

MEMORANDUM

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APRIL 1964

ON THE TRAIL OF
CHOU EN-LAI IN AFRICA

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PREFACE

The following Memorandum is the slightly edited transcript of a recorded talk given by Professor Robert A. Scalapino at the Santa Monica office of The RAND Corporation early in February. It provides a brief report on the author's recent trip through Africa in the footsteps of the Chinese Premier. It discusses Chou's reception in various places and his expressed attitudes toward a number of the new sub-Saharan countries. The Memorandum is a contribution to RAND's continuing program of studies, undertaken for the United States Air Force, concerning the strategy and tactics of Chinese foreign and military policy.

Dr. Scalapino is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. In due course he hopes to publish a detailed analysis of the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the left wing movement in Asia and Africa. The present Memorandum is his first publication as a RAND consultant.

SUMMARY

Chou En-lai's objectives in going to Africa were (1) to strengthen the kind of leftward-leaning Afro-Asian solidarity that was promoted by China at the Bandung and Moshi conferences against the interests of the nonaligned grouping fostered by India and Yugoslavia at the Belgrade conference; (2) to counter the effects of Soviet propaganda, which pictures China as deviationist, adventurist, and recklessly bellicose; (3) to spread an image of China as a major power; (4) to gain the first-hand knowledge necessary for formulating China's policy towards Africa.

Of all the countries Chou visited in Africa and Europe, he was least successful in those of North Africa. Of the countries in Black Africa which he visited, he was most successful (though only moderately) in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. In Guinea he had the advantage of dealing with a country that has been on bad terms with the Soviet Union since 1961. Even here, however, his success was qualified by African resentment against his attack on U.S. policy toward Panama, a breach of a previously agreed rule against criticism of third parties.

While Chou, in his speeches, steered clear of the Sino-Soviet conflict, probably also at African insistence, there were plenty of evidences that the conflict was spreading to Africa. Pro-Soviet leaflets were distributed in several places, and in Mali there were rival Soviet and Chinese exhibitions.

China cannot afford to compete with Western or Soviet-bloc countries as a supplier of economic aid, but she gives

small amounts for selected purposes to certain African countries and individuals. Since she cannot do much for the relatively more developed nations, she concentrates on the poorest. Her influence is likely to be greatest with countries in the pre-independence, revolutionary phase.

The primary concern of African leaders is political integration, and economic development comes in a poor second. The United States, it may be suggested tentatively, might do better to see what happens and to offer technical training to the rising generation of future leaders than to undertake massive programs of economic assistance.

ON THE TRAIL OF CHOU EN-LAI IN AFRICA

Let me start by saying that whatever my political differences with Chou En-lai, and they're rather considerable, I have the greatest admiration for a man of sixty-five who can take a trip through Africa the way he did and survive, given my own state of health at the moment.

I thought I would concentrate today upon some impressions of the Chou trip in Africa, although I would be perfectly willing to extend our discussion during the subsequent period into other facets of the Sino-Soviet dispute and its impact on the Afro-Asian world if you would like.

Firstly, I think that the Chinese Communists were very much interested in trying to combat what they regarded as a Yugoslav-India pincers movement against them in the form of rather substantial pressure for a second Belgrade conference. To put it simply, Chou's message was "Bandung, not Belgrade." The idea that Chou was trying to sell throughout Africa was the idea of a second Bandung conference, with great emphasis upon Afro-Asian solidarity as opposed to any concept of a nonaligned conference from which China would be excluded. In trying to sell this point, Chou continuously emphasized two themes: firstly, that the African-Asian countries had in common their great struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, words that were repeated so often on the Chou En-lai trip that you almost began to dream about them at night. The power of repetition becomes obvious when you follow a man like Chou around for a while. The second

theme was that the African and Asian countries have much in common because of their common timing of emergence and the struggle against poverty and for development. Chou constantly said, both implicitly and explicitly, "We may have different cultural backgrounds, we may have different ideologies, but what is really significant is we have the common struggle against imperialism and for development, and with these two things in common we should meet, we should consult, we should work together and forget ideological differences which are not really significant as long as we follow the five principles and the ten principles involving noninterference in each others' affairs and so forth." This certainly was one of Chou's primary objectives -- to try to get China into the Afro-Asian world solidly and to combat any suggestion that China ought to be left out in favor of a nonaligned group.

