Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces
Preface

This report documents the findings from the project “Enabling an Efficient and Effective Global SOF Network,” specifically the task to provide analytical support to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) regarding the future role of women in special operations forces (SOF). The project’s goal was to provide analytical assistance to USSOCOM concerning all aspects of the implementation of the future vision and operating concept put forth by USSOCOM. Task 4 aimed to assess the range of potential challenges to the effective integration of women into SOF, bringing in the operator perspective and focusing on the unit and team levels.

USSOCOM received this report in June 2015. On December 3, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the military services to open all combat jobs to women, with no exceptions. The Secretary of Defense also approved a number of studies, including this study, on the topic of women in ground combat to be publicly released. This report has been edited but otherwise not updated substantively since the final version was delivered to the sponsor in June 2015.

This report has two main objectives. It assesses potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF for unit cohesion, and it provides analytical support in validating SOF occupational standards for USSOCOM-controlled positions. The report briefly summarizes the history of integration of women into the U.S. armed forces. It reviews the current state of knowledge about cohesion in small units and discusses the application of gender-neutral standards to SOF. It identifies widely agreed on professional standards for validation of physically demanding occupations and assists SOF service components with the application of these standards to SOF occupations. The report discusses the primary data—a survey of SOF personnel and a series of focus group discussions—collected by the research team regarding the potential challenges to the integration of women in SOF. The final chapter discusses the findings of the task and presents some recommendations regarding potential implementation. The findings of this report should be of interest to those in the U.S. defense community with an interest in manpower and personnel issues and in the evolution of U.S. SOF.

This research was sponsored by USSOCOM and conducted within the Forces and Resources Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified CombatantCommands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. The overall project, as well as research on other tasks that were a part of the project, was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute.
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# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figures and Tables</td>
<td></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td></td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Context</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives and Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of This Report</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART I</td>
<td>History, Challenges, and Concerns</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO</td>
<td>The Integration of Women and Other Excluded Groups into the U.S. Military: The Historical Experience</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in the U.S. Military</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of Attitudes Toward Gender Integration in the U.S. Military</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Integration of Excluded Groups in the U.S. Military</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE</td>
<td>Physical Ability and Stress Response Differences Between Men and Women</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Men and Women Compare on Measures of Physical Ability</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex and Gender Differences in the Stress Response</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR</td>
<td>The Potential Implications of Women’s Integration on Unit Cohesion</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion Is Relevant for SOF Tactical Units</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion Exists at Multiple Levels</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion Has Multiple Dimensions</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion Considerations for Integrating Women into SOF Units</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures and Tables

Figures

2.1. Women in the Military, as Percentage of Active Personnel, 1945–2013 .................... 21
2.2. Active-Duty Women in the Army and the Overall Military, 1945–2013 .................... 21
2.3. Women in the Army, as a Percentage of Active Enlisted and Officer Personnel, 2000–2013 ........................................................................................ 22
2.4. Female Enlisted Military Police (MOS 31B) Personnel ...................................... 23
2.5. Active Component Female Enlisted Military Police (MOS 31B) Personnel .......... 24
2.6. Active Component Female Officer Military Police (MOS 31A) Personnel ............ 25
2.7. Active Component Female Enlisted Bridging Engineers (MOS 12C) ................. 25
2.8. Active Component Female Enlisted CBRN Personnel (MOS 74D) ....................... 26
2.9. Active Component Female Officer CBRN Personnel (MOS 74A) ......................... 27
2.10. “Is the Job ‘Rifle-Carrying Infantry Foot Soldier’ an Appropriate Job for Women?”—Survey of Army Soldiers, 1974 .................................................... 29
2.11. “Do You Think Women Should Be Allowed to Serve in Your Occupation/Career Field?”—Survey of Army Soldiers, Late 1990s ................................................ 30
2.12. Attitudes of White Soldiers Toward Racial Integration in the Segregated Army, 1943 and 1951 ...................................................................................... 33
2.13. Attitudes of African American Soldiers Toward Racial Integration in the Segregated Army, 1943 and 1951 ........................................................................ 33
2.14. Enlisted Soldiers’ Opinions of Removing the Ban on Homosexuals in the Armed Services, 1993 ................................................................................................. 35
2.15. Opinions on the Impact of the Repeal of DADT on Soldiers’ Personal Readiness (Respondents Who Believed That They Never Served with a Gay or Lesbian Service Member), 2010 .................................................. 36
3.1. Normal Curve Distributions for Strength Differences Between Men and Women ...... 43
4.1. The Standard Model of Cohesion ........................................................................... 58
4.2. The Magnitude of the Cohesion-Performance Coefficient Depends on Study Characteristics .......................................................... 64
4.3. Expectations for the Joint Effect of Task and Social Cohesion in SOF Units .......... 73
5.1. Support and Opposition to Opening Specialties and Units to Women .................. 90
5.2. Main Themes from Automated Linguistic Analyses of Open-Ended Responses .... 91
5.3. Two Measures of the Importance of the Women in SOF Issue .......................... 93
5.4. Experience Working with U.S. Military Women in a Combat Environment ......... 94
5.5. Assessments of Women’s Capabilities for Respondents’ Specialties .................... 95
5.6. Themes Identified Regarding the Greatest Benefit of Opening Specialties to Women ........................................................................................................ 96
viii Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

5.7. Agreement or Disagreement About the Potential Benefits of Women in SOF Units ................................................................. 97
5.8. Respondents’ Greatest Concerns About Opening Specialties to Women ................................................................. 97
5.9. Concern That Physical Job Standards Will Be Lowered ....................................................................................... 98
5.10. Frequency of References to Standards in Responses to Open-Ended Questions .................. 99
5.11. The Importance of Different Policy Actions to the Successful Integration of Women into SOF ................................................................................. 101
5.12. Suggested Implementation Actions for SOF Opening Specialties to Women ................. 102
5.13. Suggested Implementation Actions for SOF Opening Specialties to Women ................. 103
5.14. Support and Opposition to Opening SOF Specialties, by Element and Rank Group ....................................................... 106
5.15. Percentage of Respondents by Number of Extreme Negative Responses ................. 118
5.16. Classification Analysis Regression Tree Results .............................................. 122

7.1. Illustration of Criterion-Related Validity: Establishing the Statistical Relationships Between Physical-Ability Tests and Job Performance ...................................................................................... 192

Tables

1.1. USSOCOM Positions Previously Closed to Women by Unit (March 2013) .................. 4
1.2. USSOCOM Positions Previously Closed to Women by Specialty (March 2013) ....... 5
3.1. Comparison of Primary Physiological Differences Between Men and Women .......... 45
4.1. Survey Responses to Cohesion and Trust Questions .................................................. 69
5.1. Response Rates by SOF Element and Rank Group (Percent) .................................. 86
5.2. Cross-Tabulation of Q20 (Support for Opening Specialties) and Q21 (Opening Units) (Percent) ........................................................................ 90
5.3. Bivariate Relationships Between Q20 (Support for Opening SOF Specialties) and Other Variables ................................................................. 107
5.4. Comparison of Multivariate Models Predicting Support for or Opposition to Opening Specialties (Q20) ................................................................. 111
5.5. Model 3 Results and Marginal Effects of Significant Variables .............................. 115
5.6. Selected Survey Results by Quality of Experience Working with U.S. Military Women, Five-Point Scale ................................................................. 117
5.7. Model 3 Results for Total Sample, “Consistently Negative Responders” and Other Respondents .......................................................................... 119
5.8. Comparisons of Total Sample, “Consistently Negative Responders,” and Other Respondents ................................................................................. 121
6.1. Breakdown of Focus Group Participants by Grade ................................................... 128
6.2. Breakdown of Focus Group Participants by USSOCOM Component ......................... 128
Summary

The U.S. Special Operations Command, the study sponsor, received this report in June 2015. On December 3, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the military services to open all combat jobs to women, with no exceptions. The Secretary of Defense also approved a number of studies, including this study, on the topic of women in ground combat to be publicly released. This report has been edited but otherwise not updated substantively since the final version was delivered to the sponsor in June 2015.

Background and Objective

In January 2013, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the rescission of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR) and their intention to integrate women into occupational fields to the maximum extent possible and in accordance with validated, gender-neutral occupational standards. The services and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) were required to integrate women into newly opened positions no later than January 1, 2016, or to request exemptions to the policy. The rescission potentially opened approximately 15,500 special operations forces (SOF) positions controlled by USSOCOM that have been closed to women by specialty: the Air Force’s Combat Controllers (CCTs) and Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT) specialists; the Army’s Special Forces (SF) and Rangers; the Marine Corps’ Critical Skills Operators (CSOs); and the Navy’s Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) commandos and Special Warfare Combat-Craft Crewmen (SWCC). This report deals with the issue of the potential integration of women into the seven SOF military occupations that have been closed to women by specialty. In line with the rescission of DGCDAR, integration refers to the opening up of all SOF occupations and units to women, based on the application of gender-neutral standards.

SOF personnel operate in small, geographically isolated, self-contained teams for lengthy periods, often covertly, in austere conditions, and in extremely dangerous operational environments. The potential integration of women into SOF units raises a number of issues pertinent to the effectiveness of such teams, both from the perspective of physical standards and ensuring the readiness, cohesion, and morale essential to high-performing teams.

Consequently, USSOCOM asked RAND’s National Defense Research Institute to assist in identifying potential challenges that might arise if women are integrated into SOF military occupations entirely closed to women by specialty. This study had two main objectives: (1) assess potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF for unit cohesion, and
(2) provide analytical support in validating SOF occupational standards for USSOCOM-controlled positions. This report summarizes our research, analysis, and conclusions. We used a mixed-methods approach. We reviewed the current state of knowledge on small-unit cohesion and effectiveness. We identified widely agreed on professional standards for validation of physically demanding occupations and then assisted SOF service components with the application of these standards to SOF occupations. We also collected primary data to bring in the operator perspective. We conducted a census-type survey of personnel currently serving in the positions closed to women by specialty, focusing on the potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF. We supplemented the survey with information from focus group sessions that we conducted with participants from all SOF service components.

The purpose of this research was to inform USSOCOM about the depth and extent of potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF positions currently closed to women, as one input into USSOCOM leadership’s decision regarding how to proceed. As such, we have focused on the potential challenges and problems to the full integration of women into SOF and placed the potential policy change in the context of previous integrations of out-groups into the military. We also note in what follows that all of the challenges we identified have come up previously, none of them proved insurmountable, and the key to successful prior integrations was the implementation program. Lessons from the previous integrations might be useful to draw on in informing a USSOCOM implementation plan. Below we sketch out the basic guidelines for such an implementation plan; we keep the guidelines purposely concise. Expanding on these guidelines is an appropriate step after a policy decision is made, and if such a decision is in the affirmative.

Main Challenges

Two main challenges have been central to debates about the potential opening of SOF specialties to women: (1) questions regarding the sufficiency of the physical or mental abilities of members of the excluded group to cope with the tasks assigned to the unit, and (2) the impact of the entry of the excluded group on the cohesion, trust, morale, discipline, and the general efficient functioning of the unit.

To address the question of women’s abilities to meet SOF standards, we examined research exploring differences between men and women on physical ability and motor skill tests. On these dimensions, on average, men generally outperform women. These differences begin to expand following puberty and might be partially influenced by environmental factors. That said, although there are often large differences between men and women, primary emphasis must be placed on an individual’s capabilities to perform critical tasks and individual risks for developing an injury. Just as very few men succeed in qualifying for SOF, and the ones that do are in the tail of the distribution, the same is likely to apply to women, if they are allowed to enter SOF specialties. Average differences between overall populations are not good indicators for understanding readiness for SOF. For purposes of understanding the relevance of physiological differences in the ability of women to qualify for SOF specialties, in almost all cases, additional screening (e.g., physical ability test) will be a better indicator of performance and risk of injury, compared with simply knowing whether a candidate is a man or woman.

We also examined sex and gender differences in stress response to understand the physiological reasons that might affect women’s suitability for the extremely stressful environments
in which SOF sometimes operate. Men and women respond to stress differently, although much depends on the specific stressor and context. Just as with physical ability, individual differences and prior experiences have a greater impact on stress response than sex or gender. Additional screening will be a better indicator of stress response than broad distinctions along male-female lines. Stress response can be altered as individuals learn from experience and from specific training designed to cope with specific stressors.

Cohesion is a fundamental dimension of unit effectiveness in the military, and the concept is especially relevant to the types of operations in which SOF engages and the way SOF teams operate. There are two main dimensions to cohesion: task cohesion and social cohesion. Task cohesion, which captures the extent to which unit members share a common goal and coordinate their efforts to achieve it, enables units to work together effectively as a group to accomplish their missions. Task cohesion has long been recognized as a key contributor to unit effectiveness. Social cohesion, which we define broadly as the extent to which unit members like one another, trust one another, and provide social support for one another, might also increase SOF units’ effectiveness indirectly. Evidence that social cohesion directly affects unit performance is mixed, but analysts have found that social cohesion can strengthen individual unit members’ resilience, enabling groups to perform tasks effectively in stressful environments and reducing the probability that unit members will experience mental distress in the aftermath of their operations.

Integrating women into SOF units has the potential to reduce unit cohesion if female special operators are not perceived as competent and are not accepted as full members of their teams. Women’s acceptance on teams will reflect their actual and perceived ability to perform team tasks, other team members’ willingness to accept women on the team, and leaders’ efforts to promote integration. Male unit members’ perceptions of women’s performance and competence might be influenced by many factors, such as actual performance, the quality of members’ prior experience working with women, and potential biases in assessing women’s capabilities. Male unit members’ beliefs about the standards to which women are held will also influence their perceptions of women’s competence.

**Findings from the Survey and Focus Groups**

We designed a survey to gauge the extent of potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF, and we administered it among the personnel in USSOCOM-controlled positions that have been closed to women. To complement the survey, add richness, and gain a more nuanced understanding of the potential challenges, we conducted a series of focus group discussions with SOF personnel. Both the survey and the focus groups involved all the SOF service components and all SOF specialties closed to women.

The main finding in both our survey and focus group analyses is that there is strong, deep-seated, and intensely felt opposition to opening SOF specialties that have been closed to women. Overall, 85 percent of survey participants opposed letting women into their specialties, and 71 percent opposed women in their units. Although opposition exists across all services, elements, specialties, and rank groups, SEALs, Air Force Special Operations Command Special Tactics Team members, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) appeared most strongly opposed. The dominant perspective across the focus groups was that women should not be
integrated into SOF units and specialties, with potential impact on mission effectiveness and the continued ability to function as a highly performing team central to participants’ concerns.

SOF personnel identified three main concerns regarding unit effectiveness when integrating women into SOF units. First, many SOF personnel were concerned that standards would fall. Second, many SOF personnel were concerned that integrating women into SOF units would erode unit cohesion. Third, many SOF personnel were concerned that integrating women into SOF units would reduce the availability of leaders to resolve conflict between unit members (e.g., leaders might be less willing to engage in managing conflict between men and women in an integrated unit than in an all-male unit).

SOF personnel also raised other concerns, ranging from the potential impact on working with some foreign partners to complications in family life stemming from lack of privacy and close physical contact among team members that now would include women. Many of the issues brought up in the focus groups centered on the impact of specific medical issues on women (e.g., higher injury rates, increased risk of genital infections in austere operational environments, menstruation and impact on performance) and on the deployability of women (e.g., pregnancy, restrictions on utilization of women in some missions) affecting unit readiness. Some survey respondents and focus group participants also expressed concern about the retention of experienced men in SOF and about the recruitment and retention of women.

Despite the concerns most survey and focus group participants raised about potentially integrating women into SOF units, some participants also highlighted the potential benefits integrating women into SOF units might provide. About four in ten survey respondents agreed that women might be helpful in conducting sensitive operations and communicating with local populations. Accordingly, there is higher support, based on mission requirements, for attaching women in other specialties to SOF units, and higher support for opening SOF to women, than there is support for opening currently closed SOF specialties to women.

We note an overarching caveat to the findings from our survey and focus group analyses. Our effort was designed to elicit speculation as to the impact of the integration of women into SOF so as to gauge the extent of challenges and a deeper understanding of the concerns of SOF personnel. This speculation was not based on actual experiences of SOF personnel, because women are not in those units. Thus, the response is based on what SOF personnel believe might happen, and those views are influenced by many factors, including the perceptions of their own elite status, views of women in society, limited observations of women under fire, and feelings toward organizational change, to name just a few. Moreover, debates over military personnel policy take place in the political realm. Our data collection did not happen in a vacuum; instead, the intense level of feelings regarding integration of women into SOF might be a symptom of the highly charged political environment surrounding this issue and reflect the fact that SOF personnel were given an opportunity to weigh in on the issue.

**Implications**

Based on our analyses, the challenges facing USSOCOM, should it decide to integrate women into SOF units, are real and multifaceted, but none of them is insurmountable. The key to the successful integration of out-groups is the implementation process. A successful integration of women into SOF occupations will require transparency, effective leadership and communication, progress monitoring, and openness to innovation, flexibility, and adaptability. Even with
all of the above, the process is still likely to face major challenges because of the depth and scope of opposition and concern among the force. As USSOCOM considers near-term and long-term integration priorities, the mechanisms put into place will need to be flexible enough to accommodate learning and adjustments through such strategies as phased implementation and systematic experiments. Finally, putting the systems in place to enable the collection of the appropriate data throughout the integration process will ensure that progress can be tracked and that improvements can be made over time.

When looking across all of our study findings, the following areas are particularly relevant to informing USSOCOM’s implementation planning regarding the potential integration of women into SOF specialties and units:

• **Leadership is key to integration success.** Most of the concerns among SOF personnel are leadership challenges. These include command climate issues, such as the tone set during the integration process, as well as enforcing good order and discipline to prevent issues of misconduct that can have a negative impact on cohesion. Leadership can also put in place policies to quickly identify problems that might arise during implementation.

• **The implementation process is critical to long-term success.** To ensure long-term viability, USSOCOM will need to put in place practices to promote the successful integration of qualified women. This includes developing and fostering an equitable organizational culture, such as providing ample opportunities for women to demonstrate their competence. Associated with this, USSOCOM and the SOF service components will need to establish practices to limit the social isolation of women in SOF.

• **Valid, gender-neutral standards can facilitate integration.** Much of the opposition to integrating women into SOF specialties and units is rooted in concerns regarding mission effectiveness (e.g., about women not being able to physically perform the necessary tasks for the job). However, these concerns can be addressed by establishing and validating gender-neutral standards and implementing training programs that prepare female candidates to meet those gender-neutral standards.

• **Targeted recruitment and adequate preparation of female candidates are needed.** Many of the concerns expressed by SOF personnel center on doubts about women being able to adequately perform the necessary physical tasks. Our findings also indicate that the low assessment of the abilities of women is often based on experiences with military women who did not have the same training and preparation as men. Providing female candidates adequate preparation to meet gender-neutral standards could go a long way in enabling women to earn the respect and trust of their SOF teammates.

• **A deliberate pace of integration is important.** Given the differences in mission, equipment, operational environment, and culture across SOF components, USSOCOM might need to consider a phased integration approach. Such an approach would allow USSOCOM to monitor the integration process and make adjustments as needed. This type of approach also could yield important information about the risks and benefits of integration that then could be applied to subsequent integration efforts as they are expanded.

• **Integration progress needs to be monitored and assessed over time.** Monitoring and assessment will allow for quickly identifying problems and addressing them in a timely fashion. The overall measure of outcome would be unit performance. Potential categories to monitor over time include unit readiness, women’s career development, attrition, rates of misconduct, and cohesion and morale.
• **Expectation management is a critical component of success.** One of the most important aspects of expectation management is the number of women expected to join SOF if these positions are opened to them. The experiences of allied militaries indicate that those that have general-purpose combat arms positions open to women also have few women serving in those positions. From this perspective, the anxiety felt by SOF personnel about a large influx of women in a short period and a consequent altering of intraunit dynamics might be unfounded. The process may be gradual and a change might come over a generation.

Given the extreme physical requirements associated with SOF, if USSOCOM opens up all the SOF occupations to women, the number of women entering SOF is likely to be limited in the foreseeable future. But it is not a given that all SOF require such high levels of physical prowess, and the importance of physical prowess in the fulfillment of SOF missions may change in the future. In fact, future SOF operating concepts that imply greater persistent forward presence, interaction with partners, and more preparation of the environment all entail potential additional roles for women in SOF. Our survey and focus group findings indicate some receptiveness among SOF personnel to a highly trained cadre of SOF enablers, including women, that would be a repository of niche capabilities and could be utilized as needed to exploit opportunities. These enabler roles, open to men and women, could provide additional mechanisms to recruit highly skilled and motivated personnel to SOF.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The U.S. Special Operations Command, the study sponsor, received this report in June 2015. On December 3, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the military services to open all combat jobs to women, with no exceptions. The Secretary of Defense also approved a number of studies, including this study, on the topic of women in ground combat to be publicly released. This report has been edited but otherwise not updated substantively since the final version was delivered to the sponsor in June 2015.

The Context

On January 24, 2013, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the rescission of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR) and the intention to integrate women into occupational fields to the “maximum extent possible” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). The 1994 DGCDAR established a direct ground combat rule, under which women were “excluded from units below the brigade level whose primary mission [was] to engage in direct combat on the ground” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1994). The 1994 DGCDAR defined direct ground combat as

engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.

In addition to excluding women from units primarily engaged in direct ground combat, the 1994 DGCDAR included provisions for restricted assignments of women

- where the Service Secretary attests that the cost of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive;
- where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct combat units that are closed to women;
- where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Forces missions; and
- where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service members. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1994)
As put forth in the memorandum rescinding DGCDAR, the rationale for the rescission was stated as stemming from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff being fully committed to removing as many barriers as possible to joining, advancing, and succeeding in the U.S. Armed Forces. Success in our military based solely on ability, qualifications, and performance is consistent with our values and enhances military readiness. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013)

In addition, the memorandum noted that thousands of women had already been exposed to ground combat and hostile enemy action in Iraq and Afghanistan and alluded to the fact that on-the-ground realities in more than a decade of war had made DGCDAR less relevant.

The memorandum rescinding DGCDAR established a timeline for the integration of women into newly opened positions. The services and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) were required to integrate women into newly opened positions no later than January 1, 2016, or to request exemptions to the policy (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013). The services were required to submit quarterly reports on their progress in implementing the rescission of DGCDAR. In addition, the memorandum outlined the circumstances under which a position in the armed forces could continue to be closed to women:

Any recommendation to keep an occupational specialty or unit closed to women must be personally approved first by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then by the Secretary of Defense; this approval may not be delegated. Exceptions must be narrowly tailored, and based on a rigorous analysis of factual data regarding the knowledge, skills and abilities needed for the position. (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013)

The rescission of DGCDAR also included the requirement to implement “validated, gender-neutral occupational standards.” Section 543 of the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the military requirement for gender-neutral standards and required:

In the case of any military occupational career field that is open to both male and female members of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense—

1. shall ensure that qualification of members of the Armed Forces for, and continuance of members of the Armed Forces in, that occupational career field is evaluated on the basis of common, relevant performance standards, without differential standards of evaluation on the basis of gender;
2. may not use any gender quota, goal, or ceiling except as specifically authorized by law; and
3. may not change an occupational performance standard for the purpose of increasing or decreasing the number of women in that occupational career field. (Pub. L. 103-160, Section 543, 1993)

The 2014 NDAA amended Section 543 and redefined “gender-neutral occupational standard” to mean that all members of the Armed Forces serving in or assigned to the military career designator must meet the same performance outcome-based standards for the successful accomplishment of the necessary and required specific tasks associated with the qualifications and
The NDAA also mandated that, no later than September 2015, “the Services and USSOCOM should develop, review, and validate individual occupational standards, using validated gender-neutral occupational standards, so as to assess and assign members of the Armed Forces to units, including Special Operations Forces” (Pub. L. 113-66, Sec. 524, 2013).

The rescission of DGCDAR potentially has opened more than 230,000 positions in the U.S. armed forces to women able to meet occupation-specific, gender-neutral standards of performance (Roulo, 2013). Since DGCDAR concerned ground combat, the majority of the positions affected by the rescission are in the Army and the Marine Corps. The rescission also potentially opened special operations forces (SOF) positions—in all four services—that are controlled by USSOCOM.

USSOCOM, a unified combatant command, is unique in that it performs service-like functions and has responsibilities and authorities akin to those of military departments. USSOCOM has the responsibility to organize, train, and equip SOF for special operations core activities and missions. The special operations core activities are direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense, security force assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information support operations, and civil affairs operations (Joint Publication [JP] 3-05, 2014). Many of these core activities entail that SOF operate in small, geographically isolated, self-contained teams for lengthy periods of time, often covertly, in austere conditions, and in extremely dangerous operational environments. The potential integration of women into SOF brings up a number of issues pertinent to the effectiveness of such teams, both from the perspective of physical standards and ensuring the readiness, cohesion, and morale essential to high-performing teams. USSOCOM’s central concern is to ensure the high effectiveness of U.S. SOF in their core activities and for operations, as stipulated in USSOCOM’s vision of future operational employment of SOF (Szayna and Welser, 2013). Integrating women into SOF has implications for the overall mission readiness of SOF, as well as for the implementation of USSOCOM’s concepts of future operations.

Many women already had been serving in SOF prior to the rescission of DGCDAR. And many women had been involved in SOF operations prior to the rescission of DGCDAR. For example, women have been among the flight crews on Air Force special operations aircraft. The restrictions on women in SOF took two forms: (1) closed by unit, and (2) closed by specialty. Closed to women by unit meant that service specialties or career fields were open to women, but women in those specialties could not be assigned to some SOF formations, because the units in question were likely to be involved in ground combat. Closed to women by specialty meant that the entire career field or specialty was closed to women, because ground combat was an essential element of that career field or specialty. We explain the differences below.

To illustrate the effect of a position being closed on the basis of unit assignment, at the time of the rescission of DGCDAR, each of the four subordinate service component commands of USSOCOM (Air Force Special Operations Command [AFSOC], United States Army Special Operations Command [USASOC], Marine Special Operations Command [MARSOC], and Navy Special Warfare Command [NAVSPECWARCOM]) had occupations or specialties that were open to women, but women were only eligible for some of the billets open to personnel in these specialties. For example, at the time when DGCDAR was rescinded, USASOC
had 72 billets for the Electronic Warfare specialty (Army’s 29XX Military Occupational Specialty [MOS]). Of these, 37 billets (or 51.4 percent) were open to women (USSOCOM, 2013a, p. 6). The other 35 billets were closed to women (and those positions were only open to men in those specialties) because the units to which these personnel would be assigned were likely to be in ground combat. Depending on the specialty, the share of billets open to women (in the specialties already open to women) ranged from 0 to 97 percent. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the extent to which USSOCOM-controlled positions were closed to women because of unit assignment rule, broken down by SOF service component. (Appendix A, presented in the accompanying report, Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016, presents additional information, by specialty, about all closed positions at USSOCOM.)

The positions closed on the basis of specialty consisted of the Air Force’s Combat Controllers (CCTs) and Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT) specialists; the Army’s Special Forces (SF) and Rangers; the Marine Corps Critical Skills Operators (CSOs); and the Navy’s Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) commandos and Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (SWCC). USSOCOM service components have the task of selecting and training personnel and ensuring that they operate in cohesive and effective units. Thus, AFSOC selects and trains personnel to be CCTs and SOWT and integrates them into Special Tactics Teams (STTs); USASOC selects and trains personnel to be SF and Rangers and integrates them into SF A-Teams and Ranger platoons; MARSOC selects and trains personnel to be CSOs and integrates them into Marine Special Operations Teams (MARSOTs); and the NAVSPECWARCOM selects and trains men to be SEALs and SWCC and integrates them into SEAL platoons and SWCC special boat detachments. All of the formations engage in missions assigned to them, in line with the training, preparation, and doctrinally outlined core activities. Table 1.2 lists the USSOCOM-controlled positions closed to women by specialty and the personnel billets for these positions at USSOCOM.

Altogether, the rescission of DGCDAR potentially opened up 24,442 USSOCOM billets to women, with 8,945 of these closed by unit and 15,497 closed by specialty. The positions closed by specialty—SF, Rangers, SEALs, SWCC, CSOs, CCTs, and SOWT—make up the seven military occupations that form the core of SOF, and USSOCOM controls their capability requirements and career fields. Integration of women into these specialties would represent a change, as women have not been able to enter these specialties at all. That is substantively different from the USSOCOM positions for specialties where women are already present but whose ability to deploy was constrained because of unit assignment restrictions.

Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Total Billets</th>
<th>Open to Women</th>
<th>Closed to Women</th>
<th>% Open</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>15,086</td>
<td>7,191</td>
<td>7,895</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,577</td>
<td>7,632</td>
<td>8,945</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: USSOCOM, 2013a (corrected).
deals with the issue of the potential integration of women into the seven SOF military occupations that have been closed to women by specialty.

**Objectives and Approach**

Following the Secretary of Defense’s rescission of DGCDAR, Admiral William McRaven, the then-commander of USSOCOM, put together a USSOCOM implementation plan for the elimination of DGCDAR. One element of that plan was to ask RAND’s National Defense Research Institute to assist in identifying potential issues that might arise if women are integrated into SOF units. The resulting study had two main objectives: (1) assess potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF for unit cohesion, and (2) provide analytical support in validating SOF occupational standards for USSOCOM-controlled positions. This report summarizes our findings.

To carry out the two objectives, we used a mixed-methods approach. To address the first objective—assess potential challenges and obstacles to the integration of women into SOF for unit cohesion—we carried out three tasks. First, we reviewed the current state of knowledge about small unit cohesion and effectiveness. Given SOF unit characteristics and the nature of SOF operations, this task was particularly important. During the review of the literature, we

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1 See Appendix A, presented in Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016, for text of the memorandum outlining the implementation plan.
focused on the potential impacts of the integration of women on task and social cohesion in small units,\(^2\) as well as the association between social cohesion and reduced combat stress and increased individual psychological resilience.

Second, to understand the extent and scope of potential challenges to the integration of women into USSOCOM-controlled positions, we conducted a survey of personnel currently serving in the positions closed to women by specialty. The online survey comprised 46 questions (both closed-ended and open-ended) and was open for eight weeks, from May 15, 2014, to July 15, 2014. In total, 7,618 respondents participated in the survey, for an overall response rate of just over 50 percent. We reweighted our results to match the overall population of SOF in closed specialties and conducted a series of quantitative analyses of the closed-ended survey questions, paying particular attention to identifying the strength and extent of concerns about the integration of women into SOF among current SOF personnel. We also carried out qualitative and quantitative analyses of the open-ended questions on the survey.

Third, we supplemented the findings from our survey with information from focus group sessions that we conducted with SOF personnel currently serving in the positions closed to women by specialty. In total, we conducted 49 focus groups with SOF personnel. While the size of our focus groups varied, they usually consisted of eight to 12 personnel and lasted approximately one hour. We used the same questions to structure the discussions. We conducted the focus group sessions with personnel from all of the closed specialties, with the greatest attention to the numerically largest SOF service components with closed specialties, namely Army SF and Navy SEALs. Altogether, 440 SOF personnel participated in the focus groups, with all rank groups represented; given the composition of the force, most of the participants consisted of noncommissioned officers (NCOs). After all of the focus groups were complete, two RAND researchers coded all of the focus group notes to ensure intercoder reliability and then analyzed those results to identify potential positive and negative impacts of the integration of women that were raised by participants across rank, grade, and SOF component.

To address the study’s second objective—provide analytical support in validating SOF occupational standards for USSOCOM-controlled positions—we carried out two tasks. First, we identified widely agreed on professional standards for the validation of physically demanding occupations. These include professional guidelines that have been recognized in laws regulating nonmilitary organizations. Second, we provided direct analytical assistance to the SOF service components. In this task, project staff worked with individual SOF service components in assisting them with the application of professional standards for the validation of physically demanding occupations to SOF occupations. Our assistance included reviewing current standards and observing current assessment and selection courses, including the Army’s Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) and Ranger Assessment and Selection (RASP), and the Navy’s Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training.

The research reported here, as part of the task “Women in SOF,” began in May 2013. The bulk of the research was conducted between June 2013 and October 2014. Project staff briefed USSOCOM leadership on the progress of the project regularly, with the final briefing to USSOCOM leadership in October 2014. This report was finalized in February 2015. It went through RAND’s formal review process and it was revised in April 2015.

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\(^2\) We define **task cohesion** as the extent to which members share a common goal and coordinate their efforts to achieve it, and **social cohesion** as the extent to which members have interpersonal affinity for each other, share bonds of trust, and provide social support to one another. These definitions are presented in detail in Chapter Four.
Organization of This Report

The rescission of DGCDAR did not take place in a vacuum. It is a step in a long story of the opening of military occupations and specialties to women. In order to understand the decision and the context for it, Part I of this report, consisting of three chapters, examines the history, challenges, and concerns surrounding the integration of women, as well as African Americans and openly gay and lesbian personnel, into the U.S. armed forces.

In Chapter Two we briefly trace out the history of the integration of women into the U.S. military, focusing especially on the forces that engage in ground combat: the Army and the Marine Corps. We also discuss the pre- and postintegration attitudes within the military regarding the integration of previously excluded groups.

SOF routinely engage in highly dangerous and physically demanding operations. Very few men are able to pass the assessment and selection standards that the various SOF components have in place. The issue of whether women are physically able to meet the high standards required to join the SOF community is one of the central questions in the aftermath of the rescission of DGCDAR. Chapter Three discusses the current state of the literature on how men and women compare on measures of physical ability, as well as sex and gender differences in stress response. The chapter discusses the relevance of the findings for the debate on the integration of women into SOF.

The potential negative impact on unit cohesion has been a central point in previous debates regarding the integration of previously excluded groups. Chapter Four presents our findings from the analysis of the potential implication of gender integration on cohesion in SOF units. This chapter reviews the literature on cohesion, including the multiple levels at which cohesion exists, the different dimensions of cohesion, and the different definitions of task and social cohesion. The chapter also identifies the implications of cohesion for unit performance, as well as individual members’ resilience. Finally, the chapter identifies cohesion-related considerations for potentially integrating women into SOF units.

To understand the concerns of the SOF personnel and the potential challenges to the successful integration of women into SOF, we collected primary data. Part II of this report, consisting of two chapters, presents our findings regarding SOF personnel’s expectations of potentially integrating women into SOF units. Chapter Five focuses on our analyses from the survey we conducted with SOF personnel in USSOCOM-controlled positions. This chapter provides an overview of the survey design and how it was implemented, as well as an explanation for how the results were analyzed. Next, the chapter presents our main findings from the survey and identifies the key drivers of support and opposition to the integration of women into SOF specialties and units. Lastly, the chapter identifies conclusions and the policy implications of survey findings.

To complement the survey and add richness to the survey data, we conducted focus group discussions with SOF personnel in specialties closed to women. Chapter Six summarizes those findings. This chapter presents the positive and negative expectations voiced by focus group participants regarding the potential impact of integration, as well as their concerns regarding the integration of women into SOF specialties and units. The chapter then presents our analysis of participants’ concerns across rank and grade, unique concerns voiced across SOF components, concerns across mission types, and dissenting views among focus group participants. Next, the chapter presents focus groups participants’ concerns regarding the potential impacts of gender integration on the recruitment and retention of both men and women in SOF. Lastly,
the chapter presents focus group participants’ advice to policymakers regarding the potential implementation of gender integration of SOF specialties and units. Additional information on the focus group sessions is in several appendixes, presented in Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016.

Part III of this report, consisting of two chapters, outlines potential future pathways for USSOCOM if it decides to integrate women into SOF units. Chapter Seven provides a framework for USSOCOM and the SOF service components on establishing gender-neutral standards. This framework is designed to enable military services and USSOCOM to set their standards in line with the guidance on the lifting of DGCDAR while achieving maximum mission performance.

Chapter Eight presents our final observations and discusses the implications of our work for the potential integration of women into SOF. The chapter looks across all of our findings from the various tasks of the study and identifies crosscutting conclusions. It also identifies recommendations that flow out of our findings for USSOCOM leadership regarding the potential implementation of the gender integration of SOF specialties and units.

Published separately, a series of appendixes present additional data in support of the material in the main body of the report (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016). Most of the appendixes provide information about the development, planning, execution, and analysis of the survey and the focus group sessions.
In Part I, we discuss the previous integration of excluded groups into the armed forces, focusing on the recurring themes that came up: whether the members of the previously excluded group were qualified to serve and the impact of their integration on the functioning of military units. The discussion underlines the point that military personnel policy is politically determined, and the question of “who serves” is a manifestly political decision.

Chapter Two presents a history of women’s integration into the U.S. military, as well as a review of attitudes toward the integration of previously excluded groups in the U.S. military, including women, African Americans, and openly gay and lesbian personnel. The debates that surrounded previous integrations of excluded groups were a highly contentious component of political discourse in the United States, dating back at least to the 1940s. The debates centered on two main challenges: (1) questions regarding the sufficiency of the physical or mental abilities of members of the excluded group to cope with the tasks assigned to the unit, and (2) the impact of the entry of the excluded group on the cohesion, trust, morale, discipline, and the general efficient functioning of the unit. Both of these issues have surfaced in the aftermath of the rescission of DGCDAR and the potential opening of SOF specialties to women. Chapters Three and Four provide overviews of the terms of debate for these two challenges. Chapter Three discusses the current state of the literature regarding how men and women compare on measures of physical ability, as well as sex and gender differences in stress response. The chapter discusses the relevance of the findings for the debate on the integration of women into SOF. Chapter Four reviews the literature on cohesion, including the multiple levels at which cohesion exists, the different dimensions of cohesion, and the different definitions of task and social cohesion. The chapter also identifies the implications of cohesion for unit performance and individual members’ resilience, as well as discusses cohesion-related considerations for potentially integrating women into SOF units.

Historically, the expansion of women’s roles in the U.S. military was driven primarily by the need for personnel, either to fight a total war or fill personnel shortfalls that resulted from the ending of the draft. Until the 1970s, the role of female military personnel was primarily as auxiliaries to provide nursing care or to free up men from administrative duties for combat duty during times of national emergency that required the full mobilization of U.S. society. Since the 1970s, women’s participation in the military has also reflected changes within society that have led to a greater propensity for women to choose to serve in the military. The ending of the draft in 1973 and the transition to an all-volunteer military had a major impact on expanding the number of women serving on active duty in the U.S. military.

With regard to ground combat, women had been restricted initially to combat service support and combat support specialties. However, in practice it was difficult to exclude women
from combat once they had been broadly integrated into the military. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were a watershed regarding the integration of women into ground combat roles. These wars presented a less predictable, nonlinear battlefield with asymmetric threats that could potentially expose female soldiers to combat. Because of this, personnel assignment policies became less effective at excluding women from combat situations, and in practice women were participating in foot patrols, as well as convoy escort missions that came under fire.

Attitudes toward expanding the role of women in the armed forces were strongly negative as the U.S. military transitioned to the all-volunteer force. Since the 1970s, however, military personnel have become more accepting of women serving in all occupations, even combat arms specialties. A 1974 survey of male Army personnel found that 70–80 percent felt that a job as a rifle-carrying infantry foot soldier was not appropriate for women (Savell and Collins, 1975). In contrast, a 1997 survey of Army personnel found that 66 percent of male respondents in combat arms specialties felt that women ought to be allowed to serve in their specialties (Harrell and Miller, 1997). Although the magnitude of the differences in male and female perceptions of women’s performance has shrunk over time, gendered differences persist. Attitudes of women soldiers are significantly more accepting of women serving in the military than are men’s attitudes.

Women are not the only excluded group that has been integrated into the U.S. military. A similar pattern existed for integrating African Americans and openly gay and lesbian service members. For both the integration of African Americans and openly gay and lesbian personnel into the U.S. military, currently serving U.S. military personnel tended to be strongly opposed. However, their attitudes became more accepting of integration after a decision to allow individuals from these groups to join had been made and there was operational experience serving with members of the previously excluded groups. It is important to note that these two cases present only limited parallels with the potential integration of women in all military occupations and specialties after the rescission of DGCDAR, as questions about physical standards were not part of the political debate during these two periods of integration. However, the patterns of acceptance and opposition are useful to keep in mind as we consider the data on the integration of women in all military occupations and specialties.

Our review of previous integration experiences found that opposition to integrating excluded group personnel declined when it became evident that their inclusion did not reduce unit readiness or cohesion. A key component to maintaining unit readiness is the identification, validation, and application of standards for military occupations. As a result, how standards are constructed and applied has played a central role in political debates surrounding the integration of excluded groups in the U.S. military. Proponents advocating strategies to increase the participation of the previously excluded group have, at times, called into question standards’ restrictiveness, while those concerned about the adverse impact of the excluded group’s integration have emphasized the importance of maintaining stringent standards. As such, questions regarding how to construct standards can become highly politicized and reflect larger political debates surrounding personnel policies in the U.S. armed forces. In turn, those larger political debates stem from different views regarding the position of the excluded group in society, and thus issues of cohesion and the construction of standards can become elements in political fights.

The rescission of DGCDAR has removed gender-restrictive barriers in the military, and it has mandated the use of valid gender-neutral standards. Although standards have been in place for SOF specialties for decades, in the aftermath of the rescission of DGCDAR, the services
have taken steps to ensure that the standards are current and gender-neutral. The rescission has sparked a discussion as to the meaning of the term *gender-neutral standards*, the applicability of concepts from the civilian world to highly specialized military environments, and the extent to which existing standards need modification. These concerns are fundamental to SOF identity, since passing through the highly physically demanding accession and selection process constitutes a rite of passage for SOF personnel and contributes to the sense of common identity. In the course of our research, and especially as part of the task on assisting the SOF service components in their standards-validation processes, the most common question that arose concerned the likelihood of women to meet gender-neutral standards in the physically demanding SOF specialties and how well women will respond to the stressors they are likely to be exposed to during SOF operations.

Regarding women’s abilities to meet SOF standards, we examined the research exploring differences between men and women on physical ability and motor skill tests. On these dimensions, on average, men generally outperform women. These differences begin to expand following puberty and may be partially influenced by environmental factors. That said, although there are often large differences between men and women, primary emphasis must be placed on an individual’s capabilities to perform critical tasks and individual risks for developing an injury. Just as very few men succeed in qualifying for SOF, and the ones that do are in the tail of the distribution, the same is likely to apply to women, if they are allowed to enter SOF specialties. Average differences between overall populations are not good indicators for understanding readiness for SOF. For the purposes of understanding the relevance of physiological differences in the ability of women to qualify for SOF specialties, in almost all cases, additional screening (e.g., physical ability tests) will be a better indicator of performance and risk of injury compared with simply knowing whether a candidate is a man or woman.

We also examined sex and gender differences in stress response to understand the physiological reasons that might affect women’s suitability for the extremely stressful environments in which SOF sometimes operate. Men and women respond to stress differently, although much depends on the specific stressor and context. Just as with physical ability, individual differences and prior experiences have a greater impact on stress response than sex or gender. Additional screening will be a better indicator of stress response than broad distinctions along male-female lines. Stress response can be altered as individuals learn from experience and from specific training designed to cope with specific stressors.

In addition to the questions of whether women will meet gender-neutral standards in SOF specialties and how well women will respond to stressors during SOF operations, concerns have arisen as to whether integrating women into SOF units will disrupt unit cohesion. To address these concerns, we examined the relevance of cohesion for SOF units, assessed the implications of cohesion for SOF unit effectiveness, and considered whether and how integrating women into SOF units might affect cohesion in SOF units. We found that cohesion is particularly relevant for SOF units and can increase SOF unit effectiveness. Integrating women into SOF units might reduce unit cohesion if female operators are not perceived as competent and are not accepted as full members of the teams.

There are two main dimensions to cohesion: task cohesion and social cohesion. Task cohesion, which captures the extent to which unit members share a common goal and coordinate their efforts to achieve it, enables units to work together effectively as a group to accomplish their missions. As we discuss in Chapter Four, task cohesion has long been recognized as a key contributor to unit effectiveness. Social cohesion, which we define broadly as the extent
to which unit members like one another, trust one another, and provide social support for one another, might also indirectly increase SOF units’ effectiveness. Evidence that social cohesion directly affects unit performance is mixed, but analysts have found that social cohesion can strengthen individual unit members’ resilience, enabling groups to perform tasks effectively in stressful environments and reducing the probability that unit members will experience mental distress in the aftermath of their operations.

Integrating women into SOF units has the potential to reduce unit cohesion if female special operators are not perceived as competent and are not accepted as full members of their teams. Women’s acceptance on teams will reflect their ability to perform team tasks, other team members’ willingness to accept women on the team, and leaders’ efforts to promote integration. Perceptions of performance and competence play at least as important a role in generating cohesion in SOF units. Male unit members’ perceptions of women’s performance and competence might be influenced by many factors. Women’s performance on unit tasks will shape unit members’ perceptions of competence. Perceptions of women’s competence will also reflect the quality of members’ prior experience working with women and potential biases in assessing women’s capabilities. Male unit members’ beliefs about the standards to which women are held will also influence their perceptions of women’s competence. For example, studies have found that some U.S. military personnel believe that women are held to lower standards. This belief informs their expectations of women’s competence.
To provide context for how the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) arrived at the decision to rescind DGCDAR, this chapter summarizes the historical experience of integrating women and other excluded groups into the U.S. military. The first section summarizes the history of women in the U.S. military, with a particular focus on the Army and the Marine Corps. The expansion of women’s roles in the U.S. military was driven primarily by the need for personnel—either to fight a total war or to fill personnel shortfalls that resulted from the ending of the draft—and the reality that, in practice, it is difficult to exclude women from combat once they have been broadly integrated into the military. We also take an in-depth look at the trends in women’s participation in three combat support Army MOSs. We found that the trends in these specialties follow the general pattern of the integration of women in the military. The second section examines the shift in attitudes within the military about the participation of women, African Americans, and openly gay and lesbian personnel after they had been formally integrated into the U.S. military. Our examination of the military’s historical experience of integrating excluded groups suggests that military personnel initially hostile to the integration of these groups eventually have tolerated, if not embraced, their presence.

While the opportunities for women in the military have grown over time, there is no preordained end point for the extent to which women are integrated in the military. In fact, that end point is politically chosen; because military personnel policy is politically determined, the question of “who serves” is a manifestly political decision, and the debates that we illustrate in what follows show that the integration of women (and other excluded groups) into the military has been a highly contentious component of political discourse in the United States, dating back at least to the 1940s. Moreover, as we noted in a previous study, personnel policy is highly politicized, and it is the one major area (in the five major realms of civil-military relations that are related to issues of military effectiveness) where substantive civil-military differences exist.1

Women in the U.S. Military

The U.S. military has a long history of employing women within its ranks, which we review in this section. The major shift in the integration of women into the U.S. armed forces came with the establishment of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973. Prior to that, women’s roles were

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1 The five realms are threat assessment, defense resources, force design and creation, force maintenance, and force employment. Personnel policy is the main component of force maintenance (Szyna, McCarthy, et al., 2007).
highly curtailed, and there were caps on the number of women in the armed forces. The influx of women in the military after 1973 changed the situation. One result of the increased integration of women into the military was the increasing difficulty in developing personnel policies that could successfully enforce legislated restrictions on women serving in combat. As a result, DoD and the broader U.S. government revamped their combat exclusion policies several times during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in an effort to keep pace with operational realities and the greater role of women in the military. Ultimately, these restrictive policies proved increasingly impractical to execute. This became clear in 1991, with the deployments of tens of thousands of U.S. military women to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. That experience was magnified during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

A major motivation for the rescission of DGCDAR, as noted in the memorandum announcing the change in policy, was the fact that women had already participated widely in ground combat during the counterinsurgency battles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Women made up approximately 15 percent of the U.S. armed forces from 2000 to 2010. Given that there are no frontlines in counterinsurgency campaigns, as well as that armed forces personnel in combat support and combat service support positions (where female soldiers or Marines were concentrated) often came into contact with adversary forces, female service members took part in many firefights and the close combat that characterized the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Next we trace the main outlines of the integration of women into the U.S. military. We do so to provide the setting for the rescission of DGCDAR and the context for the current debates. In addition, many of the arguments, pro and con, regarding the further integration of women into the U.S. military that have emerged in the aftermath of the rescission of DGCDAR reflect earlier debates regarding the increased participation of women in the military. We also came across many of these arguments in the course of our research (survey and focus groups).

**Main Steps in the Integration of Women into the Military**

While women had volunteered in large numbers to serve on active military duty, during the first half of the 20th century, the utilization of women in the U.S. military (outside the Medical Corps) was largely a wartime expedient necessary to meet the personnel demands of total war. Until the 1970s, the roles of female military personnel were primarily as auxiliaries to provide nursing care or to free up men from administrative work for combat duty during times of national emergency that required the full mobilization of U.S. society.

Women have served in every war fought by the U.S. military, dating back to the American Revolution. During earlier wars, some women concealed their gender by pretending to be men and boys, others served as replacements for their husbands, and some women worked as spies against enemies, served as nurses, or worked in various support roles by cooking and cleaning (Sandhoff and Segal, 2013). The military continued to formalize roles for women during the start of the 20th century by creating all-women units for select roles. In 1901, for example, Congress created the Army Nurse Corps for women.

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2 See National Women’s Law Center, 2014.

3 The law that established the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) as part of the Army during World War II gave it a life span of the duration of the war plus six months (U.S. Army Women’s Museum, 2000; Harrell and Miller, 1997, p. 1).
During the U.S. involvement in World War I (1917–1918), some 35,500 women served in the military, 23,300 of whom were nurses in separate Army and Navy Nurse Corps. In World War II, women were recruited into the U.S. armed forces for similar reasons, and more than 350,000 women volunteered for military service, primarily in nursing and administrative jobs (Harrell and Miller, 1997, p. 1). By the time the war ended, in September 1945, some 266,000 women (2.2 percent of the U.S. military) were serving on active duty. After the end of World War II, the number of women on active duty dwindled rapidly.

Then, in 1948, at the beginning of the Cold War, some women were formally integrated into the U.S. military to provide a cadre of well-trained personnel who could train female volunteers to serve in support positions upon mobilization for another global war (Morden, 1990, pp. 399–400). With support of U.S. military leaders and despite stiff congressional resistance, in 1948 the Woman's Armed Service Integration Act passed (Morden, 1990, pp. 44–55). The law granted women status in the active and reserve forces of the U.S. military, limited the number of women in the Army to 2 percent of the enlisted ranks, and capped the number of female officers to 10 percent of enlisted women. In addition, female officers could not hold command positions, attain the rank of general, or have a permanent rank above lieutenant colonel (O5). The legislation also specifically prohibited women from being assigned to aircraft or vessels engaged in combat missions; based on this, the Army adopted policies excluding women from direct combat. With the passage of this law, albeit in a restricted fashion, women formally became part of the U.S. military.

In the 20 years following the passage of the Women’s Armed Service Integration Act, the number of active-duty women in the U.S. military hovered at just above 1 percent of the active force. During the Korean War, the U.S. military sought to mobilize between half a million and 1 million women. Despite active recruiting efforts, the military fell far short of its goals, and, at its peak in 1952, the number of women in the active armed forces was 46,000 (about 1.5 percent of the U.S. active military), declining to about 35,000 by war’s end, in June 1955 (Holm, 1992, p. 157). In response to the military’s inability to recruit the desired number of women, in 1951 Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall created the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) as a civilian advisory board to provide advice on the recruitment and retention of military women for the Korean War (Holm, 1992, pp. 150–151).

During the Vietnam War, DoD had a goal of adding 6,500 women to the military, in an attempt to reverse a downward trend after the Korean War (Holm, 1992, p. 187). However, women continued to be used in limited roles. In 1967, the 2-percent ceiling and promotion ceilings established by the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act were lifted, partially in response to recommendations made by DACOWITS. Despite the lifting of these ceilings,

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4 The Army Nurse Corps was established in 1901 and the Navy Nurse Corps in 1908. There were 21,480 Army nurses and 1,476 Navy nurses serving in military hospitals in the United States and overseas. More than 400 of these nurses died while in service, primarily from influenza (the Spanish flu) contracted while on duty. In addition, the Navy recruited 11,880 women to serve in stateside shore billets to free up male soldiers for sea duty. The Marine Corps enlisted 305 women for the same reason (Women in Military Service for America Memorial Foundation, n.d.).

5 The 2-percent cap was lifted in 1967, during the Vietnam War (Harrell and Miller, 1997, pp. 1–2).

6 There was a brief spike to 1.5 percent during the Korean War. From 1948 to 1969, the greatest number of women on active duty was 45,934 (1952) and the least was 14,458 (1948). By 1969, 39,506 women (1.1 percent) served in the active-duty military. See DoD, 2006, Table 2-19.
large numbers of women did not begin to join the military until the 1970s. In 1972, five years after the 2-percent ceiling was lifted, the nonnurse female proportion of the military remained at 1.7 percent (D’Amico and Weinstein, 1999, p. 42).

The end of the draft in 1973 and the transition to an all-volunteer military had a major impact on the number of women serving on active duty in the U.S. military. With the introduction of the AVF, there was a widely shared perception within DoD that women were needed to fill the ranks; subsequently, the services were directed to develop contingency plans to increase the use of women in the military (Devilbiss, 1990, p. 13). The end of the draft led to the opening up of most military occupations to women, more-extensive integration of female personnel into the services, and a rapid increase of the number of women serving on active duty. Starting in 1970, and increasingly so after 1973, women’s participation in the military and the Army showed steady growth, until it peaked at the start of the 21st century (see Chapter Two). The ending of the draft and the opening up of many Army positions to women also increased the number of women serving overseas during peacetime. In 1972, there were 1,188 WACs serving overseas, with 473 in Europe. By 1978, this figure rose to 18,490, with 13,671 in Europe (Morden, 1990, p. 283).

In 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed Public Law 95-485, which (1) disbanded the all-female WAC and integrated women into the Army, and (2) allowed women in the Navy to be assigned to duty aboard noncombatant ships (Pub. L. 95-485, 1978). Subsequently, the early 1980s marked a period of reassessing the role of women in the U.S. military. At this time, claims of reverse discrimination in the military began to emerge. The issue came to a head in 1980, when the director of the Selective Service System was sued in an attempt to rescind women’s exemption for selective service. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, and in 1981 the Court ruled that women are exempt from selective service because “women as a group…are not eligible for combat. The restrictions on the participation of women in combat in the Navy and Air Force are statutory” (Rostker v Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 1981).

When President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981, the Army announced its objection to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s goal to increase the number of enlisted women in the active Army, and instead voiced its desire to

level out the number of enlisted women in the Active Army at 65,000. . . . These modifications were prompted by indications from field commanders that combat readiness is being affected by such factors as attrition, pregnancy, sole parenthood, and strength and stamina, which have come to light during the recent rapid increase in the number of women in the Army. (W. Clark, 1981)

Accordingly, the Army decided to take a “pause” in the recruitment of women in lieu of an examination of their impact on military readiness (Holm, 1992, pp. 380–388).

In response, the Office of the Secretary of Defense announced a rapid study of the impact of women on readiness. When the study concluded, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sent a memo to the services:

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7 Growth in the percentage of women in the military during the period from 1970 to 1973 can be largely attributed to the shrinking of the overall size of the U.S. military; the number of women serving grew only slightly.

8 For a comprehensive accounting of the evolution of the AVF, see Rostker, 2006.
Qualified women are essential to obtaining the numbers of quality people required to maintain the readiness of our forces. This Administration desires to increase the role of women in the military, and I expect the Service Secretaries actively to support that policy. . . . This Department must aggressively break down those remaining barriers that prevent us from making the fullest use of the capabilities of women in providing for our national defense. (Weinberger, 1982)

The focus of the Reagan administration then became eliminating institutional barriers for women in the military (Rostker, 2006, p. 567). Lawrence Korb, an assistant secretary of defense, acknowledged that the question of combat exclusions was central to the issue of eliminating barriers. He said that if combat exclusions are legitimate, “the barriers that result are neither artificial nor discriminatory” (Korb, 1982).

