Seizing the Golden Hour
Tasks, Organization, and Capabilities Required for the Earliest Phase of Stability Operations

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This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled *Seizing the Golden Hour*, sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to capture lessons learned from U.S. interventions and offer principles for success in the initial phase of the intervention and the nonkinetic efforts to stabilize the state.

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Contents

Preface ................................................................. iii
Figures and Table .................................................. vii
Summary ............................................................. ix
Acknowledgments .................................................... xxvii
Abbreviations ........................................................ xxix

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction ......................................................... 1
Definitions and Scope................................................ 4
Research Questions and Approach............................... 6

CHAPTER TWO
Golden Hours and Path Dependency ......................... 11
Critical Junctures and Path Dependency ...................... 13
Golden Hour Security Dynamics ............................... 14
Golden Hour Political Dynamics ............................... 23
Conclusion ............................................................. 28

CHAPTER THREE
The American Experience .......................................... 31
Germany (1945–1952) .............................................. 32
Japan (1945–1952) ................................................... 40
Bosnia (1995–2005) .................................................. 70
Kosovo (1999–Present) ............................................ 76
Afghanistan (2001–Present) ................................................................. 83
Iraq (2003–2011) ........................................................................... 93
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support in
    Vietnam (1967–1973) .................................................................. 104
Conclusion .................................................................................... 109

CHAPTER FOUR
Golden Hour Tasks ..................................................................... 111
Security ...................................................................................... 113
Humanitarian Assistance ......................................................... 124
Governance ................................................................................ 126
Reconstruction and Development .......................................... 136
Conclusion ................................................................................ 139

CHAPTER FIVE
Civil-Military Arrangements for the Golden Hour .................. 141
Civil-Military Coordination Is Critical to Success ................. 141
A Diversity of Civil-Military Arrangements ....................... 145
Different Contexts Require Different Models ...................... 148
Conclusion ................................................................................ 158

CHAPTER SIX
Army Golden Hour Capability and Capacity ......................... 159
Army Doctrine and the Golden Hour .................................... 160
Accessing Golden Hour Capabilities ..................................... 162
Golden Hour Task Force Requirements ............................... 172
Basic Experience Retention ..................................................... 198
Conclusion ................................................................................ 199

CHAPTER SEVEN
Findings and Recommendations ............................................. 203
Whole-of-Government Recommendations ............................ 204
Recommendations for the Army ............................................. 207

References ................................................................................ 213
Figures and Table

Figures

2.1. Proportion of Postwar States Remaining at Peace ............... 15
5.1. Modalities of Civil-Military Interactions ....................... 143
6.1. Distribution of Golden Hour–Relevant Skills Across the Army Components, October 2015 ....................... 164
6.2. Pre- and Postmobilization Training and Preparation Time for Enabler Units During Operation Iraqi Freedom ........ 168
6.3. U.S. Central Command’s Use of Contractors, FY 2008 to FY 2017 ................................................................. 193
6.4. U.S. Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq, by Type of Service Provided, March 31, 2009 ....................... 194

Table

6.1. Estimated Postconflict Military Police Requirements ........ 181
The enduring civil wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have increasingly given rise to the view that the U.S. interventions in both were fated to fail from the beginning. Other observers, however, contend that crucial mistakes made in the first weeks and months of the U.S. interventions set these countries on downward paths, making recovery difficult. Were the postconflict interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan at high risk of failure from the beginning, or did they become the costly interventions they did because the United States missed opportunities in the early phases of U.S. operations?

James Stephenson, who served as the U.S. Agency for International Development country director for Iraq soon after the U.S. invasion, famously referred to this early phase as the golden hour, alluding to a term from the medical field that describes the minutes after traumatic injury, in which appropriate medical attention can mean the difference between life and death. The metaphor only imperfectly captures the realities of early steps to seize momentum and set postconflict countries on a path to sustainable peace, but it does highlight the centrality and urgency of such efforts. Despite the apparent consensus among civilians and military officers alike about the importance of the initial phases of stabilization, both the concept of golden hours and their operational implications remain remarkably underdeveloped. At the most basic level, there is very little rigorous evidence about whether golden hours even exist. Assuming they do exist, there is little agreement about their operational implications—in particular, what tasks should be prioritized in this period and what commitments the United
States should make now to ensure that it is adequately prepared for such contingencies in the future.

This report analyzes golden hours and the actions necessary to seize them. More specifically, it provides answers to five sets of questions:

- What is the evidence for the existence of golden hours? Assuming they exist, what are the key factors that cause them?
- What has been the American experience with such missions, and how has it been shaped by steps taken in the early weeks and months?
- What tasks are essential in the earliest weeks and months of an intervention to take advantage of golden hours to stabilize host nations? On what scale should stabilization activities be undertaken?
- How should the United States organize itself to seize golden hours? In particular, what coordination mechanisms are essential to ensure unity of effort between civilian and military actors?
- What military capabilities and capacities does the United States require to take advantage of golden hours? Which of these capabilities should the United States sustain and which should it be able to regenerate quickly, as needed? How can the United States leverage the full range of human capital available—including military personnel, civilian personnel, and contractors—to quickly execute essential tasks?

A report such as this one may seem oddly timed. The U.S. defense community has shifted its attention to high-end conventional warfighting contingencies with near-peer competitors. Both the Obama and the Trump administrations expressed an aversion to taking on large-scale, long-term stabilization missions. But this preference for more-limited commitments in scale and time should not keep the United States from making small investments in stability operations to ensure that it can regenerate its ability to perform such missions quickly should the need again arise. As the record of earlier interventions demonstrates, lengthy periods of adaptation to the requirements of stabilization can greatly
reduce the odds, and increase the costs, of achieving success. It is precisely in times such as this one, when the United States has the time to prepare, that it is appropriate to reflect on the lessons of past interventions and take steps to avoid the prior mistakes in future contingencies.

**Definitions, Scope, and Research Approach**

Analogous to the medical field’s definition of *golden hour*, in the context of foreign military interventions, the term refers to the initial phases of intervention in a foreign society in which the intervening states attempt to stabilize a traumatized society and support the creation of durable political institutions in the aftermath of conflict, whether internal (intrastate war) or external (interstate war). The concept applies only to postconflict environments, where local coalitions and perceptions of the intervener are in flux, opening opportunities that are likely to be foreclosed at later points. For these initial phases to be considered a golden hour, foreign actions must have disproportionately large impacts on the subsequent trajectory of the host nation (otherwise there would be nothing “golden” about this phase; it would be no more or less important than any other period in an intervention).

There is no fixed time frame for this “hour,” although the first weeks and months are most critical and the “hour” becomes less golden as practices and patterns of behavior become set. Clearly, it begins when the operation opens and continues until its trajectory, for better or worse, is largely set. First impressions are established, expectations are created, and local support and resistance begin to coalesce. That is not to say that course corrections are not possible well into an ongoing operation, but rather to suggest that these become increasingly difficult as time progresses.

This report is principally concerned with stability operations led by the United States, although it does draw on relevant experience by the United Nations and others. The report is further circumscribed to cases in which a golden hour might exist—that is, where the introduction of foreign forces leads to a hiatus in the relevant conflict and thus a peace to consolidate. Examples include Iraq and Afghanistan following
the United States’ invasions, but not South Vietnam, where the country was in the middle of a high-intensity war by the time the United States intervened.

Research on stabilization and stability operations has grown enormously since the U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report does not provide original empirical findings in a field in which research questions have become ever narrower. Instead, it builds on the massive and high-quality literature that already exists, synthesizing lessons from narrowly scoped studies to provide an overview of golden hours and the appropriate international actions in these periods. Because most existing studies do not focus on issues of sequencing and timing, this report teases out the implications of prior research for the earliest phases of postconflict interventions.

The findings in this report fall into four categories: those pertaining to the dynamics underlying golden hours, the tasks necessary to seize them, the ways in which interveners should organize themselves to conduct those tasks, and the capabilities interveners require to be able to succeed in these tasks quickly, before the golden hour is squandered.

**Golden Hour Dynamics**

It should not be surprising that operations which are carefully planned, properly prepared, adequately resourced, and begin well should have a better chance of ending well than those which lack these advantages. Through case studies and a review of the social science literature on postconflict political development, this report illustrates the importance of these early stages. Seizing the golden hour is certainly not a sufficient condition for long-term success. Even if everything goes right in this period, postconflict states remain highly fragile and susceptible to war recurrence. But the early days of a stability operation do seem to have disproportionately large consequences, increasing the likelihood that a state will continue to remain stable if the early phases go well—or, conversely, will suffer considerable instability if the early phases go poorly.
There are at least four dynamics—both among local actors and between those actors and interveners—that make the early stages of a stabilization mission particularly influential. First, interveners must reassure those parties in support of the postconflict political order that there will be sufficient protection for the new political order to take root. Postconflict societies are highly fragile and often badly conflicted. Without some assurance of external support, opposing factions are likely to focus on protecting their narrow interests through force, if necessary, rather than investing in precarious and unfamiliar new governance institutions. Early efforts to provide security send a strong signal of the United States’ (or other intervening forces’) commitment.

Second, at the same time, intervening forces must co-opt or deter potential spoilers and, if necessary, work to disrupt, degrade, and potentially defeat them. The resources required to suppress armed opposition are extensive, so the United States and other interveners should seek to co-opt local parties wherever possible. But if some groups are irreconcilable, it is best to confront them when they remain relatively vulnerable in the early days of a transitional situation rather than after they have had time to strengthen command and control networks, rally recruits, develop illicit networks to supply revenues and materiel, and so on.

Third, co-opting local parties into a broad-based political order is challenging. Power-sharing arrangements can help to reassure all of the parties to a peace deal, but, once established, they become difficult to amend. Care needs to be taken to build enough flexibility into the new order to permit adjustment and evolution.

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, opportunities for first impressions only arise once. Perceptions of outside interveners—and of their local partners—form relatively early on. Once established, public perceptions become anchored and relatively difficult to change. If the United States and its local partners fail, for instance, to provide for civil order and other basic services in the early days of an intervention, they will earn an enduring reputation for incompetence or worse.

A large proportion of postconflict societies return to violence within only a few years. If they can make it through this initial period, they still remain at higher risk of recurring violence for years to come.
The risk, however, is greatly reduced, suggesting that golden hours are indeed crucial.

**The American Experience**

We reviewed the American experience with large-scale stabilization missions examining golden hour dynamics in two post–World War II operations, in Germany and Japan, and six post–Cold War missions, in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.¹

The postconflict operations in Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo succeeded in consolidating the peace and producing outcomes consistent with American interests. The 1994 operation in Haiti was at least a short-term success. All of these endeavors profited from substantial advance planning and preparation focused on the postcombat mission. All were abundantly resourced. All enjoyed strong regional and global support. All took place on the basis of explicit, signed agreements with the former adversaries, committing them to cooperate with the intervention.

Most of these conditions were absent in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Planning and preparation for postcombat operations was deficient in all three cases. The forces and other resources committed to these operations proved inadequate and, in every instance, were increased only after the missions’ trajectories turned sharply downward. The Iraq intervention did not enjoy broad regional or global support. Finally, none of these postcombat operations followed a signed peace agreement or capitulation. Initial resistance was overcome, and opponents either cowed or dispersed, but they never acquiesced in the American presence.

These eight examples are thus consistent with the thesis that early action sets stabilization operations on a course from which it is difficult to subsequently deviate.

¹ We also briefly examine the pacification program in Vietnam. There was no postconflict phase in the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and therefore no golden hour, but the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program offers insights that are relevant to some operations in the golden hour.
Essential Golden Hour Tasks

Various U.S. agencies have compiled lists of hundreds of stabilization tasks that might be required to seize the golden hour. Although any of these might be critically important in any given situation, these lengthy lists provide little indication of the absolutely essential tasks that must be performed almost regardless of context.

In the security sphere, two broad tasks are absolutely essential from the outset of operations: a diplomatic strategy for cutting off potential spoilers from external sources of revenues and materiel and a military strategy for providing civil order while initiating the difficult and usually lengthy process of rebuilding or reforming indigenous security structures, which have usually disintegrated or been thoroughly discredited by reason of their behavior during the prior conflict.

In the governance sphere, two tasks are critical. First, the United States must begin to put in place power-sharing arrangements that include as broad a base as possible of potential spoilers who can be reconciled to the postconflict political order. Second, resumption of essential public services is an early priority, with more-substantial improvement a longer-term proposition.

Organization for the Golden Hour

Failure to coordinate military and civilian efforts, or to take into account the civilian tasks that need to be fulfilled as part of any military intervention, can have devastating results, as evidenced by the missed opportunities in the early days of the interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. All civil-military arrangements ultimately serve the same purpose: ensuring unity of effort, a principle that features prominently in the U.S. Army doctrine on stability operations.

Despite the need to adapt civil-military practices to the context of each mission, the stabilization literature highlights four best practices: beginning coordination and integration during the planning phase, avoiding duplicate structures, learning over multiple operations
(through doctrine and shared personnel), and building strong interpersonal relationships.

First, civil-military coordination should start not at the outset of an intervention but ahead of it, during the planning phase. When feasible, assessment teams should be deployed in theater ahead of other military actors to make contact with civilian organizations present and to determine the best location, and use, for civil-military coordination cells. Predeployment training of both civilian and military personnel is critical to ensure that these actors are cognizant of each other’s organizational structure and doctrine as soon as they get into theater.

Second, the United States and other international actors should avoid duplicate structures wherever possible. In postconflict settings that involve large numbers of national and international actors, several civil-military arrangements might be simultaneously in place, sometimes coordinating the actions of the same actors. Such duplication not only is inefficient but also risks sending conflicting guidance to the actors involved.

Third, U.S. and other personnel should attempt to incorporate lessons learned from previous operations into the planning and execution of stability operations. Historically, this transfer of experience has been more likely to take place between interventions that mobilize the same intervener and take place in quick succession. Appropriate preparations ahead of the golden hour would allow international actors to benefit from previous experience without wasting valuable time re-creating structures that have proven effective in the past.

Fourth, international actors should recognize that strong interpersonal relationships greatly improve the efficiency of activities in the golden hour. Where interventions occur in rapid succession (such as the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo), many of the personnel involved in later interventions may already enjoy good working relationships across the civil-military divide. In cases where there is no prior relationship between the involved actors, planners may need to incorporate time for key military and civilian personnel to build trust and motivation to collaborate.

Civilian actors face often insuperable difficulties operating autonomously in highly insecure environments. When the possibility of vio-
lent resistance is high, civil/military collaboration should move from coordination to integration, with both military and civilian assets interleaved into a single structure. Examples include the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program in Vietnam and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. Historically, it has taken years to design and deploy such capabilities in the past. In the future, such arrangements should be worked out among the relevant agencies in advance, at least on a contingency basis.

**Capabilities Required for the Golden Hour**

To seize the golden hour, the United States requires a variety of capabilities across civilian and military agencies. This report focuses on military and, especially, Army capabilities, since the Army is the service that maintains most of the capabilities for stability operations.

The Army typically defines its primary role in golden hour operations as providing security. It considers other potential missions—including essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief—secondary concerns and ones to be rapidly transitioned to others. The Army’s ability to provide security during the golden hour will be determined principally by factors relevant to the country in which the intervention takes place—its size, quality and reliability of existing security services, and so on. But the Army’s own preparations for this mission—including its size, training, and capability to stand up local security forces (both military and police)—will also play an important role.

Both the Army’s size and training will be determined largely by the need to prepare for high-intensity operations against a near-peer competitor. The current operating environment and policy guidance has reduced the salience of counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations security skills for the Army as it shifts its focus to high-end combat operations against peer or near-peer opponents, as required by the 2018 National Defense Strategy. As time passes, personnel with direct experience with COIN and stability operations will leave the force and be promoted out of the lower echelons (battalion and below)
that are primarily responsible for executing these operations. In an era of constrained resources and an emphasis on different threats, it is unlikely that full-spectrum training that covers both traditional combat and COIN and stability operations will continue. These trends highlight the importance of leader development and professional military education in propagating the required skills and maintaining a basic knowledge of such operations.

Rapidly standing up security forces in a postconflict operation will continue to be a challenge for the Army. Although the Army’s recently adopted security force assistance brigade structure has the potential to provide important capabilities in this regard, it has yet to be fully developed. The Army has committed itself to the security force assistance brigade concept, but sustaining the momentum to see the concept through to completion and then maintaining it should not be taken as a given. Experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan highlights the challenge of filling such units with personnel of the proper skill, grade, experience, and temperament. Such individuals are also in high demand elsewhere, so it will require continued support by the Army’s leadership to ensure that the security force assistance brigade concept comes to full fruition.

The Army’s ability to stand up properly trained civilian police forces remains rudimentary. Although this task is not ideally conducted by military police, the dearth of deployable civilian capacity for this mission suggests that it will fall to the military during future golden hour operations.

Finally, outside the security sphere, the Army has limited capacity to make significant contributions to golden hour operations with its organic capabilities. Both Army civil affairs and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel can play a role in such operations, but they lack the capacity (and often the skills) to be the lead actors. Contractors employed by the U.S. Department of Defense, however, can provide significant on-demand capacity for the restoration of essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. Proper utilization of such contractors, however, requires the ability to properly plan and supervise contractor operations and the
ability to integrate the use of contractors into golden hour operational plans.

**Findings and Recommendations**

Postconflict stabilization takes place in a wide range of circumstances, from the occupation and the governing of a defeated adversary to helping with oversight of the implementation of a peace agreement among warring factions. The United States may be acting largely alone, as part of a coalition, or within an established alliance structure. Although it is impossible to prescribe a formula for such operations that fits all cases, some basic conclusions emerge from this study regarding the existence of a golden hour and its implications for the conduct of these missions.

Experience indicates that actions taken during the early weeks and months of a postconflict stability operation set the mission on a trajectory that, if trending downward, becomes increasingly difficult to correct. A strong version of the golden hour argument might suggest that an intervention is highly likely to succeed at relatively low cost if the golden hour is seized. The evidence in this report does not support the strong version of the argument. Even if everything goes well in initial phases, postconflict countries remain very fragile. Conversely, even if an intervention goes poorly in its initial phases, it may be possible to rescue it in subsequent years with sufficient resources and luck. There is, however, also a weaker version of the golden hour argument. In the weaker version, successfully seizing the golden hour is neither necessary nor sufficient for the success of an intervention. Seizing the golden hour does, however, considerably improve the odds of success and the likelihood that success can be achieved at reasonable cost.

Establishing a positive trajectory early in any operation requires both planning and preparation beyond that needed to overcome initial resistance. All America’s post–Cold War interventions required more ground forces to stabilize the subject society than were needed to affect entry. For ground forces, at least, stabilization has thus proved more demanding in terms of capacity than the conventional combat, if any, that preceded it.
Because adversaries have been driven from power and dispersed does not mean they have disappeared, nor that they are incapable of reconstitution. Stability operations that begin on the basis of formal acceptance of the new order, either through a peace agreement among contending parties or an explicit capitulation by the former adversary, seem to have an improved prospect of success. Thus, the basis on which the conflict is terminated can have an important impact on what comes after. Postconflict stabilization is a government-wide enterprise, but collaboration between civil and military actors in the field becomes progressively more difficult as the security environment deteriorates.

We have divided our recommendations into those involving multiple agencies and those directed principally at the Army.

**Whole-of-Government Recommendations**

Two interrelated factors importantly shape a postconflict environment: the attitudes of neighboring states and the design of the new political order. In articulating its intentions for shaping the peace, the United States should aim both for inclusiveness within the society in question and for maximum international support, with particular attention to those states with easy access to and influence over that society. Although it is likely that the U.S. Department of State and the White House will take the lead in establishing these objectives and conducting the requisite diplomacy, military leaders will be consulted and should consider how such decisions will affect their mission. Political and military planning should not occur in separate silos but should be integrated from the start.

When U.S. forces first arrive in a postconflict context, they have the opportunity to reassure potential allies and to both deter and co-opt potential enemies. If they fail to do so, armed opposition networks have the opportunity to solidify; these potential spoilers, although relatively susceptible to co-option and vulnerable to disruption in their nascence, typically become disproportionately more difficult to win over or defeat if they are allowed to reach maturity. Reliably distinguishing factions that can be productively included in a postconflict order from those that are irreconcilable can sometimes be challenging
but is critical to success. Care should be taken to limit those treated as irreconcilable to an irreducible minimum.

U.S. officials should recognize that patterns of collaboration and formulas for inclusion established early on will become progressively difficult to change. Broadly inclusive governance within an otherwise divided society can create inefficiencies and promote deadlock. Consideration should be given to mechanisms that permit flexibility and evolution while preserving the necessary buy-in of all the critical actors.

Establishing security is absolutely critical in the earliest phases of such operations. Security is not simply a military task. Military forces will typically be called on to provide public order and security in cases where they intervene. Security is a prerequisite for many nonmilitary tools—including humanitarian and development assistance—to have the intended effects.

The United States is understandably reluctant to expend the massive resources necessary to secure large countries from border to border. But decisionmakers should take care that the attempt to find innovative ways to succeed in stabilization at lower cost does not ultimately become self-defeating. The United States attempted to maintain an extremely small footprint in Afghanistan and hoped to do so in Iraq, only to find that the limitations of such an approach contributed to the metastasizing of insurgency.

To some extent, local security forces can be employed, if the appropriate resources are dedicated to building these forces’ capacity and overseeing them so that they do not engage in widespread abuses. But building effective and sustainable partner capacity is typically a long-term proposition—one the United States has been only somewhat successful at in the recent past. Efforts should be made during the golden hour to begin forming (or re-forming) local security capacity, but U.S. decisionmakers should recognize that such initiatives are long-term commitments and should not sacrifice quality and sustainability in overly accelerated schemes.

Since the United States will rarely be willing to commit the resources necessary to suppress broad-based armed opposition to the postconflict order, it must attempt to broker as broad as feasible a coalition of reconcilable political actors and give them a stake in the new
political order. Again, such a process is neither a purely diplomatic nor a purely military endeavor. Diplomats will be responsible for helping to broker the new political dispensation and to manage tensions among coalition members. On the other hand, military forces will be necessary to reassure partners and deter potential spoilers.

Military and civilian actors must work out appropriate arrangements for civil-military cooperation. Where there is no viable local partner government, the U.S. military will likely be called upon to take over most essential functions. Where a reasonably effective and acceptable government exists, demands on the United States will be correspondingly lower, and a variety of civil-military coordination mechanisms (such as civil-military operations centers and civil-military cooperation) are appropriate. Where widespread violent resistance is anticipated, special arrangements for civil-military integration should be agreed to in advance. Planning and preparation for an operation should involve not just the U.S. military but also those civilian actors that will be called to play a role in the postconflict phase, to ensure a unity of effort critical to the operation’s success.

**Recommendations for the Army**
Recommendations for the Army fall into three categories: those for concepts and doctrine; training, education, and leader development; and organization and personnel.

**Concepts and Doctrine**
The Army (as well as the rest of the defense community) should update and refine doctrine and concepts for stabilization:

- Doctrine at all levels should emphasize the importance of golden hours and the priority tasks that must be implemented to seize them. These priority tasks include the provision of security (for both key population centers and infrastructure), efforts to incorporate key factions into governance structures at all levels, and the development of local security forces with an emphasis on the quality of the capabilities developed and the security governance structures necessary to oversee and sustain them. Where there is
no viable local partner government, the U.S. military will likely be called on in the earliest phases to take over many or even most essential public service functions.

- The Army should provide concepts and doctrinal guidance on how to plan and conduct so-called low-cost and small-footprint operations. Without details on what low-cost and small-footprint operations can accomplish, what they cannot accomplish, and how they must adapt ways and ends to fit limited means, this phrase risks papering over major conceptual challenges.
- Where the degree of civil-military coordination required is relatively high, the United States requires improved structures to help integrate civilian and military lines of effort.

**Training, Education, and Leader Development**

Doctrine and concepts are useless unless they are updated as the international context changes and internalized by military personnel. Once lost, this knowledge can only be slowly reacquired, complicating efforts to seize future golden hours. The Army should therefore take several steps in the areas of training, education, and leader development to ensure that its leaders retain some knowledge of stability operations:

- Organizations within the Army’s generating force must continue to serve as proponents for stabilization and preserve and update doctrine to reflect lessons learned.
- The Army should ensure that at least some of its field and tabletop exercises contain a stabilization component. It should also ensure that its schools make stabilization and irregular warfare a nontrivial part of leaders’ education.
- The Army should ensure that it can rapidly expand its capabilities for training soldiers for stability operations. The appropriateness of programs of instruction and the realism of exercises depends on maintaining a cadre of experts. Many of these experts can be hired as contractors on an as-needed basis, but not all of them.
- The Army should work to provide its leaders with the necessary experience when it is not actively engaged in COIN or similar missions in which leaders can learn through ongoing operations.
Such experience is particularly important for specializations that are critical to stability operations, such as civil affairs and military police. There are many opportunities for such personnel to gain valuable experience during peacetime if the Army is creative about its leader development processes.

**Organization and Personnel**

The Army and Department of Defense more broadly have several mechanisms through which they can have rapid access to the appropriate personnel for golden hours:

- The Army’s security force assistance brigades could potentially provide vital functions during the golden hour and beyond. The Army should give further thought to the organization of these units. As currently structured, it has very few civil affairs, military police, or other personnel who are essential for stabilization activities. The security force assistance brigades and similar units potentially offer an excellent opportunity for such personnel to gain vital experience in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
- The Army should continue and expand efforts to track knowledge, skills, and abilities relevant to stabilization among its personnel so that appropriate individuals can be rapidly identified for key assignments. Although legal and other considerations pose challenges, mechanisms to track the civilian skills of reserve component personnel should be strengthened, as feasible, to enable access to these skill sets in a crisis.
- The Army and Department of Defense can take actions to gain ready access to the necessary manpower they need from outside the Army, including through contracting mechanisms, the civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW), and potentially reservists with the requisite civilian skill sets. These mechanisms include integrating the use of contractors into the postconflict planning process so that appropriate contracts accessing the required capabilities can be written and agreed to in advance to facilitate their rapid deployment. The Army should also continue to develop and strengthen its organic capabilities to evaluate and monitor the exe-
cution of contracts in a postconflict environment to ensure that these efforts contribute to the goal of rapidly stabilizing a partner state. Understanding potential golden hour needs would also be useful in ensuring that the CEW is shaped appropriately to provide the required skills. Incentives could be targeted to attract volunteers with the skills most relevant to golden hour operations.
Acknowledgments

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Abbreviations

ACOM  U.S. Atlantic Command
CENTCOM  U.S. Central Command
CEW  civilian expeditionary workforce
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC  civil-military cooperation
CJTF  Combined Joint Task Force
CMOC  civil-military operations center
COIN  counterinsurgency
COMUSMACV  Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CORDS  Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CPA  Coalition Provisional Authority
DDR  disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DEPCORDS  Deputy for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
DoD  U.S. Department of Defense
FM  field manual
FY  fiscal year
GAO  Government Accountability Office
GARIOA  Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas
HACC  Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>humanitarian operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRS</td>
<td>humanitarian relief sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Logistics Civil Augmentation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMGUS</td>
<td>Office of the Military Government, United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operations plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander of Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>special representative of the secretary general</td>
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<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDP/PRIO</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission Haiti</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>VC</td>
<td>Vietcong</td>
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<td>V-E Day</td>
<td>Victory in Europe Day</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The early days of postconflict military interventions cast long shadows over subsequent events. Whether these interventions take the form of peace operations at the ends of civil wars and insurgencies or military occupations following wars between states, creating order amid post-conflict anarchy requires careful preparation and appropriate resources.

Diplomats, military officers, and aid officials have all emphasized the need for success in the earliest phases of such operations. James Stephenson, who served as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) country director for Iraq soon after the United States’ invasion, famously referred to this early phase as the “golden hour,” alluding to a term from the medical field used to describe the minutes after traumatic injury, in which appropriate medical attention can mean the difference between life and death.1 When the United Nations (UN) summarized the collective lessons from the first decade of post–Cold War peace operations in its Brahimi Report, it emphasized, “The first six to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain. Deployment timelines should thus be tailored accordingly.”2 Subsequent UN reports and

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Despite this apparent consensus, both the concept of golden hours and their operational implications remain remarkably underdeveloped. At the most basic level, there is very little rigorous evidence about whether golden hours exist and, if so, the precise reasons why the behavior of intervening actors is likely to have disproportionately large consequences in this early phase.\footnote{Chapter Two contains a review of the relevant literature.} Although some U.S. military doctrine—such as the Army operating concept and the newest operations manual—mentions the need for rapid “consolidation activities,” it is not generally a point of emphasis, nor are the operational implications and concomitant capability requirements discussed in detail.\footnote{See Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 3, 2016, pp. IV 11–13; Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2017, Chapter 8; FM 3-07, *Stability*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2, 2014; Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, *Stability*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012. The JP, for instance, devotes approximately one page out of more than 200 to the early phases of stabilization efforts, but even this discussion is vague and occurs after more than 100 pages of other material. The Army doctrine publication makes only a brief mention of the importance of initiative but otherwise says nothing about golden hours: “By acting quickly and mitigating sources of instability, military forces improve the security situation, retard deterioration of the institution and infrastructure, and create a space for civilian agencies, organizations, and the host nation to work” (Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, 2012, p. 10).} A better understanding of golden hour dynamics is critical to inform
many contemporary debates about strategies for intervention and the U.S. civilian and military capabilities required to implement them.

Golden hour dynamics also have important implications for decisions regarding U.S. civilian and military capabilities. On the civilian side, long-standing debates about the appropriate size and mission—or even existence—of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations depend in part on the need for rapid “surge” capacity for the earliest phases of stabilization efforts. Capability requirements for golden hours similarly may have implications for USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation.

On the military side, stability operations have not been a requirement driving U.S. force structure since the post-“surge” drawdowns in Iraq and, later, Afghanistan. Although the services have been directed to retain their knowledge of how to conduct such activities, they have not been sized to conduct them on a large scale, either in terms of overall numbers or in certain niche capabilities that are heavily stressed by stability operations. Policy guidance has made clear that conventional warfighting contingencies may unfold over mere days or weeks, while stability operations typically endure for years. Consequently, the guidance claims, readiness for stability operations should be accorded a lower priority than readiness for conventional operations, since military forces can adapt to the former over long periods. If arguments about the importance of golden hours are correct, however, these assumptions about time for adaptation may be seriously misguided.

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Definitions and Scope

As mentioned, in the medical field, the *golden hour* is defined as “the hour immediately following traumatic injury in which medical treatment to prevent irreversible internal damage and optimize the chance of survival is most effective.”9 Analogously, in the context of foreign military interventions, we apply the term to the early postcombat phases of intervention in which the intervening authorities attempt to stabilize a traumatized society and support the creation of durable political institutions in the aftermath of conflict, whether internal (intrastate war) or external (interstate war).10 This is a period when local coalitions and perceptions of the intervener are in flux, opening opportunities that are likely to be foreclosed at later points. For these initial phases to be considered a golden hour, foreign actions should be likely to have a formative impact on the subsequent trajectory of the host nation, compared with subsequent actions by the interveners (otherwise, there would be nothing “golden” about this phase; it would be no more or less important than any other period in an intervention).11 The concept has widespread currency beyond American strategic circles.12

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A postconflict or low-conflict environment is an important component of golden hours. In many cases (such as Afghanistan and Iraq), violence never completely ceased, although it greatly diminished from the levels of conflict that occurred earlier and later in these countries. Despite this residual violence, there was a qualitative difference between these cases and others, such as the Vietnam War, in which the United States intervened in the middle of an ongoing war. A lull in violence is critical for outside interveners to have a reasonable chance of building the necessary coalitions in support of a new political order.

Nonetheless, the term postconflict is relative. Even after a war has ended, violence of various sorts frequently continues at low levels: spoilers may engage in acts of terrorism or small-scale attacks to try to sabotage the peace, criminal actors may engage in violent predation, and so on. For both theoretical and practical reasons, we do not attempt to define a precise threshold of violence below which a country must fall to be considered in a postconflict period. Because golden hours are created when local actors perceive that there is a fundamentally new opportunity to redirect conflict toward political channels rather than violence, the key factor is the perceptions of local actors rather than any objective level of violence. There are also practical challenges to defining an objective threshold of violence for postconflict periods. Golden hours may last only a few months. Systematically collected data on deaths from organized violence, however, are compiled annually, so it is difficult to tell whether these deaths occurred during the period of full-scale war before foreigners began stability operations or whether they occurred after a golden hour of several months’ duration; either occurrence would lead to a much higher level of deaths in the annual data than actually occurred during the golden hour itself. Moreover, standard data sets of violence include only deaths from organized political violence (insurgency and so on); they do not include data on large-scale violent crime, pogroms, or other forms of violence that might lead to the end of a golden hour.

We do not set a fixed time frame for this “hour.” Clearly, it begins when the intervening forces arrive or, in the case of a forced entry, when initial resistance is overcome, and becomes progressively less golden as the operation’s trajectory, for better or worse, becomes largely set. That
is not to say that course corrections are not possible well into an ongoing operation, but rather that these become increasingly difficult as time progresses.

In U.S. military doctrine, stabilization is defined as “the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.” In this report, stability operations include all activities undertaken in the aftermath of either interstate or intrastate conflict to stabilize a foreign country. They can take a variety of forms, ranging from military occupation in the wake of invasion (as in Germany or Japan after World War II or in Iraq in 2003) to peace operations following a civil war (as in Bosnia).

This report is principally concerned with stability operations led by the United States, although it does draw on relevant experience by the UN and others. Over the past several decades, military interventions have become increasingly multilateral, to the point that truly unilateral interventions are the exception. The conclusions of this report are largely applicable whether the United States is acting unilaterally or multilaterally.

Research Questions and Approach

This report provides answers to five sets of questions:

- What is the evidence for the existence of golden hours? Assuming they exist, what are the key factors that cause them?
- What has been the American experience with respect to golden hours?
- What tasks are essential in the earliest weeks and months of an intervention to take advantage of golden hours to stabilize host nations? On what scale should stabilization activities be undertaken?

• How should the United States organize itself to seize golden hours? In particular, what coordination mechanisms are essential to ensure unity of effort between civilian and military actors?

• What military capabilities and capacities does the United States require to take advantage of golden hours? Which of these capabilities should the United States sustain and which should it be able to regenerate quickly as needed? How can the United States leverage the full range of human capital available—including military personnel, civilian personnel, and contractors—to quickly execute essential tasks?

To answer these questions, we combined a review of the existing literature with short case studies of stabilization in nine cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam. The cases do not encompass all instances of U.S. stabilization efforts (Operation Just Cause in Panama, for instance, was left out). They do, however, represent a broad cross-section of relevant experience. They include both very large efforts (as in Germany, Japan, and Iraq) and very small efforts (as in Somalia, Haiti, and initial operations in Afghanistan). They include both military occupations following conventional wars (Germany, Japan, and Iraq) and peace operations (Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo). Both unilateral interventions (as Japan and Iraq effectively were) and multilateral interventions (such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) are represented. The studies are drawn from a wide variety of strategic contexts, including the aftermath of World War II, humanitarian interventions, and counterterrorism efforts. In short, although they are not comprehensive, the variation in the cases along nearly all important dimensions suggests that they are representative of the United States’ experience with golden hours.14

Given the breadth of this study, we drew on existing research wherever possible. More specifically, we reviewed three streams of lit-

14 One case study—the U.S. experience with Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in Vietnam—did not occur during a golden hour. It was included in this report because it offers an important approach to civil-military coordination that might inform future U.S. operations.
erature on these operations: qualitative literature on the case studies listed above; peer-reviewed, social science analyses of the phenomenon of golden hours and the effectiveness of various instruments of stabilization; and technical analyses of military requirements for these operations. To help illustrate broad trends and requirements, we also made use of some existing data sets, including data on war recurrence, mobilization times for U.S. military forces, and the U.S. use of contractors in recent contingencies.

Each of the sets of research questions listed above frames the analysis of a subsequent chapter in this report. Chapter Two explores the concept of golden hours, evidence for their existence, and the key factors responsible for golden hour dynamics. It also briefly reviews the historical ability of intervening countries to capitalize on these dynamics and reasons why these countries have often gone through an extended period of failure and adaptation before adopting approaches that are appropriate to their goals.

Chapter Three examines the planning and early phases of nine American postconflict operations from World War II to the present.

Chapter Four analyzes the tasks necessary to seize golden hours. It first summarizes U.S. military doctrine and civilian guidance on stabilization tasks. It then reviews the existing literature on these tools to determine what is known about what works in which circumstances and where the primary debates remain. It concludes with a list of those tasks that should be priorities for the initial phase of stability operations.

Chapter Five evaluates various arrangements for civil-military coordination at both the strategic and operational levels in a variety of contexts, from Germany in 1945 to Iraq after 2003. It highlights where requirements for the early days of an intervention differ from

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15 Our case studies relied primarily on secondary sources, but they were supplemented with primary sources on key points, particularly on issues related to golden hours, where the existing literature is often thin or nonexistent. Our review of scholarly literature focused primarily on rigorous, quantitative analyses in what are considered leading social scientific journals. Because of the enormous volume of literature in this field, we were not able to conduct a fully systematic review of this literature. To maximize our coverage of the literature and reduce the chances of bias in the sources consulted, we made use of existing systematic reviews and other literature reviews wherever possible. Chapter Four provides further details of the sources consulted.
what is currently recommended in U.S. military doctrine and civilian
guidance. Based on this analysis, the chapter recommends practices
necessary before an intervention is launched and in the opening phases
of an intervention to ensure that civilian and military efforts proceed
in relative harmony.

