MEMORANDUM
RM-5851-ISA/ARPA
MAY 1969

DOCUMENTS OF AN ELITE VIET CONG DELTA UNIT: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion— Part Four: Political Indoctrination and Military Training

David W. P. Elliott and Mai Elliott

PREPARED FOR:
THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
AND THE
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

MEMORANDUM
RM-5851-ISA/ARPA
MAY 1969

DOCUMENTS OF AN ELITE VIET CONG DELTA UNIT: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion— Part Four: Political Indoctrination and Military Training

David W. P. Elliott and Mai Elliott

This research is supported by the Department of Defense under Contract DAHC15 67 C 0143, monitored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), and by the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Views or conclusions contained in this study should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of ISA or ARPA.

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

This study is presented as a competent treatment of the subject, worthy of publication. The Rand Corporation vouches for the quality of the research, without necessarily endorsing the opinions and conclusions of the authors.

Published by The RAND Corporation

FOREWORD

This report is one of a series of Rand studies that examine the organization, operations, motivation, and morale of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces that fought in South Vietnam.

Between August 1964 and December 1968 The Rand Corporation conducted approximately 2400 interviews with Vietnamese who were familiar with the activities of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army. Reports of those interviews, totaling some 62,000 pages, were reviewed and released to the public in June 1972. They can be obtained from the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce.

The release of the interviews has made possible the declassification and release of some of the classified Rand reports derived from them. To remain consistent with the policy followed in reviewing the interviews, information that could lead to the identification of individual interviewees was deleted, along with a few specific references to sources that remain classified. In most cases, it was necessary to drop or to change only a word or two, and in some cases, a footnote. The meaning of a sentence or the intent of the author was not altered.

The reports contain information and interpretations relating to issues that are still being debated. It should be pointed out that there was substantive disagreement among the Rand researchers involved in Vietnam research at the time, and contrary points of view with totally different implications for U.S. operations can be found in the reports. This internal debate mirrored the debate that was then current throughout the nation.

A complete list of the Rand reports that have been released to the public is contained in the bibliography that follows.

(CRC, BJ: May 1975)

Bibliography of Related Rand Reports

For a description of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project and interviewing process, the reader should first consult W. Phillips Davison, *User's Guide to the Rand Interviews in Vietnam*, R-1024-ARPA, March 1972.

These reports can be obtained from The Rand Corporation.

RM-4507/3 Viet Cong Motivation and Morale in 1964: A Preliminary Report, J. C. Donnell, G. J. Pauker, J. J. Zasloff, March 1965.

RM-4517-1 Some Impressions of the Effects of Military Operations on Viet Cong Behavior, L. Goure, August 1965.

RM-4552-1 Evolution of a Vietnamese Village -- Part I: The Present, After Eight Months of Pacification, R. M. Pearce, April 1965.

RM-4692-1 Evolution of a Vietnamese Village -- Part II: The Past, August 1945 to April 1964, R. M. Pearce, April 1966.

RM-4699-1 Some Impressions of Viet Cong Vulnerabilities: An Interim Report, L. Goure, C.A.H. Thomson, August 1965.

RM-4703/2 Political Motivation of the Viet Cong: The Vietminh Regroupees, J. J. Zasloff, May 1968.

RM-4830-2 Viet Cong Motivation and Morale: The Special Case of Chieu Hoi, J. M. Carrier, C.A.H. Thomson, May 1966.

RM-4864-1 Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program, L. W. Pye, January 1966.

RM-4911-2 Some Findings of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study: June-December 1965, L. Goure, A. J. Russo, D. Scott, February 1966.

RM-4966-1 Some Effects of Military Operations on Viet Cong Attitudes, F. H. Denton, November 1966.

RM-4983-1 A Profile of Viet Cong Cadres, W. P. Davison, J. J. Zasloff, June 1966.

RM-5013-1 A Profile of the PAVN Soldier in South Vietnam, K. Kellen, June 1966.

RM-5086-1 Evolution of a Vietnamese Village -- Part III: Duc Lap Since November 1964 and Some Comments on Village Pacification, R. M. Pearce, February 1967.

RM-5114-1 A Look at the VC Cadres: Dinh Tuong Province, 1965-1966, D.W.P. Elliott, C.A.H. Thomson, March 1967.

RM-5163/2 Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960: The Role of the Southern Vietminh Cadres, J. J. Zasloff, May 1968.

RM-5239-1 Insurgent Organization and Operations: A Case Study of the Viet Cong in the Delta, 1964-1966, M. Anderson, M. Arnsten, H. Averch, August 1967.

RM-5267/2 Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages, W. P. Davison, May 1968.

RM-5338 Two Analytical Aids for Use with the Rand Interviews, F. Denton, May 1967.

RM-5353-1 The War in the Delta: Views from Three Viet Cong Battalions, M. Gurtov, September 1967.

RM-5414-1 Viet Cong Cadres and the Cadre System: A Study of the Main and Local Forces, M. Gurtov, December 1967.

RM-5423-1 Viet Cong Logistics, L. P. Holliday, R. M. Gurfield, June 1968.

RM-5446-1 An Evaluation of Chemical Crop Destruction in Vietnam, R. Betts, F. Denton, October 1967.

RM-5450-1 A Statistical Analysis of the U.S. Crop Spraying Program in South Vietnam, A. J. Russo, October 1967.

RM-5462-1 A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy Camp in 1966-1967, K. Kellen, November 1969.

RM-5486-1 Viet Cong Recruitment: Why and How Men Join, J. C. Donnell, December 1967.

RM-5487-1 The Viet Cong Style of Politics, N. Leites, May 1969.

RM-5522-1 Inducements and Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors, L. Goure, August 1968.

RM-5533-1 The Insurgent Environment, R. M. Pearce, May 1969.

RM-5647 Volunteers for the Viet Cong, F. Denton, September 1968.

RM-5788 Pacification and the Viet Cong System in Dinh Tuong: 1966-1967, D.W.P. Elliott, W. A. Stewart, January 1969.

RM-5799 The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive, V. Pohle, January 1969.

RM-5848 Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion -- Part One: Unit Composition and Personnel, D.W.P. Elliott, M. Elliott; May 1969.

RM-5849 Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion -- Part Two: Party Organization, D.W.P. Elliott, M. Elliott, May 1969.

RM-5850 Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion -- Part Three: Military Organization and Activities, D.W.P. Elliott, M. Elliott, May 1969.

RM-5851 Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion -- Part Four: Political Indoctrination and Military Training, D.W.P. Elliott, M. Elliott, May 1969.

RM-5852 Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Unit: The Demolition Platoon of the 514th Battalion -- Part Five: Personal Letters, D.W.P. Elliott, M. Elliott, May 1969.

RM-6131-1 Conversations with Enemy Soldiers in Late 1968/Early 1969: A Study of Motivation and Morale, K. Kellen, September 1970.

RM-6375-1 Rallying Potential Among the North Vietnemese Armed Forces, A Sweetland, December 1970.

PREFACE

The present Memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the continuing study of Communist organization and operations undertaken by The RAND Corporation for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and for the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. It is one of a series of five closely related collections of captured Viet Cong documents, translated by RAND consultant Mai Elliott and with introductory material provided by David W. P. Elliott, now a RAND consultant but formerly a member of the research staff leading an interview team in Dinh Tuong province. Editing of the documents has been held to a minimum. Published separately for convenience in handling, the complete series consists of the following titles:

Part 1: Unit Composition and Personnel
Part 2: Party Organization
Part 3: Military Organization and Activities
Part 4: Political Indoctrination and Military Training
Part 5: Personal Letters

To facilitate the reader's comprehension of any single part, this Preface to the entire series and its appended Chronology are prefixed to each Memorandum.

Although literally tons of documents have been captured from Viet Cong political organizations and military units, detailed records of the entire scope of activities and personnel of such units and organizations are rare. Typically, documents appear to cover only a few aspects of the organization from which they come and often raise as many questions

as they answer. A contributory reason may be that large organizations tend to disperse their records both as a consequence of their size and the diversity of their component parts and as a security precaution. Small units and organizations, while often maintaining central files, are normally represented by documents of limited value.

The collection of documents presented here is unique in presenting a detailed and comprehensive picture of a military unit that, although limited in size, reflects the organizational principles and problems of the larger force to which it is attached. At the same time, the smallness of the unit allows the important factor of personality to come into clear focus, thus complementing the recitation of abstract organizational details.

These documents were captured in mid-May 1967 by an element of a U.S. brigade operating in the Mekong Delta. Their comprehensiveness indicates that an entire file of unit records was captured intact. The records include unit rosters, personnel records, documents relating to Party activities in the unit, training documents, operational plans, unit critiques, and personal letters. Comprehensive as they are, those presented in this series are only a selection from a still larger number of documents. They do, however, exemplify most of the significant data that appear in the documents omitted.

The documents are from the records of a demolition platoon of the 514th Battalion, the Local Force unit of My Tho Province in the Mekong Delta. They reflect not only the organization and command structure of the demolition platoon but that of the battalion as well. Several documents from the battalion command staff discuss problems that go beyond the immediate concern of the demolition unit itself.

An integral part of the 514th Battalion, the demolition platoon participated in many, but not all, of its battles. Since the Battalion often dispersed its companies for operations, not all of its elements were engaged in combat at the same time. Moreover, the 514th Battalion normally played a largely defensive role in its operational area. When it did engage in offensive operations, it relied heavily on the demolition unit as the cutting edge of its attack. The unit leader notes that, "We have the responsibility of being the forward group in any attack, of opening the way for the other elements, and of removing obstacles, erected by the enemy to stop our advance, with explosives."

"Since we are the fighters who have to carry out attacks with explosives," the unit leader adds, "we should always be brave and heroic. We should carry out any task assigned to us, whether it be an attack on enemy forces stationed in posts or in the field." Because of its vanguard role in combat and the need to rely on individual initiative when the unit was operating in a dispersed pattern that makes centralized command difficult, heavy emphasis was placed on developing a unit of highly motivated members. Thus, an unusually high proportion of demolition unit members belong to the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) and the PRP Youth Group.

The period covered in the documents runs approximately from the beginning of 1966 to mid-May 1967, when the documents were captured. During this time, unit records contain at least five plans of attack but mention only three being carried out. In May 1967, the 514th Battalion and the demolition unit were subjected to a series of attacks by a

U.S. infantry unit that resulted in the Battalion's defeat and the capture of these documents.

The years 1963 to 1964 marked a campaign period that was fairly successful for the 514th Battalion. Its fortunes slipped somewhat in 1965 and 1966, then briefly improved in 1967 with a successful attack on a GVN pacification project. In the above-mentioned series of battles in May 1967, the Battalion was put out of action until the Tet offensive of February 1968. As a consequence, the documents show the unit at a low ebb. Under-strength and not often in action, the 514th Battalion and the demolition unit spent much of the time training, reorganizing, and bolstering unit morale. This relatively low level of offensive military activity thus actually allows us a clearer view of the unit's nature and composition than we could normally have gained of a similar unit busily engaged in offensive operations.

Like all records of contemporary events, this one remains incomplete despite its volume and wealth of detail. From the nadir of its fortunes in May 1967, the 514th Battalion and its demolition unit recovered to play a prominent role in the partially successful and immensely destructive Tet Assault on My Tho, the Delta province town, in February 1967. In the absence of specific information concerning the revival of this unit in the intervening months, it is difficult to say how the recovery was accomplished and how permanent it will prove to be. Nevertheless, the following documents give a detailed view of the foundation on which this revival was based, and very likely provide more than a glimpse of underlying strengths and weaknesses of other and larger Viet Cong military organizations.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE C646 DEMOLITION UNIT OF THE MY THO PROVINCE 514th LOCAL FORCE BATTALION

May 6, 1966: Request from the demolition unit's Party Chapter to the battalion for additional men to add to current unit strength of 25.

May 8, 1966: Three-month training course for the demolition unit initiated.

May 27, 1966: Attack on Vinh Kim District Town by 514th Battalion and the demolition unit.

June 1, 1966: Conference of all cadres in the battalion to discuss the new political mission set forth by the Battalion Party Committee.

July 19, 1966: Planning for attack on Cay Son.

Aug 12, 1966: Battalion assigned a new area of operation by the Province Military Affairs Section.

Aug 13, 1966: Battalion moves to Hoa Dong District, Go Cong Province (part of the Viet Cong My Tho Province).

Sept 17, 1966: Meeting of all political and military cadres in the battalion to discuss the attack on "K 100," or Vinh Kim village. There are no records of the attack taking place.

Oct 17, 1966: Demolition unit commander notes that unit strength is down to 16 men and requests reinforcements.

November 1966: One month of training scheduled.

Dec 21, 1966: Unit strength totals 23 men, 19 present for duty.

Jan 2, 1967: Indoctrination to launch the 3rd Phase of Activities.

Jan 9, 1967: Six-day training program initiated with emphasis on political training.

Feb 7, 1967: Battalion in bivouac for Tet.

Feb 12, 1967: Conference of all cadres in battalion to review the tasks performed in the winter phase and to communicate to all cadres the tasks to be performed during the spring phase.

Feb 22, 1967: Thirty-day training program ordered by the Battalion Command Staff.

Feb 23, 1967: Conference of all military and political cadres in the battalion "to discuss the K 140 and K 111 military plans" on the "center of pacification of the enemy."

Feb 25, 1967: New additions to unit, but active strength remains 19 members.

Feb 28, 1967: Political indoctrination on the role of the cadres.

March 1, 1967: Another plan of attack on points "K 11C, K 18C, and K 18B" is disseminated.

March 4, 1967: Evaluation of the spring campaign.

April 6, 1967: Orders given for "deep penetration into enemy areas." Battalion splits into companies.

April 9, 1968: Meeting of all Company Command Staffs and of the Battalion Command Staff to discuss an attack plan, probably a continuation of the February 23 and March 1 plans.

May 1, 1967: Sixteen-day training schedule issued by the Battalion Command Staff.

May 3, 1967: Defense against a sweep operation in Long Tien village.

May 13, 1967: Attack by the unit on Dong Hoa village, Chau Thanh District (K 19).

May 15-17, 1967: Series of encounters with a US-GVN operation culminating in the loss of these documents.

SUMMARY

In Vietnamese Communist practice, the training of troops includes both political indoctrination and conventional military instruction. In Viet Cong parlance, the two are as intimately related as "lips and teeth."

The basic instructional unit is the company or platoon, whose commander instructs the cadres in the Party Chapter. The cadres, in turn, instruct the common soldiers. In this scheme, the cadre is of great importance. Not only is he the last link in the chain of command between Party and troops, but all instruction, military and political, has the subsidiary aim of developing his ability as a leader.

