Sustaining the Army’s Reserve Components as an Operational Force

Today’s U.S. Army Reserve Components (RCs) are an operational force regularly deployed in overseas operations, big and small, all over the globe. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) has mobilized more than 280,000 soldiers, while the Army National Guard (ARNG) has mobilized almost twice that number, more than 525,000 soldiers. In light of this experience, the Army asked the RAND Arroyo Center to identify the emerging policy lessons regarding the use of the RCs during Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and other contingency operations. In particular, the Army requested that this study:

- Document the evolution of the policies involved in the development and employment of the operational reserve.
- Analyze decisions to use the RCs and assess the effect of operational reserve policies on such decisions.
- Provide recommendations regarding future RC missions and force generation policies.

This report presents the results of our study. It provides lessons from the employment of the RCs in recent contingency operations that should inform future decisions about Army force structure and generation. The findings should be of interest to all Army leaders, but especially RC leaders and force managers. More broadly, the discussion of how to conceive of readiness and how it was affected by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan should appeal to a broader Army audience in all components, as well as a more general policy audience.
This research was sponsored by the Army G-3/5/7 and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.

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4.1. How the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Affected the RCs’ Readiness .................................................. 74
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. Army has relied more on its reserve components (RCs) than at any time since the Korean War.\(^1\) According to its 2015 Posture Statement, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) had mobilized more than 280,000 soldiers during this period.\(^2\) For its part, the Army National Guard (ARNG) mobilized almost twice that number—some 525,000 soldiers from 9/11 through March 2014.\(^3\) In 2015, the USAR had some 16,058 soldiers mobilized, including 2,600 soldiers in Afghanistan, 3,000 in the United States,

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\(^1\) The Army Total Force Policy aims to integrate “the Army’s active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) as a ‘Total Force.’” (See John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, “Army Directive 2012-08 [Army Total Force Policy],” memorandum for principal officials of Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA] Commander, Washington, D.C., September 4, 2012.) In this context, the U.S. Army consists of two components: the AC and the RC. The AC is the Regular Army. The RC consists of the ARNG and the USAR. However, the common usage is to refer to the ARNG and USAR together in the plural as the RCs. For ease of reading, in this report, we refer to the Army’s RCs. Each of the other services also has at least one reserve component. (The U.S. Air Force’s reserve components are the Air National Guard and U.S. Air Force Reserve.) For purposes of brevity, we use the acronym “RCs” to refer to the Army’s reserve components. When it would otherwise not be clear in context, we use the full term reserve components when collectively referring to the reserve components of all the services.

\(^2\) Jeffrey W. Talley, Phyllis Wilson, and Luther Thomas Jr., America’s Army Reserve: A Life-Saving, Life-Sustaining Citizen-Soldier Force for the Nation, U.S. Army Reserve 2015 Posture Statement, 2015, p. 5.

2,200 in Kuwait, 1,100 in Cuba, 150 in Qatar, and 200 in Djibouti. Similarly, in fiscal year (FY) 2013, the ARNG had 18,600 in Afghanistan alone, in addition to troops serving in 31 countries around the world, including Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Kosovo, Cuba, Djibouti, and the Philippines. Increasingly, the RCs are no longer simply augmenting the Regular Army, but assuming sole responsibility for some missions.

Thus, the RCs today are truly an operational force—defined as being able to perform the full spectrum of conflict, routinely participating in global missions (not just held in reserve for the event of large-scale conflict), and fully nested within national objectives. While there is little doubt that the RCs have changed dramatically since their Cold War incarnation, there is more debate on how they got to where they are today and, more importantly, where they should go in the future.

The Army’s RCs became an operational force long before they were labeled as such in Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” in 2008. Indeed, the concept of using the RCs as an operational force dates long before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least since the “total force concept” was promulgated in a memorandum dated August 21, 1970, by then–Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and possibly dating back as far as the Militia Act of 1903 (also known as the Dick Act). In practice, the Army turned to the RCs throughout the 20th century and on an increasingly regular basis to fight even small-scale conflicts beginning in the post–Cold War period. Importantly, as illustrated in Figure S.1, the peak usage of the RCs during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars came relatively early, during the 2004 and 2005 timeframe.

A similar story plays out when looking at the RCs’ use at home. The contributions of the RCs cannot be fully understood without considering the scale of their mobilizations for Operation Noble Eagle.

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4 Talley, Wilson, and Thomas, 2015, p. 5.
5 U.S. National Guard, 2015, p. 21.
7 DoD, 2008a.
(ONE). If not for the RCs, the Regular Army would probably have had to conduct these missions. In many cases, Regular Army units were originally employed for these missions and then backfilled by RC

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8 ONE was the name for a series of Homeland Defense missions that were conducted in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States.
units. Figure S.2 depicts the RCs’ involvement in ONE. Here too, the RCs’ peak usage occurred well before they were labeled an operational force.

If the RCs were used as an “operational force” long before official directives labeled them as such, then it implies that “demand” (i.e., need for more forces) rather than a specific set of policies was responsible for the RCs’ transformation. By extension, this also means that if the demand for forces decreases in the post–Iraq and Afghanistan period, the RCs may cease to be an operational force by default. As a result, rather than focus on how to sustain the RCs as an operational force, we suggest that the better question may be how to maintain RCs readiness to quickly become an operational force again in the future, if it is needed.

To study the RCs’ readiness and to draw on the existing readiness literature, we propose a framework to assess how the recent wars affected the RCs’ readiness as a function of capability, time, and external inhibitors. Breaking down these three variables—capabil-

Figure S.2
ONE Mobilizations, 2001–2010

SOURCE: The National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve. We hypothesize that the increase in USAR mobilizations indicated from 2004 to 2007 is because of a coding error: Soldiers mobilized to support Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom from locations in the contiguous United States might have been incorrectly counted under ONE.
ity, time, and external inhibitors—into subcomponents yields a more comprehensive understanding of readiness. Table S.1 illustrates how this framework differs from Unit Status Reports, which, we argue, are insufficient for gauging how RCs’ readiness changed during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.

Using this framework, we find that the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars increased the RCs’ readiness in several areas—particularly material resources and speed—but produced more mixed results in several other areas (see Table S.2). After several rocky years at the start of these

**Table S.1**

**RAND’s Readiness Factors Versus Current Unit Status Report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness Factors</th>
<th>Unit Status Report Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material resources (quantity and quality)</td>
<td>Equipment and supplies on hand (S level), equipment condition (R level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (quantity)</td>
<td>Personnel (P level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise (breadth and depth)</td>
<td>Training (T level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit cohesion (integration and synchronization)</td>
<td>Training (T level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhibitors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forewarning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical constraints</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of the mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

conflicts, the Army posted noticeable gains toward remedying its RCs’ personnel shortages and increased and updated the equipment the RCs had on hand. The move to cyclic readiness increased the ability of the RCs to deploy a full range of force continuously over a dozen-plus years of war. The shift toward premobilization training—although it produced only modest gains at best in reducing the total number of training days needed to deploy units—made significant gains in reducing the time needed for postmobilization training, allowing units to deploy faster once mobilized. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the wars

Table 5.2
How the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Affected RCs’ Readiness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness Area</th>
<th>Global War on Terrorism’s (GWOT’s) Impact</th>
<th>Key Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material resources</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>Cyclical readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equipping policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>End strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medical readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Increased depth; possibly breadth</td>
<td>Contingency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active Duty Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support orders/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>repeated mobilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion of units</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Turnover rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Headquarters requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>Gates memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>Switch to Pre-Mobilization Training Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(from Reset-Alert-Train-Deploy to Reset-Train-Alert-Deploy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TRICARE for medical/dental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>RCs’ Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

increased the experience levels within the force, with roughly half of the RCs’ soldiers becoming combat veterans.\(^9\)

The impact of the wars was less pronounced (or there is insufficient data to judge) in other areas. Like the Regular Army, the RCs were primarily focused on counterinsurgency, security force assistance (SFA), and area security; thus, their breadth of expertise—particularly familiarity with combined arms maneuver—did not increase and possibly even declined. Unlike the Regular Army, the RCs’ authorized end strength did not dramatically increase. Also unlike the Regular Army, the RCs were often tasked to provide nontraditional force packages or otherwise had their formations broken apart to fight in smaller units. As such, unit cohesion likely did not experience the same gains—although the data here are insufficient to make a definitive judgment. Finally, one area where RCs’ readiness decreased was in the duration RC units could remain in theater, although this was due to a policy choice rather than an inherent limitation.

At the same time, the gains in the RCs’ readiness come with an asterisk. They were made under a unique set of circumstances, where the RCs had ample forewarning about the type of mission they would perform and where that mission would be performed. Like the Regular Army, the RCs benefited—particularly after the initial iterations—from a well-developed logistical enterprise to facilitate their deployment in and out of theater. And, they were tasked primarily with certain mission sets, rather than the full spectrum of operations. In sum, while RCs made clear gains in in their readiness to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is unclear the degree to which these gains would translate to other times and contexts.

In conclusion, this report presents seven major findings:

1. The RCs became an operational force before they were labeled as such.

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2. Two types of policies emerged—protection from overuse and increasing readiness.
3. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars reshaped the way the RCs were trained and equipped and also promoted an expeditionary mind set within the RCs.
4. The increased reliance on the RCs was largely due to demand rather than improved readiness.
5. The RCs’ readiness improved during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.
6. The RCs’ readiness benefited from the absence of some inhibitors because of forewarning, fewer logistical constraints, and relatively less complex missions.
7. Sustaining readiness post–Iraq and Afghanistan Wars is only partially a policy question: It is also largely a resource issue.

Recommendations

If policymakers wish to sustain RCs’ readiness close to the current levels, we recommend the following.

Continue Operational Employment of the RCs
The first recommendation is, perhaps, the most basic: If the United States wants to sustain the RCs’ readiness, it needs to continue the operational use of the RCs. Ultimately, while policies helped make the RCs ready, much of the gains in RCs’ readiness came as a result of real-world experience. While there is the temptation to reduce RCs’ employment if the operational tempo decreases, for cost reasons if nothing else, one of the best ways to maintain trained units in the RCs is to employ them.

Reconsider RCs’ ARFORGEN
As budgets decline, a key question will be how the RCs should manage their diminished resources. This raises perhaps the single-most pressing policy issue facing the RCs’ readiness today: Should the RCs continue
to use ARFORGEN (or some other form of cyclic readiness) or return to a tiered readiness model?

Whether or not it makes strategic sense to sustain ARFORGEN going forward depends on whether the United States will continue to fight protracted ground campaigns and on the size of RCs’ budgets. If the Army continues to fight long-term ground wars, then ARFORGEN and cyclic readiness is a logical approach. Even in the absence of long-term ground wars, if the RCs are sufficiently funded, they can continue to execute a cyclic readiness model. However, if the future of conflict is fewer wars of shorter duration, then some form of tiered readiness may be the more logical approach. (A hybrid approach might also be considered, with cyclic readiness for some units and tiered readiness for others.)

Consider Amending the One-Year Mobilized Time Limit

The only clear dimension in which the RCs’ readiness decreased during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars was in terms of the duration RC soldiers could remain mobilized. This decline was due to a policy decision rather than any inherent limitation. Although the policy was well intentioned and well received at the time, there are operational reasons to amend this policy, especially if future deployments after Iraq and Afghanistan primarily will be performed by volunteers, who presumably want to deploy. In this case, then arbitrary caps on mobilized time make less sense.

Reconsider the Emphasis on Premobilization Training

One of the biggest gains to the RCs’ readiness has come in the time dimension of readiness, particularly in the speed in which units can deploy once called on. Shifting more training to before a unit gets mobilized not only mitigates the policy limits on the duration a unit can remain mobilized, but also reduces the amount of time a unit spends postmobilization before it deploys. In sum, by focusing on pre-

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10 For the RCs’ original support of 12-month mobilization limit, see Les’ A. Melnyk, Governors, Adjutants General Support New 12-Month Mobilization Policy, National Guard Bureau website, January 17, 2007.
mobilization training, the RCs became a more flexible, rapidly deployable force.

Still, there is an open question of whether a premobilization training strategy would be feasible in a post–Iraq and Afghanistan environment. While it was advantageous for units to schedule premobilization training events years out and still have these training events be directly tied into their predeployment preparations, this approach might not be the most cost-effective if the future era has a much lower operational tempo.

**Consider Maintaining the Equipping Push**

If the Army wants to continue to emphasize premobilization training, then it is essential for RC units to have the right equipment at home station and regional training centers to make the most out of training. Even aside from its value to premobilization training, equipping is a critical factor in unit deployability. After years of lackluster results, the Army today slowly is working toward the goal of having most of the RCs’ required equipment on hand. The ARNG is within 2 percent of matching the Regular Army in terms of authorized equipment on hand.\(^\text{11}\) This trend in terms of the quantity and quality of resourcing should be maintained going forward if policymakers wish to sustain the current level of operational capability in the RCs.

**Embrace the Nonstandard Force Packages**

For much of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the RCs were not tasked with requirements to maneuver as organic brigades (or similar maneuver units) but instead accomplished a range of critical but nonmaneuver missions, such as SFA or security force missions, the requirements of which did not fit neatly inside the Army’s existing force structure. The flexibility of the RCs to meet these requirements proved to be one of their greatest assets. The RCs should fully embrace roles as nonstandard force package providers rather than insisting on only deploying

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standard Modified Table of Organization and Equipment units such as full Brigade Combat Teams.

**Reexamine Medical Readiness**

Finally, the Army should reexamine its medical readiness program for the RCs. From the data presented here, the findings appear to be mixed. On the one hand, the medical readiness of the RCs is increasing, but at the same time, the percentage of the RCs with a Deployment Limiting Condition is not decreasing as much as one might expect and is still much higher than the RCs of the other services.\(^\text{12}\) Since medical readiness is not a good unto itself but aims at increasing the percentage of forces available for deployment, the trend is particularly troubling and needs to fully be understood. By the same measure, additional studies should analyze the accuracy of the data. A recent Government Accountability Office report found that stated medically available rates were often incorrect.\(^\text{13}\) Finally, this review also should examine the return on investment in terms of readiness gained from specific forms of medical care (e.g., dental care, Periodic Health Assessments, immunizations).

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\(^\text{12}\) See Figure 4.2 in Chapter Four of this report.

Acknowledgments

We wish to express our appreciation to Daniel Klippstein, our primary sponsor in Army G-3/5/7, for his support and guidance on this study. David Markowitz, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, also provided useful direction on the scope and research design. CPT Robert A. Behrman, our point of contact in G-3/5/7, played an invaluable role in coordinating with the G-3/5/7 Operations Planning Team (OPT) for this project as well as identifying and helping to link us with various subject-matter experts on readiness, sourcing, and deployment data. Furthermore, he provided useful input to the final draft—this text directly incorporates many of his comments. The former Chief of the USAR, LTG James Helmly, was especially generous with his time in being interviewed and providing additional information for this study. CPT Michael G. Anderson, at the Center for Military History, provided us access to his unpublished history of the ARNG during the Global War on Terror.

We also thank the various members of the OPT and other individuals from the following organizations who took time from their busy schedules to participate in OPT meetings or agreed to be interviewed for this project: the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, USAR Command, the Army G-3/5/7, the Army G-4, U.S. Army Installation Management Command, U.S. Army Medical Command, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, First U.S. Army, and the 196th Infantry Brigade (Training Support
Brigade). They contributed useful feedback, directly provided or helped us to identify other providers for key data, and in many cases served as primary sources for our research. The members of the Army Lessons Learned General Officer Steering Committee, chaired by LTG Robert Brown, also provided useful comments and suggestions regarding the findings in this report.

RAND researchers Michael Linick and Michael Johnson were extremely helpful in providing information from their own experiences with Army Global Force Management and the development of ARFORGEN. Craig Bond assisted with methods for expressing the relationships between the various factors of readiness. We are grateful to reviewers Carra Sims, Steve Dalzell, and Jay Carafano, whose suggestions helped to improve this report. We also thank our editor, Linda Theung, who improved its formatting and readability.
**Abbreviations**

- **AC** active component
- **ARFORGEN** Army Force Generation
- **ARNG** Army National Guard
- **ASCC** Army Service Component Command
- **ASD(HA)** Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
- **BCT** Brigade Combat Team
- **C2** command and control
- **CAM** combined arms maneuver
- **CCMD** Combatant Command
- **CO-ADOS** Contingency Operations Active Duty Operational Support
- **COIN** counterinsurgency
- **DLC** Deployment Limiting Condition
- **DoD** U.S. Department of Defense
- **DoDD** Department of Defense Directive
- **DoDI** Department of Defense Instruction
- **ESB** Enhanced Separate Brigade
FORSCOM  Forces Command
FTS  full-time support
FY  fiscal year
GAO  Government Accountability Office
GFM  Global Force Management
GFRE  Ground Force Readiness Enhancement
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism
HQDA  Headquarters, Department of the Army
IDT  inactive duty training
IMCOM  Installation Management Command
IPR  In Process Review
MOS  military service obligation
NDAA  National Defense Authorization Act
OCO  Overseas Contingency Operations
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONE  Operation Noble Eagle
PHA  Periodic Health Assessment
RC  U.S. Army Reserve Component
RFPB  Reserve Forces Policy Board
SFA  security force assistance
USAR  U.S. Army Reserve
USERRA  Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
USR  Unit Status Report
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. Army has relied more on its reserve components (RCs) than at any time since the Korean War.\(^1\) According to its 2015 Posture Statement, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) mobilized more than 280,000 soldiers.\(^2\) For its part, the Army National Guard (ARNG) mobilized almost twice that number—some 525,000 soldiers from 9/11 through March 2014.\(^3\) In 2015, the USAR had some 16,058 soldiers mobilized, including 2,600 soldiers in Afghanistan, 3,000 in the United States, 2,200 in Kuwait,

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\(^1\) The Army Total Force Policy aims to integrate “the Army’s active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) as a ‘Total Force.’” (See John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, “Army Directive 2012-08 [Army Total Force Policy],” memorandum for principal officials of Headquarters, Department of the Army [HQDA] Commander, Washington, D.C., September 4, 2012.) In this context, the U.S. Army consists of two components: the AC and the RC. The AC is the Regular Army. The RC consists of the ARNG and the USAR. However, the common usage is to refer to the ARNG and USAR together in the plural as the RCs. For ease of reading, in this report, we refer to the Army’s RCs. Each of the other services also has at least one reserve component. (The U.S. Air Force’s reserve components are the Air National Guard and U.S. Air Force Reserve.) For purposes of brevity, we use the acronym “RCs” to refer to the Army’s reserve components. When it would otherwise not be clear in context, we use the full term reserve components when collectively referring to the reserve components of all the services.

\(^2\) Jeffrey W. Talley, Phyllis Wilson, and Luther Thomas Jr., America’s Army Reserve: A Life-Saving, Life-Sustaining Citizen-Soldier Force for the Nation, U.S. Army Reserve 2015 Posture Statement, 2015, p. 5.

1,100 in Cuba, 150 in Qatar, and 200 in Djibouti.\textsuperscript{4} Similarly, in fiscal year (FY) 2013, the ARNG had 18,600 in Afghanistan alone, in addition to troops in serving in 31 countries around the world, including Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Kosovo, Cuba, Djibouti, and the Philippines.\textsuperscript{5} Increasingly, the RCs are no longer simply augmenting the Regular Army, but assuming sole responsibility for some missions.

The ARNG has been responsible for peacekeeping missions in the Balkans since 2001, the multinational observer force in the Sinai since 2002, and security forces in Djibouti since 2009.\textsuperscript{6} The RCs today are truly an “operational force,” regularly deployed in overseas operations, big and small, all over the globe. While there is little doubt that the RCs have changed dramatically since their Cold War incarnation, a debate exists concerning how they got to where they are today and, more importantly, where they should go in the future. This report identifies emerging policy lessons regarding the use of, and reforms to, the RCs during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF), Iraqi Freedom (OIF), New Dawn, and other recent contingency operations.

More specifically, this report accomplishes four major tasks: (1) documents the evolution of the policies involved in the development and employment of the operational reserve, (2) assesses the impact of operational reserve policies on sourcing decisions, (3) examines how these same policies affected the RC readiness, and (4) provides recommendations regarding future RC missions and force generation policy.

The rest of this chapter begins this examination of the policies and events that led to the creation of the RCs as an operational force. The chapter does the following:

\textsuperscript{4} Talley, Wilson, and Thomas, 2015, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{5} U.S. National Guard, 2015, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{6} U.S. National Guard, 2015, p. 21. However, Kosovo Force rotations 17 through 19 were Regular Army units, returning to an ARNG unit for Kosovo Force 20 (see Melissa Parrish, “Kosovo Force 19 Begins Their Mission,” U.S. Army web page, October 28, 2014). In addition, the USAR often supplies key enabler units to the Balkans mission—such as the hospital and civil affairs units. See Michael Harburg, “Top Army Reserve Soldiers Visit Troops at Camp Bondsteel,” U.S. Army website, March 9, 2010.
The Reserve Components Today

• unpacks the term operational force and argues that it should be based on three dimensions—subordinated to the national defense strategy, capable of full-spectrum operations, and regular and continuous use
• explains the methodology behind the study
• provides a roadmap of the remainder of this report.

Defining Operational Force

Before exploring how and why the RCs became an “operational force” and what it will take to sustain them as such, we first need to ask: What does it mean to be an operational force? The term itself is not always clear. In fact, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) often cannot settle on common terminology. Much of the literature tends to conflate operational force with operational reserve. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” uses the former term. The Reserve Forces Policy Board and Reserve leaders such as the former Chief of the USAR Lieutenant General Jack Stultz opt for the latter. Since DoDD uses “operational force,” this is the term used in this report. However, the common use of multiple terms points to the broader ambiguity surrounding the topic.

The more important question, however, is: What does the term mean? To the extent there is an authoritative definition, it comes at the end of DoDD 1200.17, which defines “RCs as an operational force” as follows:

The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of con-

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In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RCs units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.8

From this rather prosaic definition, we can extract three qualities of what precisely it means to be an operational force. First, an operational force must be able to be used across the full spectrum of conflict—generally without limitations about type of mission or where these missions occur.9 Second, an operational force must participate in missions routinely, often on a cyclic basis—not as a unique occurrence.10 Third, an operational force’s training and employment must be nested within the national defense strategy—implying it remains firmly integrated into national-level war plans and directed toward national-level objectives.

Parsing the definition to its three characteristics—full-spectrum utility, routine participation, and national objectives—helps us to think about when the RCs became an operational force and what precisely it means to sustain the RCs as an operational force in the future. As detailed in Chapter Two, the third element—subservient to the national defense strategy—relates to a slow transformation of the

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9 This does not mean that missions assigned to the RCs include every aspect of the full spectrum of operations nor that it conducts the exact same types of the tasks that are performed by the Regular Army.

10 By “routinely,” we mean that the use of the RCs as a sourcing solution is a typical course of action rather than a rare event. It is beyond the scope of this study to determine what frequency would qualify as routine, but we speculate that the boundary is near a 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio. However, this does not mean that every or most units in the RCs are mobilized that often. The key characteristic is that a portion of the RCs is continuously employed.
RCs, particularly the ARNG that played out over the course of the entire 20th century. This conversion was not just a function of the last decade. Arguably, the other two elements—participation in missions across the full spectrum of conflict and routine participation in missions—also predate the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.

Second and perhaps more importantly, the definition raises doubts about whether or not it is possible to sustain the RCs as an operational force after the United States winds down its participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, if part of what it means to be an operational force is that “units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner,” then there is an open question of whether the RCs can remain an operational force once the era of large scale, long-term ground wars end and the RCs are no longer performing regular rotations into combat zones. Perhaps, a better question is “how to sustain the RCs’ readiness”—how to sustain or update the policies and resources that allowed the RCs to operate as an operational force in the past so that they can quickly do so again in the future. Chapters Three and Four address this question.

Finally, the official DoD definition raises questions about what the RCs do not include: While much of the rhetoric about the RCs’ transformation suggests that the RCs transitioned from a “strategic reserve” to an “operational force,” the DoDD’s definition is more ambiguous. It says that the RCs provide “operational capabilities and strategic depth.” In other words, rather than an “either/or” relationship, the RCs today are both an “operational force” and a “strategic reserve” simultaneously. In Chapter Five, we explore what is required to maintain these characteristics, but before we explore any of these questions we will describe the methodology for this study.

**Scope and Methodology**

In light of the tremendous increase in the use of the RCs following 9/11, the Army asked the RAND Arroyo Center to identify the emerging policy lessons regarding the use of the RCs during Operations
Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and other contingency operations. In particular, the Army requested that this study:

- document the evolution of the policies involved in the development and employment of the operational reserve
- analyze decisions to use the RCs and assess the impact of operational reserve policies on such decisions
- provide recommendations regarding future RCs missions and force generation policies.

The research design for this study evolved considerably after we began to gather data. Originally, we had planned to develop a list of discrete policies (independent variables) and use interrupted time-series analysis to assess the effects of each of these policies to see what changes, if any, they produced in the operational capabilities (dependent variables) of the RCs. In particular, we planned to analyze how DoDD 1200.17 produced changes that converted the RCs into an operational force. However, as will be described in detail below, we determined that the RCs had been an operational force well before this policy was promulgated. Indeed, in many (if not most) cases, the collection of policies intended to establish the RCs as an operational force followed practice rather than established it.

Therefore, we conducted this study in two parts. First, we examined the relationship between changes in the readiness of the RCs and changes in their usage (i.e., how often they were deployed for missions or “sourced”). To accomplish this, we constructed two models and tested them to see whether increased readiness of the RCs resulted in increased usage (“a supply model”) or whether changes in use of the RCs were driven by requirements for RCs’ forces (“a demand model”). This aspect of our analysis is used to frame the broader policy issue regarding the nature of the RCs as an operational force and what it

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11 In a nutshell, this method compares data trends before and after the introduction of an intervention or treatment, such as a specific policy. See Chava Nachmias and David Nachmias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*, 2nd ed., New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981, pp. 113–118.
may imply for future use of the RCs if the Army is not engaged in protracted land campaigns.

Second, we adopted an approach that used the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars as the control variable, key policies that affected specific aspects of RCs’ readiness within the larger framework of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars as the independent variables, and various measures of the RCs’ readiness as the dependent variables. We use the results of this analysis to assess the impact of certain policies and to make recommendations regarding future policy.\(^{12}\)

This study relies on both quantitative and qualitative data drawn from a variety of sources. We started the qualitative analysis by documenting the key policy changes regarding the RCs over the last several decades. This included reviewing major histories, outside analyses from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service, previous RAND reports, and other sources. We also gathered primary source material including memoranda from the Office of the Secretary of Defense that directed or reiterated support for changes made to the decisionmaking framework regarding employment of the RCs and DoD and Army Directives and Instructions that formally authorized or codified changes to the employment decisionmaking framework, relevant congressional testimony and official reports concerning the employment of the RCs, journal articles and opinion pieces concerning specific changes to the framework that were contemporary to the time of the changes, and DoD predecisional briefings regarding change proposals to the decisionmaking framework.

We conducted more than 30 semistructured interviews with participants of the decisions to assign, train, and validate the RCs for overseas employment. Interviews were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis and included one or more individuals from each of the following target areas of responsibility: requirements, sourcing decisions, train-

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\(^{12}\) Our use of the term *variable* is not intended to imply that we performed regression analysis. We intend it to mean “a concept that can have various values, e.g., the ‘degree of democracy’ in a country” (Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 10–11). An independent variable is something hypothesized to cause a change in the dependent variable. (See Van Evera, 1997, pp. 10–11.)
ing decisions, and validation for employment decisions. For each area of responsibility, we developed questions to elicit the factors that the interviewees felt influenced the decisions that either they made or that others made that affected them. The areas of responsibility, timeframes, and factors elicited are summarized in Table 1.1.13

Finally, to understand the impact of the various RC-related policies and validate the perceptions of the individuals we interviewed, we also gathered relevant quantitative data—such as how frequently RC units deployed abroad and the RCs’ medical and equipment readiness.

Organization of the Report

The remainder of this report is organized into four chapters. In Chapter Two, we examine how the RCs became an operational force and, more specifically, we examine two theories—a supply-side theory (where, through a series of farsighted reforms, the RCs fielded increasingly ready units and, consequently, became a more attractive sourcing option) and demand-side theory (where increased mission requirements and a lack of Regular Army forces drove force managers to rely on the RCs more often). We use this analysis to frame the rest of the study.

To see which of these two theories better explains the RCs’ evolution into an operational force, we briefly examine the history of the RCs and their century-plus transformation to become an increasingly responsive force both at home and abroad. We demonstrate that the RCs became an operational force long before they were officially named as such and show that, while the supply model best character-

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13 We conducted interviews in summer 2015. The unit in the right-hand column is “interview.” In most cases, they were conducted with one person at a time. Some individuals had experience in more than one area of responsibility or in several timeframes and were counted as multiple interviews according to the number of relevant cells that applied from Table 1.1. Although this was a purposive rather than random sample, we believe it affords us a reasonably well-rounded perspective on the decisionmaking environment. The choice of three time periods was a largely arbitrary decision to divide the course of time covered by the study into roughly equal periods. Some interviews overlapped periods.
## Table 1.1

### Interview Plan Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Time Periods</th>
<th>Information of Interest</th>
<th>Number of Interviews Conducted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander of an RC unit that received a counterinsurgency (COIN) assignment</td>
<td>2003–2007 x</td>
<td>2008–2011 x</td>
<td>2012–2015 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Requirement Analyst support to Global Force Management (GFM) process</td>
<td>2008–2011 x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants in the collaborative sourcing process that produces the Army Sourcing Laydown</td>
<td>2003–2007 x</td>
<td>2008–2011 x</td>
<td>2012–2015 x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants in the verification for employment assessment for RC units that deployed</td>
<td>2003–2007 x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization station commander</td>
<td>2003–2007 x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead training brigade representative</td>
<td>2003–2007 x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Service Component Command (ASCC) planners</td>
<td>2003–2007 x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3/5 staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ized the RCs’ earlier evolution, the demand model best characterizes their transformation during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Therefore, this study approaches the challenge of “sustaining the RCs as an operational force” from the point of view of “preserving the RCs’ readiness.”

In Chapter Three, we turn to understanding readiness. We examine the definitional ambiguity behind the term and explain why existing measures of readiness are incomplete—at least for the purposes of this study. We then develop a framework for understanding readiness by dividing the term into its three subcomponents—time, capability, and inhibitors—that can be used to analyze how the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars affected the readiness of the RCs.

In Chapter Four, we apply the framework developed in the previous chapter. In terms of capabilities, we show how the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars improved the resourcing of the RCs and the depth of the expertise of the force. In terms of time, we then look at how the switch to cyclic deployments and premobilization training allowed the RCs to deploy more quickly after mobilizing and to sustain a sizable deployed presence for years on end. Finally, in terms of inhibitors, we look at the factors that made Iraq and Afghanistan Wars unique—namely, ample forewarning about missions, a well-developed logistical backbone particularly later on, and a subset of all the possible missions within the spectrum of conflict—and caution that, as a result, readiness gained by the RCs during Iraq and Afghanistan may not be fully applicable to other contexts.

Finally, in Chapter Five, we summarize our major findings about how and why the RCs became an “operational force,” how the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars affected the readiness of the RCs, and recommend which policies should be changed and which should be continued to sustain the readiness of the RCs going forward.
CHAPTER TWO
How the RCs Became an Operational Force: Supply or Demand?

