The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present, Volume IV

This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled “History of United States Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present,” sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, U.S. Army. The purpose of this volume is to provide the Army with a history of the evolution of the major laws that govern the Army that were written between 1898 and 1940.

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The current institutional arrangement of the Army, which comprises a Regular Army and two reserve components—the Army National Guard of the United States and the U.S. Army Reserve—has been the same since 1940. As a result, a conventional wisdom has developed that this structure is appropriate to the time and unchangeable. When debating the Army’s size, appropriate roles and functions, and the laws required to authorize, empower, and govern the Army, U.S. policymakers often think about evolutionary institutional modifications and rarely question the underlying assumptions that led to this structure. It is easier to tinker with the existing Army than to consider fundamental changes to the Army’s statutory foundation. This four-volume history of U.S. military policy argues that little about the Army’s organization is unchangeable or constitutionally mandated, a fact that should give policymakers license to explore a wider range of options for the Army of the future.¹

The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), which Congress established as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015, is a case in point.² Congress gave the NCFA the mandate, among other things, to examine the assumptions behind the Army’s current size and force mix. Despite this mandate, the


NCFA elected not to reconsider the Army’s statutory authorities and responsibilities and instead focused on ways to refine and improve the existing force. The commission’s published report argued that the nation has “one Army” and a “traditional military policy” for sound “historical, cultural, legal, operational, and strategic” reasons. By using this phrasing, the NCFA reinforces the idea that a coherent and constant “traditional military policy” has governed the Army from the earliest days of the Republic. The NCFA’s report offers 63 recommendations for such things as improving Army training and readiness, refining the mix of forces and capabilities, and improving personnel management. Yet none of the 63 recommendations calls for a reconsideration of the fundamental laws that authorize, empower, and govern the Army, or the Army’s three-component construct.

The notion of a coherent and constant traditional military policy stretching from the earliest days of the Republic to today is, however, a myth. U.S. military policy evolved substantially between the writing of the Constitution and 1940, and very little has changed since. Indeed, the term military policy was not used in the United States until the late 19th century, when Brevet Major-General Emory Upton introduced the term to Army thinkers. As used by Upton, the term military policy connoted matters pertaining to the U.S. Army, such as the laws that govern the institution and the policies for wartime expansion. Today the term continues to refer to Army matters to the exclusion of the other Services. The term traditional military policy first appeared in the 1940 Selective Service Act.

We highlight the etymology of the term to underline the fact that today’s military policy is not the result of a coherent tradition but rather the distillation of over two centuries of debates and compromises between various competing interests, many of which arguably reflected the political and cultural debates of the day at least as much as the need to meet the military requirements of the nation’s security. For each generation since the writing of the Constitution, ideology, political culture, and institutional momentum have limited the discourse on military policy and constrained the range of options available for serious consideration. Indeed, the current force structure is strikingly different from anything the Framers of the Constitution imagined. Although the notion of doing so was once considered anathema, the United States now entrusts its national security in part to a standing, professional force—its Regular Army, augmented by two largely part-time yet highly professional standing reserve components. Once organized to defend a growing nation protected by two oceans, the U.S. Army today is postured to deploy globally on very short notice.

One important example of how the use of the term traditional military policy can be misleading is the current Title 32 of the U.S. Code, which states that “In accordance with the traditional military policy of the United States, it is essential that the strength

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and organization of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard as an integral part of the first line of defenses of the United States be maintained and assured at all times.” Yet the National Guard’s role and status, and the laws governing it, have evolved considerably over time and cannot be regarded simply as a continuation of the 18th century method of producing military ground forces by “calling forth” various types of colonial militias, as the term traditional military policy implies. In fact, there is little “traditional” in the evolution of military policy.

One of the more fundamental developments explored in this series of reports is the subtle yet significant shift in the constitutional basis upon which the Army is built. Simply put, the Constitution includes one clause that empowers Congress to “raise and support Armies” and two other clauses that provide for “calling forth the Militia” of the states, as well as the authority to organize, arm, and discipline them “as may be employed in the Service of the United States,” for the purpose of executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections, and repelling invasions. The formulation assumed—accurately, at the time—that the states maintained their own militias or at least the means to raise them, even through conscription. Thus, the basic formula was for the country to rely on the “raise and support Armies” clause to maintain a small, standing federal army, but otherwise rely on the states and their militias to provide the bulk of the Republic’s fighting forces. The militias evolved, as did their relationships with federal and state governments. In brief, the missions and personnel of militia referred to by the Constitution are not the same as the missions and personnel of what eventually became the National Guard. The evolution of the latter had less and less to do with state governments (and the Constitution’s militia clauses) and more and more to do with the federal government (and the “raise and support Armies” clause).

In this four-volume series, we seek to establish an authoritative foundation for the debate over the best design for the future Army force. Drawing on archival research of primary sources and a survey of the historical literature, we trace the emergence of the laws that govern the Army today. This history has policy relevance because it shows that change in military policy is both possible and perhaps appropriate. When senior political and military leaders design Army force structure, thinking should not be constrained by such historically and politically loaded terms as traditional military policy. When imagining a future force, senior political and military leaders should recognize that current statutory foundations could be further defined and refined to enhance the Army’s ability to meet the nation’s dynamic security needs.

Figure S.1 depicts the evolution of U.S. military policy across a timeline from 1775 to the present. Along the top of the figure, we provide the strategic context across five periods—emerging America, the Civil War and the war with Spain, the World Wars, limited wars, and the Global War on Terror—as well as the nature of the Army in these periods. Along the bottom of the timeline, we highlight the specific historical

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4 U.S. Code, Title 32—National Guard, Section 102: General Policy, 2012.
Figure S.1
The Evolution of the U.S. Military Policy, 1775–Present

Emerging America
- Regular Army/militias first-line defense
- National volunteers (some conscription) = war Army

Civil War and War with Spain
- Civil War is first mass war Army
- Spanish-American War; United States enters world stage

World Wars
- Regular Army/National Guard first-line defenses
- Officer Reserve Corps + conscripts = mass war Army
- Army Reform
- Mass Mobilization
- Draft

Limited Wars
- Regular Army is primary warfighting force; supplemented by Guard, USAR, and limited conscription; mass conscription only in case of major conflict with Soviet Union
- Partial mobilization of Army RCs
- Increasing use of Army RCs on active duty
- Limited draft
- Increasing integration of Army RCs into operational plans
- Small numbers of RC personnel mobilized for Vietnam
- All-Volunteer Force post-Vietnam
- End to draft

GWOT
- Army Total Force; no plan for mass volunteers or conscription
- Integration of RCs into operational plans and missions

1903–1940: Fundamental laws passed that define the Army to present day

1940–present: No fundamental change in laws, 1940s-era laws refined into Titles 10 and 32

NOTES: USAR = U.S. Army Reserve; RC = reserve component; GWOT = Global War on Terror.
context in these periods, including the major wars fought and the size of the Army as it evolved over time in terms of the number of soldiers (the left axis) and the number of divisions (the right axis). In the middle of the timeline, we highlight the major relevant pieces of legislation that affected the evolution of the Army. The laws passed between 1903 and 1940, like the laws bearing on military policy before and after, reflect the debates and challenges of a particular historical period that differs greatly from the security environment that the nation confronts today. The laws nonetheless have remained virtually unchanged since 1940, as indicated in the figure by the thick red lines, despite significant changes in the geostrategic environment and the nation's increasing global interests and commitments.

In Volume I, *The Old Regime: The Army, Militias, and Volunteers from Colonial Times to the Spanish-American War*, we trace the history of military policy from the colonial era through the Spanish-American War. This period is critical for understanding the genesis of the basic structure of today’s Army and the various factors that informed that structure. For a combination of strategic, cultural, economic, ideological, and political reasons, the Republic decided against establishing a standing army large enough to handle a major conflict and instead relied on a variety of mechanisms for raising volunteer units and marshaling state militias to expand or augment the Army. There was a basic split between proponents of a professional federal force, who judged the state-provided militias as militarily ineffective and too often contributing to an irresponsible loss of American lives, and those who opposed or feared the idea of a standing federal force (and its costs) and wanted to rely on “the people at arms,” i.e., the citizenry organized by the states as militia units. The result was a compromise—an increasingly professional yet small Regular Army and various kinds of volunteer forces and state militias upon which the federal government would rely when the Nation needed to field a much larger force. However, authorities and responsibilities between the federal government and the states regarding the militias were not well established, nor were any mechanisms to ensure that the militias were ready and well trained when “called forth.” Nor was there any mechanism to ensure the militia forces from one state were organized, trained, and equipped like the forces of another state to facilitate their integrated employment.

Problems with military effectiveness and recruitment contributed to an evolution in the militia system. The state militias shifted over the course of the 19th century from a colonial-era compulsory force (more compulsory in some communities than others) of all able-bodied white males between certain ages to entirely volunteer units with ambiguous relationships to their state governments. States that provided funding to their community militias tended to exercise more oversight and control. The compulsory militias were all but defunct by the time of the Mexican War (1846–1848), and volunteer militias provided much of the bulk of the Union Army during the Civil War. Postwar, those same volunteer militia units—increasingly referred to as “National Guard”—began to receive more support from state governments (with some federal
assistance) and evolved into today’s National Guard. Still, their status remained vague, as did their relationship with the federal government and the Army. Mobilization remained largely ad hoc, and the country still lacked anything resembling the large and rapidly expandable militaries fielded by France and Germany in 1870.

The Spanish-American War (1898) was a major turning point. The nation mobilized much as it had for the 1846 Mexican War, using a combination of Regular Army troops, volunteers from states and territories, and state militias. Small Regular Army units were rapidly assembled from small outposts distributed mostly throughout the central and western states, where they rarely trained for any contingencies other than fighting any remaining Native Americans who had not been pushed out of the way and onto reservations and preserving the local peace. Because of concerns associated with the constitutional limitation of militia use beyond the nation’s borders, some individual state militia units voted to decide whether they would be mobilized (federalized) for the war with Spain. Some agreed, and some declined. If the unit agreed, the militia unit was brought into federal service as a volunteer unit. Other units were raised purely as federal volunteers (e.g., Teddy Roosevelt’s Rough Riders), bypassing the state militia system entirely. A large-enough Army was eventually raised under the “raise and support Armies” clause, but profound problems were identified across the force. All elements of the Army were largely unprepared for fighting as larger organized units. Many units were ill-equipped, the Army’s logistical capabilities were inadequate for deploying and sustaining forces overseas, and the tiny Medical Department was overwhelmed by infectious diseases that spread quickly through the ranks. The Army’s difficulties were so bad that, in spite of winning the war, the Secretary of War was dismissed.

The volunteer militia units varied considerably from state to state, with little consistency in terms of readiness, quality, equipping, tactics, etc. Interoperability among or between them and the Regular Army was far from assured. There was, moreover, no established mechanism for generating forces to serve overseas for lengthy periods of time. This became a problem when the United States found itself occupying the Philippines and then fighting an insurgency there. Now the nation required an expeditionary capability, and it needed a force large enough to sustain a long-term occupation.

Heavily influencing the military policy of the late 19th century and early years of the 20th century was the maturation of the National Guard as a political force. Influential members of the Guard in 1878 created a lobby group, the National Guard Association, that enjoyed considerable sway with the public and in Congress. Because of the Guard’s political influence, military policy debates and the relevant legislation passed in the 20th century often represented political compromises between the National Guard and the National Guard Association, the Regular Army and War Department, Congress, and the President.

As we shall see in Volume II, The Formative Years for U.S. Military Policy, 1898–1940, the challenges associated with the Spanish-American War stimulated new Sec-
Secretary of War Elihu Root to promote reform through a series of laws beginning in the first few years of the 20th century. These laws, the most important among them being the Efficiency in Militia Act of 1903 (also known as the Dick Act of 1903, named for Ohio Congressman Charles Dick, who simultaneously served as chairman of the House Militia Affairs Committee; president of the National Guard Association; and commander of the Ohio Division, National Guard, with the rank of Major General), swept aside the Uniform Militia Act of 1792. They recognized the National Guard (i.e., the state volunteer militia units that had emerged after the Civil War), needed to be organized, trained, equipped, and disciplined along the lines of the Regular Army. This was the first step toward what in 1970 would become the total force concept, and it added substance to the federal government’s relationship to the National Guard, including both funding and regulations. These laws and subsequent legislation passed in 1916, 1920, and 1933 made the Guard largely a creature of the federal government, but one that still retained at least a formal connection to state governments—a dual status that in previous decades would have been anathema to Guard advocates. The laws of this era also established what would become today’s Army Reserve, starting with a medical reserve cadre and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. These congressional initiatives improved the Army’s ability to expand and gave the Army access to trained specialists of the sort that were in short supply in the war against Spain. Although the new legislation greatly facilitated the nation’s relatively rapid and orderly mobilization for World War I, some problems remained, and new ones emerged. Like all previous defense laws dating back to the Constitution, the legislation passed in 1916, 1920, and 1933 represented compromises. Debates of the era focused on how best to meet the nation’s security requirements given a still deep-seated resistance to the idea (and cost) of maintaining a seemingly large standing peacetime Army, especially in light of Southern memories of federal forces being employed to enforce civil rights during Reconstruction. There was a grudging acceptance that, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, America required something more robust than the 19th century state-centric method for Army expansion; but there was little agreement over the details.

Volume III, Another War and Cold War, covers the period from 1940 to 1970 and examines how the Army, while retaining the basic legal underpinnings established by 1940, evolved in light of the radically different security requirements associated with the nation’s emergence as a superpower and the need to maintain forces overseas and to rapidly respond in support of alliance commitments. Through this period—marked above all by the wars in Korea and Vietnam—there were vibrant debates regarding how best to generate the required forces, as well as different attempts by policymakers to balance military requirements with political concerns. These experiences led ultimately to the development of Total Force Policy, which was an effort to eliminate the need for conscription, except in special circumstances, and to further professionalize U.S. military forces.
Volume IV, *The Total Force Policy Era, 1970–2015*, covers the period from 1970 to 2015, from changes to U.S. military policy that resulted from the Vietnam War through years of persistent conflict following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks. In spite of significant changes in the strategic context during this period, the fundamental laws underpinning U.S. military policy remained largely unchanged. Military policy did evolve through Army policy changes and congressional appropriations, although these generally reinforced the existing tripartite structure of the Army. To deal with the strategic, domestic, and financial constraints of the 1970s, the U.S. Department of Defense adopted the Total Force Policy. In its implementation of the new policy, the Army adapted the force mix within its three components to, when combined, fulfill the demands of war plans. The Regular Army was designed predominantly around combat forces to meet contingency timelines, while increased reliance was placed on support forces in the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard to augment the Regular Army and to serve as a strategic reserve. Additional combat forces were maintained in both the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard. Total Force Policy endured even as the nation’s strategic circumstances dramatically changed again at the end of the Cold War.

Volume IV also discusses how the demands of persistent conflict since the 9/11 terrorist attacks have led to increased use of individuals and units from the reserve components. For example, as of June 2017, about 25,000 of the 542,000 soldiers of the Army Reserve and Guard are mobilized (federalized), with many serving in Afghanistan and Iraq. Army access to its reserve components has been simplified, and the American public largely supports their regular use, even in combat zones of the type experienced since 9/11.
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A.1. Summary Table of Legislation Pertaining to the Evolution of U.S. Military Policy ................................................................. 183
Volume IV of this series, *The Total Force Policy Era, 1970–2015*, traces the evolution of the Total Force Policy with respect to the U.S. Army from 1970 to 2015. This volume seeks to explain how—and, more importantly, why—U.S. military policy evolved from an almost exclusive reliance on an active component composed of the Regular Army and draftees during the Vietnam War era to the total force concept of depending on the three components to provide complementary capabilities to meet ongoing operational demands. As observed in Volumes II and III of this series, the statutory framework of America’s military policy had been firmly established by 1940 and changed little thereafter. In contrast, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Army policy for organizing, resourcing, and employing the Army’s reserve components continued to evolve. This volume thus focuses on the respective roles of the Army’s three components—the Regular Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve—in national defense between 1970 and the present. The difference between America’s “military policy” and DoD’s Total Force Policy is that the former primarily concerns statute, while the latter primarily concerns the implementation of statute in a changing environment through executive branch policy guidance, resource allocation, and actual practice.

The total force concept was initiated in 1970 as part of the Nixon administration’s intention to end the draft and the Vietnam War, which had rendered conscription politically infeasible. In 1970, forces in the Guard and Reserve largely duplicated the capabilities resident in the Regular Army, and all three components were likely to be employed across the same range of missions in the event of a mass-mobilization global war. In practice, however, the Guard and Reserve were typically undertrained and underresourced, perceived by outsiders, and perhaps by many reservists themselves, as havens for men seeking to avoid the draft and the war in Vietnam. Just over 30 years later, Army reserve component soldiers were rotationally deploying to overseas wars, albeit not quite at the rate experienced by their Regular Army comrades. The war they were fighting was not World War III—the sort of mass-mobilization war for which the laws and policies that shaped the reserve components in the post–World War II era had envisioned—but the same sort of counterinsurgency in which President Lyndon Johnson had essentially conceded defeat rather than mobilize the reserves. In contrast to
World War II and the Korean War, in which the units of the various components were more or less employed interchangeably, the components filled complementary roles after 2001 in what has sometimes been called the Global War on Terror. The Regular Army provided the bulk of the combat forces for the heaviest fighting, with soldiers organized into brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigades. The Army Reserve tended to provide support forces, while the Guard provided some of each—both support forces and combat forces for what were mostly envisioned as less complex missions. By 2011, even the distinction between peacetime and wartime began to erode, when the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act authorized service secretaries to activate reservists for up to one year for routine missions.

The Total Force Policy evolved primarily in response to changes in the security environment. That environment included not just the objectives, strategies, and capabilities of actors on the international stage, but also domestic forces that constrained and limited DoD’s response to that environment. When Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird prescribed that “Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of active forces,” DoD had few other viable options. The United States needed a large, capable Army to serve as a credible deterrent to a resurgent Soviet Union, but the Vietnam War had rendered the draft untenable as a means of generating the manpower needed for that Army. The reserve components offered the only feasible source of manpower to meet those demands within the tight budget constraints of the early 1970s. In spite of vastly increased budgets in the 1980s, the Army’s implementation of the Total Force Policy remained essentially unchanged through the end of the Cold War. In fact, nearly all of the growth in the Army in the 1980s occurred in the Army’s reserve components, while the Regular Army’s size was generally held constant. By the early 1990s, however, the environment had changed dramatically.

The new environment required a smaller Army, but also a different kind of Army. DoD officials believed that the new environment placed a premium on responsiveness, though advocates for the Guard and Reserve questioned just how much responsiveness was attainable or even necessary. Regular Army forces and some reserve component support forces could—with some effort—meet those requirements for responsiveness. Army officials, drawing on experience mobilizing roundout combat brigades for the Persian Gulf War, argued that ARNG combat forces could not meet the accelerated timelines, a conclusion strongly contested by Guard officials and advocates. Based on these assessments, DoD thus came to rely principally on Regular Army combat forces.

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6 “Roundout” brigades are Army National Guard brigades that have been made part of an active Army division.
and reserve component support forces, even as it struggled to find a role for ARNG combat forces. By the end of the 1990s, however, peace operations had begun to place significant stress on the Army’s readiness. A potential role for ARNG combat forces emerged, in which the Army could use those forces to meet lower-risk, lower-priority missions and thereby release Regular Army forces for higher-priority missions. In the post-9/11 period, the scale of such missions expanded dramatically. This, and the rest of the Army reserve components’ evolution into their current role, occurred in response to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars’ combined demand for manpower. As was the case at the total force concept’s inception, DoD had few viable alternatives to increasing its reliance on the reserve components, with an unpopular war and a strong economy making it difficult to maintain the Army’s size, let alone increase it.

As in the period 1940–1970, very few changes to the laws governing U.S. military policy occurred from 1970 to 2015. The nation experienced significant changes in its strategic setting—this time the collapse of the nation’s only peer competitor, the Soviet Union—yet continued to rely on the legal framework that had been established before 1940. Still, DoD policy continued to evolve through changes in the implementation of statute, congressional appropriations, and DoD and Army policies.

In 1970, Laird established the total force concept. For the Army, this policy required using the Army National Guard of the United States and Army Reserve as “the initial and primary source for augmentation” for the active component in the event of crisis. As discussed in Volume II, The Formative Years for U.S. Military Policy, 1898–1940, the nation had established a similar military policy between 1903 and 1933. However, as outlined in Volume III, U.S. presidents relied primarily on conscription to fight wars in Korea and Vietnam. With the rapid downsizing of the Regular Army following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, senior leaders sought to preserve an Army of sufficient size to deter and, if necessary, defeat Soviet aggression, by more fully integrating reserve component capabilities into defense planning.

As the total force concept evolved, important differences from earlier policy and practice with respect to the reserve components developed. Starting under Army Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland, the Army began relying more heavily on reserve component units in defense planning to provide support and sustainment to Regular Army combat forces. Doing so enabled the Army to maximize Regular Army combat capabilities under resource constraints. In 1974, Westmoreland’s successor, General Creighton Abrams, realigned most of the Army’s support and sustainment capabilities in the ARNG and the Army Reserve to permit the retention of more combat forces in the Regular Army. He pushed the process even further, going so far as to plan for new divisions that would integrate ARNG combat brigades as one of the three maneuver brigades. These divisions would either deploy later, in the case of a European war, or to lower-priority theaters of operation. At the time, increasing reliance on ARNG combat forces may not have seemed especially risky, given Regular Army units’ historically mediocre levels of readiness and proficiency and dire state
in the early 1970s. Abrams’s initiative pleased Congress, which was keen to maximize the ratio of combat to support forces, but required relying on reserve component support forces for all but the most urgent missions. Such increased reliance on the reserve components required increased access to them in the event of crisis. Therefore, in 1976 Congress created the Presidential Select Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority, which allowed the President to mobilize 50,000 reservists for up to 90 days without congressional approval. As part of Total Force Policy, the reserve components received more funding, but they still struggled with readiness due to continued challenges with recruitment and limited time for training.

Yet even as the Total Force Policy matured, the conditions on which it was based were changing. When the Reagan administration took office in 1981, it convinced Congress to increase appropriations for DoD. Citing concerns about DoD’s ability to recruit enough service members to man the services’ active components, Congress limited any substantial expansion of the services to their reserve components. Congress also approved various reserve component recruiting incentives. By the end of the 1980s, reserve component units were better manned, trained, equipped, and administered than they had ever been. Yet even as these improvements were underway, the Army was in the midst of a revolution in training and doctrine. This training revolution—which included, for example, newly created combat training centers that used technology to better simulate combat—had the greatest impact on Regular Army units. With more time to spend in high-quality training, the proficiency of Regular Army soldiers and units began to improve much more rapidly than their counterparts in the reserve components. Consequently, the gap in proficiency between the maneuver brigades in the Regular Army and the ARNG widened significantly.

Trends toward increasing access to reserve component individuals and units continued as well. Congress took an additional step to ensure that the President had the authority to use these forces. After several Democratic governors refused to give consent for their National Guard units to be deployed overseas for training in Central America, Congress passed the Montgomery Amendment, which prevented governors from withholding consent. The Supreme Court upheld the law in *Perpich v. the U.S. Department of Defense*, confirming that the National Guard was first a reserve component of the Army and only secondarily a state militia.

The 1990–1991 Gulf War functioned as a test of the Total Force Policy. Reserve component support units functioned effectively. The utility of ARNG maneuver forces was hotly debated and not tested in combat, however. When the United States started mobilizing for the Gulf War, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney initially decided not to activate ARNG roundout brigades, ostensibly because of limitations to PSRC and implicitly because of uncertainty about the course of action President George H. W. Bush would eventually adopt. Under congressional pressure, however, some of these units were eventually activated. Reserve component support units mobilized and deployed quickly to the theater, but the roundout brigades struggled. Training defi-
ciencies quickly became apparent, and, by the time the first ARNG maneuver brigade was certified for deployment, the war was over.

The Gulf War also fell in the middle of a debate about post–Cold War strategy in which the reserve components’ roles and capabilities figured prominently. At the end of the Cold War, Congress sought to reduce the defense budget in part by relying more heavily on ARNG combat forces. Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn was among those that argued that the nation could rely on the reserve components more in the new, lower-threat environment. The Joint Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, however, argued for another approach, known as the Base Force. The proposal was based on the assumption that the nation needed sufficient forces to deploy quickly from the homeland to fight in two simultaneous regional contingencies. DoD argued that reserve component combat support and sustainment units could maintain a high enough state of readiness in peacetime to respond to such contingencies. Congress allowed the Army to maintain enough Regular combat forces to execute the most urgent strategic requirements under the two major theater war force-planning construct, initially 12 divisions. However, Congress declined to approve DoD’s recommended reductions in reserve component force structure and end strength, at least initially. In fact, Congress increased its emphasis on reserve component readiness. It granted the Regular Army greater authorities, such as approving training plans, to ensure that ARNG units could achieve readiness goals.

After the Gulf War, DoD’s Bottom-Up Review anticipated a somewhat less demanding international environment in which the United States would likely only have to fight and win in one regional contingency while holding the line in a second. Again, DoD proposed relying on combat forces in the Regular Army to meet the most urgent strategic requirements and reducing ARNG combat forces to levels justified by operations plans and the two major theater war force-planning construct, still in use from the Base Force review. Overall, the Bottom-Up Review called for reducing Army reserve component forces from about 700,000 personnel to about 575,000 personnel by 1999. Again, Congress declined to approve DoD’s recommended reductions in reserve component force structure and end strength, leaving the ARNG with more combat forces than DoD’s analysis could justify. On the other hand, increasing levels of commitment to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans—for which the force-sizing construct did not account—subjected the Regular Army to increasing strain. Forces committed to these operations were obviously not available for short-notice employment in crisis, nor could they prepare adequately for such missions. To mitigate the impact of peacekeeping operations on readiness, the Army used ARNG maneuver forces for lower-risk peacekeeping missions in order to keep Regular Army forces available for major combat operations. Congress further expanded DoD’s access to the reserve components, extending PSRC authority to 270 days, three times more than originally authorized.
After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States began what Army Chief of Staff General George Casey would later characterize in 2007 as “an era of persistent conflict,” with wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As the demands on the force increased, the Army began to employ the reserve components routinely and continuously. This contrasted with the reserve components’ historical experience in the 20th century, in which they were employed mostly to supplement Regular Army forces in the case of a major conflict. The reserve components were still somewhat less available than Regular Army forces. Throughout much of the period between 2003 and 2011, Regular Army units deployed every other year, while reserve component units tended to deploy somewhere between once every four to five years. However, according to proponents of the “operational reserve” concept, reserve component units would perform the same range of missions, under essentially the same set of conditions, as their active counterparts. In practice, ARNG combat forces tended to perform lower-risk missions better suited to the levels of training they could achieve in the limited amounts of time available for predeployment training. DoD also interpreted mobilization authorities more expansively to increase access to reserve component forces. DoD interpreted existing law as limiting any reserve unit’s activation to 24 cumulative months. However, in 2007, with the force under growing strain, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued guidance that reinterpreted the law as limiting any one mobilization to 24 consecutive months. In 2011, Congress went further, permitting reservists to be activated for routine, not just crisis, missions.

We note that these events took place against a backdrop of public and elite support for an assertive U.S. foreign policy and military preeminence to underwrite that policy. While opinion has turned against specific incarnations of that policy—the Vietnam War, nation building in the Balkans, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to mind—the public broadly supported U.S. leadership in world affairs in this period. America’s foreign policy elites, though differing on the ends of U.S. leadership, shared a consensus that the United States should lead. Similarly, there was a consensus that the U.S. military should remain preeminent. The combination of ambitious policy goals with constrained resources enforced reliance on both a robust Regular Army and capable reserve components.

Factors Shaping the Evolution of Total Force Policy

The Army’s implementation of the Total Force Policy was the outcome of competing interests attempting to shape the allocations of missions and resources in response to the evolving security environment. Within this environment, four major factors shaped the Army’s implementation of Total Force Policy between 1970 and 2015:
• **DoD’s analytic process**—currently known as “support to strategic analysis”—**sets the terms of the debate.** From the 1970s onward, force structure and resource allocation derived from the analysis of specific warfighting scenarios that described specific operational contexts, the forces required, and the timetable on which they would be required. The allocation of roles and missions followed directly from these scenarios. Because they placed a premium on the ability to respond rapidly—whether to a Soviet attack on Western Europe or later to regional aggression—these scenarios increasingly emphasized the need for ready, responsive forces. Whoever sets the terms of these scenarios essentially dictates the parameters of debate.

• **Constraints**—on manpower, money, and time available to train. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird initiated the total force concept because he deemed it infeasible to conscript a Regular Army, let alone one large enough to deter the Soviet Union in Europe, under the political conditions of the time. The Nixon administration did not believe the United States could afford to acquire that manpower at market rates. The Army emphasized integrating reserve component support units over combat units because it was just barely possible for the former to attain the necessary level of proficiency in the time reservists were available to train. Over time, adversaries and strategies changed, but implementation of the Total Force Policy continued to evolve toward maximizing available operational capability under constraints on (1) men and women willing to serve in the Army, (2) time to prepare, and (3) money to pay for Army forces. In short, the Total Force Policy evolved principally to meet the demands of a changing security environment.

• **Complementarity.** Over time, the Army’s implementation of the Total Force policy has emphasized employing components in complementary roles. Both reserve components provide support units, while the ARNG also has adapted to provide combat forces for lower-risk, lower-priority missions. The Regular Army has thus been able to focus its resources on maintaining highly proficient combat brigades and divisions.

• **Continuity.** Congress ultimately determines U.S. military policy and has been protective of the interests of the reserve components in the face of DoD efforts to reduce reserve component roles and resources. It has typically blocked sudden and substantial reductions in reserve component force structure and resource levels, such as those proposed in the course of the post–Cold War Base Force analysis and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, at least initially. On the other hand, Congress has also eventually acceded to such proposed changes—as it did in both those cited cases—over time as the supporting logic becomes clear. The historical record seems to indicate that Congress will not support a significant change in component roles, at least not without the support of the components and their stakeholder organizations. Congress has generally been more receptive to gradual
changes that can demonstrate continuity with previous policy and that represent a consensus among the Army’s components and their external stakeholders.
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This report is the last volume in a series that traces the evolution of U.S. military policy from 1789 to the present. The previous volume, Volume III, Another World War and Cold War, described the evolution of U.S. military policy from 1940 to 1970, covering U.S. mobilization for World War II through U.S. involvement in Vietnam. As discussed in Volume II, The Formative Years for U.S. Military Policy, 1898–1940, the laws put in place prior to 1940 created a framework for the Army to mobilize its reserve components and create a mass citizen army for World War II through a combination of volunteerism and conscription. Debates over military policy continued after World War II but did not lead to significant changes to relevant federal statutes.

This volume begins in 1970 with the advent of the total force concept, which resulted from the Nixon administration’s intention to end the draft and the Vietnam War, which had rendered conscription politically untenable. The Army’s implementation of that policy evolved over time in response to changes in the security environment. With the end of conscription, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) had little choice but to turn to increasing the contributions of the reserve components to prepare for war against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. As in the preceding decades, there were few substantial changes to the fundamental laws governing the Army. However, DoD’s approach to the employment of the Army’s three components—and their respective force structure and resource levels—continued to evolve through DoD policy changes, changes to Title 10 of the U.S. Code (the statute governing the role of the Armed Forces), and resource allocation decisions made in the course of the normal appropriations process. Congress also expanded DoD’s access to the reserve components over time, to the point where DoD could activate reserve components routinely without explicit congressional authorization. Most importantly, DoD adopted the Total Force Policy, which prescribed that “Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.”

This volume seeks to explain how—and, more importantly, why—DoD policy and practice with regard to the Army’s three components evolved from an almost exclusive reliance on the Regular Army during the Vietnam era to depending on the three components to provide complementary capabilities to meeting ongoing operational demands during the era of the Total Force Policy (1970–2015). In this report, we use the term military policy to denote the respective roles of the Army’s three components—the Regular Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the U.S. Army Reserve—in national defense and the strategy for their use.2

In 1970, forces in the Guard and Reserve theoretically duplicated the capabilities resident in the Regular Army and were liable to perform a similar range of missions in the event of a mass-mobilization global war. To be sure, support units made up a much higher proportion of the Army Reserve’s force structure than of the ARNG’s, as the former’s federal status made it easier to shape to complement Regular forces. In practice, Guard and Reserve forces were typically undertrained and underresourced, perceived by outsiders, and perhaps by many reservists themselves, as havens for men seeking to avoid the draft and Vietnam. Just over 30 years later, Army reserve component soldiers were deploying repeatedly to overseas wars, albeit not quite at the rate experienced by their Regular Army comrades. The war they were fighting was not World War III—the sort of mass-mobilization war for which the laws and policies had shaped the reserve components in the post–World War II era—but the same sort of counterinsurgency in which President Lyndon Johnson had essentially conceded defeat rather than attempt to mobilize the reserves.3 In contrast to World War II and the Korean War, in which the units of the components were employed more or less interchangeably, the components filled complementary roles in what has sometimes been called the Global War on Terror. The Regular Army provided the bulk of the combat

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3 Johnson initially declined to mobilize the Army’s reserve components because he felt that doing so would place the nation on a “war” footing, diverting national attention and effort from key priorities such as civil rights and establishing the Great Society. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, General William C. Westmoreland requested an additional 205,000 troops. Granting Westmoreland’s request would have required mobilization of the Army’s reserve components, a move recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many factors probably informed Johnson’s refusal to accede to the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s recommendation, including the war’s massive unpopularity and tenuous prospects for success. He may well have rejected any effort to escalate U.S. commitment to the war. As Walter S. Poole outlines in his history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Vietnam War during this period, however, opposition to Westmoreland’s troop request and concomitant mobilization helped fuel Eugene McCarthy’s initial victory in the New Hampshire primary. That victory in turn prompted Johnson both to cap the level of U.S. commitment and to withdraw from the presidential race. See Steven L. Rearden, *Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2012, pp. 9, 14, 43, 68; Walter S. Poole, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1965–1968*, Vol. 9, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History, 2012, pp. 59–60.
forces for the heaviest fighting, with soldiers organized into brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigades. The Army Reserve tended to provide support forces, while the Guard provided some of each—both support forces and combat forces for what were mostly envisioned as lower-risk missions. By 2011, even the distinction between peacetime and wartime began to erode, when the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized service secretaries to activate reservists for up to one year for routine missions. In other words, the Total Force Policy evolved and adapted to circumstances.

The Army shaped its implementation of the Total Force Policy to respond to changes in the national security environment—including both its foreign and domestic components—and to reflect the capabilities of its three components to provide forces for the conflicts DoD anticipated. When Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird prescribed that the reserve components would serve as “the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces,” DoD had few other viable options besides the reserve components for augmenting its manpower in a crisis. Yet while the total force concept directed the Army to rely more heavily on its reserve components, it left the Army relatively free to determine how to implement the policy. Under Chiefs of Staff William C. Westmoreland and his successor, Creighton W. Abrams, the Army looked to its reserve components first to provide capabilities that could be mobilized quickly and complement—rather than replace—Regular Army forces, a theme that continues to the present day.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, DoD began focusing on regional contingencies, which placed an even greater premium on responsiveness. Defense analyses such as the 1991 Base Force and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review envisioned a smaller Army, but also a different Army. Citing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its subsequent threat to Saudi Arabia, contemporary DoD officials believed that the new environment placed a premium on responsiveness. Citing the months-long buildup for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, ARNG advocates questioned the validity of that imperative. They argued that Regular Army forces and reserve component support forces could meet those requirements for responsiveness, which were extremely challenging for Army National Guard combat forces. DoD thus came to rely principally on Regular Army combat forces and reserve component support forces for the critical early phases of major operations, even as it struggled to find a role for ARNG combat forces. By the end of the 1990s, however, peace operations had begun to place significant stress on

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the Army’s readiness. A potential role for ARNG combat forces emerged, in which the Army could use those forces to meet lower-risk, lower-priority missions and thereby release Regular Army forces for higher-priority missions, just as envisioned in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.

The Army responded to significantly increased post-9/11 demands for Army forces by reinforcing ARNG forces’ role of assuming lower-risk missions to allow Regular Army combat forces to be focused on the most-demanding operational missions. Those forces were fully committed to combat and counterinsurgency operations. As always, the Army depended on the Army Reserve and ARNG to provide forces to support Regular Army combat forces. ARNG combat forces also met a voracious demand for forces to secure U.S. bases, lines of communication, and reconstruction activities, which required less predeployment training and maximized their availability overseas once deployed. ARNG combat forces also performed operations in what were anticipated to be lower-risk contexts after the initial invasion and after the 2007–2008 “surge” reduced overall levels of violence in Iraq.

Research Approach

Answering the question of why the implementation of the Total Force Policy evolved requires a focus on Congress. While the executive branch traditionally has the initiative with respect to organizing, training, and equipping the Armed Forces, it is Congress that actually makes the laws that establish the parameters for executive branch actions, and Congress allocates the resources to carry out its policy preferences. As the other volumes have shown, Congress has been more than willing to impose its policy preferences on the executive branch since the beginning of the Republic. It is, of course, something of a distortion to consider Congress as a unitary actor, since the U.S. Constitution expressly designed Congress to function as a forum for competing interests.

On this issue, the interests competing in Congress were largely those of the Army’s three components. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), aspired to represent all three components. Congress generally perceived that HQDA represented the Regular Army’s perspective, however. Military officials—such as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs; the Director, Army National Guard; and the Chief of the Army Reserve—and professional organizations—such as the Reserve Officers Association of the United States and the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS)—represented the reserve components on Capitol Hill. For the sake of simplicity, we will often group official and unofficial representatives of the reserve components by their shared perspective, for example, “the Guard” or “the Reserves.” The associations’ public pronouncements provide valuable insight into their perspectives. Ultimately, however, legislation—including appropriations—represents a recon-
ciliation of those differing perspectives into a single policy perspective, usually offered in the reports accompanying legislation. This volume thus relies heavily on congressional sources, such as hearings, committee reports, and legislation. While the arguments made in testimony and in other forums describe the contending positions, the legislation and resource allocation that resulted from Congress’s deliberations reflect their resolution.

Organization of This Report

In addition to this introduction, the report contains five chapters.

Chapter Two describes the domestic political, strategic, and fiscal constraints that led DoD to adopt the Total Force Policy. It explains how the Army’s implementation of the policy and outlines steps the Army took to man, resource, and equip the reserve components under the Total Force Policy.

Chapter Three outlines how the Total Force Policy matured in the 1980s as defense spending increased and the training revolution took hold.

Chapter Four discusses DoD’s proposals for evolving the Total Force Policy for the post–Cold War period. These proposals sought to concentrate combat capabilities in the Regular Army and use the reserve components primarily for support and sustainment forces. However, Congress sought to keep combat capabilities in the National Guard. As a result, DoD shifted to using National Guard maneuver units for peacekeeping missions to keep the Regular Army forces ready for major combat operations.

Chapter Five explains how the demands of persistent conflict since the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to increased use of reserve component forces. Rather than acting as the nation’s strategic reserve that would supplement the Regular Army in the event of another world war, the reserve components are now used regularly in support of ongoing contingencies and other routine military activities.

Chapter Six summarizes the analysis presented in the previous four chapters and identifies the factors likely to affect the continued evolution of Army Total Force Policy.
In August 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird first articulated the total force concept. The policy stated that “Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.”1 His approach, which he characterized as a “total force concept,” certainly represented the most plausible solution to the problem of reducing defense expenditures while maintaining adequate defense forces. The Soviet Union had attained rough nuclear parity, meaning that the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies had to reconstitute their conventional forces to deter Soviet aggression in Europe. But it had become clear, for a variety of reasons, that DoD would no longer be able to rely on conscription to sustain military capabilities. The planned move to an All-Volunteer Force, in turn, posed the enormous challenge of recruiting young men in the shadow of the unpopular Vietnam War. It also promised to increase manpower costs substantially, which meant that DoD could not afford to sustain a Regular Army substantial enough to serve as a deterrent through voluntary enlistments. Even if doing so were feasible, its cost would have threatened to derail much-needed modernization. With few other viable alternatives, Laird turned to the reserve components.

In some respects, Laird’s total force concept represented a return to the United States’ traditional military policy of relying on the reserve components to expand its military forces rapidly when required to do so. It is easy to imagine the Army complying with Laird’s directions by structuring the Regular Army to meet the demands of a certain range of contingencies—or even the initial phases of a single major contingency—with the reserve components augmenting them as necessary. Essentially, that was how the nation had employed its reserve components from World War II’s end until the start of active combat operations in Vietnam. Laird’s total force concept certainly provided scope for the Army to employ its reserve components to supplement the Regular Army once it had exhausted its capacity.

1 Laird, 1970, p. 30968.
Instead, the Army eventually responded to Laird’s policy by integrating reserve component capabilities into planned operations from the outset. Initially, under Army Chief of Staff William C. Westmoreland, the Army increased planned to employ reserve component support units to preserve combat capabilities in the Regular Army, a theme that has persisted to the present day. Later, in 1974, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams went so far as to integrate a few Army National Guard combat brigades into selected Regular Army divisions as a way of increasing the number of divisions. This approach allowed Abrams to field 16 divisions within fixed active component end strength, a number close to the Army’s peak of 19 and 2/3 divisions at the Vietnam War’s height. The Army had never done anything like this before.

Much of the historical interest surrounding Abrams’s proposals—christened the “Abrams Doctrine” after his death—concerns its supposed implications for presidential warmaking powers. In 1986, Harry G. Summers—a retired Army colonel and close associate of Abrams—alleged that Abrams had increased the Army’s reliance on its reserve components as a way of ensuring that the President could not commit the Armed Forces to war without the explicit support of the American people. The evidence for Summers’s assertion is thin: Abrams never said anything else to that effect captured by the public record. Yet while it cannot be conclusively refuted, it being difficult to prove a negative, any intention to constrain presidential power was overwhelmed by increasing legislative efforts to increase DoD’s access to its reserve components and improve their capabilities. Thus, the most hotly contested aspect of Abrams’s legacy for the reserve components—at least in terms of historiography—had the least impact on the roles and composition of the Army’s three components in succeeding years.

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3 In 1986, Harry G. Summers asserted that General Abrams had deliberately increased reliance on the reserve components so that no future president could commit U.S. Armed Forces to combat without congressional approval and the support of the American people. Other authors amplified Summers’s assertion, without adding new evidence. Later, other researchers contested this interpretation, noting the absence of any such policy objective from the documentary record. Regardless of Abrams’s intentions, there is nothing in the hearings on the Army’s 1975 program or any other contemporary resource to indicate that Congress either recognized the existence of this implicit constraint or accepted it. Indeed, the only evidence of Congress’s intentions with respect to this issue is the creation of Presidential Select Reserve Call-up, a move explicitly intended to relax constraints on the President’s ability to employ reserve forces and, by extension, all U.S. Armed Forces. For different perspectives on the subject, see Harry G. Summers, Jr., “The Army After Vietnam,” in Kenneth J. Hagan, ed., Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986; Conrad C. Crane, “The Myth of the Abrams Doctrine,” in Jason Warren, ed., Drawdown: After America’s Wars, New York: New York University Press, forthcoming; James Jay Carafano, “The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfilled Promise, Uncertain Future,” Heritage Lectures, December 6, 2004. While it is impossible to resolve the questions of Abrams’s intentions completely, Congress seemed inclined to increase the reserve components’ accessibility as a way of increasing DoD’s reliance on them, and hence their level of resourcing.
The total force concept could only work if the Army had ready access to its reserve forces—and mobilization of these forces required congressional authorization. In 1976, Congress acceded to DoD’s request by creating the Presidential Select Reserve Call-Up authority, which allowed the President to mobilize 50,000 reservists for 90 days or fewer without congressional authorization. Like the Army’s integration of reserve components, this delegation of authority was exceptional, especially because Congress was still concerned about executive overreach, as reflected in the 1973 War Powers Resolution.

Abrams’s total force approach is best understood as a response to a specific set of contingent circumstances. His 16-division proposal responded to congressional concerns about the ratio of Regular Army combat forces to support forces. It thus preserved congressional support for the Regular Army and, by extension, total force end strength. It also produced a force that came close to meeting long-standing Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates of the number of divisions necessary to sustain a conventional deterrent. The explicit reliance on ARNG brigades—known as “roundout” brigades when they are part of an active Army division—may seem unusual in light of subsequent experience during the first Gulf War. Contradicting expectations, DoD deployed these brigades’ parent Regular divisions to the Gulf without them. The Guard roundout brigades were activated only under intense congressional pressure, and they did not deploy.

It is not clear, however, that contemporary Army officials believed there was an unbridgeable difference in reserve and active components’ relative proficiency as the Army recovered from the Vietnam War. For all that reserve component units were inadequately equipped and indifferently trained, outside observers and some Army officers noted that the Regular Army had training and readiness problems of its own. Even with the Vietnam War winding down, Regular Army units—especially in Europe—had serious shortages in terms of personnel and equipment. Key Army officials, including Chief of Staff Westmoreland, felt that the quality of Regular Army training was, at its very best, mediocre. While Regular Army forces certainly had more opportunity to train—at least in theory—the Army approach to training was inadequate and out of date. The reserve components’ readiness was undeniably worse than that of the Regular Army, but the gaps may not have seemed unbridgeable to senior leaders who had

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4 Public Law 94-286, An Act to Amend Chapter 39 of Title 10, United States Code, to Enable the President to Authorize the Involuntary Order to Active Duty of Selected Reservists, for a Limited Period, Whether or Not a Declaration of War or National Emergency Has Been Declared, May 14, 1976.


fought with America’s conscript, mass-mobilization Army in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. These specific historical conditions and limitations—and probably others—shaped the Army’s approach to Laird’s total force concept.

