détente" would theoretically neutralize? For this reason, even if, emotionally and politically, De Gaulle prefers the absence of the United States, he cannot ignore the strategic necessity of its presence. The only possible dispute over the nature of this presence concerns areas other than Berlin, where the Four Power agreement of 1945 enables the French government to express, behind the cover of legal argumentation, its conviction that Western -- and that means American -- military presence is a military necessity. No one really knows General de Gaulle's true
position in this matter. But he might not have expelled NATO had he believed that an integrated defense system under American leadership would no longer continue to exist east of France.

EASTERN POLICY IN FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

"France's goal is to maintain the same military guarantees while modifying her political position within the alliance." This formulation is taken from an official report which is perhaps the clearest statement of De Gaulle's Atlantic policy.\(^{68}\) If this report can be believed, the ultimate objective is not a Franco-Soviet entente in Europe, which would be incompatible with the alliance and would represent a victory for the USSR. Could it be that General de Gaulle in his spectacular way and characteristic style is simply trying to bring about more peaceful relations between East and West, while at the same time accepting a kind of Atlantic solidarity? Such a policy would not be irreparably at odds with American policy.\(^{69}\)

To a certain extent, the General seems to be governed by such motives. This interpretation is probably more realistic than the assumption that De Gaulle is simply

\(^{68}\)La France et l'Alliance Atlantique, Service d'information, d'études, et de cinématographie des armées, Bulletin No. 17, August 1966, p. 10.

\(^{69}\)This alternative was presented before the Association Française de Science Politique by Raymond Aron and summarized in Le Monde, January 25, 1967. Entitled "Rapprochement russo-américain et rapprochement franco-russe: convergence ou contradiction?", the paper will be published by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
obsessed with a desire to expel the United States from Europe, an explanation proffered by the kindest and most admiring foreign observers as well as by the General's most incisive critics. For instance, an amusing German cartoon shows De Gaulle in a bordello, surveying the attractions of a young woman bearing the features of Harold Wilson. She has already divested herself of her clothes except a brassière labeled "British agricultural interests" and a girdle labeled "pro-American policy," and she is asking, "More?" He replies, "Everything!" In all likelihood, the truth is more complex. In the first place, De Gaulle is completely aware of a number of unavoidable circumstances that cause contradictions in his policy: Western Europe should not depend entirely on the United States for its defense; American soldiers must be expelled; the fight against the dollar must be waged, but American capital is useful and even indispensable. Also, he is sensitive to everything touching on prestige. Franco-Soviet relations flatter his ego and appeal to French national vanity.

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72 See the amusing cartoon by Jacques Faizant in the pro-government Paris-Presse, November 27, 1966: Debré ushers in the I.T.T. while Pompidou pushes the American GI out of the door.
The crux of the matter, it seems, lies in De Gaulle's concept of France as a Western country. This concept rules out any possibility of a change of camp and brings with it the desire to achieve and maintain French independence -- the General's prime objective -- not only of the USSR but primarily of the United States. Whatever amenities or direct advantages result from the new Franco-Soviet relationship, they are only one of several paths to French independence in policy and action. In no way is this relationship intended as a replacement for Franco-American relations, but it is meant as an instrument toward the transformation of these relations.

It is possible that Moscow's flirtation with Paris is only an interlude or a means of exerting pressure on Bonn and (especially) Washington, while waiting for the end of the Vietnamese war to bring about a general settlement with the only conference partner who really counts, the United States. But for De Gaulle, the creation of lasting ties with the USSR is decidedly at stake. Such ties would prevent a Soviet-American entente and force the United States to take the French more seriously.

De Gaulle can indulge himself in repaying old grudges of the war period in increasingly violent language about Vietnam (France being excluded from the role of mediator that she would like to assume), and even in sometimes puerile pinpricks. The attitude of the United States makes the General's prejudices and errors almost costless to him. 73

The manner in which the Vietnamese war is conducted politically and militarily must lead to a rapprochement of the "reasonable" powers, the USSR, France, and, as one has seen on the occasion of Kosygin's visit to London, Great Britain. It also impels countries concerned about their relations with the non-white world to break away from the United States and to repeat, in their turn, Mr. Dulles' words at the time of the Suez crisis: "For the first time, we have demonstrated our independence from Anglo-French colonial policy toward Asia and Africa. This declaration of independence has already produced an electrifying effect throughout the world."74

Rightly or wrongly, American policy in Europe appears to many Europeans, including the French and some German leaders, to allow at most for a certain relaxation in a situation destined to perpetuate itself. De Gaulle is trying almost desperately to convince the Russians that European immobility is not in their interest. But if he succeeds, he will only turn once more toward the United States and tell it: "You see, now you are the only one with a concept of European politics as a diplomatic system whose main task is not to create new complications."