On October 29, 2008, then–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued DoDD 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.”1 By “operational force,” the directive meant that RCs could participate in a full range of missions and regularly be sourced for missions at home and abroad.2 The directive proceeded to give broad—if somewhat generic—guidance to a variety of functional areas of DoD ranging from health care to acquisition and suggested that DoD start managing the RCs as an “operational force.” Beneath the directive’s bureaucratic, nondescript language was a fundamental shift: The RCs were no longer simply a “strategic reserve” oriented toward a major war against a peer competitor, but an operational force integrated within the Total Force and routinely participating in contingency operations all over the globe.3

While 2008 may mark the official adoption of the “operational force,” the term was already in common use long before the directive. DoD officials referred to the Air National Guard as an “operational reserve” since at least 2004.4 In its 2005 annual report (pub-

1 DoD, 2008.
3 The official policy for equipping the RCs states that they now must provide “operational capabilities and strategic depth” (DoD, “Equipping the Reserve Forces,” instruction no. 1225.06, May 16, 2012b, p. 2).
lished in 2006), the Reserve Forces Policy Board observed, “It is widely understood the RCs are undergoing a fundamental transformation to an operational reserve.” During an interview in August 2007, the then-Chief of the USAR Lieutenant General Jack Stultz noted, “We are no longer a one-weekend-a-month, two-weeks-in-the-summertime force. What we are now is an operational reserve. That means on a predictable basis you will be expected to be called up and mobilized to deploy to defend your nation.” Arguably, as we shall see, the intellectual roots of the RCs as an operational force run even deeper than the early 2000s—back at least to the Army Total Force Policy of the early 1970s, which mandated closer integration between the Regular Army and RCs—if not to the Militia Act of 1903 (also known as the Dick Act).

If, however, the 2008 directive did not mark the birth of the RCs as an operational force, when did the RCs become an operational force? More importantly, perhaps, why did the RCs become one? And, what exactly does this mean for the future of the RCs going forward? The debate is not merely an academic one; the models offer two different predictions for the RCs’ future as the current wars wind down and the demand for forces is reduced.

This chapter addresses these questions in the next six sections. First, it lays out two competing theories of why the RCs transformed:

• One theory posits that policies made the RCs more ready, prompting force managers to use them more often (a “supply” theory).
• The alternative theory posits that operational needs drove sourcing decisions; policies to make the RCs more ready followed suit (a “demand” theory).

Second, this chapter lays out a methodology for testing these two theories and highlights several important caveats in the approach.

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7 In 1903, the Militia Act provided increased federal funding to the National Guard in exchange for greater federal oversight.
Third, it looks at the evolution of the RCs during the 20th century and argues that a series of legislative milestones allowed the RCs to exhibit all three qualities of an operational force by at least the 1990s. Fourth, it provides an overview of the policy changes related to the RCs in the post-9/11 era that affected how the RCs were trained, manned, equipped, and deployed, ultimately culminating with them being labeled an “operational force.” Fifth, it shows how—despite these dramatic policy changes—the RCs actually played a larger role in the conflicts before these policies went into effect, rather than after, supporting the “demand” model rather than the “supply” model. Finally, this chapter concludes with the policy implications of this argument.

Two Theories of How the RCs Became an Operational Force

Arguably, there are at least two possible explanations for how the RCs became an operational force. First, a “supply” theory of the RCs’ transformation suggests that they first became a more ready and capable force and therefore became a more attractive sourcing option. Conversely, a “demand” theory suggests increased demand, coupled with decreased availability of Regular Army forces, drove the Army to rely on the RCs more heavily than in previous decades.8

The first theory, outlined in Figure 2.1, argues that Army sourcing decisions to use the RCs were a result of “supply,” whereby the increasing readiness led to the RCs being used more often. The argument here is that, through a series of reforms and budget increases, the RCs’ capabilities expanded and their readiness to perform missions abroad increased. This, in turn, made the RCs a more attractive option to force managers who increasingly turned to them to meet the needs of missions abroad. The theory also leads to a simple prediction: As the

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8 The words “supply” and “demand” are used in this study as metaphors rather than as economic terminology. Alternatively, we may say that one theory posited that, as RC forces became more ready, they were then “pushed” into the fight. The competing theory argues that RC forces were “pulled” into the fight because of a shortage of available Regular Army units.
policies remain in place, the RCs will remain an attractive sourcing option for force managers.

Today, one can find allusions to this supply-side theory of the RCs’ transformation in various forums. For example, then—president of the National Guard Association of the United States, retired Major General Gus Hargett, stated in oral testimony before the Reserve Forces Policy Board:

Since 9/11, the National Guard has transformed from a strategic reserve to a fully integrated, operational force that participates side-by-side as full partners with the Army and Air Force. The evolving role of the National Guard has led to increased involvement in overseas operations and foreign aid missions, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Sinai, and many other locations across the globe.9 [emphasis added]

An alternate second theory of reserve sourcing, outlined in Figure 2.2, suggests a “demand” model—namely, that as world events increased demand or reduced the availability of Regular Army soldiers—force managers turned to the RCs to meet the unmet demand. Importantly, this model of sourcing has little to do with increased readiness of the RCs: Force managers typically prefer to fill missions with Regular Army soldiers if the latter are available. Conversely, assum-

How the RCs Became an Operational Force: Supply or Demand?

In the past, when Regular Army forces are available, this model suggests that the RCs will remain a second choice for filling missions regardless of how “ready” they are.\(^{10}\)

Similarly, one can also find references to the “demand” theory in today’s debate. For example, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves concluded, “The notion of an operational reserve developed almost by default, in response to current and projected needs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the associated force generation requirements.”\(^{11}\) Likewise, the official Army narrative similarly attributes the RCs’ transformation to demand: “Due to mobilization and rapid-deployment demands since September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve has evolved into an operational, expeditionary force replete with streamlined deployable headquarters.”\(^{12}\)

\(^{10}\) This does not imply that some minimum level of readiness is not required for a unit to be sourced, but that a marginal increase above some threshold does not correlate with more usage.


Methodology

To test which of the two theories—whether the RCs became “more ready” and then were used more, or vice versa—is correct, we adopt a twofold approach. First, we take a birds-eye, broad-brush stroke look at the RCs’ transformation into an operational force over the longer sweep of U.S. history. While the term *operational force* officially dates to 2008 and similar language entered Regular Army/RCs discussions somewhere in the 2000s, we look at when the RCs first began to exhibit the three attributes embedded in the DoDD’s definition—capable of full-spectrum operations, nested into the national defense strategy, and deploying regularly as part of each service’s force-generation model. To understand when the RCs began to exhibit these attributes, we briefly look at the reforms of the 20th century to see whether they drove demand for the RCs or vice versa.

Second, we delve into the story of the RCs in the post-9/11 era. We compile a list of the “key” policies commonly associated with the transformation of the RCs into the operational force and examine when each of these policies went into effect and compare this timeline with more refined data on how often the RCs were used during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. If the “supply” theory is correct, as these policies were implemented and the RCs became more “ready,” the use of the RCs should have increased proportionally. Conversely, if the “demand” theory is correct, then these two variables should not be correlated. Instead, peak RC sourcing should correlate with exogenous variables—especially when sufficient Regular Army units were unavailable to fill requirements.

There are two limitations of this approach. Advocates of the “supply” theory of the operational force would acknowledge some importance of demand in driving sourcing. After all, even if the RCs are “ready,” they would still only be used if there were actual missions to perform. To compensate for this shortfall, we look at the number of

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13 We used the expert judgments of the authors, the members of the G-3/5/7 Operations Planning Team, and other stakeholders to determine which policies were critical to changes in the RCs’ readiness and employment and should thus be focused on as independent variables. However, a full list of policies relevant to the RCs is contained in Appendix B.
RC soldiers deployed both in absolute numbers, but more importantly as a *share of the total forces deployed*. In other words, we look at how much of the sourcing is assigned to the RCs versus the Regular Army.

Additionally, this approach—comparing timelines of policies to percentage sourcing—only shows correlation rather than causation. To address the correlation-versus-causation problem, we adopted a third approach—in-depth interviews. Although interviews that were conducted sometimes several years after decisions were made have their own methodological issues, they complement the quantitative data. Assuming the qualitative and quantitative findings are consistent with each other, we build confidence in our causal explanations.

Before moving on, however, three caveats must be noted:

1. The dependent variable in this study is sourcing (whether RCs were tasked more often), *not performance* (whether the performance of the RCs improved in the field). It is likely that better medical readiness, more training, or smarter personnel policies produced more capable units. This relationship—between readiness and performance—is a separate subject and the topic of a separate study. Sourcing, however, strikes at the core of what it means to be an “operational force.” As mentioned in Chapter One, two of the term’s three key attributes—routine participation in operations and integration into national-level war plans—center on how and how often forces were employed, not how well they did.

2. Even in terms of sourcing, this study looks at demand (how much the RCs were asked to do), *not capacity* (how much the RCs could have done if asked). Throughout the entire Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the RCs accomplished virtually all they were asked to do. It is possible—as their readiness improved—they

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14 Craig Bond and M. Wade Markel are leading an ongoing RAND research project on this relationship.

15 By this, we mean that they deployed as they were asked, were approximately on time, and accomplished the tasks they were assigned. At the same time, as one interviewee suggested, failure was also not an option. In the post-9/11 environment, a unit slated to deploy would
could have accomplished more if asked to do more, but like all counterfactuals, capturing this proves empirically difficult.

3. This study does not test the normative question: Should force managers draw more or less frequently on the RC force pools? While this study offers policy recommendations at the end, determining the ideal frequency of RC deployments must include a number of other variables not included in the study (e.g., Regular Army capacity, Regular Army/RCs relative effectiveness, marginal costs, second-order effects of mobilizing reservists on their civilian professions, etc.).

The Birth of the RCs as an Operational Force

The start of the RCs becoming an operational force in two of the three dimensions—oriented toward national defense missions and capable of performing a full spectrum of operations—arguably dates to multiple pieces of landmark legislation at the beginning of the 20th century. The history of the RCs dates—in some form—to the early days of the colonial militia. Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution grants U.S. Congress the power of “calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,” while Article II, Section 2, appoints the President commander in chief of the militia when it is called into federal service.16 And yet, for most of the 18th and 19th centuries, the militia remained predominantly under state, rather than federal, control. Moreover, thanks to its constitutionally directed mandate, the militia—and later the National Guard—focused on domestic security, not foreign operations. When National Guard soldiers deployed overseas, such as during the Spanish American War, they joined separate “volunteer” forces, mostly comprising deploy; the Army’s job was to make them ready. (Interview with HQDA GFM participant on May 21, 2015.)

16 “Constitution of the United States,” Article 1, Section 8.
civilians with no prior reserve experience, rather than deploy with their National Guard units.17

All this began to change in the early 20th century. With the Spanish American War, the United States began its slow transition from a regional to a global power, and the Army increasingly took on a more expeditionary role. For their part, the RCs became increasingly subordinated to the national defense strategies and capable of performing a full spectrum of operations both at home and abroad.18 In 1903, the Militia Act (Dick Act) established a simple quid pro quo relationship that became the “cornerstone” of the modern National Guard.19 In exchange for increased federal oversight and control, the National Guard received a fivefold increase in federal funding, up to $2 million in 1903.20 Later legislation—the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920—made the National Guard a component of the U.S. Army and enabled the federal government to “prescribe the qualifications for their officers.”21 The National Guard still retained its state affiliation but, by 1933, 12,381 of 13,364 National Guard officers were also commissioned into the Federal Reserve.22

17 Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War, College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1998, p. 119. Also, historian John K. Mahon estimates that 40 percent of the volunteer force had no previous drill experience. Since he estimates the National Guard’s size at the start of hostilities at 114,000 strong, but the total number of volunteers at 223,000, there are reasons to question this estimate. See John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, New York: MacMillan, 1983, pp. 128, 125, 133.

18 As will be described below, until 1908, the National Guard was the only reserve component.


21 Colby and Glass, 1943, pp. 844, 847.

22 Colby and Glass, 1943, pp. 846, 850.
Similarly, the USAR also came into existence during this period to exclusively serve federal national security priorities. In 1908, the Medical Reserve Corps was created to better enable medical professionals to join the military. A few years later, in 1912, the Army created the Regular Army Reserve to provide an exclusively federal manpower pool to augment the Regular Army when needed. Eventually, the 1916 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the Reserve Officer Training Corps, the Officer Reserve Corps (which subsumed the Medical Reserve Corps), and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. Collectively, these reforms increasingly integrated the RCs into national defense strategy—the first element of transforming the RCs into an “operational force.”

The second element of operational force—when RC units and service members can perform the full range of operations at home and abroad—also began with the Dick Act, but fought through a series of legal battles in the courts that eventually allowed the federal government to deploy the National Guard as needed. As late as 1912, Taft administration Attorney General George Woodward Wickersham concluded that the President could not “call up this new organized militia and send it abroad ‘as a part of an army of occupation’.” In the mid-1980s, some governors legally challenged federal authority to deploy the National Guard of their states to overseas without their approval. These state challenges to federal authority mostly fell flat, and the federal government gained the legal authorities it needed to deploy the RCs whenever and wherever it saw fit.

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25 In 1986, for example, Maine governor Joseph E. Brennan protested the deployment of Maine Guard soldiers to a training exercise in Honduras. Eventually, 13 other governors either followed suit or expressed reservations about such deployments. The courts later overruled these objections. See Kester, 1988, pp. 177–179.

Thanks to these reforms, the RCs began to participate in overseas operations. Approximately 433,478 National Guard soldiers and 170,000 Army Reservists served in World War I. About 300,000 National Guard soldiers and 200,000 Reservists were drawn from the prewar Army RCs to fight in World War II. More would serve in Korea, while others would be mobilized to handle the smaller-scale Cuban and Berlin Crises (see Figure 2.3). Such large-scale participation in overseas operations—particularly for contingency operations—would have been more difficult, if not impossible, had the earlier legislation not been enacted in the first half the 20th century.

Despite the increasing use of the RCs during the 20th century, the RCs were still not a true operational force, since they were not fully integrated into the Army’s force generation process. As Figure 2.3 also shows, relatively few Reservists served in the Vietnam War—a mere

Figure 2.3
The Use of the RCs in the Second Half of the 20th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Number of Reservists involuntarily mobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean War (1950–1953)</td>
<td>10 thousand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Crisis (1961–1962)</td>
<td>9 thousand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)</td>
<td>8 thousand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War/ USS Pueblo Crisis (1968–1969)</td>
<td>7 thousand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


37,643 were activated across all services and components. President Lyndon Johnson feared that deploying the RCs to the Vietnam War would provoke domestic political backlash. As former Nixon administration Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird noted, “As unpopular as the draft was, it was still an easier sell for Johnson than deploying whole National Guard and Reserve units out of their communities in middle America.” Johnson also thought that mobilizing the RCs could provoke a larger war in Southeast Asia and direct Chinese or Soviet intervention. These limitations made the RCs more of a strategic, rather than an operational, force throughout the Cold War—ready for use if there was a large-scale war with the Soviet Union, but not for relatively “minor” conflicts.

The Army’s soul searching in the aftermath of the Vietnam War led DoD and the Army to reconsider this conception and ultimately produced the intellectual roots of the third dimension of the RCs’ emergence as a truly operational force—continuous, regular use—in the Total Force Policy of 1973. The “total force concept” originated in a memorandum dated August 21, 1970, by then–Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. While the Vietnam War was fought primarily with draftees and the AC, Laird realized that, with the military facing defense cuts and abolishment of the draft, it would need to capital-

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32 Multiple interviews traced the intellectual roots of the RCs to the Total Force policy of 1973. Interview with HQDA participant May 19, 2015, and with FORSCOM sourcing officials, July 24, 2015.
ize on all available forces—Active, Reserve, and National Guard—in future conflicts:

Within the Department of Defense, these economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserves . . . Emphasis will be given to concurrent considerations of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve forces.33 [emphasis added]

The Laird Memorandum—as it became known—emphasized that the Reserves were to be the “initial and primary source of augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.”34 In 1973, just as the draft was officially abolished, Laird’s successor, James Schlesinger, turned the total force concept into total force policy.35 The Total Force Policy was originally embraced by senior Army leaders. Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams developed the “roundout strategy,” also known as the Abrams doctrine, where Reserve brigades would “roundout” certain Regular Army divisions.36

The first real test of the roundout concept occurred during the Gulf War. DoD called three National Guard brigades to “roundout” AC divisions in 1990; only one—the 48th Infantry Brigade—was cer-

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34 Cronin, 1987, p. 7.


36 Buchalter and Elan, 2007, p. 15.
tified as combat ready and only after it was too late to deploy to the Gulf War, which famously ended after only 100 hours of combat.\textsuperscript{37} Still, the ARNG deployed smaller units to perform combat, combat support, and combat service support functions. Of the 62,411 Army Guard soldiers mobilized for that conflict, 37,484 served in combat.\textsuperscript{38} Likewise, just under 84,000 Army Reservists—consisting of 63,000 drilling Reservists, 20,000 Individual Ready Reservists, and 1,000 Retired Reserves—were activated as well.\textsuperscript{39}

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, RC policies began to shift. One of the earlier changes came in the FY 1993 NDAA, which attempted to reduce postmobilization training (by increasing premobilization training) and reform unit-status reporting to make it a better measure of readiness.\textsuperscript{40} A few years later, on July 1, 1995, DoD released DoDD 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve.” The memorandum updated a 1986 version and was a first attempt to rethink the use of the RCs in the post–Cold War era. While it allowed for involuntary mobilizations for “major regional conflicts and national emergencies,” it stated that


\textsuperscript{38} Doubler, 2001, p. 283.

\textsuperscript{39} Pullen, 2008.

\textsuperscript{40} Interview with HQDA participant, May 19, 2015. Also see Ellen M. Pint, Matthew W. Lewis, Thomas F. Lippiatt, Philip Hall-Partyka, Jonathan P. Wong, and Tony Puharic, \textit{Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre- and Postmobilization Training}, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-738-A, 2015.
for lesser regional conflicts, domestic emergencies, and other missions, where capabilities of the Reserve components could be required, maximum consideration will be given to accessing volunteer Reserve components units and individuals before seeking authority to order members of the Reserve components to active duty without their consent.\footnote{DoD, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve,” directive no. 1235.10, July 1, 1995, p. 3.}

It reasserted the equality between Active and RC members, stating that the RCs are “interchangeable with the Active component for any operational commitment.”\footnote{DoD, 1995, p. 5.}

In practice, however, Regular Army and RC units were often not equally resourced in the 1990s. The Army operated on a tiered readiness model. This meant that units received their allocations of personnel, training, and equipment based on where they stood in the deployment queue: Simply put, as DoDD 1235.10 stated, “Early deploying units and individuals will have priority [for resources] over later deploying units.”\footnote{DoD, 1995, p. 5.} In theory, tiered readiness should not have placed the RCs at a disadvantage, per se. For example, the policy for equipping the RCs, dated November 2, 1992, explicitly states:

> The priority for the distribution of new and combat serviceable equipment with associated support and test equipment, should be given to units scheduled to be deployed and/or employed first, \textit{irrespective of component}.\footnote{DoD, “Equipping the Reserve Forces,” directive no. 1225.6, November 2, 1992 (certified current as of November 21, 2003).} [emphasis added]

That said, since RC units were primarily on call for major regional conflicts—not routine smaller conflicts, much less the rapid response to crises—the result was that RC units were often underresourced. Still, these policies helped pave the way for the increasing use of the RCs in the mid-1990s.
Planners recognized a need for the RCs in the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina early on, leading Headquarters U.S. Army Europe to submit through U.S. European Command a proposal requesting a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up of 4,000 RC personnel. This call-up was announced on December 8, 1995, and, by the end of that month, 34 units consisting of more than 1,100 RCs personnel had deployed to Europe. Additional RC personnel deployed to the region in early 1996, some heading to the forward areas—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Hungary, and Croatia—and others backfilling positions in Germany left vacant by deployed U.S. Army Europe units.\(^45\)

The Bosnia peacekeeping missions became just one of several operations where the RCs played an operational role during the 1990s. As shown in Figure 2.4, the RCs from all the services served in Haiti,

**Figure 2.4**
The Birth of “Operational” RCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Number of Reservists involuntarily mobilized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persian Gulf War (1990–1991)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti Intervention (1994–1996)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo Mission (1999–2003)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low intensity conflict with Iraq (1998–2003)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE, OEF, OIF, and OND (2001–May 27, 2014)</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: ONE = Operation Noble Eagle; OND = Operation New Dawn.
\(^a\) Data cut off at 2003.
\(^b\) Data include both voluntary and involuntary mobilizations.

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Kosovo, and the then low-intensity conflict with Iraq following the Gulf War. Numerically, far more Reservists served in previous conflicts. More than 857,000 RC service members were mobilized for the Korean War, for example. Only well into the aftermath of 9/11 and the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan did the RCs surpass this mark. And yet, the use of the RCs in 1990s was unique in the sense that it was regularly participating in even relatively small-scale contingencies abroad for most of the decade.

In sum, the birth of the RCs as an operational force is less a discrete event and more a gradual transition lasting decades. Ever since the Dick Act, the RCs have become increasingly subordinated to the federal government and capable of performing the “full range of missions,” beyond the constitutionally mandated roles of “execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” to include expeditionary operations abroad. The RCs became “operational” in the third sense of the word—deploying regularly as part of each service’s force generation model—on paper in the 1970s and in practice in the 1990s, when they began to regularly and continually participate in overseas operations. As the Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs noted in a review of the RCs, “Reserve Component contributions to Total Force missions steadily grew between 1992 and 1996, reaching a sustained level of 12 to 13 million duty days per year. It is during this period that the operational role of the National Guard and Reserve began to take shape.” Arguably, by the early 1990s, the RCs had possessed all three attributes—full-spectrum utility, routine participation, and nested in national plans and strategy—of being

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48 Senior RC leaders also view the 1990s as the crucial turning point for changing the way the RCs do business. Interview with HQDA participant, July 27, 2015.
49 U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8.
50 Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component: Volume I, Executive Summary and Main Report, April 5, 2011, p. 16.
an “operational force.” In most cases, the policies during this period preceded increased planning for the use of the RCs. Thus, these policies were already in place and the “operationalization” of the RCs was under way—if not completed—when DoDD 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” was promulgated in 2008.

The next two sections turn to the most recent attempts to improve the operational utility of the RCs. First, we provide a brief summary of the policies that were intended to address the shortfalls observed during Operation Desert Storm. These reforms were primarily contained in the legislation known as “Title XI” and implemented through Army initiatives such as BOLD SHIFT. Second, we examine the range of policies that were put into place following 9/11. These reforms primarily came from DoD and Army directives rather than legislation.

Post–Gulf War Reforms of the RCs

The April 1993 congressional hearings before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee touted the mobilization of the RCs for Desert Shield/Storm as a success.

Over 140,000 members of the reserve forces were called up; they performed crucial missions during all phases of the war, from mobilization to redeployment of forces. Approximately 74,000 of these soldiers were in theater, while the others were used for backfill of active duty forces deployed to the Gulf. The vast majority of these reserve units were combat service and combat service support.51

General Colin Powell affirmed this characterization in his statement that “the U.S. Military could not have achieved its mission in

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the Gulf War without the National Guard and Reserve.” However, three ARNG brigades—which were supposed to roundout and deploy with their parent Regular Army divisions—were delayed in mobilization and took longer than anticipated (according to prewar readiness reporting) to complete postmobilization training. By the time they were ready for deployment, combat operations had ended and these brigades did not deploy.

The failure to deploy any of the ARNG roundout brigades called into question the feasibility of the roundout concept and triggered congressional hearings, reports, and studies on training requirements and barriers to implementation of Regular Army support to RCs’ unit readiness. The Army developed a training strategy called BOLD SHIFT that initially focused on the roundout brigades. This strategy implemented a wide range of improvements in RCs’ training support as a response to the nondeployments of the roundout brigades in the Gulf War and was designed to improve Total Army combat readiness.

Researchers described the new approach to intensive training as being generally effective and accepted within the Army, but its implementation further highlighted the need for additional postmobilization training for high-priority RC units.

The lessons learned and principal training methods from BOLD SHIFT were subsequently folded into the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Specific aspects of BOLD SHIFT that were incorporated in the legislation included a focus on standardization and evaluation of training via the requirement for Operational Readiness Evaluations; the assignment of 2,000 Regular Army noncommissioned and commissioned officers to advise and train early deploying units; and leadership training through programs such as the USAR’s Link Up Program, the Regular Army’s Battle Command Training Program.

53 Pint et al., 2015.
54 Ronald E. Sortor, The Army Makes a Bold Shift: Improving Reserve Training, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RB-3019, 2001; also see Pint et al., 2015.
and the ARNG Brigade Command Battle Staff Training Program. Additional reforms were legislated through Title XI of the NDAA for FY 1993 and later amendments. This new law was the culmination of proposed changes to improve the readiness of the RCs as a response to concerns raised during Desert Storm.

Title XI was intended to fix the following specific problems that had been identified by the Department of the Army Inspector General regarding the readiness of the roundout brigades:

- Premobilization training lacked focus. Units did not meet expected levels of individual, crew, and platoon proficiency. Post-mobilization training plans had to be adjusted to provide sufficient time to retrain and attain the prescribed standards.
- The ARNG brigades had significant personnel readiness problems, including low manning levels of critical combat arms and low-density support specialties; military occupational specialty qualification shortfalls, and lack of medical or dental preparedness.
- Many commissioned and noncommissioned officers in key positions were ineffective in performing their duties. Leaders did not attend required professional development courses or lacked experience in their positions.
- Expectations of initial levels of training and readiness in the roundout brigades were too high because of inadequate measures and procedures for determining premobilization readiness.

A section-by-section overview of Title XI can be found in Appendix A of this report. To quickly summarize, however, the law required the following actions to address the above problems:

57 Pint et al., 2015, p. 12.
59 Pint et al., 2015, p. xi.
• Assigning 5,000 Regular Army advisors to RC units (later reduced to 3,500 in 2005) to increase the quantity and quality of full-time support.
• Associating each ARNG combat unit with a Regular Army combat unit and giving the Regular Army commander (at brigade or higher level) the responsibility to approve the ARNG unit’s training program, review its readiness reports, assess its resource requirements, validate its compatibility with Regular Army forces, and approve position vacancy promotions of officers.60
• Establishing a program to minimize postmobilization training time by focusing premobilization training on individual soldier qualifications and training, collective training at the crew or squad level, and maneuver training at the platoon level.
• Modifying the RCs’ readiness rating system to provide a more accurate assessment of deployability and personnel and equipment shortfalls that require additional resources.
• Setting an objective of increasing the percentage of ARNG personnel with prior Regular Army experience to 65 percent for officers and 50 percent for enlisted.

Many observers viewed the implementation of Title XI as a successful and “complete” package of reforms when FY 1996 NDAA was passed.61 However, some of the problems it was intended to address were not resolved—often because of funding shortfalls—and affected the initial mobilizations for the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Finally, some of the provisions in Title XI were subsequently amended or rescinded.62 For example, the Associate Unit program is no longer

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60 Under certain conditions, fully qualified officers in the ARNG and USAR can be promoted based on current assignment to a position authorizing a higher grade versus being selection for promotion by a central board and then being assigned to a position of that grade. (See chapters two and three of HQDA, Army Regulation 135–155, Army National Guard and U.S. Army: Reserve Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other Than General Officers, Washington, D.C., July 13, 2004.)


62 Pint et al., 2015, p. 71.
Post-9/11 Reforms of the RCs

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the use of the RCs skyrocketed. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, ARNG and USAR soldiers guarded the airports and other critical infrastructure sites such as chemical weapons depots as part of ONE, in many cases, relieving Regular Army soldiers of this duty so that they could perform other missions. RC soldiers regularly deployed overseas in support of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. The RCs also picked up some overseas missions previously performed by the Regular Army. From 2003 to 2013, the Kosovo peacekeeping mission, for example, was tasked to the ARNG. All in all, as shown in Figure 2.4, the number of RC soldiers involuntarily mobilized between 2001 and 2014 almost tripled the number of those in the previous decade, profoundly reshaping how the RCs were managed, sustained, and employed.

One of DoD’s initial policy responses was to try to protect the RCs from overuse. It overhauled DoDD 1235.10, releasing the first

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63 Shortly before this report was published, the Army began a new Associate Unit Pilot Program. See Secretary of the Army Memorandum, Designation of Associated Units in Support of Army Total Force Policy, March 21, 2016.

64 Email to authors from First Army G-3/5/7, November 19, 2015.

65 Officials in Army G-3/5/7 confirmed that some ONE missions were initially performed by Regular Army units. However, since these missions predated the Mobilization and Deployment Information System, they did not have data indicating units, dates, or numbers (email, July 16, 2014). Anecdotally, one former ARNG battalion commander reported that his unit relieved a Regular Army unit at a chemical weapons depot (email from former ARNG battalion commander mobilized for ONE, July 14, 2015).

66 Steven Beardsley, “Active-Duty Troops to Deploy to Kosovo for First Time in a Decade,” Stars and Stripes, March 13, 2013. Additionally, the USAR often supplies key enabler units to the Balkans mission—such as the hospital and civil affairs units. See Harburg, 2010.

67 This policy was released three years post-9/11, in a period where senior leaders were predicting that operations would soon be winding down. There was a significant drop in the
updated version in about nine years on September 23, 2004. The policy establishes that “the decision to activate RC forces must be made only after determining that it is both judicious and prudent to do so.”

The policy also attempted to refine the manner in which reserve components forces were used. To prevent the reserve components from being used simply to fill gaps in the ACs, it included language that “RC forces shall be employed in a manner that maximizes the utilization of their core capabilities throughout the ordered duration of active service.” Finally, the policy also gave general—although non-mandatory—guidance on tour length. “When possible, consistent with operational requirements, the length of deployments and/or rotations for RC forces shall not exceed the length of deployments and/or rotations for similar Active forces.”

Updating DoDD 1235.10, however, did not remedy the resource challenges facing the RCs during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. In October 2005, the GAO found that

while deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the National Guard’s non-deployed units and threatens the National Guard’s ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas.

The RCs faced readiness challenges in other areas as well, such as medical readiness. Indeed, a RAND study found that fewer than one number of personnel assigned in the RCs (see our discussion of end strength later in this report) and recurring reports of RC deployments being extended with little to no advanced planning, RC equipment shortages, and other issues that raised concerns about the RCs being overstretched.

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69 DoD 1235.10, 2004, p. 3.

70 DoD 1235.10, 2004, p. 5.

in five USAR and National Guard soldiers were fully medically ready in 2005.\textsuperscript{72}

Gradually, DoD issued guidance in an attempt to correct these ills. It developed a series of policies to track individual medical readiness across all branches and components,\textsuperscript{73} and later set the goal of ensuring that 75 percent of all service members are fully medically ready.\textsuperscript{74} It similarly revised its equipping policy to ensure the RCs remained equipped to deal with crises on the home front including Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions.\textsuperscript{75} The transformation to “modular” brigades resulted in similar organizational structures that made it easier to track and resource Regular Army and RC units in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{76} Furthermore, the Army began to hold Joint Assessment workshops, during which the RC unit, its chain of command, and First Army would collaborate to establish tailored training plans to prepare units for their missions.\textsuperscript{77} What was probably the most important policy response to solving the RCs’ (and Regular Army’s) resource challenges came in 2006, when the Army adopted the “Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)” model.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{72} “Fully medically ready = current in all categories, including dental class 1 or 2; partially ready = lacking one or more immunizations, readiness laboratory studies, or medical equipment; not medically ready = current or chronic deployment prohibiting condition, including pregnancy, hospitalization, dental class 3; indeterminate status = inability to determine the service member’s current health status because of missing health information, an overdue PHA [Periodic Health Assessment], or being in dental class 4.” See Brauner, 2012, p. 16 and figure 3.1 on p. 23.