Chapter Six analyzes the capabilities and capacities required to
seize the golden hour. It examines how the U.S. military—in partic-
ular, the Army, where most of these capabilities reside—can rapidly
regenerate those capabilities that are required but not maintained at
high levels of readiness, including timelines for the mobilization of
reserve component assets. It explores issues of contracting and how the
United States can rapidly field the large numbers of contract personnel
(such as interpreters) required for success. Finally, the chapter briefly
reviews options for “surging” U.S. government civilian personnel with
critical skills.

Chapter Seven concludes by summarizing key findings and rec-
ommendations for future U.S. practices.
The enduring civil wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have increasingly given rise to the view that the U.S. interventions in both were fated to fail from the beginning. A number of observers, however, contend that crucial mistakes made in the first weeks and months of the U.S. interventions set these countries on downward paths, making recovery difficult. \(^1\) Were the postconflict interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan at high risk of failure from the beginning, or did they become the costly interventions they did because the United States missed opportunities to seize the golden hour? The latter view assumes that golden hour dynamics exist in many, if not all, postconflict stabilization and reconstruction environments. But what empirical evidence exists to support this hypothesis? Under what circumstances might a golden hour exist? And what are the key dynamics that might cause a golden hour? If golden hours truly exist, and the factors necessary to seize them can be known ahead of time, unfortunate outcomes, such as those of Iraq and

Afghanistan, might be avoidable in future postconflict interventions. Conversely, if the concept of a golden hour is simply the product of retrospective reasoning by policymakers who have failed to win the peace but are loath to admit that winning the peace was never possible, then that knowledge might help leaders better understand when to avoid future foreign interventions.

This chapter presents evidence suggesting that early actions cast a long shadow and that postcombat stabilization missions that begin well have an improved chance of ending well. The aftermath of war presents many unique opportunities to stabilize postconflict regimes. In the case of an intervention to overthrow a regime and replace it with something new, the losers are likely to be temporarily demoralized and disorganized, their chain of command disrupted, without a clear view of the way forward. During this phase, some of them may be easier to co-opt than they will be once they have had a chance to regroup; those groups that cannot be co-opted can more easily be disrupted, degraded, and, if necessary, defeated. Moreover, in the aftermath of a long, destructive war, many old institutions might have disintegrated and former leaders might have been discredited. A vacuum of power and influence may open, into which the intervener can move before undesirable new or old forms of dominance can organize themselves.

These effects may be less present when a civil war has ended in a stalemate and an agreement that leave both sides organized to continue their competition, perhaps peacefully, perhaps not. Here, the intervener is a mediator and referee, brokering a negotiation between organized power centers rather than moving into a temporary vacuum. Even in these cases, however, the postconflict societies are in a period of transition, when power relations are shifting and new coalitions are possible.

It is a truism that you only get one chance to make a first impression. Early impressions of power, competence, and fairness will linger, as will those of weakness, incapacity, indecision, and arbitrariness.

This chapter explores several dynamics—both among local actors and between those actors and interveners—that might make the initial phases of the postconflict period particularly influential in determining the subsequent trajectory of the fragile state. In particular, it explores path dependent–like processes in postconflict security and political
dynamics that—if properly understood, planned for, and managed—might place a society on a trajectory toward sustained peace, representative governance, and economic growth. Chapter Three then reviews the empirical record for evidence of the existence of golden hours in specific interventions and evidence of whether interveners were able to successfully seize them.

Critical Junctures and Path Dependency

The academic literature on critical junctures and path dependency provides a useful theoretical framework to help understand why golden hours might exist in postconflict transitions. Broadly defined, these interrelated concepts assert that early decisions and actions can powerfully shape future possibilities and that self-reinforcing mechanisms make the probability of departing from the set pattern increasingly unlikely. University of California political scientist Paul Pierson perhaps offers the best application of the concept of path dependency (originally developed in economics) to political contexts:

Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from similar conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large consequences may result from relatively “small” or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic contours of social life.²

² Pierson, 2000a, pp. 251–252. The theoretical literature on the concepts of path dependency, critical junctures, and increasing returns is extensive, and an in-depth review is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, for some important contributions as applied to political processes, see Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991; and James Mahoney, “Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 36, No. 1, Spring 2001; Paul Pierson, “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 2000b.
The archetypal example of path dependency is the QWERTY keyboard. The current layout of English-language keyboards was developed to optimize the mechanical performance of typewriters; the keys are not ideally arranged from the perspective of typists. Despite the fact that typewriters are now almost completely obsolete, the QWERTY arrangement endures because everyone adjusted to this layout and would find it difficult to change.

This conceptualization of some political processes as path dependent holds important implications for policymakers designing the prioritization and sequencing of intervention activities in the first weeks and months of postconflict stabilization operations. If the immediate postconflict period is indeed a “critical juncture” in which “earlier events matter much more than later ones,” then getting the golden hour right is absolutely critical.3

The following sections examine the four key security and political factors most likely to produce path dependent–like mechanisms or increasing returns dynamics, which may in turn determine the success or failure of seizing the golden hour in postconflict stabilization operations. As will be seen in these discussions, golden hours are not truly critical junctures. Even if everything goes right in this period, postconflict states remain highly fragile and susceptible to war recurrence. But a weaker version of this dynamic certainly appears to be in effect: The early days of a stability operation do seem to have disproportionately large consequences, greatly increasing the likelihood that a state will continue to remain stable if the early phases go well—or, conversely, will suffer considerable instability if the early phases go poorly.

**Golden Hour Security Dynamics**

Maintaining domestic security is arguably the most critical factor in determining the long-term success of postconflict stabilization operations.4 Lamentably, it is also the most difficult. Since World War II, nearly one-half of societies recovering from one civil war have relapsed

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3 Pierson, 2000a, p. 253.
to war within five years, and nearly one-fifth returned to war within a single year. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, however, the risk of war recurrence declines steeply over time. This declining risk of war is consistent

Figure 2.1
Proportion of Postwar States Remaining at Peace


NOTES: To arrive at the estimates, we first collapsed all individual conflict-years into periods of civil war spells for each state; when a state experienced multiple overlapping conflicts, the civil war spell was coded as ending only when the last civil war ended. We used a two-year rule between conflict onsets to demarcate ongoing periods of conflict. Starting with the full universe of country-years, we then subset our analyses to only postconflict country-years, with the first year being the year after the cessation of a conflict spell. Among postconflict states, we then measured for each year the total number of states at peace and the total number at states returning to conflict.

The precise figure varies depending on exactly how “civil wars” are measured, but by nearly all academic accounts, between one-fifth and two-fifths of all civil wars reignite within five years of their end. See, for instance, Barbara Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Con-
with path-dependent dynamics; the immediate postconflict period is highly volatile, but if a postconflict political order can survive this perilous time, stability increases as the years pass.

At least two security-related dynamics in the immediate postconflict period are likely to have disproportionately large impacts on the subsequent trajectory of the state: (1) the inherent vulnerability of violent extremist organizations that might form in this early period and (2) the credible signaling of security guarantees by external interveners. Managing these dynamics is thus essential to prevent the emergence of negative self-reinforcing, path dependent–like mechanisms during the theoretical golden hour.

**Vulnerability of Violent Extremist Organizations**

In the initial phases of postconflict stabilization efforts, foreign interveners must typically engage with fractured political and militant networks in which members and supporters of the old regime or opposition groups are dispersed, disorganized, and demoralized. As occupiers endeavor to stabilize the host nation by creating durable political institutions, they must make early decisions about whether to bring together potentially reconcilable opponents in new political arrangements (such as in Bosnia); to deliberately exclude particularly unsavory elements from the political process (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan); to ostensibly maintain, but purge, the existing political order (such as in Japan); or to formalize competing power centers in de facto ethnic, religious, or tribal power-sharing arrangements (such as in Bosnia and

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Iraq). Most of these choices risk alienation of certain “losers”—or potential “spoilers”—who are hostile to the postwar peace agreements or power-sharing and patronage arrangements and who are willing to reorganize their support into new insurgent or terrorist networks and reengage in violence.6

Such nascent insurgent and terrorist networks are subject to deterrence or, if that fails, vulnerable to disruption in their early existence—but they become exponentially more difficult to defeat once they have achieved maturity and reached a tipping point in popular support and violence levels. As counterinsurgency (COIN) expert Daniel Byman notes, for every would-be organization that succeeds in developing from a protoinsurgent state into a full-blown insurgency, dozens—perhaps hundreds—of other groups fail.7 Likewise, Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert, estimates that roughly 90 percent of all terrorist networks die within their first year.8 Other widespread academic evidence exists to support the essential claim: Most would-be terrorist and insurgent organizations die young.9

The reasons why young violent extremist organizations suffer high mortality rates are both numerous and well understood in the

For the would-be insurgent, the barriers to entry into the political-military arena are confounding. Initially, most organizations or networks lack significant material resources—recruits, streams of financing, and lethal and nonlethal equipment—as well as territory or sanctuary from which to operate freely. In their early years, most groups function in relative anonymity; they fail to possess a well-defined ideology, identity, or popular grievance that appeals to widespread public support; they are deficient in military experience and training; they face numerous rival, nonstate actors; and they lack external legitimacy, outside support, well-integrated political and security structures, and the means to reward followers and punish defectors. And they must accomplish all of this while operating in the shadows of society and having limited intelligence-gathering and propaganda capacities and typically seeking to avoid far superior government military, police, and intelligence forces. Moreover, protoinsurgent organizations face particularly acute collective action problems in their early stage of existence. In the early months of an insurgency, when the combatant’s risk of arrest or death is greatest, would-be recruits face powerful incentives to “free ride”—i.e., stand on the sidelines—since the potential benefits of success will accrue to them regardless of whether they participate (at great personal risk) or not.

Conversely, despite these staggering challenges for upstart violent extremist organizations, the historical record shows that once an insurgent or terrorist organization has outlived its initial period of fragility, a
series of path dependent–like mechanisms set in, making the probability of defeat disproportionately less likely. For instance, Karl DeRouen and David Sobek’s study of civil war duration and outcomes between 1944 and 1997 concludes that “it is hard for rebels to win at any time, but chances of victory rise quickly if the rebels can make it through the first months.”

Hoffman finds that approximately one-half of terrorist groups that avoid collapse in their first year survive at least another decade. Similarly, Navin Bapat’s analysis of 91 insurgencies between 1955 and 2001 concludes that, statistically, most insurgencies fail, and if government repression of insurgencies is going to succeed, it is going to do so within the first four years of conflict. However, as time persists and the costs of war build, governments are more likely to be open to negotiations, while insurgents are less likely to be; after a period of approximately ten years, the possibility of a settlement diminishes markedly.

There are several reasons why full-blown insurgencies—having survived their early incubation period and achieved a tipping point in popular support and violence levels—produce path dependent–like mechanisms (or increasing-returns dynamics) that may, in turn, virtually ensure the failure of postconflict stabilization operations. First, as an insurgency builds momentum, collective action costs may disappear and “the risks of non-participation may actually rise, creating a situation where not supporting insurgents may be more dangerous for individuals.”

Second, early achievement of success in one critical

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14 Hoffman, 2002, p. 84.


16 Jones, 2016, p. 32. Byman (2007) supports this observation, arguing that, as violence levels rise and undermine perceptions of the state’s ability to maintain order, intimidation and “nondenunciation” become more-powerful factors because of increasing public fears of
task area—such as identity creation, communication of cause, rivalry management, and provision of social services—can quickly accelerate progress in other intermediate outcomes, producing a domino effect in insurgent strength (e.g., increasing public support, gaining external support, acquiring sanctuary, raising recruits, and attracting financing). 17 Third, if repeated government efforts of repression fail early on and insurgent capabilities and capacities continue to build, insurgent leaders are likely to conclude that their bargaining position has been strengthened and may in fact reject negotiations altogether. 18

These feedback loops thus make the task of recognizing and crushing would-be insurgent networks (or deterring their emergence) disproportionately more important in the first postconflict weeks and months—the golden hour—to prevent a nearly irreversible trajectory toward intransigent renewal of violence. As many have observed of postwar Iraq, for instance, by the time military planners “recognized the incipient conditions” and “nascent manifestations” of the insurgency roughly a year into the occupation, “it was already too late”; eventual defeat of the opposition was by then far more difficult, perhaps impossible. 19

Credible Commitment of Interveners
A second security-related golden hour dynamic is the role of foreign interveners in providing credible security guarantees to warring parties during anarchic, postconflict transition periods.

As political scientist Barbara Walter argues, warring parties are rarely able to provide credible guarantees to each other on the terms of a peace settlement. In a study of 41 civil wars between 1940 and 1990, she finds that in cases in which a third party was unable to provide future retribution and dwindling public confidence in moderate alternatives. Additionally, he notes that violence as a tool can have a cascading effect on recruitment, fostering intergroup bonds, inspiring new external support, and provoking government overreaction.

17 Byman, 2007, pp. 11–19.
short-term, credible security guarantees in the immediate transition period, postconflict peace settlements have rarely endured; conversely, her statistical analysis concludes that “every case where a third-party stepped in to guarantee a treaty resulted in a successful settlement.”

Walter explains her findings through the paradigm of the “prisoner’s dilemma.” In the postconflict vacuum of legitimate governance and judicial institutions needed to enforce contracts, treaty obligations do not necessarily fail because innate differences are irreconcilable or because compromises are unreachable, but because “adversaries cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms”—e.g., disarmament. According to this argument, although both sides may expect to benefit from compliance with a negotiated settlement—and may, in fact, be eager to do so—each party will determine that they stand to benefit more by cheating while their rival continues to abide by the agreement. In the absence of a third party that is willing and able to provide credible security guarantees, this “paradoxical and unfortunate dilemma” cannot be overcome. In this vacuum, war recurrence becomes highly likely, and any return to violence is not easily reversible. However, external military forces “can ensure that the payoffs from cheating on a civil war agreement no longer exceed the payoffs from faithfully executing its terms. Once cheating becomes difficult and costly, promises to cooperate gain credibility and cooperation becomes more likely.” Only at this point, when postconflict security guarantees have been made and have been credibly enforced by foreign


22 Walter, 1997.
interveners, can institutional power-sharing arrangements necessary for long-term success proceed.

Before these increasing returns dynamics can take effect, however, foreign interveners must ensure that their own promises to enforce compliance and punish cheaters are viewed as credible by both parties. Walter argues that, for foreign interveners to do so, three conditions must hold.23 First, the foreign intervener must possess a strong self-interest in upholding its commitments. This willingness to remain involved might be rooted in “old colonial ties, strategic interests, economic investments, or alliance loyalties.” Second, the third party must be willing to use force—and be effectively able to do so—if it becomes necessary.24 Third, the international guarantor must be able to signal its resolve, such as through highly visible troop deployments and military exercises or through over-the-horizon reaction forces with preapproval from home governments to respond rapidly in the event of violence renewal.

This last point is a critical requirement for interveners in the early postconflict period. Absent these conditions, interveners will likely fail to demonstrate their commitment to enforcing the peace, and violent extremist organizations are likely to test interveners’ resolve. As the previous section on vulnerability and durability of violent extremist organizations argued, if violence resumes in the early postconflict phase, the historical record shows that path-dependent dynamics are likely to set in, making future victory far more difficult, perhaps impossible. The implication for policymakers and military planners is clear: The costs of foreign interventions are likely to be much higher and odds of success lower if credible security guarantees cannot be provided during the golden hour.

23 Indeed, in virtually all of the potential golden hour success stories identified and explored in Chapter Three, these three conditions seemingly apply.

24 Relatedly, Walter (1997) concludes that purely observer or civilian peacekeeping missions will have little effect on overcoming credible commitment problems, and that these are the interventions most likely to experience war recurrence.
Interventions, whether led by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the UN, are typically initiated to stop something akin to aggression, civil war, genocide, terrorism, or use or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Once this immediate purpose has been achieved, the issue posed is, “What next?” The minimum requirement is usually to prevent a repetition of the offending activity and ideally to do so in a way that allows the intervention to eventually be brought to a conclusion. This, in turn, requires the establishment of an indigenous capacity for governance and security, which is to say nation building or, more precisely, state building.

Interventions are not in the first instance mounted to make the targeted societies more democratic or prosperous but to make them more peaceful. Enduring peace is likely to require some degree of political reform and economic growth. It is important, however, not to confuse the ultimate purpose, peace, with the modalities for its achievement: political and economic reform. Early decisions about the nature of transformations to be effected will allow maximum advantage to be taken of the potentially greater malleability of societies in the immediate aftermath of a war or invasion. Yet any change will encounter some resistance, and, all else being equal, the greater the transformation, the greater the risk of resistance. So, objectives need to be closely tied to resource commitments, in terms of military manpower, economic assistance, and time.

Ideally, the intervening country will want to maximize support and minimize opposition to one’s objectives. This may mean maximizing the co-option of competing elements in the society and minimizing the number of those regarded as irreconcilable and thereby to be excluded from some share of power and influence. Still, even under the best of circumstances, there is likely to be some risk that spoilers will become a source of violent resistance.

To stabilize a country over the long term, the postconflict political order must ultimately gain the support of as wide a cross-section of the population as possible and at least the acquiescence of most of the remainder. Although strong states, such as China, Egypt, or Saudi
Arabia, may be able to repress dissatisfaction, most postconflict states are too fragile to do so effectively. There are therefore important strategic reasons for the United States and similar interveners to gain broad-based political support for the orders they are trying to build through their interventions.

The initial phases of an intervention are particularly critical for subsequent political trajectories for at least two reasons. First, the political institutions that interveners help erect in this transition period often prove resistant to change; whatever faults exist in initial political arrangements tend to endure. Second, public perceptions of both the postconflict regime and the interveners tend to be shaped disproportionately by the early actions of both; first impressions can be hard to overcome.

**The Durability of Transitional Institutions**

Transitions from war to peace often pose an enormous challenge to those who would seek to craft a stable postconflict order. On the one hand, peace deals must provide strong-enough protections to potential “spoilers” of a peace deal that they believe their interests will be better served by the new political order than by fighting. On the other hand, these protections must not be so strong that they prevent effective governance. In ethnically homogenous, strong states (such as Germany and Japan following World War II), these two requirements do not pose any particular difficulty. In highly fragmented societies, however, and especially those attempting to recover from civil war or a long period of domination and repression by one ethnic group over others, these two requirements are often at odds with one another.

The typical prescription for fragmented societies recovering from conflict is power-sharing institutions. Power sharing can take a variety of forms, ranging from protections of minorities in the central government (such as veto rights, seat set-asides in the legislature and cabinet, and favorable electoral systems) to territorial protections (various forms of autonomy and federalism). For minorities to feel safe in a postconflict order, they typically demand extremely strong power-sharing protections. These protections, however, typically come at considerable cost to efficient governance:
• Such protections as veto rights can easily generate gridlock, making it difficult for the government to provide the public goods necessary for the state to function and gain the support of the population.
• Such gridlock can become “weaponized,” with each side using the threat of gridlock to bargain for even more concessions at the expense of others and the functioning of the state.
• Power sharing based on ethnicity or other markers of identity tends to reinforce the political salience of those identities at the expense of either overarching, national identities or even areas of common interest.
• The need to “buy” support from each group in the power-sharing arrangement tends to lead to bloated government expenses, as each side is guaranteed representation in civilian bureaucracies and security organs—expenses that most postconflict states can ill afford.25

Thus, power-sharing experts Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild argue that, in many cases, postconflict political orders suffer from a two-stage problem: The power-sharing arrangements necessary to secure all groups’ acquiescence to a postconflict order are so strong that they paralyze governance in later phases and create incentives for renewed conflict.26 This problem could be resolved if there were some way to transition from the institutions created for the immediate postconflict period to ones more suited to long-term governance. But political institutions tend to prove “sticky”: Once created, powerful groups form around the existing rules of the game, resisting any changes that might weaken their hold on power. Indeed, the staying power of institutions—even ones that prove utterly dysfunctional—was one of the primary phenomena that the path-dependency literature sought to explain.

26 Rothchild and Roeder, 2005.
Bosnia is perhaps the quintessential example of the two-stage problem. The Dayton Accords provided extremely strong protections to each of the ethnic groups in Bosnia. Such strong protections were needed to secure an end to the conflict. Once in place, however, the Dayton Accords led to paralysis in the central government and have thwarted efforts to focus politics on areas of mutual gain among the three major ethnic groups. The power-sharing institutions in Lebanon and dysfunctional federal arrangements in Soviet successor states, such as Georgia, provide other examples.

This discussion is not meant to imply that power sharing can never work. To the contrary, several analyses have found that appropriate forms of power sharing can indeed help to stabilize postconflict societies. After all, Bosnia, although poorly governed, has been at peace for more than two decades since the NATO intervention, and Lebanon has proved remarkably resilient in an otherwise tumultuous neighborhood despite its exceptionally weak government. Intervening authorities should be aware, however, that early moves designed to draw contending factions into a new governing arrangement, thereby minimizing those with an incentive to disrupt the process, will be difficult to modify down the road and could eventually become sources of dysfunction and even discord.

Public Perceptions and Anchoring Based on First Impressions
Satisfying public expectations in the immediate postconflict period can pose an enormous challenge. Wars often destroy physical infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, power generation, and sewage. The overthrow of the government (or its disintegration altogether) can disrupt the provision of public services, including public sanitation, health care, schooling, and, especially, security. The lack of public security, in turn, can have a range of follow-on consequences, as looters may strip public buildings of anything valuable; steal vital goods, such as food and medicine; and so on. If a postconflict government is not capable of providing public goods, the public may expect interveners to do

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so—indeed, in cases of military occupation, they are legally required to do so.

How the government and the United States or other interveners perform in this period may be critical to setting the long-term expectations of the public. If the interveners fail to meet the basic needs of the population—or worse, if they behave in ways that are visibly incompetent, openly abusive, or corrupt—their failures can make it extremely difficult to regain the public’s trust. At the same time, interveners should avoid raising expectations—underpromise and overperform should be the rule.

Public-opinion data from countries in an immediate postconflict period are sparse and generally unreliable. More polls are available from countries experiencing democratic transitions, however, which present many challenges analogous to those of golden hours. According to democracy expert Larry Diamond, public-opinion data show that negative popular expectations of governments become highly resistant to change after corrupt or abusive behavior comes to be seen as the norm.28 Such patterns—in which initial impressions become locked in—are familiar to cognitive psychologists, who have conducted extensive research on people’s tendency to anchor their judgments based on initial perceptions.29

The importance of establishing trust in periods of transition has also been observed in the dynamics of political party formation.30 Parties can either “buy” support through the distribution of patronage or build broad platforms that promise public goods to a wide segment or potentially the whole of the population. The latter approach only wins elections, however, if the party can engender trust in its promises. Such trust is built up over time, as parties are seen to make good on

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their prior commitments. This holds true for intervening authorities as well. It is difficult to build a store of trust when the party’s early performance is poor.

Although we do not have reliable data on public perceptions of governments and interveners during golden hours, the study of political transitions and political development provides many reasons to believe that public perceptions formed in transitional periods become difficult to change. Consequently, both interveners and their local partners have an incentive to provide public goods effectively in the immediate postconflict period and to ensure that their efforts to do so are communicated through appropriate information operations. Failure to do so may greatly complicate subsequent efforts to gain public support.

**Conclusion**

It should not be surprising that operations that are carefully planned, well prepared, and adequately resourced and that begin well should have a better chance of ending well than those that lack these advantages. Although none of the four dynamics reviewed in this chapter conclusively proves the existence of golden hours, they do strongly suggest that there are developments in the early days of an intervention that bear the characteristics of critical junctures and path dependency. These dynamics make it much more likely that an intervener’s actions in the early postconflict period are likely to have a disproportionately large influence on subsequent events.

The strong version of the golden hour argument might suggest that an intervention is highly likely to succeed at relatively low cost if the golden hour is seized. The evidence in this chapter does not support the strong version of the argument. Even if everything goes well in initial phases, postconflict countries remain very fragile. Conversely, even if an intervention goes poorly in its initial phases, it may be possible to rescue it in subsequent years with sufficient resources and luck. There is, however, also a weaker version of the golden hour argument. In the weaker version, successfully seizing the golden hour is neither necessary nor sufficient for the success of an intervention. It does, how-
ever, considerably improve the odds of success and the likelihood that success can be achieved at reasonable cost.

The next chapter will review the record of eight American interventions to provide further evidence that the ways in which successive administrations prepared for, organized themselves for, and conducted critical stabilizing activities in the early postconflict phases did indeed exercise a strong influence on the subsequent trajectories of the host nations.
To better understand the extent to which golden hours are critical for securing sustainable peace and the extent to which the United States was able to seize the opportunities presented in these early phases, we have chosen two post–World War II, postconflict American operations and six post–Cold War missions for examination. The American occupations of Germany and Japan remain the gold standard of post-war reconstruction. The American-led operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq form the living memory of American experience in this field. These eight cases represent a broad cross-section of relevant American experience. They include both large-scale operations (as in Germany, Japan, and Iraq) and very small efforts (as in Somalia, Haiti, and initial operations in Afghanistan). They span military occupations (Germany, Japan, and Iraq) and peace operations (Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo). Some are unilateral interventions (as Japan and Iraq effectively were), while others are multilateral to varying degrees (such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan). They cover a wide variety of strategic contexts, including the aftermath of World War II, humanitarian interventions, and counterterrorism efforts.

For each of these eight cases, we examine the planning and preparation for U.S. operations, the arrangements for civil-military collaboration established, the actions taken in the early months of the intervention, and the impact of these early activities on the ultimate outcomes. Not surprisingly, we find a correlation between careful plan-
ning, adequate preparation, and early success in establishing security and other essential public services and positive long-term outcomes.

We conclude the chapter with a look at the pacification program in Vietnam, which ran from 1967 to the American withdrawal in 1973. There was no postconflict phase in Vietnam and therefore no golden hour, but CORDS offers a unique example of full civil-military integration, one that might have application in future occasions.

**Germany (1945–1952)**

Although the U.S. Army had established military governments to consolidate the peace in the aftermath of nearly all of its major engagements prior to World War II—in Mexico after the U.S.-Mexican War (1847); in the Confederate states after the Civil War (1865); in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American War (1898); and in the German Rhineland after World War I (1918)—postwar administration of civil affairs activities was still not generally accepted as a “legitimate military function” at the time America was plunged into global war in December 1941. In each previous case, the establishment of postconflict military governments in occupied enemy territories was treated “as a kind of reluctant afterthought.”1 During World War II, however, pressure built within the U.S. Departments of War, State, and Treasury to recognize the postcombat phase of operations as “something more than a minor incidental of war”; plans for the peace were prepared in parallel with plans for military victory.2

**Advance Planning**

President Franklin Roosevelt was averse to initiating postwar planning as long as the conflicts in Europe and the Pacific raged. His embrace of unconditional surrender as the war’s objective implied, however, that Germany would eventually be occupied. Despite Roosevelt’s prefer-

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2 Ziemke, 1975, p. 3.
ence to defer planning for the peace, preparations were initiated both domestically—first within the Department of State, and later within the Departments of War and Treasury—and internationally, through a series of seven Allied summits convened between 1941 and 1945. In Washington, the first postwar planning committee was established at the Department of State in January 1942. Headed by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, it consisted of five subcommittees tasked with responsibilities in distinct policy areas relating to politics, security, economic reconstruction, and territorial issues. Members of the committee assumed a relatively “soft” position on Germany, however, and by the time it was disbanded in July 1943, it had apparently not achieved “any immediate impact on presidential decision-making.”

The Department of War planned according to the assumption that responsibility for the occupation would inevitably fall under the U.S. Army. In early 1942, the Military Government Division was created to begin publishing civil affairs handbooks; to administer the newly created School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia; and to prepare officers for eventual deployment in occupied territories. Within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Post-War Committee was stood up with the narrower duty of drafting surrender documents. And in May 1943, the War Department formed the Civil Affairs Division under the leadership of Major General John Hilldring to guide the planning for the occupation that would eventually come under Marshall’s charge. In part, Hilldring’s Civil Affairs Division sought to add a level of detailed operational planning to the “grand policies” of the Department of State’s earlier efforts. It also sought to broaden the interagency process by incorporating input and expertise from such other agencies as the Foreign Economic Administration, the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of War Information, the Economic Institutions Staff, and the Department of Agriculture.

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By late 1944, interagency friction was building in the postwar planning process in Washington, with Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau accusing the Departments of State and War of being too soft on Germany. In September 1944, the Cabinet Committee on Germany was established to resolve these differences, although it was abolished a month later after they proved irreconcilable. Subsequently, in November 1944, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was stood up to take the lead over civil-military occupation preparations for Germany and Japan. Morgenthau, meanwhile, persuaded the president to establish the Informal Policy Committee on Germany, which would include representatives from the Department of the Treasury. With significant influence from Hilldring’s Civil Affairs Division, SWNCC and the Informal Policy Committee produced the final policy plans for the occupations of Germany and Japan—Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 and Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380, respectively—as well as SWNCC Directive 150, which “translated [Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 and Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380] into military executable orders with significantly more operational details.”

As plans for the peace developed in Washington, Allied leaders convened at seven international summits throughout and immediately following the war to harmonize postwar policies: in Newfoundland (August 1941), Casablanca (January 1943), Cairo (November 1943), Tehran (November 1943), Quebec (September 1944), Yalta (February 1945), and Potsdam (July 1945). Notably, at Casablanca it was resolved that only unconditional surrender by the Axis powers would be accepted as an outcome of the war. At Tehran, Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin agreed in principle that Germany would be partitioned after the war, and they decided to establish the European Advisory

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Commission, based in London, to plan for the occupation, although little was initially done in this forum. At Yalta, the Allies agreed on the division of the four occupation sectors—administered respectively by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and, somewhat later, France—and the joint administration of Berlin, as well as policies on disarmament, denazification, prosecution of war criminals, and financial reparations. And at Potsdam, they laid plans for the creation of the Allied Control Council in Berlin, which would function as a coordinating mechanism for issues that transcended the boundaries of the individual military governorships in Germany.⁶

Civil-Military Collaboration
The Office of the Military Government, United States (OMGUS), a military entity, oversaw both military and civil matters pertaining to the U.S. occupied sector. Department of State and other civilian agency officials were integrated into the OMGUS structure and received direction from its leadership. In October 1945, General Dwight Eisenhower, commander of American forces in Europe, announced the establishment of a constabulary force of 38,000 soldiers to perform law enforcement and border control duties in the U.S. occupied zone. Although it would take more than a year after Victory in Europe Day (V-E Day) for the U.S. Constabulary to become operational, this force remained active until the German police fully assumed these responsibilities in 1952.⁷ OMGUS oversaw humanitarian assistance and funded it through the Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program, while implementation was largely left to international organizations, such as the Red Cross and religious organizations.

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Although OMGUS was in charge of policymaking and implementation in the American sector of Germany, in Berlin the Allied Control Council addressed issues at the national level and sought to ensure some degree of consistency over the administration of the four occupied zones. By 1947, however, cooperation and coordination within the Allied Control Council had largely broken down, particularly between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. At the trans-European level, the Economic Cooperation Administration—a civilian U.S. agency—oversaw the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Europe, including the western sectors of Germany from 1948 to 1951.

**Initial Actions in the Golden Hour**

U.S. postwar plans focused initially on demilitarization, denazification, and democracy promotion rather than helping rebuild Germany’s economy. Only as it realized the extent of the destruction experienced by Germany and saw the rise of the Soviet threat did the United States adopt a more ambitious plan of supporting Germany’s economic reconstruction, leading to accelerated involvement of civilian agencies in the postwar effort.

In the first weeks and months of the occupation, the most pressing objectives were to establish security and prevent remnant Nazi elements from filling the security vacuum. In the western zones, the German military was quickly disarmed and demobilized. Initially,

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8 The capital city, Berlin, was put under a similar regime, with a four-sector division and an inter-Allied authority in charge of matters related to the whole city.

9 Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, which laid out the principles of U.S. occupation of Germany, stated that the “principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world” (Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, 1945, para. 4c).


this was enabled by the sheer size of the occupying force: On V-E Day, 61 U.S. divisions, totaling some 1,622,000 men, were in Germany.\textsuperscript{12} By July 1945, however, only one division remained to establish law and order and provide border security in the U.S. occupation zone.\textsuperscript{13} One year later, on July 1, 1946, the aforementioned U.S. constabulary force formally assumed the lead in law-and-order and intelligence-gathering functions.\textsuperscript{14} Meanwhile, beginning in the fall of 1945, high-level indictments of war criminals were pursued by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Lower-level purges of Nazi officials unfolded over the first two years of the occupation, resulting in the conviction of some 118,000 individuals out of 887,000 tried.\textsuperscript{15}

Other early civil tasks undertaken by OMGUS were reorganizing German governance structures, overseeing economic and budgetary policy, and instituting democratic reforms in the press and educational system. In the U.S. sector, the administrators of the occupation embraced an incremental, bottom-up process to build democratic institutions. In the fall of 1945, political parties were first allowed to organize at the county and state levels, culminating in the holding of local elections in early 1946. Over 1947–1948, administrative responsibilities were gradually returned to the German people, and, in 1949, the first national elections were held, resulting in the creation of the first Bundestag and the election of Konrad Adenauer as the first chancellor of West Germany.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[13] Gott, 2005, pp. 9–10. In the British zone of occupation, early security and law-and-order functions were provided by the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), which was formed on August 25, 1945, and initially consisted of some 155,000 soldiers. See Jana Flieshart, “Bridging Cultures During the Cold War: The British Army of the Rhine’s (BAOR) Dortmund Garrison and Their German Civilian Workers,” Landscapes, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2014, p. 133.
\item[16] Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 8–17. In East Germany, the Soviet Union also replaced its military governor with civilian leadership in 1949.
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Although economic issues at the national level—such as those pertaining to the central bank and currency reform—fell under the authority of the Allied Control Council, each of the occupying powers determined economic reconstruction and humanitarian aid policies in their individual area of administration. Within the U.S. zone, efforts to jump-start industrial output, create a free-market economy, settle refugees, and feed millions of vulnerable citizens were given primacy. Over French and Soviet objections, in July 1946, the United States and the United Kingdom announced the economic merger of their occupation zones.\textsuperscript{17} The Marshall Plan was not launched until April 1948, but the United States and other international organizations began to infuse the West German economy with massive grants and loans to finance imports of relief supplies and recovery activities from the earliest days of the occupation.\textsuperscript{18} In 1946 and 1947, for instance, the United States provided West Germany with $196 million and $298 million in humanitarian aid, respectively, primarily in the form of GARIOA grants. Overall, between 1946 and 1952, U.S. assistance to West Germany totaled some $4.3 billion—nearly twice as much as to Japan.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Outcome}

Coming in the wake of World War II, the U.S. occupation of Germany was a predominantly military enterprise that has been seen as a sub-


\textsuperscript{18} The Soviet Union administered a separate postwar economic aid program in its sector, and it prevented reconstruction aid under the Marshall Plan from reaching Eastern Europe. See U.S. Department of State, undated-a.

\textsuperscript{19} Measured in constant 2005 dollars, U.S. assistance to Germany equaled approximately $1.6 billion in 1946, $2.2 billion in 1947, $5.8 billion in 1948, $8.6 billion in 1949; $5.0 billion in 1950; $4.2 billion in 1951; and $1.9 billion in 1952. Notably, between 1949 and 1951, a significant share of this economic assistance was provided in the form of loans rather than grants. Additionally, in 1951–1952, military aid composed a large share of total assistance, as the Allies began to rearm Germany in the early years of the Cold War. See Serafino, Tarnoff, and Nanto, 2006, pp. 10–12; and Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 17–23.
stantial success. As Cold War tensions hardened across Europe, West Germany became a fully democratic state at peace with its neighbors; a free-market economy was created, leading to annual growth of some 8 percent annually throughout the 1950s and commensurate improvements in living standards; and, as the Allies began to rearm West Germany after the outbreak of the Korean War, the nation became an indispensable NATO ally.

Several actions taken by the Allies in the early weeks and months of the occupation arguably had a disproportionately large impact on this outcome, as compared with later actions. First, in part as a result of lessons learned following the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I, the Allies signaled from the start their staying power and provided credible external security guarantees that grew in significance as the shared perception of the Soviet threat increased. The German government formally surrendered. The German armed forces were interned, sifted for war criminals, and disarmed before being released. Unlike the majority of post–Cold War U.S. interventions, German society was not plagued by an intrastate conflict that threatened to reignite during the peace, and the rapid and effective demobilization of the armed forces—in combination with the massive Allied footprint in Germany during the golden hour—prevented the emergence of violent resistance to the occupation. The nearly unprecedented decimation of German society produced “a recognition by the occupied population of the need for occupation.”