In 1982, the Army reassessed the coding system it used to assess women’s risk on the battlefield, and, as a result, some jobs were restored to women, while others were eliminated altogether. In response, Weinberger stated:

It is the policy of this Department that women will be provided full and equal opportunity with men to pursue appropriate careers in the military services for which they can qualify. This means that military women can and should be utilized in all roles except those explicitly prohibited by combat exclusion statutes and related policy. This does not mean that the combat exclusion policy can be used to justify closing career opportunities to women. The combat exclusion rules should be interpreted to allow as many as possible career opportunities for women to be kept open. (Weinberger, 1983; emphasis in original)

The new rules caused some confusion in operational units. For example, the Army found that it had many women serving in positions coded as the highest risk of combat, for which they were ineligible. In 1987, some 250 women were assigned to combat units in West Germany, but their commanders were reluctant to transfer them to other jobs, in part because of a lack of men to fill the vacancies that would result. Ultimately, it took a direct order from the commander of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) to get many of the women transferred (Devilbiss, 1990).

In 1988, a task force proposed a new “risk rule which excluded women from noncombat units or missions if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture were equal to or greater than the risk in the combat units they supported” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1988, p. 2). The effect was that, in less than two years, Assistant Secretary Christopher Jehn reported to Congress that, as a result of the new “at risk” rule, “31,000 new positions were opened to women in both the active and reserve components [and] over 63 percent of all positions in the Services [were] open to women” (Jehn, 1990).

Of the more than half a million U.S. troops deployed to the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, approximately 7 percent (about 41,000) were women (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993, p. 10). This precipitated major changes in policy with regard to the role of women in the military, including a reexamination of exclusionary laws. In 1991, Congress repealed 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 8549, the combat aviation exclusion, and, in a compromise move, established a presidential commission to further study the issue of combat exclusions (Rostker, 2006, p. 572; Holm, 1992, pp. 473–510). The Presidential
Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces issued a report in 1992 and proposed several recommendations, including

- the adoption by the military services of “gender-neutral assignment policies” to ensure that no one could be denied access to a post open to both men and women on the basis of gender
- the acknowledgment of the physiological differences between men and women and calling on the services to “retain gender-specific physical fitness tests and standards to promote the highest level of general fitness and wellness”
- the retention of existing policies that did not allow for the assignment of servicewomen to SOF, apart from service in a medical, linguistic, or civil affairs capacity
- a new law banning women from air combat positions (18 months after Congress repealed an identical law), as well as urging legislation to exclude women from ground combat assignments in the infantry, artillery, and armor and from certain assignments in air defense and combat engineers
- the opening of nonflying jobs to women on Navy combat ships while disqualifying women from service on submarines and landing aircraft (Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 1992a).

Five commission members dissented with the conclusions of the report and instead issued an “Alternative Views” section (Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 1992b). The crux of the alternative view was that “the military, in building fighting units, must be able to choose those most able to fight and win in battle” (Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 1992b, p. 44). The alternative view argued that allowing women to serve in combat units would endanger not only women but also the men serving with them. In addition, the alternative view noted that the issue of women in combat was not comparable with racial integration in 1948, because “dual standards are not needed to compensate for physical differences between racial groups, but they are needed where men and women are concerned” (Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, 1992b, p. 45).

The incoming Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, arbitrated the competing views expressed by the commission (Rostker, 2006, p. 574). In April 1993, President Bill Clinton ordered the services to open combat aviation to women and to investigate other opportunities for women to serve. In response, Aspin ordered the services to “permit women to compete for assignments in aircraft including aircraft engaged in combat missions” (Aspin, 1993). Later that year, Congress repealed 10 U.S.C. 6015 (the combat ship exclusion), opening most Navy combatant ships, except for submarines, to women. In 1994, DoD rescinded its “risk rule”: “[T]he rule no longer applied, since, based on experiences during [Operation] DESERT STORM, everyone in the theater of operation was at risk” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1988, p. 3). DoD also announced its new ground combat exclusion:

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9 The commission consisted of nine men and seven women. Some commission members would later become central figures in the debate on gay rights in the military, including Charles Moskos, a military sociologist and the architect of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”; retired Army Colonel Darryl Henderson, former commander of the Army Research Institute and author of Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, who argued that cohesion could not be developed in mixed-gender units; and Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness and a frequent critic of defense personnel policies.
Women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary
mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground . . . with individual or crew served
weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical
contact with hostile force’s personnel.10 (Aspin, 1994)

As a result of these and other policy changes, the number of positions open to women
increased substantially. For example, in both the Navy and the Marine Corps, there was about
a 30-percent increase in positions that were open to women (Harrell and Miller, 1997, p.
xvii).

Before these policy changes in 1993, 67 percent of positions were available to women in the
military; by 1997, 80.2 percent of positions in the military were available to them (Harrell
and Miller, 1997, p. 12).

This assignment policy was distinct from the policy regarding combat arms positions
being closed to women: The assignment policy and opening of positions meant that fewer
assignments were closed to women, not that fewer occupations were closed to women. For
example, a female radio operator could now serve in various radio operator positions from
which she previously would have been excluded, but still could not be assigned to those posi-
tions if they were in units with direct ground combat missions. This was distinct from service-
level policies barring women from certain military occupations, such as infantry.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be a watershed regarding the integration of
women into the military. Those wars presented a nonlinear, less predictable battlefield with
asymmetric threats that could potentially expose female soldiers to combat. Because of this,
the assignment policy became less effective at excluding women from combat situations, and,
in practice, women were participating in foot patrols, as well as convoy escort missions that
came under fire (Burrelli, 2013). Both the Army and Marine Corps created woman-only for-
mations that were attached to combat units. The Army’s cultural support teams (CSTs) con-
sisted of female soldiers who supported Army SOF; similarly, the Marine Corps set up female
engagement teams (FETs), which consisted of female Marines attached to Marine combat
units. Both of these formations were set up to allow U.S. forces access to women and children
among the local populations, which, because of cultural customs, was difficult for male soldiers
and Marines to accomplish.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also led to debates in Congress over the potential expo-
sure of women to combat. In May 2005, the House Armed Services Committee Chairman,
Duncan Hunter, introduced a bill that would have (1) prohibited women from serving in any
company-size unit that provided support to combat battalions or their subordinate companies,
and (2) blocked the assignment of women to thousands of positions previously open to them,
and in which they were already serving. The Army opposed this bill; GEN Richard A. Cody,
the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, noted: “The proposed amendment will cause confusion in the
ranks, and will send the wrong signal to the brave young men and women fighting the Global
War on Terrorism” (Tyson, 2005). The bill was ultimately defeated.

In February 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates notified Congress of the Depart-
ment of the Navy’s desire to reverse the policy of prohibiting women from submarine service.
When GEN George Casey, the Army’s Chief of Staff, was asked about his view on allowing

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10 According to DoD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “the prohibi-
tion on direct ground combat was a long-standing Army policy, and for that reason, no consideration was given to repealing
it when DoD adopted the current assignment policy in 1994” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1988).
women to serve in combat roles, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it was time to review the policy: “I believe it’s time we take a look at what women are actually doing in Iraq and Afghanistan” (McLagan and Sommers, 2010).

In 2011, and in response to the Military Leadership Diversity Commission’s findings that the services’ combat exclusion policies were a barrier to greater representation of women in the senior NCO and flag and general officer ranks, the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries to conduct a review of all gender-restricting policies (Miller, Kavanagh, et al., 2012; Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 2012).

In 2012, the Army announced that it would open as many as 14,000 combat-related jobs in six military occupational specialties at the battalion level. BG Barry Price, the director of human resources policy at the time at the Army G-1 (Personnel), said: “The last 11 years of warfare have really revealed to us there are no front lines. There are no rear echelons. Everybody was vulnerable to the influence of the Army” (Tan, 2012a). In May 2012, Rep. Loretta Sanchez and Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand introduced legislation in both houses of Congress to encourage the repeal of the ground combat exclusion (McGregor, 2012). The legislation did not pass. In May 2012, two Army reservists also filed a lawsuit that sought to overturn the remaining ground combat exclusions, claiming that they limit “their current and future earnings, their potential for promotion and advancement, and their future retirement” (McGregor, 2012). All of this led up to the rescission of DGCDAR in January 2013. Next we provide some numbers tracing the share of women in the U.S. armed forces, focusing especially on the Army because of the ground combat exclusion.

**Female Participation in the Active U.S. Military**

We illustrate the trajectory of female participation since 1945 in the active U.S. military and Army in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The effects of the end of the draft on female participation in the military emerge clearly in the two Figures. The number of women on active duty in the military services increased rapidly between 1972 and 1981, from about 45,000 to more than 185,000. Subsequently, the rate of growth moderated; the post–World War II peak of 232,823 women in the military was reached in 1989. Post–Cold War military reductions led to a decline in active-duty women, to about 196,000 in 1995. With the exception of a brief rise to 215,000 in 2003, the number of active-duty women in the military has stabilized at or slightly above the 200,000 level. However, the percentage of women on active duty has continued to increase, reaching a peak of 15 percent in 2001–2003.

Compared with the other services, the U.S. Army has deployed many more personnel in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has the largest number of women likely to have participated in direct ground combat in those theaters. During these two conflicts, the participation trends of active-duty women in the Army have diverged from those of the military services as a whole. Overall female participation in the active U.S. military peaked in 2001–2003, at 15 percent, and remained generally steady between approximately 14.5 percent and 15 percent for the next decade. Female participation in the U.S. Army peaked at 15.5 percent in 2001 and then declined to 13.6 percent in 2008, where it remained for the next five years. In contrast to the period 1970–2003, when women were a larger portion of the U.S. Army than they were of the active military force as a whole, after 2004, female participation rates in the Army have been consistently lower than the rates for all of the U.S. military. Since the start of the 21st century, the percentage of female officers has continued to increase, albeit at a slow rate,
Figure 2.1
Women in the Military, as Percentage of Active Personnel, 1945–2013

RAND RR1058-2.1

Figure 2.2
Active-Duty Women in the Army and the Overall Military, 1945–2013

RAND RR1058-2.2
while the percentage of enlisted women declined from a peak of 15.8 percent in 2001 to about 13 percent in 2009, where it has since remained (see Figure 2.3). This change in female participation rates was not driven by an absolute decline in female soldiers; rather, it is the result of an increase in the overall size of the U.S. Army and an increase in the number of men serving on active duty without a corresponding increase in women’s participation.11

Female Participation in Select Army Military Occupations

The overall trends discussed above provide a general look at the pattern of integration of women into the U.S. military. In this section, we examine trends in female soldier participation in three Army occupational specialties: military police (MP); engineers; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN). We chose these three specialties for closer examination because all three are in the combat support functions and each has considerable need for physical strength, includes exposure to physical and psychological danger, and has the potential for direct involvement in ground combat operations.

Our purpose was to see whether the overall trends matched the rate of women participation in combat support specialties, as these were opened to them. In each of these specialties, the pattern of participation is similar to the overall trends. Shortly after the opening of the specialty, there was an influx of women, and followed by a stabilization of the number of women in the MOS. Interestingly, the participation of women in all three MOSs is greater than the overall Army participation rate by women.

Figure 2.3
Women in the Army, as a Percentage of Active Enlisted and Officer Personnel, 2000–2013

NOTE: Data exclude cadets.

11 One potential explanation for this was the wartime need for additional combat-oriented positions that excluded women.
Military Police

MPs (area of concentration 31A and MOS 31B) operate in small teams within the “human domain” and gather police intelligence through continuous engagement with the local populations. MPs also need to make rapid decisions regarding the escalation of the use of force in complex situations, be tactically proficient, and know how to use interpersonal communication skills (see Field Manual 3-39, 2013). Finally, an MP’s duties can involve combat. MP teams and squads are armed with both crew-served and individual weapons. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), female MPs engaged in combat operations and served as platoon and squad leaders in firefights with insurgents. According to Army sources, female soldiers made up 10–20 percent of a typical MP company in Iraq (Twitchell, 2008). In Iraq, a female MP (Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester) received the Silver Star for bravery in a direct ground combat encounter (Botters, 2008, p. 72). The extensive use of MPs as light infantry has, according to one author, led many women who were otherwise interested in being in the infantry to join the MP (Solaro, 2006, p. 117).

Female soldiers have served as MPs since at least July 1951, when the first female MP graduated from the MP officers course in July 1951. In 1972, the MP MOS was officially opened to women, and the Army began a formal program for female MPs; in July 1977, the first gender-integrated class of MP One Station Unit Training began. By June 1978, the U.S. Army had 206 female MP officers and 684 female MP enlisted personnel, totals that increased to 429 and 1,570, respectively, by September 1991 (U.S. Army Women’s Museum, 2000). In October 1994, the last major barrier to women in the Military Police Corps was eliminated when positions in divisional MP companies were opened to women.

As Figure 2.4 shows, in 2000–2012, female enlisted MOS 31B MP personnel ranged in number from about 4,300 to 6,600 and have consistently composed around 14–15 percent of the total MP force during this period. Figure 2.5 illustrates that participation rates were slightly

Figure 2.4
Female Enlisted Military Police (MOS 31B) Personnel

![Graph showing the number of female enlisted MOS 31B personnel from 2000 to 2012.](source)

SOURCE: Data were extracted from an unpublished data set provided to RAND—the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Defense Enrollment Eligibility System (DEERS) data set.

NOTES: The sharp drop in personnel in 2003 appears to be due to inaccurate U.S. Army Reserve numbers affecting both male and female reporting. Reserve component reporting in 2005 and 2006 is also lower than both the previous and following years.
higher for active-duty female enlisted personnel and that their representation in the Military Police Corps was broadly similar to their representation among active enlisted personnel.

Figure 2.6 illustrates that, since at least 2001, women have made up roughly 20 percent of MP officers. Female officers have participated in the Military Police Corps at a higher rate than enlisted women and at a higher rate than their representation in the active officer corps.

**Engineers**

Many positions in the Engineer Corps had been closed to women because of the positions’ direct involvement in ground combat operations. Other positions have been open to women for a considerable period. For example, the position of bridge crewmember (12C MOS) has been open to women since October 1994. The primary duties of a MOS 12C bridge crewmember are to provide conventional and powered bridge and rafting support for wet and dry gap-crossing operations. This is a physically demanding job and has an Army physical demand rating of very heavy (Personnel Command, 2010). A physical demand rating of very heavy means that the job entails lifting, on an occasional basis, more than 100 pounds and frequently or constantly lifting in excess of 50 pounds (U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, 2008, pp. 5–6).

Women rapidly filled the MOS 12C position after it was opened to them, so that by 2000, some 130 women (15 percent of the available active-duty positions) were serving as bridging engineers (Figure 2.7). In addition, since 2003, active enlisted female participation in MOS 12C was slightly higher than women’s overall representation in the active component. One result of the closure of combat engineer jobs to women was that some noncombat engineer battalions (construction, bridging, and topography) were nearly fully integrated at the junior-officer level. During the 1990s, junior-officer positions in the 94th and 565th Engineer Battalions in USAREUR were more than 50 percent women. However, exclusion from combat units

### Figure 2.5

**Active Component Female Enlisted Military Police (MOS 31B) Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Active (%)</th>
<th>Army enlisted (%)</th>
<th>Active (PAX)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>2,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>1,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>2,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>2,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>2,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>2,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>2,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>2,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>2,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>2,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>2,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Data were extracted from an unpublished data set provided to RAND—the DMDC DEERS data set. Note: PAX = personnel.*
made it difficult for women to advance beyond the junior-officer level (Grosskruger, 2008, pp. 44–45).

Figure 2.6
Active Component Female Officer Military Police (MOS 31A) Personnel

SOURCES: Data were extracted from an unpublished data set provided to RAND—the DMDC DEERS data set; Beckett and Chien, 2002, p. 58. 
NOTE: The personnel numbers for 2000 are omitted because of potential errors in the source data.

Figure 2.7
Active Component Female Enlisted Bridging Engineers (MOS 12C)

made it difficult for women to advance beyond the junior-officer level (Grosskruger, 2008, pp. 44–45).

Women in engineering units have been involved in combat situations. During the second year of OIF, women from the 1st Engineer Battalion were often attached to other units on combat patrols to interact with Iraqi women during search operations (Solaro, 2006, pp. 83,
85–88). Women also have participated in the Army’s Sapper Leader Course and, by early 2013, 55 had earned the Sapper tab and one (a Marine) graduated with the most points in her class. The Sapper Leader Course lasts 28 days and teaches field craft, air operations, waterborne operations, mountaineering, and demolitions. It includes a patrolling phase, which has a ten-day field training exercise.12

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Specialist**

The CBRN jobs (MOS 74A and MOS 74D) make up a set of military specialties in which Army women participate at a greater rate than their representation in the active force. As Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show, for most of 2000–2012, women occupied more than 20 percent of the MOS 74A and 74D positions. CBRN specialists conduct CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, perform decontamination operations, conduct obscuration operations, conduct CBRN sensitive site exploitation, and operate and perform operator maintenance on assigned CBRN defense and individual CBRN protective equipment (Personnel Command, 2010). These jobs also have a physical demand rating of very heavy.

**Evolution of Attitudes Toward Gender Integration in the U.S. Military**

Dating back to at least World War II, there were concerns that integrating women into units could adversely affect military performance and unit morale and cause issues because of pregnancy and sexual harassment. Despite these concerns, one report on WACs during World War II found that “[w]omen’s morale held up excellent; pregnancy rates for those in the

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12 The course has an overall graduation rate of about 50 percent, with women having a graduation rate of about 37 percent (Tan, 2012b; Buckley, 2012; and Michaels, 2013).
Pacific [were] like that of other overseas theaters—less than one half of the world WAC rate” (Treadwell, 1954, p. 446). But WAC units were met with some resistance. According to this report, women as a “group are subject to the label of ‘unfit.’ Women have to prove themselves the exception to the rule” (Treadwell, 1954, p. 121). The report concluded, however, that “no evidence exists for gross moral breakdown as women in WACS were able to gradually convince the enlisted men their roles were to achieve military missions” (Treadwell 1954, p. 447).

Women continued to serve in the military during the 1960s and 1970s, and they were particularly in demand as the Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular among the American public (Stiehm, 1989). In 1967, Congress passed Public Law 90-130, which eased previous restrictions on the promotion of women in the service branches. These changes were unpopular within the military at the time (Devilbiss, 1990). Despite this culture of resistance toward women’s participation in the military, the Army promoted two women to the rank of general three years later, in 1970 (Devilbiss, 1990).

The transition from conscription to the AVF in 1973 marked a large upsurge in women’s participation in the military and raised concerns for some military leaders that women would face increased resistance serving alongside men. Research at the time found that women as a group were often perceived as less capable and possessing fewer leadership qualities than men. In a survey conducted by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center in 1975, 890 male recruits were asked to rate their attitudes toward women using a five-point scale. Results showed that 66 percent of recruits agreed that women were “more emotional,” 37 percent agreed that women had “less leadership ability,” 36 percent agreed that women were “less stable,” and 30 percent agreed that women were “more easily influenced” (P. Thomas, 1976, p. 11).13 In a 1972 survey administered to officers at the U.S. Naval War College, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagree with the question, “Women officers should be

13 It is assumed that respondents were comparing women with men when answering these questions.
given the same opportunities as male officers, including sea duty and flying status.” Results showed that 57 percent of women agreed with this question, while 74 percent of the men did not (Coye et al., 1973, pp. 71–72). Gendered differences in perceptions of competence might have affected job and promotion opportunities available to women. Coye and colleagues found that 43 percent of women strongly disagreed and another 41 percent generally disagreed with the statement that they were utilized as well as male officers in the Navy (Coye et al., 1973, p. 76).

In the 1970s, the extent to which male personnel were less likely to accept women as full-fledged unit members might have reflected their previous experiences working with women. In one survey of Army soldiers from January 1974, researchers found that men were more accepting of women in the military if they had a women supervisor before joining the Army, had close friends in the Army who were women, or worked with a women in the Army (D. Segal and Woelfel, 1976). Studies of integration in the service academies provide similar support for the argument that the quality of contact matters for integrating women into all-male units. Durning (1978) found that contact with women significantly improved cadets’ attitudes about gender at the U.S. Naval Academy. DeFleur and colleagues looked explicitly at the effect of the quality of male cadets’ interactions and found that negative experiences during Basic Cadet Training at the U.S. Air Force Academy could have negatively affected male cadets’ attitudes toward women (DeFleur, Gillman, and Marshak, 1978).

Since the 1970s, soldiers in the U.S. Army appear to have become more accepting of women in combat. There is evidence that some soldiers in the Army, at the time the AVF was launched, were strongly opposed to women serving in combat units. In 1974, researchers sampled male and female Army soldiers at three domestic bases in the United States (Savell and Collins, 1975). The survey asked soldiers to answer questions about their underlying attitudes toward gender, classifying their answers into “traditional” or “contemporary” gender views. It also asked these soldiers about their attitudes toward women serving in the military.

Figure 2.10 shows the responses of male soldiers to the question, “Is the job ‘rifle-carrying infantry foot soldier’ an appropriate job for women?” The male soldiers could choose either yes or no to this question. Thirty percent of male soldiers holding “contemporary” gender views believed that it was appropriate for women to serve in the infantry. The percentage was lower for male soldiers classified as having “traditional” gender views, with 12 percent of them expressing support for women in the infantry. It is important to note that this survey did not use a representative sample. Thus, the results shown here only highlight the attitudes of select soldiers, at a particular point in time, from select military installations in the continental United States.

Hertz’s in-depth interviews, undertaken in 1985 with U.S. Air Force security specialists and their wives prior to integrating women into the Air Force’s male security specialty, identified strong opposition to integrating women into the specialty (Hertz, 1996). The airmen voiced two main concerns. They expected that integrating women would threaten

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14 DeFleur, Gillman, and Marshak (1978) drew directly on Allport’s (1954) identification of the key components for effective intergroup contact. Meta-analyses conducted by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) and Pettigrew et al. (2011) found broad support for the argument that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice. However, the conditions that contribute to prejudice reduction are better thought of as interdependent bundles than independent causal factors.
• “the solidarity of the work culture where the influx of outsiders would dilute, if not eradicate, the trust and camaraderie that helps the men get through the shift” (Hertz, 1996, p. 251)

• “the content of the culture, especially a distinct orientation to an alliance of equality (among men) and dominance (of men over women)” (Hertz, 1996, p. 251).

Hertz found that the airmen’s wives’ main concern was that the presence of women in the unit might lead to sexual infidelity.

Over time, male soldiers appear to have become more accepting of women serving in the military and in combat positions. In the mid-1990s, RAND administered a survey to U.S. service personnel regarding the integration of women into the military (Harrell and Miller, 1997). Figure 2.11 shows that when male soldiers were asked whether women should be allowed to serve in men’s occupations or career fields, a majority believed that women should be allowed to serve in combat arms and noncombat arms specialties.

For those in combat arms positions, 66 percent of male soldiers believed that the Army should allow their military occupational specialties to include women. This number increased for soldiers in noncombat arms roles, with 80 percent of male soldiers reporting support for their specialties allowing women. Because of sample characteristics and question wording, the comparison of responses of Army soldiers in 1974 and the late 1990s has limitations. However, the magnitude of differences in soldier attitudes suggests that Army personnel might have become more accepting of women in combat roles since the beginning years of the AVF.

Although the magnitude of the differences in male and female perceptions of women’s performance has shrunk over time, gendered differences persist. Many serving women have faced resentment and a lack of acceptance from men in their units, particularly from junior enlisted men. Survey data has found that attitudes of female soldiers have been significantly
more accepting of women serving in the military than male soldiers’ attitudes (Rosen, Durand, et al., 1996; Miller, 1997).

Attitudes toward women in the military reflect the stereotypes that are often applied to women in the military as a group. Ethnographic studies have consistently identified a spectrum of adverse stereotypes applied to and experienced by female military personnel, which create challenges that women must navigate successfully to gain acceptance. Brownson cataloged the perennial stereotypes facing female military personnel into two categories: social ("favored," ‘ slackers,’ and ‘whiners’) and sexual ("bitch," ‘slut,’ or ‘dyke’) (Brownson, 2014, p. 778). As King noted, it is the sexual categories, “above all, the slut-bitch binary, which have been particularly obstructive” (King, 2014, p. 381). These gender stereotypes serve as lenses through which individual women’s performances are viewed, particularly in environments in which there are relatively few women. Archer has examined the impact of gender stereotypes on female Marines’ performance through interviews with male and female Marines and found that gender-role stereotypes can contribute to reduced camaraderie and mentorship, a reduced sense of shared mission, and, ultimately, poorer performance (Archer, 2012).

Resentment toward female military personnel often stems from a perception that double standards are applied to men and women (Harrell and Miller, 1997; Archer, 2012; Do et al., 2013; Brownson, 2014). Across studies using survey and interview data, double standards were most commonly noted with regard to physical fitness and the types of tasks women are asked to perform. Women were seen as enjoying privileged positions in the services due to perceptions that they were asked to do less in terms of physical fitness and were often given less strenuous tasks. Miller (1997) conducted field research on soldiers’ attitudinal patterns at eight domestic Army posts; two national training centers; and posts in Somalia, Macedonia, and Haiti and explored ways in which male soldiers expressed their resentment toward the female
soldiers with whom they served. The results from Miller’s interviews of these men showed that some of them feared expressing their beliefs about women in the military, while others used indirect forms of gender harassment against women. Some examples of these indirect forms of harassment included “sabotage of women soldiers, foot-dragging, feigning ignorance, constant scrutiny, gossip and rumors, and indirect threats. This harassment targets women but is not sexual; often it cannot be traced to its source” (Miller, 1997, p. 33).

In addition to the strategies of gender harassment documented by Miller (1997), many women in the military have also experienced sexual harassment and sexual assault. According to a 2014 census survey of all active-duty women and 25 percent of active-duty men, more than one-quarter of active-duty female personnel might have experienced sexual harassment or gender discrimination during the previous year, while approximately 5 percent of active-duty female personnel might have experienced sexual assault during the previous year (National Defense Research Institute, 2014). During 23 focus groups, which DACOWITS held in 2011 to assess the prevalence of sexual assault and harassment and the effectiveness of prevention measures in which active and reserve component personnel participated, participants highlighted the adverse consequences of sexual assault and harassment not only to victims but to units more broadly. As DACOWITS noted, “overall, most Service members thought that sexual harassment creates an environment of distrust that negatively affects unit readiness and the mission as a whole. Some Service members additionally stated that it is difficult to perform one’s duties in a harassing and hostile work environment” (DoD, 2011, p. 8).

**The Integration of Excluded Groups in the U.S. Military**

The integration of women into the U.S. military has been politically contentious, and, at times, it has proceeded in the face of substantial opposition within the armed forces. Women are not the only out-group that has faced such a situation. In this section, we review select research on the integration of African Americans and openly gay and lesbian soldiers into the armed forces, focusing on the patterns of acceptance and opposition prior to and after the decisions to integrate those groups. We also examine survey data of military personnel from before and (approximately) after the integration of these groups.

Taken together, the general pattern across all waves of integration—the integration of women, African Americans, and openly gay and lesbian soldiers in the armed forces—is that, prior to integration, U.S. military personnel tended to be strongly opposed. However, their attitudes became more accepting of integration after a decision to allow individuals from these groups. The number of cases is small, each case is unique, and each presents only limited parallels to the integration of women into all military specialties after the rescission of DGCDAR. For example, there were no issues with the physical strength of African American men or the intellectual capacity of women. And neither of these issues—physical or intellectual—applied to openly gay and lesbian personnel. But the patterns of acceptance and opposition are useful

15 Gender harassment is a distinct concept from sexual harassment. The former refers to “harassment that is not sexual, and is used to enforce traditional gender roles, or in response to the violation of these roles” (Miller, 1997, p. 35). Sexual harassment, in contrast, refers to situations where harassment is based on sexual means. Sexual harassment can lead to gender harassment, and gender harassment can lead to sexual harassment.
to keep in mind as we consider the data on the integration of women into all military occupa-
tions and specialties.

We begin with a review of survey data on soldiers before and after the integration of
African Americans during World War II and the Korean War. We then review survey data on
U.S. military personnel attitudes toward allowing openly gay and lesbian soldiers to serve in
the military.

**Racial Integration**

African Americans have served in every U.S. military conflict since the Revolutionary War (D.
Segal, 1989). Until the late 1940s, the military maintained racially segregated units. In 1945 and
1950, the U.S. Army Board issued reports on the racial integration of military units (Moskos,
1966). Both reports recommended that racial segregation remain largely intact because of con-
cerns about the performance of African American soldiers. Such concerns stemmed from the
disproportionate percentage of African Americans in the lowest categories of the U.S Army’s
aptitude classification system (Moskos, 1966). For example, 60 percent of African American
soldiers in the Army fell into the lowest aptitude categories in 1950, while 29 percent of whites
fell into the same category (Moskos, 1966).

President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9381 in 1948, which began the process
of racial desegregation in the armed services. The results from two surveys provide some evi-
dence about the effects of racial segregation and desegregation on soldier attitudes regarding
this policy change.

The first survey is part of *The American Soldier* studies that Stouffer and colleagues col-
lected in 1943 during World War II (Stouffer et al., 1949). The second survey is from Project
Clear, a survey commissioned by DoD in 1951, during the Korean War (Moskos, 1966). The
comparison of similar question items from both surveys provides some evidence of changes in
soldier attitudes before and after the signing of Executive Order 9381.

Figure 2.12 compares the results from these two surveys. It shows noticeable changes in
white soldiers’ attitudes about racial integration. In 1943, 84 percent of white soldiers in the
Army opposed racial integration, 12 percent favored integration, and the remaining 4 percent
reported indifference. The distribution of these attitudes changed during the Korean War,
when the U.S. Army began to integrate soldiers into combat units. In 1951, 44 percent of white
soldiers opposed racial integration, 31 percent were indifferent, and 25 percent favored racial
integration of Army units.

Similar changes in attitudes also occurred among African American soldiers between
World War II and the Korean War. Figure 2.13 shows that 36 percent of African Ameri-
can soldiers in the Army were opposed to racial integration during World War II, 27 percent
were indifferent, and 37 percent supported integration (Moskos, 1966). By 1951, substantial
changes in attitudes toward racial integration occurred among African American soldiers in
the Army. Survey data from Project Clear show that 90 percent of African American soldiers
favored racial integration in the Army, with 6 percent indifferent and the remaining 4 percent
opposed (Moskos, 1966).

An important finding from *The American Soldier* was that interracial contact reduced
racial prejudice of soldiers. Research from Project Clear found similar results in the U.S. Army

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16 Although the question wording and sampling procedures adopted by Stouffer and colleagues are crude by contemporary
standards of social science research, they highlight important patterns in soldier attitudes.
during the Korean War. In accordance with the Executive Order 9381, the U.S. Army began racial desegregation as the Korean War progressed. The survey data from Project Clear includes measures of racial attitudes by soldiers in all-white units and racially integrated units. There were clear differences in racial attitudes between these units (Moskos, 1966, pp. 140–141).
For soldiers in all-white units in 1951, 51 percent reported that infantrymen in segregated outfits were better than mixed-race units, with 44 percent reporting strong objections to racial integration in general (Moskos, 1966, p. 140). The results also showed that 79 percent of soldiers in segregated units claimed that officers gave lower ratings to African Americans than whites (Moskos, 1966, p. 141). The distribution of these attitudes is noticeably different for Army soldiers in racially integrated units. For example, 31 percent of soldiers in these integrated units reported that infantrymen in segregated outfits were better, and 17 percent of soldiers held strong objections to units of whites and African Americans. Further, only 28 percent of soldiers from integrated units believed that officers rated African Americans worse in comparison to whites (Moskos, 1966, p. 141).

Survey data from Project Clear and *The American Soldier* have limitations. For example, the former survey used questions with strongly worded descriptions of racial integration (e.g., feeling about serving in a platoon containing both whites and blacks), compared with *The American Soldier* surveys (e.g., should whites and blacks serve in separate outfits) (Moskos, 1966, p. 139). The U.S. Army did not solve its issue of race relations overnight. Just as in civilian society, racial tensions continued to exist in the military during and after the Korean War. For example, racial strife became conspicuous during the Vietnam War, with growing awareness of minority underrepresentation by rank and military occupational specialties (Moskos and Butler, 1996). Despite these limitations, early research on the U.S. Army shows considerable changes to soldiers’ attitudes about the racial integration of military units in a relatively short period.

**The Integration of Homosexual Personnel**

Historically, the U.S. military has used a variety of criteria to exclude openly homosexual personnel. For the most part, military personnel policies focused on sexual behaviors (e.g., sodomy) instead of the sexual identities of soldiers (e.g., self-identifying as a homosexual) when excluding homosexual soldiers (D. Segal, Segal, and Reed, 2013). After World War II, the various services adopted different exclusionary policies that they would review periodically. In 1982, the U.S. military standardized its exclusionary policies with the promulgation of DoD Directive 1332.14 (1982), which stated that homosexuality was incompatible with military service. Under the directive, homosexuality was considered a medical disability, and the services used court-martials to decide which soldiers would receive an honorable discharge for being gay or lesbian.

In 1994, DoD adopted a new policy, commonly known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT). Under the DADT policy, the military distinguished between sexual identity and sexual behaviors. The military would no longer discharge soldiers solely based on suspicion of the former, but would discharge homosexuals who expressed their sexuality in public.

In 1993, the *Los Angeles Times* conducted a survey of enlisted soldiers about their views of removing the ban on homosexuals in the military (*Los Angeles Times*, 1993). The survey used a convenience sample of service members found in public areas outside 38 military facilities in the continental United States (Rostker et al., 1993). While the survey sample was not representative, it did attempt to weigh the sample based on the demographic characteristics of the military.

Figure 2.14 shows that an overwhelming majority of soldiers opposed the removal of the ban on homosexuals in the armed services, with 74 percent disapproving (59 percent strongly disapproving and 15 percent somewhat disapproving). It is important to note that this survey
was from 1993, so the question refers to the pre-DADT ban on both homosexual identity (e.g., knowing that someone is gay or lesbian) and homosexual behaviors (e.g., gay or lesbian individuals engaging in or expressing their sexuality).

After 1993 but prior to the repeal of DADT, attitudes toward serving with openly gay and lesbian personnel appear to have become more accepting. In a 2006 survey of attitudes of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans regarding allowing gays and lesbians to openly serve, Moradi and Miller (2010) found that opposition to allowing gays and lesbians to openly serve had fallen to 40 percent.

In 2010, DoD reevaluated its DADT policy by commissioning a survey on homosexuality in the military to more than 1 million active-duty enlisted soldiers and officers (Westat, 2010). A survey question asked soldiers, “If DADT is repealed and you are working with a Service member in your immediate unit who has said he or she is gay or lesbian, how, if at all, would it affect . . . your personal readiness.” Figure 2.15 shows that, of respondents who believed that they had never served with a gay or lesbian service member, 79.6 percent held neutral attitudes about how the repeal of DADT would affect their personal readiness, 6.9 percent reported that it would have a positive effect on their readiness, and 13.6 percent believed that it would negatively affect their readiness. The distribution represents soldiers who claimed that they had never served with a gay or lesbian service member, 79.6 percent held neutral attitudes about how the repeal of DADT would affect their personal readiness, 6.9 percent reported that it would have a positive effect on their readiness, and 13.6 percent believed that it would negatively affect their readiness. The distribution represents soldiers who claimed that they had never served with a gay or lesbian service member. It is possible that some of these soldiers had served with someone who is homosexual without knowing. This survey also asked the same question of soldiers who had served with homosexual soldiers. The same pattern of results exists for these subgroups, too. Much of the findings from this Westat study found similar findings on soldier attitudes on unit cohesion, effectiveness, military readiness, and retention: A sizable percentage of soldiers held neutral views about the effects of repealing DADT on these topics.
Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

The results from the Westat survey mirror those of other studies that have assessed the growing acceptance of openly gay and lesbian personnel in the armed forces. A study conducted by Belkin and colleagues assessing a multitude of data sources regarding the effect of the repeal of DADT concluded that the “repeal has had no overall negative impact on military readiness or its component dimensions, including cohesion, recruitment, retention, assaults, harassment, or morale” (Belkin et al., 2013).

As we noted earlier, the comparisons have limitations. However, they do suggest a noticeable shift in attitudes of soldiers between 1993 and 2010. The Los Angeles Times survey indicates strong opposition among soldiers about replacing the overall ban on homosexuals in the military (Rostker et al., 1993). In 2010, most soldiers held neutral attitudes regarding the effects of repealing DADT.

**Conclusion**

Broadly speaking, similar patterns of opposition to integrating excluded groups into the armed forces existed at the outset of integrating women, African Americans, and openly gay and lesbian personnel into the U.S. armed forces. In each case, opposition to integrating personnel from the excluded group personnel declined when it became evident that their inclusion did not reduce unit readiness or cohesion. A key component to maintaining unit readiness is the identification, validation, and application of standards for military occupations. As a result, how standards are constructed and applied has played a central role in political debates surrounding the integration of excluded groups into the U.S. military. Proponents advocating strategies to increase the participation of the previously excluded group have, at times, called into question standards’ restrictiveness, while those concerned about the adverse impact of
the excluded group’s integration have emphasized the importance of maintaining stringent standards. As such, questions regarding how to construct standards can become highly politicized, and they reflect larger political debates surrounding personnel policies in the U.S. armed forces. In other words, issues of cohesion and the construction of standards have been used by advocates to argue in favor of or to prevent policy change. These issues are important in their own right, but military personnel policy is politically determined.
All of the SOF service components have competitive assessment and selection processes, followed by lengthy, sometimes years-long, grueling training, eventually leading to placement in units. Given the extremely physically demanding nature of SOF operations, all of the SOF service components have highly demanding standards for selection to SOF, fulfillment of training goals, and assignment to units.

The physical abilities of SOF personnel are akin to those of elite athletes, and the standards within the SOF service component are meant to ensure a high level of fitness and strength for operational success. Standards are also a major factor in establishing and maintaining perceptions of competence, which is important for cohesion. In our survey and in the focus groups, maintaining high standards emerged as a critical issue and a top concern for SOF personnel.

The rescission of DGCDAR has removed gender-restrictive barriers in the military, and it has mandated the use of valid gender-neutral standards. Although standards have been in place for SOF specialties for decades, in the aftermath of the rescission of DGCDAR, the services have taken steps to ensure that the standards are current and gender-neutral. The rescission has sparked a discussion as to the meaning of the term gender-neutral standards, the applicability of concepts from the civilian world to highly specialized military environments, and the extent to which existing standards need modification. These concerns are fundamental to SOF identity, because passing through the highly physically demanding accession and selection process constitutes a rite of passage for SOF personnel and contributes to the sense of common identity. For example, the demands of SOF selection processes are reflected in very high attrition rates in training, with historical attrition and voluntary withdrawal rates between 40 and 80 percent (Beal, 2010; Taylor et al., 2006; Walker et al., 2010). High injury rates have also been noted as a cause for attrition and delayed graduation. In the course of our research, and especially as part of the task to assist the SOF service components in their standards-validation processes, the most common question that arose concerned the likelihood of women meeting gender-neutral standards and the physical demands in SOF specialties, as well as how well would women respond to the stressors they would likely to be exposed to during SOF operations.

One of the tasks in our effort consisted of assisting the SOF service components in their reviews of standards to ensure that they are gender-neutral. This support involved a combination of site visits to observe assessment and selection processes, discussions about planned validation strategies, and written correspondence to USSOCOM to address key issues. Much of this feedback is compiled and summarized in Chapter Seven. The individual components have proceeded at a different pace. The SOF service components of the Army and the Marine Corps have also participated in the larger reviews regarding the role of women in those services.
To address these questions, the natural tendency might be to review gender-difference research to determine how women compare with men on relevant abilities. However, this approach is limited in at least two fundamental ways. First, gender-difference research provides an analysis of average differences between men and women, which does not tell us whether an individual woman is capable of qualifying, nor how she will respond to different stressors, particularly when trained in SOF. Second, the populations used in gender-difference research that included the general population, the general military population, or even elite athletes are not always representative of the population of men and women who would likely qualify as special operators.

But even acknowledging these limitations, gender-difference research can be useful in providing insight into general challenges women might face in qualifying and performing in an operational environment. Under a known set of minimum standards, this body of research might also be useful in providing realistic expectations about the proportion of women who would be eligible for assessment and selection into a SOF specialty. Therefore, this chapter explores gender differences with the understanding that such research might be informative, but it is still limited in its ability to generalize the SOF community.

This chapter is organized into two main sections. First, we begin with an overview of the research examining sex and gender differences related to physical ability, physiology, and risk of injury. We also describe some potential medical challenges in addition to several factors that might influence observed gender differences, and we discuss how these factors might affect the interpretation of observed differences. The second section provides an overview of the sex and gender differences in the stress responses. Sex refers to the biological differences between male and female, whereas gender refers to the socially constructed roles and relationships that are differentially applied to men and women. In particular, this section provides a discussion of influences on the way our central and autonomic nervous systems respond to stress, as well as the influence of biology, psychology, and environment. Both sections conclude with a summary of the main differences between men and women, followed by the limitations of existing research. In other words, the first section of this chapter assesses the research regarding the question of whether women are physically up to the demands of SOF, while the second section discusses the research that can shed light on whether physiological reasons might make women less suitable for the extremely stressful environments in which SOF sometimes operate.

To summarize our findings, research exploring the differences between men and women on physical ability and motor skill tests suggests that men generally outperform women. These differences begin to expand following puberty and might be partially influenced by environmental factors. Although there are often large differences between men and women, primary emphasis must be placed on an individual’s capabilities to perform critical tasks and individual risks for developing an injury. For purposes of understanding the relevance of physiological differences in the ability of women to qualify for SOF specialties, in almost all cases, additional screening (e.g., a physical ability test) will be a better indicator of performance and risk of injury, compared with simply knowing whether one is a man or woman. For example, women are, on average, more susceptible to fatigue when carrying heavy loads (Knapiak, Reynolds, and Harman, 2004; Drain, Billing, and Rudzki, 2010); however, these differences can largely be attributed to the size differences between men and women, with women having less overall

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2 The amount of weight carried by military personnel is influenced by multiple factors, including mission requirements, threat profile, and technology. Although recommendations have been made to reduce the amount of weight carried, it has
lean body mass. With appropriate preparation and training, women can increase their levels of fitness, which will reduce their risk of injury and increase their performance on physically demanding tasks. Recognizing that it is each individual’s history, physiology, and physical fitness that will influence performance levels, fatigue, and risk of injury is critical to facilitating the potential SOF gender integration.

In terms of stress response, men and women respond to stress differently, although much depends on the specific stressor and context. The cautionary note is that many of the studies on stress response are based on nonmilitary populations and on circumstances that might have limited applicability to situations of extreme stress faced by SOF personnel. Just as with physical ability, individual differences and prior experiences have a greater impact on stress response than sex or gender. Additional screening will be a better indicator of stress response than broad distinctions along male-female lines. Stress response can be altered as individuals learn from experience and from specific training designed to cope with specific stressors.

How Men and Women Compare on Measures of Physical Ability

Questions about the ability of women to perform physically demanding tasks in military and nonmilitary occupations (e.g., firefighting, police) have been addressed through extensive research and discussion for several decades (Adams, 1979; Quester, 1977; Greene, 1980; Campbell, 1993; Sharp, 1994). Consequently, hundreds of studies have been conducted to determine the extent to which men and women differ on a wide range of abilities. These studies have often led to large qualitative and quantitative reviews (i.e., meta-analyses), which can be used to summarize the magnitude of these differences and sometimes offer potential explanations for these differences.

Differences Between Average Men and Women

Overall, studies have shown that men, on average, score better on tests of muscular strength and cardiovascular (i.e., aerobic) endurance, compared with women. However, men and women do not differ on tests of movement quality, such as flexibility and balance. A recent meta-analysis, combining 113 individual studies, confirms these general findings (Courtright et al., 2013). More specifically, the study found large differences between men and women on both tests of muscular strength ($\delta = 1.81$) and cardiovascular endurance ($\delta = 2.01$), but no meaningful differences on movement quality ($\delta = -0.06$). One important finding was that the magnitude of gender differences could vary depending on the specificity of the ability measure. More specifically, tests of upper-body strength and total-body strength resulted in the largest differences on measures of strength ($\delta = 1.98$ and $2.34$, respectively). In contrast, measures of core strength resulted in no meaningful differences between men and women ($\delta = 0.27$). Gender differences on two types of movement quality—flexibility and balance—indicated no meaningful differ-

$^3$ The delta symbol indicates sample-size weighted mean effect size corrected for sampling error and measurement error in the outcome variable. Positive values indicate better performance by men. A value of zero would indicate no difference between men and women. Values above one indicate large differences between subgroups.
ences, while a third type of movement quality—coordination—indicated moderate differences favoring males (δ = 0.60).

A similar meta-analysis examined not only gender differences in these basic abilities but also computed average differences between men and women on specific physical ability tests (Anderson and Robson, 2013). For example, an examination of two commonly used tests in the military showed very large differences favoring men for push-ups (δ = 1.26) and moderate differences, also favoring men, for sit-ups (δ = 0.60). Also, as expected, the largest difference between men and women was found for the bench-press test (δ = 2.09), which is a measure of upper-body strength.

Interpreting Average Differences

Several factors must be considered when interpreting the results from these studies. First, the magnitude of observed differences between men and women on physical ability tests varies across studies and across abilities. This point is demonstrated by reviewing the 80-percent credibility intervals found in the results of quantitative reviews (i.e., meta-analyses), which provide an upper and a lower limit for which we might expect to find such differences. If the credibility interval includes zero, the results suggest no consistent differences between men and women. Furthermore, wide intervals suggest considerable differences in results across studies. That is, the results of some studies reveal large differences between men and women, while other studies likely found little to no differences. In other words, increased confidence in estimates of average differences is increased when (1) the credibility interval does not include zero, and (2) the range of the credibility interval is narrow.

Although physical ability differences are expected between men and women, on average, it is important to examine the potential range of these differences and to recognize that there are women who will achieve exceptionally high scores. In other words, average gender differences can be misleading when decisions are being made about individuals. Average differences between men and women will also decrease when comparisons are made regarding only those individuals passing a cut score on a physical ability test. That is, the differences between the general population of men and women on a strength test will be greater than the differences between a subset of men and women who have the ability to lift at least 100 pounds. Therefore, the interpretation of observed differences will depend, to some extent, on the sample of men and women who are being compared. In the context of SOF, this means that the observed differences between men and women fully qualifying and passing all job-related standards will likely be less pronounced than many of the differences reported in the scientific literature.

Another factor to consider when examining average differences between men and women is the extent to which the distributions of scores overlap. Differences can be visually interpreted, assuming that physical ability scores are normally distributed for men and women, in which most individuals will score at the mean (of their gender subgroup) and fewer individuals will score toward the extremes (i.e., either very high scores or very low scores). Figure 3.1 illustrates the average differences, as reported by between men and women on strength across three different regions of the body: (1) upper, (2) lower, and (3) core. The distance between the curves represents the magnitude of the difference. The less the curves overlap, the greater the overlap.

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4 Anderson and Robson’s paper is available from Sean Robson (smrobson@rand.org).

5 The SOF service components should consider extending these analyses by examining physical fitness scores on relevant tests among military personnel.
difference between men and women. As the figure shows, very few women would be expected to score above the average male score, which is represented by the vertical dashed line. However, the differences between men and women on core strength are minimal and not significant. When the distributions have minimal overlap, it is important to recognize that very few women would be expected to fall within the highest ranges of physical fitness of men. Finally, it is important to recognize that these distributions were constructed based on single-point estimates derived from meta-analyses. A more thorough interpretation of differences between men and women can be achieved by examining confidence intervals, which provide a range where the average score of each group is likely to fall on a given ability (see Cumming and Finch, 2005).
**Differences Between High-Performing Men and Women**

Differences between the average male and the average female are less relevant to organizations that select candidates well above the average. Therefore, a comparison of the differences between men and women at the 95th or 99th percentiles may be more informative. A study of a nationally representative population of boys and girls found that at the 95th percentiles of each gender, the estimated aerobic capacity (maximal oxygen consumption—\( \text{VO}_2\text{max} \))\(^6\) of 18-year-old men was approximately 10 percent greater than 18-year-old women (Eisenmann, Laurson, and Welk, 2011). Similar gaps of about 10 percent also have been found in studies comparing the top male and female athletes with respect to endurance running events (Cheuvront et al., 2005). That is, top-performing men achieve finish times approximately 10 percent faster than women across events ranging in distance from 1,500 meters to 42,000 meters. Performance differences are slightly less for sprint running, with males achieving times approximately 7 percent faster. The gender gap between top-performing men and women in swimming is also relatively smaller. For example, the current 1,500-meter world record for men is about 7 percent faster than it is for women. Similar gaps of 7 percent have been found in favor of men in an analysis of open-water swimmers covering a distance of 10 kilometers (Vogt, Rüst, et al., 2013). An analysis of Hawaii Ironman performance from 1981 to 2007 found the smallest gender time differences in favoring men during the swim (9.8 percent), followed by cycling (12.7 percent) and running (13.3 percent) (Lepers, 2008).

Despite clear evidence of differences between average men and average women, and between elite male and elite female athletes, a more thorough and direct evaluation of women for SOF specialties is needed. Without an extensive analysis of the job requirements, any projections on the qualification rates of potential female candidates would be incomplete. Studies comparing average differences between men and women might not generalize well to successful SOF candidates. Similarly, studies of elite athletes also have limited generalizability. For example, elite athletes are unlike special operators in that they train to meet one very specific goal. Elite marathoners, for example, emphasize keeping a lean body and building aerobic capacity. In contrast, SOF missions might require a combination of several abilities (e.g., aerobic capacity, upper-body strength, agility). Nonetheless, to the extent that SOF specialties require high levels of strength, power, and aerobic endurance, the proportion of eligible female candidates would be expected to be considerably lower than the eligible population of male candidates.

**Factors Influencing Performance**

Performance on physical ability tests, and, more important, performance on the job, is a function of many different factors, including ones that are biological, psychological, sociocultural, nutritional, and environmental. The relative influence of these factors can explain, in part, why simply knowing individual values of “maximal oxygen uptake do not reveal the person’s potential to perform well in events that demand aerobic power” (Åstrand et al., 2003, p. 265). In other words, the observed gender differences on physical ability tests cannot be attributed fully to differences in physiology between the sexes. Training, for example, can result in substantial gains in aerobic capacity and muscular strength. In the following sections, we explore the most common explanations for performance differences between men and women.

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\(^6\) \( \text{VO}_2\text{max} \) is a measure that provides an estimate of the maximum amount of oxygen that your body can use during physical activity.
Biological and Physiological Factors

Many observed gender differences on physical ability tests can be traced back to biological and physiological differences between men and women, as well as “sexually dimorphic maturation during puberty and adolescence.” A recent review of studies on the topic highlights some of the more prevalent differences between men and women (see Table 3.1) (Epstein et al., 2013).

The preponderance of this research suggests that men have an advantage physiologically in terms of aerobic capacity, anaerobic power, and muscular strength. Men are also taller and have overall more body mass. The average 20- to 29-year-old man weighs an average of 188 pounds and is 5’8” inches tall (McDowell et al., 2008). In contrast, women in the same age group, on average, weigh 156 pounds and are 5’4” tall. Recent studies, however, have suggested that women may have a greater resistance to muscular fatigue compared with men (West et al., 1995; Semmler, Kutzscher, and Enoka, 1999; Hunter and Enoka, 2001; Clark et al., 2003). Specific attention should be given to interpreting these findings, since men and women are often not matched for strength. That is, the amount of weight lifted in these studies is often determined as a percentage of each individual’s maximal ability (i.e., relative load), resulting in heavier loads being lifted by men in these studies. In a military environment where heavy loads must be carried (e.g., the weight of equipment) (Nindl et al., 2013), men’s greater overall strength would likely outweigh any advantage women have in resistance to muscular fatigue. However, the extent to which observed physical ability differences translate into better job performance is a more important question to address than average differences on physical abilities. For some abilities, it is possible that there may be large differences between men and women but that differences in job performance are relatively smaller. Such a relationship might occur when individuals’ abilities exceed job demands. Generally, such excesses of a relevant physi-

Table 3.1
Comparison of Primary Physiological Differences Between Men and Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physiological Factors</th>
<th>Compared with Men, Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Height and weight</td>
<td>Are on average 13 cm shorter (McDowell et al., 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skeletal muscle mass</td>
<td>Have less muscle mass—33 percent less in lower body and 40 percent less in upper body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Janssen et al., 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiopulmonary capacity</td>
<td>Have approximately 25–35 percent less maximal oxygen uptake (Åstrand et al., 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body composition</td>
<td>Have a greater percentage of body fat per body weight (22 to 26 percent versus 12 to 16 percent) (Malina and Geithner, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susceptibility to iron deficiency</td>
<td>Are more likely to experience anemia (S. Clark, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muscle strength</td>
<td>Have less muscular strength and power, particularly in the upper body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Beckett and Hodgdon, 1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaerobic capacity</td>
<td>Have less absolute anaerobic power; the difference is attributed to differences in lean body mass (Stefani, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muscular endurance</td>
<td>Have greater resistance to muscular fatigue relative to body mass and faster recovery following exercise (Billaut and Bishop, 2009; Epstein et al., 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bone and joints</td>
<td>Have shorter limbs relative to body length and wider pelvis, which provides a lower center of gravity but might also increase risk of specific overuse injuries (Ivkovic et al., 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are more likely to experience training-related stress fractures (Friedl, 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cal ability are valued in the context of special operations, because it is useful to have physical reserves to meet unexpected and variable mission demands (e.g., increased enemy activity) and to minimize risk of injury.

Other differences between men and women might contribute to an increased risk of musculoskeletal injuries for women. Springer and Ross offer one example: “Compared to men, women have increased pelvic width, forefoot pronation, heel valgus angulation, pes planus, external tibial torsion, and femoral anteversion” (Springer and Ross, 2011, p. 4). Comparisons of male and female athletes suggest that anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injuries are more common among women (Renstrom et al., 2008). Although research continues to evolve in search of a definitive set of risk factors to fully explain observed gender differences, it is important to recognize that prevention programs have demonstrated considerable success in reducing the risk of ACL injuries (Olsen et al., 2005; Hewett et al., 2006; and Renstrom et al., 2008). Furthermore, the prevention of overtraining (e.g., excess running) can reduce the risk of injury with little to no detriment to improvements in overall fitness (Bullock et al., 2010).

Load carriage also may present certain risks specific to women. In other cases, women who are smaller may have an increased risk of injury if the rate of pace and loads are not modified to accommodate a shorter stride length. Studies on military recruits have reported higher incidence of injuries among female recruits, particularly with stress fractures (Lappe, Stegman, and Recker, 2001; Martila et al., 2007). For example, a large study of Army recruits from 1997 to 2007 (Knapik, Montain, et al., 2012) found that stress fracture incidences occurred at a rate of 19.3 per 1,000 male recruits, compared with 79.9 per 1,000 female recruits. To restate an earlier point, caution must be exercised when generalizing findings based on the general military population to women who meet the physical fitness standards required by SOF specialties. Taking into account research demonstrating that low physical fitness is an important risk factor in training (Beck et al., 2000; Knapik, Darakjy, et al., 2006; Rauh et al., 2006), the potential injury rate of women who have the strength, endurance, and other critical abilities to qualify as a SOF operator might be considerably lower than the injury rate of women from the general purpose force.

Support for this perspective is provided by studies that control for individual levels of physical fitness. For example, a study of 861 Army basic trainees initially found that women experienced twice as many injuries as men. However, when controlling for fitness levels, women were no longer at an increased risk of developing an injury (Bell et al., 2000). The primary conclusion from this study was that cardiovascular endurance rather than gender was the primary risk factor for developing an injury. Other studies also support an association between fitness and injuries (Cline, Jansen, and Melby, 1998; Friedl, Evans, and Moran, 2008). Therefore, to minimize the risk of injuries, it is critical to establish and ensure that minimum fitness levels are met prior to starting high-intensity physical assessment and selection programs.

