NATO’s Northeastern Flank—Emerging Opportunities for Engagement

An Overview

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Key findings

• U.S. defense engagement priorities in central Europe are shifting in the face of Russian aggression.

• By engaging strategically on NATO’s eastern flank, the United States can strengthen deterrence while minimizing inadvertent escalation.

• Key countries where new opportunities for deeper partnerships are emerging include the Baltics, Finland, Poland, and Sweden.

For the first 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planned, postured, and engaged in Europe on the assumption that Russia was militarily capable of harming NATO and its European partners but did not intend to do so. Despite occasional tensions in relations between Washington and Moscow, Russia was widely assumed to be on a trajectory toward closer integration and more-peaceful relations with Europe, the United States, and its other neighbors. The Kremlin’s 2014 annexation of the eastern Ukrainian region of Crimea and active efforts to occupy and destabilize other parts of eastern Ukraine sharply challenged this underlying assumption. Aggression in Ukraine, combined with Russian snap exercises on NATO’s borders, multiple aerial incursions into NATO and partner territory, cruise missile modernization, dangerous nuclear blustering, anti-Western rhetoric, and domestic political uncertainty, have forced a deep reassessment of U.S. strategy, plans, and posture in Europe and other regions in which Russia is active. The Kremlin’s intervention on behalf of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria underscored its willingness to use force for a broad range of objectives that run counter to those of the United States.

These developments clearly have major implications for U.S. Air Force and broader U.S. Department of Defense strategy, posture, and defense engagement. RAND was thus asked to assess opportunities for enhanced partnering in central and eastern Europe in the face of this increased Russian activity.

We took a strategic, top-down approach to the analysis, focusing on nine key countries on NATO’s northeastern flank—the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden. After an in-depth political-military assessment of each country’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, we identified countries in which support for U.S. regional and
global objectives is liable to be most enduring. With an
understanding of how and what these countries might
contribute to the growing need to counter Russian activi-
ties in the region, we identified specific partnering priorities that could help strengthen regional deterrence. The
following summarizes top-line findings from the full
report, which will be published later this year.

EMERGING NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR
DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE

U.S. defense priorities in the region are shifting. As a result, so
will the focus of U.S. partnerships.

- Partnership engagement in Europe after the Cold War
aimed primarily to strengthen and reform the militaries
in central Europe to prepare them for eventual member-
ship in NATO and the European Union. After 9/11,
U.S. engagement activities shifted to strengthening these
countries’ ability to fight in out-of-area operations as
members of U.S. coalitions. They also sought to ensure the
military-to-military relationships necessary for U.S. basing
for overseas operations.
- NATO has now drawn down its operations in Afghanistan,
and the United States and its allies are less involved overall
in operations in the Middle East than before (although this
could be changing). Simultaneously, Russian aggression
has led to a refocus on ensuring the territorial security of
NATO allies in central Europe against a potential Russian
threat, including in public statements from senior U.S.
defense and military officials.

Ongoing RAND research indicates that, among potential
problem areas, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu-
ania) are particularly exposed to conventional and unconven-
tional threats from Russia.

- The potential for NATO–Russia conflict—inadvertent
and otherwise—exists across the Black Sea, Balkans, and
elsewhere. Any conflict between NATO and Russia would
be very difficult to contain to a single region or domain.
- The area of single-greatest concern for NATO in this
regard will be the Baltic States. Strengthening deterrence
and reassurance in the Baltic region will therefore be a
key priority shaping U.S. regional strategy in the face of
renewed tensions with Russia.

- In the Baltic States, geographical realities, the presence
of advanced Russian offensive and defensive weaponry in
the Kaliningrad Oblast, and the limitations of defensive
capabilities of the Baltic States themselves pose significant
challenges to NATO.

The specific strategies and requirements for strengthening
defense and deterrence in the Baltics have been and continue
to be examined and debated. The importance of certain broad
categories of requirements is emerging, however.