In content, political indoctrination aims at giving the fighter a firm Communist ideological stand, at arousing his hatred of the American "bandits," and at convincing him that the Party is the supreme leader in all things. Beyond the usual arts of war, he is coached in his unit's immediate military goals and in the presumable intentions of the enemy.

Instruction is normally carried out in a series of five steps. A general exposition of what is to be learned is first given by the instructor, followed by a session in which the trainees copy down verbatim all the salient points. The "class" then breaks up into a number of smaller units for group discussion. On reconvening, the trainees go over what they have learned with the instructor. The last step is a review of materials by question and answer.

It is worth noting finally that instruction is deemed of such importance that it sometimes continues even when the troops are on the march and during the lull of battle.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD..... iii

PREFACE..... vii

CHRONOLOGY OF THE C646 DEMOLITION UNIT OF THE MY THO PROVINCE 514TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALION..... xi

SUMMARY..... xiii

Section

GUIDE TO THE DOCUMENTS IN THIS MEMORANDUM..... 1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS IN THIS MEMORANDUM..... 9

DOCUMENTS..... 10

GUIDE TO THE DOCUMENTS IN THIS MEMORANDUM

In 1957, the Chinese Communists advanced the slogan "Both Red and Expert," meaning that ideological zeal must be supplemented by technical competence. While the "red and expert" terminology rarely appears in Vietnamese Communist writings, the term "training" (hoc tap) encompasses both conventional technical training and political indoctrination.

Within military units, the relationship between political indoctrination and specialized training is especially close because the military commanders who conduct the training from the platoon level up normally hold equivalent rankings within the Party structure and, hence, are expected to be both "red and expert." Since the intangibles of unit morale and discipline play an important role in translating military skills into successful battlefield performance, the relationship between training in technical military skills and political indoctrination within the unit must be close in order to ensure good unit performance.

Great emphasis is placed on explaining to the ordinary soldier, as well as to the cadres, the goal toward which their military skills must be directed. A short statement issued by the 514th Battalion analyzes the major military development of 1967, the arrival of U.S. troops in Dinh Tuong province: "Their scheme is not different from the Strategic Hamlet policy -- bombing and shelling the villages day and night, conducting sweep operations in the village continuously to make the people flee to

their areas so that they can be controlled more easily, and also so that they can establish a 'white belt' zone separating our areas from theirs so as to create a clear front line."(1)*

A study of the situation during the last six months of 1966 stresses the geographical importance of the province. "The enemy is using our province as a testing ground. Our province is the key to the Delta provinces, and is, therefore, an important military center -- this is why the enemy is trying very hard to fight us so as to link Saigon with the rest of the Delta provinces and to use their success here to boost their efforts elsewhere."(2) A follow-up report in March 1967 outlines in detail the U.S. plans for achieving those aims. "The enemy plans to pacify the area near My Tho city [the province capital] and to open Highway #4 [the only land route from Saigon to the Delta]. . . . The Americans will be conducting sweep operations into our liberated areas, while the puppet troops [Vietnamese Government forces] will play a static defensive role."(3)

The soldiers as well as the cadres were thus given a detailed analysis of the challenge confronting them. It was in the context of this anticipated challenge, following on the heels of several unsuccessful military actions, that the requirements for political indoctrination and military training were determined. After suffering military defeats in the areas of the province remote

---

*Superscribed numbers in parentheses refer to the documents correspondingly numbered and ordered in the body of the Memorandum. Documents are also listed by number and title on p. 9.

from its base area, the units of the 514th Battalion returned to the Plain of Reeds in late 1966 for reconsolidation and retraining. A review of the "requirements of the phase of attacks" for this period acknowledged: "We were unable to fulfill these requirements. We failed to intensify our military activities to the required degree, and this in turn affected the movement to destroy Strategic Hamlets and caused our political position to weaken."(3)

In the face of this situation, the general mission of the 514th Battalion was formulated. "Our task is to restrain the strength of the enemy and then move to destroy their control. . . . Our task is to destroy this oppressive control in . . . weak areas in line with the policy of higher authorities. We should develop among our troops the determination to fight in all . . . areas, to sap the strength of the enemy and destroy them, and to fulfill the requirements set forth by the higher authorities."(4)

To develop this determination among the troops, the first requisite is to hone the training and indoctrination instruments -- the cadres -- to a fine edge. In this task, the Party plays a prominent role. "The Party Chapter should receive training first, so that it can in turn train the fighters in the squad sections. . . . The instruction program should be submitted to the Party Chapter beforehand for approval."(4)

"Political indoctrination is aimed at making the unit members enlightened, giving them a firm ideological stand, increasing their hatred for the American bandits, and making them understand that they should implement the

resolutions of the Party during the training course and strictly carry out the orders of the command staff."(4) The leadership of the Party in political indoctrination is impressed on non-Party members down to the lowest levels. The Deputy Secretary of the Demolition Unit's Party Chapter notes that "the unit has been indoctrinated about the letter from the Region Party Committee. This will be a source of encouragement for the unit during the training course." The ultimate source of the indoctrination materials is not dissembled: "We have received the appeal of Uncle Ho, and we have attended the 12th reorientation coming from the Central [Hanoi] level."*(4)

The key to both political and military training is the cadres. "The role, position and duty of the cadres are different from those of the soldiers, because the cadres are assisted and nurtured by the Party, because the cadres are leaders, and because they should behave in an exemplary manner."(4) More specifically, the cadres are important because they are the line of direct contact with non-Party members, and the ultimate responsibility for the execution of Party policies devolves on them.

The notebook of the Demolition Unit's Deputy Party Secretary observes that "the Company is the foundation of the Battalion. The Company and Platoon cadres are the cadres who directly implement the directives of the Party, because they are the last links in the chain of command. So if they do not detect their errors and correct them in time, they will have to pay for their

---

*A reference to the convening of the 12th Plenary Session of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee in December 1965.

errors with their own lives in combat."[4] This warning underlines the personal stake that the cadres have in ensuring that their troops are properly trained and motivated.

Great emphasis is laid on transmission of the basic contents of the indoctrination to each individual. In another context, a regional directive stresses the point that "the strengthening of the collectivity should be based on the ideological training of the individuals, and this is why when criteria are determined for the collectivity, criteria for the ideological training of the individual should also be set forth."

Translating this concept into action requires an appropriate technique of training. A five step presentation is employed. Normally, these steps are: (1) general exposition of the lesson by the instructor, (2) dictation of the contents of the training document, to be copied verbatim by the trainees, (3) separation into small discussion group cells, (4) reassembly of the training group in which questions that were not satisfactorily answered by the discussion group leaders are resolved by the instructor, and (5) a review period in which the instructor uses a question-and-answer technique to test the understanding of the trainees.

Among the five steps of presenting training and indoctrination material there is only one, the first, in which the trainee is not actively engaged. The level of participation demanded of the individual ensures that the contents of the training and indoctrination will make an impression. The success of this technique depends on the cadres' zeal and competence in ensuring that the

basic principles of group indoctrination are scrupulously adhered to throughout the training.

In May 1966, a three-month training course was initiated for the Demolition Unit. Notification of the course and detailed guidance were sent to the Demolition Unit by the "Province Engineering and Demolition Section Chief" after approval by the Province Military Affairs Section. The initiative for setting up the training program came from the "General Technical Conference of the Engineering and Demolition Branch," convened by the Military Region in 1965. The guidance for the training, with appropriate clearance from the Region and Province Military Affairs Sections, came primarily through a technical supervisory channel.

Nevertheless, as the covering letter from the demolition training plan emphasizes, training should "reinforce the fighters' ideological stand of fighting for the Party and for the people" and improve their technical skills and their military contribution to the unit. The cover letter says, "In carrying out the training program, we understand that the Revolutionary policy and the military policy are interrelated -- that they are like lips and teeth. In drawing up the training program, political indoctrination will be included in the training program so as to ensure tight leadership by the Party Chapter (this means that political subjects will be the basis of the training, and that thoughts will be given the highest priority)."(7)

The instructions add that "the unit will be the basic unit of training. The unit commander will serve as the instructor, but other cadres might come down to check on

the training or to assist the unit commander in giving instructions." The reliance on the existing unit leadership to conduct the training, rather than importing specialist cadres, is due to the fact that the training aims at "reinforcing the cadres' capacity to organize and lead the unit," as well as at raising the tactical and technical level of the soldiers.(7)

As the scheduled three-month training phase drew to a close in July 1966, a plan of attack was drawn up, givng the unit detailed instructions on how to prepare for the forthcoming battle. The plan, which deals largely with technical military matters, ends with the notation "Instructions of the Company Political Officer."(8) Another checklist of preparations for combat lists a threefold mission for the political officer: motivating the men before, during and after the battle.(9)

The results of this preparation are not known since there are no records of the battles having taken place. From other evidence, it appears that at least part of the battalion had an unsuccessful campaigning season in the fall of 1966 (mentioned above) and returned to its base area for further training. Nevertheless, the unit was not able to devote its full attention to training. The notebook of the Deputy Party Chapter Secretary mentioned, among other difficulties, that "the unit is required to perform its usual mission while training."(4)

This training continued through early 1967, with occasional battle plans being studied, but few records of the battles occurring. The Tet cease fire was passed in bivouac, while training continued. In late February 1967, a 30-day training program was inaugurated "to make

the cadres and fighters completely familiar with fighting tactics and techniques so that they can carry out the forthcoming mission."(11)

At the end of April, a detailed training program for May 1967 was issued. This training was to be conducted even when the unit was moving throughout the province. On such days, the regulation was "marching from 9 to 12 o'clock at night, and the next day the units will resume their political training as usual."(13) The training was carried out at the battalion and company level, and was apparently aimed at preparing the unit for encounters with a newly arrived U.S. brigade. The Party Chapter Secretary of the Demolition Unit noted that "the unit should be broken up into three cells. Depending on circumstances and conditions, they should be armed properly and adequately, so that they can perform their dual mission of attending training courses and fighting while in the village."(14)

The schedule for May 14 specified training in "tactics for fighting against the Americans." May 15 was "practice by the companies of attack on enemy forces stationed in the field, in accordance with the plan of attack." May 16 was set aside to review the "political mission in the fight against the Americans."(15) Ironically, the schedule anticipated an unsimulated test in all these areas. During these three days, the 514th Battalion and its Demolition Unit were hard hit in a series of running encounters with elements of the U.S. 9th Infantry Divison, and in the fighting, lost these documents, among others.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS IN THIS MEMORANDUM

1. Excerpt from a Cadre's Notebook: "The Enemy's Schemes for 1967."
2. Study of the Situation During the Last Six Months of 1966 and Adoption of Resolutions.
3. Meeting to Adopt Resolutions for 1967.
4. Excerpts from the Notebook of the Deputy Secretary of the Party Chapter: "Political Indoctrination Program for the Military Training Phase."
5. Notes on the Announcement of a New Training Phase.
6. Announcement of a Training Course for the Demolition Unit.
7. Outline of Training Subjects for the Demolition Unit, signed by Sau Tho, dated May 8, 1966.
   (A) Outline of Training Subjects (Demolition Units);
   (B) Specialized Training Subjects (The Demolition Unit);
   (C) Training Program for Fighters for 1966.
8. Plan of Attack on Cay Son.
9. On the Role of the Political Officer.
10. Program of Activities Beginning February 3, 1967.
11. Implementation of Training Schedule.
12. Training Program for the Entire Battalion, Possibly Covering a Period from Late 1966 to Early 1967.
13. Political Indoctrination Program for May 1967: Political Training, Time Schedule.
14. Notes on Conducting Military Training.
15. Training Schedule for May 1967.

DOCUMENT NO. 1

EXCERPT FROM A CADRE'S NOTEBOOK
"THE ENEMY'S SCHEMES FOR 1967"

At present, the Americans have sent 10,000 troops to My Tho province. The puppet troops are falling to pieces, so they have to bring the American expeditionary forces here to reinforce them.

Their scheme is not different from the Strategic Hamlet policy -- i.e., bombing and shelling the villages day and night, conducting continuous sweep operations in the villages to make the people flee to their areas, so that they can be controlled more easily, and also so that they can establish a "white belt" separating our areas from theirs in order to create a clear front line.

They have to do this because My Tho is the link between Western Nam Bo and Saigon, because of the strategic highway going through the province, and also because the province occupies an important position in the Mekong Delta. If they lose My Tho, they will lose Western Nam Bo. The more they lose, the more they thrash around convulsively. Therefore, we have to concentrate all our efforts on serving the country and the revolution in order to oppose our enemy -- the American imperialists -- who are trampling on our fatherland. We cannot sit at home and look on.

DOCUMENT NO. 2

STUDY OF THE SITUATION DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1966 AND ADOPTION OF RESOLUTIONS

September 28, 1966

SITUATION OF 1965-66

The Americans' schemes failed and they had to increase their troops in Vietnam. They sent wave after wave of troops to the South and continued to sabotage the North. In the South, they conducted sweep operations, encroached on the Liberation areas, and tried to cut our areas up into different segments. For example, during the last dry season they tried to achieve this with their "five arrow" tactic, but failed. We destroyed 200,000 enemy in all, in both the mountain and jungle areas, and in the delta region. At the same time, we destroyed their national program of pacification, thereby robbing them of a base of support in the countryside. They now hold only half of the weapons they had before. Their religious policy has also failed, and the factions that used to oppose us have turned around to oppose them.

We have achieved victory in the 1965-66 period. We have destroyed over 200,000 enemies to date and captured many weapons. Our three types of forces are ready, from the 17th parallel to the tip of Ca Mau, and have the capability of fighting the enemy at any moment. The strength of our forces is shown by the fact that we have

destroyed enemy units from battalion to regiment size. We have the initiative on the battlefield.

The enemy has failed in their big schemes, such as the Taylor and McNamara plans, the program to herd the people into their own areas, etc., and the enemy has switched from the special war to the limited war, and increased their efforts to scoop the people up from our areas and herd them into their areas by intensified shelling and bombing. The enemy has switched to a limited war, but they are still losing.

Present Situation

The enemy has lost both in their special war and in their limited war. We are still on a winning trend. In 1965-66, the American bases continued to be destroyed. In the political field, the whole world is against the Americans. The American and puppet troops do not have any fighting spirit -- they do not dare to conduct sweep operations -- and there were cases of mutiny when the soldiers turned around and fired at their own units. Their strategy and tactics are still confusing and they have not been able to devise a definite strategy. They cannot make up their minds whether to make peace or to continue fighting. The weather has caused the American troops a lot of difficulties, and what's more, they are having difficulties with their logistics because they have to transport supplies over long distances.