The Allies’ decision to quickly hold local elections but to delay national elections for four years returned a degree of power to the defeated population—which, in turn, increased German cooperation and malleability regarding the implementation of occupation directives and policies—while avoiding the premature creation and hardening of power-sharing arrangements in a nation with limited experience in Western democratic traditions. The pre-occupation decision

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to divide postwar Germany into four administrative sectors slowed national political and economic integration during reconstruction, both between East and West and within the West itself, but ensured that the bulk of Germany was rebuilt on a liberal democratic model.22

Japan (1945–1952)

U.S. planning for postwar Japan assumed that the country would first be invaded and only gradually occupied.23 Instead, Japan surrendered in August of 1945, immediately following the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending the war a year earlier than expected. On the eve of the announcement of Japan’s surrender, General Douglas MacArthur was designated the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) in charge of the occupation by the terms of an international agreement signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union. Other Allied representatives exercised only advisory roles. Unlike in postwar Germany, there would be no spheres of influence or distinct occupation zones. Also dissimilar to Germany, the Japanese government would continue to function, and a direct military government would not be established.

At the time of surrender, the primary security challenge faced by the occupying powers was the demobilization of up to 4.3 million enemy troops in Japan, as well as an additional 3.5 million troops scattered across the former Japanese empire in China, Manchuria, Korea,

22 In particular, in the West, economic integration was impeded by France’s refusal to join the economic merger of the American and British zones, which formally took effect on January 1, 1947. For details, see Giangreco and Griffin, 1988.

23 The initial plans envisioned a two-phased invasion: Operation Olympic would begin in the fall of 1945, followed by a second assault, Operation Coronet, in the spring of 1946. In parallel with these plans, however, preparations began in May 1945 for the then—seemingly unlikely contingency of a sudden collapse or surrender of the imperial government in Tokyo. The latter plans, code-named Operation Blacklist, were first briefed to military leadership on July 16, 1945. For a more detailed account of the planning involved in Blacklist, see General Staff of General Douglas MacArthur, “Prelude to Occupation,” in Reports of General MacArthur, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Vol. 1, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966a.
and islands throughout the Pacific. At the same time, the nation faced an acute humanitarian crisis. The Allied bombings had left nearly 9 million people homeless, and approximately 3 million Japanese civilians were stranded overseas in former territories of the empire. As many as 10 million in Japan were threatened by hunger and starvation. An estimated one-quarter of Japan’s wealth was erased during the conflict, and 40 percent of the country’s urban landscape was leveled. Inflation was rampant, imports of basic commodities were disrupted, revenues and raw materials from the empire’s overseas colonies were lost, and productive capacity and gross national product (GNP) was depleted to about two-thirds of prewar levels.24

**Advance Planning**

Alongside planning for the occupation of Germany, postwar planning for Japan began in the Department of State in 1942 and soon involved interagency efforts with the Departments of War and Treasury, as discussed above. Pursuant to the “Europe first” mind-set of war planners in Washington, however, preparations for Germany received more attention than those for Japan. Eventually, postwar plans for Japan developed by the Subcommittee on the Far East under the aforementioned SWNCC were codified in Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380, *Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper.*25

American plans for the occupation (Operation Blacklist) stipulated that the first-order priorities would be “to reduce completely any local opposition, to establish bases at the strategic points outlined, to seize control of the higher echelons of government in both Japan and Korea, and to immobilize the armed forces of Japan.”26 To achieve

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25 Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380, 1945; see Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 21–22.

26 General Staff of General MacArthur, 1966a, p. 4.
these objectives, the initial missions would be purely military in nature and would focus on the disarmament of Japanese forces and demilitarization of Japanese society, suppression of any local opposition, establishment of control of strategic lines of communications, and liberation of Allied prisoners of war.

Subsequently, military operations would fuse with civil and political tasks to consolidate control over the country, prevent humanitarian crises, and lay the groundwork for longer-term institution building and governance, economic, and societal reforms. The plans for this second phase of Operation Blacklist, which began in October 1945, thus stipulated several critical, civil-military objectives: the establishment of control over the civilian population, by institution of military government, if necessary; facilitation of peaceful commerce, particularly that contributing to the subsistence, clothing, and shelter of the population; securing intelligence on and suppressing individuals and organizations that might become spoilers of the peace; arrest of war criminals; and preparation for transfer of responsibilities to the post-war government, when established.27

Throughout the planning phase, Washington policymakers deliberated intensely on whether or not to force the emperor’s abdication and to dissolve Japan’s imperial institutions after surrender. Finally, on the eve of the occupation, Washington issued an amendment to the Occupation Instructions declaring that, instead of instituting a military government, the existing government structures would be retained and postwar policies would be administered through them.28 In part, this was because U.S. planners desired to limit American troop commitments and costs, but it was also because they recognized that most

27 General Staff of General MacArthur, 1966a, pp. 10–11.
28 General Staff of General MacArthur, 1966a, pp. 25–27. As the General Staff report explains (p. 11): “It was emphasized that in view of the limited forces which would have to occupy a country of roughly eighty million, army commanders would make possible use of Japanese demobilized forces within the bound of security, and would take all steps to insure that public servants, such as the civil police, railway workers, communication workers, utilities operators and public health officials, not only remained at their tasks, but intensified their efforts to insure a continuation of all functions under what was certain to be a period of great stress.”
American civil and military personnel lacked the linguistic and cultural knowledge to be effective administrators of Japanese society.⁹

The amendment also decreed that—to avoid possible incidents that could lead to renewed conflict—the disarmament and demobilization activities would be conducted directly by the Japanese armed forces, with U.S. oversight.³⁰

**Civil-Military Collaboration**

Unlike in postwar Germany, the occupation of Japan was overseen almost exclusively by American authorities, with SCAP leading major reforms in all sectors of the Japanese government, military, economy, and society. Eventually, two international advisory bodies were formed—the Far Eastern Commission in December 1945 and the Allied Council for Japan in February 1946—but these institutions never gained strong influence over the intervention, in large part because most of the initial policies toward postwar Japan were determined before they were stood up.³¹ MacArthur’s decisionmaking autonomy was further bolstered by the fact that General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, allowed him considerable latitude to implement post-surrender directives.³²

The civil-military structure of the occupation was essentially two-tiered. On the planning and policymaking level, General Headquarters, SCAP, was primarily responsible for the civil affairs and governance tasks; on the operational level, the 8th Army and the 6th Army were responsible for executing SCAP directives.³³ Throughout the

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²⁹ As John Dower notes: “Because the victors had no linguistic or cultural entrée to the losers’ society, they had little choice but to govern ‘indirectly,’ through existing organs of government.” Dower, 1999, p. 27; Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 30.


³³ The 6th Army was inactivated in January 1946, after which time the 8th Army performed these functions for the remainder of the occupation. General Staff of General MacArthur, 1966a, pp. 196–198.
early years of the occupation, SCAP coordinated civilian and military activities by dispatching military government teams populated with officers qualified for civil affairs across Japan’s 46 prefectures to work directly with local governments.34 Each team was organized into sections that mirrored the structure of their local Japanese counterparts, such as public health, information and education, and economic development.35 Teams’ main role was to observe the implementation of SCAP’s decisions and report back to SCAP headquarters accordingly; they also played, when needed, an advisory role.36

In Tokyo, SCAP headquarters were organized into nine divisions that roughly paralleled the Japanese cabinet.37 MacArthur communicated his directives to the various relevant Japanese ministries through the Central Liaison Committee; in turn, bureaucrats and parliamentarians debated how to implement MacArthur’s decisions, and then orders were handed down to governors and mayors for execution.38 As Japanese authorities received increasing control over administrative decisions, military government teams became civil affairs teams and then faded out, before disappearing in June 1951.39 Over time, SCAP became more of a civilian-staffed entity. By 1948, it had reached a peak presence of 3,500 mostly U.S. civil servants, as well as U.S. officers who had converted to civilian status, but it remained under overall military direction.40

**Initial Actions in the Golden Hour**

Unlike in Germany, there existed on the ground no significant U.S. troop presence at the time of Japan’s surrender. The first phase of the

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35 Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 30.
37 Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 32.
38 General Staff of General MacArthur, 1966a, p. 195; Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 30, 39.
39 Takemae, 2002, p. 120.
40 Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 32.
occupation thus involved the phased deployment of American and a small number of Allied army, air, and naval units across Japan, beginning in early September 1945.41 Contrary to expectations, as Allied ground forces spread throughout the country, they encountered no pockets of armed resistance.42 U.S. planners determined that the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes should be handled by the Japanese Army and Navy Ministries themselves. These activities proceeded swiftly; by mid-October 1945, demobilization of some 7 million Japanese soldiers was complete. By the end of the year, the demilitarization of Japanese society was also essentially complete.

The occupying forces turned their attention to other humanitarian and governance tasks in the fall of 1945. The first was to assist the host government in repatriating some 6–7 million Japanese citizens and troops stranded overseas; begun in October 1945, this effort proceeded slowly and was not complete until 1948. At the same time, U.S. forces took ownership of the welfare and repatriation of approximately 1.3 million foreign nationals in Japan, primarily from Korea, China, and Formosa (Taiwan), who had been forcibly conscripted to work in mines and other wartime industries.43 Another humanitarian activity conducted during the golden hour was the provision of food and other relief supplies to the Japanese population to prevent widespread starvation and disease. Initially, however, policymakers in Washington were not forthcoming with resources to feed the former enemy. Concerned

41 The plans for Operation Blacklist called for the deployment of troops to 14 strategic geographic areas in Japan, which would permit control over 60 percent of the population, 80 percent of the country’s industrial capacity, and 48 percent of food production. General Staff of General MacArthur, 1966a, pp. 2–6.

42 This outcome was likely attributable to several golden hour actions: Japanese military commanders were given two to three days of advanced warnings of U.S. troop deployments into a given area to disarm their forces and restrict local troop movements; SCAP took immediate, effective control over the country’s print and radio media to communicate their expectations of the local population; Emperor Hirohito urged the nation to comply with occupation directives; and SCAP immediately established robust counter and operational intelligence units to monitor and combat potentially subversive elements in Japan’s postwar society.

that dire humanitarian conditions could undermine other priorities of the occupation, the first formal aid program—GARIOA—was eventually established in July 1946. Although total humanitarian aid levels were relatively low in the first year of the occupation—just $107 million in 1946 (or $859 million in constant 2005 dollars)—they quickly rose, peaking at $502 million in 1949 ($3.4 billion in constant 2005 dollars). Although Japan received no Marshall Plan–like reconstruction assistance, and total aid to West Germany was roughly double that to Japan over the period 1946–1952, “food shipments from the United States helped avert the anticipated disaster—and, in the process, enhanced the image of the United States as a generous benefactor.”

The occupying forces also conducted concerted psychological operations during the golden hour. These propaganda efforts included public relations campaigns to portray Emperor Hirohito as a supporter of democratic reform and the orchestration of a national tour for Hirohito in which he lavished praise on the U.S. occupiers and their objectives. Additionally, in the early months of the occupation, MacArthur conducted four other activities to put his democratization agenda on a trajectory for future success. First, beginning in the fall of 1945, the occupying forces apprehended and indicted more than 5,700 individuals on suspected war crime charges, including 24 high-ranking officials of the former military. Second, beginning in January 1946, SCAP began the process of purging the government of some 210,000 individuals who had held positions suspected of promoting militarism and foreign aggression. (These “demilitarization” efforts were much less sweeping and shorter lived than the comparable denazification program in Germany.) Third, beginning in October 1945, SCAP began dissolving the Special Higher Police, which had censored free speech and thought in Japanese society; removing restrictions on free speech;


45 Dower, 1999, p. 93; Serafino, Tarnoff, and Nanto, 2006, p. 1. Measured in constant 2005 dollars, total assistance to Germany totaled approximately $29.3 billion between 1946 and 1952 compared with $15.2 billion to Japan over the same period.

and freeing political prisoners. Fourth, in December 1945, directives were ordered to amend existing elections laws, giving women the right to vote and lowering the voting age from 25 to 20. Fifth, in February 1946, SCAP officials drafted a new constitution in a period of two weeks; the speed of this process was motivated by MacArthur’s desire to undermine input from the newly created Far Eastern Commission, whose mandate included authority over constitutional issues.⁴⁷ This constitution was embraced by the Japanese and has not been amended since.

Finally, during the golden hour, U.S. occupiers took several steps to democratize economic opportunity in Japanese society, although U.S. policy generally took a hands-off approach to far-reaching economic and infrastructure reconstruction efforts. The immediate activities undertaken focused on curbing rampant inflation, as well as “dissolving the large business combines (zaibatsu) that dominated the economy, expanding workers’ rights, and instituting a comprehensive land reform.”⁴⁸

**Outcome**
The occupation of Japan is generally viewed as a success. Armed resistance never emerged; pervasive, prolonged humanitarian crises were prevented; and national and local governance bodies were able to provide public services and maintain order. Japan was put on a course toward democratization and economic growth. Japan emerged as a world economic power with a stable and secure civil society.

Japan, like Germany, formally surrendered. Both occupations were conducted under military authority, with other U.S. civilian agency personnel operating within the military occupational structure. Both operations profited from substantial advance planning and preparation and coordinated unity of effort.

Whereas in Germany all national institutions were abolished with new ones being created over time, in Japan these institutions were reformed as they continued to operate. The approach in Japan proved

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⁴⁷ Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 41–43.
⁴⁸ Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 45–46.
much less costly, but Germany’s transformation was even more far-reaching, leaving that society more reconciled with its neighbors than is the case with Japan. The absence of violent resistance in both Germany and Japan was probably due mainly to the comprehensiveness of their defeat and the catastrophic damage incurred. In Germany, resistance was also deterred by a very large occupation force initially numbering almost 2 million Americans in a zone with only some 20 million Germans. Preparation for the occupation of Japan was less advanced at the end of the war than had been the case with Germany, and the occupation force was much smaller. These disadvantages were offset by the decision to maintain not just the emperor, and not just the Japanese administration, but nearly the entire state apparatus, including the executive, legislature, and judiciary, while reforming these institutions as they continued to operate.

Several activities undertaken during the golden hour likely exercised a disproportionate impact. First, the U.S. decision to maintain the emperor—as well as most of the Japanese administration and local organs of governance—guaranteed that an effective administrative infrastructure existed from day one of the occupation, and it mitigated the risk of resistance to the occupiers at both the elite and popular levels. It also allowed U.S. forces to focus on security- and humanitarian-related tasks in the first weeks and months of the occupation rather than diverting precious time and resources toward building a new government and deciding who—and who not—to include in the process. The critical, pre-occupation decision to rule indirectly also paid great dividends later as Japanese bureaucrats, who were afforded considerable influence over the outcomes of the occupation, developed cordial working relationships with SCAP staff members.

Second, MacArthur’s acquiescence to the emperor’s request that DDR processes be managed by the Japanese themselves (with U.S. oversight) arguably lessened the danger of noncompliance and the emergence of would-be spoilers, while also contributing to the speed and totality with which these activities were completed.49 The ability

49 Made on the eve of surrender, the decision to entrust Japan to disarm and demobilize its own military forces was driven by two primary considerations. First, it was believed by SCAP
of the occupying forces to provide credible security guarantees in the immediate postconflict period also likely prevented the emergence of any popular resistance movements.

Third, MacArthur’s ability to lobby successfully for expansions in his 1946–1947 budget for humanitarian relief arguably averted an acute humanitarian disaster that, in turn, might have created disastrous civil instability, undermined security established during the golden hour, and derailed the other longer-term objectives, such as democratization and economic growth.

Fourth, several actions taken by SCAP in the first months of the occupation—including conducting information campaigns aimed at raising support for America’s political objectives, apprehending suspected war criminals, limited purging of proponents of militarism within the government, and dissolving the police units responsible for enforcing restrictions on free speech—likely eliminated from the political sphere many would-be spoilers and future opponents of democratic reforms, both at the elite and public levels.

From the beginning, the American occupation was regarded as temporary, and the country’s democratic transformation was set as an objective. MacArthur moved quickly to set this transformation in motion and was given great latitude from Washington to do so.

Finally, the fact that authority was concentrated in one place—SCAP and, more specifically, MacArthur—rather than dispersed between allies as it was in Germany or among multiple agencies as in many later such operations—allowed the occupiers to quickly formulate and implement policies during the golden hour.

that Japanese administration of the process would avoid possible incidents or confrontations with American soldiers that could lead to renewed violence. Second, SCAP recognized that the technical and administrative skills of the Japanese military leadership could be exploited to accomplish the directive most effectively. See General Staff of General MacArthur, 1966a, pp. 25–27, pp. 117–118.

In January 1991, after more than two decades in power, the military dictatorship of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre collapsed, unleashing a complex civil war between rival clans and warlords in Somalia. Over the next year, the country descended quickly into anarchy as government services and law and order disintegrated completely. In April 1992, the UN Security Council approved the first of what would become a succession of linked multinational interventions, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I, to provide security for humanitarian relief in and around Mogadishu and to monitor a recently negotiated cease-fire between rival faction leaders General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mohamed Mahdi, the self-appointed “interim president.” By the time that the first UN forces finally deployed in September 1992, the security environment in the capital had deteriorated significantly; by November, Aideed was demanding UN withdrawal, and UNOSOM troops had come under attack. To avoid an unmitigated humanitarian disaster, the George H. W. Bush administration dispatched, under UN Security Council mandate, the powerful U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to stabilize Mogadishu and ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.50

Initially, the overwhelmingly superior UNITAF force of 37,000 encountered little resistance.51 The U.S.-led mission experienced quick success in achieving its key objectives of establishing a relatively secure environment to enable the distribution of aid relief and prepare for the

50 UNOSOM I initially had a mandated strength of 50 military observers and 500 security personnel. In July and August 1992, its mandate and strength were expanded to allow for distribution of humanitarian relief beyond Mogadishu. Eventually, its mandated strength would grow to 50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel, 719 logistic support personnel, and 200 international civilian staff. By comparison, UNITAF was initially expected to include 28,000 U.S. forces plus 17,000 additional forces from more than 20 countries. See UN, Department of Public Information, “Somalia—UNOSOM I,” March 21, 1997; UN Security Council, Resolution 751 (1992), April 24, 1992; UN Security Council, Resolution 767 (1992), July 27, 1992; UN Security Council, Resolution 775 (1992), August 28, 1992; UN Security Council, Resolution 794 (1992), December 2, 1992.

51 UN, Department of Public Information, 1997.
transfer of peacekeeping operations back to the UN.\(^5^2\) Indeed, although incidents of violence did continue throughout parts of the country, this fragile period seemingly represented a potential golden hour. In May 1993, the United States, which had been reluctant from the start to become committed to a complex nation-building mission, handed off responsibilities to a second-generation UN-led operation, UNOSOM II. Unlike UNOSOM I and UNITAF before it, the mandate of the new mission had been broadened to include more-ambitious objectives, including disarmament, economic development, and political institution building—in addition to provision of security and humanitarian aid. At the same time, however, the military resources authorized under UNOSOM II fell far short of those under UNITAF.\(^5^3\)

**Advance Planning**

As Washington received dire warnings of the imminent humanitarian crisis unfolding in Somalia over the summer of 1992, plans were laid for an initial American response that would be circumscribed to operating an air bridge (Operation Provide Relief) transporting food and UN troops from Kenya to Somalia. Within months of their deployment, however, UNOSOM peacekeepers were proving wholly incapable of stabilizing the situation on the ground. Interagency debates among the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of State focused on the tension between committing U.S. ground troops to Somalia for humanitarian purposes

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\(^5^2\) UNITAF’s mandate did not include broad disarmament and demobilization programs. Instead, security operations were essentially limited to four guiding principles: no banditry, no roadblocks, no visible weapons, and no “technical” (flatbed trucks mounted with light arms).

\(^5^3\) UNOSOM II’s maximum authorized force was 28,000 military and police personnel, as well as some 2,800 international and local civilian staff. However, the actual number of personnel deployed never exceeded some 16,000. UN, Department of Public Information, “Somalia—UNOSOM II,” August 31, 1996; UN Security Council, Resolution 814 (1993), March 26, 1993; David Bentley and Robert Oakley, “Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti,” Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, No. 30, 1995, p. 1.
and avoiding a “long-term commitment of resources in a no-win situation” in which the United States had no clear strategic interests.\textsuperscript{54}

In late November 1992, the NSC presented to President George H. W. Bush three policy options to help rescue the failing mission: (1) “[C]ontinue to aid and support an increased UN presence [status quo plus]”; (2) “propose an international coalition under UN command and control with U.S. airlift, sealift, logistic, and communication support”; or (3) “send one or more U.S. divisions of ground troops under U.S. command and control into Somalia to provide security for food distribution” (a U.S. military mission).\textsuperscript{55} The White House resolved to pursue the third course of action but, as noted above, made clear its intention to withdraw combat units as quickly as possible and hand off responsibility for peacekeeping operations back to the UN once security had been restored.\textsuperscript{56} The planning of UNITAF thus lacked a long-term strategy.\textsuperscript{57} As the Clinton administration took control of the White House in January 1993, no formal policy reviews were conducted to prepare for problems in the transition to the wider UNOSOM II nation-building mission. During the first months of the new presidency, no plans were developed in Washington to pressure the warring factions to formalize a new cease-fire agreement and begin political negotiations before the withdrawal of the majority of U.S. forces. The Clinton NSC did not hold its first Principals Committee meeting on Somalia until October 5, 1993, following the now-infamous “Black Hawk down” incident in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{58}

Within the United Nations, preintervention preparations for UNOSOM II were worse than those for UNISOM I. Indeed, the planning for the follow-on mission was largely driven by the U.S.


\textsuperscript{55} Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 44–45.

\textsuperscript{56} Pool, 2005, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{57} Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{58} Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 46–48.
Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than the UN itself.\footnote{These plans initially envisioned four phases for the achievement of operational objectives that consisted of rebuilding institutions of governance and infrastructure and completing reconstruction through legitimate indigenous governance structures: (1) transfer of control from UNITAF to UNOSOM, (2) consolidation and expansion of security, (3) transfer of control to civilian institutions, and (4) redeployment of UNOSOM II forces. See Roger C. Easton, *Somalia: Key Operational Considerations and Implications in an Era of Peace-Enforcement and Forced Humanitarian Assistance Ventures*, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, May 1993, pp. 14–16.} Robert Oakley, then–presidential special envoy to Somalia, and David Bentley later observed,

Little planning [for UNOSOM II] had been done by the UN, and U.S. planning on behalf of the UN was not effectively integrated. Despite strong urging by the United States, no UN planners were sent to Somalia before the arrival of the UNOSOM II Commander and Deputy Commander in late March 1993. Because of this lack of planning, the top UNOSOM II military commanders had no understanding of the transition; the number, capability, or concept of employment of their forces; or the rules of engagement.\footnote{Bentley and Oakley, 1995, p. 1.}

At the time of UNOSOM II’s deployment, for instance, the staff of the Secretary General’s military advisor numbered only two people; by the end of the mission two years later, that number would exceed 100 personnel. To make matters worse, as the first-ever UN operation authorized to employ coercive force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,\footnote{UN, Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS XVI, October 24, 1945.} the UN secretariat lacked any experience in controlling such a large peace enforcement operation.

**Civil-Military Collaboration**

Throughout the golden hour of the UNITAF or UNOSOM II interventions in Somalia, coordination across civilian and military structures—and among U.S., UN, and other international actors—was much more successful in humanitarian relief efforts than in other secu-
rity and civil affairs spheres. The immediate past experience of civilian-military cooperation during Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq informed the design of humanitarian relief during UNITAF and Operation Restore Hope. During that earlier operation, members of USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) were located in the headquarters of the Joint Task Force. DART validated requests for support sent by humanitarian organizations; the Joint Task Force then executed these requests.62 Prior to UNITAF deployment, key military personnel also received briefings on the critical humanitarian actors present in the country, their methods of operation, and the type of frictions that could potentially arise between them and the military—lessons that were based at least in part on the insights gathered during Operation Provide Comfort.63

In preparation for the deepening of U.S. involvement in Somalia, policymakers in Washington planned the establishment of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) as a mechanism for coordinating among military forces, small government affairs teams, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Somalia.64 The CMOC was operational from the very beginning of the intervention in December 1992, and it held interagency meetings daily.65 It worked as a liai-


64 Kennedy, 1997, p. 101; Jeremy Patrick White, “Civil Affairs in Haiti,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 28, 2009, pp. 4–5. As Aaron Wilkins notes, the CMOC concept was not a complete novelty: It was used for the first time by the United States during Operation Provide Comfort, which provided humanitarian assistance to Kurdish populations in northern Iraq in 1991. The model was again employed in various disaster relief efforts prior to Somalia, such as in Bangladesh in response to Cyclone Marian (Operation Sea Angel). See Aaron L. Wilkins, The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), Montgomery, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, AU/ACSC/0086/97-03, March 1997, p. 10.

son between humanitarian organizations and UNITAF headquarters, preventing duplication of efforts and enabling information sharing and coordination on such matters as military support to convoys of relief supplies or assignment of pier space in the port of Mogadishu.66

The CMOC was co-located in Mogadishu alongside the intervention’s largest humanitarian operations center (HOC), which was a structure established by the UN throughout the country to help NGOs coordinate their actions. Col. Kevin M. Kennedy, director of the CMOC throughout UNITAF, noted that “the CMOC still reported directly to the UNITAF J-3 (Operations) but also informally ‘seconded’ itself to the United Nations. This rather ambiguous relationship was left deliberately vague and worked for the best interests of all.”67 Accordingly, this relationship was replicated throughout the country, and small CMOCs were co-located with regional HOCs.68 When NGOs needed military support for their actions, they would channel requests through the HOC and then the CMOC, which would ultimately grant—or not—the request.69 Beyond sorting out logistical issues, the CMOC established relationships, at the personal level, between military and civilians.70 Although the CMOCs established in

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70 Allard, 2002, p. 70. Kennedy (1997, p. 103) notes that this small size—ten people on average—also aimed at not overwhelming humanitarian staff with a disproportionate military presence in the HOC. He also notes that, at its peak, UNITAF’s military presence reached more than 38,000, while the humanitarian community present in Somalia never went over 300.
Somalia have generally been viewed as effective organizational structures, some critics note that they were very much ad hoc creations that would have benefited from a more systematic and coherent approach—a problem remedied several years later with the release of JP 3-08 (Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations), which codified the model.\footnote{JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 9, 1996. For instance, Ambassador Robert Oakley, who was the U.S. special envoy to Somalia from December 1992 to March 1993, called the CMOC in Somalia “an effective, innovative mechanism not only for operational coordination but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian perceptions” (quoted in JP 3-08, 1996, para. III-16). Allard calls the establishment of the CMOC “one of the most important initiatives of the Somalia operation,” based on the large number of humanitarian organizations operating in Somalia and the difficulty of operating securely, for both international military and civilians, in a country that lacked a functioning government (Allard, 2002, p. 69). Baumann, Yates, and Washington note that, “[o]n the whole, the results [of CMOC] were more positive than negative, with the CMOC receiving high praise. Several civilian veterans of humanitarian operations claimed that it offered the best NGO-military interface they had ever witnessed” (Baumann, Yates, and Washington, 2003, p. 54). For dissenting views of the CMOC experience in Somalia, see Kennedy, 1997, pp. 104–115; Gorsuch, 2012, p. 14; Mockaitis, 2000, p. 47; White, 2009, pp. 4–5.}

Command and control between and among U.S. and other international forces in Somalia was much less successful after the transfer of overall peacekeeping responsibilities to UNOSOM II in May 1993. Prior to this transition, the command structure of UNITAF was fairly clear-cut. Although the U.S. commander retained overall control of UNITAF operations, Somalia was divided into nine geographical sectors, with security responsibilities delegated to distinct coalition members assigned to each area. Liaison officers facilitated coordination between UNITAF command and individual partner nations.\footnote{Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 59–61.}

By contrast, military organizational control was much more confused and unwieldy throughout UNOSOM II. Owing largely to inadequate planning and a lack of clear doctrine, “[t]here was confusion over the roles of the UN Secretary General, the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping, the Secretary General’s Special Representative, the Turkish Force Commander, and his U.S. Deputy Commander.”\footnote{Bentley and Oakley, 1995, p. 2.}
Furthermore, because of Washington’s decision not to take ownership of the Somalia crisis and simultaneous reluctance to subordinate U.S. combat units to foreign command, three distinct chains of command existed for U.S. soldiers in Somalia throughout UNOSOM II. First, after the conclusion of UNITAF, some 3,000 U.S. forces remained in country operating under the auspices of UNOSOM II, then led by Turkish Lieutenant General Çevik Bir—though the U.S. forces were kept operationally segregated from other multinational forces. Second, during UNOSOM II, the United States deployed an estimated 1,300–1,400 quick reaction forces to Somalia, falling completely outside the UN command structure; rather, they were commanded by Major General Thomas Montgomery, who was also Bir’s deputy. Finally, the United States deployed additional special operations forces (SOF) reporting not to Montgomery but directly to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).74

Initial Actions in the Golden Hour

As the first UNITAF forces came ashore on December 9, 1992, an estimated one-third to two-thirds of the population of 7.5 million were at risk of dying from a famine caused partially by drought but more by a breakdown in security and the food distribution system; approximately 300,000–500,000, including one-quarter under the age of five, had already perished; some 2 million to 3.5 million had become refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs); and about 60 percent of the nation’s infrastructure had been destroyed by war.75 Initial actions in the first four months of the intervention were thus focused nearly exclusively on securing the distribution of humanitarian relief. In the first phase of operations, Marine expeditionary units were initially deployed to secure air and naval lines of communication and to allow for the safe deployment of additional follow-on U.S. and coali-

74 Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 59–61.
tion ground forces. These landing forces were unopposed.\textsuperscript{76} During phase two, eight humanitarian relief sectors (HRSs) were established throughout southern Somalia, control over which was assigned to different coalition partners.\textsuperscript{77} As security was established in a given HRS, humanitarian relief convoys began to move in, and distribution of aid proceeded accordingly. The third phase of operations allowed time for civilian agencies and NGOs to consolidate their work of ending the acute famine, while U.S. and UN officials began planning for the transition to UNOSOM II. Finally, the fourth phase was designed to facilitate the smooth handoff of security responsibilities for each HRS from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.\textsuperscript{78} Meanwhile, mediation efforts between the contending local factions were pursued, although this was somewhat beyond UNITAF’s explicit mandate.

The first three phases of Operation Restore Hope were executed as planned. A modicum of security was tentatively imposed, feuding warlords were largely appeased and controlled, a 4,000-strong interim police force was established in Mogadishu and other locations, heavy weapons were removed from the urban battlefield, relief workers moved throughout the country in relative security, and military factions and civil leaders consented to pursue a political dialogue.\textsuperscript{79} But

\textsuperscript{76} As UNITAF forces spread throughout the countryside, the overwhelming display of U.S. and coalition military superiority “quickly established a dominating physical and psychological presence”; despite the grave potential for armed opposition owing to Somalia’s history of “militancy, xenophobia, and available weaponry,” only isolated incidents of resistance occurred. See Bentley and Oakley, 1995, p. 3; Easton, 1993, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{77} These HRSs were located in Mogadishu, Bale Dogle, Kismayo, Bardera, Baidoa, Oddur, Belet Uen, and Gialalassi.

\textsuperscript{78} Easton, 1993, pp. 12–14.

\textsuperscript{79} Between 1991 and 1995, some 17 national-level and 20 local-level formal peace and reconciliation initiatives were convened, many sponsored by the UN. Lamentably, in the opinion of Somalia expert Ken Menkhaus, “UNOSOM attempted to portray its simultaneous pursuit of regional and national accords, and its work with both faction leaders and civil leaders, as a coherent two-track diplomacy. The United States, for its part, described its policy as ‘constructive ambiguity.’ In truth, very little thought was given to how these different peace initiatives related to one another. The plethora of peace conferences held through 1993 and 1994 reflected reactive, crisis-driven, and ad hoc policymaking” (Ken Menkhaus, “International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in...
the hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces and slow buildup of UN peacekeepers jeopardized the objectives of the final phase.\textsuperscript{80} Indeed, at the time of UNITAF liquidation in May 1993 (five months after its establishment), only roughly one-half of planned UN troops were on the ground in Somalia, and these forces were much more poorly equipped than their predecessors.\textsuperscript{81} Further, as a consequence of Washington’s aversion to broader nation-building goals in Somalia, the UNITAF period was largely characterized by the activities that were not undertaken: No international police, technical experts, or administrators were deployed to begin to attempt sustainable security sector reform, disarm and demobilize combatants, build judicial and governance structures, lay the foundations for elections and democratic institutions, reduce poverty and promote economic growth, and so on. Although the initial plans for Operation Restore Hope envisioned the deployment of eight to ten Army Reserve civil affairs units, only two active duty units were eventually deployed. Indeed, the total number of civil affairs officers in Somalia never exceeded 30 at any time—compared with, for instance, more than 1,000 deployed to Panama in 1989 and more than 300 to northern Iraq in 1991.\textsuperscript{82}

Conversely, the mission assigned to UNOSOM II was much more ambitious in scope, even as the quality of forces assigned to it diminished significantly. Through disarmament processes, UNOSOM II was expected to consolidate gains in law and order while providing “assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country’s institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State Somalia,” in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., \textit{Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention}, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997, p. 54). For a detailed account of this history, see also Menkhaus, 1997, pp. 42–63.


\textsuperscript{81} White, 2009, p. 7.

based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country’s economy and infrastructure.” These efforts were bound to antagonize every warlord in the country.

UNOSOM II was not adequately resourced with the human, material, and financial means to achieve such ambitious goals. Remaining American troops in country were not under UN command and the special operations strike force was not under the resident American commander but rather was subordinated directly to CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida. The mission soon became waylaid by a deterioration in security and a collapse of the earlier political progress. On June 5, 1993, just one month after UNITAF’s liquidation, General Aideed’s forces attacked UNOSOM II peacekeepers in Mogadishu, killing 23 Pakistani troops. The UN Security Council ordered Aideed’s arrest and authorized a new policy of disarmament by coercion. Throughout the summer of 1993, UN forces became increasingly focused on military operations.

In October 1993, an American special operations team was surrounded in downtown Mogadishu when two of its Black Hawk helicopters were downed during a mission to capture one of Aideed’s deputies. In the ensuing firefight, forces loyal to Aideed killed 18 American soldiers and captured one. Neither the local American quick reaction forces nor the UN command had been alerted to the intended mission, and it took most of a day to mount the necessary rescue operation. In its aftermath, Clinton sent additional American forces but also announced his intention to withdraw all American troops within six months. The rest of the UN force left a year later, and Somalia descended into decades of civil war.

**Outcome**

UNITAF was quite successful within the narrow scope of its humanitarian relief mission. UNISOM II, by contrast, was an almost complete failure as measured against its broader nation-building mandate. Since the United States was the dominant international actor through both phases, it bears much of the responsibility for the result. The ulti-

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83 UN, Department of Public Information, 1996.
mate failure of the two missions, considered together, resulted from the too-narrow original mission for UNITAF, the poorly managed transition to UNISOM II, the complex UNISOM II command relationship, and the disparity between UNISOM’s mandate and the military and civil assets available to it.

Somalia was the first of what would be a growing number of post–Cold War nation-building missions for which American and UN officials lacked relevant experience. Inadequate planning, unduly complicated command and control structures, plummeting military capabilities accompanied by expanding mission objectives, and a failure to deploy the civil assets necessary for the expanded nation-building mission ultimately sunk the U.S. and UN operations. As UN forces departed Somalia in May 1995, they left behind the epitome of a failed state doomed to rapacious cycles of armed conflict, piracy on the high seas, and the emergence of an al Qaeda–affiliate insurgent movement, Harakat al-Shaba’ab al-Mujahideen. Although U.S. and international forces had temporarily averted famine, on their departure the country still lacked a central government and effective indigenous security forces, and it remained wracked by chaos and clan warfare.

As noted, from the outset the United States signaled its intention to withdraw the bulk of its forces as soon as the humanitarian conditions would allow. Indeed, Bush initially promised that U.S. troops would be out of Somalia before Clinton’s inauguration on January 20, 1993. UNITAF thus provided no credible external security guarantees. Although U.S. forces successfully confiscated some heavy weapons, the warring parties explicitly refused to disarm, anticipating that the pre-planned exit of UNITAF would produce a renewed security vacuum, which they could move to fill. As Special Envoy to Somalia Robert Oakley and his deputy, John L. Hirsch, later reflected, these initial U.S. decisions precluded UN political and economic objectives during UNOSOM II:

[During the transition planning] the UN Secretariat felt that only the United States could carry out the kind of comprehensive disarmament and stabilization that would enable a UN peace-keeping force to operate effectively when U.S. forces departed.
There was considerable apprehension that without such action the security situation would deteriorate quickly. The faction leaders would again use violence to seek personal advantage, and the UN national reconciliation and economic reconstruction programs could not be implemented.84

The inexperienced Clinton White House had failed to fully comprehend—or at least, give adequate attention to—the potential for the security situation to destabilize quickly. As Nancy Soderberg, then with the NSC staff, recalls, “The reason there were no principals’ meetings on Somalia [before the Black Hawk down incident] was that everyone thought [the situation] was going well.”85 In short, policymakers in Washington failed to recognize in real time the gathering threat owing to UNOSOM II’s broader mandate and weaker force. By the time they did, the original strategy of warlord co-option had shifted to warlord confrontation, and the ability of the interveners to act as impartial powerbrokers was lost for good.