Other physiological differences between men and women suggest that during military training, women might be more likely to experience iron deficiency and urinary incontinence (Orr et al., 2011; Epstein et al., 2013). However, effective prevention and treatment strategies are available for both of these conditions, suggesting that education and monitoring might be helpful in mitigating these challenges. Furthermore, the extent to which these conditions would affect female SOF operators is unknown.
Social, Cultural, and Psychological Factors
In addition to physiological differences between men and women, performance might also be influenced by social and cultural factors (Cheuvront et al., 2005). Historically, participation rates of women in sports have been lower than men, due to a wide range of influences, including structural barriers and fewer opportunities than men (Videon, 2002). However, shifts in laws (e.g., Title IX), social norms, and attitudes toward women have resulted in increased participation rates by women in a wide range of sports (Thornton, 2011). For example, the percentage of female participants competing in the 1981 Hawaii Ironman was 6 percent, compared with 27 percent in 2007 (Lepers, 2008). Coinciding with increased participation rates are substantially improved performance times in different athletic competitions. Although the performances (e.g., times) of both men and women have improved over the past several decades, the percentage of improvement for women has generally exceeded the improvement rate of men (Seiler, De Koning, and Foster, 2007). As a result, the gender gap has narrowed considerably.

Whether or not gender differences will ever be eliminated has been the source of considerable debate and speculation (Sparling, O’Donnell, and Snow, 1998; Whipp and Ward, 1992; Coast, Blevins, and Wilson, 2004; Cheuvront et al., 2005; Lepers, 2008). Although there are implications in resolving this question, the more-critical questions for purposes of our research are (1) whether observed gender gaps would have a negative impact on mission performance, and (2) what steps can be taken to help provide equal opportunities to men and women for meeting SOF selection standards. Thus, from the perspective of recruiting women into SOF specialties (if these are opened to women), the main issue is not about reducing the gap between men and women but rather about increasing individual abilities through education and training to meet standards for safe and effective job and mission performance.

Another factor that might influence the magnitude of observed differences between men and women on physical ability tests is self-selection. It is widely accepted that women participating in athletics can be stigmatized, especially when they violate social norms and expectations (Blinde and Taub, 1992). For example, aggressive female athletes have been labeled as “lesbians.” Such implied stigmatization may discourage girls and women from pursuing so-called masculine activities (e.g., physically demanding jobs) and sports. The extent to which physically fit women choose not to pursue demanding occupations could result in greater differences between average male and female scores on physical ability tests. On the other hand, smaller differences might be found in studies where only physically fit women applied for the position. Such self-selection processes might help to explain some of the large credibility intervals (i.e., variability) observed in meta-analytic studies of physical ability.

Training and Experience Factors
Prior experience (e.g., practice) and access to resources can also have an impact on observed performance differences. A meta-analysis comparing motor performance in boys and girls concluded that many of the gender differences observed prior to puberty are likely influenced by environmental conditions, such as higher expectations and more opportunities to practice for boys (J. Thomas and French, 1985). However, some differences between boys and girls, such as throwing ability, appear early in life, suggesting underlying biological differences between

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7 The Hawaii Ironman triathlon is widely considered the world’s premier athletic endurance contest. Held annually since 1978, it is the culmination of a series of triathlon qualification races that take place around the world. The Hawaii Ironman competition consists of a 2.4-mile ocean swim, a 112-mile bike race, and a 26.2-mile marathon.
the sexes (Nelson et al., 1986). Prior experience might also be an important factor to consider when examining specific types of tests, as women might have had less opportunity to practice and develop the specific techniques to perform well on some tests.

While acknowledging that the magnitude of differences between men and women might be partially influenced by prior experiences and exposure to different opportunities, it is equally important to remember that physical abilities can be developed over time, with proper training and coaching. In the context of military training for very demanding jobs, training has been shown to substantially increase the capabilities of women. In a study conducted by the Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, women who completed a 24-week training program focused on box lifting and load carriage lifted 30- to 47-percent heavier boxes (Harman et al., 1997). The women also improved the pace at which they could carry a 75-pound backpack over a two-mile course—from 3.4 to 4.4 miles per hour. Despite these positive findings, this specific training program also resulted in a very high incidence of injuries—23 out of the 40 women (58 percent) who completed at least half of the training experienced one or more injuries. Improvements ranging between 16 to 19 percent in lifting capacity were found in a study of a 14-week training program of female soldiers (Knapik and Gerber, 1996). This training program also resulted in times that were 4 percent faster on a road march of 5 kilometers while carrying approximately 42 pounds. A more recent study of 56 recreationally active women compared the effectiveness of three types of training programs (aerobic endurance, strength, and combined endurance and strength) over eight weeks on their ability to improve performance on tactical occupational tasks (e.g., road march, repetitive lift and carry) (Hendrickson et al., 2010). Although all three training programs resulted in improvements, the program emphasizing both strength and aerobic endurance had the broadest impact, positively influencing performance in all outcome measures.

Studies such as these provided the basis for a meta-analysis of training effects to determine (1) the extent to which different physical abilities can be improved, and (2) whether such training interventions helped to reduce the differences between men and women (Courtright et al., 2013). This quantitative review included 21 studies, of which 85 percent were from analyses of military training programs (e.g., basic combat training). As expected, the results showed improvement on cardiovascular endurance and muscular strength for both men and women. Specifically, training resulted in moderate to large effects, ranging from a $\delta$ of 0.76 for cardiovascular endurance (men) to a $\delta$ of 1.13 for muscular strength (women). This finding complements other research demonstrating that the relative gains from a heavy-resistance strength-training program are roughly the same for men and women (Cureton et al., 1988).

Because physical ability improves for both sexes, training does not reduce observed gaps between men and women on physical ability tests. Despite the lack of convergence between test scores, training can help better prepare women to meet minimum standards of physical ability. Furthermore, the training programs reviewed in the Courtright et al. (2013) meta-analysis typically ranged from six to 16 weeks; additional training would be expected to lead to larger gains in muscular strength and endurance. Furthermore, tailoring the training program to the level of experience might help to achieve maximum strength gains (for example, see Rhea et al., 2003).
Sex and Gender Differences in the Stress Response

SOF training and missions often involve exposure to stress-inducing environments. To better understand the implications of potentially integrating women into SOF and identify the necessary training modifications or considerations that might be called for, we reviewed the empirical literature about how men and women respond to stress. Research on sex and gender differences in the stress response cuts across several disciplines, including biological, social, and behavioral sciences. In this section, we discuss the influences on the way human central and autonomic nervous systems respond to stress, as well as the influence of biology, psychology, and environment. We end with a discussion of limitations.

We discuss both sex and gender differences in stress reactivity. While biological factors associated with sex (e.g., hormones, such as estrogen and testosterone) certainly can have an impact on the stress response, gender influences all of the interactions that individuals have with their environments. Therefore, gender plays an important role in whether the individual perceives his or her environment as stressful, and how he or she subsequently responds (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004).

Biological Predictors of Sex Differences

Available research is generally consistent with a model of stress regulation that posits two biobehavioral systems: the classic fight-or-flight response, which might be more characteristic of men, and a tend-and-befriend response, which might be more characteristic of women (Taylor, 2006). Unlike the fight-or-flight response to stress, where the individual’s reaction is to either flee from or avoid the stressor or fight or confront it, tending behaviors are aimed at protecting the self and offspring, to promote safety and mitigate distress. Befriending behaviors are intended to establish and preserve social networks. The two systems appear to involve different neuroendocrine systems (Klein and Corwin, 2002) and the activation of different brain regions (Motzer and Hertig, 2004), the systems might give rise to different psychological outcomes for men and women (Kaplow et al., 2005). These systems (e.g., hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal [HPA] axis, neuroendocrine, autonomic nervous system) are influenced by genetics (Jabbi et al., 2007; Gillespie et al., 2009; White et al., 2012).

Genetics/Epigenetics

Severe stress and trauma exposure (e.g., combat or sexual assault) can become biologically embedded through acquired “epigenetic modifications,” potentially increasing vulnerability to mental health problems (Ptak and Petronis, 2010). Epigenetic modifications in gene expression are environmentally induced modifications to the genome that affect gene expression but do not alter DNA sequences (Novik et al., 2002; Roth and Sweatt, 2011). These can be stable and long lasting, but also potentially reversible (Bagot and Meaney, 2010; Perround et al., 2013). A growing literature, based largely, but not entirely, on animal studies, shows that early life stressors initiate a biological cascade, leading to alterations of the stress response system, which, in turn, leads to HPA axis dysregulation (described in more detail below). This dysregulation can result in altered stress reactivity to subsequent life stressors and can be inherited by the next generation (Francis et al., 1999; Champagne et al., 2003; Bet et al., 2009; McGowan et al., 2009; McEwen et al., 2012; and Tyrka et al., 2012). However, these changes can also be reversed with intervention (Perround et al., 2013).
Recent research indicates that sex differences in epigenetic modifications at certain genes might influence the emergence of mental health problems, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which is more common in women than in men in the general population (Olff et al., 2007). A study found that epigenetic changes in the expression of pituitary adenylate cyclase-activating polypeptide (PACAP), a peptide involved in stress regulation, were associated with PTSD in female, but not male, inner-city trauma survivors (Ressler et al., 2011). The researchers proposed that estrogen-related influences might make women more susceptible to PTSD following trauma.

Epigenetic mechanisms that could explain sex differences in the stress response are only just beginning to be uncovered. For example, given that men are likely to be more vulnerable to the onset of drug and alcohol problems following stress and trauma, compared with women (Fox and Sinha, 2009; Ayer et al., 2011), it is possible that epigenetic mechanisms also contribute to the development of addiction in response to stressful events. To our knowledge, this question has not yet been investigated.

**Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis**

A key biological system involved in the stress response is the HPA axis. The HPA axis regulates the response and adaptation to changes in the environment, including stressors. When exposed to stress, the central nervous system is activated, and corticotropin releasing hormone (CRH), adrenal corticotrophic hormone (ACTH), and cortisol are released in the brain. The increased cortisol levels elicit the inhibition of the HPA axis, and once the stressor is gone, cortisol levels normally return to their baseline levels (Jacobson and Sapolsky, 1991). HPA axis activity is usually assessed using repeated measurements of salivary cortisol during a normal day, or before, during, and after a laboratory-based stress paradigm, which could include a psychosocial, pharmacological, or physical stressor.

Variations in HPA axis activity have been observed in clinical and healthy populations (Chida and Hamer, 2008; Chida and Steptoe, 2009). Individuals with mental health problems, such as depression, anxiety, aggression, substance use, and other emotional and behavioral problems, often display maladaptive cortisol responses, such as cortisol levels that do not sufficiently increase in response to a stressor, or that do not recover after the removal of a stressor (Burke et al., 2005; Chida and Hamer, 2008). A blunted cortisol response indicates a maladaptive response to stress, which can contribute to mental health problems over time (Burke et al., 2005).

The nature and extent of sex differences in HPA axis activity have not been fully teased apart, but they are influenced by many factors, such as the type of stressor. Most studies examine psychosocial stressors, but some utilize physical or pharmacological stress tests. In response to psychosocial stress tasks, such as public speaking, men typically exhibit a higher cortisol response than women (Kajantie and Phillips, 2006). However, the type of psychosocial stressor matters. In a laboratory study, Stroud and colleagues exposed men and women to stress tasks that emphasized either achievement (in this case, challenging mathematical tasks under time pressure with verbal audience feedback) or social networks (a social rejection task with a fake discussion in which research confederates acted in a socially rejecting way toward the participant) (Stroud, Salovey, and Epel, 2002). In response to the achievement task, men
showed cortisol increases, but women did not. On the other hand, women showed a cortisol stress response to the social rejection task, but men did not.

The amount of social support available also influences sex differences. In another study, researchers systematically varied the amount of social support that participants received during the psychosocial stress task (Kirschbaum, Klauer, et al., 1995). One group of men and women received no social support prior to a stressful mock job interview. A second group received support from a stranger, and a third group received support from a romantic partner. Men showed the highest cortisol stress responses in the no-support and stranger-support conditions, while women showed higher stress responses in the partner-support condition. These studies and others (e.g., Powers et al., 2006) indicate that the specific characteristics of the stressor influence the HPA axis responses of men and women. The studies also suggest that, more than biological sex, gender might play a role in how we respond to stress.

The research on physical and pharmacological stressors (e.g., infusion of CRH) is more limited, but it is inconsistent as well, with some studies revealing a higher stress response in women and others finding no sex differences. In their review of the literature on sex differences in the HPA axis response to stress, Dedovic and colleagues concluded that the inconsistency in these findings could be because physical, pharmacological, and psychosocial stressors affect the HPA axis at different levels (Dedovic et al., 2009). Men and women might respond similarly to stress stimuli at one level and differently at another.

Hormones also influence the HPA axis response to stress. In some studies, women in the luteal phase of their menstrual cycles (who have higher levels of estrogen, on average, relative to women in the follicular phase and to men) show similar cortisol levels in response to psychosocial stress, compared with men. Conversely, women in the follicular phase and those taking oral contraceptive pills generally demonstrate lower levels of cortisol in response to psychosocial stress, compared with men (Kirschbaum, Kudielka, et al., 1999; Dedovic et al., 2009). However, research shows that these effects are inconsistent. For instance, the type of population studied (e.g., younger versus older) and the type of stress task can change the direction of the sex differences (Dedovic et al., 2009). Some researchers have hypothesized that sex differences might have evolved to buffer the fetus from the detrimental effects of an influx of stress hormones, such as cortisol (Kajantie and Phillips, 2006). While estrogen likely influences the stress response, androgens appear to have a weaker effect on the HPA axis (Dedovic et al., 2009). However, injection of testosterone, a male sex hormone, has been shown to elicit blunted responses to stress (Lund, Hinds, and Handa, 2006; Handa et al., 2008; Zuloaga et al., 2008).

**Physiological Reactivity**

The autonomic nervous system, which consists of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems, plays a key role in the fight-or-flight response. When confronted with a threat or stressor, the release of cortisol leads to an increase in blood pressure, blood sugar, and a suppression of the immune system. Cortisol elicits the preparation of muscles for a response, and the hormones adrenaline and noradrenaline prepare the body for action, including increased heart rate, constriction of blood vessels, and “tunnel vision.” The physiological response to stress is often measured, during a stressful laboratory task, with repeated assessments of heart rate, blood pressure, and skin conductance. Typically, stress elicits increases in all three measures.

Research studies on the physiological response to stress suggest that, as with their HPA axis response, men generally show greater skin conductance and blood pressure reactivity to
stressed, but there are few apparent sex differences in heart rate (Kajantie and Phillips, 2006; McLean and Anderson, 2009). Also, hormonal status influences physiological reactivity, with increased reactivity observed in women in the luteal phase of their menstrual cycles and decreased reactivity during pregnancy and after menopause (Kajantie and Phillips, 2006).

Psychological Predictors of Sex Differences
In this section, we review the empirical literature on psychological predictors of sex differences in stress reactivity. We have chosen to focus on psychological factors with the strongest links to gender differences, as well as the factors that are most relevant to military populations who face stressors that are often traumatic, such as combat and sexual assault.

Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Trauma is an extreme form of stress that can lead to particularly adverse mental and physical health consequences. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), a potentially traumatic event (PTE) is defined as “exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violation” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Examples of PTEs include combat and war, physical abuse, sexual abuse, motor vehicle accidents, torture, and natural disasters. In the general population, men experience more PTEs overall, compared with women, but women are more likely to experience sexual assault and domestic abuse, which are more likely than other PTEs to result in mental health problems, such as PTSD (Kessler et al., 1995; Tolin and Foa, 2006). However, women’s increased exposure to certain types of trauma does not fully explain why women are twice as likely to develop PTSD than men in the general population (Tolin and Foa, 2006; Olff et al., 2007).

The PTE most commonly investigated in military populations is combat exposure, though few studies have examined gender differences in combat exposure. Research generally indicates that men have higher rates of combat exposure overall, compared with women (Office of the Surgeon Multinational Force Iraq and Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army Medical Command, 2006; Rona, Fear, et al., 2007). However, Hoge and colleagues found that women were significantly more likely than men to report certain types of exposure, such as handling human remains (Hoge, Clark, and Castro, 2007). Men were more likely than women to directly fire at the enemy or to be in a firefight.

There is a strong link between combat exposure and PTSD for both men and women (Hotopf et al., 2006). Although there is little research on gender differences in combat-related mental health problems, a study on deployed male and female OIF service members from infantry and combat support units revealed very similar rates of PTSD among men and women (13 percent and 12 percent, respectively) (Office of the Surgeon Multinational Force Iraq and Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army Medical Command, 2006). In two studies that controlled for the amount of combat exposure, one found similar rates of PTSD among men and women in combat support units (Hoge, Clark, and Castro, 2007), while another found higher rates among women (Tanielian and Jaycox, 2008). However, men and women might differ in the type of combat stressors they face, and different types of stressors might lead to different mental health outcomes.

Female service members are significantly more likely than male service members to experience sexual assault and sexual harassment (National Defense Research Institute, 2014; Murdoch et al., 2007). Sexual assault is the experience of unwanted sexual contact, which can range from unwanted touching to rape. Sexual harassment can include sexual involvement
that is coerced—for example, to avoid a negative performance evaluation—as well as sexual behaviors leading to a hostile work environment. These types of stressors are more common in male-dominated workplaces with large power differentials (Ilies et al., 2003), such as the military. In one recent study, 31 percent of military women reported experiencing unwanted sexual attention in the past year and 52 percent reported other unwanted sexual experiences, such as repeatedly being told offensive sexual jokes (Lipari et al., 2008). In a sample of Gulf War veterans, sexual assault was a stronger predictor of PTSD than combat exposure (Kang et al., 2005). Furthermore, sexual assault during military service poses greater risk for mental health problems, such as PTSD, compared with sexual assault experienced before or after military service (Himmelfarb, Yaeger, and Mintz, 2006). Some researchers have suggested that this could be due to aspects of the military environment and culture, such as feeling betrayed by fellow service members or fears that reporting the assault will have negative consequences (Street, Vogt, and Dutra, 2009).

Other Stressors
Female service members might also experience gender harassment, which means behaviors that occur because of the victim's sex or gender, are hostile or degrading, and are not sexually based (Street, Vogt, and Dutra, 2009). Gender harassment can include offensive remarks about a gender or the treatment of one gender as though its members must work harder to prove themselves. Women are more likely to be exposed to gender harassment than men (National Defense Research Institute, 2014; Vogt, Pless, et al., 2005). In a recent study, the majority (54 percent) of female service members reported experiencing gender harassment in the past year (Lipari et al., 2008). Research suggests that gender harassment can have more-detrimental mental health effects than sexual harassment (Rosen and Martin, 1998), which might be because gender harassment is chronic and difficult to combat. As with sexual assault and sexual harassment, gender harassment has the potential to threaten safety and mission effectiveness, which depend on unit cohesion. There is also evidence that male service members use gender harassment to express their resistance to gender integration in the military (Miller, 1997).

Women are also more likely than men to experience a lack of social support during deployment (Rosen, Wright, et al., 1999). As noted, the presence of social support can have a strong impact on both men's and women's reactions to stress (Dedovic et al., 2009; Vogt, Pless, et al., 2005). Service members who feel supported by their peers and leadership also report higher levels of well-being and combat readiness, compared with those who do not feel supported (Dedovic et al., 2009).

Self-Esteem and Self-Efficacy
Self-esteem and self-efficacy refer to the individuals' confidence in themselves in general or in their ability to achieve a goal, respectively. Self-esteem and self-efficacy have been related to the cortisol stress response (Dedovic et al., 2009; Pruessner, Hellhammer, and Kirschbaum, 1999). Since one's confidence in his or her ability to cope with stress might dictate how one responds when confronted with a stressor, and since self-efficacy is an important predictor of avoidance (Emmelkamp and Felten, 1985), these constructs have been hypothesized to explain the relationship between gender and the stress response (Dedovic et al., 2009). Women generally report lower self-efficacy than men (Buchanan and Selmon, 2008), and research indicates that self-esteem is developed differently for men and women. Self-esteem in men is built by achiev-
ing goals that reinforce the man’s autonomy, whereas self-esteem in women is often developed through social connectedness (Josephs, Markus, and Tafarodi, 1992; Baumeister and Sommer, 1997). The divergence in men’s and women’s self-esteem often begins in childhood, when parents encourage greater autonomy in their sons while discouraging it in their daughters (McLean and Anderson, 2009). These different bases for self-esteem are likely to translate into different responses to stressors and threat: Men might automatically “fight” or “flee,” while women might “tend” or “befriend.” Both self-esteem and self-efficacy can be altered throughout the lifespan as individuals learn from experience (Bandura, 1997). For instance, a man whose parents fostered his independence might find his self-esteem dampened in a work setting with extremely critical and negative supervisors and coworkers.

Conclusions
There is evidence that men and women respond to stress differently from one another. Men appear to have greater HPA axis and physiological responses to stress than women, in general, although this finding depends on the specific stressor and context. Men and women are both vulnerable to potentially traumatic events, including combat exposure, but women are more often victims of sexual assault, which is a particularly toxic form of trauma, posing a relatively high risk for PTSD. Women service members are also more likely than men to experience other stressors, such as sexual and gender harassment, and low social support. However, rates of PTSD among combat-exposed men and women do not seem to differ greatly. Finally, women and men have varying types and levels of self-efficacy and self-esteem, which are socially influenced and can precipitate different responses to stress.

There are several limitations to this body of research, particularly when the findings might be applied to SOF men and women. First, the measure of stress response in these studies varies depending on the discipline and area of study. Some researchers use physiological or biological indicators of a stress response, such as cortisol secretion or heart rate. Others use self-reported measures of thoughts, feelings, and mental health disorders. These studies might not be directly comparable.

Very little research on sex and gender differences in the stress response has been conducted within military populations, so the majority of findings are based on healthy or clinical populations of civilians. SOF personnel, men or women, are likely to be more mentally and physically fit and more tolerant of risky and fear-inducing situations than the average civilian research subject is. In addition, most studies focus on psychosocial stressors. For example, a classic stress paradigm monitors research subjects while they give a speech in front of an audience. Thus, the studies we reviewed might have limited generalizability to SOF and the most common forms of stressors they face.

Finally, it is important to note that sex and gender differences vary across the population and might be nonexistent in some groups; individual differences certainly exist, as such factors as personality, genetics, and previous experiences often have a much larger impact than sex and gender on responses to stress. In fact, some have suggested that differences between men’s and women’s responses to stress might already be diminishing as more women enter and remain in the workforce full time and more men assume responsibilities in the home (Dedovic et al., 2009). The human stress response depends on a complex interaction of many factors, of which sex or gender is just one.
CHAPTER FOUR
The Potential Implications of Women’s Integration on Unit Cohesion

Analysts have long identified cohesion as a fundamental dimension of unit effectiveness in the military. To assess the potential impact of integrating women into SOF units, we conducted a multidisciplinary review of small-group cohesion. This assessment builds on RAND’s two in-depth analyses of small-group cohesion, with regard to the implications of repealing DADT (MacCoun, 1993; MacCoun and Hix, 2010). In particular, this study updates previous analyses in light of recent military health research; this new research highlights the importance of social support for individual team members’ resilience to mental distress resulting from high-stress deployments. The military health community’s focus on strengthening unit cohesion to increase individual unit members’ mental resilience reflects the prevalence of cases of mental distress, such as PTSD, associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and has contributed to an increased emphasis on unit leaders fostering unit cohesion.

The study of cohesion is highly interdisciplinary. Sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, management scientists, medical practitioners, biologists, and even physicists have assessed the sources and implications of cohesion. Scholars have analyzed group performance across a wide array of groups, ranging from voluntary social groups, work groups, sports teams, military units (usually not in combat situations), and experimental groups formed solely in the laboratory. Although many findings from civilian studies are important for military units, cohesion in groups of soldiers is often distinct from cohesion in work groups in civilian contexts. Soldiers face significant risks that few civilian employees confront in their jobs, such as the strain of military service on the families of service members, psychological distress from

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1 In the 1800s, the French military theorist Ardant du Picq (1920) identified group cohesion as a key source of a soldier’s motivation. A pathbreaking study by Shils and Janowitz (1948), based on interviews of German prisoners of war (POW) to investigate why they continued to fight as the war was ending, pointed to the importance of loyalty toward the primary combat unit as a combat performance motivator. Similarly, when asked in surveys, the second most common reason why American soldiers continued fighting in World War II was loyalty to their combat units (the most frequent answer was ending the war so they could return home) (Stouffer et al., 1949). Marshall (1947) also highlighted the importance of cohesion in combat during World War II, although his results have been called into question (Spiller, 1988). During the Vietnam War, researchers identified the low levels of cohesion that resulted from high unit-personnel turnover as an important explanation for low unit effectiveness. For example, Moskos (1975) and Savage and Gabriel (1976) examined the effects of an individual rotation policy on unit cohesion during America’s military involvement in South Vietnam. They argued that this rotation policy did not allow interpersonal relationships to develop between soldiers, as the military separately interchanged soldiers within combat units (see Faris, 1977, for a dissenting view). While the specifics of all of the early work mentioned above have been questioned, there is a long-standing consensus that cohesion is a critical aspect of combat performance.

2 Department of Defense Instruction 6490.05 (2013), Maintenance of Psychological Health in Military Operations, directs unit leaders to develop strategies related to unit cohesion to mitigate the impact of combat and operational stress reactions.
combat, and risk of injury or death during military service. As a result, throughout this analysis, we pay particular attention to findings assessed through military samples. However, very few analyses include SOF tactical units in their samples. Therefore, the direct relevance of the findings from these studies for SOF units must be caveated based on the differences between the characteristics of groups in other social contexts and tasks included in each analysis and SOF unit characteristics and tasks.

In this chapter, we examine the relevance of cohesion for SOF units, assess the implications of cohesion for SOF unit effectiveness, and consider whether and how integrating women into SOF units might affect cohesion in SOF units. We find that both task and social cohesion can increase SOF unit effectiveness. Integrating women into SOF units might reduce unit cohesion if female operators are not perceived as competent and are not accepted as full members of their teams.

**Cohesion Is Relevant for SOF Tactical Units**

The U.S. Congress created the modern-day SOF with the passage of the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the 1987 National Defense Authorization Act. This amendment recognized that the organization of SOF was different from other military components. The command structure of SOF is unique in that it relies on small, cohesive units that engage in highly specialized missions where soldiers employ limited force projection.

SOF tactical units—such as Army Rangers and Special Forces groups, Navy SEAL teams, Marine Corps Special Operations teams, and Air Force Special Tactics teams—require tactical skills to maneuver undetected; engage in small-unit combat; and forcibly subdue, capture, and detain resisting enemy personnel. They also require elite physical capabilities to enable these small units to patrol long distances (longer than 10 kilometers) with packs of food, water, and ammunition weighing 50 pounds or more over almost any terrain in any weather, day or night. The tactical mobility for these SOF occupations includes such activities as static line parachuting, high-altitude, high-opening free-fall parachuting, helicopter fast roping or rappelling, helicopter ladder recovery, rock climbing, climbing over walls and fences, long-range (longer than 50 nautical miles) small-boat maritime transits, surf passage, gear portages, and combat dives (longer than 4 nautical miles), while carrying weapons, ammunition, body armor, batteries, radios, scopes, and other tactical gear. Team members must be prepared to carry any wounded member of the team or wounded detainee, as well as documents or computers found on the target. Because SOF tactical units are small, every member of these teams, from the officer leading the patrol to the medical, weather, crew, or communications personnel, must be physically prepared to maneuver and fight alongside the rest of the team, or they risk becoming a liability, slowing maneuvers through contested terrain and compromising the mission (JP 3-05, 2011; Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05, 2012; Naval Warfare Publication 3-05, n.d.; Naval Warfare Publication 3-05.2, 2013; McRaven, 1995).

Although cohesion has long been associated with greater performance in all military units, an analysis of the implications of cohesion for military units identified four key group
characteristics that were associated with an increased impact of cohesion on military unit performance (Salo, 2011):3

1. Groups are small and autonomous.4
2. Work and social interactions are intense and cooperative.5
3. Leadership has a direct influence on everyday life (Bartone and Kirkland, 1991; Mael and Alderks, 1993; Siebold and Lindsay, 1994, 1999).
4. Training, learning, and performance are focused on task-related skills and group performance (Salo, 2011).

Recent military health research identifies a fifth key group characteristic:

5. Groups operate in a stressful environment, such as combat (Thoits, 1995; Griffith and Vaitkus, 1999; Ross and Jang, 2000; Ahronson and Cameron, 2007; Griffith, 2007; Iversen et al., 2008; Rona, Hooper, et al., 2009; Griffith and West, 2010; Pietrzak, Morgan, and Southwick, 2010; Sundin et al., 2010; Du Preez, Wessely, and Fear, 2012; and Mitchell et al., 2012).

These five characteristics closely mirror SOF unit characteristics and the nature of SOF operations, highlighting the importance of unit cohesion for SOF units:

1. Units are small and function autonomously when deployed.
2. Units work cooperatively to accomplish interdependent outcomes.
3. Leadership is a key component of unit effectiveness.
4. Units train and perform as a team.
5. Units operate in austere environments and combat situations.

**Cohesion Exists at Multiple Levels**

Siebold and colleagues at the U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research developed the “standard model” of military group cohesion over the last two decades (Siebold, 1996, 2007, 2012; Siebold and Kelly, 1988b; Siebold and Lindsay 1999). Their model identifies where cohesion can occur within different levels of military organizations (Figure 4.1).

Peer cohesion (sometimes referred to as horizontal cohesion) encompasses the horizontal bonds that link members at the same level in a military hierarchy (e.g., squad or group members). Peer cohesion characterizes the strength of within-group bonding. Leader-subordinate

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3 Salo’s analysis of more than 500 cohesion-related studies represents an agenda-setting volume that lays out the standard model of military unit cohesion. The analysis reflects work the author undertook both at the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences and through his dissertation research.

4 The footnotes for these four key characteristics identify additional supporting literature. With regard to the increased importance of cohesion in small, autonomous groups, see Carron and Spink, 1995; Wheelan and Davidson, 2009.

5 With regard to the heightened effects of cohesion on performance when work and social interactions are intense and cooperative, see Beal et al., 2003; Carron and Chelladurai, 1981; Chen, Tang, and Wang, 2009; Gully, Devine, and Whitney, 1995; Lawler and Yoon, 1996; and Zaccaro and McCoy, 1988.
Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

Cohesion (sometimes referred to as **vertical cohesion**) encompasses the vertical bonds between members at different levels in a military hierarchy (e.g., between squad or group members and squad or group leadership). M. Segal and Bourg (2002, p. 507) defined **vertical cohesion** as “the extent to which unit members believe their leaders care about them.” Studies suggest that higher levels of vertical cohesion increases subordinates’ identification with, trust in, and attraction to their leaders and increases leaders’ confidence in their subordinates (Furukawa et al., 1987; Bartone and Kirkland, 1991). Salo noted that “in a small unit with strong vertical cohesion, the leader is thus able to direct and control the group members’ behavior more effectively (Griffith, 1986), and to influence the norms created in subgroups that direct attitudes and behavior toward organizationally important goals” (Salo, 2011, p. 30) Taken together, peer and leader-subordinate cohesion form primary-group cohesion.

Organizational cohesion encompasses the bonds that exist between unit personnel and their next-higher organizations (e.g., companies or battalions). These organizational units define the status of soldiers relative to other service members, using a rank structure, occupational specialty, or mission assignment. Institutional cohesion encompasses the bonds that exist between personnel and their service components (e.g., the Army) or country. It is at the institutional level that a military defines a meaningful purpose and social identity for soldiers. For example, each branch in the U.S. military creates a servicewide identity with recruitment advertisements (e.g., “Army Strong), professional customs (e.g., commissioning ceremonies), and symbols (e.g., uniforms and flags). Taken together, organizational and institutional cohesion form secondary-group cohesion. The secondary group consists of the hierarchical levels that direct the tasks and purposes of the primary group. It includes relatively few interpersonal bonds with the primary group (Salo, 2011, p. 35). However, by setting the institutional rules that govern behavior in the unit, actions taken at the service or company level can affect the behavior of unit members and therefore unit cohesion.

In this review of small group cohesion, we focus on primary group cohesion. Primary group cohesion more directly affects unit performance and encompasses the interpersonal relationships underpinning what is generally viewed as unit cohesion. As a result, we expect that the potential integration of women into SOF units should have a larger impact on primary, rather than secondary, group cohesion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 4.1</th>
<th>The Standard Model of Cohesion</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Levels at which cohesion can occur</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary group</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional (e.g., Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational (e.g., company, battalion)</td>
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<td><strong>Primary group</strong></td>
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<td>Leader-subordinate (vertical)</td>
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<td>Peer (horizontal)</td>
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Cohesion Has Multiple Dimensions

Early analyses tended to view cohesion as unidimensional and reflective primarily of members’ mutually reinforcing positive behaviors and attitudes toward group membership. Over time, scholars identified alternative sources of group cohesion. As Carron and his colleagues argued, not all groups are a voluntary formation of individuals based on their mutual attraction. In the case of sports teams or military units, groups are made because of the need to perform specific tasks, and group membership is based on members’ specific skills (Carron and Chelladurai, 1981; Carron, 1982; Carron and Brawley, 2000). As a result, group members might work together and maintain high group cohesion, even when they do not like each other, because they need each other to attain their goals.

The recognition that group cohesiveness might reflect not only interpersonal attractiveness but also a shared commitment to a common goal has led to the subsequent recognition that there are different types of cohesion. Recent research has focused on the instrumental and affective dimensions of cohesion. Within studies of cohesion in military units, these two dimensions are generally referred to as task cohesion and social cohesion, although these terms often vary across disciplines. In keeping with common usage, we use the terminology social and task cohesion.

Task Cohesion

Definition
We define task cohesion as the extent to which unit members share a common goal and coordinate their efforts to achieve it. This definition is based on MacCoun’s cohesion analysis for a RAND report that assessed the repeal of the DADT policy, and this has become standard usage across unit-cohesion studies (MacCoun, 1993). Task cohesion is an inherently group-
based construct, as it requires identification and the sharing of group goals and coordinated efforts.

**Implications for Unit Performance**

Early cohesion analyses found mixed results for cohesion, ranging from strongly positive correlations between cohesion and task performance,\(^\text{10}\) to no relationship,\(^\text{11}\) to, in a few cases, a negative correlation between cohesion and task performance.\(^\text{12}\) In particular, Stogdill’s influential analysis from 1972 assessed the relationship between cohesion and performance in 25 studies (Stogdill, 1972). Across the studies, Stogdill argued that one-third of the analyses found a positive relationship between cohesion and productivity, one-third found a negative relationship, and one-third found no relationship. However, rather than demonstrating the inconsistent effects of cohesion, Stogdill’s study highlighted the lack of definitional consistency and metrics that existed in cohesion studies. As Peter Mudrack found when he tried to replicate Stogdill’s analysis, “no two studies referenced by Stogdill operationalized group cohesiveness in exactly the same way. In fact, 15 of the 23 studies which [Mudrack] was able to locate did not specifically attempt to measure cohesiveness at all, and ten of these 15 studies did not appear to be concerned with anything remotely resembling cohesiveness” (1989, p. 775; emphasis in the original).

As analysts refined their definition of and metrics for task cohesion, studies have more consistently associated task cohesion with improvements in outcomes, such as:

- task performance
- communication\(^\text{13}\)
- discipline\(^\text{14}\)
- motivation\(^\text{15}\)

\(^\text{10}\) Early studies that found a positive correlation between cohesion and task performance are Berkowitz, 1954; Cohen, Whitmyre, and Funk, 1960; Goodacre, 1951; Lott and Lott, 1965; Mikalachki, 1969; Schachter et al., 1951; and E. Thomas, 1957.

\(^\text{11}\) Early studies that found no correlation between cohesion and task performance are Bakeman and Helmerich, 1975; Gross, Martin, and Darley, 1953; and Straw, 1975.

\(^\text{12}\) One early study that found a negative correlation between cohesion and task performance is Deep, Bass, and Baughn, 1967. However, as Mudrack (1989) argued, many of the “negative” studies included in Stogdill (1972) do not explicitly address cohesion.

\(^\text{13}\) Studies have found a reciprocal relationship between communication and cohesion. While studies have found that greater cohesion has been associated with more-effective communication (Carrwright, 1968; Festinger, Schachter, and Back, 1950; Grice and Katz, 2005; Zacarro, Guiltiery, and Minionis, 1995), greater communication is also associated with increasing cohesion (Festinger, 1950; Mesmer-Magnus and DeChurch, 2009). Although it is difficult to empirically disentangle directionality, conceptually, the interdependence of cohesion and communication is expected.

\(^\text{14}\) Units with greater cohesion tend to have fewer disciplinary issues; see Manning and Ingraham, 1983; Oliver et al., 1999; and Zacarro, 1991. Results are similar in sports studies (Carron, Widmeyer, and Brawley, 1988; Fraser and Spink, 2002; Spink, 1990).

\(^\text{15}\) The argument that cohesion is a strong motivator in combat has a long history. It was referenced as a key component of successful units as early as the Greek phalanges and the Roman legions (Gal, 2012) and historically has played a key role in the success of military units.
• training effectiveness\textsuperscript{16}
• stress buffering (Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Siebold and Kelly, 1987; Yagil, 1995; Griffith and Vaitkus, 1999; Griffith, 2002)
• job satisfaction (Dobbins and Zaccaro, 1986; Griffith, 1988; Oliver et al., 1999; Ahronson and Cameron, 2007).

The most widely studied relationship in the military cohesion literature has been the effect of cohesion on task performance.\textsuperscript{17} Studies have used a wide array of methods and data to assess this relationship, and a series of meta-analyses has been undertaken to identify systematic findings across seemingly disparate studies. Meta-analyses derive their explanatory power from combining information from independent studies that address similar questions to produce estimates of the underlying relationships that are more reliable than the individual studies could be, given their more limited information.

Meta-analyses only produce more-reliable information if the individual studies included ask similar questions, include similar concepts, and have similar units of analysis. As Mudrack’s critique of Stogdill’s meta-analysis highlighted, these conditions have been difficult to create in meta-analyses of cohesion effects. As a consequence, the results of these meta-analyses must be interpreted with a great deal of caution. This is particularly the case with earlier meta-analyses that were based on underlying studies with a great deal of variation in how cohesion was defined and measured.\textsuperscript{18} That said, across meta-analyses published since the 1980s, there has been a consistent correlation between task cohesion and increased task performance. The magnitude of the relationship has varied depending on the types of groups included in the analyses, whether group or individual performance was measured, and whether behavioral performance or outcome performance was examined.

The magnitude of the cohesion-performance relationship tends to be weaker under the following circumstances:

• in experimental analyses in which groups were formed solely for the purpose of analysis
• when individual performance was analyzed rather than group performance
• when outcome performance was analyzed rather than behavioral performance.

Mullen and Copper (1994) published the most influential meta-analysis linking task cohesion and task performance. Their analysis examined 49 articles and 66 cohesion-performance correlations that explicitly addressed the multidimensional nature of task and doctrinal role in military organizations (Wessely, 2006). Shils and Janowitz (1948) highlighted the motivational aspect of cohesion in their seminal article. Whether the relationship between combat motivation and cohesion stems from task or social cohesion is difficult to disentangle. Examples provided in Gal (2012), King (2013), and Wong et al. (2003) contain elements of both task and social cohesion. Similar to the relationship between cohesion and communication, the relationship between motivation and cohesion appears to be interdependent (Yagil, 1995).

\textsuperscript{16} Siebold and Lindsay, 1991. Reversing directionality, King (2006) highlighted the importance of training effectiveness for unit cohesion.

\textsuperscript{17} This has been referred to as performance and effectiveness.

\textsuperscript{18} Pigott (2012) discussed recent methodological advances in meta-analyses. More-recent cohesion meta-analyses have benefited from both conceptual and statistical improvements.
Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

social cohesion. Mullen and Copper found a small but significant correlation between task cohesion and task performance. Their analysis played an important unifying and agenda-setting role in the study of cohesion by highlighting the linkages between task cohesion and task performance, as well as demonstrating that there are important moderating effects on the relationship between task cohesion and performance. Their work set the stage for more-careful and more-rigorous sampling and measurement approaches in subsequent analyses. Mullen and Copper’s sample reflected the range of extant cohesion studies and included analyses that looked at experimental and real groups, individual and group performance, and outcome and behavioral indicators.

Gully and colleagues expanded Mullen and Copper’s analysis by arguing that (1) cohesion should have a larger impact on group rather than individual performance, and (2) cohesion should matter more for group performance to the extent that the group’s tasks were interdependent (Gully, Devine, and Whitney, 1995). Based on a meta-analysis of 46 studies, they found that (1) cohesion had a larger impact on group performance than individual performance, and (2) for groups that perform interdependent tasks, increased cohesion was associated with greater improvements in task performance than for groups that performed inherently individual tasks (e.g., golf or production-line manufacturing). Although Gully, Devine, and Whitney’s analysis only included five military studies, their differential finding is highly relevant for SOF units, given SOF’s intensely interdependent task profiles.

Oliver and colleagues at the U.S. Army Research Institute conducted a meta-analysis of the relationship between group cohesion and task performance in military samples, examining 39 studies, which were found in academic venues and government reports (Oliver et al., 1999). Due to the difficulties in assessing the task performance of deployed units, the team focused on such metrics as combat readiness. They found a substantively strong and statistically significant relationship between group cohesion and task performance. In keeping with Gully, Devine, and Whitney, they also found that the impact of cohesion was much stronger for group, rather than individual, performance. As Oliver and colleagues (1999, p. 77) noted, their findings for group performance closely mirrored Gully, Devine, and Whitney’s findings for groups with high task interdependence, perhaps reflecting the highly interdependent nature of many military tasks.

Beal and colleagues (2003) further refined analysis of the relationship between task cohesion and task performance by highlighting that where analysts look for performance improvements affects their ability to link increases in cohesion with increases in performance. In particular, Beal and colleagues argued that group cohesion affects group performance, but that

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19 Evans and Dion (1991) found a similar link, albeit substantively stronger (potentially due to a bias in their identification of relevant relationships to test), between cohesion and task performance, based on a sample of 16 studies. Unlike Mullen and Copper (1994), however, Evans and Dion did not distinguish between task and social cohesion.

20 Mullen and Copper’s results must be interpreted with caution, as the analysis faced serious methodological challenges. In particular, their analyses violated the assumptions that concepts are measured consistently across similar units of analysis. These assumptions hold for Mullen and Copper’s analysis. Beal et al. (2003, p. 991) extensively critiqued the consistency of Mullen and Copper’s results, on the basis of issues related to level of analysis, stochastically dependent effects, and the use of regression weights for determining the relative contributions of components of cohesion.

21 Oliver et al.’s (1999) military sample was almost four times the size of the military component included in Mullen and Copper (1994). Whereas Mullen and Copper found a 0.23 correlation between task cohesion and task performance in their military sample, Oliver et al. found a 0.40 correlation between group cohesion and group task performance.

22 Oliver et al. (1999) found a 0.20 correlation between group cohesion and individual task performance.
group outcomes might reflect many other factors that are unrelated to the performance of the group. To link more explicitly group cohesion with group performance, Beal and colleagues limited their meta-analysis to studies that assessed the impact of group cohesion on performance metrics rather than outcome metrics, and they found a strong relationship between group task cohesion and group performance. François Chioccio and Hélène Essiembre (2009) find similar results when examining the behavioral performance of project teams.23

Figure 4.2 compares the strength of the correlation between task cohesion and task performance across these five meta-analyses. Mullen and Copper’s (1994) analysis shows the smallest magnitude correlation between task cohesion and task performance. Their analysis includes the broadest scope, incorporating real and artificial groups, groups that perform individually oriented tasks and interdependent tasks, and military and civilian groups.24 Of the five meta-analyses, Mullen and Copper’s analysis represents a broad sample of groups and environments and is less narrowly focused on the tasks and conditions pertaining to SOF units than the other four analyses. We use Mullen and Copper’s results as our baseline comparison in Figure 4.2.

The results from Beal and colleagues and Chiocchio and Essiembre highlight the relationship between task cohesion and group, rather than individual, performance. The results from limiting analyses to group effects and performance, rather than outcome metrics, suggest a relationship between task cohesion and task performance that is 40 percent larger than Mullen and Copper’s results. The analysis from Oliver and colleagues adopted similar scope conditions but further limits the sample to only military groups. Therefore, their results suggest a relationship between task cohesion and task performance that is 60 percent larger than Mullen and Copper’s results. Finally, Gully, Devine, and Whitney limited their analysis to groups that engaged in highly interdependent tasks. For these groups, the relationship between task cohesion and task performance was almost twice as large as the relationship reported by Mullen and Cooper.

Overall, the results reported in Figure 4.2 suggest that task cohesion

- is associated with higher task performance
- has a greater impact on group than individual performance
- improves group performance in military groups (potentially more than in civilian groups)
- has a greater impact in groups that undertake highly interdependent tasks.

The relationship between task cohesion and task performance appears to be interdependent and mutually reinforcing. While greater task cohesion leads to greater task performance, greater task performance also appears to contribute to greater task cohesion. Which direction is stronger is a topic of heated debate and has been difficult to measure with methodological validity.25 In addition, strong leadership appears to refract the effects of task cohesion (Tziner

23 Project teams are defined as “groups that perform a defined, specialized task within a definite time period, and whose members are generally cross-functional and disband after project termination” (Chioccio and Essiembre, 2009, pp. 391–392).

24 Mullen and Copper’s (1994) analysis was self-consciously broad to encompass a diversity of environments and their effects on the cohesion of group performance. Although we focus on their overarching effect here, Mullen and Copper’s analysis also provided a more nuanced analysis of the differential effects of group type, which set the stage for future analyses.

25 For a discussion of this debate, see Casey-Campbell and Martens, 2009; and Salo, 2011. For a critique of attempts to disentangle this relationship, see Gully, Devine, and Whitney, 1995.
and Vardi, 1982; Siebold and Kelly, 1988b; Siebold, 1996; Siebold and Lindsay, 1999). In units with poor leadership, cohesion had a weak to nonexistent effect on unit performance. In contrast, when leadership was strong, the relationship between cohesion and performance was also strong (M. Segal and Bourg, 2002).

### Social Cohesion

**Definition**

Unlike task cohesion, for which there is a relatively consensual definition adopted by most analysts, defining social cohesion is more contentious. Within the multidisciplinary literature on social cohesion in the military, three key dimensions have been identified for inclusion in
social cohesion: unit members’ interpersonal attraction, shared bonds of trust, and provision of social support.

The most commonly used definition is a narrow one, in which social cohesion is limited to interpersonal attraction. Broader multifaceted definitions of social cohesion run the risk of conceptual stretching, in which similar concepts are included under an umbrella definition and can lead to confusion, ambiguity, and disputes. Including such concepts as trust and social support within the definition of social cohesion might conflate the antecedents of cohesion with the outputs that result from cohesion. For our analysis of the potential impact of integrating women into SOF units on SOF unit effectiveness, two key factors counteract the use of a narrow definition of social cohesion. First, our literature review and the survey and focus group analyses undertaken as part of this project (and discussed in the following chapters) strongly identify the need for SOF personnel to define the affective dimension of cohesion more broadly than simply interpersonal attraction. SOF personnel include trust and the social support built within groups as part of their definitions of social cohesion. Second, interpersonal attraction, trust, and social support have different implications for unit effectiveness. Adopting a narrow definition of social cohesion might fail to identify the multifaceted effects that unit-level social relations have on unit effectiveness. Delineating how these three dimensions might affect unit cohesion is important, as each one has different implications for unit effectiveness.

**Interpersonal Attraction**

Most commonly, cohesion scholars have identified social cohesion as the strength of members’ interpersonal attraction. MacCoun and Hix defined social cohesion as “the extent to which group members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy each other’s company, and feel emotionally close to one another” (2010, p. 139). This definition highlights the positive emotional bonds that can exist among members in a socially cohesive unit (Kuwabara, 2011).

Social-psychological experiments on the conditions that generate trust and cohesion in groups provide strong support for the linkage between interpersonal attraction and social cohesion (Lawler and Yoon, 1996; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon, 2000, 2008). For example, experiments report that group members attribute their positive and negative emotions to others during collective tasks. When these members attribute positive feelings to others, research finds that it can generate trust and cohesion in groups.

**Social Support**

Social support has been identified as a key component of social cohesion. In response to the large number of overseas deployments and combat operations that the United States and its partners have been involved in, military health experts have focused on the social support provided by socially cohesive units as a means to mitigate the symptoms of mental distress, such as PTSD. Working from a different starting point than cohesion scholars, mental health analysts have developed a framework in which social support and unit social cohesion are intimately interconnected and in which social support in military units is generally seen as a component of social cohesion. As a bridge between the military health and cohesion literatures, Griffith (2007) assessed the parallels between social support and social cohesion and found that mili-

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26 Similar definitions are used in Carron and Brawley (2000), Friedkin (2004), Zaccaro (1991), and Zaccaro and Lowe (1988).
tary units’ antecedents, functions, and consequences were strongly similar, both conceptually and empirically.

Griffith’s assessment of the overlap between social cohesion and the provision of social support is important, as many of the measures of social support at the unit level are identical to measures of social cohesion at the unit level. To measure social support in units, scholars have used instruments similar or identical to those used in unit cohesion studies. For example, to assess unit-level social support, Griffith and West (2010) asked survey respondents to assess whether there were people in the unit they could turn to, and Pietrzak, Morgan, and Southwick (2010) asked respondents to assess the extent to which their unit was like a family to them. Highlighting the synonymous treatment of social support and social cohesion in military health studies, Mitchell and colleagues identified their explanatory variable as social support in the form of unit cohesion (Mitchell et al., 2012, p. 487). As a comparison, Brailey and colleagues examined the relationship between unit cohesion and PTSD, without reference to social support, using the measures “members of my unit understand me” and “my unit is like a family to me” (Brailey et al., 2007).

**Trust**

Some cohesion scholars have called into question the focus on members’ interpersonal affection and instead emphasize the importance of members’ trust in one another. Belkin and colleagues define social cohesion as “whether or not [group members] share bonds of trust” (Belkin et al., 2013, p. 598). Siebold (2007) defined the affective dimension of cohesion as trust. With regard to unit social cohesion, shared bonds of trust capture the aggregation of individual members’ belief that their fellow members will behave as expected.

Similarly to cohesion, trust is found within relationships between people (Coleman, 1988). It involves expectations for the self and others in relationships that have some degree of risk or uncertainty in outcomes (Kollock, 1994; Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000). Trust can exist between specific people who interact with each other in groups, or it can be a generalized set of beliefs in categories of people or types of organizations (Uslaner, 2004; T. Smith, 1997). Trust provides a framework for unit members to observe, analyze, decide, and take action in the complex context of combat. Lewis and Weigert (1985, p. 969) argued that trust is an efficient way for individuals to navigate “the monstrous complexity posed by contingent futures.”

In a military unit setting, trust is built on both task-related competencies that emerge through training exercises and individuals’ beliefs that, in periods of stress, unit members will carry out their assigned tasks (King, 2006). As such, trust is a function of reciprocal interactions between soldiers working toward some common professional goals, but it might also extend beyond a professional context. King (2007, p. 641) made this point by stating:

> In addition, these collaborations may extend well beyond professional practices into informal interactions, as military sociologists have shown; but, even here, mutual trust can be created and affirmed only through cycles of concrete cooperation, as soldiers do things together.

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27 Identifying trust as a component of social cohesion does not undercut arguments that trust can arise contextually in high-stress environments, such as conflict operations, as analyses of swift trust attest (Kramer, 1999; Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollingshead, 2007; Meyerson, Wéick, and Kramer, 1996; Ben-Shalom, Lehrer, and Ben-Ari, 2005). Similarly, including trust as a component of social cohesion does not imply that social cohesion is synonymous with trust.
This parallels studies of trust in teams more broadly. Mayer and colleagues identified three factors that contribute to perceived trustworthiness: benevolence, which represents a mutual desire to do well; ability, which represents competence with regard to skills needed in a specific domain; and integrity, which represents the trustor’s perception that the trustee will adhere to an acceptable set of principles (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). For a SOF unit, this might mean that team members trust an individual member who shares a desire to help the team accomplish its mission (benevolence), is competent at the job (ability), and will adhere to the (often-unwritten) principles of the SOF community (integrity). As a result, trust is related not only to social cohesion but also to task cohesion. Trust can be seen as a bridge between task and social cohesion.

Including trust as a component of social cohesion is contentious. In a review of cohesion literature, Griffith (2012) found that, in addition to its inclusion in social cohesion, trust is sometimes included as an additional dimension of unit cohesion. MacCoun and Hix (2010) argued that trust is distinct from cohesion, highlighting the difference between trust and interpersonal attraction. Trust is most likely an antecedent to social and task cohesion. When including trust in a definition of social cohesion, scholars tend to focus on the results generated by cohesion rather than on delineating the differences between the causes and content of cohesion.

Some studies have adopted more-inclusive definitions of social cohesion, which encompass both interpersonal attraction and trust. Hogg (1992) argued that “social cohesion builds upon interpersonal commitment, trust, loyalty, and attraction.” Griffith (2007, p. 142) identified an emotional component of cohesion, “indicated by degree of trusting, caring, and liking or interpersonal support.” Similarly, in a survey conducted for DoD to assess service members’ attitudes toward the repeal of DADT, social cohesion was defined as “the emotional bonds of friendship, caring, and trust between unit members” (Westat, 2010).

Social Cohesion in RAND’s Survey and Focus Groups
It is of particular importance for our analysis that excluding trust as a dimension of cohesion does not comport well with unit members’ common use of the terms social cohesion and trust. In an analysis of cohesion in British military units, Berkshire Consultancy (2009) found that interview respondents favored a cohesion definition that included both friendship and trust, and many respondents emphasized the importance of trust for social cohesion. Similarly, in our focus group sessions, summarized in Chapter Six, we found that many SOF personnel strongly believed that trust was a key component of unit cohesion.

We included separate questions in our survey (described in Chapter Five) to take into account SOF personnel’s perceptions of their units’ social cohesiveness with regard to interpersonal liking, social support, and trust, as well as their units’ task cohesiveness. We asked SOF personnel to assess the following statements on a five-point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, or from very low to very high:

- “Most members of my unit socialize when off-duty,” which is a commonly used question to identify levels of social cohesion in units
- “The extent to which your unit members are like a family,” which is a commonly used question to identify both levels of social cohesion and social support in units
- “The level of trust among members in your unit,” which is used to measure shared bonds of trust
• “The extent to which your unit members work together to accomplish the mission,” which is a commonly used question to identify unit task cohesion.

Responses to “the extent to which your unit members are like a family” and “the level of trust among members in your unit” were highly correlated, at 74 percent. These results reflect the intertwined belief among SOF operators that unit members are a family and that they must trust each other. As one SEAL commented,

The SEAL Teams operate on a basis of Trust and Brotherhood. All of our proficiency in the tactics we use rely on the trust we have in our brothers. Knowing I do the right thing to protect my brothers is reinforcing the trust I have that my brothers are, in turn, doing the right thing. We need to find equal ground that we all can relate to as operators. That ground is this Brotherhood. Brothers in arms. Without the utmost simplicity of a trusting Brotherhood, the ideals, tactics, and overall success of this dear unit will fall.

In keeping with the task-related competencies embedded in SOF personnel’s perceptions of trust, responses to “the level of trust among members in your unit” and “the extent to which your unit members work together to accomplish the mission” were correlated at 62 percent, also quite high, albeit lower than the relationship between “the level of trust among members in your unit” and “the extent to which your unit members are like a family.”

The degree to which trust affects task and social cohesion will vary across groups. One explanation for the stronger relationship between trust and social cohesion might be the role SOF standards play in ensuring a minimum level of competence in all operators. Building on Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman’s (1995) conceptualization of trust—reflecting perceptions of benevolence, ability, and integrity—might lead current operators to place greater emphasis on benevolence and integrity because standards ensure ability. In contrast, if operators perceive a lowering of standards, the importance of ability in trust formation might become much more important. The importance of SOF standards as an underpinning of trust is a common theme throughout the responses to the open-ended survey questions and focus groups. Repeatedly, respondents said that if standards were lowered, new unit members would not be trusted. The following quote is representative of many of the responses to the open-ended survey question, “What is your greatest concern about opening SOF specialties to women?”

The physical standards will be lowered or there will be a double/separate standard set up for female operators. . . . [T]he men would not have confidence in her abilities and most importantly there would be a lack of trust in her ability to uphold an equal share in watching each other’s back in combat.

The survey also provides some evidence that the aspect of social cohesion delineated solely by interpersonal attraction is distinct from that included in social support or shared bonds of trust. To isolate the interpersonal attraction component of social cohesion from other social cohesion measures, we asked respondents to assess, on a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, the statement “most members of my unit socialize when off-duty.”