OUR WEAK AND STRONG POINTS

1. The line and policy of our Party are correct. Our Party is imaginative and has initiative, as shown by its leadership in arming the troops and in providing guidance in combat.

2. Our people have firm morale and they are indomitable, and that is why we are winning the war. At present, we have succeeded in winning the allegiance of the people (in winning control over the people) [danh dan duoc].

3. Our people's guerrilla warfare is carried out by an extremely large force. Sometimes we attack the enemy with large forces, sometimes we attack them with a small number of troops, sometimes we attack them from without and sometimes we attack them from within -- the enemy cannot foresee our tactics and strategy because we have such a wide range of tactics and strategy.

4. We have the strong and widespread support of the people in the world, as shown by the fact that people in many countries have signed petitions asking to go to Vietnam to fight and many countries are sending us supplies. The American people's support is the most outstanding.

SITUATION IN OUR PROVINCE

1. Special characteristic of our province: our province is heavily populated and rich in resources.

2. The Revolutionary movement in our province is widespread and very strong. The enemy is using our province as a testing ground. Our province is the key

gateway to the delta provinces, and is, therefore, an important military center -- this is why the enemy is trying very hard to fight us here in order to link Saigon with the rest of the delta provinces and to use their success here to boost their efforts elsewhere.

THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE PAST MONTHS

1. The enemy has met with defeat in their pacification effort. Their pacification program has failed in Go Cong, Cho Gao, and Chau Thanh Districts, for example. Generally speaking, they have failed everywhere, and at present they are only trying to restart in a few areas.

2. Their rear area is under strong pressure, and they were defeated by our forces in Than Cuu Nghia, Van Cang, and Trung Luong.

3. They suffered severe defeats in the dry season in areas such as Long An, for example, where their "two arrow" tactic failed. In 1965 the enemy lost 14,000 dead and wounded, and so far this year they have lost 10,000 dead and wounded. They have also lost a large quantity of weapons and ammunition.

At present, we have 85 guerrilla units; and as for the Local Force units, they are so strong now that they are capable of destroying enemy company-size units.

The political struggle movement is at its peak, and generally speaking the people have a firm revolutionary stand. This is shown in their participation in face-to-face struggles and in their volunteering to join civilian laborers' teams to serve on the front line, etc.

4. The situation in our liberated areas is good. In 1965, we were able to recruit 10,000 new fighters to send to the higher authorities. The liberated areas are strong from all points of view.

We are strong in the military field in all three kinds of areas.

Our Party has firm control of all the villages and industrial firms. The policy that is being applied most faithfully is the one that requires everyone to love the people and be loyal to the Party. We have the spirit of self-reliance. We have been self-sufficient -- from the time when we were still weak to the present when we have become strong.

INTERNAL UNITY

Thanks to the indomitable spirit and the indoctrination of the Party, we were able to achieve victory in our attacks. Our unity is shown in our effort to carry the dead and wounded from the battlefield, and in reinforcing each other in combat.

The unity between the troops and the people is well maintained. For example, during the fighting in Phu My our troops were able to help repair the houses of the people in spite of the fact that they also had to fight.

GENERAL SHORTCOMINGS IN OUR PROVINCE

The armed struggle has not reached the required degree of intensification.

1. In the military field. There are many villages which have only a small unit of badly armed guerrillas.

Take the case of Hau My village, for example. It used to be a strong village before, but now it is very weak.

2. In the political field. Our political strength has declined. Compared to the situation before, the political movement has weakened a great deal. At present, the popular associations are very weak, and cannot fulfill their requirements.

Many cadres in the Party Chapters have committed many errors in their leadership; for example, there were cases of cadres threatening to beat up the people.

During combat there were violations of the policy concerning the dead and wounded.

3. Political indoctrination. The cadres have been neglecting this task and have not been providing guidance to their subordinates.

4. Management task. Before, the unit observed regulations better than they do at present. They no longer observe regulations strictly in their everyday life and they use inappropriate language in dealing with others. This is due to the lack of criticism and guidance [thieu sanh hoat]. Now that we have been indoctrinated on the three good points of the Party Chapter, we should be able to overcome these shortcomings.

QUESTIONS

1. In 1965 and at the beginning of 1966, in what fields did the enemy suffer big defeats?

2. What were the big victories that we achieved? What is the meaning of these victories?

3. What were our strong and weak points?

(In discussing these questions, we should go into the performance of the unit and each individual in the unit in detail.)

Discussion to last for 5 hours.

Indoctrination session to be conducted for half a day, and then a free discussion will be conducted for the next three days.

DOCUMENT NO. 3

MEETING TO ADOPT RESOLUTIONS FOR 1967*

March 27, 1967

I. THE ENEMY SITUATION

There were two phases: the winter period, which covers October, November, and December, and the spring period, which covers January, February, and March.

When the enemy started their winter phase in October 1965, they had 33 companies of Civil Guards, in all 19,000 troops. These troops were mainly deployed in the three upper districts. In the lower three districts, there was one battalion to carry out the pacification program.

Enemy Schemes

1. The enemy continued to pacify the three upper districts. Their main target was still the vicinity of My Tho city, and they centered their efforts on Binh Duc.

2. The enemy tried to pacify the areas along National Highway 4, so they could herd the people into these areas. They conducted sweep operations frequently in these areas in order to pacify them.

In the lower three districts, the enemy kept only one battalion, because they considered these districts as their own secure areas. We sent the 2nd Company down

---

*In the handwriting of Sau Kim, the Party Chapter Secretary.

to the lower three districts to operate, and at the same time we were also very active in the upper three districts.

The enemy pushed their Chieu Hoi propaganda strongly ahead, but they did not obtain any results.

The enemy lost the initiative in many areas. For example, when the 2nd Company went down to the three lower districts and started operating, the enemy had to send their forces down to these districts to cope with the situation. In the upper three districts, we attacked many targets, such as Tam Hiep, Cu Chi, and patrol boats, and this put the enemy on a defensive position.

In this period the enemy lost 2,000 troops and so had only 17,000 troops left in the winter phase. In this period the enemy also killed 497 innocent civilians, wounded 349 others, arrested 687 people and conscripted 646 youths. Seventy-seven enemy soldiers surrendered to us, and turned in 21 weapons. In this period, the enemy also lost 124 weapons.

II. The enemy tried to pacify the three upper districts but did not obtain any results because the areas were flooded and they couldn't do anything. In the lower three districts, the enemy installed their oppressive control machinery around the district capitals, but in spite of this they couldn't get anything accomplished. The enemy forces were large but they couldn't do anything because we were attacking them fiercely at the time.

[The weak points of the enemy]

1. They lacked manpower.

2. The quality of their army left much to be desired because most of their troops were new recruits. This was why they couldn't implement their plans.

3. The enemy was mostly on a defensive position. There were many cracks in their defense, however, and in our attacks we struck very accurately at enemy targets.

4. The enemy's use of artillery shelling was restricted.

5. The enemy's rear areas were unstable, and the enemy was weak in contested areas, such as Cu Chi and Tam Hiep.

6. The enemy's morale has slipped very low, and they were constantly worried that the Americans would withdraw from the country.

Even though the enemy had many troops at their disposal, we were able to strike wherever we wanted to. The enemy troops still retained some capability. For example, there were Civil Guards and SDC troops stationed in the lower three districts, and this was why the 7th Division was not forced to stretch thin their line of troops. We inflicted some losses on the 7th Division, but these losses were not heavy, and this was why this division is still able to operate.

The enemy classified various areas into different categories and allocated the task of operating there to different forces, and this was why they were able to conduct sweep operations continuously, on a daily basis.

The enemy was determined -- and made every effort -- to build the American base, and to intensify their Chieu Hoi activities. The Americans have introduced the following number of troops into our theater of war: 1 brigade, 3 infantry battalions, 1 armored battalion (with 100 armored cars), and 1 artillery battalion with 18 cannon. In all, they have brought in 4,000 troops.

Before, the enemy divided this part of the country into two regions, but now they consider it as forming only one region: Eastern Nam Bo. The Americans began to arrive here in force on January 9, and by January 22 they had completed their introduction of troops. After that they began operating.

III. The enemy had two methods of operation:

1. They conducted patrols around their base areas.

2. They conducted sweep operations along our anti-American perimeter 3 and also in the liberated areas.

To date there have been a total of 20 sweep operations of battalion size.

Observations of the Current Affairs Section

1. The enemy has established a base area with the intention of staying here for a long time.

2. The enemy plans to pacify the areas near My Tho city, especially the areas surrounding the province capital (in Binh Duc and Tam Hiep), and to open Highway 4 (the areas stretching over 2km on both sides of the highway will be cleared).

3. The enemy also plans to pacify the three lower districts, and their effort will be especially centered on the areas along the Cua Tieu River, along the Mekong River, and along Route 28 leading to Cai Be.

The Americans will be conducting sweep operations into our liberated areas while the puppet troops will play a static defensive role. The Americans have the task of destroying our large units. The enemy will try to wipe

out our guerrillas and cadres (this is only a guess) -- in some areas, the local infrastructure has been attacked.

But at present the enemy has not yet completed the construction of their base, and this is why they are still in a defensive position. The puppet troops are getting weaker and weaker. As for the pacification and Chieu Hoi cadres, they are bad and cruel elements. As for us, we have the support of the people -- we are extremely strong because we have this support and also because we have a revolutionary spirit.

The Americans are in a weak position because they have to cope with a people's guerrilla war and because of the opposition of the American people in their home country.

- The Americans have many shortcomings.
- They operate in platoon and company size, and this creates favorable conditions for us to attack them.
- They are in conflict with the puppet troops.
- They use conventional warfare tactics.
- We employ guerrilla warfare tactics against them and keep them on the run.
- They use demagogic methods in dealing with the people.

The Strong Points of the Enemy

- They have a large number of troops to attack us and they have heavy artillery fire power. They take advantage of every occasion to affect our morale with their psychological warfare activities.

We have put out of action 2,515 enemy troops. We killed 1,272 of them, wounded 761, and captured 68. In all we destroyed 3 companies, 10 platoons, and 8 squads. We also captured 132 weapons. We shot at and damaged 5 airplanes; in addition, we damaged 24 armored cars, destroyed 3 boats, damaged 2 others, and destroyed 2 posts and 4 watch towers.

Observations.

1. The guerrillas have intensified their activities.

2. There were two strong Local Force Companies: one in Go Cong District and the other in Cai Be district.

The Phase of Attacks Against the Americans. The Americans arrived here on January 26, 1967. During this phase of attacks, the guerrillas in Binh Duc wiped out 66 Americans. Long Trung village wiped out 49 Americans, Thanh Phu 42, Song Thuan 39, Thoi Son 17, Phuoc Thanh 9, the district liaison teams 5, and the Local Force 8.

The moment the Americans set foot here we were able to attack them at once. We attacked their armored unit, their artillery unit, their airplanes, etc.; in a word, we attacked every kind of forces and equipment at their disposal. We were able to attack them during the day as well as at night. We attacked them everywhere, with whatever means we had.

The Determination to Fight Against the Americans. This determination has not been brought to its highest pitch, and it is not firm and intense enough. Many still overestimate the Americans, and generally speaking, many are afraid of difficulties and of the Americans' operations.

In fighting the Americans, the local infrastructure should use guerrilla warfare tactics.

- We lacked weapons for combat purposes.
- Not all our units have been able to attack the enemy.
- With regard to the people, not enough of them have participated in the struggle.
- We have not been hitting the puppet troops hard enough.
- Our political struggle is still not intense enough.
- Our activities to proselyte the puppet and American troops have not been very effective.
- We have not been able to expand our local infrastructure widely enough, and we have not been able to wipe out many enemy troops.

Reasons Why We Were Able to Attack the Americans As Soon As They Set Foot Here.

The enemy suffers from all the shortcomings mentioned above, but we suffer from a basic overconfidence [chu quan].

- Our base of support is the people. Because of this support we should have absolute confidence [in our victory].
- Our armed forces have good morale and are very heroic. They have emerged successfully from all the tests of the enemy.
- We enjoy the leadership of the Party and of the Party Chapter.

- Our strength lies in the high morale of our troops and of the people.
- We were able to attack the Americans at once because we have the leadership of the Party and because of the clearsighted guidance of the Party.

In order to be able to attack the Americans, we should be given indoctrination, consolidate our organization, improve our behavior, do away with our hesitant attitude, endure hardships and miseries, and stay close to the enemy.

The Americans are weakening and are on the defensive. This is why the puppet troops have not been able to carry out their pacification program successfully. For the last two years they have had nothing but failure.

They have tried unsuccessfully to destroy our forces. On the contrary our forces and cadres are still very strong.

The Americans' position is weakening, and they are in a quandary. The puppets are in the same position. As for us, we are getting stronger and stronger. We have one strategy for the entire theater of war, and we are very strong. This is shown by the fact that right in our province we were able to maintain our initiative this year, and for this we were awarded a bronze medal by COSVN.

In the political field, we are also on the offensive, in spite of the flood.

In the military field, our battalion was able to conduct attacks in spite of the flood.

Requirements of the Phase of Attacks. We were unable to fulfill these requirements. We failed to intensify our military activities to the required degree, and this in

turn affected the movement to destroy Strategic Hamlets and caused our political position to weaken.

Our recruitment effort did not produce good results, and not all our units conducted attacks against the enemy: there were 125 guerrilla units, but only 35 conducted attacks.

From the ideological point of view, we did not dare to attack the enemy boldly. We were conservative and rightist. We overestimated the enemy and underestimated ourselves. This was why we failed to attack the enemy fiercely in this phase.

Our fighters were afraid of death, and of difficulties. In the next phase, we should use all our strength and energy to plunge into combat and destroy the strength of the enemy.

Our attitude was superficial and we did not act with urgency.

DOCUMENT NO. 4

EXCERPTS FROM THE NOTEBOOK OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE PARTY CHAPTER: "POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION PROGRAM FOR THE MILITARY TRAINING PHASE"

GOAL: Understanding the aim of the battalion training course for the companies and sections [phan doi].

Attack to wipe out the enemy: On the basis of this principle, we should make an all-out effort to train the units, to give them a firm grasp of fighting technique and tactics, and to improve the leadership, organization, and command of the cadres, so that the fighters and sections will do their utmost to fight the enemy.