\textsuperscript{73} William Winkenwerder Jr., “Policy for Individual Readiness Metrics,” memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (M&RA), and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), and Director Joint Staff, HA 3-009, May 2, 2003.

\textsuperscript{74} DoD, “Individual Medical Readiness (IMR),” instruction no. 6025.19, January 3, 2006a.

\textsuperscript{75} See DoD, “Equipping the Reserve Forces,” directive no. 1225.6, April 7, 2005.

\textsuperscript{76} Interview with DA G-3/5/7 Strategic Planner, July 21, 2015.

\textsuperscript{77} Interviews with Installation Management Command (IMCOM) leadership and staff, May 21, 2015, and with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015.

\textsuperscript{78} Charles C. Campbell, “ARFORGEN: Maturing the Model, Refining the Process,” Army, June 2009, p. 50.
Unlike the tiered-readiness model, where the units would be manned, equipped, and trained based on where they stood in a sequential deployment queue, under ARFORGEN, units would be manned, equipped, and trained based on where they were in a three-phase cyclical deployment model. While the names of the three phases changed over time, the cycle consists of a period of training, followed by one in which forces are available for operations, and finally, a period of recuperation. The tempo of the cycle depends on both the demand for units and the component, with the RCs’ tempo slower than the Regular Army’s. ARFORGEN marked a key policy shift for the RCs. Compared with tiered readiness, it took a more egalitarian approach for force generation. As then–Forces Command (FORSCOM) Commander General Charles Campbell remarked, “The Army progressively builds readiness over time and includes every unit in the Army—active, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve.” And, according to the former Chief of the USAR, Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, this predictable cyclic model formed the centerpiece of transforming the RCs into an operational force. (See Figure 2.5.)

In practice, ARFORGEN often did not work as cleanly as it was intended. Because of variation in demand for forces, units that were high in demand or insufficient in number to support longer dwell times were deployed more often than others; thus, resources consequently remained unevenly distributed across the force. As one senior RC leader put it, the early days of ARFORGEN were more like “tiered readiness in motion” rather than an entirely new system. Like the old tiered readiness model, the Regular Army would typically be assigned to emerging missions, with RC units assigned to sustain the mission in follow-on rotations. Still, thanks to ARFORGEN, sourcing decisions

79 Campbell, 2009, p. 54.
81 Interview with HQDA participant July 27, 2015.
82 Interview with USAR GFM participant on March 13, 2015.
looked at what capabilities were needed and resources were allocated to who was next in the queue, regardless of component.  

Next to ARFORGEN, the policy shift that probably had the most impact for the RCs came on January 19, 2007, in a memorandum issued by then–Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (hereafter referred to as the “Gates memo”). It limited involuntary mobilization to one year maximum (including training), directed the mobilization of RC service members by units (not as individuals or ad hoc teams), minimized the use of stop loss, and expanded incentives for RC ser-

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83 Interview with HQDA GFM participant on May 21, 2015.

84 This constraint applied to members assigned to operating force units. Individual Mobilization Augmentees could be mobilized as individuals to fill headquarters and ad hoc unit
vice members who repeatedly deploy or extend. More importantly, for determining the tempo of deployments, the memorandum reaffirmed the goal of a one-to-five ratio of mobilized to demobilized time as the ideal for how frequently RC units are activated.85

Subsequent policies proceeded to expand and implement the Gates memo and ARFORGEN, attempting to protect RC units from overuse and provide greater predictability for RC personnel, families, and employers.86 The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs set goals of 24 months of advanced notice to alert an RC unit of an upcoming deployment and 180 days for publishing the actual order.87 It also required that the Secretary of Defense be notified when RC units exceeded set standards, such as when mobilizations lasted longer than 12 months, units mobilized faster than the one-to-four mobilization-to-dwell ratio, or involuntary mobilization occurred without 90 days of prior notice.88 Similarly, the next edition of DoDD 1235.10, published on November 26, 2008, directed the use of the “train-mobilize-deploy model” for the RCs versus the previous “mobilize-train-deploy model” (discussed in further detail below), reaffirmed the one-to-five mobilization-to-dwell goal, and modified the advanced warning to a DoD standard of 90 days, although 180 days remained

vacancies. Additionally, with chain of command approval individuals assigned to units could volunteer to be mobilized via the Worldwide Individual Augmentation System.

85 Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, “Utilization of the Total Force,” memorandum to the Secretaries of the Services, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Undersecretaries of Defense, Washington, D.C., January 19, 2007. This ratio was a goal and could be waived by the Secretary of the Army up to four to one. In many cases, however, units rotated more quickly. The data are not clear regarding how often the goal was met, especially during the “surge.”

86 Interview with HQDA leadership on July 31, 2015.

87 T. F. Hall, Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, “Reserve Component Alert/Mobilization Decision Process Implementation,” memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (M&RA), and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), August 20, 2008.

88 Hall, 2008, p. 3.
the goal (the policy was subsequently changed back to 24 months and 180 days in a revision to the directive on September 21, 2011).89

The policy reforms extended beyond mobilized-to-dwell ratios and revamped how the RCs trained. DoDD 1235.10, for example, also instructed, “RC pre-mobilization resourcing and training shall reduce post-mobilization training to the shortest time period possible to increase the time available for deployment.” The major driver for the policy to emphasize premobilization training was the one-year limit on RC mobilizations. To maximize “boots on the ground time,” it was necessary to conduct as much training as possible prior to mobilization.90 Unlike in the past, where reserve units would be kept at relatively low states of readiness and then experience a lengthy train-up after they were mobilized, DoDD 1235.10 ordered that RC units train longer and more frequently prior to being mobilized to build readiness over time and shorten time spent at the mobilization center prior to deployment.91

Other reforms targeted equipment shortfalls. To address the National Guard’s equipment shortfalls at home because more of its equipment was shipped overseas to fight the wars, the 2008 NDAA required DoD to report on “any shortfall in equipment” that may hamper the National Guard’s response to a domestic disaster or national emergency and identify plans on how to correct those defi-


91 This is a cursory overview of premobilization training under the previous “mobilize-train-deploy” construct. In practice, much of the premobilization training was scheduled within a few months of mobilization (in some cases, it was contiguous to mobilization) to maximize the number of deployers who would participate and to sustain training retention through mobilization. Rather than a general increase in training intensity over an extended period of time, most of the training was conducted in the premobilization year, with major training events held as close to mobilization as possible.
ciencies.92 Later DoD policy memoranda reinforced the equipment mandate. DoDI 1225.06, “Equipping the Reserve Forces,” instructed

To fulfill assigned missions, the RCs of each Military Department shall be consistently and predictably equipped. The RCs must have the right equipment, available in the right quantities, at the right time, and at the right place to support a “Train, Mobilize, and Deploy” construct for the Total Force.93

Neither ARFORGEN, the Gates memo, nor the slew of implementation policies that followed solved all of the troubles involved with the RCs’ transition to fully being routine force providers. A topic of some dispute, it is not clear how often the objective 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio was met. In 2006, the ARNG estimated the rotation rate at 1:4.94 A 2007 Defense Science Board study estimated the rotation rate was even higher—closer to a 1:3 ratio for both the ARNG and the USAR.95 It is possible that ratios for units with high-demand skill sets that are primarily sourced from the RCs (e.g., Military Police) maintained a higher tempo, perhaps as high as 1:1.96

Equipment accountability proved particularly challenging. A 2008 General Officer Steering Committee found that, as a result of improperly documented equipment transfers from 2003 to 2008 during the Iraq War, the RCs were owed some 85,000 pieces of equip-

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93 DoD, 2012b, p. 2.
94 Based on an ARNG G1 assessment in October 2006. Email from DA G-3/5/7 strategic planner, dated January 9, 2015.
95 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., September 2007, p. 23. Many Regular Army units also rotated faster than the goal.
96 Interview with HQDA participant on May 19, 2015. It is beyond the scope of this report to resolve the question of exactly how fast some RCs units rotated, but the data seem clear that, in at least some cases, it was more frequent than 1:5.
Four years later, on September 28, 2012, the DoD Inspector General similarly found, “Army officials did not implement procedures to properly account for the transfer and replacement of 239,332 pieces of RC equipment, valued at approximately $5.8 billion.” The Inspector General placed the blame primarily on faulty transfers of equipment between the RCs and the Regular Army.

Just as the RCs’ problems were never fully resolved, the policy fixes did not end either. For example, later policy memorandums tweaked the timelines for mobilization of the RCs yet again. Nonetheless, this brief history of RCs’ policy post-9/11 begins to paint a picture of how the RCs gradually became trained, manned, and equipped to fill the role of a routine force provider, regularly used both at home and abroad and not just on an ad hoc basis.

The Impact of the RCs’ Reforms on Sourcing

The question, of course, is what exactly was the impact of these post-9/11 reforms on the RCs? As mentioned before, there are a variety of potential benefits from these policies that were intended to make the RCs more “ready.” The RCs may have more capacity to fill requests for forces, and RC units may be more effective once deployed, for example. For the purposes of this section, however, we look only at one indicator—whether force managers chose to rely on the RCs more frequently because of the reforms.

Figure 2.6 tests this notion. It examines the number of soldiers deployed globally, during the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.


100 For example, later policy allowed for less than 30-day notification in the event of crises under select circumstances. See change 1 to HQDA, “Accessing the Reserve Components (RC),” instruction no. 1235.12, June 7, 2016.
from 2003 to 2012. Importantly, since RCs often deploy as ad hoc force packages—rather than as Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)—it measures contributions by individuals, both in absolute numbers and in terms of the percentage of the force. As such, it provides the first detailed test of our major theories. If the “supply” model is correct, then the use of the RCs—as a share of the forces deployed—should increase over time as more of the reforms outlined above went into effect. If the “demand” model is more apropos, however, then there should be less of a correlation.101

For the most part, Figure 2.6 indicates the greatest period of RCs’ use was during 2003 through 2005 and followed by a period of consistency. Sourcing from the RCs remained relatively stable both in absolute and in percentage terms for most of this period, providing roughly a third of the total force deployed. In general, the National Guard contributed on average roughly 21 percent of the deployed force compared with 9 percent for the Reserves. With an exception of the large surge of forces from 2004 to 2005, and another smaller one from 2009 to 2010, there is little variation in the relative shares between Regular Army forces and the RCs. Importantly, the first surge in the RCs—between 2004 and 2005—occurred long before the official policy designating the RCs as an operational force in 2008 and before many of the other policies impacting RCs’ readiness were promulgated. At first glance, then, the data seem to favor the “demand” rather than the “supply” model of sourcing.

Looking at the details behind why there were sudden surges in demand for the RCs’ forces further validates the “demand” model of sourcing: In both cases where the RCs’ share of the total force deployed significantly increased, it was due to a sudden increase in demand combined with the unavailability of Regular Army forces to meet it. The 2004 to 2005 time period—where the share of RCs’ forces deployed increased to more than 40 percent of the force—correlates with the period when the Regular Army was going through “transformation”

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101 As discussed in this chapter, the growth of the Total Army during this period occurred disproportionately in the Regular Army. Thus, Regular Army availability increased after 2007 at a greater rate than the RCs’ availability.
(the conversion to the modular BCT that affected most of the force), so fewer Regular Army units were available for deployment overseas.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{102} Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “National Guard Commanders Rise in Revolt Against Active Army; MG Rossi Questions Guard Combat Role,” Breaking Defense, March 11, 2014. For details about the Army’s transformation to a modular force, see Stuart E. Johnson, John E.
As a result, the ARNG—which transformed later than the Regular Army—increased its deployments, especially to Iraq. It sent four brigades in 2004, five in 2005, and then four again in 2006, but only one in 2007 as ARNG brigades went through transformation.\textsuperscript{103} Demand then spiked again for the Afghanistan Surge in 2009 and 2010.\textsuperscript{104}

A similar story plays out for domestic deployments. If the Regular Army performed the majority of overseas deployments in the post-9/11 period, the RCs performed the majority of the domestic responses. Perhaps the most important of these missions was ONE—the name for the support to federal, state, and local agencies and Homeland Defense after the 9/11 attacks. Unfortunately, while Regular Army units did support ONE, the data are not available to indicate how much the Regular Army contributed to the effort. This makes it problematic to create a chart for domestic missions analogous to Figure 2.6.\textsuperscript{105} Nonetheless, the data for the RCs—both USAR and ARNG—are depicted in Figure 2.7.\textsuperscript{106}

Unsurprisingly, Figure 2.7 shows a sharp spike in the years immediately after 9/11, and then an equally precipitous decline in 2005, as the United States slowly returned to steady state operations domestically.\textsuperscript{107} Like the overseas deployments, the time of peak usage long

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{103} Freedberg, 2014. Notably, there is some debate about how to count BCT contributions and characterize the missions performed (as such, the numbers vary between sources). It may be more accurate to describe them as “brigade equivalents.”
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{104} Freedberg, 2014.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{105} G-3/5/7 email, July 14, 2015.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{106} Since RCs soldiers are paid by the day, there is a record of which soldiers performed what mission and for how long.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{107} We hypothesize that the increase in USAR mobilizations indicated from 2004 to 2007 is due to a coding error: Soldiers mobilized to support OEF and OIF from continental U.S. locations may have been incorrectly counted under ONE.
\end{flushright}
precedes the official proclamation of the “operational force,” indicating more of a “demand” rather than a “supply” model of sourcing.  

Interviews generally confirmed the “demand” model for sourcing decisions. Several interviewees noted that, for later deployments (roughly 2013 and after), the driving factor was money—not readiness—in sourcing decisions. For example, according to one interviewee, the USAR was ready and authorized to respond to the Ebola outbreak in Africa, but in the end did not deploy for lack of funding.

A similar situation played out for later Kosovo missions. Interviewees stated that the Army paid for the ARNG to deploy to Kosovo from the base budget—not the additional Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. As a result, when the budget grew tight because of sequestration and other factors and demand for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly dropped, some Army senior leadership preferred to send Regular Army units instead, since the Army would not

108 It could be argued that this was a “traditional” homeland security mission for the ARNG and thus not an indicator of becoming an operational force.

109 Interview with USAR GFM participant, March 15, 2015.
have to spend additional dollars to mobilize forces from the RCs.\textsuperscript{110} Ultimately, although the RCs continued to supply some high-demand units for which the preponderance was in the RCs, later, when it came to sourcing decisions for contingencies other than Iraq or Afghanistan and some security cooperation missions, the readiness of the RCs was—for better or worse—apparently a secondary consideration.\textsuperscript{111}

**Resources: The RCs’ Budgets**

A detailed consideration of the budget processes for funding the RCs is beyond the scope of this study.\textsuperscript{112} It is intuitive that greater funding results in greater readiness, but how much additional readiness is produced by an additional dollar of spending is a complex issue. Particularly contentious is the question of readiness produced for a marginal dollar provided to the Regular Army versus the ARNG or USAR. Although Klimas et al. usefully discussed the range of trade-offs in terms of unit outputs, we are not aware of work that resolves the broader readiness versus expenditures dilemma.\textsuperscript{113}

Nonetheless, an analysis of the experience of the RCs during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars and other contingencies during that time would be incomplete without at least a minimal consideration of the

\textsuperscript{110} Interview with GFM leadership on July 21, 2015.

\textsuperscript{111} Joshua Klimas is currently conducting RAND research regarding the marginal costs and other considerations for using Regular Army versus RC units for preplanned overseas missions.

\textsuperscript{112} The extent to which the annual appropriations for the RCs are a result of “policy” is arguable. Gian Gentile is currently conducting RAND research on the various factors that influence the budgets of the ARNG and USAR as part of a multivolume history of American military policy from the Constitution to the present.

budget trends during this period. Figure 2.8 shows the total Budget Authority for ARNG and USAR, including Military Personnel, Military Construction, and Operations and Maintenance, from FYs 2000 through 2016. As indicated, the RCs experienced a period of budgetary growth that coincided with increased deployments but subsequently flattened out and began to decline around FYs 2012–2013.

The period of increases in the RCs’ budgets supported their employment as an operational force in several ways. Additional pay and allowances were, of course, needed to cover the marginal costs of mobilization (e.g., being paid for 360 days per year versus the typical

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Figure 2.8
ARNG and USAR Annual Budget Authority FYs 2000–2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>8,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


RAND RR1495-2.8

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114 See section “Post–Gulf War Reforms of the RCs” of this chapter about the impact of funding shortfalls and the failure to fully implement the initial Title XI reforms.

115 These data include all enacted war and supplemental funding but does not include Research Development, Test, and Evaluation and other appropriations that directly benefit the RCs but are not separately attributed. FY 2013 is the Annualized Continuing Resolution Funding level.
average of 39 days) but also funded additional premobilization training days and provided additional personnel to help train, administratively prepare, and logistically support deploying personnel. Military construction increased the number and improved the quality of RC training facilities. Many of the equipment shortfalls previously discussed earlier in this chapter were mitigated, as will be described in Chapter Three.

**Conclusion: The Implications of “Demand”-Based Sourcing**

The emergence of the RCs as an operational force was not a discrete event nor did it happen in 2008. Rather, it was a gradual set of major reforms starting in the early 20th century that allowed for increasing federal control over the RCs in exchange for resources. These broad reforms—that exchanged federal dollars for greater control and increasing integration into the Total Army—paved the way for the RCs to contribute substantially to the World Wars, the Korean War, the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s, and eventually the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. During this period, the “supply” model is accurate: First, the policymakers—to include Congress—established the legal framework allowing the RCs to be operationalized and making them more available, and then the RCs were used more.

As for the host of reforms in the 2000s, however, the “demand model” seems to be more relevant: In most cases, RC readiness policies followed the RCs’ increasing use. In other words, while certain policies improved the RCs’ readiness, the increase in their readiness seems to have been a secondary concern when it came to sourcing decisions. Instead, a host of exogenous variables often drove sourcing, such as demand, budgets, relative skill sets, and the availability of Regular Army units to fill combatant command (CCMD) requirements.

What does this mean for “sustaining the RCs as an operational force” going forward? For starters, because practice (rather than policy) drove the use of the RCs as an operational force during OEF and OIF, it raises the question whether—*ceteris paribus*—the RCs
can remain an “operational force” if future demand for Army forces decreases. In some sense, the RCs as an operational force would be easier to maintain if it was simply the result of a single directive such as DoDD 1200.17. In this case, it would simply be a matter of keeping certain programs in place and specific policies on the books. Instead, at least part of the RCs’ increased readiness came, as one senior officer put it, from “building muscle memory.” Keeping that muscle memory requires continuous opportunities to exercise these skills, or they will atrophy with time. As a result, whether or not the RCs can be sustained as an operational force after the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars end, absent a strong demand signal from some other contingency, remains an open question.

If the demand for Army forces declines, the debate shifts subtly from “how to sustain the RCs as an operational force” to “how to sustain the readiness of the RCs.” Although the two questions overlap, they are not identical. “Sustaining the RCs as an operational force” focuses on how to ensure the RCs regularly participate in overseas missions. In a nutshell, RCs could remain operational by being frequently used for missions. The rub, however, is whether the marginal costs of such operation will be adequately resourced.

116 Interview with ARNG commander on May 19, 2015.

117 On a similar point, one RC senior leader said in an interview that by and large RC units can be kept in a state of heightened readiness for about one year—not continuously—before needing to be reset. Interview with HQDA leadership July 31, 2015.

118 This will be especially challenging if DoD faces a budget crunch and mobilizing RC soldiers is perceived as a more expensive option compared with sending Regular Army soldiers who are already being paid full-time salaries, regardless of whether or not they are deployed.

119 In a nutshell, RCs could remain operational by being frequently used for missions. The rub, however, is whether the marginal costs of such operation will be adequately resourced.
In fall 2013, as Congress and the Executive Branch were locked in debates over the defense budget, then–Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno made a stunning revelation. He stated that only two of the Regular Army’s 43 BCTs were “combat ready.”

General Odierno followed up with yet more controversial statements about readiness. In November 2013 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, he stated: “I believe our challenge is much greater today than it has been since I’ve been in the Army in terms of readiness. This is the lowest readiness levels I’ve seen within our Army since I’ve been serving for the last 37 years.”

Outside observers were more skeptical of this claim. American University professor Gordon Adams noted that Odierno “did not define what war it is he wants to fight, except by the standard Army definition of a BCT that’s been through all of the training exercises, all levels of combat readiness, and is 100 percent ready to do anything you call upon them to do.” As Adams pointed out, readiness is a relative measure: It often depends on what the unit is specifically tasked to do. Consequently, readiness can be an ambiguous and controversial term.


The debate over Odierno’s statements about readiness highlights three key issues surrounding readiness. First, “readiness” is an amorphous term, and defining it is a notoriously tricky task. Second, readiness is not simply an RC issue. All Army components—and indeed all the Services—struggle with the issue. While practically every unit seeks to maintain high levels of readiness, they often struggle to define what readiness is, how to measure it, and what the appropriate benchmark should be. Finally, Odierno’s remarks underscore the distinction between “operational use” and “readiness.” Less than a month before Odierno made his remarks about having only two combat BCTs “combat ready,” the Army identified three BCTs—two infantry and one armor—for deployment to Afghanistan.4 Since these BCTs were qualified to perform training or advisor missions—rather than combat per se—they were not counted as part of the BCTs that were “ready.”5 In other words, forces can be “deployed” but not be ready for the full spectrum of operations, just like they can be “ready” but never be “used.”

If, however, we want to identify lessons for sustaining the RCs as an operational force in terms of “readiness,” we need to wade into this debate, define “readiness,” and outline how the Army can measure and affect it. We do that in this chapter. The next section examines how the Army has dealt with and defined doctrine concerning readiness. While it has grown increasingly comprehensive as of late, the Army still struggles to precisely measure this construct. In the second section, we review the Army’s use of “C-ratings” and “A-ratings” to measure readiness and argue that these metrics are often flawed for assessing improvements in readiness over time—because they are either subjective or devoid of a proper baseline. Thus, in the third section of this chapter, we offer a more concrete definition of readiness. By breaking the term down into its component and subcomponent variables, we provide a framework that is more useful to assessing the impact of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars on the RCs.

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5 Bacon, 2013.
Defining “Readiness”

As a concept, “readiness” proves a deceptively complex term to define. On the most basic level, it is roughly synonymous with the term “prepared,” and few analysts dispute the idea that military units should be prepared. The question, of course, is “prepared to do what?” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs’ Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System offers two answers to this question based on the level of war. On the broadest level, “readiness from the strategic perspective focuses on the ability of the joint force to perform missions and provide capabilities to achieve strategic objectives as identified in strategic-level documents (e.g., National Security Strategy [NSS], National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy [NMS]).” On a narrower level, “Readiness from the tactical perspective focuses on unit readiness, defined as the ability to provide capabilities required by the Combatant Commander to execute assigned missions, and derived from the ability of each unit to conduct the mission(s) for which it was designed.”

The Army’s own answer follows suit. In AR 525-30 Army Strategic Readiness, the Army states, “Army Strategic Readiness focuses on the readiness of the Army as an institution to provide sufficient, capable units to support the national military strategy (NMS).” Like the Guide, the AR 525-30’s definition of readiness is the ability to execute strategic plans.

The problem with the AR 525-30 and the Guide’s answer to the “ready for what?” question is that national strategic objectives—such

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6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Guide 3401D, CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System, November 15, 2010b, p. 1. Other doctrinal publications more or less adopt a similar definition. JP 1-02 defines “readiness” as “the ability of United States military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national military strategy.” It comprises “unit readiness” or the ability of units to execute their assigned missions and the ability of combatant commanders “to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, November 8, 2010a (amended through February 15, 2016).

7 HQDA, AR 525-30 Army Strategic Readiness, Washington, D.C., June 3, 2014a, p. 2. The key issue with this definition is that it moves beyond the question of the condition of units in the Army’s inventory to include the Army’s ability to produce and sustain a flow of units in that condition.
as those outlined in the NSS—are often vague and, more importantly, they constantly change as global operational environment changes. And if the strategic objectives are fluid, then defining “readiness” on a tactical level proves all the more challenging. Indeed, while the Guide focuses on the ability of units to “provide capabilities required by the Combatant Commander to execute assigned missions,” the fact of the matter is that most units are not assigned to a specific Combatant Commander, much less assigned a mission until there is a conflict—at which point it may be too late to be fully prepared.

Another answer is to be ready for everything. Indeed, the Army Doctrinal Publication 7-0 states, “The Army trains to provide ready forces to combatant commanders worldwide. Units train in garrison and while deployed to prepare for their mission and adapt their capabilities to any changes in an operational environment.”\(^8\) And yet as a benchmark, to be “ready for everything” provides little definitional clarity. As one RAND report found,

> The audience for readiness reporting may have an inaccurate understanding of what Army units are ready to do and capable of doing, in part because of overuse of the term “full-spectrum operations (FSO), in part because the readiness system does not require greater precision, and in part because there may be a lack of appreciation within the Army for the distance separating particular bands of the capabilities spectrum.\(^9\)

Still, other documents choose to bracket the question of “ready for what?” entirely. For example, in his article introducing the release of the FM 4-0 Sustainment in 2009, Major General James E. Chambers, then the commanding general of Army’s Combined Arms Support Command, talks about “readiness” as a dependent variable—what the Army’s sustainment enterprise is meant to produce—but does not

\(^8\) HQDA, ADP 7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders, August 23, 2012b, p. 2, paragraph 7.

define the term directly.\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, the Army Doctrinal Publication 4-0 
\textit{Sustainment}, published as the successor to FM 4-0 in 2012, takes a
similar approach. It defines readiness as what the Army’s generating
force, sustainment community, and personnel services organizations
aim to produce, but leaves the term itself undefined.\textsuperscript{11}

Chambers is not alone in not focusing on the “ready for what?”
question. Most of our interviewees—most notably those from First
Army—defined readiness as comprising individual soldier readiness,
plus the manning, equipping, and training of the overall unit.\textsuperscript{12} In this
definition readiness is not a single discrete object, but an overarching
theme encompassing many different areas.

Perhaps readiness has an aggregation problem: There are a lot of
subcomponents to it that are lumped under a single umbrella term. So
rather than try to define what the term means, a more fruitful approach
may be to deconstruct the term and understand what falls under the
theme. Understanding each of the individual components can help one
understand the concept of readiness in total, particular in respect to
RCs readiness for purposes of this study.

\section*{Measuring RC Readiness: Beyond C Ratings}

Aside from the definitional ambiguity in RCs’ readiness, or perhaps
partly because of it, the RCs in the past have often struggled to measure
readiness. Indeed, the first edition of \textit{AR 220-1 Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration—Consolidated Policies} in 1963 was only
eight pages long, with no separate chapters and just a single appendix.\textsuperscript{13}
In contrast, the 2010 version of the regulation spanned 113 pages, with

\textsuperscript{11} HQDA, \textit{ADP 4-0 Sustainment}, Washington, D.C., July 31, 2012a, pp. 4, 8, 15.
\textsuperscript{12} Interview with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015.
\textsuperscript{13} Ongoing RAND research by Dwayne Butler on Army strategic sustainment readiness.
11 chapters and four appendixes.\textsuperscript{14} While the Army has collective metrics to capture units’ readiness, most notably A and C ratings, these readiness measures tend to suffer either from a high degree of subjectivity on the one hand or from the lack of a proper baseline on the other.

\section*{A and C Ratings}

The cornerstone of how the Army measures individual unit readiness is the C, or category, rating. As \textit{CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System} explains, “The C-level reflects the status of the selected unit resources measured against the resources required to undertake the wartime missions for which the unit is organized or designed.”\textsuperscript{15} The C-levels consist of five ratings, with C-1 reflecting the “most ready” units and “C-4” being the least ready. (C-5 is reserved for units going through Department of the Army directed action; see Table 3.1.) A unit’s C rating is, in turn, based on four measurements—Personnel (P-level), Equipment and Supplies on hand (S-level), Equipment Condition (R-level), and Training (T-level).\textsuperscript{16} Commanders are required to report these levels, as well as their own assessment, to the Department of the Army on a regular basis. The current system, the Defense Readiness Reporting System—Army, which is based on the commanders’ unit status report, was adopted Army-wide in 2011.\textsuperscript{17} Nonetheless, C ratings—along with their four component variables—are decades old and well-known. As a GAO study from the mid-1990s remarked, “C’ ratings that range from C-1 (best) to C-4 (worst), are probably the most frequently cited indicator of readiness in the military.”\textsuperscript{18}

More recently, the Army has added A-level, or “assigned” level, readiness measures in addition to the C ratings. Especially during the last decade and longer of stability operations, units were often assigned


\textsuperscript{15} Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{16} Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{17} HQDA, 2011, paragraph 2-1.

tasks that they were not originally designed to do—such as general-purpose force infantry units providing training to and advising partner-nation security forces or air defense artillery units providing convoy security. As a result, a unit could be fully “ready” in the sense that they were fully ready to accomplish their intended mission but unprepared to conduct major combat operations. To address this shortfall, in 2010, the Army added A-level ratings. Like the C-ratings, A levels are a collective measurement of readiness, except A ratings capture a “unit’s
ability to accomplish its assigned mission.” If a unit is assigned a mission it was designed to do, in theory, the A and C rating should be the same, but often this is not the case. Like the C level, however, A levels are determined by subordinate measures—namely “assigned mission manning” and “assigned mission equipping.”

The Challenges of Measurements
Despite their long history and ubiquity, A and C ratings have significant drawbacks as the principal measure of readiness for the RCs. Many of these assessments are determined by the units’ own leadership chain of command and, as a result, are—at least to some degree—subjective. Indeed, AR 220-1 specifically states, “the commander can subjectively adjust the C-level or the A-level initially established for the unit that is based on the lowest (worst case) level computed for the associated measured resource areas.” In the past, the degree of subjectivity has proven to be the Achilles’ heel of these assessments. One of the faults the GAO found in the aftermath of the roundout brigades’ failure to deploy in time to Desert Storm was that the C ratings were often unreliable and inflated.