- On land, for instance, the United States has announced its
intention to preposition armor and other stocks across sev-
eral countries in the region. Meanwhile, regional deploy-
ments of U.S. and allied armored and infantry brigades
have been publicly mooted by several parties—above all,
the leaders of the Baltic States.
- In the air domain, the importance of adequate allied infra-
structure that would permit rapid regional surge access in
crisis conditions is increasingly clear. So is the potential
need to train and equip allied forward air controllers, as
well as a need to ensure adequate U.S. and allied capabili-
ties and stocks for the suppression-of-enemy-air-defense
mission. Basing and overflight rights in crisis conditions,
moreover, remain issues of significance.

- Across all domains, the importance of closely integrated
command and control (C2), both between air and land
components and with allies, is also clear, as is overall
interoperability, as established and demonstrated through
frequent joint, multinational exercises.

Engagement with several of the countries considered
for this study will be crucial to achieving these objectives.
Although their will and ability to contribute to specific deter-
rence tasks will vary, the Air Force should seek to build close
partnerships across multiple domains, including the capability
for coordinated air defense operations and air–ground/surface
attack operations in the region. These are also the countries in
which the United States will have to operate in the event of a
crisis, either in combined combat operations or for forward bas-
ing in support of those operations. No less important is the fact
that these are the countries where the United States will need to
posture, operate, and engage for deterrence in peacetime.

By building the necessary relationships and by shaping part-
ner plans, strategy, and capabilities toward achievable objectives,
Air Force engagement will be vital to laying the groundwork for
the necessary cooperation and thus maximizing the value that these allies and partners can bring to the table.

**STRATEGIC TRENDS IN NATO’S NORTHEASTERN FLANK**

The countries considered for this study stretch from central Europe northward through the eastern Nordic region. Five share borders with Russia, three more share borders with Russia’s close ally Belarus, and three border Ukraine itself. All are affected by the war in Ukraine in one way or another. These countries are, moreover, often those that have been most directly targeted by Russia’s recent military activities. Many of them have been threatened by Russian snap exercises on their borders, Russian propaganda directed against their citizens, cyberattacks, espionage, and airspace and maritime violations of their territory. Although Russian saber rattling and muscle flexing have also targeted other European countries, this group includes most of those that have been directly affected by renewed tension with Russia (outside Ukraine itself). Indeed, aside from Turkey, which is increasingly overwhelmed by the war in Syria, all of the allies currently most likely to call for NATO military action by invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty¹ are included in this group (with the possible exception of Romania). Examining the opportunities for closer defense engagement with them is therefore timely and appropriate.

The response of these countries to increased tension with Russia, however, has been somewhat varied. We did not find significant new opportunities in three of the four “Visegrad” countries—the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.² New opportunities for partnering in these countries are limited for domestic political and economic reasons or because they lack military and defense resources. Opportunities for partnering are emerging in other countries: Poland, the Baltic States, Sweden, and Finland.

The case studies in the main report provide strategic overviews of the defense engagement climate in each country, tailored for leaders and analysts in the U.S. defense enterprise and Air Force in particular. In the rest of this section, we make general observations regarding strategic trends in the group.

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² Named for a 1991 summit in the Hungarian town of Visegrád. The fourth is Poland.
the United States in light of Russia’s aggressive behavior. It operates in many advanced military fields of interest to the Air Force, including not only advanced fighter aircraft but also space and cyber. Finland is also a wealthy country with an advanced industrial-technological base and relatively powerful military capabilities, including a sizable F/A-18 C/D force equipped with Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs).

• Foreign policy experts and leaders in both Sweden and Finland express concern that a military crisis in the Baltic States would be highly detrimental to both countries’ national interests. Hence, although both countries are concerned and vigilant about the risk of a direct attack on their territory, they are equally, if not more, concerned about how a conflict elsewhere in the Baltic region might affect them. Because their interests in regional stability are so deep, Finland and Sweden’s commitment to deterring regional conflict should remain correspondingly strong and credible.