REQUIREMENT: Everyone should overcome all difficulties, get all equipment and weapons ready, stabilize the organization of the Party, Labor Youth, and of the unit, in order to be well prepared to begin the training course.

GUIDELINE: The Party Chapter should receive training first, so that it can, in turn, train the fighters in squad sections. Training should be in line with the requirements. Simulated combat should be realistic and similar to real combat. Weapons and other equipment necessary for the training should be ready. The instruction program should be submitted to the Party Chapter Committee beforehand for approval. While training the troops, the cadres should check the troops' performance frequently, to point out their good and bad points and correct errors in time.

Method to Conduct Training

Use the platoon, section, or company as a basic unit for training. Before conducting the training course, the cadres should prepare in advance the training field, the training plan, and all weapons and equipment necessary for the training course. The Party Chapter should be given training first.

Guideline for the Political Indoctrination Mission

In order to insure a good training program, it is necessary to indoctrinate the cadres and fighters to make them thoroughly understand the directive concerning the political indoctrination task. Political indoctrination is aimed at enlightening the unit members, giving them a firm ideological stand, increasing their hatred for the American bandits and their henchmen, bolstering their morale to a high level on the training field, and making them understand that they should implement the resolutions of the Party during the training course and strictly carry out the orders of the command staff.

Forms under which the Political Indoctrination Task can be Implemented

Use poems, songs, folk songs, bulletins, plays, shows.

Have the men wear appropriate slogans on their shirts and stick these slogans on their rifle butts when they are on the training field.

Depending on the circumstances, use whatever method is best.

Commendation of the cadres and fighters who perform well during the 10-day phase.

Teaching about the outstanding performance of the men in the sections, and informing other units of such performance so that they can tell their own members about it.

Advantages and Difficulties

Difficulty: the unit is required to perform its usual mission while receiving training.

Difficulty: the enemy situation.

Difficulty: rainy season, which affects health of the unit members. Indoctrination of a number who do not like training. Bad morale will adversely affect the results of the training course.

Advantages: The unit has been indoctrinated about the letter from the Regional Party Committee. This will be a source of encouragement for the unit during the training course.

The morale of a number of cadres has been bolstered and stabilized.

A number of cadres have studied the program of training, and have received the direct and careful guidance of the Party Committee.

The news of victories from many battlefields will be an encouragement to the unit.

Assessment: The advantages that we enjoy are basic and the difficulties are only temporary ones. If we devise good measures, and if we know how, we will be able to overcome them.

Leadership Requirements

The cadres should understand their mission clearly, and they should do their utmost to train the men in order to meet the requirements of the war.

The cadres should prepare in advance the training program and all weapons and equipment necessary to conduct the training course.

They should maintain unity between cadres and fighters.

They should maintain strict secrecy with regard to the training program, and so on.

They should train the unit members to be ready for combat and to avoid creating confusion in case of bombing or shelling.

They should exercise the utmost care during training to avoid such incidents as accidental firing of weapons, men breaking their legs by falling, and so on; and they should strictly prevent the loss of equipment during training.

They should provide guidance during the training course and check the performance of the troops.

They should praise and commend in time those who perform well.

SCHEDULE

(November 1, 1966)

Numerical Order	Subjects (for training)	Military	Political	Number of days
1	Coiling ropes			1
2	Hooking wire to batteries			1
3	General review			1
4	Hooking pins to mines			1
5	Alarm, enemy activities			No training
6	Continuously exploding charges			
7	No training in morning			
8	Bangalores			
9	How to carry bangalores			
10	General review			
11	Bangalores			
12	No training in morning			
13	General review			
14	Reorientation	Supplementary training for 1966	Political indoctrination course	
15	Discussion			
16	Discussion			
17	Questions and answers period	Further discussion in evening	Combat: 1st Platoon	
18	Marching			
19	Marching			
20	Fighting			
21	Rest			
22	Kiem thao session			

Numerical Order	Subjects (for training)	Military	Political	Number of Days
23	Meeting of Labor Youth Group section, and of Party Chapter			
24	Review			
25	Assaults on posts			
26	Coiling ropes			
27	Review on method to hook wire to batteries			
28	Reconnaissance		Meeting of Party Chapter and of the entire unit	
29	Reconnaissance			
30	Kiem thao session			
31	Rest			

INDOCTRINATION ON THE THREE GOOD POINTS OF THE PARTY CHAPTER (1ST PHASE) AND REVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE 1ST PHASE OF ACTIVITIES DURING 2ND PHASE

November 28, 1966

I. Why is it Necessary to Conduct the Indoctrination?

We have received the appeal of Uncle Ho, and we have attended the 12th reorientation coming from the Central level.

The enemy is planning to conduct an extremely fierce counterattack against us in the forthcoming dry season.

II. We have to Understand that in the Future the War Between us and the Enemy will be very Fierce

We will achieve victory both from the point of view of military strength and initiative, as will be shown by our victories in the winter and spring campaign, and by the victories which we will achieve in the coming summer. COSVN is determined to achieve a great victory in the winter and spring campaign, and this too will be our strategy for that period.

III. In Order to Carry Out this Strategy and Achieve Success we will have to make the leadership of the Party Chapter good from three points of view, and the unit will have to be made to understand clearly their new mission and the new situation. The Party Chapter will have to provide good leadership.

IV. Building up the Three Good Points of the Party Chapter

This means building up the Party. This is a basic and vital mission which will help the Party Chapter to follow the situation at the lowest level more closely. This means that we will have to strengthen the PRP Youth Group, the Company, and the mass of non-Party members, politically speaking. Building up the Party Chapter is a key and urgent task, which will be carried out over a long period of time. In view of the current situation and the new mission, it should be carried out in order to meet the requirements of each phase of activities. At the same time, the task of building up the three good points of the Party Chapter should be implemented hand-in-hand with the task of fighting and with carrying out other tasks. Only in this way can it bring about good results.

Criteria to evaluate the three good points of the Party Chapter. The task of building up the three good points of the Party Chapter should be all-encompassing and should be carried out at all levels -- from top to bottom. To build up the three good points, it is necessary to motivate the people also. In order to build up the three good points of the Party Chapter, we will have to build up the three capabilities of the company and to make the PRP Youth Group into a front-line force [Chi Doan tien tuyen].

BUILDING UP THE THREE GOOD POINTS OF THE PARTY CHAPTER: SECOND PHASE

- Review of the goals and requirements of the first phase, and dissemination of the results of the first phase,
- Discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Party Chapter and its three good points and the PRP Youth Group,
- Study of the self-criticism paper of the comrade Party Chapter Secretary in the past period.

* * *

THE ROCKETS OF CHINA

1. China used to be a backward agricultural country exploited by the imperialists.

2. China is frequently struck by natural calamities. The revisionist clique has withdrawn all their technicians from China.

3. China is threatened by the imperialists.

Seventeen years ago she was a backward country. Now she has overtaken France and England in her economic development, and she is about to catch up with the Soviet Union. At present, she has a modern agriculture and a modern industry. She has successfully conducted four atomic tests, whereas the imperialist bloc has failed in every one of their atomic tests. She has become strong from every point of view so as to defeat the imperialist bloc and to protect the peace. When the imperialist bloc

became strong and expanded, all the people in the world were worried, but China's expansion and development made all the people in the world rejoice.

* * *

ATTACK ON THE ENEMY COMMUNICATION ROUTES

Recently we attacked Route 13 and this attack led the enemy to believe and announce that this route is now held by the 9th "VC" Division. We also attacked Route 1. This strategy of cutting off communication routes is inflicting heavy damage on the enemy and causing confusion in their ranks. They are badly shaken because they can't ensure reinforcements when they come under attack, because this segments the battlefield and transforms their main force into a regional force.

* * *

ACHIEVEMENT OF THE REGION DURING THE MONTH

514th Battalion: the 514th Bn. destroyed seven enemy platoons and one enemy squad, and captured 50 weapons.

267th Battalion: two platoons and one squad of the enemy were wiped off the map by this battalion. The battalion also captured 12 weapons.

263rd Battalion: this battalion destroyed one enemy platoon and one enemy squad, but did not wipe them off the map.

In Go Cong: our forces destroyed one enemy platoon and one enemy squad, but did not wipe them off the map.

In Cai Be: our forces destroyed one enemy platoon and one enemy squad, but did not wipe them off the map.

* * *

SELECTION OF OUTSTANDING DEMOLITION FIGHTERS (December 1966):

Four comrades were chosen: Vinh, Phuoc, Hien, and Muoi.

Selection of Exemplary Cadres (December 1966)

* * *

INFORMATION ON CURRENT EVENTS (ROCKETS WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND EVALUATION OF THE 2ND PHASE OF ACTIVITIES)

December 5, 1966

I. INFORMATION ON CURRENT EVENTS

Attacks on the Enemy's Rear Bases:

a. Attack on two ammunition dumps in Bien Hoa, destroying 500,000 cartridges and bombs.
b. 11 attacks on Soc Trang airfield.
c. Two attacks on Tan Son Nhut airbase.
d. Attack on hotel housing close to 200 pilots.
e. Attack on two ships in the Tonkin Gulf.
f. Attack on a 2-ton ship.
g. Attack on the My Tho wharf and on an aircraft carrier.

Our attacks on the rear bases of the Americans exposed their weakness and their carelessness. The people showed their attachment to the Revolution and to the tradition of opposing the invaders: for example, in the attack on Tan Son Nhut airbase, the people there helped us for the first time. We have a strong armed force that extends from our rear bases to the towns and cities. We also have good tactics, and the people contribute their strength to our movement by giving us their support. Our hearts and minds are our nuclear weapons.

* * *

December 21, 1966

1. Organization, goals, and achievements of unit members from the highest to the lowest level.

2. Need to guide and indoctrinate a number of comrades.

3. Everyone should consider his achievement as unimportant and uphold the achievements of others when they are outstanding.

4. Everyone should make an effort to write down the achievements of the unit.

5. Everyone should write down:

- the formation of the company, and its achievements up to the present,
- the difficulties that the unit has had involving weapons and equipment,
- the success of the training of the Party Chapter and PRP Youth Group Chapter, and of

the political indoctrination,

- the date and place of each attack: on what day and where it was conducted, what the results of the attack were, how many comrades scored outstanding achievements during the attack, the morale of the comrades, how they behaved, their bravery, their unity with the rest of the unit, and how they economized their equipment.

* * *

INDOCTRINATION TO LAUNCH THE 3rd PHASE OF ACTIVITIES AND TO REINFORCE FORTIFIED TRENCHES

January 2, 1967

1. Goals and Requirements. We should fortify our trenches to guard against enemy attacks and to achieve victory in combat.

2. The 263rd Bn not only fulfilled the requirements, but even achieved more than had been required of it. The fortified trenches that it dug were in line with the measurements set down by higher authorities and spaced to ensure good fields of fire. Their trenches provided complete security for the troops.

3. Requirement: The Party Chapter should understand fully its task and do its utmost to provide leadership to the unit. It should also indoctrinate the unit in order to eradicate overconfidence, and to train their subordinates thoroughly in fighting tactics to ensure victory in combat.

4. We should indoctrinate the troops to make them brave and heroic in defensive combat. We should provide clear and appropriate leadership, and we should indoctrinate the unit to give them a good understanding of ideological concepts.

5. Political indoctrination: indoctrination to eradicate overconfidence (overconfidence leads the men to lose their vigilance), to wipe out pessimism, to make them more willing to bear hardships, and to observe discipline.

6. With regards to the Party Chapters and the Cadres; They should improve their personal conduct, always set a good example and be the first in performing every task, and they should constantly remind their subordinates of their mission.

7. Emulation campaign to reinforce trenches: to last for a week.

8. The unit should show bravery in attack and courage in defensive actions.

9. Slogan: "Obtain the same achievements as the 263rd Bn, and even overtake them."

Slogan: "Let's not go to sleep when we arrive at a bivouacking area and find no fortified trenches."

10. Use the 2nd Company to provide guidance for fortified trenches.

* * *

MEETING OF THE PARTY CHAPTER SECRETARIES

January 9, 1967

- Purpose: determination to complete the training program for the year.
- Length of training: 6 days.
- Program of training for Party members.

Contents of the Political Training Program

In the past we have fought and attended training sessions at the same time. The political training of cadres and fighters in the past, however, was not carried out properly. What's more, the fighters and cadres did not pay much attention to indoctrination and did not apply themselves. There were times when the fighters attended indoctrination sessions while the cadres did not. The political indoctrination of the fighters was too general, and consisted of only a few subjects which were dealt with in a general manner, and this was why the fighters failed to understand clearly what they studied during the political training course. The cadres did not scrutinize carefully the personal conduct of the fighters in order to help correct their errors. This failure by the cadres to scrutinize carefully the performance of the fighters made them ignorant of the extent to which each fighter understood combat tactics, and so on. Generally speaking, the regulations concerning the training period were not applied faithfully, as shown by the daily complaints of the unit members.

- Weakness of the Party Chapter: The Party Chapter did not give much assistance to the lower echelons concerning the military and political subjects and other subjects that were part of the training program.

Results of the training course

1. The performance of the unit has improved with regard to operations (marches) and taking up position in target area (the unit takes up a position that is closer to the enemy line).

2. Marksmanship: This has improved. Before, the troops had to fire a large quantity of ammunition before they could wipe out the enemy, but now they no longer have to use up as much ammunition as before.

3. The leadership of the unit has improved. There is more constructive criticism leading to correction of errors. The Party Headquarters, the Party Chapter Committee, and the cadres now provide better leadership than before.

Forthcoming Mission

There will be a 6-day training course, consisting of five steps:

1. Political indoctrination. In order to make the Party Chapter, the cadres, and the fighters understand their mission in the forthcoming phase of activities and in combat, it will be necessary to indoctrinate them.

2. During the indoctrination course, it should be pointed out to the cadres that they should not repeat what they have to say over and over again, because this

will not bring about any results. On the contrary this will prevent them from getting results.

3. Chemistry. This subject has been included in the training program so everyone will have to study it. The lower echelons will consider this subject unimportant because they have never studied it before in any of their training courses. But everyone in this training program, from the cadres to the fighters, will have to study it.

4. The leadership of the cadres. During the training period, the cadres should set a good example. They should be present at every class. The Party members and cadres should be told that they should be very active to set a good example.

5. To ensure good results, the unit members should be well fed and well taken care of. The leaders should praise the men whenever they do something well. They should also make sure that the men observe the regulations and time schedule.

6. There should be simulated combats during the training course.

Application of the regulations concerning the training period.