28 Similarly, “the extent to which your unit members are like a family” and “the extent to which your unit members work together to accomplish the mission” were correlated at 59 percent. The strong correlations between trust, task cohesion, and social cohesion measures are in keeping with such arguments as Siebold’s (2011), which found the distinction between task and social cohesion outdated and focused more on the interdependent process by which cohesion is fomented and sustained.
The correlation between this question and “the extent to which your unit members are like a family,” “the level of trust among members in your unit,” and “the extent to which your unit members work together to accomplish the mission” were 46 percent, 41 percent, and 34 percent, respectively. The lower correlations between responses to the statement “most members of my unit socialize when off-duty” and the other three questions might reflect the relatively lower score given to this question vis-à-vis the others, as can be seen in Table 4.1.

Taken together, the survey results suggest that SOF operators

- might perceive a similarity between trust and other components of social cohesion, such as social support
- view trust, task cohesion, and social cohesion as interrelated
- might not perceive socializing as a key component of a cohesive unit.

**We Use a Broadly Inclusive Definition**

The preceding discussion highlights the multidimensional nature of social cohesion. Each of the three dimensions—interpersonal attraction, shared bonds of trust, and social support—affects how units perform and is difficult to disentangle. Disagreements over the definition of social cohesion lead to divergent findings about the importance of social cohesion to unit performance. These disagreements have important implications for assessing the role of interpersonal attraction, trust, and social support within units. For example, scholars who define social cohesion as solely interpersonal attraction are more likely to find that social cohesion provides fewer benefits (if any) to unit effectiveness. In contrast, scholars who define social cohesion to include trust or social support are more likely to identify social cohesion as beneficial for unit performance.

To provide the greatest scope for our assessment of the implications of social cohesion for SOF unit effectiveness, we adopt a broadly encompassing approach that includes all three elements. We treat social cohesion as the extent to which unit members like one another, trust one another, and provide social support for one another.

An alternative approach for USSOCOM to consider, instead of this broadly inclusive definition, would be to define social cohesion solely in terms of interpersonal attraction, as “the extent to which group members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy each other’s company, and feel emotionally close to one another” (MacCoun and Hix, 2010, p. 139). USSOCOM could also include considerations of unit members’ trust, social support,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>“Strongly Agree” or “Very High” Response (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The extent to which your unit members are like a family</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The level of trust among members in your unit</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extent to which your unit members work together to accomplish the mission</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most members of my unit socialize when off-duty</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and task social cohesion in its assessment of the potential integration of women into SOF units and implementation procedures. As research into interpersonal attraction, trust, and social support continues, we expect that researchers will continue to refine the definitions, metrics, and hypothesized causal pathways underpinning each of these concepts.

**Implications for Unit Performance**

Evidence that social cohesion directly affects unit performance is mixed. Mullen and Copper’s (1994) meta-analysis found little support for the theory that social cohesion improved unit performance. Beal et al. (2003) found that social cohesion was associated with greater performance efficiency, but that the effect was smaller than for task performance. In contrast, Chiocchio and Essiembre (2009) found that the relationship between social cohesion and behavioral performance was greater than the relationship between task cohesion and behavioral performance. However, the strength of Chiocchio and Essiembre’s (2009) finding with regard to behavioral performance is mitigated by the weaker relationship they found between social cohesion and outcome performance, a decline that was not evident in the relationship between task cohesion and outcome performance.

These mixed results stem from multiple causes. First, different analyses use different definitions of social cohesion. This makes it particularly difficult for meta-analyses to pinpoint the relationship between social cohesion and unit effectiveness. Second, although social cohesion and, in particular, trust, have been linked to such positive performance-related outcomes as improvements in cooperation (McAllister, 1995), communications (J. Smith and Barclay, 1997; Reagans and McEvily, 2003), and organizational citizenship (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; Konovsky and Pugh, 1994; Kidwell, Mossholder, and Bennett, 1997; Brower et al., 2009; and Chen, Tāng, and Wang, 2009), high interpersonal attraction is also associated with deleterious performance-related outcomes, including reduced focus on task-related group goals (Carreiras and Kummel, 2008), groupthink (Janis, 1982; Baron, 2005), and excessive socializing (Davis, 1969; I. Steiner, 1972; and Tziner, 1982). Third, the effect of social cohesion on group performance might depend on the group’s level of task cohesion. Fourth, social cohesion is likely to indirectly affect unit performance rather than directly, making it difficult to measure in meta-analyses of studies that assess the direct effects of cohesion on group performance. In particular, the increased stress buffering and mental resilience experienced by individuals in units with high social cohesion might indirectly improve unit performance in high-stress situations but might have no effect on performance in other situations. This is particularly difficult to identify through previous cohesion meta-analyses, as most of the studies included few, if any, samples of people who have undergone extremely stressful conditions, such as combat (Griffith, 2012).

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29 Beal et al. (2003) found that the magnitude of the correlation between task commitment and task efficiency was 0.343. The magnitude of the correlation between interpersonal attraction and task efficiency was 0.284.

30 Chiocchio and Essiembre (2009) found that the magnitude of the correlation between task cohesion and behavioral performance was 0.343. The magnitude of the correlation between social cohesion and behavioral performance was 0.485.

31 Chiocchio and Essiembre (2009) reported that the mean correlation between task cohesion and outcome performance was 0.346. The reported mean correlation between social cohesion and outcome performance was 0.201.

32 Trust has been linked broadly with performance at both the group and individual levels (Lawler, 1992; Mayer and Davis, 1999; Dirks, 1999; Costa, Roe, and Taillieu, 2001; Costa, 2003; Schippers, 2003; Dirks and Skarlicki, 2009; Hempel, Zhang, and Tjosvold, 2009; Mach, Dolan, and Tzafrir, 2010).
Social Support Can Improve Unit Members’ Resilience

In response to the increase in reported cases of post-deployment psychological distress that military personnel have experienced, military health experts have assessed whether social support can ameliorate individuals’ vulnerability to the symptoms of mental distress, such as PTSD. Studies based on U.S., British, and Canadian general-purpose forces have found that social support appears to reduce combat-related stress and increase psychological resilience. Studies have found a positive relationship between social support and increased psychological resilience across a range of mental distress symptoms.

A key focus in the literature has been on the role of social support in reducing the onset of PTSD. In an analysis that limited the source of PTSD triggers to nonbattlefield life experiences, Brailey and colleagues focused on the relationship between unit cohesion and PTSD in a sample of U.S. Army soldiers who had never deployed to a warzone (Brailey et al., 2007). The authors found that soldiers from units with high cohesion were less likely to exhibit PTSD symptoms than soldiers in units with lower cohesion, and that high unit cohesion attenuated the impact of life experiences on PTSD. In an analysis of U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom and OIF veterans, Pietrzak and colleagues found that veterans who believed that their units provided social support were less likely to suffer from PTSD symptoms, such as sleep difficulties (Pietrzak, Morgan, and Southwick, 2010). British studies have revealed similar results (Iversen et al., 2008; Rona, Hooper, et al., 2009; and Du Preez et al., 2012). Researchers also have found a positive relationship between increased unit cohesion and reductions in a broader set of psychological distresses, such as low self-esteem and depression (Ahronson and Cameron, 2007), sleep disorders (Pietrzak, Morgan, and Southwick, 2010), risk behaviors (Griffith and West, 2010), and suicide ideation (Mitchell et al., 2012).

Although most military health studies have focused on the relationship between social support and mental distress in general-purpose forces, Sundin and colleagues examined the effect of cohesion in two British SOF communities—the Royal Marines Commandos and paratroopers—on the role of cohesion in the British Army Infantry (Sundin et al., 2010). The results for British SOF units were similar to those found in other units. Although the SOF units reported higher levels of unit cohesion than infantry units, within the SOF sample, higher levels of unit cohesion were associated with lower levels of mental distress. Sundin and colleagues’ results suggest that SOF operators tend to have greater resilience than conventional forces, but that the benefits of social support are important for SOF operators.

Some caveats need to be borne in mind when interpreting the strength of these studies, as almost all were based on surveys that relied individual respondents’ assessments of their unit cohesion, and researchers were unable to observe the effects of any traumatic events that unit members might have experienced. Taken together, however, these analysts have found that social cohesion appears to strengthen group solidarity and integration, enabling groups to perform tasks effectively in stressful environments, such as conflict, and reduces the probability that unit members will experience mental distress in the aftermath of their operations (Griffith, 1988; Griffith and Vaitkus, 1999; Griffith, 2002).

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33 These findings build on an older literature that found that groups suffered greater disintegration when cohesion was low, and that cohesion reduced the negative effect of stress on individual well-being and performance (Savage and Gabriel, 1976; M. Steiner and Neumann, 1978; Solomon et al., 1987; Solomon, Mikulincer, and Flum, 1988; Solomon and Mikulincer, 1990; Quick et al., 1996; Watson, 1997).
High Interpersonal Attraction Might Reduce Unit Effectiveness

High interpersonal attraction has been associated with reduced group performance (Stogdill, 1972; Rovio et al., 2009). For example, highly socially cohesive groups might prolong tasks to spend more time with each other. The group might prioritize socializing with each other over completing their tasks efficiently (Davis, 1969; I. Steiner, 1972; Tziner, 1982). More perniciously, groups with high interpersonal attraction might succumb to “groupthink” (Janis, 1982).

There are three main types of groupthink symptoms (Janis, 1982):

- overestimation of the in-group (as strong, smart, invulnerable, morally superior), with corresponding negative stereotyping regarding the out-group (as weak, immoral, stupid, and wrong)
- close-mindedness (e.g., rationalization of doubt)
- pressuring for uniformity (via self-censorship and illusions of unanimity).

Groupthink symptoms might manifest into defective decisionmaking processes:

- inadequate contingency planning
- inadequate information gathering
- biased risk assessment
- inadequate consideration of the range of options
- inadequate consideration of the extent to which the advocated action meets original or fundamental objectives.

Not all socially cohesive groups experience groupthink. In a review of 30 years of work on groupthink, Baron (2005) found that groupthink was most likely in groups typified by high self-identification with the group, high group norms, and low self-efficacy. In particular, groups high in social cohesion but low in task cohesion were most likely to experience groupthink. As task cohesion increased, the symptoms of groupthink disappeared. Similarly, Bernthal and Insko (1993) more directly assessed the relationship among task cohesion, social cohesion, and groupthink, finding that groupthink was present in groups with high social cohesion and low task cohesion, but that groups high in task cohesion were unlikely to experience groupthink, regardless of level of social cohesion.

Social and Task Cohesion Might Jointly Increase Unit Effectiveness

Although there has not been a large amount of analysis examining the interactive effect of social and task cohesion, and none of it has been done with SOF units in the sample, researchers have found that groups that have high social and task cohesion tend to have higher performance than groups that have either low social or low task performance (Zaccaro and McCoy, 1988). In particular, social and task cohesion appeared to be most reinforcing when groups engaged in disjunctive tasks, in which the group must determine a single solution for the entire group. Most SOF unit tasks are disjunctive tasks in which the unit must choose a specific strategy to achieve their objectives.

Baron (2005) provides a summary and discussion of Janis’s original conceptualization of symptoms and defective decisionmaking processes.
The finding that groups that are more socially and task cohesive have higher group performance comports well with broader social and task cohesion findings and seems to apply well to SOF units. Based on these findings, we map the key interactive cohesion expectations for SOF units in Figure 4.3. Units that have high social cohesion and low task cohesion might result in the lowest unit effectiveness, as they are the most likely to suffer from the deleterious effects of social cohesion. This expectation derives from the groupthink literature, discussed in the previous section, in which the adverse effects of high social cohesion diminished as task cohesion increased (Baron, 2005; Bernthal and Insko, 1993). Units that have neither task cohesion nor social cohesion might not suffer from the deleterious effects of social cohesion, but they will lack motivation to coordinate their efforts to accomplish a shared common goal. Units that have high task cohesion and low social cohesion might perform well, particularly in less stressful environments, but might be vulnerable to the deleterious effects of low individual resilience in high-stress situations. In contrast, we expect that the highest-performing units in stressful environments would likely to be units that are highly task oriented and in which team members experience high levels of trust and social support.

Cohesion Considerations for Integrating Women into SOF Units

In this chapter, we provided a multidisciplinary overview of small-group cohesion and discussed how cohesion can increase unit performance and individual unit members’ psychological resilience. Based on our review of cohesion and group performance, some key findings emerge with regard to cohesion in SOF units.

Figure 4.3
Expectations for the Joint Effect of Task and Social Cohesion in SOF Units

- Low task cohesion and high social cohesion increases probability of adverse outcomes, such as groupthink, excessive socializing
- High task cohesion increases team productively, mitigates adverse effects of social cohesion; high social cohesion increases individual resilience
- Low task and social cohesion increases vulnerability to unit disintegration
- High task cohesion increases team productivity; low social cohesion may increase individual psychological vulnerabilities in stressful environments
• Unit cohesion is multidimensional; it includes both instrumental (task cohesion) and affective (social cohesion) components.
• Task cohesion can increase unit effectiveness.
• Social cohesion can increase individual unit members’ resilience.
• Task and social cohesion can jointly increase units’ effectiveness and resilience.

The benefits of cohesion on team performance increase for small, autonomous teams that engage in intense, cooperative tasks; depend on team members’ capabilities to accomplish their goals; and operate in stressful situations. These characteristics typify small SOF tactical units, in which each team member is critical to accomplishing interdependent tasks, and which operate for long periods in extremely austere, physically demanding, and highly stressful environments.

Research regarding the effects of gender integration on unit effectiveness and unit cohesion has been mixed. Most studies that have examined the relationships between gender and unit readiness and cohesion in conventional forces have not identified any direct effects (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1977; Johnson et al., 1978; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1993; Harrell and Miller, 1997). This led DACOWITS to conclude that “there is little empirical evidence that the presence of women in military units reduces cohesion” (DoD, 2009, p. 13). However, some studies have identified indirect effects of gender integration, in which such preexisting unit concerns as low unit cohesion, low acceptance of women, and quality-of-leadership considerations have larger adverse effects on unit readiness and cohesion in mixed-gender units.35

An Army study assessing return of forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises in 1977 found no discernible, independent effect from gender on Army companies’ operational capabilities: “There were no consistent patterns of individual male versus female performance differences over the entire exercise, whether the tasks performed were considered as a whole, were divided into common and unique tasks, or occurred in high stress or low stress companies” (Johnson et al., 1978, p. 1-2). However, Johnson and colleagues did find that the performances of women—even more so than men—were affected by the quality of leadership and management policies. The authors reported, “Leadership and management problems were widespread and [that] appears to be the underlying cause of many problems involving women who were observed in REFORGER” (Johnson et al., 1978, p. 1-3). M. Segal and Bourg (2002) argued that quality of unit leadership is a critical variable for managing gender integration.

Research by Rosen and colleagues found that male soldiers’ acceptance of women in their units appeared to be related to how cohesive mixed-gender units were. In a survey of combat service support soldiers, Rosen and colleagues found that, for junior enlisted males, individual soldiers’ perceptions of horizontal cohesion was positively correlated with their personal perceptions of their acceptance of women (Rosen, Durand, et al., 1996). This effect was counterbalanced by their overall lower perception of cohesion in units with a higher percentage of women. In 2003, Rosen and colleagues looked more closely at the role hypermasculinity—

35 It is important to note that the studies examined in this section focus on conventional forces. There has been speculation that the greater importance of cohesion for SOF units might reduce the applicability of these findings for SOF units. For instance, although there is little evidence in conventional forces that the social heterogeneity created in units through gender integration has directly contributed to erosion in unit cohesion, given the higher levels of cohesion in SOF units, the social heterogeneity engendered by integrating women might have a greater adverse impact in SOF units (Simons, 2014).
which they defined as the extreme or exaggerated attributes that are stereotypically associated with being a man—played a role in male soldiers’ acceptance of women in their units, as well as in the creation of unit cohesion more broadly (Rosen, Knudson, et al., 2003). The authors examined the effects of hypermasculine culture on unit cohesion using a survey of active-duty men and women stationed at an Army post in Alaska in 1998. They found that hypermasculinity was positively correlated with cohesion in all-male units. In contrast, hypermasculinity was negatively correlated with unit cohesion in mixed-gender units; however, these results were not statistically significant.

In previous RAND research, Harrell and Miller found that when women were perceived as competent in noncombat units, gender generally had a minimal effect on task cohesion (Harrell and Miller, 1997). In contrast, units with preexisting conflicts and divisions were more likely to identify gender as a cause of negative unit outcomes. Harrell and Miller noted, “[P]eople whose unit cohesion appeared to be low were most likely to mention gender as an issue, although gender was only one of several characteristics that separated people—and was often not the primary rift” (Harrell and Miller, 1997, p. 61).

The importance of perceived competence for unit members’ acceptance was evident in Berkshire Consultancy’s interviews of British male soldiers serving in mixed-gender units involved in close ground combat incidents, as well as in our survey and focus group analyses. In a sample of British soldiers who had served with women in combat, Berkshire Consultancy (2009) found that most interview respondents did not perceive any impact on task performance during combat due to women’s presence: “For the small minority of men who felt there was a detrimental impact, this was due to lack of perceived competence in her role and her lack of strength/training, reflecting her not having been selected or trained to deliberately undertake ground close combat.” As we describe in Part II of this report, our survey and focus group analyses suggest that perceptions of performance and competence play at least as important a role in generating cohesion in SOF units. Based on previous research regarding gender integration in conventional forces, we expect that the effect of gender integration on cohesion in SOF units will reflect acceptance of women in the unit rather than overarching gender differences. More specifically, we expect that integrating women into SOF units has the potential to reduce unit cohesion if female SOF personnel are not perceived as competent and are not accepted as full members of their teams. Women’s acceptance on teams will reflect their ability to perform team tasks, other team members’ willingness to accept women on the team, and leaders’ efforts to promote integration.

Male unit members’ perceptions of women’s performance and competence might be influenced by many factors. Women’s performance on unit tasks will shape unit members’ perceptions of competence. Perceptions of women’s competence will also reflect the quality of members’ prior experience working with women, as well as potential biases in assessing

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36 In a meta-analysis of intergroup contact, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found that, overall, increasing intergroup contact was associated with increased perceptions of competence. Duehr and Bono (2006) found that male expectations that women could be good managers were correlated with their past satisfaction with women as their managers. In an analysis of officers in the Swedish Armed Forces, Ivarsson, Estrada, and Berggren (2005) found that the quality of officers’ contact with women in the military was strongly correlated with their attitudes toward women in the military. Young and Nauta (2013) found similar results in a sample of U.S. Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) students. The effect of in-group perceptions of out-group individuals is not limited to gender. An analysis of peer perceptions in the Israel Defense Forces found similar effects across ethnic groups (Ben-Shalom, 2012). These results match those in our survey of SOF personnel, in which respondents’ attitudes toward integrating women into SOF units were positively correlated with the quality of their
women’s capabilities. Male unit members’ beliefs about the standards to which women are held will also influence their perceptions of women’s competence. Studies have found that some U.S. military personnel believe that women are held to lower standards. This belief informs their expectations of women’s competence.

experiences working with women. The results also comport well with the past experience in the United States with integrating out-groups, such as African Americans, women, and homosexuals, into the military.

37 Foschi (1996, 2000) has found that people often rate men higher than women for the same performance on gender-neutral tasks. Looney, Robinson-Kurpius, and Lucart (2004) undertook an experiment at the U.S. Naval Academy; they asked midshipmen to rate officers for a possible promotion based on a written fitness report. Participants received identical fitness reports for either Lieutenant Alice Reynolds or Lieutenant Arthur Reynolds. Looney, Robinson-Kurpius, and Lucart found that participants ascribed more emotional characteristics to Alice Reynolds than they did to Arthur Reynolds.

38 In a recent Air Force Academy study, Do et al. (2013) found that 20 percent of study participants believed that women are held to lower military standards. In a series of structured interviews with Marines, Archer (2012) found that gender stereotypes influenced the perceived abilities of female Marines.
The Expectations of SOF Personnel Regarding Potentially Integrating Women into SOF Units

As discussed in Part I of this report, military personnel perceived two main challenges during each of the previous integrations of excluded groups into the U.S. armed forces. First, personnel were often concerned that members of the excluded group would be unable to cope mentally or physically with the tasks assigned to the unit. Second, personnel were concerned that integrating members of the excluded group would erode unit cohesion. These concerns were generally mitigated when there was evidence that personnel from the previously excluded groups did not erode unit readiness or cohesion.

Based on these historical integration concerns—as well as the differences between male and female physiology, the different abilities of men and women to do physically demanding jobs, and the potentially different stress responses among men and women—we identified the potential challenges that might accompany the integration of women into currently closed SOF specialties. Consequently, USSOCOM should be able to design a program of integration that is successful and retains a highly capable, if not a stronger, force. Physical and mental abilities have an impact on dynamics within the small unit. To understand the challenges posed by integration, we need to assess the extent to which this impact is perceived as problematic among the currently serving SOF personnel in the specialties that have been closed to women.

In this part of the report, we discuss the data that we collected regarding the impact of the potential integration of women into SOF units. To understand the concerns of SOF personnel and the potential challenges to the successful integration of women into SOF, we collected primary data on SOF personnel’s expectations about the challenges and benefits of potentially integrating women into SOF units, as well as personnel’s recommendations for implementation. We adopted two approaches to eliciting SOF personnel’s opinions about integrating women into SOF units. First, we conducted a census-type survey of personnel currently serving in the positions closed to women by specialty, focusing on the potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF. Second, to complement the survey and add richness to the survey data, we supplemented the survey with information from focus group sessions conducted with participants from all SOF service components and across ranks and grades.

Chapter Five provides an overview of the survey design and how it was implemented, presents our main findings from the survey, identifies the key drivers of support and opposition to the integration of women into SOF specialties and units, and discusses the conclusions and policy implications of survey findings. Chapter Six provides an overview of the focus groups’ design and how they were conducted; presents the participants’ expectations regarding the potential impact of integration, their concerns regarding the integration of
women into SOF specialties and units, and their expectations regarding the potential impacts of gender integration on recruitment and retention; and discusses the conclusions and policy implications of the focus group findings. Both chapters provide fine-grained analyses across service components and rank and grade.

The main finding in both our survey and focus group analyses is that there is strong, deep-seated, and intensely felt opposition to opening SOF specialties that have been closed to women. Overall, 85 percent of survey participants opposed letting women into their specialties, and 71 percent opposed women in their units. Although opposition exists across all services, elements, specialties, and rank groups, SEALs, AFSOC STT members, and NCOs appeared most strongly opposed. The dominant perspective across the focus groups was that women should not be integrated into SOF units and specialties; central to participants’ concerns were the potential impact on mission effectiveness and their continued ability to function in highly performing teams.

SOF personnel identified three main concerns about unit effectiveness that might ensue from integrating women into SOF units. First, many SOF personnel were concerned that standards would fall. Second, many SOF personnel were concerned that integrating women into SOF units would erode unit cohesion. Third, many SOF personnel were concerned that integrating women into SOF units would reduce the availability of leaders to resolve conflict between unit members.

Overwhelmingly, SOF personnel who participated in the survey or the focus groups identified maintaining high performance standards as the most important criterion for successfully implementing the directive to open SOF specialties to women. In both the survey and focus groups, SOF personnel expressed significant doubts that women would be able to meet the physical, mental, and overall job demands of closed SOF specialties. Emphasizing current SOF personnel’s concerns over the potential adverse impact that might ensue if women are integrated into SOF units, many survey respondents and focus group participants stated that performance standards would be lowered so that women can qualify. In particular, focus group participants emphasized their concerns that political pressure would lead to women being pushed through training and that, over time, standards would fall for women and men.

SOF personnel were also concerned that integrating women into SOF units would erode task and social cohesion. Of the survey respondents, 80 percent expected a decline in task cohesion, and 83 percent expected a decline in social cohesion. Focus group participants emphasized their beliefs that male unit members’ behavior would change if women were part of the team, and that the small team dynamics that contributed to SOF unit effectiveness would erode. Examples ranged from how male unit members communicated and socialized to whether respondents would be able to trust male unit members who became distracted, either because they were overly protective of or were sexually attracted to female unit members.

Issues of leadership and personnel management were raised in both the survey and the focus groups. Of survey respondents, 65 percent expected that it would be more difficult to go to unit leaders when there were problems or concerns regarding conflicts between unit members involving women. Focus group participants expressed their concerns that favoritism might be shown toward women in terms of training, promotion, and allegations of sexual harassment and sexual assault.
Part II: The Expectations of SOF Personnel Regarding Potentially Integrating Women into SOF Units

In addition to the widely held concerns by SOF personnel that integrating women into SOF units might have an adverse impact on standards, cohesion, and leadership, other concerns were also raised, ranging from the potential impact on working with some foreign partners to complications in men’s marriages to women (stemming from lack of privacy and close physical contact among team members that now would include women). Many of the issues brought up in the focus groups focused on the impact of female medical issues (e.g., higher injury rates, increased risk of genital infections in austere operational environments, and menstruation and impact on performance) and the deployability of women (e.g., pregnancy and restrictions on the utilization of women in some missions) on unit readiness. Some survey respondents and focus group participants also expressed concern about the retention of experienced men in SOF and about the recruitment and retention of women.

Most survey respondents and focus group participants reported the poor quality of their prior experiences working with U.S. military women in combat environments. Perceptions of SOF personnel about the magnitude of the potential challenges to the successful integration of women into SOF might reflect this. If so, it will be important to reset and create a new normal in special operators’ assessments to overcome the negative perceptions that currently prevail.

Despite the concerns that most survey and focus group participants raised about potentially integrating women into SOF units, some participants also highlighted the potential benefits that integrating women into SOF units might provide. About four in ten survey respondents agreed that women might be helpful in conducting sensitive operations and communicating with local populations. Accordingly, there is higher support, based on mission requirements, for attaching women in other specialties to SOF units and higher support for opening SOF units to women, than there is support for opening currently closed SOF specialties to women.

A minority of survey respondents and focus group participants believed that well-trained women in SOF could be highly capable enablers who could enhance effectiveness in some missions (e.g., surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance, and access to specific populations) and that allowing women to join SOF would provide USSOCOM access to a pool of highly capable and motivated individuals. However, one striking finding from the focus groups was that many participants were uncertain as to why USSOCOM ought to consider integrating women into SOF units. Many participants stated that it was unclear what additional capabilities women could provide; they also thought that integration was a political decision and that SOF was being used as a social experiment.

Before proceeding further, we note an overarching caveat to the data presented in the two chapters in this part of the report. Our effort was designed to elicit speculation about the impact of the integration of women into SOF to gauge the extent of challenges and a deeper understanding of the concerns of SOF personnel. This speculation was not based on actual experiences of SOF personnel, because women were not in those units. Thus, the response is based on what SOF personnel believe might happen, and those views are influenced by many factors, including the perceptions of SOF personnel’s own elite status, views of women in society, limited observations of women under fire, and feelings toward organizational change, to name just a few. Moreover, as we discussed in Part I, debates over military personnel policy take place in the political realm. Our data collection did not happen in a vacuum; instead, the intense level of feelings on the issue of the integration of women into SOF might be a symptom of the highly charged political environment on this issue and reflect the fact that SOF person-
nel were given an opportunity to weigh in on the issue. We caution the reader that similarly high levels of negative responses and intense feelings were voiced by service members prior to the repeal of DADT and prior to the entry of excluded groups into the military. As we noted in Chapter Two, those opinions turned out to be misleading as a guide toward the actual impact of the policy changes and the military’s adaptation. The opinions expressed in Chapters Five and Six relate to the extent and depth of concerns but do not necessarily foreshadow the policy outcome if the policy on entry of women into SOF were to change.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Women in SOF Survey

If the currently closed SOF specialties are opened to women, we need to understand the potential challenges that might accompany such integration so that USSOCOM can design a program of integration that is successful and retains a highly capable, if not a stronger, force. These challenges would be based on the concerns for unit cohesion and on the differences between male and female physiology, the different abilities of men and women to do physically demanding jobs, and potentially different stress responses among men and women. The first step to developing an understanding is to gain an accurate assessment of the magnitude and scope of the potential barriers and challenges to the successful integration of women into SOF. The critical element here is to understand the extent to which the issues of physical and mental abilities and impact on dynamics within the small unit are perceived as problematic among currently serving SOF personnel in the specialties that have been closed to women, since—if the SOF positions are opened to women—any women who self-select into these SOF specialties will encounter firsthand these perceptions and attitudes. Success of any such integration will depend on overcoming those perceptions and the challenges stemming from them.

Before proceeding, several cautions are in order. First, the Women in SOF survey dealt with a highly politicized issue, and respondents might have viewed the survey as a referendum on the policy change, rather than an opportunity to identify potential challenges and options for smoothing implementation; although our analysis of “consistently negative responders” suggests that very few respondents responded in an overt, systematically oppositional, and strategic fashion, it is certainly possible that our results reflect more-subtle strategic responses. Second, we note that many of our survey questions asked respondents about their expectations regarding very specific potential consequences of integrating women into closed SOF specialties. But as described in Chapter Two, many military personnel made quite dire predictions in earlier efforts to open the military to African Americans and gays and lesbians, which proved to be quite wrong. Moreover, there is a substantial scholarly literature that suggests that individuals are not very good at making predictions, perhaps especially in cases where strong emotions are involved. Accordingly, we caution that responses to these questions need to be interpreted very carefully.

1 For example, Philip Tetlock’s research has shown that experts are no better than dilettantes in their predictive accuracy, and some dilettantes (foxes, in Tetlock’s vernacular) might actually have the upper hand (Tetlock, 2007). RAND’s 1993 report on gays in the military provides an analysis of research on why people’s actual behavioral responses are sometimes very different from what one might predict on the basis of their attitudes (Rostker et al., 1993). Nisbett and Wilson (1977) found individuals to be generally incapable of explaining the motivations for their behavior. Research by Kahneman (1992) and Kermel et al. (2006) on affective reasoning has shown that people are sometimes very bad at predicting future emotional states.
We are not aware of any recent systematic and comprehensive study that has assessed the perceptions and views of all USSOCOM personnel in positions currently closed to women regarding the topic of integration of women into SOF. Consequently, in cooperation with USSOCOM, we designed and administered a survey to gauge the extent of potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF among the personnel in USSOCOM-controlled positions that have been closed to women. To complement the survey, add richness, and gain a more nuanced understanding of the potential challenges, we conducted a series of focus group discussions with SOF personnel. This chapter presents the results of our survey and the analyses we conducted using the survey data. The next chapter summarizes the findings from our focus groups.

Based on the survey, our main findings are

- Opposition to opening SOF specialties to women is both deep and wide, with high levels of opposition across all SOF elements. Our analyses of responses to open-ended questions suggest that this opposition also is deep-seated and intensely felt.
- The principal sources of this opposition are the belief among SOF personnel that women do not have the physical and other capabilities to meet the demands of the specialties; the belief that the currently high levels of cohesion and trust in units will suffer if women are allowed in; and the importance that SOF personnel attach to maintaining high standards, coupled with deep concern that performance standards might nonetheless be lowered to enable women to qualify for specialties.
- The lower level of opposition to women in SOF units than specialties, as well as the fact that about four in ten of our respondents agreed that women might be helpful in conducting sensitive operations and communicating with local populations, might present additional opportunities for the participation of women in SOF.

The chapter is organized in six main sections:

1. Identification of the policy questions that guided the development of the survey instrument
2. Background on the survey design and implementation
3. The analytic approach we took in addressing the policy questions
4. Presentation of our main findings on each policy question
5. The results of statistical analyses that helped us identify the key drivers of support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women
6. Brief discussion of the implications of our analyses for the potential opening of previously closed SOF specialties to women.

Policy Questions

We designed the survey to address nine key policy questions:

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2 We are aware of two studies in 2014, neither of which is available to the general public, that partially addressed SOF concerns about opening currently closed positions to women: a survey of AFSOC personnel in closed specialties and a study of Army SF that used focus groups.
1. Do special operators generally favor or oppose policies to open their specialties and units to women?
2. How important to special operators is the issue of integrating women into SOF?
3. What experience do special operators have working with military women?
4. What preexisting attitudes do special operators have regarding women who might be integrated into their specialties?
5. What do special operators believe might be the greatest benefits from opening closed SOF positions to women?
6. What do special operators suggest might be the greatest challenges that USSOCOM leaders will face in opening closed SOF positions to women?
7. What impacts do special operators expect on the following: unit performance, unit cohesion, unit trust, and leadership and personnel management?
8. What implementation actions do special operators believe that USSOCOM leaders should take to foster more-beneficial outcomes and to address key challenges?
9. How do responses to the above questions vary by key subgroup (e.g., service, unit, specialty, grade)?

Each of these questions is addressed in the section on our main findings.

**Survey Design and Implementation**

**Survey Design**

We designed the survey to address these policy questions while also gathering information to touch on a number of theoretically and practically important constructs that have been discussed in the scholarly literature on military performance, including

- task cohesion—the extent to which members of a team work well together to accomplish a task or mission
- social cohesion—the extent to which members of a team like one another and are connected by friendship, familial, or other social bonds
- trust—the extent to which members of a team believe that they can rely on other members of the team
- leadership—especially the extent to which leaders are available to help resolve conflicts between team members
- contact—which builds from the contact hypothesis that argues that the greater the number of interactions with an out-group, and the better the quality of the experience from those interactions, the more favorably disposed an individual will be to members of the out-group.

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3 For additional detail on the survey design, see Appendix B in Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016.
4 For a detailed review of scholarly work on task and social cohesion, see Chapter Four.
5 For a more thorough description of the intergroup contact hypothesis and conditions for optimal intergroup contact, see Pettigrew, 1998.
In addition, we designed the survey to pose questions that could help to illuminate the respondent’s views on the expected consequences of opening his specialty or unit to women. Some questions, for example, asked the respondent to assess his current unit on some measure (i.e., task cohesion, social cohesion, trust, leadership) and also to indicate his expectations of how he might assess his unit on this measure if it included women. In other cases, we asked questions about the likelihood of specific consequences (e.g., that having women in the unit would improve the unit’s ability to operate in other cultures).

To accommodate the policy questions, the underlying theoretical constructs, and the desirability of assessing the current unit and potential consequences of opening the unit to women, we organized the survey according to 11 domains of inquiry, with several related questions in each domain. The domains comprised the following elements:

- Q1–Q3: open-ended questions about the possible benefits of opening specialties to women, as well as key concerns and actions that might address these concerns
- Q4–Q8: questions about respondents’ views regarding the importance of various measures to successfully implementing the policy to open SOF positions to women
- Q9–Q10: questions on the importance of the issue to respondents, as indicated by the amount of attention they had paid to news and information on the subject of opening SOF specialties, as well as how much they had thought about the issue
- Q11–Q12: questions about the amount and quality of experience respondents had had working with U.S. military women in a combat environment
- Q13–Q19: questions that asked for assessments of the task cohesion, social cohesion, level of trust, and leadership management of conflict in respondents’ current units
- Q20–Q21: questions about respondents’ approval or disapproval of opening their specialties or units to women
- Q22: a question about the respondent’s level of concern that physical job standards for their specialties will be lowered
- Q23–Q25: questions about respondents’ beliefs regarding women’s physical, mental, and overall capabilities for job specialties
- Q26–38: questions about the anticipated consequences of opening specialties on task cohesion, social cohesion, trust, and leadership management of conflict in the respondents’ units in the event that their specialties are opened to women
- Q39: an open-ended question that asked respondents if there were any other thoughts they wanted to share
- Q40–Q46: a series of demographic questions.

To the maximum extent possible, we used (or adapted) questions that had been used in previous peer-reviewed RAND research or in relevant academic research. Our initial collection effort yielded about 140 candidate questions for the survey, which, with our additional research into relevant scholarly work in the area, expanded the pool of items to about 300 candidate questions for the draft instrument. To ensure a balanced survey and the availability of multiple items for each construct we were measuring, we constructed a 24-cell survey design matrix defined by six key themes (cohesion, performance, readiness, morale,  

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6 See, for example, Krosnick et al., 1993; the authors treat issue importance as one of a number of proxies for attitude strength.
leadership/personnel management, and general women in SOF issues) and four substantive sections (experience, attitudes, expectations, and implementation advice). Our initial planning target was a survey of about 100 mostly closed-ended questions, which would take respondents about 20 minutes to complete, and would, on average, entail about four questions in each cell of our survey design matrix. In consultation with USSOCOM, the design target for the survey was subsequently reduced to a shorter instrument of about 50 questions, which would take respondents about ten minutes to complete, and would, on average, have about two questions in each cell of the survey design matrix. The survey instrument went through multiple reviews before finalization.

Supplemental information for those interested in the study methods is published in a series of appendixes in Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016. For details on the relationship between these policy questions and individual items in our survey instrument, see Appendix B. Also see Appendix C for sampling frame options for the survey, Appendix D for our efforts to reduce respondent burden, and Appendix E for additional details on key variables and constructed indexes in our analyses.

**Survey Implementation**

The survey was conducted over eight weeks, from May 15, 2014, to July 15, 2014. Eligible respondents were personnel serving in USSOCOM-controlled SOF specialties that have been closed to women. Invitations to participate in the online survey were emailed to more than 15,000 servicemen in these specialties. All individuals were informed that their participation in the survey was completely voluntary, that their commanders would not know whether they completed the survey, and that there was no penalty for choosing not to respond. See Appendix F for the informed consent statement, Appendix G for the exact wording of all questions on the Women in SOF survey (the instrument in its entirety), Appendix H for the survey-recruitment materials, and Appendix I for the memorandum certifying the scientific merit of the survey (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016).

The survey yielded a total of 7,618 completed surveys, for an overall response rate of 50.1 percent. The survey achieved a high response rate (see Table 5.1), and evaluation of the composition of the sample revealed that it was reasonably representative of the target population. See Appendix J for detailed information on the implementation and response rate to the survey (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016). For inference, the survey results, accordingly, were reweighted to exactly match the population by SOF element and rank group to provide estimates of the larger population.

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7 The data were cleaned to remove respondents who were not members of the specialties of interest. We believe that the low response rate from AFSOC might have been due to survey fatigue, as we understand that AFSOC battlefield airmen had been surveyed just prior to the fielding of our survey.

8 The correlation between the sample and population percentages in a matrix defined by SOF element and rank group was 0.95. For additional details on how the population and raw sample compare, see Appendix J (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016). In addition, several characteristics of the average member of our sample appeared to be quite close to those said to describe the typical USSOCOM special operator—68 percent of our sample was married, the average age was 30.6 for enlisted personnel and 35.5 for officers, and 51 percent of the sample had an associate or higher college degree. See “The Typical Special Operator . . .” in USSOCOM, 2013b, p. 58.

9 Because the response rate for AFSOC is much lower than that for the other SOF elements, the results for this SOF service component are least reliable, statistically speaking.
The strong correlation (0.95) between the composition of the survey sample and the SOF population, when comparing the matrix defined by SOF element and rank group, suggests that the sample looks very much like the population (see Appendix J).

### Analytic Approach

In this section, we summarize our approaches to analyzing the closed-ended and open-ended questions.

#### Approach to Closed-Ended Questions

We analyzed the survey results from a number of different analytic perspectives.\(^{10}\) For the closed-ended questions (see Appendix K for charts of survey results), the analytic approach included the following steps:

- calculating univariate descriptive statistics and graphing the results of each survey question to understand the basic distribution of responses (see Appendix L and Appendix M)\(^ {11}\)
- constructing indexes of selected variables (see Appendix E)\(^ {12}\)
- reviewing bivariate cross-tabulations, correlation, and regressions of various combinations of questions to understand their basic relationship and level of association between the outcome of interest (Q20, support or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women), and other variables\(^ {13}\)

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10 Unless otherwise noted, we report weighted results.

11 Charts that report the marginal percentages of those who selected each response on each question and constructed index are reported in Appendix L; univariate descriptive statistics for each are reported in Appendix M (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016).

12 The construction of indexes is described very briefly later in this chapter, with more detail provided in Appendix E (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016).

13 As the data from the survey were primarily ordinal, rather than interval, level, we used two nonparametric correlation statistics—Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau-b—for all correlations for unweighted sample data, but only Kendall’s tau-b
• conducting exploratory factor analyses to reveal the underlying structure of our independent variables, and classification and regression tree (CART) analyses, an empirical technique that recursively partitions observations into progressively smaller groups and presents results in terms of a classification tree to identify which independent variables are the most important predictors of the dependent variable, support or opposition to opening specialties (Q20)
• conducting multivariate statistical modeling to identify the key drivers of support or opposition to opening SOF specialties (Q20)\textsuperscript{14}
• comparing various subgroups (e.g., SOF elements, rank groups, specialties, and “consistently negative responders” and other respondents) and those who had a positive or negative experience working with U.S. military women in a combat environment.\textsuperscript{15}

Because the focus of our survey is on the potential policy change of opening SOF specialties (not units) to women, and because the results for the two questions that ask this directly are so highly correlated,\textsuperscript{16} we focused most of our statistical analyses on Q20, which asked respondents whether they favored or opposed opening their specialties to women, but we did review some additional survey evidence related to the difference in responses to Q21, which asked whether respondents favored or opposed opening their units to women.

\textit{Index Construction}

For a number of survey items, we constructed indexes that represented composites of different survey items that assess a similar concept (domain). The goal in constructing these composite indexes was to improve the reliability of measures for certain constructs. Our indexes included the following:\textsuperscript{17}

• \textit{Task cohesion difference index}. We constructed an index that measured the expected change in task cohesion in a hypothesized future unit with women, based on separate estimates of current unit task cohesion and expected future task cohesion in a unit with women.\textsuperscript{18}
• \textit{Social cohesion difference indexes}. We constructed two indexes that measured the expected change in social cohesion in an hypothesized future unit with women, based on separate estimates of current unit social cohesion and expected future social cohesion in a unit with women.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{14} Most of our multivariate statistical modeling involved ordered logit models, which are the most suitable model form for ordinal-level data.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, to assess similarities and differences in the response patterns to our closed-ended questions, we computed correlation coefficients for all possible subgroup pairs (e.g., by service, SOF element, specialty, and rank group) for all questions using the unweighted sample, and we ran separate multivariate models for each SOF element.

\textsuperscript{16} We computed the correlations between responses to Q20 and all other variables, and responses to Q21 on all other variables, for the unweighted sample, and then computed the correlation between the two results for a “correlation of correlations”: the result was a correlation of 0.93 for the Spearman’s rho scores and 0.91 for the Kendall’s tau-b scores, indicating a very high level of agreement between the two.

\textsuperscript{17} Details on the construction of these indexes, and their associated Cronbach alpha scores, which measure the internal consistency of items combined into an index, are provided in Appendix E (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016).

\textsuperscript{18} The index was constructed from Q13, Q17, Q28, and Q33.

\textsuperscript{19} The index was constructed from Q14, Q18, Q29, and Q34.
• **Unit trust difference index.** We constructed an index that measured the expected change in unit trust in a hypothesized future unit with women, based on separate estimates of current and expected future unit trust.\(^{20}\)

• **Leadership availability difference index.** We constructed an index that measured the expected change in the availability of leaders to resolve conflicts between unit members in a hypothesized future unit with women, based on separate estimates of current and expected future unit trust.\(^{21}\)

• **Capabilities index.** We constructed an index of respondents’ expectations as to whether women had the physical strength and stamina, mental toughness, and overall ability to serve effectively in their specialties.\(^{22}\)

• **An index of consistently negative responses.** We constructed an index of extreme negative responses by counting the number of times each respondent chose the most extreme negative response out of eight questions that asked them to assess an hypothesized future unit that included women.\(^{23}\)

Along with other variables from our survey, we assessed the importance of these various difference indexes and other scores in our multivariate statistical modeling to identify the key drivers of support for and opposition to opening SOF specialties to women (Q20).

**Approach to Open-Ended Questions**

We also analyzed responses to the four open-ended questions from a number of different perspectives, including qualitative content analysis, automated linguistic analysis, and automated concordance analysis. Each of these approaches relied on counting words, concepts, and themes in the open-ended responses.\(^{24}\)

**Qualitative Content Analysis**

Our first approach was to conduct a qualitative content analysis of the open-ended questions. This involved identifying an initial set of key themes of policy interest, reviewing a sample of responses to the open-ended questions to refine our understanding of themes present in the responses, developing a codebook and formal coding rules, and conducting a detailed qualitative content analysis of a random sample of responses (10 percent) to the open-ended questions by researchers who had been trained on the coding rules and who had achieved sufficiently high intercoder reliability scores (see Appendix M).

**Quantitative Analyses**

We had a high response rate on the open-ended questions, and we recognized that coding only a 10-percent sample might leave important gaps in our understanding of the responses to these questions. Accordingly, we supplemented the qualitative content analysis coding effort

\(^{20}\) The index was constructed from Q15, Q16, Q31, and Q32.

\(^{21}\) The index was constructed from Q19 and Q35.

\(^{22}\) The index was constructed from Q23, Q24, and Q25.

\(^{23}\) The index was constructed from Q28, Q29, Q30, Q31, Q32, Q33, Q34, and Q35.

\(^{24}\) To provide an overview of the content included in the four open-ended questions, we also created a word-cloud visualization, which we present in Appendix M. The word cloud echoes many of the key findings of the automated linguistic and content analyses, and it highlights the high frequency of the use of standard(s) in responses to the open-ended questions.
with two additional computationally based quantitative analytic efforts that were less resource-intensive. These approaches were the following:

- **Automated linguistic analyses.** First, we conducted two parallel analyses of all of the open-ended responses using two different automated linguistic analysis tools (called Docuscope and Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, or LIWC). These tools have been developed by scholars to assess authorship, sentiment, and other features of language and can provide insights into a speaker’s stance, intent, and tone by tabulating and aggregating words according to taxonomies that associate specific words with specific concepts—for example, agreement, disagreement, sadness, anger, and resignation (see Appendix N and Appendix O for more detail);

- **Automated concordance analyses.** Second, we used an automated concordance analysis tool to conduct a set of parallel analyses that focused on understanding the relative prevalence of specific words and phrases in responses to the open-ended questions. The tool enabled both raw word counts, as well as Key Word in Context (KWIC) output that reported the language that preceded and followed specified terms. We conducted computer-based concordance analyses of the open-ended responses to identify the frequency of usage of key words and terms, such as standards and no benefits.

As will be seen, these various lines of analytic effort generally pointed to convergent findings, while each highlighted some interesting nuances in the survey results.

**Main Findings**

The survey addressed nine key policy questions. In this section, we present the main findings for each policy question.

1. **Do Special Operators Generally Favor or Oppose Policies to Open Their Specialties and Units to Women?**

   The survey asked respondents two questions about opening their specialties and units to women: “Do you favor or oppose opening your specialty to women?” (Q20) and “Do you favor or oppose opening your unit to women?” (Q21). As Figure 5.1 shows, about 85 percent of respondents opposed opening their specialties to women, with three out of four strongly opposed, while about seven in ten opposed opening their units to women, with nearly six in ten strongly opposed.

   As the cross-tabulation in Table 5.2 shows, responses to these two questions were strongly correlated: 71.3 percent of the cases in the weighted sample gave the same response on both

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25 The tool is called AntConc, and it is available as freeware on Laurence Anthony’s website, www.laurenceanthony.net/antconc_index.html.

26 This approach revealed, for example, that the term standards was the most prominently mentioned term in open-ended responses after SOF and women, and that when discussing benefits, most respondents said that they saw “no benefits,” “none,” or similar formulations.
questions. The Somer’s D measure—which measures the association between two ordinal variables on a −1 to +1 scale, with +1 indicating a perfect positive relationship—was 0.645.27

As we will discuss, the lower levels of opposition to opening units to women is consistent with what appears to be a relatively common belief that women could make valuable contributions to SOF missions without being members of the respondent’s specialty. This can be

Table 5.2
Cross-Tabulation of Q20 (Support for Opening Specialties) and Q21 (Opening Units) (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response to Q20 (Opening Specialties)</th>
<th>Strongly Oppose</th>
<th>Somewhat Oppose</th>
<th>Neither Oppose nor Favor</th>
<th>Somewhat Favor</th>
<th>Strongly Favor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly oppose</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat oppose</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither oppose nor favor</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat favor</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly favor</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Reweighted sample. Percentages might not sum to total due to rounding.

27 The Spearman’s rho measure of association for the unweighted sample was 0.579, and Kendall’s tau-b was 0.540; neither statistic is suitable for use with weighted survey data, so we employed Somers’ D. For more on Somers’ D, see Newson, 2006.
accomplished, for example, by attaching women in other specialties or units to existing SOF units to conduct specific missions.

Analysis of responses to the four open-ended questions using the Docuscope and LIWC automated linguistic analysis tools also revealed strongly negative views toward opening SOF specialties (see Figure 5.2).28

As described in the figure, the language used by respondents in these open-ended questions suggested strongly negative views toward, and concerns about, the policy change, while also emphasizing such values as achievement, professionalism, and team cohesion; this sort of language strongly suggests worries about the impact of the policy change on respondents’ units. The language used in responses to open-ended questions suggests that opposition to women serving in their specialties and units is deep-seated, intense, and somewhat emotional. The following are a few examples of comments from the survey.

The following respondents’ comments on the potential benefits of opening SOF specialties to women were selected to illustrate the typical sorts of comments that were offered:

There will be no benefits.

Absolutely nothing, it will detract from SOF effectiveness.

Women should be SOF operators, but we need to recognize that women have unique skill sets that men do not. When we ask the question of whether or not SOF specialties should be open to women, we should look at the strengths of women & use those towards certain missions instead of opening all career fields to women. For instance, women would be amazing unconventional operators & would fill gaps where men are lacking. On the contrary, most women are not physiologically built to walk 30 miles w/ 80 lbs & then conduct target recon

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28 The Docuscope and LIWC systems are automated tools that enable analysts to compare a set of documents (or, in this case, open-ended survey responses) with a standard corpus of English-language documents to identify ways that these documents differ systematically from the standard corpus. Q1 asked respondents to identify the greatest benefit of opening specialties to women; Q2 asked respondents about their greatest concern; Q3 asked what actions should be taken to address their greatest concern; and Q39 asked if they had any other thoughts on the issue of opening specialties to women. Appendixes O and P provide more-detailed descriptions of these tools, as well as the details of our analyses of open-ended responses using Docuscope and LIWC (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2015).
for 5 days. There are exceptions, but we should look at a more dynamic approach of identifying men & women’s strengths, & then match those strengths to missions in order to grow our SOF portfolio in a manner that promotes the natural & learned strengths of operators to the missions that they are best suited. This is great in theory & implementation would be hard, but SOF would have a more dynamic operator force whose strengths are aligned with specific missions.

American women are more widely accepted on the Global stage, where generally American males are categorized or associated with the general hatred for the US felt by most of the world. Therefore, the only real benefit gained, would be to covert or sensitive operations where having women attached to a team or unit would give deniability to the men there. American males are looked at hard when entering countries abroad, where women by themselves aren’t or couples would not be looked at as such.

And the following are some of the typical concerns that were expressed about opening SOF specialties:

Reduction in physical standards considered pre-requisites for entry into the career field, and the correlated changes to small unit dynamics that such changes might bring.

Lowering or changing the standards for SOF leading to not being as effective on the battlefield and even costing lives.

My greatest concern is that there will be a severe lack of truly qualified women. This could cause a marked decrease in the physical standards so that women are represented in more significant numbers. Doing this would degrade the cohesion and trust that makes special operations units as capable as they are, and compromise the elite esprit de corps.

Our greatest concern is that the DoD &/or Congress will force [USSOCOM] to implement policy that does not align w/ our SOF truths. We do not want SOF psychological, intellectual, & psychological standards to lower in order to appease public outcry for women in SOF. We want to fight besides women that meet the standard, & it must be one standard for men & women. If there is a separate standard for women, they will never be accepted as operators. If we lower the standard to accommodate women, they will never be accepted as operators.

2. How Important to Special Operators Is the Issue of Integrating Women into SOF?

The high response rate to the survey (50.1 percent) and the completeness of item responses for survey respondents suggest that both our target population and our respondents considered the issue of opening SOF specialties to women to be very important—an issue that was worthy of the time necessary to take the survey.

29 DMDC reported that from 2008 to 2010, the response rates for its online surveys have ranged from 29 percent to 32 percent for active-duty personnel (DoD, 2010, p. 37).

30 On average, 97 percent responded to the first three open-ended questions, nearly 93 percent completed the open-ended questions, and the average respondent answering the open-ended questions gave responses of more than 20 words. The last open-ended question (Q39) had the lowest response rate: only about 74 percent of our respondents responded to this question.
In addition, research has shown that the amount of attention an individual pays to news and other information and the amount of consideration that an individual has given to an issue are associated with perceptions of issue importance. Accordingly, we asked two questions to assess the importance to respondents of the issue of women in SOF: “How much have you paid attention to news and other information about opening SOF specialties to women?” (Q9) and “How much have you thought about the issue of opening SOF specialties to women?” (Q10).

As Figure 5.3 shows, a little more than half of our respondents indicated that they had paid “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of attention to news and information on the issue, while nearly two out of three indicated that they had thought “quite a lot” or “a great deal” about the issue. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the amount of thought that respondents had given the issue made a small but statistically significant contribution to predicting support or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women.

3. What Experience Do Special Operators Have Working with Military Women?
We asked two questions about the quantity and quality of experience that respondents had had working with U.S. military women in a combat environment: “With how many U.S. military women have you worked in a combat environment?” (Q11) and “Please rate the quality of your working experience with U.S. military women in a combat environment” (Q12).

As Figure 5.4 shows, nearly nine out of ten respondents indicated that they had worked with at least some U.S. military women in a combat environment; of these, about six in ten indicated that the quality of their experience working with women in a combat environment

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**Figure 5.3**
Two Measures of the Importance of the Women in SOF Issue

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31 On issue importance, see Krosnick et al., 1993; Fournier et al., 2003.
Our multivariate analyses revealed that respondents’ quality of experience working with women is an important predictor of support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties, and those who had a negative experience working with women in a combat environment were much more negative in a range of other views.

4. What Preexisting Attitudes Do Special Operators Have Regarding Women Who Might Be Integrated into Their Specialties?

The survey included a preamble: “We would now like to ask you several questions about opening SOF specialties to women. By ‘women,’ we mean U.S. military women who will have passed the admission and qualification standards for your specialty.” Following the preamble, the survey asked respondents three questions about their estimates of women’s capabilities, inquiring about respondents’ level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: “Women will have the physical strength and stamina to be effective in my specialty” (Q23), “Women will have the mental toughness to be effective in my specialty” (Q24), and “Women will be capable of handling the demands of my specialty” (Q25) (see Figure 5.5).

As shown in the figure, about six in ten strongly disagreed that women would have the necessary physical strength and stamina or be capable of handling the demands of respondents’ specialties, while a little over four in ten strongly disagreed that women would have the necessary mental toughness.

The focus groups revealed that many SOF operators felt that the U.S. military women they had worked with downrange had not had the same high levels of training that they had had, and the women lacked the same discipline. The survey did not, however, enable us to distinguish between those whose negative judgments were based solely on unfavorable past experiences working with military women and those for whom other potential factors (e.g., latent sexism) might have influenced their judgments.
We computed the correlations between respondents’ assessments of women’s physical strength and stamina (Q23), their mental toughness (Q24), and their overall capabilities for handling the demands of SOF specialties (Q25). The results showed that Q23 (physical ability) was more highly correlated with Q25 (overall ability to do the job) than was Q24 (mental toughness).33 These results suggested that both assessments were important, but that assessments of women’s physical strength and stamina were somewhat more important in overall judgments about women’s capabilities for handling the demands of SOF specialties.

Respondents’ beliefs about women’s physical, mental, and overall capabilities were consistently the most important predictor of respondents’ support or opposition to opening their specialties to women (see the section on our multivariate analyses).34

5. What Do Special Operators Believe Might Be the Greatest Benefits That Might Result from Opening USSOCOM Positions to Women?

The first question in the survey was an open-ended question: “What do you think might be the greatest benefit of opening SOF specialties to women?” Our content analyses of responses to this question are reported in Figure 5.6.35

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33 The correlations between Q23 and Q25 for the unweighted sample were 0.7182 (Spearman’s rho) and 0.6747 (Kendall’s tau-b), whereas the correlations between Q24 and Q25 were 0.5490 and 0.4941, respectively.