It seems to me a second objective of Chou En-lai was in some sense to recast the image of China which had been tarnished a bit by the Chinese position on the Test Ban Treaty and by the general Soviet propaganda that China was, after all, an adventurist, left-deviationist society within the framework of the Communist-Marxist world. For in countries like Ghana, Mali, and Guinea, particularly, where the affiliations are in some degree with the socialist world, the Chinese had to compete with the Russians in the light of the propaganda forays of the last eighteen months or so. And here Chou's tactic was of course to emphasize wherever he could the thesis that there was no more peace-loving power in the world than China, that the Chinese had always favored peace and were opposed to war, that peace

could only be assured by the defeat of imperialism and the imperialist forces headed by the United States, but that China, for her part, would continue to work for total disarmament and the total destruction of nuclear weapons, as would all peace-loving peoples. This theme Chou spelled out time and time again on the trip as you know, and in this connection also, of course, wherever he could, he tried to write such a theme into the joint communiques that concluded his stay.

I think that a third objective of Chou En-lai on this trip was to get across the impression, in Africa particularly, that China was a major power, that with all of her difficulties, and of course he did not emphasize these, although he referred to them occasionally, China was a force to be reckoned with in the world and it was totally unrealistic to try to ignore China or not to pay her the homage due a major power. And Chou constantly reiterated the fact that "the 650 million people of China support you." He brought out these massive statistics, and when you go to a poor little country like Mali which has, oh, about two million people and you say the 650 million people of China are with you, there may be a kind of combined impact of shock, awe, and concern. I heard a couple of African audiences give an "oooo" whenever the figure 650 million was mentioned. There is no question but Chou wanted this trip to give people a physical impression of the vastness and importance of China and have it make an impression upon them, and of course wherever Chou went, propagandists were busy planting stories in the local press about Chinese successes and progress -- rather extensive stories in the countries that were most friendly to him such as Ghana.

Finally, it seems to me a fourth fairly basic objective of the Chinese Premier was to size up Africa himself. This was Chou En-lai's first experience in Africa, at least Black Africa, and an opportunity for him to get some impressions. In the long run, this may be the most important result of the trip, namely, the impact upon the Chinese leadership itself and its subsequent decisions. I feel quite certain that in the coming weeks the authorities in Peking will be reviewing their African policy, rethinking their position, and trying to decide the best tactical and strategic approach for Africa insofar as China is concerned.

Now what about the question of the success or failure of the trip and some of its implications in terms of the African countries? I would like to concentrate in this particular discussion upon the five countries where I had personal observations, either of the trip itself or of the prelude to the trip. These include Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. I was in these countries at the same time as Chou En-lai, although my stay went beyond his a couple of days and started one or two days after he arrived in each case. I was in Somalia and the Sudan when it was known that Chou was coming and I talked to various and sundry people, indigenous and otherwise, about it. I was not in the U.A.R., Tunisia, Morocco or Algeria, and, therefore, what I know about these trips is what I have picked up from people who accompanied the Chou entourage, non-Chinese, that is, and what I read in the communiques, etc.