In September 1991, General Raoul Cédras deposed the first freely elected president in Haitian history, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in a military coup that drew widespread international condemnation.86 These antidemocratic political developments in the Caribbean neighbor state were immediately denounced by President Bush as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”87 Nearly three years later—after the impo-


86 Cédras’s rise to power marked the seventh government in four years in Haiti, since the ouster of the 29-year military dictatorship of the Duvalier family in 1986.

sition of increasingly draconian international sanctions and repeated, failed attempts at a diplomatic resolution of the crisis—the UN Security Council issued Resolution 940, on July 31, 1994, authorizing a Multi-national Force (MNF) headed by the United States to use “all means necessary” to restore Aristide to power. This resolution also called for a follow-on UN peacekeeping mission to subsequently assume responsibility for maintaining order, retraining the army and police, and monitoring elections.88 Six weeks later, on the eve of intervention, President Clinton declared in an address to the American public, “Now the United States must protect our interests, to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our borders, and to preserve stability and promote democracy in our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us.”89

Even as American paratroopers were airborne, on their way to effect a forced entry, Cédras capitulated and signed an agreement terminating military leadership and allowing coalition troops to enter Haiti unopposed. Four weeks later, Aristide was returned to power.

**Advance Planning**

In the spring of 1994, the Clinton administration was divided on the use of force in Haiti, with strong advocates on both side of the debate.90

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89 Clinton, 1994.

90 The key principals advocating for intervention included Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, National Security Advisor Tony Lake, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Deputy National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Presidential Advisor George Stephanopoulos. On the other side, Secretaries of Defense Les Aspin and William Perry, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell and John Shalikashvili, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director James Woolsey,
Nevertheless, chastened by the collapse of U.S. efforts in Somalia, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense William Perry directed DoD to begin preparing an interagency “political military plan” intended to integrate the efforts of relevant agencies in the event of a policy reversal leading to a U.S. military intervention. In May 1994, the Interagency Working Group, the Haiti Executive Committee, was formed, bringing together representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the CIA; and USAID.91 The Haiti Executive Committee worked to define the strategic policy objectives, desired end state, and criteria for success of an eventual intervention.92 Meanwhile, the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) began developing operational plans for two contingencies: forcible invasion (Operations Plan [OPLAN] 2370) and permissive intervention (OPLAN 2380).93 Unfortunately, the American military, pleading operational security, refused to provide any information regarding its own plans to other civilian agencies, a precaution that proved excessive given the absence of any serious resistance, and one that was not repeated in its subsequent approach to the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. In parallel with ACOM planning, the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury and USAID toiled with their own OPLANs throughout the summer of 1994, in spite of their relative institutional inexperience in such detailed planning. Indeed, for perhaps the “first time in [U.S.] history,” a formal political-military OPLAN was created, which impelled “civilian agencies toward the sort of precision, discipline, and forethought that military establishments routinely


93 Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 55–57.
demand of themselves." On September 12, 1994—less than a week before the invasion—representatives from ACOM and the other agencies convened to rehearse the final political-military plans; instead, the meeting revealed that significant civil-military coordination challenges remained, owing largely to the bifurcated nature of the operational planning process over the previous months.

At the strategic level, the plans called for a two-phase operation, just as they had in Somalia: an initial American-led phase to last six months, following which leadership would be turned over to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). In many ways, the planning for Haiti reflected the painful lessons learned from the Somalia experience. As a legacy of the previous mission, the plans for Haiti very consciously sought to avoid “mission creep.” Washington’s objectives were clear and limited in scope and time. Aristide was to be returned to power. A new civilian police force was to be raised and trained. Elections for a new parliament, president, and local officials were to be held and the winners installed. This was to be completed within two years, by which time all remaining American troops would be withdrawn. Meanwhile, broader economic reconstruction efforts would be left largely to international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and to individual donor states.

In contrast to the second phase in Somalia, this time the United States agreed that the remaining American troops would be fully integrated into the UN force, which would be commanded by an American, U.S. Army Major General Joseph Kinzer. Additionally, unlike the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the handoff from American to UN control of the military operation was elaborately prepared, with two full dress rehearsals involving the leadership of both teams—the first held at Blair House, across the street from the White House, and the second in Haiti on the eve of the transfer.


95 Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, p. 16, p. 35.

96 Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 74.
Civil-Military Collaboration

A fully staffed American Embassy functioned in Port-au-Prince throughout the crisis and was available from the beginning to work with U.S. and multinational forces. Indeed, the American ambassador was at the airport to greet the first arrival of American forces. Responsibility for civilian activities thus fell largely to the American ambassador, while the U.S. commander directed military operations.

As in Somalia, a CMOC was stood up in the early days of the intervention. Staffed with 12 officers and 11 enlisted, the CMOC is described by one author as “the pivotal point of coordination”97 between the military and the more than 400 NGOs that were present at the time in Haiti.98 Because of humanitarian organizations’ concerns that a perceived association with the military would be a liability, an additional structure, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), was set up to interact directly with these organizations, but it reported directly to the CMOC.99 The creation of HACC proved crucial in another respect. Because CMOC was physically located on the U.S. military base in Port-au-Prince, where security was “incredibly tight,” it could not “function effectively”; many international civilian aid workers could not access CMOC facilities, and so U.S. civil affairs officers were forced to operate out of the HACC.100

The aforementioned disconnect between ACOM and civilian agencies in the planning process produced other civil-military collaboration problems on the ground in the early days of Operation Uphold Democracy. Despite the presence of hundreds of NGOs in Haiti at the time of the intervention, the deployment of additional civilians tasked with undertaking development projects was slowed by a lack of logistical coordination between U.S. agencies. A more serious problem was the division between the Department of State and DoD over which


98 Wilkins, 1997, pp. 18–19.


100 Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 58–59.
agency should be responsible for public order, given the unreliability of the local police force, which was a particularly abusive branch of the Haitian military. The Department of State recruited several hundred international civilian police to oversee Haitian police operations, but these would arrive only slowly. Several days into the operation, the Pentagon was compelled to dispatch additional U.S. military police to undertake this function pending the arrival of the civilian force.\textsuperscript{101}

The Haiti intervention also showed the cultural differences and suspicion between the military and NGOs that had prevailed in earlier interventions.\textsuperscript{102} Unlike in Somalia, where briefings on the humanitarian situation and the NGOs involved in the country had been provided to the military, the uniformed personnel about to deploy in Haiti had limited knowledge of the civilian actors they would encounter.\textsuperscript{103} The effectiveness of the CMOC was further constrained by its co-location with the Joint Operations Center in a secure military compound that NGO personnel could not access. The HACC was aimed at providing another forum in which the U.S. military and NGOs could meet, but the exact purpose of this additional structure, which functioned similarly to a CMOC, created confusion.\textsuperscript{104}

**Initial Actions in the Golden Hour**

U.S. forces landed in Haiti on September 19, 1994, with the immediate objectives of restoring the Aristide government, imposing order, beginning the return of refugees, and then handing the mission off to UN forces within six months. As noted, the first goal was quickly achieved—Aristide returned from exile on October 15, 1994—and the Haitian Parliament was soon convened for the first time in a year and a half. Although the OPLANs for a forcible entry into the country envisioned the immediate defeat of the Haitian Army, U.S. forces—by virtue of their unexpected permissive entry—instant found themselves

\textsuperscript{101} Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, pp. 13–14; Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 59–60.

\textsuperscript{102} Hayes and Wheatley, 1996, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{103} Wilkins, 1997, pp. 28–29.

\textsuperscript{104} White, 2009, pp. 7–8.
collaborating with that army to provide security in the first days of the mission. However, several early actions were taken to place controls on the army: The leaders of the military regime were removed from the country; the heavy weapons unit responsible for Aristide’s ouster was disbanded; the paramilitary group, Front for Advancement and Progress in Haiti, was disarmed; and a cash program was instituted to buy back weapons from the broader population.105 Despite DoD’s initial reluctance to assume any public order role, American military police were deployed to oversee the activities of Haitian police pending the arrival of international civilian police.106 U.S. forces also made limited repairs to damaged infrastructure and assisted the population during floods.107 On March 31, 1995, operational authority was officially transferred from the U.S.-led MNF to UNMIH.

After the UN mission was stood up in the spring of 1995, national and local elections were held. The Haitian Army was disbanded and a new civilian police force raised and trained. Efforts to counteract the effects of years of international sanctions and to promote economic growth were launched, but made very slow progress. At the end of the eighteen months originally foreseen for the UN-led, largely U.S.-manned peacekeeping operation, the new civilian police force was still green and growing. American troops departed, to be replaced by Canadian and other peacekeepers, and this UN peacekeeping force remained for another two years.


Outcome

The United States remedied in Haiti many of the planning and operational deficiencies that had marred the Somalia operation. The operation opened with the formal capitulation of the outgoing regime. Both the initial American-led intervention and the subsequent transfer to UN authority were well prepared and adequately resourced. Unity of military command was maintained throughout both phases of the operation. The existence of a fully staffed and already operational U.S. embassy on the ground when U.S. forces arrived facilitated civil-military collaboration. Operation Uphold Democracy’s key benchmarks were all achieved on time, and U.S. forces encountered no resistance during the narrowly focused mission.

Yet this success proved short-lived. In 2004, American and UN troops had to intervene again when Aristide was overthrown for the second time. The Haiti mission started well but ended too soon. When the last UN troops left in 1998, the economy was still stagnant, the judiciary remained unreformed, and the raw new police force was gradually corrupted and eroded, unable in the end to suppress a coup d’état by a few dozen former members of the disbanded Haitian military. The case of Haiti thus offers mixed support for the existence of golden hours. On the one hand, the initial actions outlined above placed Haiti on a positive political trajectory that did not require significant course corrections during the MNF’s and UNMIH’s tenure to achieve their narrowly defined set of objectives. On the other hand, the early and timely achievements in dismantling corrupt and repressive security forces, retraining the police, reforming the judiciary, renewing democratic institutions, and instituting economic reforms were not sustained long enough to have an enduring effect. A good beginning eases the follow through, but it does not make it unnecessary. Particularly in highly underdeveloped countries with little or no history of good governance, enduring political stability is a long-term project.

After more than three years of war involving Serbian and Croatian forces, as well as contending Bosnian factions, the combination of a successful ground offensive by Croatian and Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat troops (Operation Storm), a brief NATO air campaign (Operation Deliberate Force), and intense diplomatic efforts led all parties to agree on the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995. The Dayton Accords were formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. Less than a week later, NATO deployed its Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. IFOR’s mandate lasted one year, roughly corresponding to Bosnia’s golden hour. In December 1996, it was succeeded by a follow-on NATO mission, the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), which remained in Bosnia until 2005.

Advance Planning

Both the negotiations that ended the war and the military operation that ensured implementation of that agreement were multilateral endeavors. The nature of the NATO military command arrangements and the degree of civil-military integration built into the NATO headquarters structures compelled a considerable degree of forward planning before mounting the intervention. Nevertheless, the operation was controversial in the United States and Europe, and the diplomacy leading to it had often been difficult, not just with the parties to the conflict and the Russians (who ultimately provided a military contingent to IFOR) but also among the allies.

As Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was conducting “shuttle diplomacy” and working toward the final peace agreement in Dayton in the summer and fall of 1995, interagency planning was taking place in Washington to address the implementation of an eventual agreement. These meetings dealt with three major issues: “the mandate and mission of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), the exit strategy and deadline, and the civilian implementation effort.”\(^{108}\) On the first

\(^{108}\) Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 67.
issue, one side, the “minimalists,” led by National Security Advisor Tony Lake, argued that IFOR’s role should be limited to separating and demobilizing the contending armies. On the other side, led by Holbrooke, the “maximalists” argued that IFOR’s military role should be more expansive, to include policing and provision of public security, combating criminalized networks, capturing war criminals, protecting refugees, securing elections, and investigating human rights violations. Eventually, prior to the signing of the Dayton Accords, a compromise was brokered: IFOR’s principal tasks would be limited to the military aspects of enforcing the peace settlement—such as enforcing zones of separation between the warring ethnic groups and cantoning heavy weapons—but commanders on the ground would also be given the flexibility to assist with civil activities, such as assisting the UN with humanitarian missions and protecting movements of refugees and IDPs. Law enforcement and policing duties, however, would fall to the new UN International Police Task Force. This disagreement about the proper breadth of IFOR’s role in the implementation of civil affairs would continue to resurface in interagency policy debates for the next several years.109

On the issue of exit timelines, U.S. planners agreed on a one year deadline for deployment of NATO troops. It was believed that this would allow sufficient time to achieve the military goals specified in the annexes of the Dayton Accords. However, the relatively short withdrawal timeline was also driven by American domestic political concerns. At the end of IFOR’s mandate, the situation was still too unsettled for NATO to withdraw its military presence, and U.S. and NATO troops remained in Bosnia for a decade.110

Institutional gamesmanship and competition between the United States and its European allies resulted in highly fragmented civil structures. Under the terms of the Dayton Accords, it was determined that an Office of the High Representative (OHR) would be created to oversee the implementation of the civilian annexes of the accords and to be

109 Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 67–70.
110 Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 68.
the final authority for interpretation of the accords. The High Representative was to be appointed by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, an ad hoc, unwieldy body consisting of representatives of 55 countries and international agencies supporting the peace process. The Steering Board of the council—which included members of eight nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), as well as the presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic Council—appointed former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt to the position of High Representative. Independent of OHR, several other international organizations assumed operational implementation of civilian annexes of the accords: an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission, responsible for democratization, elections, and negotiations of arms control agreements; the UN, in charge of police reform and war crimes tribunals; the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), responsible for refugee returns and humanitarian assistance (including coordination of NGOs and private voluntary organizations); and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, charged with reconstructing and rebuilding the country’s economy and financial system.

111 The 11 annexes to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina were quite comprehensive. They addressed such issues as the terms of cease-fire; security and arms control measures; withdrawal of foreign fighters and phased redeployment of indigenous troops to zones of separation; prescriptions to build regional stabilization; delineation of interentity boundaries; creation of an international police task force; drafting of a new constitution; holding of national elections; establishment of commissions on human rights, displaced persons, refugees, and public corporations; design of an arbitration system to adjudicate future disputes between the parties; and the preservation of national monuments. See U.S. State Department, “Dayton Peace Accords,” webpage, undated-b.

112 At the time of this writing, more than two decades after the signing of the Dayton Accords, the Peace Implementation Council and OHR remain in existence as the international structures overseeing the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace. See Office of the High Representative, “Peace Implementation Council,” webpage, undated.
Civil-Military Collaboration

In the early days of the mission, IFOR and OHR had limited interaction and did not coordinate their efforts.\textsuperscript{113} As George Joulwan and Christopher Shoemaker observed,

There was no formal integrating structure established at any level, and no means by which the military and civilian implementation plans and activities were reconciled and coordinated. The integration that did occur was primarily at the operational level—in Bosnia itself—and occurred as a result of \textit{ad hoc} arrangements between the commander of IFOR/SFOR and the High Representative.\textsuperscript{114}

Nor was there smooth coordination between the High Representative, the UN, and the OSCE, all of which operated independently. IFOR was unwilling to confront local criminalized spoiler networks, and the civilian agencies lacked the capacity to do so. This lack of coordination contributed to the entrenchment of these spoiler networks. Meanwhile, the civilian effort experienced halting progress in the early days, particularly in the domain of police reform.\textsuperscript{115} Coordination of the civilian and military efforts improved to some degree under IFOR’s successor, SFOR.\textsuperscript{116} SFOR was much more involved in civilian tasks than IFOR, from helping to restore services to participating in the

\textsuperscript{113} Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 101.


\textsuperscript{115} John G. Cockell, “Civil-Military Responses to Security Challenges in Peace Operations: Ten Lessons from Kosovo,” \textit{Global Governance}, Vol. 8, No. 4, October–December 2002, p. 487. This late start was also due to delays in setting up and staffing OHR and the complexity of the tasks at hand, from reforming the security sector to repatriating refugees (see Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 101). Paddy Ashdown, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2002 to 2006, noted that enforcing the rule of law should have been the priority in postwar Bosnia, and that the international mission had failed in that regard (Paddy Ashdown cited in Marcus Cox, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Limits of Liberal Imperialism,” in Charles T. Call and Vanessa Wyeth, eds., \textit{Building States to Build Peace}, Boulder, Colo.: International Peace Institute, Lynne Rienner, 2008, p. 251).

\textsuperscript{116} Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 101.
Seizing the Golden Hour

Two main factors explain this shift. First, the most-immediate military needs had been taken care of by IFOR, leaving some time and resources for SFOR to undertake additional tasks. Second, the experience of the first year had made it clear that NATO military units had to be more active in combating criminalized power structures and supporting civilian efforts at police reform and economic reconstruction. SFOR supported the efforts of civilian organizations through its Civil-Military Task Force, which assisted the SFOR commander and close to 180 civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) personnel deployed with the three SFOR multinational task forces located across Bosnia. The Civil-Military Task Force staff included personnel with specialized skills, such as economists and agriculture specialists, provided for in large part by the United States.

Initial Actions in the Golden Hour

In the immediate aftermath of the Dayton Accords, IFOR and OHR produced mixed results in establishing security and law and order in Bosnia. On the one hand, NATO troops were prepositioned, deployed immediately, and quickly succeeded in separating the warring parties and monitoring the zones of separation between armed ethnic groups. This process was facilitated because “the front lines had hardened after more than three years of war and ethnic cleansing.” Because IFOR refused to take responsibility for overseeing civil order functions, and international police initially had no power to conduct independent investigations or make arrests, three ethnically based police forces remained in place and unreformed. Thuggery and organized crime remained endemic. Although armed conflict did not reignite, this fragile security environment also slowed the return of ethnic minority refugee and IDP populations. In the first postconflict years, those dis-

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117 Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 97.
120 Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 89.
placed people who returned to areas in which they were in the minority often faced violent attacks. Indeed, it took several years for UNHCR’s efforts to produce an acceleration in returns.121 Similarly, OHR’s absence of authority over other civilian international actors, the poor coordination between IFOR and all the other international organizations, and the intransigence of the warring ethnic parties significantly impeded progress on many other civil affairs tasks in the first year after the end of hostilities. Economic and political integration, for instance, stagnated throughout IFOR’s existence. The first national elections held almost a year after Dayton returned to office many of the same hard-line, ethnic-nationalist leaders who had been in power during the war. The new Central Bank was slow to become an effectual entity. Introduction of a new common currency did not occur until June 1998. Black market activities continued to fuel criminal organizations. Passage of new economic laws to encourage free market operations took years to achieve.122

**Outcome**
The NATO military intervention benefited from extensive national and multinational planning and was abundantly resourced. The operation took place on the basis of an agreement entered into by all the parties to the preceding conflict. Civil implementation was less thoroughly planned, and less coherently organized. International military and civilian authorities operated autonomously, and responsibilities on the civil side were dispersed among several actors.

Clinton had originally set a one-year deadline for concluding the NATO operation in Bosnia, much as he had set similar deadlines in Haiti. Fortunately, on this occasion he did not stick to it. NATO stayed until 2005 and then turned over its peacekeeping responsibilities to a smaller European Union Force that remains in Bosnia to this writing. The country remains ethnically polarized and in need of international oversight, but the peace agreed in Dayton has endured for more than 20 years.

121 Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 96–98.
122 Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 102–105.
The Bosnia intervention in its early days illustrated the risks of a too-rigid division of labor between military and civilian organizations. Not only were the two efforts disjointed, but there was also a lag between the former (which was quickly deployed through IFOR) and the latter (which was off to a late start with OHR and the other civilian multinational actors). It soon became clear that there would be no stabilization without a broader military role in the security sector and that NATO had an important role to play in that regard. As a result, military authorities became increasingly involved in a wider range of tasks over time. SFOR developing a CIMIC capability was an achievement in itself, as few NATO members at the time had such capability. When SFOR tried to internationalize its CIMIC capability, personnel for which were overwhelmingly provided by the United States, a number of NATO members asked the organization to provide a CIMIC course to their personnel about to be deployed in Bosnia. The role of OHR also changed. It eventually became a more powerful position that was able to coordinate more closely with military authorities. In these respects, the case of Bosnia is a powerful reminder that mistakes made in the golden hour of postconflict interventions can sometimes be overcome, given the will and means to do so. In particular, in contrast to Somalia and Haiti, the staying power of the international community provided external security guarantees to the warring parties and allowed time to consolidate gains beyond the security sphere.

Kosovo (1999–Present)

From the end of World War II to 1989, Kosovo—populated approximately 80–90 percent by ethnic Albanian Muslims and the rest by a Serb minority—existed as an autonomous region within Serbia, one of Yugoslavia’s constituent republics. In 1989, Serbia’s new president, Slobodan Milošević, revoked the province’s autonomous status, and the institutions of governance and industry came increasingly under Serb-

124 Oliker et al., 2004, pp. 11–13.
minority control. As Yugoslavia began to break apart in the 1990s following the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe, Kosovar Albanian resistance to Serbian repression intensified, culminating in 1996 with the emergence of an armed insurgency by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Under deteriorating security conditions that threatened to reignite ethnic tensions elsewhere in the region, the international community began efforts to resolve the conflict, first through diplomatic processes and then through economic sanctions. When these efforts failed, NATO initiated a bombing campaign against Serbia to force its withdrawal (Operation Allied Force) on March 24, 1999. Seventy-eight days later, Milošević capitulated and agreed to withdraw Serbian Army, police, and officials from Kosovo. On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which provided that NATO troops would assume responsibility for security while the UN would assume all other governance functions. These tasks were taken up by NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

**Advance Planning**

Kosovo was Clinton’s fourth intervention and NATO’s second. The intervening force, approaching 50,000 troops, was large for a society of only 2 million. Military planning within the U.S. government and NATO had been extensive. Less time was spent on planning the civil aspects of the intervention, which were put under the UN only a few days before the Serb withdrawal.

Within the U.S. military, planning for an air campaign against Serbia began as early as June 1998, even a month before Milošević

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126 UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), June 10, 1999; Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO’s Air War for Kosovo*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1365-AF, 2001, pp. 5–11; Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 111–112. In addition to KFOR and UNMIK, which have remained on the ground in Kosovo from June 1999 until the time of this writing, the European Union has also maintained a rule of law monitoring, mentoring, and advising mission in Kosovo (EULEX) since 2008.
ordered the first full-scale offensive against the KLA; these initial contingency plans, called Operation Nimble Lion, were developed by the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and identified 250 possible targets for U.S. and allied strikes.\textsuperscript{127} After escalations in violence in July, on August 11, 1998, the NSC directed the formation of an interagency working group consisting of senior officials from the NSC staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State, CIA, and Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a comprehensive political-military plan. Frustrated by Milošević’s repeated broken promises of restraint, on January 15, 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright pressed in a Principals Committee meeting in the White House Situation Room that the time had come to issue an ultimatum to Serbia: Agree to an interim peace agreement, which would be enforced by NATO ground troops, or face an imminent bombing campaign. The new Kosovo strategy, referred to as “Status Quo Plus,” was initially met with reluctance by some cabinet members, but the same day a policy tipping point occurred: In the Kosovo village of Racak, Serb forces massacred some four dozen civilians, transforming “the West’s Balkan policy as singular events seldom do.”\textsuperscript{128} Through February and March, the warring parties met at Rambouillet and later in Paris. On March 18, the Kosovar Albanians agreed to the terms of agreement, but the Serbian authorities refused; six days later, the bombing campaign began.\textsuperscript{129}

Throughout the three-month air campaign, intense negotiations took place among Russia, acting largely on behalf of Serbia; the United States; and key European allies. Eventually, Russia played an influential role in persuading Milošević to withdraw all Serb forces and joined in passing UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), authorizing the NATO and UN deployments. This resolution reflected the Bosnian experience by establishing a more integrated structure for civil implementation and an explicitly shared responsibility between NATO and the UN for establishing public order.

\textsuperscript{127} Lambeth, 2001, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{129} Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 78–79.
In preparation for its postconflict peacekeeping duties, NATO had assembled forces in neighboring Macedonia in the months preceding Milošević’s capitulation. When that came, these KFOR ground troops were ready to enter Kosovo on a few hours’ notice to begin securing the peace. Having endured the challenges of a fractious division of responsibilities among international civilian entities in Bosnia, U.S. and other decisionmakers were committed to instituting a more cohesive arrangement in Kosovo. Ultimately it was decided that the UN would provide the overarching lead for civilian implementation in Kosovo through UNMIK, while other entities would be nested under the UN’s lead. Unfortunately, the UN’s role as the lead in all civilian peacekeeping matters was determined just days before the end of the air war. UNMIK civilian personnel began arriving within days of KFOR’s entry but took several months to achieve full strength.

Civil-Military Collaboration

The division of labor between NATO and the UN has similarities with the one that prevailed in Bosnia, with NATO in charge of military issues and the UN in charge of reform and reconstruction, but with more overlap and greater unity on the civil side. As in Bosnia, different organizations had responsibility for different civilian functions in Kosovo, but all under a single institutional umbrella. UNMIK, led by a special representative of the secretary general (SRSG), had as subordinate pillars UNHCR, which handled refugee returns and humanitarian issues, and the OSCE, in charge of the electoral process and democratization; economic reconstruction fell under the European Union. The UN took direct charge of policing and police reform, judiciary, corrections, and other governance functions. At the time, this four-pillar integrated structure represented an organizational novelty. UNMIK temporarily acted as the governing authority in Kosovo, gradually transitioning to Kosovar self-government.

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KFOR’s mandate prescribed close coordination with the civilian effort and specifically directed NATO to assume responsibility for public security until the UN could deploy sufficient civilian assets, notably international civilian police. Within KFOR, the Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force was in charge of liaising with international organizations and NGOs. As UN civilian police began arriving, KFOR and UNMIK coordinated their action closely, conducted occasional joint patrols, and at times even set up joint operations centers. Eventually, in April 2001, a joint security initiative was set up to formalize their operational coordination.

From the very beginning of the intervention, in June 1999, the interim SRSG, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, and his successor, Bernard Kouchner, established and maintained close collaboration with KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) General Mike Jackson, which involved the two of them meeting daily. At the operational level, the Joint Security Executive Committee held weekly meetings that allowed KFOR and UNMIK to discuss security issues that had not been resolved during the COMKFOR and SRSG daily meetings. This mechanism, too, was established as early as August 1999.

As another lesson from Bosnia applied in Kosovo, KFOR, the UN, and the OSCE all adopted similar geographic divisions, breaking down the country into five sectors of operations to facilitate CIMIC. KFOR and the UN also had roughly comparable organizational divisions that facilitated exchanges—for instance, at the sub-

headquarters level, KFOR brigades interacted with UNMIK regional administrations.\textsuperscript{137}

**Initial Actions in the Golden Hour**

KFOR moved into Kosovo immediately on the heels of the departing Serb forces. The KLA signed an agreement to demilitarize. This process was certified as complete three months later.

During this time, armed conflict did not resume in Kosovo, but in the absence of a fully deployed UNMIK civilian police force, the Serb minority and Roma civilian populations were subjected to harassment and intimidation and isolated acts of reprisal violence—killings, beatings, abductions, and rapes, as well as arson, looting, and destruction of property. In these first months, an estimated 164,000 Serb minority civilians fled Kosovo (some leaving before the arrival of KFOR troops, some afterward) and others were displaced to enclaves under KFOR protection.\textsuperscript{138} By August 1999, UNMIK civilian police had begun a phased process of assuming policing duties from KFOR, and in the months following, it began building and training a new multiethnic local police force, the Kosovo Police Service.\textsuperscript{139}

Similarly, KFOR played an important role in helping address the most-pressing humanitarian needs in the first weeks and months of the intervention—from airlifting aid supplies to facilitating the return of refugees—until UNHCR and various NGOs could fully assume the role.\textsuperscript{140} Within the first month of KFOR’s deployment, some half a million refugees and IDPs—about one-quarter of the prewar population—

\textsuperscript{137} Cockell, 2002, p. 489.


\textsuperscript{139} Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 117–120.

were returned to their homes. International aid agencies distributed food to approximately 1.5 million people in these early weeks. Meanwhile, the United States, the international community, and the Kosovar expatriate community donated generously to reconstruction and development efforts; from 1999 to 2000, this financial assistance totaled an estimated $1.9 billion.\(^{141}\)

On KFOR’s arrival, no residual civil administrative structures remained, with Serb administrators and police having departed with their military. The KLA leadership sought to fill these roles in competition with the more moderate League for Democratic Kosovo, but the UN assumed direct governance responsibility. Transitional administrative structures were not fully established under UNMIK oversight until the end of 1999. Despite these difficulties and remaining ethnic tensions, in October 2000, local elections were held, followed by the adoption of a Constitutional Framework on Provisional Self-Government in May 2001 and the holding of peaceful parliamentary elections in November 2001.\(^{142}\)

**Outcome**

The NATO and UN intervention in Kosovo is generally regarded as one of the international community’s most successful post–Cold War peacekeeping operations. The ground element of the operation was carefully planned and abundantly resourced. It took place following the agreed withdrawal of all Serb forces and the previous agreement of Kosovar representatives to welcome a NATO intervention. As in Bosnia, international military and civil authority was divided, but in contrast to Bosnia, civil authority was unified under UN leadership. Civil assets flowed more slowly than military, but still more quickly than had been the case in Bosnia.

In the immediate aftermath of the air war and the somewhat-chaotic security and governance vacuum that ensued, large-scale vio-

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141 Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 121, p. 125.

The American Experience    83

Lence did not resume—although discriminate acts of violence and persecution were committed against the Serb minority and Roma civilian populations. Eventually, free and fair local and national elections were held, progress in economic development was made, and Kosovo remained at peace with its neighbors, no longer a destabilizing influence in the Balkans. Although Kosovo’s final political status remained undetermined until 2008, it eventually became an independent state by the self-determination of its own people. It has since been recognized as such by more than 100 nations, though not by Serbia or Russia. For its part, the international community has sustained its commitment to ensure lasting internal and external security guarantees; at the time of this writing, a small NATO force—several hundred Americans and a UN mission—still remains, as does a civilian European Union mission.

Afghanistan (2001–Present)

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States mounted a campaign to overthrow the Taliban government, employing SOF, CIA officers, and heavy air assets in support of a long-standing indigenous insurgency. By December, the Taliban had been driven out of all the major population centers and a new provisional Afghan government had been established in Kabul. That same month, the UN Security Council authorized the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help maintain security in Kabul. At American insistence, this force was confined to the city limits. The small American force in the country, around 8,000–10,000 strong throughout 2002, engaged in neither peacekeeping nor classic population-centric COIN operations, focusing instead on the more circumscribed goal of tracking down remaining al Qaeda elements, while relying on local militias to maintain security. Over the next several years, the UN successfully fostered the writing of a new national constitution and the democratic election of a president and parliament. Security and economic development did not keep pace with this political progress.
Advance Planning
Planning for the Afghan operation was necessarily limited, owing to the rapid military response dictated by the events of September 11, 2001. Although the CIA had previously contemplated a covert program to aid anti-Taliban guerrillas, in the immediate days following the 9/11 attack, “real-time intelligence about Afghanistan was in short supply,” and contingency plans for a ground invasion of Afghanistan did not exist.143 Throughout September and into early October 2001, principals from the NSC convened daily to develop an ad hoc campaign to destroy al Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban regime once it had refused to extradite Osama bin Laden. The CIA took the initial lead in designing and carrying out this plan, deploying officers to liaise with and fund intensified operations by anti-Taliban militias. In the weeks following the 9/11 attacks, CENTCOM deployed approximately 1,000 U.S. SOF.144 This small American force operated in combination with heavy airpower and the manpower of the “Northern Alliance,” a loose alliance of anti-Taliban militias. The CENTCOM plan also called for early humanitarian aid airdrops, and it envisioned the eventual deployment of conventional forces to “mop up and go after the remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda elements.”145

In parallel with the initial invasion preparations, more-limited planning was conducted for the postconflict occupation phase. The George W. Bush administration resisted the prospect of becoming entangled in long-term, large-scale nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the NSC recognized “the need for developing plans for political structure, security, public information, encouraging international donors, and setting up an international conference on

145 Collins, 2015, pp. 23–33; Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 90–93.
Afghanistan’s political future.\textsuperscript{146} However, no detailed or comprehensive strategy was developed to guide the postwar plans.

In this intervention, few of the lessons learned in the 1990s were applied by the new U.S. administration. The stabilization force deployed was much smaller than that sent into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo, although the country was much larger. Indeed, relative to population size, KFOR was some 50-times bigger than the initial U.S. and international military commitment in Afghanistan. No provisions were made for public security beyond Kabul. No formal—or even much in the way of informal—arrangements were put in place for civil-military collaboration. Nor was there any institutional link between the international force in Kabul and the few American forces located elsewhere in the country.

\textbf{Civil-Military Collaboration}

Coordination between military and civilian authorities was informal and poor. ISAF was confined to Kabul. The United States located its military headquarters at Bagram Air Base, some 30 miles from the capital. Security throughout the rest of the country was left to the Afghans, who had neither a national army nor a police force. Responsibility for key reforms was distributed among lead nations. The United States assumed charge of military training, the Germans for police training, the Italians for judicial reform, and the Japanese for DDR. Some disarmament and demobilization of militia took place, but otherwise none of these efforts progressed far. The United States, for instance, wasted the first year in an ill-conceived and underresourced military training effort. By Balkans standards, American and other international economic assistance was very low, and leadership on reconstruction and development was widely dispersed.

Beginning in 2003, this minimalist approach began to change, albeit slowly. NATO took charge of ISAF, which previously, at American insistence, had no institutional home.\textsuperscript{147} The United States began

\textsuperscript{146} Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{147} For the first year and a half of its existence, ISAF was led by a series of national commands falling outside the U.S., UN, or NATO command structure.
contributing troops to ISAF. Toward the end of 2003, ISAF began to slowly expand beyond Kabul, a process that was not completed until 2006. By then, the large and still growing American commitment in Iraq precluded further increases in Afghanistan.

In the summer of 2002, the United States began to develop the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), with the purpose of helping the new Afghan government extend its authority outside Kabul.148 The first team, a mix of military and civilian officials, was deployed in early 2003. The U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned describes the PRTs as “an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities. The PRT is intended to improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation’s legitimacy and effectiveness in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services.”149

PRTs were involved in a large range of missions, from security sector reform to development projects and institution building.150 They eventually consisted of large teams—50 to 100 personnel—placed under military command (typically a colonel or a lieutenant colonel). The teams included representatives from the Department of Agriculture, the Department of State, and USAID.151 A weekly Executive Steering Committee working group managed by NATO and the UN provided policy guidance to PRT commanders.152 After 2006, all PRTs


152 Keane and Wood, 2016, p. 103. Michelle Parker and Matthew Irvine note that this working group was “comprised of embassy secretaries, [UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan], development agencies working in PRTs, and the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Brigadier
fell under ISAF control. By then, they had reached a total of 26—12 U.S.-led, 14 led by other nations—and remained at that number until they started being phased out in the summer of 2012 as NATO force levels in the country diminished.153

PRTs showed considerable flexibility in their missions, structures, and capacities, depending on, among other factors, the country in charge and the type of environment (relatively secure or not) in which they operated.154 In the German-led PRT, for instance, military and civilians reported to their separate chains of command rather than an integrated one.155 Some authors cite as a best practice the predeployment training of the UK- and Canadian-led PRTs, which had military and civilians train together so that they would already have some familiarity with how each operated.156

PRTs had a difficult start. Initially, the U.S. teams could use DoD Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid funds only for small-scale reconstruction projects and could not support longer-term development projects or security forces personnel training. PRTs also lacked appropriate equipment, which went by priority to the military effort.157 Civilian presence on PRTs was low, often limited to a junior


155 Oksari Eronen, “PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil-Military Integration,” CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies, Vol. 1, No. 5, 2008. This source notes that “[m]ilitary components are led by colonels and civilian parts by representatives of the German Foreign Ministry to the provinces. They decide matters concerning the whole PRT collegially and represent the unit on equal bases towards the local population and officials.”