34 Q23, Q24, and Q25 were combined into a single capabilities index for use in our multivariate modeling.

35 In developing the content analytic coding schemes for each of the open-ended questions, the study team coded a sample of responses using an initial set of key themes and issues that were of central interest to the study, and then the team modified the coding schemes to ensure that other, less well-anticipated themes that respondents mentioned would not be missed. For details on the codes in Figure 5.6, see Appendix N (Szya, Larson, et al., 2016).
As shown in the figure, the most frequent theme in responses to this question, accounting for about a third of all coded responses, was that there were no benefits associated with opening SOF specialties to women. About one in five respondents indicated that they thought having women in their specialties might increase cultural access, while smaller percentages identified the potential benefits of intelligence collection and clandestine activities, as well as potential benefits from attaching women in supporting roles to existing units, providing a unique or greater diversity of perspectives, and generally increasing the pool of available SOF.

Two additional closed-ended questions asked respondents about their level of agreement or disagreement with the ideas that adding women to SOF units could improve their units’ ability to conduct sensitive operations or communicate with foreign populations (see Figure 5.7).

As shown in the figure, about a third of respondents agreed that having women in their units could improve their ability to conduct sensitive operations, and a little more than four in ten thought that it could improve their units’ ability to communicate with foreign populations.

6. **What Do Special Operators Suggest Might Be the Greatest Challenges That USSOCOM Leaders Will Face in Opening SOF Positions to Women?**

The survey asked respondents a number of questions about the potential challenges USSOCOM leaders might face in opening SOF positions to women. Perhaps the most informative of these was the second question in the survey, an open-ended question that asked respondents: “What is your greatest concern about opening SOF specialties to women?” Figure 5.8 reports the results of our content analyses of the most prominent themes in responses to this question.

The most prominent theme in responses to this question was the concern that performance standards would be lowered—essentially a statement reflecting lack of confidence in USSOCOM leadership’s ability to successfully manage the issue of integrating women into closed SOF specialties—followed by concerns about SOF team cohesion and morale and concerns that women who were assigned to respondents’ specialties would not possess the necessary
Figure 5.7
Agreement or Disagreement About the Potential Benefits of Women in SOF Units

Please state your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements . . .

Q37: If women are assigned, it will improve my unit's ability to conduct sensitive operations
Q38: If women are assigned, it will improve my unit's ability to communicate with foreign populations

NOTES: The figure presents the percentages for the most frequently mentioned themes present in Q2, based on a detailed content analysis. See Appendix N for details. SHARP = Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention; EO = equal opportunity.

Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

physical abilities. Fewer than 10 percent of respondents mentioned a variety of other concerns (e.g., fear of double standards for men and women, or politicization of SOF) or used the question to express some other sentiment (e.g., opposition to opening specialties to women).

This concern about standards being lowered was echoed in responses to a question that directly asked about the subject: “How worried or not are you that the physical job standards of your specialty will be reduced during the opening of SOF specialties to women?” (Q22). As shown in Figure 5.9, nearly three out of four respondents indicated that they were “extremely worried” about the prospect that physical job standards would be lowered, while only 3 percent said that they were not worried at all.

Indeed, our automated concordance analysis revealed that the term standards was one of the most frequently mentioned terms in responses to the survey’s four open-ended questions (see Figure 5.10).

As shown in the figure, there were more than 400 mentions of standards, by nearly 300 respondents, in responses to Q1 (on the main benefit of opening specialties); about 4,000 references, by more than 2,750 respondents, in response to Q2 (on concerns); nearly 3,400 mentions, by 2,402 respondents, in response to Q3 (on implementation); and about 1,650 mentions, by about 1,100, respondents in Q39 (the last nondemographic question, asking the respondents whether they had any other thoughts they wanted to share). Put another way,

Figure 5.9
Concern That Physical Job Standards Will Be Lowered

Q22: How worried or not are you that the physical jobs standards of your specialty will be reduced during the opening of SOF specialties to women?

73.1
14.6
6.2
3.2
2.9

Extremely worried
Quite worried
Somewhat worried
A little worried
Not at all worried

For more on these subjects, see the summary of results of our focus groups, in Chapter Six.

“Decreased cultural access” is a particularly interesting case. Where some respondents thought that having women in their units might increase cultural access with local populations, some respondents, especially SF, noted that the presence of women could create problems for training missions in societies that held women in lower standing than men.

We note that the mentions in response to Q1 had little to do with benefits; the question appears to have been an early attempt by these respondents to signal their concern about the possible lowering of performance standards.
more than one-third of our respondents mentioned the term standards in their responses to open-ended questions.

As we describe in greater detail later in this chapter, respondents generally supported high (or even increased) performance standards, based on mission requirements, and warned against lowering standards or having different standards for men and women.

Several other questions that were asked in the survey pointed to additional concerns, on the part of respondents, that pose potential challenges that USSOCOM leaders might face:

- **Order and discipline.** Four in ten respondents indicated that they expected order and discipline in their unit to “greatly decrease” (Q26).
- **Treatment of SOF women.** One in three respondents said that they expected that women would be treated unfairly “frequently” or “all of the time” (Q27).
- **Acceptance of SOF women.** Only about four in ten respondents appeared to believe that men would accept women as equals if they pulled their share of the load, while an equal number thought that they would not be accepted as equals even if they were able to do so (Q36). Put another way, many respondents appeared to believe that women’s performances would not be the sole determining factor in whether they were accepted.
7. What Impacts Do Special Operators Expect on the Following: Unit Performance, Unit Cohesion, Unit Trust, and Leadership and Personnel Management?

Unit Performance

The survey results detailed a variety of concerns among respondents that suggested the belief that SOF unit performance would decline if women were allowed into specialties that are currently closed. For example, 60–80 percent of respondents appeared to believe that women lack the capabilities to be effective in respondents’ specialties (Q23, Q24, and Q25), and nearly three out of four indicated that they were “very worried” that the physical job standards for their specialties would be lowered, presumably to make it possible for women to qualify (Q22). More than 90 percent of respondents indicated that having the same performance standards for men and women would be “extremely important” in successfully integrating women into SOF (Q4).

Although respondents were divided on whether they believed that having women assigned to their units would improve their ability to conduct sensitive, low-profile operations (Q37) or communicate with foreign populations (Q38), some respondents detailed possible benefits associated with attaching women to their units to conduct specialized intelligence, civil affairs, military information support operations (MISO), or other supporting operations.

Taken together, the overall mosaic of these results suggests concerns that performance standards would be lowered and unit performance would decline if women entered specialties that are currently closed, while making some allowances for the possibility that the participation of women might improve unit performance in other specialties and roles.

Unit Cohesion

Our indexes of task cohesion and social cohesion suggest that about four out of five respondents expected that unit cohesion would decline if women were assigned to their unit: 80 percent appeared to expect a decline in task cohesion (Q13, Q17, Q28, and Q33) and 83 percent appeared to expect a decline in social cohesion (Q14, Q18, Q29, and Q34).

Unit Trust

Similarly, our indexes of trust suggested that about three out of four respondents appeared to expect a decline in the level of trust among members of their units (Q15, Q16, Q30, and Q31) if women are assigned to their specialties.

Unit Leadership and Personnel Management

In a similar vein, according to our index of the leadership’s availability to manage personnel conflicts, about two out of three respondents expected that it would be more difficult to go to unit leaders during conflicts with female members of the unit (Q19 and Q35) than is the case in their current, all-male unit. In addition, nearly four in ten expected adverse impacts on unit order and discipline (Q26).

39 We computed difference scores by subtracting the current assessment of the respondent’s unit on a dimension (e.g., task cohesion, social cohesion) from the respondent’s assessment of the unit in a hypothesized future in which women were members of the unit.
8. What Implementation Actions Do Special Operators Believe That USSOCOM Leaders Should Take to Foster More-Beneficial Outcomes and Address Key Challenges?

The survey posed a number of closed-ended questions that asked respondents to rate the importance of various options in successfully implementing the policy of integrating women into SOF. The basic question was: “How important would each of the following be in successfully integrating women into SOF?” Figure 5.11 provides the results of these questions.

As shown in the figure, two options—maintaining the same performance requirements and standards of conduct for men and women—received the most support: More than 90 percent of respondents indicated that they thought that these policy options would be “extremely important” to the successful integration of women into SOF. Respondents viewed the other options, including leaders consistently engaging personnel, training for working with women, and selecting SOF men suited to a mixed-gender environment to be far less important to the successful integration of women into SOF.40

Suggested implementation actions also came up in our open-ended questions. For example, one of our open-ended questions (Q3) asked: “During the opening of SOF specialties to women, what action(s) should be taken to address this concern [from Q2]?” Figure 5.12 lists the most-prominent themes from our content analyses of responses to this question.

As the figure shows, the most frequently mentioned implementation actions that were suggested to address respondents’ chief concerns about opening SOF specialties (denoted with an asterisk) were to refrain from lowering standards, followed by expressions of support for common performance standards that would apply to both men and women. A large number of other ideas (including attaching women in other specialties to respondents’ units for specific missions, separating men and women, and taking a phased approach to implementing the opening of specialties to women) were suggested by smaller numbers of respondents. In addi-

Figure 5.11
The Importance of Different Policy Actions to the Successful Integration of Women into SOF

40 Our focus groups revealed strong opposition to the last two options.
Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

In the question elicited a range of responses that had little to do with specific implementation ideas. Respondents also suggested a number of implementation actions in their responses to the last nondemographic question in the survey (Q39), which asked: “Do you have any additional thoughts or suggestions regarding the opening of SOF specialties to women?” Figure 5.13 presents the most-frequently mentioned themes in this question, with actual implementation options denoted by an asterisk. Again, many respondents addressed issues that had little to do with implementation of the policy to open SOF specialties to women.

As shown, the most-frequent responses to this question were expressions of opposition to opening specialties and units to women. Of the responses that can be considered implementation actions, attaching women in different specialties to teams was the most frequently mentioned option, followed by not lowering standards, thoughts on the timing and phasing of implementation, and common gender-neutral standards.

Implementation Ideas: Respondents in Their Own Words

Beyond the broad themes just described, responses to the four open-ended questions provided interesting nuances and detail regarding potential implementation actions. We next report respondents’ suggestions related to the main topics that were mentioned in connection with implementation: performance standards, attaching women to SOF units, separation of men and women, education and training, timing and phasing, and leadership.

Performance Standards

The following are illustrative of the suggestions that were made on the subject of performance standards:
“Do not lower standards: operators accepted under lower standards will not be seen as equals.”
“Don’t change standards.”
“Maintain or increase standards.”
“Standards are set for a mission-based reason, and must be gender-neutral.”
“Make current male standard the standard for everyone, or improve the current standards and set those for everyone.”

Attaching Women to Existing SOF Units

A recurring theme in responses was the idea that women in different specialties could be attached to existing units to perform specialized functions and roles; this option seemed to be preferred to opening specialties to women. The following are illustrative of this line of thinking:

- “Women have roles in SOF, just not as SEALs, SWCCs, Rangers, Special Forces, MARSOC, AFSOC Special Tactics Team.”
- “Women would be useful in support roles, or attached to existing units.”
- “Have female elements trained in certain specialties that can be attached to units for specific missions.”
- “Use women in environmental preparation, CA [Civil Affairs], MISO, low visibility, and intelligence gathering operations.”

NOTES: The figure presents the percentages for the most frequently mentioned themes present in Q39, based on a detailed content analysis. Asterisks denote implementation options. See Appendix N, in Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016, for details.
Separation of Men and Women
Another option that was offered suggested segregating men and women, illustrated by the following sorts of statements:

- “Completely separate men and women.”
- “Place women on woman-only teams.”
- “Give women their own set of standards.”
- “Give women their own training pipeline.”
- “Place those that meet standards on their own teams.”

Education and Training
Respondents also spoke of education and training—as playing an important part in the integration of women into SOF. Illustrative ideas in this area included

- “Clearly delineate the benefits of allowing women into SOF specialties, and disseminate this information to units.”
- “Women should be educated on what SOF culture is like (make women fit SOF as it is, don’t change SOF for women).”
- “Open/honest/realistic sexual harassment training and classes.”
- “Education on how women’s roles in teams will affect unit.”

Timing and Phasing
Some respondents offered thought on the timing and phasing of implementation, including

- “Gradually integrate women into SOF specialties in order to slow the systemic shock and evaluate SOF response.”
- “Implement a trial phase or experiment where the effects of allowing a few select women in a unit can be studied.”

Leadership
Finally, respondents identified actions that could be taken by leaders to smooth the implementation of the policy change:

- “Ensure leadership is well-prepared to handle all of the concerns expressed.”
- “Bring in women leaders first, so that there is some establishment of leadership by women in SOF and they can address female needs.”
- “Do not force unit leadership to accept official or unofficial quotas: Women should have to meet the same standards, which are mission based; Treat men and women—with respect to physical, appearance, training, and all other standards—the same.”
- “Allow leadership to act without political pressure.”

9. How Do Responses to the Previous Eight Questions Vary by Key Subgroup (e.g., service, unit, specialty, grade)?
Although there are some differences in attitude toward opening specialties by SOF element and rank group (see Figure 5.14), the differences pale in significance to the similarities. We first discuss the similarities, and then the differences.
**Similarities Among Key Subgroups**

We were interested in the extent to which different subgroups (e.g., service, SOF element, specialty, rank group) gave similar answers to the questions in our survey. Accordingly, we computed correlation coefficients for all possible subgroup pairs for all questions using the unweighted sample, and then we compared the median correlation coefficients. The median correlations for each subgroup on the *closed-ended questions* were all high:

- by service: 0.90
- by unit: 0.90
- by specialty: 0.79
- by rank group: 0.90.

We conducted a similar set of analyses to assess similarities in responses to our *open-ended questions*. For the human content analyses, the median correlations in the prevalence of the various themes across subgroups were as follows:

- by service: 0.88
- by unit: 0.86
- by rank group: 0.88.

For our automated linguistic analyses, the median correlations by SOF element were 0.96 (LIWC) and 0.99 (Docuscope).

These high correlations across the closed- and open-ended questions are strong evidence that respondents in different subgroups had very similar responses to the battery of questions in our survey: There appears to be more that binds respondents with different backgrounds than divides them.

**Differences Among Key Subgroups**

As shown in Figure 5.14, across SOF elements and rank groups, opposition to opening specialties is consistently high. In all cases, about eight in ten respondents (or more) opposed opening their SOF specialties to women, and about six in ten respondents (or more) strongly opposed opening their specialties.41

As shown on the left side of Figure 5.14, the greatest opposition was among Navy SEALs, AFSOC STT members, and Army SF. Moreover, the difference between SEALs (the highest overall opposition to opening SOF specialties to women) and Rangers (lowest) is about 10 percent, while the difference in strong opposition (SEALs again highest and SWCCs lowest) is about 14 percentage points.42 On the right side of the figure, the difference between the highest (NCOs, E-5s, and E-6s) and lowest rank group (warrant officers [WOs]) in terms of overall

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41 Moreover, our focus groups revealed strong opposition to opening SOF specialties to women across all specialties, and, although our survey results suggest lower levels of strong opposition, our Ranger and SWCC interlocutors were no less vocal in expressing their opposition than the SEALs, who registered the highest levels of strong opposition.

42 We conducted paired comparisons between all SOF elements using the Kruskal-Wallis test; we found that the greatest number of statistically significant differences on the 35 ordinal questions in our survey were associated, on the one hand, with the SEALs and with SWCCs, SF, Rangers, and MARSOC operators, on the other. Put another way, SEALs were the most unlike the other SOF elements in their responses to the full set of survey questions.
opposition is about 10 points, while the range of strong opposition is about 16 points (NCOs highest and WOs lowest).

As we discuss in the next section, membership in different SOF elements turned out to be the second most important set of predictors of support of or opposition to opening specialties, after assessments of women’s capabilities for SOF’s demands.

Identifying the Key Drivers of Support and Opposition

Our approach to identifying the key drivers of support and opposition for opening SOF specialties (Q20) to women began with a review of tables and figures that reported the marginal percentages associated with each response option for each question. The analyses also included bivariate cross-tabulations and correlation analyses, as well as multivariate statistical modeling. Having laid the groundwork for understanding how the individual survey items bear on our main findings, this section describes the results of our bivariate and multivariate analyses to identify the key drivers of support or opposition to opening SOF specialties.

Our multivariate statistical modeling suggests that the key drivers of support and opposition to opening SOF specialties to women are respondents’ beliefs about women’s capabilities, the SOF element, the quality of respondents’ experience working with U.S. military women in a combat setting, the amount respondents say they have thought about the issue of women in SOF, and years of service. There also is some—and somewhat mixed—evidence that expectations regarding changes in task cohesion, social cohesion, unit trust, and the availability of leaders for conflict resolution in an hypothesized future unit that included women may also play a role in support or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women.
Bivariate Analyses

We began our efforts to understand the key drivers of support and opposition for opening SOF specialties to women by exploring the simple relationship between Q20, which asked respondents to indicate their level of support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women, and all of the other variables in our survey (see Table 5.3).

As shown in the table, all of the correlations between Q20 and the other variables in our survey were statistically significant—all but one at the 0.001 level—although only a subset (in bold in the table) exceeded a nominal value of +0.3 or −0.3.43

Q25, which asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed that women would be capable of handling the demands of their specialties, had the highest correlations with Q20.

Table 5.3
Bivariate Relationships Between Q20 (Support for Opening SOF Specialties) and Other Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Question</th>
<th>Spearman's Rho</th>
<th>Kendall's Tau-b</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q4. Importance of same performance requirements</td>
<td>−0.142</td>
<td>−0.135</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5. Importance of same standards of conduct</td>
<td>−0.070</td>
<td>−0.066</td>
<td>0.967^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6. Importance of providing education and training</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>1.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7. Importance of leaders consistently engaging personnel</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>1.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q8. Importance of selecting men suited to mixed-gender environment</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>1.383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q9. How much attention paid to news and information</td>
<td>−0.138</td>
<td>−0.121</td>
<td>0.799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10. Amount thought about issue</td>
<td>−0.167</td>
<td>−0.146</td>
<td>0.792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11. Number of military women worked with in combat environment</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
<td>1.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12. Quality of experience working with military women</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>1.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13. Current unit task cohesion: work together to accomplish mission</td>
<td>−0.126</td>
<td>−0.120</td>
<td>0.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14. Current unit social cohesion: members are like a family</td>
<td>−0.175</td>
<td>−0.165</td>
<td>0.581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15. Current unit trust: level of trust among unit members</td>
<td>−0.159</td>
<td>−0.151</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q16. Current unit trust: respondent’s level of trust for unit members</td>
<td>−0.154</td>
<td>−0.146</td>
<td>0.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q17. Current unit task cohesion: unit united in accomplishing mission</td>
<td>−0.104</td>
<td>−0.099</td>
<td>0.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18. Current unit social cohesion: unit members socialize</td>
<td>−0.183</td>
<td>−0.170</td>
<td>0.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q19. Current unit leadership: can go to leaders for conflict resolution</td>
<td>−0.102</td>
<td>−0.095</td>
<td>0.760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q21. Support/opposition to opening unit to women</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>3.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q22. Worry about reducing job standards</td>
<td>−0.359</td>
<td>−0.333</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23. Women will have physical strength and stamina</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>2.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24. Women will have mental toughness</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>2.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25. Women will be capable of handling demands of specialty</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>3.756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 In the social sciences, +/−0.3 is a standard threshold for deciding whether a correlation coefficient is strong enough to be substantively meaningful. This is not the same thing as the statistical significance of a correlation coefficient, which indicates the probability that a correlation coefficient that large could have occurred by chance.
The interpretation of the odds ratio is that a one-unit increase in Q25 increases the odds ratio of a corresponding increase in Q20 by a factor of 3.7.

The next-highest correlations were with Q21, which asked about support for opening units to women; Q23, which asked whether respondents agreed that women have the physical strength and stamina to be effective in their specialties; Q24, which asked respondents whether they agreed that women have the mental toughness to be effective in their specialties; and Q32, which asked respondents to assess their expected level of trust for women in a future unit that included women.

Not surprisingly, support or opposition for opening SOF specialties is highly correlated with support for or opposition to opening units, but, as we noted earlier, there is much higher support for the latter option, which is reflected in the fact that the correlation is not substantially higher—e.g., on the order of 0.8 or 0.9.

Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the three questions asking respondents to assess U.S. military women’s capabilities for SOF demands (Q23, Q24, and Q25) are among the variables that are most highly correlated with support for or opposition to opening specialties: The belief that U.S. military women will have the mix of physical strength and stamina, mental toughness, and overall capability for these positions is each closely associated with sup-

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44 The correlations between Q21 (support for opening SOF units to women) and the other variables in the survey were very similar to those for Q20.
port, and the belief that they lack these capabilities is closely associated with opposition. The high correlation between support for or opposition to opening specialties, and respondents’ expected level of trust for women in a hypothesized future unit that included women (Q32), further suggests that trust is at least in part built on performance expectations.

**Exploratory Factor Analysis**

To understand better the underlying structure of support or opposition to opening SOF specialties (Q20), we conducted exploratory factor analyses. We included in our factor analyses all of the closed-ended questions in our survey, with the exception of our dependent variable (Q20) and Q21, which asked about support or opposition to opening units (as opposed to specialties) to women.

These analyses revealed that the highest-loading variables in the first factor were related to assessments of women’s capabilities; assessments of the potential impact of women on such factors as unit task cohesion and social cohesion, trust, and conflict management by leaders in a future SOF unit that included women; and the quality of experience respondents had had working with women in a combat environment. The second factor was dominated by variables related to respondents’ assessments of their current units. Accordingly, we included most of these variables in our multivariate statistical models.

**Multivariate Statistical Analyses**

We also developed multivariate statistical models to further refine our understanding of which variables should be considered key drivers of support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women (Q20). Our multivariate analyses were guided by both theoretical considerations (e.g., task cohesion, social cohesion, and trust) and practical considerations (e.g., the quality of respondents’ work experiences with U.S. military women in a combat environment, the availability of leaders to resolve intraunit conflict, and the desirability of comparisons between respondents’ views of the current unit and their expectations regarding what a future unit with women might be like).

All of our models had several features in common. First, the dependent variable across all models was Q20, the level of support or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women.

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45 To improve the reliability of our measure, we combined these three items into an index that met standard levels for the alpha statistic.

46 Factor analysis algorithms compute a correlation matrix and identify, based on the correlations between included variables, the underlying dimensionality and latent structure of the data, as well as which variables are most closely associated with (or load most highly on) which underlying factors. We chose to use factor analysis because it controls for multicollinearity—i.e., correlations between variables.

47 We also conducted factor analysis using our indexes, with generally similar results.

48 The first factor in a factor analysis accounts for the largest proportion of variance, the second accounts for the next-largest proportion, and so on.

49 Multivariate models introduce statistical controls so that the marginal contributions to an outcome of individual variables can be understood.

50 Put another way, we assumed that a respondent’s position on the dependent variable, support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties (Q20), was influenced or caused by his positions on the independent variables. We acknowledge, however, that it is entirely possible that respondents decided that they supported or opposed opening their specialties and then aligned their other attitudes to be consistent with this position. This is commonly referred to as attitude constraint. For classic papers on the subject, see Converse, 1964; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1985.
Second, all were ordered logit models that were designed to identify the contribution of each independent variable to a change in support or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women (Q20). Third, all of our models relied on weighted sample data and used standardized scales to improve comparability, wherever possible. In all cases, we report both the Chi-square value and statistical significance from the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test that was used to test the overall fit of the models with the data, as well as the statistical significance of the regression coefficients, which was assessed on the basis of z-scores. We also report the expected percentage correctly predicted (EPCP), expected percentage reduction in error (EPRE), and Akaike information criterion (AIC) value.

**Results**

As described in Table 5.4, we explored a range of alternative specifications for our multivariate statistical models, and conducted sensitivity analyses, to better understand which variables are key drivers of a respondent’s support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women, as well as to ensure the robustness of our findings.

As described in the table, our final models used various forms of our difference variables for task cohesion, social cohesion, unit trust, and availability of leaders for conflict resolution, as well as including years of service (computed from Q40); amount of thought given to the issue (Q10); marital status (from Q43); our capability index (computed from Q23, Q24, and Q25); the quality of the respondent’s past work experience with U.S. military women in a combat environment (Q12); and SOF element.

In all cases, the coefficients are log-odds ratios; these are the amount of change in the log of the odds of the dependent variable, resulting from a one-unit change in the independent variable. In the present case, for example, a one-unit increase on the capabilities index is associated with an increase of nearly 1.19 in the log odds of a higher level on Q20, a result that is stable across all three of our multivariate statistical models.

The models were as follows:

- **Model 1: difference variables.** We designed the survey to illuminate intertemporal comparisons of task cohesion, social cohesion, trust, and the availability of leaders to resolve...
Table 5.4  
Comparison of Multivariate Models Predicting Support for or Opposition to Opening Specialties (Q20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1: Difference Variables</th>
<th>Model 2: Separate Present and Future</th>
<th>Model 3: Difference Variables with Controls and Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities index (Q23, Q24, Q25)</td>
<td>1.186**</td>
<td>1.189**</td>
<td>1.186**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12. Quality of work experience</td>
<td>0.175**</td>
<td>0.175**</td>
<td>0.176**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10. How much thought about issue</td>
<td>−0.092**</td>
<td>−0.090**</td>
<td>−0.089**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q40. Years of service</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task cohesion difference index</td>
<td>0.282**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 1 difference index</td>
<td>0.217**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.752**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 2 difference index</td>
<td>0.117**</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust difference index</td>
<td>0.180**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership difference index</td>
<td>0.133**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task cohesion present index</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.134</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task cohesion future index</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.313**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14—Social cohesion 1 present index</td>
<td>−0.184**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.040**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q29—Social cohesion 1 future index</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.224**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q18—Social cohesion 2 present index</td>
<td>−0.167**</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q34—Social cohesion 2 future index</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.096**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust present index</td>
<td>−0.336**</td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust future index</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.141**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership present index</td>
<td>−0.116*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership future index</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.137**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task cohesion index interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 1 index interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.113**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 2 index interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust index interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership index interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF element (compared with Army Rangers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSOC</td>
<td>−0.884**</td>
<td>−0.884**</td>
<td>−0.872**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>−0.858**</td>
<td>−0.851**</td>
<td>−0.850**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>−0.522**</td>
<td>−0.526**</td>
<td>−0.526**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSOC</td>
<td>−0.273</td>
<td>−0.256</td>
<td>−0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWCC</td>
<td>−0.272*</td>
<td>−0.261</td>
<td>−0.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square test of independence</td>
<td>2,058.5</td>
<td>2,059.4</td>
<td>2,076.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
conflicts among members of the unit, asking respondents for assessments of their current unit on these dimensions, as well as of a future hypothesized unit that included SOF women. This first model used the differences between respondents’ assessments of the future unit and those for the current unit (see the column “Model 1: Difference Variables,” in Table 5.4).56

– As shown in the table, most of the variables in this model achieved statistical significance at the 0.05 level or better; the exception was status as a MARSOC operator.

– The variable with the largest coefficient was the capabilities index, the coefficient for which was 1.19; a one-point change in the capabilities index is associated with a 1.19 unit change in the log-odds ratio of having a higher value on Q20.57 Put another way, respondents’ assessments of U.S. military women’s capabilities appear to have been the dominant consideration in driving support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties.

– The next-largest coefficients were generally for our SOF elements: AFSOC STTs (−0.884) and Navy SEALs (−0.858) and Army SF (−0.522) were more strongly disapproving of opening specialties than Army Rangers, MARSOC operators, or Navy SWCCs.

– The diagnostics for the model also are good:
  ◦ The $p$-value for the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test (0.0000) suggests that the probability of a model with this good a fit occurring by chance is less than one in 10,000.
  ◦ The EPCP was 67 percent.
  ◦ The EPRE for the model, which measures the reduction in prediction error relative to a naive model that uses the modal value on the outcome variable, was nearly 25 percent, a fairly healthy reduction in error.

56 The current unit scores were subtracted from the future unit scores, such that a positive value indicated that the respondent seemed to be anticipating an improvement on that dimension, while a negative value indicated that the respondent expected deterioration.

57 For a discussion of the interpretation of output from ordered logit models, see “Stata Annotated Output: Ordered Logistic Regression,” n.d.
The AIC for the model, which is a diagnostic that can be used to compare alternative models (rewarding parsimonious models that have a good fit to the truth and punishing those that do not), was 9,164.58.

Because difference scores can, in some cases, yield unreliable coefficients in multivariate statistical models, and to confirm the robustness of our findings, we also explored two additional alternative model specifications: (1) a model in which the difference indexes were dropped and the present and future estimates entered simultaneously, and (2) a model that included the difference variables but also controls and interaction terms to provide a more reliable basis for estimating the coefficients for the difference variables:

- **Model 2: separate present and future.** In this model, our indexes for present and future task cohesion, social cohesion, unit trust, and leadership availability for conflict resolution were entered simultaneously. This was not as satisfying a formulation as the earlier model, as the present and future estimates were not directly linked to one another.
  - As shown in Table 5.4, most of the variables that also were in model 1 retained statistical significance in model 2, and were of similar magnitude.
  - The coefficient for the capability index is again the largest of any in the model (1.19), and the value is very close to that in the first model; in other words, notwithstanding the difference in the model specification, the capability index was nearly identical to that in the previous model.
  - AFSOC, SEALs, and SF again had the next largest coefficients of the SOF elements, which were similar in magnitude to those in model 1.
  - All but one of the present and future indexes were statistically significant in this model: The task cohesion present index was the sole exception. In addition, and as expected, the present indexes all had a negative coefficient, and the future indexes all had a positive coefficient.\(^{59}\)
  - The \(p\)-value for Chi-square remained at 0.0000, the EPCP remained at 67 percent, the EPRE remained at 25 percent, and the AIC was 9,167.

- **Model 3: difference variables with controls and interactions.** This model included the difference variables, but it also included the respondent’s estimates for the current unit on task cohesion and the other dimensions of assessment. It also included interactions between the individual levels of the present estimates, and the individual levels of the difference variables, which was designed to provide more reliable coefficients on the difference variables:
  - The coefficient for the capability index is again the largest (1.19), and the value remains very close to that in the first two models.
  - The coefficients on the SOF elements remained negative, of similar magnitude, and statistically significant.

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\(^{58}\) According to Mazerolle (2004): “In itself, the value of the AIC for a given data set has no meaning. It becomes interesting when it is compared to the AIC of a series of models specified a priori, the model with the lowest AIC being the ‘best’ model among all models specified for the data at hand.”

\(^{59}\) The interpretation is that the higher the rating for the current unit, and the lower the expected rating for a hypothesized future unit that included women, the weaker the support for opening SOF specialties to women.
Of the difference indexes, present indexes, and interactive terms, only those for social cohesion 1 (the unit being “like a family”) attained statistical significance.

The p-values for Chi-squared remained at 0.0000, the EPRE was 68 percent, the EPRE remained at nearly 25 percent, and the AIC was 9,168.

Discussion of Results

Seven variables—the capabilities index, three of the SOF element variables, the quality of experience working with U.S. military women, how much the respondent had thought about the issue of women in SOF, and years of service—appear to be robust explanatory variables: Each consistently achieved statistical significance across all model forms and was consistent in valence and magnitude. While nearly all of the variables relating to task cohesion, social cohesion, trust, and leadership achieved statistical significance in the first two models, only the three variables associated with social cohesion 1 (the unit “being like a family”) were statistically significant in model 3. Because we consider model 3 (the model containing difference variables with controls and interaction terms) to be the most reliable of our models, we view social cohesion 1 as having a stronger claim to be a key driver of support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women than these other variables. Interestingly, this result echoes RAND’s 1993 and 2010 studies on gays in the military—as well as DoD’s Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—which also reported that social cohesion, but not task cohesion, was most likely to be affected by a contested change in military group composition and to be associated with opposition to opening the military to out groups. In any event, using this model as the focal point, we now summarize the key drivers of support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women in terms of their marginal effects (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 translates the coefficients, which are in log-odds terms, into marginal changes in the probability of strongly opposing the opening of SOF specialties to women. As shown in the table, a one-unit increase in the capabilities index reduces the probability of supporting the opening of SOF specialties to women by 13.2 percent, and AFSOC or SEAL membership reduces the probability of support by nearly 10 percent, relative to the reference group of Army Rangers. The other variables have smaller impacts on support for opening SOF specialties to women.

To summarize, then, in declining order of importance, our analyses suggest that the key drivers of support for and opposition to opening SOF specialties to women are

- **Capabilities (index based on Q23, Q24, and Q25).** The most important driver of support or opposition was a respondent’s beliefs about U.S. military women’s physical, mental, and overall capabilities for meeting the demands of the respondents’ specialties: Those who doubted women’s capabilities were far more likely to oppose opening SOF specialties than those who believed that women have the necessary capabilities. The fact that most respon-

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60 Nonetheless, we note that social cohesion, trust, and leadership variables attained statistical significance and were roughly of comparable magnitude in models 1 and 2, which we offer as evidence of their robustness. Thus, although these variables are not statistically significant in model 3, there is some reason to believe that they also might influence support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties.

61 See Rostker et al., 1993; National Defense Research Institute, 2010; and DoD, 2010.
dents doubt that women possess the necessary physical and other capabilities best explains the high levels of overall opposition to opening SOF specialties to women.

- **SOF element.** Although majorities of all SOF elements in our sample were strongly opposed to opening SOF specialties to women, respondents who were AFSOC STT members or Navy SEALs evidence the strongest opposition to opening specialties, followed by Army SF. As described earlier, however, there are more commonalities among SOF elements than differences, so these are differences in strength of opposition, not differences in kind. Nonetheless, these specialties are likely to represent the greatest challenges to USSOCOM leaders in opening SOF specialties to women.62

Four additional variables consistently had somewhat weaker, but still statistically significant, impacts on support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women:

- **Social cohesion index 1.** The more the respondent believed that there would be an increase in social cohesion in terms of unit members being “like a family,” the lower his level of opposition to opening his specialty to women.
- **Years of service (index computed from Q40).** This was the best single measure of seniority. The more years of service a respondent had, the more likely he was to support opening

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62 We also ran model 3 separately for every SOF element except AFSOC, which had too few respondents. These analyses revealed that the capabilities index remained the most important variable for each element and that, as judged by the size of the coefficient, this variable was most important for SEALs (a coefficient of 1.355) and SF (1.211).
his specialty to women.\textsuperscript{63} This suggests good potential for top-down support from more-senior officers and enlisted personnel, but it also suggests increasing challenges in building support as the policy is pushed down to more-junior personnel.

- **Quality of working experience with U.S. military women (Q12).** The next-most important variable in support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women was the quality of the respondent’s past working experience with U.S. military women in a combat environment. Those who had had good experiences working with U.S. military women were more likely to support opening their specialties to women than those who had not.\textsuperscript{64}

- **Amount thought about the issue (Q10).** The more the respondent said that he had thought about the issue, the higher the level of opposition to opening his specialty to women. We cannot tell from the survey data the extent to which this reflects actual deliberation about the merits of the policy change, the level of concern about the policy change, or some combination of the two.

It is important to note as well that a number of other variables were statistically significant in two out of three of our models; indeed, the coefficients for many of these variables exceeded those for the last three variables. Accordingly, there is somewhat mixed evidence for considering the following variables to be additional key drivers of support or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women:

- **Task cohesion:** the extent to which members of a team work well together to accomplish a task or mission
- **Social cohesion 2:** the extent to which members of a unit socialize with one another
- **Trust:** the extent to which members of a team believe that they can rely on other members of the team
- **Leadership:** the extent to which leaders are available to resolve intraunit conflict.

### The Quality of Experience

We wondered whether expectations about a hypothesized future unit that included women might differ for those who judged their past experiences as negative and those who viewed them as positive. Our idea was both that the quality of past experience might condition expectations and that the differences in expectations might illuminate potential reasons respondents reported negative experiences working with U.S. military women in a combat environment. Table 5.6 reports the median response categories for those who said that they had a positive, negative, or neither positive nor negative experience working with women.

The table reveals that those who reported a negative experience working with women had lower median scores on 20 out of 25 of the questions in the table than those who reported a positive experience (the lower scores are in bold in the table).\textsuperscript{65} In addition to having more-

\textsuperscript{63} The coefficient is based on the raw variable; if we rescaled the variable to a five-point scale, such as that used for the other variables, the coefficient would be 13 times larger; hence, years of service is actually the next-most important driver of support or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women, after the capabilities index and SOF element.

\textsuperscript{64} The quality of experience working with U.S. military women in a combat environment was the only one of two variables that were included to test the contact hypothesis that turned out to be statistically significant in our models. The other variable was the amount of experience a respondent had working with U.S. military women in a combat environment.

\textsuperscript{65} There were 12 cases in which those reporting negative working experiences with women had lower scores than those who said that their experience had been neither negative nor positive.
### Table 5.6
Selected Survey Results by Quality of Experience Working with U.S. Military Women, Five-Point Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q4. Importance: same performance requirements</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5. Importance: same standards of conduct</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q11. Quantity of working experience with U.S. military women</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q20. Favor or oppose opening specialty to women</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q21. Favor or oppose opening unit to women</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q22. Worry that performance standards will be lowered</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q23. Women will have physical strength and stamina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q24. Women will have mental toughness</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q25. Women will be capable of job demands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q26. Expectation: order and discipline</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q27. Expectation: how often women will be treated unfairly</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q28. Expectation: extent unit members will work together</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q29. Expectation: extent unit members will be like a family</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q30. Expectation: level of trust among unit members</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q31. Expectation: level of trust for unit members</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q32. Expectation: level of trust for women in unit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q33. Expectation: men and women will be united</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q34. Expectation: men and women will socialize</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q35. Expectation: will be able to go to unit leaders to resolve conflicts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q36. Expectation: if they pull their share of load, women will be accepted</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q37. Expectation: will improve sensitive, low-profile operations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q38. Expectation: will improve communication with foreign populations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q40. Service years</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q42. Age</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q44. Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:** All estimates are based on weighted sample data. Median values. “Expectation” questions asked respondents about their expectations for a hypothesized future unit that included women. Those who reported a negative experience working with women had lower median scores on 20 out of 25 questions, highlighted in gray. For Q4 to Q38, a lower score connoted a more negative judgment, while a higher score connoted a more positive judgment.
negative expectations, respondents with negative views on the quality of their past experiences working with U.S. military women tended to be younger and had fewer years of service and slightly lower education levels than those who had positive views of working with women.

**Sensitivity Analyses for “Consistently Negative Responders” and Others**

As was described earlier, we first coded as “consistently negative responders” respondents who had two or more extreme negative responses out of a total of eight possible items that asked about a hypothesized future unit that included women; we coded everyone else as “other respondents.” A total of 2,017 respondents (28.4 percent) in our sample were coded as “consistently negative responders,” and the remaining 5,075 respondents (71.6 percent) were coded as other respondents. Figure 5.15 presents data on the percentage of respondents associated with different counts of extreme responses. The figure shows that 56.2 percent of our respondents had no extreme negative responses, 15.6 percent had one extreme negative response, and so on.

We wondered whether “consistently negative responders” might differ from those who were not so negative on the factors that drive support for and opposition to opening SOF specialties to women. To address this question, we ran the model 3 specification for each group separately. The results are reported in Table 5.7.

As shown in the table, the coefficients for respondents other than our “consistently negative responders” look very similar to those for the total sample, which is not all that surprising given that they compose about 80 percent of the sample. While the “consistently negative responders” also exhibit some similarities (for example, the coefficient on the capabilities index, while

---

66 The most extreme negative response was the modal response for only one variable (Q32), one of three questions that asked about trust in a hypothesized future unit that included women. The issue of respondents who choose extreme responses is not unlike that of problem-oriented reporting in the health policy field. See Elliott et al., 2007.
### Table 5.7
Model 3 Results for Total Sample, “Consistently Negative Responders” and Other Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities index (Q23, Q24, Q25)</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>“Consistently Negative Responders”</th>
<th>Other Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.186**</td>
<td>0.942**</td>
<td>1.238**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12. Quality of experience</td>
<td>0.176**</td>
<td>0.391**</td>
<td>0.153**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10. Amount thought about issue</td>
<td>−0.089**</td>
<td>−0.160</td>
<td>−0.074*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q40. Years of service</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>−0.043</td>
<td>0.024**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task cohesion difference index</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>1.67**</td>
<td>−0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 1 difference index</td>
<td>0.752**</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.899**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 2 difference index</td>
<td>−0.177</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>−0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust difference index</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>−0.116</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership difference index</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task cohesion present index</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.786*</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 1 present index</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>−0.133</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 2 present index</td>
<td>−0.070</td>
<td>−0.167</td>
<td>−0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust present Index</td>
<td>−0.183</td>
<td>−0.148</td>
<td>−0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership present index</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>−0.706**</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task cohesion index interaction</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>−0.514*</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 1 index interaction</td>
<td>−0.113**</td>
<td>−0.074</td>
<td>−0.143**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion 2 index interaction</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>−0.020</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust index interaction</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership index interaction</td>
<td>−0.005</td>
<td>−0.071</td>
<td>−0.009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOF element (compared with Army Rangers)

| SEAL | −0.850** | −0.383 | −0.873** |
| AFSOC | −0.872** | −0.640 | −0.723*   |
| SF   | −0.526** | −0.431 | −0.525** |
| MARSOC | −0.259   | −0.063 | −0.281   |
| SWCC | −0.264   | −0.631 | −0.263   |

Chi-square value: 2,076.6 (Total Sample), 166.5 (“Consistently Negative Responders”), 1,574.3 (Other Respondents)

P-value for Chi-square test: 0.0000 (Total Sample), 0.0000 (“Consistently Negative Responders”), 0.0000 (Other Respondents)

EPCP (%): 67.8 (Total Sample), 93.9 (“Consistently Negative Responders”), 56.8 (Other Respondents)

EPRE (%): 25.2 (Total Sample), 13.3 (“Consistently Negative Responders”), 21.1 (Other Respondents)

AIC: 9,167.6

**NOTES:** * = statistically significant at 0.05 level; ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level.
somewhat smaller, is roughly of the same magnitude), they also exhibit a number of important differences, both with the other respondents and with and the total sample.

For example, support from “consistently negative responders” appears to hinge more on expected changes to unit task cohesion than expected changes to social cohesion, which is the opposite of the case for other respondents and the sample as a whole:

- The coefficient on the task cohesion difference index for the “consistently negative responders” (1.67) is the largest statistically significant coefficient in the model for “consistently negative responders,” whereas that index is not statistically significant either for the other respondents or for the total sample. Support for opening SOF specialties from our “consistently negative responders” appears to depend much more heavily on their expectations of how unit task cohesion will be affected if women are allowed into their specialties than it does for other respondents, or the sample as a whole. Put another way, high unit performance appears to be a more important driver of support or opposition for the “consistently negative responders.”

- In a similar vein, the coefficient on the social cohesion difference index does not achieve statistical significance for the “consistently negative responders,” whereas it is both large and statistically significant for the other respondents and the total sample. Support from “consistently negative responders” appears to rely less on expected changes to social cohesion than it does for other respondents or the sample as a whole. Put another way, personal bonds with other unit members appear to be somewhat less important to “consistently negative responders” than to others.

Two other differences between the “consistently negative responders” and the other groupings are notable:

- First, whereas the quality of experience working with U.S. military women in a combat environment was statistically significant for all three groupings, the coefficient on that variable for the “consistently negative responders” (0.391) is more than twice that for the other groups (0.153 for the other respondents and 0.176 for the total sample). This suggests that the quality of the experience working with U.S. military women in a combat environment is a much more important determinant of support or opposition for “consistently negative responders” than for other groupings. Moreover, if the quality of “consistently negative responders’” experiences can be improved in the future, “consistently negative responders” might be more inclined to support opening SOF specialties to women.

- Second, it is worth noting that in the model for the “consistently negative responders,” some other variables that were statistically significant for the other groupings failed to attain statistical significance. Perhaps the most notable of these are the dummy variables for SOF element, none of which attained statistical significance for “consistently negative responders.”

As a consequence of these differences between “consistently negative responders” and others, we decided to take a comparative look at the three groupings, focusing on the variables that attained statistical significance in our models, to better understand the characteristics of “consistently negative responders” in comparison to other groups (see Table 5.8).
The table provides a basic comparative portrait of the total sample, the “consistently negative responders,” and the other respondents on the key variables identified in model 3.

As shown, the median consistently negative responder, compared with the other groups, had more-negative views about U.S. military women’s capabilities, the quality of experience he had had working with U.S. military women, and the likely changes in task and social cohesion if women are allowed into his unit. He also was slightly less likely to be married, had slightly fewer years of service, and said that he have given more thought to the policy change than others. Finally, our SEAL and AFSOC respondents were more likely to be “consistently negative responders” than their presence in the total sample would imply: 26.6 percent of our “consistently negative responders” were SEALs, whereas SEALs composed only 21.4 percent of the overall population; for AFSOC, the percentages were 5.6 percent and 4.6 percent, respectively.

The principal conclusion that we drew from this set of analyses was that the “consistently negative responders” might present unique challenges that will require careful consideration in implementing any policy to open SOF specialties to women. To prevent or mitigate the more-dire impacts that most concern “consistently negative responders,” it will be important to understand the sources of their consistently strong negative views on the potential consequences of opening their specialties to women. It will also be important to fashion an implementation plan that successfully addresses their concerns. Prominent among these concerns—which are perhaps most acute among “consistently negative responders” but prevalent within the force as a whole—are the following:

### Table 5.8
Comparisons of Total Sample, “Consistently Negative Responders,” and Other Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>“Consistently Negative Responders”</th>
<th>Other Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities index (Q23, Q24, Q25) (−2 to +2 range) (median value)</td>
<td>−1.33</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q12. Quality of experience (−2 to +2 range) (median value)</td>
<td>−1</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q43. Currently married (%)</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q10. Amount thought about issue (1 to 5 range) (median value)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q40. Years of service</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF element (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangers</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSOC</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSOC</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWCC</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: All estimates are based on weighted sample data.
Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

- concern that women lack the physical strength and stamina, mental toughness, and basic ability to perform the duties associated with responders' specialties
- concern that performance standards will be lowered, or that SOF women will be allowed in only as a result of meeting lower performance standards than the men
- concern that the poor experiences that responders said they had working with less well-trained U.S. military women downrange will continue if women are allowed into their specialties
- concerns about the prospects for disruptions to unit order and discipline, including sexual misconduct
- concerns that unit leaders will be less available to help resolve intraunit conflicts involving women
- concerns about the impact that women would have on unit task cohesion, trust, and performance, as well as the social bonds that exist within current SOF units.

Classification and Regression Tree Analyses

CART analysis is a technique that recursively identifies the variables that best partition observations into progressively smaller groups, and presents results in terms of a classification tree that identifies which independent variables are the most important predictors of the dependent variable: the variables at the top of the tree are the best initial discriminators of outcomes on the dependent variable, variables in the next level down are the next best discriminators, and so on.
Unlike our multivariate statistical modeling (just described), which involved specifying which variables would serve as explanatory variables or predictors of support or opposition to opening specialties (Q20), CART analysis, like factor analysis, is an empirical approach that analyzes the underlying covariance matrix. Accordingly, as a cross-check on our multivariate models, we ran a set of CART analyses to assess the robustness of our findings on key drivers, and to see what if any other variables might also be important in influencing support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties (see Figure 5.16).

The figure orders the questions from top to bottom in terms of their importance as predictors of Q20, support for or opposition to opening SOF specialties, based upon the amount of variance they explain; the length of the vertical lines connotes the amount of variance each question or variable explains in predicting responses on Q20. As shown in Figure 5.16, our CART analysis generally confirmed that a respondent’s assessment of women’s overall capabilities for SOF (Q25) was the most important predictor of support or opposition to opening SOF specialties (Q20). More specifically, a cut point of 2.5 on Q25 explains the most variance in Q20, while the other variables in the tree, with shorter vertical lines, explain smaller amounts of variance.

The next most important predictors also were related, directly or indirectly, to capabilities and future assessments: the belief that assigning women to the respondent’s SOF unit would improve the unit’s ability to conduct sensitive, low-profile operations, such as unconventional warfare (Q37); a respondent’s anticipated level of trust for women in a future unit that includes women (Q32); the belief that if women pulled their share of the load, then men would accept them as equals (Q36); and respondents’ levels of concern that the physical job standards for their specialties would be lowered (Q22).

Altogether, these five variables were able to correctly predict 75.5 percent of our respondents’ positions on Q20, somewhat better than the multivariate statistical models reported in Table 5.4, which correctly predicted about 67 percent of our respondents’ positions on Q20. On the other hand, unlike our multivariate statistical models, the CART analyses, being empirical, are not theory informed or theory driven: As with factor analysis, CART simply reports the result of its analysis of the underlying covariance structure.

We view as a quite favorable outcome the fact that the CART analysis generally echoes the basic findings of our factor analyses and our theory-driven multivariate statistical modeling, while also adding some interesting nuances that were not revealed by the multivariate models. On the latter point, perhaps of greatest interest is the reappearance of Q22, respondents’ level of concern that the physical job standards for their specialties would be lowered, as a predictor of support for opening SOF specialties to women, which was a factor that our other

67 For example, a value of 1.0 or 2.0 on Q25 (strongly or somewhat disagreeing that women would be capable of handling the demands of the respondent’s specialty) was the most important discriminator of support or opposition to opening SOF specialties to women, and a value of 1.0 to 4.0 on Q37 (not agreeing strongly that assigning women to the respondent’s unit would improve the unit’s ability to conduct sensitive, low-profile operations) was the second-most important discriminator of support or opposition.

We also ran a CART analysis that used a five-item index for capabilities, based on Q23, Q24, Q25, Q36, and Q37, with a similar result: That model revealed capabilities and the belief that if women pulled their share of the load, then men would accept them as equals (Q36).

68 The CART analysis also correctly predicted 92 percent of those who strongly opposed opening their specialties to women.
analyses suggested was very important but was not statistically significant in our multivariate statistical models. The CART result reinforces the importance of this belief.

**Conclusions and Policy Implications**

Our analyses of the results of the Women in SOF Survey suggest a number of conclusions and implications:

- There is strong opposition to opening SOF specialties that have been closed to women. Overall, 85 percent of respondents opposed letting women into their specialties, and 71 percent opposed women in their units. Although opposition exists across all services, elements, specialties, and rank groups, the data suggest that SEALs, AFSOC STT members, and NCOs are most strongly opposed.
- Maintaining high performance standards appears to be the most important criterion for successfully implementing the directive to open SOF specialties to women. However, there are significant doubts among special operators that women can meet the physical, mental, and overall job demands of closed SOF specialties, as well as pervasive concerns that performance standards will be lowered so that women can qualify. This concern appears to reflect a lack of confidence in USSOCOM leadership’s ability to successfully manage the issue of integrating women into SOF.69
- Only about four in ten respondents agreed with the proposition that women would be accepted if they carried their share of the load, with an equal number disagreeing. This suggests that respondents view performance standards as a necessary but not sufficient condition for accepting women into SOF.
- In a similar vein, given the poor quality of experiences working with U.S. military women in a combat environment that most respondents reported, it will be important to reset and create a new normal in special operators’ assessments to overcome the negative perceptions that currently prevail.
- Concerns about negative impacts on social cohesion, task cohesion, trust within the unit, and the availability of leaders to resolve conflict between unit members also fueled opposition.
- Nonetheless, about four in ten of our respondents agreed that women might be helpful in conducting sensitive operations and communicating with local populations. Accordingly, there is higher support, based on mission requirements, for attaching women in other specialties to SOF units and higher support for opening SOF units to women than there is support for opening currently closed SOF specialties to women.70 If the positions are indeed opened, then this might present USSOCOM with additional opportunities to integrate women into SOF beyond simply responding to the directive to open previously closed SOF specialties to women.

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69 See Chapter Three for a discussion of requirements for establishing gender-neutral performance standards.

70 Although many of our respondents reported an unfavorable experience working with U.S. military women in a combat environment, there might be higher support for attaching women in other specialties to SOF units due because it already is quite common to attach other specialties to SOF elements on a mission basis.
Thus, although the survey illuminates a wide range of challenges that USSOCOM is likely to face in opening SOF specialties to women, it also points to a range of paths that could help to manage these challenges and mitigate their impacts, all of which will require top-down support from USSOCOM senior leaders. We say more on this topic in the concluding chapter of this report.

The next chapter details the results of our focus group sessions with personnel in the same positions as those of survey respondents; these sessions were designed to provide additional depth and richness to the survey results.
A standardized survey has many advantages, but it also has limitations, in that it does not allow for the full range of nuances in views to register. Our survey included both closed- and open-ended questions and allowed us to use statistical analytical techniques to understand the concerns regarding the potential integration of women into SOF specialties. But we know that word limitations constrained some responses. To gain a richer understanding of the survey responses, we conducted a series of focus group discussions with SOF personnel in the positions closed to women.

We conducted a total of 49 focus groups (each lasting about an hour). The focus groups occurred from July 2014 through September 2014, and they involved every SOF service component, as well as personnel from all seven SOF specialties closed to women. The focus groups took place at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina; Coronado, California; Ft. Bragg, North Carolina; Ft. Benning, South Carolina; Hurlburt Field, Florida; Norfolk, Virginia; and Virginia Beach, Virginia. In total, 440 SOF personnel participated in the focus groups. Table 6.1 lists the breakdown of the focus group participants by grade. In total, the following SOF personnel participated: 91 junior enlisted personnel (E-1 to E-5); 240 senior enlisted personnel (E-6 to E-9); 29 warrant officers; 47 junior officers (O-1 to O-3); and 33 senior officers (O-4 to O-6).

Table 6.2 lists the breakdown of the focus group participants by USSOCOM component.

The focus group questions included a variety of topics.

- **Expectations regarding the potential impacts of integration:**
  - What will be the positive and negative impacts of integrating women into your SOF specialty?
  - How do you think the integration of women into your unit/team will impact:
    - Unit cohesion or trust among unit/team members?
    - Your individual morale and unit/team morale?
    - Your individual ability and your unit/team’s ability to perform the mission?
    - Your unit/team’s readiness?
  - Do you have any concerns about the impact of integrating women into your unit/team?
  - If women are allowed to serve in SOF, do you think the military will find it easier or more difficult to recruit good personnel than they do now? Why?
  - If women are allowed to serve in SOF, do you think the military will find it easier or more difficult to retain good personnel than they do now? Please explain.

- **Advice regarding implementation:**
**Table 6.1**  
Breakdown of Focus Group Participants by Grade  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Total Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.2**  
Breakdown of Focus Group Participants by USSOCOM Component  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USSOCOM Component</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Number of Focus Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSCOC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSOC</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Ranger</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army SF</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVSPECWARCOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWCC</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During integration of women into your specialty, what action(s) should be taken to address the concerns you have?

What other advice would you give to leaders if the decision is made to integrate women into SOF units/teams?

Are there specific actions that commanders can take to minimize any potential adverse impacts that integration might have on their units/teams?

During each focus group, at least two RAND research staff were present—one leading the session and the other taking comprehensive notes (in Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016, see Appendix P for the focus group oral consent form and Appendix Q for the focus group session questions). The substance of the comments did not vary depending on the gendered composition of the RAND team conducting the focus group sessions, although, on occasion, a few of the participants appeared to tone down their comments; they used less profanity when a woman was present. To ensure intercoder reliability, two RAND researchers then coded the notes from the 49 focus groups to systematically document participants’ responses, as well as identify any patterns across grade and SOF service component.