Strategic Context

At the dawn of the 1970s, the Nixon administration faced a series of interlocking national security challenges. The Vietnam War absorbed U.S. military resources in a peripheral theater of operations. The war itself was incredibly divisive at home, as high casualty rates and large draft calls increased the strength of opposition to the war and to the underlying foreign and defense policies that were believed to have led to it. The U.S. military’s focus on Vietnam created strategic vulnerabilities elsewhere, especially in Europe. Soviet military modernization had brought the Soviet Union to a rough strategic parity with the United States, eroding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and so increasing the relative vulnerability of the United States and its NATO allies. On top of all that, a slowing economy and increasing inflation reduced the resources available for defense. U.S. officials believed the country was politically, economically, and militarily overextended.

The Nixon administration’s response matched the problems it faced. During the 1968 presidential campaign, in an attempt to reduce the issue’s salience to the voting public, Nixon had promised to end both the Vietnam War—under favorable conditions for the United States—and the draft that fed it. He also had proposed what became known as the Nixon Doctrine, which at its heart was the result of domestic, strategic, and economic factors. First, allies would be expected to bear most of the burden for their own defense, especially in terms of ground combat troops; this came to be known as burden sharing. Once in office, Nixon tried to reduce U.S. declaratory commitments, moving from a two-and-a-half-war strategy ( premised on simultane-
ously defeating the Soviets in Europe, combating the Chinese communists in Asia, and contending with a contingency operation somewhere else) to a one-and-a-half-war strategy (in which the United States would maintain the capability to fight one major war in either Europe or Asia and one minor war elsewhere simultaneously).\textsuperscript{10} Although U.S. military strength in Vietnam declined rapidly from its zenith in 1968 to the United States’ complete withdrawal by 1973, the war continued to complicate Nixon’s strategic realignment. Even after 1973, there were major contingency plans to return if necessary. Still, the thrust of Nixon’s strategy was clear: to refocus U.S. strategy on Europe, reduce U.S. commitments to sustainable levels, and mitigate the domestic divisions associated with the draft.\textsuperscript{11}

But even to implement the one-and-a-half-war strategy, the Nixon administration had to reconstitute U.S. conventional forces and the credibility of the deterrent they underwrote. The reduced commitments implied by the one-and-a-half-war strategy still exceeded the active component capacity the United States would be able to field under the manpower constraints imposed by the end of the draft. It also exceeded the fiscal constraints on personnel costs imposed by a tightening economy. Laird, Nixon’s Secretary of Defense, thus looked to substitute reserve component for active component forces throughout DoD wherever prudent and feasible.\textsuperscript{12}

A Resurgent Soviet Union
While the United States had been consumed in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had shifted the correlation of military forces in Europe in its favor. Traditionally, NATO had relied on U.S. nuclear superiority to make up for a substantial inferiority to the Warsaw Pact in terms of conventional forces. By 1970, however, U.S. officials believed that the Soviets had achieved something approaching parity in terms of strategic and theater nuclear forces.\textsuperscript{13} That meant that deterring the Soviet Union rested on the strength of the NATO’s conventional forces.

Unfortunately, the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and those of its Warsaw Pact allies substantially outnumbered those of the United States and the rest of NATO, especially in terms of tanks and artillery pieces.\textsuperscript{14} The Soviets had also undertaken a


\textsuperscript{11} The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to the Nixon administration’s declaratory “one-and-a-half-war” strategy at the time, fearing that it spread U.S. forces too thin and, at the same time, invited Chinese aggression. See Rearden, 2012, p. 348.

\textsuperscript{12} Hunt, 2015.


major military modernization program that eroded U.S. qualitative advantages, even if it did not erase them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Lyman Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, doubted NATO’s ability to mount a conventional defense of Europe, because of numerical inferiority and problems in readiness across the alliance. To be sure, Laird was less pessimistic about NATO prospects, provided that NATO countries increased defense spending.\footnote{Hunt, 2015, pp. 310–311.}

In 1970, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that it would require 17 U.S. “division force equivalents,” or DFEs, within 90 days to mount an initial defense of NATO against a Warsaw Pact invasion.\footnote{The DFE concept allowed separate brigades and regiments to be aggregated into a single, commensurable unit and implied enough combat support and sustainment forces to allow it to function effectively.} These DFEs also implied necessary support forces. Since two DFEs were to be provided by the Marine Corps, it fell to the Army to provide 15 divisions, one and one-third DFEs more than the FY 1970 defense program allocated to the active component. Some of these DFEs would have to come from the Army’s reserve components. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that reserve forces had never achieved that level of readiness in the past and were unlikely to do so in the future. Furthermore, with all active component forces committed to Europe, reserves would have to handle any non-NATO contingency.\footnote{Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1969–1972, Vol. 10, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History, 2013, p. 61.}

A war in Europe was not the only possibility for which Army forces had to be prepared. Force planning over the years from 1970 to 1976 also included continuing operations Vietnam during the withdrawal, halting Chinese aggression in Korea or elsewhere in Asia, invading Cuba, and major operations in the Middle East. Defense officials did not necessarily see that these other contingencies would develop on the same rapid timeline as a Soviet invasion of Europe, however. Moreover, given public aversion to repeating the Vietnam experience and thawing relations with China, they viewed large-scale war in Asia as somewhat unlikely, as well.\footnote{Poole, 2013, pp. 49–79; Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1973–1976, Vol. 11, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History 2015, pp. 19–44.}

To understand how Army leaders implemented Laird’s guidance, it is important to understand the nature of the war that they expected to have to fight in Europe. U.S. Army leaders expected that war would be incredibly violent and incredibly brief, launched with little warning by Warsaw Pact forces. Privately, senior U.S. Army officers thought it would be a matter of days before NATO was forced to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. To the extent that Army forces would be relevant in such a conflict,
they would have to be able to deploy rapidly and operate effectively with very little additional preparation.19

In the fall of 1977, *The National Guardsman*—NGAUS’s in-house publication—published a “Statement of Position” on “United States Military Posture and the Short War Strategy” that noted the potentially deleterious implications of the prevailing strategy’s assumptions for the Guard:

> the near-obsession with the short war theory has created a very clear understanding that Defense is interested only in those units which can be deployed in accordance with one of the early deployment scenarios. We constantly hear talk of the need to “purge” the system of those units which contribute only marginally to the NATO requirement—and that requirement is neatly tailored to short-war thinking!

> It is this sort of discussion which leads us to conclude that the short war strategy is strewn with pitfalls for the Guard.20

The article went further, noting how the assumption of a short war implied that much of the Guard’s force structure was superfluous. The author questioned whether a war in Europe would in fact be resolved so quickly. He asserted that a robust reserve component might provide the final increment needed to resolve a conflict that would inevitably exceed combatants’ prewar expectations. While reserve component leaders were prepared to change to be useful to a short war wherever possible, they were unwilling to concede that there was no need for capacity—mostly resident in the reserve components—to wage wars of greater scale and duration than originally anticipated.

**The State of the Army**

In 1970, the condition of U.S. ground forces thus represented “the area of our greatest weakness,” according to a memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Richard Nixon.21 DoD had deferred modernization and procurement plans to fund ongoing operations in Vietnam. The war’s voracious demand for manpower, materiel, and money denuded the rest of the Army. According to Richard DeSobry, who had served in Vietnam and Germany,

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They took equipment away from Europe. They took people away from Europe during the Vietnam War. It wasn't unusual to have, say, one field grade officer in a battalion and maybe one 1st lieutenant and new 2nd lieutenants commanding companies. They had very little. They didn't have the money to really do the training. People-wise, it was disastrous.22

Lieutenant General Donald H. Cowles had commanded a division in Germany before deploying to Vietnam himself and had observed a similar phenomenon. According to Cowles, “Well, you don't build a division under these conditions.”23 A 1972 audit by the Comptroller General’s office, the forerunner to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), found similar conditions in the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), those units designated to rapidly reinforce forward deployed forces in the event of a crisis. The report noted bluntly: “It would be difficult for STRAF units to deploy quickly at full strength because many units are not combat ready.” It attributed this inadequate condition to “[t]he high turnover of personnel, lack of qualified personnel, and funding restrictions, which were beyond the direct control of the divisions.”24 According to historian Ingo Trauschweizer, the U.S. V and VII Corps in Germany could muster only 88 percent of their authorized strength. Over a third of the U.S. Army Europe’s units had less than 75 percent of their authorized personnel. In light of these and other deficiencies, Army officials estimated that the U.S. corps could defend only about half of their assigned forward areas.25

Reserve component readiness also languished. To be sure, the reserve components had ample manpower, with the draft providing considerable incentive for enlistment. Even that was hardly an unmixed blessing, leading as it did to the not entirely unjust-


23 “Interview with Lieutenant General Donald B. Cowles,” 1975, pp. 58–59. In fact, the Army Staff ceased work on revising tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) for its divisions because there would not have been enough men to fill out the proposed divisions. See John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Washington D.C.: U.S. Center of Military History, 1998, p. 353. Also see U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12604, to Authorize Appropriations During the Fiscal Year 1973 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Naval Vessels, Tracked Combat Vehicles, Torpedoes, and Other Weapons, and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to Prescribe the Authorized Personnel Strength for Each Active Duty Component and of the Selected Reserve of Each Reserve Component of the Armed Forces, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 25, 26, 27; February 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, March 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, April 17, 24, 1972, pp. 9392–9393.


tified public perception that the reserve components were a haven for well-connected
draft evaders.26

Yet while the reserve components had plenty of people to train, they had relatively
little equipment on which to train them and little money with which to do so.27 In
his 1970 posture statement, Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor noted that “the
readiness posture of the Reserve Components is improving but at a lesser rate than
we would like to see.” He attributed shortcomings to “the lack of adequate amounts
of modern equipment, the shortage of tactical training areas at or near home stations,
and the shortage of qualified personnel resulting from continuous turbulence.”28 In
fact, reserve component readiness seemed low indeed at the beginning of the 1970s.
A GAO audit in 1970 found that ten of ten units selected for analysis “were not ready
to mobilize and deploy rapidly as planned . . . because of deficiencies in organization,
training, equipment and management.”29

Materiel and personnel problems were not necessarily the only issues with readi-
ness. The level of peacetime training proficiency did not appear to be particularly high,
either. In a 1973 lecture at Fort Polk, Louisiana, then–Lieutenant General William E.
DePuy described the perennial state of the U.S. Army in stark terms:

The American Army even today, and never anywhere more closely than here at
Fort Polk, is the product of World War II. . . . Anyway, what kind of an Army
was that for World War II, Korea and Vietnam—a very big Army filled with
draftees, expanded enormously in time of war and in the last war without call-
ing the Reserves, which meant we had to set up a factory to produce privates and
lieutenants and we did that and got away with it because Americans are good men
on average. World War II was the biggest example in which we took an Army of
200,000 and expanded it to eight million. And they were not very good.30

26 The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB), Major General Francis S. Greenlief, noted this phenom-
emon in his FY 1972 annual report:

The decline in strength this fiscal year is attributed to several factors. Congressional delay in passing the new
draft law, from July to September had an effect on nonprior service enlistments. Draft motivated young men
adopted a “wait and see” attitude. The winding down of the Vietnam conflict also contributed to a lessening
of draft tension with smaller quotas. Waiting lists to join Army National Guard units quickly diminished and
soon became non-existent. Plans proceeding with establishment of the Modern Volunteer Army also had a det-
rimental impact on nonprior service enlistments.

See Major General Francis S. Greenlief, Annual Report (66th) of the Chief, National Guard Bureau for Fiscal Year


General Paul F. Gorman, who—with support from DePuy—later ushered in the Army’s training revolution with the advent of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), in 1973 echoed DePuy’s sentiments on the condition of the Army on the heels of Vietnam with regard to general condition of training:

Having gone through the Korean War with the United States Army, I know the Army could not simply call up a division and send it into action without preparatory work. I watched the 3rd Division deploy from Fort Benning [to the Korean War]. I know those guys could not fight their way out of a wet paper bag. There were few cohesive Army units in Korea, despite the fact that there were a lot of combat veterans from World War II in their ranks. There were a lot of brave people, and they did yeoman service trying to make the system work but the nation did not do much to help them succeed. I saw much the same thing again in 1966–67 and again in 1970–71 in Vietnam.31

Gorman and his mentor DePuy attributed the lackluster combat capability they described in no small part to the contemporary training model, which had changed little since it had guided mass mobilization for World War II. According to DePuy,

From World War I until 1975, the Army followed the Army Training Program which carried a division from individual training through squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment or brigade, to division, in each arm or service on the basis of so many hours for this and so many hours for that. Men and units proceeded through the program whether they learned or not. Frankly, nobody knew. There were few tests and what there were, were subjective. If you could survive the schedule you were presumed to be trained.32

Later, Gorman and DePuy would thoroughly transform the Army’s training system to correct the shortcomings described above. In the early 1970s, however, the Army Training Program produced units with questionable proficiency in their wartime tasks. Together with personnel and equipment shortages, it reduced Army units’ potential effectiveness in a conflict to a point that may have seemed not all that much better than what could be expected of reserve component units.

Vietnam and the Advent of the All-Volunteer Force
According to Laird’s biographer, Richard Hunt, the Vietnam War was the dominant issue during the Secretary of Defense’s tenure, the fact from which everything else, including the total force concept, flowed. By relying principally on the draft to raise

the forces necessary to wage the Vietnam War—instead of mobilizing the reserve components—the Johnson administration had highlighted the inconsistencies and inequities of the Selective Service system.\(^{33}\) Richard Nixon himself thought the draft was inequitable, as it seemed to demand compulsory service from some citizens arbitrarily, a system that “cannot be squared with our whole concept of liberty, justice and equality under the law.”\(^{34}\) Whether or not the draft heightened opposition to the Vietnam War, the Vietnam War certainly heightened opposition to the draft. During his presidential campaign, Nixon promised to end the draft. Laird agreed with Nixon’s goal, but he wanted to move deliberately. For Nixon, however, it was a question of when, not if—and when could not come soon enough. Mere days after his inauguration, President Nixon directed the Secretary of Defense to begin organizing the commission that would in turn develop a detailed plan for ending the draft. When Laird

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33 The draft’s role in providing manpower is complex, with both a direct and indirect component. While the Gates Commission report noted that “The often ignored fact, therefore, is that our present armed forces are made up predominantly of volunteers,” that statement was true of the Armed Services as a whole, which included about as many draft-motivated volunteers as “true volunteers.” (See Thomas S. Gates, Jr., The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, Washington, D.C., February 1970, pp. 6–7). Certainly, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations chose to increase the Army’s size in particular by increasing draft calls rather than increasing pay and incentives, as pointed out by George Q. Flynn, a historian of American conscription: “American leaders had no hesitation in turning to the draft,” a predilection born of their experience in the Korean War. Of that experience, Flynn notes, “The administration, Congress, and the military establishment realized quickly that the United States could not fight even a limited war without conscription” (George Q. Flynn, Conscript and Democracy: the Draft in France, Great Britain and the United States, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002, pp. 72–75).

34 As quoted in Hunt, 2015, p. 66.
demurred, trying to create some flexibility, Nixon reiterated his directive. Nixon’s commitment was clear: The charter of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force—better known as the Gates Commission, after its chairman—directed the group not to evaluate the change, but to determine how and on what schedule Nixon’s promise to end the draft was to be kept.

While the Gates Commission noted that “No estimate has been attempted of the maximum size of a force that could be provided on a voluntary basis. When it is posed in this general form, the question of maximum size is not a meaningful one,” it nonetheless went on to conclude that the maximum size of the regular force that could be sustained at the pay rates they were recommending was 2.5 million service members in all three military branches. At the recommended rates, it would not be possible to sustain a force of 3.0 million, though DoD could recruit and retain a larger force by increasing pay rates even further. By way of comparison, DoD had reached a maximum size of 3.4 million service members at the height of the Vietnam War. Although the analysis concerned all three services, its conclusions primarily affected the Army as DoD’s largest and also most manpower-intensive service. If anything, the Gates Commission understated the difficulty of incentivizing enough soldiers to fill the Army’s ranks. Besides the economic incentives Gates Commission members envisioned, Army leaders also saw that it would be necessary to demonstrate to prospective recruits that the Army offered meaningful, rewarding opportunities.

Constraints
As the nation’s military moved to all-volunteer status, with the resultant increase in per capita personnel costs, economic conditions and political opposition to the Vietnam War imposed fiscal constraints on defense spending. Both Laird and Kissinger later noted that public opposition to the war translated into opposition to the entire defense program. This opposition continued throughout the 1970s. The Democratic party controlled Congress during that decade; according to political scientist Benjamin O. Fordham, Democratic representatives and senators never mustered more than 44 percent in support of funding increases or increasing the military’s “bureaucratic autonomy.” In addition, the Nixon administration was concerned about the impact

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of military spending on an increasingly fragile economy, as inflation, driven in part by defense and social welfare spending alike, had reached 7.2 percent in late 1969.\textsuperscript{41} In a memorandum to President Nixon asking for some relief from budget constraints imposed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Laird acknowledged the problem, expressing his belief that large budget deficits “would cause severe economic problems,” including increasing inflation, high interest rates, decreased housing starts, and other “severe economic dislocations.”\textsuperscript{42} Laird nonetheless went on to argue for modest relief from OMB’s budget constraints. Even so, it is clear that while the Nixon administration might have bridled at specific budget limitations imposed by Congress and their underlying rationale, its principal members accepted the reality of significant fiscal constraints on their response to the situation.

Manpower costs were a particular concern. With the end of conscription, DoD and the Army were going to have to provide more in terms of pay and benefits to attract and retain soldiers in the required numbers. In testifying in support of the 1973 Defense budget, Laird noted that average basic pay had more than doubled since 1964, driven by the growing demand for skilled workers in the U.S. economy and DoD’s requirements for increasingly skilled service members to operate ever more sophisticated weapons.\textsuperscript{43} Even though conscription theoretically enabled the government to commandeer manpower at a price it chose, DoD had nonetheless been forced to increase that price over time. Having to pay market prices for an All-Volunteer Force would only exacerbate the situation. The need to modernize the Armed Forces made the problem posed by increased personnel costs even more acute.\textsuperscript{44}

The situation was somewhat more complicated, however, than an economic supply-and-demand curve in which the number of potential recruits was a simple function of compensation offered to them. Army leaders in particular were concerned that they would not be able to recruit enough soldiers of sufficient quality to meet even the reduced manpower requirements of the volunteer Army without the incentives posed by conscription. An Army study conducted shortly before the Gates Commission rendered its report indicated that recent Army volunteers had been primarily draft-motivated. Volunteers traded a longer term of service for greater control over their

\textsuperscript{41} Hunt, 2015, pp. 63–64.


\textsuperscript{43} U.S. House of Representatives, 1972, pp. 9338–9339. Military pay had risen steadily during that time. The average pay for an E-4 with fewer than two years of service had risen from $122.30 per month in 1964 to $249.90 by the end of FY 1971. Even adjusting for inflation, that was an increase in pay of over 50 percent. See U.S. Department of Defense, Military Pay Charts, 1949 to 2017, Indianapolis, Ind.: Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 2017. Pay tables are deflated using Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF), website, undated.

\textsuperscript{44} Hunt, 2015, p. 29.
conditions of service. As historian Beth Bailey points out, they were less likely to be
sent to Vietnam and “only 2.5 percent joined the infantry.” Some Army leaders were
thus not sanguine about their ability to recruit large numbers of soldiers in the shadow
of the Vietnam War, even as levels of commitment declined. Neither was the GAO;
a May 1973 study forecasted that the Army would not meet its 1974 quality goals. In
fact, the Army met neither its 1974 quality nor its quantity goals, and experienced
difficulty again in 1976. Even if the Army could have afforded a large Regular Army,
it is by no means clear that it could have recruited one.

With costs in mind, Laird looked to the reserve component forces. Because of
the part-time nature of their commitment, they can maintain the same force structure
at much lower personnel cost—albeit at lower readiness levels—than can active com-
ponent forces. Secretary Laird thus cited lower reserve component personnel costs
as a primary reason for increasing reliance on them, if their readiness levels could be
enhanced, in his written testimony in support of the 1972 budget:

Lower sustaining costs of non-active duty forces, as compared to the cost of main-
taining larger active duty forces, make possible a greater flexibility in planning the
Total Force structure. This lower cost of non-active forces allows more force units
to be provided for the same cost as an all-active force structure, or the same number
of force units to be maintained for lower cost. However, it also requires that the
capability and mobilization readiness of Guard and Reserve units be promptly and
effectively enhanced.

In short, costs drove Laird to adopt the total force concept in the overall context
of President Nixon’s decision to end the draft. The nation was not willing to fund
active component forces large enough to meet all of its security commitments at the
same time it funded military modernization and other priorities. Reserve forces could
provide the same force structure at much lower cost. Whether or not reserve compo-

pp. 36–38. As George Q. Flynn put it, “Draftees went into the infantry and volunteers into support elements.”
46 U.S. General Accounting Office, *Report to the Congress: Problems in Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the
47 U.S. General Accounting Office, *Recruiting for the All-Volunteer Force: A Summary of Costs and Achievements,
48 The relative costs of active and reserve component forces are heavily sensitive to assumptions about how they
will be employed, and how much force structure is required to produce some required level of deployed opera-
tional capacity. See Joshua Klimas, Richard E. Darilek, Caroline Baxter, James Dryden, Thomas F. Lippiatt,
Laurie L. McDonald, J. Michael Polich, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Stephen Watts, *Assessing the Army’s Active-Reserve
Component Force Mix*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-417-1-A, 2014; Jacob Alex Klerman,
nent units could provide the same level of proficiency was another matter entirely. Laird’s statement above indicates that he did not believe reserve component units were capable of doing so at the time he initiated the policy. If making the total force concept effective required increasing “capability and mobilization readiness,” then it seems reasonable to infer that the reserve components could not provide similar levels of capability at the time Laird adopted the policy. As will be shown later, the readiness of the Army’s reserve components at the time was questionable. We must therefore assume Laird adopted the total force concept because it was the only option for meeting the nation’s extensive defense commitments that appeared fiscally feasible.

Implementing the Total Force Concept

Faced with the need to reconstitute America’s conventional deterrent despite stringent fiscal and tightening manpower constraints, Laird turned to the reserves. He officially articulated the policy in an August 1970 memorandum, but he appears to have made his intentions clear months earlier.50 On December 22, 1969, Army Chief of Staff General Westmoreland issued a memorandum that “the Reserve Components must be considered the initial and primary source of certain additional units and individuals in any future rapid expansions,” words almost identical to the ones later found in Laird’s August 1970 memorandum.51 Over time, that particular phrase became associated with the subsequent official policy.52 However, that reliance on U.S. reserves constituted only one part of the total force concept was just one element of the evolving defense strategy, which also emphasized enabling allies and partners to defend themselves.53 In 1973, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger formally upgraded the total force concept to the Total Force Policy.54

The reserve components were—not surprisingly—very supportive of the new policy. At the NGAUS’s fall convention in 1970,

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50 Hunt, 2015, p. 388.
51 Westmoreland’s memo can be found in Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense on Reserve Forces, 1970, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, February 24, 1971, p. 18. One must either assume that Laird was taking his lead from Westmoreland, or—more probably—had expressed the Total Force Policy informally to key DoD leaders well before recording it in an official memorandum.
52 Hunt, 2015, p. 292.
Delegates to the National Guard Assn.’s 92d General Conference made it abundantly clear that they heartily endorse the Defense Secretary’s recent reaffirmation of the traditional policy that the Army and Air Guard are to be included as “the initial and primary source for the augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency,” and that they are to be fully supported to that end.55

Later, NGAUS submitted testimony to the House Armed Services Committee supporting the total force concept:

This was the most significant and encouraging policy statement to emerge from the Department of Defense in many years, in respect to the National Guard and other Reserve Components. Also encouraging is the vigor with which the policy is, in most cases, being implemented by the Departments of Defense, Army and Air Force.56

NGAUS clearly favored a comprehensive enhancement of the role of the Guard with a concomitant increase in resources. Confronting the impending end of the draft, NGAUS asked to increase recruiting resources. NGAUS’s statement also argued against further reductions in force structure, and indeed argued for increasing the number of National Guard divisions.57 Clearly, NGAUS saw the total force concept as an opportunity to at least partially reassert the Guard’s “traditional” role.

The total force concept was neither NGAUS’s only or even its primary concern at the time. The highest priority in NGAUS’s legislative program was getting Congress to authorize retirement benefits for Guardsmen and reservists before they reached 60 years of age.58 Other priorities included reenlistment bonuses, retirement credit for military technicians, and upgrading the rank of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to lieutenant general.59 This broadening of NGAUS’s legislative agenda to focus on the details of DoD policies and budgets for the National Guard would continue through today. As time went on, NGAUS legislative priorities broadened even further. By 1978, the list had grown to 47 different priorities in eight different categories.60

In contrast to NGAUS’s objectives with respect to the total force concept, the Army’s implementation of the total force concept emphasized employing reserve com-

ponents’ capabilities to complement those of the Regular Army rather than substituting for them. That is, the Army focused its efforts on support units that could help Regular Army formations perform their missions. Resources allocated to the reserve components increased, especially relative to those allocated to the Regular Army. The Army prioritized “first to fight” units, however. Such units could deploy rapidly to a potential war in Europe. In effect, that meant that initial implementation of the total force concept focused on company-sized support units that could attain—or at least approach—desired readiness standards within the time allotted for training reserve component units and soldiers. Other issues with longer-term impacts—such as the issue of reserve component recruiting in the era of the All-Volunteer Force—were deferred until later in the decade.

Manning the Reserve Components

While it had become clear that the Army’s reserve components would be critical to the Army’s ability to generate needed operational capacity under the All-Volunteer Force, reserve components received relatively little attention during the transition from conscription. Since World War II, and especially during the Vietnam War era, conscription had served as a powerful incentive for young Americans to join the reserve components. As an example of coercive voluntarism, it also proved to be a strong incentive to join the Regular forces as well. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were waiting lists to join reserve component units. Army officials did anticipate that ending the draft would make it significantly more difficult to maintain reserve component strength. However, the Gates Commission argued that an increase in drill pay, combined with a willingness to recruit less well-educated recruits, would allow reserves to maintain their authorized strength. Army personnel planners disagreed, but their skepticism was part of a broader argument that the Army could not secure enough manpower to meet its commitments without conscription. When that argument failed to halt transition to the All-Volunteer Force, the Army devoted relatively little effort and few resources to incentivizing reserve component recruiting.61

Not surprisingly, both Regular Army and select reserve personnel numbers declined over the period. The latter declined substantially less than the former, however, as reflected in Figure 2.1. Regular Army end strength declined precipitously from just above 1.3 million at the end of FY 1970 to just over 800,000 at the end of FY 1972, after which the rate of decline became considerably more gradual. Reserve component paid drill strength—the number of personnel actually on the books—decreased slightly between FY 1970 and FY 1976, as the Army tried to decrease the number of reserve component units and increase their rate of fill. The components struggled even to meet the reduced manpower demands of these declining authorizations. In FY 1973, for instance, the active component muster an end strength of 801,015 of an

authorized strength of about 825,000. The ARNG and the USAR fell short of their goals, by 16,733 and 25,801 soldiers, respectively. This effort was part of a general shift away from treating the reserve component units as a structure on which an Army could be built—almost a cadre force—toward treating the reserve component units as capabilities to be employed more or less as they existed in accordance with war plans. As aforementioned, the Guard viewed its traditional role as serving as the basis for raising a mass-mobilization Army that would deploy and fight after integrating additional manpower and equipment during post-mobilization training. Under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, DoD began the process of aligning both active and reserve component force structure with war plans. The Army tried to eliminate units for which there was no operational requirement. It struggled to increase the readiness

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62 Bell and Cocke, 1977, pp. 59, 95.
of those reserve forces for which there was a valid requirement. As described in Volume III and will be described in later sections, those efforts met with varying degrees of success.

The decline in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) was precipitous, however. The IRR was—and is—a pool of individuals who have completed their initial period of military service but who remain liable to recall in the event of a crisis until their full military service obligation is fulfilled. The IRR exists to provide trained manpower to fill initial gaps in units faster than the training pipeline can provide them. It was particularly important for rapid mobilization of reserve components units. Reserve units frequently include many soldiers who have yet to complete the training necessary to deploy with their unit and function effectively. As of 2018, the period of obligation is eight years; in the early 1970s, it was six years. Thus, an individual who enlisted for three years in 1974 would have had three years remaining in which he or she was subject to involuntary recall to active duty in the event of a national emergency until his or her active duty obligation had expired. Someone drafted for two years would have had four years remaining on that obligation. As the Army got smaller, this meant that fewer prior-service soldiers were entering the IRR. Moreover, as the All-Volunteer Force shifted to longer enlistments and an emphasis on reenlistment, those who left the service tended to have less time remaining on their obligations. Consequently, IRR strength declined from a 1972 peak of just over 1 million to about 217,000 in FY 1976. A 1983 GAO report concluded that similar levels (227,000) were less than half of what was needed to meet mobilization demands.

Equipping the Reserve Components

The Army also increased the amount and quality of equipment provided to the reserves. By 1970, the reserve components were suffering from substantial equipment shortfalls. From 1965 onward, the Army had diverted equipment originally intended for the reserve components, as well as from the Regular Army, to sustain operations in Viet-

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As the United States withdrew ground forces from Vietnam between 1969 and 1973, the Army was able to end that diversion of equipment and channel some back into the reserve components. Department of the Army Historical Summaries (DAH-SUMs) and congressional testimony for the period from 1970 to 1976 describe a constant flow of equipment either purchased for or cascaded to the reserve components. Reserve component aviation force structure in particular received a boost, as the Army was finally able to provide helicopters to the reserve components instead of Vietnam. Between FY 1970 and the end of calendar year 1973, National Guard aviation capacity grew from 891 helicopters—mostly older, piston-driven aircraft—to 2,154 helicopters, most of which were the same turbine-driven aircraft that the Regular Army used. To be sure, as the Guard and Reserve were getting new equipment, some of their other stocks became unusable or obsolete. Still, by 1976, the reserve components’ overall condition with respect to equipment had improved in both absolute terms and relative to requirements. In 1972, the Army reported that the reserve components had $3.8 billion of a mobilization requirement of $7.8 billion (49 percent). By 1976, the Army had provided $4.1 billion against a mobilization requirement of $6.4 billion (64 percent).

Critical deficiencies remained, however, particularly with regard to the Army’s more modern M-60 tanks and communications equipment. Army officials had anticipated such shortcomings. Consequently, they concentrated resources on early deploying units. In 1971, the Army established a policy to equip all early-deploying units with at least 80 percent of their authorized equipment. This directive was consistent with a directive from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. That directive prescribed that the services prioritize equipping all forces according to their deployment requirements, regardless of component—a mandate that would later become known as “first to fight.”

65 Bell, 1973b, p. 74.
67 It is difficult to interpret these figures, since it is unclear how the value of equipment required and provided was calculated, especially for equipment originally purchased for the Regular Army then transferred to the reserves. The galloping inflation of the 1970s might have made this apparent increase less impressive than it might seem at first glance, however. For trends with regard to reserve component equipping, see Bell, 1973b, pp. 74–76; Bell, 1973c, pp. 71–73; Bell, 1974, pp. 111–113; Bell and Cocke, 1977, pp. 96–97; Cocke, 1978, p. 74; Cocke, 2000, p. 62; Cocke et al., 1977, pp. 63–64.
68 Cocke et al., 1977, p. 63.
Reserve Component Training and Readiness

The Army also increased efforts to train reserve component units. Between 1970 and 1976, the budget for Operations and Maintenance, Army National Guard (OMNG), increased by about $800 million in 2016 dollars. By way of comparison, OMNG obligations in 2016 were $6.6 billion. That represented a 40 percent increase in the Army National Guard’s budget for operation and maintenance. The budget for Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR), increased by about $200 million in 1973—when the Army Reserve’s operations and maintenance budget was separated from the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA), appropriation—and 1976, a more modest increase of around 20 percent, while the Regular Army’s operation and maintenance budget in 1976 stood at around $31 billion in 2016 dollars. As percentage increases, these were respectable, and they enabled the reserve components to improve their training. While training is not the only activity funded from the operations and maintenance appropriation, that appropriation is intended to fund training or activities that enable training and readiness.

The Army also undertook a number of other measures to improve reserve component readiness. Most of these measures were low-cost and generally involved some form of increasing Regular Army oversight of, and contribution to, reserve component units’ readiness activities. Such measures included roundout units, the Mutual Support Program, and the associated unit program. Under roundout, subordinate reserve component units would substitute for Regular Army units—e.g., a Guard maneuver brigade within a Regular Army division—within understructured higher-echelon Regular Army units. Initially, most roundout formations were battalions. In the Mutual Support Program, similar Regular Army and Reserve units were paired with the expectation that they would share assets to improve their mutual readiness. The associated unit program was similar, but did not involve the potential exchange of labor or materiel in the form of spare parts. Instead, it was intended to catalyze frequent interaction that would facilitate reserve component units learning from Regular Army units. As will be seen, any results produced by these initiatives did not exceed the modest amount of resources devoted to them.

Finally, the Army also increased the level of full-time support provided to the reserve components. The Army provides full-time support personnel to “improve RC [reserve component] readiness and mobilization/deployment planning and preparation.” These full-time personnel currently fall into several categories, including Regular Army soldiers, Guardsmen and Reservists in an active duty status—known as Active Guard and Reserve (AGR), a program established in the 1980s—ordinary

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70 Bell, 1973b, p. 89; Bell and Cocke, 1977, p. 107; Cocke et al., 1977, p. 78.
civil servants, and a special category of civil servants known as military technicians. There are two categories of military technicians. Dual-status technicians are full-time civil servants who, as a condition of their employment, also hold positions in reserve component units. The second category consists of non-dual-status technicians. They are also full-time civil servants, and may also serve in a reserve component, but they are not required to do so as a condition of their civil service employment. Both types of technicians are responsible for providing day-to-day maintenance and administrative support. The number of military technicians increased from a total of 30,455 at the end of FY 1970 to 37,247 at the end of FY 1976.  

The Army could and did provide its reserve components with more money, equipment, and support to improve unit readiness. What it could not do, however, was to provide them with more time to train. Guardsmen and Reservists were funded to train for 39 days a year. Then, as now, many individual Guardsmen and Reservists used their own time to augment that funded training time. Many did not. Their very status as reserve component soldiers meant that there were competing demands on their time, demands that outweighed reserve component duty in both frequency and individual importance. This had the effect of limiting them to company-level readiness. In 1971, Army Chief of Staff Westmoreland told the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee that “the best we can expect is company level training,” given the number of training days available. Westmoreland testified that if the Army increased the number of training days, it would decrease enlistments in the reserve components and thus erode readiness.

Reserve components nevertheless struggled to achieve the objective of company-level readiness. In FY 1975, for instance, just over half of the reserve components’ major combat units achieved company-level readiness. That was still better than the year prior, when only one separate brigade had reported meeting that standard. That was according to the Army’s own accounting. The GAO’s external assessment—based on an audit conducted in 1974—was harsher, answering the question posed by the title of their report—The Reserves: Can They Effectively Augment the Active Forces?—with an implicit negative. The GAO report noted:

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73 Bell, 1973b, p. 72; Cocke et al., 1977, p. 62.


76 Cocke, 2000, p. 63.
The Government budgets over $4 billion annually for Reserve Forces, yet most Reserve units cannot carry out missions for which they were organized. Problems plague Reserve components in practically all areas—people, equipment, and training. Some problems, such as equipment shortages, can be corrected if enough money is available. Others, however, such as delays in mobilizing and training Reserve Forces, may be inherent.\(^7^7\)

In sum, regardless of the degree to which the Army improved—or did not improve—reserve component manning, equipping, and training, limits on available training time meant that the highest level of proficiency that reserve component units could achieve would typically be company-level proficiency. The timelines associated with NATO war planning meant that anything not more or less immediately ready for deployment was unlikely to be useful at all. The reserve component forces that could prove useful to the Army in such a crisis were those that could be successfully employed at the company level. Support units—logistics, transportation and engineers, for example—could meet this criterion, but maneuver units—e.g., armored, infantry, and attack aviation forces—generally functioned at the battalion level and higher. Effectively, this reduced the probable utility of reserve component maneuver forces in Europe.

**Integrating the Reserves into Operational Plans**

In the early days of the total force concept, the Army’s integration of reserve component units into its war plans focused on company-level logistics units. In 1972, then-Lieutenant General William E. DePuy testified that contingency plans for Europe had gone to “the ragged edge” in relying on the reserve components, indicating that he felt that the Army’s reliance on its reserves approached and possibly exceeded acceptable levels of risk. The first wave to deploy would include combat service support “company-level units trained in peacetime to a high level so that they can be quickly deployed.” From there, the Army would build to separate brigades and divisions, all the while drawing on the IRR to fill out existing organizations and replace casualties.\(^7^8\)

The Army’s plans did not neglect larger formations. In spite of the Guard’s pressure to increase the number of divisions, Congress and the Army held the number constant, at eight, assuming that those brigades and divisions would deploy later, possibly much later.\(^7^9\) NATO contingency plan timelines caused Army leaders to focus on providing a ready force composed principally of Regular combat forces and a combination of Regular and reserve component support forces.


\(^7^8\) U.S. House of Representatives, 1972, pp. 11819–11820.

\(^7^9\) Cocke et al., 1977, p. 59.
Later, in 1974, the Army would institute what it then called Total Force Analysis. Total Force Analysis assessed different force structure options—various combinations of combat and support forces, distributed differently among the Army’s components—ability to meet operational demands. It considered the nature of the threat, the kinds of capability required, and the timelines on which they were required. Based on this analysis, the Army determined its required force structure and allocated that force structure among its components. Units that would be needed sooner would typically be allocated to the Regular Army, although many reserve component units, especially support units, were included in the early force. Units that could arrive later were largely allocated to the reserve components. Over time, Total Force Analysis has evolved into Total Army Analysis, which is “an annual computer-assisted force-structuring process begun in 1975 that lists the units needed in each of the Army’s components to meet the national defense strategy.”

The National Guard as an institution was heavily involved in these efforts, which were part of a larger Army effort at reorganization and reorientation. Lieutenant General James G. Kalergis, who spearheaded Army reorganization efforts for Army Chief of Staff Abrams, recalled that Major General Francis Greenlief—the Chief of the National Guard Bureau at the time—was “a very active participant.”

Kalergis’s recollection indicates that Abrams’s commitment to integrating the reserves was not mere window dressing, and that the Guard’s official representatives were not opposed to the direction the Army was taking to reorganize Army formations.

These efforts to integrate reserve component units into operational plans based on their capabilities and potential readiness reflected the impact of Robert McNamara’s reforms on defense planning. Both Regular and reserve component forces increasingly had to be justified in terms of their likely utility with regard to specific roles in specific contingencies instead of the general role of regular and reserve forces for war in general. Over time, this logic would erode the Guard and Reserve’s autonomy in shaping their forces.

**The 16-Division Army**

As these trends were unfolding, Army Chief of Staff Abrams announced a plan during a congressional hearing in March 1974 that appeared to substantially augment the importance of its reserve components’ importance. At the time, the Army still faced a
number of different challenges. Its ability to mount a successful conventional defense of Western Europe—in conjunction with its NATO partners—remained at best questionable. Congress at least acknowledged the validity of that mission, but the Army was also concerned about contingencies in the developing world. At the same time, along with the rest of DoD, the Army faced continued congressional pressure to reduce its budget and end strength. Army Chief of Staff Abrams apparently believed that Regular Army end strength—then at about 783,000—was particularly vulnerable to further reductions, in part because of persistent congressional concern about an apparently low ratio of combat forces to support forces, the so-called tooth-to-tail ratio. Abrams wanted to “hold the line” at about 785,000 Regular Army soldiers. To achieve congressional support for that goal, Abrams thought he had to demonstrate that the Army could produce a reasonable deterrent to Soviet aggression in Europe with the forces and resources it sought.

To that end, Abrams proposed restructuring the Army to increase the number of Regular Army divisions from 13 to 16, within an end strength of 785,000. An additional eight combat divisions from the Army National Guard would raise the number to 24 total divisions. Support forces would come from each of the Army’s components, but reserve component support forces would be crucial. Some on Abrams’s staff were apparently surprised at the plans, as he had made the decision independently with little staff work that explored the idea’s implications. They were also unclear on why he had settled on 16 Regular Army divisions. Lieutenant General Elmer Almquist, Abrams’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, later stated that

I think some of the studies we had done and stuff indicated that there could be some improvement made in the number of tactical units, which we had no idea that, you know, he’d stretch it to 16 divisions. The number was his own.

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83 “Interview with Lieutenant General Donald B. Cowles,” 1975, p. 57.

84 The difference between 783,000—the Army’s actual strength at the end of FY 1973—and Abrams’s goal of 785,000 is statistically minor, just over 0.2 percent. It is difficult to assess the validity of Abrams’s concerns about the threat of congressional action to further reduce Regular Army end strength. On the one hand, given his political astuteness and previous experience as Vice Chief of Staff, Army, no one was better postured to assess the Army’s vulnerability to further cuts. On the other hand, as Figure 2.1 indicates, Regular Army end strength essentially plateaued in 1972 at around 800,000, declining very gradually thereafter until it reached about 780,000 in 1973. Regular Army end strength then hovered at around 780,000 until the Cold War’s end.


Yet 16 divisions was roughly consistent with planning figures emerging from the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) over the period. As aforementioned, since at least 1970 the JSOP had estimated that at least 15 Army divisions were required to mount a conventional defense of Europe. Given that it was also considered necessary to maintain the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea, there was a simple logic to “stretching” the number of Regular divisions to 16. Going back even further, National Security Decision Memorandum 84 from 1970 had declared “The Defense Program should maintain no fewer than 16-1/3 active divisions.”87 In his congressional testimony, Abrams asserted that an Army of 16 Regular divisions would provide a “good chance” of allowing a successful defense.88

It was, however, simply not possible to stretch the Regular Army to 16 divisions with an end strength of 785,000 soldiers without additional reliance on reserve component forces. Thus, the new understructured divisions Abrams proposed relied on ARNG roundout brigades to complete their force structure.89 The roundout concept had been introduced before for units at the battalion level and lower; Abrams innovation was to propose that the concept be extended to brigades. Abrams biographer Lewis Sorley attributed the roundout proposal to General DePuy, who had originally told Abrams that the Army “had enough resources for ten good divisions, not thirteen.”90 This proposal at least implied that ARNG brigades would deploy and fight as part of Regular divisions. To create those 16 Regular combat divisions—even relying on ARNG roundout brigades—the Army had to convert 50,000 positions from later-deploying Regular Army support and sustainment forces to combat forces.91 In effect, that meant that the Army would increase its reliance on the reserve components to provide support and sustainment functions. In a European scenario, that reliance meant that combat forces would deploy and perhaps fight before all of the forces needed to support and sustain them throughout a longer conflict were available.92 Abrams’s 16-division proposal thus simultaneously increased and highlighted the Army’s reliance on reserve component units—especially sustainment units—to generate balanced operational capabilities. The major new element, however, was its explicit reliance on

92 Cocke et al., 1977, p. 18.
ARNG combat brigades as integral parts of Regular Army divisions. Because not all Regular Army divisions could deploy overseas simultaneously, it was envisioned that these few roundout divisions would have additional time available to complete the training and integration of its roundout brigade before deployment.

We should pause here to note several caveats that mitigate the significance of Abrams’s 16-division proposal. First, and most importantly, it was simply a more aggressive form of the total force concept. The original concept directed that the reserve components “be prepared to be the initial and primary source” for augmentation of Regular forces, a concept that was implicitly contrasted with the reliance on conscription to expand the Regular Army during the Vietnam War. The concept did not, however, specify the functions that those reserve forces should perform. Second, neither integrating ARNG maneuver brigades into Regular Army divisions nor relying more heavily on reserve component support forces actually placed reserve component forces in the “front line” of combat, at least in and of themselves. Roundout brigades were going to form part of the new divisions that, as originally conceived, were to be infantry rather than mechanized or armored divisions. These new divisions were not envisioned for early deployment to Europe in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion. In short, the front line of combat forces—at least with regard to the Warsaw Pact—still consisted of Regular Army units.

Abrams’s proposal was not merely a stratagem to achieve programmatic objectives, however. He believed that the additional divisions would be needed, just not necessarily in Europe. According to Cowles, Abrams believed the probability of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe to be extremely low. Abrams, however, thought that the Soviets were likely to push elsewhere, as they seemed to be doing in Africa and Indonesia at the time. Even if Abrams did not necessarily believe that reserve component units would prove useful in the initial phases of a conventional defense of NATO, he clearly envisioned employing them well before active forces had been exhausted in order to preserve the conventional deterrent in Europe.

Later, after Abrams’s death, the approach he articulated became known as “the Abrams doctrine.” The best-known component of the Abrams doctrine was the idea that by making it impossible to employ the Army without recourse to its reserve components, Abrams had intended to ensure that the Army would only go to war with the support of the American people. The source of that idea is a 1986 essay by Colonel Harry G. Summers, the author of the influential 1986 book *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* and a former member of Abrams’s personal brain trust. Since then, a number of other authors have taken it as given. Yet Abrams himself

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never publicly stated such an intention, and while a number of prominent officials have lent credence to Summers’s contention, others have declined to do so. Certainly other priorities appeared to be more urgent, among them maintaining a Regular Army end strength of 785,000 and mounting a credible conventional deterrent in Western Europe.

The 16-division Regular Army was thus a specific policy proposal, intended to address specific manpower and force structure issues in a particular strategic context, in a specific timeframe, defined by the life of the Future Years Defense Program, typically a six-year period stretching from the next year—the “budget year”—and another five years. In this case, that meant the period between 1976 and 1980. In most respects, Abrams’s proposal simply represents the logical evolution of Laird’s total force concept, pursued by DoD and the Department of the Army since 1969. In relying on ARNG maneuver brigades as an integral part of Regular Army divisions, however, Abrams’s proposal made a visible and explicit commitment to employing the full range of reserve component capabilities as part of a total force. The components’ units might differ with respect to their precise degree of readiness, but all were theoretically supposed to be available within the abbreviated timelines of one or more operations plans.