To combat the problem of subjectivity in C ratings, the Army currently puts RC units through a process of external validation before they deploy (see Figure 3.1). In essence, after an RC unit is tagged to provide forces to fill a CCMD requirement, it begins an extended period of training and certification. The RC unit consults with the ASCC through a series of In Process Reviews (IPRs) to develop a training plan. Before 2005, during premobilization, the RC unit com-

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21 HQDA, 2010, p. 41.
22 HQDA, 2010, p. 14. However, FORSCOM is currently engaged in an initiative to make the T rating more objective by tying it to certain specific quantitative measurements. (“Working Group #2,” Microsoft PowerPoint briefing, October 22, 2015.)
23 One of the three brigades reported a command and control (C2) status, while two reported C3. In theory, this meant that they should have been ready to deploy within 28 and 40 days, respectively. GAO, 1991, p. 24.
Figure 3.1
RCs’ Deployment Validation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase IA: Notification of sourcing to alert</th>
<th>Phase IB: Alert to mobilization station arrival</th>
<th>Phase II: Mobilization station arrival to deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ASCC and RC chain of command develop a training plan and a directed mission-essential task list that is reviewed at in-process review no later than notification of sourcing and 60 days</td>
<td>• Unit conducts premobilization training (up to 60 days) with specific focus on individual readiness</td>
<td>• Unit conducts postmobilization training with a special focus on collective training readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct individual medical review to identify nondeployers no later than notification of sourcing and 120 days</td>
<td>• Conduct initial Soldier Readiness Processing (alert and 60 days)</td>
<td><strong>C2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ASCC and RC chain of command conduct a Joint Assessment of in-process review to assess state of premobilization training and needs at mobilization station (between M-365 and M-270)</td>
<td>• ASCC with U.S. Army Reserve Command and the state adjutant generals in support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Submit a Department of the Army Mobilization Processing System packet for the unit no later than M-210</td>
<td><strong>C2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct a final assessment/IPR if required (between M-60 and M-30)</td>
<td>• ASCC and unit commander certifies postdeployment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• ASCC validates unit for deployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C2**
• Reserve chain of command with the ASCC in support

**Requirements**
• Unit commander certifies predeployment training
• First general officer in RC unit’s chain of command approves RC unit commander’s certification


RAND RR1495-3.1
mander conducted the premobilization assessment following a cumulative training event that marked the transition from the equivalent of the ARFORGEN Reset/Train state to the Ready state. Sometime during 2005–2006, this began to be accomplished with a set of Joint Assessments between the RCs’ commanders and First Army representatives with regular meetings to track progress toward unit readiness during the premobilization period against an agreed-on set of benchmarks. At the end of the phase, the unit chain of command certifies and the first RC general officer approves the certification of the unit’s training.

During the Phase II postmobilization training, however, the RC unit moves to a mobilization site, where it is assessed and validated by First Army to formally certify that the unit is ready to perform its mission just prior to deployment. Today, the commander’s assessment is assisted by a Validation Board, increasing the level of oversight and participation. The validation is tied to the mission requirements and readiness standards that have become more uniform. As a First Army interviewee stated, “it really starts at the Joint Assessment. By the time you get to the Validation Board, you need to know everything about the individual and collective readiness of the unit.” Any discrepancies in readiness are recorded and communicated to the theater commander through scorecards and “red sheets.” While it is rare to encounter significant issues that result in a unit failing the validation for employment, a handful of units have delayed their arrival date in theater because of readiness issues, and another few were allowed to deploy by exception, with the concurrence of the theater commander.

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24 Interviews conducted with ARNG Commander on May 19, 2015, with USAR Commander on June 2, 2015, and with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015. This policy was later codified in guidance that mandated that an IPR between the RC unit and First Army review the unit’s deployed Mission Essential Task List and deployment training plan within 60 days of sourcing (in theory, about two years before the mobilization) and then an official joint validation IPR 180 days before mobilization. See Pint et al., 2015 p. 46.

25 Note that these benchmarks are based on knowledge of the mission the unit will perform once deployed.

26 One force manager reported that Regular Army units also had “deploy by exception” decisions in roughly the same proportion as the RCs (interview with a force manager on July
the reasons why units ran into trouble with successfully navigating the validation board included: lack of specificity in the requirements from the theater commands, changes in theater conditions between the time the requirement is written and when the unit arrives in theater, and poor premobilization preparation.27

Unfortunately, these external assessments are not a panacea for measuring readiness improvements for two reasons. First, these readiness assessments lack a baseline because RC units do not begin this process until they have been chosen as a sourcing solution. Additionally, Regular Army units do not go through the same external validation process (see Figure 3.2). The CCMD first identifies the need for forces. The unit commander then certifies he is capable of performing the mission. The first O6 (or for high-risk or sensitive missions, the first general officer) then confirms this assessment, and finally, the ASCC validates this assessment. Importantly, for the Regular Army, there is no equivalent to postmobilization training, and while many Regular Army units will perform Combat Training Center rotations prior to deployment, there is no formal external assessment of the Regular Army unit.28 The ASCC bases its validation on Regular Army units’ own reporting.29

Second and perhaps more importantly, even bracketing the lack of a Regular Army baseline, these external assessments tend to be clumsy metrics if we want to track the readiness of the RCs as whole over time. While we can measure how many RC units are validated and the time it took to complete the validation process, both metrics leave out other

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21, 2015). However, we were unable to obtain specific data for any component.

27 Interviews with IMCOM leadership and staff on May 21, 2015, USAR Commander on June 2, 2015, and with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015. We note that one of the drawbacks of identifying units one or two years before deployment and building training plans accordingly is that conditions—and thus training requirements—in the theater may change. This issue is addressed below.

28 The difference in RC versus Regular Army validation processes does not render the measurement of RC readiness meaningless. However, it does mean there is not a common baseline across the total force that can be reliably used to generate comparisons.

29 See HQDA, 2014. FORSCOM is the force providing ASCC for continental U.S. forces. The unit’s chain of command validates the unit’s readiness.
key aspects of readiness, such as what range of missions the RC unit can perform, when the unit will need to cycle home, or how sustainable the pace is of operations as a whole. Moreover, in order to truly understand RC readiness, we need to know more than just whether RC units are ultimately validated to perform a given mission set; we need to understand where precisely they are strong and where they are weak, what can they do and how soon can they do it.

As a result, rather than simply using collective measures of readiness, we need to disaggregate “readiness” down into its subcomponents. Through this process, we can identify more concrete ways to measure readiness in addition to how these variables interact. Once this analysis is complete, we can begin to assess how such major events as the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars affected organizations as large as the ARNG and the USAR.
Deconstructing “Readiness”

Arguably, to understand readiness over time, we need to first deconstruct it into its subcomponents—beyond what such aggregate measures A or C ratings allow. In this section we present a framework describing the various factors of readiness in terms that will be useful for assessing how the RCs were affected by the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Perhaps more importantly, this approach helps to identify which factors may be more readily influenced by policy.30

In his classic Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences, political scientist Richard Betts defines readiness as a “mix of speed and effectiveness that allows for satisfactory performance in combat”31 (emphasis in the original). Betts defines readiness as a function of delivering capability in a given amount of time.32 And while Betts wrote his book 20 years ago, it is still cited as one of the more influential descriptions of how to think about readiness today.33 Indeed, Betts’ definition of “readiness” fits nicely with the Joint Publication 1-02 definition of readiness: the ability of forces to “meet the demands of the national military strategy.” If we accept this definition, then what we really need is for the force to have the skills and tools necessary to solve the problem (i.e., provide the capability) and be able to provide these abilities within the time constraints set by the strategy.34 If the force is not available in time or does not have the capabilities when called on, it will not meet the demands of the national military strategy and consequently cannot be counted as “ready.”

However, we add one more factor to Betts’ readiness framework: external inhibitors. If, as Betts said, readiness is, ultimately, measured against combat performance, then it must also include those variables

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30 Arguably, this use of the term readiness could be qualified as situational readiness or force readiness to distinguish it from the construct measured by A and C levels.


33 Interview with HQDA participant on July 27, 2015.

34 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010, p. 304.
that a unit cannot necessarily control but can still impact its combat performance. Ultimately, this leads to a basic readiness framework depicted in Table 3.2. Increases in capability and/or time produce an increase in readiness while an increase in the external inhibitors results in less readiness, and vice versa. We don’t know how much a given change in one factor will cause readiness to change, but we assume the direction of change to be consistent with readiness and training doctrine. As will be explained below, these factors vary in their sensitivity to readiness policies. External inhibitors are factors that are beyond the control of the unit—and usually the Army—such as the complexity of the mission or the quality of enemy soldiers and equipment.

The internal variables of capability and time are interchangeable, at least to some degree. Time can often be turned into capability. Hypothetically, most able-bodied people can be turned into athletes with sufficient time to train. Conversely, capability can also be turned into—or more accurately, sacrificed—for time. For example, one can train medical doctors quickly if they are expected to perform only basic first aid or if we are willing to accept a higher rate of mistaken diagnoses and botched surgeries. Of course, the mutability of variables only goes so far. Not everyone can become an Olympic athlete regardless of the amount of time devoted to training, just like all medical training requires a certain baseline time investment, even if one does lower

Table 3.2
Components of Readiness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Direction of Effect on Readiness</th>
<th>Sensitive to Readiness Policies?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External inhibitors</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \downarrow$</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35 Alternatively, these relationships could be expressed mathematically as functions.
Understand RCs’ Readiness

36 Still, the trade-off between time and capability usually exists at least on some level.

Importantly, as General Odierno’s remarks about Army readiness highlight, “readiness” does not exist in a vacuum; it is readiness to perform a certain type of mission or meet a specific demand. As a result, any readiness framework needs to include external inhibitors: factors that often exist beyond a unit’s control that make it more difficult for “military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.”37 Ultimately, the internal factors—the unit’s capabilities and speed—need to be judged relative to certain external factors—inhibitors—to ascertain the unit’s true readiness.

The internal factors also share a relationship with the external inhibitors: Namely, if a mission has more inhibitors, it will, by and large, require more time or capability to be ready. As shown in Figure 3.3, missions that require larger units and that perform complicated tasks in more arduous conditions will need more time to prepare, *ceteris paribus*, than smaller units performing less complicated tasks in more optimal conditions. In other words, the more inhibitors there are, the more time it takes to be “ready.”

**Internal Factors**

From the basic readiness framework outlined in Table 3.2, we can then begin to break down each of its internal factors. What makes one unit or individual “capable”? And what comprises “time”? The former question lends itself to a more concrete answer. The capability of the force generally comes from both its physical and human capital. As listed in Table 3.3, physical capital comes from both the quantity and quality of its material resources, whereas human capital comes from the quantity of personnel available and the breadth and depth of each individual’s

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36 This, of course, does not imply that asking RC soldiers to fight in modern war is like expecting a recreational athlete to play in professional football. Unlike an average recreational athlete wishing to turn pro, with sufficient time and resources, RC soldiers and units can perform equivalently to Regular Army soldiers and units. Estimating just how much time and resources would be necessary to make an RC unit equally ready is a complex and controversial issue that is beyond the scope of this study.

37 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010a, p. 198.
**Figure 3.3**
Factors That Affect How Long Units Need to Get Ready to Deploy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Can get ready more rapidly</th>
<th>Requires more time to get ready</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual soldier, team, squad, crew (fewer than 20 persons)</td>
<td>Battalion (300–700 persons), brigade (2,500–4,500 persons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Truck company (nonhostile area–focus on transporter skills)</td>
<td>Complexity of training tasks at a given echelon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment brigade HQ (command semi-autonomous subordinate elements)</td>
<td>Complexity of collective integration and synchronization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: BCT deployed as security forces, truck company in nonhostile area (no convoy security/counter-IED training)</td>
<td>Complexity of assigned mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent major training event, little personnel turnover since major training event</td>
<td>No recent major training event, significant personnel turnover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit manned/equipped to standard, needs little external training support (personnel, facilities, ranges)</td>
<td>Manning/equipping shortfalls, needs significant external support, multiple other units claiming same resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** IED = improvised explosive device.
expertise. Perhaps, above all, capability also requires a measure of unit cohesion: how the individuals and parts fit together to form a coherent unit working in unison.

By contrast, time comes into play in readiness discussions in three dimensions (see Table 3.4). First, there are discussions of speed, or how quickly an asset can be deployed and be ready to fight.38 Second, there are issues of duration, or how long an asset, once deployed, can remain on its mission before needing to refit. Finally, for operations fought using a rotational basis and particularly those fought by an all-volunteer force, there are issues of sustainability, or how long the pace

### Table 3.3
**Components of Capability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Direction of Effect on Readiness</th>
<th>Sensitive to Policy?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material resources (quantity and quality)</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (quantity)</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise (breadth and depth)</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit cohesion (integration and synchronization)</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.4
**Components of Time**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Direction of Effect on Readiness</th>
<th>Sensitive to Readiness Policies?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>$\Delta \uparrow = \Delta \uparrow$</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 By making “time”—and, therefore, readiness—also dependent on measures of duration and sustainability, the intent of this approach is to go beyond the conventional understanding of readiness to a much broader measure of the utility of a force for a given conflict scenario.

38 This includes the time necessary to train a unit to the required level of proficiency.
of operations can be maintained. If individual assets can only remain in the fight for a finite period of time before needing to be refit, then force managers need to ensure that there are sufficient replacement forces to replace them.

Importantly, all the factors mentioned above are internal variables or can be shaped by policy and resource levels. Choices about training, manning, and equipping can directly impact units’ capabilities and, more indirectly, how quickly they can deploy to theater and how long they can remain there. Similarly, decisions about the size of the force and the tempo of deployments directly affect the ability to sustain force commitments over time. Since readiness is not a constant measure, but rather the ability to perform a given task or mission, there are also a series of factors—inhibitors—that neither the unit nor the Army may be able to control; these are the subject of the next section.

External Inhibitors

A range of external factors also shape a unit’s ability to fulfill a given mission, starting with the mission itself. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, larger, more complex operations against a larger or more sophisticated adversary will intuitively increase the difficulty of the task at hand. As the complexity of the mission increases, the size or capabilities of friendly forces needed to win in combat also increase.

Second, the amount of forewarning also can shape readiness. If the force knows where it will be going and what sort of adversary it will face once it gets there, it can tailor its preparations to that environment. Units can be more efficient in developing training plans by leaving out tasks that have a high likelihood of not being required to perform. For example, training to conduct division-level river crossings was a staple of Cold War preparations to fight the Soviet Army in Europe but would be a waste of time for units deploying to Afghanistan today.

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39 Multiple interview subjects stressed the connection between an all-volunteer force and readiness. Interviews May 19, 2015, June 2, 2015, July 21, 2015, and July 31, 2015.

40 As we will discuss, external factors are generally beyond a unit’s (and possibly component’s) control.
In some cases, the force can even tailor the unit itself, creating and training an ad hoc unit specifically designed to accomplish a certain task. In other words, sufficient warning can offset breadth of capabilities. Conversely, if the force lacks certainty about its task, adversary, or operating environment, it will need to prepare for a wider range of tasks—increasing the demand for a wider range of capabilities.

Finally, logistical constraints can also shape the readiness framework, specifically in terms of time. If the mission occurs closer to where assets are based and offers better-developed logistical infrastructure to move resources in and out of theater, other things being equal, the speed of the response will be quicker. These constraints also affect what sorts of capabilities are required to project forces, again impacting readiness. Logistical constraints on the home front can also affect time as well. RC units often need go to mobilization sites for predeployment training after they mobilize, but before they deploy. As a result, if the logistical infrastructure at the mobilization sites is not developed ahead of time to accommodate the required throughput of reserve units, the ability of RC units to respond quickly is affected and, consequently, their readiness may decrease.41

Together, these three factors—complexity of the mission, degree of forewarning, and logistical constraints—are important inhibitors to a force’s overall readiness (see Table 3.5) and function as a divisor in the overall readiness framework. Unlike the components of capability and

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**Table 3.5**

**Readiness Inhibitors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Direction of Effect on Readiness</th>
<th>Sensitive to Readiness Policies?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complexity of mission</td>
<td>Δ↑ = Δ↓</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forewarning</td>
<td>Δ↑ = Δ↑</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical constraints</td>
<td>Δ↑ = Δ↓</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41 Klimas et al., 2014, p. 6.
time, however, units—and, in many cases, the Army—cannot directly affect them.42

While units can plan for more complex missions, attempt to anticipate future demands, or practice operating in austere environments, they generally have less control over such factors as how many people they have in the ranks, what skills they train, or how they generate deployable forces. As a result, most of the debates about “preserving readiness” focus on maximizing the internal factors rather than minimizing the external inhibitors.

This characteristic of inhibitors has implications for policy: There are some aspects of readiness that decisionmakers cannot straightforwardly influence. Arguably, they may also be an important consideration in sourcing decisions. As our discussion in Chapter Two indicated, everything else being equal, force managers tended to prefer Regular Army units as sourcing solutions, but when required to accept trade-offs, usually assigned the less difficult missions to RC units. This implies that, the greater the inhibitors, the greater the readiness advantage of sourcing with Regular Army units because they typically have a relative advantage in speed because of greater pre-sourcing training time.

Conclusion and Caveats

Ultimately, the framework presented here for readiness takes the C rating and its subcomponents, then builds on it to form a more nuanced measure. As shown in Table 3.6, it includes a consideration of the quantity and quality of material resources—level of supplies on hand (or the S level) and their condition (the R level). Like the Unit Status Report (USR), this construct also looks at the quantity of personnel—or the P level—as well their individual expertise and coherence as a unit; capabilities traditionally captured under the training (T) level.43 And yet,

42 The potential for trade-offs between capability and time is discussed in this section.

43 This framework also covers most of the Army strategic readiness tenets—manning; training; capacities and capabilities; equipping; sustaining; and installations—with the exception
from there, it goes two steps farther. Rather than simply look at capability, it includes a specific discussion of the time dimension: the speed that units can deploy, the duration of time they can spend there, and the capacity of the system to generate combat power over time. And, since readiness is a relative rather than an absolute good, our approach also includes a specific discussion of those factors that can aid or inhibit a unit’s readiness in a given context—namely, the degree of forewarning about the impending mission, logistical constraints, and the complexity of the mission at hand.
While this framework offers a more comprehensive way to look at RCs’ readiness over time, it still has limitations, so three caveats must be kept in mind. First, readiness does not equate to combat performance. Highly ready units can still underperform in combat if the adversary is much stronger or because of the fog of war. Conversely, units with poor readiness records might still be able to excel if the enemy is much worse. This framework only decomposes the elements of readiness and does not attempt to assess RCs’ combat performance of the wars, which is an important but separate research question. Second, readiness is a dynamic and graduated measure. While these variables are mostly quantifiable, none is dichotomous or static. This framework does not aim at grand pronouncements of whether the RCs “are” or “are not” ready, but rather, whether they are “more” or “less” ready; how this has evolved over time; and, most importantly, for the purposes of this study, how policy has affected this trend. One of the great advantages of ARFORGEN for the RC was its ability to predictably contribute time and resources into RC readiness.

Furthermore, as General Odierno alluded in his remarks quoted at the beginning of the chapter, readiness is context dependent, and “ready to do what” is the key question. Units may be ready to do their designed mission (i.e., what they were intended to on paper) but not their assigned mission (i.e., what they are actually told to do in combat). Similarly, readiness to do a select niche mission is different than being able to perform the full spectrum of operations. While this framework attempts to capture part of this situational dependency, any assessment of readiness is bound to time and context and, hence, has limited value.

Finally, uncertainty plays an important but difficult-to-measure role when it comes to the “ready for what?” question. Although changes such as the 2007 surge occurred during the Iraq War, requirements and rotation rates were largely predictable. What would have happened if a major unexpected contingency occurred elsewhere? Given a fixed Total Army force structure, do force managers keep some highly ready Regular Army units in reserve, accept the rapid deployment of less ready RC units, or accept that responding to the new contingency is simply going to take more time?
With these caveats in mind, we turn to how the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars affected RCs’ readiness.
Even if the RCs’ readiness did not create the “RCs as an Operational Force,” the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars still had a profound impact on the RCs’ readiness. In this chapter, we apply the readiness framework developed in Chapter Three to the historical record to examine whether key policies produced the desired effects of increased RC readiness. Table 4.1 indicates that, because of changes in force generation and other policies spurred on by the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the RCs made significant gains on both the capability and time dimensions of readiness. We explore these improvements in three sections. In the next two sections, we analyze how each key policy affected the subcomponents of capability—material resources, personnel, expertise, and cohesion of units—and then the subcomponents of time—duration, speed, and sustainability. In almost every case, RCs’ readiness quantifiably improved. In the third section, we examine possible external inhibitors from the readiness framework—complexity of the mission, forewarning, and logistical constraints—and suggest that, while the RCs’ readiness certainly improved during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, external inhibitors were at lower levels than might be anticipated in the future security environment. Ultimately, we conclude that while the RCs’ readiness improved during the wars, some of this change may have been situation dependent; it is not clear whether it can be replicated to other types of conflict.¹

¹ However, we note that such situational dependence also applies to Regular Army units.
Table 4.1
How the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Affected the RCs’ Readiness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness Area</th>
<th>Global War on Terrorism’s (GWOT’s) Impact</th>
<th>Key Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material resources</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>Cyclical readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Equipping policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>End strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medical readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Increased depth; possibly breadth</td>
<td>Contingency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Active Duty Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support (CO-ADOS) orders/repeated mobilizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion of units</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Turnover rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Headquarters requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>Gates memo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>Switch to Pre-Mobilization Training Model (from Reset-Alert-Train-Deploy to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reset-Train-Alert-Deploy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TRICARE for medical/dental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>RCs ARFORGEN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: RAND analysis and HQDA, 2011b, paragraph 3-5.

Capability

Overall, deployments for the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars expanded the RCs’ capabilities. As they gained access to a generous supplemental war budget—known as OCO funding, they made noted gains in equipment readiness. More of the RCs’ units and soldiers deployed, adding depth of expertise and more combat experience to the force. The RCs’ medical readiness likewise increased, although whether or not this directly translated into increased deployability is less clear. In other areas, the deployments had a more modest impact. Theater demands often strained the RCs’ ability to get equipment at home station, while
high turnover rates and the need to field ad hoc force packages undermined unit cohesion.

**Quantity and Quality of Material Resources**

One of the areas where RCs’ readiness made the most quantifiable improvements—quantifiably and qualitatively—is of material resources it had on hand. As previously mentioned, prior to the adoption of ARFORGEN, the Army operated under a tiered readiness model in which the first to fight would be manned and equipped first. While the policy did not state so explicitly, it often favored Regular Army units that would deploy to crises first. The Army also established a tiered readiness concept for the RCs, in which 15 units were designated as Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESBs) and given priority in resourcing. In return, ESBs were expected to deploy on short notice for future wars. Ultimately, this subset was used almost exclusively for overseas missions in the initial years of the GWOT.\(^2\) Of the 14 RC brigades deployed for flagged missions prior to 2006, 12 were designated as ESBs.\(^3\) Under cyclical readiness, a wider number of RCs units were given the opportunity to access the Army’s limited resources.

The downside to the tiered readiness model is that the rest of the force generally suffers when they are lower-priority units, as limited stocks of deployable personnel, equipment, and training opportunities are prioritized for deploying and next-to-deploy units. As multiple interviews noted, “We were robbing Peter to pay Paul” and “readiness came at a cost—it stripped the units back home.”\(^4\) A GAO report cited that, in February 2005, the USAR had only 76 percent of its required equipment on hand, and these numbers included older-

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\(^2\) Elements of ESB and divisional brigades were also used extensively in the homeland.

\(^3\) RAND analysis of DMDC data; see Figure 4.2 in this report.

\(^4\) Interviews with HQDA GFM on May 21, 2015; with FORSCOM representative on July 9, 2015; with HQDA participant on July 27, 2015; and with HQDA leadership on July 31, 2015. The analogy of “Robbing Peter to pay Paul” is perhaps the most universal of the perceptions of RCs’ readiness recorded in our interviews. It was used to refer to shortages in personnel, equipment and access to schools, training facilities, and medical and dental care experienced by those RC units not designated for deployment within the next one to two years.
generation trucks, night-vision goggles, and rifles and assorted other essential equipment. The ARNG was in no better shape. In October 2008, the GAO also reported the ARNG had only 76 percent of its required equipment on hand, and much of that was deployed, with only 63 percent of its required equipment located in the United States and available for training.

The Army undertook a sustained effort to correct these deficiencies. Aside from moving away from the tiered readiness model, the Army requested $22.7 billion from 2003 to 2010 to equip the ARNG and USAR. The Army also made an active effort to track down “missing” RC equipment (often equipment deployed to theater but never officially transferred off the RCs’ books): Indeed, from 2003 to 2013, the Army reconciled some 83,000 of 85,000 equipment items in this category.

These efforts produced results. By the end of FY 2014, the ARNG had 93 percent of its equipment on hand, while the USAR stood at 87 percent, or 80 percent if one excludes approved equipment substitutions. (By comparison, the Regular Army stood at 95 percent for the same year.) The improving quality and quantity also manifest in other ways, such as in newer equipment, especially in the ARNG, because of an aggressive recapitalization and modernization program. Ultimately, the DoD National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for

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5 GAO, Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, Washington, D.C., GAO-05-660, July 2005a, p. 15. Similar problems also exist for units in reset under a cyclical readiness model. However, since they will eventually rotate into a readiness phase, they are less likely to have a long-term resourcing problem.


7 GAO, 2009, p. 25.

8 DoD, 2015b, pp. 2–3.


Fiscal Year 2015 stated that the ARNG is presently “the best-equipped force in its long history.”

While the FY 2016 version of the report gave the more sanguine assessment that it is “manned, trained, equipped, and experienced at historically high levels,” there is little doubt that the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars positively affected RCs’ equipment readiness. For many years, the RCs did not have enough of the right equipment. A concerted effort was necessary to reduce the shortfalls. In a period of declining budgets, it may be tempting to reduce RC equipment fills and to slow or halt modernization. Doing so, however, would be expensive to quickly rectify and seriously degrade the ability to use the RCs as an operational force.

**Quantity of Personnel**

The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars affected the quantity of RCs’ personnel in two dimensions. First and most directly, the wars only slightly affected the ARNG and USAR’s authorized end strengths (or how large a force is allowed). Second, and more importantly, the wars shaped the number of soldiers available for deployment—largely by expanding medical care for RC members and thereby keeping them fit to fight. In both of these variables, the RCs showed modest, if at times inconclusive, gains in readiness.

The most straightforward story may be in terms of authorized end strength. Unlike the Regular Army, which saw its authorized end

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14 Authorized end strength is the allowable size of the force and is established by Congress. Assigned strength is the number of soldiers who are actually belong to a force. Authorized and assigned strengths are also established for units within a force. Authorized end strength has an impact on the capability of a force or unit. In general, the larger the size of the force, the greater capability it possesses. Assigned strength relates more closely to the readiness of a unit. Ceteris paribus, a unit whose assigned strength is a lower percentage of its authorized strength is less ready than an equivalent unit with a higher assigned strength percentage. However, when considering whether the RCs are operational forces, there is interplay between both categories of strength.
strength increase by almost 80,000 during the war, the RCs’ size did not shift nearly as dramatically. In fact, the assigned strength of both the ARNG and the USAR shrank during the initial years of the OIF when neither force was able to recruit and retain enough soldiers to maintain their authorized end strength. The ARNG dropped from 351,089 to 333,177 assigned, while the USAR from 211,890 to 189,005 assigned (well below its authorized end strength of 205,000) between FY 2003 and FY 2005. Both components eventually recovered. By FY 2008, the ARNG increased its assigned strength to 360,351 (well above its authorization 351,300 for the year). Eventually Congress increased the ARNG’s authorized end strength to 358,000, before reducing it again to 354,200 in FY 2014 as part of the budget battles. By contrast, the USAR increased its assigned strength to 200,910 in FY 2012 before declining somewhat to 196,251 assigned.15

Policy changes during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars also affected the availability of personnel for deployment. During the earliest mobilizations of the RCs for the GWOT, units and individuals often arrived at the mobilization stations with significant medical or dental issues.16 As pointed out to us by multiple interviewees, the RCs (unlike the Regular Army) have no separate category in which to place personnel who have significant individual readiness issues (pregnancy, newly recruited, nearing retirement, etc.).17 These individuals are counted against the unit’s assigned strength, even though they are nondeployable, providing a misleading indicator of units’ personnel readiness.

15 Kapp and Torreon, 2014, p. 4.

16 In an interview with IMCOM leadership and staff on June 4, 2015, the example was cited that, when the 39th Infantry BCT mobilized in October 2003, more than 600 (of approximately 5,200) soldiers arrived at the mobilization center as “nondeployable” and needed to be replaced. In total, 1,200 ARNG soldiers from more than ten states were used to cross-fill the BCT prior to deployment. See also “1st Cavalry Division Deployment Order,” first-team. us website, undated.

17 The Regular Army has a Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students account to represent soldiers not assigned to units. See John F. Schank, Margaret C. Harrell, Harry J. Thie, Monica M. Pinto, and Jerry M. Sollinger, Relating Resources to Personnel Readiness: Use of Army Strength Management Models, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR 790, 1997, pp. 18–19.
To deploy the unit, the RCs needed to cross-level deployable staff or transfer personnel from nondeploying or later-deploying units to fill out the complement of deploying personnel. Such cross-leveling comes at the cost of disrupting the training and cohesion of the unit. A 2010 RAND study found that, across five different types of RC units surveyed, 40 percent to 50 percent of the soldiers who deployed had been in the unit less than one year.\(^\text{18}\)

To correct this problem and reduce the percentage of medically nondeployable members, in circa 2006, RC soldiers with mobilization orders were provided full access to the DoD health care systems for themselves and their dependents beginning 180 days prior to mobilization.\(^\text{19}\) For example, according to one RAND study, RC service members’ collective medical readiness increased from 26 percent of the force in 2006 to 45 percent of the force in FY 2010.\(^\text{20}\) While the Army RCs were still collectively below the DoD standard of 75 percent, and while the ARNG and the USAR lagged behind the Air Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Navy Reserve in medical readiness, they too showed dramatic improvements—both increased their medical readiness by more than 10 percent. These numbers become more impressive when focusing on the components of medical readiness. In FY 2006, only 56 percent of ARNG service members and 34 percent of mobilized USAR service members were dentally ready. Because of improved access to dental care, by FY 2010, the numbers increased to 85 percent and 61 percent, respectively.\(^\text{21}\)

Nevertheless, the effect of better medical care at reducing the number of nondeployable soldiers was not as clear as one might expect. To the contrary, while the RCs’ medical care expanded in FY 2006, the number of USAR soldiers with Deployment Limiting Conditions (DLCs) more than doubled to about 20 percent of the force and


\(^{19}\) They also qualified for DoD healthcare for 180 days after the end of mobilization.


remained at that level through FY 2010.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, the number of ARNG soldiers with DLCs also increased during the same timeframe and hovered between approximately 15 percent and 20 percent of the

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{Percentage of Selected Reserve with a Deployment Limiting Condition}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{22} See figure 3.2 in Brauner, Jackson, and Gayton, 2012, p. 24. DLCs themselves include a variety of medical conditions—from temporary conditions (such as pregnancy, broken bones) and permanent but mitigable conditions (e.g., asthma) to more serious conditions that permanently limit service members’ ability to perform their duties (e.g., specific types of diabetes and mental illnesses). See Brauner, Jackson, and Gayton, 2012, p. 38.
force (see Figure 4.1).\textsuperscript{23} A recent study by GAO found that the medical nonavailable rate for the USAR in January 2015 was 22 percent and 21 percent for the ARNG.\textsuperscript{24}

The rise in the DLC and nonavailable rate, however, cannot be considered a readiness failure. Among the reasons for the rising DLC rates was that the RCs introduced regular Periodic Health Assessments (PHAs), annual health screenings in lieu of a physical every five years, as part of Health Affairs Policy 6-006 during this period.\textsuperscript{25} PHAs helped screen for DLCs on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{26} And so, the rising DLC rates in post-2006 can be partially explained by better detection methods, along with the prolonged strain of wars on the force. Intuitively, it seems possible—if not likely—that the percentage of DLCs actually dropped, but better surveillance resulted in better reporting, and previously unrecognized DLCs came to light. However, the data to test this hypothesis are not available. In sum, the relatively high DLC and nonavailable rate muddies the claim that increased medical coverage yielded a more deployable force since there does not seem to be a solid baseline.