Some of these challenges were addressed gradually. Eventually, PRTs benefited from a stronger civilian presence and longer civilian deployments. They were also authorized to fund their projects through Department of State Economic Support Funds.\footnote{McNerney, 2005–2006, p. 37.} Although the purpose of PRTs was to unify military and civilian action, they also aimed at doing so in coordination with Afghan authorities; from 2004 onward, an Afghan Ministry of Interior official was assigned to each PRT.\footnote{McNerney, 2005–2006, p. 42.}

As an organizational model for integrating military personnel, civilians, and Afghan government representatives at the tactical level, PRTs have generally been regarded as an innovative and positive development in the COIN campaign in Afghanistan.\footnote{S. Jones, 2008, pp. 106, 131; McNerney, 2005–2006, p. 40.} Yet the various constraints imposed by individual NATO members on how their PRTs could operate also resulted in varying levels of effectiveness.\footnote{S. Jones, 2008, p. 107.} One main critique of the PRT model came from NGOs concerned that military involvement in development projects would make their work more difficult and more dangerous. As a result, they kept their distance.\footnote{Franke, 2006, pp. 10–11. After the international NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) lost staff members to an attack in June 2004, the organization blamed PRTs for its loss (see Mark Sedra, “Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan: The Provincial Reconstruction Team Debate,” Alberta: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Datalink #16, March 2005).} Some NGOs also resented what they perceived as a lack of consultation with NGOs on the part of PRT staff prior to deployment and the quick rotation of staff who required constant relearning.\footnote{Franke, 2006, p. 11.}
Conor Keane and Steve Wood argue that, in spite of the apparent civil-military integration that PRTs embodied, the conception that military and civilians had of their respective roles remained separate.\textsuperscript{165} Finally, even civilian components of the PRT sometimes failed to coordinate their action as they pursued their respective agencies’ strategies.\textsuperscript{166} The Army’s current doctrine on stability (FM 3-07) notes that, while provincial reconstruction teams have experienced success in Iraq and Afghanistan, their implementation also has highlighted significant challenges to interagency coordination. Overall, their levels of effectiveness, cohesion, and coherence have varied. Observers have suggested that provincial reconstruction team performance hinges almost solely on the ability of the military commander to work around obstacles to coordination.\textsuperscript{167}

\textbf{Initial Actions in the Golden Hour}

The United States’ immediate military objectives were rapidly achieved. Major combat operations began on October 7, 2001. One month later, Northern Alliance forces entered Kabul, marking the end of the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda training camps were quickly eradicated, its organizational structure was disrupted, and its senior leadership was forced to scatter to safe havens in and around the northwest Pakistan border.\textsuperscript{168} In early December, the International Conference on Afghanistan was held in Bonn, Germany, establishing the Afghan Interim Authority headed by Hamid Karzai, laying the framework for the drafting of a new constitution and national elections, and requesting the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. By UN Security Council Resolution 1386, ISAF was officially established on

\begin{itemize}
  \item Keane and Wood, 2016, p. 104. These authors note that such conflicting priorities could at times jeopardize the missions’ objectives. One example they give is that, “[i]n battleground regions, Special Forces operated out of PRT compounds, which they used as holding grounds for suspected terrorists or places to interrogate prisoners.”
  \item Keane and Wood, 2016, p. 107.
  \item FM 3-07, 2014, para. 3-11.
  \item Collins, 2015, p. 25.
\end{itemize}
December 20, 2001, and the following March, by UN Security Council Resolution 1401, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan was created to help implement the terms of the Bonn Agreement.¹⁶⁹

Subsequently, in the first months following the formation of the interim government, U.S. military activities continued to focus on the hunting down of remnant al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. The light U.S. footprint took no responsibility in this fragile golden hour for maintaining public security, nor did it support other governance functions. The 5,000-strong British-led ISAF force deployed in December 2001 but remained within Kabul. Despite calls from outside observers—including Karzai and the UN—to expand ISAF’s areas of operation beyond Kabul, the Bush administration remained singularly opposed; it thus missed a critical opportunity in the golden hour to shape the mission and policies of this international force—a lesson in and of itself for future joint operations. Only after NATO took command in October 2003 did ISAF operations gradually expand beyond the capital area.¹⁷⁰ As Joseph Collins notes, “While the formation of the government looked impressive, the truth was that the Afghan government was invisible in the countryside and had few police officers or army forces under its control.”¹⁷¹

As noted, other political-military functions during the golden hour—including early efforts at reforming the security sector, judicial system, and governmental institutions—were divided among lead partner nations. Unfortunately, no hierarchical body was established to coordinate these nation-building activities. Other social and economic reconstruction efforts proceeded haltingly, with poor U.S. interagency coordination and limited financial resourcing. Although a grave humanitarian disaster did not transpire, in the first year, inter-

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¹⁷⁰ Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 99.

national economic assistance to Afghanistan was only about $50 per capita—compared with about $1,400 and $800 in Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. 172 It was not until May 2002—roughly eight months after the beginning of combat operations—that CENTCOM established a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)—CJTF-180—to “oversee tactical operations while taking control of an increasingly complex military and political situation.” 173 More than a year later, in June 2003, the Department of State published its first comprehensive strategy detailing reconstruction activities, goals, and performance indicators for USAID and other civilian agencies operating in Afghanistan. In the operation’s second year, new U.S. interagency coordination and implementation organs—specifically, the Afghan Interagency Operating Group in Washington and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Office in Kabul—were established. And as PRTs slowly deployed to provinces beyond the capital, U.S. military functions began to expand beyond the circumscribed goal of hunting terrorists. 174

Outcome

Following the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001, it was not inevitable that an insurgency would emerge in the new, postconflict Afghanistan. Indeed, from December 2001 through the end of 2002, a relative lull in violence persisted across the country as the widely inclusive, internationally supported interim administration established by the Bonn Agreement was installed and subsequently recognized by tribal delegations from all provinces of Afghanistan. 175 In these early months, when fighting had essentially stopped, an opportunity existed to consolidate the peace and promote political reconciliation after 23 years of war in Afghanistan. Karzai, in fact, remained publicly open

172 Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 95; Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 146, 157–158.


to the potential for Taliban participation in a new unity government, and in early 2002, some progress was made in initiating high-level dialogue between leaders of the Taliban and the interim government. However, these efforts were instinctively opposed by the Bush administration, which never gave serious consideration to the possibilities of weaning the Taliban from its ties with al Qaeda and bringing the group into the political process.

The golden hour failings of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan were manifold. The American postconflict role in Afghanistan was not planned, organized, or resourced as an occupation, on the German or Japanese models, nor as a stability operation as in Bosnia and Kosovo. The United States did not seek a surrender by the Taliban government, nor did it intend to assume responsibility for establishing a secure postconflict environment for leading efforts at reconstruction. American military and civilian authorities were headquartered many miles from each other. The small international force in Kabul did not answer to the United States, the UN, or NATO, and it was precluded from leaving the city. The Bush administration’s initial choice of a low-profile, small-footprint approach to postconflict stabilization in Afghanistan was a conscious decision, reflecting Republican criticism of all four of the Clinton administration’s military interventions and candidate Bush’s promise during the 2000 presidential campaign to avoid nation building in the future. This led his administration to rebuff calls by both Karzai and the UN to deploy ISAF peacekeepers beyond Kabul.

Although the capital remained secure throughout Afghanistan’s golden hour, the small American force outside the city thus proved unable to prevent the Taliban (and al Qaeda) leadership from regrouping in Pakistan and, beginning in 2003, projecting a nascent insurgency back into Afghanistan. The United States eventually assumed responsibility for building a new Afghan army but made no effective

176 Semple, 2009, p. 29; Douglas Ollivant, “The Pashtuns and the Taliban,” *Foreign Policy*, June 9, 2014. Indeed, as Michael Semple observes, “The political engagement pursued by the government with Hezb-i-Islami since the end of 2001 offers a case study of what reconciliation might have been like had the Taliban opted to develop a political organization parallel to its insurgency” (Semple, 2009, p. 61).

177 Semple, 2009, p. 4.
effort to do so through 2002. In this early phase, Washington chose to play no role in the police, judicial, or penal sectors. Its economic assistance was too slight to allow it to lead the donor community on reconstruction, which was also fragmented and slow to get started.

Washington’s initial reluctance to resource security sector, economic, and governance capacity building or to permit the deployment of a countrywide international security presence left a void of international leadership in Kabul and a vacuum of power throughout much of the country, which the Taliban was eventually able to fill in many areas. Even as it improved, U.S. and international civil-military coordination was undermined by several factors, including a “lack of agreement on goals and strategy; lack of accountability; incentive systems that emphasized agency-wide rather than government-wide goals; lack of empowerment at the operational/tactical level; constraints on information sharing; and limited opportunities for joint analysis and planning.”178

By 2005, the Bush administration had largely abandoned its aversion to nation building, but by then, Iraq had become an even more demanding priority, and the new strategies and additional resources were mostly applied there. Only once Iraq had been temporarily stabilized was it possible beginning in 2009 to shift greater forces, financial resources, and high-level attention to Afghanistan, and those all began to diminish a few years later. It was only in 2010 that the United States began trying to foster a negotiated end to the conflict.

Iraq (2003–2011)

Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq (March–May 2003) to remove Saddam Hussein from power, the U.S. military and civilian agencies found dilapidated infrastructure and civil servants gone and generally were faced with a much more demanding reconstruction task than they

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178 Yodsampa, 2011, p. 96.
had envisioned.\textsuperscript{179} Initially, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), led by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Jay Garner, was to take the lead on the civilian aspects of stabilization, but this responsibility was abruptly shifted to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Ambassador Paul Bremer in April 2003, even as Garner’s staff was arriving in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{180} Iraq was then governed by the CPA on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom as an occupied territory under the laws of war for the next 14 months. On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred political authority to an interim Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. By then, however, an increasingly violent insurgency was taking hold, public sentiment toward U.S. forces was turning from that of liberators to that of foreign occupiers, and it was becoming clear to many observers that the allied coalition had failed to establish a secure environment or stabilize the country.\textsuperscript{181} As COIN expert Bruce Hoffman contemporaneously wrote in June 2004,

\begin{quote}
A critical window of opportunity was lost because of the failure to anticipate the widespread civil disorders and looting that followed the capture of Baghdad. In something akin to a chain reaction, this failure was in turn further exacerbated by the operational disconnects that have been cited between the Departments of Defense and State in pre-invasion/post-conflict planning and the inadequacy of the initial [OHRA] effort that, many argue,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{179} Anne Henderson notes that, during the planning phase, civilian coalition officials had communicated to the military a “preserve-and-protect” list of critical infrastructure that should not be destroyed to facilitate the postconflict reconstruction effort, but nothing on that list was preserved (Anne Ellen Henderson, \textit{The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Identified}, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, April 2005, p. 8).


today continue to plague civilians in the [CPA] and U.S. military commanders.\textsuperscript{182}

**Advance Planning**

Although the Afghan intervention was necessarily improvised, planning for Iraq began more than a year before the invasion.\textsuperscript{183} In late November 2001, even as the Taliban were being driven from Kabul, President Bush directed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to update OPLAN 1003, contingency plans initially developed three years earlier in the event of a military intervention to overthrow the Hussein regime. Rumsfeld, in turn, charged CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks with guiding this war-planning effort, which, after a lengthy iterative process, resulted in the presidential approval of the four-phased OPLAN Cobra II in January 2003.\textsuperscript{184}

Unlike in Afghanistan, it was determined that civil aspects of postwar Iraq would not be led by the Department of State but rather by DoD. Subsequently, on January 20, 2003, just eight weeks before the start of combat operations, ORHA was established within DoD to coordinate and integrate a vast array of postwar planning that had already been conducted by agencies throughout the U.S. government. Within DoD, for instance, preparations had begun the previous year in the Office of Near East and South Asia, later renamed the Office of Special Plans. CENTCOM and the Joint Staff also conducted parallel planning efforts. At the Department of State, the Future of Iraq Project was established in March 2002 to convene Iraqi expatriates with civilian experts. At the CIA and USAID, planning began in May 2002 and September 2002, respectively. And at the interagency

\textsuperscript{182} Hoffman, 2004.


\textsuperscript{184} Bensahel et al., 2008, p. 6; Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 104.
level, several working groups—such as the Executive Steering Group, the Iraq Political-Military Cell, and the Humanitarian/Reconstruction Group—were established, beginning in the summer of 2002, to coordinate an array of political-military issues among the NSC, DoD, Department of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, USAID, Department of Justice, and other civilian agencies.\textsuperscript{185}

Despite more than a year of postwar planning by various government organs, these separate efforts were never fully integrated. On an individual level, the planning efforts of many of these groups and agencies suffered serious flaws as well. The product of the Department of State’s Future of Iraq Project, for instance, was essentially deemed unimplementable and largely ignored.\textsuperscript{186} Similarly, the Office of Special Plans, which was established after the 9/11 attacks to assess Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities, “produced guidance on issues ranging from de-Baathification to the future of the Iraqi army but little could be considered an executable plan.” Meanwhile, the Executive Steering Group’s efforts were concentrated mostly on combat activities rather than phase IV operations, and the work of the Iraq Political-Military Cell and the Humanitarian/Reconstruction Group was largely ignored by the Executive Steering Group.\textsuperscript{187}

As combat operations neared, Garner’s newly established ORHA thus faced a difficult undertaking. The organization was short on time, personnel, and expertise.\textsuperscript{188} ORHA’s postwar planning efforts were further undermined by the fact that they were initially based on several assumptions that did not materialize in the aftermath of combat operations—specifically, that Iraqi ministries would continue to function despite the purge of senior leadership; that local government authorities would continue to provide essential services; that the Iraqi police would continue to maintain law and order; that the Iraqi Army would remain intact and contribute to stabilization efforts; that

\textsuperscript{185} Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 104–116.

\textsuperscript{186} For a detailed discussion of the extent to which the Department of State was excluded from the planning process, see Rieff, 2003.

\textsuperscript{187} Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 107–110.

\textsuperscript{188} Rieff, 2003.
the international community would quickly contribute resources to the postwar power vacuum; and that an interim Iraqi government would soon be established, allowing for the holding of national elections and the writing of a new constitution within months of Saddam’s ouster. Ultimately, all of these assumptions proved unfounded.

**Civil-Military Collaboration**

Testifying before Congress prior to the beginning of combat operations, war architect Douglas Feith, then serving as under secretary of defense for policy, asserted that, in executing its humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and civil administration tasks, ORHA would “plug in smoothly’ to the military’s command structure on the ground in Iraq.” Rather to the contrary, due in part to the aforementioned prewar planning failures, in the earliest days of the occupation, military forces, ORHA, and the lead contractor chosen by USAID, RTI, did not make a clear attempt at coordinating their respective efforts. By several retrospective assessments, ORHA civilian officials did not feel that their efforts were afforded proper respect by their military counterparts. This situation was likely compounded by ORHA’s decision not to be co-located with the military headquarters to which it was then subordinated.

Civil-military friction increased further when ORHA was replaced by the CPA. The CPA was nominally a civilian organization although staffed heavily by seconded military personnel. It reported to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. This proved the worst of several available organizational options. Unlike both the Department of State and the U.S. military, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had no experience setting up a branch office of the U.S. government abroad and

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189 Dobbins et al., 2008, pp. 112–115.
190 Quoted in Rieff, 2003.
no cadre of experienced personnel available to staff it. As a result, the CPA never had more than half of its positions filled, and most of these incumbents turned over every few months. Even the military command for postinvasion Iraq was improvised at the last moment, when a newly arrived corps headquarters was assigned to head CJTF-7. This headquarters was never staffed up adequately to assume its new responsibilities and also suffered from multiple vacant positions at the general officer level and below throughout its 14 months of existence.

The quick switch from ORHA to the CPA also meant that the organization that found itself in charge—the CPA—was not the one that had spent months planning for postwar Iraq. It took more than two months for Bremer and his staff, after his arrival in Baghdad, to complete a plan of action. In early July, Bremer delivered to the Office of the Secretary of Defense the new, expansive strategic plan, titled “A Vision to Empower Iraqis.” In the interim, civil affairs units had to improvise. These units, which were based with the various combat units, did not coordinate at the country level, resulting in a disjointed effort. The CPA divided Iraq into four administrative regions that did not match the six major subordinate commands established by the military. In another example of lack of coordination, the CPA changed the composition of several provincial councils that had been established by the military, generating confusion and frustration on the part of the military, not to mention the displaced councilors. In addition to getting a late start, the CPA was also shorthanded, limiting

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194 Wright and Reese, 2008, p. 155.
197 Egnell, 2009, p. 79.
its ability to operate outside Baghdad—a limitation that undermined its credibility with the military as well as the Iraqis.\textsuperscript{200}

The situation improved gradually. In June 2003, CJTF-7 started co-locating some of its staff with the CPA, and there seem to have been good working relations between division commanders and CPA staff based outside Baghdad.\textsuperscript{201} Nevertheless, the command relationship between the military and civilian efforts was not clearly spelled out, resulting in some confusion about the extent to which Bremer could instruct his military counterpart, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez (commander of CJTF-7). Sanchez reported directly to CENTCOM headquarters, in Florida, while the CPA reported to the Secretary of Defense, in Washington. In effect, despite Bremer’s full executive powers as the administrator of Iraq, he lacked “direct authority over 98 percent of official American personnel in Iraq.”\textsuperscript{202} This dual chain of command and unclear relationship created friction between the CPA and CJTF-7 staff.\textsuperscript{203} The U.S. military has extensive experience working alongside an American embassy, and vice versa, but the relationship between the CPA and CJTF-7 was unique and unwieldy. It was not until September 2003 that the CPA and CJTF-7 began to align their strategic plans.\textsuperscript{204}

\textbf{Initial Actions in the Golden Hour}

Despite DoD’s initial assumption from the earliest stages of planning in 2002 that “forces would continue to flow into theater even after the end of Phase III [operations],” the opposite occurred. American units began to withdraw as soon as Baghdad had fallen, with the intention

\textsuperscript{200} Wright and Reese, 2008, p. 155; Dobbins et al., 2009, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{201} Wright and Reese, 2008, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{202} Dobbins et al., 2009, p. xiii.

\textsuperscript{203} Wright and Reese, 2008, p. 154; Dobbins et al., 2009, p. 17. This latter source notes that, “[f]ormally, Bremer and the CENTCOM commander . . . both reported to Rumsfeld, whereas Sanchez reported to CENTCOM, putting him one step lower in the command chain than Bremer.”

\textsuperscript{204} Dobbins et al., 2008, p. 122.
of being down to 30,000 by the end of the first year.\textsuperscript{205} Initial efforts to form an interim Iraqi government, as had been done in Afghanistan, were abandoned in favor of an American-run occupation regime conducted under the laws of war, advised by a purely consultative body of prominent Iraqi figures. Tens of thousands of senior and midranking civil servants were dismissed from office by reason of their membership in the Baath party. For the first months of the occupation, Iraqi government ministries were thus run by CPA senior advisors. Plans to hold early local elections were postponed. As noted, the CPA lacked resources to deploy advisors beyond Baghdad to local governance structures at the provincial and municipal levels.\textsuperscript{206}

In the prewar planning process, the Iraqi police were assessed to be relatively competent, so no U.S. or international civilian police were deployed, as had been done in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. American troops stood by while looters stripped public buildings—including 17 out of 23 government ministries—to the bare walls. Public order broke down throughout the country.\textsuperscript{207} The U.S. military had dispersed rather than interned the Iraqi soldiers during the invasion. The United States had neither sought nor received a formal surrender. The CPA went on to formally dissolve the army. No program was implemented to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the dispersing Iraqi Army personnel into civil society. Large-scale efforts to reform the Iraqi police were delayed many months. Once these efforts did take off, they produced poorly trained, corrupt, and abusive police forces.\textsuperscript{208} Efforts to raise a new Iraqi army also got off to a very slow start, with minimalist objectives.

Iraq’s critical infrastructure was in great disrepair, owing to the legacy of the Iran-Iraq War, years of sanctions following the first Gulf War, and the rampant looting following the fall of Baghdad. These conditions greatly affected essential services, including water, electric-

\textsuperscript{205} Bensahel et al., 2008, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{207} Rieff, 2003.

\textsuperscript{208} Dobbins et al., 2009, pp. xxii–xxv.
ity, sewage, health, and education. In the prewar planning, no Ameri-
can funding had been set aside for reconstruction assistance, on the
assumption that Iraq could fund its own rebuilding. Most of Iraq’s
neighbors were hostile to the American project in Iraq. And as violence
levels began to increase—most notably after the June 3, 2003, truck
bomb attack that killed Sergio Vieira de Mello, chief of the UN mis-
sion, and others in the UN headquarters—relief workers from the UN,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other NGOs began to
withdraw their personnel.209

Despite all these obstacles, the CPA was able to institute several
reforms during its 14-month existence. It reopened the courts; removed
Baathist influence; reformed the prison system; began training a new,
independent judiciary; created the Central Criminal Court to prosecute
high-profile cases; began pursuing war criminals; surveyed Saddam-era
mass grave sites; and introduced aggressive anticorruption measures.
Although all of these can be considered worthy accomplishments and
necessary cornerstones of an effective democracy, they do not necessarily
align with the critical security and governance tasks that should be
prioritized in the golden hour (see Chapter Four).210 Indeed, the detainee
abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib probably did more to undermine
the credibility of the U.S. occupation than these combined achieve-
ments did to improve it.

Similarly, economic policies implemented by the CPA in its first
year helped grow the Iraqi economy by an astounding 46.5 percent in
2004, despite the absence of a large infusion of foreign aid and inves-
tment. This growth was achieved largely because of early economic
measures to check inflation, issue a new currency, institute banking
and financial system reform, stimulate consumer demand, expand
liquidity, reduce tariffs, institute temporary job creation, and secure
external debt relief. The CPA has been justly criticized, however, for
earmarking too many funds for large, slow infrastructure projects; fail-
ing to “maximize fast initial spending for immediate impact”211; not

210 Dobbins et al., 2009, pp. xxx–xxxi.
211 Clad, 2013, p. 12.
properly co-opting the Iraqi business community; “being naively ideological in its devotion to free-market principles”;\textsuperscript{212} and creating unrealistic expectations about the pace of economic recovery. Economic growth declined in 2005 as the insurgency gained momentum.\textsuperscript{213}

**Outcome**

As in Germany and Japan, Iraq was occupied and governed under the laws of war as a conquered state. Unlike those earlier cases, however, the occupation of Iraq was not planned, prepared, or conducted under uniformed military authority. It was only several weeks into the operation that the decision was made not to turn over authority to a sovereign Iraqi government but rather to improvise a civilian occupation regime responding directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a government organ lacking institutional experience in occupational administration. Nor was any effort made to secure a formal surrender by representatives of the former Iraqi regime. On the ground, civil-military coordination took place between separate and effectively autonomous authorities, and mission accomplishment suffered from a lack of unity of effort.

Although the CPA achieved more in the economic and social realms than it has generally been given credit for, the American civilian and military authorities in Iraq failed to prevent the emergence of a virulent insurgency, which was still growing in strength when the CPA turned its responsibilities over to a sovereign Iraqi government and an American Embassy in June 2004. By then, public sentiment was growing increasingly hostile toward the intervention and toward the continued presence of U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{214}

Flawed planning, inadequate resources, dysfunctional civil and military command arrangements, and several misguided early decisions during the golden hour—including the CPA’s controversial policies disestablishing the Baath party, purging the senior and middle ranks of the civil service of tens of thousands of members, and formally

\textsuperscript{212} Dobbins et al., 2009, p. xxxii.

\textsuperscript{213} Dobbins et al., 2009, pp. xxxi–xxxiv.

\textsuperscript{214} Bremer and McConnell, 2006, p. 164.
disbanding the Iraqi Army and intelligence services—created and pro-
longed a vacuum of power, antagonized significant segments of the
population, and allowed violent resistance to the American presence to
emerge, gain strength, and inflame sectarian passions. Indeed, by 2006
Iraq was mired in full-scale sectarian conflict involving organized Shi’
a militias and violent Sunni terrorist networks, most notably al Qaeda’s
first formal affiliate group, al Qaeda in Iraq.

It would take the United States years of effort, and a significant
increase of military manpower and changes in strategy, to even par-
tially recover from these early failings. As domestic public support for
the war eroded, the White House, the U.S. national security estab-
lishment, and the U.S. Congress debated possible policy reorienta-
tions to reverse the downward trajectory set by mistakes during the
golden hour. In January 2007, the Bush administration adopted a new
COIN doctrine, a temporary “surge” in U.S. forces, which would raise
U.S. troop levels in Iraq from some 140,000 to 170,000, and efforts
to co-opt Sunni tribes, including many former insurgents, weary of al
Qaeda’s violence against Iraqi civilians in al Anbar province. Together
with improvements in the quality of the Iraqi Security Forces and a
series of Shia militia cease-fires, led most notably by Moqtada al-Sadr
and the Mahdi Army, these policy shifts eventually achieved tangible,
albeit temporary, reductions in violence over 2007–2008 and led to the
beginning of a gradual withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces beginning
in late 2007. Indeed, by June 2009, the total number of Iraqi police
had increased from only 8,000 at the beginning of the occupation
to 277,000, while the Iraqi military grew from zero troops to nearly
274,000 members; at the time of final withdrawal, the combined Iraqi
Security Forces numbered some 800,000 personnel, of which approxi-
mately 350,000 were Iraqi military and the rest mostly Iraqi police.215

The relatively secure environment and domestic political equi-
librium that emerged from the surge could not be sustained, at least

not without a sustained American military presence. When that was removed after 2011, sectarian tensions rose, Sunnis were increasingly excluded from the government and the security forces, and the quality of the latter deteriorated. Al Qaeda in Iraq moved to Syria, rebranded itself as the Islamic State, and returned in 2014, advancing to the very suburbs of Baghdad before being halted by combined American, Iraqi, and Iranian efforts.

The relative success of the 2007 surge and the post-2014 anti-Islamic State campaign is evidence that early mistakes can be rectified and of the high cost of having to do so.


Our review of the United States’ experience in stabilization included one case that occurred outside a golden hour: U.S. pacification efforts in Vietnam. The CORDS program was initiated in the later years of the American intervention in Vietnam. We include it here, after the discussion of golden hours, because it represents the most extensive integration of American civil and military personnel and functions short of the straightforward subordination of civilian agency officials to military authority represented by the German and Japanese cases.

Set up in May of 1967, CORDS was intended to unify the efforts of the U.S. military and U.S. civilian agencies—the Department of State, USAID, U.S. Information Agency, and CIA—as they attempted to pacify Vietnam and counter Vietcong (VC) insurgents’ influence, particularly in the countryside. A program designed by President Lyndon Johnson’s advisor Robert Komer, who became its first head, described it as “a unique, hybrid civil-military structure which imposed unified single management on all the diffuse U.S. pacification support programs and provided a single channel of advice at each level to [government of Vietnam] counterparts.”

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what today would be labeled rural counterterrorist operations, support to static local security forces, development assistance, and information operations.

**Civil-Military Collaboration**

The CORDS program was established under the authority of General Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV). Westmoreland nominally reported to the U.S. ambassador in Saigon for the pacification mission, but the embassy had no staff overseeing the function, and the ambassador interfered little in the CORDS program. Komer became Westmoreland’s deputy for CORDS (DEPCORDS)—a civilian position made equivalent in rank to a three-star general officer, with an ambassadorial title.217 Komer came out of the Johnson NSC Staff, and before that from the CIA. His successor, William Colby, was also a CIA officer and subsequently went on to head that agency. Both Westmoreland and Komer had championed integrating the entire pacification effort under the military. Komer’s rationale was that the military was the dominant player in Vietnam and controlled most of the resources.218

The chain of command alternated civilian and military layers from top to bottom. At the headquarters level, under Westmoreland and his DEPCORDS, Komer was a chief of staff, who oversaw eight assistant chiefs of staff, including one for CORDS.219 A similar structure existed at the regional level, with a regional civilian DEPCORDS reporting to the U.S. senior American military officer for the region. CORDS province advisory teams supporting South Vietnamese prov-

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ince chiefs reported directly to the regional DEPCORDS.\textsuperscript{220} The mil-
tary and civilian chains of command were thus merged into one, with a
single individual at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels
answering to the level above.\textsuperscript{221}

CORDS oversaw most U.S. programs in rural Vietnam other
than the “main war” being conducted by conventional maneuver units.
These included activities initiated by the CIA, USAID, Department of
State, or Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. CORDS covered
a wide range of programs, including those related to police reform,
rural development, refugees, support for local defense units, VC defec-
tors (the Chieu Hoi program), and rooting out VC organizational
infrastructure (the Phoenix program). CORDS civil-military advisory
teams covered all of South Vietnam’s 250 districts and 44 provinces.\textsuperscript{222}
The half-military, half-civilian Pacification Study Group composed of
country experts conducted field assessments of various CORDS pro-
grams to ensure quality and relevance.\textsuperscript{223}

**Outcome**

Reviews of the CORDS program generally emphasize its effective-
ness at undercutting VC influence.\textsuperscript{224} CORDS made it more difficult
for the VC to recruit and collect taxes.\textsuperscript{225} The number of insurgents
decreased.\textsuperscript{226} The number of South Vietnamese reportedly living in “rel-
atively secure” villages increased by almost 20 percent between 1968
and 1970.\textsuperscript{227}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Andrade and Willbanks, 2006, p. 15.}
\footnote{Frank L. Jones, “Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification
Policy,” *Parameters*, Autumn 2005, p. 113.}
\footnote{Komer, 1972, p. 115.}
\footnote{William Schoux, “The Vietnam CORDS Experience: A Model of Successful Civil-
Military Partnership?” U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005, p. 20.}
\footnote{Coffey, 2006, pp. 26, 31; McNerney, 2005–2006, p. 44.}
\footnote{Schoux, 2005, p. 13; Coffey, 2006, p. 31.}
\footnote{Coffey, 2006, p. 26.}
\footnote{Andrade and Willbanks, 2006, p. 17.}
\end{footnotes}
Several factors contributed to this improvement. First, Westmoreland and Komer established a good working relationship that survived their replacement by General Creighton Abrams and Colby in 1968. Second, CORDS benefited from considerable attention by Johnson, who made the program a priority. This top-level support, as well as the decision to put CORDS under the military, provided this effort with an unprecedented level of funding and resources. At its peak in September 1969, CORDS had 7,601 U.S. advisors in Vietnam (up from the pre-CORDS level of approximately 1,000 in early 1966)—fulfilling Komer’s wish for a large-scale pacification effort, which he deemed essential for success. The novel idea of integrating the civilian (State, USAID, and CIA) effort under the military provided the former with much-needed resources, which led civilian agencies to quickly overcome their initial reluctance toward working under Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. As Komer noted of the CORDS bureaucratic structure, “paradoxically, this resulted in greater U.S. civilian influence over pacification than had ever existed before.” The military, on the other hand, benefited from the expertise of civilians in areas regarding, for example, refugees and agriculture.

CORDS had shortcomings, too, and in 1972 Komer judged it “at best only a qualified success to date.” Although there was improved unity of effort between the military and civilians, Long notes that “Ambassador Komer still had limited ability to influence how U.S. forces were employed.”

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228 Jones, 2005, p. 115; Andrade and Willbanks, 2006, p. 15.
234 Komer, 1972, p. 117.
ficult time winning hearts and minds in areas that had experienced sustained destruction from the U.S. military.\textsuperscript{236} Another shortcoming of CORDS was the program’s inability to build the capacity, accountability, and legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government.\textsuperscript{237} Finally, CORDS’s replicability might be limited. Dale Andrade and James Willbanks argue that CORDS worked because the 1968 Tet Offensive had already dealt a blow to the VC. Prior to that date, Westmoreland had faced a higher operational tempo from the VC.\textsuperscript{238} CORDS proved an effective instrument for COIN, further weakening the VC, which had already suffered deep losses during the Tet Offensive, but it obviously posed no obstacle to the North Vietnamese regular forces, which overran South Vietnam two years after the American withdrawal.

The PRT program has often been compared with the CORDS program in Vietnam in its attempt to integrate the military and civilian efforts at battling an insurgency. Yet the two programs show several key differences. As Henry Nuzum notes, “CORDS had three components absent from our [PRT program in Afghanistan]: (1) sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), (2) numerous teams, and (3) a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels.”\textsuperscript{239} Civilian participation was much lower in PRTs than in CORDS, and this low level of civilian participation limited the range of civilian expertise that PRTs could rely on.\textsuperscript{240} Summarizing the differences between the two programs, Michael McNerney concludes that “CORDS looked in many other ways like a better staffed, better

\textsuperscript{236} Gary R. Hess, \textit{Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War}, 2nd ed., Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2015, p. 120.

\textsuperscript{237} Hess, 2015, p. 121; Coffey, 2006, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{238} Andrade and Willbanks, 2006, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{239} Henry Nuzum, \textit{Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of Unity of Effort in American Counterinsurgency}, Carlisle, Pa.: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, p. iii.

\textsuperscript{240} Nuzum, 2010, p. 59; GAO, 2008, p. 2. The GAO report notes that, “[a]s of April 2008, 10 of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs included 88 or more military personnel—the majority of whom provide security and other support for the PRTs and 3 civilian personnel from State, USAID, and USDA.”
funded, more effective PRT program.” CORDS also had a much wider scope of responsibility, overseeing support for static Vietnamese security forces and what would be labeled the counterterrorist missions of SOF and CIA operatives in the field going after the VC’s underground political infrastructure.

**Conclusion**

The postconflict operations in Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo succeeded in consolidating the peace and producing outcomes consistent with American interests. The 1994 operation in Haiti was at least a short-term success. All of these endeavors profited from substantial planning and preparation focused explicitly on the postcombat mission. All were abundantly resourced. All enjoyed strong regional and global support. All took place on the basis of signed agreements with the former adversaries, committing them to cooperate with the intervention.

Most of these conditions were absent in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Planning and preparation for postcombat operations were deficient in all three cases. The forces and other resources initially committed to all three of these operations proved inadequate and, in every instance, were increased only after the missions’ trajectory turned downward. The Iraq intervention did not enjoy broad regional or global support. Finally, none of these postcombat operations followed a signed peace agreement or capitulation. Initial resistance was overcome and opponents either cowed or dispersed, but they never acquiesced to the American and allied presence.

In Germany and Japan, civil and military activities took place under American military authority, and civilian officials were integrated into the military occupation structures. Iraq was also organized as an occupation, but under civilian leadership with a separate and autonomous U.S.-led military command. Bosnia and Kosovo were multinational operations, with military activities overseen by NATO.

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In Bosnia, civil implementation was divided among several international authorities, while in Kosovo these were integrated under the UN. Somalia and Haiti were two-stage military operations, the first stages under American command and the second under that of the UN. In Afghanistan, military and civilian responsibilities were widely dispersed. A freestanding international force helped maintain security in Kabul. The Afghan government was responsible for civil order throughout the rest of the country, although it had no national army or police force. The UN supported the development of a constitution and national elections. Leadership in security sector reform was divided among five Western governments, while responsibility for overseeing economic reconstruction was even more widely dispersed.

These eight examples are thus consistent with the thesis that early action sets stabilization operations on a course from which it is difficult to subsequently deviate.
CHAPTER FOUR
Golden Hour Tasks

As the preceding chapter has illustrated, the United States struggled to adapt to the requirements of stability operations and golden hours in the post–Cold War period. Many lessons that had previously been learned had to be relearned, while other practices appropriate to the new context had to be invented from scratch. In particular, the United States struggled to define the appropriate scope for stabilization activities. Reluctance to become overcommitted drove a very narrow mandate for UNITAF in Somalia. But the limitations of such a narrowly scoped operation led to the much more ambitious mandate of UNOSOM II. Similarly, the United States military sought to limit the scope of its responsibilities in the early days of the post-Dayton intervention in Bosnia. When such a limited approach proved inadequate, the United States worked with its allies and partners to expand the role of SFOR and the High Representative. These more-comprehensive roles were institutionalized within the UNMIK structure in Kosovo from the outset of operations. But frustrations with this expansive conception of stabilization led to the minimalist approach initially adopted by the United States in Afghanistan and then Iraq. In these instances as well, the failures of limited operations eventually led to much larger, more-comprehensive stabilization efforts. Determining which stabilization tasks are essential and which can be deemphasized or postponed has proven elusive.

Reflecting on this experience, U.S. agencies attempted to provide guidance about the types of tasks that were essential to any stability operation, often with tasks for the initial phases broken out from
Later phases. This guidance generally took one of two forms. On the one hand, some U.S. agencies developed exhaustive lists of stabilization tasks, often running to many dozen tasks and several hundred subtasks.1 As broad overviews of the complexity of such operations and the need for extensive planning and coordination, these lists are extremely helpful. They are also helpful as frameworks from which elements can be selected to plan for specific contingencies. Unfortunately, they are so expansive that they provide little guidance to help establish strategic priorities. Other official guidance avoided this laundry-list approach, but only by emphasizing that each case is unique and stabilization tasks will have to be adapted to local context. Although such observations are undoubtedly true, they also do not help guide U.S. agencies toward consensus on strategic priorities.

This chapter seeks to offer guidance on the stabilization tasks that have repeatedly proved essential in the initial phases of operation, based on a review of prior rigorous analyses. Various U.S. agencies and international organizations have developed different categorizations of stabilization tasks. For the sake of simplicity, we collapse the various categories used in U.S. military doctrine and various civilian frameworks into four: (1) security tasks, (2) humanitarian tasks, (3) governance tasks (including participatory politics, service delivery, and justice), and (4) reconstruction and development tasks. In general terms, the review provides strong evidence for the prioritization of certain security and governance tasks in the golden hour, while most economic stabilization and development tasks unfold over a much longer period.2


2 The experiences of the United States, other countries, and organizations in stabilization activities over the past three decades have provided an enormous literature from which we can draw lessons. In conducting our review of that literature, we looked for the results of rigorous evaluations wherever possible. Where rigorous evaluations are infeasible or simply have not yet been conducted, we provide a summary of the evidence that is available. Given the number of evaluations that have been conducted across the full range of stabilization activities, it is not feasible to provide an exhaustive or truly systematic review. One recent review of stabilization-oriented development assistance in post-2001 Afghanistan alone, for instance,
Security

Both observers and policymakers generally accord security tasks highest priority among the various tasks to be performed during stability operations. Indeed, the slogan “security first” was adopted by some observers who believed that international interventions were frequently overambitious and should focus on a narrower, more-achievable set of goals. How to achieve security, however, is a complex question. Evidence suggests that the first essential tasks must begin before foreign forces ever arrive in country, with diplomatic efforts to secure the support of neighbors and regional powers with a stake in the outcome of the intervention. Equally important is to design an approach to post-conflict governance that co-opts the maximum number of contending factions and influential personalities and minimizes the number of those deemed irreconcilable. Early tasks for the U.S. military include border control; the direct provision of security for the government, key infrastructure, and potentially the local population; DDR; and a beginning to security sector reform.