**Presidential Select Reserve Call-Up Authority**

If the reserve components were to be useful in a crisis, however, they had to be readily accessible. Until 1976, mobilizing elements of the reserve components required partial mobilization authority that, in turn, required Congress to declare war or a

national emergency. Concerned that congressional deliberations might take too long in the event of a crisis, DoD sought and Congress enacted legislation authorizing the President to mobilize up to 50,000 reservists in the event of an emergency, for up to 90 days, without congressional authorizations. The military was especially concerned with its ability to access units providing critical logistical and deployment capabilities necessary to support a rapid, large-scale deployment to Europe.\(^96\) The Senate report accompanying the bill also expressed hope that by authorizing the President to make such a call-up, a more flexible use of reserve units and personnel would follow, leading to an enhanced credibility of those forces and improved efficiency of the total force concept.\(^97\)

The deliberations on the proposed legislation were almost as interesting for what they revealed about policymakers’ assumptions about the nature of the war they anticipated and the role of reserve components in that conflict. Briefly stated, stakeholders—including both DoD officials and the congressmen before whom they testified—expected that the outcome of conflict would be decided rapidly and that the reserve components had to be prepared to contribute to that outcome. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs William K. Brehm declared that “We simply cannot afford to spend $5.6 billion annually on a force oriented solely toward a lengthy mobilization of the type envisioned in the past.”\(^98\) Brehm’s reasoning once again demonstrates the lasting impact of McNamara’s reforms of planning and programming processes on policies and resource allocation for the reserve components. Ultimately, the justification for reserve component force structure rested on war plans far more than it did on “traditional” military policy. Brehm testified that the eight existing National Guard divisions would be available for deployment within 8 to 14 weeks of mobilization; an insert for the record stated that all Selected Reserve units were “planned for employment by M+3 months.” Later, Brehm speculated that it would make more sense to organize a unit “from scratch” than to maintain it in the reserves if it would take longer than 12 months to ready it for employment.\(^99\) In short, DoD envisioned the ability to commit the entire Army—Regular Army and the Selected Reserve—within a year to fight a short, bloody war.

\(^{96}\) Sorley, 1991, p. 46.
\(^{97}\) U.S. Senate, Enabling the President to Authorize the Involuntary Order to Active Duty of Selected Reservists for a Limited Period Without a Declaration of War or National Emergency, S. Rep. 94-562, 1975a, p. 3.
Conclusion

By the end of 1976, the Army was moving toward Abrams’s vision of the Total Force Policy. The transfer of support functions from the Regular Army to the reserve components was well underway. The Army had activated the last two of its new active divisions, the 5th and 24th Infantry Divisions, and four Army divisions had roundout brigades. Almost all reserve component units had been integrated into operational planning, with timelines requiring their “arrival in NATO or CONUS [continental United States] mobilization stations within the first 90 days of a major conflict.”

Those measures provided enough division equivalents to plausibly meet Joint Chiefs of Staff estimates of requirements for a defense against a Warsaw Pact invasion, and thus provide Abrams’s “good chance” of success in that scenario. For all the attention garnered by the roundout brigade concept, however, most of the critical support to be provided by the reserve components took the form of support and sustainment capabilities. Finally, Congress—by authorizing the President to call up the reserve components without prior congressional approval—had made it possible in time of crisis to depend on essential support elements from the reserve component.

The Army’s implementation of the Total Force Policy—including Abrams’s 16-division Regular Army force—was a rational effort to leverage the capabilities of the reserve components to maximize the Army’s operational capacity with limited resources. It was not simply the outcome of bureaucratic processes that had shaped and sized the Regular Army to meet national security challenges with little help from the Reserve over the 1960s. With the adoption of Total Force Analysis, the Army adapted its processes to the new policy. Nor did it represent the political triumph of the reserve associations. NGAUS clearly supported augmenting the Guard’s role in national defense. Much of what NGAUS wanted, however, including robust support for recruiting and an increase in ARNG force structure, was either deferred or did not happen at all. Given its history and past efforts to reduce Guard force structure, Guard advocates would probably have preferred for the Army to integrate Guard combat divisions wholesale into war plans. Instead, the Army focused on integrating support companies. Even the roundout brigades were meant to fill out lower priority units intended for secondary theaters. Its implementation of the Total Force Policy was premised on a careful analysis of what kind of capabilities the reserve components could reasonably provide to meet the demanding timelines of a potential war in Europe.

Whether the Army’s implementation of the Total Force Policy would have produced the required military capability is another question entirely. The Army provided the reserve components with more resources, but these additional resources were

100 Cocke et al., 1977, p. 18.

still insufficient to achieve readiness objectives for manning, training, and equipping. Having lost the recruiting incentive provided by conscription, the reserve components frequently fell short of manning objectives, and the Army took some time to implement compensating measures such as reserve component recruiters and recruiting incentives. In terms of training, shortages of equipment and time prevented many reserve component units from attaining company level proficiency, let along achieving proficiency at the maneuver brigade level. Time may well have been the most serious constraint. With only 39 days a year available for training, units would struggle to attain higher levels of proficiency no matter how well-equipped and well-resourced they were. Regular Army units were reported to be in better shape than reserve components, but internal and external observers also found significant readiness problems. Fortunately, the strengths and weaknesses of the total force were never tested in battle against the Soviet Union or any other enemy during this period.

Regardless of its potential operational effectiveness, the Army’s 1976 implementation of Laird’s Total Force Policy was probably the most plausible option for meeting the Soviet challenge under the constraints imposed by policy and circumstance. The Nixon and Ford administrations did not think the United States could afford a Regular Army big enough to counter the Soviet threat, and in any case Congress probably would not have funded it. Even if reserve component units were of questionable readiness (and therefore questionable utility) against Warsaw Pact forces, Regular Army units’ shortcomings with regard to readiness and training may have seemed to reduce the relative risk in relying on them for missions lower in priority than a potential war in Europe. Understanding the state of the Regular Army in the early 1970s, and—in the opinion of key leaders like Generals William Westmoreland, William DePuy, and Paul Gorman, its historical tradition of lackluster tactical competence—is critical to understanding why Army leaders in the 1970s would conclude that employing round-out brigades posed an acceptable risk. As we will describe, distinguished Army generals would reach a different conclusion when it came time to actually deploy those units to the first Gulf War, after the Regular Army had made substantial and unprecedented improvements in its level of combat proficiency.

Even as the vision of the total force was evolving, other trends were in motion that would set a limit to its utility. Internal to the Army, new doctrines were emerging that would place a premium on tactical proficiency, while a new approach to training was evolving that would enable Regular Army units to attain unprecedented levels of effectiveness. New missions—emphasizing rapid deployment and the early commencement of operations—would emerge. Those missions’ timelines demanded deployment schedules that most reserve component forces would not be able to meet.
By 1976, the Army had established the architecture of its version of the Total Force Policy. It had changed force mix to maximize combat units in the Regular Army by transferring support missions to the reserve components. It undertook a variety of initiatives to improve reserve component readiness across the dimensions of personnel, training, and equipment. Congress acted in 1976 to make the reserves accessible in what was expected to be a rapidly developing and fast-moving war in Europe if the Soviets ever were to attack. At that time, however, all three of the Army’s components were still recovering after the Vietnam War had degraded their readiness, albeit in different ways.

Over the next 14 years, the Army improved the capability and integration of its three components. All three components received more money, better equipment, and better training. During the Reagan defense buildup, the Regular Army and the ARNG experienced similar increases in resource levels, at least in proportional terms. Funding for the Army Reserve also increased, but at a lower rate. As we will show later in the chapter, it actually declined on a per capita basis throughout this period. Reserve component units—especially support units—increasingly deployed overseas for training. The performance of those support units during the Persian Gulf War seemed at least partially to validate the Total Force Policy. The capabilities of ARNG roundout brigades, however, remained untested in combat and hotly contested within the national security community.

Over these 14 years, an alternative view of the policy and its purposes also evolved. Under Laird’s total force concept as first articulated, reserve forces were to be “prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces.” In this view, reserve forces were to provide any additional capacity required beyond that which the Regular Army could provide. Over time, Congress continually intervened to increase the priority accorded to the reserve components. Congress limited Regular forces’ growth, insisting that any expansion of capacity take place in the reserve com-

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1 Laird, 1970, p. 30968.
ponents. When the Soviet Union’s collapse made downsizing the U.S. defense establishment inevitable, Congress attempted to shield the reserve component from reductions. Congress insisted on the mobilization of roundout brigades for the Persian Gulf War, even though available Regular Army capacity exceeded operational requirements. A view had taken root that reserve component forces were to be employed not simply if they were needed, but because they were integral components of the Total Force. For the reserve components and some of their supporters in Congress, the Total Force Policy had evolved from a means to an end to an end in itself.

**Strategic Context**

Preparing the Army to defend NATO against a Soviet attack remained the Army’s focus throughout most of this time period. Until the Warsaw Pact’s collapse, its forces continued to significantly outnumber those within NATO, especially in terms of artillery and tanks. While U.S. officials comforted themselves that Western capabilities were qualitatively superior to those produced by Warsaw Pact forces, the latter had performed depressingly well against Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Anti-tank guided missiles such as the Sagger had inflicted heavy losses on Israeli armored forces, while Soviet-made air defense systems had denied the Israelis the air supremacy to which they had become accustomed. Losses on both sides approached 50 percent. Examination of equipment captured by the Israelis indicated that Soviet equipment was at least fit for the purposes for which it was designed, including operations in a chemically contaminated environment. The Army’s analysis of the Yom Kippur War’s lessons indicated that in any future war, Soviet forces would be technologically sophisticated and highly lethal. General William E. DePuy summed up the war’s lessons for combat with the aphorism “What can be seen can be hit; what can be hit can be killed.”2 Army officials expected that a war in Europe would equal or exceed the Yom Kippur War in lethality. Such a war would be bloody, but it would also be brief. Sustaining a conflict of this intensity for any length of time was considered impossible for either NATO or the Warsaw Pact.

Potential conflict in Europe was not the only problem confronting policymakers, as other potential threats began to engage their attention as early as 1977. Besides

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illustrating the challenging nature of the modern battlefield, the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the subsequent Arab oil embargo highlighted the region’s importance to the world economy and its vulnerability to disruption by either external forces or regional adversaries. Planning for Middle Eastern contingencies had commenced as early as 1974. The first serious policy proposals for what would become the “Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force” emerged in 1977. By 1979, the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis provided the impetus to translate those proposals into reality. And the Middle East was not the only potential problem. Perceived Soviet adventurism in Africa and Latin America also concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.3 The need to prepare for such out-of-area contingencies led Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer to sponsor the development of light divisions beginning in the early 1980s.4 Planners did not expect such contingencies to require more than one or two divisions, and they put the premium on rapid deployment and responsiveness rather than mass.

It is important to recall that DoD planned and prepared for contingencies in the Middle East in the general context of worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union. That is, such plans assumed that U.S. forces would either deploy to confront Soviet adventurism or deploy elsewhere against the backdrop of possible war in Europe. To the extent that plans might have envisioned employing less ready forces—including ARNG combat formations—for other contingencies, they did so to preserve the highest readiness forces for employment in Europe. Put more plainly, the reason that Army planners were willing to countenance employing roundout divisions in the Middle East is that they thought that the all-Regular divisions would probably be fighting the Soviets in Europe at the time. The fact that the first actual employment of U.S. forces took place after the Soviet Union’s collapse tends to obscure that historical context.

The Reagan Defense Buildup
The Total Force Policy arose in no small part because of resource constraints in the early 1970s. The Nixon administration wanted to reestablish a conventional deterrent against Soviet aggression, but Nixon’s decision to end conscription meant that doing so entirely with active component forces would be prohibitively expensive. As shown in Chapter Two, the administration worried about the economic impact of either a tax increase or deficit spending. In any case, Congress opposed increasing spending on the military.5

5 For in-depth analysis of the crafting of defense budgets during the Nixon administration, see Hunt, 2015, Chapters 3, 10, 11, 16, and 18.
Ten years later, even though the economy remained weak in the early 1980s, the Reagan administration did not intend to remain bound by the fiscal constraints accepted by its predecessors. In March 1981—just over a month after President Reagan’s first inauguration—Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, a former director of the Office of Management and Budget, submitted written testimony rejecting those limits:

"Today, the budget is not sufficient for our strategic needs. It is clearly inadequate to support our widespread commitments in peacetime. Further, it constrains our ability to meet challenges to our interests in times of crisis."  

Weinberger went on to directly challenge the idea of constraints:

"It is important to understand, in considering our supplemental request and budget amendment, that the principal shortcoming of the defense budget we inherited is not so much that it omitted critical programs entirely in order to fully fund others, but rather it failed to provide full funding for many programs it conceded were necessary but felt unable to afford. To correct this defect requires, of course, that we propose corresponding increases in the same programs—programs that, in our view, we cannot afford not to fund adequately."  

The resulting sustained increase in defense spending produced one of the largest peacetime buildups in American military history, with defense outlays between 1981 and 1989 rising 33 percent. Figure 3.1 depicts total defense spending in 2015 constant dollars during the Reagan buildup in relation to the decade prior and the decade following.

Limited resources had contributed to the creation of the Total Force Policy. The Reagan administration proved willing to incur substantial deficits to improve America’s defense posture. The willingness to incur deficits relaxed the fiscal constraints that had helped push Melvin Laird to adopt the total force concept. As Figure 3.2 indicates, the Reagan-era budget deficits were unprecedented in the post–World War II era. The Reagan administration was absolutely convinced that the United States had to spend what it deemed necessary on defense. As former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger put it in 1990 C-SPAN interview:

"But, the paradox of democracies is basically that they are very unwilling to invest the amount that they need in their military to keep them democracies, and I was"

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Figure 3.1
Department of Defense Total Obligational Authority, Fiscal Years 1970–1999

RAND RR19954-3.1

Figure 3.2
Federal Government Surpluses and Deficits, 1946–1989

NOTES: TQ = transition quarter. In FY 1976, the government changed its fiscal year so that it began on October 1 annually. Until that point, it had begun on July 1. The transition quarter, as its name suggests, covered the "extra" quarter for the fiscal year that had ended on June 30, 1976, until the new fiscal year that began on October 1.
RAND RR19954-3.2
very conscious of that and I knew that we’d never had or sustained a military buildup in peacetime for longer than 20 months before. We did it for 5-1/2 years under President Reagan. And I think it was absolutely essential that we do it. We’d fallen really far behind.9

Rather than substantially increasing the size of the Regular Army, however, Congress looked to enlarge the reserve components. The Reagan administration sought to increase the Regular forces of the Navy and Air Force, but hold them relatively constant for the Army and Marine Corps. Growth would largely be in the Army’s reserve components, which were assessed as being about 175,000 trained personnel below their FY 1986 wartime objectives.10 In the 1982 House report authorizing 1983 DoD appropriations, the House Armed Services Committee went so far as to state “it is the committee’s position that the Department of Defense should program the use of reserve personnel for new force structure unless some persuasive evidence exists . . . that active personnel must be used.”11

The Training Revolution

For Army planners, operational proficiency would be a key issue in integrating the Army’s three components into the total force. If reserve forces were to substitute for Regular Army forces, as envisioned in Abrams’s 16-division force, then they would have to be able to perform at similar levels, at least when adequately resourced. As observed in Chapter Two, the difference in levels of performance between Regular Army units’ actual and reserve component units’ potential proficiency may not have been substantial at the beginning of the 1970s. Short of manpower, equipment, and resources, Regular Army units’ level of training proficiency was not necessarily high. Reserve component units were in even worse shape, but the Army’s senior leaders apparently did not find the gap unbridgeable at that time. Faced with the need to improve training in order to recruit and retain soldiers, and to cope with the anticipated demands of the modern battlefield, the Army initiated what Army historian Anne W. Chapman


terms a training revolution.\textsuperscript{12} That revolution substantially improved Regular Army forces’ proficiency, but it required a time commitment that reserve component forces could not match.

The roots of this training revolution lay in the early 1970s. In the course of visits to various Army posts, Chief of Staff General William C. Westmoreland had become concerned about the quality of Army training. In his views, training lacked the “dynamism” necessary to engage soldiers. His concern with this topic intersected with his broader concern about professionalism in the Army, and with a general sense among key subordinates that the Army’s traditional approach to training was inadequate for the serious business of modern war. In consequence, Westmoreland established a “Board for Dynamic Training” in 1971, headed by then—Brigadier General Paul Gorman. Gorman is particularly important because he would go on to become one of the key figures in the Army’s training revolution as TRADOC’s first Deputy Chief of Staff for Training from 1973 to 1977.\textsuperscript{13}

Over the course of his long engagement with Army training, Gorman promoted several reforms that continue to define U.S. Army training management to this day. First, TRADOC described the military tasks that soldiers and units were supposed to perform, initially in a series of “how to fight” manuals and later in various soldier training publications—known as “soldier’s manuals”—and in Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) publications. Second, TRADOC shifted the Army’s training focus away from large-scale maneuvers above brigade level toward tactical units at the battalion level and below. Third, TRADOC sought ways to improve the realism and rigor of training through the use of technology. The single most important innovation in this area was the introduction of the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), which allowed the Army to simulate the effects of direct fire combat.\textsuperscript{14}

The centerpiece of these reforms were the combat training centers, of which the first was the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, established in 1981. There, units engaged in mock battles—employing the full range of U.S. capabilities against a professional opposing force employing Soviet tactics.\textsuperscript{15} Experienced observer/controllers compared unit performance with the standards defined in ARTEP publications and doctrine and provided detailed feedback to units. By 1991, more than 155 battalions had passed through the National Training Center (NTC), of which 12

\begin{footnotes}
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were ARNG.\textsuperscript{16} As the foregoing descriptions indicate, these training reforms focused primarily on maneuver units, not support units. Combat support and sustainment units supporting maneuver battalions and brigades also received training with their parent maneuver units. Aside from these attached units, sustainment and support units—whether Regular Army or reserve component—received considerably fewer training opportunities and less support. As Lieutenant Colonel Jo B. Rusin wrote in 1988, “Given the heave support missions of combat service support units, training time is difficult to find.”\textsuperscript{17}

While it may have been difficult to assess the impact of the “training revolution” on Army unit proficiency at the time, it is certainly clear in retrospect. Defense analyst Stephen Biddle attributes the First Gulf War’s outcome to the more mundane elements of doctrine and the Army’s thorough implementation of those elements: maintaining covering forces to provide early warning and locate the enemy’s main body, integrating arms and services, siting weapons, and coordinating fires, along with countless other prosaic fundamentals of warfighting. Based on the results of simulated combat, Biddle argues that even had the Iraqis had U.S. weapons and the U.S. fought with Soviet cast-offs, the outcome would have been just as lopsided in the U.S. Army’s favor.\textsuperscript{18}

Attaining and maintaining that level of proficiency, however, required considerable time and resources. As shown in Chapter Two, Army training proficiency was uniformly mediocre or worse when the Total Force Policy was initiated. Over the next two decades, the Army’s training revolution substantially improved levels of training proficiency in Regular Army maneuver units, as their commanders applied more resources in a more disciplined and systematic fashion. While the reserve components benefited from the training revolution as well, stringent limitations on training time prevented ARNG maneuver units from achieving the same level of effectiveness. Because the training revolution focused on maneuver units, however, the disparity between Regular Army and reserve component support units may not have been nearly so pronounced.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Jo B. Rusin, \textit{Soviet Threat to Combat Service Support Forces: A Training Challenge}, thesis, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air War College, 1988, p. 35. Rusin also alludes to the relative inattention that senior officers pay to support unit training: “Too often the defense plans of combat service support units are not closely scrutinized by the Corps G-3. Strands of concertina wire, a few individual fighting positions, and guards with machine guns at each entrance and exit point are frequently accepted as adequate” (Rusin, 1988, pp. 25–26).
\end{itemize}
Continuing Integration of the Reserve Components

Throughout the period 1977 and 1991, the Army worked to improve its reserve components’ capacity, readiness, and accessibility. Army Selected Reserve authorized strength increased from about 544,000 in 1977 to 780,000 in 1991. The Army devoted increasing resources to recruiting and retaining reservists in the all-volunteer era, going so far as to consider offering bonuses for enlistment in the IRR. The Army continued or increased many programs to enhance reserve component readiness, aligning reserve component units with their Regular Army counterparts in various forms and increasing levels of full-time support. With the rest of the Army, reserve component units aligned themselves with the new training regime being developed and promulgated by TRADOC, and ARNG units conducted training rotations at the new NTC almost from the beginning.

Once the largesse of the Reagan defense buildup began to flow, the reserve components got more of the modern equipment they were authorized; an ARNG armored battalion was one of the first units to receive the M-1 Abrams tank, a fact frequently cited by Army leaders whenever they were questioned about their support of the reserve components. Access increased as well. Congress and the Carter administration doubled the number of soldiers that could be called to active duty under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). Increasing numbers of reserve component units conducted overseas deployment training (ODT), including training not only in Germany and Korea, but also in Central America, deployments that put them near the center of contemporary American controversies over foreign policy. We will explore each of these issues in greater detail below. Distilled to the essence, however, these analyses will demonstrate that from 1977 and 1991 the Army had spent more effort preparing its reserve components for combat than it had ever done throughout its history. After Operation Desert Storm, the question became whether those efforts had been enough.

Approaching the Limits of Total Force Integration

As the Reagan defense buildup gathered momentum, Congress became increasingly concerned with its expense and impact on the national deficit. Personnel costs were especially problematic, paired with congressional concern that DoD was reaching the limit of the active component manpower it could obtain relying on volunteers. DoD

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20 Public Law 96-584, An Act to Amend Title 10, United States Code, to Provide Greater Flexibility for the Armed Forces in Ordering Reserves to Active Duty, and for Other Purposes, December 23, 1980.

officials clearly felt pressure to do more than use reserve forces to expand structure. Several of them testified to various committees that it would be extremely risky to transfer any additional missions to the reserve components. In 1983, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that those limits had been reached:

The strength of our Active Component is 780,000 soldiers. The sixteen divisions which constitute our active force—many of which are dependent on Reserve Component units to “round them out”—are barely adequate for today’s national security obligations. We have shifted many less time-urgent defense requirements from our Active to our Reserve Components, but have reached a point where this is no longer a viable option. Any reduction in our active duty end strength would have to be in our forward deployed forces. Other nations are generally aware of our strength requirements; such a reduction would be perceived by our friends and potential enemies as a weakening of our land force capability and a diminishing of our international commitments.22

Witnesses at a contemporary House Armed Services Committee hearing on “U.S. Commitments and the Forces Available to Meet Them” generally agreed. Major General Robert Teater, chairman of the Active/Reserve Mix Committee of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, testified: “I would surely not recommend that we attempt to alter our readiness immediately, or quickly, or summarily by transferring large missions or additional missions to the Guard and Reserve at the expense of the active forces.”23 Even retired Major General Francis S. Greenlief, executive vice president of the NGAUS, expressed reluctance to accept additional missions without significant increases in manpower and equipment for reserve component forces.24 Greenlief asserted that NGAUS did not support reductions in the active forces of the Army or Air Force, and that the “Guard Association does not claim the expertise to determine what resources, if any, should be diverted from the Active Forces to the National Guard and Reserves.”25

Responsiveness was a key criterion. Reserve component units that could be ready for deployment based on their existing training, or within 90 days or fewer, could conceivably replace active component units. That category mostly included company-sized combat support or combat support units. It was considerably harder to envision

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24 A member of the Nebraska Army National Guard, Greenlief served as Chief of the National Guard Bureau from 1971 to 1974 and Executive Vice President of the National Guard Association of the United States from 1974 to 1984. In 1999 he was promoted to lieutenant general by the governor of Nebraska.  
larger maneuver units meeting this goal. General Teater, himself an Army Guardsman, conceded that it might be problematic to expect even the roundout brigades to deploy immediately.26

For that reason, reserve component support forces were seen as key enablers for the Rapid Deployment Force, but combat forces were not. In hearings on the expansion of PSRC authority from 50,000 reservists to 100,000, DoD witnesses articulated the need to have rapid access to enabler forces to assist with deployment and support of deployed forces. Even when pressed closely by Senator Sam Nunn, the powerful chair of the Armed Services Committee and an advocate for reserve component forces, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Robert W. Komer responded that

the roundout units were largely for late deploying divisions, later deploying divisions for a NATO scenario because the early deploying divisions had to go very rapidly as part of the rapid reinforcement program. So units like the [deleted] and the [deleted] and so forth, which would have the roundouts, would have time to call up their Reserve brigades and get them ready. Then, when we shifted to the RDF [Rapid Deployment Force] concept, the emphasis is equally on speed, and since the [deleted] and we intend to marry it up with the [deleted] and send it out very early in any RDF deployment, it would be going so fast that you would not want to hold it up to get the Reserve brigade ready.27

Later, there was considerable controversy over the initial decision not to mobilize roundout brigades for deployment to Operation Desert Shield. Robert L. Goldich of the Congressional Research Service later wrote that

There can be little doubt that, in the 17 years that the roundout concept existed prior to August 1990, both active Army and Army National Guard leadership left the impression in public comments and congressional testimony, that the roundout brigades would and could deploy with their parent divisions under all circumstances, without any explicit reference to the time that might elapse between mobilization and deployment.28

Komer’s testimony, however, made clear that Regular Army units, augmented by roundout units, were expected to deploy later than non-roundout units. It also suggested that DoD officials never really contemplated employing roundout brigades as

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part of contingency force packages of the sort initially deployed to Operation Desert Shield.

In short, by the early 1980s the Army had reached what its leaders felt was the maximum extent of its ability to transfer missions to the reserve components. The Army would rely principally on Regular combat forces augmented by the reserve components to provide later-deploying forces to Europe and sustainment forces to secondary theaters of war. For contingency operations, the Army would rely on Regular Army combat forces, to which it had immediate access.

Manning the Reserve Components
The reserve components had struggled to man their forces to authorized levels during the All-Volunteer Force’s initial period. In previous years, the reserve components had relied on the threat of conscription, often during wartime, to incentivize enlistment. They had little, if any, recruiting force and had needed to offer no incentives to meet their complete accessions requirements and still have waiting lists of individuals wanting to join. But once draft calls started to diminish, so did propensity to join the Army Reserve or ARNG. Paid drill strength of the Army Reserve went from 263,299 in June 1971 to 185,753 by September 1978. The IRR declined from 1,059,064 in June 1972 to 143,882 in January 1978. Taken in total, the Ready Reserve had gone from 1,192,453 when the total force concept was announced in 1970 to 338,847 in seven years.29 Despite “the significant effort” made by the ARNG of enlisting some 104,000 and securing 113,000 extensions in 1978, it “reached a new low” in personnel strength, declining to 344,431 when in FY 1970 it numbered 388,954.30

With time, and with help from Congress in the form of incentives, the reserve components managed to at least partially overcome their initial difficulties and even increase strength over time. In fact, almost all of the numerical growth in the Army’s size between 1977 and 1988 occurred in the reserve components, after which the Army’s size stabilized and then declined. The ARNG had established a part-time recruiting force as early as 1973.31 At the end of FY 1976, the Army Vice Chief of Staff approved the Army Reserve Recruiting Plan, which authorized a full-time military recruiting force dedicated to the Army Reserves.32 This new recruiting force did not suffice to

31 Bell and Cocke, 1977, p. 95.
eliminate shortfalls in and of itself; the reserve components still struggled to attract soldiers. In response, Congress authorized recruiting and retention incentives for reserve component soldiers as part of the FY 1978 NDAA. Incentives included both cash bonuses for enlistment and retention and educational assistance. The value of these incentives increased rapidly. By 1992, just after the end of this period, the combined value of such incentives for the ARNG alone reached $111.6 million in FY 2015 dollars. Defense officials did not believe that money alone explained increased recruitment. Testifying in 1983, Lawrence J. Korb—the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics—stated that surveys indicated the primary reason soldiers joined the reserve components was to “feel like they are contributing to the Nation’s security.” Whatever the reasons behind individuals’ decisions to join the Army’s reserve components, the reserve components expanded by almost 200,000 soldiers over the period, as indicated in Figure 3.3, while Regular Army end strength stayed more or less stable. Later, when the end of the Cold War and the desire to realize a “peace dividend” led to pressure to reduce the Armed Services’ sizes and costs, the reserve components and their advocates in Congress would fight to retain this growth even after the threat it responded to had collapsed.

An increasing number of those soldiers were full-time reservists and military technicians. Late in the 1970s, DoD created the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program. AGR soldiers and their counterparts in other services are both on full-time active duty status and at the same time members of their reserve components. At the start of the period, there were just over 36,000 military technicians providing full-time support to the Army’s reserve components. By 1991, the Defense Manpower Requirements Report indicated that there were almost 75,000 military technicians and active Guardsmen and Reservists, with additional support provided by full time civil servants and Regular Army advisers.


At the time, some of those technicians were being converted into full-time AGR positions. See Cocke et al., 1979, p. 74; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and Office of the
The state of the IRR also began to recover during this period, though its strength still continued to fall considerably short of anticipated wartime requirements. IRR strength reached its nadir in 1977 at 149,000. By 1986, it had reached a nominal strength of over 310,000, declining slightly to below 285,000 in 1989.38 These numbers fell considerably short of a manning objective exceeding 400,000.39 Additionally,

Figure 3.3

SOURCES: Data for this chart were synthesized from several sources, including Department of the Army Historical Summaries, FYs 1977–1991 (see U.S. Army Center of Military History, “Department of the Army Historical Summaries [DAHSUMs],” website, 2017); House and Senate reports on DoD appropriations bills; and the Defense Manpower Data Center.

...
the Army faced challenges in actually obtaining soldiers from the IRR in the event of an emergency. At a fundamental level, addresses were validated infrequently, if ever. Moreover, Service planners expected that fewer soldiers would report than were nominally in the IRR based on previous mobilization experiences, and fewer of those that did report would be both eligible and needed. Problems were anticipated with regard to the matchup between grade and skills needed and individuals with those skills that were even potentially available from the IRR.40

In response to these perennial shortfalls, DoD considered and implemented a number of approaches. Options considered at the time included extending the current military service obligation to women, screening personnel departing active or drilling reserve duty for the reserve, enlisting soldiers directly into the reserve (and paying them a bonus), and a number of other measures.41 In retrospect, the most productive of such measures appeared to be extending the military service obligation from six to eight years and periodic screening of soldiers in the IRR to ensure that they were indeed available for mobilization and qualified for service.42 Such changes did bring the IRR closer to its numerical goal, as well as increasing the proportion available for service. The degree to which the IRR would be able to meet immediate manpower requirements remained untested, however.

**Equipping the Reserve Components**

The reserve components benefited from the Reagan defense buildup, though perhaps not to the same extent as the Regular Army. Figure 3.4 compares the nominal value of equipment required by the two reserve components with the value of equipment actually on-hand for the period from 1982 through 1991, in constant 2015 dollars. The value of equipment on-hand is shown as a solid line, while the wartime requirement is depicted as a dotted line. As Figure 3.4 indicates, the value of each component’s equipment doubled over the period of observation, though neither closed the gap with the wartime requirement. Obviously, in absolute terms the ARNG fared much better, probably as a consequence of the higher value of combat systems relative to those used in combat support and sustainment, the primary focus of the Army Reserve. Throughout the period, equipment shortages remained one of the leading causes of readiness shortfalls in the two components.43

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41 U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979, p. i.
The Army continued to provide new equipment on a “first to fight” basis, in which units were equipped based on their position on the deployment schedule rather than on the basis of component. In that vein, some reserve units received new equipment before similar Regular Army units. As previously mentioned, for example, an ARNG armored battalion was one of the very first to receive M-1 Abrams tanks, and one of several to receive them before some Regular Army units. Other modern equipment, including Bradley Fighting Vehicles and the computerized artillery Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), was also fielded to the reserve components more or less the same time as to Regular Army units. In short, the Army and its reserve components benefited from simultaneous modernization programs.


Cocke et al., 1980, pp. 18–19.

Training the Selected Reserve

The Army undertook additional efforts to increase reserve component training readiness between 1977 and 1991. It allocated more funds to reserve component operations and maintenance, though only the ARNG’s appropriations actually increased on a per capita basis. ARNG combat forces also took part in the training revolution, though restrictions on the time available to them for actual training limited the impact of that participation. The Army also attempted to improve on programs initiated during the early 1970s—described in Chapter Two—to have Regular Army units and commanders provide training and readiness oversight to associated reserve component units. As had been the case in the 1970–1976 timeframe, these modest efforts produced modest results. These efforts probably rendered reserve component forces better trained than they had been in U.S. history, but still considerably short of the levels of proficiency Regular Army units were beginning to achieve.

As Figures 3.5a and 3.5b illustrate, operations and maintenance budgets for all three components increased between FYs 1977 and 1991. Increases for both the Regular Army and ARNG were substantial relative to their baseline, an increase of approximately 50 percent in absolute terms, as shown in Figure 3.5a. The increase in Army Reserve budgets was less pronounced. It is important to remember, however, that the reserve components increased in size during this period, as well. While per capita budgets are at best a crude measure of changes in force structure—which in their turn imply more training and hence more costs—they do provide a useful way of normalizing budget trends. Figure 3.5b indicates that while per capita ARNG operations and maintenance budgets increased at about the same rate as those for the Regular Army, reserve operations and maintenance budgets actually declined in per capita terms.

Figures 3.5a and 3.5b confirm that budgets for reserve component military personnel and operations and maintenance at best kept pace with those for the active component. In fact, except for the 1985 increase driven by the aforementioned change in accounting rules, per capita military personnel budgets remained more or less constant. In terms of operations and maintenance, ARNG per capita budgets kept pace with those of the Regular Army, but only to return to their 1977 levels. Army Reserve budgets declined throughout the period, albeit only gradually. These trends stand in marked contrast to Army budgets from 1970 to 1976, the trends for which were shown in Chapter Two. In that earlier period, reserve component budgets increased, at least relative to those of the Regular Army.

At the beginning of the 1980s, there were several programs underway to improve Army readiness, many of which continued initiatives begun in the early 1970s. The two new key programs were Capstone and Affiliation. The former, initiated in October 1979, aimed to align every reserve component unit with the command under which it would serve in wartime. The latter aimed to establish a relationship between reserve component and Regular Army units wherever possible. At this point, the Affiliation program continued much the same as it had since its initiation in 1974. There
were three categories of alignment: Roundout, Augmentation, and Mobilization and Deployment Capability Improvement programs. Over time, however, the Capstone program seemed to supplant Affiliation. And in both cases, implementation struggled to match the objective, and results were ambiguous at best.

In theory, Capstone was supposed to enable units to prepare more effectively for wartime employment and was initially focused on the NATO mission in Europe. The headquarters to which active and reserve component units were to be assigned in wartime—which we will call “gaining commands”—were to make contact with their subordinate reserve component units and provide them with information to focus their training. That information included the locations to which they were likely to be deployed and the missions they would perform on arrival in theater. When the GAO audited the program in 1982, the seven reserve component units visited in Massachusetts stated they found that kind of information very helpful and it improved morale. Given the limited training time available to reserve component units, anything that could narrow units’ training focus could maximize training efficiency. Regular Army implementation was somewhat haphazard, though. As of September 1982, between 12

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46 See the Army Posture Statement in U.S. Senate, 1983, pp. 517–518.
and 30 percent of reserve component units in different readiness regions had yet to be contacted by their gaining commands, fully one year after coordination was originally to have been initiated. Implementation tracking was somewhat spotty, with at least one Army readiness region reporting nearly 100 percent contact of its reserve component units, while other regions were not able to provide data. At the time, the GAO attributed such shortcomings to the absence of any centralized mechanism for monitoring compliance.47 Ten years later, the GAO reported that of about 5,500 active and reserve component units eligible for the Capstone program, 116 units (2 percent) did not have a Capstone alignment. The GAO estimated that, since the last Capstone alignment of units in 1989, the Army had spent about $521 million on these 116 unaligned units. The GAO noted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 1991 testimony in which he asserted that units without a military requirement should be eliminated. However, the GAO noted that since the Army lacked appropriate processes to track Capstone...

implementation, the Army could not determine whether these unaligned units were (1) excess to the wartime command’s planning, (2) the Army’s TAA process was generating excess force structure requirements, or (3) these units were simply unneeded and could be eliminated. According to the GAO, 461 units had not heard from their gaining commands in over two years. Given the turmoil over those two years—the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union’s collapse, Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Desert Shield—it is likely that gaining commands were themselves unsure of the rapidly changing war plans and the units that would still be available to implement them, their wartime missions, and whether they even still had such missions. Still, while Army leaders frequently paid obeisance to the program’s value in public, efforts at implementation over a decade’s time seem to have belied the rhetoric. These shortcomings in Capstone implementation figured heavily in the Guard’s eventual critique of proposals to reduce the reserve components.

The reserve components also participated in the training revolution, insofar as limited training time and resources permitted. Reserve component units started conducting training in accordance with ARTEP standards as early as 1979. ARNG infantry and armor battalions conducted several rotations at the NTC; 12 battalions had trained there as rotational units by 1990. By way of comparison, 155 total battalions had trained there since the NTC’s opening in 1980 (as indicated earlier in the chapter). As with the Regular Army, participating in combat training center rotations primarily benefited maneuver units and the combat support and sustainment units that directly supported them.

Improving units’ readiness meant little if the Army could not mobilize those units in a timely and effective fashion. For that reason, DoD and the Department of the Army undertook a number of mobilization exercises to rehearse procedures and identify shortcomings. Exercise Nifty Nugget took place in the winter of 1978 and revealed significant shortcomings in Army mobilization plans and procedures. Nifty Nugget focused on rapid mobilization in support of a NATO contingency. In addition to revealing shortcomings in planning and organizational capacity to process reserve component units and individuals, it also indicated that the existing PSRC authority—50,000 service members for 90 days—was inadequate. Exercise Proud Spirit followed in 1980, revealing new shortcomings and indicating that some of the

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50 U.S. Senate, 1990b, p. 624.
older ones persisted. The significance of these exercises lay principally in the fact that they were held at all. They indicated a serious commitment to effective mobilization of the reserve components in support of a war in Europe, the scenario for which the Total Force Policy had been developed.

**Ready Enough?**
The end results of these efforts were reserve component units that were better manned, trained, equipped, and administered than any in the nation’s history. In the spring of 1990, Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono testified before several congressional committees that

> Reserve component units have shown similar improvements [to those of the Regular Army], with our National Guard currently showing a 21 percent increase in units reporting combat ready status since 1980. The number of USAR [U.S. Army Reserve] units reporting combat ready status has similarly shown a 26 percent increase over the same period. This significant progress was due in large part to the rigorous training program for both Active and Reserve components. Reserve component participation in “Overseas Deployment for Training” increased five-fold, and all components participate in training at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs).

With Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait still in the offing, the Army’s reserve components—even the Army National Guard—had benefited from additional manpower, secured in part through additional federal resources to incentivize recruiting and retention; more modern equipment, which, though still short of mobilization requirements, still exceeded anything the reserve components had received before in peacetime; additional full-time support to facilitate management and administration, thereby leaving more time for training; and, perhaps most importantly, additional funding for training and opportunities to conduct it, both at the Army’s premier training center and overseas.

To be sure, there was as much left undone as completed. Manpower and equipment shortages persisted, and it proved difficult for reserve component units to escape the constraints of their limited training time. In 1989, analysts Martin Binkin and William F. Kaufmann of the Brookings Institution expressed skepticism about the Army’s reliance on the reserves:

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Such a degree of dependence would not be a source of concern if the reserve components came close to matching their active-duty counterparts in capability and readiness. But they do not . . . many of the units lack full sets of equipment; much of the materiel is not up-to-date; and many of the items are “borrowed” from time to time to provide emergency military assistance for other countries. Training days for the reserves are, naturally, far fewer than for the regulars, and the training itself is less demanding. It is doubtful that even the priority reserve combat units designated to round out active-duty divisions could be ready for deployment in fewer than thirty days.54


The National Guard is simultaneously a militia, at least nominally controlled by the several states, and a federal reserve force. Each state’s National Guard in theory answers to two commanders-in-chief: the President and its governor. In practice, the fact that most of the Guard’s funding comes from the federal government causes it to focus primarily on its role as a federal reserve force, except for state and local emergencies. In the mid-1980s, ARNG units’ participation in ODT placed the ARNG in the middle of a controversy over U.S. foreign policy toward Central America and precipitated a constitutional issue about competing state and federal authority over the Guard. Some governors—such as Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts and Rudy Perpich of Minnesota—tried to assert their authority to prevent units from their states from participating in missions whose purpose they opposed. The governors lost their arguments before the Supreme Court, but what is interesting is that the National Guard sided with federal authorities, reemphasizing the transition of the National Guard’s identity from state militia to a federal reserve force that had been essentially completed by the National Defense Act of 1933.

As part of efforts to improve their readiness and increase their relevance, reserve component units also participated extensively in ODT during the 1980s. Instead of their normal annual training, reserve component units participating in ODT would deploy to either take part in larger exercises—such as the Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) or Team Spirit in Korea—or leverage this opportunity to advance some U.S. foreign policy goal. Units would do so by conducting civic action programs, for example, or by constructing infrastructure. Over the 1980s, reserve component partici-

participation in ODT rose steadily, from approximately 4,200 soldiers in FY 1981 to a high point of almost 40,000 soldiers in 1991.55

Many of these ODT exercises took place in Central America, inserting the reserve components in general and the ARNG in particular directly into the controversy over U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. The 1970s and early 1980s experienced an increase in insurgency and unrest, which were most acute in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The Reagan administration supported the government in El Salvador against communist-backed insurgents and provided sometimes overt and often covert support to insurgents fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. It was in this context that Perpich attempted to prevent Minnesota Guardsmen from participating in exercises in Central America, even though the National Guard missions in question had no direct role in either supporting the contras or in combat against insurgents in El Salvador. Title 10 of the U.S. Code at that time required such consent before forces can be deployed overseas for training. Perpich refused to assent to Minnesota Guardsmen’s deployment outside the United States.56

The resolution of this controversy further strengthened federal predominance in managing the National Guard. In response to the obstacles thrown up by more liberal governors, Congress—led by Representative Sonny Montgomery of Mississippi—amended Title 10 to prevent governors from withholding their consent “because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty.”57 The House Armed Services Committee wanted to go even further, asking the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to consider withholding federal funds from states that declined to participate in such training and operations.58 When DoD deployed a Minnesota National Guard unit to Honduras for ODT in 1987, Governor Perpich assented under the constraints of the “Montgomery Amendment” but sued to reverse what he viewed as the abrogation of his authority over the National Guard under the constitution’s militia clause.59


57 U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 12301, Reserve Components Generally, November 14, 1986.


59 The following sources agree on the case’s origins and its general enhancement of federal authority over the National Guard. It is neither within the scope of this report nor the competence of its authors to assess the legal reasoning and other aspects of their scholarship, nor is it necessary to do so: Monte M. F. Cooper, “Perpich v. Department of Defense: Federalism Values and the Militia Clause,” University of Colorado Law Review, Vol. 62, 1991; Andrew M. Curtis, “Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense (D. Minn. 1987),” Berkeley La Raza Law Journal,
The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court. A unanimous court determined that the National Guard’s dual status gave the President ample authority to determine the time, place, manner, and conduct of training for National Guard units and individuals were in a federal status. Legal scholars, whether they thought the Court decided correctly or otherwise, generally agreed that this decision and the reasoning behind it maximized the formal federal authority over the National Guard beyond even the already formidable power accrued through federal funding. For all intents and purposes, the National Guard had become primarily a reserve component of the U.S. Army and only secondarily militias of the various states and territories.  

Everything Changes: The Soviet Union Collapses

In November 1989, the foundations of modern American defense policy were shaken to their foundations when the German crowds started dismantling the Berlin Wall. The risks that had concerned Binkin and Kaufmann—that reserve forces would be in no condition to play their intended role in the defense of Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion—were rendered moot. The Soviet Union’s collapse removed the threat that was too big for the Regular Army to handle on its own. The United States could now afford a Regular Army large enough to handle the threats that remained with reduced reliance on the reserve components.

Now the Army had to reconsider its force mix and force structure rapidly. Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee in the spring of 1990 that

I rather envy my predecessor, Jack Marsh, who presided over a historic eight-year rebuilding of the Army. He could sit at this table and propose identifiable threats as justifications for specific lines in the budget. We were in a cold war, and all here could visualize real enemies who posed threats considerable enough that countering them was justification for the expenditure of our citizens’ money. But much has changed in this past year. Today, I expect to be asked about the threat, the size of the Army, and the need for continued high expenditures.

By this time, reductions in force were already on the way. The question was how those reductions would be apportioned across the Army’s three components. Naturally, the reserve associations opposed any reductions to their force structure and end strength. Testifying in 1988—even before the Soviet Union had collapsed—retired
Major General Evan L. Hultman of the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) stated the association’s position on impending cuts:

ROA is concerned that having been assigned additional missions or responsibilities, the Reserve forces will now be expected to accept across-the-board reductions or a “fair share” of the cuts. It is our contention that the Reserve components should be provided more resources, not less, when the active forces are cut.62

Retired Lieutenant General LaVern Weber (Oklahoma National Guard), NGAUS’s executive director and the former Oklahoma Adjutant General and Chief of the National Guard Bureau, echoed Hultman’s concern, stating

We strongly urge that as Congress realigns priorities within the FY 1989 DoD budget they apply savings from other areas to reinstate the proposed Guard and Reserve force structure cuts in order to retain the maximum number of skilled personnel and Total Force combat capability possible within the budget limit.63

It should be noted that Weber expressed other concerns. Those concerns started with increasing full-time support personnel and included other objectives, such as equipping the Guard, increasing its facilities through military construction, and improving personnel entitlements.64 The next year, when the need for cuts became even more apparent, Hultman again appeared before the committee and made the same argument.65

Congressional committees were demonstrating sensitivity to any prospective reductions to ARNG and Army Reserve end strength, however. Representative Montgomery went so far as to propose an amendment to the 1989 defense authorization bill that would have completely shielded the reserve components from any cuts whatsoever. While the amendment was defeated—and even Montgomery conceded he had gone “too far”—his effort indicates a lot about congressional tendencies to shield the reserve

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64 U.S. Senate, 1988b, pp. 68–81.