Now, insofar as Black Africa is concerned, I would say that this trip was moderately successful -- this is my first tentative judgment and one that I may want to

revise upward or downward after I have had a chance to survey the documents a little more thoroughly and to reconstruct my notes. Having just returned, I can give only an off-the-cuff report, but I would call it a moderately successful trip for Chou in the sense that I think that in terms of the joint communiques and private conversations, he got just about what he expected to get. So far as I can see, the Chinese made no striking new advances in goals and objectives. On the other hand there was a shoring up of positions already held, a reiteration of lines that had previously been signalled, and there was this impact of China on Africa in a vastly more visible, deeper sense than had previously taken place. There was, in addition, as I suggested, the opportunity for the Chinese leadership to see Africa in the raw and to make their own subsequent decisions.

In connection with this question of the success of Chou's visit, let me talk a little bit about the foreign politics of the countries he visited and particularly the so-called socialist states of Black Africa: Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. It is my impression that one can probably generalize about these three states in terms of foreign policy as follows:

There are five or six objectives that they hold, roughly in this order of priority: first, Pan-Africanism. Because of both internal and external politics, Nkrumah of Ghana and, to a perhaps somewhat lesser extent, Keita of Mali and Sekou Touré of Guinea all firmly believe in the concept of Pan-Africanism and give this a very high priority in their thinking about foreign policy orientation.

Second on the list I would put the general concept of nonalignment but couple it with a third concept of affiliation with the socialist world. There is some degree of discrepancy between these two objectives, nonalignment and affiliation with the socialist world, and these countries live with that discrepancy without trying, at the moment, to reconcile it. Each of them considers itself socialist. Each talks about the importance of supporting the progressive forces, by which they do not mean the Warsaw Pact countries alone, but a broader, looser concept of the socialist world. In this connection, incidentally, each of them wants to stay on good terms with all of the so-called socialist countries. They want to be friendly with the USSR, with China, and with Yugoslavia, with whom they have the best relations, as well as with the East European countries. Nonalignment continues in every case to hold an emotional and political appeal. Ghana has probably slipped the furthest towards the so-called socialist camp. Though this may be a dangerous generalization, I would say that Mali is the most nonaligned. But whatever the pattern of individual variations, it is my opinion that this combination of nonalignment on the one hand as a proclaimed policy of state and some degree of affiliation with the socialist camp on the other constitutes the second and third objectives of the foreign policy of these states.

Fourth, I would put the concept of Afro-Asian solidarity. This has an emotional appeal and a certain political advantage, but it doesn't rank higher than fourth place, in my opinion, on the priority table of the foreign policies

of these countries. Indeed, as for West Africa, it may well be that ultimately she will feel a more powerful sense of identity with what might be called Negro America. I'm not referring now to the United States, but to the Caribbean, to Brazil, and to other areas where there is a substantial African or Negro population. Geographically and culturally, West Africa could much more easily identify with these areas than with Asia, which is very far away and culturally very distinct. But so long as there is some appeal to the view that there must be a joint struggle against the Western world, against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, Afro-Asian solidarity will have a certain political value for these so-called leftist states. But finally, and this should not be ignored, there is a certain interest in continuing ties with the West, for much of the culture of societies like Ghana, Mali and Guinea is still Western derived, and many of the elite are Western in their educational backgrounds, in some of their ways of life, modes of expression and so forth. It is, I think, very false to assume that Nkrumah is Ghana. Despite the fact that he runs Ghana -- a not inconsiderable fact -- there are large numbers of the Ghanaian elite who are much more moderate politically, much more oriented toward the West. The subsurface of this society is still very strongly oriented toward the West, and if I give this fifth priority in terms of current foreign policy, it is largely because of the political circumstances of today and the trends of the last two years rather than what may necessarily be true in the future, depending, of course, upon the political exigencies of the moment.