Cutting Off External Support

Insurgencies require not only people to fight but also the revenue streams, weapons, and other materiel with which to support the fight. Broadly speaking, insurgencies can acquire the necessary revenues and materiel from one of two sources: international sponsors (especially states, but also nonstate actors, such as diaspora movements or radicalized networks) or illicit economies (such as narcotics trafficking and trade in so-called conflict diamonds and other easily extractable and

found 89 studies that met its conditions for rigor. (See Radha Iyengar, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Stephen Hegarty, “Lessons Learned from Stabilization Initiatives in Afghanistan: A Systematic Review of Existing Research,” Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, WR-1191, 2017.) Consequently, this review is necessarily selective. We draw on existing systematic reviews, however, to make this chapter as comprehensive as possible. Unfortunately, very few existing analyses have given systematic attention to issues of timing and sequencing.

transportable natural resources). To prevent the formation of armed opposition groups during the golden hour, interveners may seek to cut off such resource flows.

State sponsorship plays a particularly powerful role in the formation and sustainment of militant networks. One early effort to quantify the role of state sponsorship found that state sponsors “played a major role in initiating, sustaining, bringing to victory, or otherwise assisting” nearly two-thirds of insurgencies in the post–Cold War era.4 A later study placed the proportion closer to five-sixths of insurgencies.5

Militant groups have many other options for material support besides states. Diasporas, refugee communities, and radicalized networks also are major sources of such support.6 For those militant groups without either state or nonstate sponsors, transnational illicit economies provide a major source of income and materiel. Conflict-affected states with easily transportable, high-value natural resources (such as alluvial diamonds, opium poppy and coca, and, in certain circumstances, oil) appear to be at higher risk of conflict.7 When con-


flicts in such countries break out, they are also often more intense and longer-lasting.\(^8\)

International interveners seeking to seize the golden hour will want to curtail incipient opponents’ access to outside resources, making armed opposition to the postconflict order both more difficult and less lucrative. Such efforts should begin with international diplomacy. States are the most significant external sponsors of insurgent movements (measured by their frequency and, in many cases, by the resources at their disposal). States can also be critical partners in cutting off illicit resource flows. For those countries neighboring the state in which the intervention takes place, improved border enforcement can make important contributions to stabilizing the postconflict country. In cases in which militants receive revenues through illicit economies, multilateral instruments can be an important part of the solution. These multilateral instruments may take the form of buyers’ cartels to limit revenues from illicit resources (such as the Kimberley Process for conflict diamonds), internationally sanctioned trust funds to oversee revenues from oil fields, or other mechanisms. In all of these cases, however, broad-based international support is critical. Building that broad base of support should begin before an intervention is launched—and indeed should precede the decision to intervene at all.

**Direct Provision of Security**

Intervening forces are typically called on to provide security to government personnel and buildings, critical infrastructure, arms storage sites and other military facilities, and border crossings. They may be directed to secure locations of critical natural resources, such as oil fields and refineries in Iraq, to prevent sabotage or looting. They may also be used in operations against former combatants, such as efforts to arrest war criminals in Bosnia or operations to destroy remaining Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Finally, occupation forces and UN “blue helmets” under many UN Security Council mandates incur a respon-

sibility to protect civilians in the host country, although intervening states have varied in their willingness to take on this responsibility.

There is substantial evidence from UN operations that peacekeeping forces greatly improve the odds that postconflict countries will not lapse back into war and will keep residual violence at low levels. Unfortunately, rigorous analyses of these missions have not examined whether deployment during the earliest postconflict phases is essential to their success. Given the extremely high risk of conflict recurrence in the earliest years after a war concludes, however, the preventive effects of UN operations are likely even greater in the golden hour.

Evidence on the effects of military occupations, as opposed to peacekeeping missions that follow on the conclusion of a peace agreement, is more mixed, largely because such occupations themselves are much more heterogeneous and less frequent than peacekeeping missions. Whereas peacekeeping operations of various sorts generally conform with a relatively coherent set of principles, military occupations vary tremendously depending on the country conducting the intervention and the context of the occupation. There are few enough recent cases of military occupation that it is difficult to assess them

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statistically even when considered as a group; when broken apart by the country leading the occupation, cross-national statistical comparison becomes practically impossible. Case studies, however, are certainly possible, and they suggest some relatively consistent patterns. In particular, the outcomes of U.S. occupations appear to have been shaped in substantial part by the level of effort—measured in terms of manpower, time, and money—the United States devoted. These case studies also suggest the importance of mobilizing resources for the intervention during the golden hour.

The number of forces required to be effective varies depending on the context of the intervention. Where all major parties have willingly accepted a peace settlement, as in the case of consensual (Chapter VI) UN peacekeeping operations, force requirements can be quite small. Where a political settlement was imposed (as in Bosnia and Kosovo), or in cases where interveners represent an occupation force, force requirements may be much larger. Another variable is the existence or absence of reliable, compliant, and competent indigenous forces capable of ensuring civil order. Experience suggests that, in the aftermath of a conflict, these capabilities will most often be found inadequate or even entirely absent.

Earlier research suggested certain ratios of security forces to local population as a means of establishing force requirements, and some of these ratios became part of U.S. military doctrine. More recently,

11 Dobbins et al., 2003.
13 UN, 1945; Dobbins et al., 2007, p. 39.
14 James Quinlivan proposed as a rule of thumb a ratio of 20 security forces for every 1,000 inhabitants of the country to be stabilized; see James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters, Winter 1995. This ratio at one point was incorporated into Army doctrine; see FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006. For useful overviews of debates over force sizing for stability operations, see James Andrew Zanella, Combat Power Analysis Is Combat Power Density, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: School for Advanced Military Studies, 2012; and Shawn Woodford, “Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency,” Mystics and Statistics (Dupuy Institute), January 4, 2016.
both analysts and policymakers have moved away from specific force-to-population ratios. Analysts have developed more-complex means of grappling with the ways in which context shapes force requirements, while policymakers have sought to reduce the enormous costs of large-scale stability operations, sometimes with counterproductive results. Recent analysis continues to suggest that larger numbers of forces generally improve the odds of success, although with diminishing returns to scale.\(^{15}\) Recent practice has also generally shifted to longer-duration missions to give stabilization efforts more time to take root, although this practice also increases the short-term costs of such missions.

**Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

DDR programs seek to gain control of weapons, ammunition, and explosives; to assist in the transition of combatants from the organized formations that fought in the wartime period to the new roles that they will take on in the postcombat period; and, for those combatants who are not incorporated into the country’s new security services, to assist in their reintegration into civilian life.\(^{16}\) DDR programs have evolved. A first generation of such efforts focused narrowly on immediate security concerns. A variety of studies, however, demonstrated that social relationships between former combatants and their communities played a critical role in DDR outcomes.\(^{17}\) As a result, a second generation of DDR programs focused more broadly on reconstruction

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\(^{15}\) See, especially, Watts et al., 2017, Ch. 2.


and peace-building efforts that incorporated the broader community as much as the former combatants.\textsuperscript{18}

The importance of DDR in the golden hour seems almost self-evident. The ready availability of small arms and light weapons is clearly associated with the incidence and intensity of conflict. Violence in Kosovo, for instance, intensified after arms depots in neighboring Albania were looted during political instability in 1997, while the civil war in Mali intensified after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya flooded the region with weapons. More generally, statistical analyses of armed conflict have found evidence of this relationship between conflict frequency and intensity and the availability of weapons.\textsuperscript{19}

The contribution of DDR programs to preventing conflict recurrence, however, is much less clear. There have been relatively few systematic studies of DDR’s impact, and those that do exist have often found either no effects or effects that are highly sensitive to local context.\textsuperscript{20} One of the few rigorous analyses to address this question, an evaluation of DDR programs in Burundi, found some evidence that reintegration programs improved the livelihoods of ex-combatants but no evidence that they became more satisfied with the peace process or the evolving postconflict political order.\textsuperscript{21} A study of the effects of conditional cash transfer programs for combatants in Colombia reached more-optimistic conclusions, finding that they were associated with

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\textsuperscript{18} For an overview, see Stephen Burke, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Sequencing: A Systematic Review of Lessons Learned,” SSRN, April 3, 2015.


\textsuperscript{20} For an overview, see Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis, \textit{Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs: An Assessment}, Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2010. For specific studies highlighting the importance of social context, see Annan et al., 2011; Kaplan and Nussio, 2018; Phayal et al., 2015; and Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007.

\end{flushleft}
higher rates of demobilization. Overall, rigorous evaluations in this field are sparse and suggest highly variable outcomes depending on context and program design.

One of the ways that the international community has sought to adapt DDR programming to local context is by making this programming more responsive to the needs of women and children. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) helped to launch gender mainstreaming in peace-building practices, while numerous measures (including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, along with its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict) detail the obligations of states in regard to child soldiers and other children affected by violent conflict. In practice, however, implementation of these commitments has been highly uneven.

Given the strong association between the availability of small arms and light weapons and violent conflict, U.S. forces should prioritize control of such arms during the golden hour, where feasible. They can seek control either through disarmament or demobilization efforts (if U.S. and allied forces are deployed in sufficient strength to do so), or by ensuring that local security forces that are being incorporated into a security sector reform effort themselves maintain control of these stocks. Programs aimed at reintegration of former combatants into civilian life, however, appear to be a long-term proposition in which program design must be painstakingly adapted to local circumstances. In-depth planning for such programs should begin early, but they should not be expected to produce broad impact in the initial phases of an intervention.

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Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform is an approach to building the security institutions of partner governments. It differs from traditional “train and equip” or security force assistance approaches in that it emphasizes broad accountability (not only to the civilian government but also to the population as a whole) as a goal co-equal with technical capacity building.²⁶

Both policymakers and academics have looked to security capacity building as an essential—indeed, perhaps the essential—task for stability operations. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, for instance, wrote that, in stability operations, “the effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of its local partners. This strategic reality demands that the U.S. government get better at what is called ‘building partner capacity.’”²⁷ In her study of postconflict military interventions, Monica Duffy Toft argues that security sector reform is the linchpin of any effort to bring sustainable peace.²⁸

Societies emerging from conflict rarely have reliable, competent internal security forces. In the best of circumstances, it may be possible to distinguish between the most repressive elements—for example, the security services or secret police—and the more normal and perhaps less tainted army and police. Where the security sector has collapsed, however, or where it has been a part of the reason that a country descended into civil war, security sector reform does not provide a rapid mechanism for transitioning from U.S.-provided civil security to full reliance on local capacity. Most rigorous studies of security sector assistance suggest that such assistance builds sustainable capabilities only very slowly—and then often only in partner nations that


are relatively well governed. As one element of a long-term strategy to self-sustaining peace, security sector reform may well be essential. But the United States cannot make foreign security forces more capable or less repressive quickly. During the initial phases of an intervention, U.S. forces will have to supervise such forces closely, either in cantonments if they are being demobilized or in close partnership to provide oversight if the indigenous forces continue to provide security.

In the most extreme circumstances, the United States and its allies may need to create local security forces from scratch, establishing the new organizational structure and managing the recruitment, training, sustainment, and operational employment of the new forces, as occurred in Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Police represent a particular challenge for the United States. Although police are an essential component of an security sector reform program, the United States has very limited capabilities for building local police forces. Although the relevant Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement has a modest capacity for police training, larger efforts, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, invariably fall to the U.S. military. Capacity building and reform of the police also in many ways represent a greater conceptual challenge than similar efforts for partner militaries. As a general rule, military forces

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29 One recent RAND study found that U.S.-provided security sector assistance reduces state fragility, but that these effects, while statistically significant, are very modest. Another RAND study found that U.S.-provided security sector assistance does not have a measurable impact on reducing the incidence of civil wars in “front line states” that are at risk of conflict spillover from their neighbors, at least within a policy-relevant time frame. See, respectively, Michael J. McNerney, Angela O’Mahony, Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Caroline Baxter, Colin P. Clarke, Emma Cutrufello, Michael McGee, Heather Peterson, and Leslie Adrienne Payne, *Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-350-A, 2014; and Watts et al., 2017. See also Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, “Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, Nos. 1–2, 2017.

30 On both the importance of international support for police building and the personnel and logistical challenges, see Jones et al., 2005; and David H. Bayley and Robert M. Perito, *The Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism, and Violent Crime*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2010. Recruiting and vetting sufficient numbers of translators represents a particular challenge in police building, because the numbers of personnel involved are large but dispersed throughout the country.
are less involved in daily civil interactions (with important exceptions, of course) and typically operate in large units, where oversight is, while not easy, certainly easier than oversight of more-dispersed activities. Police, in contrast, are in daily contact with citizens and are constantly called on to make judgments about when and how to intervene in social interactions. They also tend to operate as individuals, pairs, or at most in very small teams, making oversight much more difficult. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the evidence about international police-building efforts is often disappointing. Although rigorous impact evaluations have found a few instances of successful reforms in India and Colombia, most impact evaluations have found no positive effects, and many less rigorous evaluations have also cautioned against high expectations, outside very favorable circumstances.31 Early efforts in Iraq were particularly unfortunate, transitioning an ineffectual police establishment into an abusive source of sectarian oppression.

31 One recent systematic review of international police programs found only a handful of rigorous impact evaluations. Of these, the large majority found no positive effects of reform efforts. Two in Colombia found some positive effect, although the evidence in one of these was relatively weak. See Angela Higginson, Lorraine Mazerolle, Michelle Sydes, Jacqueline Davis, and Kerrie Mengersen, Policing Interventions for Targeting Interpersonal Violence in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review, London: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 2015. Less rigorous reviews have also not reached particularly optimistic conclusions. Mike Brogden, for instance, declares that, “[d]espite the enormous sums spent on this [community-oriented policing] export process, we have little evidence of its impact or, indeed, of the effect of international exchange and trade in police values, ideologies, policies, and technologies” (Mike Brogden, “‘Horses for Courses’ and ‘Thin Blue Lines’: Community Policing in Transitional Society,” Police Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2005, p. 67). Bruce Baker finds that police reforms founder on a range of challenges, including “a lack of political will; resistant police culture; and deep distrust by a postconflict population of a police noted for its wartime abuses and long-standing corruption. More prosaically the reforms are often neither affordable in the long term nor sustainable” (Bruce Baker, “Policing Post-Conflict Societies: Helping Out the State,” Policing and Society, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2009, p. 329). For other nuanced but generally cautionary overviews of these programs, see Mercedes S. Hinton and Tim Newburn, Policing Developing Democracies, New York: Routledge, 2009; and Robert Davis, Nicole Henderson, and Cybele Merrick, “Community Policing: Variations on the Western Model in the Developing World,” Police Practice and Research, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2003.
Key Considerations for Planning

This review suggests that at least two broad security-related tasks are absolutely essential from the outset of operations: a diplomatic strategy for cutting off potential spoilers from external sources of revenues and materiel and a military strategy for providing security to either the host country as a whole or at least critical parts of the country.

Some DDR and security sector reform programs play an important role in long-term stabilization efforts. Given the destabilizing potential of large numbers of uncontrolled small arms and light weapons, intervening forces should attempt to secure them (in conjunction with local security forces), where feasible. But the shape of DDR and security sector reform programs will vary considerably depending on context, and in general they will require some time to be adapted to local circumstances and ultimately successful. Early steps should include separating and demobilizing the most-abusive elements and carefully overseeing the behavior of those that are left.

For defense planners preparing for unknown future contingencies, perhaps the single most important question posed by the existing state of knowledge about stability operations concerns force sizing. In general, analyses have found that larger numbers of forces contribute to improved odds of success. From a policymaker’s perspective, however, there are very few contingencies that can justify the enormous expense of large-scale stability operations. Planners are therefore being asked to produce acceptable results with fewer resources than were available at the height of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan or, relative to their population size, Bosnia and Kosovo. This means that caution must be exercised before taking on such missions, and objectives need to be scaled to match resources.

Humanitarian Assistance

According to Christoph Zürcher, “Humanitarian aid includes relief and assistance, protection, support services, and material assistance like food and medical supplies. Running refugee camps, which can include services such as education, training, and labor programs, also falls into
A variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations have developed capabilities and processes for distributing such aid quickly. These efforts are often under way even before an intervening force arrives and can be quickly expanded, provided that force creates a more secure environment. Given the scale of humanitarian requirements in immediate postconflict periods, however, intervening military forces will almost inevitably also be called on in the early days to assist in aid delivery.

Although the case for humanitarian assistance seems obvious, it in fact can have complicated and sometimes adverse effects in conflict-affected countries. When provided during an ongoing conflict, it can help to reduce the costs of continued fighting and be diverted to armed groups (effectively becoming a part of their logistical support systems). Studies of the effects of humanitarian assistance in areas of ongoing conflict have frequently found that such assistance is associated with more-intense violence and longer-duration conflicts when implemented by NGOs and other civilians.\(^{33}\) The reasons for this perverse outcome vary according to context, but, in broad terms, humanitarian assistance can create additional resources over which factions may fight; can serve essentially as the logistics networks for militants who steal food, medicine, fuel, and other valuable items from the international assistance effort; and can reduce the incentive of the warring parties to negotiate or concede defeat (since they are partially insulated from the worst consequences of continued fighting). When assistance is provided with the support of military forces in conjunction with an ongoing counterinsur-


gency, it can potentially help to stabilize a region, but generally only in secure areas or in areas with a large counterinsurgent presence.\textsuperscript{34}

There are relatively few rigorous studies of the effects of humanitarian assistance in a golden hour context, where levels of violence are much lower, and those that do exist do not reach consistent findings.\textsuperscript{35} Nonetheless, the findings on the effects of humanitarian assistance in conflict environments should serve as a warning. To the extent that humanitarian assistance alleviates the costs of war, it may incentivize a return to fighting. The provision of security by intervening forces and the conditioning of large-scale assistance on adherence to the terms of the postconflict political order may be important requirements for preventing misuse of assistance.

**Governance**

Although tasks performed by intervening military forces contribute to security, they can be successful only in conjunction with an appropriate strategy for governance. The U.S. military, for instance, emphasizes that security emerges out of a complex interaction of security and governance processes:

In hostile environments, joint forces may be tempted to utilize all available capacity on security efforts. However, security is usu-


ally conditional on a degree of popular consent and this, in turn, is conditional on the restoration of basic governance functions. Accordingly, the [joint force commander] should not presume that others could implement, for example, governance functions once the joint force has managed to reduce the level of violence.36

Governance functions, in other words, are critical and enduring tasks. Given problems of civilian capacity and movement in nonpermissive environments, the military is likely to retain sizable responsibilities for governance throughout the golden hour and very possibly much longer.

This section reviews what is known about supporting appropriate governance in postconflict states, dividing the field into three sections: political inclusion and participation, provision of basic public services, and justice and dispute resolution. Core power-sharing arrangements and the provision of basic public services must be put in place from the outset of an intervention. Other aspects of governance are likely to evolve over many years.

Political Inclusion and Participation
The United States’ fundamental goal in interventions is typically to prevent the host society from returning to war. Political inclusion and participation may be means to that end but seldom are primary goals in and of themselves. As the case studies in Chapter Three suggested, the United States looked to democratic governance in Germany and Japan to prevent a return to fascism and militarism. In more-recent interventions, the United States has sought to promote political inclusion as a mechanism for preventing renewed civil wars.

Many scholars have noted that negotiated settlements are much more likely to degenerate into renewed fighting than are civil wars that end in one side’s military victory.37 This finding suggests that it might

37 Indeed, Page Fortna writes, “[t]hat peace is more stable after decisive military victories than after wars that end in a tie is perhaps the most consistent finding of the literature on the durability of peace after both civil and interstate conflict” (Fortna, 2004, p. 273). See also Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3, 1995; Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen,
be better if the United States let civil wars proceed toward definitive conclusions rather than intervene to halt them in progress. But this assumes one does not care who wins and is prepared to endure the destabilizing regional effects of such a conflict until that occurs, which is sometimes not the case.

Military victories have become much less common in recent years; civil wars now tend to last longer and end less conclusively than they did during the Cold War. Typically, the United States intervenes in civil wars only when it becomes clear that no acceptable party in the concerned state is likely to be able to win on its own. Unless the United States is willing to provide the dominant level of effort required to defeat and then suppress challengers, and to do so over extremely long periods, it inevitably will have to rely on strategies that co-opt potential spoilers and bring them into a postconflict political order. Although they will not be necessary in all cases, appropriately designed power-sharing arrangements that try to accommodate all major political factions can help to stabilize postconflict polities, at least in the short term.

As described in Chapter Two, however, power-sharing arrangements also run the risk of paralyzing governance and creating bloated and inefficient bureaucracies. To try to diminish these risks of power sharing, the United States often seeks to introduce some mechanisms


38 See, for instance, Toft, 2010.


of popular accountability that could work, over time, to make the major actors present at the end of a war more responsive to the governance needs of their populations. Democratization, in other words, is not an end in itself or a short-term goal but rather a way to try to legitimize, internally and internationally, the power-sharing arrangements and allow them to evolve toward more-effective governance over time. Because indigenous mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness are often slow to develop, the United States and other members of the international community can play a supporting role. They can provide resources to local government institutions conditional on performance. In the early stages, such support can focus on “quick wins” on issues with broad support. Over time, assistance can gradually transition to helping local actors take on more-difficult tasks.41

Many observers have been skeptical of the role of democracy in fragile and conflict-affected states and have argued that elections, in particular, especially when conducted soon after the end of a conflict, can be highly destabilizing.42 Although these concerns are warranted, there are at least four reasons to invest in gradual liberalization as part of a long-term strategy. First, preexisting forms of government are likely to have been irremediably discredited. Second, local populations will inevitably press for more power to choose their own leadership, often sooner rather than later.43 Third, there are many measures that interveners can take to stabilize this process. These risk-mitigating measures include stability operations, appropriate design of power-sharing arrangements, and transition mechanisms that encourage responsible governance.


institutions, and, where feasible, delay and appropriate sequencing of local and national elections.\textsuperscript{44} Finally, as a long-term strategy, higher-quality democracy provides strong protection against the risk of war recurrence.\textsuperscript{45}

During the golden hour, the critical task for the United States is to design workable power-sharing arrangements that include all reconcilable potential spoilers. The more numerous those deemed irreconcilable and excluded from the new dispensation, the greater the likely resistance and the larger the necessary security presence to suppress it. In the longer term, efforts can and should be undertaken to make these elite-based compromises more responsive to popular demands.

**Provision of Basic Public Services**

States are expected to provide the infrastructure necessary for a number of critical public goods—clean water, waste disposal, electricity, education, transportation, health systems, and so on. In postconflict societies, however, the ability of the state to provide these basic services is compromised. Rebuilding damaged infrastructure may take years, but interveners will be expected to assist in restoring many of these services, delivered by some combination of military personnel, disaster response, and development agencies in conjunction with their implementing partners and those portions of the local government that remain effective.

Observers agree on the critical importance of these functions. Disagreements arise over two interrelated issues: first, the extent to which outside organizations should provide these services themselves rather than seeking to rapidly build up the capabilities of the local state to do so and, second, the extent to which fairness should govern the allocation of such services.

Current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and development specialist Clare Lockhart made an influential argument for placing state capacity building at the center of international efforts to stabilize frag-

\textsuperscript{44} Brancati and Snyder, 2012; Flores and Nooruddin, 2012.

\textsuperscript{45} See, for instance, Walter, 2004, pp. 361–388.
As a long-term goal, a focus on state building makes sense. In the shorter term, many postconflict states will be incapable of providing critical services without extensive international support—and sometimes even with such support. Rather than posing a binary choice between state building and direct service provision, it makes more sense to focus on different mixtures of local and international service delivery, with the precise relationship between local and international service providers varying by sector and the partner state’s ability to provide services appropriately and evolving over time. To the extent that international personnel must substitute for indigenous capacity, providing basic public services requires substantial manpower—and often in technical fields where neither the United States nor other international actors have substantial, readily deployable personnel.

The second major consideration for providing basic public services concerns their equitable provision to the entire population rather than only to members of the ethnic groups, clans, localities, or other groups that are closely aligned with the government. Since most intra-state conflicts are driven at least in part by inequitable access to opportunities and government services, it is important to expand access to these services. The precise level of service provision and what will be considered fair, however, will vary from situation to situation. A variety of mechanisms have been developed to attempt to improve the quality and equity of service distribution throughout fragile states by increasing popular participation in the design, implementation, and oversight of programs. Innovations include community-driven devel-

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49 For an overview, see Dorothea Hilhorst, Ian Christoplos, and Gemma Van Der Haar, “Reconstruction ‘from Below’: A New Magic Bullet or Shooting from the Hip?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 7, 2010.
opment programs (in which local authorities, such as informal consulting councils, play key roles in the allocation of resources) and public evaluations of government performance through scorecards. Such mechanisms have been found to improve outcomes in at least certain circumstances, although the overall record is mixed and certainly does not show any indication that substantial change can happen quickly. It appears that considerable trial and error is involved in matching appropriate mechanisms to specific contexts, even when development specialists have considerable time available for planning.

As part of their efforts to stabilize postconflict states, development agencies and their implementing partners should continue to develop plans to improve the capacity of indigenous institutions to provide basic services and to improve citizens’ ability to hold government officeholders accountable for service delivery. The results of these efforts, however, are likely to become apparent only over the course of many years and often decades. In the golden hour, U.S. military capabilities will be required to help provide many of these services, and it will often take some time before the appropriate civilian capabilities (indigenous and international) are in place to take over these responsibilities.

Justice and Dispute Resolution

Numerous observers agree on the importance of justice and dispute-resolution mechanisms for postconflict stability.\(^{51}\) Unfortunately, there have been few rigorous studies of the field and the role that international actors can play in rapidly improving capabilities in this area.\(^{52}\) Those studies that do exist have found that many international programs aimed at justice reform and capacity building have had relatively modest success overall and an even worse record in postconflict contexts.\(^{53}\) Given the importance of this sector, these findings should not discourage efforts to improve justice delivery, but they do offer some guidance for how to go about these tasks.

Courts and other formal institutions of justice suffer from two major problems in many developing countries and especially in those recovering from conflict. First, these institutions are typically extremely underresourced and often inaccessible to ordinary citizens. At the end of its civil war, Sierra Leone had only 125 lawyers for a population of approximately 5 million people.\(^{54}\) In Cambodia, no student graduated from the Cambodian law school for the three decades that the coun-

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try’s civil war lasted. Even in many Latin American countries, which are comparatively wealthy by the standards of most conflict-affected countries, it is prohibitively expensive for much of the population to prosecute a case in state courts. Second, courts often struggle with corruption and independence from the executive branch. Many observers seem to see the rule of law as a less demanding and more rapidly achievable goal than democracy. Studies of judicial independence, on the other hand, suggest that democracy is typically a precondition for independent courts and the rule of law. Developing functional courts and other formal institutions of the rule of law, in other words, is a long-term prospect for many postconflict countries, especially those with lower levels of development.

Informal institutions of justice and conflict resolution, on the other hand, may be more promising. In many cases, informal institutions, such as village or clan elders or dispute resolution councils organized by business associations, may be all that is available. Some recent research has suggested that internationally supported education programs can improve the performance of such institutions. Cooperation with informal justice providers can pose many of its own challenges, including the failure of these informal bodies to operate in accordance with internationally accepted human rights standards and their tendency to systematically favor the powerful and well connected.

over more marginal populations. But in many postconflict contexts, there may be few alternatives.\textsuperscript{59}

Transitional justice, including lustration, should be approached with considerable caution, as should the detention and prosecution of alleged war criminals. There is an unavoidable tension between retribution and reconciliation, as exemplified in denazification and de-Baathification, and by the U.S. imprisonment of Taliban leaders seeking to reconcile with the new regime in Kabul. It can take years, sometimes even generations, for societies to come to terms with past abuses. Seeking to hurry the process in already divided societies can worsen polarization and stiffen resistance.\textsuperscript{60}

**Key Considerations for Planning**

Three central conclusions emerge from this overview of governance issues in postconflict environments. First, power-sharing arrangements should seek to include as broad as possible a base of potential spoilers who can be reconciled to the postconflict political order, but efforts should also be made to incorporate incentives and processes that will nudge politics over time from rigid power sharing to more-flexible protections for political minorities. Second, provision of essential public services is an early priority, with more-substantial improvement a longer-term proposition. Third, many practitioners and observers have proposed relying on informal mechanisms of local governance during the extended period in which formal state capacity is being rebuilt. Especially in lower-income countries, informal governing institutions provide many of the services on which citizens rely. But they are subject to their own problems of inequitable service provision. It also takes international actors considerable time and effort to understand how these informal institutions work; relying on cookie-cutter approaches may be misguided, but it is considerably quicker, which explains in part why international actors so often fail to adapt


\textsuperscript{60} For a more extended discussion of the forms of transitional justice and the pros and cons of various alternatives, see Dobbins et al., 2007, pp. 91–100.
to local circumstances. Taken together, these findings suggest that international actors will have to play a major role in brokering inclusive coalitions and providing critical service.

Reconstruction and Development

Level of economic development (measured in terms of GDP per capita, infant mortality, and similar statistics) is one of the strongest predictors of intrastate conflict: More economically developed countries are at substantially lower risk of civil war. Moreover, although the field is large and complex, recent evaluations of development assistance have generally found that it is associated with small but noticeable improvements in economic growth and other development goals. Taken together, these findings suggest that development assistance is an important part of a strategy to stabilize postconflict states.

The reality, however, is complicated. In the immediate aftermath of war, countries often post impressive rates of growth as market activity that was suppressed by conflict resumes. International actors can assist this recovery process through economic stabilization measures, including helping to establish a stable currency, protecting critical natural resources from looting and destruction, restoring critical transportation links and utilities, and reopening borders and markets to legitimate trade. Within a few years, however, growth levels typically return to something much closer to historical norms. International actors


63 Dobbins et al., 2007, Ch. 9.
can try to boost levels of growth by implementing projects beyond the critical economic stabilization tasks discussed above, but in doing so they encounter at least two major challenges. First, because of the extensive destruction that often occurs during a civil war, a postconflict country’s absorptive capacity may be low for the first few years after a war’s end, reducing the effectiveness of aid in the short term. Second, rapid infusion of large amounts of assistance can fuel corruption. Development assistance can help to modestly improve growth prospects over the long term, but it is more limited in what it can accomplish rapidly.

As with arrangements for governance, the overriding objective for economic assistance is redirecting competition within the society for wealth and power from violent to peaceful channels. In the shorter term, more-focused development programs might be targeted to specific communities to assist in stabilization. These more-focused programs may have noticeable effects within weeks or months. Types of development programs that might be used include community-driven development, cash transfer, employment programs, and others. They might help stabilize a partner nation by providing improved opportunities for participation in the licit economy (thus making illicit enterprises, such as rebellion or crime, less attractive). They might also improve the legitimacy of the partner government, by showing that it is responsive to local concerns and might help develop networks to provide information on potential “spoilers.”

The evidence of these programs’ effectiveness is mixed but suggests the importance of security and government capacity as preconditions for success. Unemployment, for instance, was not found to drive insurgent recruitment in several ongoing conflict zones, suggesting that employment programs may be poorly suited for reducing

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violence. On the other hand, one study found that, in a postconflict environment, where residual violence was low, appropriately designed employment programs reduced illicit activities by high-risk men and reduced their desire to participate in mercenary work available nearby. A series of studies on employment programs in parts of India affected by relatively low-intensity Maoist insurgencies generally found that employment programs reduced incentives for violence in the longer term—but, again, the ability of the government to provide services and security appears to help set the conditions for success. Similarly, community-driven development and conditional cash-transfer programs were found to improve security, but largely in regions that were already secure. In regions in which insurgencies were active, these programs could exacerbate violence as militants sought to disrupt the services being provided.

Heavy infrastructure replacement requires local buy-in and is sometimes better handled by such institutions as the World Bank.
via subsidized loans tied to a stream of dedicated revenue rather than through bilateral donor grants.

**Conclusion**

This review of the literature on postconflict stabilization tasks suggests several lessons relevant to the golden hour.

First, many stabilization tasks can effectively be implemented and show some positive return only in the long term—often the very long term, understood in years or decades. This is particularly true of most capacity-building and other development assistance, including capacity building in the security sector. Although many policymakers have looked to the development of indigenous security forces as an exit strategy for U.S. troops, building sustainable improvements in the capacity of foreign security forces is a long-term proposition. Precisely because these efforts will take years, they should be initiated early with an emphasis on both quality and quantity of the resultant force rather than speed in its generation.

Second, most humanitarian and development tasks yield only gains in stabilization when implemented in a relatively secure environment.

Third, in both conflict and postconflict environments, security and governance are in many ways two sides of the same coin. In very simple terms, state builders can attempt to stabilize a country through either co-optation or suppression. In most circumstances, the United States is unlikely to invest the resources necessary to suppress powerful spoilers over an extended period, and the United States’ local partners are unlikely to have the capabilities necessary to do so. As a result, the United States must work to build as broad a coalition as possible in support of a postconflict political order, including as many reconcilable members of the contending factions and former adversaries as can effectively be managed within power-sharing institutions.

Fourth, diplomatic efforts are an essential component of providing security. Neighboring states and regional powers can play an extremely helpful or highly destructive role in stabilizing the peace. If the United States cannot gain their support—or at least their grudging
acquiescence—for the postconflict political order, it will be extremely difficult to build a lasting peace.

Taken together, these lessons emphasize the importance of coalition building at both the international and national levels (i.e., working with other countries to cut off support for potential spoilers and working with all major factions within the host country to build a broad base of political support) and the direct provision of security in the host nation during the golden hour. Even if the United States performs these tasks, stabilization is typically a long-term endeavor. But the odds of success are likely to be greater and the cost of achieving it much less if these tasks are implemented.
Although the literatures on stabilization and U.S. doctrine both recognize the need for a unity of effort between civilian and military actors that can be achieved only by good civil-military relations, they also acknowledge the wide variety of civil-military constructs that can be put in place depending on the type of actors involved and the level—strategic, operational, or tactical—considered. The diversity of postconflict contexts makes the application of a single model for civil-military arrangements difficult and often counterproductive and warrants instead a flexible approach that takes into account the specific circumstances of each case. Although flexible, this approach can rely on several lessons that cut across some of the most successful cases of civil-military arrangements. Successful practices include starting coordination and integration during the planning phase, avoiding duplicate structures, learning over multiple operations (through doctrine and shared personnel), and building strong interpersonal relationships.

Civil-Military Coordination Is Critical to Success

Failure to coordinate military and civilian efforts, or to take into account the civilian tasks that need to be fulfilled as part of any military intervention, can have devastating results, as evidenced by the missed opportunities in the early days of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. All civil-military arrangements ultimately serve the same purpose: ensuring unity of effort, a principle that features prominently in the U.S. Army doctrine on stability operations, as one of four prin-
ciples on which stability tasks are based. Because stabilization requires international and local actors to work at the same time on security and governance—since neither is sustainable without the other—such unity of effort is critical to operational success. Although the literature on stabilization recognizes the challenges that arise when civilians and the military attempt to work together in stability or peace operations (and provides guidelines to overcome such challenges), it also insists on this same principle as key to ensuring that military and civilian entities in a given intervention further each other’s action rather than work at cross-purposes.

This leaves open the question of what constitutes good civil-military relations. What degree of integration of civilian and military efforts is required to achieve the unity of effort that is so important to success? There are many shades of civil-military coordination, from mere coexistence through coordination to fuller integration, and various authors describe them differently, creating some confusion. A 2009 RAND report, for instance, establishes the difference as follows: “Coordination can be thought of as aligning separate activities with a common purpose. Integration means uniting activities into a

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single, functioning whole.”

Definitions also vary according to institutions: USAID’s guidelines identify three levels of cooperation with DoD: communication (or simple information sharing); coordination, when USAID and DoD work together to achieve shared objectives; and, more rarely, collaboration, when “personnel from each institution co-locate overseas or at headquarters.” Other entities still define such levels differently. As one author shows, the words cooperation and coordination are understood differently by NATO and the UN. Figure 5.1 presents these different modalities of civil-military interactions on a continuum, which become more unified as the level of integration increases.

The highest level of integration is achieved when a single authority is fully in charge, with other agency personnel acting in an advisory capacity. Examples would be the military governments in post–World War II Germany and Japan and the normal peacetime embassy structure. Something approaching this standard would be an arrangement interspersing military and civilian actors from different agencies in a

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**Figure 5.1**

**Modalities of Civil-Military Interactions**

- Coexistence
  - Little to no interaction between civilian and military actors
- Communication
  - Civilian and military actors exchange information
- Coordination
  - Civilian and military actors deconflict action
- Integration
  - Civilian and military actors are integrated in a single structure or chain of command

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4 Gompert et al., 2009, p. 59.


single chain of command. Examples are the CORDS program in Vietnam and PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. UN peacekeeping operations are integrated in the sense that the force commander is directly subordinate to the civilian head of mission, who is responsible in turn to the UN Secretary General.