The tenor of their objections is illustrated by the following question for the record for the Secretary of the Army submitted as part of the hearings on the 1990 and 1991 DoD appropriations bill:

However, the committee cannot understand the rationale to cut the Army Reserve and Army National Guard by approximately 23,000, especially since previous testimony indicated that there is a serious shortfall in combat support and combat service support forces in the Reserve Components.67

The committee peppered him with other questions, asking why the reserve components were being cut when the Army was taking steps to preserve active component end strength, and how much Congress would have to add to the budget to preserve those forces from end-strength reductions.68 This discussion was taking place in a context in which the Regular Army was expecting to reduce its own strength by around 135,000 soldiers.69

Both houses of Congress opposed reducing reserve component end strength. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report on the DoD appropriations bill stated flatly that “The Committee disapproves of the Army’s proposal to reduce Active and Reserve forces on an equal basis.”70 The report cited the cost differential, and argued for placing even heavier reliance on the reserve components than during the Cold War. The roundout concept was especially important to the committee:

The Army also should consider new and unique ways to integrate Reserve and Active component forces. The roundout system has proven to be extremely successful for both the Army’s Active and Reserve components. Under a normal roundout association, two active brigades are teamed with a Guard or Reserve brigade in a division. The Committee requests that the Army establish and validate a super roundout division consisting of two Guard/Reserve brigades and one active brigade.71

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66 Binkin and Kaufmann, 1989, p. 34.
68 To be sure, these were questions for the record, and thus implicitly not considered of sufficiently high priority to warrant an in-person colloquy between Army officials and members of the Appropriations Committee during testimony.
The Senate Appropriations committee also reduced the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA), appropriation by $40.6 million because it felt that missions and equipment should be transferred to the reserve components. The report noted that “The ability of the Guard and Reserves to contribute to lower intensity conflicts has been amply demonstrated in the Just Cause and Desert Shield operations.” This statement may have exaggerated the case somewhat, given that reserve component participation in Operation Just Cause had been minimal, and Operation Desert Shield had barely begun when the Senate Appropriations Committee issued its report.

Indeed, Senator Nunn was proposing greater utilization of the reserve components as a cost-avoidance measure. Nunn asserted that “we must be willing to call up the reserves in the future,” and that increased warning time “increasingly allows the heavy armor mission to be shifted to the Reserve components . . . matched to available airlift and sealift, as well as the Soviet buildup curve.” He argued that the demise of the Soviet Union increased the time available to prepare and deploy forces, thus reducing the risk associated with relying on the reserves for major combat capabilities.

As we will show, however, the assertion that the Guard and Reserve had demonstrated their capabilities in Just Cause and Desert Shield was only partly correct. By that time, only support and sustainment forces had participated in these operations in any quantity. Well before Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, it was clear that both the Regular Army and its reserve components were facing potentially significant reductions in end strength and funding, that congressional forces were mobilizing to protect the reserves, and that demonstrating the Guard combat capability embodied in the round-out brigades was important for the defense of Guard roles, end strength, and resources.

Yet while stakeholders debated the extent to which the Soviet Union’s collapse permitted increased utilization of reserve forces to achieve U.S. objectives, there was no debate about those objectives themselves. The Soviet Union’s collapse greatly reduced the possibility that military events elsewhere in the world could critically affect the security of the United States, implicitly calling into question the need for an active U.S. global role. U.S. military strategy had relied heavily on the reserve components and mass mobilization in eras in which no major, urgent threat to the United States had loomed abroad, and the outcome of foreign wars had no immediate implications for U.S. national security. Arguably, such conditions had reasserted themselves. The debate the U.S. Congress and the national security establishment were having instead was about how the Soviet Union’s demise affected the kinds of forces and the amount needed to underwrite a still expansive vision of America’s global role. As Andrew J. Bacevich notes, “The emergency that had begun in the 1930s finally ended; the imper-

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72 U.S. Senate, 1990a, p. 22.
ative for exercising global leadership persisted.” Before a debate about the ultimate purposes of American strategy could happen, however, Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait intervened.

The Total Force Policy in a New Era: Reserve Component Participation in the Persian Gulf War

Reserve component participation and performance in the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War is often treated as validation for the Total Force Policy. But the context for which that policy had been designed and in which it had been implemented had collapsed by the time Iraqi forces entered Kuwait. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird designed the Total Force Policy to enable the United States to constitute a fiscally feasible conventional deterrent against the powerful and more numerous Warsaw Pact forces. Whether or not reserve component forces were as capable as their Regular Army counterparts, or even adequate, they were the only option for providing necessary capacity within the fiscal constraints of the early 1970s. By August 1990, however, the Soviet Union had effectively collapsed, leaving the U.S. Army with excess capacity. In light of this dramatic change in context, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were less a test of the Total Force Policy as originally conceived, and instead an experiment in how the Army would meet the needs of a new and uncertain era.

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces crossed the border into Kuwait. They accomplished their objectives quickly and competently, completing their seizure of Kuwait within 48 hours. The invasion took the United States and its allies by surprise. While satellite imagery had detected Iraqi forces massing at the border a few days earlier, that intelligence had not provided enough time to interpret the information or make the political decision to respond, let alone deploy forces capable of constituting a robust deterrent. Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait gave it control over a substantial portion of Middle Eastern oil reserves and put its forces on Saudi Arabia’s unprotected border.

President George H. W. Bush quickly decided to deploy military forces to deter further Iraqi aggression. As soon as the Saudis agreed to host U.S. forces, troops began to deploy to the region according to the outlines of Operation Plan 90-1002, a plan for the defense of Saudi Arabia. The XVIII Airborne Corps, whose principal combat elements consisted of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the

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74 A. J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010, p. 138. To cite Bacevich is not to agree with his general critique of U.S. foreign and military policy, but merely to acknowledge that another outcome was at least theoretically possible.

24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), formed the heart of the Army’s initial contribution.\textsuperscript{76} By design, these Regular Army divisions required considerable reserve component support. It could hardly have been otherwise, as 73 percent of the Army’s support forces were in the reserve component\textsuperscript{77} and much of the support force structure that still resided in the Regular Army was forward deployed in Europe and Korea. Thus, to provide the required support, President Bush employed his relatively new and hitherto untested PSRC authority under Section 673b of Title 10 of the U.S. Code to activate almost 25,000 Army National Guardsmen and Reservists on August 22, 1990, three weeks after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{78}

Almost all of those units were support units of one kind or another. The “support” category included not only logistics units but also combat support units such as engineers and artillery. However, instead of relying on Capstone alignments, the Army chose to activate units with the highest readiness status. According to a 1992 RAND report, about 70 percent of these units had a readiness status of C-3 or better.\textsuperscript{79} At the time, that designation meant that a unit has required resources and has accomplished training necessary to undertake major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. These units are expected to have 65–75 percent of personnel MOS qualified, to have completed 55–70 percent of unit training, and to need 29–42 days to be fully trained.\textsuperscript{80} Interestingly enough, Regular Army support forces were reporting similar levels of readiness. A C-3 readiness rating typically meant some combination of personnel and equipment shortages, and the need for up to six weeks (assuming continuous training of 24 hours per day) of additional training time to be prepared to deploy.\textsuperscript{81} In short, most support forces were reporting that they were ready to go to war, albeit with some caveats. These statistics should be interpreted with some caution, however. A contemporary GAO report found that many units overstated their readiness, and that evaluations of National Guard units’ readiness were even less reliable.\textsuperscript{82}

Not included in this total, however, were the 24th Infantry Division’s and the 1st Cavalry Division’s roundout brigades, the 48th Brigade of the Georgia National Guard.

\textsuperscript{77} See Table 2-1 in Composition of Total Army, in Scales, 1997, pp. 48–54.
\textsuperscript{78} See Table 5-7 in Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1992, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{80} Brauner et al., 1992, p. 46.
\textsuperscript{81} Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1992, p. 121.
and the 155th Armored Brigade of the Mississippi National Guard.83 Officials at U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSOM) had initially included the roundout brigades on troop lists, but Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney overrode them. Citing concerns about DoD’s ability to train and employ the brigade within the 180 days potentially allowed under PSRC authority, Cheney insisted on Regular Army brigades.84 According to its reported readiness status, the 48th would have required about 28 days of postmobilization training to become ready for combat operations, while the 155th would have needed about 40 days.85 Even assuming that estimate had been accurate—an assumption neither the GAO nor Army officials were willing to make—it still would have taken several weeks after training was complete to deploy the unit to the theater of operations and integrate it into the order of battle.

Instead, the Army deployed the 197th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division, in place of the 48th and 155th Brigades. The GAO would later observe that the 197th Infantry Brigade had higher reported levels of readiness than the 48th in all categories. Guard proponents countered that the 197th had not been at C-1 when deployed, but Guard brigades had been required to meet this criterion for deployment. Moreover, the 48th had more-modern equipment. Both the Regular Army and the ARNG brigades had the M1 tank in their armored battalions. The 48th Brigade’s infantry battalions had the relatively new Bradley Fighting Vehicles, however, while the 197th Infantry Brigade was still equipped with the older M113 armored personnel carrier.87 In short, even though the 197th’s reported readiness was higher, the issue of which unit would have been able to deliver greater capability is unclear. Because the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division, did not report its readiness separately, it is not possible to compare its reported readiness with that of the 155th Brigade. FORSCOM officials assessed the brigade as being in a “high C-2 or low C-1” status, based on the reported readiness of its component units. Like the 48th Brigade and in contrast to the 197th, the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Armored had the more modern tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.88

83 Ironically, the 155th’s chosen title was “the Mississippi Rifles.”
84 This authority allowed the President to activate units for up to 90 days, with the potential for another 90 days with congressional approval.
The decision was controversial from the start. On August 24, Representative Montgomery wrote a letter formally urging Secretary of Defense Cheney to activate the 48th and 155th brigades. On the 27th, Montgomery followed up with a news release stating of those Guard combat units that “they are well prepared right now, and could be on the job alongside the active forces in a matter of days.”\textsuperscript{89} Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, publicly opined that the two units should be deployed as “a test for the future.”\textsuperscript{90} Representative Newt Gingrich, then the House Republican Whip, weighed in as well. Congressional pressure to activate these combat brigades continued to intensify. On October 16, Aspin attributed the failure to do so to “active force prejudice.”\textsuperscript{91} Finally, in response to Secretary Cheney’s cited reason for not activating these units—the limited time for which they could be activated under Section 673b—Congress extended the duration of activation to 180 days, to be followed by another 180 days with congressional approval. This one-time extension applied only to “Selected Reserve Combat Units.”\textsuperscript{92} Some key congressional leaders, including Aspin, wanted these units used.

Those congressional leaders seem to have been concerned about how the use—or nonuse—of the roundout brigades would affect the future allocation of roles and resources. Increasing reliance on the reserves had been one of the key elements in Senator Nunn’s proposals for a new security strategy just six months before. If ARNG combat brigades could not be employed in this crisis, then it undermined any argument for using them in other circumstances. Congressional leaders were also probably responding to reserve component stakeholder groups. According to Stephen M. Duncan—former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs—National Guard leaders feared that a DoD decision that the roundout brigades were not needed would be used to “justify a shift of resources to active forces.”\textsuperscript{93} On the other side, General Colin Powell believed that those congressmen wanted to make Desert Shield a test of the degree to which DoD could rely on reserve component forces.\textsuperscript{94} In any event, congressional pressure was unable to force DoD to deploy those roundout brigades to the Gulf, though it did prove able to force their mobilization.

At the same time, the Bush administration was coming to a formal decision to undertake offensive operations against Iraq. Reaching this decision took months of intense internal debate, due in no small part to the desire to avoid a Vietnam-style


\textsuperscript{90} Duncan, 1997, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{91} Duncan, 1997, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{92} Duncan, 1997, pp. 49–51.

\textsuperscript{93} Duncan, 1997, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{94} Duncan, 1997, p. 81.
quagmire. On August 23, Bush had told reporters that “This [the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait] will not stand,” but the President’s conclusion took some time to become formal administration policy. Over the next several months, Generals Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf argued strenuously for a strategy of containment and sanctions against Iraq. Secretary of Defense Cheney was skeptical of the efficacy of the strategy the generals advocated. Cheney’s views prevailed by mid-October, and the forcible liberation of Kuwait became U.S. policy. To that point, it had been far from clear what kind of forces would be needed, and for how long. Given the uncertainty about objectives and the nature and duration of U.S. operations, it hardly made sense to activate combat forces that would take months to prepare and then remain available for only a few months after that. When President Bush made the decision to undertake offensive operations to liberate Kuwait, that signaled that Schwarzkopf’s U.S. Central Command would need more forces and more money from Congress to prosecute the war. The Bush administration also required Congress’s at least tacit acquiescence for the combat operations that were envisioned. In sum, the administration needed congressional support at the same time key congressional leaders were agitating for the activation and deployment of the roundout brigades.

Under political pressure and coincident with the need to convince key congressional leaders to support the administration’s strategy, DoD activated the two brigades as part of the next call-up on November 20, 1990, along with the 256th Brigade of the Louisiana National Guard. Including these brigades, the call-up added another 55,000 soldiers to the 25,000 already activated. Most of these soldiers were in support units, just like the first wave of activations. These units were less well prepared than the original group, however. In August 1990, 85 percent of Army Reserve units and 97 percent of ARNG units activated reported C-3 or better upon activation. By November, those percentages declined to 66 and 75 percent, respectively. On activation, these units would report to their mobilization station, undergo a brief period of postmobilization training and administrative processing, and then deploy to the Gulf or other duty stations as appropriate. For these support units, the transportation schedule drove their deployment, not their readiness status.

Even as these support forces were flowing to the Gulf, the three roundout brigades were undergoing an ordeal of their own in preparing for deployment. It quickly became clear that premobilization reports of unit readiness had been overly optimistic. Soldier nondeployability rates in the three units surged, though the Army was able to remedy many deficiencies quickly. By December 1990, 50 percent of the 48th’s soldiers were deemed to be nondeployable. Second Army and III Corps—the head-

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quarters responsible for readying these units for deployment—revised training plans substantially, increasing the number of required training days from 28 to 91 for the 48th Infantry Brigade, and from 40 to 106 for the 155th Armored Brigade. The 256th was assumed to require 135 days, or over four months of additional training. Units struggled with gunnery, in no small part because previous scores reflected more their familiarity with their ranges at home station than their actual gunnery skills. Only about half of the 48th Infantry Brigade’s tank and Bradley crews qualified prior to mobilization. While all of the other two brigades’ crews qualified on Table VIII—the principal qualification range for tank crew gunnery—only about 8 percent of the 155th’s armored platoons qualified. Before finally being certified as ready for deployment on February 28, 1991, the 48th alone had spent 41 days at the NTC.98

The 48th Infantry Brigade’s struggles at the NTC were in some respects symbolic of the larger changes in the U.S. Army. While the 48th Brigade may have been more ready for deployment than many combat units deployed in previous wars, the Army’s training revolution had increased the level of proficiency—and consequently, capability—that Regular Army units could achieve. It had to clear hurdles—such as the NTC—that had not even existed when Laird originated the Total Force Policy. By the same token, Regular Army units had been meeting these elevated standards for some years already as part of the training revolution. By the standards of previous wars, achieving even a minimal level of readiness for deployment within 91 days was impressive for units of any component. The brigade had filled its ranks and completed gunnery and maneuver training against a competent opposing force in a relatively brief time. When Laird announced the Total Force Policy, the NTC did not exist, nor did any concept for creating one. Units were considered ready for deployment when their commanders said they were, based on a training regime that lacked both rigor and resources. By the time the 48th arrived at Fort Irwin, however, 155 maneuver battalions had conducted rotations there, only 12 of which were ARNG. The 48th’s experience suggest that while Guard units’ level of proficiency had increased significantly relative to past wars, that of Regular Army units had increased even more.

By the time the 48th was assessed as ready for deployment, the war was over. Yet even though the roundout brigades never deployed to the Persian Gulf, the integration of Regular Army and reserve component forces had been a success in many respects. Support units had mobilized, deployed within weeks and performed their functions effectively in combat. To be sure, it had taken far longer than anticipated for the roundout brigades to achieve sufficient readiness for the Army to certify them as ready for deployment. Yet, as Robert Goldich of the Congressional Research Service observed in 1991, roundout brigades were never envisioned for this sort of contingency, even though imprecise and “can-do” public pronouncements served to create the oppo-

site impression.\textsuperscript{99} In overview, then, the Army’s reserve components had provided the forces required from them, thus appearing to justify the confidence placed in them.

The war’s successful conclusion also reinforced popular support for an expansive view of America’s role in the world and the military force to sustain it.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Over the 14 years between the establishment of PSRC authority and the 1991 Gulf War, the Army’s reserve components became more capable and better integrated into the Total Army. Congress and the Army devoted an ever-increasing share of resources to its reserve components. End strength, funding, full-time support, and training support all increased, though reserve component funding increased more slowly than that of the Regular Army. Reserve component units integrated new equipment, learned new doctrine, and practiced it according to the ARTEP standards promulgated by TRADOC. Reserve component units received equipment according to their priority for deployment, with combat arms units receiving priority. Training could only improve reserve component units’ readiness so much, given statutory and practical limitations on the time reserves had available for training. ARNG battalions did train at the NTC, however, though not as frequently as did Regular Army units. Reserve and Guard units deployed all over the world, participating in the annual REFORGER in Germany, Team Spirit in Korea, and in other locations in Latin America and Africa, honing their skills and serving as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. For most intents and purposes, the reserve components functioned as part-time components of the Regular Army. When \textit{Perpich v. U.S. Department of Defense} highlighted the tension between the National Guard’s status as a state militia and its status as a federal reserve, the National Guard opted decisively for the latter. And during the Persian Gulf War, reserve component support units mobilized and deployed within weeks, supporting the vast buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia and the lightning war that followed.

In that time, however, the Total Force Policy had begun to evolve from a means to an end—mitigating U.S. numerical inferiority to the forces of the Warsaw Pact—to an end in itself. Laird had initiated the total force concept to reconstitute a conventional deterrent under fiscal constraints. He reasoned that the United States could not afford a volunteer Regular Army large and capable enough to play its part in NATO’s defense of Europe. Military leaders anticipated that defending Europe was going to demand highly trained, well-equipped, forward-stationed forces able to “fight outnumbered and win,” and other forces capable of rapidly reinforcing them. To provide those capabilities, the Army had to maximize immediately available combat power. Under Creighton Abrams and his successors, the Army transferred as many missions

for later-deploying forces as possible to the reserve component forces. Reserve forces were to provide “initial and primary augmentation” to Regular Army forces. By 1983, however, Army leaders testified that they had reached the limit of their ability to further integrate reserve component forces into operational plans. Nonetheless, congressional leaders pressed the Army—along with the other services—to do more. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the need to mitigate the Soviet Union’s quantitative superiority vanished; a different combination of full-time and part-time forces was possible, and “the peace dividend” from the Cold War could be harvested. Yet in the face of potential reductions, influential congressmen sought to shield the reserve components from reductions. When the Persian Gulf War came, some members of Congress again intervened in an attempt to get the roundout brigades deployed, even though there were more than enough Regular Army combat formations available. By that time, an alternative perspective to the original vision of “augmentation” had emerged. In this latter view, clearly represented in congressional efforts to force mobilization of the roundout brigades, the Army should mobilize reserve component for contingency operations units simply because they were part of the total force.100

Two competing interpretations of the Total Force Policy had thus emerged. Laird’s vision—at least as articulated at the time—increased utilization of the reserves as a way of meeting U.S. defense requirements under resource constraints. Under the interpretation to which the reserve components and their congressional supporters adhered, integrating the reserve components into force structure and operations was an end in and of itself. Much rode on which interpretation would prevail as DoD entered the post–Cold War era. In comparison with the assessments of future challenges and the allocation of force structure and resources in consequence of those assessments, the Persian Gulf War itself was a rather straightforward concern. For all the looming conflict, the Total Force Policy had proved viable over the latter stages of the Cold War; how it evolved in the face of new challenges in an evolving strategic environment is the subject of the next chapter.

Even before Iraq invaded Kuwait, key figures in the national security community began to reorient U.S. strategy. With the Soviet Union collapsing, the United States needed to identify the challenges for which it would shape and size the Armed Forces; the future was far from clear, and did not grow substantially clearer throughout the rest of the decade. But with a large, persistent deficit in prospect, planners sought to meet those challenges as economically as possible, aware that reduced international risk offered the prospect of reallocating defense resources to other priorities. In this context, identifying how best to utilize the reserve components for national defense was a key issue in the post–Cold War strategic environment.

Senator Sam Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, represented one pole in the debate over the future role of the reserve components. In a series of speeches in the spring of 1990, Nunn had argued that decreased risk and increased warning time allowed for a much greater reliance on reserve component forces. As discussed in the previous chapter, Nunn even proposed shifting the Army’s capability for mechanized warfare to the ARNG.

His assessment was that the Armed Forces, not just the Army, could increase their utilization of reserve component forces. Nunn’s strategy essentially assumed that a less threatening world allowed for slower response times, and that the reserve components could meet those demands for responsiveness.

The Joint Staff and General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1990s during the George H. W. Bush administration, advanced another view: the Base Force. Powell’s approach placed a premium on rapid response. Under contemporary conceptions of the Base Force, DoD would rely mostly on Regular Army combat forces to deploy rapidly to the regional contingency operations—seen as the most challenging scenario for U.S. strategy—and fight. The reserve components would provide support forces, and, in turn, DoD would reduce the number and size of reserve component combat forces that could not meet the accelerated timelines that proponents of the Base Force believed to be critical.

The primary point of contention with respect to reserve component forces was the degree to which the joint force could rely on ARNG combat brigades and divisions. A series of strategic reviews—beginning with the aforementioned Base Force and
continuing through the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)—led DoD officials to the conclusion that the most important operational needs should be met with Regular Army combat forces.1 DoD proposals attempted to allocate resources in accordance with this assessment and to reduce reserve component strength in general and ARNG maneuver forces in particular. Congress repeatedly declined to accept DoD’s proposals, authorizing more end strength and resources to the reserve components than DoD requested and reallocating resources from other areas of the budget in support of these changes. Still, however grudgingly, Congress eventually gave ground, reducing reserve component end strength and resource levels. Those reductions were substantially smaller than those endured by the Regular Army. And while congressmen might clash with DoD officials about the relative efficacy of ARNG and Regular Army combat forces, they never forced DoD to rely on the former to execute the most pressing contingencies identified in the strategy. After the 1997 QDR, the Army maintained just enough Regular combat formations to meet the demands of two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies with support forces from the reserve components. At the same time, Congress never allowed the Army to reduce the number of ARNG combat forces to the level the Army thought was actually required. Instead, the Army was forced to retain a significant number of ARNG maneuver brigades and divisions for which the operational requirement was defined vaguely at best.

Eventually, the Army’s increasing involvement in peacekeeping operations did what a decade of strategic reviews had not been able to accomplish: provide an opportunity to increase the utilization of ARNG combat forces. The frequent peacekeeping operations of the 1990s eroded Regular Army readiness in many ways. Most importantly, it tied down combat divisions and thereby rendered them unavailable should a major contingency erupt. At the time, this was interpreted as a readiness “crisis.”2 To alleviate this crisis, the Army turned to ARNG combat forces. Beginning in FY 2000, the Army began using ARNG division headquarters to oversee operations in Bosnia, a practice it considered expanding to other such operations in the future. Thus, by the end of the decade, the Army’s version of the Total Force Policy had evolved so that the Regular Army focused on providing maneuver forces—supported by reserve component support forces—to conduct major combat operations, while ARNG maneuver forces could be employed in lower-risk contingencies to free up Regular forces for higher-priority missions.

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Perspectives in Conflict: Assessing Reserve Component Unit and Individual Performance in the Persian Gulf War

As observed in the previous chapter, key stakeholders in DoD, the reserve components, and Congress all anticipated that reserve component participation and performance in the first Persian Gulf War would have substantial impact on force planning and policy. That was one of the reasons that the reserve component associations and their champions in Congress reacted so strongly against the decision not to activate the round-out brigades. If large ARNG combat formations were not able to achieve deployment readiness standards in time for utilization in the Persian Gulf War—a war that seemed to represent the future of conflict in the post–Cold War world—then their continued viability might be at risk. Indeed, DoD’s proposed Base Force—the Joint Staff’s proposed approach to the post–Cold War world developed more or less contemporaneously with the Gulf War—proposed reducing six Regular and two Guard divisions and converting two additional Guard divisions to cadre status, as well as associated end-strength reductions. It is thus unsurprising that reserve component proponents in Congress insisted on a more rigorous assessment of the implementation of Total Force Policy during the war.

In general, those assessments validated DoD’s approach to employing the reserve components. External organizations such as the GAO and the RAND Corporation found, in studies discussed in more detail below, that the employment of reserve component support forces had been a success, but that the roundout brigades had been even less ready than had been assumed at the conflict’s outset. Not surprisingly, NGAUS disputed the latter conclusion, as did allies in Congress. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce these efforts to the conflict over the utility of ARNG combat brigades. These studies also identified areas where DoD could amend its policies to make employment of the reserve components more effective and efficient. While external assessments may have undermined the case for increased reliance on the reserve components—and for concomitant reductions to Regular forces—Congress nevertheless directed DoD to redouble its efforts to improve reserve component readiness—including and perhaps especially the readiness of ARNG combat units—for the next war.

U.S. victory in the Persian Gulf War seemed to validate elements of the Total Force Policy, along with most of the other military reforms DoD had undertaken since the Vietnam War. Thousands of reservists had mobilized quickly and efficiently to serve alongside their Regular Army counterparts for the first time since the Korean War. These reservists had played critical roles in deploying, supporting, and sustaining Army combat forces. The roundout brigades were unable to demonstrate their proficiency before the war ended, however, and never deployed. At the time, stakeholders believed the interpretation of this record would shape the Total Force Policy’s future. As former Army Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer noted shortly before the 48th Brigade of the Georgia ARNG arrived at the NTC, “how much reliance is placed on the
National Guard and Reserve in the post U.S.–Soviet confrontational era will be written in the sands of the National Training Center or Saudi Arabia.3

It was in this context that stakeholders commissioned and executed a number of studies in an attempt to discern—or shape—the lessons the Persian Gulf War held for the future direction of the Total Force Policy. Congressional committees held hearings on the conduct of the war, both formally and as part of hearings on the 1992 and 1993 NDAAs. As part of a larger study on the future force’s mix of active and reserve components, the Senate Armed Services Committee required research into the “effectiveness of Total Force Policy during the Persian Gulf Conflict.”4 The most contentious issue was the readiness of ARNG combat brigades for deployment; there was little disagreement that reserve component support forces had performed adequately. The GAO separately investigated issues surrounding both the performance of reserve component support forces and ARNG maneuver brigades, and the Congressional Research Service looked into the latter issue.5 DoD looked into this issue as part of its broader assessment of its conduct of the war.6 Finally, NGAUS performed its own assessment, which differed sharply with GAO, Congressional Research Service, and DoD assessments with respect to assessment of their roundout brigades’ performance and which accused the Regular Army of bias.7

There was general consensus that reserve component support units performed well. DoD’s own internal evaluation found that “The call to active duty and the performance of the RC [reserve component] members who served in connection with the Gulf conflict were marked with extraordinary success.”8 Since the only reserve component forces that deployed were support forces—and some artillery units—clearly that


assessment applied principally to those support units. A contemporary RAND Corporation assessment echoed that assessment, noting that reserve component support units were able to quickly meet the requirement to deploy at C-3 status. The larger the unit, the longer it took. Army Reserve units required similar levels of postmobilization time. The report noted, however, that the primary factor affecting postmobilization training time was the availability of transportation assets. Postmobilization, predeployment training was curtailed or extended based on when aircraft of ships were available, and then continued upon arrival in theater.9

The most significant issues with regard to reserve component support units involved personnel shortages and force structure. Because most reserve units did not have their full, authorized complement of personnel, and because the President initially had not sought partial mobilization authority that allowed him to call up members of the IRR, readying reserve component units for deployment required drawing qualified personnel from other units. This process is known as cross-leveling. The GAO also observed that the Army had exhausted its inventory of some unit types in the Persian Gulf, indicating a potential shortage.10 In a later article for the GAO’s internal magazine, GAO analysts dryly observed that reserve component support units could have deployed in much better condition had some of the resources lavished on the combat maneuver brigades—which did not deploy—been devoted to support forces.11 In short, while noting some problems, the defense community accepted that reserve component support units could perform at acceptable levels in support of contingency operations.

In contrast, the consensus in the analytic community was that the ARNG roundout brigades had not been able to reach the necessary level of proficiency in time to contribute effectively to the outcome. Most assessments followed that of the GAO, from which is worth quoting at length:

The Army has not adequately prepared its National Guard roundout brigades to be fully ready to deploy quickly. When the three brigades were activated, many soldiers were not completely trained to do their jobs; many noncommissioned officers were not adequately trained in leadership skills; and Guard members had difficulty adjusting to the active Army’s administrative systems for supply and personnel management which are different from those the National Guard uses in peacetime. Also, when activated, many soldiers had serious medical or dental conditions that would have delayed or prevented their deployment.

The activation of the three roundout brigades also revealed that the postmobilization training plans prepared by the three brigades during peacetime had

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underestimated the training that would be necessary for them to be fully combat ready. The plans were based on peacetime evaluation reports that Army officials believed overstated the brigades’ proficiency and training readiness. After the brigades were activated, active Army trainers developed substantially revised training plans calling for over three times the number of training days estimated in readiness reports and requiring the support of almost 9,000 active Army trainers and other personnel.12

As the quotation above indicates, the GAO placed much of the blame for the roundout brigades’ poor performance on the Army. The GAO also observed that the Army had not provided roundout brigades with the attention and resources that might have enabled them to meet a demanding deployment schedule. The GAO further observed that

the Army had no tested criteria to determine the proficiency that roundout brigades would need to demonstrate prior to their deployment. Without a formal validation process, the Commander-in-Chief of Army Forces Command decided to make a validation judgment for each brigade based on firsthand observations and input from trainers and senior staff from all organizations involved in the training program—III Corps, the Second Army, the 4th Infantry Division, the 6th Infantry Division, and the NTC. Validation criteria, however, were not specified.13

Martin Binkin of the Brookings Institution later echoed these concerns about the deployment and training standards.14

The National Guard disputed these assessments of the roundout brigades’ readiness and capability. Guard proponents believed that the roundout brigades had amply demonstrated their readiness for deployment. Writing in June 1992, just a little over one year after the war’s end, NGaUS president Robert F. Ensslin, Jr., wrote:

The perceptions of what actually happened to the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) from Georgia at the National Training Center and what one would think happened based on reading the GAO report or the “Army Times” is dramatic. As General Edwards pointed out in testimony, the 48th Brigade underwent the usual six engagements with the NTC’s notorious OPFOR [opposing force]. The norm is to lose the first two battles, tie two and then win two as the unit’s learning curve skates up.

12 U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991, p. 3. The RAND study team, reviewing similar data at more or less the same time, reached similar conclusions; see Brauner, Thie, and Brown, 1992, pp. 62–67.


The 48th Brigade tied two and won four. This is far better than the average active Army brigade does, and this with a force nearly twice as complicated to command as a normal two-battalion NTC rotation.15

NGAUS officials could also point to conciliatory and commendatory post-war comments by the new Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, and the FORSCOM commander, General Edwin Burba. At least as understood by the Guard collectively, Sullivan agreed that the roundout brigades “met every mobilization standard ever set for them.”16 Burba apparently publicly endorsed the Guard’s position that roundout brigades could be ready in 60 days or fewer.17 Of course, both Sullivan and Burba—respectively serving as the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff and the FORSCOM commander during Desert Shield and Desert Storm—had been intimately involved in the decisions that had prevented the roundout brigades’ deployment. The Guard was also sensitive to the fact that the process for assessing the roundout brigades’ readiness was ad hoc and controlled entirely by Regular Army officials. While there was general agreement that the roundout brigades were not able to meet the standard for deployment established by the Regular Army in a timely fashion, outside observers—such as Representative Les Aspin and former Army G-1 Robert G. Yerks—did not necessarily agree that the standards were either clear or valid.18 For the most part, then, Guard proponents felt that the roundout brigades could in fact have met deployment timelines and served effectively in combat, thus validating increased reliance on the Guard.

Analytic organizations did seem to agree that it would take at least 90 days for ARNG brigades to get ready for deployment, in contrast to the 60 days that some Army leaders had assumed prior to the war.19 Nonetheless, GAO analysts noted that even the 90-day figure was not dependable:

The 90 days or so of training required to validate the readiness of one brigade may not be a reliable indicator of the time that units will need for future mobilizations because (1) the Army did not specify the criteria to be used in its validation decision and (2) the tremendous amount of active Army resources used to support the brigade’s training may not be available in a future crisis.20

17 Beveridge, 1992, p. 22.
19 According to Stephen Duncan, Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono had assumed that it would take 60 days of postmobilization training to prepare the roundout brigades for deployment. See Duncan, 1997, p. 37.
The common estimate of 90 days, however, would become increasingly significant in subsequent deliberations over Army force structure and force mix. Post–Cold War planning scenarios placed a premium on rapid deployment. In testimony on the Fiscal Year 1993 NDAA, Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan argued that it would take at least 90 days to prepare a ARNG combat brigade for deployment, in no small part because it would be highly unlikely that the brigade would have all of the people it needed on mobilization.21 The Department of the Army Inspector General indicated that training time could be reduced to as little as 50 days if no validation exercise at a combat training center were required, but might require as many as 110 if such an exercise were mandated.22 Thus, while stakeholders could not necessarily agree on the question of whether ARNG combat brigades had in fact been ready for deployment, most accepted that it would take at least 90 days to prepare them for deployment in the future.

To ensure that ARNG combat brigades would be ready for deployment in a timely fashion in the future, the GAO recommended a number of measures. Those measures included more-intensive leader training and education, closer Regular Army supervision of ARNG brigades’ training and readiness, better screening of individual readiness, and better definition and articulation of readiness and deployment standards. The Department of the Army also recommended a number of measures to improve ARNG brigades’ readiness.23

There were also a number of other issues on which there was general agreement, the most significant of which involved constraints imposed by the PSRC authority. As noted, DoD lacked access to the IRR under this authority. This was because PSRC authorized the President only to activate units, not individuals. The law’s authors anticipated that partial mobilization would follow quickly on the heels of a call-up, and so would provide access to the IRR. In the Persian Gulf War, however, the Bush administration relied heavily on PSRC, which meant that the Army had to fill vacancies in activated reserve component units with personnel from other units.24

A number of minor problems also plagued individual readiness. Many soldiers arrived at mobilization stations in a nondeployable status. Many issues were administrative—e.g., soldiers who were technically nondeployable because they had not had a medical or dental exam within the prescribed interval—and were remedied quickly. Some, however, were more serious. The GAO noted that the 48th Brigade, for example, had sent around 250 soldiers back to Fort Steward from the NTC because of

22 Brauner, Thie, and Brown, 1992, p. 67.
more serious conditions that included “ulcers, chronic asthma, spinal arthritis, hepatitis, seizures, and diabetes.”

Others involved soldiers who were untrained for their duty positions, and those were also hard to fix. In its assessment, the GAO faulted the Army for not providing sufficient training opportunities for reserve component units, but noted that it was often difficult to reconcile military training with reservists’ civilian occupations. The GAO found serious problems in the roundout brigades in terms of officer and noncommissioned officer competence and commitment, inability of mechanics and crews to diagnose and repair equipment, unsatisfactory tank gunnery skills, and a general lack of discipline.

Congress did not dispute the consensus that reserve component support forces’ performance in the Persian Gulf War validated reliance on them for future contingency operations. But while congressmen accepted the positive assessment of reserve support forces, some did not embrace the less rosy conclusions about ARNG roundout brigades. Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, never completely accepted Regular Army rationales for not deploying the roundout brigades during the first Persian Gulf War.

The influential Mississippi congressman Sonny Montgomery stoutly maintained that those units had, in fact, demonstrated ample capability in training. In the Senate, Sam Nunn pressed Major General Barry McCaffrey—the commander of the 24th Infantry Division with which the 48th Brigade had been aligned—to concede that had the roundout brigades been activated immediately, they would have been ready for combat operations at the commencement of the ground offensive.

The committee notes the controversy concerning the three Army National Guard round-out brigades that were mobilized during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The committee believes that the criticism of the round-out brigades is misplaced. The round-out concept never presumed that the round-out brigades were immediately ready for deployment. The round-out concept always anticipated a period of post-mobilization training. All three of the brigades underwent post-mobilization training, met combat proficiency standards, and would have been to Southwest Asia had they been needed. The committee notes that these units—had they been mobilized in late August/early September 1990, would have completed

29 See Senator Sam Nunn’s interchange with then–Major General Barry McCaffrey on the decision not to mobilize the 48th Brigade, U.S. Senate, 1991b, pp. 132–134. Nunn argued that Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s argument that the 90-day limit on PSRC authority precluded both training and employing the 48th was at best mistaken, because the President could have declared a national emergency and invoked his partial mobilization authority.
their post-mobilization training in ample time for deployment for the land campaign, since many of the forward combat units did not arrive until late January 1991.30

At the same time, members of Congress charted a middle course that allowed DoD to maintain enough Regular Army force structure to meet its most pressing demands, yet also compelled the Army to increase its efforts to improve reserve component readiness. To understand Congress’s response to assessments of reserve component performance in the Persian Gulf, it is necessary to consider their alternatives. Had Congress—or, more accurately, key congressional leaders—accepted that ARNG combat brigades simply could not provide adequate levels of capability within anticipated deployment timelines, they would have allowed the Army to reduce ARNG combat force structure. As we will discuss shortly, DoD’s 1993 budget proposal recommended doing just that, planning on significant reductions in Army reserve component forces, especially combat forces. Had Congress conclusively believed that DoD’s decision not to employ the roundout brigades rested on nothing more substantial than Regular Army bias against the Guard, it could have required the Army to reduce its Regular Army force structure, essentially compelling increased utilization of those ARNG combat forces. As we will see, Congress instead supported the Army retaining just enough regular Army combat forces to meet anticipated demand while resisting reductions to reserve component force structure and end strength—at least initially.

Congress also directed the Army to redouble its efforts to support reserve component readiness. In 1991, Congress required the Army to provide a minimum of 2,000 officers and enlisted advisors to assist selected reserve units, as specified by Title XI of the FY 1993 NDAA, also known as the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992.31 The act included a number of provisions, setting objectives for ARNG combat units to contain a minimum number of officers and enlisted soldiers, establishing requirements for noncommissioned officer education, using simulations to reduce postmobilization training time, mandating annual medical assessments, and increasing Regular Army oversight of National Guard units. Title XI directed the Secretary of the Army to associate every National Guard unit with a Regular Army counterpart, and gave the commanders of those associated units significant authority to approve Guard units’ training plans; review readiness reports; assess manpower, training, and equipment requirements; and validate their associated Guard units’ compatibility—now termed interoperability—with the Regular Army. Title XI even gave Regular Army commanders the authority to review officer promotions in their associ-

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30 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1991, p. 155.
ated Guard units. In sum, while Congress would not force DoD to rely on reserve components for both combat and support units, it continued to prod the department to do what could be done to render combat units worthy of such responsibility.

**Adapting to an Evolving Strategy: Total Force Policy and the Strategic Reviews of the 1990s**

The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 had eliminated the principal threat against which DoD had prepared for most of its existence. Until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, decisively reoriented the focus of U.S. strategy, interpreting the implications of the Cold War’s end for the international security environment and the U.S. defense establishment consumed the strategic discourse. The other major factor in post–Cold War era was declining resources, and that issue was also related to the end of the Cold War. Without the compelling need to counter the Soviet Union, popular pressure built for a “peace dividend.” In January 1990, eight months before Iraq invaded Kuwait, a Gallup poll indicated that 50 percent of Americans thought that the United States was spending “too much” on defense, against 45 percent who believed that U.S. spending was either “about right” or “too little.” A few months later, Nunn spoke on the Senate floor arguing how changing international conditions allowed the United States to reduce defense spending without imperiling security. This context, in which the Soviet Union’s collapse seemed to diminish threats to the United States, leading to a decline in available resources, gave rise to a series of major strategic reviews to assess the implications of these two factors. Those reviews included the Base Force effort led by the Joint Staff between 1989 and 1993, the incoming Clinton administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1997 QDR.

As stated, these strategic reviews were more or less independent assessments to determine how little the United States could afford to spend on defense in the post–Cold War era. The Joint Staff initiated the Base Force in an attempt to forestall what it viewed as ill-considered and premature reductions in U.S. military strength in an era of declining Soviet military power. The Clinton administration, believing that the Base Force had been too cautious in its estimate of the residual threat posed by the Soviet Union and regional powers such as Iraq and North Korea, initiated the Bottom-Up Review in the hopes of enlarging the peace dividend. Nunn’s and other congres-

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34 Nunn, 1990a; Nunn, 1990b.

sional critics’ dissatisfaction with what they saw as an excessive amount of wasteful overlap in functions between the armed services led to the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions that was to determine an appropriate allocation of roles, missions, and functions in the face of new global realities.\textsuperscript{36} In contrast, Congress eventually mandated the QDR—the first of which occurred in 1996–1997—to compel the executive branch to periodically articulate a national defense strategy and align resources against it. Although each review sprang from different motivations, all involved the same community of people, assessing essentially the same strategic situation, under the same resource constraints.

These deliberations affected the Army profoundly, as one of the dominant and perennial questions in this strategic discourse was how much (more) should Army size and resources be cut in the absence of a major land threat to the United States and its vital interests. Allocation of scarce resources within the Army was a major source of friction among the Army’s three components, and among the Army, the Administration, and Congress. Results from the Base Force review—completed first—set the tone. The Base Force’s strategy required the Army to continue to rely on reserve component support forces, but to place primary reliance on Regular Army combat forces to meet the most important contingency demands. Throughout most of the decade, DoD and the national security community defined potential demands in terms of two short, sharp wars against regional aggressors such as Iraq and North Korea. DoD would reduce its estimates of the scale and intensity of those demands over the course of the decade. No one anticipated long-term, large-scale commitments to stability operations like those that would confront the Army in the next decade, however. And despite the conclusions of three strategic reviews, Congress continued to resist reducing reserve component strength and force structure. Instead, Congress repeatedly proved willing to retain Army Reserve and especially ARNG strength in excess of DoD’s estimates of operational requirements. In the end, however, reductions did occur, though not on the scale or schedule that the Army would have preferred.

**Declining Resources for Defense**

Perhaps the single greatest factor affecting the evolution of the Total Force Policy between 1992 and 2001 was the reduction in resources available for defense. The budget deficit, attributed to the Reagan administration’s combination of tax cuts and defense spending, had become an issue of intense concern in Congress. In 1985, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Control Act, which required automatic, across-the-board spending reductions in the event that the deficit exceeded a statutory maximum.\textsuperscript{37} In 1989, faced with a minor recession and the beginnings of the Soviet crack-up, OMB requested substantial cuts in defense spending in the FY 1990


budget. OMB did not get its reductions, but it did get a freeze.38 When, over the course of FY 1990, it became apparent that the decline of the Soviet threat was real and relatively permanent, momentum for defense cuts grew. In the 1990s, the debate over the defense budget changed from how much the nation had to spend to deter the Soviets to how much DoD could afford to cut in an uncertain world. The resulting reductions were considerable. From FY 1991 through FY 2001, the Army’s total obligational authority decreased by 34 percent.39

**The Base Force Sets the Tone**

Work on the Base Force began well before the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse, and even before the East Germans began tearing down the Berlin Wall in 1989. Initially, the Joint Staff was simply concerned with the potential for regional contingencies and started devoting analytic and planning efforts to address that issue. Sensing the changes undermining the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, General Colin Powell, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1989, felt the need to prepare for a post-Soviet future and reinforced these efforts. Powell anticipated demands for what would be called a “peace dividend” and wanted to establish a defensible rationale for DoD force structure and resources going forward. The Joint Staff projected a 25 percent reduction in real defense spending between 1989 and 1997.40

The Base Force’s major implication for subsequent reviews and the Total Force Policy was the force-sizing construct that emerged from it. When the Joint Staff began planning for the Base Force, no clear and significant threats to U.S. interests had emerged to replace the Soviet Union. Instead, planners substituted the construct of more-theoretical regional contingencies, loosely modeled on the Persian Gulf War and cross-border aggression on the Korean peninsula. Rapid, almost immediate response to these contingencies was at a premium. Army analysis indicated that the lead brigade deployed for the first contingency needed to arrive within four days, while the last elements of a five-division corps needed to close within 75 days.41 During the Persian Gulf War, reserve component support forces had demonstrated their ability to meet those timelines, at least partially; ARNG maneuver forces had not. To meet the demands of the two-major-regional-contingency force-sizing construct, the Base Force

analysis recommended a force of 12 Regular Army divisions, augmented by as few as six reserve component divisions and two reserve component cadre divisions, as the minimum force necessary for the United States to protect its global interests.\(^\text{42}\) This recommendation was a reduction of six Regular Army divisions and two ARNG divisions from the Army’s FY 1990 inventory.\(^\text{43}\) End strengths were to decline, as well. Regular Army end strength was to decline 29 percent to 535,000 by FY 1995. The ARNG end strength would be reduced by 27 percent to 321,000, and the Army Reserve end strength by 23 percent to 230,000.\(^\text{44}\)

However demanding the timeline, meeting operational requirements for two major regional contingencies did not demand as many forces as fighting the Soviets in a world war. The Joint Staff’s proposal might be characterized as “less of the same.” The Base Force proposal recommended an aggregate reduction of 25 percent in land forces, including the reserve components, with reductions being more-or-less proportional across the three components. Planners focused on reserve component forces supporting Regular Army allocated to the defense of Europe. They reasoned that if both the mission and the Regular Army forces no longer existed, then there was little justification for the reserve component forces that supported them. DoD and Army leaders reasoned that since the reserve components experienced most of the growth in the 1980s, it made sense to reduce them as the threat from the Warsaw Pact declined. Moreover, if the Warsaw Pact’s demise required the divestiture of Regular Army forces, then it required divesting the reserve component forces aligned to support those Regular Army units under the CAPSTONE concept.\(^\text{45}\)

Guard advocates disputed that rationale, as they resisted any rationale that might lead to a reduction of ARNG force structure or resources. Retired National Guard Colonel Reid K. Beveridge—editor of National Guard magazine—noted that the Regular Army had paid little attention to the CAPSTONE concept in the 1980s and during the Persian Gulf War. According to Beveridge, the Army had mobilized support units without regard either to their readiness or their CAPSTONE alignment. Guard leaders considered the failure to deploy the roundout brigades to be a particularly egregious violation of the program’s spirit. Beveridge began by focusing narrowly on the logic of tying force reductions to CAPSTONE alignment. In his view of the program and that of NGAUS, if the Army had not mobilized reserve component units in accordance with CAPSTONE alignment, then CAPSTONE provided an inade-

\(^{42}\) Jaffe, 1993, p. 12.