Well, this is a very hasty and superficial sketch of the political and cultural facts that Chou En-lai had to face in those areas. Now, how was Chou handled by his host countries? There is some evidence that there were prior consultations among the African leaders as to what the rules of the game would be for this trip. There is some evidence, for example, that it was generally agreed ahead of time that every effort would be made to prevent Chou En-lai from exploring openly the problem with the Soviet Union and, indeed, that there might be some attempt even, in private consultations, to keep Chou En-lai from entering into the Sino-Soviet conflict with the leadership of these countries. Put very briefly, the attitude of most of these so-called socialist states toward the Sino-Soviet conflict is, "We don't want to be involved in it. Preferably, we would rather not even consider that it exists. We don't want to hear about it. We are absolutely determined to stay neutral because we want to remain on good terms with all of the disputants." As I said earlier, for all of these countries, this view includes remaining on good terms with Yugoslavia, which has been a force of considerable importance in these states. I had it on what I consider fairly reliable authority that Chou was constantly briefed in private, "Don't talk about the Sino-Soviet dispute. Don't raise that. It's not a point in which we're involved." Now in actual fact, the Sino-Soviet dispute entered very much into this trip because, whatever the Chinese did or did not do, the evidence of their competition with the Soviet Union was so substantial that the Soviet Union retaliated in a variety of ways. I can

give you one, and perhaps the most dramatic, illustration. When Chou En-lai landed at the Bamako Airport in Mali, a sizeable crowd was out, of course, to see him. Passing among the crowd were Malians distributing pamphlets entitled "Friends and Comrades in Africa." This pamphlet was essentially a recitation of the extensive economic and technical assistance which the Soviet Union had given in Africa, but there were four paragraphs in the pamphlet that were vitriolic and open attacks upon the Chinese -- why the Chinese are in Africa -- and, essentially, they were Soviet-line attacks. "They want to separate the workers of the capitalist world from the workers of the underdeveloped world. They want to assume the leadership of the international progressive movement, etc., etc." Now the fact that these pamphlets were passed out at the airport, and there is every evidence that they were Soviet initiated, is just one illustration of the way in which the Sino-Soviet cold war has been injected into Africa at this point, and I could give many others.

In my opinion it was a tactical error on Chou's part to combine this African trip with the Albanian trip. I think it was strategically and tactically wrong, for this brought the Yugoslavs onto the scene. Yugoslavs were handing out their own pamphlets when I was in Africa, and they had one already in circulation when Chou got to Guinea. Distributed by the Yugoslav Embassy in Guinea, it proclaimed, "This is what Chou En-lai says in Africa," and cited Chou on peaceful coexistence, noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries: "We just want to live-and-let-live with out neighbors under different social systems."

"And this is what he said on the borders of Yugoslavia in his recent trip to Albania," at which point the pamphlet referred to Chou's violent attack upon the Yugoslavs and his incitement to overturn the false Marxist-Leninist leadership. "Now which Chou En-lai do you want to believe?" This was the gist of this pamphlet, and, I must say, it was rather well done. Even before Chou En-lai left Africa, both the Russians and the Yugoslavs had their "truth squads" on his trail, and they were pushing in rather quickly.

Another dramatic illustration of the competition lay in the two fairs. As a prelude to Chou En-lai's visit to Mali, the Chinese had an exhibition, and it was open for several weeks. The Soviets didn't open their exhibition until the day after Chou En-lai left. They wanted to open it while he was there, but the Malian government refused them permission to do so. A comparison, which I haven't really time to make here, between these two exhibits is, I think, a fascinating study in the way in which China and Russia respectively are trying to win friends and influence people today in Africa. I will limit myself to summarizing my impressions of the two exhibits. I visited them both and took fairly extensive notes.

The Chinese exhibit was a simple, relatively unsubtle, straightforward propagandistic effort in which the Chinese, with almost scientific precision, had laid out not only their political themes, but the priority that they wish to give them. As you entered the building you got priority number one, and then you went right on through the rest of them. There was no mistaking the message. Some of it was quite crude. For example, the attacks upon the West included

before and after pictures, before China was liberated and after, and even had the dead babies and the people writhing in missionary hospitals that hark clear back to Boxer Rebellion-type propaganda. But it was essentially a very simple exhibit in which the underlying themes were "We're still backward, but we're coming forward fast. We are a mob which you can follow and understand. We're a have-not nation with many problems, but we've completely eliminated imperialism. We're ready to fight to eliminate it throughout the world and we're with you -- no strings, no requests, nothing."