Baltic States

• The small sizes of the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—make them highly vulnerable to Russian aggression. Estonia and Latvia also have Russian-speaking populations who could be vulnerable to Russian manipulation for unconventional or hybrid warfare strategies. Because of its border with Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave, Lithuania is also a flashpoint for conflict.

• Like Poland, the Baltic States have long expressed anxieties about their exposure to Russian attack. Unsurprisingly, and again like Poland, their interest in closer defense cooperation with the United States has only intensified with the changes in the regional security environment.

• Unlike Poland, the Baltic States’ defense resources are very limited. Their air and other armed forces are tiny. Currently, they would be utterly unable to defend themselves against a determined Russian attack without major outside help. As a result, they are eager for any engagement the United States or NATO will offer.

• The challenge will be to determine the nature and types of engagement most likely to strengthen defense and deterrence in these countries (see “Specific Engagement Activities”). The absence of native airpower capabilities should not lead the Air Force to neglect these countries. To the contrary, it is indicative of significant need, especially in light of the threat from Russia. That threat calls for not only much-enhanced Baltic air defenses but also enhancements to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and air-related infrastructure, among other things.

Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary

• Hungary has been among the most reticent about the U.S. and NATO approach to Russia during the Ukraine crisis. Although Hungary has not broken formally with the alliance, NATO’s tensions with Russia, on which Hungary depends for natural gas, have led Budapest to significantly diverge from Washington and many European capitals. The current Hungarian government, led by semi-authoritarian populist Victor Orban, also has worryingly close ties to Moscow.

• There are reasons to believe that Russia-related tensions with Hungary could diminish over time, however. Hungary has contributed to reassurance efforts with air policing deployments in the Baltics, despite its pro-Moscow stance. Moreover, insofar as tensions continue over Russia, Hungarian leaders might actually come to view closer cooperation with the United States at Papa Air Base as an antidote.

• Although key Czech leaders are cognizant of the Russian threat and have aligned with the United States, they face domestic political dynamics that make a dramatic ramp-up in defense spending (and consequently in defense capabilities) unlikely. The United States can expect the Czechs to continue to help with such missions as Icelandic air policing and Baltic air policing, and contribute in small numbers to operations elsewhere. Large amounts of support, however, are unlikely in the near future.
In Slovakia, there is stronger pro-Russian sentiment, stoked by Russian propaganda and other forces. The Slovak economy is small, and the military is in poor condition. Hence, although the Slovaks have invested in some new capabilities (e.g., UH-60s), their overall contribution to any NATO operation—particularly in terms of airpower—will be quite limited.

**SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES**

There is a broad range of activities that the U.S. Defense Department can and does seek to undertake in the countries considered for this study, as elsewhere in the world. Engagement activities can include, for example, force posture activities, military exercises, equipping activities (foreign military financing and foreign military sales), technology transfer, information sharing arrangements (physical and legal), deployments or exchanges of personnel for security cooperation, education and training (i.e., of foreign personnel, through International Military Education and Training or other programs), and direct military-to-military engagements (senior or other levels). When it comes to these countries, however, there are specific activities that should be prioritized in support of top-level U.S. strategic objectives. The following recommendations are based on our strategic assessment of the political military trends in the country, its resources, and the requirements of likely U.S. regional strategy going forward.

**Poland**

Seek to ensure that Poland is able to provide a secure logistics and staging point for forward-based U.S. and NATO operations in the region by denying airspace and defending against short-, medium-, and long-range missile attacks. Poland also should eventually have capabilities to contribute to air-air and air-ground/surface operations over the Baltic States, Baltic Sea, or Belarus. To this end, prioritize

- continued increases in the size and resourcing of the aviation detachment at Lask Air Base. Activities at Lask should focus on training the Polish F-16 crews to allow Poland to deploy its F-16s in an operational setting as soon as possible. Increases in bilateral F-16 exercises at Lask are also desirable to demonstrate capability, continued commitment, and persistent presence in Poland and the region.
- continue rotational presence of F-22s to Poland, including at Lask
- assess potential for increasing sale of JASSM and adding JASSM-ER (Extended Range) to Polish missile inventories
- initiate a feasibility study of a Polish F-35 purchase.