\(^{43}\) Jaffe, 1993, p. 44; Sherry, 2008.


quate basis for force structure reductions. This perspective focused on such errors with respect to specific units—that the disestablishment of Regular Army Unit A could not justify the disestablishment of reserve component Unit B because the latter was not really aligned with Unit A. As to the larger issue of the extent to which reductions in Regular Army forces justified reducing the reserve component forces supporting them, Beveridge argued that the changed security environment dictated greater reliance on a large, capable—yet much less expensive—reserve component.  

Further, the emphasis on rapid deployment reduced the need for ARNG combat forces: Army planners were not confident that ARNG brigades could be relied on to deploy within required timeframes, and they were certain that ARNG divisions could not. Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan testified to this effect before the House Armed Service Committee in 1992:

You are talking about 90 days and 365 days, and I will tell you for the record that the likelihood of me training a brigade in 90 days that has 550 infantrymen in it, when it is authorized 1,100, and it has 8 artillery men in it when it is authorized 81, is zero. I can’t do it. I just can’t do it. I don’t think anybody can do it! The best we can do, assuming a near full-up unit at mobilization, is 365 days for a division and 90 days for a roundout brigade. A unit at less than full strength at mobilization will take longer to train. I am not denigrating anybody’s performance, it is just going to take me a long time to do it.  

Secretary of the Army Michael P. W. Stone went one step further, arguing that the reserve combat forces simply could not generate the level of proficiency needed in modern warfare. He began by making the point that the Army should not expend precious resources maintaining forces that had no plausible operational role for the foreseeable future:

The arithmetic is simple—we can’t afford the luxury of carrying units that have no wartime mission. The reserve components are, of course, part of our national defense structure. Their design and unit composition are part of a comprehensive architecture. The architecture is a precise construction of the means to prevail—in an elaborate, intricate, organized manner—against threats to our nation. The reserve components are funded as a defense institution, not as a social institution. If a reserve component unit has no defense mission, it should not be funded with defense dollars that are needed for other parts of the defense architecture. In saying this, I add that I am mindful of the state role of the National Guard.

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46 Beveridge, 1992.

Stone went on to make the point that the “training revolution” had increased Regular Army units’ general level of proficiency well beyond that attainable by ARNG combat units, at least in the time they had available for training:

In Iraq we raised the level of combat to an unprecedented height. We were able to do this in great part because of the high state of readiness and training our troops achieved prior to arriving in Southwest Asia. Our training centers had a great deal to do with this. Synchronizing jets, artillery, helicopters and maneuvering troops at night in foul weather is an art form developed by experience and honed by practice. Our maneuver forces achieved this level only through constant training— training time that cannot be duplicated at this point by even the most dedicated Guard and Reserve units.48

The Guard and its proponents simply did not accept such arguments. As noted, Guard proponents continued to assert that the roundout brigades had been every bit as capable as the Regular Army units that had displaced them, at least with a modicum of postmobilization training.

The Base Force proposal reflected Sullivan’s and Stone’s assumptions and concerns about responsiveness and proficiency. Overall, it reduced Regular end strength by 84,000 soldiers in FYs 1992–1993 while decreasing the Guard and Reserve by 91,000 and 64,000, respectively.49 The proposed cuts fell especially heavy on ARNG combat forces. The Army proposal reduced them from their Cold War height of ten divisions to six, though it did envision retaining two cadre divisions in the Army Reserve.50

If the Joint Staff’s “Base Force” proposal might be characterized as “less of the same,” the Guard’s position might be considered “back to the future,” or “and now for something completely different.” Guard proponents did not dispute DoD’s description of the anticipated security environment. Instead, they argued that the need to deploy forces predominantly based in the United States to contingency operations in places such as Korea and the Middle East made the Guard more, rather than less, relevant. They conceded that DoD would have to continue to rely on a small Regular Army to provide forces such as the 82nd Airborne Division and the rest of the XVIII Airborne Corps to respond immediately to emerging crises. Guard proponents such as NGAUS president Major General Robert F. Ensslin, Jr., and NGAUS’s executive director LaVern Weber maintained that limitations on strategic lift imposed a delay of at least 60 days before a second wave of combat forces could be dispatched to the area of operations. Weber asserted that

50 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1991, p. 201.
Any Guard unit can be combat ready within 60 days of mobilization. Since airlift or sealift is rarely available much more quickly than this, most missions—particularly infantry and armor missions—can find a good place in the Guard and Reserve.\footnote{LaVern E. Weber, “The Grass Roots Strength of the Guard: Divided We Fall,” \textit{National Guard}, Vol. 45, No. 6, June 1991.}

In April 1993, \textit{National Guard} editor Beveridge was citing figures in support of the proposition that Guard brigades could be ready for deployment and combat within 60–80 days. Voicing the Guard’s general perspective, Beveridge asserted that the Guard’s territorially-based manning policy—in which soldiers stayed with the same units throughout most of their service careers—enabled Guard units to sustain levels of readiness comparable to those of active component units with many fewer training days. He wrote that “Guard commanders . . . achieve their levels of readiness based on low personnel turmoil and greater cohesiveness in crews, squads and teams.”\footnote{Reid K. Beveridge, “Force Structure/Force Mix: The Rand Study Still Leaves Open-Ended Questions,” \textit{National Guard}, Vol. 47, No. 4, April 1993.}

In addition to arguments about military efficacy, Guard proponents also argued that use of the reserve components helped promote public support of the war effort. Writing in \textit{National Guard} magazine in September 1992, Representative Montgomery wrote:

It [the Total Force Policy] integrated the Guard and Reserves into the force structure so that we would not go into any major conflict without their early involvement. This was to ensure the support of the American public and the Congress. In the Persian Gulf War, the military went to war in August, but the people went to war when the Guard and Reserves were called up. This grass roots public support came when almost every city, town and county had a son, daughter, husband or wife march off to war. This enhanced a positive attitude toward the military and toward the war effort, a factor so obviously lacking in the Vietnam War.\footnote{G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery, “The State of the Guard,” \textit{National Guard}, Vol. 46, No. 9, September 1992, p. 22.}
Implicitly, Montgomery was leveraging Summers’s interpretation of the Abrams Doctrine in support of placing greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve. Essentially, he contended that whatever narrow tactical advantage Regular Army units might hold, the Guard’s ability to generate public support offered a compensating advantage in overall military effectiveness. Beveridge reiterated that argument a year later in that same magazine, writing that

mobilization for the Persian Gulf War resonated through every congressional district, and it focused the minds of ‘Main Street America’ on its sons and daughters who were deploying, not only in the active components, but from local armories, air bases and reserve centers.54

Cost formed the capstone to the Guard’s argument. Guard proponents never ceased to argue that, as NGAUS executive director put it, “the Army Guard can produce combat-ready units for about one-fourth the cost of an identical unit on active duty.”55

Instead, the Guard threw its support behind House Armed Services Committee Chairman Aspin’s proposals for reorienting the U.S. defense posture. Representative Aspin generally accepted the broad logic of the Guard’s position but not necessarily its minimalist estimates of the amount of postmobilization training required. Given the risks associated with inadequate training, Aspin was inclined to accept Regular Army estimates of the amount of training required, with brigades requiring at least 90 days of postmobilization training and divisions requiring at least 365 of postmobilization training. Still, Aspin felt those parameters still afforded ample room for heavier reliance on reserve component forces to support the nation’s defense strategy. Aspin described his preferred approach to employing reserve component forces as “roundout, replacements, and unit rotation.” He described those concepts in the following terms:

Under our plan, the first four active Army divisions to respond to a contingency would not have Guard combat roundout units. The role of the Guard with these four divisions would be replacement. We envision four Guard brigades ready to replace elements of these divisions that are broken in the fighting. That’s the replacement function: roundup if you will.

Next, we would provide four heavy Guard brigades that would contain the roundout for the four later-arriving active Army divisions responding to a contingency. These divisions would deploy about three months into a contingency and the Guard brigades would have time to train up and deploy with them. That’s the roundout function.

54 Beveridge, 1993, pp. 50–51.
Third, we envision four heavy Guard divisions and an armored cavalry regiment to provide a rotation force. These forces would be used to relieve forces that had deployed earlier. . . . These forces would be available a year after initial mobilization.\(^{56}\)

NGAUS urged its members to fight against proposed reductions tooth and nail. In the July 1992 issue of *National Guard*, Ensslin urged that Guard commanders at all levels promulgate the message that

> the Guard is combat ready, it can contribute to the future national security strategy; and it is essential in large numbers to accomplish the state mission, such as the recent civil disturbance duty in Los Angeles.\(^{57}\)

The purpose of this message was to urge Guardsman at all levels to contact their representatives and protest proposed reductions to Guard end strength and force structure. Meanwhile, NGAUS lobbied Congress furiously. Powell apparently attributed the formation of the Senate National Guard Caucus to efforts to oppose the Base Force proposal.\(^{58}\)

In arguing against Powell and the professional military that he represented, the Guard, its advocates, and its congressional supporters were taking on perhaps the most respected man and one of the most respected institutions in America at the time. In 2004, biographer Walter Isaacson described Powell’s status on his appointment as Secretary of State as having been “the most respected man in America, a heroic soldier and wise statesman with rock star appeal.”\(^{59}\) In early 1992, as Congress was deliberating over the Base Force and the new national defense strategy, Powell was at the height of his popularity, riding a wave of prestige following Desert Storm’s stunning victory. In October 1991—the date closest to the congressional deliberations described here—69 percent of Americans surveyed by the Gallup Organization reposed a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the armed forces. In contrast, the presidency enjoyed only a 50 percent approval rating; Congress scored 18 percent.\(^{60}\) To have substituted some combination of Aspin’s and Nunn’s proposals to place primary reliance on the reserve components to execute U.S. military strategy would have meant overriding the most respected man and the most respected institution in America on an issue at the core of their professional expertise.


\(^{58}\) Beveridge, 1992, p. 21.


Moreover, achieving primacy among the Army’s three components was hardly NGAUS’s only legislative goal, or even its most important one. NGAUS’s lobbying efforts extended beyond the Guard’s role in national defense to include the practical matters that stemmed from that role. In January 1991, the ARNG’s legislative action plan listed ten major categories of issues that pertained to the Army, listed in Table 4.1. Increasing the Guard’s full-time support was NGAUS’s highest priority, though NGAUS sought to forestall the employment of Regular Army soldiers in that role. What might loosely be termed personnel issues consumed most of NGAUS’s attention, as indicated in Table 4.1. “Tort Claim and Disability Protection” derived from Guardsmen’s vulnerability to civil suits in consequence to their involvement in counterdrug operations while in a nonfederal status. The Guard also intended to lobby to maintain a rather extensive fleet of fixed-wing aircraft that were perhaps even more useful for state missions than for wartime requirements. NGUAS was asking for more

Table 4.1
National Guard Association of the United States
Legislative Priorities for 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Issues</th>
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<td>Full-time support manning</td>
<td>• Growth in the full-time support force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Integration of active component personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel benefits</td>
<td>• Burial in national cemeteries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Survivor Benefit Plan</td>
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<td>• Tax deduction for expenses</td>
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<td>Tort Claim and disability protection for personnel</td>
<td>• Federal Tort Claims Act</td>
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<td>• Traveling to and from training</td>
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<td>Education benefits</td>
<td>• Army Continuing Education System</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Montgomery G. I. Bill</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student Loan Repayment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous equipment funding</td>
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<td>Mission support aircraft</td>
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<td>Environmental compliance</td>
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<td>Military construction</td>
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<td>Equipment modernization</td>
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<td>ARNG training programs</td>
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</table>

money for the Guard to support compliance with increasingly stringent environmental regulations, to improve ARNG facilities, and to purchase the most modern equipment, including attack helicopters, tanks, and air defense assets.\textsuperscript{61} Obviously, all of these priorities were connected with the Guard’s role in national defense or state support, but lobbying efforts in all of these areas could and would continue regardless of the outcome of the larger debate.

Rhetorically, Congress supported the Guard’s position. Congress received the Base Force proposals with some skepticism. Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees appear to have favored larger reductions to Regular Army forces and smaller ones for the reserve components. Montgomery argued that the reductions were too great, stating that the National Guard’s authorized strength had never fallen below 400,000.\textsuperscript{62} The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY 1993 NDAA accused DoD of having abandoned the Total Force Policy in its proposal. The committee, moreover, argued that DoD’s proposed reductions in reserve component strength did not rest on careful analysis but were merely the results of a “share the pain” budget approach.\textsuperscript{63} Congress, accordingly, did not fully approve DoD’s recommendation, choosing instead to reduce reserve component strength by only 54,320 over FYs 1992 and 1993. Concurrently, Congress increased procurement of equipment for the reserve components, increased full-time support levels and, as indicated, passed the aforementioned Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992.\textsuperscript{64}

Congress’s rationale for these decisions emphasized cost. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report estimated that the Army’s proposed force structure incurred $370 million in additional costs by failing to transfer more support functions to the reserve components. The committee’s strong recommendation to the Army to transfer all combat force structure to the reserve components that could not be deployed with current and programmed air and sea lift capabilities within 60 days suggests that the committee also believed that the Army was retaining excessive and unusable Regular Army combat force structure. Finally, the committee appeared to assume that there were no significant differences in performance between Regular Army and reserve component forces, at least none that could not be eliminated with a minimal amount of postmobilization training. The report asserted full equivalence between Regular Army and reserve component support forces. It also asserted that all three roundout brigades had met Army standards for combat proficiency, thus aligning the Senate Armed Services Committee with the Guard’s position and implicitly discounting the


\textsuperscript{64} U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1991, pp. 14, 207.
conclusions of the Army’s Inspector General, the GAO and the RAND Corporation. In short, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s response to the Base Force largely followed the prewar conclusions of its chairman, Sam Nunn.

The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report was coincident with many of the views of the various reserve component associations, which strongly resisted any cuts to force structure and end strength. Indeed, testimony from their chiefs on the FY 1993 NDAA largely echoed the report’s language. Major General “Curly” Hultman, executive director of the Reserve Officers Association, reiterated the claim that the Base Force’s reductions had been driven by concerns about budgets rather than strategy. Hultman maintained that until Congress could get better analysis, it should forbid any precipitous reductions in reserve component strength. The heads of the Adjutants General and National Guard Associations also argued for maintaining ARNG end strength at current levels, and against any move to reduce ARNG end strength below 400,000. Ensslin, the NGAUS president, echoed the Senate Armed Services Committee report in arguing that DoD should not maintain Regular Army force structure that could not be deployed within 60 days using existing and programmed assets. They presented their plan to match ten Regular Army divisions—versus the 12 divisions proposed by the Base Force—with ten ARNG divisions, two more than authorized at the time and four more than proposed by the Base Force. Ensslin closed his testimony by noting that NGAUS’s highest priority was to preserve “units and flags.”

A small group of legislators dissented. Representatives William L. Dickinson, Herbert H. Bateman, Jon Kyl, and Jim McCrery countered that the majority on their committee “really believes is that there is one policy for the active forces and a quite different one for the National Guard and Reserve.” In contrast to the majorities on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the dissenters considered DoD’s analysis quite persuasive. They stated

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65 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1991, pp. 204, 299.

66 U.S. Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1993 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, on S. 3114, Authorizing Appropriations for Military Activities of the Department of Defense, for Military Construction, and for Defense Activities of the Department of Energy, to Prescribe Personnel Strengths for Such Fiscal Year for the Armed Forces and for Other Purposes: Part 6, Manpower and Personnel: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, S. Hrg. 102-833, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 25; April 8, 30; May 13; June 2, 1992b, pp. 469–482. It is not completely surprising that the concepts and language used in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s report and the Reserve Officers Association matched so closely. The committee’s staff director was Arnold L. Punaro, a Marine Corps reservist who himself had mobilized for Desert Shield. Punaro had worked with Senator Nunn in some capacity for almost 20 years by that point. Later, Punaro served as Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. See Arnold L. Punaro and David Poyer, On War and Politics: The Battlefield Inside Washington’s Beltway, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2016. In the book, Punaro discusses his extensive relationship with Nunn, though he does not spend much time on reserve component issues.

that the department’s plan to reduce both active and reserve forces is not the product of a capricious or malicious desire to give precedence to one component or the other, or to continue a perceived bias against the reserves. Rather, the total force plan stems from a careful analysis of our potential threats and national defense requirements, and by an effort to provide the force structure best suited to carry out those requirements, within imposing fiscal constraints.68

The net effect of the proposed legislation was “to require more than 298,000 soldiers to be cut from the active forces, but just 28,500 from the guard and reserve. That’s more than a 10-1 ratio,” which would “undermine the future effectiveness of both the active and reserve forces.”69 The congressmen also argued that the costs of maintaining unneeded end strength and force structure diverted money from readiness. The dissenters did not prevail, but they did demonstrate that Congress was not monolithic in its support for the reserve components.

While the Senate Armed Services Committee was adamant that the Army integrate reserve component forces into its force structure to a much greater extent than it had done so far, it was willing to consider different approaches to employing ARNG maneuver forces to augmenting Regular Army units. In the FY 1994 NDAA, Congress directed that the Army establish a test program for employing the roundout or round-up concepts—the latter proposing using ARNG combat forces to augment Regular Army forces instead of substituting for them—at company and battalion levels. Thus, while Congress resisted DoD’s proposals to reduce reserve component strength and resourcing in general and their attempts to reduce ARNG combat strength in particular, it was willing to be flexible about how the Army could employ reserve component combat capabilities.70

What Congress did not do was to force DoD to rely on ARNG combat forces to meet the threats represented in illustrative planning scenarios. As noted, the Base Force proposal included 12 Regular Army divisions, six ARNG divisions, and two Army Reserve cadre divisions. NGAUS countered with a proposal for ten Regular Army and ten ARNG divisions.71 When asked about this proposal during testimony, Powell demurred strongly, stating

> There is no need for additional Guard divisions in the structure. . . . We should not compensate for going lower [than recommended strength levels for the Regular


Army] by having more less ready National Guard formations. . . . We do not need more National Guard structure strength.\textsuperscript{72}

In the short run, Congress largely sided with the reserve components, but it did not compel DoD or the Army to rely on ARNG combat forces in order to execute the base force strategy. The FY 1993 NDAA established end strengths of 422,725 and 279,615 for the ARNG and the Army Reserve, respectively, and forbade the Army to make any force structure reductions not directly tied to the elimination of a Regular Army unit, reserve component installation, or Army weapon system in FY 1993. However, Congress did not impose further reductions on the Army over and above those requested by DoD.\textsuperscript{73} Congress had also authorized DoD to reduce the number of ARNG divisions from ten to eight, reversing the increases of the 1980s. The modest reductions in reserve component end strength Congress approved precluded any increase in ARNG force structure. In the longer term, the reserve components could not forestall end-strength reductions, as will be discussed later. Likewise, Congress allowed the Regular Army to retain enough end strength to field 12 divisions, at least through 1995.\textsuperscript{74} In short, Congress would not allow DoD and the Army to reduce reserve component strength to the level indicated by the latter’s analyses, but Congress also declined to reduce Army end strength—and thus force structure—to a level at which the Army would have been forced to rely on ARNG combat forces in order to execute the strategy. The overall effect was to force the Army to rely more heavily on reserve component support forces, but to continue to place primary reliance on Regular Army combat forces to execute the Base Force strategy.

The Bottom-Up Review Refines Base Force Estimates

In 1993, the incoming Clinton administration felt the need to review U.S. strategy in light of the changing world situation. During the campaign, President Bill Clinton had argued that reduced tensions made further reductions—over and above those already realized or planned as a result of the Base Force analysis—in defense spending possible. Indeed, when the Bush administration first proposed the Base Force, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Aspin had argued that the Base Force had failed to take into account the speed and scale of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Aspin was now Clinton’s Secretary of Defense. In short, the new Clinton administration believed that it could realize a larger “peace dividend” than that provided by the Base Force; the Bottom-Up Review was to be their instrument for doing so. Because the review continued to use the two-major-regional-contingency force-sizing construct articulated

\textsuperscript{72} U.S. Senate, 1992a, pp. 496–497.


\textsuperscript{74} U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1991, p. 201; U.S. House of Representatives, 1991b.
during the Base Force, however, its implications for the Army were similar and boded no changes to Army components’ roles.\textsuperscript{75}

To be sure, the Bottom-Up Review resulted in a further planned decrement of two Regular Army divisions, from 12 divisions to ten. That decision was based on changed assumptions about operational demands. Joint Staff analyses assumed that a smaller ground force, coupled with overwhelming airpower, could hold the line in the second major regional contingency until success in the first freed other naval and ground forces to “swing” for use in the second major operation. While some stakeholders—the Army in particular—doubted the validity of the analysis on which this planned reduction rested, the purpose of the analysis was to determine how many Regular combat units were required.\textsuperscript{76} The Bottom-Up Review also reported that “Combat support and combat service support . . . units in the Army Reserve are able to deploy rapidly and be integrated effectively into the active force—a fact that was demonstrated clearly during the Persian Gulf conflict.” In the future, reliance on combat support and combat service support units would depend on how quickly these could be activated and on the size of the “residual active-duty support forces needed for peacetime missions.” It also assumed that the reserve components could continue to provide the bulk of support capabilities needed, even in the short-notice contingencies described by the two-major-regional-conflict force-sizing construct.\textsuperscript{77} The Bottom-Up Review did not support continuing the Army’s roundout concept, however.

The Bottom-Up Review also continued to assume that the Base Force decision to reduce ARNG combat forces to six decisions would be carried out. In addition, the Bottom-Up Review prescribed further reductions to reserve component end strength, from about 700,000 in 1993 to 575,000 in 1999. The review proposed an ARNG force structure of 37 brigades organized into five divisions and enhanced readiness brigades which had the goal of being able to deploy in 90 days to reinforce active forces. The enhanced readiness brigade concept essentially eliminated the roundout concept. These maneuver brigades that would receive additional resources and be available to supplement Regular forces in the second major regional contingency if needed.\textsuperscript{78} The review also articulated an intention to employ reserve component forces in support of Regular forces in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistant operations, as well as replace Regular forces conducting such operations when they are needed for a major regional conflict.\textsuperscript{79} In short, the Bottom-Up Review justified its reductions

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner, 2001, pp. 41–43; Sherry, 2008, pp. 81–82.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Sherry, 2008, p. 84.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Aspin, 1993, p. 93.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Aspin, 1993, p. 28.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Aspin, 1993, pp. 91–93.
\end{itemize}
to force structure and end strength by assuming less demanding contingencies and increased utilization of reserve component support forces, but not combat forces.

The Guard viewed the progress of the Bottom-Up Review with some trepidation. Guard leaders were concerned about overall force structure reductions and the shift in emphasis to the as yet ill-defined enhanced readiness brigades. Ensslin, who had replaced LaVern Weber as NGAUS’s executive director, said that

Unless there is additional force structure and end strength that is not reflected in the report, it is obvious that there will be less reliance on the National Guard in the future. The low level of forces in the Army National Guard would also severely impact on the Guard’s ability as the first responder in domestic emergencies.80

Moreover, the Guard also perceived that the emphasis on enhanced readiness brigades reflected a deemphasis of ARNG divisions. In an interview with National Guard magazine, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs confirmed that perception, noting that they accepted the Army Staff’s planning factors for mobilization and deployment. Brigades that could conceivably be ready in 90 days were potentially useful, but divisions that required 365 days of postmobilization training were less so, except as a strategic reserve.81 A year later, NGAUS’s new chairman, Air National Guard Major General John L. Matthews, effectively conceded the shift, stating:

We must be willing to abandon outdated warfighting units for the new forces that will be needed. We must always be viewed by the nation as part of the solution, not part of the problem. Empires for empires’ sake are not constructive and make no contribution to reliance on the Guard.82

Perhaps not entirely incidentally, Matthews was an airman and thus may not have been as attached to retaining the ARNG’s emphasis on its divisions.

To accommodate these force structure reductions, end strength was also to be reduced. Regular Army strength was to decline to 495,000 by FY 1999. ARNG strength would be reduced to 367,000, while the Army Reserve would shrink to 208,000.83

The conference report for the FY 1994 NDAA—submitted after the review’s completion—noted congressional concerns about active and reserve component end strength levels:

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The conferees are concerned about the future end strength of the Army and the Army’s ability to support the spectrum of contingency operations upon which the Bottom-Up Review was premised. . . . The conferees are not convinced that the end strength of the Army can be reduced below the levels authorized for fiscal year 1994 [540,000 for the Regular Army, 410,000 for the ARNG, and 260,000 for the Army Reserve] if the Army is to continue its various peacekeeping missions and maintain its capability to respond to two major regional contingencies simultaneously.\textsuperscript{84}

The reserve component associations, however, did not oppose the resource allocation implied by the Bottom-Up Review. Major General Donald E. Edwards, president of the Adjutant Generals Association, testified that the association he represented was generally content with DoD’s proposal, based on the acceptance of a force structure of 420,000 spaces for the next three years. Ensslin, representing the NGAUS, also expressed general satisfaction. While Hultman, representing the Reserve Officers Association, had issues about the organization of the reserves, he expressed none with respect to end strength, even though the 260,000 reservists DoD had requested was substantially fewer than the number authorized the previous year.\textsuperscript{85}

While the Bottom-Up Review prescribed reductions in reserve component end strength of 125,000, it did not allocate the approximately 575,000 positions it prescribed for the Army’s reserve components among them. That task was left to the Army. Facing this contentious responsibility, the Secretary of the Army tasked a group of senior officers representing various stakeholder groups in the reserve components and the reserve associations, chaired by Vice Chief of Staff J. H. Binford Peay III, to resolve the issue.\textsuperscript{86} The relative quiescence of the reserve associations might have owed something to their participation in the process leading to what became known as the “Offsite Agreement” of October 29, 1993. The Offsite Agreement included representatives of HQDA, Army Reserve, ARNG, the National Guard Bureau, and the associations (i.e., the Association of the United States Army, NGAUS, the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, the Adjutants General Association of the United States, and the Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association).


The signed agreement “describes the end strength and force structure for FY99.”87 It also addressed the “swap” of about 10,000 soldiers worth of force structure between the Guard and Reserve. The Army Reserve units/capabilities transferred to the ARNG included Special Forces, aviation, armor, mechanized infantry, and field artillery. ARNG units/capabilities transferred to the Army Reserve included quartermaster, medical, transportation, signal, and military police, among others. The Offsite Agreement did two things: allocate roles and missions among the three Army components, and allocate the Bottom-Up Review’s reductions to reserve component force structure. It formalized trends that had been developing for some time, essentially divesting the Army Reserve of combat missions and focusing it on support roles. The ARNG, obviously, retained combat force structure.88

The components may have been able to reach that amicable agreement because Congress left the Army with maneuver forces it did not need, in spite of the Bottom-Up Review’s recommendations. A 1995 GAO report noted that DoD plans included no immediate role for the eight ARNG divisions that existed at the time.89 The Army justified their existence by the theoretical need to provide relief and reinforcement for committed forces should conflicts extend beyond their extended duration. Too much should not be read into that support, since the Army had argued for such reductions and supported the Base Force strategy that envisioned cuts of similar magnitude. The GAO argued that the Army should plan on leveraging support capabilities in those divisions to meet existing shortfalls. A year later, the GAO noted that

Although the Guard has come down in size, our analysis shows that the combat forces may still be too large for projected war requirements. The Guard’s combat structure, with 42 combat brigades, exceeds projected requirements for two major regional conflicts, according to war planners and DOD and Army studies. According to DOD documents and Army officials, the excess forces are a strategic reserve that could be assigned missions such as occupational forces once an enemy has been deterred and as rotational forces. However, we could find no analytical basis for this level of strategic reserve.90


In short, contemporary analyses of the particular scenarios used for force-sizing did not support the continued maintenance of a significant portion of the ARNG’s force structure, especially its combat forces. We must therefore attribute Guard combat forces’ continued existence to some other factor. As noted, Congress had been skeptical of the analysis that led to the Bottom-Up Review’s force structure reductions, perhaps believing that the scenarios used did not in fact capture the full range of contingencies that threatened the nation or their possible scale. In the end, it is difficult to find an explanation in the documentary record for the maintenance of this combat capacity. None of the stakeholders—including the Department of the Army—ever conceded that these ARNG combat forces were excess to requirement, let alone explained their rationale for retaining them. It is difficult to imagine anyone making such a concession, either. Similarly, there is no record of any credible alternative analysis demonstrating a need for those forces under contemporary force-planning scenarios or war plans. While it is possible to develop several plausible explanations for this circumstance, it is difficult to find supporting evidence.

Congress supported the Bottom-Up Review’s recommendations for reductions in the Regular Army, but declined to reduce ARNG combat force structure to five divisions and enhanced readiness brigades. Congress did not insist, however, that the Army rely on ARNG combat forces to meet the most important strategic requirements as defined by the two-major-regional-contingency force-sizing construct. The House Armed Services Committee recommended that the Army use the roundout concept to increase the number of divisions it could field to 12, with at least four being Regular Army rounded out with one or two Guard brigades. The committee also recommended the Army conduct a test of a RAND Corporation study that “suggested that roundout units could become combat ready faster if the integration took place at the battalion or company level, as opposed to the brigade level.”91 And Montgomery again voiced his opposition to reserve component cuts, but agreed to support the Army Offsite Agreement reductions.92 Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, however, approved the modest reductions in reserve component end strengths proposed in the budget.93 But even though the Army requested 88,000 fewer soldiers’ worth of reserve component end strength for FY 1997 than it had for FY 1994, neither the reserve components nor their associations voiced strong opposition.

Thus, the Bottom-Up Review continued the paradigm established by the Base Force, while gaining measured support from Congress. In that paradigm, the Regular Army provided the combat forces to implement strategy; Regular Army combat forces were supported by a combination of Regular Army and reserve component support forces. ARNG combat forces, including what were then called “enhanced readiness brigades,” continued to exist, but were intended to provide strategic depth to reinforce the Regular Army should operational demands exceed the calculations of the review’s supporting analysis.

**Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces**

Shortly after the Bottom-Up Review, with the 1994 NDAA Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to establish an independent panel that would review roles and missions. The resultant Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) had as its main focus evaluating and identifying overlap of missions between the services.\(^\text{94}\) Although intended to look at all services, one of the more ominous findings of the commission was that the Army’s reserve forces were a good example of the lack of appropriate organization, training, or appropriate equipage in the Armed Forces. CORM argued that the combat structure exceeded the requirements of two major regional conflicts, so it recommended five general principles:

- First, shape and size the Total Force to meet the military requirements of the national security strategy.
- Second, allocate resources on a tiered basis with higher priority for training, resources, personnel, and equipment to units scheduled to deploy early and frequently.
- Third, eliminate or reorganize reserve component forces with lower-priority tasks to fill shortfalls in higher-priority areas. The ARNG combat divisions, with approximately 110,000 personnel spaces, were required for war with the Soviet Union but not in the post–Cold War security environment, since the Bottom-Up Review had deleted that requirement.\(^\text{95}\) The Army at the time estimated a shortage of 60,000 combat support troops, and CORM recommended that the Secretary of Defense “direct the Army to restructure its combat divisions to provide the additional support forces needed.”\(^\text{96}\)
- Fourth, all services should “ensure that individuals and units of the Reserve Components are fully incorporated into all relevant operational plans” and used as such.

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\(^{94}\) Sherry, 2008, p. 92.

\(^{95}\) Sherry, 2008, p. 98.

• Fifth, an improvement in integration and cooperation between Regular and reserve components since “[s]eamless integration is the key to effective Reserve support for the Total Force.”\footnote{U.S. Department of Defense, 1995, p. 2-25.}

Another aspect of the CORM was a recommendation for a “quadrennial strategy review” at the beginning of each presidential administration as a way to compel each incoming presidential administration to articulate a national strategy and align resources to support it.\footnote{U.S. Department of Defense, 1995, pp. 4-8 and 4-9.} In pursuit of this objective, as part of the 1996 NDAA Congress mandated that the executive branch conduct strategic reviews every four years, with the first to take place in 1996–1997. In many respects, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review served as a template. Legislation passed as part of the FY 1997 NDAA Act required DoD to undertake

a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005.\footnote{See Section 923 of Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, September 23, 1996.}

**The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review**

With regard to the 1997 QDR, specifically, some in Congress and the broader defense community thought that technological advances were creating an opportunity to fundamentally reorient U.S. strategy, force structure, and posture.\footnote{Sherry, 2008, p. 119.} The QDR was thus expected either to force reconsideration of U.S. strategy, the budget and resources underpinning that strategy, or both.

Conditions were not ripe for such reconsideration, however. The near-term operational requirements of peacekeeping and other ongoing operations—to be described in a later section of this chapter—placed claims on Army force structure, as did the two-major-regional-contingency force-sizing construct that persisted from the Base Force. More importantly, budgets were effectively frozen at levels that made it difficult to align strategy and resources but also made developing other strategies challenging.\footnote{Larson, Orletsy, and Leuschner, 2001, p. 84.}

From DoD’s perspective, the principal purpose of the 1997 QDR was to increase defense procurement to at least $60 billion annually. Personnel reductions would free
the necessary resources. The QDR’s analysis of the same set of problems, using the same analytic tools under the same set of constraints, produced an outcome very similar to that of the Base Force and Bottom-Up Review. In the absence of any unambiguous threat, defense resources were to be reduced still further. The reduction in resources affected the Army with particular force. The Army was directed to reduce personnel costs by $2 billion annually. After considering various approaches, the Secretary of the Army directed savings to be equally divided among Regular Army military personnel, reserve component military personnel, and Department of the Army civilians. This 1/3-1/3-1/3 approach required Regular Army reductions of 15,000 soldiers, and reserve component reductions of 15,000 full-time equivalent soldiers, which equated to about 45,000 part-time soldiers (due to their lower annual personnel costs) and up to 33,700 civilians, depending on the grades of the reduced billets. How the 45,000 reductions in reserve component personnel would be divided among the Guard and Reserve was the subject of much analysis and senior leader consideration. Eventually, the Secretary of the Army approved the reduction of 37,000 Guardsmen and 8,000 Reservists.

From the perspective of HQDA, the Army was cutting forces it did not need in order to retain forces that it did. According to the GAO, the Army’s programmed force structure in 1997—before any cuts—left “substantial Guard structure in place that has no valid war-fighting mission.”102 The force structure primarily at issue consisted of the Guard’s combat divisions and brigades. Joint Staff–led wargames and other analyses also informed the 1997 QDR estimates of end-strength requirements and reached similar conclusions. However, ARNG participants in those wargames complained that they were terminated arbitrarily, before circumstances would have required the commitment of Guard divisions.103 Without an analytic justification, those combat units and the end strength associated with them were at risk.

To achieve even this level of DoD-mandated reduction and still maintain the ten Regular Army divisions deemed minimally necessary to meet priority operational requirements, the Army had to transfer additional support functions for formations that deployed later in sequence to the reserve components. Controversy erupted almost immediately. Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee observed that the Regular Army and the ARNG seemed to be “feuding,” a conclusion that Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John

M. Shalikashvili regretfully validated.\textsuperscript{104} The NGAUS wrote President Clinton, alleging that any reduction in the ARNG’s end strength would imperil the ability of the ARNG in the several states to perform state missions.\textsuperscript{105} This effort might be better understood as a rationale rather than a reason; an earlier RAND study had found that

Regarding the state mission, the National Guard structure is largely unused and though important during state emergency and disaster situations, it is generally not the primary response agency—state authorities in general view the Guard as a supplementary resource, provided largely by the federal government, that they can use for augmentation. Further, when states are overwhelmed by emergencies or disasters, the federal government provides an ample reserve of broad capabilities and resources that are available to assist the states.\textsuperscript{106}

The Guard’s lobbyists and supporters were trying to exert their strength to avert any diminution of its size or importance. The Guard’s anxiety presumably ran deeper than sheer numbers. The influential Senator John Warner of Virginia pressed the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff to assure him that the reduction in strength would not result in Guard forces being “relegated to tasks that do not measure up to the challenge of, say, our combat forces,” an assurance duly rendered by the service chiefs.\textsuperscript{107}

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Army leadership convened an offsite meeting in June 1997 to determine how the reserve component cuts were to be taken, by whom, and when. Participants agreed to reduce Regular Army end strength by 5,000 soldiers annually for FYs 1997–1999; reduce ARNG end strength by 5,000 soldiers annually in FYs 1998–1999 and 7,000 soldiers in FY 2000; reduce Reserve end strength by 3,000 soldiers in FY 2000; and reduce the reserve components by the remaining 25,000 soldiers via a process that includes Total Army Analysis for FY 2007. These near-term reductions fell far short of the target established by the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{108} The Army might have tried to impose the larger reductions recommended by the QDR. Without the support of the reserve components’ chiefs and stakeholder


\textsuperscript{105} U.S. Senate, 1997.

\textsuperscript{106} Roger Allen Brown, William Fedorochko, Jr., and John F. Schank, \textit{Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard}, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-557-OSD, 1995, p. xxi. This report also asserted that any large-scale, simultaneous state and federal demand for National Guard forces would be extremely unlikely, an assertion that proved regrettably mistaken during Hurricane Katrina.

\textsuperscript{107} U.S. Senate, 1997, p. 141.

groups, however, those reductions probably would not have withstood congressional scrutiny.

In the end, Congress resolved the issue by allowing the Army’s three components more end strength than the Army asked for. Congress reduced authorized end strength from 495,000 in FY 1998 to 484,800 for FY 1999. In reality, since the Army had programmed 488,000 for FY 1998, the reduction amounted to only 3,200 below authorized levels. Congress reduced the ARNG’s authorized end strength by 4,516 over the same period and increased Army Reserve end strength by 1,000.109 Congress thus averted “open warfare” between HQDA and the reserve associations by relaxing the resource constraints driving them toward conflict. Congress did not force the Army to reduce Regular Army force structure and end strength to the point at which it would have to rely on ARNG combat forces to meet the demands of strategy, however.

Continuing Public Support for International Engagement

Debate over the roles of the Army’s three components in national defense took place against a backdrop of continued public support for a high level of international commitment. This was not inevitable. The Soviet Union’s collapse could have undermined the principal rationale for worldwide U.S. commitments and a robust defense establishment. In 1992, former Reagan speechwriter and 1992 Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan echoed George McGovern’s 1972 plea to “Come home, America!” He was not alone. Cold Warriors such as former U.N. Ambassador Jeannie Kirkpatrick, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brezinski, and Foreign Affairs editor William Hyland felt that a period of retrenchment and reconsideration was at least worthy of consideration.110 Had America “come home,” leaving the rest of the world to solve its own problems, the ability to respond rapidly to crisis may not have mattered so much in the debate over component roles and resourcing.

Instead, America proved more inclined to enjoy its “unipolar moment” than it was to withdraw from the stage on which it had proved victorious. In October 1991, about two-thirds of those surveyed in a CBS/New York Times poll concurred with the assertion “Now that relations with the Soviet Union have improved, the United States should assert itself more than ever.”111 Other polls revealed similar results. In March 1993, 61 percent of those surveyed by Gallup thought that it was important for the United States “to be No. 1 in the world militarily.”112 Establishment opinion was, if anything, more unified. Both candidates in 1992 shared “an assertive, internationalist,

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free-trade-oriented and activist vision for America’s role in a post–Cold War era.”113 If anything, the Clinton administration pursued even more assertive U.S. military role, with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright championing frequent employment of the military to promote U.S. values and enforce the liberal international order.114 America’s military interventions increased over the 1990s, including a wider range of countries and causes than had hitherto been the case. At this pinnacle of American power, no major political force in the nation’s political life was clamoring to withdraw from the world.

Apparent fissures in this unity began to appear by the end of the 1990s, but those fissures seemed more to concern the ends of American engagement than its extent. Writing in *The National Interest*, journalist James Kitfield described Republican political leaders exhibiting “a disdain for the world beyond America’s borders that is increasingly echoed in Republican ranks.”115 Actually, the evidence Kitfield adduced in support of this conclusion was somewhat more ambiguous, with Republicans tending to object more to the novel peacekeeping operations to which American forces were being committed than to the forces themselves. Though Kitfield could point to dissension in Republican ranks over the precise role the U.S. should play in world affairs, he also acknowledged Republicans still generally supported U.S. dominance of international affairs and military preeminence to enforce that dominance. At the same time, an ascendant Republican majority was also concerned about balancing the budget and was willing to restrict military spending in order to do so, especially in the absence of a convincing threat to the United States itself. In the end, most Americans still supported an assertive foreign policy. A poll conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations found that

support for an active role by the United States in world affairs remains strong, with 61 percent of the public and 96 percent of leaders in favor. On the question of the country’s biggest foreign-policy problems, one of the responses chosen by the public, “staying out of the affairs of other countries,” is down 12 points, from 19 percent in 1994 to 7 percent today. The American public is also more confident in the role of the United States in the World. Fifty percent believe it now plays a more important and powerful role as a world leader than it did 10 years ago, and only 19 percent (down seven points) foresee a lesser role. More than three-quarters of the public (79 percent) and 71 percent of leaders believe the United States will play a greater role in the world 10 years from now.116

113 Ornstein, 1992, p. 11.
Stable or even increasing international commitments meant that DoD had to find forces to intervene across the globe, with little notice and for indefinite duration. At the same time, the desire for a peace dividend constrained the resources available to maintain those forces. As usual, the United States needed more military capacity than it cared to maintain, at least in expensive regular forces. This combination of ambition and frugality helped make increased reliance on the Army’s reserve components an attractive option.

Military Policy: An Issue Without Broad Public Salience
Disagreements between the Army’s three components about the nation’s future military policy were intense over the major defense reviews described in this chapter. In 1992, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Aspin noted that “The relationship between the Army National Guard and the active Army is simply not what it should be.” The relationship improved temporarily with the conclusion of the 1994 Offsite Agreement, but, as the preceding discussion of the 1997 QDR illustrates, the relationship had reverted to internecine conflict by the decade’s end. The title of an October 1997 article in the Washington Post illustrates the situation: “National Guard, Regular Army in a Tug of War; Partners Vying Bitterly for Dwindling Resources.” The article went on to cite Major General Edward Philbin, NGAUS’s executive director, who questioned Regular Army officials’ motives and probity:

The Army’s motives and statements are suspect. The general consensus in the Guard is that the Army wants to remove the Guard’s historical combat mission, fearful that someone in Congress will decide the Army’s own 10 divisions are too expensive and replaceable with Guard units.

As important as the issues were to the stakeholders in these three reviews, and for all the fierceness of lobbying efforts and public lobbying, the allocation of roles and resources among the Army’s three components was an issue that appeared to lack broader public salience. A ProQuest search of five major U.S. dailies for the term National Guard Association—connoting some potential relationship to an issue or controversy relating to national military policy—turned up 72 articles. Of these articles, only 14 actually concerned military policy, most of which were straight reporting about the competition for a share of dwindling defense resources. The New York Times published the only editorial expressing a policy preference, an article titled “Rethink

117 Aspin, 1992, p. 28.
120 The newspapers included the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Christian Science Monitor.
the Army National Guard.” The *Times* sided with the Regular Army, asking “The National Guard may or may not be a bargain, but what good is a bargain if the bargain is not really needed?” 121 This level of reporting—14 articles over ten years—and its thrust indicate that the future of the National Guard and of national military policy were of remote interest to the broader public.

**Consistent Roles and Declining Resource Levels**

The 1997 QDR ended with much the same result for the Total Force Policy as had the Base Force. Regular Army combat forces, augmented by Regular Army and reserve component support forces, would meet the initial operational demands of two major regional contingencies. Reserve components would provide additional combat and support forces as needed. The Army also maintained ARNG combat force structure for which there was at least a theoretical need as reinforcing or rotational forces in the second major contingency, especially if the conflict lasted longer than anticipated. Meanwhile, resources for all three components declined, though perhaps not as fast as originally anticipated. Certainly, Regular Army strength had declined rapidly, from around 727,500 in 1991 to around 480,000 by 1999, a level around which it would remain through 2001. 122 Reserve component end strength declined substantially as well, in spite of initial resistance by the reserve components and their congressional sponsors. In 1991, authorized reserve component end strength stood at around 776,000, with 457,300 authorized in the ARNG and 318,700 authorized to the Army Reserve. 123 At the time, Congress did not support the George H. W. Bush administration’s budget proposals to reduce Army reserve component end strength by over 146,000 soldiers over a two-year period. By the end of the decade, however, Congress was fighting to keep the Army reserve components’ end strengths at 357,000 and 209,000, respectively, for the ARNG and the Army Reserve, a reduction of around 210,000. 124 Over time, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the desire to reap a “peace dividend” from reduced defense spending, the promise of new technologies to change the character of war, and observations of the utilization of reserve component forces all contributed to the trend toward reductions in all Army components.