The Soviet exhibit covered a much wider range of interests, and was much more subtle. The propaganda was certainly present, but it didn't hit you in the face in the same way the Chinese did. There was a subdued tone to the Soviet exhibit. It had a certain amount of taste, style, and substance. It was a visual illustration of the fact that the Soviets have at least one foot in the advanced world. Space and science -- all the major exploits of the modern Soviet Union were set forth, and it was very interesting to watch the Malian peasants move through the Soviet exhibit. The Russians had not ignored simplicity. You started, for example, in examining agricultural implements, say a hand-pushed plow, but you worked up to a very intricate scientific machine at the end of the line. Most of the peasants were standing around the plow, but there was something for everybody in this exhibit, all the way from the very simple to the very sophisticated.

The Soviets had their books for sale. Incidentally, Soviet representatives in Mali referred contemptuously to

the Chinese exhibit as a side show and a giveaway because the Chinese sold souvenirs and various other things. But, in fact, the Chinese were very much more bold with their books and their propaganda than the Soviet Union. The Chinese presented under glass the entire range of Chinese materials on the Sino-Soviet dispute, and right in the center of the huge exhibit was a section devoted to Comrade Stalin with a large picture of Stalin. But these were not for sale. Outside, for sale, there were no pamphlets directly upon the Sino-Soviet dispute, only the collected works of Mao Tse-tung and the other Chinese leaders. Whether this had been determined after consultation with the Malian government I don't know, but it was as close as you could come. If you wanted these things under glass, incidentally, you could write to Peking. There were little order blanks there, but they weren't being actually sold in Mali.

The Russians, on the other hand, displayed none of the literature that was most directly involved in the dispute, except perhaps Khrushchev's speech to the Twenty-Second Party Congress, but even that was mainly directed, as you know, toward Albania, not toward China. So that even here the Russians were more subtle than the Chinese. You got the sense of China the revolutionary, brash force and the Soviet Union being somewhat more subtle and subdued.

Now, I think I have given you maybe enough evidence that the Sino-Soviet dispute is in Africa. However much Nkrumah wishes it weren't there and would go away, it is present. Of course the situation in Africa is a little bit different from what it is in Asia insofar as the

communist movement is concerned. Most of these countries in Africa do not have bona fide communist parties as do those in Asia. Consequently, it may be possible for the self-styled Marxists or Marxist-Leninists of Africa to avoid taking stands that will clearly mark them as leaning toward one side or another or being in one camp or another. It seems to me clear that the communist parties in Asia tried very, very hard in earlier years to avoid alignment, to follow a kind of neutralist policy. This has given way, in most cases, before the inexorable pressures from Moscow and Peking to stand up and be counted, to take positions. And while it is still true that the long-range objective of many Asian communist leaders is probably to be independent of either Moscow or Peking, a position that can be defended at least as independent, I think it is very doubtful that such parties can hold to this, and, consequently, as you well know, the dangers of factionalism within each party have grown to the point now where in several cases you have open splits and in all cases you have subterranean ones.

The African Left, the African Marxist or Marxist-Leninist movement, hopes to avoid this partially by not having official internationally connected communist parties that are forced to take stands on the "litmus paper" issues. I talked to some of the young, self-styled Marxist-Leninists in Africa, particularly in Ghana, where I met a number of the young radicals around Nkrumah, including this fellow P. D. Boffa, who was in the news yesterday as leading the anti-American riot. I spent two hours talking with him. These people take a certain pride, I think, in being able

to say, "Well, Mr. Khrushchev isn't right on this, but the Chinese are probably not right on that." It's quite something for a man like Boffa to sit back and say, "Well, no one is quite right on this. We've got a different perspective." There's a good deal of that going to go on in Marxist intellectual and pseudo-intellectual circles in Africa in my opinion.