The cadres should report to the higher echelons about the contents of the training program and about the regulations and time schedule for the training period, and they should ask for the opinion of the higher echelons. They should also take good care of weapons and equipment, provide good medical care for the men, and prevent unfortunate accidents that might reduce the numerical strength

of the unit. They should make sure that no weapons are fired accidentally during training.

The unit staff should assist the lower echelons during the training period. There should be indoctrination to wipe out overconfidence and to make the unit always vigilant.

Emulation

1. An emulation campaign should be launched during the training course. The Party members, cadres, and fighters will all have to take part in it with enthusiasm.

2. Good results should be obtained. Over eighty percent of the requirements should be fulfilled.

3. In order to make sure that all 100 percent of the unit participate in the training course, the Party Chapter has to be strict about enforcing disease-prevention measures, making the men observe hygienic practices and feeding them well.

4. The unit members should maintain unity and help each other.

5. Everyone, from the cadres down to the fighters, should observe the regulations concerning the training period.

6. Everyone should make an effort to save time and develop their initiative.

7. Serving the unit: When the subordinates make a request, the cadres should immediately act on it to help these subordinates.

8. Tomorrow night, the training program will be disseminated among the Party Chapter. It should be

pointed out that emphasis should be put on military and demolition subjects during the training course.

Emulation criteria

1. Emulation concerning morale, sense of responsibility during the campaign.

2. Emulation concerning observation of time schedule and regulation.

3. Emulation concerning digging of fortified trenches in line with prescribed measurements.

4. Emulation concerning unity and mutual assistance.

5. Emulation against feigned sickness and negligence of studies.

* * *

ACTIVITIES OF THE PRP YOUTH GROUP CHAPTER

Meeting of January 14, 1967 to Criticize the Party Chapter

1. The Party Chapter did not behave in an exemplary manner. For example, the Party Chapter members did not show up at the fortified trenches right away even when their subordinates had all taken up position there.

2. The Party Chapter members are still quick tempered.

3. Their working method is still unclear.

4. They do not observe discipline well.

5. They fail to show a good sense of unity; for example, they do not give much assistance to their subordinates.

6. Their assistance to the PRP Youth Group was superficial.

7. They do not pay much attention to the opinions of their subordinates. They are negligent in their work and very overbearing toward their subordinates.

REPORT ON TRAINING PHASE

1. Number of troops attending training course:
   - How many squads and platoons?
2. Training subjects:
   - What are the tactics that are taught during the course?
   - What are the techniques that are taught during the course (individual movements, rifle range, etc.)?
3. Indoctrination:
   - How many comrades have good morale during the course?
   - How is their good morale shown during the course, by what actions?
   - How many comrades have bad morale during the course? How is their bad morale shown during the course, by what concrete actions?
4. Attitude of the unit members during training course:
   - modest?
   - sincere?
   - enthusiastic, zealous?
   - good observance of regulations and time schedule?
   - behavior of cadres and fighters?

5. Results:
   - In the field of tactics?
   - Which subject makes the most impact, which one the least?
   - Which unit section [phan doan] performs best? Which one performs worst?
   - What percentage of the unit understand the combat techniques taught?
6. Criticism. Criticism of:
   - Instructors
   - Cadres (company, platoon and squad levels)
   - Fighters
   - Contents of the training program
   - Length of training course
   - Training plan
7. Evaluation of good and bad points to draw experience
   - Good and bad points of instruction
   - Good and bad points of students during classes
   - Suggestions

MONTHLY NEWS REPORT

Meeting to Relate Attacks Against the Americans, Held on February 14, 1967

When the Americans landed on Van Tuong* they ran into the 3rd Division of North Vietnam. Engaging this division, they intended to cut it into three segments and then put strong pressure on each segment. When they landed, they were one division strong and were armed with heavy equipment. Their intention was to fight, then withdraw to let airplanes bomb and artillery shell our forces' position to destroy our forces. When our forces were wiped out, they planned to come back.

* * *

Meeting on February 18, 1967

The following observations were made during the meeting:

- When bivouacking in people's houses, the troops fished from their ponds and took vegetables from their gardens without asking.
- The troops were careless in their contacts with the villagers; for example, they had contacts with families that were bad elements.

---

*In Quang Ngai Province. This attack was claimed by the Front as the first major confrontation between the VC and American forces, and as the first defeat of the "American Expeditionary Force." It took place on August 18-19, 1965.

- Business dealings between the troops and the people were not smooth. The troops walked around in the open in a careless manner. They were overconfident; for example, they did not take cover when aircraft appeared.
- The troops were careless with their books and newspapers and threw them all over the place where they stayed. This was why we had to check everything carefully before moving on.

The meeting decided to do the following things:

- Tonight: check the families where the troops are stationed and the activities of the troops (how they live and eat, their movements in and out, the way they hang their washing out to dry).
- then propagandize the families.
- motivate these families to oppose the Americans.
- motivate these families to build the fence around the Combat Village.
- Tomorrow: carry out civilian proselyting activities, and then report on results.

(A young girl reported to the local infrastructure that one of the men in the unit had sneaked into her bed at night. The infrastructure then reported this to us.)

- To be present at the office at 2:00 p.m. for discussion.

Checking the unit: roll calls have been made in each squad.

Evaluation of the good and bad points of the unit in its relationship with the people.

Civilian proselyting activities: five comrades are detailed to scoop mud from ditches for the people, fill two jars with fresh water, row one sampan full of fire wood, sweep and clean the houses of the people, and propagandize the people while helping them.

Forthcoming production activities: harvesting paddy. Each comrade in 1967 will have to supply his own food for two months. As for the other units: each of these units will have to supply its own food for from four to six months. The following units will have to supply the following number of men for production activities:

2nd Company: 1 cell
3rd Company: 1 cell
1st Company: 1 cell
Signal team: 1 man
Reconnaissance team: 1 man
Staff : 1 man
4th Company and Demolition unit: 1 man each

Situation. Evaluation of current enemy situation and our own situation. Study of the terrain.

Our intention. Strategic use of our forces. Our plan is to attack the Americans so as to prevent them from launching an attack against us; begin the winter and spring campaign for 1967; fight against the enemy's

pacification scheme; and attack the rear base of the Americans.

Goals and requirements. We will have to wipe out the enemy to strengthen our own forces, increase our level of political understanding, consolidate our ideological stand, and implement the political mission of the provinces.

Advantages and difficulties

a. Advantages

- The enemy has many shortcomings: their morale is low and there is conflict in their ranks.
- The terrain is favorable for us.

b. Difficulties

- The enemy is capable and has good means of communication.
- We will have to march over a long distance to reach the target, and we will have to withdraw over a long distance after the attack.
- There will be a moonlit sky.

The enemy is overconfident and relies too heavily on their strong fire power. We have reconnoitered the target carefully and all our previous raids against the enemy were successful.

Leadership requirements

a. Ideological leadership: The cadres should show interest and attention, they should behave in an exemplary manner, and they should bolster the fighting spirit of the men.

b. Special attention should be paid to the following:
   - Maintaining secrecy.
   - Maintaining unity and coordination.
   - Taking up position for the attack and withdrawal.
   - Cleaning up the battlefield: gathering weapons and carrying off dead and wounded.
   - Penetrating deep into enemy lines, cutting enemy forces into small segments, wiping out all the enemy, and fighting with grenades.

* * *

POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: THE ROLE OF THE CADRES

February 28, 1967

1. Understanding the role, position, responsibility and duty of the cadres

The role, position, responsibility, and duty of the cadres are different from those of the soldiers, because the cadres are assisted and nurtured [boi duong] by the Party, because the cadres are the leaders, and because they should behave in an exemplary manner.

2. Basic principles of leadership and the requirements that the cadres should fulfill

If the cadres do not have a firm grasp of these principles, how can their subordinates and the unit understand them? The cadres should act in accordance with the demands of their position [yeu cau can bo phai co cuong vi].

3. The basic role of the cadres

The cadres should have a basic understanding of the responsibility that their position devolves upon them. They should be ready and willing to carry out missions whenever the Party needs them. They should do their utmost to study military and political subjects. They should help each other and they should not have the attitude of "It's his job; let him do it." They should be ready from every point of view to carry out missions whenever the Party needs them.

The important role of the cadres

Their role stems from their position as cadres and from the fact that they are the troops of the Party. Their main tasks are political and military. In order to have a strong army, the cadres should have a firm ideological stand, a virtuous behavior, and a firm grasp of political matters. Only if the cadres have a firm grasp of the line and policy and the guiding concept of the Party will we be able to defeat the enemy.

The cadres should implement the tasks entrusted to them by the Party and the Party Chapter.

The company is the foundation of the battalion. The company and platoon cadres are the cadres who directly implement the directives of the Party because they are the last links in the chain of command. If they do not detect their errors and correct them in time, they will have to pay for their errors with their own lives in combat.

1. The cadres at company and platoon levels should implement directives to the letter.

2. They should intensify political indoctrination to strengthen the ideological stand of the unit; only in this way can the Party Chapter maintain tight control over the unit.

3. They should have a firm grasp of the policy of the Party and implement it well. They should observe discipline, check on the performance of their subordinates, and strengthen the unity of the unit because unity is vital for the completion of all tasks.

4. They should strengthen the unit in order to be able to complete all missions entrusted by the higher authorities.

5. The task of the cadres is to make the unit excellent in combat, to provide good training to the troops, and to ensure good production activities, etc. They should also give the unit a firm political and military foundation [co ban quan su va chinh tri].

Qualifications of the cadres

1. They should be Party members because they are the leaders.

2. They should have a higher level of self-enlightenment [giac ngo] than the non-Party members, and they should have a firm grasp of the Party policy and of Marxist ideology.

3. They should do their utmost to study military and cultural matters in order to have a higher level of political argumentation. Since the war is getting fiercer and fiercer, we must have a better level of understanding in order to strengthen our ideological stand in the days to come.

4. They should exhibit an exemplary behavior proper to Revolutionaries, they should have a good understanding of the psychology of the masses, and they should be serious and mature people.

5. They should be brave in combat. They should not display a bureaucratic attitude just because they are Party members and are the leaders, while the troops are their subordinates. They can only acquire prestige if they perform bravely in combat.

In summary, the cadres should have the following four qualifications:

1. They should be Party members.

2. They should do their utmost to study political and military matters.

3. They should behave virtuously as is proper for our forces, and they should carry out the motto of "living and eating with the people," etc.

4. They should be brave in combat and should not be overbearing toward subordinates.

Criteria of the cadres:
- Firm ideological stand and a good sense of responsibility.
- Brave performance in combat.

EVALUATION OF THE SPRING CAMPAIGN AND RESOLUTION ON THE WINTER CAMPAIGN*

First Lesson

March 4, 1967

This indoctrination course is designed to make the Party members correct their own shortcomings and the shortcomings of the unit.

Evaluation of the winter campaign

We notice that the special characteristic of the enemy is their loss of initiative and their confusion and lack of capability over the entire theater of war. No matter how many troops and weapons they are reinforced with, they are still bogged down.

Their scheme of sabotaging the North has also failed. They bomb the North in order to prevent the North from sending supplies and reinforcements to the South so that they can annihilate our forces. But in spite of this bombing, the North continues to develop and to become stronger from every point of view -- economic, cultural, etc. In spite of the enemy scheme, we in the South have achieved success in the recent winter campaign.

In spite of the failure of their scheme, the American imperialists are still unwilling to admit

---

*This should read "Evaluation of the Winter Campaign and Resolution on the Spring Campaign," as the following text makes clear.

defeat, and they continue to harass the South and the North.

During the winter, that is to say during the rainy season, they could not spread their forces over the entire theater of war, so they concentrated their forces and launched a second wave of attacks against us.

In our province, the enemy is now pacifying the three lower areas. It is because the guerrillas in these three lower areas are weak that the enemy has been able to expand. In the three upper areas, the enemy are still huddled together, clinging to their position and protecting their posts. In the three lower areas, they apply commando tactics in order to induce our comrades to rally and to force the people to move out to the areas under their control.

The main body of the 514th Bn attacked the enemy in the winter campaign and inflicted extremely heavy losses on them in eight continuous attacks. The 2nd Company rushed to this fierce battlefield and deployed its troops to attack the enemy. They obtained good results by inflicting heavy losses on the enemy and gaining the initiative on the battlefield.*

Because of the defeats that we inflicted upon them in the attacks in November and December, the enemy concentrated 30,000 troops, over 1,000 cannon, and all sorts of other equipment and weapons, to launch their second

---

*This refers to the campaigns to the east of My Tho town in the latter half of 1966. A significant body of documentary and interview information, however, contradicts the claim of success made here.

offensive in the dry season. But in spite of all this, they failed in both the South and the North in the first phase of their offensive, as shown by their defeats in Tay Ninh and on other battlefields.

Evaluation of our performance and morale. In the third quarter of the year we fought 785 battles in all. In the 4th quarter, we killed 2,515 enemy soldiers. The province forces made a good contribution to this success by destroying one company, six platoons, and one squad of the enemy, and capturing 132 weapons of various kinds. The guerrillas fought 815 battles and captured 27 weapons. During this campaign, many comrades set shining examples.

Political struggle: 88,000 people took part in this struggle.

Troop Proselyting: We succeeded in making 520 enemy soldiers leave the ranks of the enemy, of whom 181 were Civil Guards. We also succeeded in capturing a number of posts with the help of fifth columnists.

Political indoctrination and military training: development of the "three good points" of the Party Chapter, selection of fighters with an outstanding performance during emulation campaigns, etc.

Shortcomings: We had the following shortcomings during the campaign:

1. Overestimation of the strength of the enemy; we failed to evaluate the strength of the enemy accurately. We thought that we were in a more difficult position than the enemy, and so we failed to attack them continuously to take full advantage of the favorable opportunity.

2. Loose coordination and control during combat. Criticism and indoctrination are needed to correct this error.

3. Failure to urge the troops while they perform their tasks. The cadres did not follow the performance of their subordinates closely. Weaknesses in combat and report, etc. The main cause for this is that the Party members did not fulfill their responsibilities. In the coming days, they should conduct themselves in a new revolutionary way [cach mang kieu moi]; that is to say, they should do their utmost in performing their tasks.

Intentions of the enemy for forthcoming period

1. In the forthcoming period, the enemy will try to make up for the military defeats that were inflicted upon them in the past. Their scheme will be both political and military. In the political field, they will try to move the people to the areas under their control, and to carry through their pacification program in the Delta. They will carry on their pacification activities in the areas along the Mekong River: in Long An, Ben Tre, and My Tho. Since the puppet troops cannot pacify, the enemy has had to ask the American troops to move into an area first, to hold it for a few days, and then hand it over to the puppet troops.