FRENCH POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE 1967 ELECTIONS

This is not the place to evaluate French anti-Americanism. Only two observations seem indicated. First, the Vietnamese war makes the United States appear to believe

in the use of violence\textsuperscript{75} at a time when the Soviet Union is using force nowhere and seems to act everywhere as a mediator. Moreover, the image of American "economic colonization" is shared by a majority -- including even the most "Atlantic" of De Gaulle's opponents.\textsuperscript{76} Second, De Gaulle's policy appears too anti-American to many. It is significant that the communiqué issued in common by the Communist Party and the Federation of the Left, of which Mitterrand is president, mentions only agreement on domestic policy and emphasizes "differences on important aspects of foreign policy."\textsuperscript{77} No less significant is the manner in which Couve de Murville has conducted his election campaign in the Seventh District of Paris, one of the most bourgeois sections of the city. In his propaganda leaflet, he included a talk with the American ambassador and a dinner with Manlio Brosio, Secretary General of NATO, among his daily activities.\textsuperscript{78} Judging by a poll conducted in his election district in January 1967, his concern can easily be understood:\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{75}See for instance the editorial by Father Wenger, editor-in-chief of \textit{La Croix}, a strongly pro-American Catholic daily, December 30, 1966, in answer to Cardinal Spellman's position on total victory.

\textsuperscript{76}Cf. the editorials by J. J. Servan-Schreiber in \textit{L'Express}, especially that of February 6, 1967, or the statements by Guy Mollet, notably those in \textit{Témoignage Chrétien}, January 26, 1967.

\textsuperscript{77}Text in \textit{Le Monde}, December 22, 1966.

\textsuperscript{78}\textit{Vilème Rive gauche}, Supplement to No. 17, January 1967.

\textsuperscript{79}\textit{L'Express}, February 8, 1967.
OPINION POLL IN COUVE DE MURVILLE'S ELECTION DISTRICT,
JANUARY 1967
(Seventh Arrondissement of Paris)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Unsatisfied</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building Europe</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building the nuclear force</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward America</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapprochement with the USSR</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This response, in a well-to-do part of Paris, to the question about the Soviet Union emphasizes the point made above, namely that for a variety of reasons the rapprochement with the USSR has always enjoyed much popularity in France. Why should one not have the best of relations with an unaggressive USSR? It has become more liberal and these relations tend to make it seem even more liberal. And if the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair casts doubt on this assumption, it is a small thing in the eyes of many compared with the napalm bombing in Vietnam.  

It is safe to assume that, as in 1944, De Gaulle has deliberately exploited the desire of many Frenchmen for good relations with the Soviet Union in order to cut the ground from under the French Communist Party during the election campaign. This policy has a considerable influence.

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80 By contrast, see Esprit, a left wing Catholic monthly, whose February 1967 issue is largely devoted to the Sinyavsky-Daniel affair.
on the play of political forces in France. A large photograph of Jacques Duclos, old leader of the party, in smiling conversation with the President at a reception in the Soviet embassy given in honor of Kosygin, was hardly suited to persuade the partisans of the extreme Left that De Gaulle's "personal power" was their worst enemy. Duclos explained:

I am a courteous man. I was invited by comrades, and there I met a gentleman whom I knew and who shook my hand. He said to me, "I am pleased to see you." That's a trivial phrase. Then he said, "It is a long time since that happened last." That is a statement of fact, for I had not met him since the day after the liberation.

The tactics of the French Communists in the second round of the parliamentary elections showed the effect of the government's policy. On the day following Kosygin's visit, L'Humanité carried a sub-heading: "Lecanuet is malcontent," while L'Aurore, the champion of both anti-Gaullism and anti-Communism, headlined: "The Franco-Soviet declaration: Cooperation, Entente, Friendship. And Jacques Duclos interprets: 'Beat the Democratic Center so that the U.N.R. keeps its majority!'" These journalistic expressions may give an exaggerated picture of the role of foreign affairs in the campaigns for the elections of

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81 See Paris-Match, December 17, 1966.
82 Le Monde, December 11 and 12, 1966.
83 L'Humanité, December 12, 1966.
84 L'Aurore, December 10, 1966.
March 5 and 12, 1967. It was a small role; but paradoxically, these affairs deserve an important place in the explanation of the results.