Now it is true, of course, that on certain issues even the African Left have had to take a stand. There is no inclination, so far as I can determine, anywhere in these countries to desert Yugoslavia or to accept in any sense the Chinese definition of Yugoslavia. There is no attempt, in my opinion, to accept totally the Chinese line on Bandung. Countries like Ghana, Guinea, and Mali will be for a second Bandung, yes, and a second Belgrade, yes, too. The form that nonalignment here will take is, "We'll go to any international conference, especially one that's sponsored by the Left." I have some detailed information on how the African delegations at Moshi and at Bandung voted on the critical question whether the Soviet Union is an Asian country. This is the issue that the Chinese raised in order to exclude the Russians. Without going through my notes, however, I cannot give you this information at the moment. Let me simply say that the votes were split. Certain African delegations took the position that the Soviet Union is not an Asian power, and that their use of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and others is not legitimate since these are not independent entities. Others took the position that the Soviet Union should be involved. The Somalian delegation supported the Soviet Union's involvement, as

did the Ghanaian delegation. It is my understanding that the Guinean delegation supported the Chinese position.

But Guinea is an interesting case, because Sekou Touré and the top Guinean leaders are very angry with the Soviet Union. Ever since the so-called Teachers' Union Plot in 1961 when Sekou Touré requested the recall of the Soviet Ambassador on a charge of internal interference in Guinean affairs, the Soviet Union's position in Guinea has been very precarious. As a matter of fact, this is probably the reason why Guinea was one of the very few countries that refused to sign the Test Ban Treaty. So in one sense, the Chinese came out better in Guinea than in almost any place else. Guinea is hostile to the West on ideological grounds, is angry with the Soviet Union, and really has no place else to go.

But even in Guinea, a careful reading of the joint communique will show that Sekou Touré didn't give away anything he didn't want to give away. There is the support for the principle of an Afro-Asian conference. But the Yugoslavs are doing very well in Guinea, and Touré has made it clear that he would certainly go again to Belgrade. Even while Chou was in Guinea, Touré, on a number of occasions, made statements that "Guinea is going to remain nonaligned, and that's the fundamental base of our policy." And perhaps most interestingly of all, it was reported to me, and I think reliably, that Chou En-lai was supposed to clear every public speech and statement with the Guinean government. Whether he presented it for clearance or not, his attack upon the United States in the Panama incident was not authorized, and was a violation of the agreement

among African leaders that there would be no attacks on third countries in the course of the Chou En-lai tour. As a result -- and this is certainly true -- this portion of Chou En-lai's speech was completely removed from all newspaper and radio accounts. People who were in Guinea knew that the attack was made, but the Guinean press, which is totally government controlled, removed it from Chou's officially reported speech.

Now this is interesting, and there are reports, also, that the government was very angry with Chou for having done this. This indicates what I tried to suggest at the outset, namely, that while I think the Chou trip was moderately successful, it was not, in my opinion, a trip that set new positions for the Chinese, that pushed China, as it were, into orbit insofar as African support went. Of course these countries are going to support China's admission to the UN, and of course the timing of the trip and of the de Gaulle statement may have given China some additional advantages in those countries of Africa which she did not visit, the old Brazzaville group. For the trip had its effects, naturally enough, in the countries like Senegal, the Ivory Coast and a number of the other ex-French colonies who had been closely associated with France in the French Union. But my own feeling is that what is more significant is that China is going 1) to reconsider her African policies and 2) there is almost certainly going to be a stepped-up competition between not only the West and China, but, perhaps more interestingly, between the Soviet Union, between the so-called Eastern European Soviet bloc and the Chinese communists and additional

complications in terms of the involvement of Yugoslavia. The Africans look forward to this with some foreboding. They are really concerned about being drawn into this struggle, and you can understand why. They don't know how to prevent it; they have said in effect on numerous occasions: "Please do not attack third countries," and yet this flood of pamphlets pours into Africa on an ever-increasing scale.