The United States should also encourage Poland’s ability to provide intratheater fixed- and rotary-wing lift, reinforcing its transition away from old Russian-made An-28 light aircraft and Mi-8 and Mi-2 transport helicopters, while encouraging the eventual development of a refueling and even strategic lift capability.

The United States and NATO should also seek to expand Poland’s ISR ability, particularly its nascent unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) fleet, across the spectrum of operations—short-, medium-, and long-range—so as to better contribute to the Polish ability to aid in air-to-ground/surface operations over the Baltic States, Baltic Sea, or Belarus. Specifically,

- offer a small training team at the newly established UAV base in Poland (at Mirosławiec airfield), to assist with joint exercise planning and ISR capability development
- develop a joint UAV exercise program bilaterally or via NATO
- in the longer term, encourage Polish acquisition of medium- and long-range UAVs.

Finally, the United States should continue to encourage public-private partnerships in Poland to strengthen Poland’s ability to defend against cyber attacks, as well as its expertise on space issues, by offering joint-training, small-scale cyber-response exercises aimed at damage mitigation, or by supporting public-private cyber and space workshops in Poland.

In senior leader and operator engagements with Poland, the focus should be on continuing to emphasize common core interests in regional stability while fostering understanding within the Polish military of the complexity of the U.S. perspective on Russia and escalation concerns. Engagement should also stress the importance of Polish support for and capabilities toward addressing NATO’s southern flank threats.

**Sweden and Finland**

The United States should aim to support Swedish and Finnish efforts to demonstrate that they are capable of defending their airspace with confidence for several weeks and a minimum of U.S. or NATO support. This will ensure that these Nordic partners are available as a launching point for allied logistics.
and air operations over the Baltics if needed. Ideally, both Sweden and Finland would also have a capability for air operations against air and ground forces in the Baltics and surface vessels on the Baltic Sea. To this end, priorities include

- Increasing Swedish and Finnish participation in such large and complex U.S. exercises as Red Flag and Green Flag; increasing the frequency and sophistication of U.S., Swedish, and Finnish exercises at Ämari Air Base; inviting Sweden and Finland to directly participate in Baltic and Icelandic air policing missions; involving Sweden as early as possible in related exercise planning
- Sustained U.S. training on Nordic territory on the model of Arctic Challenge 2015
- Encouraging Sweden and Finland to maintain sufficient munitions stocks, especially for air-air, but also for air-ground (including JASSM and JASSM-ER)
- Encouraging Sweden and Finland (along with other allies) to build an air-to-air refueling consortium on the model of NATO’s Strategic Airlift Capability; increasing training with Sweden and Finland on aerial refueling
- Encouraging Swedish and Finnish participation in NATO ballistic missile defense discussions and exercises with the possibility of eventual integration into the NATO system
- Engaging Finnish Air Force and Army leaders on Finland’s air defense capability, particularly as Helsinki seeks to upgrade its air defenses, potentially by pooling with Sweden.

A key reason the United States should seek to strengthen the relationship with both countries is to ensure high confidence that U.S. aircraft will have access to Swedish airspace and bases in the event of a conflict. Sweden is unlikely to guarantee such access publicly, but the likelihood that it would be granted in a crisis can be reinforced by considering increased personnel exchanges with both U.S. European Command and the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and working via partner engagement to develop a common strategic picture, including via contingency planning. U.S. defense planners should also engage in more tabletop exercises and scenario-based seminars to facilitate more-concrete policy discussions with Sweden and Finland.