**Depth and Breadth of Expertise**

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan certainly provided the RCs with greater expertise, although perhaps more from practice rather than policy. Overall, as of December 2012, the Army—across all components—provided about 59 percent of the total service members deployed to global overseas contingencies (predominantly Iraq and Afghanistan), as measured in troop years.\textsuperscript{27} And although the Regular Army provided the bulk of these deployments (roughly 70 percent on average), the RCs also gained considerable combat experience. Roughly


\textsuperscript{25} Brauner, Jackson, and Gayton, 2012, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{26} Brauner, Jackson, and Gayton, 2012, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{27} Based on data from the DMDC Contingency Tracking System Deployment File (O’Connell, Wenger, and Hansen, 2014, p. 4).
53 percent of all ARNG soldiers and 49 percent of all USAR soldiers deployed at least once.\textsuperscript{28} The RCs also became home to many Regular Army veterans as well, preserving their expertise once they left the active force.\textsuperscript{29} Some 27 percent of USAR combat veterans gained their deployment experience while serving with the Regular Army, while 11 percent of ARNG did the same.\textsuperscript{30}

Two important caveats, however, are in order. First, this accrued expertise atrophies. As the deployment rates to Afghanistan and Iraq decline, the Army—across all components—will lose some of this expertise. Indeed, the RCs lost on average about 15 percent of the force per year between 2001 and 2012 (compared with the 13 percent for the Regular Army).\textsuperscript{31} As a result, according to some calculations, the Army will lose about half of its deployment experience over the next five years.\textsuperscript{32} Second, like the Regular Army, all these deployments focused on certain types of missions (predominantly security force assistance [SFA], local security, and some COIN) in principally two environments: Iraq and Afghanistan (although deployment locations also included the Balkans, the Sinai, and Horn of Africa). Consequently, there is a question of whether the RCs, like the Regular Army, lost breadth of expertise—particularly with high-end warfare—in exchange for added depth of the experience in COIN, SFA, and local security.

Apart from the actual deployments, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars also boosted RCs’ expertise in less direct ways. With the growth of wartime supplemental defense spending or OCO funding, it became comparatively easier to put RC soldiers on long-term orders. Some of these soldiers supported their RC units, but many also augmented the Regular Army. CO-ADOS orders allowed RC soldiers to directly sup-

\textsuperscript{28} O’Connell, Wenger, and Hansen, 2014, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{29} Between 2001 and 2012, 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers left the AC each year. On average, approximately 7,000 of these joined the USAR, and 5,500 joined the ARNG. O’Connell, Wenger, and Hansen, 2014, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{30} O’Connell, Wenger, and Hansen, 2014, p. 7.


port Regular Army missions. These opportunities allowed RC soldiers both to practice their military skills full-time and to gain experience outside those opportunities normally open to RC members during their reserve careers, such as assignments in the Pentagon and with CCMDs and ASCCs.

Overall, the ability to spend an extended length of time in functionally full-time Army employment was relatively widespread. For example, according to data provided to RAND by the National Guard Bureau, approximately 28 percent of the 358,078 soldiers assigned to the ARNG in September 2012 were either on CO-ADOS, mobilized, Active Guard/Reserve, or a military technician (a full-time civilian employee of the National Guard). However, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq wound down, by September 2014 this proportion dropped to approximately 21 percent of 354,072.\(^3\)

In sum, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars increased the RCs’ readiness expertise in two ways. First and most directly, it meant that a significant percentage of the force was combat veterans. Second, it allowed for a large number of RC soldiers to spend time on long-term orders, allowing them to train full time like their Regular Army counterparts and gain valuable experience even if they were not deployed. Together, these added depth to the level of expertise in the RCs. The extent to which they also contributed to the breadth of expertise in the RCs and developed skills needed for other types of conflicts (outside COIN and SFA), however, remains unknown.

**Integration and Synchronization of the Unit**

Unit cohesion—the idea that soldiers train at home station and then fight together as an organized unit so that they become a single, united entity—is widely attributed as being one of the principal contributors to combat effectiveness.\(^3^4\) That said, measuring this variable is notori-

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\(^3\) Email, August 4, 2015. While we have data on the number of soldiers deployed to designated combat zones and data on the number of RC soldiers who performed various types of extended duty (e.g., mobilized, CO-ADOS), the data sets available did not permit us to quantify the degree of overlap between these two groups.

\(^3^4\) For the classic study of the importance of unit cohesion on combat effectiveness, see Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in
ously challenging, since it is built on the bonds between leaders and the troops themselves.\textsuperscript{35} In the civilian context, dozens of studies over the last several decades have tried to dissect the appropriate measure for cohesion—such interpersonal interaction, task commitment, and group pride—and then measure its impact on performance with differing results.\textsuperscript{36} Meta-analyses—studies of these studies—show that, by and large, group cohesion, particularly with smaller groups, impacts performance.\textsuperscript{37} As a result, understanding the impact of Iraq and Afghanistan Wars on RCs’ unit cohesion proves difficult to capture. Still, a number of the studies have assessed different aspects of cohesion, all indicating that the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars had mixed effects in this dimension of readiness.

One method for studying cohesion has been to examine the RCs’ turnover rates. Even during the Cold War and the early 1990s, turnover rates were always a matter of concern. A 1994 RAND study drawing largely on data from the mid-1980s found that only 70.4 percent


\footnotesize{In one well-cited study, military psychologist James Griffith defined cohesion as}

a) the quality of instrumental and affective relationships among junior enlisted soldiers,  
b) the quality of relationships between junior enlisted soldiers and their leaders,  
c) soldier internalization of Army values, and  
d) soldier confidence in weaponry and leaders.

James Griffith, “Measurement of Group Cohesion in U. S. Army Units,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 1988, pp. 149–171. Most of these measures are subjective, so we instead focus on the duration of the relationship between leaders and the troops, rather than try to characterize it further.

\footnotesize{For a list, see Daniel J. Beal, Robin R. Cohen, Michael Burke, and Christy L. McLendon, “Cohesion and Performance in Groups: A Meta-Analytic Clarification of Construct Relations,” Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 88, No. 6, 2003, pp. 994–995. Additionally, their meta-analysis suggests that the relationship of cohesion and performance is stronger in more interdependent groups. To the extent that RC units are deployed in nonstandard enabler units, perhaps the relevant level of cohesion is really at that smaller package size, and hence, turnover at that level is more important than turnover in larger units and higher echelons.}

of soldiers in the ARNG were in the same unit after 15 months, with 15.4 percent changing units; 11 percent leaving the service; and the remainder transferring to either the USAR, Regular Army, or another branch of service. A similar trend played out in the USAR. Some 69.6 percent were in the same unit after 15 months, 20.3 percent changed units within the USAR, 7.8 percent left the service, and the rest transferred to the ARNG or other branches of service.\textsuperscript{38}

After the Iraq War began, the churn picked up considerably. A RAND study that looked at units that deployed between 2003 and 2011 found that half of all the officers and 40 percent of the noncommissioned officers arrived in their units within a year of the deployment.\textsuperscript{39} It showed how, in the typical RC unit, about 30 percent to 50 percent of the officers and 25 percent of the noncommissioned officers move to different units or separate from service every year.\textsuperscript{40} Even among those who stayed, about 30 percent of the officers and 20 percent of the noncommissioned officers did not end up deploying with the unit.\textsuperscript{41} This particular study did not compare these turnover rates with those of the Regular Army, but concluded that this rate of turnover largely reflected normal levels (as opposed to a mass exodus prior to deployment).\textsuperscript{42} High turnover rates raise questions about RC unit cohesion—especially because the RCs’ training model increasingly emphasizes premobilization training.\textsuperscript{43}


\textsuperscript{39} Lippiatt and Polich, 2013, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{40} Lippiatt and Polich, 2013, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{41} Lippiatt and Polich, 2013, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{42} However, an earlier RAND study found that deploying Regular Army infantry battalions had been “just as unstable as National Guard battalions.” Furthermore, the study reported that “AC military police and truck companies [were] even less stable than their RC counterparts. Among MP units, only 42 percent of personnel in AC units were stable, compared with between 55 and 65 percent of RC units” (Lippiatt and Polich, 2010, p. 50).

\textsuperscript{43} Lippiatt and Polich, 2013, p. 17. However, major collective training events can be scheduled as close as possible to the mobilization date in part to maximize the number of cross-leveled personnel who participate.
Even some senior Reserve leaders note turnover as a potential problem. For example, then–Deputy Commander for Support for First Army Major General Mark MacCarley introduced his Military Review article on RCs’ training by noting the challenges of turnover for RC units and cites as an example a sustainment command headquarters, which underwent 70-percent overall and 95-percent senior leadership turnover since returning from deployment three years earlier.44 MacCarley later argues that high turnover rates are a surmountable problem because of growth in overall expertise within the force and better training as whole, but turnover rates still prove a challenge.

A second but related aspect of unit cohesion has to do with how RC units deploy and particularly whether the senior leadership, ultimately, deploy with their commands. After the transformation, maneuver BCTs supplied most of the combat power.45 In the Regular Army, BCTs deployed to and then fought in theater as a unit, maintaining unit integrity from predeployment training through reintegration back at home.46 RC soldiers, in contrast, often did not deploy as part of BCTs. Since the USAR principally provides “enabler” or combat support and combat service support units, force packages often consisted of smaller units—down to the company size—or even smaller size elements such as platoons, teams, and detachments—without their organic leadership. Even the ARNG, which does have BCTs, often deployed for SFA or local security missions rather than COIN missions, which often demanded smaller units (see Figure 4.2). While the ARNG often insisted that the Army deploy the entire BCT leadership, in practice, ARNG units were often separated from their organic leadership.47

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45 They also did so prior to transformation but were not called BCTs.

46 We do not have data on the degree of cross-leveling that took place in Regular Army BCTs and enabler units.

47 One force manager reported that, if the CCMD requirement was for 27 individual companies, the ARNG insisted on deploying battalion and brigade headquarters, although they would not operate as such. While battalion and brigade leaders undoubtedly gained deploy-
How Iraq and Afghanistan Affected the RCs’ Readiness

Figure 4.2

Deployed personnel as a percentage of Modified Table of Organization and Equipment required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployed personnel as a percentage:</th>
<th>&gt;90%</th>
<th>75–90%</th>
<th>50–75%</th>
<th>25–50%</th>
<th>5–25%</th>
<th>&lt;5%</th>
<th>“Flagged” deployment</th>
<th>COIN mission</th>
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SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center data.
NOTE: HBCT = Heavy Brigade Combat Team; ID = Infantry Division; SCOUT = scout; SECFOR = security force; deps = deployments.

RAND RR1495-4.2
Importantly, both data points—the relatively high rates of turnover and the fact that RC units often deployed without their leadership, if not in nonstandard force packages—only partially answer the question. While they point to limitations in RCs’ unit cohesion during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, they do not answer the question of whether, despite these limitations, the RCs’ units were overall more cohesive, synchronized, and integrated than they would be if it were not for these conflicts. Indeed, it is plausible that the growing amount of shared combat experience within both the ARNG and USAR—discussed in the previous section—provided a common base of knowledge that allowed the RCs’ units to function better at home, even if they often did not deploy or fight together downrange, and made them more ready for future missions.

**Time**

During the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, RCs’ readiness in terms of time also improved in almost all dimensions. A shift from post- to premobilization training increased the speed in which the RCs’ units could deploy after mobilization, while the switch to ARFORGEN put the RCs on a sustainable and predictable path to keep generating units for overseas missions. The one area where RCs’ readiness did not improve was duration or how long RC units could remain deployed, although this was more because of a policy choice (and a desire to avoid keeping RC service members away from their families and civilian professions for too long) rather than demonstrated limitations in the RCs themselves.

**Duration**

During the initial iterations of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the Army mobilized Reservists for yearlong deployments to theater. Since many RC units needed refresher and theater-specific training before

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they deployed and since training often occurred not at these units’ regular Reserve Centers or armories but at centralized training sites, RC soldiers often spent well over a year away from home—in many cases, longer than Regular Army soldiers.48

As a result, in 2007, then–Secretary of Defense Gates issued a memorandum limiting involuntary mobilizations to less than 12 months (not counting postmobilization leave), mandating that mobilization of ground combat, combat support, and combat services support be “managed on a unit basis” and reaffirming the goal of a 1:5 year mobilization–to-demobilization ratio.49 Exceptions would be allowed but would require the approval of the Secretary of Defense. In 2008, the Assistant Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum setting a goal of 24 months prior to mobilization for the alert for deployment and required a minimum of 180 days in advance for the mobilization order to be published.50 These timeline requirements remain essentially the same today.

While the Gates memorandum may have improved the quality of life for RC soldiers, it came at a cost of decreasing RCs’ readiness in the sense that the “duration” the RCs’ units could remain in theater became more limited. Yet, a partial consequence was the authorization for extending training periods of up to 45 days before mobilization. It is not clear that soldiers (and their families and civilian employers) preferred two periods of extended absence versus a longer but contiguous mobilization period. It also raises the question of whether breaking predeployment training into two or more extended periods improves or degrades skill retention. A possible question for future research may be:

48 First Army—the unit assigned with helping to prepare RC soldiers to deploy—maintained a series of mobilization training centers throughout the United States, including Fort Stewart, Georgia; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Camp Shelby, Mississippi; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Hood and Fort Bliss, Texas; and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington State. First Army: Training for Today’s Requirements and Tomorrow’s Contingencies, 2012–2014, Rock Island, Ill., undated, p. 3.


50 Hall, 2008.
Which approach leads to a deeper bench of soldiers who retain more necessary knowledge? It also increased the relative costs of deploying RC units, since multiple RC units now had to deploy to provide the same amount of boots-on-ground time as their Regular Army counterparts. It is possible that this decline in “duration” was compensated by an increase in sustainability—as shorter rotations put less strain on the force and allowed the RCs to retain more high-quality personnel. Measuring this trade-off, however, proves difficult.

**Speed**

After the Gates 2007 memorandum limited RCs’ involuntary mobilizations to 12 months in duration, the Army realized that, to maintain a roughly nine-month deployment period in theater for the RCs, units would need to arrive at the mobilization center at a significantly higher state of readiness. Significant policy changes that enabled the RCs to achieve a higher state of premobilization readiness include the following:

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51 In practice, even before the one-year mobilization limit, RCs’ units tended to rotate less frequently than Regular Army units.

52 For example, limiting mobilization lengths to a year was cited as one of the ways to improve “family readiness” in one RAND study; see Laura Werber, Margaret C. Harrell, Danielle M. Varda, Kimberly Curry Hall, Megan K. Beckett, and Stefanie Howard, *Deployment Experiences of Guard and Reserve Families: Implications for Support and Retention*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-645-OSD, 2008. Notably, some interviewees placed more importance on predictability rather than tour length. (Interview with RC senior leaders on July 31, 2015.)

• **Earlier notification of sourcing and alerts.** With one to two years to prepare for missions, both cross-leveling and mission-focused training could begin earlier. Although the 2010 RAND study found that cross-leveling remains a significant issue, RC commanders we interviewed believe that being able to start the cross-leveling process earlier is beneficial to readiness. Earlier mission-focused training has become institutionalized in Army processes with the establishment of Joint Assessment workshops and the adoption of Contiguous Training and the Train-Mobilize-Deploy paradigm.

• **Joint Assessments.** The Joint Assessment workshop, a conference between the RCs’ unit commander and First Army representatives, establishes mission-focused training plans and begins a series of in-process reviews within approximately 60 days of the unit’s notification of sourcing. The plan that is developed at the workshop is described as “a contract . . . representing a commitment by both sides.” Over time, Joint Assessment interactions became more formalized, with weekly videoteleconferences between the unit and the mobilization center to track progress and resolve all issues related to readiness, not simply training issues.

• **Contiguous training.** In 2009, the Secretary of Defense approved a policy of contiguous training to authorize the RCs to consolidate training days in the year prior to deployment to the period just prior to mobilization rather than spread them out equally

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54 Earlier notification of sourcing and alert times were mandated by memorandum (Hall, 2008).


56 USAR commander interviewed on May 19, 2015.

57 These gains are all in the context of predictable deployments. As will be discussed later, they may not apply to different missions or an unanticipated surge.

58 Pint et al., 2015, p. 46.

59 Both First Army and RC commanders characterized the Joint Assessments in these terms. (Interviews conducted with ARNG Commander on May 19, 2015, with USAR Commander on June 2, 2015, and with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015.)
across an entire year. The policy of contiguous training in its current form allows the RCs to begin mission-directed training as much as one year prior to mobilization and for First Army to track that progress. The result is fewer surprises at the mobilization center. Furthermore, contiguous or near-contiguous training increases the ability to sustain training proficiency and ensure as many cross-leveled personnel as possible can participate in major Annual Training or Active Duty for Training events.

- **Shift from Mobilize-Train-Deploy to Train-Mobilize-Deploy.** Even without the formal Secretary of Defense approval of contiguous training, there was a significant shift in training timelines and accountabilities in mid-2000s. Several state ARNG headquarters implemented their own individual initiatives that allowed for additional training in the premobilization time period using training resources allocated under ARFORGEN. Over time, a consensus developed that the goal of premobilization training is to achieve collective training to the squad or platoon level, while the goal of postmobilization training is collective training to the unit level (as illustrated in Figure 4.3).

- **Elimination of duplicative training.** There are many reports of units undergoing duplicative pre- and postmobilization training events in the years 2001–2005. This was attributed to the lack of a coordinated training plan, loss of records, or lack of trust or cultural biases between the RCs and the Army’s multiple training organizations. The Joint Assessments appear to have had a positive impact in this area, and later reports on reserve readiness do not cite duplicative training as a significant issue. As one of our interviewees stated, “At first, there was very little trust, but by

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61 A former First Army interviewee noted, “[With visibility into premobilization activities], if the RCs unit didn’t look like it would complete in time, we could push the mobilization date earlier in order to meet the latest arrival date (LAD) in theater.” Interview with IMCOM leadership and staff on May 21, 2015.

62 We note that this is the term used to describe the new approach, but it is really Train-Mobilize-Train Some More (but less than before)-Deploy.
2004–2007 [each side of the pre- or postmobilization accountability] had developed greater confidence that the other would do their part.” Increased automation and information sharing probably also played a role.

- More efficient use of training time. Premobilization RCs’ training became more mission focused and scenario based. The move to scenario-based training was explained by several of our interviewees as a response to the 12-month mobilization restriction and the typical budgetary restriction of 39 days per year of RC training either when not mobilized or in the year prior to mobilization. To fit all of the skills necessary for mission readiness into a limited weekend, the RCs found that they could not afford idle time between training sets and so began to weave skills training together into scenarios. Together, this meant that the RCs’ notification and deployment model shifted dramatically from where it was at the start of GWOT, from Mobilize-Train-Deploy to Train-Mobilize-Deploy (see Figure 4.3).

This new model—coupled with better early treatment medical care to ensure that more of the unit’s soldiers actually deployed with their units—increased the speed after mobilization with which units could deploy to theater. As shown in Figure 4.4, the total time of post-mobilization training needed to deploy an ARNG brigade assigned a COIN or SFA mission dropped significantly after the initial rotations of OIF and OEF. Some of this reduction may be attributed to eliminating the requirement for RC units assigned to local security and SFA missions to complete a combat training center rotation prior to deployment. Second and perhaps more importantly, the RCs were able to

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63 Interview with IMCOM leadership and staff on May 21, 2015.
64 Interviews with ARNG Commander on May 19, 2015, and with USAR Commander on June 2, 2015.
Figure 4.3
Typical RCs’ Deployment Timelines, 2004 and 2008

Circa 2004 RC deployment timeline—deployed forces
- As soon as possible
- Reset/train
- NOS
- Ready
- Exceeded 12-month mobilization goal
- Alert
- MOBEX
- MOB
- Available
- Validation
- Deploy

Circa 2008 deployment timeline—deployed forces
- Objective: 5 years/usually less
- Reset
- NOS
- MOB–730
- Train
- MOB–360
- Ready
- Alert
- Joint assessments
- Available
- MOB
- Validation
- 1st Army
- Deploy

Key events
- Notification of Sourcing (NOS)
- Alert to deploy (alert)
- Mobilization (MOB)
- Deploy

Readiness assessment points
- RC commander assessment
- Joint assessments
- Final mission capability assessment

Training periods
- Pre-/postmobilization training
- Culminative training event

SOURCE: RAND analysis of Army policy documents and briefings.
NOTE: The primary driver for the change implemented in 2008 was the one-year mobilization limit implemented in 2007; MOBEX = mobilization exercise.
shift some of the training from postmobilization to premobilization. While the training time needed to prepare an ARNG for different combat missions remained roughly constant post-2006 (with approximately 165 days for COIN, 125 for advise and train, and 120 for security forces), more of that training could be done before the unit was officially mobilized—thanks in part to contiguous training and Joint Assessment workshops between the RCs and the mobilization center.

A similar story plays out for the Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. As shown in Figure 4.5, in many cases, the average amount of training required for units to deploy decreased over the
course of the war. Even in cases where it did not (i.e., battalions and companies that operated outside of the forward operating base), there was a noticeable shift from postmobilization to premobilization training. This, in turn, allowed RC units to deploy more quickly once mobilized and, once there, allowed them to remain in theater longer before reaching mobilization caps.

The shift to premobilization training had another, although perhaps unintended, effect on the level of leadership of the force. Since the RCs’ chain of commands were responsible for the units going through premobilization training, it meant that they had to take ownership of the training and readiness in ways they did not when most of the train-
ing was done at the mobilization site under the auspices of First Army. To paraphrase an IMCOM interviewee, training was now something the RCs did, rather than something done to them.\textsuperscript{66} While quantifying the effect of increasing responsibility on the RCs’ leadership for training is problematic, it is possible that the shift to premobilization training increased the speed in which RC units deployed and also had positive effects on leadership.\textsuperscript{67} In addition to the impact on speed of deployment, increased involvement by unit leadership in the planning and conduct of training should also improve unit cohesion.

**Sustainability**

Overall, the policies implemented during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars improved the RCs’ sustainability and ability to regularly field forces for prolonged periods of time. As previously discussed, prior to 2006, the Army operated on a tiered readiness model—with those units slated to deploy first receiving a greater share of the resources—which, in practice, often benefited the Regular Army. Even within the RCs, units operated on a tiered readiness model with the ARNG’s ESBs receiving a greater share than other units; unsurprisingly, the ESBs were some of the first units to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005.

As the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars wore on, this policy became increasingly problematic. In 2004, GAO raised concerns that routinely deploying the ARNG overseas and cross-leveling equipment to deploying units may impede the ARNG’s ability to respond to domestic emergencies at home.\textsuperscript{68} Similarly, a 2005 GAO report found that it was becoming increasingly difficult for the USAR to continue to provide ready forces. The report identified three primary causes. First, GAO pointed to extensive cross-leveling of personnel and equipment from

\textsuperscript{66} Interview with IMCOM leadership and staff on May 21, 2015.

\textsuperscript{67} ADRP 7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders, in fact, presumes this synergistic relationship: When leaders train their units, they not only increase the efficacy of their units but develop themselves into leaders as well. See HQDA, 2012b, pp. 1–2

nonmobilizing to mobilizing units—some 53,000 soldiers and some 235,900 pieces between September 2001 and April 2005—hampering the former’s ability to prepare for future missions.\(^6^9\) Second, because of DoD policies restricting how long and how often Reservists could be mobilized, GAO estimated only 31,000—some 16 percent of the USAR—were eligible for mobilization.\(^7^0\) Third, GAO noted that, at the time of the report’s publication, the USAR had been authorized only about 68 percent (26,354) of the 38,846 full-time staff it required to perform critical readiness tasks, such as training and maintenance.\(^7^1\) In 2006, the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at GAO, Janet A. St. Laurent, reiterated these concerns in testimony before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves and noted that these problems are due to “a resourcing structure that is inconsistent with the RCs’ new operational role as well as limiting mobilization policies and practices.”\(^7^2\)

Ultimately, the Army changed its mobilization policies and practices. As discussed, ARFORGEN ensured a more predictable, if not more even, distribution of resources across the force. Limitations on mobilization to a year, theoretically, reduced the strain on the RCs’ families and employers. New recruiting pushes—together with more favorable recruiting conditions—expanded the ARNG and brought the USAR closer to its authorized end strength.\(^7^3\)

None of these changes completely quelled the concerns over whether the RCs were on a sustainable path. For example, in September 2007, a Defense Science Board report concluded the following:

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69 GAO, 2005a, p. 4.

70 GAO, 2005a, p. 4.

71 GAO, 2005a, p. 19.


73 Importantly, a Congressional Research Service report attributes the rebound in Army recruiting post-2008 across all the components more to factors other than a shift in policy, including comparatively high unemployment rates in the civilian economy, improved security situation in Iraq, and reduced recruiting goals for the Army as it completed its expansion. Kapp, 2013, p. 1.
Given current levels of operational demand, today’s Army active, National Guard, and reserve force structure will not support DOD’s policy mandating dwell times of one year deployed and two years not deployed (1:2) for the active force and one year mobilized and five years not mobilized (1:5) for the reserve components.74

The report also cast doubt on whether the shift to premobilization training was sustainable from both a cost and a family-disruption perspective.75 A 2009 GAO report echoed these concerns. It concluded the following:

It is also not clear how long reserve component forces can sustain the current high pace of operations without difficulties in recruiting and retaining reserve component soldiers or compromising the viability of the all-volunteer citizen soldier reserve components, which are an important national resource critical for both domestic and overseas missions.76

And yet, for all the doubts about the long-term sustainability of RCs’ force generation policies, the model worked. As seen in Figure 2.6, the RCs provided roughly 30 percent of deployed soldiers throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And while there was much handwringing along the way, the RCs never failed to fill a request for forces.77 Despite the concerns, the Army’s force-generation model as applied to

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76 GAO, 2009, p. 28.
77 “Since before 9/11, the Army Guard and Air Guard have met every deployment requirement—more than 760,000 individual overseas mobilizations and counting—while meeting the same training and readiness standards as their active duty counterparts” (U.S. National Guard, 2015, p. 7). That said, multiple interviewees suggested that RC soldiers often filled roles other than their military occupational specialty, indicating that the Army likely accepted “in lieu of” assignments to meet demand (interviews with HQDA participant on May 19, 2015 and with HQDA GFM on May 21, 2015).
the RCs proved sustainable and likely became more sustainable after the shift away from sequential to cyclic deployments circa 2006.

**Inhibitors**

While the recent wars that have spanned more than a decade improved the RCs’ readiness in a number of ways, the RCs also benefited from relatively few inhibitors. Particularly, as the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars lasted much longer than originally anticipated, RC units—as was the case with Regular Army units—benefited from ample forewarning about the nature of their mission and the adversary and the operating environment, allowing them to tailor their predeployment training. Similarly, after the initial rotation or two into theater, both RC units and Regular Army units could rely on a relatively well-developed logistical infrastructure to deploy into theater and sustain operations. Finally and more controversially, RC units were assigned different and, by some accounts, less complex missions.78 While this does not detract from the gains the RCs made in terms of readiness in both time and capability, this may mean that, if the RCs are required to operate in a different environment with greater inhibitors in the future, there may be a greater strain on the RCs’ readiness.

**Forewarning**

Lasting from October 2001 through the present day, the war in Afghanistan is the longest conflict in American history.79 The Iraq War—spanning from March 2003 to December 2011—comes in at number three, just behind the Vietnam War and more than double

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78 According to some interviewees, even when the Regular Army and RCs were both assigned COIN missions, they would be treated slightly differently, with Regular Army generally taking on more “direct combat” and complex jobs (interview with FORSCOM participant on July 9, 2015).

the length of the Second World War. 80 While the length of these conflicts strained the Army as whole and in particular the RCs to generate forces, it also gave the Army the benefit of forewarning. As one interview subject stated, “To do it right, you need to know the mission requirements.” 81 After the initial rotations, units knew roughly where they were going, what they would be doing, and who they would be fighting months and sometimes years out.

While forewarning benefited Regular Army units as well, it proved critical for training RC units to deploy. As one interview subject stated, “[we] need to recognize that the RCs’ starting point will always be less than the Regular Army starting point.” 82 Consequently, the more lead time RC units have to train, the better. Moreover, this relative clarity about the mission, the adversary, and the environment helped focus unit preparations. 83 In fact, the RCs’ shift to a longer premobilization training period, rather than a more condensed variant postmobilization, was premised on the idea that certain core training tasks could be identified and trained upward of two years ahead of time. Multiple interviewees highlighted this two-year forewarning as critical to the RCs’ success. One asserted: “Two year notification is essential to team training, hope we don’t have to relearn that lesson next time.” 84 Another stated, “Knowing two years out where we were going, the RCs could execute more of the training plan prior to mobilization.” 85 And a third acknowledged, “With 12–24 months to get ready, it made a huge difference.” 86 Admittedly, if the RCs required two years’ prior

80 Taylor, 2014. Whether American participation in the Iraq War actually ended in 2012, however, is debatable.

81 Interview with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015.

82 Interview with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015.

83 We note that much of this challenge is exacerbated by having a smaller Army. During the Cold War, Army units had a great deal of uncertainty regarding “when” but much less regarding “what.” Some divisions could concentrate on war plans for fighting the Soviets while others could focus on the North Koreans.

84 Interview with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015.

85 Interview with HQDA policy analyst on June 2, 2015.

86 Interview with IMCOM leadership and staff on May 21, 2015.
planning to get ready, then it prompts the question of just how “operational” the RCs actually are.

One of the unknown counterfactuals is what the impact would be if the RCs needed to deploy forces without a similar degree of forewarning. According to interview subjects, the RCs’ ability to rapidly field forces under these circumstances would depend on the complexity and size of the mission. As one interview subject stated, “The number of days required depends on where we are going in the world and why. For simpler missions, we can do it in 45 days.”87 Most agreed, however, that lack of forewarning would pose a challenge to readiness. As one interviewee posited, “The challenge is in knowing what to be ready for.”88

**Logistical Constraints**

One of the underappreciated aspects of the OIF and OEF was the relatively robust logistical enterprise that allowed units to rapidly deploy into and out of theater. In June 2001, months before the September 11 attacks and years before the Iraq War, the United States already had about 26,000 troops deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of operations—mostly to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and ships offshore—many supporting the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq.89 As a result, when both conflicts began, the Army could benefit from the presence of a logistical backbone to support the deployments in and out of theater. Eventually, forward operating bases in once-isolated Afghanistan became home to shops ranging from Burger Kings to Oakley sunglasses stores.90

This is not to downplay the logistical challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan. Both theaters required a herculean effort, particularly

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87 Interview with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015.
88 Interview with Force Manager on July 21, 2015.
during the initial deployment and during the retrograde, especially given that Afghanistan is landlocked. That said, if the RCs were asked to deploy into more austere theaters, the situation might alter their status within the readiness framework.