2. The enemy will use the puppet and American troops to attack our forces and to occupy our weak areas.

3. The American troops will help the puppet troops herd the people and move them to the enemy areas, conscript youths to reinforce the puppet army, and finally to segment the theater of war in eastern Nam Bo.

The strong points of the enemy. Their forces have been reinforced with more troops. They have enough troops to throw into combat. If they want to occupy the weak areas, they have enough troops at their disposal to do so.

The weak points of the enemy. The enemy lacks good leadership. This is why they always lose when they attack us. On the other hand, we always strike at our targets very accurately. For example, when the enemy has only 169 troops at their disposal, they think that their forces are very large -- this is a proof of their poor judgment. They do not have the initiative. At present, the enemy has what they call a "mobile jail" to imprison their troops and officers that are too cowardly. At present, there are 800 cowardly soldiers and officers in this jail. The enemy expansion is limited by unfavorable terrain and bad weather. The scheme of the enemy is to use demagogic appeals with the people.

Our forthcoming mission

1. Requirement: Everyone should be determined to achieve victory in the forthcoming spring campaign.

2. We will use all our forces to attack the Americans and the puppets.

3. We should carry the mission entrusted to us by the higher authorities to victory.

4. In order to obtain our goal we should nurture our spirit of determination to attack and destroy the strength of the enemy.

5. We will fight to stop the enemy from herding the people into their areas.

6. We should strongly push forward civilian proselyting activities while carrying out our combat mission.

7. We should correct our shortcomings in combat.

8. In combat, we should do our utmost to achieve victory, and we should see to it that each is fiercer than the previous one.

Direction of our forthcoming mission

At present, our three types of forces have a foothold in all three types of areas. The enemy is trying to pacify the weak areas. We should develop among our troops the determination to fight continuously in all three areas, to sap the strength of the enemy and destroy them, and to fulfill the requirements set forth by the higher authorities.

We will have to expand the people's guerrilla warfare. The task of our unit is not just to fight the enemy, but also to assist the Local Force and the guerrillas.

In addition to our task of fighting the enemy, we should carry out civilian proselyting activities. To have good results in this field, we should maintain exemplary personal conduct in our relationship with the people.

Method of operation

We will either concentrate or disperse, depending on the order of the higher authorities. After each operation we should review our performance upon return to our base area, criticize it, and try to correct shortcomings.

Strengthening our base area: This is a task that we should also carry through.

Political tasks

1. Dissemination of policy among the Party Chapter Committee, the cadres and troops.

2. Organization of reorientation course for weak areas.

3. Maintenance of secrecy and vigilance against spies.

In studying Resolution 12,* it is determined that:

1. We should develop the spirit of determination to attack the Americans in the spring campaign.

2. We should consolidate our ideological stand to fight harder.

3. We should observe discipline, especially in combat.

4. We should not underestimate the enemy and we should not be overconfident. We should attack the enemy

---

*This refers to the Resolution of the 12th Plenum of the Lao Dons Party Central Committee in Hanoi, December 1965.

more often and in order to achieve this, the Party should exercise tighter leadership.

5. The Party Chapter should urgently strengthen the unit. In combat they should have strong determination and a keen sense of responsibility.

The task of strengthening the Party. The "three good points" of the Party Chapter should be developed. The fighting spirit against the Americans should be heightened and the Party organization should be strengthened. In order to expand the membership of the Party, the Party members should propagandize and indoctrinate non-Party members in order to recruit them.

Implementation of the three important policies [chinh sach lon]

1. concerning the dead and wounded fighters,
2. concerning captured weapons and equipment,
3. concerning surrenderers and prisoners

Rear Services. The most important concern is economy. In our battalion there are still a number of comrades who waste their ammunition, money, and clothing.

STRENGTHENING OUR MOVEMENT IN THE WEAK AREAS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

Second Lesson

Goals and Requirements

1. We understand our position in the weak areas in the countryside and think that we should strengthen our movement there.

2. We are determined to strengthen our movement in the weak areas, and we are confident that we will succeed in this task.

The weak areas have a great strategic importance in the eyes of the Revolution.

The enemy scheme is to pacify these weak areas, but they lack the determination to do so. They are hesitant and do not dare to rush forward to operate in these weak areas.

The people in the weak areas are ideologically capable of strengthening the Revolutionary movement there.

The lesson can be divided in two parts.

I. The Important Position of the Weak Areas in the Countryside and our Mission in These Areas

Definition.

a. The weak areas in the countryside include the villages and hamlets that are still occupied by the enemy, where the enemy still maintain posts but cannot go out of these posts to operate, and where our local infrastructure is still strong.

b. The weak areas are also those where we are weak and have to operate from a distance "like a man fishing with a casting rod" [Cong tac cân cau].

c. The weak areas are those which our forces and the enemy are contesting for control.

d. The weak areas are those which neither the enemy nor our side controls.

e. The weak areas are those where our strength and that of the enemy are balanced.

At present we divide the weak areas into three types:

1. Weak areas close to towns and cities,
2. Areas located in regions dominated by religious sects, such as Chau Thanh district, and
3. Areas located in liberated areas or in our base areas.

Our task is to contain the strength of the enemy and then move to destroy their control. They maintain their oppressive control [Kim Kep] over the people with their posts and with commandoes who penetrate deep into our base areas. In order to destroy this oppressive control, we have to combine all our forces to attack them. Our task is to destroy this oppressive control in these weak areas in line with the policy of the higher authorities.

There are two weak provinces in our region. In our province there are three basic weak areas; there are also many weak areas in the three upper districts where the enemy forces and our forces are in an "interlocking comb teeth" position. This is why we have to liberate these areas.

II. The Importance of the Mission in the Weak Areas

What is the importance of the mission in the weak areas, in general? What is the importance of the mission in the weak areas with regard to the theater of war in our province and region? What is meant by the "importance of the mission in the weak areas?"

The importance of the weak areas lies in the fact that their control will tip the balance of strength in our favor. If we occupy these areas completely, our movement there will be strengthened and expanded, and this will help us in our move to launch a general offensive on the enemy. We have to wrest these weak areas from the enemy in order to draw on the manpower there to fight against the enemy.

In general, what is the importance of the mission in the weak areas?

1. When we go to the weak areas, we have to do our utmost to destroy the enemy's oppressive control and to enlarge our liberated areas, to regroup and then spread out and surge forward to attack the enemy, to wrest population and territory from the enemy, to help the guerrillas and Local Force, motivate the people to carry out people's guerrilla warfare, and to prepare the groundwork for the large units to come and wipe out the enemy.

2. We have to gain initiative in the weak areas to protect our forces and these areas, to enlarge our forces, wipe out enemy officials, security agents and administrative machinery there, and to push our movement there strongly forward.

3. We have to attack the weak areas very strongly in order to make the enemy lose their foothold and a source of manpower from which they can recruit troops to attack us.

4. We have to attack the weak areas very strongly in order to find manpower and materiel resources for the Revolution.

The mission in the weak areas therefore is an extremely important mission. It is also a strategy that the Revolution in the South can apply successfully.

* * *

POLITICAL MISSION

April 6, 1967

ENEMY SWEEP OPERATIONS

- The enemy's scheme is to carry out their pacification program, gain a foothold, and herd the people into their areas. Binh Duc village is now the main pacification target. The second most important pacification target is the area near our base areas.

Advantages:

One favorable factor is that the enemy has to leave their fortified positions in order to penetrate deep into our base areas. Another advantage for us is the fact that in the base areas we have the traditional support of the people.

Our Target Areas: Binh Duc and National Highway 4.

Concentration and Dispersal

Orders have been issued for deep penetration into enemy areas.

- First and 3rd Companies ordered to move into lower areas.
- Second Company and 4th Company, the Demolition Unit and the Battalion Command Headquarters ordered to remain in upper areas.
- Two companies ordered to penetrate deep into enemy areas to attack the enemy.
- Signal outfit ordered to move with the 1st and 3rd Companies.
- Reconnaissance team ordered to split up [among the companies].

Plan of attacks: small and large attacks, attrition tactics, and attacks to wipe out enemy units.

Need for Ideological Leadership

- The enemy's scheme to conduct frequent sweep operations gives us a favorable opportunity for attack. To conduct these operations, the enemy has to spread out, but they do not have the capability to keep their troops supplied, so we can attack them.

- The enemy morale is badly shaken because they have to spread out to attack us.

- Therefore we must have strong morale in order to attack them continuously before they can get organized [chua kip on dinh].

- We should know how to use our forces.

Incitement of Hatred Against the Enemy

The enemy has sprayed poisonous chemicals all the way from Nhi Binh village to Tan Hoi village. Hundreds of villagers passed out or died because of these chemicals. The people's paddy has been destroyed by the enemy's amphibious cars, and this is why the people are now living very miserably.

Hardships: The situation being what it is, there will be times when we will have to go without sleep and food in order to attack the enemy continuously.

Discipline: In view of the current situation, we will have to urgently carry out the orders issued by the higher authorities as soon as we receive them.

Implementation: The Party Chapter Committee will be responsible for the implementation of this mission. There will be discussion of this mission in the Party Chapter and among the troops.

DOCUMENT NO. 5

NOTES ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW TRAINING PHASE*

For the past few weeks, the unit has been going on mission far away and it has been spending all its time fighting. This is why it has not had the opportunity to receive more training and to consolidate its ranks.

The other day, the unit marched from Cho Gao to my father's native village in the evening. The moon lit up the path that the troops marched on. The fighters marched through vast rice fields full of ripe yellow rice plants, and slipped through rows of trees dense with green leaves and of bamboo which littered the path with leaves. The troops marched shoulder to shoulder, and walked fast to reach their destination quickly. The moment we arrived at our destination the commander of the unit ordered us to dig fortified trenches for our own protection if an attack occurred the next day. I sat down to write to my friends. Suddenly, a comrade from the Battalion Reconnaissance Unit came running to our unit and invited the commander to come to a meeting. At that moment, I thought that the commander was asked to come to the meeting to review the recent attacks, such as the one in Tan Thanh and Binh An. I was still wondering about the purpose of the meeting when the unit commander returned. He gathered the entire unit so that the Battalion Commander could address us all. My heart beat very fast, and I wondered

---

*Three pages in the handwriting of Be Danh.

what had happened that prompted the Battalion Commander to visit the unit. Perhaps something had happened in the unit? Perhaps he wanted to indoctrinate the unit? Suddenly, the Battalion Commander raised his voice and said in a soothing tone: "I convene this meeting today to tell you about the program of the upcoming training phase, so that you will understand it well. This training phase will concentrate on fighting technique and tactics, because our unit has been weak from this point of view." At that moment, all the eyes in the unit were riveted on the Battalion Commander, and the look in their eyes showed that the men wanted to voice their agreement with the Battalion Commander and their determination to carry orders through. But they could not say anything because they had to wait till the Commander finished speaking. The Battalion Commander had just finished speaking when from the back a soft voice said: "I have something to say." The Battalion Commander invited this comrade to speak up. This comrade then talked about his love for training, his determination to complete the training and to overcome all difficulties and hardships, and promised to complete his mission during the training and indoctrination phase. As he finished speaking, the entire unit shouted that everyone was of the same mind, and applauded noisily. This showed that the unit was as determined as this comrade to fulfill its duty. Then the unit commander stood up and promised the Battalion Commander that his unit would maintain its high morale and its determination during the training phase and that it would do its utmost to make the men apply apply themselves to their training.

Finally, the Battalion Commander made some recommendations. He told us that we should be determined to fulfill the requirements of the training phase, and said that we would experience many difficulties. He mentioned the cold weather, the rainy season, the flood, the fact that we would have to attend the training course as well as operate as usual, the physical exhaustion that this would cause, the abundance of mosquitoes, and the fact that we would have to attend the training course at night. He said that he hoped we would overcome all these difficulties so as to achieve good results. He added: "If we want to defeat the Americans, we have to perfect our fighting technique and tactics. Each one of us should understand well and absorb all fighting technique and tactics so as to achieve victory in our attacks." After he finished speaking, the entire unit shouted its approval and applauded him -- the applause was like a burst of gunfire firing straight into the heads of the Americans and Khanh.* The meeting was then ordered to break up, and each of us returned to his sleeping place. Everyone understood the training program well, and all seemed enthusiastic and determined to fulfill the requirements set forth by the higher authorities.

At the start of the training phase for the entire Demolition Unit, the unit commander convened a meeting to tell us about all the training subjects. The men stood at attention and all the ranks were very quiet. No one said anything, so that we could all hear everything that the unit commander said. He made recommendations and

---

*"Khanh" = General Nguyen Khanh, former Premier in South Vietnam.

reminded us that we should do our best during the training phase and to study well all subjects. The he said that today, the first day of the training, we would begin to study how to climb high walls, and how to cross over deep and shallow moats.

DOCUMENT NO. 6

ANNOUNCEMENT OF A TRAINING COURSE FOR THE DEMOLITION UNIT

TO: KIM AND THONG

I am sending documents [authorizing the two of you] to begin training the demolition unit.

The training course will last three months (until July), and training will take place between combat missions. The training course will last from May to July.

The training program and documents have already been made available to you, so the only thing left for you to do is to set up a schedule and organize the training for the unit.

If you have any difficulties concerning the unit or the individual cadres themselves in the course of accomplishing this task, let me know and I will resolve them.

Each month, send a report of the results of the training course to me. At the end of the course, send me a general report reviewing all the details and results of the course.

At the same time, please make out a list of the members of the unit and send it to me, along with a list of weapons in the unit. I have already sent you formats for filing these reports.

I wish you both good health, happiness, and much leadership capacity.

May 9, 1966

We are like brothers,

Signed: Sau Tho

P.S. At present, I'm busy completing training for the upper district zone.