In the longer term, Sweden and Finland are countries with potential to make contributions to ISR with enhanced UAV capabilities. Benefitting from this will require adequate interoperability and data-sharing agreements, both bilaterally and between the Nordic countries and NATO. Eventually, Sweden and Finland should also be expected to develop space capabilities with military ISR applications. The United States could shape this development today via personnel exchanges or other cooperation on space research, for example, at Swedish research facilities, such as Esrange, or working with Sweden and Finland on protection of critical commercial or dual-use space infrastructure. Another potentially fruitful initiative would be to establish an innovative, cyber-focused relationship between U.S. Air National Guard and Sweden and Finland; in addition, intensified sharing of cyber research, knowledge, and best practices with Finland and Sweden via exchanges and joint subregional public-private seminars or other forms of training is desirable.

Finally, although Sweden and Finland are not seeking full membership in NATO, membership is a longer-term possibility. Stockholm and Helsinki should be encouraged to make it clear that Moscow’s destabilization of the region only pushes their countries further toward full membership. Accordingly, it will be important to prepare the ground. At the same time, efforts to strengthen intra-Nordic and Nordic-Baltic relations should continue.

### The Baltic States

For all three Baltic states, the critical objective needs to be ensuring that these states are able to rapidly receive allied ground forces and operate in support of allied air superiority forces, for deterrence in peacetime as well as in a crisis situation. To this end, priorities include

- Sustained support for joint terminal attack controller and joint fires observer training for both Baltic and other NATO ground forces
- Agreements on rules of engagement and C2 arrangements for crisis situations among allies and partners that could provide air assets to the region
- Mid-level engagements to identify priority airfields beyond Ämari, Lielvarde, and Šiauliai for future improvement
- Prepositioning of supplies for crisis operations, including fuel, munitions, and other equipment at Ämari, Lielvarde, and Šiauliai, as well as other locations
- Analyzing potential additional improvements to Latvian facilities
- Greater cooperation between the Baltic States and Nordic Defense Cooperation, especially with Finland and Sweden.

In addition, over the medium and long terms, the United States should seek to strengthen the Baltics’ individual and subregional contributions to air and missile defenses, through
• senior leader discussions on the development of Baltic air defense capabilities, including the appropriate balance between Baltic and NATO assets
• sale or grant of short- and medium-range air defense systems to the Baltic States.

It is also desirable, and within reach for the Baltic countries, to develop ISR capabilities for monitoring a developing crisis situation, through
• senior leader discussions regarding longer-term goals for Baltic ISR and how the United States can contribute to building capabilities
• exploring enhanced ISR capabilities for small, manned Estonian aircraft
• exercises to test ISR capabilities in border areas and C2 arrangements in crisis
• potential sale or grant of additional radars where needed, such as low-altitude radars for border areas
• exploring the potential sale or grant of small or medium UAVs.

Finally, in the cyber domain, Estonia has worked to make itself a regional hub. This effort deserves continued U.S. support, including via personnel exchanges and support for training exercises.

The foregoing list of recommendations is not intended to be comprehensive of all the activities the Air Force, let alone the Defense Department, might consider or pursue in the countries studied for this report. It is, however, a list of priorities consistent with political military trends in these countries and evolving U.S. regional strategy. To be sure, there are no certainties in defense planning or in the countries examined for this study. Among these uncertainties, the greatest of all is, no doubt, Russia itself, whose future trajectory spans the gamut between persistent Putinism and catastrophic collapse. Needless to say, the need for a strategy that links regional political and other realities to specific objectives remains essential.

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About This Report

In 2014, RAND was asked whether new opportunities for U.S. Air Force engagement were emerging in central Europe as a result of Russian aggression in Ukraine. This document presents an overview of our findings from the resulting research effort; our full report will appear later in 2016. That report examines the impact of renewed tension between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia over a group of key allies and partners in central and northeastern Europe. It provides overviews of how the climate for defense engagement is changing in each country. There are in-depth assessments for nine key countries on NATO’s northeastern flank—the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden—that focus on developing robust engagement strategies for these countries. Although both politics and resources will constrain partnership opportunities and the ability of these countries to contribute to U.S. regional defense objectives, opportunities for strengthening partnerships do exist in multiple areas.

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