I think I might just close by talking a bit about what I think future Chinese tactics will be in Africa, and this is very hypothetical. In the first place, in Eastern Africa China has followed a policy remarkably similar to that which Russia followed about thirty-five years ago in Eastern Asia -- namely, she has come to areas, tried to discern promising individuals or organizations, and then given small but nevertheless important amounts of aid for various purposes. Thus in a country like Kenya, as is well-known, she gave funds to Odinga, a prominent Luo politician, ostensibly, and perhaps really, for scholarships for Kenya students and for such other purposes as he might deem fit. In Somalia there is a good deal of evidence that elements in the Ministry of Information, including the Minister himself, have had access to Chinese funds, and, certainly, the press in Somalia and certain elements of the press in other parts of Eastern Africa have been particular targets for the Chinese. In Zanzibar maybe this has paid off, for the man that they backed in Zanzibar, Babu, came to power in connection with the recent revolution. I interviewed Babu two years ago. I spent a couple of hours with him in his home. At that

time, of course, he was just somebody on the out, and, subsequently, he was in prison shortly after I left Zanzibar -- I don't feel that there is any connection. But Babu, at that time, openly admitted that he was obtaining funds. He was serving as a correspondent for the New China News Agency; he had been to Peking and was impressed. On the other hand, he didn't come to Marxism via Peking but rather through the London School of Economics, like many other Afro-Asian intellectuals, and he struck me as a man of fairly considerable power and one that Peking couldn't necessarily count on. Remember -- if you remember your history -- the Soviet Union couldn't ultimately count on many of the people that they started supporting in the early 20's either. I think that the attrition rate of this first generation of sponsored individuals is likely to be quite high. Nonetheless, this was a tactic which didn't involve much money and, coupled with the red carpet treatment given to selective African groups, delegations, and individuals going to Peking, was the opening Chinese approach, along with massive radio propaganda. One of the best transmitters anywhere is beamed through Eastern Africa, and you can pick up English and Swahili language broadcasts in Eastern Africa from Chinese sources with ease.

Now, in one sense you can say China got to East Africa at the proper time. She got there before independence, when the nationalist liberation movements were gestating. She picked individuals and groups and became involved in some degree in the revolutionary process. This is also true, to a certain extent, in parts of North Africa, particularly Algeria. And through this she fueled her

campaign -- "We're doing more for the African national liberation movement than the Russians; we're more committed to a revolutionary approach to overthrow imperialism." Whether this campaign was completely effective I do not know. I had one very interesting interview with someone close to the Algerian leadership who told me that the Algerian leaders' attitude toward the Chinese in the course of the revolution was a mixed one. On the one hand they were grateful for Chinese offers of support and assistance and for some training that was given, but on the other hand they wanted to be exceedingly cautious because they know China's "ulterior motives" in this matter. Furthermore, they were not unsophisticated about world politics: they knew heavy Chinese involvement in the Algerian revolution would have adverse repercussions in the West and, ultimately, after the success of the revolution, they hoped to depend somewhat upon Western support for their rehabilitation process. Therefore, they were less than eager to jump at Chinese-proffered aid. I have reason to believe that it was probably true, both because of the source and because this makes general sense. In any case, it seems to me, the Chinese can only do so much. It may well be that their greatest period of effectiveness is during revolutionary situations, and that once a government comes into power in the aftermath of revolution the Chinese have less to offer in terms of hardware and all of the other accoutrements of stabilization than they do in the revolutionary process itself. And their main support will come from those people who are disenchanted with or unacceptable to both the Soviet and Western camps,

and only from these. I do not know, but this, it seems to me, is at least a possibility.