Document No.7 (A)

Outline of Training Subjects (Demolition Units)

Num. order	Contents	Time length: No. of days	Time length: No. of nights	Goals and requirements
1	Explosives: characteristics, composition, use and effect of commonly used explosives, such as Xit Dit (sic), black powder and TNT; especially of Xit Dit and TNT. - Checking and maintenance of various kinds of explosives, and other equipment such as batteries, wire, mines, etc.; they should be maintained well. The unit commander should frequently urge and check those who are responsible for the maintenance of explosives and other equipment. - Protective measures against accidents. - Explosives used for making mines.	2	2	- The unit members should have a firm grasp of the characteristics, effect, and use of these three kinds of explosives, especially of Xit Dit and TNT. - They are required to be familiar with all the measures to maintain the equipment and protect the unit against danger and accidents which might cause damage and losses to the unit. - They should know how to make various types of mines, etc.
2	Wiring and electric power: - Basics of electricity; source of electric power; electric measure: Ohm. - Advantages and disadvantages of different methods of wiring: parallel and series wiring. Determination of length of wire (negative pole and positive pole). - Method to protect wire.	5	5	- The purpose of the training is to enable the cadres and fighters to distinguish between an alternating and a direct current and to determine the power of the current. - It is also designed to make them familiar with the two methods of wiring: parallel and series wiring with the method of hiding batteries wired in series and batteries wired in parallel. - The cadres and fighters should have a firm grasp of the method to protect the wire hooked to the batteries and the lives of the men in the unit.
3	Reconnaissance: - Organization of reconnaissance team. - Principles of reconnaissance. - What this task involves, and the steps that should be followed in order (bus station, docks, airfields, ports, posts, and enemy forces stationed in the field).	2	2	- The cadres and fighters should have a firm grasp of the reconnaissance mission and method. - They should have a firm grasp of the various steps of this mission. - While carrying out a reconnaissance mission, the cadres and fighters should be careful at every step, and they should only proceed when success seems assured. They should not be subjective and underestimate the enemy; they should not go out to drink, and they should not contact people carelessly and indiscriminately.
4	Camouflage to avoid lights: - Natural light, artificial lighting, illuminating flares, Munsen lamps, electric lights. - Camouflage method. - Individual movements while moving through a fence, wading in muddy and swampy ground, walking on dry leaves or through low or high grass, and crawling.	3	3	- The reconnaissance team should find out the strong and weak points of the sentinels, and about the operational pattern of the enemy. - They should have a firm grasp of the method of camouflage appropriate to different surroundings and terrain.

TOTAL TIME LENGTH

- There are four general training subjects to be taught for 10 days and 10 nights.
- The remaining 4 days are to be devoted to political indoctrination.
- Request 6 additional days for training.

} 12

- Specialized training subjects: 4; training to last for 23 days and 23 nights
- The person in charge of drawing up training documents will base them on the documents of 1964 and 1965.
- General assessment at the end of the training course: 5 days and 5 nights.
- The 1964 and 1965 documents should be chosen, and additional topics should be added, in accordance with the needs and requirements of the unit and of the war, when drawing up the training program for 1966.

5	Political indoctrination subjects:			
6	Target practice and throwing grenades: - 3 methods of throwing grenades: throwing grenades when not carrying other weapons; throwing grenades in a standing position and while carrying weapons; throwing grenades in a kneeling position and while carrying weapons (the unit members should practice these methods at a range of 25 m or over) - Target shooting with submachine guns, rifles; firing at night at a distance of from 3 to 50 m (without lights)			- The aim of this training is to enable the fighters to destroy the enemy at short and long range; to throw grenades into enemy forces stationed in the field, into communication trenches, into underground tunnels, and into important enemy targets.

Approved by the Province Military Affairs Section / 860
May 1, 1966 Signed: Tu Thao

May 8, 1966
Action Officer (Nguoi Phu Trach) the Province CBDC (Engineering and Demolition) Section Chief
Signed: Sau Tho

Document No. 7 (cont'd) (B)

SPECIALIZED TRAINING SUBJECTS
(The Demolition Unit)

Num. order	Contents	Time length		Goals and requirements
		No. of days	No. of nights	
1	Overcoming obstacles with explosives. (barbed-wire fence, firing from communication trenches, and mine field). - Organization of the cells in charge of triggering continuously exploding bangalores. - Allocation of tasks. - Wrapping and tying bangalores, and carrying explosives. - Individual movements before and during the operation march. - Where to place the bangalores.	5	5	- The purpose of the training is to make the unit members familiar with the technique (coiling wire, tying the bangalores and placing them.) - The members are required to understand clearly when they should set off continuously exploding bangalores. - The attack should be tightly coordinated. The cadres in particular should have a firm grasp of the timing; they should know what to do; they should be alert and have the initiative in case many things happen at the same time.
2	Individual penetration inside posts. (The unit will rest during the day time and receive training at night.	6	6	- The individual unit members or the cells are required to penetrate all the way to the foot of the fortified wall without making any noise. At the same time they should try to penetrate into the center of the post.
3	Coordination between various cells. - Unit formation during march to take up position in in target area. - Preparation of bangalores and ignition of bangalores. - Assault, individual movements during assault, and attack to occupy a foothold in the post.	3	3	- The purpose of the training is to make the cadres and fighters familiar with individual movements. - The training is designed to ensure tight coordination between the cells, and to make sure that they can react in time in different circumstances.
4	Overcoming natural and artificial obstacles: - Mud, deep water, shallow water, ditches, dry leaves, lime, sand, and grass. - Crawling to cut off barbed wire (with ladder or planks).	7	7	- The purpose of the training is to make the unit members familiar with the individual movements that will enable them to overcome these obstacles without making any noise. - The training is designed to ensure tight coordination between the cells, and to make the unit members familiar with crawling and cutting off barbed wire.
5	General review and final testing. - Three days of general review (that is to say, general checking at the end of the training course to evaluate the level of technical understanding of the cadres and fighters). - Two days of testing on all training subjects.			- General review and testing are aimed at the key experiences during the training phase that the fighters and cadres should pay attention to. - These are living experiences which will improve the performance of the cadres and fighters. This will in turn lessen the bloodshed in combat. This is in line with the military policy of our Party. - The test is designed to make the fighters review the living experiences of the unit, and at the same time to evaluate the level of technical understanding of the unit members at the end of the annual training course. It will also help us to evaluate the efficiency of the instructors, and in this way, it will help us to make greater efforts in the future. - All the cadres and the unit Party Chapter should prepare the training field, weapons and equipment, and training documents. They should complete this task well and carefully.

Document No. 7 (cont'd) (C)
TRAINING PROGRAM FOR FIGHTERS FOR 1966 (7B. V)

GENERAL GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS

On the basis of the document stemming from the General Technical Conference of the Engineering and Demolition Branch convened by the Military Region in 1965, which was approved by the Engineering and Demolition Section (Ban Cong Binh Dac Cong):

We will assist the Province Engineering and Demolition Section (Ban Cong Binh Dac Cong Tinh), on the basis of the above document and of the real combat requirements of the province and unit, to draw up a training program and organize combat training in accordance with the real combat conditions on the battlefield.

Also on the basis of the real requirements of the unit and of the Engineering and Demolition Branch in 1966, reported by the Province Engineering and Demolition Section and by the Province Military Affairs Section, we will implement this directive and will begin to train the unit to consolidate it and reinforce its strong points.

1. The training will give the Engineering and Demolition fighters a basic understanding of their specialized technique and tactics; only in this way will they be able to complete their mission in attacking post and land and water communication routes.

2. The indoctrination will reinforce the fighters' ideological stand of fighting for the Party and for the people, making great efforts to serve the armed forces, carrying on the struggle, completing any mission that is

entrusted to them, overcoming all difficulties, and defeating any enemy.

On the basis of this fundamental task, we will not cease to develop and uphold our proletarian characteristics in all our missions and actions.

3. The training will reinforce our sense of organization and discipline, make us better prepared to execute the orders of our superiors at all times, make us modest, encourage us to learn from our teachers, our friends and the collectivity, and listen to the indoctrination of our superiors. We should do anything that is good, and we should overcome our bad habits. In this way, we will quickly become good fighters, and capable and virtuous cadres.

PRINCIPLES AND METHOD OF TRAINING

a. Principles of Training

In carrying out the training program, we understand that the Revolutionary policy and the military policy are closely interrelated -- that they are like teeth and lips (if the lips open the teeth will be cold). In drawing up the training program, political indoctrination will be included in the training program so as to ensure tight leadership by the Party Chapter (this means that political subjects will be the basis of the training and will be given the highest priority).

In implementing the training program, the principles of training will serve as the foundation, the cadres will serve as the mainstay, the infantry will be the main focus

of attention, technique will constitute the contents of the training program, and at the same time tactics will also be emphasized.

The unit will be the basic unit of training. The unit commander will serve as the instructor, but other cadres might come down to check on the training or to assist the unit commander in giving instructions. But mainly, the unit commander will be the principal instructor of the unit, and the cadres and old fighters will serve as the backbone of the training course, aimed at reinforcing the cadres' capacity to organize and lead the unit, and at developing the tactical and technical level of the soldiers.

We should use the training targets and the battlefield requirements as the basis of training, and at the same time we should also use the basic training coupled with real combat conditions to draw up the contents of the training course.

The training will be based on the equipment available to the unit, and the training site will be chosen on the basis of the terrain.

During the training course, the unit commander will train the unit, and the cadres will instruct the fighters. The instructors should be modest and polite, and they should observe the two great military and political democratic principles, etc. At the same time they should maintain secrecy and protect the security of the unit's training area.

Document No. 7 (cont'd) (C)

b. Training Method

The training should move from the base to the top, from simple to complicated things, and from separate to coordinated actions.

The instructors should talk in a concise and clear manner. They should talk less and do more, and should accompany their words with actions. They should correct errors whenever they arise; they should review what they have already learned all the while that they study new things. They should not be angry and shout at the fighters.

During the training, the teaching of theory should be accompanied by practice. The instructors, the cadres and the unit commander should follow the progress of the fighters closely, correct their errors and assist them.

The unit drills should come between teaching of theoretical principles [huan luyen doi ngu xen ke voi nguyen tac]. There should be an assessment of results at the end of each training phase (each phase will last one month).

The training subjects should be taught in order, one after the other, and the cadres should do everything in order, one after the other. They should be systematic in their work.

May 3, 1966

DOCUMENT NO. 8

PLAN OF ATTACK ON CAY SON*

July 19, 1966

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

17 - Directions: east, west, south, north.

27 - Terrain features on all four sides.

37 - Enemy situation and the number of enemy troops in the target area.

47 - Enemy's general equipment -- different kinds of weapons available to them.

57 - Different types of enemy troops, and location of their command headquarters.

67 - Layout of their communication trenches and barbed wire fences.

77 - Length and width of their defense perimeter.

87 - Layout of their houses and blockhouses.

97 - Situation among the people on the outside.

107 - Our own situation: the weapons available to us.

117 - The tactics and technique that our cadres and fighters have studied.

127 - General observations on the terrain features in the area where our troops will be deployed.

137 - Advantage: our fighters and cadres are familiar with this type of attack.

---

*Handwritten note, ending abruptly with the heading "Instructions of the Company Political Officer."

147 - Our fighting capability: many units will coordinate in the attack.

157 - Our tactical intentions.

167 - Our determination.

177 - Organization for the attack: each of our elements will pin down one wing of the enemy forces.

187 - Unit's deployment: the elements will be deployed so that they can reinforce each other [doi hinh chien dau thanh mot the doi].

197 - Confirmation of the main and secondary thrusts of the company.

207 - Use of the troops and weapons of each wing of our forces.

217 - Mission of each wing of our forces.

227 - Coordination for attack on main and secondary targets.

237 - Organization of withdrawal.

- Instructions of the Company Political Officer.

DOCUMENT NO. 9

ON THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER

I. UNDERSTANDING THE GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS OF DEFENSIVE WORKS.

- Defensive deployment of the Battalion and various companies.
- Mission of the Battalion, Companies and Platoons.

II. BEFORE COMBAT

- Studying and evaluating the enemy situation.
- Choosing the main and secondary directions of our defensive attack.
- Tactical considerations and use of troops.
- Deploying the units for combat, allocation of tasks to each small section.
- Organizing a vigilance system and preparing the units from the ideological point of view to make them ready to fight.
- Holding discussions to assess conditions.

III. DURING COMBAT

- Accurate report on conditions and situation.
- When to open fire. Appropriate maneuvers to move troops and to make full use of firepower.
- Reactions to new situations.

---

*Handwritten note.

- Coordination of troops and firepower according to each circumstance.
- Execution of orders at each level.
- Acting with urgency, and how to reinforce each other speedily.
- Preservation of weapons and ammunition.

IV. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BATTLEFIELD.

- When to withdraw from the battlefield.
- Unit formation for withdrawal.

V. POLITICAL MISSION AND IDEOLOGICAL GUIDANCE.

- Before the battle: do the political officers succeed in making the unit members understand the need of coming to the support of their comrades?
- During combat: do the political officers succeed in motivating the unit members to assist each other and come to the support of each other?
- After the battle: do the political officers reconsolidate the unit and take preventive measures?

VI. DRAWING EXPERIENCE FROM THE BATTLE

- What are the good and bad points during combat?
- What can we learn from the battle?

VII. PROPOSALS FOR COMMENDATION AND PUNISHMENT

DOCUMENT NO. 10

PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES BEGINNING FEBRUARY 3, 1967*

FOR THE DEMOLITION UNIT

- February 3 and 4, 1967: study of protection mission.
- February 5, 1967: the 2nd and 4th Companies and the Battalion Headquarters study rules and regulations.
- The 1st and 3rd Companies practice bayonet drills and unit maneuvers.
- The Battalion Headquarters study unit maneuvers.
- February 6, 1967: the 2nd and 4th Companies study unit maneuvers. The 1st and 3rd Companies study unit maneuvers, bayonet drills, calisthenics with and without weapons. The Battalion Headquarters practice calisthenics without weapons.
- February 7, 1967: the entire battalion studies about responsibilities during Tet celebrations.

February 3, 1967

The Battalion Command Staff

*Typewritten instruction sheet.

DOCUMENT NO. 11

IMPLEMENTATION OF TRAINING SCHEDULE*

Assaults on Post

- Practice by the squads for 2 days and 2 nights.
- Practice by the platoons for 3 days and 2 nights.

Ambush

- Practice by the squads for 2 days.
- Practice by the platoons for 3 days and 1 night.

Attacks on Forces Stationed in the Field

- Practice by the squads for 2 days and 2 nights.
- Practice by the platoons for 3 days and 2 nights.

Technique

- Bayonet drills for 3 days and 2 nights.
- Throwing grenades for 2 days.
- Target shooting (1st lesson) for 5 days.
- Target shooting (2nd lesson on reaction fire) for 5 days and 5 nights.

Specialized subjects

- Determination of length of practice based on amount of time available.

---

*Two pages, typewritten.

30-DAY REVIEW PROGRAM

Purpose

To make the cadres and fighters completely familiar with fighting tactics and technique, so that they can carry out the forthcoming mission.

Requirements

The cadres and fighters should apply themselves to the utmost during the review phase.