One study notes that, although integration is extremely difficult to implement, it is worth the effort, since the “creation of an overarching organization—a civilian-military implementation staff—at both the strategic and the operational level is the key to the effective use of diverse organizations and resources, as well as to the successful conduct of the day-to-day management of conflict prevention at all levels.” The above-mentioned RAND report concurs that integration is a more difficult proposition than coordination and advocates for such structures only in contexts where violence levels are high; in these cases, “managing risk, allocating forces to civil efforts with the greatest [COIN] payoff, responding to fluid threats, and optimizing the employment of civil and military resources demand integration, not just at headquarters but on the ground.”

The Special Inspector General for Iraq drew a similar conclusion, outlining as the first lesson from the U.S. intervention in Iraq the need to “[c]reate an integrated civilian-military office to plan, execute, and be accountable for contingency rebuilding activities during stabilization and reconstruction operations” that “would provide clarity about who is responsible for planning and executing rebuilding activities, truly resolving the dual

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7 Even then, integration did not lead the various agencies involved to fundamentally alter their functioning. In these two cases, the new constructs served different purposes. In Afghanistan, PRTs were establishing contacts and relationships with the population; they engaged in local stabilization and reconstruction assistance, with limited political outreach. CORDS, however, focused on pacification, which is different from development or stabilization, as it included some elements that would be more akin to counterterrorism (CORDS had control over most CIA operations, including the Phoenix program).


9 Gompert et al., 2009, p. 59.
systemic weaknesses of the Iraq program: the lack of unity of command and poor unity of effort.”

A Diversity of Civil-Military Arrangements

Civil-military arrangements involve various actors, from the civilians and military of the same country to broader arrangements that also include regional and international public and private actors. These arrangements also operate at various levels. Examples from the case studies include, at the strategic level, the daily meetings of the NATO military commander and the UN administration chief in Kosovo or similar collaboration between the coalition force commander and the administrator of the CPA in Iraq. Other arrangements, such as PRTs, took place at the operational or tactical levels. CORDS covered all three levels, from the close relationship established between COMUS-MACV and DEPCORD at the top of the structure to province advisory teams on the ground.

Interagency Versus Multinational Constructs

When the actors of stabilization are mainly the U.S. military and U.S. civilian agencies, the challenge is achieving interagency collaboration, also described as having a whole-of-government approach. The Army doctrine on stability highlights the importance of adopting such an approach and further elaborates on how to link military and civilian lines of effort with the guidance of the National Security Strategy and under the leadership of the Department of State.11 JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, offers eight “hallmarks of successful whole-of-government planning and operations,” from having a designated lead agency to ensuring that all involved organizations work for the same strategic objective.12 On the civilian side, USAID published in 2015 an

12 JP 3-08, 2016, p. II-3.
update to its 2008 Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy, which outlines guiding and operating principles for cooperation with DoD. This document recommends establishing both standing and ad hoc working groups to facilitate cooperation with DoD and notes that “country assistance’ or ‘civilian-military’ working groups have proven to be highly effective—especially when they have the active support of the Chief of Mission, as well as the USAID Mission Director and Senior Defense Official.” In 2013, the Unity of Effort Framework was developed as a planning tool to help U.S. government agencies share information and better visualize their roles and responsibilities.

The U.S. military is also often required to cooperate with non-governmental U.S. civilian entities. In this case, there is usually no integration but only various levels of coordination. The military then establishes an interface—for instance, a CMOC—with the civilian actors in charge of reconstruction to facilitate information sharing, deconfliction, and cooperation. This comprehensive approach takes into account all actors involved in stability and is also described under this term in Army doctrine. Army doctrine establishes five levels of interaction with such nongovernmental partners: coexistence, communication, information sharing, formal coordination, and cooperation and collaboration. The ability to move from one end of the spectrum to the other is based on five factors: similarity of objectives, similarity of higher authority, degree of trust, whether one’s attitude is cooperative; and willingness to commit resources. Such coordination can take place with international actors, as CMOCs attempted in Somalia

13 USAID, 2015.
14 USAID, 2015, p. 5.
17 FM 3-07, 2014, Figure 3-1.
and Haiti, and with local government representatives, as in PRTs in Afghanistan. Some arrangements cover military interactions with two or three of these categories of civilian actors.

In UN peacekeeping operations, the American military participates in an integrated civil-military structure, under a civilian representative of the UN Secretary General who answers to the overall force commander. In NATO operations, the American military participates in an integrated command structure with other militaries. Unlike the UN arrangement, however, the NATO model does not integrate local military and civil authorities, which always report up through independent chains of command.

**Theater and Operational-Level Constructs**

Although civil-military coordination structures will inevitably have to be tailored to the requirements of specific circumstances, Joint and Army doctrine supply some generic constructs for civil-military coordination. Some of these constructs work simultaneously at different levels. The local American or NATO commander, the host government, and the combatant commander may all establish civil-military coordination mechanisms, and so might the local UN representative.

At the operational level, civil affairs personnel can work on inter-agency coordination through civil-liaison teams, civil-military support elements, or by directly supporting existing structures such as PRTs. Another type of arrangement mentioned in the Department of Defense Directive on irregular warfare is civilian-military teams, which are defined as “[t]emporary organizations of civilian and mili-

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18 For a comparison of the establishing authority, function, composition, and authority of HOCs, HACCs, and CMOCs, see JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 3, 2014, Figure II-6.

19 JP 3-08, 2016, p. IV-26; JP 3-29, 2014, Figure II-6.

20 A civil-liaison team is “a stand-alone team for the civil-military operations center” that “provides the supported level civil-military operations center with a storefront for Civil Affairs operations and civil-military operations coordination capability without interfering with the regular staff functions” (FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2011, Glossary-5).

21 FM 3-57, 2011, para. 3-122.
ary personnel specifically task-organized to provide an optimal mix of capabilities and expertise to accomplish specific operational and planning tasks,” although these teams can also “achieve objectives at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels.” Examples of civilian-military teams include PRTs and joint interagency task forces, which “may be formed when the mission requires close integration of two or more [U.S. government] departments and agencies.” Other civil-military arrangements are integrated within existing structures. For instance, geographic combatant commands may have joint interagency coordination groups that can also include other partners beyond U.S. interagencies, such as international organizations or NGOs. In cases where a joint task force has been established, an executive steering group can facilitate coordination at the strategic level.

Different Contexts Require Different Models

The examples of postconflict stabilization examined in Chapter Three are diverse: Some had environments more permissive than others; some required the entire rebuilding of a country, while others had more-limited objectives; some involved only one intervening country, while others called on entire coalitions; and some efforts were small, while others were extremely large. All required some degree of involvement in reconstruction on the part of the military, as well as the participa-

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23 FM 3-57, 2011, para. 3-123.

24 JP 3-08, 2016, p. II-23 and IV-27.

25 For a definition of joint interagency coordination group, see JP 3-29, 2014, p. II-5.

26 JP 3-08, 2016, p. II-12.

27 An executive steering group “is composed of senior military representatives from the [joint task force], principals of the embassy (e.g., ambassador, [deputy chief of mission], political or [political-military] counselor), the [host nation], international organizations, and possibly NGOs and private sector entities present in the [joint operations area]. It is the high-level outlet to exchange information about operational policies and resolve difficulties arising among the various organizations” (see JP 3-08, 2016, p. IV-21).
tion of civilian agencies or organizations that specialize in such recon-
struction. As the cases show, the types of arrangements—a broad term
that includes structures, mechanisms, and even informal practices—
through which civilians and military personnel coordinated their
action can take many forms and be more or less effective.

For this reason, there can be no universal template for civil-
military arrangements. Instead, such arrangements need to be respon-
sive to the specific postconflict environment they serve, limiting their
replicability across interventions. As one author notes, “Depending on
the mandate and structure of a stability operation, different mecha-
nisms may ensure optimal coordination on the ground, but a joint
operations center or civil-military coordination cell could provide valu-
able logistics and coordination support.” Joint doctrine notes that fac-
tors that influence the type of coordination structure most suitable
for a given intervention include “the type of operation; the extent of
military operations; and the degree of agency, international organiza-
tion, NGO, and private sector involvement.” CMOCs, for instance,
are more or less effective depending on how wary NGOs are of being
seen in close association with the military—a factor that changes
from intervention to intervention. Army doctrine recommends a flex-
ible approach to set up and utilize CMOCs: “A CMOC is tailored to
the specific tasks associated with the mission.” Similarly, joint doc-
trine notes that “CMOCs are tailored for each mission” and that “the
organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent.” As a
result, there can be no model CMOC.

31 JP 3-08, 2016, p. IV-22.
The degree to which some civilians can be integrated in an overall stabilization effort varies from intervention to intervention. Humanitarian actors, some of whom see too close an association with the military as a liability, strongly defend the principle of a “humanitarian space,” where they would be the only ones to operate.33 As the United States Institute of Peace and Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* notes, “there are actors who remain outside of the unity of effort campaign for good reason.”34 The Army’s doctrine on stability recognizes this fact and notes that “[m]any actors, particularly nongovernmental organizations, participate in unified action at their own discretion.”35 As a result, the best arrangement for cooperation between the U.S. military and international NGOs may depend on the political sensitivity of being associated with the U.S. military in a given context. The joint doctrine states that, when such sensitivity is high, it may be more helpful to use the UN cluster system as the framework for interaction rather than one under military auspices. Another alternative is to have a virtual CMOC, in which the military and civilians can still coordinate but through online communication rather than physical co-location, which may present dangers for NGOs seeking to maintain some degree of distance from the military operations.36

Despite the need to adapt civil-military practices to the context of each mission, the stabilization literature highlights some best practices. Those best practices that appear to cut across cases and are supported by various evidence sources are generally reflected in U.S. military doctrine. Conditions favoring successful civil-military relations

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36 JP 3-08, 2016, p. IV-22.
include beginning coordination and integration during the planning phase, avoiding duplicate structures, learning over multiple operations (through doctrine and shared personnel), and building strong interpersonal relationships.

**Beginning Coordination and Integration During the Planning Phase**

Solid civil-military arrangements were set up early in only three of the post–Cold War cases reviewed for this analysis: Somalia (in the American-led phase), Haiti, and Kosovo. In most other cases, appropriate civil-military arrangements took some time to evolve. In Vietnam, for instance, CORDS did not start until 1967; in Bosnia, it took close to a year before the military and civilian efforts engaged in effective coordination; PRTs in Afghanistan began to be established in the second year of the intervention; and, in Iraq, the organization that had planned for the postconflict phase—ORHA—was abruptly replaced by another—the CPA—which elaborated its own plans. Operations in Germany and Japan were relatively well coordinated from the beginning because the effort was dominated by the U.S. military from the outset.

Several authors have underlined the importance of starting civil-military coordination not just at the beginning of the intervention but ahead of it, during the planning phase. One study recommends deploying civil affairs assessment teams in theater ahead of other military actors to make contact with civilian organizations present and to determine the best location, and use, for a CMOC.\(^\text{37}\) Based on the Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo cases, another study underlines the importance of predeployment civil-military planning to ensure that military and civilian actors are cognizant of each other’s organizational structure and doctrine as soon as they get into theater—an element that was present for

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\(^37\) M. Davis, 1996, pp. 53–61. Other recommendations include ensuring that the CMOC director works directly for the Chief of Staff; having liaison officers embedded in the CMOC; preferring a location closer to NGOs than to military headquarters; having frequent exchanges with the rest of the staff, particularly logistics and intelligence; and using the CMOC to educate civilians and military about each other.
Kosovo, but missing in Haiti and Bosnia. A close working relationship from the very beginning between the United States and its partners—whether individual countries or multilateral organizations—plays a similar role, particularly in the case of multinational deployments. Some of the elements that can ensure good cooperation between military and civilians also happen predeployment—for instance, through training modules for the military and civilian agencies focusing on familiarization with each other.

The importance of an integrated or at least coordinated planning process is also mentioned in the U.S. military doctrine. President Clinton mandated the development of an integrated civil-military campaign plan in preparation for any intervention. A National Defense University handbook on complex crises calls for the setup of an interagency policy coordination committee that would develop a political and military plan, monitor its implementation, and conduct an after-action review. JP 3-07, on stability, similarly emphasizes that “[e]stablishing a whole-of-government approach to achieve unity of effort should begin during planning,” adding, however, that there is no template for how such planning should occur. Joint doctrine on peace operations also rec-

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39 Hollen and coauthors note that, in the case of Kosovo, “[w]hile the overall operation was NATO-led, much of the initial NATO J-9 staff in Pristina was manned by U.S. active/reserve civil affairs and U.K. Civil Affairs Group staffers. That provided immediate familiarity with the lead staff for the transition” (Hollen et al., 2003, p. 10).

40 Franke, 2006, p. 20.


ommends that “[m]ilitary and civilian agencies develop complementary plans.”

Save for the large-scale reconstruction efforts that followed World War II in Germany and Japan, civil-military arrangements appear to have been put in place sooner when civilian organizations were expected to play a predominant role, as in humanitarian interventions. In Somalia, for instance, there was an expectation on the part of the military that it would have to work with civilian organizations, which would largely lead the humanitarian effort. In that case, a CMOC was part of predeployment planning and was set up immediately. Solid, fully developed civil-military arrangements may take a longer time to be established and become effective in cases when the military expects to focus exclusively on traditional military tasks and leave public safety and reconstruction tasks to civilian actors, as happened at the beginning of the Bosnia experience. The case studies suggest that in instances where the military is expected to be quickly in and out, or that reconstruction will be a minor endeavor, as in Afghanistan, the chances that a solid civil-military mechanism will be set up immediately after the end of combat operations are even slimmer.

Avoiding Duplicate Structures

In postconflict settings that involve large numbers of national and international actors, several civil-military arrangements might be simultaneously in place, sometimes coordinating the action of the same actors. In the Haiti case, for instance, the coexistence of a HACC and a CMOC created some confusion as to the respective roles of the two structures. The rule now is that HACCs are normally present in the early stages of a humanitarian operation and are eventually replaced by CMOCs or

45 JP 3-07.3, 2012, p. IV-2. Doctrine generally emphasizes the role of external actors, however, with local populations being described as the recipients of stabilization efforts (particularly when it comes to capacity building) rather than actors actively involved in this process. On unity of effort, for instance, Army Doctrine Publication 3-07 states that “[c]ommanders . . . facilitate a shared understanding among the U.S. forces, United States Government (USG) agencies, international actors, multinational actors, and nongovernmental organizations” (Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, 2012, para. 8).
arrangements led by host governments.46 JP 3-08, too, warns against “trying to duplicate coordination structures.”47 If both a CMOC and a group chaired by the host government have been established, they should be co-located to reduce confusion, and the CMOC’s operation should be gradually taken over by the host government.48 Similarly, if the UN has established a cluster system,49 the United States should use cluster meetings first as a means of coordination before setting up its own arrangements for coordinating with international organizations and NGOs, following a “complement rather than compete” principle.50

Learning over Multiple Operations

Some of the case studies also suggest that a learning process influenced the speed at which civil-military arrangements were established. In the Somalia case, the understanding that a CMOC would be needed immediately derived from the recent experience of Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq. This transfer of experience has been more likely to take place between interventions when they mobilize the same intervener or interveners and take place in quick succession under the same U.S. administration. The CMOC concept that proved useful in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope to interact with NGOs and channel requests for military support, for instance, had

47 JP 3-08, 2016, p. IV-23.
48 JP 3-08, 2016, p. IV-23.
49 The UN created the cluster system in 2005 to help coordinate activities between the various agencies and organizations present during an emergency response. Key response activities—from food security to health and emergency shelter—are assigned to a lead UN agency that serves as a point of contact for, and organizes frequent meetings with, other organizations involved in the response. The U.S. military has routinely had individuals attend such meetings for information-gathering and information-sharing purposes, and the cluster system is described in the Army’s doctrine on stability (FM 3-07, 2014, para. 3-122. See also JP 3-29, 2014, pp. II-29–II-31; for an illustration during the 2009 Padang earthquake in Indonesia, see Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Stephanie Pezard, Laurel E. Miller, Jeffrey Engstrom, and Abby Doll, Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-146-OSD, 2013, p. 54).
50 JP 3-08, 2016, p. IV-23.
been employed by the U.S. Marine Corps shortly before, during the response to the devastation caused by Cyclone Marian in Bangladesh in April 1991 (Operation Sea Angel) and earlier still by the U.S. Army in northern Iraq. The relations between military and civilian entities in postconflict Kosovo benefited from a desire to not repeat the early mistakes of the Bosnia intervention. The failure of the George W. Bush administrations to build on the lessons of those operations in the early month of the Afghan and Iraqi operations contributed to the failure of each to stabilize those societies. The formalization of lessons through doctrine, as happened for the CMOC structure, is also helpful to ensure that mechanisms that prove effective in an intervention stand a higher chance of being adopted in later interventions. This might not be sufficient in shaping future behavior, however, unless it is reinforced through education and training prior to intervening. Education might focus, for instance, on teaching military operators the rudiments of civil-military affairs and how they support the mission. It could also teach elements of success and failure of prior operations and train operators to better identify which of these lessons might be applicable to a new environment. Operators should also learn how to familiarize themselves as quickly as possible with the political, social, and cultural contexts of the environment in which they will operate. Interactive activities, such as tabletop exercises and cooperative games, could help operators practice these skills, by putting them in situations where they have to work out solutions with other participants—some of whom may have different backgrounds and operating styles. The repetition of such practical exercises is particularly useful to familiarize participants with situations that they might find initially uncomfortable. Finally, games and tabletop exercises would also be most effective if participants saw their scenarios as salient (this scenario might indeed occur) and realistic (this scenario might actually happen this way).

52 See also Hollen et al., 2003, p. 12.
53 Conversation with RAND researchers on doctrine and learning processes.
Build Strong Interpersonal Relationships

A rapid succession of deployments also means that, beyond that learning process, the same staff may be involved, as happened in Somalia and Haiti, creating some degree of continuity among people who already know their counterparts and their organizations. As one study notes, “successive operations in Haiti and Bosnia also helped develop a solid corps of highly competent civil affairs specialists. Although slow to deploy in Haiti and Bosnia, these personnel were invaluable once established.”54 Another study notes, more generally, that “the intangible aspects of leadership and interpersonal communication, regardless of how well a CMOC is established, will ‘make or break’ its overall effectiveness,”55 while yet another recommends longer tours for military personnel involved in CIMIC—or training civilian CIMIC liaisons who can stay in theater longer than military personnel and provide some continuity.56

Army and joint doctrines recognize these elements, particularly for interagency coordination. JP 3-07 notes that, for interagency planning, “the importance of personal relationships between military commanders and civilian leaders cannot be overemphasized. Absent formal interagency mechanisms and given the myriad of cultural, funding, [command and control], and other issues that will arise among partners, these personal relationships are essential to melding a cohesive comprehensive approach to stabilization efforts.”57 In cases where there is no prior relationship between actors, “[p]lanners may need to factor in additional time to build trust and motivation to collaborate.”58 Some authors point out that the importance of interpersonal relations makes it easier for countries with smaller bureaucracies than the United States to adopt an interagency approach when conducting whole-of-government efforts abroad.59 Proper selection

54 Hollen et al., 2003, p. 13.
58 FM 3-07, 2014, para. 3-8.
59 For the example of Australia, see John Gordon IV and Jason H. Campbell, Organising for Peace Operations: Lessons Learned from Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon
of staff for civil-military coordination is another key element of success. To facilitate this selection, DoD is encouraging the tracking of individuals who have spent substantial time in, for instance, PRTs, so that they can be identified more easily for future missions and their knowledge transferred to new contingencies.

**Preparing to Operate in Hostile Environments**

Ideally, an intervening military force quickly establishes a secure environment in which civilian actors can circulate without the need to travel in armored convoys and live in heavily guarded caserns. In such circumstances, the arrangements set out in joint and Army doctrine for civil-military coordination should suffice. But civilian agencies will have difficulty operating autonomously in hostile environments and particularly in engaging far into the hinterlands. Where such a threat environment is a possibility, preparations should be made during the planning phase to deploy integrated teams with military security early in any operation. The Afghan and Iraq PRTs offer one means of so doing. These were led by the U.S. military in Afghanistan and the Department of State in Iraq. If there is not already a well-staffed American embassy in country when the intervention takes place, the Department of State will not be well positioned to direct the operations of these outposts, and that responsibility should probably fall to the military. Even in cases where a hostile environment is not anticipated but believed possible, contingency plans to deploy such integrated teams should be made, lest valuable time be lost should the necessity for them become evident. More-substantial integration, on the model of CORDS in Vietnam, should be considered when a large-scale commitment to an ongoing COIN campaign is in the offing.

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Conclusion

The eight case studies examined in Chapter Three and a review of the stabilization literature suggest that civil-military arrangements need to be reviewed and often redesigned for each prospective intervention, with an understanding that the circumstances that made some of them successful in the past might have changed. What remains constant, however, is the necessity to plan for such arrangements, with the knowledge that they will likely need to evolve postdeployment to meet the specific (and often yet unforeseen) requirements of the situation. The conditions favoring successful civil-military coordination that can be found in the stabilization literature have generally been integrated in the U.S. military doctrine. What the doctrine does not include, however, is guidance on when such arrangements should move from coordination to integration—a shift that the literature suggests should happen when levels of violence are particularly high\textsuperscript{62}—nor does it provide much in the way of models for such higher degrees of collaboration. Agencies are naturally reluctant to accept any degree of integration until local circumstances make clear the necessity to do so, by which time it is generally too late to regain the momentum that was present during the initial weeks of the intervention. Ensuring that doctrine is effectively applied by military actors from one intervention to the next requires some efforts in the areas of education and training. Teaching the basics of civil affairs and lessons from past interventions, as well as reinforcing these through exercises and role-playing, can help operators internalize what they might otherwise see as doctrinal principles with little to no practical relevance. Finally, the importance of the learning process at play for those civilian and military actors involved in more than one intervention, as well as the value derived from good interpersonal relations between these same actors, suggests that good personnel management practices—such as maintaining the tracking of personnel deployed in stabilization missions and assigning civil-military personnel to longer tours—could go a long way toward facilitating early, and effective, civil-military coordination or integration.

\textsuperscript{62} See Gompert et al., 2009, p. 59.
Although the Army has been periodically involved in stability and post-conflict operations throughout most of its history, the requirement to conduct such operations does not play a driving role in the way that the Army is organized, trained, or equipped. As a result, its golden hour capabilities and capacities are largely derivative of its primary wartime missions. As will be discussed in this chapter, and congruent with the observations in Chapter Four, the Army does recognize the importance of postconflict stability operations and emphasizes the criticality of internal security in enabling such operations.

This chapter discusses the Army’s role during the golden hour and the capabilities that it believes are important for such operations. It further examines the Army’s ability to access the skills necessary to conduct such operations, skills that often exist in the reserve component or that will be acquired through the hiring of contractors. It examines the challenges involved in conducting security force assistance activities designed to improve the host nation’s military and civil police capabilities. The chapter also notes some of the challenges facing the Army’s civil affairs branch, one of the few Army capabilities primarily designed to execute golden hour missions—in particular, those related to governance, economic development, the provision of public services, and infrastructure development. Finally, this chapter discusses the limited capacity of the Army to execute large-scale infrastructure and development projects, as well as provide public services, with its organic resources and its need to rely on contractors for such missions.
Current Army doctrine contains the concept of consolidating gains, which is broadly congruent with the idea of the golden hour. Consolidation of gains activities are intended “to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the condition for a stable environment allowing for the transition of control to legitimate authorities” and are a critical component of achieving enduring political outcomes.\(^1\) More to the point, Army doctrine notes that “the window of opportunity for setting a geographic area on a desirable path to consolidate gains is potentially narrow.”\(^2\) Among the actions Army forces must take to consolidate gains are the provision of area security and the execution of minimum-essential stability tasks (providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment), followed by the “establishment of a safe and secure environment in which to provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”\(^3\) Doctrinally, however, the initial priority for Army forces while consolidating gains, and hence during the golden hour, is “ending enemy resistance and preventing the enemy from prolonging the conflict.”\(^4\) Army doctrine further identifies the following capabilities, in addition to maneuver forces to provide area security, as being particularly important to consolidating gains: engineers, military police, explosive ordnance disposal units, civil affairs, and medical.\(^5\) The above doctrinal observations provide the basic framework for the ensuing discussion of Army golden hour capabilities and capacities.

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2. FM 3-0, 2017, p. 8-3.

3. Commanders are legally required to provide minimum-essential stability tasks when controlling populated areas. See Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, 2017, pp. 3-4, 3-7 to 3-8; and FM 3-0, 2017, pp. 8-3–8-4.


5. FM 3-0, 2017, pp. 5-7, 8-2.
The Army’s doctrinal list of stability tasks can be found in Army Techniques Publication 3-07.5, *Stability Techniques*, and FM 3-07, *Stability*. The Army divides the tasks it plans to conduct into five broad categories: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance, and support economic and infrastructure development. The Army is capable of executing many of the stability tasks in a limited way, but it is not designed to do so, and most of the tasks are secondary to the Army’s primary mission of conducting offensive combat operations. In 2011, the Army assessed that it was capable of enforcing peace agreements but that it lacked the capacity to provide security to entire countries for extended periods, that it was not well prepared to support civil control operations, that its ability to restore essential services was limited to small-scale and short-term efforts, and that it had a limited capacity to conduct large-scale repair

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7 The October 2017 publications addressing Army operations emphasize the importance of offensive and defensive tasks in major combat operations against high-capability opponents. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 (2017, p. 1-10) states that “Army formations are organized, equipped, and trained to employ lethal capabilities in a wide range of conditions. The demonstrated lethality of Army forces provides the credibility essential to deterring adversaries and assuring allies and partners.” FM 3-0 (2017, pp. ix, 1-2–1-3, 1-9), notes that, although “the U.S. Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, large-scale ground combat against a peer threat represents the most significant readiness requirement.” It also notes that “Army forces must be organized, trained, and equipped to meet worldwide challenges against a full range of threats. The experiences of the U.S. Army in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st century are not representative of the most dangerous conflicts the Army could face in the future. While the Army conducted combat operations in both locations, for the most part it focused its efforts on counterinsurgency operations and stability tasks. Only a fraction of the forces committed in either theater were engaged in offensive and defensive tasks on any given day. . . . In the future, large-scale combat operations against a peer threat will be much more demanding in terms of operational tempo and lethality.” Similarly, it states that, although Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 “addresses various threats across the range of military operations, FM 3-0 is focused on peer threats in large-scale combat operations. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains world-wide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage.”
of critical infrastructure. In addition, much of its capability to conduct these operations resided in its reserve component.8

**Accessing Golden Hour Capabilities**

With the exception of some civil affairs capabilities, Army operational units are neither designed with the capabilities required nor trained and equipped to conduct most golden hour missions and tasks.9 This is particularly true for those missions and tasks not directly related to the provision of security through the employment of combat forces.10 As a result, important shortfalls exist in the areas of establishing civil control, restoring or providing essential services, and repairing critical infrastructure.11 Army doctrine does, however, identify several capabilities that it considers to be particularly relevant to golden hour operations. These capabilities include the following:

- military police units to provide population control and infrastructure security
- medical units to provide public health services
- logistics units to provide food and water (including bulk transportation and water purification)
- general engineering units to repair infrastructure or provide emergency shelter

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9 Another exception is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which focuses on military construction, real estate acquisition, and the development of U.S. national infrastructure through civil works programs. The corps thus has the capability to plan and manage overseas infrastructure and large-scale construction projects. FM 3-34, *Engineer Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 2, 2014, pp. 1-13–1-14.

10 The Army emphasizes that the training required to be proficient in stability tasks differs from that required for offensive and defensive tasks. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, 2017, p. 3-3.

• explosive ordnance disposal units to clear unexploded ordnance
• operational contract support
• civil affairs units that “provide expertise in civil security, civil control, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil information management, and civil administration planning which are all essential to the continuous process of consolidating gains to ensure a lasting and sustainable outcome.”

As Figure 6.1 illustrates, for the most part, the above capabilities reside in the Army’s two reserve components: the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. In particular, 75 percent or more of all quartermaster, transportation, civil affairs, engineer, and medical units are located in the reserve components. The number of soldiers involved in these capabilities can be quite substantial. The Army Reserve, for instance, has the

• 200th Military Police Command, with some 14,000 soldiers organized into four brigades, 22 battalions, and 53 companies
• two theater engineer commands, with some 24,600 soldiers capable of horizontal and vertical construction, sapper operations, bridging operations, and route clearance operations and of providing technical engineering support
• two medical commands, with 15,700 soldiers in deployable medical units; about 59 percent of the Army’s medical capacity resides in the Army Reserve
• two theater sustainment commands, with 55,600 logistics soldiers.

The Army’s reserve components also have several golden hour capabilities that cannot be found within the Regular Army. These capabili-

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12 Military information support operations, public affairs, and combat camera units also play an important role in shaping public perceptions. FM 3-0, 2017, pp. 2-57, 5-7, 8-2, 8-3.
ties include vertical engineering (approximately 12,200 soldiers) and a number of independent truck company types (approximately 12,700 soldiers). This concentration of golden hour capabilities in the reserve components implies that any significant postcombat stability operation is likely to require the mobilization of reserve soldiers.

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15 These numbers are from fiscal year 2015. Four types of truck companies exist solely in the reserve component: light-medium truck companies, medium truck companies (cargo), medium truck companies (petroleum, 5,000-gallon), and medium truck companies (petroleum, 7,500-gallon). See National Commission on the Future of the Army, “Reserve Component Unique Units,” February 12, 2016.
The numbers in Figure 6.1, however, do not represent the deployable capacity of the guard and reserve for a large-scale contingency operation. Short of a total war, most guard and reserve units and individuals will serve on a rotational basis, currently set by policy of one year mobilized and five years not mobilized (1:5 ratio) during steady state rotations and one year mobilized and four years not mobilized (1:4 ratio) during surge rotations. In addition, guard and reserve personnel will be deployed for only nine months during their year of mobilization.\textsuperscript{16} In practice, this means that between 12.5 percent (steady state) and 15 percent (surge) of the guard and reserve units will be deployable for golden hour operations at any one time.\textsuperscript{17}

As a general rule, Regular Army capabilities can be accessed more rapidly than those in the guard and reserve. First, the political decision to mobilize reserve personnel and units must be made, the units then need to be mobilized, and finally they must undergo some degree of postmobilization training before they are validated for operational use. Although guard and reserve company-sized support and logistics units can be deployed more rapidly than larger combat formations, Regular Army units generally have the advantage during short-notice contingencies.\textsuperscript{18} This advantage, however, may be less relevant for postconflict golden hour operations because they can often be executed using follow-on forces or because such operations are often more deliberate in nature than no-notice emergencies.\textsuperscript{19} In addition, recent experience with the use of guard and reserve forces suggests that they can be prepared in sufficient time to conduct golden hour operations.


\textsuperscript{17} Nine out of 72 months is 12.5 percent, and nine out of 60 months is 15 percent.

\textsuperscript{18} Klimas et al., 2014, pp. 1–2.

\textsuperscript{19} True large-scale, no-notice contingencies involving U.S. forces have been historically quite rare. Even in the case of Operation Desert Storm, the most recent such event, the United States had many months to prepare for and execute offensive and postconflict operations.
Predicting the time required to mobilize guard and reserve capabilities to conduct postconflict operations is an imprecise endeavor, as it is dependent on uncertain variables. These variables are the threat environment, the complexity of the operations, the amount and nature of premobilization training and preparation, the time required to make the political decision to mobilize reservists, the risk acceptance of national and theater commanders, and the amount and nature of post-mobilization training required. However, historical data from Operation Desert Storm and the more-recent COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a useful set of bounding estimates. In preparation for Operation Desert Storm, guard and reserve forces were given little notice of their pending mobilization for a major combat operation, while for Iraq and Afghanistan during the period 2003–2010, reservists were generally given extensive notice for largely preplanned rotational deployments.

Based on data from guard and reserve mobilizations during Operation Desert Storm, a previous RAND study estimated that guard and reserve support units (combat support and combat service support) deploying by air could be validated within eight to 16 days of being mobilized. Support units deploying by sea could be validated within 20 to 43 days of mobilization, with the average being about 29 days. For all of these units, additional time was required to transit their

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20 Estimating the time it may take to make the political decision to call up the reserves is particularly challenging, as it will depend on the interests at stake, the domestic political environment, and the objectives of the operation. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the decision to call up the initial tranche of reservists was made on August 22. At that time, the United States had not yet made the decision to conduct offensive operations to free Kuwait. On November 14, a second reserve call up was announced. This was about two weeks after President George H. W. Bush approved a military build-up to conduct offensive operations, roughly eight days after the build-up was publicly announced and when the approximate times of the planned offensive operations were known. In the aftermath of September 11, reservists were called up almost immediately to conduct homeland defense operations.


mobilization stations to the operational theater. This time, however, would be the same for all Army forces.

Information about the average time required to validate guard and reserve combat support and combat service support units during the rotational deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq is not available. However, several studies have estimated the amount of time following mobilization that it took for guard and reserve units to arrive in theater for preplanned rotational deployments. Klimas and coauthors calculate that the average postmobilization preparation time in the period 2008–2010 for guard and reserve enabler units from mobilization to arrival in theater was between about 44 and 52 days, depending on the environment in which they were expected to operate. In addition, these units averaged around 11 days of premobilization preparation time in addition to their typical annual 39 days of training. Ellen Pint and coauthors arrive at similar estimates for a broader period. Their data are presented in Figure 6.2 and illustrate that, although overall preparation time remained relatively constant, increases in premobilization preparation time improved guard and reserve response time by noticeably reducing the postmobilization preparation time required during the 2008–2010 period. This analysis includes between 12 and 15 days of nontraining time for such activities as time spent at home station, movement to the mobilization site, leave, preparation for deployment, and deployment. These three studies suggest that most guard and reserve capabilities relevant to the golden hour can be made available

23 Depending on the availability of transportation, the distance to be traveled, and the size of the unit, units moving by air can reach the operational theater in a matter of days, while units moving their equipment by sea can take two to three weeks to assemble in theater. Thomas Lippiat and coauthors estimate that it takes on average 22 days for ships to load, transit, and unload in Southwest Asia from the United States (Lippiat et al., 1992, p. 31).

24 Klimas et al., 2014, p. 5. The predeployment preparation time includes all training in the year prior to mobilization and the time from mobilization to arrival in theater. Separate times are calculated for enabler battalion headquarters, companies that operated “outside of the wire” (i.e., outside the forward operating base), those that sometimes operated off the forward operating base, and those that always remained on the forward operating base. Data were from the period 2008–2010.

25 Ellen M. Pint, Matthew W. Lewis, Thomas F. Lippiatt, Philip Hall-Partyka, Jonathan P. Wong, and Tony Puharic, Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component and Pre-
within about 60 days of mobilization. It should be noted, however, that these figures are averages and that the mobilization time for some critical capabilities could be longer. Conversely, if the operating environment is considered to be more permissive than that of Iraq or Afghanistan.

Figure 6.2 Pre- and Postmobilization Training and Preparation Time for Enabler Units During Operation Iraqi Freedom

SOURCE: Pint et al., 2015, pp. 50, 52.
NOTES: Category 3 units are those that travel or conduct most of their missions outside the confines of a forward operating base. Examples of category 3 units are combat engineers, military police (combat support), and truck companies. Category 2 units conduct most of their missions within the confines of a forward operating base but will sometimes travel off it. Examples of Category 2 units are construction engineers, maintenance, and medical (area support) companies. Category 1 units rarely, if ever, leave the confines of the forward operating base. Examples of Category 1 units are financial management detachments, public affairs detachments, and quartermaster and supply companies.


26 It should also be noted that the Operation Desert Storm estimates are not directly comparable with the later estimate, as they do not include transit time to the theater of operations. This difference is mitigated to some extent by the fact that, during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom–Afghanistan, most units deployed by air and fell in on equip-
istan, deployment times could potentially decrease. In addition, the improvements in postmobilization preparation times between the periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2010 highlight the need to maintain pre-mobilization training and preparation.

Currently, the guard and reserve are seeking to institutionalize and preserve the readiness gains made during the contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army Reserve, for instance, is seeking to maintain a ready force of 25,000 to 33,000 soldiers that can be deployed within 90 days of mobilization. The force will have three basic readiness bins. It will have a fight-to-night force of some 177 units that can be deployed within 30 days or less and an operational depth force of some 133 units with two readiness pools: 31–60 days and 61–90 days.27 Finally, it should be noted that guard forces have historically been able to react rapidly to domestic disasters, incidents that utilize many of the capabilities that would be required in a golden hour situation. This suggests that in contingencies with a permissive operational environment and that do not require combat and extensive force protection training, guard and reserve forces may be deployable more rapidly than for wartime contingencies.