Now in Western Africa, the Chinese got there late. Western Africa was already independent, and you already had established governments, most of those with which the Chinese communists dealt proclaiming socialist objectives and, indeed, insisting that they were following the socialist path.

In this connection, incidentally, there was one very interesting thing about Chou En-lai's trip. On every possible occasion his African hosts, in introducing him or welcoming him, would make some comment about "We are happy to have Premier Chou En-lai here to see our own socialist experiment." Nkrumah said, "It is particularly fortunate that Chou En-lai has arrived at this period when the socialist revolution of Ghana is being accelerated." But in response, Chou En-lai did not once use the word "socialism" in praising the governments and leadership of Ghana, Mali, and Guinea. This did not go unnoticed. Several members of the Ghanaian cabinet, in discussing the Chou visit with the Yugoslav Ambassador, asked him, "Why do you suppose it was that Chou En-lai never once referred to Ghanaian socialism?" The Yugoslav was only too glad to answer him. And so, having been given this tip, I watched carefully throughout these countries, and Chou always carefully avoided mentioning socialism as the system that was prevailing. He said, "We're glad that you're making progressive steps; we want to compliment you upon your independence from imperialism." There were many complimentary and eulogistic phrases, but "socialism"

wasn't one of them, and I think this is interesting because, among other things, it probably indicates that the Chinese insist that scientific socialism has to be scientific socialism and not what's going on there in Africa.

In any case, the Chinese in these countries of Western Africa are dealing with established governments. There is little evidence that they are engaged in Western Africa in intensive individual forays. I found no evidence of what could be called Chinese subversion. It would be too dangerous I think. And they learned a lesson from the Russians. The Russians got into such deep trouble in Guinea that the Chinese don't want to follow them. They have small technical and economic aid programs which have been relatively successful. Chou made much of this, and, indeed, he did so to strike back at the Russians. He said, "Our aid programs are generous. We give long-term arrangements with either no interest or little interest. We work at the same levels as the indigenous population. We do not demand any special housing privileges, nor do we rob the country." Incidentally, you have to know the Russian aid programs in order to know how much this strikes home. And he said also, "We have no desire to interfere in internal affairs. We have no strings to our aid, no interest in involvement in internal politics whatsoever." In Mali he issued a kind of eight-point pronunciamento on Chinese economic assistance rules and regulations. At least three of those eight points were direct attacks on the Russians, not on us, and the others could be interpreted either way. But this economic and technical assistance program, is small and rather selective.

Personally, without going into it in great detail, I can't say that I foresee any large-scale economic and technical program of the Chinese in Africa. First of all they can't afford it. Secondly, the aid that they have proffered has only been partially used, actually. The lines of credit that have been drawn upon are very much less than have been allocated thus far, and there are a number of other reasons, in my opinion, for arguing that the economic and technical program will be minimal but oriented toward certain kinds of projects that will bring maximum political advantage. There probably will be a step-up in the attempt to get at organizations through cultural exchange, through educational and other kinds of interaction. There certainly will be an attempt to keep harmony with these states through the formula of the Afro-Asian solidarity meeting, and China will certainly hope that, more and more, some of these states will take her line on key international issues and make speeches on her behalf until such time as she gets in the UN. But it's very clear that the Chinese are fighting a two-front battle in Africa, one front against the West, and another equally important front against the Russians.

I think my own impression is that Chou was relatively satisfied with the trip as a beginning, and that he was probably much less satisfied with the North African part of the trip, where I think he got much less. I think Egypt, Tunis, and even Algeria proved to be much harder to crack in terms of Chinese desiderata than the so-called socialist Black African states, and in my opinion this is partly because of the leadership role that the U.A.R.

herself hopes to play, various complicated internal factors now taking place in Algeria, the general European orientation of this area as contrasted with the current leadership in the socialist Black African states, and also standards of living and levels of development. One only has to spend three weeks in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, particularly in Mali and Guinea, to realize that here one is in the underdeveloped portions of the underdeveloped world.