**Difficulty of Mission**

Finally, some argue that RC units performed less difficult missions during OIF and OEF, although these claims prove difficult—if not impossible—to rigorously test. Essentially, this argument makes two claims. First, it has been asserted that, after the initial rout of Saddam Hussein’s and the Taliban’s conventional forces, COIN, SFA, and area security missions during OIF and OEF were less demanding than major combat operations and combined arms maneuver. For example, during OIF and OEF, after the initial push into theater, units did not have to conduct combined arms maneuver, and, aside from the improvised explosive device or occasional antiair attack, units could transition into theater relatively unopposed. Consequently, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars put less strain on the force than it would have experienced if it had fought major combat operations of equivalent length.

Second and more controversially, some general officers have claimed that, even within the realm of COIN and SFA tasks, the RCs (primarily the ARNG BCTs) performed the less difficult missions on average. For example, *Breaking Defense* reported the following from an interview with Major General John Rossi:

> These missions are “all important, all very dangerous,” Rossi said, “but some [are] more complex than others.”
> And a future fight against a better-armed, better-organized, and faster-maneuvering enemy will be more complex.

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91 For an example of these challenges, see David Banian, “From Hard to Harder: Iraq Retrograde Lessons for Afghanistan,” *Army Sustainment*, October–December 2013.

Rossi acknowledged that it’s by no means impossible to train a Guard brigade to the same standard as an active-duty one: It just takes time—time the Army may not have in a future crisis.

“This [issue] is not looking at redoing OIF and OEF on the predictable ARFORGEN [Army force generation process],” Rossi told me. “What would it take from a no-notice cold start?”

The USAR, which consists almost solely of combat support and combat service support troops, deployed mostly “enabler” units, rather than maneuver BCTs. ARNG did deploy BCTs, but these were often not tasked with COIN missions. As discussed earlier, of the 47 ARNG BCTs deployed between 2004 to 2013 to Iraq and Afghanistan, 23 performed area security missions and another seven conducted SFA missions. Of the remaining 17 that did perform COIN duties, nine performed these missions relatively early in the conflicts between 2004 and 2006. However, as the former Chief of the National Guard Bureau Lieutenant General (Ret.) Steven Blum noted, “Units do not get to select their mission assignments.” Thus, the fact that ARNG units were often not assigned COIN missions does not necessarily indicate a lack of readiness on their part. Indeed, it is possible that the ARNG BCTs were capable of performing these missions but were not tested because the missions were assigned instead to Regular Army units.

Ultimately, it is problematic—if not impossible—to comprehensively test whether combined arms maneuver or COIN is a more difficult mission, just as it is problematic to untangle whether COIN, local security, or SFA is a more challenging task. Intuitively, difficulty of mission is a critical factor in determining what set of characteristics or capabilities are necessary for a unit to be “ready” but we were unable to conclusively resolve this issue with the available data.

For our basic purposes, it is sufficient to put an asterisk next to conclusions about the RCs’ readiness. The gains in the readiness of the

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93 Freedberg, 2014.

94 Freedberg, 2014.
RCs were made within a certain context. Should the mission change, the RCs’ readiness levels may change as well.

Conclusion

Overall, because of new policies and increased budgets, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars increased RCs’ readiness in several areas. After several rocky years at the start of the conflict, the Army posted noticeable gains toward remedying the RCs’ supply shortages and updating the equipment they have on hand. The move to cyclic deployments increased the ability of the RCs to deploy a full range of force, continuously over the more than 12 years of war. The shift toward premobilization training—although it produced only modest gains in reducing the total number of training days needed to deploy units—made more significant gains in reducing the time needed postmobilization, allowing units to deploy faster once mobilized. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the wars increased the experience levels within the force, with roughly half of the RCs having deployment experience.95

The impact of wars was less pronounced (or there is insufficient data to judge) in other areas. Like the Regular Army, the RCs were primarily focused on COIN, SFA, and area security; thus, their breadth of expertise—particularly familiarity with combined arms maneuver—did not increase and possibly even declined. Unlike the Regular Army, the RCs’ authorized end strength did not dramatically increase. Also unlike the Regular Army, the RCs were often tasked to provide nontraditional force packages or else had their formation broken apart to fight in smaller units. As such, unit cohesion likely did not experience the same gains—although the data here are insufficient to make a definitive judgment. Finally, one area where RCs’ readiness decreased was in the duration RC units could remain in theater, although this was due to a deliberate policy choice rather than an inherent limitation—and might be relatively simple to remedy.

95 In December 2012, 49 percent of the USAR and 53 percent of the ARNG had some deployment experience (O’Connell, Wenger, and Hansen, 2014, p. 9).
At the same time, some of the gains in RCs’ readiness come with a caveat. They were made under a unique set of circumstances, where the RCs had ample forewarning about the type of mission they would perform and where they would perform it. Like the Regular Army, the RCs benefited—particularly after the initial few rotations—from a well-developed logistical enterprise to facilitate their deployment in and out of theater. And they were tasked primarily with certain specific mission sets rather than the full spectrum of operations. In sum, the RCs made clear gains in readiness over the years but it is unclear to what degree these gains would translate to other times and contexts.
Going forward, whether the RCs remain an operational force will be largely out of their hands. A confluence of world events—and external conditions—drove a surge in demand for forces that in turn resulted in the RCs being employed as an “operational force.” Therefore, whether the RCs remain an operational force will depend largely on whether the demand for forces remains high in the aftermath of large-scale ground conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan or whether policymakers decide to continue and fund a similar frequency of RC mobilizations despite the absence of similar conflicts.

However, the Army has more control over whether the RCs remain ready so that they can quickly be used as an operational force if called on to do so in the future. In this regard, the transformation of the RCs during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars provides several valuable lessons. The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. First, it captures the seven core findings of this study. Second, it offers a series of concrete recommendations for the RCs going forward to maintain readiness after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan end.¹ Third, it identifies several areas in which the RCs’ training and employment processes should be further investigated. And fourth, it concludes with some final thoughts on the subject.

¹ The RCs’ employment in other contingency operations and ONE also had an effect in improving readiness, but we focus on the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, as they have the largest data set and clearest contributions.
Finding 1: The RCs Became an Operational Force Before the Label

As our analysis in Chapter Two has shown, the RCs were transforming into an operational force, with the components of the Army becoming increasingly interdependent long before then—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued DoDD 1200.17 on October 29, 2008, and the RCs were officially labeled as an “Operational Force.” Indeed, there is no single discrete date on which the RCs became an “Operational Force.” The process lasted for more than a century, with several significant dates along the way. The Militia Act of 1903 made the National Guard more responsive to federal needs in exchange for federal funding, while a series of policy initiatives in 1908, 1912, and 1916 created the contours for the USAR and modern RCs. The 1973 Total Force Policy ensured that the RCs would go to war with the Regular Army. The peacekeeping operations of the 1990s were the first test of this concept and probably the inflection point; and after 9/11, the RCs became an operational force in the fullest sense of the word.

The point here is not a purely academic one. The fact that the RCs became an operational force over the course of decades, long before the Gates memo, underscores the fact that the impetus of RCs’ transformation is much more than a piece of paper or one set of policies. It is the result of long-term historical trends and as a result, the RCs will likely remain an operational force for far longer than the tenure of any particular Secretary of Defense, but this characteristic will be primarily demand rather than policy driven. (As will be reflected in Finding 7, funding will also be critical.) While the process to mobilize and deploy RC units during the initial years of the GWOT often proved messy, the RCs with the Regular Army in support still managed to get it done. Assuming the broad legal framework and implementing policies established over the course of the 20th century remain in place, the Army should be able to mount a similar effort in the future—espe-

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2 DoD, 2008.

3 Interviews with HQDA GFM and with IMCOM leadership and staff, both interviews conducted on May 21, 2015.
cially as the Army is dependent on the RCs’ having a certain degree of operational capabilities.

**Finding 2: Two Types of Policies Emerged—Protection from Overuse and Increasing Readiness**

Many policies, of course, will not neatly fit into only one bin or the other. However, keeping the RCs from becoming overstressed and improving their readiness were the two major purposes of the policies related to the RCs. The Gates memo limiting RC mobilization length and frequency is the archetype of the former category. The post–Gulf War reforms, particularly Title XI of the 1993 NDAA, exemplify the latter category. Although the adoption of ARFORGEN preceded the issuance of the Gates memo, it illustrates the interdependence of the two categories of policies. Part of the reason that ARFORGEN was successful for the RCs was that it addressed both types of policy goals.

**Finding 3: The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Reshaped the Way the RCs Were Trained, Equipped, and Manned**

At the same time, the RCs are being employed more intensively and over a more extended period today than compared with any other point in history. While the Regular Army still provided the bulk of the forces (measured in number of soldier-years deployed) to Iraq and Afghanistan, Chapter Four of this report shows that the United States relied on the RCs to provide forces for these conflicts more than at any other point since the Korean War. Moreover, quantifying the full scale of the RCs’ contribution during the GWOT requires including ONE and other Homeland Defense and Home Security missions, which—if it were not for the RCs—would have probably fallen to the Regular Army to perform.

And yet, what makes the post-9/11 period unique in the RCs’ history is not the sheer number of soldiers deployed, but the manner in which they were employed. As a result of policy decisions that made
ARNG and USAR capabilities equivalent in design and employment to Regular Army units, they were employed as a full-fledged member of the force generation pool, routinely sourcing overseas operations. Additionally, some missions—such as peacekeeping in Kosovo, were sourced almost entirely by RC units. This degree of integration means that reduced readiness in certain RC formations could increase the requirements for Regular Army forces. In other words, if sufficiently ready RC units are not available for missions on the left side of the spectrum of conflict, Regular Army units may be called on as a sourcing solution and reduce Regular Army unit availability for high-intensity combat and rapid deployment missions.

Additionally, this shift has had a profound effect on the mindset and the operations of the RCs. Gone are expectations of being a weekend warrior. A former director of the ARNG, Lieutenant General William Ingram, commented, “Our soldiers expect to be gainfully employed. Every one of them has either enlisted or reenlisted since 9/11, motivated by a desire to serve their country. One weekend a month and two weeks in the summer are not what they signed up for.”4 Indeed, the National Guard Posture Statement 2015 states, “Today’s National Guard members are motivated by the expectation that they will be deployed in service to their country.”5 This transformation is not simply a bumper sticker but has affected practically every aspect of how the RCs are manned, trained, and equipped.

**Finding 4: Demand, Not Supply, Drove Sourcing Decisions**

Importantly, while the readiness of the RCs changed over the course of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the RCs’ transformation does not appear to have influenced sourcing decisions directly, although the Total Force policy set the general conditions for increased use of the RCs. From both the interviews and the quantitative data discussed in

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4 William E. Ingram, Jr., “The Army National Guard: Where We’ve Been and Where We Want to Go,” Army, August 2012, p. 28.
5 U.S. National Guard, 2015, p. 7.
Chapter Two, the RCs’ readiness—real or perceived—does not seem to have influenced force managers’ decisions about who to select as sourcing solutions for missions. Rather, force managers usually turned first to the Regular Army and, if the Regular Army lacked the availability or the capabilities (in the case of certain enablers primarily resident in the RCs) to support the tasking at hand, they then turned to the RCs. After ARFORGEN streamlined the process, they looked to who was available in the queue. In sum, the RCs’ increasing use during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars is primarily a demand rather than supply-side story: While the RCs did become “more ready,” they were not used more frequently as a consequence, but, rather, sourcing decisions were based principally on Regular Army availability, with the RCs being used when the former was unavailable. However, force managers also assumed that the RCs would be ready in time once sourced.

The fact that demand rather than supply drove sourcing does not mean that the RC reforms of the last decade were irrelevant or that they should be rolled back. To the contrary, the fact that readiness did not play a significant factor in determining sourcing is, perhaps, indicative of how far the RCs have come since the debacle with the roundout brigades’ mobilization in the run-up to Desert Storm. As one strategic planner remarked, the debate was over what the demand should be, not whether it could be met. Any analysis of what policies should be maintained as the RCs transition off of their Afghanistan and Iraq footings needs to study both deployment history and capacity to respond to crises. Regular Army availability is affected by both CCMD demand and institutional factors such the modular transformation discussed in Chapter Two and, of course, by the size of the Regular Army. Thus, institutional factors also affect the demand for RC forces.

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6 To reiterate, we use supply and demand here as metaphors rather than economics terminology. Parts of both theories of RC use applied: The readiness of the RCs increased as resourcing increased as a result of expected employment but sourcing was driven mostly by the availability (or nonavailability, as the case may be) of Regular Army units.

7 Interview with DA G3/5/7 strategic planner on July 21, 2015.
Finding 5: The RCs’ Readiness Improved During the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

The question about how to sustain the readiness of the RCs going forward is particularly important because, for the most part, the RCs made dramatic strides—on both the capabilities and time dimensions—during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Using the framework developed in Chapter Three, the analysis presented in Chapter Four shows that the policy of getting units ready on a rotational basis across all the RCs increased the readiness of the entire force. Much of our analysis was focused on BCTs because of the availability of data and the focus of the Title XI reforms. However, the increase in readiness also held true for enablers.8

After the Army initially struggled to equip the Total Force, particularly at home station, RC units today have higher rates of equipment on hand than they did a decade ago, and more of it is modern. The RCs grew slightly in size during the wars, and their medical readiness improved, although the percentage of the force with DLCs did not decrease as dramatically. The depth of expertise within the force also increased; the RCs now have a greater share of combat veterans than at the start of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, although this may diminish with time.

The RCs also posted gains in terms of time-based variables. The average number of training days needed to prepare a company-sized enabler unit to deploy decreased by almost ten days, a reduction of between 8.7 percent and 10.3 percent of total predeployment training.9 More importantly, the shift to premobilization training means that RC units of all sizes can deploy more quickly once mobilized than they could before. Likewise, the adoption of ARFORGEN and the shift from sequential to cyclic deployments now allows the RCs to maintain

8 It is beyond the scope of this study, but a potential topic for future research is to determine if there is a “sweet spot” for some capability types. For example, Civil Affairs may have become less ready due to a high demand in relation to the number of such units while other specialties become more ready.

9 See Figure 4.5. The net reduction depended on the mission. Some units saw no decrease on average.
sizable forces deployed for extended periods of time and not simply rely on select units such as the ESBs. Indeed, the only time dimension where the RCs did not improve was in the duration a particular unit could remain deployed because of the one-year mobilization cap set by Secretary Gates.

**Finding 6: The RCs’ Readiness Benefited from the Absence of Some Inhibitors**

The gains in the RCs’ readiness need to be caveated, however, in the sense that the RCs—like the Regular Army—benefited from certain conditions present during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars that may not be present in other campaigns. As discussed in Chapter Three, like the Regular Army, the RCs benefited from ample forewarning about their mission, which allowed, in turn, for a longer train-up period for RC units to prepare for deployment. Also like the Regular Army, after the initial rotations, the RCs benefited from a well-developed logistical infrastructure that enabled units to deploy and redeploy more easily. Finally, RC units also performed somewhat different missions than the Regular Army, which may have also enabled increased RC participation, although it is impossible to conclusively prove this assertion. While the Army’s degree of control over these factors—forewarning, logistical constraints, and complexity of the mission—is limited, they will impact the RCs’ readiness going forward.

**Finding 7: Sustaining Readiness Is a Resource, Not Just a Policy, Question**

Whether or not the RCs can sustain their current level of readiness going forward will depend on the policies governing the RCs, but also—and, in some ways, more critically—on the level of resources allocated to the RCs. This may seem obvious, yet it is important to recognize the limits of readiness policies. Annual appropriations for the ARNG and USAR are exogenous factors that can limit the impact that
policies alone have on the readiness of the RCs. As shown in Figure 2.8 in Chapter Two, the increases in readiness and employment of the RCs were accompanied by increases in funding.

Sustaining the observed gains in equipment readiness and training will require resources to continue. Many of the interviewees identified the level of the RCs’ funding as the greatest impediment to the RCs’ readiness going forward. With defense budget cuts, many interviewees argued that resources are already insufficient to achieve readiness for more than a subset of the RCs. The loss of OCO funding will result in even fewer resources for the Total Army. As one interview subject noted, “We can’t make everybody ready; we don’t have the resources. We need horizontal and cyclical management of resources focused on readiness at the tip of the spear.”\(^{10}\) Another echoed, “Total Force will only be as good as the resources we can apply.”\(^{11}\)

Resources are the prerequisite for many of the factors that compose readiness. As one interviewee remarked, “Readiness is more than just getting deployed, it goes all the way back. Less funding leads to fewer seats for schooling, leads to individuals not certified, leads to inability to deploy.”\(^{12}\) Funding is a requirement for the RCs’ progress on the equipment/resources and the medical resources fronts as well. It also impacts the time dimension. Improving premobilization training at home station and regional training centers to decrease postmobilization training time requires that RC soldiers and units have access to the equipment they will operate in theater at home station or a nearby local training area.\(^{13}\) All of this requires money, so funding may consequently be the long pole in the tent for readiness.

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10 Interview with HQDA and RCs leadership on July 31, 2015.
11 Interview with First Army leadership and staff on June 4, 2015.
12 Interview with ARNG Commander on March 15, 2015.
13 The necessity to centralize training is also dependent on the type of training. For example, unless they happen to be stationed on a major installation, RC armor units will have to travel to a remote site to conduct live-fire tank gunnery, but many tasks can be performed at home station using a Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer.
**Policy Recommendations for Sustaining RCs’ Readiness**

Although many of the factors related to the RCs’ readiness is outside of their ability to control, and only part is within the Army’s control, some of the gains in the RCs’ readiness made over the last decade-plus of wars can be shaped by cogent policies. Ultimately, it will fall to others to set the RCs’ topline budgets. Similarly, the RCs may not get a couple years of forewarning before their next mission nor will they be able to choose the complexity of the missions they are tasked with performing. Despite all the efforts to ensure a “continuum of service,” the Army—both Regular Army and RCs—is projected to lose some of the depth of experience it gained during the wars.\(^ {14}\) And yet, there are several areas where the Army can sustain and even improve the RCs’ readiness gains.

**Continue Operational Employment of the RCs**

Perhaps the first recommendation is the most basic: If the United States wants to sustain the RCs’ current level of readiness, it needs to continue the operational use of the RCs. Ultimately, while policies helped make the RCs ready, much of the gains in RCs’ readiness came as a result of real-world experience. There may be the temptation to reduce RC employment if the Army’s operating tempo decreases, for cost reasons if nothing else. However, one of the best ways to maintain trained units in the RCs is to employ them. In this sense, such deployments as rotating RC units into Europe in response to Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine, serve a dual purpose.\(^ {15}\) Not only do they aim to accomplish an operational mission (in this case, deterring Russian aggression), but they also serve a training function as well.

**Reconsider RCs’ ARFORGEN**

As budgets decline, a key question will be how to manage the RCs’ diminished resources. This raises perhaps the single most pressing

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\(^ {15}\) See Michelle Tan, “Army Looks to Rotating and Reserve Forces for Europe Missions,” *Army Times*, October 8, 2015.
policy issue facing RCs’ readiness today: Should the Army continue to use ARFORGEN (or some other form of progressive readiness) for the RCs or return to a tiered readiness model? As one interview subject stated, “It’s impossible to have all units ready all the time. We need a sustainable readiness model.” What long-term readiness model should be used for the RCs—and whether it should be progressive, tiered, or some combination of the two—will depend on what policymakers predict to be the shape of future conflicts and level of funding appropriated by Congress. Additionally, this issue is also relevant to the Army Total Force Policy, which directs that the Army’s AC and RCs should be integrated as a “Total Force.”

As discussed earlier, ARFORGEN and cyclic deployments offered the RCs multiple advantages. It kept the bulk of the RCs “operational” with RC units routinely moving into the available pool and employed for overseas missions. At least in theory, it maintained unit cohesion as units trained and then deployed together. The RCs’ ARFORGEN mirrored the Regular Army, keeping the Army’s three components on a similar system, although at different rotation rates. Above all, it allowed the RCs to deploy sizable numbers of forces for well over a decade of continuous conflict.

Nonetheless, ARFORGEN has never neatly fit with the RCs’ particular characteristics. Unlike the Regular Army,

- The RCs have less control over their personnel fill rates, as commands have a limited ability to force RC soldiers to accept positions away from their home of record.
- RC commanders are largely responsible for their own recruiting.
- The RCs often deploy nonstandard force packages—rather than deploying only as entire battalions and brigades.

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16 Interview with IMCOM Leadership and staff on May 21, 2015.
18 As mentioned, in practice, there was extensive cross-leveling.
19 The USAR allows commands to reassign soldiers within 50 miles of their home of record. ARNG soldiers are limited in their choice of unit until within state boundaries.
As a result, a policy such as ARFORGEN—which rests on entire units going through well-defined reset, train/ready, and available cycles as units—may make less sense. Even if a unit does deploy as unit, a five-year cycle does not fit neatly with the typical RC military career trajectory. Leaders will change out repeatedly over the course of the cycle. Soldiers will get promoted, move on to other opportunities, or retire. And so, the number of soldiers who will be in the unit for both the full train-up cycle and the available phase may not be worth the cost of having all or most RC units complete the full ARFORGEN cycle.

Moreover, the concept of unit-based cyclic deployments, arguably, also contradicts other tenets of RCs force management. In particular, DoD policy prioritizes voluntary deployment over unit cohesion and prefers to fill deployments based on volunteers, even if that means cross-leveling personnel. The ARNG also has continuous state obligations for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security and Defense Support to Civil Authorities, regardless of where they sit in the deployment cycle. Neither imperative squares neatly with ARFORGEN or any unit-based cyclic deployment model.

Whether or not it makes strategic sense to sustain ARFORGEN going forward depends on whether the United States will continue to fight protracted ground campaigns and the size of RCs’ budgets. If the Army will continue to fight long-term ground wars, then ARFORGEN and cyclic deployment is a logical approach, despite the limitations and inconsistencies enumerated above. Even in the absence of long-term ground wars, if the RCs are sufficiently funded, they can continue to execute a cyclic readiness model. However, if the future of conflict is fewer wars of shorter duration and less funding, then some form of tiered readiness may be the more logical approach. (A hybrid

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20 Of course, Regular Army soldiers also change jobs, but the greater frequency of rotation might make it easier to schedule reassignment between deployments. It might also be argued that RC career patterns favor ARFORGEN because many would otherwise spend most of all their careers in low priority units and have fewer deployment and training opportunities.

21 For the long-standing preference for volunteers for deployment, see DoD, 1995, p. 3, and DoD, 2011, p. 6
approach might also be considered, with cyclic deployment for some units and sequential deployments for others.)

Aside from the strategic issues discussed above, the Army may simply have no other choice than to move the RCs away from ARFORGEN depending on the budget situation. As one interviewee commented, “To continue to use the RCs in a cyclical manner will require a dedicated source of funding. Money was less of an issue during OIF/OEF because we had OCO funds available.” Maintaining readiness on a cyclic basis across the force presents greater marginal costs, and declining budgets may force the Army to adopt a tiered readiness approach for the RCs—with part of the force being operational and the rest strategic reserve—if it lacks the funds to do otherwise.

Already, the Army has begun to move away from ARFORGEN. In May 2014, the Army began to develop a replacement for ARFORGEN, the Sustainable Readiness Model. While the precise contours of the plan and its implications for the RCs are still being worked out, some public statements suggest that the Sustainable Readiness Model may look similar to the tiered readiness of the pre-ARFORGEN era.

Regardless, the replacement for ARFORGEN should maximize, to the maximum extent practical, forewarning and predictability for the RCs.

Consider Amending the One-Year Mobilized Time Limit
Beyond the debate about whether or not to stick with cyclic deployments, there are several other areas where the Army can preserve, if not increase, the RCs’ readiness in the future, starting with duration. The only clear dimension in which RCs’ readiness decreased over the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars was in terms of the duration that RC soldiers could remain mobilized. This reduction was due to a policy decision rather than any inherent limitation. The policy was well intentioned

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22 Interview with force manager on July 21, 2015.


and well received at the time.\textsuperscript{25} Today, there are operational reasons to amend this policy. Arbitrary caps on mobilized time make less sense, especially if future deployments after Iraq and Afghanistan will primarily be performed by volunteers, who presumably want to deploy.

One possibility may be to adopt the National Guard Bureau’s recommendation on mobilization limits of 12 months of “boots on the ground” time, rather than the current 12 months of mobilization time.\textsuperscript{26} However, this study did not assess what specific impacts this alternative policy would have on cost, retention, and other factors necessary to preserve readiness in the force.

\textbf{Reconsider the Emphasis on Premobilization Training}

One of the biggest gains to RCs’ readiness has come in the time dimension of readiness, particularly in the speed with which units can deploy once called on. Shifting more training to the period before a unit gets mobilized not only avoids policy-imposed limits on the duration a unit can remain mobilized, but also reduces the amount of time a unit spends in postmobilization training before it deploys. In sum, by focusing on premobilization training, the RCs become a more flexible, rapidly deployable force.

Still, there is an open question of whether a premobilization training plan would be feasible in a post–Iraq and Afghanistan environment.\textsuperscript{27} One of the prerequisites that enabled the RCs to increase premobilization training and reduce postmobilization training time was relative certainty about where units would deploy and what type of missions they would perform, at least a year out.\textsuperscript{28} As a result, units

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For the RCs’ original support of 12-month mobilization limit, see Melnyk, 2007.
\item Frank Grass, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, “Authorities and Assumptions Related to the Rotational Use of the Guard,” memorandum to Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno, Washington, D.C., May 31, 2013.
\item We do not offer a prediction regarding the degree of conflict the U.S. military will be engaged in over the next decade or two. If it is significantly lower than in the past dozen years, then it is intuitively likely that fewer forces will be deployed.
\item The second year prior was primarily focused on individual readiness, with collective training occurring in the following year. Several interviews questioned whether collective training that was not contiguous to mobilization was worth the effort. Interviews with First
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
could schedule premobilization training events years out and still have these training events be directly tied to their predeployment preparations. Going forward, if there is more uncertainty about future operations, such a premobilization focus may no longer be a viable option.

**Consider Maintaining the Equipping Push**

If the Army wants to continue to emphasize premobilization training, then it is essential for RC units to have the right equipment to make the most out of training. This may hold true regardless of premobilization training strategy because improvement in equipping is one of the readiness factors that take the longest to achieve. (Another way to express this concern is that equipment on-hand is a potential inhibitor that requires a long lead time to address.) After years of lackluster results, the Army today slowly is working toward the goal of the RCs having most of their required equipment on hand. The ARNG is within 2 percent of matching the Regular Army’s average fill of required equipment on hand.29 This trend in terms of the quantity and quality of resourcing should be maintained going forward if policymakers wish to sustain the current level of operational capability in the RCs or wish to be able to quickly reestablish operational capability even if other readiness factors are allowed to decline.

**Embrace Nonstandard Force Packages**

One of the great advantages of the RCs was also cited as one of their readiness flaws. As noted previously, many RC BCTs and other large formations did not deploy as full Modified Table of Organization and Equipment units.30 This lack of unit cohesion is particularly challenging if the unit is tasked with performing brigade missions that require maneuvering as a brigade (versus parceling out its companies or battalions to operate under a different chain of command). For the much of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the RCs were not tasked with require-

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29 DoD, 2015b, pp. 1–8, 2–4.

30 See Figure 4.2.
ments to maneuver as organic brigades or battalions but instead accomplished a range of critical but nonmaneuver missions—such as SFA or local security missions—that did not fit neatly inside the Army’s existing force structure. The flexibility of the RCs’ force structure to meet these requirements proved to be an important characteristic. For example, one force manager remarked that, when he broached the subject of fielding nonstandard units, the Regular Army had “a severe allergic reaction.” The RCs, and particularly the USAR, however, proved more willing to build units to meet specific mission requirements. Going forward, the RCs should fully embrace the role of nonstandard force package provider. The leadership of the USAR and ARNG should express willingness to have their units sourced for missions that will require a tailored, versus Modified Table of Organization and Equipment, force.

Reexamine Medical Readiness

Finally, the Army should reexamine its medical readiness program for the RCs. From the data presented here, there appears to be a mixed finding. On the one hand, the medical readiness of the RCs is increasing, but at the same time, the percentage of the RCs with a DLC is not decreasing as much as one might expect—and is still much higher than the RCs of the other services. Since medical readiness is not a good unto itself, but rather aims at increasing the percentage of forces available for deployment, the trend is particularly troubling and needs to fully be understood. By the same measure, such further study should analyze the accuracy of the data. A recent GAO report found that stated medically available rates were often incorrect. Finally, this review also should examine the return on investment in terms of readiness gained from specific forms of medical care (e.g., dental care, PHAs, immunizations).

31 Interview with former Department of the Army Force Manager, August 11, 2015. Additionally, a FORSCOM interviewee expressed similar sentiments in an interview conducted on July 24, 2015.

32 Figure 4.2.

33 GAO, 2015.
Directions for Future Research

To help inform some of the above policy considerations, there are several issue areas for future research, starting with marginal costs. Previous research suggests that certain RC units may, in fact, be more expensive than the Regular Army in the context of protracted conflicts fought with rotational forces. Because the ARFORGEN cycle spins almost twice as fast for the Regular Army than it does for the RCs (a goal of 1:3 deployed-to-dwell for Regular Army compared with a goal of 1:5 mobilized-to-dwell for the RCs), it consequently requires roughly double the number of units from the RCs to provide the same output as units from the Regular Army. If the United States, however, is no longer fighting protracted conflicts and ARFORGEN is changed dramatically or eliminated, then the Army should reconsider these costing assumptions. If ARFORGEN remains in place, the cost calculation should consider a range of possible future rotation rates versus examining only the past experience of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.

A second set of issues concerns the switch from postmobilization to premobilization training. At the time, the Gates memo placed caps on mobilization length with the belief that shortening postmobilization training time would reduce the stress on RC soldiers’ families and employers. It is plausible, however, that a single, longer absence is, in fact, less disruptive to RC members’ families and civilian employers than multiple shorter absences under a premobilization training focus. Future research should examine family and employer preferences. The costs and benefits of premobilization training should also be explored. Presumably, by shifting more training to before mobilization, units are training some soldiers who will end up not deploying with the unit. In some cases, if the strategic circumstances change, an entire unit could begin to go through the process of premobilization training and then not deploy if the need for forces changes during the run-up to mobilization and deployment. For example, during Operation United Assistance, the U.S. response to the Ebola outbreak, RC units trained for

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34 Klimas et al., 2014. However, we note that these ratios are goals and in many cases both Regular Army and RCs units have rotated more quickly.
the mission but did not deploy.³⁵ The cost and the effect of this “excess capacity” on the force should be quantified to support smarter decisions about the differences between pre- versus postmobilization training costs. Additionally, such research should examine the effect of split (versus contiguous) predeployment training periods on sustainment of individual and collective skills. In other words, it should ask: Which approach leads to a deeper bench of soldiers who retain more necessary knowledge?

The cost-benefit analysis between pre- and postmobilization training, in turn, touches on a third area for future exploration—namely the architecture needed to support future RC readiness. While most of this study focused on the readiness of RC units themselves, future work should focus on what institutional support the Army should provide to the RCs, both within components (e.g., how states organize to support deploying ARNG forces) and across them (e.g., U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) to support increased employment of RC forces. If cross-leveling is as prevalent and necessary as history suggests it is, for example, the Army as a Total Force needs to assess how it supports cross-leveling as an organization. Similarly, future work should also touch on what physical infrastructure support is needed to support the RCs. Depending on whether the RCs perform more or less premobilization training, they may require different types of installation support to allow RC soldiers to train at or near home station.