- They should have a firm grasp of the contents of the training program.
- They should make the training practices as life-like as possible.
- They should prepare the training field and training equipment properly.
- The cadres should have a firm grasp of all the subjects taught.
- The fighters should be familiar with technique and tactics taught.

Tactics

- Ambush; firing at long range.
- Attack on enemy forces stationed in the field, with no obstacles to obstruct firing.
- Assaults on posts.

Technique

- Bayonet drill. Throwing grenades.
- Target practice (2nd lesson): firing at night, on three kinds of targets.
- Target practice (1st lesson taught in 1965).

Specialized subjects

- Target practice with machine guns on fixed and mobile targets.
- Moving in the target area and setting up machine guns.
- Target practice with DK on fixed and mobile targets. Moving in target area and setting up DK. Assembly and disassembly of DK.
- Shooting at open and hidden targets.
- Shooting at targets with advance and no advance preparations.
- Sighting and setting weapons' range.
- Signal orders.
- B40: assembly and disassembly of shell, sighting, determination of range, sighting mechanism.

Demolition

- Coiling and stringing wire.
- Detecting and removing mines; cutting barbed wire.
- Attack on mobile targets.

Reconnaissance

- Lying in wait for enemy and capturing enemy bare handed.

- Keeping watch on the enemy, and methods to secretly detect the enemy.
- Moving into target area to take up position with infantry units.

Signal

- Coiling and stringing cables under enemy fire; stringing cables across rivers and orchards. Knowledge of complicated technique.
- Connecting cables, and maintenance of weapons.

Man Pack Radio

- Relaying messages and maintaining liaison between units in assaults on posts, defensive actions against sweep operations, and attacks on enemy forces stationed in the field.
- Radio operators who relay messages should relay them faithfully.

IMPORTANT POINTS TO BE REMEMBERED DURING THE REVIEW TRAINING PHASE

Ambush tactics with long range-firing

- Proper deployment of troops in accordance with terrain features.
- Deployment of troops for assault. Assault maneuvers.
- Commanders' maneuvers to maintain firing coordination during assaults.
- Formation of troops for moving.

Assault on Posts

- Deployment of troops for assaults.
- Deployment of troops for reinforcements.
- Coordination of firepower and troop strength.
- Attack on centers of resistance, communication trenches.

Attack on Forces Stationed in the Field

- Secret maneuvers to launch assault.
- Troop deployment for assault.
- Coordination of firepower and troop strength.
- Attack on centers of resistance, last resistance pockets, and communication trenches.

Each company and section will determine the length of time to be spent on each training subject, with the approval of the unit military staff.

Training equipment and expenses will be taken care of by each company and section.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Companies: each of these companies will have 8 round batteries. The 4th Company will have 4 round batteries or 1 flat battery.

In accordance with orders from above, each company will buy their own batteries, and the Battalion will give them a refund later on the basis of the receipts produced. In the case of the 1st and 3rd Companies, they should use the batteries issued to them previously; they will not be given any extra ones.

This review and training program will be carried out for 30 days, not including days spent on moving, attending

political-training sessions, and fighting. In addition, each morning the troops should spend 20 minutes on target practice outside their fortified trenches.

February 22, 1967

The Battalion Command Staff

Document No. 12

Training Program for the Entire Battalion (Demolition Units)

Date	Subject	Items	Contents	No. of days	Length of time	Instructor	No. of nights	Remarks
1st phase 26		Principles	- Ideological stand, behavior, leadership and guidance in combat. - Special aspects of defensive action to fight off sweep operations. - Furthering the cadres' knowledge of basic methods. - Improving the administration of our army.		4 hrs. 4 hrs.			
		Regulations	- Proper behavior and clothing to be adopted. Military courtesy. - Maintenance of weapons and administration of the unit; daily reports.					
			1st Company					
27	Tactics	Assaults on posts.	- Platoons practice assaults on posts. - Squads review tactics till completely familiar with them.	2	14 hrs.	Tam Kieu		Further study in the morning
			2nd Company					
27		Ambush	- Individual fighting	2	14 hrs.			General study session.
			- Squad fighting.	2	14 hrs.			Further study in the evening.
			- Platoon fighting.	2	14 hrs.			Further study in the morning.
			- General review for each platoon.	1	7 hrs.			General review.
			- Study of use of chemicals	2	14 hrs.			
			3rd Company					
27		Attack on forces stationed in the field.	- Platoon fighting. - Review until familiar with tactics.	2	14 hrs.	Chin Thep		Further study in the evening.
			4th Company					
2nd phase 67	Technique	Target practice.	- 60-mm mortars: correction of inaccurate range. - Firing on mobile targets. - Firing at night without advance preparations of weapons. - Technique and tactics concerning the assembling and use of mortars, and calling for mortar shelling. - Range and direction of weapons when reinforcing friendly units.					
			DKZ 57					
			- Understanding the function of the barrel, sighting and elevation mechanism. - Assembly and disassembly of weapon. - Firing on suddenly appearing targets without preparations. - Reaction fire in standing and kneeling positions.					
			For the entire battalion					
			- Bayonnet drill; throwing grenades.		Whenever there is free time.			
			- Target practice for reaction fire at night.		Whenever there is free time.			
			- Group exercises in squad and platoon size.		Whenever there is free time.			
			Signal unit					
			Reconnaissance unit					
			- Intercepting enemy radio messages		10 hrs.			
			- Capturing prisoners		10 hrs.			
			- Vigilance during marches and surveillance in bivouacking areas.		7 hrs.	Minh		
			- Sketching terrain.		7 hrs.			
			Demolition unit					

The Battalion might possibly change the date and time.

Document No. 13

Political Indoctrination Program for May 1967 and Political Training Time Schedule*

The South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces—The 514th Battalion (For the Demolition Unit)

POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION PROGRAM FOR MAY, 1967			
Order	Contents	Length of time	Remarks
1	The political mission: the fight against the Americans (3rd Company)	7 hrs.	
2	Indoctrination on 3-man cells (comrade Tong)	7 hrs.	Constructive criticism.
3	Reorientation on weak areas.	20 hrs.	There will be Kiem Thao sessions.
4	Protective mission (cong tac bao ve)	56 hrs.	Bolstering morale. Study of regulations of the unit.
5	Indoctrination on the three good points of the Party Chapter.	14 hrs.	
	REAR SERVICES		
1	Financial policy for 1967	7 hrs.	
2	Reviewing and balancing of books. Disease prevention. Production for self-sufficiency.	7 hrs.	Discussion and Kiem Thao sessions.
3	General assessment and evaluation of individual performance.	7 hrs.	
TOTAL	POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION	104 hrs.	
TOTAL	REAR SERVICES	21 hrs.	

This length of time includes only the amount of time spent during the day. In addition, each unit should do their utmost to find time to study at night, to make sure that enough time is spent on this political indoctrination.
Two nights will be devoted to talks on current events.

Note: Evaluation report regulations.

- The 1st and 4th Companies, the Signal Outfit, and the Battalion Office should report on the 9th, 19th and 29th.
- The 3rd Company, the Reconnaissance Unit, and the Demolition Unit should report on the 10th, 20th and 30th.

April 30, 1967
For the Command Staff of the Battalion,
signed: Minh Tam.

*One-page typewritten document.

Document No. 13 (cont'd)

THE 514TH BATTALION

THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

POLITICAL TRAINING TIME SCHEDULE

4:30 AM	Getting up.
4:30 to 4:40 AM	Folding clothes, blankets, and hammocks.
4:40 to 5:00 AM	Calisthenics.
5:00 to 5:30 AM	Breakfast -- Taking cover in fortified trenches.
5:30 to 7:00 AM	Cultural education.
7:00 to 8:20 AM	Target practice and review of grenade throwing technique.
8:30 to 11:30 AM	Formal political training.
11:30 to 12	Lunch and discussion.

From 12 to 1:30 PM: Rest

1:30 to 1:40 PM	Getting up.
1:40 to 4:30 PM	Political training.
4:30 to 5:00 PM	Discussion and evaluation in 3-man cells, cleaning weapons.
5:00 to 5:30 PM	Dinner
6:30 to 8:30 PM	Political training.
8:30 to 9:00 PM	Going to bed.

Regulations.

- Marches: marching from 9:00 to 12 o'clock, and the next day the units will resume their political training as usual.
- The day following the march, the units will be allowed to rest from noon to 2:00 PM to make up for the time spent marching the previous day.
- Each day from 5:30 PM to 6:00 PM, each unit will report about their training during the day to the Battalion and the Military Staff.
- Each day, from 4:00 PM to 4:30 PM the Permanent Duty Section of each company will report to the Permanent Duty Section of the Battalion.
- Each day, at 5:00 PM: Change over of the Permanent Duty Section of each company and of the Battalion between the old staff and the new staff.

- This time schedule will be applied starting on April 30, 1967 until new orders are issued.
- Each unit should communicate this time schedule to every one of their fighters.

April 29, 1967
For the Command Staff of the Battalion,
signed: NGO-RIN

DOCUMENT NO. 14

NOTES ON CONDUCTING MILITARY TRAINING*

IMPLEMENTATION OF ORDERS

Our unit has been given the following tasks for the month of May. By the end of May, our unit, along with the Battalion, must have destroyed one enemy company; along with the other companies, our unit must destroy two enemy posts; and our unit, on its own, must shoot down one airplane. In addition, we should seek out the places where Americans land their troops by helicopters to attack them with directional mines and sniping at them with rifles.

Our unit should also carry out a general review in military training, with emphasis on fighting technique and tactics. The training should be realistic, by sending unit members on real mission. We should also make sure that each comrade on reconnaissance mission knows how to draw a sketch of the target, so that each reconnaissance mission is fruitful. By the end of May, we should complete the reconnaissance of three targets in order to launch our attacks (secrecy should be maintained).

TRAINING PROGRAM

The unit should be broken up into three cells. Depending on circumstances and conditions, they should be armed properly and adequately, so that they can perform

---

*In handwriting of Sau Kim.

their dual mission of attending training courses and fighting while in the villages.

All the cadres and fighters in the unit, after they are allocated their tasks for the training phase, should perform as follows in order to improve their level of understanding concerning the reconnaissance technique. The cadres should do their utmost to lead and command their subordinates. They should guide the fighters to the utmost of their capability in order to help the fighters understand quicker the tactics and technique taught, so that they can perform their tasks successfully during the training phase. The fighters should be extremely alert and pay close attention when they perform a reconnaissance mission. They should reconnoiter everything accurately and carefully from outside the target all the way inside. They should examine and touch everything, and they should avoid guesswork. The fighters in our unit should have high morale, as well as a virtuous behavior. While on a reconnaissance mission, they should be careful and minute. They should report accurately and not lie in their reports.

TRAINING METHOD

The unit should be trained by going on real reconnaissance missions. They should go out at night to reconnoiter and come back during the day to discuss their mission and draw lessons from it. Outstanding performers will be selected for public commendation or for award of commendation letters, depending on their performance during reconnaissance and on their execution of orders.

In order to ensure good results during the training phase on tactics and reconnaissance technique, the following rules should be enforced:

(a) During the training and reconnaissance phase, no cadres and fighters will be allowed to go on home leave or to contact their families to come and visit them. They should not have frequent contacts with the people, and they should not go and drink in wine shops (it is absolutely forbidden to get drunk).

(b) They should absolutely defer directly to the local chain of command in the area where they are stationed with regard to lodging and food supplies.

Document No. 15

Training Schedule for May 1967*

The South Vietnam National Liberation Armed Forces — The 514th Battalion

Date	Contents	Length of time	Checked by	Instructor	Night time	Remarks
May 1	Party Chapter Confrerence and meeting of cadres.	7 hrs.	Party Committee	Party Secretary		
May 2	Study of financial policy for 1967.	7 hrs.	Assist. Company Com.	Bn. Com. Staff		
May 3	Individual fighting technique, 3-man cell fighting technique.	6 hrs.	Company Com.	Squad Leader and Pl. Leader		
May 4	Evaluation of policy for 1967.	7 hrs.	Dep. Bn. Commander	Command Staff		Discussions of plan by all units.
May 5	Practice of raid on enemy forces by 3-man cells and squads.	6 hrs.	Co. Commander	Squad and Platoon Leaders		
May 6	Indoctrination on the 3 good points of the Party Chapter.	7 hrs.	Party Committee	Party Secretary		
May 7	General practice of raids.	6 hrs.	Co. Commander and Mil. Staff	Assist. Platoon and Platoon Leaders		
May 8	Indoctrination on the 3 good points of the Party Chapter.	7 hrs.	Party Committee	Party Secretary		
May 9	Principles of raid by platoon and company.	4 hrs.	Party Committee	Military Staff		Each squad should check results of training for 4 hours in the morning.
May 10	Practice by the platoons of attack on enemy forces stationed in the field.	6 hrs.	Mil.Staff and Co. Com.			
May 11	Indoctrination on the responsibilities of the military personnel, and discussion.	6 hrs.	Military Staff	Company Command Staff		
May 12	Practice by the platoons of attack on enemy forces stationed in the field.	6 hrs.	Mil.Staff and Co. Com.	Platoon Leaders and Co. cadres		
May 13	Theory concerning firing at night.	3 hrs.				Rest in the afternoon, and preparations for general practice by platoons at night.
May 14	Tactics for fighting against the Americans.	4 hrs.	Command Staff	Deputy Bn. Commander and Bn. Com.		
May 15	General practice by the Companies of attack on enemy forces stationed in the field, in accordance with the plan of attack.	6 hrs.	(The plan of attack will be drawn up by the companies)			
May 16	Political mission in the fight against the Americans.	7 hrs.	Bn. Command Staff	Company Political Officer		

- The remaining 13 days of the month will be devoted to moving and fighting.
- The companies and sections are free to use their nights as they see fit, but they should inform the Battalion of their plan.
- Evaluation and observation on training should be made as we go along. For example, the 3-man cells make a preliminary evaluation of the training and next comes the turn of the platoons. This is to be done at night.
- The units should not take one hour devoted to one subject to add to the teaching of another subject. They should report a day in advance whenever they want to make a change. The training program will be approved by the Party Chapter and the unit commander.
- Upon completing the training of one subject, the training documents should be returned in order to maintain secrecy. The units are not allowed to keep these documents.
- In the case of the Signal Unit, the Reconnaissance Unit, and the Demolition Unit: they should draw up a political training time schedule with the help and approval of the Battalion, but they can fill out their time schedule for military training themselves.

May 1, 1967
For the Command Staff of the 514th Bn.
Signed: TU RIN

*One-page typewritten document.