In all democratic countries, the voters normally show far more interest in domestic than in foreign affairs -- as long as there is no international crisis, no traumatic external problem. Since the end of the Algerian war, France has had no grave external problem to resolve; the Germans have had reunification and the Americans the war in Vietnam. Even the small attention that the campaigning parties and candidates in this election gave to the outside world is perhaps one indication that France has emerged from her long preoccupation with domestic crises.

What political force did have an interest in stressing international affairs? Not the left opposition, since its common program made it clear that the Communist Party and the Federation of the Left held greatly divergent views on these matters. The Democratic Center was at a loss for arguments. The Franco-German rapprochement under Kiesinger; the apparent unity of the Six vis-à-vis Britain and the Kennedy Round; the announcement of De Gaulle's intention to go to Rome for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the European treaties; and, finally, the increasing detachment of the United States from Europe, its little appreciated president and its protracted, unpopular war -- all of these could hardly furnish the Democratic Center with ammunition against the government. The Gaullist group, of course, could play up the incontestable prestige of the General, the new Franco-German solidarity, and the success of the opening to the East. But since the Gaullists knew that the nuclear force program was not popular, they made
very little use of a last minute argument that could have been marshalled in defense of that program, namely that the affair of the non-proliferation treaty (made at the end of the Fourth Republic and executed under the Fifth) justified the nuclear choice technologically as well as in terms of "power ranking."

Nevertheless, foreign policy has played at least a triple role in the outcome of the elections:

(1) The defeat of Lecanuet could be foreseen once serious analyses of the presidential election of December 1965 had become available. François Goguel showed that the agricultural aspect of the European idea had worked in Lecanuet's favor at the time. 85 The replacement of Edgar Pisani by Edgar Faure and the substitution of a demagogic for a realistic policy brought many peasant voters back to the Fifth Republic. The consummation of the common market for agriculture in 1966, which ended the uncertainties caused by the rupture of June 30, 1965, had the same effect.

(2) As we have seen, the tactics of the Communist Party can only be explained with foreign policy as a starting point: rather a Gaullist victory than the least risk that Lecanuet's Democratic Center might exert leverage either on the policy of the Gaullists or on the Federation of the Left, whose Guy Mollet was closer to Lecanuet than to Waldeck Rochet in his international ideas. For

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the Communists, foreign policy considerations made the Democratic Center "reactionary" and ruled out any support for its candidates in the second round. If General de Gaulle had held on to his anti-Soviet policy of 1961, such support for "fellow republicans" would have been possible.

(3) The Eastern policy worked even more against the Gaullists than against the Democratic Center and thus was largely responsible for the surprise of the second round. The candidates of the Fifth Republic had a hard time, especially between the two rounds, calling on the voters to close ranks against the Communist candidates while simultaneously implying that Communism was no longer a danger, as shown by De Gaulle's visit to Moscow and Kosygin's return visit. But no one fully anticipated the impact of the presidential journeys on the anti-Communist reflex: the latter did not work any more, or only very little, on the left, the left center, and the right center.

Between the two rounds, the "respectability" of the Communists made sudden progress. This explains the failure of the computers, which had been programmed on the basis of electoral behavior in 1962. Indeed, polls taken before the first round had shown that the voters of the Left Federation (Socialists and Radicals) and the Democratic Center — Mouvement Republicaine Populaire (MRP) — and Independents had voting intentions similar to those manifested in 1962. Fifty-nine percent of the Federationists intended to vote for the Communist candidate if he were the only opponent left to face the candidate of the Fifth Republic; only ten percent of the Centrists said they would do likewise. Another poll, taken between the two rounds, showed that these percentages had already risen
to seventy-six and twenty-four. The actual returns of March 12 indicated an even greater shift.

Perhaps it was the premature claim of complete victory for the General after the first round that made a number of voters decide to "teach him a lesson" and to put their anti-Gaullism before their anti-Communism. After all, the risk that the Communists would come to power was practically nil. Nevertheless the second round demonstrated how much the Communist Party had been reintegrated into normal political life. Differences in political outlook will determine how this new situation is seen, with possible interpretations ranging from the accusation that De Gaulle is the "pioneer of Communism" to the comforting assertion that the power of the right is no longer permanently the "defense against Communism."

The outcome could have a surprising effect on De Gaulle's future foreign policy. One should not exclude the possibility that one of his coming speeches will suggest that Eastern Europe, after all, still needs to evolve considerably before it can be a worthy partner. But the role of domestic considerations in his foreign policy should not be exaggerated. After all, the results of March 12 did not give De Gaulle compelling reasons to change the foreign policy maneuvers that we have tried to describe in the foregoing pages.