Forewarning and the role of time when analyzing the balance of Regular Army versus RC units in the Army Total Force is a fourth area for future study. As already mentioned, there is an open question about the extent to which the RCs can execute a premobilization-centric training model if they did not have ample forewarning about the nature and type of mission they would conduct. Future studies should expand on this insight and analyze what can and cannot be accomplished in premobilization training during a period of strategic uncertainty. An even broader question, however, relates to the nature of time in campaign planning. One of the underlying assumptions in

many of the Regular Army–RCs mix debates is that speed is essential for readiness and that forces must be deployable rapidly if they are to be useful. In practice, however, many wars—including Desert Storm, OIF, and even World War II—included lengthy build-up times before the onset of hostilities for U.S. forces. As a result, a quick deployment, in many circumstances, may not matter as much as commonly supposed, and this, in turn, may affect assessments of the utility of the RCs relative to the Regular Army.

The G-3/5/7 Operations Planning Team for this study also raised the following issues that were not addressed within this report but may be useful topics for future research:

- Should the institutional structure for mobilization be revised? If yes, how?
- Are training facilities used by the RCs both sufficient and efficient? Should the expected reductions in the size of the Total Army cause changes to training facility numbers, sizes, and locations?
- Are there changes to equipment concentrations (e.g., diffuse home station distribution versus concentration at fewer centralized training sites) and theater-provided equipment policies that would improve RC operational force generation capabilities?

**Sustaining the RCs as an Operational Force**

At the end of the day, whether or not the RCs remain an operational force may be beyond the RCs’ or any Army policymakers’ control. According to the DoDD definition, one of the critical aspects for a force to remain operational is that it must be regularly and continuously used in missions overseas. And so, if the era of persistent large-scale ground wars end, the RCs may cease to be an operational force by this definition.

The Army, however, has more influence on sustaining the RCs’ readiness. To be sure, it cannot always count on having the same minimal inhibitors, such as years of forewarning about impending mis-
sions, as were present for the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Similarly, neither the ARNG nor the USAR has a single topline budget that they control and appropriations may be influenced but not controlled by the Army or DoD. Nonetheless, the Army can influence the policies that increased the RCs’ capabilities and allowed them to respond more quickly and sustain a high level of effort for years on end.
APPENDIX A
Summary of 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, Title XI

Title XI is broken down into 19 sections, which can be grouped into four functional categories:1

- **Deployability enhancements** focuses on training, medical readiness, and leadership experience and qualifications (11 sections)
  - Sections 1111, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1121, 1131, 1135, 1136
- **Compatibility enhancements** to improve RCs and AC interoperability (five sections)
  - Sections 1112, 1113, 1120, 1133, 1134
- **Inspection and assessment** of units (two sections)
  - Sections 1122, 1132
- **Feasibility study** of initiatives (one section)
  - Section 1137.

§1111: *Prior active-duty service*. Original wording of this required 65 percent of officers and 50 percent of enlisted members to have at least two years of prior active-duty service.2 In the 1996 NDAA, this was revised by Congress, as the AC and RCs viewed this requirement as an unrealistic guideline, especially as the AC drawdown continued. The new goal was to assign officers who still owed payback time from

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1 Stredwick, 1996, p. 11.
2 Pint et al., 2015, p. 28.
a service academy or a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program, to finish out their owed service in the National Guard.³

§1114: Noncommissioned officer education requirements. This required noncommissioned officers to complete military education requirements before being eligible for promotion to a higher grade. By 1996, this was fully implemented through the Total Army School System.⁴

§1115: Nondeployable status in personnel accounting. The National Guard created a new category for members who did not complete the requirements for minimum training, did not meet physical standards, or for another reason could not be deployed. This category was fully implemented in the ARNG in accounting with the interconnectivity of Standard Installation and the Division Personnel Reporting System.⁵ However, over time, there have been changes in the requirements and policies regarding trainees, transients, holdees, and students, and nonstandardized use of these categories across the RCs, which might not yield the accurate insight into end strength deployability this section meant to give.⁶

§1116: Minimum physical deployability standards. Any soldier who does not meet the minimum physical standards set for deployment must have their status transferred to nondeployable within 90 days. This section was implemented with the development of the nondeployable personnel account established in the previous section. As previously mentioned, the varying usage of the trainees, transients, holdees, and students category indicates this section might not be giving the accurate snapshot of end strength.

§1117/1118: Medical/dental screenings and readiness. Original wording required annual medical and dental screenings of all ARNG members and a full physical examination to be completed biannually. This was determined to be cost prohibitive to implement (as the RCs

³ Pint et al., 2015, table 5.1.
and thus the NDAA for FY 1996 changed the annual screenings to apply only to high-priority units deploying within 75 days of mobilization and the biannual physicals for soldiers over the age of 40 assigned to high-priority units. In 2001, the formation of TRICARE Dental aimed to improve dental readiness with improved benefits and reduced costs for care for reservists. 

§1119: Combat unit training. According to the 2015 RAND report, this section requires the Army to establish a program to minimize the post-mobilization training time required for ARNG combat units. It requires unit premobilization training to emphasize individual soldier qualification and training; collective training and qualification at the crew, section, team, and squad levels; and maneuver training at the platoon level. Combat training for command and staff leadership is required to include multi-echelon training to develop battalion-, brigade-, and division-level staff skills.

The FORSCOM Ground Force Readiness Enhancement program was designed to provide combat training for command and staff leadership positions, as well as minimize postmobilization training required for National Guard combat units by focusing individual soldier qualification and training at the crew, squad, and platoon level during premobilization training.

§1121: Modification of the deployment readiness rating. This has been implemented with the USR and AR 220-1. The USR is updated every 90 days, and it identifies readiness and shortfalls for personnel in

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7 “AC/RC Integration Item 98-95, Medical and Dental Readiness in the Reserve Component,” memorandum for the Reserve Component Coordination Council, Washington, D.C., October 1, 2001.

8 Pint et al., 2015, p. v.


manning, deployability, and Military Occupational Specialty Qualification. For tracking equipment, it includes readiness assessment, comparing the equipment required for deployment to the equipment possessed by the unit. It also keeps an updated status on training reports for the Mission Essential Task List as well as the Military Occupational Specialty Qualification and Warrior Tasks.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsection{1131: Active component training responsibilities.} This associated each ARNG unit with an active-duty combat unit. It also assigned the AC commander with responsibility for an approval over the RCs’ training program and assessment of resources, including personnel and equipment, review of readiness reports, and annual validation of compatibility of the RCs and AC units. The First Army now fills many of the roles and requirements the AC commanders were assigned in this section; so while the integration is being tended to by an active component, it is no longer necessarily in the purview of the active-duty combat unit with which the RCs are associated.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsection{1135: Deployment planning.} This provision was to assess the number of days required for postmobilization training and identify priorities for mobilization of RCs units.\textsuperscript{13} The Unit Deployment Designator System was integrated into the Army planning process to provide estimated postmobilization training days allocated to the RCs’ unit, as well as timing of deployments after mobilization.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsection{1136: Prior-service enlistment bonus.} This was amended in Section 308i (c) of Title 37, Pay and Allowance of the Uniformed Service, and is still in effect.

\textsection{1112: Service in selected reserve in lieu of active-duty service.} An officer who is a graduate of one of the service academies or who was commissioned as a distinguished Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduate and is released from active duty before completing his or her active-duty service obligation shall serve the remaining period of that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Pint et al., 2015, p. 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Pint et al., 2015, table 5.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Pint et al., 2015, table 5.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Stredwick, 1996, p. 14.
\end{itemize}
obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve. Graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program may perform their minimum period of obligated service by a combination of two years of active duty and the remainder of their service obligation in the National Guard.

§1113: Review of officer promotions by commander of associated active-duty unit. Recommended promotions above first lieutenant are reviewed by the commander of the AC unit associated with the National Guard unit for his or her concurrence or nonconcurrence in the promotion.

§1120: Use of combat simulators. This requires the expansion of the use of simulators, simulations to increase training opportunities for the RCs. Part of the Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) was the Total Army Training Study, and the use of simulators was “aggressively” expanded. By 1996, the Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer, the Weaponeer, and Guard Fist I and II were all fielded for RCs’ use in response to this requirement. Simulation training (e.g., Simulator Networking [SIMNET], Close Combat Tactical Trainer [CCTT], or Joint Army Navy Uniform Simulation [JANUS]) was implemented for virtual training. Simulators and advanced training devices and technology continue to be a part of ARNG training.

§1133/1134: System compatibility and equipment compatibility. To achieve smoother integration for mobilization, the Army adopted Open Systems Environment standards so that finance, supply, personnel, and maintenance management could all be compatible between the RCs and AC. The yearly posture statement reports on compatibility between the RCs and AC. Budgetary restraints have been named as the consistent cause for why this requirement has not been implemented. For example, a U.S. Army Reserve reported stated that:

The Army Reserve consistently trails the Total Army in modernization and equipment on-hand, thus creating compatibility risk. The presence of incompatible equipment in Army Reserve formations reduces the Army Reserve’s ability to work shoulder to

15 Stredwick, 1996, p. 15.
shoulder with other Army components to provide needed capabilities to the Army and the Nation.16

§1122: Inspections. This is to evaluate whether the combat arms unit meets deployability standards. The Operational Readiness Evaluation program created a report that included the status of the personnel, maintenance, supply, operational records, training records, and a summary evaluation of the unit’s capability to accomplish its wartime mission. This report became part of the USR to determine a unit’s deployability status as part of the GFRE program.17

§1132: Training compatibility. Originally, this dedicated 2,000 AC officers and 3,000 warrant officers and enlisted personnel as advisors to RCs units. However, the RAND report points out that there was no clear basis for this number, and while there were thousands of AC personnel assigned to RCs for a variety of training and support tasks, there is no standard for involvement and still no clarity on what the “right” number is.18

§1137: Study of implementation for all RCs. According to Stredwick, the DoD study is complete: (1) It found that sections 1111, 1112, 1117, 1119, 1131, and 1132 were not appropriate for implementation in the USAR. (2) It found that policies already exist within the USAR for Sections 1113, 1114, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1133, and 1134. (3) It found that DoD chose to implement Sections 1115, 1116, 1118, and 1135 by policy, not legislation. (4) It finally found that the Army’s intent is to fully implement policy provisions of Title XI in the ARNG and the USAR.19

16 Talley, Wilson, and Thomas, 2015.
17 Stredwick, 1996, p. 17.
18 Pint et al., 2015, table 5.1.
19 Stredwick, 1996, p. 17.
Defining an Operational RC\textsuperscript{1}

**DoDDs and DoDIs**

- **DoDD 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” October 29, 2008.**\textsuperscript{2}
  - Does not provide a definition of *operational reserve*, but it does provide a definition for *RCs as an operational force*. This is the definition:

  The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or period manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families and employers. In their strategic roles, RCs units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As

\textsuperscript{1} In our research, the sponsor asked us to take as an assumption the definition of *operational reserve* contained within DoDI 1200.17. This section provides the DoDI 1200.17 definition and two additional proposed definitions found while researching other related topics.

\textsuperscript{2} DoD, 2008a.
such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.

Additional DoD Policy

  
  – This report provides a recommended definition for *operational reserve*. The “approved slides” contained within the report also provide other definitions of *operational reserve* used by DoD, Army G-3/5/7, and the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve.

- **Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, November 8, 2010a (amended through February 15, 2016).**
  
  – Defines *operational reserve* as “An emergency reserve of men and/or materiel established for the support of a specific operation.”

Equipment Readiness

Public Laws and Statutes


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4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010a.

Title XI contains the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Although Title XI is discussed more fully in its own section below, relevant portions of the legislation are included herein.

- Section 1134, “Equipment Compatibility”
  * Amends 10 U.S.C. § 10541(b) to require the National Guard and Army Reserve Equipment annual report to include a statement on the current status of the compatibility of equipment between the Army reserve components and active forces, the effect of that level of incompatibility on combat effectiveness, and a plan to achieve full equipment compatibility.6

  - Title III, Subtitle E, Section 351 amends 10 U.S.C. § 10541 to require the mandated DoD report to Congress on RCs’ equipment to include the following:
    - “An assessment of the extent to which the National Guard possess the equipment required to perform the responsibilities of the National Guard pursuant to sections 331, 332, 333, 12304(b) and 12406 of [Title 10] in response to an emergency or major disaster . . . such assessment shall
      * (A) identify any shortfall in equipment provided to the National Guard by the Department of Defense throughout the United States and the territories and possessions of the United States that is likely to affect the ability of the National Guard to perform such responsibility;
      * (B) evaluate the effect of any such shortfall on the capacity of the National Guard to perform such responsibilities in response to an emergency or major disaster that occurs

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in the United States or a territory or possession of the United States; and
* (C) identify the requirements and investment strategies for equipment provided to the National Guard by the Department of Defense that are necessary to plan for a reduction or elimination of any such shortfall.”

- United States Code, Title 10, Section 10541, National Guard and Reserve Component Equipment: Annual Report to Congress, December 31, 2011.9
  – This provision was originally added as part of the NDAA for FY 1991.
  – Each year, the Secretary of Defense is required to submit a written report to Congress concerning RCs’ equipment for all services for each of the three succeeding FYs (subsection a). Subsection b sets forth the lengthy reporting requirements on the Selected Reserve’s equipment including, but not limited to, recommendations on what the Selected Reserve should have on hand, the quantity and ages of what they have on hand, and the quantity of deployable and nondeployable substitutes the Selected Reserve has in lieu of the preferred equipment.10

DoDDs and DoDI s

  – Section 7 of the Enclosure requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to “establish policies and develop procedures to ensure the RCs are managed as an effective operational force for all matters related

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8 See also Section 10541(b)(9) of United States Code, Title 10, Section 10541, National Guard and Reserve Component Equipment: Annual Report to Congress, December 31, 2011.


10 For a full list, see Section 10541(b) of United States Code, 2011.
to the DoD Acquisition System; research and development; advanced technology; integrated test and evaluation; production; logistics; installation management; military construction; procurement; environmental security; and nuclear, chemical, and biological matters.”11

– Section 10 of the Enclosure also requires the Secretaries of the Military Departments to:
  ◦ (1) “ensure procurement programs and processes provide visibility and accountability of RCs equipment in the Program/Budget justification materials through the timely execution of funds and distribution of procured assets”12
  ◦ (2) “accelerate modernization while balancing the need for restoring immediate readiness through recapitalization with the imperative to prepare for future conflicts with more advanced adversaries.”13

• DoDI 1225.06, “Equipping the Reserve Component.”14
  – Revisions15
    ◦ November 9, 1992: “The priority for the distribution of new and combat serviceable equipment with associated support and test equipment, should be given to units scheduled to be deployed and/or employed first, irrespective of comment.”
    ◦ April 7, 2005: Revised to ensure RCs is better equipped to address homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions.
    ◦ May 16, 2012: “To fulfill assigned missions, the RCs of each Military Department shall be consistently and predictably equipped. The RCs must have the right equipment, available in the right quantities, at the right time, and at the right

12 DoD, 2008.
14 DoD, 2012b.
place to support a ‘Train, Mobilize, and Deploy’ construct for the Total Force.”

Additional DoD Policy

  – Found that “Army officials did not implement procedures to properly account for the transfer and replacement of 239,332 pieces of Army Reserve Components equipment, valued at approximately $5.8 billion. As a result, Army Reserve Components have lost transparency of their equipment transfers and may experience equipment shortages that could hinder their ability to train soldiers and respond to Federal, State, or local emergencies.”

Army Policy

  – Section 3(b) states it is Army policy for the Army to “ensure the Total Force is organized, trained, sustained, equipped and employed to support combatant commander requirements as force packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives.”
  – Section 3(f) states it is Army policy that its “equipping strategy will ensure that procurement and equipping processes enable the Total Force to perform the missions of the Department of the Army.”

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17 McHugh, 2012.
• **Army Directive 2015-13, “Equipment Transparency Policy.”**\(^{20}\)
  – Established Army policy and assigned responsibilities within HQDA, for equipment transparency; that is, the accountability, traceability, and reporting of requirements regarding the programming, funding, contracting, production, and delivery of procurement items for the RCs.\(^{21}\)

**Force Structure and Management**

**Public Laws and Statutes**

• **10 U.S.C. § 129a, “General Policy for Total Force Management.”**\(^{22}\)
  – Subsection (a) requires the Secretary of Defense to “establish policies and procedures for determining the most appropriate and cost efficient mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel to perform the mission of the Department of Defense.”\(^{23}\)
  – Subsection (b) sets forth the principle of risk mitigation over cost, whereby the force structure shall be sufficiently sized and appropriately mixed to carry out both DoD’s mission and the armed forces’ core mission areas.\(^{24}\)

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\(^{21}\) DoD, 2015a, p. 1.

\(^{22}\) United States Code, Title 10, Section 129a, General Policy for Total Force Management, December 31, 2011.

\(^{23}\) United States Code, 2011.

\(^{24}\) United States Code, 2011.
  – Section 512 amends Title 32 by adding Chapter Nine, “Homeland Defense Activities.”\textsuperscript{26}

Additional DoD Policy

• Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Utilization of the Total Force,” 2007 memorandum.\textsuperscript{27}  
  – Established the following policies:
    ◦ (1) Capping of involuntary mobilization of RCs to a maximum of one year at any given time. At service discretion, this period could exclude individual skill training required for deployment and postmobilization leave.
    ◦ (2) Requirement of mobilization of ground combat, combat support, and combat service support to be managed on a unit basis to maintain predictability and cohesion for RCs.
    ◦ (3) Planning objective remaining as mobilization-to-dwell ratio of 1:5 for RCs and boots on the ground—to-dwell of 1:2 for AC, although circumstances may necessitate a shorter dwell time.
    ◦ (4) Establishment of programs to compensate or incentivize RCs required mobilizing sooner than 1:5 ratio or extending beyond established rotational goals.
    ◦ (5) Requirement for all commands and units to review administration of the hardship waiver program.
    ◦ (6) Requirement to minimize stop-loss for both AC and RCs.


\textsuperscript{26} Public Law 108-375, 2004.

\textsuperscript{27} Gates, 2007.
  - The section on “Developing a 21st Century Total Force” is on pages 75–81 of the 2006 review. In the continuum of service discussion, the 2006 QDR states “the Reserve Component must be operationalized . . . [and] [i]n today’s global context, [the strategic reserve] concept it less relevant.”

Army Policy

  - Effective January 1, 2012, changed boots on the ground–to-dwell time to nine-month deployment period for General Purpose Forces (Division and below) supporting named operations outside the continental United States.
  - “This policy is necessary to integrate active and reserve forces at a tactical level within the Army’s force generation process, consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s policies for Utilization of the Total Force.”

• Operational Readiness Evaluation program
  - Section 1122 of Title XI of the NDAA for FY 1993 (discussed further in its own section below) required Army inspections of ARNG units, including to determine if they were meeting

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29 DoD, 2006b, pp. 76–78.


deployability standards. The Operational Readiness evaluation program created a report that included the status of the personnel, maintenance, supply, operational records, training records, and a summary evaluation of the unit’s capability to accomplish its wartime mission. This report is now part of the FORSCOM GFRE program to determine a unit’s deployability status.32

Medical Readiness

Public Laws and Statutes

  - Title XI contained the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Although Title XI is discussed more fully in its own section below, relevant portions of the legislation are included herein.
    - Section 1116, “Minimum Physical Deployability Standards”
      * The Secretary of the Army shall transfer the personnel classification of an ARNG member from that member’s unit to a Section 1115 category if that person does not meet the physical profile standards required for deployment.
    - Section 1117, “Medical Assessments”
      * Each ARNG member is required to undergo an annual medical and dental screening. Each ARNG member over the age of 40 is required to undergo a full physical examination at least every two years.
    - Section 1118, “Dental Readiness of Members of Early Deploying Units”
      * ARNG units scheduled for early deployment in the event of mobilization must be dentally ready for deploy-

32 Stredwick, 1996, p. 16.
ment. The Secretary of the Army was required to submit a report on the dental readiness plan to the House and Senate Armed Service Committees (HASC and SASC) no later than February 15, 1993.

  - Section 704 of the NDAA for FY 1996 repealed Sections 1116 and 1117 of Title XI, discussed above. Instead, it revised 10 U.S.C. § 1074a, “Medical and Dental Care: members on duty other than active duty for a period of more than 30 days.” The revision restricted annual medical and dental screenings and biennial physicals for soldiers over 40 years of age to only those members of the Army’s Selected Reserve who were assigned to units scheduled for deployment within 75 days after mobilization.

**DoDDs and DoDIs**

- **DoDD 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” October 29, 2008.**
  - Section 3 of the Enclosure requires the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD [HA]) to “ensure policies are in place to support medical and dental readiness such that RCs members comply with required medical and dental standards pre-activation through deactivation.”
  - Section 10 of the Enclosure also requires the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure that resources support RCs member medical and dental readiness.

- **DoDI 6025.19, “Individual Medical Readiness,” June 9, 2014.**
  - Revisions
    - January 3, 2006

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33 DoD, 2014d.
34 DoD, 2014d.
* Requires quarterly reporting of the six IMR performance metrics and establishes the required minimum goal of having more than 75 percent of service members fully medically ready.

- June 9, 2014

* Leaves the goals simply as “as established by ASD(HA) based on the recommendation of the IMRWG.”

**Additional DoD Policy**

- **William Winkenwerder Jr., “Policy for Individual Readiness Metrics,” memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA), Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (M&RA) and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (M&RA), and Director Joint Staff, HA 3-009, May 2, 2003.**
  - Sets forth six “essential Individual Medical Readiness (IMR) elements” to monitor each service member and be tracked by the services and reported quarterly. The six elements were established by a joint service working group.

**Mobilization of and Access to the Reserve Components**

**Public Laws and Statutes**

  - Title XI contained the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992. Although Title XI is discussed more fully in its own section below, relevant portions of the legislation are included herein.

  - Section 1135, “Deployment Planning Reform”
    * Required the Secretary of the Army to develop a system for identifying the priority for mobilization of RCs units.

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35 DoD, 2014d.
The priority system was required to be based on regional contingency planning requirements and doctrine and integrated into the Army war planning process. The system was to include the use of Unit Deployment Designators to specify postmobilization training days allocated to a unit before deployment, and Section 1135 set forth requirements on the use of these designators.

- **United States Code, Title 10, Section 115, Personnel Strengths: Requirement for Annual Authorization, October 28, 2009.**
  - Amended by “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,” Pub. L. 108-375 to add subsection (b) that creates Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) and Full-Time National Guard Duty—Operational Support (FTNGD-OS) categories. The final report from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve states that the categories of ADOS and FTNGD-OS were created at DoD’s request.\(^\text{36}\)
  - ADOS and FTNGD-OS members are those who volunteer for active duty to provide operational support. They can remain on active duty under these duty statuses for up to three years (or for three years cumulatively over a four-year period, if not consecutive time periods), without being counted against active duty end strength.

- **United States Code, Title 10, Section 12304b, Selected Reserve: Order to Active Duty for Preplanned Missions in Support of the Combatant Commands, January 2, 2013.**
  - Established in the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.”\(^\text{37}\)
  - RC members activated under this authority are not counted in computing authorized end strength for members on active duty.


Section 12304b sets forth limitations for ordering RCs units to active duty under this authority. The order to active duty has statutory limitations:

- (1) cannot be for more than 365 consecutive days
- (2) only 60,000 or less RCs members can be on active duty under this authority at any one time
- (3) the manpower and associated costs of this active duty must be specifically included and identified in the defense budget materials for the relevant fiscal year(s)
- (4) the relevant budget information must include a mission description and anticipated length of time on active duty for those units activated under this authority
- (5) the secretaries of the military departments must submit to Congress a written report setting forth both the circumstances necessitating the activation under this authority and the anticipated use of each unit so activated.


  - Section 511, “Increased Period of Active Duty for Reserve Forces Mobilized Other Than During War or National Emergency.” Subsection (a) changed the consecutive active duty days’ cap from 90 to 270 and removing the statutory text prohibiting the Secretary of Defense from extending active duty under this section to 90 days or fewer.
  - Subsection (b) required the Secretary of Defense to submit to House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee a report on “the desirability of increasing the authority of the President to order units and members of the reserve components to active duty without the consent of the members concerned.” The report was required to be submitted by April 1, 1995.

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38 Although the source makes reference to 10 U.S.C. § 673b, this section was renumbered to 10 U.S.C. § 12304, “Selected Reserve and certain Individual Ready Reserve members; order to active duty other than during war or national emergency.”
  – Section 522(a) amended 10 U.S.C. § 12304(a) to increase the consecutive active duty days’ cap from 270 to 365 days.

  – Section 514 amends 10 U.S.C. § 12301 to include active duty for training within the statutory authority to order the RCs to active duty.
  – Section 512 amends Title 32 by adding Chapter Nine, “Homeland Defense Activities.”

DoDDs and DoDIs

  – Relevant revisions
    ◦ July 1, 1995
      * Updates policy to implement legal requirements pertaining to the order of RCs units and individuals to active duty in support of operational missions, contingency operations, during a national emergency, or in time of war.
      * Establishes policy for ordering RCs to duty under Sections 12301(a), 12301(b), 12302, or 12304 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
    ◦ September 23, 2004
    ◦ November 26, 2008
      * Updates policy and responsibilities for mobilizing the RCs to include appropriate guidance from Secretary Gates’s memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force,” January 19, 2007.
      * Section 3(b) of Enclosure 2 establishes involuntary mobilization of the RCs to a maximum of 1 year at any one time. It also sets the RCs mob-to-dwell ratio at 1:5, although it is acknowledged that “today’s global demands
will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units to be remobilized sooner than this standard. The intention is that such exceptions be temporary . . . [and] exceptions shall be approved by the Secretary of Defense.” For individuals who are involuntarily mobilized with a frequency and duration beyond this, DoD will incentivize them pursuant to Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, “Programs to Support Utilization of the Total Force.”

• DoDI 1235.12, “Accessing the Reserve Components (RC),” February 4, 2010 (incorporating Change 1, April 4, 2012).39
  – Revisions
    ◦ January 19, 1996
      * “For planning and programming purposes, it is DoD policy that when Reserve component augmentation of the active forces is required for major regional conflicts and national emergencies, access to the Reserve components and individuals through an order to active duty without their consent will be assumed. For lesser regional conflicts, domestic emergencies, and other missions, where capabilities of the Reserve components could be required, maximum consideration will be given to accessing volunteer Reserve component units and individuals before seeking authority to order members of the Reserve components to active duty without their consent.”
    ◦ February 4, 2010
      * Section 4(a): “The RCs provide an operational capability and strategic depth in support of the national defense strategy.”
      * Section 4 sets forth the DoD standards for RCs usage including, but not limited to: (1) a mobility-to-dwell ratio of 1:5; (2) approval of a mobilization order 180 days prior to the mobilization date; (3) authorization of an alert notification up to 24 months prior to the mobili-

tion date; (4) a minimum of 30 days’ notification prior to involuntary mobilization to support emergent requirements; (5) discussion of the approval, coordination, notification, and release process to accessing the RC.

* Enclosure 3 sets forth the guidelines for mobilizing and demobilizing RC forces.

- April 4, 2012

* Implements provisions of NDAA FY 2010 on limiting scheduling of mobilization/premobilization training for an RC unit at a temporary duty location that is outside the normal commuting distance of that unit when a suspension of training of at least five days is anticipated/occurs. The Secretaries of the Military Departments may waive the applicability of this limitation if he or she determines that it is in the national security interests of the United States, although written notice of the waivers was required through December 31, 2014.40

* Revises Section 4 (Policy) to
  - (1) expand DoD policy from activation to use of RC forces, “entailing activation, employment, deactivation, and response to changes in operational requirements”
  - (2) include procedures to determine if mobilization with less than 30 days notification is warranted in “crisis situations”
  - (3) include principles for management of RCs forces during changes to operational requirements.

* Adds language to Section 11 (Commanders of the Combatant Commands) to require
  - (1) timely notification to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Military Departments of changes to operational requirements affecting RCs forces

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- (2) identification of requirements with RCs forces for off-ramp or curtailment 180 days prior to deployment or redeployment
- (3) evaluation of RCs units and members for allocation to other requirements within their areas of responsibility.

Pending

* On May 27, 2015, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) met with members of the Army G-3/5/7 to discuss matters concerning both how the policy construct for accessing the RCs was developed and its utility. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has asked the RFPB to consider recommendations for revising DoDI 1235.12.

Additional DoD Policy


  – Set forth policy guidelines to provide flexibility to the services and Combatant Commanders in evaluating RCs’ mobilization on a case-by-case basis during operational force reductions. The included decision matrix provided a general guideline on handling RC mobilization during force reductions and included the following:

  ◦ “(1) If the RCs unit can replace an AC unit, consider deploying the RCs to allow greater dwell time in stressed AC units and MOSs [military service obligations]. . . (3) if a RCs unit has less than 12 months total mobilization time, return the AC to home station. Consider de-mobilizing the RCs after 12 months of total mobilization time.”

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41 David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “Reserve Component Policy Options During Operational Force Reductions,” memorandum for sec-

– Established policies that (1) involuntary mobilization of reservists will be for maximum of one year at any given time; (2) mobilization of ground combat, combat support, and combat services support will be managed on a unit basis; (3) mobility-to-dwell goal ratio will remain 1:5, although circumstances may require quicker remobilization.


– In its discussion on continuum of service, the 2006 QDR states “to fight the long war and conduct other future contingency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the Reserve Component must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.”42 The 2006 QDR states that DoD will take actions to

  ◦ (1) “pursue authorities for increased access to the Reserve Component; to increase the period authorized for Presidential Reserve Call-up from 270 to 365 days.”43

Army Policy

• Army Directive 2012-08, “Army Total Force Policy.”44

– Section 3(e) states it is Army policy to “streamline the voluntary and involuntary call to active duty of RCs personnel and units to rapidly expand and sustain Total Army capabilities.”
– Section 4(e) requires the Army to “use the new authority provided by 10 United States Code section 12304b . . . to allow the Army to benefit from the shared experiences of the last decade of war.”

• AR 500-5, “Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources: Army Mobilization,” April 16, 2015.\(^{45}\)
  – Adds Section 105, which defines Army mobilization as follows: “Army mobilization is the process of bringing the Army to a state of readiness for war, contingency, or national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Component (RC), as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.”

### Personnel Readiness

#### Public Laws and Statutes

• 10 U.S.C. § 10542, “Army National Guard combat readiness: annual report.”\(^{46}\)
  – This provision originated in the NDAA for FY 1994.
  – Subsection (a) requires the Secretary of the Army to include in its annual Army Posture Statement “a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, including particularly information relating to the implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of [NDAA for FY 1993] (hereinafter in this section referred to as “ANGCRRRA”).
  – Subsection (b) contains lengthy requirements for this report including but not limited to the numbers and percentages of both officers and enlisted personnel with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of ARNG, the number

\(^{45}\) AR 500-5, Army Mobilization

\(^{46}\) United States Code, Title 10, Section 10542, Army National Guard Combat Readiness: Annual Report, November 25, 2015.
of officers who came from the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps under certain conditions, the number of waivers, and the number and distribution by grade for each State.\textsuperscript{47}

**DoDDs and DoDIs**

- **DoDI 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” October 29, 2008.**
  - Section 4 of the Enclosure requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to “establish policies and develop procedures to ensure the RCs have operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.”
  - Section 10 of the Enclosure requires the Secretaries of the Military Departments to:
    - (1) manage their RCs as an operational force:
    - (2) “ensure that the RCs participate across the full spectrum of missions at home and abroad”
    - (3) “ensure RCs forces meet operational readiness requirements as identified by the President and the Secretary of Defense”
    - (4) “ensure sufficient depth of RCs unit and individual capabilities to meet established DoD force utilization goals.”