The dominant perspective across the focus groups was that women should not be integrated into SOF units and specialties, and some focus group participants were highly emotional about the topic of integration. For example, in one focus group, to demonstrate that women are not suitable for SOF positions, one participant gave the RAND team a set of images of male and female animal species to demonstrate his point that men and women are biologically different and that they have different roles. For other participants, their views on gender integration were very personal:

I have a ten-year-old daughter, I tell her, you can do whatever you want . . . except [this: pointing at his SEAL insignia]. [Laughter] (E-9, SEAL)

If my daughter wanted to do it, if that was her dream, I’d want her to get it—but do not drop the standards to cheapen her dream. (E-6, MARSOC)

I have two daughters who are very good at SWCC stuff, and I tell them not to let standards dictate what they can or can’t do. I tell them that they have to get what they want out of life and never let anyone tell them no. I don’t see women demanding that they be able to enter the Special Forces, but if they really wanted to, this is what they would do. (W-3, SWCC)

But the standards must remain the same [emphatic]. We can’t coddle them. I wouldn’t want my daughter to join and go for SF, but wouldn’t coddle her if she did. (E-7, SF)

While there were SOF-service component specific comments, there was a great deal of unanimity of views and similarities in issues and concerns across SOF. We have thematically organized the comments from focus group participants and added specific quotes to illustrate the themes and subthemes, identifying the participant by grade and SOF component.

We stress that some of the comments reported in this chapter might not be factually true; they might be based on hearsay or on one-sided interpretations and biases. However, the comments represent perceptions of SOF personnel as they chose to share with us, and they illustrate the depth and emotion attached to the views.
**Expectations Regarding the Potential Impact of Integrating Women into SOF**

The focus group discussions centered on the impact of gender integration on individuals, units, and the SOF community as a whole. Most of the participants had conducted operations with CSTs and FETs and used their experiences with these units—both positive and negative—as reference points for considering integration.

**Positive Impact**

Discussions in all of the focus groups tended to revolve around the potential negative impacts of integration, with only a small minority of comments referring to potential positive impacts. The comments about positive impacts were usually followed with the caveat that the positive impacts applied only under a very narrow set of circumstances. However, potential positive impacts were noted across a wide range of grades and SOF service components, and the themes were (1) how women could enhance a limited set of niche missions, and (2) that women could access a different demographic and a different set of skills.

**Women Could Enhance a Limited Set of Niche Missions**

In each focus group, there were some observations made that women had enhanced some unit functions in specific situations. When asked to identify a potential positive impact of integration, participants were most likely to say, across focus groups, that women could enhance some missions, including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and provide access to populations denied to male SOF members.

There are positives. We do have female enablers. There are soft skill areas where this could work. (O-2, Rangers)

The intel role (18F) might be viable. I’ve had both good and bad experiences with the CSTs. But when they were good, they were very good. (E-7, SF)

There could be positives for positions not in the line. Maybe for intel or S5 [operations]. Right now, we’re missing out on intelligent, hard-working, high performing females. (E-6, Rangers)

I think we are selling ourselves short by not opening it up to the best individuals. There are some positives. In some countries, two gorilla [extremely muscular men], tattooed men would look suspicious. But me and [a woman] walking down the street holding hands would not. It opens up new possibilities. (E-6, MARSOC)

However, participants were quick to caveat that women should not be integrated organically into SOF teams as operators, but instead should be used as niche enablers.

It’s better off having them [women] as attachments rather than focusing on their having the same MOS. They’re there for a specific job, like engaging with females in other countries. (E-6, MARSOC)

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1 The caution in this statement about bad experiences pertained to such issues as fraternization and lack of experience in combat situations, and there was broad consensus on these caveats among those in the focus groups who saw the potential of increased capabilities.
Fill specific roles that would bring capacity to missions. But I think that would be a better way to incorporate them into SOF—focusing in on their strengths, as opposed to broad-brush stroke of opening up everything to women. (E-9, SEAL)

There are lots of benefits in the intel world in niche roles; we’ve all seen this. But the broad stroke is bad. (E-6, AFSOC)

I had a female intelligence officer, to get intel. She was pulled from the company because there were concerns about her being with SOF, which was a shame, because she was a good intel officer. She wasn’t going to pull heavy loads, but she was good at her job. They have access we don’t in most cases. That’s the way to go. But to put them in the team, to put them through the exact same training as shooters, five-day patrols—that’s when we’ll run into the physical differences between men and women. (E-7, MARSOC)

I don’t think there would be any benefits not already provided by FETs. I don’t think there’s anything a trident-wearing female could provide that a non–trident-wearing woman could not. (O-3, SEAL)

The performance of the CSTs and FETs had influenced some of the focus group participants to conclude that women could provide an additional capability that would be useful.

The CSTs are successes. Build them up as a tool. But not in the team room unless it is necessary. Then it is a completely different dynamic. Shape capabilities better in support MOSs rather than organic [concentrate on improving the capabilities in the combat support occupations rather than trying to place those capabilities into SOF combat units]. Right now, CSTs are without a career path, used late, underutilized, no MOS. But we can use them. But in an ODA [Operational Detachment–Alpha]—it’s a terrible idea. (W-2, SF)

In certain aspects, I defaulted to FET because they have the medical, intel piece. If you had something similar to those units, once again appeasing both sides, not jeopardizing standards of SEAL teams, we call them the enablers. . . . I think if we utilized nurses, intel, linguists, maybe come up with a pool of certain enablers, I think that could help out [USSOCOM]. (E-9, SEAL)

**Access to a Different Demographic and Set of Skills**

Some focus group participants also emphasized that a positive impact of opening SOF specialties and units would be tapping into a different demographic and set of skills, as well as it filling personnel shortages. Some said that, ultimately, they want the best skill sets available for the task—regardless of whether that person is male or female.

Most would agree we’re selling ourselves short on not having females in certain roles. I want the best people at their job in every position in the [Ranger] Regiment. (E-6, Rangers)

Diversity. Other perspectives, outlook. Different approaches to problem solving. (E-5, AFSOC)

I believe there is a place for women in our unit, for certain aspects of what we do. Some are better suited than we are as men, in some aspects. (E-8, MARSOC)
One positive is that it gives us an additional demographic for recruitment. We’re undermanned. They [women] could fill roles less attractive to some of us, like supply. (E-4, Ranger)

Another positive is that it might help to push other needed changes. We are inefficient in many ways. They might bring a different perspective. (E-4, Rangers)

Studies show that females are more detail oriented. They have good organizational skills. We could improve the infrastructure in the battalions—that’s a positive. (E-4, Rangers)

A more senior member of the Ranger Regiment echoed this sentiment, but approached it more from a standpoint of employment of optimizing the skill set of the unit:

We could have an ops/support split like others (Delta). Standards should be appropriate for the job. On one deployment I made a [U.S. Air Force] female the J2 over a Ranger. You just need to use the best people for each job. We could modify selection and assessment to make this happen. . . . Same unit, same mission. As it is, we bleed talent to other units, and they police it up. (O-4 Ranger)

Negative Impact
There was overwhelming consensus that the integration of women into SOF units would have major negative impact. Three broad categories of impact were identified from the comments of participants: (1) impact on mission effectiveness, (2) impact on future missions, and (3) impact on cohesion and morale. There was also general agreement across the focus groups that there were too many drawbacks to integration and that women did not add any capabilities that do not already exist.

Impacts on Mission Effectiveness
One of the most dominant themes in the focus groups was that integration could have negative impacts on mission effectiveness. Participants cited concerns related to the physical and mental ability of women to conduct SOF missions and impacts on cohesion and unit readiness. The specific concerns of participants are discussed later in this chapter.

Impact on Future Missions
There was widespread concern expressed that as integrating women into all SOF specialties is being considered, the nature of current and anticipated SOF missions is not understood or is not being correctly evaluated. Despite the numerous comments about the performance of CSTs and FETs in Iraq and Afghanistan, some participants cautioned that this was not an appropriate and forward-looking way of considering future operations. In particular, some participants emphasized that integration needs to be considered in light of potential future conflicts with near-peer adversaries.

If your point of view is focused on opportunities in the last ten years of combat for females, these are self-evident. But for ten years we’ve been fighting people 800 years behind the rest of the world. If we’re fighting near-peers, the focus should be on finding the extreme of endurance for the hardest missions. Why would you voluntarily reduce capability? (O-4, SEAL)
The combat we face right now is not the same as others—the U.S. is the best trained, best equipped, and up against the dumbest enemies. Not even close to fights in the past. Today, the U.S. couldn’t mentally accept 3,000 deaths at beachhead infiltration. Someday, the U.S. will find itself fighting a real enemy. (O-4, SF)

Avoid wars with any very valid enemies out there. Do not let Russia or China cause a fight. (E-8, MARSOC)

This concern was repeated in different services and pay grades. Junior enlisted personnel indicated that they have seen evidence of new mission planning in their training regimens, and several of them emphasized that the future operational environment might not have the mature infrastructure that was in place during the later years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Our training cycle has already changed for the next war. We’re looking at patrols lasting for weeks, not operating on FOBs [forward operating bases]. More like 2003–2004 Iraq. Not FOBs and helos. (E-5, Rangers)

The issue isn’t if we’re in nice big bases in Iraq or Afghanistan [e.g., based in a mature theater, with developed infrastructure] with latrines and nice facilities. What about when we go to different areas? (E-5, MARSOC)

**Impact on Cohesion and Morale**

Many participants also expressed misgivings that this policy was being forced on the SOF community in a top-down approach and that the imposition of gender equality would have an adverse effects on the cohesion of small SOF teams, as well as on the outlooks of many of the special operators. There were numerous opinions that the accomplishment of being screened and selected for SOF units would be diminished if there were pressure to select women and graduate them from training programs.

It’s a slap in the face telling us that chicks can do our job. It’s not the physical aspect that bothers me. My issues are morale and retention. This wouldn’t be special to anyone anymore. (E-4, Rangers)

Special Forces will stop being looked at as elite. (E-8, SF)

Participants listed several effects of what they considered to be an imposed equality, including low retention and breakdowns in trust and unit cohesion. These effects are discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections of this chapter.

**Drawbacks Without Additional Capability**

There was also widespread concern throughout the various service components and pay grades that there was no benefit to be gained for the effort and cost required to integrate effectively. During the focus groups, several participants asked, “Is the juice worth the squeeze?” They questioned whether integration was worth the numerous costs they foresee in manpower, mission effectiveness, and budget.

We can train our way out of these issues. I’m sure enough PowerPoint briefs can train Marines not to do it, but then we’re back to: Is the juice worth the squeeze? Is it worth it to...
retool everything to get one or two females into it, to change all the teams, is it worth it? (O-3, MARSOC)

Is the juice worth the squeeze? If we’re talking about 0.5 percent of the population for females who even want to join, to be a SWCC or SEAL, is it worth trying to implement, fight through all the struggles: manning, facilities, cohesion, spousal issues? (E-8, SWCC)

How does it help us? Is the juice worth the squeeze? (E-7, Rangers)

At the end of the day . . . for that one psychotic woman—exactly just as psychotic as we are—is it worth all of this? (E-6, SEAL)

Many others indicated their belief that the SOF community was already integrated. CSTs, FETs, and female “enablers” were frequently referenced as examples of women already contributing to the mission. Most of those participants were quick to point out that inserting women with redundant skill sets into small units would upset cohesion and morale.

We already have CST. It’s a good capability, but it already exists. Don’t force me to take something I don’t need. Don’t evolve CST to ODA. (E-6, SF)

Why are we changing from women on attachment to women in our MOS? Attachments work and will cause few issues at home with my wife. Attachments have worked well. I don’t understand the need. There are more negatives than positives. (E-6, SF)

What is the benefit of adding a female to the team? What am I gaining by opening things to females that we don’t already have? (E-5, MARSOC)

What does a female provide, that if the need should arise, couldn’t already be filled by some sort of support role? (E-5, MARSOC)

The following section discusses the specific concerns that were raised regarding the integration of women into SOF specialties and units.

**Concerns Regarding the Integration of Women into SOF Specialties and Units**

The main concerns expressed by focus group participants included:

- the potential impact on standards
- integration is a political decision, and SOF is being used as a social experiment
- it is unclear what additional capabilities women would provide
- the ability of women to do the job
- favoritism
- the potential impact on cohesion
- women might be a distraction
- the potential impact on families
- female medical issues
- issues related to the deployability of women
• the potential impact on working with some foreign partners
• the potential impact on the image of SOF teams
• changes to facilities
• additional screening and training
• the impact of female fatalities
• what will happen to women who integrate into SOF.

As one Marine noted:

None of this is coming from us just because we’re bigots. These are well thought out points. It’s not just that we don’t want women. (E-5, MARSOC)

Impact on Physical Fitness Standards
The most dominant set of concerns centered on the potential impact of integration on physical fitness standards. Participants expressed concern that standards might be lowered or changed because woman cannot physically meet them, and there might be pressure to push women through training to achieve quotas or demonstrate success. In addition, some participants claimed that standards had already been lowered for other minorities and were concerned that the same would happen for women.

Physical Fitness Standards Might Be Lowered
The overwhelming view among participants across focus groups was that women could not meet current standards and that, as a result, standards would inevitably be lowered.

I know there are women who can do this, but they are few and far between compared to men. I’m not being an a—hole about it; just a realist. The average male in here could pick one another up, but my wife couldn’t do that. Will the standards change, is my biggest concern. (E-6, MARSOC)

If the standards are the same and they get through, I wouldn’t have a problem. But if they maintain the standards, I don’t see how women could get through. (O-3, SEAL)

The single most common point raised by the participants was that physical fitness standards should not be lowered.

The standards can’t be dropped. People will end up dying if the standards are lower, because the standards are very relevant to our jobs. (O-3, SEAL)

[Standards can’t change]—it makes or breaks the introduction of women. (O-5, SEAL)

They can’t lower the standards. SOF can’t be mass-produced. If they change the standards—it’s not who we are. (E-6, MARSOC)

If a female can’t perform to current standards, it doesn’t change the job. Now, you give a person who is weak, someone who should’ve been removed but [was not] because of standards not being upheld . . . what do we do? (E-6, MARSOC)

In order for women to be truly—well, somewhat—accepted, they must go through the same training pipeline we all did, without changing the standards. (E-8, SEAL)
Many participants also expressed concerns that there would be pressure to push women through training, and, as a result, standards would be lowered. In particular, many participants said that they thought that standards would be lowered in an attempt to demonstrate success or to achieve quotas. There was a concern that the intent to maintain standards is simply lip service. For many of these respondents, the crux of their concerns revolved around letting women apply for these positions, because that would mark the beginning of a slippery slope, which some respondents believed would lead to an erosion of standards.

My biggest fear is that, when implemented, the program must be successful. Females will need to train up. We’ll all look bad if it fails, therefore the standards will be lowered. (E-7, SF)

One of the biggest concerns: Is it just saying open spots to women, or are they going to be forced through? (E-5, SEAL)

At some point, they’ll say: you have to allow this person to graduate, regardless of whether they’re able to. (E-6, MARSOC)

I have nothing against letting them in, but the standards can’t change. And I think we would need to lower them. If people really want to see a female graduate, it will be a problem. (E-6, SF)

Even if you say standards didn’t change, people will be skeptical that they made it through on their own. When they [leaders] don’t get the product they want, we’ll change the standards. It will lower the bar for all students. (E-6, Rangers)

This seems like a desire to make the exception the rule. Everyone knows a female could make it through physically. Once they’re here, if only a few make it through, then there will be complaints of unfairness. Standards will diminish. (O-3, Rangers)

If they keep the standards, there will be no problems. But if they open it up, there will be women who don’t make it through Infantry Training Battalion. And when a politician says, “Hey, I voted for this. Why are there no results?” Then they’ll lower the standards. (E-6, MARSOC)

There will be pressure from the top. Once we figure out how the standards will work with women, we will still need to figure out where the hotspots are. Hotspots are those portions of training that might be unsuitable for women, but when every single one of those hotspots is removed, the training will become inferior to what came before. (O-4, SEAL)

Some respondents expressed concerns that standards would be lowered because trainers and commanders would face pressure to push women through training.

Trainers may be unwilling to push the most vulnerable button for women because they are women. The trainers would be afraid of sexual harassment or discrimination and so the training would not be at the same level. (E-4, SEAL)

Standards absolutely will change due to equal opportunity complaints. The biggest fear for a commanding officer is an equal opportunity charge. (O-3, SF)
Standards will change. An O-6 is not going to want to answer questions about why a female was kicked out of the SEALs. The standards will change. (E-7, SEAL)

Comparison to the Integration of Other Minorities
Some respondents expressed concerns that standards for women would be lowered, because in their view, standards have already been lowered for other minorities. The implication from these comments is that other minority groups have received preferential treatment (including lowering standards) to achieve particular quotas and that the same would be done for women.

If one makes it, people will ask why the other two didn’t. There will be scrutiny; standards will lower. Just like when we were told we need more minorities. (E-9, SEAL)

I was at the schoolhouse for three years, and I have been told to suck the egg before. There is extra attention given in sensitive areas like this. In order to keep the numbers up, flags pop up when minorities fail, and higher-ups want them to get through the training. This leads to some compromises in training standards. (W-3, SWCC)

This has been done for minorities as well. Graduate rates were down, so we removed the swim requirement. PT [physical training] scores were modified. (E-9, SF)

This already happens. You hear people say, “We have to promote this many minorities.” What’s going to happen if not enough females fit the requirements? She’s going to get promoted when she’s substandard, over ten other guys that meet the standards. (E-6, MARSOC)

I saw the same thing with blacks back in the day; standards changed to accommodate blacks. (E-9, SEAL)

Related to this, some respondents also claimed that, as with other minorities, women would be stereotyped because of the perception that they passed lower standards.

Currently, there are already negative stereotypes associated with nonwhites who made it through on the basis of the perception that they had easier training. This will be even worse with women. (O-3, SEAL)

This [pressure to lower standards] hurts them [minorities] and others because the people who could pass the higher standards end up only passing the lowered standard and have an asterisk with their reputation. (E-6, SWCC)

Integration Is a Political Decision and a Social Experiment
A dominant perception across all of the SOF components and across all ranks and grades was that the decision to open SOF specialties and units to women is politically motivated, and not driven by operational needs. Many participants expressed frustration that the decision was due to politicians pursuing political agendas.

This is a political thing. This is people in Congress. Because there is no grassroots movement of women saying we want to. It’s some congressmen trying to make equal rights for

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2 In the late 1990s, there was a debate regarding the causes of underrepresentation of minorities, especially African Americans in SOF. See Harrell, Nataraj, et al., 1999.
women. Whether anyone in this room wants to say it or not, that’s what I think we all think. (E-6, MARSOC)

Bringing in women would lead to a loss of many men, and we don’t want to be socially engineered by politicians. (E-4, SEAL)

It’s good that society pursues equality, but SF shouldn’t be a petri dish. (E-7, SF)

There was a political decision of: It’s equal rights. But if they would tell us, “we need 15 women in special operations for this specific reason,” I think you’d get a better response. (E-6, MARSOC)

No one is willing to say that the guy to the right of me is less valuable than a social experiment. What are we doing right now that requires a female in that position? Are you prepared to tell her there are things she can’t do? (W-5, SEAL)

**What Capability Gap Do Women Fill?**

One of the most dominant concerns we heard was that no one has explained what the operational requirements are for introducing women into SOF specialties and units. Many participants expressed frustration that this was a decision that was being imposed on them, and they did not, ultimately, understand how and why the integration of women would improve mission effectiveness.

What are we doing or not doing, right now, that would require this change? (E-7, SF)

We almost feel owed for someone in Washington to tell us why, what we’re spending, why are you doing this, what will women add to the teams? Because I’ve never heard someone say, “If you bring women into the teams, we’ll have this.” (E-5, SEAL)

It’s being force-fed something people don’t understand. It’s not that’s something we do or don’t want—it’s something we don’t understand. (E-6, MARSOC)

Show me how they [women] improve the [Ranger] Regiment. It has been a failure integrating females in other units before. I know they can’t do the real world mission. I need to count on people to perform when asked. (E-8, SF)

In particular, many participants wanted to know what capability women would bring to the fight.

I want to know the reason behind it. That drives the process. If it is a capability gap, what is it: If equality, then it’s nonsense. Women are not created equal. I know bad-a-s women, but even they can’t do it. (E-6, SF)

If you can show me how putting women in there is going to make that mission easier to accomplish, then I’ll support it all day long. But if you tell me it’s about making people feel better about themselves, or as a social experiment, I’ll never support it. (E-6, MARSOC)

This isn’t driven by an operational need. We haven’t seen a deficiency where a female with a trident would’ve helped. (O-4, SEAL)
What is the point to all this? To fill a perceived gap within our battalion, or is it just promoting a political agenda? Because if it’s a gap, there is no gap. If we need a female presence, we get that [through a FET]. (E-6, MARSOC)

Why won’t someone tell us why women will strengthen us? (E-5, SEAL)

Some participants suggested the need to first identify the capability gap and then think about if and how women might fill those gaps.

Just like any other acquisition of gear or new program, the first question we must ask is, “What is the benefit of doing it?” What are we getting out of it, other than to appease this public opinion that there is a strong feminist movement in America today, that “I can do whatever a man can do”? (E-5, MARSOC)

I think the first step is: We have to clearly define what it is we want; what is the end product. Otherwise, we’re just spinning our wheels trying to get a mythical creature we haven’t defined. (E-7, MARSOC)

Changes like this should come from the bottom up. If there is a need, we should identify it. (E-6, AFSC)

We really have to ask, “Is there a gap to be filled?” Are we lacking something? If it’s in the name of political correctness or progress, I don’t think that’s a valid-enough argument. (E-6, SEAL)

The Ability of Women to Do the Job
The majority of participants across the focus groups expressed concerns that women would not be able to carry out all of the tasks that are required in their MOSs.

I have nothing against women. If they can put up a woman now that can beat the numbers and do my job, I’d be thrilled to work with her. But the statistics—these women can’t even do eight pull-ups. (E-6, MARSOC)

I think for me, it’s always going to be in the back of my mind: Can this woman do the job? I don’t care what she’s shown me, what she’s done. There’s always going to be that trust factor in the back of my mind. (E-8, SWCC)

We talk about how SOF is supposed to provide a level of economy that general-purpose forces can’t. That’s based off physical abilities of a very small set of guys. We may all have individual skill sets we contribute, but we are expected to be on the same level physically. If we start opening up slots and there are special quotas for females, what are we compromising in terms of our ground capabilities? (E-5, MARSOC)

Some participants indicated that their concerns stemmed from their personal experiences with women in combat and training situations.

Teaching women tactics is like training a 12-year-old. . . . During the event, when the firing began, the women put down their weapons and yelled, “Stop! It’s too loud”—even with ear protection. (E-6, SF)
Women are very protective. They nurture kids. Will a woman return fire and kill a child insurgent fighter? In Iraq, we were ten to 15 kilometers ahead of the element. The female coalition soldiers would not return fire because there were kids in the crowd. It will happen in the ODA because women are protective creatures. (E-5, SF)

Some participants also expressed concerns that if women cannot meet the standards, it will cause downstream manning implications.

If women were to come in, we would have to drop plug and play and give everyone their own specialties, because there are some specialties that women could not do. This will lead to bottlenecks. (E-5, SWCC)

**Physical Requirements of the Job**

Many participants discussed their skepticism that women could perform the physical requirements of the job and that additional manpower requirements would be needed to compensate for women. Concerns specific to each SOF component are discussed later in this chapter.

A 50-caliber [machine gun] is not a light weapon. Our guys now throw it on the boat by themselves. If you need two people to do those things, it increases workload, manpower requirements. (W-2, SWCC)

Physical ability is the biggest concern. Lifting a 40-caliber [gun] on to a truck is a two-man job, frequently done by one man in theater. (E-7, SF)

If I’m shot—I’m 220 pounds without gear—what female is going to carry me out in a timely manner? That’s a showstopper because any of the guys in this room right now could do it. (E-7, SEAL)

Some participants also expressed concern that they would need to provide additional force protection for women—thus requiring more manpower.

In our operational environment, where we work, a woman is a liability. Women are a sideshow. We need additional security to protect her. (E-6, SF)

A lot of time, we have smaller teams—two or four people. If three are male and one is female, now you’ve got to put her in a separate location. You have completely separate force protection concern that you have to take into account downrange (W-2, SWCC)

**Missions Are Harder Than Training Standards**

A common theme across the SOF components was that combat missions are far more demanding than training. Therefore, training standards should only be viewed as the minimum requirements necessary for the job.

You have to have trust in the team member to do the job, keep it together on a mission. The schoolhouse doesn’t take you there. Combat is the only way to get you there. (O-4, Rangers)

The PT test is a horrible measure of the ability to do the job. (E-6, Rangers)
Training is just the baseline. After that, there is even more-intense training, and I doubt that women can actually handle that. (E-7, SWCC)

I know females who could make it through the training, but I don’t know one who could do the combat operations. (E-8, SF)

It is important to remember that training is only an indicator of how well someone could perform in combat. It does not actually simulate combat. (O-4, SEAL)

Most look at BUD/S as the end all, be all. It’s not. The training here and operations are much worse. BUD/S is a sliver of what we do. (E-7, SEAL)

Ask any of us when we were the coldest, the most challenged, the most tired. . . . It wasn’t at BUD/S. You still have to prove yourself after BUD/S. (O-3, SEAL)

**Favoritism**
A general concern voiced by many participants was that women would be treated with favoritism on a number of fronts, including training, promotion, and allegations of sexual harassment.

I’m concerned about favoritism for promotion, forced standards. Say I get dropped to a new team. If there’s a female master sergeant who, in my opinion, doesn’t rate to be there, because I knew other master sergeants that have combat experience. But they wanted a female team chief, so they can write in a paper that they have one. (E-6, MARSOC)

Favoritism is a problem as well. Females may use their position to their advantage. (E-7, SF)

And it happens now. They go cry wolf, claim, “I’m being treated unfairly” . . . and now you’re adding the “I’m a woman” card. I don’t feel any policies can be effective for integration. (E-5, MARSOC)

**Impact on Cohesion**
The potential impact on cohesion weighed heavily on the minds of many focus group participants. In particular, many participants had concerns about the impact that the integration of women might have on small-team dynamics.

There are still issues of cohesion. The ways we talk and relate to each other are going to change. It’s a scientific fact, when you put a woman in the room, the way men act changes. (O-3, MARSOC)

I’m concerned about the social dynamics. Females are used against males in SERE [Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape] to break that dynamic and bond. (E-6, AFSOC)

At the Tactical Operations Center, the dynamic changes immediately as soon as a woman is introduced among the men. The men start acting like idiots. (O-4, SWCC)

This is a recipe for disaster. The team dynamics will change. It happened all seven times I had CSTs downrange. (E-9, SF)

In our MOS, our specialty, there’s a brotherhood-type bond amongst guys. A standard of respect, an understanding of what we went through to get here. If you add a female into
the mix, we’d have issues with—there’s a closeness, an understanding of how we treat, talk, relate to each other. (E-6, MARSOC)

I don’t care how manly or aggressive this chick may be. If you add her into a small unit of guys going out to look for a firefight, to look to kill somebody, it will change things. From the dynamics of how the unit works, to—just the attitude will be different. And I firmly believe we will not be as effective, and it will result in the loss of future lives. (E-5, SEAL)

Men act different around females. When a female is brought into a room of alpha males—for a female to get along with a group of males—it’s not just being able to do the job, but be part of the group, the brotherhood. I don’t think it can work. (E-5, SEAL)

Women increase drama among men. . . . Drama will eventually be detrimental to unit cohesion. (E-8, SEAL)

Some participants emphasized the unique bonds associated with small teams and that those bonds could be broken if a women were inserted into the teams.

I think it would completely unravel the fabric of that small unit. The cohesive nature of a small unit is going to unravel. (E-6, MARSOC)

We verbally berate each other without reason sometimes, just because it’s funny. . . . With a female, if a comment came across, and she doesn’t take it as she’s supposed to, as a team person, it won’t go well for her. It just won’t. (E-4, SEAL)

It’s not about the [vulgar] language; it’s about the environment that creates. Now [with women present] we can’t just sit around and be men. It’s not about the language itself—that’d be easy. (O-3, MARSOC)

There’s what you go through in training and your official time, and then you have the locker room bonding, the team space bonding, the guys messing around. As strange as it sounds, someone slapping someone with a towel in the shower—that’s an element of the male cohesive unit. (O-3, SEAL)

**Walking on Eggshells**

One of the main concerns among participants was that if women were introduced to SOF units and specialties, men would need to censor their language or their behavior—or, as many of them put it, “walk on eggshells.”

This is a brotherhood. There are places for them [women], but this isn’t one of them. They cause drama, especially on deployment. I worked with CSTs while on deployment. It made a big difference as to how people acted. (E-4, Rangers)

War is really ugly—it takes a certain type of person. And it takes a certain psychology for coping with that. The brutality of war will not change. Infantry operations require outlets for coping without equal opportunity problems. (O-2, Rangers)

You can’t be as hard on girls as you are on guys. The atmosphere is highly competitive, which then leads to sexual harassment claims. . . . Then leadership has to deal with the claims. The troops say “screw this.” (E-8, SWCC)
If I was to say to X, stop being a pussy, that would be classified as a sexist comment, and then I’d have to worry about political correctness. Just like if I were to say, “stop being gay.” I don’t mean it in a degrading way, but now I have to worry about offending someone. (O-3, MARSOC)

Some participants also discussed the potential operational consequences of having to walk on eggshells.

We will always be walking on eggshells and second-guessing everything. This cannot happen in combat, or else capabilities will be degraded. (E-5, SWCC)

Guys would be afraid to say thing they say on a daily basis, just joking around. That might translate operationally. (O-3, SEAL)

**Concerns Regarding Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Allegations**

On a related theme, many participants expressed concerns that they would need to change their language or their behavior to avoid sexual harassment and sexual assault allegations.

We don’t have the time or patience to deal with thinking about how we walk or talk around females. It’s not part of our nature. It will definitely impact the timeliness of our jobs, our state of mind, and the complete surrounding in the teams. We are expected to be misogynistic. That is our job. (E-7, SEAL)

We become combat effective because we are politically incorrect. Sexual assault training is already taking away strength. There is no need to fix something that isn’t broken. (E-6, SWCC)

If you have a problem with other men in your platoon, you can just fight it out, or beat him up. But with women, they will pull the sexual assault card and that will no longer be possible. This will change the way business is done. (E-6, SWCC)

“Women in the kitchen”—they are more sensitive for hazing. There will be more claims of sexual harassment—even if it’s not sexual harassment. “Quit bitching” is not gendered, but might be seen as such. This will lower trust because we’ll have to step lightly. (E-5, SF)

Small teams absolutely must bond. But sexual harassment and assault are very public issues right now. Guys would be walking on eggshells. (E-8, SF)

Some participants also expressed concerns about how physical contact during training and operations might lead to allegations of sexual harassment or sexual assault.

A lot of the training we do is very close physically. One of the standards is the buddy tow. You have to swim over, grab around the chest, and swim to the other side. Quite literally right across the chest, so is that going to be an issue? Another example is SERE school. Commonly, people spoon each other to stay warm. (E-7, SWCC)

I’ve been intimately very close to men trying to stay warm. Nothing sexual about it. We were freezing. What about when a woman gets here? Are we supposed to say no because she’s a woman, or yes because she’s part of the team. (E-4, SEAL)
Stripped down and buddy spooning. . . . Can’t imagine girls would be comfortable with that . . . in mud and puke. (E-5, SEAL)

One participant recounted a story about how the fear of sexual harassment affected behavior in a combat situation.

We’ve done medical training, and the first step is, take all the person’s clothing off so you can check he’s not bleeding out any more. I’ve seen an Army girl bleed out after an airstrike because no one did that. Everyone was afraid to touch her, to take her pants off, afraid of sexual harassment suits, and she died. (E-7, SEAL)

Other participants were concerned that integration might lead to more sexual assault cases, and they expressed puzzlement about DoD’s emphasis on reducing sexual harassment in units and yet seemingly moving forward with integrating women into combat units in a way that would likely increase sexual harassment.

We’re trying to get rid of rape and sexual assault, but now we are going to put Melissa right in the front lines [in the Marine infantry units]? You have knuckle-dragging dudes there, and have them get back from combat, and then she takes a shower. You can’t say, “let’s go forward with this; we’ll bring down sexual assault by doing this.” (E-6, MARSOC)

Potential Impact on the Image of SOF
A major concern across all of the SOF components was the negative impact that the integration of women might have on the SOF image. Specific concerns across the SOF components are discussed later in this chapter.

You’d have to rewrite everything SEALs have worked for, the ethos: Men have fought and died building the proud tradition and feared reputation that I am bound to uphold. Honestly, I feel like a female portrays weakness. (E-5, SEAL)

Men are attracted to the idea of joining a brotherhood, a special all-male fighting force. Diminish the reputation of the team, then it’s mission failure because we’re not prepared to answer national-level missions because we don’t have the right manpower and training to complete tasks. (O-3, SEAL)

The first SOF component to let women in is going to be labeled weak. (E-6, MARSOC)

Some participants were also concerned about how adversaries might view SOF after integration.

This is an alpha-male specially selected environment. They believe they are the best of the best. Perception is reality—people won’t believe they are as bada-s as they were. And adversaries will know that. It [integration] will degrade how we look at each other, but also how bad guys look at us. (E-4, Rangers)

When people think of SOF, we are the alpha males of the warfighting community. The apex predator on the battlefield. If you are on the other side of the fence, what are you scared of? Guys like us coming in at night with guns. Females are seen as second class. Integrating females will be seen as a sign of weakness. They are going to lose their fear of us. (E-6, MARSOC)
If any of your sons or daughters are captured and held captive by evil people, do you want a bunch of girls to go get them or a bunch of pipe-beating SEALs to rescue them? (W-4, SEAL)

**Women May Be a Distraction**

Participants also expressed concern that woman might be a distraction from the mission. In particular, participants emphasized that fraternization would be inevitable and that men might behave differently toward women to protect them from harm.

When I’m on a team and deployed, I want these guys . . . to be aggressive alpha males at all times. I don’t want them to shy away from that. Adding a female to the mix is going to be a distraction. They’re just going to try to impress the female, to compete for her attention. It will cause issues. (O-3, MARSOC)

Introducing women will affect good order and discipline and any distraction will take away from the mission. (E-9, SWCC)

I deal with 21- to 30-year-old guys in my unit. Half of them are single, getting in trouble and chasing women on weekends. It is hard enough to keep them focused. Now I would have to deal with this within the unit, and we haven’t even gotten to mission preps and execution yet. (E-6, AFSOC)

SOF is dealing with suicides and domestic violence. We’re trying to heal after 12 years of combat. Now we’ll have additional pressures. (E-7, Rangers)

I’m sure there are females out there who can do it, but I would definitely worry about the culture. It changes the interactions between people, even between males. It’s a distraction that is not useful. (O-4, SF)

Some participants emphasized that they are already busy and that the integration of women might take up even more of their time.

We’ve got enough s--t to do. It’s going to absorb thousands upon thousands of man-hours to get people within SOF to accept women in SOF. That’s the reality. We got enough s--t to do. We don’t have enough time to deal with this. (E-7, SWCC)

It’s going to take the focus off the mission. And of the million things you’ve got on your to-do list, now it’s problem number one. (O-3, SEAL)

All of these consequences require time. We are at 100-percent effort as it is. The effort to deal with this would need to come from other areas [for example, training]. There would be significant impact on what a leader would have time to do. (O-2, Rangers)

This will be a large drain on time. When something happens, we’ll get the Army answer: seven hours of EO [equal opportunity] training. We’ll lose time on actual training. (E-7, Rangers)

The 90-plus–hour work week is normal around here. Having females around would be a distraction. It would be a constant leadership challenge to deal with romantic relationships, etc. (O-2, Rangers)
**Fraternization**
Participants across rank and SOF component expressed concerns about inevitable fraternization and the consequences.

We can’t train the romantic or sexual relationships out of people. Guys will have less trust, and this will lead to a drop in proficiency. (O-3, Rangers)

CSTs are always used as the example in these discussions. I have not been on one deployment where CSTs were not sleeping with someone or got caught up in something like that. Marriages have ended over having CSTs out there. (O-3, Rangers)

The guidance seems to just be “make sure you’re professional.” But in my opinion the CSTs were terrible. There is a primal quality to life on deployment; it just doesn’t work. (O-3, SF)

If you put a female in that environment, the natural attraction is for men to be attracted to women. You can talk about professionalism, but “keep your d--k in your pants” won’t be enough when the attraction goes both ways. (E-5, MARSOC)

**Men Might Protect Women**
Some participants also expressed concern that women would be a distraction because men might act differently toward women because they may want to protect them from harm. For instance, some participants indicated that the mission might be compromised because some men might prioritize the lives of women on their teams above mission accomplishment.

They’re sisters, not colleagues—always something to watch out for. (E-8, SEAL)

It’s in men’s nature. Women will get more attention. In combat, if a woman gets hurt, men may drop what they are doing to help her. (E-6, SF)

It’s genetically instilled in men to protect women. Having that situation in a combat situation would prove deadly to the unit. (O-3, SEAL)

Some participants cited specific examples of how men had protected women in training or combat situations.

On one deployment, we had a female intel specialist working with us. [One of the men] completely lost effectiveness. He was more concerned about protecting the female. (E-7, SF)

In survival training, people helped the females. If they were stuck at certain parts, you just give them a hand. If it had been a guy, we probably would’ve watched them struggle and laugh. (E-8, AFSOC)

I was raised to take care of a female, open doors for a female, to nurture and provide. When I look at this other O-4, I don’t worry about him. But if there’s a female in a support role, my mind changes. I want to make sure I know where she’s at. (O-4, SEAL)

No matter what, when I get a tasker for two raids, and I have three squad leaders and one is a woman, sorry, I’m not sending her. (E-6, MARSOC)
Potential Impact on Families

Another dominant theme in most of the focus groups was the potential detrimental impact of the integration on the families of male SOF personnel—especially their wives. Participants were most concerned that this would be a distraction from the mission.

- It is going to affect our operational effectiveness because we’re fighting with our wives. . . . Now it’s a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Troubles on the home front affect your readiness. (W-2, SWCC)

- I think a lot of guys’ wives probably sleep soundly at night knowing there aren’t women around. (O-3, MARSOC)

- The men who join the SEALs are physical by nature and not so cerebral, so some may break down on deployments and cheat. There’s already enough drama amongst the wives. (O-3, SEAL)

The specific concerns across SOF components about the potential impact on families are discussed later in this chapter.

Female Medical Issues

Female medical issues were also a major concern among focus group participants. In particular, participants were concerned about (1) higher injury rates among women, (2) issues related to hygiene, and (3) issues related to premenstrual syndrome and menstruation.

Higher Injury Rates

Apart from mission specifics, the long-term implications of SOF operations were discussed frequently. This included physically demanding training evolutions; injuries that cannot be properly attended because of operational tempo; and mission-specific challenges, such as small boat operations. Respondents across service components were especially concerned about long-term injuries over time.

- There will be physiological problems with the training program. Their injuries will be prohibitive to completing the pipeline. It might take 12, 24, 36 months to get a female through with the time she’ll need to recover. (E-7, SEAL)

- Females will certainly exert themselves to keep up, maybe too much so. The Medical Review Board process will be difficult. There is a lot more potential for long-term and career-ending injuries. (W-2, SF)

- Physically, women are not built the same way men are. Bone structure, bone density is different. I’m talking about problems that military men have been experiencing over the years. I think it would be only compounded with women, because they’re women. They’re just not built for it. Even if they can stand the standards, the long-term effects on them will be greater than on men. (E-8, SWCC)

- I just don’t believe that the female body is designed for 10-plus years of this type of activity. There will be big physiological changes and significant medical implications. (E-7, Rangers)

- Effects and abuse on the body over time. Can the female frame stand up to that abuse? The costs are significant if they can’t. If we find out years down the road that it’s a problem, how
Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

Hygiene
Many participants talked about some of the challenging environments in which they operate and the impact that austere environments might have on female hygiene.

Take hygiene: we shower once a week—this will lead to medical issues. (E-6, SF)

When women first were in combat arms in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were women who were not able to properly take care of their hygiene for a set amount of time. They got sick. A woman’s job, or purpose in life, isn’t to go do what we do—kill and all. It’s to nurture. We sleep in the mud. A woman goes through that, it’s going to create so many problems on her body. (E-6, MARSOC)

Several participants also cited personal experiences in which they witnessed women who developed medical issues related to hygiene.

I deployed with a female combat cameraman and we had to medevac her out for a yeast infection, which takes away from the mission. (E-6, SEAL)

We had a FET, a cultural support team, attached to us in a crappy village. We had to get a helicopter flown in to extract just one woman because she was having issues with feminine hygiene. That helicopter wasted gas, could have been shot down. It’s not an isolated incident. It happens all the time. (E-6, MARSOC)

Premenstrual Syndrome and Menstruation
While in the minority, some participants discussed concerns about premenstrual syndrome and menstruation. Most of the concerns centered on perceptions that women might be more irritable or emotional during these times, or that women might be more limited in the activities during menstruation.

Acting on emotions may be a problem. Judgment may be altered. The effects of combat may have a different impact during those times, I’m not sure. (E-8, AFSOC)

And what about PMS and that time of the month? Do we just stock Midol and carry that around with us? There’s nothing good about that. (E-8, SF)

I think PMS is terrible, possibly the worst. I cannot stand my wife for about a week out of the month for every month. I like that I can come to work and not have to deal with that. (E-6, SWCC)

I have a wife. She’s very independent. But when that time of her month comes, she’s weaker. (E-5, SEAL)

Issues Related to Deployability
A major concern across SOF components focused on issues related to deployability—particularly the impact of losing a team member on a small, self-reliant team. Participants emphasized that every single team member plays a critical role and that if women may not be deployable
under certain circumstances (e.g., pregnancy, injuries or other medical issues, being a single parent), unit readiness would be compromised.

Readiness is a compelling argument against this [integration]. It will impact the “op alert” phase for rapid response. Will she be able to leave in the middle of the night? I’m not sure how to manage this. (E-7, Rangers)

In a small unit, where you have seven to ten guys, the loss of one person is catastrophic. (E-9, SWCC)

Everyone has a small specific role, so we can’t lose people. This makes us different from a big ship. (W-2, SWCC)

Specific concerns related to deployability included pregnancy and restrictions on the utilization of women for some missions.

**Pregnancy**

The major concern raised regarding deployability was pregnancy. Participants emphasized that losing a member of a small team, especially at a critical time, could be devastating and would cause unique manning issues. These manning issues can be especially challenging in some of the SOF components.

Deployability issues are big. This is a small career field with high OPTEMPO [operating tempo]. I have concerns about pregnancy issues and other medical concerns as well. It’s very hard for us to absorb losses in personnel as it is. (O-4, AFSOC)

The issue is readiness. Females would need to be ready to deploy constantly, just like we are. We would have issues with pregnancies, whether they were accidents or intentional. We would lose leaders at the wrong time. (O-2, Rangers)

If she gets pregnant, she’ll leave the team. Men don’t leave the team. What if the team sergeant is a woman? Or the medic? Whatever cohesiveness is gained in training is lost, especially if the woman is in a key leadership position. (E-7, SF)

We have four people on a boat. It’s a lot of time and money to prepare them. If a woman gets pregnant and can’t go out on a mission, you have to find someone else to fill that role. (E-5, SWCC)

PMS and pregnancy issues are a concern. Especially anything that keeps them from deploying. It is bad if we spend months training for deployment, and then they don’t go. (E-8, AFSOC)

Now you’re taking someone we rely on. She decides to go out and get pregnant. . . . If she even comes back after that—because now she has a child to take care of—I have lost an asset to the team who is not a one-to-one replacement. There is no one-to-one replacement. (E-6, MARSOC)

When we take a leadership position, we commit to some amount of time of my best effort. Will we change the policy so that she needs to commit to that? If she’s in the squad for seven months, then pregnant right before deployments, what are we going to do about that? (E-7, Rangers)
Restrictions on Utilization
Some participants also raised concerns that woman might not be able to be utilized for the full set of SOF mission sets. In particular, participants were concerned that women could not be utilized to work with some foreign partners and that woman might not be able to be used for some missions because they are not physically able to carry out the mission.

Some countries—especially parts of Africa, the Middle East—look at it as disrespectful for women to talk to men of certain stature. I think it has an impact on manning when you look at what detachment she’s in, where she can get sent. (E-8, SWCC)

We’ll focus less on the mission and more on her. And we won’t be able to employ her everywhere. (E-7, SWCC)

Potential Impact on Working with Some Foreign Partners
A major area of concern across the SOF components focused on the potential inability of women to work with some foreign partners—especially those that view women as inferior to men. Training foreign partners is a key mission for several SOF components, and good rapport with their foreign counterparts is essential. In some of the countries where SOF trains partners, gender norms are very different from those in the United States. There was a widespread perception among participants that women in SOF would not be treated seriously in such countries.

We work with foreign partners. It doesn’t matter what I think. Many of these people have absolutely no respect for females. (E-6, AFSCOC)

How do you convince people following Sharia law that this is acceptable? Exporting social values is not generally well received. (W-4, SF)

The initial impression of a foreign partner is important. Being seen as intimidating, competent builds rapport from the first good impression. It will be very different if there is a woman on the team. There will be a perception that she can’t fight. (E-7, SF)

[Some countries] are basically still savages. They have no respect for women at all. I was doing FID [foreign internal defense] training and was the only white guy, American there. This type of mission wouldn’t work with women. (E-6, SF)

We can assimilate, but we can’t force our partners to accept them. (E-7, SF)

Many societies are quite hierarchical and treat women not only as not equal but as little more than property. There was a widespread view among participants that the presence of women in leadership or instructor positions would be seen as insulting and detrimental to the whole mission.

If a woman were team leader, there would be less rapport with the host nation. There would be less team building if there were no respect for women on SF teams. (E-7, SF)

As a guy, if I don’t have a beard but my subordinate does, my subordinate with the beard gets talked to. They automatically divert to him for any questions of authority. What if
the team sergeant is female, but we can’t go over and make plans because they don’t want to talk to a female? That’s a major part of what we do, so it’s a problem. (E-5, MARSOC)

Some respondents also expressed concerns that this limitation would cause challenges in manning missions. Since the utilization of women for some missions would be restricted, some participants argued that the pool of people who could conduct these types of missions would be smaller and more time would be spent shuffling people to accommodate this limitation.

Depending on the area we are operating in, we will need credibility and won’t be able to get it if women are a part of our team. It can be hard enough to get them to listen to the enlisted troops. Women will make it even more difficult. If the pipelines and units are separate, then commanders can choose when to implement women and when to not. (W-3, SWCC)

Foreign partners are another issue. They won’t deal with females in many cases. It depletes the number of capable forces by having to mix and match. (O-4, AFSOC)

Many of those partners just don’t respect females. We will have a smaller pool of people suitable for engagements. (O-4, AFSOC)

Changes to Facilities
There was a widespread perception among participants that women and men would need to be separated in berthing and bathroom facilities and that this would lead to perceptions of unfairness because fewer women would have the same facilities as a larger number of men. The main concern though was how to build a cohesive team while separating and treating some of the team members differently. Some participants recounted previous experiences in which they needed to accommodate women and doing so caused discontent among team members.

Once I had females in my command in a building built for all-male teams. Now I had to cordon off half of the room to accommodate females, and now males are doubling up lockers, saying, “What the hell? I’m an operator and she has her own suite.” There are going to be significant facility issues. (E-9, SWCC)

At Fort Bliss, three women shared their own barracks. Men were stacked. Women had time in the shower, in the bathroom. Guys had to wait 20 minutes for a shower. It breeds dis - sension. (E-7, SF)

On the last deployment, the presence of females definitely hampered our team. We had very little living space to begin with. We had to clean out our tents. Some guys had to sleep outside in Afghanistan just to accommodate three women. (E-7, SF)

One time, I was in a super severe environment and we had three females with us. We had bathrooms in a bag. We had run out because the commander had told us only females could use them. So then, all the guys got pissed off at the girls, just because they’re here, we’re burdened. It wasn’t good for morale. (E-5, MARSOC)

Additional Screening and Training
A concern that came up during discussions was the need for additional screening and training, including psychological screening and sensitivity training.
We screen for a particular type of person. We would need to determine the traits that make a person more likely to be able to work with females. (E-5, AFSOC)

Men will still be the majority in SOF. Will this require additional training to desensitize men to seeing females killed or placed in danger? (E-5, AFSOC)

I know what they will do—implement annual classes, annual training. That’ll just make us madder. (E-5, MARSOC)

Don’t make me do even one more week of additional training or classes. (E-5, MARSOC)

**Impact of Female Fatalities**

While in the minority, some participants discussed the potential impacts that female fatalities might have on men in SOF units.

No doubt some can pass. Give me 400 females, I’ll assess them the same. The problem is the second- and third-order effects. For example, what happens when a woman is killed in front of a man? (E-7, SF)

It’s inherent also that seeing a woman die has a greater effect on a man’s psyche than seeing a man die. (O-3, MARSOC)

One participant recounted the trauma that he has experienced since witnessing a woman killed in combat:

I’ve zipped up body bags on men and women. And with men, I could eat Cheerios after. But with women? The smell of burned hair—I can’t smell it any more, I can’t stand it. I can’t even fire up Pop-Tarts because it reminds me of the smell of burned hair. (E-6, MARSOC)

Several SEAL participants across multiple focus groups also discussed the difference between male and female POWs.

If a woman is captured, this would be worse than a man being captured and would take away the focus from warfighting. (E-4, SEAL)

If I was a POW, he just got beat up by five guys, I’m like [shrug]. If a female SEAL comes in and says, “I just got raped by five guys,” it totally changes the mentality of guys about what he’s going to do next. I’m just saying, that’s something to think about. (E-5, SEAL)

Some time ago, there was a part of Navy SERE where females were taken to the “torture chamber” and guys folded almost immediately to prevent that from happening. It puts the rest of the unit at risk. (E-9, SEAL)

**Public Reaction to Female Fatalities**

Some participants also expressed reservations that the U.S. public is ready to see women killed in combat.

The U.S. public won’t be willing to see women raped, skinned, and shown on Al-Jazeera. I think it will backfire. (W-2, SF)
We see men killed in a certain way. Females being killed will have a different political impact. There will be constant media imaging. (E-5, AFSOC)

I’m not sure that Americans are ready to see females being captured, made a spectacle of, hung from bridges or poles. What will the U.S. say when this happens? (E-7, SF)

I don’t think the average American is ready to see women slaughtered. I’m not ready to see that. (E-6, MARSOC)

**Concerns for Women Who Might Integrate into SOF**

Although in the minority, some participants also expressed concerns for the women who might integrate into SOF. These concerns center on two areas: (1) career-progression issues and (2) support and morale.

**Career-Progression Issues**

While in the minority, some participants discussed the career-progression challenges that women will face during the initial phases of integration, as well as when they move up the ranks.

There’s a question of development. One or two females in a 1,000-man unit? There would be no support structure. One or two females doesn’t work. We would need a larger number. (O-2, Rangers)

Every SEAL command must be led by a SEAL. There could not immediately be female SEALs at higher levels. They would need to rise through the ranks just like the men. They would need to have the exact same training as the men, with no training tailored to female needs. (O-5, SEAL)

I agree. This has to grow from the bottom. There can’t be any lateraling. (O-5, SEAL)

Some participants also expressed concerns about how women would be able to move up the ranks and the sort of challenges they might face when they enter leadership positions.

There is a career-progression issue here. The CSM’s [Command Sergeant Major’s] credibility comes from all of his experience on the teams. My credibility comes from rank and the three years I had on them a long time ago. That short window of experience might be a problem with pregnancy and other issues. You can’t pause an officer’s career. We might end up with some females who have very little time with the teams. (O-5, SF)

If you told them their new commanding officer is a female, many guys would try to get a new unit. (O-3, SF)

And some men can’t take orders from women. If you all of the sudden you have a female chief, some men don’t like to take orders from women. (E-7, SWCC)

We are alpha males. A female would be pushed up in rank, or maybe she would even make it on her own. How do guys follow her? We don’t recognize rank—we recognize experience and abilities. (E-7, SEAL)
Several senior personnel expressed a concern that women involved with the SOF community have not been given a viable program and career path, and that the development of such a program would not only benefit USSOCOM but provide a constructive means of integration.

Right now, CSTs are without a career path, used late, underutilized, no MOS. But we can use them. (W-2, SF)

You do see great, aggressive females. The key is finding the right program for them. Codify that program and they will step forward, so they won’t be guessing at this whole spectrum of programs. Right now there [are] too many programs for females that have been tried and failed; they are dead ends. Advertising is important. Get the right program, then get the word out effectively. How do females know the path to this type of service now? How do you articulate that? (O-4, SF)

**Support and Morale**

Some participants also voiced concerns about the lack of female support structures and low morale among women entering these positions.

The female will have no support system. She will be isolated. (O-5, SF)

I think it will affect the female’s morale. It would be bad for her. If we’re perceiving this inequality, we’re going to segregate and cast her aside. Same as if there’s a dude who can’t hack it, he’s going to get segregated. (E-5, MARSOC)

I don’t see the female’s morale being that high. If she changes by herself, stays in a hotel room by herself. I don’t see a lot of morale if she has to do everything separately. (O-3, SEAL)

**Analysis of Concerns Across Rank and Grade**

Across SOF components, junior enlisted personnel cited the following concerns the most:

- cohesion might be negatively affected
- sexual assault and sexual harassment allegations might arise
- standards might be lowered
- the decision to lift the ground combat exclusion was politically motivated, not driven by operational needs.

Senior enlisted personnel cited the following concerns the most:

- standards might be lowered
- the decision to lift the ground combat exclusion was politically motivated, not driven by operational needs
- cohesion might be negatively impacted
- families might be negatively affected.

Warrant officers in the focus groups cited the following concerns the most:
• women might not be able to conduct the mission
• standards might be lowered.

Finally, officers cited the following concerns the most:

• standards might be lowered
• the decision to lift the ground combat exclusion was politically motivated, not driven by operational needs
• women would not increase capability in SOF teams.

Analysis of Unique Concerns Across SOF Components

The participants’ comments showed a great deal of similarity across all the SOF components. That said, specialty-specific concerns also came up during the discussions.

AFSOC

Our focus groups with AFSOC personnel comprised 12 enlisted personnel and 5 officers. In addition to concerns about lowering standards and women not being able to participate in missions with partner nations, AFSOC focus groups expressed four sets of concerns that were either phrased more strongly or appeared to be unique to AFSOC:

• pregnancy and other deployability issues affecting unit readiness—especially since AFSOC personnel often occupy unique positions in a unit
• synchronization of integration across SOF components
• challenges with deploying as individuals, rather than as a unit
• challenges associated with the physical aspects of their jobs.

Deployability Issues Affect AFSOC Differently

A dominant concern expressed in our AFSOC focus groups was that pregnancy would impact deployability and unit readiness—especially since AFSOC personnel often occupy unique positions in a unit and deploy as individuals. Participants discussed the long timeline associated with mission planning, as well as the manning implications of trying to find a replacement if a woman were not able to deploy.

Right now, we’re dealing with deployment scheduling months out. I can’t factor in exclusions, such as pregnancy or the type of mission not being appropriate for females, that far out. It will cause bias. It should be totally equal or nothing. (E-6, AFSOC)

PMS and pregnancy are a concern. Especially anything that keeps them from deploying. It is bad if we spend months training for deployment and then they don’t go. (E-8, AFSOC)

Manning is already very low. Losing an operator would hurt. (E-5, AFSOC)

Synchronization of Integration Across SOF Components

AFSOC participants acknowledged their unique position as operators who normally deploy as individuals to support other SOF units. Several participants expressed the concern that
if AFSOC were integrated and other SOF components were not, the deployment of female operators to support male SOF teams would be problematic.  

If waivers were granted to other SOF entities but not to us, there is a divide. Some of us can then only do certain missions, and this would limit career opportunities for women. (E-5, AFSOC)  

Some AFSOC participants also noted that each of the SOF components has selection and training pipelines of different lengths. Therefore, if the integration was not coordinated across the SOF components, there might be a policy mismatch between the personnel whom AFSOC can supply and those units that require AFSOC’s support.  

On linking up with other SOFs, we’ve had males that didn’t work out well. If we send a female to a unit with none, that would be a big problem. This needs to be done in all the services or none. (O-3, AFSOC)  

**Challenges Associated with Deploying as Individuals, Not Units**  
Many AFSOC participants also expressed concerns about the challenges that a woman might face deploying as an individual, rather than a unit. These concerns included being perceived as an outsider and the need to bond quickly with a team, as well as the ground commander. While men also face these challenges, most AFSOC participants said that they thought these challenges would be even more difficult for women.  