123 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1991, p. 201.

Resourcing the Reserve Components

The 1990s saw an increase in the importance of the reserve components relative to the Regular Army. Decreases in available resources affected both the Regular Army and the reserve component, striking the former more severely. The Regular Army experienced substantial declines in end strength, but also in operations and maintenance funding. Reserve component end strength declined as well, but not at the same rate as that of the Regular Army. In terms of operations and maintenance funding, the reserve components actually experienced increases in absolute terms, and especially when adjusted for declines in end strength. Though full-time support to the reserve components decreased slightly between 1992 and 2001, such support increased significantly as a percentage of end strength. Taking advantage of the Regular Army draw-down and dedicated funds from Congress, the reserve components actually increased their equipment fill; the ARNG increased the value of equipment on-hand in absolute terms over the period.

Manning the Reserve Components

As indicated in Figure 4.1, the Regular Army’s end strength dropped more sharply than those of its reserve components. Starting in the middle of the decade, reductions for all three components declined at about the same rate. The reserve components and their stakeholder organizations had resisted these reductions, but Congress eventually supported them.

Figure 4.1 demonstrates that Congress eventually approved reductions in reserve component manpower levels from their Cold War peaks to approximately the same level recommended by the major strategy reviews. In 1991, the Base Force had recommended that ARNG be reduced to 321,000 by 1997. Its actual 1997 strength—370,000—significantly exceeded that recommendation. The Bottom-Up Review recommended reductions to 367,000 by FY 1999, but the actual strength was 357,000, 10,000 fewer soldiers than recommended in 1993. The Army Reserve underwent similar reductions. The Base Force recommended a 1997 strength of 230,000, but the actual strength was 213,000. The Bottom-Up Review recommended reductions to 208,000 by 1999; its actual strength was 207,000. In response to the 1997 QDR, Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer had proposed reducing the reserve components by 45,000 from their combined FY 1996 strength of 596,000; by September 2001, the Army reserve components’ combined end strength was 555,000, about 41,000 fewer soldiers than in 1996.125

Congress—and the reserve components—may have reduced their opposition to reductions in reserve component force structure because it became difficult to find recruits. All three components experienced increasing difficulty recruiting in the late 1990s. The Regular Army failed to achieve its recruiting goals in FYs 1998 and 1999. The Army Reserve failed to attain its objectives in those two years as well. The National Guard, while it managed to meet its objectives for quantity, proved unable to meet Army and DoD goals of having 90 percent of recruits having a high school diploma in those two years. DoD as a whole was having difficulty recruiting in the face of a strong economy and declining propensity to enlist among America’s youth.

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Equipping the Reserve Components

The degree to which reserve component units had the equipment they needed to train and deploy is difficult to discern, but available equipment appeared increased over the decade. In inflation-adjusted terms, the value of ARNG equipment on hand appears to have increased by over $10 billion, from $40.6 billion in FY 1992 to $51.2 billion in FY 2000. This is especially significant because ARNG end strength decreased substantially over this period. In percentage terms, the Guard increased from having 75.4 percent to 86 percent of its wartime equipment requirement on hand. In percentage terms, the Army Reserve also increased from 65.5 percent of its wartime requirement on hand to having 84 percent of its equipment on hand. The dollar value of equipment on hand actually declined, from about $10.6 billion to $8.5 billion in FY 2015 dollars. Because the Army Reserve had shrunk significantly over that time, however, it was possible to substantially increase fill in percentage terms even while reducing the overall stock of inventory.

Training the Reserve Components

In contrast to Total Army manpower trends, in which all three components underwent substantial reductions, funding for training the reserve components increased relative to funding for the Regular Army. Training funding is broadly reflected in operations and maintenance appropriations (Figures 4.2a and 4.2b). Regular Army operations and maintenance appropriations declined between FY 1992 and FY 2001. Reserve component authorizations, however, increased initially, then decreased, then resumed their upward trend toward the end of the decade. When examined on a per capita basis—as indicated by Figure 4.2b—Regular Army operations and maintenance budgets remain more or less flat, but those of its reserve components show a steady increase.

Full-time support for reserve component readiness increased in relation to reserve component end strengths as well. While the combined strength of the Army’s reserve components declined by about 24 percent between FY 1992 and FY 2001, full-time support to the reserve components—including AGRs, military technicians, and Regular Army advisers under Title XI—decreased by only about 3 percent. As a percentage

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128 See Table 6-3, “Values of Major Equipment Items, Spare Parts and Other Items” in Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs: Fiscal Year 1992, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 1993, p. 99. See also Table 5-1, “Major Equipment On-Hand” in Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs: Fiscal Year 1999, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1999, p. 111. Inflation-adjusted totals are derived by dividing the contemporary reported value of equipment on hand by the deflator for procurement in that year found in Table 5-6: “Department of Defense Deflators—Budget Authority by Public Law Title” in Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2015. These measures are at best rough approximations of the degree to which the reserve components are equipped. The value of the wartime requirement varies significantly from year to year, while the value of equipment on hand can decline dramatically with no explanation. These variations are probably explained by changes in unit design.
of reserve component end strength, full-time support increased from about 9.9 percent of aggregate reserve component end strength to about 12.5 percent.129

Contingency Operations Create Opportunities to Employ Reserve Component Forces

The reality of contingency operations after the Persian Gulf War shaped the evolution of the Total Force policy in ways that the theoretical debates and formal analysis of several strategic reviews had not been able to do. These reviews—at least with regard to the Army—had attempted to define the type and quantity of Army forces needed to prevail in two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies. That analysis resulted in an Army shaped for conventional combat, especially its Regular com-

ponent. The Regular Army was optimized to provide just enough combat capability to achieve success, in sequence, in the aforementioned contingency operations. But in order to provide that capability under increasingly tight resource constraints, the Army shifted even more support capability to the reserve components. Many of these types of support forces, such as civil affairs, engineers, and sustainment, were predominately located in the Army’s reserve components and were in highest demand.

An Army shaped for conventional combat was not ideally suited to the peacekeeping operations to which Army forces were increasingly committed. Providing the necessary combat forces to peacekeeping operations meant that those forces were not available for major regional contingencies, thus degrading readiness, at least in theory. This circumstance led to the increasing use of Guard command-and-control and maneuver formations to meet operational demands in stable contingency operations. Shifting such missions to the Guard allowed the Army to preserve Regular Army formations’ availability for conventional conflict. One of the first such endeavors was when the headquarters of the 49th Armored Division of the Texas ARNG, augmented by Regular and Reserve personnel, deployed to Bosnia in 2000. Real-world operations were thus able to do two things that the series of strategic reviews had not: demonstrate
a real-world need for ARNG maneuver forces and integrate a fuller range of reserve component capabilities across a wider spectrum of military operations.

The frequency and scale of Army deployments to contingency operations increased rapidly through the 1990s. These smaller-scale contingencies began almost immediately in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, with deployments to support the no-fly zone over northern Iraq (Operation Provide Comfort) and in support of peace enforcement operations in Somalia in 1992. Initially, the deployments were relatively small in scale and were sourced mostly with Regular Army units. Over the course of the decade, however, contingency operations requirements increased until they reached their peak in FY 1999, when on any given day an average of 31,000 soldiers were deployed. This level of commitment was unprecedented in the post–Vietnam War era.

Army employment of reserve component forces was limited at first but then grew. Initially, the Army relied almost exclusively on Regular Army forces to deploy to Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and operations in Somalia. In fact, the Army deployed only one reserve component unit to Somalia, a composite truck company formed from several different units and staffed largely with volunteers. Otherwise, DoD proved reluctant to activate reservists to meet contingency demands until the mid-1990s, even though the bulk of relevant capabilities resided in the reserve components. In the longer term, however, this reticence appeared to be untenable. Reserve component forces were involuntarily activated in support of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994, and in 1995, Army officials anticipated that considerably more would be needed if the United States deployed large forces to Bosnia to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords. Reservists deployed as individuals, also. According to a 1998 GAO report, the Army Reserve supported operations in Bosnia with 1,613 individual augmentees. Such individuals might fill gaps in deployed units, augment contingency headquarters, or comprise ad hoc units formed specifically for the mission in question.


Partly in anticipation of the need to support relatively large-scale peacekeeping and stability operations, the Clinton administration requested an increase in its PSRC authority in 1994. At that time, the President could activate up to 200,000 service members for up to 90 days on his own authority. Congress could grant a further 90-day extension, for a total of 180 days. The administration sought an increase in the number of days allotted under the authority, to 180 days under the President’s inherent authority with the possibility of a 180-day extension. The original intention behind PSRC was to allow DoD to set things in motion at the same time it went to Congress for partial mobilization authority. To meet the increasing demands of peacekeeping operations, DoD needed access to support capabilities predominantly found in the reserve components. The Army had organized itself in this manner to maximize its combat capabilities for major contingency operations at the lowest cost. As a result, conducting sustained peacekeeping operations with only Regular Army combat and support forces would quickly exceed Army personnel tempo goals. DoD thus sought expanded authorities to gain access to those reserve component capabilities for longer periods of time. In a report titled *Accessibility of Reserve Component Forces*, DoD committed to activating fewer than 25,000 reserve component service members for peacekeeping operations at any given time. DoD still reserved the right to exercise the authority to activate the full 200,000 in the event of a major contingency operation.\(^{134}\)

Peacekeeping operations were not the only reason for the administration to seek to expand its PSRC authority. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Deborah Lee also cited the experience of the roundout brigades during Desert Storm in her testimony to the House Armed Services Committee in support of this change.\(^{135}\) In 1990, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had cited the 90-day limitation as part of the basis for his decision not to activate the roundout brigades. Cheney had reasoned that the roundout brigades would consume a substantial portion of the 90 days allowed under the authority simply to mobilize and complete predeployment training. Yet in spite of the importance of expanding PSRC authority to enable more effective response to major contingency operations, the issue immediately facing the Clinton administration was how to provide forces for peacekeeping operations that seemed to loom on the horizon.

Peacekeeping operations shaped the Total Force Policy in this period indirectly, as well. Stakeholders believed that participation in peacekeeping operations degraded the readiness of Regular Army combat forces in a number of ways. At a 1998 hearing on military readiness, Representative Joel Heffley observed that

From the perspectives of each of the subcommittees represented here, readiness is fraying . . . Chairman Bateman and the Subcommittee on Military Readiness have focused intently on the erosion of unit readiness and the stress imposed by trying to do more and more with less and less.\textsuperscript{136}

Beyond this general perception of fraying, the GAO reported that frequent short-term deployments increased wear and tear on equipment, increased stress on soldiers and families, and reduced opportunities to train in more-conventional combat operations. As the quote from Heffley reflected, supported by similar comments from Representative Steve Buyer, chairman of the Military Personnel Subcommittee, and Representative Ike Skelton, many in Congress believed that peacekeeping operations exacerbated existing readiness deficiencies caused by a mismatch between strategy and resources. That is, stakeholders felt that the Army—along with the rest of DoD—had undergone reductions in force structure and end strength that made it difficult to conduct large-scale, long-term peacekeeping operations and still remain prepared for short-notice deployment to major regional contingencies. Most importantly, units deployed to peacekeeping operations were not immediately available for the major regional contingencies for which active component combat force structure had been so carefully tailored. The state of those divisions and their readiness for “real” war was a major concern for Congress and DoD from the mid-1990s through the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{137}

Fraying readiness may have been an inevitable consequence of the nature of stability operations and the Army’s reduced size. In a 1995 article for Parameters, historian James T. Quinlivan observed that successful stability operations seemed to require a ratio of forces to population of 10 soldiers to 1,000 residents, at least for the type of operations U.S. forces were conducting in the Balkans. At that ratio, a stability operation in a country of 1 million citizens could require all the U.S. Army’s contemporary infantry units over the span of two years. Quinlivan also noted that stability operations could extend for prolonged periods of time. He concluded that participation in such operations might result in soldiers facing “repeated deployments to combat-like tours for what appear to be less-than-vital national interests.”\textsuperscript{138}

Given such concerns, the Army started to turn to ARNG division headquarters and other forces to control operations in Bosnia and Kosovo toward the end of the


decade. In 2000, the 49th Armored Division headquarters assumed responsibility for the command and control of operations in Bosnia. At the time, the Army planned to alternate Regular Army and ARNG divisions in that role, supported to some degree by ARNG combat brigades. The Army was also considering using those ARNG division headquarters to manage operations in Kosovo. In response to an inquiry from Senator James Inhofe, then the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Military Readiness, the GAO examined this initiative. The GAO concluded that this initiative might not actually improve readiness, because preparing ARNG divisions for service commanded a considerable amount of both Regular Army and ARNG attention and resources. Its report recommended that the Army study the results of the initial deployment further before committing to it fully.

The reserve components came to welcome these requirements. The ARNG’s director, Major General William A. Navas, Jr., considered this as an opportunity to make the Guard relevant. In his oral history, he recounts a story about providing Guard capabilities in support of peacekeeping operations:

I recall vividly that day when my staff came in and said the Army wants to take the FDC and the Target Acquisitions Battery from the 28th Division, but if we send these guys up to Bosnia for three months or four months the readiness of the division is going to go to hell. I said, “Well where is the 28th Division going to go in the next three years?” So we did and we have been doing that.

Navas came to view National Guard organizational structure not as sacrosanct and indivisible, “but as a repository of capabilities that could be used.”

The demands of enduring peacekeeping operations had thus done something that nearly a decade of strategic analysis had not been able to achieve: create low-risk opportunities for increased employment of reserve component combat forces. In the wake of the Cold War’s end, DoD had pared regular Army divisions and their subordinate combat forces to the minimum necessary to wage two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies. Force-sizing analyses, however, had not accounted for peacekeeping operations, considering them to be “lesser included” contingencies that could be supported with the same force structure intended to conduct the major regional wars. Yet Regular forces could not do two things at once, and they required time in between operations to rest, reset, and retrain. If DoD needed to preserve its combat


forces for “real” wars, then it needed to find some other way to meet demands. Employing ARNG forces seemed to offer a plausible vehicle for meeting operational commitment while preserving Regular Army combat forces for higher-priority missions.

Conclusion

By the summer of 2001, the Total Force Policy had evolved to accommodate a new de facto division of roles. DoD would retain enough Regular Army combat forces to meet the most urgent strategic requirements, supported by Regular Army and reserve component support forces. Combat and support forces from all components would be included in the pool for lower-risk, lower-priority missions—such as peacekeeping operations in the Balkans—to leave Regular Army combat forces available for higher-priority missions.

This de facto policy did not result entirely from DoD’s standard business processes. The series of wargames and analyses that supported the Base Force, the Bottom-Up Review, and the 1997 QDR focused on the forces needed to meet the requirements of two near-simultaneous major theater wars. The Base Force established a requirement for 12 active Army divisions. The Bottom-Up Review reduced that floor to ten by relaxing some assumptions about the simultaneity of the two scenarios of major contingency operations that formed the basis for DoD force structure. The resulting recommendations also aimed to reduce ARNG combat force structure and reserve component end strength. Throughout the 1990s, however, Congress steadfastly refused to significantly reduce the number of ARNG combat forces, especially ARNG divisions. In the end, Congress supported reductions across the Army, with increased investments in reserve component oversight, equipping, and training. On the other hand, these analyses most certainly were essential in determining the number of Regular Army divisions and the amount of support forces maintained within the Army inventory.

Nor did the policy result primarily from political considerations. Reserve component associations had argued strenuously for a return to America’s “traditional” military policy. By this they meant a small regular Army for immediate response, with the bulk of the nation’s ground capability being provided by the reserve components. Needless to say, the reserve components lobbied hard against any reductions in force structure, end strength, and other resources. They established the Senate National Guard Caucus and courted congressional leaders including Nunn, Aspin, and Montgomery, among many others. As indicated by the tenor of congressional hearings, a significant number of representatives and senators responded by supporting the reserve components in that position. Influential lawmakers such as Nunn and Montgomery argued for even greater reliance on the reserve components after the threat of imminent conflict with the erstwhile Soviet Union had receded, in some cases citing America’s “traditional” military policy. Yet for all that, neither the reserve component associa-
tions nor their leaders could command the nation’s attention on military policy in the same way that Ellard Walsh and Milton Reckord had been able to do in previous generations. It would be unfair to attribute this loss of salience to NGAUS leaders. More likely, the precise role of the reserve components in national defense was merely one issue among many in the vast and complex arena of defense policy. This was true even for the Guard itself, as NGAUS’s plethora of lobbying priorities illustrates. Moreover, the Guard and its advocates were trying to override the professional judgment of the most respected officials and the most respected institution in American society within their professional domain. Whether swayed by their arguments—unlikely given the tenor of remarks in committee reports on the different NDAAs—or simply cognizant of the inherent risk of overriding generals such as Powell, Congress declined to do so.

Congress authorized and appropriated the resources needed to secure the nation and its interests within the limitations of a diminishing defense budget. The size of the Army’s components was reduced, but Congress generally declined to support even deeper cuts, as it continued to prod the Army to find ways to utilize better its reserve components. In spite of the fact that Congress usually resisted any reductions in the reserve components when DoD first proposed those reductions, eventually Congress did acquiesce in substantial drawdowns—more than 200,000 soldiers—in the two reserve components.

In retrospect, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the decision not to deploy the three roundout brigades to the Persian Gulf War to the evolution of military policy in the 1990s. Before and even after the war, congressional pressure to increase employment of the reserve components was high. It formed the centerpiece of strategies advanced by the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Had the brigades deployed and operated without major incident, such congressional pressure might well have proved irresistible. In the absence of an actual deployment, Congress proved unwilling or unable to override the professional judgment of senior Regular Army officers and the analytic community, no matter how vociferously Guard proponents contested their assessments. Thus, the Persian Gulf War left the Regular Army with the only proven combat maneuver capability in the Army’s three components.

Rather, the political process adapted the Total Force Policy to a new and more complex strategic environment in the 1990s. Resource constraints and continued public support for an assertive American foreign policy may have been the two most salient aspects of that environment. While the Soviet Union’s fall made reductions inevitable, the perceived need to dominate the international environment also implied acceptance of the need to maintain a capable, responsive Army. The debate thus concerned just how much the reserve components could actually contribute, and how big the Regular Army had to be to support expansive U.S. policy goals. The Army fought to maintain just enough Regular Army combat and support forces to successfully execute two near-simultaneous major regional contingency operations. In an attempt to preserve its
The Army continued to transfer support functions to the reserve components, just as it had since the initiation of the Total Force Policy. DoD and the Army resisted pressure to substitute ARNG combat forces for Regular Army units to meet the critical demands of strategy—represented in the 1990s by the two-major-regional-contingency force-sizing construct—just as they had since the initiation of the Total Force Policy. Under the pressure of indefinite peace operations, however, the Army relied more heavily on a wider range of reserve component capabilities in both defense planning and in the actual conduct of operations. Integrating more ARNG and Army Reserve units and individuals into ongoing operations would allow Regular Army forces to focus on higher-priority missions. The framework that had evolved in the 1990s would provide the basis for unprecedented employment of the reserve components after September 11, 2001.
CHAPTER FIVE

Increasing the Army’s Operational Depth, 2002–2015

The terrorist attacks of September 11 posed an unprecedented challenge for U.S. strategy. The United States experienced the most substantial attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor. The attack was even more significant because it was conducted by a nonstate actor. U.S. strategy struggled to come to grips with the sudden new realities of the situation. How DoD would adapt its institutions, strategy, and capabilities to this new context was far from clear. Certainly, no one anticipated that it would have a major impact on the employment of the Army’s three components to fulfill global operational demands for ground forces.

Employment of the reserve components initially followed familiar patterns established over the course of the 1990s. DoD and state governors mobilized thousands of National Guardsmen and Army Reservists to secure critical infrastructure and reassure a jittery population. Reserve component soldiers were also mobilized to provide support capabilities to contingency operations, first in Afghanistan and then later for the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. ARNG combat forces also assumed responsibility for conducting stability operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, freeing Regular Army units for operations elsewhere. Beginning in the spring of 2004, ARNG combat forces were deployed to conduct stability operations in Iraq. Although the situation in Iraq had begun to deteriorate over the summer of 2003, the emerging insurgency still seemed well within the capabilities of those forces. Even then, this employment of ARNG forces was mostly seen as a stopgap measure to allow Regular Army maneuver brigades to convert to a new modular design, a measure seen at the time as essential in posturing the Army for what was assumed to be an “era of persistent conflict.”

As the insurgency metastasized, however, it became apparent that DoD and the Army would need to make heavy and recurrent use of the reserve component combat and support forces to meet operational demands. As an operational reserve, reserve components were assumed to be somewhat less available than Regular Army forces to

perform the same range of missions, under essentially the same set of conditions. In terms of policy, the major difference between the components was that Regular Army forces were considered to be available at a significantly higher rate than their reserve component counterparts. Throughout much of the period between 2003 and 2011, Regular Army units deployed every other year, while reserve component units tended to deploy somewhere between once every four to five years. The Army provided units from all components to fill operational demands. Field commanders typically sought to align allocated forces in a manner that accomplished the mission while minimizing risk. When the situation permitted, ARNG combat forces were employed in lower-risk missions, primarily as security forces. With this pattern of heavy and recurring employment of the reserve components to meet ongoing operational requirements as background, in 2002 Congress amended Title 10 of the U.S. Code to permit service secretaries to mobilize reservists involuntarily not just for crises, but for routine missions as well. Many key stakeholders came to refer to this evolution as a “transformation” to an “operational reserve.”

The struggle over the Army’s 2014 Aviation Restructuring Initiation (ARI) illustrated the residual tensions between the Regular Army and the ARNG. Its resolution also further shaped the components’ roles. The Army developed the ARI as part of its efforts to meet ongoing and potential operational demands even as external pressures reduced available resources. There were a number of different components to the ARI, but its most controversial aspect was a plan to consolidate all of the Army’s attack heli-

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2 U.S. Code, Title 32, National Guard, Section 102, General Policy, 2012.

3 See, for example, Lieutenant General Stephen Blum’s speech before the National Governors’ Association on April 15, 2004 (George Cahlink, “Changing of the Guard,” Government Executive, April 15, 2004), or his testimony before a house hearing on “Transforming the National Guard (U.S. House of Representatives, Transforming the National Guard: Resourcing for Readiness: Hearing Before the Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-188, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 29, 2004c, p. 79). Several other stakeholders during that hearing used the same term. The use of the term operational reserve was not limited to advocates for the reserve components. Successive Army Chiefs of Staff also used the term. General Peter J. Schoomaker promised that the ARNG would be “properly equipped to perform effectively as the Army’s operational reserve” (see U.S. Senate, Department of Defense Appropriation, Fiscal Year 2007: Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Hrg. 109-301, Pt. 2, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 28, 2006, p. 175). General George W. Casey, Jr., used the term frequently. See, for example, his remarks at LTG Ron Helmly’s requirement or his speech to the Atlantic Council (George W., Casey, Jr., “Speech to the Atlantic Council,” May 28, 2009; George W., Casey, Jr., “Remarks at the Retirement Ceremony of Lieutenant General Ron Helmly,” September 19, 2008). In 2014, General Raymond Odierno testified before Congress that “My goal remains to sustain the National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve as an operational reserve” (Lisa Ferdinando, “Odierno: Army Faces ‘Tough’ Choices in Uncertain Fiscal Times,” ARNEWS, April 8, 2014). The term operational reserve is somewhat problematic, however. Nonetheless, it was the term of art in common usage during the period covered in this chapter. The Reserve Forces Policy Board found in 2013 that “senior defense officials use the phrase Operational Reserve inconsistently,” which has the potential to create “confusion within the Department, in communications to Congress, and with the Public.” For the Reserve Forces Policy Board’s recommended definition, see Arnold L. Punaro, Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board on the ‘Operational Reserve’ and Inclusion of the Reserve Components in Key Department of Defense (DoD) Processes, Washington, D.C.: Reserve Forces Policy Board, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, January 14, 2013.
copters in the Regular Army. The ARI’s architects viewed it as the inescapable solution to the problem of meeting potential operational demands with limited fiscal resources. The Guard—and its allies in Congress—viewed it as the first step in depriving it of its role as the Army’s “combat reserve.” The controversy’s resolution in 2016 further reified the roles of the Army’s different components as they had evolved over the past decade and a half. The Regular Army provided combat forces for the most-demanding missions; the ARNG provided combat forces for lower-risk, lower-priority missions; and the Army relied on both reserve components to provide the bulk of support forces needed. The struggle over the ARI also provides unique insights into the perspectives of key stakeholders on all sides.

The Army’s heavy reliance on its reserve components evolved because the services, in particular the Army, had little other choice. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simply required more capacity than the Regular Army could provide. In theory, DoD could have chosen to rely principally on expanding the Regular Army rapidly, as it had to meet the demands of the Vietnam War. In the conflict’s early days, DoD and Army leaders initially resisted enlarging the Regular Army. They did not anticipate the demands that overseas contingency operations would pose. Even if they had decided to enlarge the Regular Army, however, it is not clear that they could have done so under the conditions that obtained between 2004 and 2007, when the need for more manpower became painfully apparent. The economy was relatively strong, the wars were unpopular, and young Americans’ propensity to volunteer for service was declining. Substantial increases in recruiting incentives barely sufficed to maintain Army end strength in the period before the 2008 financial collapse, and only through the expedient of relaxing recruiting standards. On the other hand, even more substantial increases in recruiting and retention incentives might have enabled the Regular Army to expand substantially during that period. The crisis in Iraq had passed by the time the Army was able to assimilate the mass of recruits incentivized to enlist by the Great Recession.

Transformation and the Total Army at the End of 2001

To assess the degree to which the Total Force Policy changed with respect to the Army from 2002 through 2015, it would be useful to understand where it stood at the beginning of this period. While the Army had just started to increase its reliance on reserve component units to conduct peacekeeping and stability operations, its vision for the future implied reducing its reliance on reserve component forces for major operations. In the late spring of 1999, incoming Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki announced a vision for “Transformation” that placed a premium on rapid responsiveness, speed of deployment, and high levels of training and combat proficiency. Shinseki established a goal of being able to deploy five divisions within 30 days, much
faster than most reserve component units could mobilize and prepare for deployment. Though the Army made every effort to make the reserve components full partners in its Transformation, its general thrust implied a long-term decline in the utility of reserve component forces, especially combat forces.

The Army’s Transformation was intended as a coherent response to the radical changes in the security environment since the Soviet Union’s collapse. According to the Army, the United States faced a diverse array of challenges in a wide range of places. Instead of being able to focus on one threat—the Soviet Union—the Army had to be able to respond virtually anywhere, across the entire “spectrum of conflict” portrayed in Figure 5.1, from support to civil authorities all the way up to, theoretically, global nuclear war. At the time, this spectrum of conflict mostly constituted an acknowledgement that stability operations were both a legitimate and an inevitable use of Army forces. As indicated by Figure 5.1, the Army did acknowledge the problems of counterinsurgency that would consume so much of its efforts and capacity from September 11, 2001, forward as a theoretical possibility. But as Figure 5.1 also indicates, it was just one among many. Most of the rhetoric around Transformation focused on the need to deploy rapidly, with overwhelming force, to defeat regional opponents like

\[\text{Figure 5.1}\]
\text{The Army’s 2001 Conception of the Spectrum of Conflict}

\[\text{SOURCE: U.S. Army, 2000.}\]
Increasing the Army’s Operational Depth, 2002–2015

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Army plans in the early 2000s did not anticipate that long-term, large-scale counterinsurgency would emerge as the Army’s dominant challenge throughout the rest of the decade.

To meet these challenges, Shinseki envisioned rapid transition to an “Objective Force.” Responsiveness and deployability were key issues. Responsiveness implied a need to be able to generate appropriate capabilities, capable of immediate and effective operations. By deployability, General Shinseki meant the ability to arrive rapidly in a theater of operations to either achieve a fait accompli or prevent an adversary from doing so. Key officials considered the Army’s historically ponderous deployments to be a significant source of strategic risk. For example, Shinseki and other Army officials frequently cited the gap in time between Iraq’s initial invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the arrival of U.S. armored forces capable of defending against a renewed attack. The labored deployment of Task Force Hawk, the Army’s erstwhile contribution to Operation Allied Force, the war over Kosovo, was also an issue of which policymakers remained keenly aware. Shinseki envisioned forces light enough to arrive rapidly but powerful enough to defeat substantial armored forces, which most potential aggressors then possessed. Information technology seemed to provide an opportunity to reduce the mass of the force enough to allow rapid deployment while retaining sufficient lethality to defeat armored forces. Ubiquitous sensors—mounted on satellites, drones, and other reconnaissance platforms—would allow U.S. commanders to locate enemy forces more rapidly and precisely. A pervasive network would disseminate that information broadly to U.S. forces, allowing them to engage enemy forces at greater ranges using a wider variety of technologically advanced weapon systems. Being able to see first, and therefore strike first, the Army could reduce the risk of operational surprise and thus deploy fewer forces. The Army had been pursuing this concept since the early 1990s, when Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan had initiated the Force XXI initiative. These capabilities were to be embodied in the Future Combat Systems program, a “system of systems” that was supposed to achieve lethality and survivability through the integrated effects of networked systems and long-range fires. In combination, responsiveness and deployability required a high level of sophistication on the part of combat forces, and thus high levels of training.

In short, the Army’s version of “Transformation” tended to confirm and accentuate the division of responsibilities that emerged from the 1990s. An Army white paper on Transformation called for “higher levels of integration between the active and reserve components to the point of truly being The Army, not three separate

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components.”⁶ A couple of sentences later, however, that same white paper stated “The distribution of Objective Force capabilities between the active and reserve components must accommodate requirements for immediate strategic responsiveness.” That sentence clearly envisioned placing the most urgently needed capabilities in the force available for immediate employment, the Regular Army. The Army took rhetorical pains to include the reserve components in its Transformation. Reserve component forces would continue to provide additional forces for campaigns that happened to drag on.⁷ We should remember this was the same rationale that the GAO had found unpersuasive in the 1990s when it observed that much of the ARNG’s combat structure had “no valid war-fighting mission.”⁸ The Army nonetheless allocated resources toward integrating the reserve components into Transformation. The ARNG was to receive one of the six Stryker brigade combat teams originally planned and was included in fielding plans for the Future Combat Systems program.⁹

The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars’ Impact on the Army’s Division of Labor

The Army’s employment of its reserve components as an “operational force” represented a major evolution in American military policy.¹⁰ In World Wars I and II, the nation fully mobilized the reserve components “for the duration.” For the Korean conflict, the Army had mobilized portions of the reserve components, also for a specific period of time. During Vietnam, the reserves had hardly been mobilized at all, President Johnson having chosen instead to wage the war almost entirely with active component forces. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the Army mobilized reserve component forces on a recurring basis, a situation that the existing laws governing mobilization almost certainly had not anticipated and to which those laws were not particularly well suited. To some extent, this extensive reliance on the reserve components represented a policy choice and not a simple inevitability. After the 9/11 attacks, Congress had repeatedly pressured DoD to enlarge the services, the Army in particular. Instead, DoD relied more heavily on the reserve components to provide the

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manpower and capabilities needed to conduct operations overseas in Iraq and Afghani-
stan. In part, this resulted from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s reluctance to
increase the Army’s size and take on the long-term fiscal liabilities it would entail. Yet
the element of necessity was probably more important than Rumsfeld’s preferences.
Even if Rumsfeld had been amenable, expanding the Regular Army might well have
been extraordinarily difficult. Until the 2008 financial crisis, the Army struggled to
meet its recruiting targets in the face of a strong economy and an unpopular war.

Continuity After September 11
The initial response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks conformed to traditional patterns of
reserve component employment. In the immediate aftermath, thousands of National
Guardsmen and Army Reservists were mobilized under federal and state control under
the auspices of Operation Noble Eagle. They reinforced existing security at U.S. mili-
tary bases and patrolled U.S. airports, as well as other government facilities and any-
where else that might constitute a terrorist target. Over the course of FY 2002, the
National Guard contributed more than 10,000 soldiers to such missions. The Guard
and Reserve also provided support and security forces in support of Operation Endur-
ing Freedom, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that began in 2001. At the time, these
were seen as one-time occurrences in the face of a crisis situation.

After the 9/11 attacks, many in Congress wanted to expand the size of the Regular
Army. Representative John McHugh—chairman of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee’s Military Personnel Subcommittee—opened hearings by asking whether the
armed services were large enough for their anticipated missions. McHugh was already
concerned because of the stress the services—the Army in particular—experienced
during the 1990s. He and other committee members were also concerned that the
Army was already mobilizing reserve component soldiers too frequently and for too
long. Under Secretary of Defense David S. C. Chu acknowledged the subcommittee’s
concerns. He noted, however, that the armed services were already struggling to recruit
and retain enough service members to maintain their current strength. Chu expressed
Secretary Rumsfeld’s reluctance to expand the Army until other options had been
exhausted. For the time being, DoD was content to rely on congressional relaxation of
strict end-strength limits. Congress had authorized DoD to exceed end-strength tar-

gets by up to 2 percent—just short of 10,000 soldiers—without congressional approval. McHugh did not appear to find Chu’s answer satisfying, however, responding that

I will speak as an individual Member. And, I feel similarly to other Members, like Congressman Ike Skelton, the Ranking Member on the full Committee, that end strength is severely restricted to the point that I think it jeopardizes peoples’ lives and it jeopardizes the people of all the services to do what we are asking them to do.\(^\text{12}\)

McHugh cited Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki’s rough estimate of a potential need for a 40,000 increase approvingly. But though Chu’s answer left McHugh and the subcommittee he headed far from satisfied, they did not overrule DoD on the question of end strength. DoD requested—and Congress authorized—Regular Army end strength for FY 2003 of 480,000, the same level authorized for FY 2002.\(^\text{13}\) This would not be the last time the issue emerged, however.

**The Impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom**
The U.S. invasion of Iraq that created conditions for the employment of the Army’s reserve components as an “operational force.” Plans for the original invasion followed the template established for Desert Storm, albeit at a much-reduced scale. The Army mobilized reserve component support forces for what DoD and U.S. Central Command authorities thought would be a short, sharp campaign. But as the Iraqi insurgency began to take hold, it became clear that the Regular Army simply did not have the capacity to secure Iraq by itself. The Army turned to its reserve components, initially as a stop-gap measure pending reorganization of the Regular Army. In the process of responding to the demand for forces to conduct operations in Iraq, DoD developed and institutionalized the concepts and processes supporting its management of its reserve components as an “operational force,” as Department of Defense Directive 1200.17 put it.

For the invasion itself, of course, the Army mobilized thousands of reserve component soldiers, mostly in support units, much as it had for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Army experienced no public pressure to employ ARNG combat forces like that exerted on behalf of the roundout brigades in 1990 for Opera-


tions Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As with the Desert Storm historical precedent, DoD officials envisioned a hasty demobilization of those forces shortly following what was assumed would be a successful invasion. As too many other sources to list have recounted, however, DoD and its subordinate elements conducted little serious planning for the long-term occupation of Iraq, as DoD officials had envisioned a rapid transfer of authority to an indigenous Iraqi government and a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces. Testifying in 2005, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard Cody told the House Armed Services Committee that U.S. Central Command and Army planners had anticipated a reduction from 16 maneuver brigades in June of 2003 to four or five by the middle of 2004.

Needless to say, reserve component forces could play little role in a plan for the occupation of Iraq that did not exist. Even in the immediate aftermath of the successful invasion of Iraq, nothing arose to alter the prevailing template for employment of the reserve components.

The situation in Iraq began to deteriorate almost immediately, however. By the middle of July 2003, General John Abizaid—the newly appointed commander of U.S. Central Command—acknowledged that the United States had become embroiled in “a classical guerilla type campaign.” By September 2003, it became clear that commanders in Iraq would need considerably more U.S. forces and for a longer period than they had originally estimated. To meet the short-term demand for forces, the Army had to turn to the reserve components for both support and combat forces. The Army ordered 20,000 Army Reservists and National Guardsmen to Iraq, where, along with Regular Army forces, they would serve for one year under the Army’s new deployment policy. The Army also mobilized three National Guard combat brigades for the next rotation to Iraq, as well as the full range of support forces. Those brigades underwent

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16 Quoted in Wright and Reese, 2008, p. 32.

rigorous postmobilization training to prepare them for their expected missions, including rotations at the NTC or the Joint Readiness Training Center.\textsuperscript{18}

The reserve components, along with the Regular Army, also began providing “in-lieu-of” units. These were units that would perform a function in theater different from the one for which they had originally been organized and trained. For example, by late 2003, the Army had committed nearly all of its active and reserve component military police units. Still more were needed to guard the burgeoning population of detainees and to provide security for fixed sites and lines of communication. To meet these demands, approximately 3,700 ARNG combat and support soldiers underwent training in selected military police skills and collective tasks before deploying to Iraq.\textsuperscript{19}

The reserve components continued to provide in-lieu-of units in this manner throughout the remainder of the conflicts.

Congress had already been concerned that the increasing utilization of the reserve components was causing them undue strain. In spring hearings on the FY 2003 NDAA—well before the invasion of Iraq—McHugh was already asking, “Are we mobilizing Reservists too frequently and for nonessential purposes?”\textsuperscript{20} At subsequent hearings on ongoing operations in Iraq in September 2003, Senator John McCain expressed his concern about the deployments, quoting a senior ARNG official who stated that “Our people don’t sign up to be full-time soldiers. If they did, they would join the regular Army.”\textsuperscript{21} Senator Ben Nelson of Florida raised questions about equity and the one-year length of deployments at that hearing, as well.\textsuperscript{22} At the time, these deployments seemed to exceed the normal parameters for employment of the reserve components. Under the reigning paradigm, reserve component forces would surge for the crisis—in this case, the original invasion of Iraq—after which responsibility for providing forces would revert to the Regular Army. By fall 2003, however, the crisis had already extended beyond these initial expectations.

Over the longer term, the Army planned to reduce its reliance on the reserve components by restructuring to expand operational capacity. In July 2003, Rumsfeld sent a memorandum to the service secretaries and chiefs of staff directing them to “Structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve” as a “matter of the utmost urgency.”\textsuperscript{23} In response to such pressure and his own analysis of the broader strategic and operational environment,


\textsuperscript{19} Wright and Reese, 2008, pp. 262–263. See also U.S. House of Representatives, 2004c, pp. 62, 270–271.

\textsuperscript{20} U.S. House of Representatives, 2002a, pp. 1–2.

\textsuperscript{21} U.S. Senate, 2003 p. 25.

\textsuperscript{22} U.S. Senate, 2003 pp. 82, 102–104.

incoming Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker planned to add ten more maneuver brigades to the Regular Army through modular transformation. Schoomaker also planned to “rebalance” the force by reducing the number of units—such as field artillery and air defense—not needed in the current operational environment and increasing the number of units—such as military police and civil affairs—that were in high demand. To accommodate the friction of transition, the Army requested a temporary end-strength increase and planned to rely more heavily on the ARNG and Army Reserve until this modular transformation was accomplished. In fall 2003, Army leaders believed that these changes would suffice to enable them to meet anticipated operational demand with predominantly regular forces.²⁴

At the time—fall 2003—the estimate that violence would decline and capacity would increase probably seemed reasonable. As the Army’s official history of the period puts it,

as the fall of 2003 began the Coalition appeared to be making limited progress across its political, military, and economic lines of operations. The CPA [Coalition Provincial Authority] and the Coalition had begun rebuilding Iraq’s decrepit infrastructure, establishing limited local governments, and training the first Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force]-7 had also made progress in its military operations, directing its units to shift from large-scale offensive operations that were common in some AORs to a broader effort that mixed smaller, more focused attacks on the insurgent threat with operations designed to win support from the populace.²⁵

Insurgent attacks were on the rise, but as Figure 5.2 shows, they still had a considerable way to go before reaching the levels they would in 2005–2007. Casualties, however, were starting to mount, as indicated by Figure 5.3. In short, when Army officials were making their decisions about which forces to send to Iraq, the risk probably seemed relatively low, and options were limited.

New Reserve Component Roles and Missions
As Figures 5.2 and 5.3 indicate, however, the situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate. Insurgent attacks and Army casualties increased, including Guardsmen and Reservists. Reserve component deployments increased. As of 2010, 298,728 Army National Guardsmen and 173,825 Army Reservists had deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.²⁶

²⁵ Wright and Reese, 2008, p. 33.
²⁶ See Table 3.1, “Service Members Deployed, by Branch of Service and Component as of 2010,” in Committee on the Assessment of Readjustment Needs of Military Personnel, Veterans, and Their Families, Board on the Health of Select Populations, Returning Home from Iraq and Afghanistan: Assessment of Readjustment Needs of
quickly became apparent that neither overall levels of U.S. commitment nor reserve component mobilization levels were going to decline anytime soon. Figures 5.4a and 5.4b depict reserve and active component deployments from September 2001 to June 2009. While the Army’s reserve components seldom approached the Regular Army’s level of deployment, their contributions were nonetheless significant throughout the period. Between September 2001 and December 2008, the Army Reserve and ARNG provided about 35 percent of the soldiers deployed to Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.27 Note that the peak of reserve component deployments occurs in early 2005. The increasing employment of reserve component soldiers in active combat operations marked a change from over half a century of practice since the Korean War. And, while the Korean War itself provided ample precedent for employing the

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reserve components extensively in a war that was not going well, the fact that the war was going badly did not increase congressional enthusiasm for this new policy. Clearly, DoD’s de facto policy for employing the reserve components had changed—and not in a fashion that stakeholders welcomed. As a backdrop to his introductory remarks to a hearing on reserve component issues, McHugh referred to a photograph of two reservists in a cargo truck on which was written “One weekend a month, my ass.”

In contrast to reserve component employment in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Army’s reserve components provided both combat and support forces in the course of this mobilization. Obviously, the Army continued to employ reserve component support forces almost interchangeably with Regular forces. That was less true of combat forces. Of course, that the Army was employing Guard combat brigades in a combat role was relatively new. The Army had not done so since the Korean War, over 50 years previous, and had pointedly declined to do so during Operation Desert

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Figure 5.4a

Figure 5.4b

SOURCE: Bonds et al., 2010.
RAND RR19954-5-4a
Storm.\textsuperscript{29} Most of the combat forces were oriented on missions with lower complexity, predominantly providing security to fixed sites and lines of communication in Iraq and Afghanistan. A RAND Corporation study that analyzed the employment of 45 ARNG combat brigades found that 27 had been used to provide security forces.\textsuperscript{30} As we have noted already, a number of reserve component formations were also repurposed to serve as security forces. Several ARNG combat brigades also deployed primarily to train, advise and assist partner forces, mostly as Task Force Phoenix. Task Force Phoenix was responsible both for managing institutional training for the Afghan National Army and providing combat advisers to field units.\textsuperscript{31}

Nine of those ARNG combat brigades were employed in counterinsurgency missions. The level of risk to which these brigades were exposed varied substantially depending on the year in which they were deployed and the area of operations to which they deployed. The risk could be quite high, however. For example, the 2nd Brigade, 28th Division, of the Pennsylvania ARNG deployed to Ramadi in the middle of the Sunni Triangle, from July 2005 to June 2006. Over the course of its deployment, it suffered 81 fatalities.\textsuperscript{32} For the first time since the establishment of the 1973 Total Force Policy, Guard units were engaged in serious fighting.

The Army also mobilized a considerable number of reservists as individuals, often as volunteers. Many Army Reserve soldiers and National Guardsmen were cross-leveled, or transferred from their unit of assignment to other deploying units that were higher priority.\textsuperscript{33} The Army Reserve provided individual augmentees to fill critical vacancies in deploying Regular Army or Army Reserve units.\textsuperscript{34} In addition, provisions of Title 10 allow reserve component soldiers to volunteer as individuals for active duty to fill mission-essential billets in deploying units or in the Army’s generating force.\textsuperscript{35} The graphs shown in Figures 5.4a and 5.4b reflect these individuals as well.

\textsuperscript{29} In fact, the routine commitment of Army National Guard combat brigades in combat under the leadership of their peacetime Guard officers was relatively unprecedented. In World War II and Korea, units tracing their origins to the National Guard contained substantial Regular Army and Reserve contingents, especially in their leadership cadres.

\textsuperscript{30} See Table 3.1 in Ellen M. Pint, Matthew W. Lewis, Thomas F. Lippiatt, Philip Hall-Partyka, Jonathan P. Wong, and Tony Puharic, Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre- and Postmobilization Training, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-738-A, 2015, p. 50.


\textsuperscript{32} John L. Gronski, “2/28 BCT Fallen Warriors Memorial,” undated. Major General Gronski commanded the brigade during this deployment.

\textsuperscript{33} Lippiatt and Polich, 2010b, pp. 21–24.


\textsuperscript{35} U.S. Code, Title 32, National Guard, Section 102, General Policy, 2012; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel: Reserve Components Need Guidance to Accurately and Consistently Account for Volun-
New Roles Evolve

Questions about the size of the Regular Army and the percentage of the reserve components being mobilized and deployed resurfaced in 2004 hearings over the NDAA. Representative Ike Skelton, in particular, pushed Acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee and Chief of Staff Schoomaker to explain why—if end strength were adequate—DoD was having to deploy Navy and Air Force personnel to perform Army missions. Schoomaker responded to the immediate question by noting that global force managers quite properly focused on the capability to be provided rather than the service providing it. For the longer term, he reiterated the Army’s plan to expand operational capacity within existing end strength by transferring billets from the institutional Army—headquarters, equipping enterprise, training base, and so forth—to the operational Army. Representative Joel Hefley also expressed concern about how much the Army and DoD were calling on the reserve components. Interestingly, Hefley focused his concern on the issue of equity, noting that that he had concerns about the reserves:

I think a lot of us do on this committee, the way they are being used; the frequency of their use. We are beginning to get more and more complaints from our employers saying we want to be patriotic, but we can’t have key employees gone as much as they are gone.