- **DoDI 1205.18, “Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components,” May 12, 2014.\textsuperscript{48}**
  - Revisions
    - May 25, 2000
      - Section 4 set forth DoD policy on the FTS program. A significant role of the FTS program was to achieve delineated RCs readiness goals, including:
        * “4.2.1. Mobilizing and enhancing the deployability of Reserve component units and personnel;”

\textsuperscript{47} For a full list see United States Code, Title 10, Section 10542(b), 2015.

\textsuperscript{48} DoD, “Full-Time Support (FTS) to the Reserve Components,” instruction no. 1205.18, May 12, 2014b.
* 4.2.2. Achieving established unit readiness and deploy-
ability standards;
* 4.2.3. Training Selected Reserve personnel in their
military occupations to ensure their skill qualification
and readiness;
* 4.2.4. Recruiting and manning Reserve component
units;
* 4.2.5. Maintaining unit equipment, facilities, supplies,
and records;
* 4.2.6. Providing Reserve component advice, expertise,
and liaison to AC activities, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the Combat-
ant Commands, and assisting in the development of
policy and procedures affecting the Reserve compo-
nents;
* 4.2.7. Providing AC experience, advice, doctrinal
expertise, and liaison to Reserve component units;
* 4.2.8. Supporting Total Force integration initiatives
and Reserve component missions.”

May 12, 2014
* Section 3 sets forth DoD policy on FTS to the RCs.
Specifically, “the RCs’ maintain a cadre of FTS per-
sonnel who are primarily responsible for assisting in
the organization, administration, recruitment, instruc-
tion, training, maintenance, and supply support to the
RCs . . . the mix of FTS personnel, which consists of
Active Component (AC personnel, Active Guard and
Reserve (AGR) personnel, military technicians (MTs)
(dual status), non-dual status technicians (NDSTs),
and other federal civilian employees (CIV), is deter-
mined by the Secretary concerned to optimize consist-
ency and stability for each RCs to achieve its assigned
missions.”
* Enclosure 3 sets forth the procedures for the FTS pro-
gram and its management.
• DoDI 1215.13, “Ready Reserve Member Participation Policy,” May 5, 2015.49
  – Revisions
  ◦ December 14, 1995
    * Section 3 set forth minimum requirements for participating in the Ready Reserve. This included: (1) participation in at least 48 scheduled inactive duty training (IDT) periods annually; (2) a minimum of 14 days and maximum of 30 days of active duty training (ADT) annually. National Guard members were required to assemble for: (1) IDT and instruction at least 48 times annually; (2) a minimum of 15 days of training encampments, maneuvers, or exercises annually.
  ◦ July 1, 1998
    * Revised ADT time period requirement to exclude travel time.
  ◦ May 5, 2015
    * Renamed from “Reserve Component (RC) Member Participation Policy” to “Ready Reserve Member Participation Policy.”
    * Establishes procedures for processing Service members who do not meet member participation requirements of Ready Reserve.

• DoDI 1235.12, “Accessing the Reserve Components (RC),” February 4, 2010 (incorporating change 1, April 4, 2012).50
  – Revisions
  ◦ January 19, 1996
    * Section 2.7 stated that “activation” or “mobilization” included “actions taken after the order to prepare Reserve component units and individual members for the perfor-

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mance of operational missions, contingency operations, and service during periods of national emergencies or in time of war.” It did not include ordering RCs to active duty for training.

Section 5 sets forth the procedures for mobilizing the RCs.

February 4, 2010

* Section 4(e) states “the RCs will be allocated resources in the form of manpower, training, equipment, and compensation to fulfill roles and missions as both a strategic and operational force that is a fully integrated part of the national defense strategy.” This included:
  - “(1) The RCs will maintain, and incentivize when necessary, qualified Selected Reserve manpower to meet requirements generated by assigned roles and missions as subject to congressional end strength limitations.
  - (2) The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) will be screened, maintained, and individually prepared for activation as a pre-trained manpower pool to ensure the total force is completely resourced in the event of a contingency operation, national emergency, or war.
  - (3) Ready Reserve units and personnel will be provided resources to execute the train-mobilize-deploy model in order to fulfill their assigned roles and missions in the national defense strategy.”

April 4, 2012

* Implements provisions of NDAA FY 2010 on limiting scheduling of mobilization/premobilization training for an RC unit at a temporary duty location that is outside the normal commuting distance of that unit when a suspension of training of at least five days is anticipated or occurs. The Secretaries of the Military Departments may waive the applicability of this limitation if he or she determines that it is in the national security interests of the
United States, although written notice of the waivers was required through December 31, 2014.51

* Revises Section 4 (“Policy”) to
  - (1) expand DoD policy from activation to utilization of RCs forces, “entailing activation, employment, deactivation, and response to changes in operational requirements”;
  - (2) include procedures to determine if mobilization with less than 30 days notification is warranted in “crisis situations”;
  - (3) include principles for management of RCs forces during changes to operational requirements;

* Adds language to Section 11 (“Commanders of the Combatant Commands”) to require
  - (1) timely notification to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of the Military Departments of changes to operational requirements affecting RCs forces
  - (2) identification of requirements with RCs forces for off-ramp or curtailment 180 days prior to deployment or redeployment
  - (3) evaluation of RCs units and members for allocation to other requirements within their areas of responsibility.

Pending

* On May 27, 2015, the RFPB met with members of the Army G-3/5/7 to discuss matters concerning both how the policy construct for accessing the RCs was developed and its utility. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has asked the RFPB to consider recommendations for revising DoDI 1235.12.

51 See also Title V, Subtitle B, Section 514 in Public Law 11-84, 2009.
Army Policy

  - Section 3(d) requires Army Commands and ASCCs to “ensure that the procedures and processes for validating the predeployment readiness of assigned forces are uniform for AC and RCs units and Soldiers.” Army commanders also are “Responsible for certifying personnel readiness and individual training for assigned personnel.” Army policy requires that “standards for qualification and professional development will be the same for AC and RCs personnel.”

Title XI of the NDAA for FY 1993 (Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992)

Public Laws and Statutes

  - Section 414, “Pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves.”
    - Required the Secretary of the Army to institute a pilot program to provide AC advisors to Selected Reserve combat units, combat support units, and combat service support units that have a high priority for deployment. The aims of the pilot program were (1) to improve RCs unit readiness; (2) substantially increase the number of AC personnel advising RCs personnel; (3) provide a basis for determining the most effective AC-RC mix (officers and enlisted) for organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, and training RCs units. This pilot program became the Army’s BOLD

- Title XI of the NDAA for FY 1993 is the “National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992.” Most provisions of Title XI are not codified in the United States Code, so the section numbers discussed herein refer to the section numbers within the NDAA.

- Subtitle A—Deployability Enhancements
  * Section 1111, “Minimum Percentage of Prior Active Duty Personnel.”
    - Required the Secretary of the Army to increase the percentage of qualified prior active-duty personnel in ARNG to 65 percent for officers and 50 percent for enlisted personnel by September 30, 1997. Also required the Secretary of the Army to prescribe regulations establishing accession percentages for FYs 1993–1997 to achieve this objective.
    - Defined qualified prior active-duty personnel as members of the ARNG with a minimum of two years of active duty.

  * Section 1112, “Service in Selected Reserve in Lieu of Active Duty Service.”
    - Graduates of the service academies and commissioned distinguished ROTC graduates who were released from active duty before completing his or her military service obligations (MSOs) were required to serve the remainder of that period in the Selected Reserve.
    - Required the Secretary of the Army to provide a program to ROTC graduates so they could perform their minimum MSO by a combination of two years of active duty and the remainder of service within the National Guard.

  * Section 1113, “Review of Officer Promotions by Commander of Associated Active Duty Unit.”

\textsuperscript{52} BOLD SHIFT discussed further in “Training Readiness” section.
- Established procedure for review of an ARNG officer recommended for promotion to grades above first lieutenant. This review was to be conducted by either the commander of the active-duty unit associated with the officer’s ARNG unit or another active-duty officer designated by the Secretary of the Army.

* Section 1114, “Noncommissioned Officer Education Requirements.”
- Restricts the Secretary of the Army’s ability to waive any professional military education (PME) requirement for noncommissioned officers as part of promotion to a higher grade, except in circumstances where such waiver is necessary to preserve unit leadership continuity under combat conditions.

* Section 1115, “Initial Entry Training and Nondeployable Personnel Account.”
- Required the Secretary of the Army to establish a personnel accounting category for ARNG members who either had not completed the minimum training requirement for deployment or who were otherwise nondeployable. This category was to be used for reporting of personnel readiness only. Also set forth circumstances for an ARNG member’s discharge due to failure to complete the minimum training required for deployment.

* Section 1116, “Minimum Physical Deployability Standards.”
- The Secretary of the Army shall transfer the personnel classification of an ARNG member from that member’s unit to a Section 1115 category if that person does not meet the physical profile standards required for deployment.

* Section 1117, “Medical Assessments.”
- Each ARNG member is required to undergo an annual medical and dental screening. Each ARNG member
over the age of 40 is required to undergo a full physical examination at least every two years.

* Section 1118, “Dental Readiness of Members of Early Deploying Units.”
  - ARNG units scheduled for early deployment in the event of mobilization must be dentally ready for deployment. The Secretary of the Army was required to submit a report on the dental readiness plan to the House and Senate Armed Service Committees no later than February 15, 1993.

* Section 1119, “Combat Unit Training”
  - Required the Secretary of the Army to establish a program to minimize the postmobilization training time required for ARNG combat units. The program was required to emphasize premobilization training for (1) individual soldier qualification and training; (2) collective training and qualification at the crew, section team, and squad level; (3) maneuver training at the platoon level as required of all Army units; and (4) combat training for command and staff leadership, including annual multiechelon training to develop battalion, brigade, and division skills, as appropriate.

* Section 1120, “Use of Combat Simulators.”
  - Required the Secretary of the Army to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies to increase training opportunities for ARNG members and units.

Subtitle B—Assessment of National Guard Capability

* Section 1121, “Deployability Rating System.”
  - Required the Secretary of the Army to modify the readiness rating system for USAR and ARNG units to ensure that it provided an accurate assessment of each unit’s deployability and any shortfalls requiring additional resources. This included equipment readiness and personnel readiness.

* Section 1122, “Inspections.”
- Required either inspectors general or other Regular Army commissioned officers to conduct inspections to determine (1) whether the amount and condition of ARNG property is satisfactory; (2) the ARNG is organized in accordance with Title 32; (3) ARNG members meet prescribed physical and other qualifications; (4) ARNG and its organization are properly uniformed, armed, and equipped, and are being trained and instructed for active duty in the field, or for coast defense; (5) ARNG records are kept in accordance with Title 32; (6) accounts and records of each ARNG property and fiscal officer are properly maintained; and (7) ARNG units meet deployment requirements.

Subtitle C—Compatibility of Guard Units with Active Component Units

*Section 1131, “Active Duty Associate Unit Responsibility.”

- Each ARNG combat unit must be associated with an active-duty combat unit. The commander (brigade level or higher) of that associated active-duty unit is responsible for (1) approving the ARNG unit’s training program; (2) reviewing the unit’s readiness report; (3) assessing the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of the ARNG unit; and (4) validating at least annually the compatibility of the ARNG unit with the active-duty forces.

- The Secretary of the Army was required to achieve full implementation of this plan by October 1, 1995.

- The First Army now fills many of the roles and requirements the AC commanders were assigned in this section; so while the integration is being tended to by an active component, it is no longer necessarily in the purview of the active duty combat unit with which the RCs are associated.  

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53 Pint et al., 2015.
* Section 1132, “Training Compatibility.”
  - After September 30, 1994, no fewer than 2,000 officers and 3,000 warrant officers and enlisted members shall be assigned to serve as advisors to the ARNG.
  - A 2015 RAND report indicated there was no clear basis for these numbers, and while there were thousands of AC personnel assigned to RCs for a variety of training and support tasks, there still is neither a standard for involvement or clarity on the “correct” number of advisors.  

* Section 1133, “Systems Compatibility.”
  - Required the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a program to ensure Army personnel systems, supply systems, maintenance management systems, and finance systems are compatible across all Army components.

* Section 1134, “Equipment Compatibility.”
  - Required the legally mandated annual National Guard and Army Reserve Equipment annual report to include a statement on the current status of the compatibility of equipment between the Army reserve components and active forces, the effect of that level of incompatibility on combat effectiveness, and a plan to achieve full equipment compatibility.

* Section 1135, “Deployment Planning Reform.”
  - Required the Secretary of the Army to develop a system for identifying the priority for mobilization of RCs units. The priority system was required to be based on regional contingency planning requirements and doctrine, and integrated into the Army war planning process. The system was to include the use of Unit Deployment Designators to specify postmobilization training days allocated to a unit before deployment,

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54 Pint et al., 2015, table 5.1.
and Section 1135 set forth requirements on the use of these designators.

* Section 1136, “Qualification for Prior-Service Enlistment Bonus.”
  - Amended 37 U.S.C. § 308i to limit these bonuses to instances where “the specialty associated with the position the member is projected to occupy is a specialty in which the member successfully served while on active duty and attained a level of qualification commensurate with the member’s grade and years of service.”

* Section 1137, “Study of Implementation for all Reserve Components.”
  - Mandated the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of the feasibility of implementing Title XI provisions for all RCs. Required the Secretary of Defense to submit an implementation plan to HASC and SASC no later than December 31, 1993.
  - According to Stredwick “The DoD study is complete: (1) It found that sections 1111, 1112, 1117, 1119, 1131, and 1132 were not appropriate for implementation in the USAR. (2) It found that policies already exist within the USAR for Sections 1113, 1114, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1133, and 1134. (3) It found that DoD chose to implement Sections 1115, 1116, 1118, and 1135 by policy, not legislation. (4) It finally found that the Army’s intent is to fully implement policy provisions of Title XI in the ARNG and the USAR.”

**Army Policy**

- The Army implemented Title XI requirements in BOLD SHIFT, a pilot program to improve RCs training. BOLD SHIFT is discussed in the Training Readiness section below.

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Training Readiness

Public Laws and Statutes

  
  – Title XI of the NDAA for FY 1993 is the “National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992.” Title XI is discussed in its own section herein, but relevant provisions are included below.
  
  ◦ **Section 1115, “Initial Entry Training and Nondeployable Personnel Account.”**
    * Required the Secretary of the Army to establish a personnel accounting category for ARNG members who either had not completed the minimum training requirement for deployment or who were otherwise nondeployable. This category was to be used for reporting of personnel readiness only. Also set forth circumstances for an ARNG member’s discharge because of failure to complete the minimum training required for deployment.
  
  ◦ **Section 1119, “Combat Unit Training”**
    * Required the Secretary of the Army to establish a program to minimize the postmobilization training time required for ARNG combat units. The program was required to emphasize premobilization training for (1) individual soldier qualification and training; (2) collective training and qualification at the crew, section team, and squad level; (3) maneuver training at the platoon level as required of all Army units; and (4) combat training for command and staff leadership, including annual multiechelon training to develop battalion, brigade, and division skills, as appropriate.
  
  ◦ **Section 1120, “Use of Combat Simulators.”**
    * Required the Secretary of the Army to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices
and technologies to increase training opportunities for ARNG members and units.

- Section 1131, “Active Duty Associate Unit Responsibility.”
  * Each ARNG combat unit must be associated with an active-duty combat unit. The commander (brigade level or higher) of that associated active-duty unit is responsible for (1) approving the ARNG unit’s training program; (2) reviewing the unit’s readiness report; (3) assessing the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of the ARNG unit; and (4) validating at least annually the compatibility of the ARNG unit with the active duty forces.

  * The Secretary of the Army was required to achieve full implementation of this plan by October 1, 1995.

  * The First Army now fills many of the roles and requirements the AC commanders were assigned in this section. So, while the integration is being tended to by an active component, it is no longer necessarily in the purview of the active-duty combat unit to which the RCs is associated with.56

- Section 1132, “Training Compatibility.”
  * After September 30, 1994, no fewer than 2,000 officers and 3,000 warrant officers and enlisted members shall be assigned to serve as advisors to the ARNG.

  * A 2015 RAND report indicated there was no clear basis for these numbers, and while there were thousands of AC personnel assigned to RCs for a variety of training and support tasks, there still is neither a standard for involvement or clarity on the “correct” number of advisors.57

  - Section 515, “Active Component Support for Reserve Training.”

56 Pint et al., 2015, table 5.1.
57 Pint et al., 2015, table 5.1.
Required the Secretary of the Army to establish one or more AC units “with the primary mission of providing training support to reserve units . . . [and] each such unit shall be part of the active Army force structure and shall have a commander who is on the active-duty list of the Army.”\textsuperscript{58} This requirement was to be implemented by September 30, 1995.

Additionally, the Secretary of the Army was to submit to both House and Senate Armed Services Committees his plan to meet this requirement, including any proposals for statutory changes necessary to achieve this objective.\textsuperscript{59}

Section 517, “Revisions to Pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves.”

Amended Section 1132 of Title XI (“Training Compatibility”) to require a minimum of 2,000 AC personnel to serve as RCs advisors, with this requirement increased to a minimum of 5,000 after September 30, 1994.

Also required the Secretary of the Army to include in its annual Army Posture Statement information related to the implementation of the Pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves.


Required the Secretary of the Army to include in the annual Army Posture Statement details on the ARNG, including implementation of Title XI requirements.


Section 521, “Sense of Congress Concerning the Training and Modernization of the Reserve Components.”

Discusses congressional findings on RCs training and modernization based on the DoD 1993 Bottom-Up Review. Some of the key findings include: (1) an assumption of an increased reliance on the RCs; (2) the lack of a standard

\textsuperscript{58} See Section 515(a) of Public Law 103-160, 1993.

\textsuperscript{59} See Section 515(b) of Public Law 103-160, 1993.
readiness evaluation system; and (3) funding constraints handicapping ARNG training and RCs readiness and modernization.

  - Section 514, “Revisions to Army Guard Combat Reform Initiative to Include Army Reserve Under Certain Provisions and Make Certain Revisions.”
    - Revised Section 1111 of Title XI to remove percentage goals for officers and enlisted personnel with AC experience.
    - Required Secretary of the Army to establish a program permitting the separation of officers on active duty (minimum of two years’ but less than three years’ active service) on the condition that the officer is accepted for appointment in the ARNG. The goal was a minimum of 150 prior active-duty officers becoming ARNG members each year.
    - Required the Secretary of the Army to increase the number of qualified prior active-duty enlisted members in the ARNG to a minimum of 1,000 new enlisted members each year. The enlistment requirements to be used were set forth in Section 8020 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 1994.\(^{60}\)

  - Section 1006(d)(2) amends the law to remove “pilot” from the statutory language creating the RC training pilot program that later became BOLD SHIFT.

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\(^{60}\) Public Law 103-139, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, November 11, 1993.
DoD Directives and Instructions

- **DoDI 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” October 29, 2008.**
  - Section 1 of the Enclosure requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to “ensure that total force policies encourage optimum integration of AC and RCs personnel to provide the most efficient training opportunities to all personnel, allow for shared use of resources, and provide the most operational benefits and mission capability.”
  - Section 10 of the Enclosure requires the Secretaries of the Military Departments to:
    - (1) “ensure that, while providing strategic depth, RCs units and individuals train and are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy”;
    - (2) “ensure the appropriate level of full-time support personnel—AC, Active Guard and Reserve, military technicians (dual-status), non-dual status technicians, and other Federal civilian employees—to meet the readiness requirements of the RCs”;
    - (3) “program and execute resources where required to support a ‘train-mobilize-deploy’ construct. Funds for training and equipment must be provided to coincide with the Services’ force planning cycle and enable an effective pre- and post-mobilization training and deployment process”;
    - (4) ensure facilities and training areas are available to support RCs training requirements.”

- **DoDI 1215.06, “Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories for the Reserve Components,” March 11, 2014.**
  - Revisions
    - March 14, 1997
      - “All RCs members shall receive training IAW assignments and required readiness levels. Training programs

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shall provide for the minimum number of training periods required for attaining the prescribed unit readiness status and maintaining individual proficiency. The primary purpose of all training is the enhancement of individual skills and/or unit effectiveness. Training may be conducted in IDT, AD, or FTNGD status. Mission and operational support may occur in the conduct of training.”

° November 26, 2008
  * Updated policy to include guidance pursuant to Gates’s 2007 memorandum, “Utilization of the Total Force.”
  * Updated policy to include guidance on Active Duty Operational Support.
  * “RC pre-mobilization resourcing and training shall reduce post-mobilization training to the shortest time period possible to increase the time available for deployment. . . . Force generation plans shall be resourced for allocating personnel, training, and equipment to ensure employment readiness.”\(^62\)

– Enclosure 4, Section 2 states that “all RCs Service members will receive training pursuant to assignments and required readiness levels.”

**DoDI 1235.10, “Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve,” November 26, 2008 (incorporation Change 1, September 21, 2011).**

– Revisions
  ° July 1, 1995
    * Section 4.3.2.4 states “The Selected Reserve shall receive priority for allocation of personnel, training, and equipment over all other Reserve component categories. Early deploying units and individuals will have priority over later deploying units.”
  ° November 26, 2008

\(^{62}\) DoD, 2014b.
* Updates DoDI to include guidance on (1) Gates’s 2007 memorandum on “Utilization of the Total Force”; (2) calling or ordering RCs to AD under sections 12301(a) 12301(b), 12302, 12304, 12406, or 331-335 of Title 10; (3) ordering RCs volunteers to AD under Section 12301(d); and (4) planning, preparation, and execution of mobilization and demobilization of RCs units and members serving on Active Duty Operational Support, active duty in support of contingency operations, active duty during national emergencies, and active duty in time of war.

◦ September 21, 2011
* Changes DoD standard for mobilization approval to mobilization date from “90 days, with a goal of 180 days” to “180 days.”

Additional DoD Policy

  – Established a new policy with respect to premobilization versus postmobilization training for reservists. The new policy specified “from this point forward, involuntary mobilization for members of this period may exclude individual skill training for deployment and post-mobilization leave . . . the planning objective for involuntary mobilization of Guard/Reserve units will remain a one year mobilized to five year demobilized ratio. However, today’s global demands will require a number of selected Guard/Reserve units to be remobilized sooner than this standard.”

  – In its discussion on continuum of service, the 2006 QDR states “to fight the long war and conduct other future contin-
gency operations, joint force commanders need to have more immediate access to the Total Force. In particular, the Reserve Component must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.” The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Report states that DoD will take actions to
○ (1) “develop select reserve units that train more intensively and require shorter notice for deployment.”

Army Policy

• **Army Directive 2012-08, “Army Total Force Policy.”**
  – Section 3(c) requires the Army to “integrated AC and RCs forces at capabilities at the tactical level (division and below).” Section 3(c) specifies that this includes “predeployment collective training of tactical-level organizations, including for those organizations that will routinely deploy as multicomponent forces.”

• **BOLD SHIFT Pilot Program**
  – BOLD SHIFT was a Forces Command program approved by the Army Chief of Staff with the objective to “develop, test and implement programs to upgrade the overall readiness of a force that fully integrates the Active and Reserve Components of America’s Army.”
  – BOLD SHIFT “redirected the training goals from achieving proficiency across all echelons to concentrating on lower ones—platoons and crews—and using more focused training events. Additionally, the Active Army devoted an average of

63 DoD, 2006b, p. 76.
64 DoD, 2006b, p. 77.
65 McHugh, 2012.
66 Additional sources on the BOLD SHIFT program include Department of the Army, “Organization of the United States Army,” Washington, D.C., pamphlet 10-1, June 14, 1994; Pint et al., 2015; and Sortor, 2001.
67 Department of the Army, 1994.
22,000 person-years to support the combat brigades’ Annual Training (AT) events. The aim was to build a basic level of proficiency into lower-echelon units and their leaders, to serve as a foundation for postmobilization training.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{• FORSCOM GFRE program}

- The FORSCOM GFRE program was designed to provide combat training for command and staff leadership positions, as well as minimize postmobilization training required for National Guard combat units by focusing individual soldier qualification and training at the crew, squad, and platoon level during premobilization training.\textsuperscript{69} Section 1120 of Title XI of the NDAA for FY 1993 required expansion of the use of combat simulators and simulations to increase training opportunities for the RCs. Part of the GFRE included the Total Army Training Study, and the use of simulators was “aggressively” expanded in use. By 1996, the Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer, Weaponeer, Guard Fist I and II were all fielded for RCs use in response to this requirement. Simulation training (SIMNET/ CCTT/JANUS) were implemented for virtual training.\textsuperscript{70} Simulators and advanced training devices and technology continue to be a part of ARNG training.

\textbf{Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)}

\textbf{Public Laws, Statutes, and Regulations}

- \textbf{38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335}\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{68} Sortor, 2001.

\textsuperscript{69} Hill, 1996.

\textsuperscript{70} Stredwick, 1996.

\textsuperscript{71} United States Code, Title 38, Sections 4301–4335, Employment and Reemployment Rights of Members of the Uniformed Services, current through Public Law 114-38.
Congressional purpose is to encourage noncareer service in the armed services by (1) eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and employment resulting from military service; (2) minimizing the disruption to reservists, employers, fellow employees, and community members by providing for prompt reemployment of eligible service members; and (3) prohibiting discrimination against potential, current, and former service members (38 U.S.C. § 4301[a]). USERRA sets forth the protections available to eligible service members, service member obligations to utilize USERRA protections, and procedures for assisting, enforcing, and investigating USERRA rights and potential violations. Selected provisions are set forth below.

Section 4303(13): Definitions (author’s note: numbering added to enhance readability)

• ”The term ‘service in the uniformed services’ means the performance of duty on a voluntary or involuntary basis in a uniformed service under competent authority and includes (1) active duty, (2) active duty for training, (3) initial active duty for training, (4) inactive duty training, (5) full-time National Guard duty, (6) a period for which a person is absent from a position of employment for the purpose of an examination to determine the fitness of the person to perform any such duty, and (7) a period for which a person is absent from employment for the purpose of performing funeral honors duty as authorized by section 12503 of title 10 or section 115 of title 32.”

Section 4311: Discrimination against persons who serve in the uniformed services and acts of reprisal prohibited.

• “A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, application for
membership, performance of service, application for service, or obligation.”72

– Section 4312: Reemployment rights of persons who serve in the uniformed services"

◦ Subsection (a) enables a service member to claim USERRA right to reemployment and other protections if (1) that service member provided his or her employer with advance written or verbal notice of military service; (2) the cumulative length of the service member’s absence and all previous absences for military service with this employer does not exceed five years; and (3) the service member reports to or submits an application for reemployment.

* EXCEPTION—Subsection (b) precludes advance written or verbal notice of military service where such notice is precluded by military necessity or impossible or unreasonable under the relevant circumstances.

◦ Subsection (c) provides exceptions to the five-year cumulative period for purposes of claiming USERRA protections. They include:

* (1) service beyond five years that is required to complete an initial service period
* (2) a military service period where, through no fault of the service member, he or she was unable to obtain orders releasing him or her from service prior to the expiration of the five-year period
* (3) military service performed under 10 U.S.C. § 10147 or 32 U.S.C. §§ 502(a), 503 to fulfill additional training requirements determined by and certified in writing by the Secretary concerned as necessary for professional development or completion of skill training or retraining
* (4) military service performed by a service member.

- (A) ordered to or retained on active duty under 10 U.S.C. §§ 688 (involuntary active duty by a military retiree), 12301(a) (involuntary active duty in war-

72 See section 4311(a) of United States Code, 1996.
time), 12301(g) (retention on active duty while in captive status), 12302 (involuntary active duty during a national emergency), 12304 (involuntary active duty for an operational mission for up to 270 days), or 12305 (involuntary retention on active duty of a critical person during crisis or other specified conditions)

- (B) ordered to or retained on active duty (other than for training) under any provision of the law because of a war or national emergency declared by the President or Congress

~ The U.S. Department of Labor’s USERRA pocket guide states this category includes not only reservists involuntarily called to active duty for ONE, OEF, and OIF but also reservists and retirees who volunteered for active duty.73

- (C) ordered to or retained on active duty (other than for training) in support, as determined by the Secretary concerned, of an operational mission for which personnel have been ordered to active duty under 10 U.S.C. § 12304

~ The Department of Labor’s USERRA pocket guide stated “this . . . exemption for the five-year limitation covers persons who are called to active duty after volunteering to support operational missions.”74

- (D) ordered to or retained on active duty, as determined by the Secretary concerned, in support of a critical mission or requirement of the uniformed services

- (E) called into active service under Title 10, Chapter 15 or 10 U.S.C. § 12406

- (F) ordered to full-time National Guard duty (other than for training) under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2)(A) when authorized by the President or the Secretary of


74 U.S. Department of Labor, Veterans’ Employment and Training Service, undated.
Defense for purposes of responding to a Presidential declaration of a national emergency that is supported by federal funds.

- Section 4316: Rights, benefits, and obligations of persons absent from employment for service in a uniformed service
  * Subsection (a) mandates that a service member reemployed under USERRA is entitled to the same rights and benefits due him/her by seniority at the time military service began and any additional seniority, rights, and benefits that would have accrued to that person if he or she had remained continuously employed instead of on military service.
  * Subsection (b) states that a service member absent for military service is deemed to be on furlough or leave of absence and entitled to the rights and benefits of other employees on furloughs or leaves of absence for other reasons.

  - This part of the Code of Federal Regulations implements USERRA protections, rights, obligations, and procedures. Much of the language contained within the regulations mirrors that contained within the USERRA statute. However, the regulations provide more complete guidance on USERRA requirements such as what constitutes military service, advance notice, what qualifies for purposes of the five-year service limit, etc.
  - Section 1002.6 makes clear that “USERRA’s definition of ‘service in the uniformed services’ covers all categories of military training and service, including duty performed on a voluntary or involuntary basis, in time of peace or war.” However, Section 1002.44 states that USERRA protections do not apply to independent contractors, and it sets forth the criteria for deciding if someone falls within that employment category. For National Guard members, Section 1002.57 makes clear that USERRA protections only apply to National Guard service under Federal
authority, whether that is performed under Title 10 or Title 32 (Section 1002.57(a)). National Guard service under State authority is covered by State law.
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This report identifies emerging policy lessons regarding the use of, and reforms to, the U.S. Army’s Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational reserve derived from analyses of their contributions to Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and other recent contingency operations. These lessons can be applied to sustain the readiness of the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard in future contingencies.

Using historical and quantitative analyses, combined with in-depth interviews, this report documents the evolution of the policies involved in the development and employment of the operational reserve. It assesses the impact of operational reserve policies on sourcing decisions, examines how these policies affected the readiness of the RCs, and provides recommendations regarding future missions and force generation policy for the Army’s RCs.

This report concludes that the Army’s current operational reserve concept evolved in response to the demands of overseas contingency operations, resulting in a force that is significantly more ready and capable than the pre–September 11 RCs. The ability to sustain this level of capability is at least as much a matter of the resources the Army can devote as it is a matter of policy.