AFSOC is different because we’re attached to other teams. You’re already the outsider. It’s hard to imagine pulling off bonding with the team through another layer of separation. . . . We’re like the guy who joins the football team the night before the game. This would just exaggerate those barriers. (E-8, AFSOC)  

When we join a team, we’re already disadvantaged. We’re [United States Air Force], the new guy that no one knows. We need the ground commander’s trust. We need to bond with the team. It will be that much more difficult with a female. (E-5, AFSOC)  

**Challenges Associated with the Physical Aspects of Their Unique Jobs**  
Many of the AFSOC participants also expressed concerns about whether women could handle the physical demands of their jobs. In particular, participants wondered whether women could carry the amount of gear that is required, and whether they could carry out the various other physical tasks that are required when attaching to other SOF components—all while performing their specific mission.  

I was [to carry a load that was] 110 pounds over body weight on my last deployment. If weight needs to be shifted from a team member, that will be a major loss of credibility with the ground force commander. (E-5, AFSOC)  

At the end of that walk with all that gear, we actually need to perform the mission. We need to control and speak coherently. (E-8, AFSOC)  

Since AFSOC personnel work with teams from across the SOF components, they must be ready to carry out a wide range of physical tasks. As a result, many participants were adamant that physical standards could not be lowered.
There should be no bias in physical standards. They are requirements—you meet them or you don’t. No judgment calls. (O-4, AFSOC)

I don’t see a lot of females trying to get in. Females that could do it are few and far between. But lowering standards is not possible. (E-8, AFSOC)

PT standards are also an issue. We already water down PT plans when we include nonoperators and other support personnel. (E-8, AFSOC)

MARSOC
Our focus groups with MARSOC personnel comprised 42 enlisted personnel and five officers. In addition to expressing many concerns about lowering standards and that cohesion might be negatively affected, focus group participants also expressed three sets of concerns that were phrased more strongly or appeared to be unique to MARSOC:

• women might not be able to perform the physical aspects of their mission
• standards are already being lowered in the Marine Corps infantry to accommodate women
• since many MARSOC personnel come through the ranks in the Marine Corps infantry, it is difficult to create a MARSOC culture that is be amenable to the integration of women.

Challenges Associated with the Physical Aspects of MARSOC Jobs
Many MARSOC participants mentioned that they need to do a wide variety of physical tasks and that everyone on the team is expected to carry out all of those tasks. Some participants also referred to instances in which they had women attached to their unit and the women could not keep up in varying ways.

I think it will affect effectiveness of teams, their ability to carry out the mission. I’m not opposed to women in the military. But in this specific MOS, I don’t think they’ll be able to accomplish tasks the way we do now. (E-6, MARSOC)

Put a woman operator in team, then I’m up at the breach with the door, he gets hit, I carry him out. That’s a special core duty we have and I just don’t think women would excel at it. (E-8, MARSOC)

Working in 14-, eight-, nine-man teams, everyone must do many things at once. No one gets to focus on just one slice of the pie. (E-5, MARSOC)

Women slowed us down. There were security considerations. An inability to patrol at the pace we would typically move at—carrying 45 pounds for each kit, all the technology—at a sustained pace. (O-3, MARSOC)

Women Already Have Difficulty Meeting Marine Corps Standards
Some participants also expressed concern that standards in the Marine Corps are already being lowered to accommodate women. In particular, some participants cited that women have to do a flex arm hang for the Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test (PFT) instead of having to do pull-ups, as the men do, because women had difficulty meeting the pull-up standard.
They’ve changed that, because if they make them do pull-ups, they have to kick them out. (E-6, MARSOC)

Participants also pointed to the fact that no woman has passed the Marine Corps Infantry Officer Course (IOC) and that few women have passed the Marine Corps School of Infantry (SOI) course (in a recent experiment).

We just sent ten females to SOI. So you have a 30-percent success rate at SOI. I’ve seen some guys go thru SOI who I wouldn’t trust with my damn life to a live round. (E-6, MARSOC)

**Difficulty in Creating an Organizational Culture Amenable to Integration**

The structure of MARSOC differs from that of the other SOF components in that it has a large number of personnel who are assigned for a tour, but not necessarily permanently part of the community. Several MARSOC participants noted that this creates an organizational culture that is not as uniform as those in the other components. Though the feedback from MARSOC personnel was generally against integration, some of those who addressed the subject of implementation believed that if it were to be done successfully, it would need to be left to the core members of the community.

If [USSOCOM] isn’t specific about how it’s done, MARSOC will pick up the ball and run over to the Marine Corps and try to mimic what they’re doing, instead of going bottom up and asking our advice. They’ll just use Big Marines. (E-7, MARSOC)

As long as we keep getting conventional Marines into these senior leadership positions, we will never have the type of mentality that it would take to set up a female program directly. Or I should say—until you get a SOF operational mind-set up at the higher levels—the decisionmaker levels—you’ll never understand how they can fully tactically and operationally be utilized to the best of their ability. (E-8 MARSOC)

I’d want to see female operators. I’d love to see [USSOCOM] come down here and say, “General X, you’re going to do this and this. Here are your constraints. Define what roles you want females to play in an operational scope.” . . . We can go back to the Marine Corps and say, “Hey, we’re implementing females into combat operations. Slowly, but successfully.” (E-8, MARSOC)

It has to be a [USSOCOM] initiative supported by the Marine Corps, not dual [Marine Corps–USSOCOM]. At least within MARSOC. (E-7, MARSOC)

**Rangers**

The focus groups conducted with the Rangers included 46 enlisted personnel and eight officers. In addition to concerns that standards might be lowered to push women through initial training, and that pregnancy might affect unit readiness, Rangers raised two sets of concerns that were phrased more strongly:

- women might have a negative impact on the culture and image of the Rangers
- things might change in the barracks while in garrison.
One of the most dominant themes in our discussions with Rangers was that women would have a negative impact on the cohesion and culture of the Rangers. This was clearly a core concern of this community. Many of the participants discussed what they perceived as a devastating impact that the integration of women might have on Ranger culture.

This will be a huge cultural loss. It will be the death of the Ranger culture. It will be the death of the organization as we know it. (E-5, Rangers)

The culture is the strength of this organization. Females would fill these roles, but the culture is different. (E-7, Rangers)

The physical standards aren’t the reason to not integrate. Ten percent of females who want to get through may be able to. But the culture change once they’re in is the real problem. (O-3, Rangers)

The bottom line is that Ranger culture will change. This is an all-male unit. Discussions wouldn’t happen or won’t happen the way they do now or we would have a lot of equal opportunity problems. In some instances, that might be a good thing, but this will entail a change in performance. Our leaders expect things from us, and those things require certain cultural traits. (O-3, Rangers)

Many Rangers also expressed the view that the addition of women might negatively affect the image of the Rangers. Participants discussed the potential impacts of integration on morale, as well as the potential impacts on U.S. adversaries’ perception of Rangers.

It will have a very negative impact. A lot of guys will leave the very day that a female dons the tan beret. That’s a lot of pride taken out of the unit. (E-4, Rangers)

This is an alpha male specially selected environment. They believe they are the best of the best. Perception is reality—people won’t believe they’re as bada-s as they were. And adversaries will know that as well. It will degrade how we look at each other, but also how bad guys look at us. (E-4, Rangers)

It’s going to happen. And standards will certainly go down. Will the beret be the same? (E-5, Rangers)

Rangers also extensively discussed the “garrison” side of integration. Many of the junior enlisted Rangers live in barracks and spend a large amount of their time on post. Rather than focus on what might happen during deployment, many participants cited concerns about what would happen at home. In a unit that prides itself on rapid deployment, some participants clearly believed that the discipline issues resulting from such close quarters—even within the United States—would threaten their mission effectiveness. This was discussed by both junior and senior enlisted personnel.

What would happen with the barracks? Make them co-ed? Prepare yourself for a lot of problems with that. (E-4, Rangers)

We are unique. Our only focus is being ready to go. This will be a distraction. There will be relationships within the unit. The barracks will be like frat houses. (E-7 Rangers)
Special Forces

The participants in the focus groups with SF personnel included 79 enlisted personnel, 14 warrant officers, and 20 officers. In addition to concerns that standards might be lowered to push women through initial training, SF participants raised four sets of concerns that were phrased more strongly or were unique to their mission and organization:

- women might not be able to interact effectively with some partner nations (a main priority of the SF mission)
- women might have a negative impact on the image of SF
- women might disrupt the unique dynamic in SF teams
- women might develop medical issues from operating in austere environments.

One of the primary concerns of SF participants was the effect that integration might have on their ability to interact with foreign partners—many of which do not recognize women as equal to men. In particular, many SF expressed concerns about women not being able to interact effectively with partner nations and the impact that this would have on unit manning.

Operational focus is my primary concern. SF areas of deployment are in Third World and less than Third World countries. They do not have equal rights for women. If a woman were a team leader, there would be less rapport with host nations. There would be less team building if there were not respect to women. There would be less ability to be a force multiplier. I am less concerned with other concerns. (E-7, SF)

FID/UW makes us different. She can kick doors, but she won’t be able to effectively interact. (E-7, SF)

Some team members will be limited in the operations they take part in. We’re already very undermanned. (E-7, SF)

Why would we want them if they can do half the job? (E-7, SF)

Participants from other communities were also concerned about this effect, but because FID is integral to the SF mission, this might account for the focus on this concern within the SF community.

Another major concern expressed by many SF participants is the negative impact that women might have on the image of the SF. In a nutshell:

SF will stop being looked at as elite. (E-8, SF)

In response to the statement above, another participant said:

Yeah, but we said that about gays. (E-8, SF)

In the exchange below, another participant pushed back on the dominant views that women might have a negative impact on the image of the SF:

I once saw a pregnant woman wearing a green beret [for two years, support personnel were permitted to wear the beret]. It was a huge disruption for morale. (E-9, SF)
I remember her. She had no tab, but that b—h was wearing a beret. If I see a female wearing one, I’ll retire. (E-9, SF)

Yes, but you guys will phase out. Younger people have less of a problem with this. (E-8, SF)

Another dominant theme in our discussions with SF personnel related to the unique mission and culture of SF ODA teams. Many participants emphasized that the small size of the ODAs create a unique team dynamic that might be upset if a woman is introduced into the team. Many participants also emphasized that ODAs often live in austere environments among the enemy and routinely see combat.

ODAs are different. We are the premier unconventional warfare group. We live in remote places for long periods. Other [USSOCOM] units work in larger FOB areas. Females won’t have [changes] for decompression or other females [for support] in ODA settings. (E-8, SF)

Other groups have had some success [with integrating women], but we are living among the enemy when we go out. Other groups seize an objective, then separate the population. This isn’t the same. Living in small teams is the key issue. (E-8, SF)

We have females who are capable of certain physical events, but the social terrain of an ODA is very difficult for integration. (W-4, SF)

Combat environments require combat operators. The ODAs are engaged constantly when in theater. Sometimes for months. That perspective is not represented in the current argument. (W-2, SF)

Some SF participants also expressed concerns about the physical impact of working in austere environments—particularly on female hygiene.

SF needs physical capabilities. Women might have physical strength, but what we go through, they need more. Take hygiene: We shower once a week—this will lead to medical issues. (E-6, SF)

When traveling, we relieve ourselves off the back of the truck. How will women handle that? We go weeks, sometimes months without a shower. There will be hygiene issues. (E-7, SF)

**SEALs**

The focus groups with SEAL personnel included 92 enlisted personnel, eight warrant officers, and 39 officers. In general, the SEAL participants were among the most adamant that their small-unit teams should not be integrated. In addition to concerns that standards might be lowered, SEAL participants raised five sets of concerns that were phrased more strongly or were unique to their mission and organization:

- the impact of changing informal SEAL standards
- integrating women might impact men’s families
- concerns regarding alleged sexual harassment and sexual assault
- concerns related to close, physical interaction with one another
- concerns that women might not be able to perform the physical aspects of the job.
There was some discussion of informal standards in SEAL culture (those physical standards that are not official standards, but rather cultural standards) and how those could not remain the same if women are integrated.

Standards can't remain the same. There are things not on paper that can't happen with women. (E-5, SEAL)

Even if the standard doesn't change on paper, it would change informally. (E-6, SEAL)

When discussing the issue of standards, many SEAL participants turned to the impacts that integration might have on the BUD/S training course.

The boat races are when the instructors, when the boat crews start screaming, getting derogatory. When guys start punching each other. That's when you find those weaker guys not holding up their end of the boat. With girls, I can't behave the same way. (E-5, SEAL)

If I were an instructor, I'd be afraid to berate a female the way a male gets berated. (E-5, SEAL)

Now they're going to say, “Why's the guy picking on that lady? He's singling her out.” That's been part of BUD/S for years. (E-5, SEAL)

SEALs were also quite concerned about the impact that integration might have on their families. Many participants mentioned that this additional stressor would just be one more thing to distract them from the mission.

It is a major concern for a lot of the wives that—it's bad enough that half of us have us have a better relationship with our platoon than our family. It is a consideration that needs to be taken to the table. (E-9, SEAL)

My wife was absolutely livid about this. (E-6, SEAL)

The wives will definitely object. My wife knows how close we are here. She won't want a female entering that mix. (E-7, SEAL)

I think my wife would probably have trouble with me shacking up in a tent with a woman for a week on a mountain. I've done dives in small confined spaces—it's not a job that men and women can do together. (E-7, SEAL)

In addition, many SEALs were also concerned about alleged sexual harassment and sexual assault if women were integrated into their teams. Many participants mentioned that they would need to watch their language or alter their behavior around women for fear of being accused of sexual harassment or sexual assault. This too was cited as just another stressor that could affect operational effectiveness—especially by causing teams to be “timid.”

There's ways that men act—you're going to have to watch yourself everywhere you go, never turn the switch off. You're going to be worried all the time. What if I say something wrong? (E-5, SEAL)
We don’t walk on eggshells. We say what we want; guys take it or leave it. Especially with all the sexual harassment and rape charges coming out—it’s like, did I just say something that ended my career? (E-4, SEAL)

There will be fear amongst men. Just the fact of sexual assault. There would be added stressors for married guys as well. . . . It will make them timid. Our job is about violence in action. When you start bringing timid men into a firefight, people will die. (E-5, SEAL)

Many SEALs expressed concerns that training and missions require SEALs to interact with one another physically, which might cause problems if women are integrated. Some also expressed concerns about sexual harassment or sexual assault allegations stemming from this close physical interaction.

We interact with each other physically very close. All the different times we touch each other. When we’re about to jump off a helicopter, you have to check things, go between a guy’s legs. At what point can a woman say she was touched in the wrong way? (E-4, SEAL)

Everywhere we change, we change in front of each other, from wet to dry clothes. Some guys don’t wear stuff underneath. Now, in a security situation, what do you do with that one woman who must change clothes in front of guys? (E-4, SEAL)

Another dominant concern expressed by many SEALs was that women might not be able to physically carry out the types of missions expected of all SEALs. In particular, many participants cited specific physiological or medical issues that might prevent a woman from carrying out particular tasks.

I’ve got people who will get shot if she can’t get up that ladder, do the equivalent of 90 pull-ups with all the equipment on her, to get up that ladder. (W-3, SEAL)

When females are on their menstrual cycles, they have increased chance of bends, so we wouldn’t bring them on target. (W-3, SEAL)

I see 20-hour workdays, high metabolic rates. Women would lose weight quickly. There was a study the Brits did on a regular battalion, in which they [women] were not able to keep up physically. Women’s bodies will break down quickly because of the lack of testosterone—even if they are in shape. (E-4, SEAL)

We have to work 12 hours a day, seven days a week for six months of the year. . . . The physiological differences make it very difficult and the possibility of injury is more likely. (E-9, SEAL)

**SWCC**

The focus groups conducted with the SWCC included 67 enlisted personnel, seven warrant officers, and three officers. SWCC raised four concerns that were either phrased more strongly or were unique to the nature and demands of their missions:

- the potential physical toll of operating SWCC watercraft
- the potential consequences of living and working in the austere environment of SWCC watercrafts
• the potential impacts that integration might have on men’s families
• the potential need to change the facilities and equipment that are specific to the missions.

Most SWCC participants expressed concerns about the physical toll of operating in their watercraft. Most participants were skeptical that a woman with a smaller frame and bone density could withstand such conditions for more than a few years.

The impact you take on these boats—which is standard practice here—does wear on us a lot. That’s something you would have to see how it would work out, but I think it would be a big concern. (E-5, SWCC)

There are a lot of us with shoulder and back problems. It’s like a car crash when you’re out there. (E-6, SWCC)

Doesn’t matter if it is one-foot or ten-foot waves; every one has an impact. Tremendous amount of stress on your body. Could a woman do it, handle it just as much as a man? Yeah, maybe. But do we really want to put women through that? (E-7, SWCC)

All of us have physical issues of some kind from the boats. Backs, knees, beat up, we’re broken. Across the board. And we’re all physically fit guys. How is that going to be for a woman doing this for 20 years? (W-3, SWCC)

I definitely see benefits of women in NSW [Naval Surface Warfare]. I would love to see closed-looped female operation to support missions. But from the long-term physical condition, long hours under way on a boat—that’s a completely different mission set. (W-2, SWCC)

Another major theme of concern among SWCC participants was the austere environment of the boat. Participants emphasized that there is no bathroom or privacy on the boat and that they often spend long periods of time on the craft. Such an environment creates logistical challenges on many fronts.

[We go out] for long periods of time—24 hours or longer. You have to change clothes; everyone has to see you naked. You’re in an open boat, no closed areas, no bathrooms but you have to change out of your dry suit into clothes. You have to get naked. This is potentially an issue. (E-7, SWCC)

There’s no privacy on the boat and nowhere to pee for 12 hours at a time. It’s much easier for men to pee over the side than women. (E-9, SWCC)

Recently we were out longer [on the boat]. Now it’s morning and I gotta go number two. What do we do? I’m not going to tell everyone to stop. There was an empty ammo can so I just squatted and went out in the open on the deck. (W-1, SWCC)

In addition, many SWCC participants also discussed the potential impacts that integration might have on their families—particularly since they might be in a small confined space on their boats for such long periods.
Insights from the Focus Groups 165

It’s going to create a lot of family drama. I know for a fact, no matter how strong your relationship is with your spouse, if I say I’m going on a trip for 30 days with Kelly, my wife is going to say, “no the f—k you’re not.” (E-8, SWCC)

Right now, there are no questions from my wife when I’m on deployment because she knows I’m just out with the boys, but if women are introduced to the Special Forces, she won’t be as trusting. (E-9, SWCC)

Even if I am okay with bathrooms that are shared between me and a woman, my wife still wouldn’t be. (E-9, SWCC)

Lastly, some SWCC participants also discussed the need to modify facilities (since many of them do not have showers or restrooms for women), as well as their equipment.

This building has an open shower for everyone. We’d have to have a complete other room to facilitate women. Then what about body armor and anything else—boots. Whatever gear we wear that has to be modified. (E-7, SWCC)

Dry suits, for instance, comes to mind. It has a zipper that you can open about ten inches to urinate, then zip it back up. For women, that’s a problem. (E-7, SWCC)

Analysis of Concerns Across Mission Types

In addition to common concerns that were prevalent throughout the focus group discussions, common operational themes were also identified. The concerns associated with these operations are important because, while they might not have been commented on as frequently as other concerns, they are potential showstoppers to the successful integration and employment of women in SOF operations.

Austere Conditions

Many participants shared anecdotes of the austere conditions that were necessary for months at a time on various operations.

Our missions just don’t lend themselves to females. We’re not conducting training with the German Army. We’re operating in very austere environments. (E-7, SF)

These included the inability to bathe, the necessity of staying motionless in holes dug into the ground for long periods of time, and needing to “spoon” with other team members to maintain warmth. Several concerns were pertinent to these conditions.

Lack of Privacy

Some deployments I’ve done . . . we were living in small facilities, fighting. Those segregated compartments for sleeping and showering weren’t available. Sometimes we lived in tents—stacked on top of each other. The sense of privacy that women would expect won’t be there. (E-5, MARSOC)

There are times we’ve had to bathe in creeks at the sides of roads. I don’t see how that would work with women. (O-3, SEAL)
Hygiene
The first was that hygiene issues might develop faster or be more significant for women than for men in these environments.

Guys can go six months on baby wipes; females can’t without getting sick or other issues. We’ve seen this before. When women first were in combat arms, in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were women who were not able to properly take care of their hygiene for a set amount of time. They got sick. (E-6, MARSOC)

Hygiene is a big issue. We need to be on austere bases with infrequent supply drops. Will she get special treatment to be medically safe? (E-4, Rangers)

Close Physical Contact
Second, the closeness of SOF team members is prohibitive to those who are concerned with appropriate relations between men and women and explaining the realities of deployment to spouses.

There is a lot of discussion about sharing tents and things of that nature, but that isn’t applicable. We might be in a foxhole for a long period of time with two to three other people. How is that going to work with a female? (E-7, SEAL)

My last deployment was just me and one other guy. . . . I would not have done my two-man mission with a female. I just won’t do it. (E-7, SF)

Demands of Movement
The severe stress placed on the body during movement to and from objectives was also discussed in each of the focus groups. Specifically, participants pointed out that the physical demands of an operation far exceeded those experienced during training—with the added stress of needing to perform the mission once on target.

Some females crush the male PFT scale, but will collapse under the weight of a ruck. My body (30 years old) is starting to break down after nine deployments. (E-6, Ranger)

We have a small guy on our team and he’s expected to haul all of his mission equipment. To counter the IED [improvised explosive device] threat, we’ve started walking a lot more. He’s expected to take all of his gear. . . . At the end of that walk with all that gear, we actually need to perform the mission. We need to speak and control aircraft coherently. (E-8, AFSOC)

If weight needs to be shifted to another team member, that will be a major loss of credibility with the ground force commander. It will impact the mission significantly. (E-5, AFSOC)

Small-Boat Operations
As previously discussed, SWCC participants cited many concerns specific to their small-boat operations. These included the physical toll of operating on the watercraft, the potential physical toll of operating the watercraft, the potential consequences of living and working in the austere environment of the watercrafts, and potential changes to equipment that are specific to the missions.
Dissenting Views

Many participants were unwilling to even imagine the possibility of women being present in SOF teams.

We like to kill things and bang women. It doesn’t matter if she’s qualified. (E-8, SF)

But several participants expressed that it all comes down to standards: If standards are gender-neutral and maintained at their current levels, and the women can perform to those standards, there might be some benefits to having women in SOF teams.

The facilities would need to be modified. But if they don’t lower the standards, I don’t see a problem. (E-8, AFSOC)

The majority of it is based on performance. If she’s a liability—she’s a problem. Being a good operator and a good teammate are the only things people care about. (O-4, AFSOC)

I think the gain of women joining could be worth it. Overall, the situation will figure itself out. If there are girls that can make it through the training, then they can make it. (E-6, SWCC)

It’s not a gender thing, really. We have plenty of male s--tbags. If they can get a female through without lowering the standards, then they can come. (E-9, SEAL)

If you can do your job, good. Otherwise, you are useless to me. If she’s an asset, good. If she’s the weak link, then go. (E-7, SF)

If they pull their weight, no worries; they’ll mesh as one, fight as one. (E-7, MARSOC)

I believe the SEAL teams can adapt if anyone can, because the teams are not so strict and there is less structure in the SEALs. SEALs can work with women, but I want the standards upheld. (O-3, SEAL)

If you train a female well and send her to the ODA, she’ll be fine. We underestimate our guys. . . . I would have loved to have females on the teams I led and would’ve had a role for them. (O-5, SF)

If they maintain the standards and do it fairly, the number of females in MARSOC would be minimal at most. If they go through the same process, the same standards, I think they’ll have the same mind-set and pull their weight. (E-6, MARSOC)

Some participants also indicated that the integration of woman might raise standards for both men and women.

Of course, it could be that it will raise standards. Weak men are coming through as well. Integration might compel men to perform better in order to not fail when women are passing. (E-7, SF)

We’ve had males who we couldn’t get rid of. S--tbags. Maybe this will raise standards. (E-6, SF)
Some participants indicated that they did not think that women would have a negative impact on cohesion.

If she can talk all the s--t we talk and do all the stuff we do, why not? No harm to unit cohesion. (E-6, MARSOC)

We look for those who get along. I don’t think cohesion will be as big an issue. It adds some extra stress, but we can work around it. (E-6, MARSOC)

I think they’d find a way to work with women. We have all worked with women. I don’t know if it would have a huge effect. (E-6, MARSOC)

Other participants believed that there would be short-term effects, but also believed that younger recruits would not be as opinionated about or averse to the presence of females.

We will lose a lot of mouth breathers, alpha males. There will be an initial loss. It will depend on how it is implemented. A green beret is a big accomplishment. But will it destroy your dream and goal because a woman is there? There will be an initial loss, then flatten to plane, then back up in five to then years. My granddad got out of the Navy in [the 1960s] with the introduction of the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice]. With DADT, everyone was up in arms, but what happened? Nothing. People who complained are still here. They need to pay the bills. The military is still the best out there. The hardcore will get out; the rest will stay in. (W-2, SF)

Some participants also cautioned that the same concerns were raised when gay service members were integrated.

We live with gays on the teams. It works. Some of the same concerns were expressed about them. (O-5, SF)

I’d say it’s going to go down the road a lot of others have. Like the gays-in-the-military piece. Guys fought it forever, and there have been little to no repercussions from it. (E-6, MARSOC)

**Potential Impact on Recruitment and Retention**

Recruitment and retention were major discussion points for each focus group. Opinions about the impact of integration on recruitment and retention were divided—with some foreseeing a significant drop in numbers and quality of SOF personnel and others predicting no significant effect.

**Recruitment of Men**

Many participants were concerned that integration would lead to a decrease in male recruitment. Their reasons centered on the belief that men attempt to join these organizations because they want to be part of an elite unit. Whether due to the presence of women or an expected lowering of standards, there are concerns that these units would no longer be seen in the same light by prospective applicants.
It will be bad for recruitment. I personally would choose a unit without females. I was looking for a brotherhood when I came here. (E-5, Rangers)

You have to make people feel special to do jobs that most people would not want to do. That’s been understood through history. We didn’t join for the money; we joined to be elite. If that goes away, how do you bring people in? (E-5, AFSOC)

I think there could be drops too—in particular from males. How do you get guys through the door if this is a rating open to both females and males? I think it could be an issue. “Geez, how special is it if she can do it?” (E-9, SWCC)

There’s plenty of talk about a mass exodus once the first female puts on a trident. (O-3, SEAL)

**Retention of Men**

Concern over the retention of men was discussed in every focus group, but there was not consensus on whether there would be a significant long-term impact. Several themes emerged from these discussions.

**Exodus of Experienced Personnel**

The most frequently cited concern was a loss of current SOF personnel.

If people are forced to accept this, guys will leave. They will take a lot of experience and leadership with them. We’ll definitely miss that experience. (E-3, Rangers)

One reason I’m getting out next summer is because I don’t want to deal with this. This is politically motivated, and I think they’ll regret it. You will lose experienced leaders. (O-3, Rangers)

If females are in support roles, little to no impact. If in a combat unit, we’ll see some disillusionment. There will be a period of turbulence, probably one to three years. There are definitely some people who would bolt. There would be culture change, and there would be diminished capability. (O-4, Rangers)

[The guys who leave,] that will benefit us. As we move away from kinetic operations, there’ll be guys who get out because all they want is to shoot guys in the face. (E-7, MARSOC)

There was also concern expressed about the loss of experienced personnel who are close to retirement age and might not want to deal with the numerous changes that integration would bring. In one focus group of Navy SWCC personnel, an informal poll indicated that 11 of the 17 senior enlisted personnel present intended to retire if women came to their units. The loss of combat-experienced personnel, in particular, was cited as a major concern for several participants.

We’re at a generational change. You have an old generation fighting for 13 years, and now a new generation. Like when they started allowing homosexuals in the military, a bunch of people left, said, “I didn’t sign up for this crap.” You’re going to have people who have been fighting for 13 years that will leave. (E-6, MARSOC)
Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

Adverse Impacts on Families
Many participants voiced concerns over what integration would mean for their spouses, and several predicted that tension at home would also drive a decrease in retention. Close quarters on deployment, long hours for training, and close physical contact during training and on deployment were cited as problems for many of the spouses. Several participants stated that their spouses were even upset that these focus groups were taking place. Participants based much of their concerns on past experience with the introduction of CSTs.

For retention, we’ll see a decrease. Lots of home front problems. The high drama rate of CSTs had an effect. The spouses weren’t happy, and a lot of guys will bolt. (E-7, SF)

Me, I’m getting out. I will walk away from years of service. A lot of guys will do that. There’s no way I’m going to explain to my wife why I’m going to share a hotel room with a woman. I’m not dealing with that. I deal with enough s--t. Them or me—that’s the way it works. (E-6, MARSOC)

Lack of Faith in the Organization
Finally, some participants cited a retention problem that came not from the integration itself but from the imposition of the policy in a top-down manner. Many of these individuals believed that officials with an incomplete understanding of the environment that SOF operate in are formulating policy for political reasons or that apply to other parts of the military but not SOF. These participants believed that many would interpret integration as a breach of trust.

It wouldn’t come from animosity for women but the lack of support from the top. If they’re going to weaken the teams simply for political reasons, or to help their career over making the teams operationally stronger and safer, why be a part of that organization? (E-5, SEAL)

We have little faith because we don’t see the implementation plan or risk mitigation. How do you deal with issues like periods or pregnancies? What’s the plan? (E-4, Rangers)

The FETs are good because it’s impossible to talk to women in the Middle East. It’s just that I don’t want the standards or unit cohesion to be degraded. I also distrust the leadership on this issue because standards have changed in the past when leadership said they wouldn’t. (E-6, SWCC)

Recruitment of Women
In addition, many participants voiced skepticism that an appreciable number of women would be interested in joining SOF. For many this was not a concern. But for those who were concerned with pressure to push women through the training pipeline, a low number of applicants was viewed as increasing the likelihood that lower-quality operators would be sent to SOF units.

Women aren’t exactly beating down the doors to come to MARSOC either. (E-6, MARSOC)

Gender-neutral will mean standards will be lowered. They will lower standards when they don’t get the numbers they want from the training process. (E-6, Rangers)
Standards will go unenforced, if not lowered, to make good graduation numbers. Relaxing those standards will not serve the female well when she gets to the team. She will be disadvantaged. That will foster animosity. (O-5, SF)

Because politicians with an agenda want to see female numbers pass selection and the schools, the quality is going to go by the wayside. (E-6, MARSCOC)

Retention of Women
In addition to retention concerns with men, many participants believed that women who did join SOF units would have low retention rates. Some argued that these rates might be low enough to render women’s training not cost-effective.

Family Timeline
One potential reason for low female retention, cited in several groups, was the timing of a military career and the desire for a family that many individuals would have. Many participants considered it unlikely that a woman with a family would attempt to join SOF; therefore, applicants would likely be younger. Several also believed that the physical effect of having children and the time away from the unit for maternity leave would be a barrier to continued operations. Finally, many speculated that the demands of SOF operations would be difficult for a woman with young children.

I’m very concerned about retention of females. A young female recruit would probably want a family after six years or so. That would be a lot of time and money invested in training for someone who separates at that point. (E-7, AFSOC)

Long-Term Physical Toll
Other concerns for the retention of women were centered on the long-term effects on the body of SOF missions and training. Numerous participants cited their own recurring injuries and speculated that a person with smaller frame and bone density would have difficulty withstanding the physical stress for more than a few years.

There will be problems with retention. Women will have more injuries. Women might meet minimum standard, but they can’t meet the average. They can’t do well in a competitive environment, and they can’t be part of the elite. Emotionally, this will depress them. They will leave. (E-7, SF)

There will be long-term effects on women. We have guys that can no longer walk. Small guys get destroyed. A 150-pound woman is a big woman, but a small guy. Everyone carries the same weight. I can see women making it in 20 years. They may last half the time, but cost as much. So we will spend twice as much money to end up in the same place. (E-7, SF)

Advice to Policymakers Regarding Implementation
Focus group participants were asked what advice they would give the USSOCOM leadership regarding the potential implementation of integrating women into SOF specialties and units. In almost all of the focus groups, the initial response to this question was a definitive “don’t implement it because we’re against it.”
Sack up. Ask for the exemption. Be a leader, not a politician. I don’t care about females in combat—we’re different. (E-7, SEAL)

Ask for the exemption. Create another pipeline. Define the requirement that needs to be addressed. (E-8, SEAL)

However, when coaxed, many offered advice on implementation, as well as the roles that women could and should fill within the SOF community.

**Advice Regarding Standards**

Many participants were concerned with the maintenance of standards in their communities and stated that their primary advice would be to leave the standards in place. Some were afraid that a separate set of standards would be developed for women, leading to a decrease in morale and trust in the teams. Others believed that pressure to ensure that a required number of women passed would lead to the lowering of standards and a decrease in operator quality across the board.

I think it depends on what the standard is. If the standard is dropped—if we grow the force, we have to drop the standards. If they want to add 5 percent special operations on the ranks—there’s always an exception to the rule. I’ve been outperformed cardiovascularly by women. But if the standards are dropped, morale will go down, as will cohesion. Retention will be negatively affected. Men will leave. (E-8, MARSOC)

If the standards were maintained, several participants saw significantly fewer problems with integration, because of the small number of women expected to qualify. The communities could continue to screen and select personnel without interference and thus avoid many of the negative consequences that have been discussed.

Maybe we are overanalyzing this. Open it up, maintain the standards, allow us to weed out the ones who can’t make it. (O-5, SF)

This is all contingent on standards. As long as you have people capable of doing the job, you’ll get likeminded people. (E-7, SF)

If standards were maintained and she’s able to get into team, then guys who got in, they all know what they’ve done to get there. She would have respect. She’d have the mind-set. They’d have respect for her. (E-6, MARSOC)

**Training Pipelines**

There were substantive concerns that the nature of initial SOF training and the adversarial approach taken by instructors would result in equal opportunity or harassment claims by women. Many participants believed that instructors would be so fearful of this that they would go easy on female students. Additionally, some participants felt that the women would be disadvantaged, as they would have no support structure on which to rely during the mental, emotional, and physical challenge of completing the training pipeline.

How are we going to train them? We will need a female cadre, but where do we get them from? What if the student is the only female and needs to speak with someone? (E-7, SF)
One solution that was proposed was to assign female “chaperones” to the pipeline, whose sole responsibility would be to monitor the female students. The chaperones would be a witness for both instructor and student but would not have any active role in the training itself. These personnel could be employed until women rotated back to instructor billets through normal career progression.

You’ll need some sort of chaperone for the training process until enough females can become instructors. (E-7, SF)

I wouldn’t mind chaperones. You need a witness during the training process to make it fair and avoid “he said, she said.” That way, no one loses their job. (E-7, SF)

I would tell [leaders] not to change any training, just let the women in, and have observers to see the training before and after the women are brought in. (O-5, SEAL)

Additionally, there were many who advocated that women involved with SOF go through a more rigorous training pipeline—even if it is separate from the current pipelines used to train men. While this might not result in the awarding of a tab or insignia, some participants believed that this raised competence in key areas and also instilled some esprit de corps among the graduates.

The NSW females have been received pretty positively. The Army groups I’ve worked with have not been beneficial. The difference is selection and screening. The Army took females out of big Army, put them in units, without doing screening or training. We saw that, learned from mistakes. Asked for all volunteers, so no woman was forced into that deployment. And we did training, getting beat on the beach in Coronado before they moved into the pipeline for deployment. So there’s a little more to females in NSW. (W-3, SWCC)

**Phased Implementation**

Several participants advocated implementing the policy in phases once a final decision was made. Despite concerns that joint operations could be inhibited by such a move (voiced primarily by AFSOC participants), many believed that a “trial run” was necessary to identify implementation challenges.

If you had to do it, then don’t just blanket it. Don’t do it at all, but if you are, don’t just say, “open the door.” Make it for select billets that women are specifically better at or more suited to. (E-6, MARSOC)

Some participants mentioned that certain SOF components were suitable for these trials, though none expressed the belief that their own community was one of these.

Phasing is most appropriate; the impact will be less on other branches. They should start in some other branch where there is no guarantee of combat. Find out what the benefits are and then phase it into SEALs. (E-4, SEAL)

**Begin with a Pilot Group**

Other participants suggested beginning with a pilot group to help identify requirements, as well as the capabilities of women.
For a small target, let’s develop a small SOF female unit, identify requirements, and how it can support SOF. Then you can start to expand where you think this needs to go, rather than putting them in units right out of the gate. (W-3, SWCC)

Have they considered running a test? Get the most fit CrossFit female they can find and see if she can do the training. My biggest concern is the physical stuff. Need to address that first. (E-7, SF)

**Begin with Conventional Forces**

Another view was that conventional forces should be fully integrated before SOF units. This was particularly prevalent in Army SF, where many personnel are recruited from other parts of the Army.

Use a tiered approach. Put women in infantry first. Use it as a gateway. Enter SOF later. This is a progressive approach. Can’t it start with conventional forces? If it has to happen, use tiers. (O-4, SF)

Maybe after ten years in the 82nd, maybe they can crack the nut on these problems. Then move them up to SF. (E-7, SF)

Let it start in the conventional army. That’s what I had to do to join SF. Start the females there. (W-2, SF)

This view was also mentioned by MARSOC personnel, since MARSOC also recruits from the Marine Corps—in particular the infantry, which is currently closed to women.

**Begin with Officers Only**

Some participants believed that starting the integration with officers would work, as has been done in other cases, including with submarines. Some believed that the social separation between officers and enlisted, as well as the difference in tasks, might make this the most workable solution.

They’ll probably come in as officers. . . . They’ll do planning and things like that. (E-7, SF)

An O-3 gets respect by virtue of rank, not experience. That’s harder with an E-7 or E-8. (E-7, SF)³

Other participants saw the differences between officers and enlisted not as facilitating integration but as being an additional complication.

Simultaneous integration would work best. There’s already a barrier between officers and enlisted; this would just be another. There would be strong negatives. (O-4, AFSOC)

In some SOF communities, there would likely be little impact. Though not specifically asked about this idea, SEAL participants stated, on several occasions, that their community is based only on experience and not rank. It is therefore unlikely that an implementation using officers first would be effective.

³ This individual was then reminded by another participant of the impact of having the senior team member be a women during key leader engagements with foreign partners. He then reversed his opinion.
Advice Regarding Potential Roles for Women in SOF

In addition to advice regarding implementation, participants offered advice about the roles that women could serve within SOF that could enhance capability.

Pooled Resource of Niche Enablers

Though participants were highly resistant to the inclusion of women on the teams themselves, every focus group discussed the benefit of having women with specialized skills available for specific missions, including intelligence, access to female populations, and taking custody of female detainees.

The dominant perspective across the focus groups was that women in these roles should be enablers, not organic to SOF teams. These women could be available to be attached to SOF teams in need of their particular skill sets.

The motor pool concept could work. The idea behind CST is legitimate—can get access, info. But we were training on our previous mission. (O-3, SF)

That’s the beauty of enablers. They enhance ODA capability, male or female. They come, then they are gone. But long-term effects of placing them in ODAs will be very detrimental. (E-9, SF)

We need to take a look at the entire organization. There are 60 specialties here; only three are combat arms. In MOSs like intel and personnel, there are benefits. The 35 series [Military Intelligence] has large numbers of females. We’re missing out on some really good people by excluding them. (E-8, Rangers)

If we look at our core mission sets—small units, long durations. Women just would not be value added. But when we go to outward fringes, women are certainly value added. (E-9, SWCC)

There are women that have those special niches that would fit. I think that if that’s the way we’re going to go forward with this, that’s the way it should start. Figure out where they can fit. Separate program. See where we can employ them. (W-3, SWCC)

I’ve worked with females in special operations. The dynamic does change. But it’s no different than situations with females already in theater. With proper employment, they are as or more effective than men in some circumstances. But there’s a difference between “need female 18B on an ODA” and “having female 18Bs available to support.” (O-5, SF)

Many participants also suggested building off of the roles that women already occupy in SOF.

We have females in SOF. We need to expand their role and educate the force on how they can be introduced and utilized. ODA members should know how to utilize all SOF assets. Don’t focus on how to make them operators. Focus on expanding their role. (O-4, SF)

Yes, women have access and placement. But we already do that because we already have the mechanism in place. The way ahead for me is to keep the status quo. (E-8, SWCC)
Many participants expressed that they had positive experiences with CSTs that were attached to their units. Having these specialized teams available to be utilized by the mission commander enjoyed wide support across the services and pay grade groups.

If anything, a FET should broaden their scope and operation and embed themselves with different boat teams to familiarize themselves with SOPs [standard operating procedures], so if the need arises to have a female on board, we can pull one from a FET. (E-7, SWCC)

Look at the CST program and beef it up. Raise their standards for that program. We should be able to call on them when needed. Make it so they can go with any team. Forcing females on Special Forces ODAs is not the answer. (E-7, SF)

The force needs females. CST was not a bad program. But they were attached only. The pipeline is ideal. Train them to be pulled when needed and attached to a unit. The ODAs will pull them for specific requirements. (E-9, SF)

Changing CST would address a lot of issues—avoiding integration and adding credibility to the CSTs with better training. (E-5, SF)

FETs work well. They are all volunteer, have no physical standards, and rudimentary weapons training. You could expand that and give them their own pipeline. They still wouldn’t be SEALs, but would be effective. SEALs aren’t broken, so we don’t need this fix. (E-4, SEAL)

Create an All-Female Unit and Training Pipeline

Several participants believed that creating all-female units was a possibility. These units could be used as pools from which specialists could be drawn to support specific mission requirements.

Pure female ODAs, housed in their own company away from men, could work. Can’t do the missions we have talked about necessarily, but maybe intel. (E-7, SF)

A female unit with high standards that we can pull from would be good. (E-4, Rangers)

If you want to incorporate women as seamlessly as possible into Naval Special Warfare itself, the smartest thing to do is create an independent organization. So you have SEAL, SWCC, and this special unit. That way, they have the requirements they met, respect for being in NSW, and SEAL and SWCC can get all the benefits and enhancements women can bring. (E-5, SWCC)

I think a separate pipeline in which women were trained well, but not expected to man boats or kick down doors, would have some benefit. (O-4, SWCC)

Here’s how you can solve the problem without losing the support of the guys: Take CST, make it part of SOF—but for women only. They will get to do stuff, in the same places, but without the green beanie. (E-6, SF)

When asked whether an all-female unit should receive a trident, one SEAL responded:

No—they could get a mermaid with two guns, crossed. (O-3, SEAL)
Conclusions

There was a great deal of unanimity of views and similarities in issues and concerns raised by participants across our focus groups. The overwhelming majority of participants indicated that they were against the integration of women into their small teams for a variety of reasons. The main concerns expressed by focus group participants across SOF components included:

- the potential impact on standards
- integration is a political decision, and SOF is being used as a social experiment
- it is unclear what additional capabilities women would provide
- the ability of women to do the job
- favoritism
- the potential impact on cohesion
- women might be a distraction
- the potential impact on families
- female medical issues
- issues related to the deployability of women
- the potential impact on working with some foreign partners
- the potential impact on the image of SOF teams

The main concern among participants was that physical fitness standards should not be lowered or changed. However, most participants were skeptical that women could meet current standards, and that, as a result, there would be political pressure to lower standards. Even among participants who felt that women might be able to meet current standards, many felt that the other costs of integrating women into SOF teams are too high.

I think we’re going to find some bada--s women out there—very good athletes. I think it comes down to all the other things we discussed in here. The grenade you’re going to throw into operations: pressure on the force, families, and readiness. I think that’s what will be impacted the most inside SOF. (E-9, SWCC)

Focus group participants also offered the following advice for USSOCOM leadership as they consider potential implementation:

- maintain standards
- consider pipeline issues as integral to the integration process
- implement in phases using a pilot group, or beginning with particular ranks or MOSs.

Participants also offered some ideas to USSOCOM leadership about potential roles that women could fill in SOF. While most participants did not see a role for women in SOF teams, many did think that women could be used in SOF as enablers in key niche areas, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, and access to certain populations. Many participants indicated that a pooled resource of these female niche enablers might be very helpful. In addition, many respondents indicated that another favorable option is to develop all-female units that
have their own standards and training pipelines that could then augment other SOF teams as needed. Consequently, while most participants were against the integration of women as organic elements of small SOF teams, many were receptive to utilizing women as attached enablers for very specialized roles.
The rescission of DGCDAR has the potential to open approximately 15,500 SOF positions to women. These positions are controlled by USSOCOM and have been closed to women by specialty: the Air Force’s CCTs and SOWT specialists, the Army’s SF and Rangers, the Marine Corps CSOs, and the Navy’s SEALs and SWCC. As the previous chapters have highlighted, the potential integration of women into SOF entails a number of issues pertinent to the effectiveness of such teams, in terms of physical standards and ensuring the readiness, cohesion, and morale essential to high-performing teams.

The purpose of this research was to inform USSOCOM about the depth and extent of the potential challenges to integrating women into SOF positions thus far closed to women, as one input for USSOCOM leadership regarding how to proceed. As such, we have focused on the potential challenges and problems to the full integration of women into SOF and placed the potential policy change in the context of previous integrations of out-groups into the military. All of the challenges we identified have come up previously, none proved to be insurmountable, and the key to successful prior integrations was the implementation program. If USSOCOM makes the decision to proceed, lessons from the previous integrations might be useful to draw on in informing a USSOCOM implementation plan. In this part, we sketch out the basic guidelines for such an implementation plan, and we keep the guidelines purposely concise. Expanding on these guidelines is an appropriate step after a policy decision has been made, assuming that the decision is to proceed with integration.

This report has assessed the extent and breadth of potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF units. Based on our analyses, the challenges facing USSOCOM, should it decide to integrate women into SOF units, are real and multifaceted, but none is insurmountable. The key to the successful integration of excluded groups is the implementation process. A successful integration of women into SOF occupations will require transparency, effective leadership and communication, progress monitoring, openness to innovation, flexibility, and adaptability. Even with all of the above, the process still is likely to face major challenges because of the depth and scope of opposition and concern among the force. As USSOCOM considers near-term and long-term integration priorities, the mechanisms put into place will need to be flexible enough to accommodate learning and adjustments through such strategies as phased implementation and systematic experiments. Finally, putting the systems in place to enable the collection of the appropriate data throughout the integration process will ensure that progress can be tracked and that improvements can be made over time. In Chapters Seven and Eight, we review our main findings, present our final observations, and identify the recommendations that flow out of our findings for USSOCOM leadership regarding the potential implementation of the gender integration of SOF specialties and units.
The issue of gender-neutral standards is a critical component of the successful potential integration of women into SOF. It is the single most important issue to currently serving SOF personnel, and it has ramifications for the effectiveness of the force. Chapter Seven provides a framework for USSOCOM and the SOF service components regarding establishing gender-neutral standards. This framework is designed to enable military services and USSOCOM to set their standards in line with the guidance on the lifting of DGCDAR while achieving maximum mission performance. The framework is based on a six-step approach that builds on best practices applied to civilian organizations and federal agencies, and it provides conceptual clarity for the service components. The six steps are the following:

1. Identify the physical demands and requirements of the job.
2. Identify potential screening tests.
3. Validate the tests, and select those with the highest validities and lowest adverse impact.
4. Establish minimum test scores.
5. Implement screening.
6. Confirm that the tests are working as intended.

This process summarizes a comprehensive and widely accepted approach for establishing standards relevant to gender integration and the selection of SOF personnel. Although the framework has implications for gender integration, it is based on scientific practices that have emerged, over several decades, from research with civilian and military organizations that select, train, and qualify the best individuals for the job—whether male or female. Even if the service components adopt this approach, challenges are still likely to arise during implementation.

First, service components already have existing selection tests and standards for SOF specialties. These standards were developed before women were eligible, but they are still relevant occupational standards. These standards need to be evaluated against the remaining steps in the process—validation, establishing minimum test scores, screening implementation applicable to both men and women, and confirming the tests are working as intended. The six-step process can serve as a valid checklist within existing processes.

Second, some existing physical tasks and activities are not designed to measure critical physical abilities but instead are used to measure other important characteristics, such as creativity, critical thinking, teamwork, leadership, perseverance, and persistence under stress. These tasks and activities are critical to identifying and training special operators, but they are also difficult to validate. Indirectly measuring such characteristics through performance on physical tasks and activities is more difficult than explicitly identifying and measuring physical job demands required by the mission, but it is possible, as long as the effort is systematic and explicit.

Third, each of the service components has different amounts of resources and expertise available for executing the required steps for validation. Conducting a job analysis entails substantial upfront costs, whether there are only a few or many service members in that specialty, which means that some service components might be stretched thin in terms of resources available. To carry out a thorough job analysis for each specialty, the service components need to consider the number of specialties being reviewed when dedicating time and staff resources and—whenever possible—leverage each other’s resources and expertise for conducting task and physical demand analyses.
Fourth, extensive time and resources are required to conduct a comprehensive job analysis and fully evaluate the physical-ability tests and standards currently in place to ensure that they are gender-neutral. Validation will take more than a few months of effort; it is a long-term process, which requires constant attention to ensure that the tests and standards are working as intended. Expectation management throughout the process will be critical. A genuine attempt at validation that meets intermediate timelines and milestones but is long-term in orientation is preferable to a quick and potentially incomplete validation that is open to questioning and difficult to defend.

Fifth, as our survey and focus group analyses have identified, there are many concerns about the process of establishing gender-neutral standards—that the outcome of the process is already predecided, that there is pressure from outside DoD to reduce standards if women are unable to qualify, that few women will be able to meet the standards to qualify, or that few women who might be capable of success will be interested. It is critical to communicate throughout the SOF community that the validation process is based on widely accepted scientific principles to ensure that the most-capable individuals are selected, that its purpose is to be unbiased and objective, and ultimately that it is meant to improve organizational and mission effectiveness.

Finally, changes made to the current physical-ability standards might be viewed negatively by personnel within the SOF community. Specifically, women who qualify under any new standards might be perceived as less competent and less trustworthy than already-serving special operators, because the women have not proven themselves capable of passing the old standards. There is potential that such beliefs might lead to lower morale and undermine faith in leadership and unit readiness. Ideally, the service components would head off such concerns and deal with them directly and proactively. SOF service components and USSOCOM should consider a strategic communication plan that clearly outlines the process and its goals.

When looking across all of our study findings, the following areas are particularly relevant to informing USSOCOM’s implementation planning regarding the potential integration of women into SOF specialties and units:

- **Leadership is key to integration success.** Most of the concerns among SOF personnel are leadership challenges. These include command climate issues, such as the tone set during the integration process, as well as enforcing good order and discipline to prevent issues of misconduct that can have a negative impact on cohesion. Leadership can also put in place policies to quickly identify problems that might arise during implementation.
- **The implementation process is critical to long-term integration success.** To ensure long-term viability, USSOCOM will need to put in place practices to promote the successful integration of qualified women. This includes developing and fostering an equitable organizational culture, such as providing ample opportunities for women to demonstrate their competence. Associated with this, USSOCOM and the SOF service components will need to establish practices to limit the social isolation of women in SOF.
- **Valid, gender-neutral standards can facilitate integration.** Much of the opposition to integrating women into SOF specialties and units is rooted in concerns regarding mission effectiveness (e.g., about women not being able to physically perform the necessary tasks for the job). However, these concerns can be addressed by establishing and validating gender-neutral standards and implementing training programs that prepare female candidates to meet those standards.
• **Targeted recruitment and adequate preparation of female candidates are needed.** Many of the concerns expressed by SOF personnel center on doubts about women being able to adequately perform the necessary physical tasks. Our findings also indicate that the low assessment of the abilities of women is often based on experiences with military women who did not have the same training and preparation as men. Providing female candidates adequate preparation to meet gender-neutral standards could go a long way in enabling women to earn the respect and trust of their SOF teammates.

• **Deliberate pace of integration is important.** Given the differences in mission, equipment, operational environment, and culture across SOF components, USSOCOM might need to consider a phased integration approach. Such an approach would allow USSOCOM to monitor the integration process and make adjustments as needed. This type of approach could also yield important information about the risks and benefits of integration that then could be applied to subsequent integration efforts as they are expanded.

• **Integration progress needs to be monitored and assessed over time.** Monitoring and assessment will allow for quickly identifying problems and addressing them on a timely basis. The overall measure of outcome would be unit performance. Potential categories to monitor over time include unit readiness, female career development, attrition, rates of misconduct, and cohesion and morale.

• **Expectation management is a critical component of success.** One of the most important aspects of expectation management is the number of women expected to join SOF if these positions are opened to them. The experiences of allied militaries indicate that those that have general purpose combat arms positions open to women also have few women serving in those positions. From this perspective, the anxiety felt by SOF personnel about a large influx of women in a short period of time and a consequent altering of intraunit dynamics might be unfounded. The process might be gradual, and a change might come over a generation.

Even with all of the above, there are still other complex concerns that we came upon in the course of our research; none involves easy solutions. For example, there might be challenges to mission effectiveness from deploying women to work with local and irregular forces in countries where there are strict gender roles, segregation of the sexes, and prevailing norms and customs view women as not equal members of the society. There might be workarounds to such challenges, but they are likely to remain.

Given the extreme physical requirements associated with SOF, if USSOCOM opens up all the SOF occupations, the number of women entering SOF is likely to be limited in the foreseeable future. But it is not a given that all SOF require such high levels of physical prowess, and the importance of physical prowess in the fulfillment of SOF missions might change in the future. In fact, future SOF operating concepts that imply greater persistent forward presence, interaction with partners, and more preparation of the environment all entail potential additional roles for women in SOF. Our survey and focus group findings indicate some receptiveness among SOF personnel to a highly trained cadre of SOF enablers, including women, that would be a repository of niche capabilities and could be utilized as needed to exploit opportunities. These enabler roles, open to men and women, could provide additional mechanisms to recruit highly skilled and motivated personnel to SOF.
The issue of gender-neutral standards is a critical component of the successful potential integration of women into SOF. It is the single most important issue to currently serving SOF personnel, and it has ramifications for the effectiveness of the force. This chapter provides a framework for USSOCOM and the SOF service components for establishing gender-neutral standards that are mandated in policy guidance documents.

In Chapter Three, we discussed how men and women differ in their physical abilities. Some of these differences matter for understanding the likelihood of entry into SOF, specifically for specialties that require high levels of strength, power, and aerobic endurance to meet the extreme physical demands of operational missions. Potential gender integration raises unique questions about the gender-neutrality and validity of existing tests and standards for selecting women. For example, using standard fitness test scores that have been adjusted based on gender and age would be not be gender-neutral and would be inconsistent with current directives. Even when standards are based on job requirements, it is possible that some tests might not work equally well for women and men. On the one hand, women might perform well on some tests but perform poorly on job tasks. This might occur for tests that have been documented to have a body mass bias (Vanderburgh et al., 2011). That is, having a smaller frame might be an advantage when performing pull-ups or running but might be a disadvantage when having to perform a road march while carrying heavy loads. In contrast, women might perform poorly on other tests yet perform physically demanding job tasks successfully. This might occur if women use different abilities to get the job done. In either case, updating prior validation studies using the proposed framework will help to maintain high levels of performance while ensuring that tests and standards are equally effective for both men and women.

So, how can the military services and USSOCOM go about ensuring that their standards are in line with the guidance on lifting DGCDAR and are set at a level to maximize mission performance? To address this question, we first recognize the following points:

1. SOF currently has established standards, which have evolved to meet mission requirements and ensure that the best operators are selected.
2. In the context of gender integration, the effectiveness of current (or revised) tests and standards is not known; therefore, a common framework to evaluate current or revised tests and standards is recommended.
3. There is no one single method for establishing the validity of a selection system. Many practical factors (e.g., safety of research participants) could limit the adoption of an ideal scientific approach.

4. SOF assessment and selection systems are designed to achieve multiple objectives. These might include ensuring that operators have both the necessary physical and mental attributes needed to succeed in an environment that is characterized by uncertainty, isolation, extreme physical demands, and danger.

5. Minimum standards are meant to define the level at which individuals will not be considered for assessment, selection, training, and so on. Individuals selected for SOF specialties often exceed the minimum standards; therefore, performing at the minimum standards on a test does not guarantee selection or consideration for a SOF specialty. When individuals who meet the minimum standard are not considered, special attention should be placed on evidence demonstrating a monotonic relationship between test scores and job performance. That is, individuals with higher test scores should have a higher probability of success.