[It was typical to receive] complaints from families saying, my spouse wants to do his duty, but gosh, enough is enough. I think that is going to begin to affect our retention. . . . I was just out in Germany last week, and the biggest complaint I got was that reservists are not treated the same as regular duty; that reservists who come do not ship a car. They arrive with two suitcases. That is all they are allowed.36

In this broader context, DoD leaders began to transition the reserve components “from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve,” as Lieutenant General Steven

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Blum—then Chief of the National Guard Bureau—put it in 2004.37 In describing this transition, DoD leaders were considerably clearer about what the reserve components no longer were (a strategic reserve) than about what they were becoming (an operational reserve). Blum described the former condition as follows:

All of the reserve components represented here today, and I can only speak for the National Guard, but it is common to all of us, we were built for a strategic reserve, to go in case of World War III to be overstaffed, overstructured, underresourced and to be filled up with people by a draft and to get money and equipment and training over a long period of time before we would go anywhere after we had exhausted the active force.38

Implicitly, serving as an “operational” force meant frequent mobilization and deployment for better-equipped forces at higher levels of readiness. Theoretically, improvements in equipping and readiness reduced postmobilization training requirements in time. In general, the reserve components themselves all supported this transformation, which also strengthened their claim to more-generous resourcing. The chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and the head of the Adjutant Generals’ Association of the United States both testified in favor of these trends.39

Still, this transition to an “operational” role was not without its growing pains. Public perceptions began to grow that reserve component soldiers and units were receiving inequitable treatment during predeployment training and lower priority for critical equipment while deployed. McHugh reported hearing “disturbing” testimony when he visited National Guardsmen in training:

comments about being placed in jobs for which they didn’t train, not the reason they joined; inequitable treatment based on a variety of measurements; the uncertainty of deployment et cetera.40

News stories began to appear claiming that reserve component soldiers were having to purchase makeshift armor with their own money to counter the rising threat posed by improvised explosive devices.41 Moreover, because of personnel and equipment shortages, the reserve components had to transfer people and equipment from

40 Quoted in U.S. House of Representatives, 2004b, p. 1144.

While such news stories might seem to indicate some dissatisfaction with higher levels of mobilization and deployment, the Guard and its advocacy organizations supported the reserve components’ increased role. In April 2004, National Guard wrote that “Today’s operations and emerging threats require a new ARNG, one that is lighter, more flexible and specifically resourced for rapid deployment.”\footnote{“The Army National Guard: Transforming While at War,” National Guard, Vol. 58, No. 4, April 2004.} NGAUS’s chairman of the board, Major General Gus Hargett, characterized the increasing use of Guard formations as “the new normal.”\footnote{Gus L. Hargett, “Recognizing the ‘New Normal,’” National Guard, Vol. 58, No. 6, June 2004.} General Blum seemed to express the general sentiment among Guard leaders when he remarked, “We’ve been stretched because we were needed.”\footnote{“‘We’ve Been Stretched Because We Were Needed’: Another Conversation with Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, National Guard Bureau Chief,” National Guard, Vol. 58, No. 8, August 2004.} Blum went on to assert that employing the Guard and Reserve enhanced political support for the war, stating that

> when you call up the Guard you call every community, every town, every school, every church, every factory, every retail store.

> [For] families, this is huge. That is why this country is so solid behind our soldiers, because four out of ten of the soldiers on the ground in Iraq today are Guard and Reserve.\footnote{“‘We’ve Been Stretched Because We Were Needed,’” 2004, p. 21.}

In many respects, events seemed—to Guard officials, at least—to validate the arguments that the Guard had been making for years: that it could provide useful and responsive military capabilities in contingency operations. Not everyone agreed, of course. In 2005, Minnesota Representative John Kline cited a conversation with his state’s adjutant general the previous year. According to Kline, the general said:

> ...
his soldiers, his national guard [sic] soldiers, did not enlist in the active Army, that they enlisted in the national guard and they are proud to serve there. They are proud to be called up and serve, but they didn’t enlist in the active Army and they cannot be called upon to be continually called up.47

Although there was dissension in the ranks, the Guard and its supporters generally presented a united front to Congress and DoD. The Guard and Reserve welcomed their new role and used it as rhetorical leverage to extract more resources from DoD and Congress. Testifying before the House Committee on Government Reform in April 2004, Major General Timothy J. Lowenberg expressed the position of the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS):

The Adjutants General Association of the United States joins the Defense Science Board in stressing the importance of continued dual-missioning of the Guard. Although the National Guard is a key military component of our national domestic security strategy, homeland security is not and must not become the sole or primary mission of the National Guard.48

Later, in 2006, retired Major General Francis D. Vavala, AGAUS vice president at the time, stated it even more emphatically:

On behalf of the adjutants general, let me be clear: Our greatest desire is to work within the Department of Defense to achieving the strong, appropriate National Guard needed to defeat terrorism and secure our homeland.49

In this, he was supported by NGAUS’s president, retired Brigadier General Stephen M. Koper, formerly of the Air National Guard.50 In 2004, Lowenberg had argued for increased spending on the ARNG, particularly for full-time support. He advocated increasing its full-time manpower above its contemporary level of 60 percent of the authorized requirement.51 Koper and Vavala were there to testify in favor of getting the Chief of the National Guard Bureau another star and membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This had long been an objective for the Guard, one it finally achieved in 2012.

48 Quoted in U.S. House of Representatives, 2004c.
In spite of these shortcomings, Congress generally supported the reserve components’ transition to an “operational force.” The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report on the FY 2005 NDAA stated that

The committee supports the transformational initiatives being taken by the Department and the military services to integrate the Active and Reserve components, and several provisions approved by the committee are aimed at enhancing the reserve continuum of service and recognition of the operational support provided by the Reserve.52

To work out the details of how DoD should support this transition, Congress established the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve.53 The reorientation itself, however, was not in question.

Although supportive of the operational reserve in concept, the House Armed Services Committee had grown frustrated at limited Army capacity and the consequently enforced reliance on the reserve components. McHugh opened a 2005 hearing on The Adequacy of Army Forces by reviewing his subcommittee’s long-term advocacy of the need to increase the Army’s size and expressing frustration that DoD and the Army continued to resist the subcommittee’s recommendations to expand. Notably, McHugh characterized the reliance on the reserve components as “potentially unsustainable.”54 Clearly, his policy preference would have been to expand the Army to reduce stress on all Army components.

McHugh’s observations were validated by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s subsequent 2007 decision to expand the Regular Army’s permanently authorized end strength by 65,000. In 2005, however, expanding the Regular Army may not have been feasible. The Army was struggling to recruit and retain enough soldiers to maintain the formations it had created across all three components. Trouble began to show in FY 2004, when the Army fell short of its objective for new recruit contracts by 15 percent.55 Propensity to enlist among youths 16–21 years of age—a key indicator of the difficulty of the recruiting mission—declined from 16 percent who believed they might “be serving in the Military in the next few years” in November 2003 to 9 percent in June 2007.56 The Regular Army fell almost 6,000 recruits short of its recruiting

54 Quoted in U.S. House of Representatives, 2005 pp. 1–2.
goals in 2005. Of those, only 87 percent were high school diploma graduates, compared with a DoD goal of 90 percent. While the Regular Army managed to attain its numerical goal of 80,000 recruits in FY 2006, only 81 percent of those recruits were high school graduates. The Army also had to issue an increasing number of waivers; by 2007, about 20 percent required some sort of medical or misconduct waiver. The ARNG failed to achieve its own goal every year between FY 2003 and FY 2005, falling short in each year by at least 13 percent. In FY 2005, the ARNG fell over 13,000 short of its target of 63,000. The Army Reserve also fell short of its FY 2005 goal by almost 5,000 recruits. The Army had increased recruiting and retention incentives massively to even attain these results. Active component enlistment and reenlistment incentives climbed almost $1 billion, from approximately $354 million in 2004 to $1.343 billion in 2006 (in constant 2016 dollars). Army Reserve incentives increased from $60 million to $366 million, and ARNG incentives went from $146 million to $639 million (again in constant 2016 dollars). A 2010 RAND study found these incentives were critical to meeting accessions objectives, but at a high cost. The study estimated that a 100 percent increase in the enlistment bonus would only produce a 5.5 percent increase in enlistments, assuming that the effects of enlistment were indeed linear.


prisingly, the war itself was a major disincentive. The RAND study found that “the war had a sizable negative effect on high-quality enlistments, even though the precise magnitude of the effect remains somewhat uncertain.”

The question of whether the Army should have expanded in the past or not was moot. At that moment in time, expanding the Army—including all or any of its components—through voluntary enlistment would have proven to be extremely difficult.

**Army Force Generation’s (ARFORGEN’s) Effect on the Operational Employment of Reserve Component Forces**

Even as concepts and policy for increased employment of the reserve components continued to evolve, it became apparent that the Army would have to continue to provide a large number supporting forces for an indefinite period of time. Thus, to meet the needs of protracted conflict, the Army adopted a unit rotation approach. During the Korean and Vietnam wars, units deployed to the theater of operations and remained until overall U.S. force posture changed. The Army sustained unit personnel levels by rotating individual soldiers through those units. Contemporary observers believed that the individual rotation policy “badly damaged unit cohesion.” Thus, when the need to maintain U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan over an extended period of time became apparent, Army officials decided to rotate units wholesale. Under the resulting policy—known as the Army Force Generation model, or simply ARFORGEN, units would form, train, deploy to the theater of operations, and then redeploy, after which they would repeat the cycle.

The adoption of ARFORGEN meant that active and reserve component units would undergo repeated cycles of deployment and preparation for deployment. The Army established a goal for active Regular forces of not more than one year deployed out of every three. For reserve component forces, the goal was not more than one year mobilized out of every six, in consonance with Rumsfeld’s July 2003 guidance.

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The contemporary interpretation of partial mobilization authority could be interpreted in more than one way, which posed a problem for recurring mobilization under ARFORGEN. Section 12302 of Title 10 states

In time of national emergency declared by the President after January 1, 1953, or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve under the jurisdiction of that Secretary to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months.

In 2002, DoD officials interpreted that provision as limiting their ability to mobilize soldiers for longer than 24 cumulative months under the same mobilization authority. Testifying before Congress in 2002, Chu said that “under the law we can only call them [reservists] up to active service for at most two years.” In other words, DoD could mobilize individual soldiers for no more than 24 cumulative months under a single invocation of partial mobilization authority. Soldiers who had reached that limit could not be mobilized involuntarily.

By 2005, that interpretation threatened to limit the number of reserve component soldiers available for employment. Lieutenant General James Helmly, the Chief of Army Reserve, had concluded that the Army Reserve had only about 37,000 soldiers left who met the criterion described by Chu. As Helmly explained in congressional hearings on the subject, previous mobilizations for Operation Noble Eagle—the domestic employment of reserve component soldiers in the wake of 9/11—combined with overseas contingency operations limited the supply of available reserve component soldiers. While there were many more reservists who had not yet reached 24 months of mobilization, many of these had been mobilized for more than a year at some previous point. Those soldiers could not deploy for a year without exceeding 24 cumulative months of mobilization. Chu and his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Thomas Hall, contested Helmly’s analysis, considering it unduly pessimistic. According to them, continual turnover in the reserve components meant that about one-fifth of reservists would be new to the reserves at any given time—and hence eligible for deployment—at a gross level of analysis. The two DoD officials did not directly challenge the underlying premise—that reservists could only be mobilized for up to 24 months in aggregate.

Events forced a resolution of the issue. Conditions in Iraq continued to deteriorate throughout 2006, leading to a situation that seemed to approach civil war. Calls

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were mounting for the United States to withdraw. The Iraq Study Group—headed by former Secretary of State James Baker III and former Representative Lee Hamilton—recommended dramatic changes in the U.S. conduct of the war, internationalization of the conflict, and the withdrawal of U.S. combat brigades by 2008. Instead of acceding to this consensus and reducing U.S. commitment to Iraq, President George W. Bush and a small coterie of military and civilian advisers instead conceived of the “Surge,” or the “Baghdad Security Plan,” as it was officially known. Instead of decreasing the U.S. footprint, DoD would increase it substantially in the hopes of restoring security. To implement this plan, and change course more broadly at DoD, Bush replaced the commander in Iraq and the Secretary of Defense with General David Petraeus and Robert Gates, respectively. Regardless of who was in charge, the Army would need many more soldiers to implement the Surge.

Upon confirmation, Gates almost immediately requested that Congress authorize an increase in the Regular Army’s size—a reversal of DoD policy to that point—to 547,400 soldiers. The increase would not be achieved in time to support the surge to be executed in the next few months, given the time required to recruit and train the additional soldiers. Gates’s move validated previous congressional concerns on the issue but could do little to address the immediate crisis. Nor was it by any means clear that the Army would be able to accomplish the desired growth in a timely fashion. The war remained unpopular; the economy—with which the military had to compete—remained relatively strong in early 2007; and the propensity for military service among the nation’s youth had declined to its lowest point since before the 9/11 attacks. The additional soldiers would take time to recruit, train, and organize into units. In the meantime, the Army was left to execute the Surge with the units it had on hand.

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72 See Figure 1.8 in Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, p. 77.


In the event, the Army proved able to increase end strength by 17,000 in FY 2007 through the continued expedients of paying immense bonuses ($1.2 billion in 2016 dollars for Regular Army incentives in FY 2007) and continuing to reduce educational and other criteria for enlistment and retention). Whether the Regular Army could actually have increased its end strength substantially earlier in the decade is an open question. Certainly, the fact that the Army was able to increase end strength by 17,000 in FY 2007 argues that it could. The substantial increase in incentives needed to recruit and retain the force argue against the proposition, however. In any case, the reluctance to increase the Regular Army’s size was not simply a policy preference.
The reserve components were the most promising source of those units, but the ambiguous language of the statute on partial mobilization authority called their availability into question. On January 19, 2007, Gates addressed this issue with his memorandum on “Utilization of the Total Force.” The memo did three things. First, it limited the duration of involuntary mobilizations of reserve component personnel to one year, implicitly addressing congressional and popular concerns about excessive mobilization. Second, it reaffirmed DoD’s commitment to mobilizing reserve component soldiers for no more than one year in six, even as it acknowledged it would have to exceed that ratio in the short term. Third, it endorsed unit mobilization and demobilization. Thus, the memorandum implicitly interpreted partial mobilization authority as limiting involuntary mobilization to no more than 24 consecutive months, but permitting recurring mobilizations under the same partial mobilization authority.

The policy’s one-year limitation on mobilization also tended to limit the roles that reserve component forces could play. Reserve component units required different amounts of postmobilization training time to prepare for specific overseas missions, depending on its complexity and difficulty. In most cases, units also undertook premobilization training while mobilized under the authority of Title 32 of the U.S. Code. According to a 2015 RAND Corporation analysis, most reserve component support units required between 43 and 73 days of postmobilization training in the period between 2003 and 2011; ARNG combat brigades, in contrast, required between 69 and 155 days of postmobilization training. Figure 5.5 depicts the range of variation, according to the mission in question. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) that would be responsible for providing security to fixed sites and lines of communication were at the lower end of the range, requiring between 69 and 87 days of postmobilization training. BCTs responsible for conducting counterinsurgency operations in a specified area of operations—a more demanding responsibility—required between 94 and 155 days of postmobilization training. Note also that most of the post-2007 reduction in postmobilization training days depicted in Figure 5.5 simply represents a transfer of time mobilized under Title 10 to time mobilized under Title 32 (i.e., training conducted between alert and mobilization). This practice, although perhaps not entirely consistent with the spirit of Gates’s policy guidance, provided the Army the opportunity both to utilize its reserve component forces for important missions and to maximize “boots on the ground” time in theater. To the extent that units required six months of postmobilization training, the policy limited units to six months deployed of a one-year mobilization period. Obviously, units can and did prepare and deploy for

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75 Pint et al., 2015, pp. 50–52.

76 Pint et al., 2015, pp. 50–52.
counterinsurgency missions under these restrictions. The one-year limit on mobilization tended to make employing units for this purpose considerably less attractive than employing them as security forces, however. The RAND analysis bears this out: Of the 45 Guard BCTs analyzed, only nine were employed in a counterinsurgency capacity, 27 were deployed as security forces, and nine were employed to train and assist partner security forces.77

Gates’s memorandum on “Utilization of the Total Force” was simply the latest of a series of adaptations to the demands of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. DoD began to formalize these adaptations in policy through issuing Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force. The directive stated that it was DoD policy that “The Active Components (ACs) and RCs are integrated as a total force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies.”78 Service secretaries were directed to provide sufficient resources to reserve component units’ training and readiness to allow those units to be rapidly mobilized and employed across the full spectrum of operations, in accordance with their unique competencies and capabilities.79 In promulgating this directive, DoD

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77 Pint et al., 2015, p. 50.
indicated that it intended to continue employing reserve component units and individuals for the full range of overseas contingency operations, subject only to policy that limited the frequency and duration of such employment.

**Institutionalizing Recurring Use of the Reserve Components**

Three years later, DoD sought and received authority to employ reserve component formations for routine military operations as well as contingency operations in the 2012 NDAA. In addition to other mobilization authorities, Section 12304b authorized service secretaries to mobilize up to 60,000 reservists at any one time for no more than 365 consecutive days to conduct preplanned missions, such as joint exercises or other recurring events, provided that “the manpower and associated costs of the active duty and a description of the mission are included in the budget materials covering the fiscal year or years in which the units or members are anticipated to be ordered to active duty.”80 In the committee report, the Senate Armed Services Committee explained that they took this step “to enhance the use of reserve component units that organize, train, and plan to support operational mission requirements to the same standards as active component units under service force generation plans in a cyclic, periodic, and predictable manner.”81

**Resourcing the Total Force**

Resourcing between FY 2002 and FY 2015 indicated no significant shifts in roles or responsibility between the components. Active component manpower changed the most in response to escalating demands from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, though more slowly than some in Congress would have liked. Operations and maintenance spending by the components increased at about the same rates overall. While Regular Army operations and maintenance obligations appear to have grown much faster than those for the Army Reserve and ARNG, that increase primarily represents spending on overseas contingency operations that funded activities by forces from all three components. Levels of full-time support for the reserve components rose steadily during this period.

Congress and DoD chose to respond to changes in anticipated operational demand by increasing the size of the Regular Army. Congress did not attempt to reverse the 1990s reductions in the reserve components. As Figure 5.6a indicates, the Regular Army’s size varied considerably in this period, with end strength peaking in FY 2010 at 566,045.82 Reserve component end strengths remained more or less con-

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constant, with the Army Reserve’s end strength declining by about 9,000 soldiers from 2002 through 2015. The narrative is complicated with respect to the reserve components, however, because DoD could and did adjust the proportion of the reserve components it mobilized at any given time. Still, in outline, DoD held Army reserve component end strength more or less constant while adjusting Regular Army end strength in response to operational demand and fiscal pressures.

Figure 5.6b tells a more complicated story, with funding for all components changing significantly in response to changing market conditions. Spending on enlistment and reenlistment bonuses increased from $565 million (in 2015 dollars) in FY 2004 to $1,475 million in FY 2005. The next year it climbed to approximately $2.3 billion, a level at which it remained until FY 2010. Concurrently, the Army exceeded its end-strength objective in FY 2009, well ahead of schedule. Expenditures on incentives declined rapidly thereafter.  

Between 2002 and 2015, DoD funded the Army’s three

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Figure 5.6b

SOURCES: Department of the Army budget estimates for Military Personnel, Army (MPA); Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA); and National Guard Personnel, Army (NGPA) for FYs 2002–2017. See footnote 79 for specific citations.

RAND RR19954-5.6b
components at levels needed to maintain end strengths deemed necessary to support the strategy.

End strength, of course, provides only a partial picture of reserve component manning over this period. Many reservists serve substantially more than their allotted 39 days. For that matter, many serve less. A recent RAND report found that the median number of duty days served by ARNG soldiers increased from 39 days in 2000 to 42 days in 2013. Similar figures for the Army Reserve showed an increase from 38 days to 41. There were also many soldiers who served in excess of 75 days in both components. As the term median indicates, however, there were a great many soldiers who served fewer than 39 days in either fiscal year.84

Overall, while the analysis indicates a small but real increase in the number of duty days performed over the period from 2000 to 2013, it also indicates that there were definite limits to the amount of time the Army could rely on getting from those soldiers. The degree to which this number of additional training days, enabled by additional spending, could mitigate the differences in Regular Army and reserve component readiness is unclear, however.

Obligations for operations and maintenance also increased at similar rates for all three components between 2002 and 2015. At first glance, it might appear that Regular Army operations and maintenance spending increased far more, and at a faster rate, between FY 2002 and FY 2011, then declined precipitously thereafter. Most of this spending was for contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, and supported all three components. The dotted blue line still illustrates an overall positive trend. Indeed, these increases in spending might represent even less real growth in terms of capability than indicated here. A 2017 study by the Congressional Budget Office noted the general upward trend in operations and maintenance expenditures, but attributed most of that increase in costs to increases in civilian labor, health care, and fuel.85 In other words, there is a real chance that the trends represented in Figure 5.7 simply represent efforts to maintain capabilities funded by Army operations and maintenance appropriations at a constant level.

The one area in which the reserve components did experience unambiguous improvement was in terms of full-time support. Full-time support—including AGRs and military technicians—increased from 67,249 in FY 2002 to a peak of 83,631 in 2014, declining slightly to 82,296 in FY 2015.86 This increase represented a 22 percent gain in full-time support levels.

Figure 5.7
Army Operations and Maintenance Obligations Trends, Fiscal Years 2002–2015

SOURCES: Department of the Army budget estimates for Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA); Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR); and Operations and Maintenance, Army National Guard (OMNG), for FYs 2002–2017. See footnote 79 for specific citations.

RAND RR19954-5.7

Persistent Support for an Assertive Foreign Policy

Even though most Americans came to see the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as “mistakes”—in the precise wording of Gallup polls that surveyed the course of public opinion over time—they still continued to support an assertive foreign policy and a globally preeminent military. By August 2005, 54 percent of those surveyed in a Gallup poll viewed the Iraq War as a mistake. That percentage dropped below 50 percent only once between then and June 2015.87 By February 2014, Gallup found that most Americans had come to view the war in Afghanistan as a mistake as well.88 Yet for all that, Americans continued to support an assertive U.S. role in the world. In February 2007, just as the Surge in Iraq was crystallizing opposition to the war, 73 percent of those surveyed thought the United States should either take the leading role or a major role in world affairs. In fact, the percentage of Americans who supported an assertive U.S. role hovered between 70 and 80 percent from 2001 through 2017, though it varied slightly in response to achievements and setbacks on the world stage. At its lowest point in the decade—February 2007—61 percent of respondents continued to think it was important that the United States remained “Number 1” in the world militarily.89

For the most part, elite opinion mirrored that of the broader public.90 Whatever their positions on Iraq, major party presidential candidates in 2004 through 2016...
espoused U.S. leadership in international affairs and a military strong enough to support that involvement. Even though George W. Bush had campaigned on a less expansive foreign policy, his administration became synonymous with an aggressive foreign policy to root out America’s enemies wherever they might be found. His adversaries did not differ with Bush’s wartime aspirations for the scale of U.S. reach, but rather with its direction toward Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2004, with his candidacy largely fueled by opposition to the Iraq War, John Kerry nonetheless advocated for “alliances on a global scale” and to “Modernize the world’s most powerful military to meet new threats.”91 Similarly, in a 2007 speech to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, then-Senator Barack Obama stated, “So I reject the notion that the American moment has passed. I dismiss the cynics who say that this new century cannot be another when, in the words of President Franklin Roosevelt, we lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good.”92 America had declined George McGovern’s 1972 call to “come home, America.” By the 21st century, no major political candidate or influential school of thought even advocated this kind of modesty.

In spite of costly and unpopular wars, public and elite support for a leading U.S. role in world affairs remained a reasonably stable position in the 21st century for both the greater American public and the elites that helped shape that position. This level of policy ambition combined with the difficulty of manning regular forces large enough to underwrite it to enforce continued reliance on the reserve components for the foreseeable future.

The Reserve Components as an “Operational Force”

Under the pressure of events, DoD had developed and embraced the concept of an operational reserve. In their “operational” role, reserve component soldiers and units became at least theoretically liable for the full range of operations under nearly the full range of conditions under which Regular forces were employed. In practice, DoD revealed a preference for employing reserve component units in support roles and in lower-risk, lower-complexity combat roles, such as providing security. DoD had always prepared to use the reserves in crises, after some additional preparation and training. What was different was that DoD now intended to use the reserves for routine missions. The principal remaining difference was the frequency with which reserve units and individuals could be employed and the duration for which they could be employed. But while operational pressures had bound the components together more tightly, fiscal pressures were coming that would tend to force a reexamination of the components roles and resourcing.

The Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative and the National Commission on the Future of the Army

The Army’s experience with its 2014 Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) illustrates a path by which it might have retreated from the approach to employing the reserve components that evolved during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but did not. The Army staff developed the ARI in response to persistent operational demand and declining budgets. The 2011 Budget Control Act—better known as “the sequester”—threatened to substantially reduce the resources available to the Army. Operational requirements for Army aviation capabilities were not projected to decline nearly as fast as Army budgets, however. The ARI tried to address this problem by consolidating all of the Army’s AH-64 attack helicopters in Regular Army aviation units, thereby denuding the ARNG of attack helicopter capabilities. In terms of meeting operational demands anticipated at the time at the lowest cost, the ARI was unassailable, a conclusion supported by independent analyses by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation directorate (OSD CAPE) and the GAO. In the views of the ARNG and its supporters in Congress, however, the ARI also threatened to undermine the Guard’s role as the Army’s “combat reserve.”

In the 2015 NDAA, Congress limited the ARI’s immediate implementation, citing concerns that the initiative upset the allocation of roles achieved in the 1993 Offsite Agreement. Congress also created the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) to address the issue. The NCFA was to provide recommendations to the President, Secretary of Defense and Congress. The NCFA’s resulting compromise left the ARNG with substantially diminished attack helicopter capabilities, but did not eliminate them entirely. Under the NCFA’s recommendation, the ARNG retained four reduced-strength attack helicopter battalions, each with 18 AH-64s. Congress endorsed this solution in the FY 2017 NDAA. In accepting this result, Congress continued to validate the concept of employing the ARNG as a “combat reserve,” albeit with similar but not necessarily identical capabilities to those of the Regular Army. This result was consistent with the reserve components’ evolving role as an operational force, in which the reserve components provided complementary but not necessarily duplicative capabilities. Beyond its policy outcome, the conflict over the ARI is interesting principally because of what it illustrates about the state of Total Force Policy and the positions of major stakeholders after a decade of the reserve components’ recurring employment in operations.

Increasing Fiscal Pressures and Tough Choices

Increasing fiscal pressure, especially those created by the Budget Control Act of 2011, helped set the stage for the ARI. DoD’s FY 2011 planning and budgets had envisioned modest reductions in the Army’s budget and end strength. In constant dollars, the Army’s base budget was to reach a peak of $145.4 billion in FY 2013, and then decline
by little over 2 percent to $142.4 billion by FY 2015. This reduction was primarily a function of a reduction in the Army’s end strength, from a peak of around 569,000 to 520,000. Political conflict over the national debt led to more drastic and sudden reductions in Army spending, however. In exchange for agreeing to raise the debt limit, the House of Representatives insisted on credible measures—to be defined in the near future—to reduce federal spending and thereby reduce the deficit. However, the resulting bipartisan, bicameral “super committee” and leaders of the House, leaders of the Senate, and the President failed to reach agreement on a package of revenue enhancements and spending reductions. That failure triggered the enforcement provisions of the act, an automatic, across-the-board reduction in discretionary spending for defense and nondefense activities alike. The so-called sequester took effect in March 2013, reducing the Army’s obligatory authority by almost $9 billion in nominal dollars over the rest of the fiscal year. In April of 2014, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) estimated that the sequester would reduce the Army’s total obligatory authority by $26.4 billion (in nominal dollars) below planned levels over the period between FY 2016 and FY 2019.

**Army Aviation’s Vulnerability to Fiscal Pressure**

These reductions threatened to affect Army aviation capabilities with particular force. Though aviation forces made up only about 11 percent of the Army’s force structure in terms of manpower, aviation procurement typically consumed about a third of the Army’s base procurement budget. Proportional cuts to Army procurement

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would thus have a disproportionate impact on Army aviation capabilities. Moreover, about $10 billion of the future procurement budget was allocated to cockpit and sensor upgrade program (CASUP) for the Army’s OH-58 Kiowa scout observation helicopter. The Kiowa was an aging platform whose capabilities were falling further behind the requirements of anticipated operational environments. Concurrently, the Army was in the midst of upgrading its UH-60 Blackhawk utility and AH-64 Apache helicopter fleets. Against this backdrop of needed upgrades and declining resources, Army aviation capabilities—especially attack helicopters—were in high demand to support ongoing operations and joint contingency plans. By the summer of 2013, matters had come to a head. General John F. Campbell, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, summed up the situation in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2014:

The bottom line is funding constraints drove the Army to reevaluate Army aviation. Today we have the very best aviation in the world, and what we want to be able to do is continue to have the very best aviation in the world. But based on the budget, we couldn’t do that. If we just went status quo or if we just took cuts out of our combat aviation brigades, continued to have seven platforms, didn’t divest of the old aircraft, kept that, we would not have the best aviation.

The Aviation Restructure Initiative Emerges

The Army’s answer to this challenge was the ARI, developed in summer 2014 and presented in October. Essentially, the ARI met the constraints imposed by declining resources, aging aircraft, and high levels of operational demand by relying on the newest version of the Apache attack helicopter—the AH-64E—as both the attack and scout platform, and by concentrating those aircraft in the Regular Army. The ARI did the following:

- Retired the OH-58 Kiowa platform and canceled the CASUP and any other upgrades.

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Envisioned employing the new AH-64E as an aero-scout platform, teamed with unmanned aircraft systems. While this option was not ideal, it was the most cost-effective in the near term.

- Consolidated those AH-64s in the Regular Army.
- Transferred 111 UH-60s to the ARNG, on the theory that this aircraft was more useful in the homeland defense and consequence management mission that fell primarily to the Guard.
- Replaced the aging fleet of training aircraft with the UH-72 Lakota, many of which were to be transferred from the ARNG to the training base.
- Inactivated three regular Army aviation brigades; no reserve component brigades were inactivated.100

The criteria according to which the Army Staff developed the ARI focused almost exclusively on cost-effectiveness in support of ongoing operations and defined contingency plans and planning scenarios. Those criteria included meeting anticipated demand; retaining the Army’s most modern aviation systems; enabling the Army to rapidly rebuild aviation force structure, if needed; and adjusting Total Army force structure to better support the homeland defense mission.101 Notably, these criteria did not include sustaining the ARNG’s ability to function as the Army’s “combat reserve,” a role cherished by the ARNG and associated advocacy organizations but not defined in law or policy.

Not surprisingly, the National Guard and its advocates reacted unfavorably to the ARI. The initiative proposed to reduce the equipment and resources available to the ARNG. It also threatened the ARNG’s status as the Army’s combat reserve by depriving it entirely of a particular combat capability. If accepted, the same rationale could be used to take other ARNG capabilities. The National Guard Bureau eventually offered a counterproposal that challenged the Army Staff’s assumptions about Guard availability, readiness cycle, and postmobilization training requirements on which the ARI was based. The Guard’s main objection was that the proposal reduced the total capacity ultimately available to the Army. Under the National Guard Bureau’s counterproposal, the ARNG would retain six battalions of attack helicopters, for a total of 24 battalions instead of the 20 envisioned under the ARI. It should be noted that the Guard alternative did so at the expense of operational float aircraft that would have otherwise been available to maintain unit readiness and replace losses, and by purchasing additional aircraft. It would have entailed slightly higher costs, by between $90 million and $180 million annually, with additional up-front costs of up to $570 million.102

Analyses of the Aviation Restructure Initiative and Alternatives

The ARI fared well analytically, however, over the winter of 2013–2014. Army analysis found that the ARI force met potential contingency demand better than the alternative proposed by the ARNG. The TRADOC Analysis Center’s analysis was typical. It compared alternative force structures’ ability to meet different combinations of demand under approved DoD planning scenarios. Demand took many different forms, including major combat operations, homeland security, and military engagement activities, such as joint exercises with partners and allies. Some of these missions required the full combat capability of brigades with both lift and attack assets, while others might simply require lift capabilities and other aviation capabilities. The analysis compared options’ ability to meet the demand with the optimal capability. The analysis found that consolidating attack helicopters in the Regular Army allowed the Army to meet projected demands more effectively.\(^{103}\)

The analysis was obviously complicated, and it explored different assumptions about the degree of advanced warning the United States might have before hostilities broke out, the amount of time needed for ARNG units to mobilize and deploy, and the readiness cycle under which those units would mobilize. The fundamental reason that the analysis turned out as it did, however, was the difference between regular Army and reserve component readiness cycles. Under the contemporary ARFORGEN readiness construct, active component units were available nine months out of every 24, while DoD policy prescribed that reserve component units be mobilized no more than one year in six.\(^{104}\) Even assuming that postmobilization training for reserve component aviation units would require no more than 90 days, that meant that ARNG Apache battalions would be available no more than nine months out of every five years. Under such assumptions, ARNG assets would be available only 40 percent of the time that Regular Army assets were for rotational deployments to enduring and predictable missions.\(^{105}\) Given those assumptions and a fixed number of helicopters, every helicopter

\(^{103}\) See “TAB D–Aviation Force Structure Sufficiency Risk Analysis,” in U.S. Army, 2015f.


\(^{105}\) RAND Corporation analysts had pioneered these output based analyses which measured the cost of units not in terms of their annual operating and support costs—the measures often used in cost comparisons of active and reserve forces—but in terms of how many units needed to be maintained in the inventory in order to sustain one in operations, then some kinds of reserve component units could actually be more expensive than their active component counterparts. See Klimas et al., 2014; Klerman, 2008. For an example of the way proponents of the reserve components typically make such cost comparisons, see the statement “For about $50 billion a year, the Nation maintains a strong, operationally engaged National Guard and Reserve force that comprises about
allocated to the reserve components reduced the Army’s overall capacity. Moreover, given reserve components’ postmobilization training requirements, allocating assets to the ARNG also reduced the Army’s capacity to cope with short-notice contingency requirements.

Different assumptions about reserve component aviation units’ availability might have produced different results. Testifying later before the NCFA, Major General Edward Tonini, president of the Adjutants General Association of the United States, argued that DoD’s analytic assumptions understated the Guard’s availability:

The last thing I’d like to say about the 1 to 5 policy is that we didn’t ask for it. I know it was well-intentioned and probably designed to prevent overuse of the Guard or possibly avoid “abuse” of the Guard during prolonged conflicts.

But just like the Air Force Commission discovered—I can confirm that our Guardsmen are not telling me they’ve been deployed too often as a peacetime rotation force.106

Had DoD’s analysts departed from current policy and explored different assumptions for the Guard’s availability, however, they would have had to do the same for the Regular Army. In the end, the analysis could only approximate senior leaders’ judgment about the relative availability and utility of Regular Army and ARNG aviation assets in future contingencies.

The Army’s analysis appeared convincing to DoD officials and the GAO. A “Tiger Team”—a special group convened to address a specific, urgent problem with a tight deadline—convened by OSD CAPE validated the TRADOC Analysis Center’s analysis. While the GAO observed that the Army’s analysis could have been more sophisticated, it concluded that “The Army’s analysis of the proposals’ abilities to meet projected demand is based on a reasonable methodology and is suitable for comparing one proposal against the other.”107

The Guard’s Reaction
The Guard’s response to the ARI took place within the broader context of what had become the Guard’s established defense of its “traditional” role. In truth, the Guard had anticipated something like this for some time, as looming fiscal pressures presaged


competition for resources. Maine’s Adjutant General—Brigadier General James D. Campbell—reiterated that argument in an article for *Parameters*, the Army War College’s periodical, in the spring of 2014. That argument rested on four pillars. First, the Guard’s role as the Army’s combat reserve was enshrined in the constitution, statute, and policy. Efforts to reduce the ARNG to an adjunct of the Regular Army violated the spirit of U.S. laws, even if it could not be conclusively demonstrated that they violated their letter. Second, reserve component forces cost substantially less than their active duty counterparts. Campbell conceded that recent analyses had called that premise into question based on the peculiar circumstances of the Army’s rotational readiness model, ARFORGEN, but registered two important caveats. To begin with, such cost comparisons were highly sensitive to assumptions about availability. Most such analyses had assumed that ARNG formations such as armored brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigades would be available for one year in six. If such units were assumed to be available one year out of every four, it could restore the ARNG’s units’ cost advantages. More importantly, Campbell argued that the future was very likely to differ from present circumstances. Thus, estimates of future costs based on policy constraints and a readiness model developed for a highly contingent set of circumstances were unlikely to be valid. All that could be predicted with any confidence was that ARNG units’ peacetime costs were substantially less than their Regular Army counterparts. Echoing the Guard’s arguments during the debates over the Base Force, Campbell’s third major point was that constraints on available shipping limited the utility of Regular Army forces, even those that could be ready for immediate deployment. Noting that this was not the case, he argued that any asset that took 60 days or longer to ship properly belonged in the ARNG. Finally, Campbell asserted that ARNG units were as capable as their Regular Army equivalents after some minimal period of postmobilization training. Again, Campbell conceded that fewer ARNG maneuver units had performed “full-spectrum” missions. He countered that Guard units had performed the missions assigned; how those missions were assigned provided no evidence about units’ relative capability. Campbell asserted that there was no explicit evidence that those that had conducted such missions performed in a manner inferior to their active component equivalents. In short, General Campbell made the Guard’s traditional argument that increasing resource constraints dictated transferring more capabilities to the reserve components, not proportional reductions in all three.108

Guard advocates’ testimony before the NCFA largely followed this logic. NGAUS’s president at the time, Major General Gus Hargett, testified using a diplomatic approach that emphasized opposition to the fiscal pressures that had led to the ARI and also opposed reductions in the Regular Army. Like Campbell, Hargett questioned the applicability of cost estimates based on current policy tailored to this recent history of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and, of course, asserted the comparative

efficacy of ARNG units. Hargett also went on to reiterate what had become a familiar point, that employing the Guard and Reserve helped secure the political support of the American people. Tonini, President of the Adjutant Generals’ Association, was not nearly as diplomatic as Hargett or as analytical as Campbell. He made essentially the same points that Campbell had. He also expressed considerable animus about the way the Regular Army had made its decisions about how to allocate its declining resources, specifically its failure to negotiate with the separate state and territorial adjutant generals. He contrasted this failure with Air Force efforts to determine the future of the Air National Guard. More critically, Tonini imputed bad faith to the Regular Army’s opposition to the commission:

You have to ask yourself why the Active Army was so adamant about not having a Commission to review these matters. The energy expended in preventing you 8 Commissioners from ever meeting and deliberating these issues—was nothing short of monumental.

Why would anyone not want an unbiased second opinion? It’s because—I believe—they’re afraid of the answer.

In spite of the differing degrees of comity that Campbell, Hargett, and Tonini brought to the discourse, they all essentially agreed on the same essential premises. In the view of various Guard representatives, law, policy, and tradition all dictated that DoD rely primarily on the ARNG for its landpower capabilities, especially in times of straitened fiscal circumstances.

Congressional Reaction
After DoD essentially accepted the Army’s analysis without demur, the ARNG’s allies in Congress moved quickly to defer the ARI’s implementation. Guard advocates maintained that it called long-standing institutional arrangements into question. The co-chairs of the National Guard Caucus—Senators Patrick Leahy and Lindsey Graham—and 17 co-sponsors introduced an amendment to the FY 2015 NDAA to delay the ARI’s implementation until a “National Commission on the Future of the Army” had investigated the issue further. Graham’s statement on introducing the amendment made explicit reference to the ARNG’s role as a “combat reserve,” noting, “The changes fundamentally alter what it means for the National Guard to be a combat reserve of the Army”; quotations from the co-sponsors indicated similar con-


110 Tonini, 2015, p. 18.
cerns. In fact, the legislation itself required that the Secretary of Defense affirm that transferring any helicopters from the ARNG “would not create unacceptable risk . . . to the Army National Guard in its role as the combat reserve of the Army.” In a contemporary hearing, Representative William L. Enyart—formerly the Adjutant General of the Illinois National Guard—asked Secretary of the Army John McHugh: “Has the mission of the National Guard changed? If you use that logic, what you’re saying is that the Guard is only going to be used for domestic purposes or disaster response.” The “logic” to which Enyart referred was the analysis conducted by the Army and validated by OSD CAPE and the GAO.

It is worth exploring the roots of congressional objections to the proposal, because they illustrate factors with which the Army will have to contend in the future as it shapes its policies. Several members of Congress—mostly members of the National Guard and Reserve Caucus—later submitted testimony to the NCFA that reflected their perspectives.

Many of the legislators were, or had been, members of the National Guard themselves. First and foremost, however, members of Congress represented the interests of their constituents, or those of voters in their states. Several members of Pennsylvania’s delegation spoke up in favor of the state’s 1st Battalion of the 104th Aviation Regiment, an attack and reconnaissance unit. Others mentioned the ARI or the broader topic of Army components’ roles and resourcing, but emphasized saving the Regular Army installations in their districts.

Second, legislators often expressed the belief that the ARNG’s capabilities were fully equivalent to those of the Regular Army. Pennsylvania Representative Bill Schuster argued that ARNG pilots had “executed missions with the exact same degree of precision and care as the active duty component.” Representative Mark Takai of Hawaii—himself a 16-year veteran of the Hawaii ARNG and president of the Hawaii National Guard Association—wrote that “Throughout my service, I have seen Guard units perform the same tasks as Active units—never could you tell a difference in profession-

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111 “Leahy, Graham Introduce Bill to Launch Commission to Evaluate Army Budget Changes Proposed by the Administration . . . National Guard Caucus Co-Chairs Underscore Implications for Guard And Reserves,” 2014.


alism or executing the mission.” Sometimes legislators expressed this belief in the Guard’s equivalent effectiveness using terms such as cost-effectiveness.

Third, members expressed concern about permanently eliminating a capability from the Guard to meet the temporary constraints of the present dilemma. According to Representative Steven M. Palazzo of Mississippi, “The ARI, once carried out, cannot be easily undone.” Responsive to their constituents, skeptical that Regular Army units actually provided substantially greater capability and concerned about inflicting irreversible damage on the National Guard as an institution—and thus on the U.S. Army’s broader capabilities—the members of the National Guard and Reserve Caucus opposed a sudden change in the National Guard’s role.

Congress was also reluctant to upset the balance they believed that the 1993 Offsite Agreement, the most recent statement on the roles of the three Army components, had established. The Senate Armed Services Committee report that accompanied the passage of the FY 2015 NDAA that created the NCFA cited the 1993 Offsite Agreement as the guideline for the allocation of future roles and missions:

This system for the alignment of core capabilities among the Army’s reserve components has served the Nation, the Army, and the domestic support and public safety needs of the states very well ever since. The committee recognizes the success of this agreement, as evident by the successful partnerships in combat, security, and support missions by active and reserve service members in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The committee encourages the Army to continue to maintain the reserve components as an operational reserve and manage the distribution of combat arms, combat support, and combat service support capabilities and forces consistent with and respectful of the intent of its “1993 Offsite Agreement” regarding reserve component core competencies.


The committee’s endorsement of the operational reserve also indicated congressional inclinations to retain the reserve components at their current level of relevance and resourcing.

**The National Commission on the Future of the Army**

The NCFA commenced its work April 2, 2015. The NCFA’s charter was more expansive than simply resolving the controversy over the ARI. It also included the broader issues of the components’ respective roles and the Army’s ability to support the nation’s strategy under the resource constraints imposed by the sequester. The NCFA rendered its report in January 2016. On the subject of the ARI, the commission recommended a somewhat unbalanced compromise. It did not endorse the ARI, but it did affirm the quality of the analysis and acknowledge the constraints of the problem it was trying to solve. Yet while it did not go as far as the ARI in removing all AH-64s from the ARNG, it also conceded less to the ARNG than it had originally asked for in the National Guard Bureau’s proposed alternative. Instead of the six battalions that the National Guard Bureau had proposed, the NCFA recommended that the ARNG retain four understrength battalions, each with 18 Apaches instead of the 24 normally authorized to attack helicopter battalions. In the event that an ARNG battalion needed to deploy with its full complement of helicopters, cross-leveling from other units would be required. The NCFA sidestepped the Army’s fiscal constraints under the 2011 BCA; the compromise it recommended cost more than the Army had originally allocated to its aviation forces.

In making its recommendation, the NCFA appears to have prioritized comity and cooperation among the components over meeting a specific set of operational requirements under a specific set of resource constraints. It did cite the superior wartime “surge” capability—the ability to maximize the number of units committed eventually to a given operation—provided by retaining four battalions of Apaches in the ARNG and recommend relaxing the resource constraints that had brought this issue to a head. But in favoring modification of the ARI, the commission reasoned that the ARI exacerbates a problem highlighted in this report: the lack of unity between the Regular Army and Army National Guard forces. The ARI will further reduce the “connective tissue” that binds the Regular Army and Army National Guard together.

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120 National Commission on the Future of the Army, 2016, p. 3.

According to the NCFA, along with benefits to wartime capacity, operational tempo, and costs, this modified approach allowed for perhaps the “most important” factor—that Apaches within the National Guard would mean “commitment to regular use of those forces, therefore contributing to a key Commission goal of achieving one Army that works and trains together in peacetime and, if necessary, fights together in war.” In the NCFA’s analysis, perpetuating stable institutional relationships outwardly appeared more important to the Army’s long-term ability to support national strategy than the specific demands of any particular moment.