To guide the military services in ensuring that its standards are gender-neutral, RAND researchers recently developed a comprehensive six-step approach that summarizes professional and legal guidelines, which apply to civilian organizations and federal agencies. These guidelines include the *Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures* (Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2003), *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, and National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999), and the “Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection” (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1978), which was jointly adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice and has been included into the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (29 CFR Part 1607, 1978). The U.S. military is not required to adhere to these regulations, but using a framework based on these well-established guidelines will provide conceptual clarity to the efforts of the service components, will enable the easier sharing of relevant information across components, and will help identify areas of concern. Furthermore, this framework is provided with the understanding that SOF have established standards and that each service might have conducted previous studies documenting different forms of validity evidence. Nonetheless, the services can use the framework to evaluate and measure their progress and ensure that relevant documentation is provided in relation to each of the six steps.

We begin this section with definitions of the relevant terminology to establish a common baseline; then turn to an overview of the six-step process with emphasis on the requirement to establish the validity of occupational tests and standards; and finally conclude with a discussion of implementation challenges.

**Why Standards?**

What is meant by the term *standards*? *Standards* refer to set criteria that must be met to enter or remain in an occupation. Standards can be applied at multiple times to determine who becomes and remains a special operator. For example, standards might be used during recruitment, selection, assessment, training, and reenlistment. A minimum score on a physical test
used to determine who is qualified for a job is one example of an occupation-specific entry standard. An example of a standard applied during training is a gate or hurdle that determines whether a candidate is eligible to move on to the next phase of training. If training gates and hurdles are necessary for a given occupation, the standards for these decision points should be the same for both men and women. Although it is important that all standards used to make decisions about a person’s career are tied to occupational requirements and are gender-neutral, the standards that the services should focus on first are those used to determine who qualifies for training, who is allowed to pass each hurdle in training, and who is ultimately placed on the job as a special operator.

Gender-neutral standards are standards (e.g., minimum scores on a physical-ability test) in which gender is not a factor in decisions about the minimum qualifications for a job. That is, the same standards apply to both men and women assigned to perform the same job duties. Job-related or occupationally relevant standards for SOF should be gender-neutral, as the skills or abilities needed to perform essential job duties will be the same regardless of who is performing them. For example, if evidence from a validation study (discussed in a subsequent section) shows that successful operators assigned to Job X must be able to run 1.5 miles in 10 minutes, then everyone, regardless of gender, must meet this requirement. Some organizations adjust times for men and women based on known physiological differences; however, this type of adjustment is not gender-neutral because different standards are set for each gender. For example, although research studies have shown that women, on average, have less aerobic capacity, for a gender-neutral standard, there would be no adjustment made based on gender. If aerobic capacity is critical to the job, the minimum aerobic capacity needed should be specified, and everyone should be required to meet that minimum, regardless of gender. The bottom line is that gender-neutral standards should be based on job-related requirements, and these standards should be the same for both men and women.

All training activities should have clear objectives and should be tied to occupational or operational requirements. At a broad level, training activities can be used for developmental purposes or for screening out candidates who would make unacceptable operators. If the purpose of the training activity is to screen out candidates, then this training activity needs to be gender-neutral, and the same standards must apply to both men and women. That is, women would be expected to march with a rucksack the same distance, carry the same weight, and complete the same training objectives in the same time as specified for men. Training designed for developmental purposes can be individualized to maximize fitness gains in a safe and effective way. Such training is gender-neutral to the extent that training activities and goals are based on an individual’s current fitness levels rather than gender status.

An important point to understand in the context of setting gender-neutral standards is the concept of bias. Bias is “systematic error that differentially affects the performance of different groups of test takers” (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, and National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999, p. 31). For example, bias can occur when a test is administered differently for men and women. This type of bias can be minimized by standardizing test administration conditions and instructions and by training and monitoring test proctors. Another type of bias, predictive bias,1 refers to systematic error that occurs when a test or standard is a better predictor of performance of one

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1 In the event that predictive bias is found, additional analyses would be recommended prior to the implementation of the test or standard to identify and address potential causes.
group (e.g., men) than another group (e.g., women). In other words, a test would have predictive bias to the extent that more-accurate decisions are made about men’s qualifications than women’s qualifications. For example, a test resulting in average gender differences that does not correspond to similar gender differences in job performance would have to be further evaluated for test bias. However, simple average difference in men’s and women’s performances on a test is not by itself an indication of test bias. On the contrary, gender differences on many physical ability tests would be expected because there are average differences in many underlying physical abilities (Courtright et al., 2013).

**Types of Tests and Standards**

There are two broad objectives for the use of physical-ability tests in the workplace: (1) predicting health and fitness, and (2) predicting job performance. Many physical-ability tests, including those conducted by the military (i.e., Air Force Fitness Assessment, Army Physical Fitness Test, Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test, and Navy Physical Readiness Test), are designed to evaluate overall fitness, decrease the risk of negative health outcomes (e.g., cardiovascular disease), and instill a culture of fitness. Scores on these tests are generally adjusted for physiological differences across age groups and between men and women. In other words, for men and women, and for individuals of different ages, the same score would be interpreted differently. For example, to achieve a perfect score on the two-mile run for the Army Physical Fitness Test, a 19-year-old man has to finish in 13 minutes and 0 seconds, while a 30-year-old women would have to finish it in 15 minutes and 48 seconds. General fitness or health assessments do not need to be gender-neutral unless they are used to make decisions about the qualifications of operators for specific occupations.

The second broad type of fitness test is designed to ensure that individuals can perform the essential functions of the job and meet mission demands. These occupationally relevant physical-ability tests and standards can be expected to differ across occupational specialties because each specialty has different physically demanding tasks and duties. Within a specialty, given that everyone at a particular grade level should be capable of performing basically the same tasks and duties, the physical-ability standards at that level should be the same for all personnel, regardless of gender. These occupationally relevant fitness standards are often referred to as *absolute standards*, since the standard is equally applied to all individuals performing the same job. It is these physical-ability tests and standards that are the focus of the following six-step approach.

**Six-Step Approach**

This six-step approach is a way to organize and track the ongoing efforts by the service components in establishing gender-neutral standards. The definitions presented highlight some of the major factors that should be considered at each step. Full implementation and oversight of the steps should involve the participation of industrial-organizational psychologists and exercise physiologists, among other subject-matter experts. It is important to understand that these steps require considerable effort, resources, and time.
1. **Identify the Physical Demands and Requirements of the Job**

A job analysis should be conducted first to identify the physical requirements of the job. Although there are several approaches for conducting a job analysis, a task analysis is a common and defensible approach that defines all the tasks that are performed by operators within a specific job. Once all tasks have been documented, a task-analysis questionnaire is typically completed by a representative sample of operators to collect additional details about the importance, frequency, and duration of and the effort required to perform each task. The results from this questionnaire can provide a strong foundation for efforts to validate many different types of human resource systems, such as screening criteria, training standards, and job performance and mission standards.

A similar physical-demands analysis should be conducted to identify the physical demands required during all qualification stages, such as assessment and selection. These analyses should identify which training activities require physical effort, their level of effort, and their relationship to job or mission requirements. For many training activities, a direct link to job or mission requirements can be made (e.g., land navigation exercise). Other training activities, however, might require establishing an indirect link when the training activity would not be performed as part of the job or mission (e.g., lifting a log repeatedly with several other trainees). One way to establish an indirect link is to identify common underlying abilities required to perform well on the training activity and on an important job task. For example, lifting a log might require teamwork, muscular strength, and muscular endurance, which might be important abilities required to perform one or more important job tasks. Factors to consider when establishing such indirect links include not only the similarity between the underlying abilities required by training activities and important job tasks but also the level of those required abilities. Without adequate documentation from a systematic job analysis, decisions about the qualifications of candidates or operators will lack adequate justification.

2. **Identify Potential Screening Tests**

The second step in the process is to select several tests that can be used to measure the different physical abilities needed to perform important physically demanding job tasks. Two broad types of approaches are typically taken to measure physical abilities. The most direct approach is to use work samples or job simulations, which are miniaturized versions of the job. The tasks to be included in a work sample test should be selected using several criteria, including the task’s importance and representativeness to the overall job. Because work samples often require technical skills to perform certain tasks, tests of basic physical abilities are used more frequently as screening tests to determine readiness for training. Depending on the tasks identified by the job analysis, a range of ability tests might be selected to measure muscular strength, muscular endurance, aerobic endurance, anaerobic power, equilibrium and balance, flexibility, and coordination and agility. Prior research should be reviewed to identify ability tests that have sufficient test-retest reliability. Other criteria for selecting tests might include the cost of the test, ease of administration, and potential injury risk incurred from taking the test.

3. **Validate the Tests, and Select Those with the Highest Validities and Least-Adverse Impact**

Although the first two steps can be completed with minimal guidance from experienced analysts, validation of physical-ability tests and work sample tests will require personnel with experience designing and executing such research studies. Consequently, researchers with
background in industrial-organizational psychology, exercise and work physiology, or statistics should lead the validation studies. Two of the more common strategies for validation include (1) content validity, demonstrating a linkage between test content and job (and training) content, and (2) criterion validity, demonstrating a linkage between test performance and job (and training) performance. In addition to predicting job performance, criterion validity can also be used to demonstrate how well tests predict other important criteria, such as training success and injuries. To the extent possible, researchers should pursue multiple strategies for validating tests and standards. In general, validation should be viewed as the accumulation of evidence to support inferences made about an individual with a specific test score. As part of the validation efforts, researchers should also examine the potential for tests to have predictive bias. For example, do the tests predict job performance equally well for men and women? Validation is discussed in more detail in the following section.

4. Establish Minimum Test Scores

Once the validation studies have been completed, a systematic approach should be taken to establish the minimum scores required to pass each test. Several different methods are available for establishing these minimum scores, and deciding on the best method, or methods, will depend on several factors, including the type of validation studies completed as part of step 3. In most cases, the process of establishing minimum test scores requires expert judgment about what constitutes minimally acceptable performance on the job. Therefore, determining who should participate as experts in this step is one of the most important decisions at this stage. In general, experts should have considerable experience in the job and should be representative of different perspectives within the job, such as duty location and pay grade, as well as demographic background (e.g., race, ethnicity). Another important factor to consider when establishing minimum test scores is whether training can be expected to produce improvements on the physical abilities required to perform well on tests, during future training, and on the job. To the extent that such improvements can be expected, minimum test scores required to enter training may be significantly lower than test scores required to qualify for selection as an operator.

Even though different methods might be used to establish minimum test scores, the objectives remain the same. That is, minimum test scores should be gender-neutral, which means that men and women have to meet the same standards to demonstrate their capability to perform important job tasks. Test scores should not be adjusted to account for average physiological differences between men and women. These types of adjustments would undermine the purpose of establishing minimum standards that serve as an indication of one’s ability to perform essential job tasks.

5. Implement Screening

Several steps must be taken prior to implementing new tests, including developing standardized protocols for test administration, training test proctors on how to administer and score the tests, and preparing information materials for candidates. Once these steps have been completed, the new tests should be phased in gradually, to allow for adjustments to be made to test protocols, testing materials, and training for test proctors. To phase in new tests, one approach could be to continue using existing tests to make screening decisions while trying out the new tests with a few cycles of candidates. In addition to addressing any problems with the new tests,
this trial period can help to increase confidence among existing operators and address concerns that standards are being lowered.

6. Confirm That the Tests Are Working as Intended

Periodic reviews of the entire testing program will help to ensure that the tests are being administered fairly and according to standardized protocols. In addition to these checks, a system to reevaluate job requirements on an annual basis should be implemented. Any substantive changes to the job requirements should trigger a review of the tests and standards to confirm that they are appropriate for ensuring that operators have the physical abilities needed to perform essential job tasks. The predictive validity of the testing program should also be revisited periodically to determine whether the best candidates are selected not only for training but ultimately for the job.

Validation

The six-step process summarizes a comprehensive and widely accepted approach for establishing standards relevant to gender integration and the selection of SOF personnel. Although the framework has implications for gender integration, it is based on scientific practices that have emerged over several decades from research with civilian and military organizations that select, train, and qualify the best individuals for the job—whether male or female (Koppes, 2014). Validating standards is a critical element of the framework to achieve this goal.

As described in the previous section, step 3 of the process for establishing gender-neutral standards is validation. Validation refers to the process of gathering, evaluating, and documenting evidence that indicates whether tests and standards are useful in making decisions about someone’s qualifications for a job. Validation is a scientific process best conducted by experienced scientists who can lead the research designs and analyses needed to develop appropriate performance measures; conduct the required validation studies; and establish gender-neutral, occupationally relevant tests and standards.

Validation involves a series of coordinated studies designed to address several questions, including

- What physically demanding tasks are performed by special operators?
- What physical abilities are needed to perform important job-related tasks?
- What conditions affect the level of each ability that is required?
- What tests can be used to effectively measure the important physical abilities that are required?
- What standards, cut scores, or gates will be used to determine qualified personnel?
- How has each of the standards, cut scores, or gates been validated?

The terms valid, validity, and validation are used here in a very specific, technical, and scientific sense:

Validity refers to the degree to which evidence and theory support the interpretations of test scores entailed by proposed uses of tests. Validity is, therefore, the most fundamental consideration in developing and evaluating tests. The process of validation involves accumulating evidence to provide a sound scientific basis for the proposed score interpretations. It is the interpretations of test scores required by proposed uses that are evaluated, not the test itself. When test scores are used or interpreted in more than one way, each intended inter-
A test is valid when data show that there is a scientific basis for interpreting scores from a test. One such interpretation, with regard to tests used to select individuals for training in the SOF context, may be stated: “Individuals with higher test scores are more likely to successfully complete training.”

**Strategies for Establishing Validity**

To provide the scientific evidence required to support such interpretations, one of three types of validation strategies, acknowledged by the “Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection” and the American Psychological Association, should be followed:

- **Content validity**: A demonstration that the content of a selection procedure is representative of important aspects of performance on the job.
- **Criterion-related validity**: A statistical demonstration of a relationship between scores on a selection procedure and the job performance of a sample of workers.
- **Construct validity**: A demonstration that (1) a selection procedure measures a construct (something believed to be an underlying human trait or characteristic, such as honesty), and (2) the construct is important for successful job performance.

The type of validation strategy appropriate for a given test and situation depends on many factors, including the type of test and how individuals’ test scores are interpreted. For example, what does a score of “18 pull-ups” tell us about an individual? That the individual is capable of performing some set of job-related tasks, that the individual would perform a set of job-related tasks better than an individual performing fewer pull-ups, that the individual is less likely to drop out of training, that the individual is less likely to sustain an injury, or that the individual is dedicated? Although all of these conclusions may ultimately be shown to be a valid inference from the test score, it is important to demonstrate this scientifically through data collected from appropriate validation studies.

In addition to the type of inferences that we want to make about test scores, the type of test can influence the appropriateness of a specific validation strategy. Tests can range in their level of complexity and in how directly they measure job-related knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs). In the following sections, we provide an overview of content validity and criterion-related validity, as these two approaches are most commonly used to validate physical ability tests.

**Content Validity**

Relatively direct measures, also known as work sample tests, are sometimes used when there is a clearly documented physical requirement that is performed frequently on the job. A ruck march test, for example, could be designed based on data from a systematic job analysis to ensure that there is a high correspondence between the content (e.g., load, distance, pace) of the test and the job. Establishing this correspondence between the test and the job is referred to
as content validity and requires a systematic linkage, made by subject-matter experts, between assessment components and job requirements:

Selection procedures [tests] are more supportable when they minimize the assessment of extraneous factors . . . and approximate the [physical] level and complexity of the job. Formal documentation of the links between assessment components and the KSAOs or work behaviors they are intended to measure should be developed. Once assessments are developed, it should be clear how the assessment content representatively samples important aspects of the observable job domain or the body of knowledge that is a prerequisite for observable work behavior [on important, job-related tasks]. (McPhail and Stelly, 2010, pp. 682–683)

Work sample tests are generally designed to measure an individual’s capability to perform a relatively specific, but small, number of tasks. That is, a ruck march test would be designed to tell us how well a trainee or operator can move while under a heavy load.

**Criterion-Related Validity**

Criterion-related validity is supported when there is a statistically significant relationship (e.g., correlation) between test scores and job-performance scores. Tests other than work-sample tests can be designed to ensure capabilities to perform a wider range of tasks by measuring basic abilities, such as upper-body muscular strength and endurance. A pull-up test, for example, might be designed to ensure the capability to perform several important job-related tasks requiring upper-body strength and endurance (e.g., climbing a rope ladder, a caving ladder, over a wall). In this case, a criterion-related validity study, with a representative sample of participants, could be an appropriate strategy to ensure that the number of pull-ups an individual can complete is a good indicator of future performance on important, job-related tasks (see Figure 7.1), such as climbing a wall during urban warfare.

A criterion-related validity study can also be a useful strategy for establishing validity when physically demanding tests are designed to measure nonphysical abilities. For example, a test that requires six individuals to work together to move heavy equipment over sandy terrain for ten kilometers may be designed to measure teamwork, leadership, and persistence. The minimum data requirements for establishing the validity of this type of test requires test scores and job-performance scores on the same ability. For example, instructors could provide ratings of teamwork for individuals on the test, and supervisors could provide ratings of teamwork for these same individuals after they have completed a mission at some point in the future. The statistical correlation between these two sets of ratings would then be examined to ensure that test teamwork scores are positively correlated with teamwork job-performance scores. That is, individuals with the highest test scores are most likely to receive the highest job-performance scores.

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3 Work-sample tests can also be used to predict an individual’s capability to perform other tasks not included on the test, especially when an underlying ability, such as muscular endurance, is needed to perform tasks sampled on the test and other job-related tasks not included. For example, a test requiring individuals to climb a caving ladder while wearing body armor could be used to predict tasks requiring similar upper-body strength, such as climbing over a wall or pulling oneself into a helicopter. To support this type of linkage, a criterion-validation study would need to be conducted.
192    Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces

Although these types of events\(^4\) can be useful for measuring important job-related abilities, several issues need to be addressed when using physically demanding tests to assess nonphysical, job-related abilities:

What is the purpose of the test (e.g., is a test that requires a team of eight individuals to move equipment over sandy terrain designed to measure teamwork, motivation, and the ability to handle stress)?

- Which nonphysical abilities or attributes will be measured? Are the requirements for these abilities supported by data collected from a systematic job analysis?
- How will these abilities be measured on the test (e.g., instructor ratings, peer ratings)? What is the reliability of these ratings?
- Which physical abilities are required to perform well on this test? Are these physical abilities (and amount of abilities and level of physical effort) supported as required by data collected from a systematic job analysis?
- Are physical and psychological stressors applied during the test? If so, are these stressors supported as required by data collected from a systematic job analysis?
- Are there nonphysical methods available for measuring these nonphysical abilities? If other methods are available, why are they not being used?

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\(^4\) Multiple events that include multiple job-related performance dimensions and where performance is evaluated by multiple raters are commonly referred to as assessment centers.
Choosing a Validation Strategy: Content Validity Versus Criterion-Related Validity

It is important to note that a content-validity approach is most appropriate when scientifically establishing the correspondence between important physically demanding tasks required on the job or mission and physically demanding tasks required in training and on tests. On the other hand, it is generally less appropriate to rely solely on content-validity approaches for justifying the use of physical tests or tasks to measure nonphysical abilities. Therefore, the use of any physically demanding tasks or activities designed to measure these types of characteristics should be supported by other forms of validity evidence (e.g., criterion-related validity). One approach might be to demonstrate that scores on these tasks or activities are statistically related to important job outcomes.

Depending on the nature of the abilities and how they are being measured, more-complex construct-validity studies might also need to be conducted. From a technical perspective, “construct validity is based on an integration of any evidence that bears on the interpretation or meaning of the test scores—including content- and criterion-related evidence—which are thus subsumed as part of construct validity” (Messick, 1995, p. 742). Evidence of convergent and divergent validity might be also be needed:

Convergent evidence exists when (a) test scores relate to scores on other tests of the same construct, (b) test scores from people who differ in the extent to which they possess the focal construct also differ in a predictable way, or (c) test scores relate to scores on tests of other constructs that are theoretically expected to be related. Discriminant evidence occurs when test scores do not relate to scores on tests of theoretically independent constructs. (Binning and Barrett, 1989, p. 482)

Because construct validity often combines multiple validation strategies (e.g., convergent validity, discriminant validity), it is essential that the SOF service components conducting the validation studies consult with a qualified researcher who can assist with research design and the interpretation of results.

Job-Performance Measures

When determining which job performance measures to use in a validation study, it is important to evaluate several factors, including the purpose of the test and the scientific validity, relevance, representativeness, sensitivity, and reliability of the criteria. These factors, emphasized in the “Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection,” provide additional clarification when using training performance as a criterion:

Where performance in training is used as a criterion, success in training should be properly measured and the relevance of the training should be shown either through a comparison of the content of the training program with the critical or important work behavior(s) of the job(s), or through a demonstration of the relationship between measures of performance in training and measures of job performance. Measures of relative success in training include but are not limited to instructor evaluations, performance samples, or tests. (29 CFR Part 1607, 1978, Section 14B[3])

Performance can be defined using a wide range of criteria, including evaluations of training performance and job or mission performance. Depending on the type of performance criteria, multiple sources might be appropriate for measuring performance, including the use of
instructors, psychologists, or peers to obtain independent ratings. In addition to providing different perspectives, the use of multiple raters provides the added benefit of being able to evaluate interrater reliability. In all cases, the raters should be familiar with the rating instrument and performance standards, and their ratings should be based on observation of job-related behaviors and outcomes.

As part of the overall review of the scientific validity of performance criteria, steps should be taken to ensure that instructors are fully trained on how to evaluate and that ratings are evaluated for reliability. Acknowledging that the development and evaluation of performance criteria is a complex process, a qualified research team should lead efforts to evaluate the scientific validity and reliability for each performance criterion that will be used in validation efforts to establish operationally relevant, gender-neutral tests and standards. The research team should consist of individuals with backgrounds or expertise in industrial-organizational psychology, exercise physiology, and statistics. Additional expertise in occupational health or medicine might also be helpful if tests and standards are designed to predict or minimize injuries in training and on the job.

Establishing the Validity of Job-Performance Measures
Similar to establishing the scientific validity of a work-sample test, a content-validity approach can be used to establish links between training content and important job tasks. This is an important step even when using training outcome measures, such as attrition and injuries, which might be influenced by multiple factors, some of which might be unrelated to an individual’s job-relevant abilities. Attrition, in particular, might be influenced by a variety of job-relevant factors, including low motivation, lack of physical or mental preparation, and insufficient abilities. Attrition might also be influenced by such unwanted factors as instructor bias, unreliable or nonstandardized testing, and irrelevant training curriculum. Therefore, a content-validation study should be conducted to document the linkage between training and the job. Such a study would help to establish the relevance of physical training tasks, training conditions, and the application of psychological or physical stressors. These linkages should facilitate an understanding of attrition and injury outcomes, including why and how they are influenced by different job-relevant abilities.

Documentation
A critical part of the six-step approach is establishing full and proper documentation of how each step in the process is performed—providing justification and evidence of how each step was undertaken. Throughout the process, it is preferable to err on the side of providing too much information rather than too little. In the appendixes we provide a recommended outline for the report elements that USSOCOM will need to fully explain the gender-neutrality of physical-ability tests, assessments, and standards (Szayna, Larson, et al., 2016). Many of the report elements will require input from individuals with expertise in personnel selection, validation, and statistics. The aim is to provide adequate documentation to demonstrate that USSOCOM adhered to widely accepted scientific and professional guidelines in its evaluation.

The report, or more likely, several reports, documenting the process should contain these major sections:

- **Background information** on how operators are currently selected into the specialty, including a thorough description of all the tests, assessments, and standards that are used to determine the qualifications and readiness of operators in each specialty.
• A description of the physical tasks and demands of the specialty (i.e., job analysis). Documentation for the job analysis should present not only results of the job analysis but also information on how it was conducted. The documentation should be clear as to which tasks were extracted from relevant training documents or regulations, from interviews or surveys with subject-matter experts or from other documents describing the physical demands of particular missions.

• An examination of alternative tests and assessments that were considered or have been used previously. The documentation should provide an explanation as to why alternative tests and assessments were not adopted. This is an important step, especially for tests and assessments that might result in subgroup differences to show that efforts were taken to identify other options that are equally valid but result in the elimination or reduction of subgroup differences.

• Conceptual linkage of tests/assessments to job analysis results. Tests and assessments can be linked directly to important, physically demanding tasks, or they can be linked to important knowledge, skills, and abilities.

• Validation evidence. Documentation should describe the validation methodology, the validation study results, and a summary of conclusions that can be drawn from each statistical analysis. It is important to identify and document the objectives of all tests and assessment activities.

• A description of the standard setting procedures for tests and assessments that require a minimum score.

Examining Fairness and Bias

Fairness has many meanings and there is no single, commonly accepted definition of fairness (American Educational Research Association et al., 1999). However, when evaluating a test, four types of fairness are often examined, including (1) subgroup outcomes (e.g., qualification rates for men and women), (2) equal treatment of all possible candidates, (3) equal opportunities to learn about the tests being used for selection, and (4) a lack of predictive bias (Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2003).

The first of these definitions suggests that equal subgroup outcomes occur when the selection or qualification rates are equal for different subgroups (e.g., men and women). It is important to note that this definition of fairness has been rejected (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, and National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999). As discussed previously, there are sometimes large differences between men and women on their physical-ability test scores, which could result in differential qualification rates of men and women (if those tests are used). Therefore, average gender differences on physical-ability tests should not be used to interpret whether these tests are biased or unfair toward women. However, when outcomes differ by subgroups, it is important to demonstrate that those selection tests are job-related. The remaining three definitions of fairness should be evaluated to determine whether a selection process and the tests used are fair.

Second, all candidates should be treated equally. That is, the same tests, standards, and process should be used for all candidates. Although different tests might measure similar physical abilities (e.g., upper-body strength with pull-ups versus flexed-arm hang), it is important that the same test and testing conditions (to the extent possible) should be applied to all candi-
considerations. Ensuring that equal standards are applied is also fairly straightforward; however, it is important to note that if normative standards that compare the relative standing of test-takers with each other are used (e.g., 90th percentile of all test-takers—regardless of gender), then male and female test scores should be combined to form one norm group. The use of gender-specific norms to select candidates (e.g., 90 percent of female test takers and 90th percentile of male test-takers) is not consistent with currently accepted definitions and interpretations of gender-neutral standards. Finally, the overall selection process and policies should be consistently applied across all candidates. This includes ensuring that administration instructions are standardized, instructional feedback is provided equally to men and women, and number of opportunities for retesting is standardized so both men and women have equal opportunity for retesting.

Third, all candidates should be provided with equal access to information about the tests and selection process. Details about the tests, standards, and scoring process should be equally available. This does not mean that this information must be provided to everyone, but if it is provided to men, then it should be equally available to women. Finally, if opportunities to practice the tests (e.g., obstacle course) are provided, such opportunities should be communicated and made available equally to both men and women.

A fourth possible source that could affect fairness is a test’s predictive bias. Predictive bias occurs when the test is a better indicator (i.e., predictor) of future job performance that consists of the same job tasks for one subgroup compared with another. One example of predictive bias, presented earlier, is that some fitness tests might have a body mass bias (Vanderburgh et al., 2011). For example, smaller individuals might do well on a fitness test (e.g., pull-ups) but are unable to perform an operational task while wearing heavy equipment (e.g., ruck sack, body armor). In contrast, pull-ups might be a good indicator of performance on the same operational task for heavier individuals. In other words, pull-ups would be a good predictor of future performance for individuals from one subgroup but not for individuals in the other subgroup. Although predictive bias might not be expected when comparing men and women, it is important to examine when the percentage of women passing the test is significantly lower than the percentage of men. If a test is found to have predictive bias, additional research should be conducted to identify potential alternative tests that measure that specific ability. Returning to the predictive bias example with body mass bias: It is possible that a pull-up test while wearing a weighted vest predicts performance equally well for all individuals regardless of their sizes.

Fairness is a complex, multifaceted construct with many different definitions. Although no single definition exists, it is clear that differential subgroup outcomes do not necessarily indicate that a test is biased. Consistent with this perspective, measures of physical ability can have moderate to large gender differences, resulting in different selection or qualification rates for men and women, but still be fair and unbiased. Nonetheless, it is important to demonstrate evidence that any tests resulting in subgroup differences are job-related (see the next section). To promote overall fairness, best-practice guidelines suggest steps to ensure equitable treatment, opportunities, and access to information for all candidates, regardless of gender. Further, predictive bias should be examined when there is sufficient and appropriate data to compare the relationship between tests and job performance for different subgroups. Because predictive bias requires statistical expertise, statisticians or similar experts (e.g., industrial-organizational psychologists) should be consulted regarding how to conduct these analyses.
Implementation Challenges

The previous sections described a framework that can be used to establish gender-neutral standards, including validation and documentation requirements. The framework offers structure to the process and can serve as a useful construct for explaining the approach used in the development of standards. Even if the service components adopt the six-step approach, challenges will still arise during implementation. To conclude, we discuss some of the most important challenges and how they can be addressed.

SOF Has Existing Processes

We recognize that the service components have existing selection tests and standards for SOF specialties that have been identified by a different process than the one described here—one within which the six-step process does not neatly fit. These standards were developed before women were eligible for SOF specialties but are still relevant occupational standards. But these standards still need to be evaluated against the remaining steps in the process: validation, establishing minimum test scores, and screening implementation applicable to both men and women. The six-step process can serve as a valid checklist within existing processes.

Physical Tasks and Activities Often Measure Other Characteristics

Some existing physical tasks and activities (in training, selection and assessment, and so on) are not designed to measure critical physical abilities but instead are used to measure other important characteristics, such as creativity, critical thinking, teamwork, leadership, perseverance, and persistence under stress. These tasks and activities are critical to identifying and training special operators, but they are also difficult to validate.

Measuring such characteristics indirectly through performance on physical tasks and activities is more difficult than identifying and measuring physical job demands explicitly required by the mission, but it is possible, as long as the effort is systematic and explicit. The questions that need to be addressed are

- Is the purpose of these tasks and activities clearly documented?
- Are there performance standards that correspond to these tasks and activities?
- Is there job-analysis evidence documenting the importance of such characteristics?
- What validity evidence is available to demonstrate that such characteristics can be reliably measured when candidates are performing these tasks and activities?
- Are there alternative methods for reliably measuring these characteristics that might be equally or more valid but require less physical strength and endurance?

This is not an exhaustive list and, depending on the specifics, there might be additional questions to address. The service components should consider the above list of questions as they go about their validation efforts.

Requirements for Resources and Expertise

Each of the service components has different amounts of resources and expertise available for executing the required steps for validation to ensure that current and future standards are gender-neutral. As a general principle, the number of occupational specialties will influence the level of effort required to execute something akin to the six-step process. In other words,
conducting a job analysis entails some substantial up-front costs, whether there are only a few
or many service members in that specialty. What that means is that some service components
are stretched thin in terms of resources available.

To carry out a thorough job analysis for each specialty, the service components need to
consider the number of specialties that are being reviewed when dedicating time and staff resources
and—whenever possible—leverage each other’s resources and expertise for conducting task and
physical-demand analyses and statistical analyses that evaluate the relationship between physical test
scores and operator job or training performance. We realize that each of the service components
and specialties is unique, but there are parallels and overlaps between them, and it would be
wise to share these lessons within the SOF community. One of the ways to leverage the efforts
of the components is to devote time at regular meetings to specific topics pertaining to job
analysis and validation and allow the service components to report their progress and share
ideas and suggestions. Such information-sharing will be helpful to increase efficiencies and
promote discussion of evolving best practices.

Command Expectations
The time and resources required to conduct a comprehensive job or task analysis and to fully
evaluate the physical-ability tests and standards currently in place to ensure that they are
gender-neutral is a resource-intensive process. Validation will take more than a few months of
effort; it is a long-term process, which requires constant attention to ensure that the tests and
standards are working as intended.

It is understandable that there would be concerns about the length of the process and that
command expectations should be realistic. Completing the steps required to thoroughly vali-
date standards will take time and resources. A more appropriate way of thinking about the process
is to consider the current stage as only the beginning of the effort that is bound to take years to do
properly. A genuine attempt at validation that meets intermediate timelines and milestones but
is long-term in orientation is preferable to a quick and potentially incomplete validation that is
open to questioning and difficult to defend.

Misunderstanding and Criticism of the Process
Besides the intrinsic value of the documentation in providing the evidence for a thorough job
analysis and validation of tests and standards, there is also an important strategic commu-
nication element. There are many concerns about the process of establishing gender-neutral
standards—that the outcome of the process is already predecided, that there is pressure from
outside DoD to reduce standards if women are unable to qualify, that few women will be able
to meet the standards to qualify, or that few women who might be capable of success will be
interested. Many of these concerns were echoed in the survey and focus group responses.

It is critical to communicate throughout the SOF community that the validation process is
based on widely accepted scientific principles to ensure that the most-capable individuals are selected,
its purpose is to be unbiased and objective, and that it is ultimately meant to improve organizational
and mission effectiveness. In other words, validation is the scientific process used to demonstrate
that a screening process is successful at (1) identifying individuals who have the highest prob-
ability of succeeding on the job, and (2) screening out individuals who would be unable to
perform the essential functions of the job. All of these concerns reinforce the importance of
documentation and the need to follow the practices described in this chapter.
We recommend that the message regarding the intent and the transparency of the validation process be made clear throughout the force. Similarly, it is important to communicate throughout the SOF community that challenges regarding the low qualifying rates of women are best addressed by presenting documentation that shows adherence to scientific best practices and guidelines (i.e., validation). For it to have full significance, the message would need to originate with USSOCOM leadership and be fully reinforced by leaders within each special operations command.

**Timing of the Changes and Implementation**

Related to the preceding point, as indicated by the survey and focus group responses, any changes made to the current physical-ability standards might be viewed negatively by personnel within the SOF community. Specifically, one area of concern is that women who qualify under any new standards would be treated as second-class citizens by already-serving special operators because the women have not proven themselves capable of passing the old standards. A complementary area of concern is that current operators might have less trust in any operators qualifying under the new standards, since the new standards might be perceived as lower just to allow women to qualify. Therefore, operators who qualified under the old standards might have less confidence in new operators’ ability to perform essential job duties. From a long-term perspective, there is potential that such beliefs might lead to lower morale and undermine faith in leadership and unit readiness.

Ideally, the service components would head off such concerns and deal with them directly and proactively. SOF service components and USSOCOM should consider a strategic communications plan that outlines the process and its goals clearly. Specific aspects of the plan might include involving well-respected operators in the development process at all points, continuously asking for their input about it along the way, keeping them informed about the process used to develop the standards, and checking at various points to make sure operators have faith that the standards review and validation process works.

**Limitations on Female Special Operators Performing Certain Missions**

It is possible that factors outside U.S. control could limit the ability of female special operators to perform certain missions—such as female SOF members operating in countries that have strict views on gender roles in societies. A concern is that women would not be accepted in such countries, especially in leadership positions (e.g., as trainers of foreign forces). Since training foreign partners is one of the doctrinal SOF missions, the presence of women in SOF might make mission accomplishment more difficult in some countries. But women could also bring capabilities to SOF in specific areas, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, and access and placement.

There is no easy answer to the fact that cultural norms surrounding gender roles in some other societies differ from the prevailing norms in the United States. USSOCOM is going to need to eventually address the employment policy for SOF women, if such a point comes to pass. Ideally, USSOCOM would consider such questions sooner rather than later. The answers might be case-specific. Other U.S. government agencies’ and departments’ employment policies regarding women might provide some parallels.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Observations and Implications

The rescission of DGCDAR has led to the potential opening of some of the most physically demanding and psychologically stressful of all military occupations. The assessment and selection process for these occupations is highly competitive, and the training that follows is long and exacting. Even among the highly fit and motivated men who self-select into these specialties, few find success during the rigorous entry and qualification process.

Our research aimed to assess the range of potential obstacles to the effective integration of women into these specialties, focusing on the challenges at the unit and team levels. The two categories of challenges concerning the integration of women into SOF center on questions regarding (1) the physical and psychological capabilities of women to deal with the physical tasks required as part of SOF missions and the psychological stress associated with the extremely dangerous and austere environments in which SOF operate, and (2) the impact of the integration of women on the cohesion, trust, morale, discipline, and the general smooth functioning and intraindividual dynamics of SOF small teams.

In this chapter, we summarize our findings and discuss the implications of our research for the potential integration of women into all SOF specialties.

Findings

Our assessment of the research examining sex and gender differences related to physical ability shows that men generally outperform women on physical ability and motor skill tests. Similarly, men and women respond differently to stress. However, these general male-female differences across populations are not all that useful for screening for suitability for SOF, since selectees for SOF are, by definition, in the tail of the distribution. In almost all cases, primary emphasis in the selection and accession process must be placed on individual screening, as it is each individual’s history, physiology, and physical fitness that will influence his or her performance levels. Similarly, individual differences and prior experiences have a greater impact on stress response than sex or gender. Training can improve physical-ability performance and can modify response to and coping with stress.

Our review of the research on cohesion, a fundamental dimension of unit effectiveness, shows that unit cohesion is multidimensional, with instrumental (task cohesion) and affective (social cohesion) components. Task cohesion is critical, but the highest-performing units in stressful situations have both high task cohesion and high social cohesion. The benefits of cohesion on team performance increase for small, autonomous teams that engage in intense, cooperative tasks; depend on team members’ capabilities to accomplish their goals; and operate
in stressful situations. All of these characteristics typify small SOF tactical units. Integrating women into SOF units has the potential to reduce unit cohesion if female special operators are not accepted as full members of their teams. Women’s acceptance on teams will reflect their ability to perform team tasks, other team members’ willingness to accept women, and leaders’ efforts to promote integration. Male unit members’ perceptions of women’s performance and competence could be influenced by many factors. Women’s performance on unit tasks will shape unit members’ perceptions of competence. Perceptions of women’s competence will also reflect the quality of members’ prior experience working with women and potential biases in assessing women’s capabilities. Male unit members’ beliefs about the standards to which women are held will also influence their perceptions of women’s competence.

We collected primary data to assess the extent of challenges to the potential integration of women into SOF. We designed and administered a survey to gauge the extent of potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF among the personnel in USSOCOM-controlled positions that have been closed to women. To complement the survey, add richness, and gain a more nuanced understanding of the potential challenges, we conducted a series of focus group discussions with SOF personnel in those positions.

Our survey showed that opposition to opening SOF specialties to women is both deep and wide, with high levels of opposition across all SOF elements. The opposition is deep-seated and intensely felt. The principal sources of this opposition are the belief among SOF that women do not have the physical and other capabilities to meet the demands of SOF specialties; the belief that the current, high levels of cohesion and trust in units will suffer if women are allowed in; and the importance that SOF personnel attach to maintaining high standards, coupled with deep concern that performance standards might nonetheless be lowered to enable women to qualify for specialties. There was some receptivity among SOF personnel to the opening of SOF units to women in enabler roles, with the acknowledgment that women might be helpful in conducting sensitive operations and communicating with local populations.

Our focus group sessions reflected the survey findings, with the greatest concern being the potential lowering of standards and skepticism about women’s ability to carry out some of the challenging SOF missions. There was also dissatisfaction with the rescission decision and a perception that SOF was being used as a social experiment. The potential issues that SOF personnel foresaw from integration included lower cohesion, favoritism, lower readiness and deployability, and more family problems. Operationally, SOF personnel were concerned about additional medical and hygiene issues, force protection, and difficulties working with some of the partner forces. There was a perception that, because of new incentive systems in place once women are allowed to enter SOF, standards eventually will be lowered for men and women. Similar to the survey results, there was some openness to roles for women in SOF as enablers.

The concerns centered on the elements critical to the functioning of SOF small units and teams: the capabilities of personnel to carry out assigned missions and the atmosphere of cohesion and trust within the small SOF teams that allows each team member to perform at the highest level. The concerns regarding the integration of women are widespread among currently serving SOF personnel, resulting in challenges to the integration of women into these specialties. For any integration of women into SOF to be successful, these challenges will need to be taken into account. At least some of the concerns might be overly sweeping, in that, if SOF specialties are opened to women, much depends on the quality of female recruits, their preparation and motivation, and the willingness of the leadership to not cut corners and to treat all recruits fairly. If there is a clear perception that lowering mission-determined standards
is out of the question, and the leadership enforces this attitude, then perceptions of women as not up to the task will not easily to the women who pass through the process. And, if women are perceived as competent, integrating women into SOF units is less likely to adversely affect unit cohesion.

These findings must be interpreted with some caution. Our survey and focus groups were designed to elicit speculation from SOF personnel as to the impact of the integration of women into SOF so as to gauge the extent of challenges and gain a deeper understanding of the concerns of SOF personnel. This speculation was not based on actual experiences of SOF personnel, because women are not in those units, but rather their beliefs about what might happen if women are integrated. Moreover, debates over military personnel policy take place in the political realm. Our data collection did not happen in a vacuum; instead, the intense level of feelings on the issue might be a symptom of the highly charged political environment and reflect the fact that SOF personnel were given an opportunity to weigh in.

We note that most, if not all, of the concerns voiced by SOF personnel had come up in previous waves of integrating excluded groups into the military. In all the previous cases, there was relatively quick acceptance of the previously excluded group, and opposition to their integration declined greatly over time. The case of women entering SOF specialties is on the far end of the spectrum in terms of the physical demands and exposure to dangerous military environments. Since, in a general-population comparison, women lack some of the physical abilities of men, the potential integration of women into all SOF specialties might be more challenging than previous cases of integrating women into military specialties, but there is no reason to believe that the challenges are insurmountable. The integration of excluded groups, whether in the U.S. military or in some roughly analogous organizations in the civilian world, always causes some change and adaptation within the organization, but it is not necessarily a change for the worse (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Lundquist, 2008). Cultural resistance to change, especially in highly effective organizations, is to be expected (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek, 2004; Kay and Friesen, 2011; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). But it is the implementation process that will determine whether the changes have a net negative or positive impact (Fiske, 2000; Gaertner et al., 1989).

Implications

As we have noted repeatedly, the purpose of this research was to inform USSOCOM about the depth and extent of potential challenges to the integration of women into all SOF positions. If USSOCOM makes the decision to proceed, the critical element for success will be the implementation plan. Below we sketch out the basic guidelines of such an implementation plan. Expanding on these guidelines is an appropriate step after a policy decision is made, if the decision is to proceed with implementation.

For the integration to be successful, the process will require transparency, effective leadership and communication, progress monitoring, and openness to innovation and experimentation. Even with all of the above, the process is still likely to face major challenges because of the depth and scope of opposition and concern among the force. As USSOCOM considers near-term and long-term integration priorities, the mechanisms put into place will need to be flexible enough to accommodate learning and adjustments through such strategies as phased implementation and systematic experiments. Finally, putting the systems in place to enable the
collection of the appropriate data throughout the integration process will ensure that progress can be tracked and that improvements can be made over time.

When looking across all of our study findings, the following principles are particularly relevant to informing USSOCOM's implementation planning: (1) leadership is key to integration success; (2) the implementation process is critical to long-term integration success; (3) valid, gender-neutral standards can facilitate integration; (4) targeted recruitment and the adequate preparation of female candidates are needed; (5) a deliberate pace of integration is important; (6) integration progress needs to be monitored and assessed over time; and (7) expectation management is a critical component of success. We discuss each of these issues below.

**Leadership Is Key to Integration Success**

Findings from our survey and focus groups indicate that most concerns among SOF personnel are leadership challenges. These include command climate issues, such as the tone set during the integration process, as well as enforcing good order and discipline to prevent issues of misconduct that can have a negative impact on cohesion. Leadership can also introduce and enforce policies to quickly identify problems that might arise during implementation. Leadership can facilitate the implementation process by addressing some concerns expressed by SOF personnel regarding potential changes in intraunit dynamics during the integration process. These include concerns that political pressure will force standards to be lowered and unqualified women will be pushed through training and concerns related to privacy, hygiene, and berthing, as well as the widespread perception by men that they will have to “walk on eggshells” because of potential sexual harassment charges. For instance, some of these concerns could be addressed by implementing policies to both protect women from sexual harassment and sexual assault and to protect men from false allegation of sexual harassment and sexual assault.

In addition, there will be a need for an information campaign that tackles all of the difficult issues and concerns among SOF personnel, and this information campaign will need to be reinforced at all levels of the chain of command. The findings from our survey and focus groups indicate that there is already much anxiety, misinformation, and misunderstanding. Moreover, there is some skepticism as to whether USSOCOM leadership will be able to navigate the process of potential integration without sacrificing some of the SOF standards and without bending to suit political leaders. This information campaign will need to explain the motivation behind the integration process and the goals of integration. It will also need to clearly outline the processes and timelines for integration and address different interpretations of key terms, such as *standards, validation, gender-neutral*, and *bias*. Some expectation management is in order.

Our findings also indicate that there are small but important differences across the SOF components, as well as across ranks and grades, in terms of the level of opposition to opening their specialties and units to women. For instance, opposition to women entering SOF specialties and units is lowest among senior NCOs, warrant officers, and officers; therefore, they could play a critical role in facilitating implementation. These groups could also play a key role in disseminating and explaining the information campaign.
The Implementation Process Is Critical to Long-Term Success

To ensure long-term viability, USSOCOM will need to put in place practices to promote the successful integration of qualified women. This includes developing and fostering an equitable organizational culture, such as providing ample opportunities for women to demonstrate their competence. Our findings from the cohesion literature indicate that a key requirement for task cohesion is that team members must demonstrate that they can pull their weight on a team. If women are not given opportunities to demonstrate their abilities, they will be perceived as having inadequate abilities. Associated with this, USSOCOM and the SOF service components will need to establish practices to limit the social isolation of women in SOF. This aspect will need to be taken into consideration when making decisions regarding training andberthing. In addition, USSOCOM would benefit from establishing formal structures to monitor and evaluate inclusion practices to establish which ones are most effective.

Simultaneously, USSOCOM will need to focus on long-term integration priorities. To ensure long-term success, from the outset of its implementation planning, USSOCOM will need to consider long-term career-progression issues for women in SOF. This includes creating viable career paths for women in SOF, as well as ensuring that women have equal access to educational, leadership and promotion opportunities, and strong mentors (either male or female).

Valid, Gender-Neutral Standards Can Facilitate Integration

Much of the opposition to integrating women into SOF specialties and units is rooted in concerns regarding mission effectiveness (e.g., women not being able to physically perform the necessary tasks for the job). However, these concerns can be addressed by establishing and validating gender-neutral standards and implementing training programs that prepare female candidates to meet those standards.

While gender-neutral standards are often pointed to as a barrier to women entering ground combat occupations, our findings from the cohesion literature suggest that gender-neutral standards might facilitate task cohesion in gender-integrated units. Gender-neutral standards might actually reduce barriers to integration because they help to establish an equal foundation among all new recruits and help to dispel the notion that women in combat arms occupations are physically unprepared and incapable of completing their jobs effectively. If women can meet the requirements, then they will be able to establish their competence in completing a given task.

Targeted Recruitment and the Adequate Preparation of Female Candidates Are Needed

We found that many of the concerns expressed by SOF personnel center on doubts about women being able to adequately perform the necessary physical tasks. Our findings also indicate that the low assessment of the abilities of women is often based on experiences with military women (in particular CSTs and FETs) who did not have the same training and preparation as men. Providing female candidates adequate preparation to meet gender-neutral standards could better facilitate the physical conditioning women need to pass those standards. Such training and preparation could also go a long way in enabling women to earn the respect and trust of their fellow SOF teammates.

Some participants in our study did indicate that they had no doubt that there were some women who could adequately perform those tasks. This perception reinforces the view that tar-
targeted recruitment strategies can also be used to find the right female candidates for SOF positions. Developing strategies to target women already in peak physical condition will maximize the chances that those women will pass valid gender-neutral standards.

**A Deliberate Pace of Integration Is Important**

Given the differences in mission, equipment, operational environment, and culture across SOF components, USSOCOM might need to consider a phased integration approach in which specific MOSs, units, or ranks are integrated first and then others are gradually integrated over time. Such an approach would allow USSOCOM to monitor the integration process and make adjustments as needed. This type of approach could also yield important information about the risks and benefits of integration that then could be applied to subsequent efforts as integration is expanded.

A phased approach would provide additional time to allow SOF members and USSOCOM leadership to adjust to the specific issues pertaining to the presence of women. A phased approach could dispel some of the assumptions that many SOF personnel have about the potential negative impacts of integration. Consequently, disproving those assumptions through early examples of integration efforts could smooth the process as it later expands. On the other hand, if the results are problematic, then changes could be instituted before embarking on any full-scale program.

**Integration Progress Needs to Be Monitored and Assessed over Time**

To ensure continued learning and improvement during any potential integration process, USSOCOM will need to monitor and assess integration progress over time. Such monitoring and assessment will allow USSOCOM leadership to quickly identify problems and address them. The overall measure of outcome would be unit performance. Potential categories to monitor over time include unit readiness, female career development, attrition, rates of misconduct, and cohesion and morale.

To do this, USSOCOM will need to develop a detailed monitoring plan that assigns responsibility and accountability to the various pieces of the plan. A strong monitoring plan relies on robust data systems that facilitate the necessary data collection to measure integration progress. A first step would be to consider which systems are already in place to collect the appropriate data to monitor integration progress over time and whether any new data systems are necessary.

There are important questions regarding the effectiveness of the potential integration of women into SOF that remain unclear. These questions include: What are the most effective recruiting strategies to identify women who are both interested in SOF and in peak physical condition? Which training programs are most suitable to prepare women to meet SOF gender-neutral standards? Given the many unknowns in place, adopting a broad strategy for collecting data using multiple methods and from multiple sources would be appropriate to monitor the effectiveness of integration. Ideally, studies adopting an experimental design (using both test and control groups) would be preferred, but sample sizes might not be large enough to conduct such studies, and qualitative case studies might be necessary.

Any potential integration process would benefit from making the most of the critical window of opportunity that precedes the decision of whether to integrate; this time should be used to establish the baselines against which future progress will be assessed. Without these baselines, it is impossible to track progress over time—as evidenced by previous gender-
integration efforts, including combat aviation. Establishing a strong monitoring plan, identifying the data system necessary to collect the appropriate data, and establishing baselines before integration occurs would enable progress monitoring and making the necessary adjustments over time.

Expectation Management Is a Critical Component of Success

A key part of the implementation process will be to manage expectations within, and external to, SOF. Our collection of primary data showed deep and widespread opposition to the integration of women into SOF. To maximize the chances of integration success, USSOCOM will need to base its implementation strategy on empirical data. Doing so would enable USSOCOM to set realistic goals and to counter pressure from both proponents and opponents of integration.

One of the most important aspects of expectation management is the number of women expected to join SOF if these positions are opened to them. Our review of the experiences of allied SOF indicate that, despite having positions open to women for more than a decade, there are very few women in allied SOF. In fact, the experiences of allied militaries indicate that those that have general-purpose combat arms positions open to women also have few women serving in those positions. From this perspective, the anxiety felt by SOF personnel about a large influx of women in a short period and a consequent altering of intraunit dynamics might be unfounded. The process might be gradual, and a change might come over a generation.

Final Observations

Even with all of the above, there are still other complex concerns that we came upon in the course of our research. None involves easy solutions. For example, prevailing norms and customs in many of the developing countries where U.S. SOF personnel operate do not view women as equal members of society. Combined with strict gender roles and segregation of the sexes, such attitudes might make the deployment of U.S. female special operators difficult, if not counterproductive, for such missions as security force assistance or UW (these are doctrinally core activities of SOF). More specifically, one of the primary missions of Army SF is to provide training to partner militaries and militias (security force assistance). Would future female SF personnel be as effective in such missions and environments as male SF personnel? There might be workarounds, but these challenges are likely to remain.

Given the extreme physical requirements associated with SOF, if USSOCOM opens up all the SOF occupations to women, the number of women entering SOF is likely to be limited in the foreseeable future. But it is not a given that all SOF require such high levels of physical prowess, and the importance of physical prowess in the fulfillment of SOF missions might change in the future. In fact, future SOF operating concepts that imply greater persistent for-

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1 We examined women’s integration in the militaries of 18 U.S. allies and treaty partners. We primarily concentrated on NATO states with professional militaries. Most of these countries allow women to serve in their ground combat units and have done so for more than a decade (especially in the aftermath of the European Court of Justice ruling, in 2001, on equal gender rights in the military) or longer (dating back to the early 1980s, in some cases). We are aware of female combat SOF personnel in Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Norway. We found no confirmation of more than a few women in the SOF of each of these countries (fewer than ten).
ward presence, interaction with partners, and more preparation of the environment all entail potential additional roles for women in SOF. Our survey and focus group findings indicate some receptiveness among SOF personnel to a highly trained cadre of SOF enablers, including women, that would be a repository of niche capabilities and could be utilized as needed to exploit opportunities. Potential roles and capabilities gaps that female SOF could fill include intelligence, reconnaissance, access to populations, and security. These enabler roles, open to men and women, could provide additional mechanisms to recruit highly skilled and motivated personnel to SOF.
Abbreviations

ACL  anterior cruciate ligament
AFSOC  Air Force Special Operations Command
AIC  Akaike information criterion
AVF  all-volunteer force
BUD/S  Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL
CART  classification and regression tree
CBRN  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCT  combat controller
CRH  corticotropin releasing hormone
CSO  critical skills operator
CST  cultural support team
DACOWITS  Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
DADT  “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
DEERS  Defense Enrollment Eligibility System
DGCDAR  Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule
DoD  Department of Defense
DMDC  Defense Manpower Data Center
DSM-V  *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*
EPCP  expected percentage correctly predicted
EPRE  expected percentage reduction in error
FET  female engagement team
FID  foreign internal defense
FOB  forward operating base
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>HPA</td>
<td>hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>KWIC</td>
<td>Key Word in Context</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIWC</td>
<td>Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARSOC</td>
<td>Marine Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>MARSOT</td>
<td>Marine Special Operations Team</td>
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<td>MISO</td>
<td>military information support operations</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>military police</td>
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<td>NAVSPECWARCOM</td>
<td>Navy Special Warfare Command</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NSW</td>
<td>Naval Surface Warfare</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Operational Detachment–Alpha</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<td>PAX</td>
<td>personnel</td>
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<td>PFT</td>
<td>Physical Fitness Test</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>prisoner of war</td>
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<td>PT</td>
<td>physical training</td>
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<td>PTE</td>
<td>potentially traumatic event</td>
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<td>PTSD</td>
<td>posttraumatic stress disorder</td>
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<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Sea, Air, Land</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SOI</td>
<td>School of Infantry</td>
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<td>SOWT</td>
<td>Special Operations Weather Team</td>
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<td>STT</td>
<td>Special Tactics Team</td>
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<td>SWCC</td>
<td>Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen</td>
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<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>U.S. Army in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>USASOC</td>
<td>United States Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAC</td>
<td>Women’s Army Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>warrant officer</td>
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———, “Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule,” memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Department, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Washington, D.C., January 13, 1994.


DACOWITS—See U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services.


DoD—See U.S. Department of Defense.


Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces


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USSOCOM—See U.S. Special Operations Command.


Considerations for Integrating Women into Closed Occupations in U.S. Special Operations Forces


The elimination of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule has opened to women some 15,500 special operations forces (SOF) positions. The integration of women raises issues pertinent to the effectiveness of SOF teams, in terms of physical standards and ensuring readiness, cohesion, and morale. This report assesses potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF for unit cohesion and provides analytical support in validating SOF occupational standards for positions controlled by U.S. Special Operations Command. The report summarizes the history of integration of women into the U.S. armed forces, reviews the current state of knowledge about cohesion in small units, and discusses the application of gender-neutral standards to SOF. The report identifies widely agreed-on professional standards for the validation of physically demanding occupations and assists SOF service components with the application of these standards to SOF occupations. The report also discusses the primary data—a survey of SOF personnel and a series of focus group discussions—collected by the research team regarding the potential challenges to the integration of women into SOF. The report then presents recommendations regarding the implementation process of integrating women into SOF.