Reifying the Operational Reserve

Congress endorsed the NCFA’s recommendations, and with them, the respective allocation of roles and missions among the Army’s three components. In rejecting the ARI as originally proposed, Congress and the NCFA dismissed logic that could have justified concentrating large maneuver forces and capital-intensive units in the Regular Army, while relegating the ARNG primarily to support roles. Congress continued to validate the Guard’s role as the Army’s “combat reserve.” Yet in rejecting the National Guard Bureau’s proposal and leaving the ARNG with only four understrength attack battalions, the NCFA also underlined that Congress still intended to rely primarily on the Regular Army to provide landpower capabilities to meet the nation’s most pressing—and dangerous—operational needs. Congressional connections to the Guard and sympathy for its position animated their interest in the issues raised by the ARI, but ultimately did not determine Congress’s position on them. Instead, Congress—by way of the NCFA it commissioned—ultimately appeared to accept the logic on which the ARI was premised. Despite the NCFA’s stated concern about comity among the Army’s three components, Congress made clear that anticipated operational demands and operational availability should primarily govern defense investment, tempered by the long-term goal of preserving comity among the Army’s three components.

Conclusion

Before September 11, the Army had begun to rely on the reserve components to a greater extent than it ever had, at least outside of the context of an active war. This was because operational commitments to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and other small-scale contingencies were increasing, even as resources—and consequently manpower—were decreasing. As we observed in Chapter Four, those conditions forced

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the Army to rely on reserve component support forces routinely, and even to begin to rely on ARNG combat forces to undertake lower-risk missions.

The demand for Army capabilities intensified after September 11. Initially, it may have seemed as if the Army would be able to apply the Total Force Policy in the same way that it had in the 1990s: mobilizing reserve component support forces for all contingencies, then employing ARNG combat forces later once the situation had stabilized. Even when the Army initially decided to deploy ARNG combat forces to Iraq, the situation—while admittedly riskier than the Balkans—was still far from the full-fledged insurgency that it later became.

Yet instead of diminishing, the insurgency metastasized. Operational demands expanded well beyond the Regular Army’s capacity to meet them. DoD policymakers declined to expand the Regular Army—which may well have been infeasible due to a robust economy and unpopular war that combined to reduce young Americans’ propensity to serve—and were thus forced to rely on the reserve components to provide manpower and capabilities to meet operational demands for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Eventually, policy caught up with practice. By 2011, Congress even authorized DoD to mobilize reservists involuntarily for routine missions, just as long as those missions had been forecasted and resourced through the normal budget process.

Throughout this difficult period, popular and elite opinion continued to support an expansive foreign policy and a military capable enough to underwrite it, regardless of opinion with regard to specific manifestations, such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Policymakers and voters both believed that the United States should continue to play the dominant role in world affairs and that the U.S. military should remain “Number 1.” In view of ambitious objectives and doubts about the ability to recruit a Regular Army large enough to support them, continued reliance on the reserve components in both “peace” and war appeared to be inevitable.

Routine employment of the Army’s reserve components thus proved to be a durable result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In effect, the reserve components were treated similarly to the Regular Army, albeit at a lower state of readiness. Even diminished demand did not cause policy to revert to its prewar state, as the Army’s experience with the ARI illustrated. According to contemporary analyses, the ARI represented the most cost-effective way to provide attack helicopter capabilities for ongoing operations and specified contingency plans. Yet it threatened to relegate the ARNG’s aviation forces to their prewar status as a “strategic reserve.” National Guard proponents also feared that it foreshadowed the eventual loss of the Guard’s role as the Army’s “combat reserve.” In spite of vigorous lobbying and considerable congressional sympathy for the Guard, however, Congress declined to accept Guard arguments that the nation should rely on Guard forces for all but the most immediate operational missions. Although neither Congress nor the NCFA challenged Guard proponents’ assertions that ARNG units provided identical capability as substantially less cost, there were no moves to place principal reliance on the ARNG to provide the bulk of capa-
bilities needed for current operations and future conflict. The resulting compromise over attack helicopters paid homage to the Guard’s role as the Army’s “combat reserve,” but, by substantially reducing the number of attack helicopters allocated to the Guard, it also implicitly validated the Army’s primary reliance on Regular Army forces to meet the most important operational demands.

In short, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq led to the evolution of the Army’s reserve components into an “operational force.” The reserve components are liable to contribute capabilities under the full range of circumstances, just like Regular Army forces. In the short term, temporary alleviation in operational demands might create conditions that could reduce reliance on an operational reserve. On the other hand, competing demands for resources could enforce even greater reliance on the reserve components. Looking forward, the future evolution of the Total Force Policy will probably continue to depend on trends in operational demands and available resources.
Understanding the factors that shaped the evolution of Total Force Policy since 1970 can help Army leaders guide that evolution going forward. As Richard Neustadt and Ernest May put it in *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*:

Knowing how the concerns emerged, knowing how the situation evolved, can help. That knowledge by itself will not answer the questions [facing decision makers]. The future can never look exactly like the past. Usually it should not. But past conditions can offer clues to future possibilities.

In the case of the Total Force Policy, there are four main factors that have shaped its evolution: DoD’s analytic processes; constraints on manpower, money, and reserve components’ availability for training; change in the roles of the components; and congressional preferences for continuity.

**DoD’s Analytic Scenarios Frame the Debate**

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s unfortunate aphorism “you go to war with the army you have” inadvertently highlights an important truth: DoD shapes the Army to fight the wars it anticipates, which seldom match the wars the Army actually fights in all their relevant particulars. In and of itself, that circumstance merely illustrates that prediction is difficult. The broader implication is that to shape the force—including the capabilities of the Army’s reserve components—it is necessary to first shape the scenarios—that is, any cases or constructs used to guide force development—from which that force will be derived.

“Support to Strategic Analysis” is the name for the process by which DoD derives the Armed Forces’ size and structure from a set of designated warfighting scenarios. This process can trace its lineage back at least as far as Robert S. McNamara’s institu-

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tion of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process. At least nominally, forces were funded according to the role they were expected to play in these scenarios. In the 1970s and 1980s, the relevant scenario was a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The need to generate combat power rapidly led to a focus on employing smaller, more easily mobilized reserve component units. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, major regional contingencies became the relevant force-sizing scenarios. Once again, the scenarios in question seemed to dictate a need for responsive capabilities. In turn, the need for responsiveness seemed to dictate reliance on Regular Army combat forces throughout the Base Force discussions, Bottom-Up Review, and 1997 QDR, even as DoD tweaked the scenarios parameters in response to changing strategic circumstances and the need to justify budget reductions. Similarly, the scenarios in use in 2013 set the terms for the debate over the ARI.

This reliance on scenario-based planning has highlighted the importance of Regular Army units and smaller, more responsive reserve component units as well. The scenarios used to support the Base Force and Bottom-Up Review justified substantial reductions in Guard and Reserve force structure, particularly with regard to ARNG combat divisions. Several different analyses—Army, DoD, and GAO—found the 2014 ARI to be a nearly unique solution to the planning scenarios then in use. Even though the NCFA did not agree that the ARI represented the best solution to actual strategic requirements, it did acknowledge that it was the best solution to the specific problems described in planning scenarios.

Even with a sympathetic audience in Congress, arguments that planning scenarios do not necessarily represent the full range of potential operations in which the United States might become involved, or reflect the actual conduct of those operations, have carried relatively little weight. In the 1970s and 1980s, reserve component advocates expressed caution about the “short war” scenarios guiding defense planning. In the 1990s, similar voices argued that the prescribed scenarios overstated the actual need for responsiveness, citing the six-month buildup to Desert Storm. Those arguments had little effect, and advocates for the Guard and Reserve were instead forced to argue—at something of a disadvantage—that major maneuver units could be ready for combat in 60 days or fewer, conclusions that even allies such as Les Aspin were reluctant to accept. While Congress has often rejected the implications of analyses showing that ARNG combat forces are surplus to requirements, it has seldom challenged the analyses themselves.

DoD appears to be reducing its reliance on the planning scenarios governing force structure, however. In 2011, OSD CAPE reduced its participation in the Support

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to Strategic Analysis process. Officials were concerned that the process had become too cumbersome and manpower-intensive to support the actual decisions confronting DoD. Instead, OSD CAPE relied on combatant commanders’ contingency plans as the basis for evaluating programs and force structure.\(^4\) To the extent that the shift is limited to contingency plans rather than scenarios, the mode of analysis will not affect the allocation of roles and missions among the components. Whoever establishes the parameters of the strategic and operational problems to be solved will continue to set the terms of the debate over force structure, a debate in which advocates for the Regular Army retain an inherent advantage. If, however, DoD’s processes for establishing force structure move away from scenario-based planning, it may provide an opportunity for proponents of the reserve components to recast the debate in terms more favorable to reserve forces.\(^4\)

**Constrained Resources Limit Policy Options**

The Army’s implementation of the Total Force Policy evolved as it did within a number of exogenous constraints. The Army had, at best, a limited ability to loosen those constraints over this time period.

**Manpower**

Of the constraints, manpower was the most important. Melvin Laird initially articulated the total force concept as part of a broader effort to reconstitute a credible conventional deterrent in Europe. Due to an inequitable system of conscription and an unpopular war in Vietnam, the United States could no longer count on conscription to provide the manpower for large-scale conflict with the Warsaw Pact. It seemed unlikely that the Armed Forces could find enough volunteers to man a Regular Army large enough for that purpose, at least at the price that DoD could afford to pay in 1970. The only plausible sources of additional manpower at that time were the reserve components. In the 1980s—when the Reagan defense buildup meant that money was no object in reconstituting U.S. capability—Congress declined to authorize growth in Regular forces’ end strength on the grounds that the Armed Forces were already getting all the recruits they were likely to get. Even though all three Army components chafed against end-strength reductions that funded a “peace dividend,” all three experienced significant difficulty maintaining even the end strengths to which they were reduced. A similar dynamic recurred in the mid-2000s when all three components struggled to maintain their strength in the face of a reasonably strong economy and unpopular war.

Money constrained the Army’s alternatives as well, though to varying degrees over the period. When Laird originated the Total Force Policy, a weak economy and the Nixon administration’s fiscal conservatism limited resources available for defense in general and manpower in particular. Under these conditions, the Army could not have afforded the pay and incentives needed to maintain an Army large enough to deter the Soviets. The Reagan administration’s willingness to fund DoD through deficit spending removed the fiscal constraints for several years. Once the Soviet Union collapsed and political leaders attempted to provide a “peace dividend,” those constraints returned. The Army’s 1997 QDR and 2013 ARI both attempted to reconcile strategic requirements with fiscal constraints and brought the Army’s components into conflict. No matter how large the Army’s budget, Army leaders will always face the challenge of allocating additional resources among end strength, readiness, and modernization to maximize Army capabilities.

Yet while Americans’ propensity to serve and available fiscal resources have persistently limited the Regular Army’s capacity—indeed, that of all the components—reserve forces’ availability for training significantly limits their ability to replace Regular Army forces, especially large forces, such as brigade combat teams, performing complicated missions. In 1970, relying on ARNG roundout brigades may not have appeared likely to reduce Army capabilities greatly. As the Army underwent its training revolution, however, it became clear that focused, well-resourced training could dramatically increase unit proficiency. With only 39 days of training per year, ARNG brigades could not approach Regular Army levels of unit performance. The 48th Brigade required more than 100 days of training before it was certified for deployment to Operation Desert Storm in 1991, while brigade combat teams preparing for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan required about six months of predeployment training. Throughout the 1990s, this inevitable limit on ARNG combat forces’ ability to mobilize meant that successive reviews—the Base Force, the Bottom-Up Review, and the 1997 QDR—relied almost exclusively on Regular Army combat forces to perform the most urgent and challenging missions. It is difficult to see how reserve forces can mitigate the impact of limited training time on combat forces’ proficiency or increase the amount of training they receive and still maintain their character as reserve forces.

For the foreseeable future, these constraints will not relax. The pool of recruits is not projected to grow significantly or shrink substantially. There is likely to be contin-

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ued pressure on defense spending. The Congressional Budget Office projects increasing federal debts and deficits, largely due to projected increases in entitlement spending. It is likely that fewer resources will be available for DoD and thus for the Army. Finally, it is hard to envision that the pressures of the modern American economy will enable significant increases in the time available for reserve component forces to train, except on an occasional basis. Fluctuations in the economy and other contingent events may cause propensity for military service to decline at precisely the times that military manpower is most needed. Any change to the current incarnation of the Total Force Policy will have to address the constraints imposed by manpower, money, and the time available to train.

Components’ Complementary Roles

In addition to constraints, the Total Force Policy’s evolution has been the result of the Army’s collective ability to identify ways for reserve component forces to complement Regular Army capabilities. By the time the Army’s reserve components had evolved into an “operational force,” the Army had succeeded in integrating reserve component forces into operations to an unprecedented degree. The Army did so by relying on the different components to provide complementary capabilities. The Regular Army provided the combat forces needed for the most critical strategic tasks and those support forces immediately required in a crisis. The Army Reserve primarily provided support forces, and only support forces after the 1994 Offsite Agreement. The National Guard also provided support forces and combat forces for lower-risk, lower-priority missions.

“Complementary” is not the same thing as “equivalent,” however. While Guard advocates maintain that it can provide combat capabilities equivalent to those of the Regular Army—albeit with a modicum of postmobilization training—the actual historical record can neither validate nor completely invalidate this assertion. What that record does show is that by relying on its three components to provide complementary capabilities, the Army was able to provide effective operational capabilities for land warfare at significantly lower costs than it could have by relying exclusively on Regular Army forces. Increasing reliance on the reserve components would require identifying additional functions and missions that the reserve component units could perform at acceptable levels of risk. As a rule, reserve component units have achieved premobilization readiness at the company level at best. However, most types of support units—supply, transportation, personnel service support, and so forth—do operate at company level or below. The Army has thus increased its reliance on reserve component support units from 1970 forward. Reserve component support units performed acceptably in the first Gulf War and have done so since.

It has been more difficult to find a complementary role for ARNG combat forces. Defense reformers often view ARNG combat brigades as acceptable substitutes for
their Regular Army counterparts. Senator Sam Nunn, for example, proposed transferring the “heavy armor mission” to the reserve components after the Soviet Union’s demise became apparent. However, preparing reserve component units to synchronize and integrate combined arms operations at the battalion echelon and higher has required extensive postmobilization training incompatible with prevailing concepts of rapid deployment. Cold War operations plans placed a premium on responsiveness and deployability, a premium that actually seemed to increase after the Cold War ended. U.S. planning for the two-major-regional-contingency force-sizing construct that prevailed in the 1990s emphasized the need to deny aggressors the ability to consolidate their gains and also to conclude wars rapidly. As the roundout brigades experience during the Gulf War demonstrated, however, it was difficult for ARNG combat forces to achieve Regular Army standards of proficiency rapidly. It took in excess of 100 days of postmobilization training before Army officials certified the 48th Brigade ready for operational employment. By the early 2000s, the Army was providing almost six months of postmobilization training before ARNG brigades deploying to conduct arguably less potentially lethal counterinsurgency missions. It should be noted that Guard advocates disputed Regular Army estimates of the time required to prepare combat forces for deployment.

Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams intended for roundout brigades to allow the Army to stretch its combat capabilities to cover contingencies outside of Europe during the Cold War. Later, in the 1990s, DoD sized the Army for two major theater wars but employed it to conduct peacekeeping operations. Units employed in peacekeeping operations were not available for short-notice deployments to other crises, nor could they prepare effectively for combat operations while deployed. Readiness suffered accordingly. To release Regular Army forces for combat operations, the Army began deploying ARNG combat forces to conduct peacekeeping and stability operations in the Sinai Peninsula and the Balkans, a practice that intensified during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army also employed ARNG combat forces extensively to provide security—a less demanding but still vital mission—to U.S. bases and lines of communication in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the Army has even employed ARNG units to conduct counterinsurgency operations, generally in lower-threat contexts.6

To the extent that future resource constraints entail greater reliance on the reserve components, it will be necessary to analyze operational plans and concepts of operation more closely in order to identify additional functions and missions that reserve component units can perform at acceptable risk. Over the period covered by this history, such missions have either been support missions conducted by company-sized or smaller units, missions in lower-threat areas of operations, or missions that do not require extensive synchronization and integration of combined arms operations.

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6 It must be acknowledged that the deployment of 2nd Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania Army National Guard), to Ramadi in 2005–2006 was anything but low-risk.
Congressional Preferences for Continuity in Policy

The final factor that has influenced the evolution of the Total Force Policy is Congress. Put simply, congressional members tended to resist policy changes that seemed to represent a sharp break with established practice and policy. In 1990, after over a decade of the Army’s rhetorical emphasis on the Total Force, key members of Congress reacted sharply against DoD’s initial decision not to mobilize the roundout brigades for the Persian Gulf War. Shortly afterward, Congress initially rejected the Base Force’s recommendations for substantial reductions in reserve component force structure and end strength, as well as similar recommendations in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. Large-scale reductions in the wake of the 1997 QDR did not even make it to Congress. As the Army’s experience with the 2013 ARI indicates, Congress also reacts sharply to what stakeholders perceive as major qualitative changes in reserve component roles.

In this resistance to changes in the reserve components’ roles and resources, congressmen reflect the interests of their constituents. The Guardsmen, Reservists, military technicians, and other civil servants supporting reserve component units reside and presumably vote in particular districts. For National Guard constituents, at least, preserving the National Guard’s status as the Army’s “combat reserve” is an especially strong interest. It is not the only one, however, that motivates congressional representatives and senators; other interests are also at stake. Representative Sonny Montgomery of Mississippi made sure to highlight reserve component units’ economic impacts on local communities as Congress discussed the post–Cold War drawdown. In fact, as congressional participation in the NCFA’s deliberations indicates, many elected representatives with strong interests in military affairs—such as Major General (retired) Montgomery—are themselves current or former members of the reserve components. Members have subjected—and are likely to continue to subject—any proposal that erodes those constituents’ interests to rigorous scrutiny.

Analysis of congressional behavior with regard to the reserve components must also account for the influence of the reserve components’ powerful lobbying arms, especially NGAUS. Over the period between 1970 and 2015, NGAUS demonstrated considerable effectiveness. Congress more than doubled the number of full-time personnel supporting the Guard, an issue perennially at or near the top of NGAUS’s legislative priorities, among many other measures intended to improve its readiness. Funding steadily increased, even as ARNG end strength declined. NGAUS helped foil—at least initially—DoD efforts to reduce Guard force structure and end strength. NGAUS arguments seemed to resonate with Congress and were reflected in committee reports accompanying the various NDAAs. In 2012, Congress put the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, another long-time NGAUS policy goal.

For all that, NGAUS’s influence and Congress members’ sympathies with their reserve component constituents were insufficient to determine the evolution of Total
Force Policy. While initial resistance to DoD and Army proposals to reduce reserve component resources in the early 1990s was stiff, Congress eventually conceded much of what DoD had originally sought. For example, Congress initially refused to approve Base Force plans to reduce Army reserve component end-strength levels by 157,000 in 1992. By the end of the decade, however, Congress had approved reductions in their combined end strength of about 210,000. Though Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer’s post-1997 QDR proposals to reduce reserve component end strength in order to maintain Regular Army end strength of 480,000 were politically infeasible, Congress did not force the Army to make further reductions in Regular Army end strength below that level. Although Congress was sympathetic to arguments for increasing reliance for the nation’s defense to reserve component forces in the early 1990s, Congress never compelled DoD to reduce Regular Army forces to the point at which DoD would have had to rely on ARNG combat forces as part of the decisive phase of military operations. And, while the NCFA—and, by extension Congress—declined to endorse the ARI’s wholesale transfer of the attack aviation mission to the Regular Army, it acceded to a substantial reduction in ARNG capacity.

Explaining why Congress supports the ARNG’s position—and, to a lesser extent, the Army Reserve’s—is relatively easy. Doing so aligns members with politically influential lobbying organizations such as NGAUS, protects member’s constituents’ interests, and—in the case of current and former Guardsmen and Reservists—accords with their own personal worldview. As the foregoing examples indicate, however, Congress does not always side with the Guard. Explaining why this is so is somewhat more challenging, especially since there is relatively little documentary evidence of congressmen publicly challenging Guard arguments.

The debate over the Base Force in the early 1990s provides some hints, though. It was absolutely central to the Guard’s position that any reserve component unit could be made ready for deployment within 60 days. Military leaders such as Colin Powell and Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan insisted that it would take at least 90 days of postmobilization training for ARNG combat brigades to achieve the necessary readiness. Though it undercut his preferred strategy to some degree, House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin sided with Powell and Sullivan. “We’re talking about lives here,” he explained. This incident may illustrate that while Congress is loathe to deprive the Guard and Reserve of resources, it is equally reluctant to overrule the professional military completely on matters when lives or national security is at stake. Congress tends to be more accepting of proposals that represent a viable consensus and that demonstrate continuity with past policy.

Based on the foregoing analysis of historical events, it seems clear that the Total Force Policy or its successor will continue to evolve with constraints imposed by the security environment—including especially resources available for defense—and a
better understanding of how the components might complement each other’s capabilities. Future security challenges are of course unclear. The Total Force Policy emerged primarily to confront the strategic challenge posed by the Soviet Union within fiscal and manpower constraints. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the policy evolved to meet the demands of regional contingency operations. No one foresaw, however, the emergence of peacekeeping operations as a heavy demand on Army operational capabilities, or the need to conduct large-scale, protracted counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no reason to suppose that DoD’s ability to predict major changes in the security environment will improve substantially in the future. The nature of that future security environment will probably be the dominant factor in determining how the Army will size, organize, and employ the force.
# APPENDIX A

## Summary Table of Legislation Pertaining to the Evolution of U.S. Military Policy

### Table A.1
Summary Table of Legislation Pertaining to the Evolution of U.S. Military Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute/Act</th>
<th>Historical Context</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Links to Titles 10 and 32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| U.S. Constitution: Militia, Raise/ Support Armies, and President as Commander in Chief Clauses | • 1787: Framers want small standing army  
  • Framers envision a select portion of the militia as a federal reserve  
  • Framers also envision the militia as the military force to deal with domestic issues such as insurrection and enforcement of laws | • The constitutional basis for Regular Army, federal army reserve, and militias  
  • No constitutional link between Regular Army and militia  
  • Future policy—laws enacted—would therefore define roles of militia and Regular Army | • Title 32 states National Guard is trained and has its officers appointed under militia clause  
  • Title 10 organized current U.S. Army under raise/support armies clause |
| 1792 Uniform Militia Act             | • George Washington wants militia organized on his 1783 “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment” | • Congress passes militia law with no mechanism for federal enforcement  
  • Is based on militia clause of Constitution  
  • Only militia law until 1903 | | |
| 1795 Amendment to the 1792 Calling Forth Act | • Concern over 1794 Whiskey Rebellion and possible future rebellions  
  • Congress’s trust in Washington allows them to give Executive control over militia to deal with domestic problems | • Gives President power to call forth militia without restrictions placed by the 1792 act  
  • Starts the statutory movement away from the militia envisioned in Constitution | • Title 10 gives President authority to either “call forth” or “order” National Guard without congressional authorization per 1795 act |
Table A.1—continued

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| **1799 “Augment the Army” Act** | Failure of negotiations with France increased fear of war between the two nations  
Domestic unrest at home over taxes to pay for military mobilization increases need for expanded military to deal with insurrections | • Gives President power to expand temporarily the Regular Army by 24 regiments  
President given authority to accept organized companies of volunteers from the militia into federal service  
1799 act gives President authority to use this expanded Army for the same purposes when “calling forth” the militia | • Title 10 gives President power to expand Regular Army and use it for domestic problems in combination with National Guard per the 1795 act |
| **1807 Insurrection Act** | With frontier expanding and continuing domestic unrest, there is need for Regular Army for internal problems in addition to Militias | • Gives President authority to use the Regular Army and Navy for internal rebellions and other problems  
Completes the statutory movement away from militia envisioned in Constitution | • Title 10 gives President authority to use Regular forces for domestic problems |
| **1863 Enrollment Act** | American Civil War. Union Army having trouble relying on states to bring men and units under federal control to meet manpower demand after two years of war with high casualties | • First federal statutory law that authorized a federal draft premised on universal military duty under the “raise and support armies” clause | • Title 10 relies on the Constitution to give it the statutory means to raise and support an army  
Implicit is the assumption that a national draft might be necessary to do so, as stipulated in Title 50 |
| **1898 Act to Provide for Temporarily Increasing the Peace Establishment of the United States in Time of War** | Spanish-American War. Regular Army and state National Guards largely unprepared for expeditionary warfare  
Debacle of deploying the Army to Cuba to fight Spain spurs significant postwar Army reforms | • Continues Congress on path increasing reliance on armies clause to organize army for war and maintains precedent for American men liable for service in “national forces” | • Same as 1863 Enrollment Act |
Table A.1—continued

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<tr>
<td>1903 Act to Promote Efficiency of Militia (Dick Act)</td>
<td>• Spanish-American War reveals problems expanding Army and its readiness</td>
<td>• First update to Uniform Militia Act for federal organizing of militia since 1792</td>
<td>• Title 32 refers to Guard as “organized militia” and directs state Guards to be organized like Regular Army</td>
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<td>• Secretary of War (Elihu Root) implements major reforms for U.S. Army</td>
<td>• Is based on militia clause</td>
<td>• Title 32 is premised on militia clause and armies clause of Constitution</td>
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<td>• United States enters world stage as new global power</td>
<td>• Is statutory birthday of modern Guard</td>
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<td>• Perceived need for major Army reform to fight 20th century industrial wars</td>
<td>• Federal government recognizes state Guards as “organized militia”</td>
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<td>• Directs state Guards to be organized like Regular Army</td>
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<td>• Establishes federal oversight</td>
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<td>• Formalizes process of trading autonomy for federal aid</td>
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<td>• Directs Guard units to train for a minimum of 24 drill periods per year, including a 5-day summer encampment</td>
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<td>• Funds Guard 5-day encampments</td>
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<td>1908 Army Medical Department Act (April)</td>
<td>• Experience in Spanish-American War with casualties because of poor sanitation and health issues drives need for reform in Army medical care</td>
<td>• Establishes Medical Reserve Corps</td>
<td>• Title 10 Army Reserve premised on armies clause</td>
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<tr>
<td>1908 Dick Act Amendment</td>
<td>• Growing tension between Regular Army and War Department and state Guards</td>
<td>• Statutory birthday of Army Reserve</td>
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<td>• Constitutional debate over use of state Guards in foreign wars as organized militia</td>
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<td>• State Guards worry federal volunteers will eclipse their desire to be in first line of defense</td>
<td>• Establishes state National Guards as Organized Militia of Several States when called to federal service before any volunteers (individuals or units) and can deploy overseas</td>
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<td>• Further stokes legal debate over constitutionality of deploying the state Guards, organized on the militia clause, outside of United States</td>
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<td>• Title 32 stipulates state Guards are trained and have their officers appointed under the militia clause</td>
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### Table A.1—continued

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1916 National Defense Act</td>
<td>• World War I underway for two years • Mexican border issues • Debate over whether</td>
<td>• Establishes National Guard as component of Army when federalized and in service of the United States • Constitutional premise is armies clause • Directs state Guards to be organized like Regular Army • Gives detailed organization direction for Army • Establishes Organized Reserves and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) • Funds Guard for weekly armory training • Is major increase of federal oversight and control of Guard • Sets end-strength goal for state Guards at 435,000 and Regular Army at 280,000 • States that Guards when federalized will be drafted as individuals • Establishes Militia Bureau under Secretary of War, not Army Chief of Staff</td>
<td>• Title 10 recognizes the Army National Guard of the United States as a standing reserve component of the Army • Virtually all funding for National Guard under Title 10 is based on Congress organizing the Guard for war under the armies clause • Title 10 allows for Reserve Officers Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917 Selective Service Act</td>
<td>• U.S. enters World War I, needs to form quickly a mass citizen-based war army • Selective Service national draft is the means to provide manpower</td>
<td>• First major national draft in American history • Draws on 1898 act and 1863 Enrollment Act that virtually all adult males are susceptible to federal military service • First time Army receives major amounts of manpower without using the state militia systems</td>
<td>• Title 10 is statutory framework to carry out constitutional provision to raise and support armies • National conscription is an implicit mechanism in Title 10 and explicitly stated in Title 50, to carry out that function, if needed • Conscription into federal forces premised on armies clause</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1920 Army Reorganization Act (amendment to 1916 National Defense Act)</td>
<td>• End of World War I yields more debate on how to organize peacetime army</td>
<td>• Continues much of 1916 National Defense Act</td>
<td>• Title 10 National Guard Bureau headed by Guard officer</td>
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<td>• War Department produces plan similar to 1915 Continental Army Plan that calls for federal-only reserve to Army</td>
<td>• Sets end-strength goal for Guard 435,000, Regular Army 280,000 (but over next 20 years, neither is funded to those levels)</td>
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<td>• Backlash from Congress</td>
<td>• Word draft used to bring Guard to federal service but says Guard can be used for any mission (implying foreign wars)</td>
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<td>• John M. Palmer becomes key adviser to Senate Military Affairs Committee</td>
<td>• Makes Chief of Militia a Guard officer (formerly a Regular Army officer); also says if Guard demobilized from federal service will be by units, not individuals</td>
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<td>• Demobilization of Guard as individuals not units embitters Guard toward Regular Army</td>
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<td>• National Guard had sought this kind of legislation since the years following end of World War I</td>
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<td>1933 National Guard Act (amendment to 1916 National Defense Act)</td>
<td>• Main problem is how to mobilize mass citizen-based war army</td>
<td>• Is statutory birth of modern guard as dual state and federal reserve force</td>
<td>• Title 10 defines U.S. Army as Regular Army, Army National Guard of the Several States, the Army National Guard while in the Service of the United States, and the Army Reserve</td>
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<td>• Both Regular Army and Guard at 50%</td>
<td>• Establishes U.S. Army as the Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, the Officers Reserve Corps, the Organized Reserves, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps</td>
<td>• Title 10 uses “call forth” and “order” to federalize Guard</td>
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<td>• Organized Reserve units are manned at skeleton levels</td>
<td>• Says Guard is reserve component of U.S. Army at all times; because Guard is permanent reserve of Army the word ordered is used for first time</td>
<td>• Joins the armies and militia clauses into statutory law.</td>
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<td>• Based on World War I experience, National Guard Association of the United States and Guard lobby Congress hard for Guard to be made reserve component of Army at all times</td>
<td>• The statutory birthday of the modern Army Total Force</td>
<td>• Title 32 reflects “joining” by stating Guard is trained and has officers appointed under militia clause; however, it is organized and equipped under the armies clause</td>
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<td>• National Guard had sought this kind of legislation since the years following end of World War I</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940 Selective Service Act</td>
<td>• World War II looms</td>
<td>• Stipulates explicitly the term “traditional military policy of the United States” is to maintain “at all times” the National Guard as “integral part of first line defenses”</td>
<td>• Title 32 (as does Title 50) stipulates almost verbatim the term “traditional military policy” as stated in the 1940 Selective Service Act</td>
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<td>• Regular Army, Guard, and Organized Reserves mobilizing and preparing</td>
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<td>• Palmer brought back by Marshall to think about postwar military policy</td>
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<td>• Guard worries again about being eclipsed by War Department relying on Army Reserve before Guard</td>
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APPENDIX B

Taxonomy of Important Terms

**Active component:** This term is often used as a substitute for the Regular component of any of the military Services, and is often confused with *active duty*.

**Active duty:** The term *active duty* means full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. The term includes full-time training duty, annual training duty, and attendance, while in the active military service, at a school designated as a service school by law or by the Secretary of the military department concerned. The term does not include full-time National Guard duty (10 USC 101(d)(1)).

**Armies clause:** Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress “shall have the power to,” among other things, “raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than Two Years.”

**Army National Guard (ARNG):** ARNG is defined in 32 USC 101 as “that part of the organized militia of the several States and Territories, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, active and inactive that a) is a land force; b) is trained, and has its officers appointed, under the 16th clause of section 8, article I, of the Constitution; c) is organized, armed, and equipped wholly or partly at Federal expense; and d) is federally recognized.” The National Defense Act of 1916 introduced the use of the term *National Guard* for the organized militia. After the National Security Act of 1947 created the Air Force, the term *Army National Guard* was established to distinguish the land force. When referring to the Army National Guard as a reserve component of the Army, either of the terms *reserve component* (singular) or *reserve components* (plural) should be used. Title 10 of the U.S. Code generally uses the plural term, but it also uses the singular term, which is why either of the two can be used. See also *Army National Guard of the United States* and *National Guard*.

**Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS):** The ARNGUS is the reserve component of the Army all of whose members are members of the Army National Guard (10 USC 101(c)(3)). See also *Army National Guard* and *National Guard*.
Army of the United States divisions, World War II: Formed by the War Department starting in 1943, these were divisions formed in excess of what the 1920 amendment had established: 9 Regular Army, 18 National Guard, and 36 Organized Reserve divisions.

Army Total Force Policy: This is a formal term adopted in DoD and Department of the Army policy (not statutory law) documents starting in 1970 with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s “total force concept” for the entire DoD. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger later formalized Laird’s “total force concept” as the “total force policy” in 1973. It would be incorrect to apply this term to the U.S. Army of 1936, or even 1966, since it is a specific historical term that emerged in a specific historical context. This term was created in an attempt to characterize a shift in DoD thinking, which included higher expectations for the annual investments made in reserve forces and resulting higher levels of readiness.

Calling forth militia clause: Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress “shall have the power to,” among other things, “provide for calling forth The militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”

Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB): The CNGB is responsible for the organization and operation of the National Guard Bureau but does not exercise command over the Army and Air National Guards of the States and Territories. The CNGB serves as a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries and Service Chiefs of the Army and Air Force on issues related to the nonfederalized National Guard. In 2011, Congress revised 10 USC 10502 to include the CNGB as a four-star general and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Commander-in-chief clause: Article II, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution states that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States . . .”

Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG): Since 1948 and under 10 USC 10506, the DARNG is appointed by the President and is tasked with assisting the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau related to the Army National Guard. To be eligible for this four-year post, the officer must be an active member of the Army National Guard and have been nominated for selection by his or her governor or, in the case of the District of Columbia, the commanding general of the District of Columbia National Guard. The President may, with or without the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation, appoint the DARNG from general officers of the Army National Guard.
Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC): Established in federal law by the 1916 National Defense Act, the ERC comprised prior enlisted men from the Regular Army and new enlistees who would receive specialty skills training in the Regular Army. It was similar to the Officers’ Reserve Corps in that it was intended to provide a manpower replacement pool of enlisted soldiers with special skills for Engineers, Signal, Quartermaster, and Medical Corps to expand the Regular Army when needed. But, like the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the law allowed the President to assign ERC members as reservists to the Regular Army or to form new reserve organizations. Only a handful of men came into the ERC.

First-line defenses and second-line defenses: First-line defenses refers to U.S. ground and naval forces that will first meet an enemy of the United States in combat. Second-line defenses refers to follow-on forces that will take much longer to mobilize and prepare for battle. For example, in the 19th century, the first line of ground defenses against an invasion from a foreign power was the small Regular Army scattered throughout the country alongside the state militias. The second line in this context would have been a larger volunteer army that would be mobilized by the several states and provided for federal service. In the 20th century, which ground forces were in the first and second lines of defense became the subject of debate among the War Department, Regular Army, and National Guard proponents. Guardsmen saw their organized state militia units as being a part of the first-line defense with the Regular Army. In their view, the Regular Army would respond first but would be quickly joined by ready National Guard units. In this view, the second line would have been the larger volunteer or conscript army. Many Regular Army officers contested this view, arguing that the first-line defenses ought to comprise only the Regular Army and a federal reserve force. The second line of defense, in their view, would have been the larger militia and volunteer army that would take time to mobilize and train. In this view, the state National Guards would be dedicated to state missions, and not typically part of the larger war army, which many Regular Army officers believed must be under the command of one commander-in-chief, namely the President, and not subordinate to state governors, as were the state National Guards.

Inactive Duty for Training (IDT): First codified in 1952, this term refers to authorized training performed by a member of the Army Reserve or National Guard not on active duty or active duty for training. Commonly known as “weekend drill,” IDT includes regularly scheduled unit training assemblies, equivalent or additional training, and any special duties authorized for reserve component personnel by the Secretary concerned.

Medical Reserve Corps: Established in federal law on April 23, 1908, in response to capability shortfalls during the 1898 Spanish-American War, the Medical Reserve Corps was the first federal reserve to the U.S. Army organized under the armies clause.
It was to be made up of certified medical doctors who had volunteered to serve in the Medical Reserve Corps and be called to active service when the need was determined by the Secretary of War. This Medical Reserve Corps was the forerunner of the modern Army Reserve of today.

**Military policy:** Refers to the foundational laws that govern the U.S. Army by defining what the Army consists of—its component parts—and the relationship between those component parts. The first true legal statement of a military policy to govern the Army was the 1916 National Defense Act, although that law did not use the term explicitly. See also *traditional military policy*.

**Militia:** See Appendix A: Summary Table of 19th Century Militias and Volunteer Forces. Also see *organized militia*.

**Militia clause:** Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress “shall have the power to,” among other things, “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

**Mobilize or mobilization:** Refers to either calling forth militias of the several states or ordering the reserve components to federal service to augment the Regular Army.

**National Army divisions, World War I:** Established by the War Department in 1917 to designate newly formed Army divisions that were made up of draftees (and cadres from Regular Army and National Guard formations) that were created in addition to Regular Army and National Guard divisions.

**National Guard:** The National Guard evolved out of the volunteer uniformed militias that developed prior to the Civil War. After the Civil War, starting in the 1870s, volunteer uniformed militia units increasingly called themselves National Guard or National Guards. Until the early 20th century, these National Guard units were state entities unto themselves with little or no federal oversight or authority. With the Dick Act in 1903 came federal recognition of the National Guard units as the “organized militia” of the several states. Over the course of the 20th century, the level of federal funding for the National Guard increased to the point that, today, virtually all of the funding for the National Guard comes from the federal government. See also *Army National Guard* and *Army National Guard of the United States*.

**Officers’ Reserve Corps:** Established in federal law by the 1916 National Defense Act to facilitate the rapid expansion of the Army, the Officers’ Reserve Corps was to consist of men who had volunteered to be in it, had received the appropriate level of
training as further stipulated by the 1916 act, and would be liable to be ordered by the
President to federal service to fill out and expand the ranks of the Regular Army. The
Officers’ Reserve Corps was premised on the armies clause. Its historical use was gener-
ally during the period between 1916 and 1941.

**Organized militia** and **unorganized militia**: The first use of the term *organized militia* in federal law was in the 1903 Dick Act, which recognized the National Guards of the several states as the “organized militia” and premised on the militia clauses. This statutory term should not be confused with various militia units in 18th and 19th century America that were organized, either under compulsory service or volunteerism.

The term **unorganized militia** was first stipulated in federal law in the 1903 Dick Act to refer to men between ages 18 and 45 who were not members of the state National Guards or “organized militia.”

**Organized Reserve Corps**: This term is often used in post–World War II writings to describe the “Organized Reserves” during the interwar years from 1920 to 1940. The term *Organized Reserve Corps* was not used during those interwar years unless someone was referring to an actual “corps” formation in the Organized Reserves. The term *Organized Reserve Corps* came into use during the World War II years, especially when planners were writing about postwar Army organizations. However, the term was first stipulated in federal law in the Army Organization Act of 1950. The 1952 Armed Forces Reserve Act then stipulated the term *Organized Reserve Corps* would be replaced with *Army Reserve*. Therefore, the term *Organized Reserve Corps* should be used carefully and only when referring to the years between roughly 1944 and 1952. Unfortunately, many secondary sources use *Organized Reserve Corps* interchangeably with *Organized Reserves* to describe the Organized Reserves during the interwar years. One other point of confusion is that the abbreviation *ORC* is also used for the Officers’ Reserve Corps; the two organizations are obviously quite different and distinct.

**Organized Reserves**: Established in the 1920 amendment to the 1916 National Defense Act, the Organized Reserves consisted of the Officers’ Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps. The 1920 law added this new term from the 1916 National Defense Act for organizational purposes, because when World War I ended in 1918, the Department of War intended to maintain in peacetime an organized Army reserve, under the armies clause, that had actual “in being” corps, divisions, regiments, etc. A big difference from the National Guard was that the Organized Reserve units were of skeletal strength, consisting only of officers. Importantly, the 1920 amendment designated nine corps regional areas in the United States responsible for training and recruiting for the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserve divisions in it. The 1920 amendment stipulated that each corps area would have one Regular Army division, two National Guard divisions, and three Organized Reserve divisions.
This force structure would become the nucleus for a greater Army expansion in World War II.

**Regular Army**: In continuous existence since 1788 as stipulated in federal law, the Regular Army is the full-time, standing component of the Army. The term *active duty* is often used as being synonymous with the Regular Army, but it is not. The confusion comes from the premise of the Regular Army being a full-time “active” force.

**Reserve component**: This singular term may refer to any of the reserve components of the military services or the Coast Guard described below under *reserve components*. With regard to the Army, *reserve component* may refer to either the Army Reserve or the Army National Guard of the United States. The term first appeared in the Code of Federal Regulations in 1926, when Title 32 defined the National Guard as the United States’ reserve component. It has since expanded in line with the emergence of additional reserve forces.

**Reserve components**: As codified in 1994 in 10 USC 10101, *reserve components* is the collective term for the seven individual reserve components of the U.S. military: Army National Guard of the United States, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air National Guard of the United States, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. Under 10 USC 10102, the purpose of the reserve components is to “provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.”

**Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC)**: The ROTC was established in statutory law by the 1916 National Defense Act. The law authorized the President, under the armies clause, to establish ROTC detachments at U.S. colleges granting four-year degrees. The law also mandated ROTC detachments at U.S. colleges and universities that were established by the 1862 U.S. land grant (Morrell Act), which provided federal land to newly formed states to build colleges and universities. A provision of the Morrell Act directed that military tactics and sciences be taught at these land grant institutions. Hence the connection between the 1916 National Defense Act establishing the ROTC and the 1862 Morrell Act.

**Traditional military policy**: A term created by an important Army reformer of the first half of the 20th century, John McAuley Palmer. Palmer first used the term in a report he wrote for the Secretary of War Henry Stimson in 1912. In Palmer’s view, the “traditional military policy” of the United States was to have a small Regular Army in peacetime that would be expanded by mobilizing the mass of the citizenry into a war army that was also led by “citizen soldiers.” Palmer also began, in the years prior
to World War I, to add an additional tenet of this “traditional military policy,” which 
was to have this citizen army in place in peacetime so that it could be equipped and 
trained. In 1940, Congress applied the term \textit{traditional military policy} in statutory law 
to the National Guard, by stating “in accordance with the traditional military policy 
of the United States, it is essential that the strength and organization of the National 
Guard as an integral part of the first line defenses of the United States be maintained 
and assured at all times . . .”

\textbf{U.S. Army or Army:} The term \textit{Army} refers to the totality of the U.S. Army at any given 
time in U.S. history—that is, the Regular Army and whatever type of force has been 
added to expand it. It is incorrect to assume that the term \textit{Army} is synonymous with 
\textit{Regular Army}; \textit{Army} refers to the Regular Army \textit{and} the actual or potential means to 
expand it. For example, one could use the term \textit{Army} during the War of 1812 to mean 
the Regular Army, compulsory militia units provided by the several states to expand 
the overall size of the Army, and volunteer militia units from the several states. Or, 
by way of another example, the term \textit{Army} in 1944 meant units of the Regular Army, 
Organized Reserves, the National Guards of the states and territories, and the Army of 
the United States. As a more recent example, the term \textit{Army}, as stipulated in Title 10 
of the U.S. Code, means the Regular Army, the Army National Guard of the United 
States, the Army National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the 
Army Reserve (i.e., the U.S. Army Reserve). The Army recognizes its birthday as occurring 
in 1775, when the Continental Congress established the American “Continental” 
Army.

\textbf{U.S. Army Reserve:} The 1952 Armed Forces Reserve Act, a major piece of legislation 
reforming all of the military services’ reserve components, largely based on the experience 
of the partial mobilization during the Korean War, replaced older terms for the 
Army, such as \textit{Organized Reserves} and \textit{Organized Reserve Corps} with the new term \textit{Army 
Reserve}. It is important to note that this legal title should be used in singular form and 
not in the plural—\textit{Army Reserves}—since in its singular form, as stipulated in law, it 
refers to the individual members and units of the Army Reserve. At the Department 
of Defense (DoD) level, it is typical to refer to the \textit{reserves} (plural and lowercase) when 
referring collectively to the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Marine 
Corps Forces Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve—but, importantly, not the Army 
National Guard. When referring to the Army Reserve as a reserve component of the 
Army, the term \textit{reserve component} should be used; the \textit{Army reserve components} are the 
U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National Guard of the United States.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard and Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARI</td>
<td>Aviation Restructuring Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARTEP</td>
<td>Army Training and Evaluation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPE</td>
<td>Center for the Army Profession and Ethic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASUP</td>
<td>Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CORM</td>
<td>Commission on Roles and Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAHSUM</td>
<td>Department of the Army Historical Summary</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Military Personnel, Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCFA</td>
<td>National Commission on the Future of the Army</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NGAUS</td>
<td>National Guard Association of the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODT</td>
<td>Overseas Deployment Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMA</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance, Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMAR</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
OMNG    Operations and Maintenance, National Guard
OSD CAPE  Office of the Secretary of Defense–Cost Assessment and
           Program Evaluation
PSRC    Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up
QDR     Quadrennial Defense Review
REFORGER  Return of Forces to Germany
TRADOC  U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
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Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors of this four-volume series show that there is no such thing as a “traditional” U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940.

Volume IV covers the period from 1970 to 2015, from changes to U.S. military policy that resulted from the Vietnam War through years of persistent conflict following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks. In spite of significant changes in the strategic context during this period, the fundamental laws underpinning U.S. military policy remained largely unchanged. Volume IV also discusses how the demands of persistent conflict since the 9/11 terrorist attacks have led to increased use of individuals and units from the reserve components.