The Army also has access to DoD’s civilian expeditionary workforce (CEW) as a potential source for golden hour skills that might not be readily available among uniformed military personnel. The CEW was created in 2009 with the intent of providing a cadre of 20,000–30,000 DoD civilians who could be rapidly mobilized to provide civilian skill sets in support of extended complex contingency operations.28 This broader force pool that was intended to provide rotational capac-


ity was not fully developed and was eventually replaced by the more limited concept centered on a smaller pool of 5,300 individuals who could be sourced as needed.\textsuperscript{29} This program was developed in part as a response to DoD’s need to provide personnel to support PRTs and defense institution building in Iraq.\textsuperscript{30} The CEW covers a broad range of civilian job specialties and positions, and those potentially most relevant to the golden hour are

- contracting staff
- foreign affairs staff
- language specialists to serve as translators and cultural advisors
- civil engineers to support civil-military operations projects
- regional development and government capacity-building experts, such as individuals in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program
- personnel in Ministry of Defense Advisors program performing defense capacity-building activities.\textsuperscript{31}

The CEW is not intended to provide just stability-related skills; its highest readiness category, Emergency-Essential, is a designation for personnel who support the success of combat operations or the availability of combat-essential systems.\textsuperscript{32} In addition, in practice, the CEW has been used largely to avoid force caps placed on military personnel by substituting DoD civilians for uniformed personnel rather than to fill low-density, high-demand positions with civilians possessing skills not normally found in the uniformed services.\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, nearly 50 percent of the personnel deployed under the CEW program have been contractors.\textsuperscript{34} This dilutes its intended purpose of tapping exist-

\textsuperscript{29} Dunigan et al., 2016, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{30} Dunigan et al., 2016, pp. 2–6.

\textsuperscript{31} Dunigan et al., 2016, pp. 17–18.

\textsuperscript{32} Dunigan et al., 2016, pp. 18, 67.

\textsuperscript{33} Dunigan et al., 2016, pp. 20, 75–76.

\textsuperscript{34} Dunigan et al., 2016, p. 62.
ing DoD expertise and makes it similar to other efforts to fill capability gaps with contracted capability.

The CEW is designed with three readiness categories: immediate (1–45 days), urgent (46–120 days), and routine (120-plus days). Only the first of these three categories is comparable to the response time of guard and reserve unit capabilities, and the last might not deliver capabilities rapidly enough to be useful for golden hour operations. In practice, the CEW was often unable to meet these timelines, and several combatant commands were dissatisfied with the program because of the time it took to deploy civilians after they had been identified as needed. More recently, however, response times appear to have been improved from 120-plus days to 45–60 days.

As currently structured, the CEW program is not suited to provide personnel to execute manpower-intensive golden hour tasks, nor does it appear to be configured to address potential operational needs. The CEW is also not the only, or even primary, source of deployable DoD civilian personnel. It does, however, have the potential to relatively rapidly provide niche capabilities (e.g., contracting, regional expertise, and civil engineering) useful for the planning, supervision, and monitoring of both golden hour and longer-term development activities.

In addition to the above capabilities organic to the Army and DoD, the Army also has access to the broad array of golden hour–relevant skills that can be found in the private sector. As will be discussed later, the use of contractors is a critical, but potentially problematic, component of the Army’s ability to conduct golden hour operations.

35 Dunigan et al., 2016, p. 50.
36 Dunigan et al., 2016, p. 50.
38 The structure of the CEW is not based on mission-specific or scenario-driven personnel planning. See Dunigan et al., 2016, pp. 118–120.
Golden Hour Task Force Requirements

Army doctrine on stability operations identifies a broad range of activities that can be conducted during a military operation, which Army forces might be called on to execute. Army operations doctrine prioritizes these activities and notes that, of these tasks, the Army considers the provision of security to be foundational for all other potential golden hour activities and the one that it is most suited to conduct. The broader question of the Army’s capacity to directly provide military security during the golden hour will not be discussed here, as it is largely a question of the overall size of the Army. The topics on which the following sections will focus are the ability of Army forces to develop the host nation’s security institutions to provide its own security, the role of civil affairs forces, and the ability of Army forces to utilize contractors to execute stability tasks not related to stability.

Security

As noted, one of the most critical golden hour tasks is the establishment and maintenance of internal security. The early establishment of a credible security presence is important for several reasons: (1) It can prevent the emergence of viable organized armed and violent opposition to the new government by exploiting the vulnerability inherent to emerging insurgent groups, (2) it provides evidence that the security guarantees provided by the external interveners are credible, and (3) it can help generate popular support for the new order by illustrating that it can provide safety to the general public and enabling it to undertake other efforts to mitigate the underlying causes of discontent in a relatively permissive environment. The provision of security, however, can be a manpower-intensive undertaking, particularly if violent opposition groups have had time to solidify. By March 2009, about two years after the start of the Iraqi surge, there were nearly 1 million foreign and domestic security personnel conducting operations in Iraq.\footnote{This number includes 223,592 personnel in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, 497,939 in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, 4,160 in the counterterrorism force, 94,000 in Sons of Iraq, 30,000 with private security contractors, and 147,000 in the coalition force. It does not include Kurdish Peshmerga personnel or contractors providing logistics support to U.S. mili-}
The Army aggregates security-related stability tasks into two broad primary stability tasks: establish civil security and establish civil control. Civil security focuses on the provision of security for both the state and the population and is intended to establish “a safe, secure, and stable environment,” which is necessary for obtaining indigenous support for military operations. Civil security is seen as setting the conditions for an enduring resolution of a conflict.\textsuperscript{41} Civil control focuses on fostering the rule of law and includes the security-related tasks of establishing public order and safety and supporting law enforcement and police reform.\textsuperscript{42} Security force assistance activities would support both of these broader tasks by helping integrate former combatants and security force personnel into reformed security institutions and by creating indigenous security forces that can support and eventually replace those of the foreign intervenor. Security force assistance is a golden hour task both because the task of establishing and maintaining security often requires greater resources than the intervenors are willing to provide and because it indicates to the indigenous population that the intervenors do not intend their occupation to be permanent. In addition, these stability tasks will be supported by offensive activities conducted in support of COIN and counterterrorism operations. The following analysis will focus on the requirements to provide law and order support, both directly and through mentoring host nation police forces, and security force assistance to a partner’s military.


\textsuperscript{42} FM 3-07, 2014, pp. 1-2–1-3.
Security Force Assistance to a Partner’s Military

Nearly any golden hour operation will entail security force assistance operations to strengthen or establish a partner’s military forces.43 These operations will need to be conducted both to ensure that existing security forces supplement coalition area security missions and do not undermine coalition objectives and to train a security force that can eventually replace coalition forces. Recent experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan, however, highlight the challenge in providing the manpower required for such missions.

When fully implemented, the Army’s security force assistance brigade concept will provide the Army with a golden hour capability to conduct security force assistance operations with task-organized and extensively trained personnel. The security force assistance brigades are the only general-purpose Army units whose core mission is conducting security cooperation activities and that are designed to be rapidly deployed into a theater to train, advise, and assist partner security forces in logistics, communications, maneuver strategies, and other military tasks.44 Security force assistance brigades will have few junior enlisted personnel and will be staffed by senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and company and field grade officers.45 Of a unit’s 529 soldiers, about 370 (70 percent) will be designated as advisors and receive extensive training, while the remaining 30 percent of the unit’s personnel will serve as support personnel to operate the bri-

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43 Security force assistance is defined as “Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions” (FM 3-2, Army Support to Security Cooperation, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2013, p. 1-10). It thus covers assistance to a partner’s military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces. The focus of this section is security force assistance to a partner’s military. The following section, on law and order, will discuss building up a partner’s police force.


45 NCOs will be staff sergeants and above, and officers will be captains and above. See Gary Sheftick, “New Academy Will Train Security Force Assistance Brigades,” Army.mil, February 17, 2017.
The skill mix of these personnel will reflect that found in a standard infantry or armored brigade combat team, and they will not be supplemented by personnel with other skills that may be relevant to golden hour operations. The Army intends to have six security force assistance brigades (five Regular Army and one Army National Guard) operational by 2023. At least initially, all security force assistance brigades are to be filled by experienced volunteers who have completed their key and developmental assignments, and advisors are expected to have previously served and done well in similar positions. In addition, the volunteers need to complete a security force assistance brigade assessment and selection process. Once selected, security force assistance brigade soldiers will undergo an extensive training process, including a six-week course at the Military Advisor Training School. Training will also include immersive language training (up to 16 weeks), cultural training, foreign weapons training, advanced medical training, advanced driver training, and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training. In total, it may take between 13 and 18 months of personnel and unit level training to prepare a security force assistance brigade for operational deployment.

Even at full strength, however, the six planned security force assistance brigades will not have the capacity to conduct security force assistance operations on the scale undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. In total, the six planned security force assistance brigades will have the capability to provide a maximum of 2,220 advisors, of which it is realistic to assume that, given rotational requirements and training...

cycles, between 25 percent and 33 percent (550 to 733 advisors) can be deployed at any one time.\footnote{The number of available advisors assumes a boots on the ground to dwell time ratio for active component security force assistance brigades of between 1:3 (steady state) and 1:2 (surge). Army Regulation 525-29, 2011, p. 2.}

Determining operational advisor requirements in a golden hour scenario is highly context dependent, in terms of the type of force being built, its size, the security environment in which it is expected to operate, and the methods chosen to train and mentor it.\footnote{The potential force requirements for security force assistance efforts in a postconflict environment are discussed in Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Stephen Watts, Joshua Klimas, James T. Quinlivan, and James Crowley, unpublished RAND Corporation research, 2010. This section is based on research conducted for that publication.} In general, however, light infantry forces are ideal for the area security and COIN tasks required in a postconflict environment: They are relatively cheap, are relatively easy to train, and have the force structure to undertake soldier-intensive security tasks. A notional light infantry division for postconflict security operations would consist of about 18,000 soldiers organized into four brigades of four battalions (16 total light infantry battalions), plus supporting forces.\footnote{This notional division is based on Iraqi divisions being trained and mentored in late 2009. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, \textit{How the Iraqi Army Operates}, 3rd ed., Fort Leavenworth, Kan., September 2009, pp. 25–31.} During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan, one of the methods chosen to train and mentor partner security forces was the use of military transition teams and embedded training teams. Because this method most closely resembles that of the security force assistance brigades, we use it as a framework for estimating the number of advisors required to train and mentor a notional light infantry division. Assuming that the mentoring efforts during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan provide a rough template for future security force assistance brigade operations, 20 training teams, with 374 soldiers in total (215 officers and 159 senior NCOs), would be required to advise and mentor a single partner’s light infantry
A single security force assistance brigade could thus provide mentors for about one division, and the planned force of security force assistance brigades could provide sustained support for 1.5 to 2.0 divisions.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, a single security force assistance brigade could provide advisors for about four independent brigades and the planned force of 6.4 to 8.5 brigades.\textsuperscript{56} In practice, the number of partner security forces that can be advised and mentored will depend on the skill and grade composition required and that which is available within the security force assistance brigades, but these calculations provide a rough estimate of the potential of the planned security force assistance brigade force structure.

Although 1.5 to 2.0 divisions or 6.4 to 8.5 brigades are unlikely to be sufficient to meet the total security requirements of a contingency equivalent to either Iraq or Afghanistan, the ability to begin advising and deploying such a force during the golden hour period is beneficial. Beginning to stand up a competent military force early in a crisis signals the intent to eventually transition the security task to the partner nation and begins to fill security gaps that foreign forces are likely to be too scarce to cover. It also allows the process of security force development to begin while follow-on forces for a more substantial effort are being prepared and trained. Finally, having a peacetime capability to conduct postconflict partner military force development potentially provides the capability to plan such activities in advance and to integrate them into the broader concept of operations.

As the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrated, it is a challenge to develop and deploy a capacity for large-scale security force assistance operations. Ensuring that security force assistance brigades continue to be staffed with qualified volunteers with personal

\textsuperscript{54} There would be one division team, one division combat service support team, four brigade teams, four brigade combat support teams, four brigade combat service support teams, and 16 battalion teams. The team structure is based on information provided to RAND by the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance in April 2010 and a Task Force Phoenix Situation and Task Organization briefing from December 2007.

\textsuperscript{55} This is based on 1.5 to 2.0 security force assistance brigades being available at any one time.

\textsuperscript{56} This assumes 86 advisors per brigade.
traits amenable to advising will also be a challenge. The security force assistance brigades require a large number of senior NCOs and officers who are also in high demand elsewhere. In the past, organizations similar to the security force assistance brigades often lost out in this competition for resources, and units were filled by personnel who were available, rather than necessarily qualified, and were downsized because of the difficulty in finding the personnel of the required grade. Recruiting enough qualified volunteers to fill out the security force assistance brigades may also be a challenge. One challenge is the belief among potential volunteers, based on the experiences of transition team and Afghanistan-Pakistan Hand program members, that serving in an advise-and-assist organization will be detrimental to their careers. Overcoming this obstacle will require a continued commitment by senior Army leadership to make service in a security force assistance brigade a career-enhancing assignment and to ensure that personnel serving in a security force assistance brigade are promoted.

Law and Order
The golden hour period following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 provides a cautionary tale about the difficulty in establishing an indigenous police force in the wake of a conflict. Initially, the United States intended that the bulk of this task would be conducted by civilian police advisors; however, the ability of the civilian sector to rapidly provide a large number of civilian military police advisors proved to be limited. An initial prewar assessment, which was rejected by the NSC, by the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program recommended that 5,000 international police advisors be deployed to Iraq. Shortly after the invasion, a U.S. assessment team determined that the Iraqi police were incapable of restoring public order and recommended to the CPA in May 2003 that 2,500 international police officers be immediately deployed to restore


order and that 6,600 civilian international police advisors and 360 international police trainers be recruited to reform and train an Iraqi police force. This was rapidly deemed to be an unrealistic plan and was revised downward to about 1,500 international police advisors who were to be deployed in 2004. In addition, many police officers who were trained during this initial period deserted during the April 2004 uprisings and the start of armed resistance to the coalition and the new Iraqi government.\(^{59}\) Given the challenge of finding sufficient numbers of international police advisors and international police trainers, the U.S. military was eventually given the task of training and mentoring the Iraqi police, but providing adequate support to police training programs remained a challenge. Coalition forces in Iraq, however, were never able to field enough police training teams to adequately monitor all Iraq’s police forces because of funding constraints and limitations on the number of available military police.\(^{60}\)

In other smaller postconflict situations, however, it was possible to deploy civilian police to conduct law-and-order operations. During operations in Kosovo, UNMIK was able to initially deploy 1,800 civilian police officers in 1999; they began a phased takeover of law enforcement operations in August 1999, about two months after the end of the conflict. The international civilian police presence reached a peak strength of 4,450 in 2000. This latter strength was nearly double that requested (and rejected) for Iraq and was maintained through at least 2004. A number of heavier police gendarme-type units designed for high-end police operations, such as riot control, also began arriving April 2000. In addition, about 200 international police instructors were operating the Kosovo Police Service School by March 2000.\(^{61}\)


\(^{60}\) Each police training team had 12–15 members, two to four of whom were international police liaisons, with the remainder being military personnel, most of whom were military police. See Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2007, p. 33; Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, p. 287.

\(^{61}\) The Kosovo Police Service School initially had an eight-week basic training course, followed by 19 weeks of field training. See F. Jones, 2005, pp. 33–34, 35–36; and Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 119–120.
During operations in Bosnia, NATO forces did not have a mandate to conduct law-and-order operations, and that mission was left largely to the existing ethnically aligned police forces. The UN did deploy 1,721 civilian police trainers and advisors under the auspices of the UN International Police Task Force, but it took it eight months to reach full strength, and it struggled to influence the local police forces.\(^6\)

Both the direct provision and the training and mentoring of law and order personnel can be manpower-intensive tasks, particularly in regard to countries with medium to large populations. The number of police required to maintain and establish law and order in any given society will depend on a variety of factors, and directly linking the number of police to a given level of domestic security or crime rate is a challenge. In terms of establishing law and order after a conflict, one study recommended a minimum of 1.5 international civilian police per 1,000 inhabitants to initially conduct law-and-order operations and a minimum of 2.0 trained indigenous police officers per 1,000 inhabitants after five years.\(^6\)\(^3\) During this initial period, indigenous police officers will need some level of training and mentoring until they are assessed to be capable of independent operations. During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ideal level of mentoring was one police training team per police station. U.S. military police doctrine, however, recommends a higher level of engagement during the initial stages of an operation and suggests partnering one military police platoon with each indigenous police station.\(^6\)\(^4\) Table 6.1 provides the estimates of the number of military police personnel required to provide direct law-and-order support and mentoring for a range of notional populations.

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62 Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 93, 97–98.
64 This coverage can expand to up to four police stations per platoon as the confidence and proficiency of the host nation police force increases. Augmented squad-sized police development teams can be used if the host nation’s police competency has been assessed at a high level. Their deployment marks the transition from a partnership to an advisory role. A police station for planning purposes ideally has about 200 police personnel. Army Techniques Publication 3-39.10, Police Operations, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 26, 2015, pp. 7–17 to 7–18, E-7.
As points of reference, Fiji has a population of roughly 1 million people, Jordan has 10 million, and North Korea has 25 million. The countries in which the United States is currently operating or recently has operated now have populations of 1.9 million (Kosovo), 34.1 million (Afghanistan), and 39.1 million (Iraq).65

Providing direct law-and-order support to a country the size of Jordan would be a challenge for the U.S. military. The Army Reserve’s 200th Military Police Command, which contains 97 percent of the Army Reserve’s military police, consists of approximately 14,000 sol-

Table 6.1
Estimated Postconflict Military Police Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel Type</th>
<th>Size of Population (Millions)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>25</th>
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<tr>
<td>Number of international civilian police</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>37,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of indigenous police</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of military police companies to replace international civilian police</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>131.6</td>
<td>175.4</td>
<td>219.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of military police companies to mentor indigenous police</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of military police companies for police training teams</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: The estimates assume a notional police station of 200 police and a military police company with 171 personnel. The first two rows provide estimates of the numbers of indigenous civilian police and indigenous police officers to provide law and order to a population, based on the planning factors discussed previously. The third row estimates the number of military police companies required to replace the indigenous civilian police on a one-for-one basis. The fourth row provides an estimate of the number of military police companies required to mentor the indigenous police officers on the basis of one military police platoon per police station. The last row provides an estimate of the number of military police companies needed to provide a squad-sized police training team for every police station.

diers and 53 military police companies. Providing such support would exceed the Army Reserve’s capacity in terms of both total manpower and operational units. Only roughly 12.5 percent (1,750 military police officers or ten equivalents to military police companies) of these would be available at any one time, given the Army’s preferred rotation policy of a 1:5 mobilized to dwell ratio for the guard and reserve in contingency operations. Similarly, providing adequate mentoring personnel would potentially require exceeding preferred dwell-time policies and would leave few Army Reserve National Guard military police available for other missions.

The utility of having military police train and mentor host-nation police forces in law-and-order operations is unclear. In Afghanistan, the training provided by U.S. soldiers tended to focus on military skills and resulted in a militarized police force with little capacity to conduct law enforcement operations. Many military police officers are not prepared to train and advise civilian police in most required law-and-order tasks. Instead, they tend to focus on high-end tasks, such as riot control, convoy security, motorized patrol, and checkpoint establishment, rather than the skills required for community-based policing. Furthermore, the focus on these COIN-oriented skills makes it more difficult to later transition host-nation police to more-traditional civilian policing tasks and can leave local police forces incapable of protecting local communities from sectarian and criminal violence.

66 The 200th Military Police Command has a total of 113 military police units; this includes four brigade headquarters, 22 battalion headquarters, 53 companies, and smaller detachments. These units consist of those focused on combat support, internment and resettlement, and criminal investigations. U.S. Army Reserve, 2016, pp. 64–65.

67 There would be 2,100 military police personnel and 12 military police companies at the reserve component’s surge 1:4 mobilized to dwell ratio.


Training host-nation police personnel to conduct law-and-order operations is a task best accomplished by law enforcement professionals.\textsuperscript{70} It is also one that cannot be done rapidly; training competent police patrol officers can require well over 20 weeks of basic training, and efforts to do so in less time can lead to police personnel inadequately trained to conduct law-and-order operations.\textsuperscript{71} However, deploying large numbers of civilian police trainers and mentors is a difficult task, and the history of such efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that it is unlikely that adequate numbers of such personnel can be deployed in the future. Because the United States continues to lack a civilian, deployable, rule-of-law training force that can operate in a high-threat environment, it will likely have to continue to rely on military personnel who are generally not well prepared to develop police forces focused on community policing and criminal justice.\textsuperscript{72}

To mitigate the challenges involved in using military police to train partner nation police forces, the Army may want to pursue policies that leverage the civilian police capabilities that currently reside within the guard and reserve. For instance, the guard and reserve (particularly the Army Reserve National Guard) could keep track of personnel who are police officers in civilian jobs, with a particular focus on senior-ranking police and personnel who have served in police training academies or in other mentoring capacities. These preidentified personnel could either be formed into police training teams as necessary or cross-leveled to military police companies that may be tasked with training and mentoring partner police forces. It would also be beneficial if military police units that will be given golden hour tasks received postmobilization instruction in civilian policing and training and mentoring skills. Finally, the Army may want to provide military police officers and senior NCOs with on-the-job training opportunities in civilian police agencies, with a preference going to soldiers who have displayed a training or teaching mentality. These efforts should be


\textsuperscript{71} SIGAR, 2017, pp. 59, 97–98, 122–123.

\textsuperscript{72} SIGAR, 2017, pp. 62, 177–178.
supplemented by doctrine that provides guidance on standing up civilian police forces focused on law-and-order tasks, emphasizes professionalization over rapidly producing large quantities of police officers, coordinates the efforts of the multiple agencies and foreign organizations involved in the development of police forces, and provides security to civilian police trainers and advisors who may need to operate in insecure environments.73

Addressing the security gap that emerges during the golden hour because of the lack of an international civilian police presence is another challenge. Although it has been suggested that the United States develop its own constabulary police capabilities, this seems unlikely given current resource constraints and the lack of interest in creating U.S. paramilitary forces.74 One potential alternative would be to increase the emphasis in U.S. security cooperation programs of the training of deployable partner-nation civilian police units and trainers. However, if the Army is to participate in such efforts, legislation restricting DoD participation in civilian police training would need to be modified, and the Army would need to develop the capacity to conduct such training. Alternatively, the Army could develop a program of instruction that could be used to prepare military police units for such tasks, perhaps focused on gendarme-type skill sets.75 When deployed, such units could potentially be infused with preidentified Army Reserve personnel with a civilian police background or Regular Army soldiers with similar skill sets.76

**Civil Affairs**

As noted, Army doctrine identifies civil affairs personnel as a critical component of its ability to conduct stability tasks during the golden

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74 F. Jones, 2005, p. 225.

75 It could potentially be based on what Dennis Keller calls *stability policing skills*. See Keller, 2010, pp. 22–24, 39–40.

76 These units could include personnel from military police law enforcement detachments or the Criminal Investigation Command. Army Techniques Publication 3-39.10 (2015) is devoted to such skills.
hour. Army civil affairs personnel fall into two basic categories: the generalists and the functional specialists. Most civil affairs personnel have area and linguistics skills and cultural training and can provide commanders with specialized expertise on the civil component in their areas of operation. A smaller number of reserve specialists also have advisory capabilities and civilian professional skills that parallel those of the host nation’s government. These skills can be particularly relevant to those stability tasks not directly related to the provision of security and which utilize civilian expertise not related to the conduct of combat operations.

The bulk of the Army’s civil affairs capacity is located in its civil affairs teams. These teams, however, are composed of generalists who execute civil affairs operations, conduct civil reconnaissance, and assess civilian society. These generalists prevent civilian interference with military operations, mobilize civilian resources to support military operations, and conduct emergency operations to sustain the civilian population. They are not functional specialists trained to help rebuild civil society; these skills reside with the civil affairs functional specialists and are found only in reserve civil affairs units. These experts plan and enable host-nation operations in six areas: rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information. Civil affairs functional specialists have civilian-acquired core competencies that provide reserve civil affairs commands, brigades, and battalions the ability to carry out functions normally performed by civil governments and are focused

on the development, reconstruction, and stabilization of civil society.\textsuperscript{81} The functional specialists determine the status of host-nation infrastructure, develop short- and long-term projects and recovery plans, set project priorities, and assess the actions needed to achieve stability. They often work directly with host-nation governments to develop governing capacity and provide expertise to civil-military organizations, such as PRTs.\textsuperscript{82}

Most of the Army’s civil affairs capability resides within the Army Reserve. In 2014, the Army had about 25 Regular Army civil affairs companies assigned to U.S. Army Forces Command, 30 special operations civil affairs companies assigned to U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and 132 Army Reserve civil affairs companies. In addition, the Army Reserve had all the Army’s civil affairs commands and all its functional specialists. In total, the Regular Army civil affairs force consisted of 3,081 soldiers, while the Army Reserve had 8,477 soldiers.\textsuperscript{83} Of these, only 624 soldiers are civil affairs functional specialists.\textsuperscript{84} Since 2014, however, there has been a reduction in Regular Army civil affairs capacity because of the elimination of several battalions of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade. This brigade was stood up with five battalions in September 2011 to support the Army’s general-purpose forces. It was initially intended that the brigade be reduced to a single battalion by the end of fiscal year (FY) 2017, but the decision as to whether to eliminate the last two battalions was postponed to March 2018, pending the outcome of the Army’s Total Army Analysis process.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{81} Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management}, Washington, D.C., Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, December 3, 2014, p. 189.


\textsuperscript{83} In addition, there is a small number of Army National Guard personnel (2 percent of total personnel) serving within existing civil affairs units. There are no Army National Guard civil affairs units. Civil Affairs Association, “Helping to Secure the Victory,” briefing, 2014, slides 16–18.


\textsuperscript{85} Raymond A. Thomas, “Advanced Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Raymond A. Thomas, USA Nominee for Commander, United States Special Operations Command,” Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, March 9, 2016, p. 27; Christopher Holshek, “2017
The doctrinal allocation of civil affairs personnel is a civil affairs company that provides direct support to a brigade combat team or a maneuver enhancement brigade. This support relationship provides each supported commander with a CMOC and five four-soldier civil affairs teams. During combat operations, this would allow the brigade commander to allocate a civil affairs team to each of its three maneuver battalions, leaving one additional team to directly support the brigade headquarters or another element of the commander’s choosing. In stability operations, however, a brigade combat team’s field artillery battalion and cavalry squadron are also often assigned areas of operation. Under such conditions, the brigade will lack the ability to provide dedicated civil affairs support to all of its elements responsible for controlling territory. Excluding U.S. Special Operations Command civil affairs units, which are intended to support SOF operations, the current civil affairs force can rotationally deploy on a sustained basis roughly 20 civil affairs companies. Although this should be sufficient to provide deployed brigade combat teams and maneuver enhancement brigades with their doctrinally desired civil affairs support, it would likely limit the amount of civil affairs support available to noncombat forces operating in a country, as well as to other missions, such as PRTs. Indeed, in 2008, the Army was unable to meet the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan demand for civil affairs forces under prescribed dwell ratios.

During the post–World War II occupation of Japan, the United States deployed 54 military government teams that were broadly comparable to the Army’s current civil affairs functional specialty cells.


87 This was derived from a boots on the ground to dwell ratio of 1:2 for ten Regular Army civil affairs companies and 1:5 (nine months deployed) for 132 Army Reserve civil affairs companies.

Their role was to observe and report on how U.S. military government decrees were being implemented. The United States also created a headquarters that focused on the nonmilitary matters involved in the occupation of Japan. This headquarters had nine sections that mirrored the structure of the Japanese cabinet and was staffed by U.S. civil servants and former U.S. officers. At its peak, it consisted of 3,500 individuals, of whom about 25 percent were involved in administering U.S. reform programs. The current civil affairs force could not provide this level of support to a similar operation today. As noted, the current force has roughly 624 specialists, of whom only some 78 are available under normal rotation policies.

There appear to be some significant weaknesses in the current civil affairs force, which could limit its ability to fully support golden hour activities. For instance, although civil affairs personnel were used to fill civilian “holes” in PRT manning, many of the DoD personnel selected for this task lacked the full range of skills required for these positions. The Army Reserve civil affairs force has had severe shortages of O-3s and O-4s, and in 2008 it had only 61 percent of its required O-4s and 16 percent of its required O-3s. The shortage of O-3s is particularly problematic, as they provide leadership for the civil affairs teams. It also remains unclear as to how qualified civil affairs functional specialists are, and there appears to be “an overall decrease” in their use as the military has focused on more-tactical civil affairs, which utilized civil affairs generalists. Emphasis on functional specialists has declined, and more emphasis has been placed on civil affairs

89 Each team had sections dealing with government, economics, information, education, and public health, which paralleled the structure of local government. See Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 30.

90 Dobbins et al., 2003, pp. 31–32.


Finally, geographic combatant commands have very little interaction with the civil affairs commands, even though they house much of the civil affairs functional specialist and planning expertise. As a result, the civil affairs functional specialist expertise appears to be underutilized.95

Civil affairs capability cannot be rapidly expanded through the induction of new personnel. Civil affairs officer candidates must have achieved the rank of Captain (or be First Lieutenants eligible for promotion to Captain) and undergo a rigorous 57-week selection and training process, which includes 25 weeks of language and cultural instruction. Civil affairs NCO candidates must have achieved the rank of Specialist (E-4) and undergo a 49-week selection and training process.96 Reserve civil affairs personnel do not receive the same level of training; enlisted personnel take an 11-week advance individual training course, and officers participate in 195 hours of distance learning and two four-week residence courses at Fort Bragg. In addition, reserve personnel receive no language or cultural training, and there is some concern that this abbreviated program of instruction does not adequately prepare them for their mission.97 Civil affairs functional specialists (area of concentration 38G, military government specialist) are even more difficult to grow. In addition to the standard branch qualifications, they must also gain expertise over a period of years in their functional specialty, pursue postsecondary education, and acquire professional certification in their career field.98

Although Army Reserve civil affairs generalists were stressed during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, there appear to be suf-

95 Hicks and Wormuth, 2009, p. 42.
98 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014, p. 206.
ficient numbers of civil affairs generalists to support future military operations. The potential critical shortfall is in the number of functional specialists who have the skills required to support golden hour activities directed at providing essential government services, supporting economic development, and supporting governance. These skills do not reside in the Regular Army and are developed primarily through nonmilitary careers. One path to mitigating this shortfall is to develop better methods, either in peacetime or early in a crisis, to recruit or access midcareer senior professionals from the private sector who already have the skills and experiences needed. Developing and maintaining a database of relevant civilian skills already possessed by soldiers would also enable accessing the capabilities during a crisis. Finally, the Army could consider developing a program that would reach out to military retirees who might have developed relevant skills in the civilian sector after their separation from the military.

Reconstruction and Other Nonsecurity Golden Hour Activities
The Army recognizes that it has a role to play in golden hour activities not directly tied to the provision of security. Among these tasks are the provision of essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. For the most part, the Army lacks the capability to conduct these activities on a large scale and for an extended period. In addition to civil affairs personnel discussed above, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is another center of golden hour skills within the Army, particularly those skills related to infrastructure development and reconstruction.

Most of the Army’s capability to conduct civil engineering resides within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Its primary missions are to execute Army and DoD military construction and real estate acquisition programs and the development of the nation’s infrastructure.


100 Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, 2017, p. 3-4.

101 It should be noted that the Army has an extensive capability to distribute emergency supplies; this task can be utilized using existing logistics capabilities and does not require additional specialized skills.
through the civil works program.\textsuperscript{102} The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers consists of about 35,600 civilian employees and 782 uniformed military personnel and is responsible for a large number of construction contractors (about 300,000 in 2014) who actually execute its civil works and military construction projects. The majority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff (83 percent) are employed in its civil works districts, which focus on water resources (e.g., navigation, flood control, hydropower, water supply, and environmental restoration) and are not intended to be deployable overseas.\textsuperscript{103} The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides general engineering support to the operational Army through reach back (often in the form of teleengineering) and forward presence. The corps has several deployable elements relevant to golden hour operations, which include forward engineer support teams, contingency real estate support teams, and environmental support teams. These teams are composed of uniformed military personnel and Department of Army civilians and provide infrastructure assessment, engineer planning and design, technical support, and construction and real estate management support.\textsuperscript{104} In 2014, 102 civilians and 34 soldiers were organized into forward engineer support teams.\textsuperscript{105}

The U.S. military is likely to use contractors for logistics support operations, as well as for construction, during the golden hour. Although the Army has a variety of ways to leverage contractor support, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is an important way of doing so. The Army has a variety of deployable units that can support the provision of contract support. These include the


\textsuperscript{104} FM 3-34, 2014, pp. 1-14–1-15.

\textsuperscript{105} U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2014, slide 13. A forward engineer support team–main has about 38 military and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civilian specialists. It executes large contracts or special engineer support programs and can serve as a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers headquarters during large contingency operations. A forward engineer support team–advance has four personnel and provides engineering planning and designing support and can conduct limited infrastructure assessment. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Field Force Engineering Teams,” webpage, undated.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Army Materiel Command’s Army field support brigades and contracting support brigades, and the Army Reserve’s LOGCAP Support Brigade.

Use of Contractors

DoD has the ability to access and deploy a large number of contractors to support its military operations. This capability, however, has often proved to be a double-edged sword because weaknesses in vetting, overseeing, and managing contractors can lead to abuse, waste, corruption, and the undercutting of the overall coalition mission. Figure 6.3. illustrates just how heavily the U.S. military relied on contractors to support its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, the number of contractors deployed in theater has often exceeded the number of deployed military personnel. As can be seen, the number of contractors in the CENTCOM area of responsibility peaked at more than 250,000 personnel at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although these figures represent the number of contractors in a mature theater of war, the U.S. military has been able to rapidly leverage contractors during recent operations. Within six weeks after the declared end of hostilities in Iraq, contractors were conducting logistics functions that the Congressional Budget Office estimates would have required approximately 12,000 U.S. soldiers to provide.106 By December 2004, there were 38,305 LOGCAP personnel deployed to Kuwait and Iraq.107

Figure 6.4 illustrates the range of capabilities provided by contractors during the extended contingency operations in Iraq. Although most of these individuals were deployed in direct support of the U.S. military and were not intended to provide stability operations–related expertise or capabilities, many of these contracted capabilities, such as transportation, construction, and translator support, are relevant to golden hour activities.

106 These contractors were deployed under LOGCAP III’s Task Order 59, which called for providing logistics services to 130,000 soldiers from June 13, 2003, to June 12, 2004. Congressional Budget Office, Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces, Washington, D.C., October 2005, pp. 28–30.

107 At the same time, there were 45,800 Army combat support and combat service support personnel deployed in the same area. See Congressional Budget Office, 2005, pp. 4–5.
Figure 6.3
U.S. Central Command’s Use of Contractors, FY 2008 to FY 2017

Most reconstruction and infrastructure tasks are beyond the capability and capacity of the U.S. military and will be conducted by contractors. The construction capabilities required to support infrastructure and reconstruction needs during stability operations will likely exceed Army engineer capabilities and need to be provided by contractors.\(^{108}\) Civilian augmentation programs and other contracted
efforts, however, can provide construction, general engineering, and logistics support.109

The early phases of recent postconflict operations provide examples of the use of contractors for golden hour tasks. In the run up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers hired the contractor Kellogg, Brown, and Root to repair Iraq’s oil sector. It was supported in this work by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil, which consisted of 129 personnel, 90 of whom were civilians. Although this effort had some initial success, the declining security situation, poor contractor performance, and frequent program changes resulted in a significant decline in oil production in late 2004.110 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity consisted of 84 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers civilians and 90 soldiers, many with specialized electrical skills. The task force designed 26 projects to repair and upgrade the Iraqi electrical system and managed the work of three contractors responsible for executing the projects, which ran the gamut from refurbishing power plants to rebuilding transmission towers. By June 2004, Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity had started 66 projects and had increased Iraqi electrical generation capacity. However, two years after the invasion, Iraq’s average daily power output remained below prewar levels.111 In addition, postconflict water, sewage, and health system reconstruction was handled by contractors.112 More recently, DoD relied heavily on contractor support during Operation United Assistance, the U.S. military response to the Ebola outbreak in Liberia, and currently uses contractors to construct,


111 Despite the increase, Iraq’s average daily power output remained well short of its stated power-generation goals, and work was significantly behind schedule on seven generation plants. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, pp. 150, 152, 184.

supply, maintain, and operate remote camps for U.S. personnel advising and assisting local African militaries.113

With proper planning, contract personnel can be made rapidly available to support golden hour operations. LOGCAP contracts, for instance, can offer relatively quick response rates. In 2005, the LOGCAP contract with Kellogg, Brown, and Root required “performance” as early as 15 days after the contractor was notified of a particular task order. Although this goal has not always been met, contractors have generally provided faster responses than reserve component units.114 Such a response time, however, requires that LOGCAP contracts already be in place and that they are designed to cover the types of activities required to exploit the golden hour.115 In addition, LOGCAP, contracting logistics, contracting officer’s representatives, and logistics mission command capabilities need to be deployed early in an operation.116 Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the Army and DoD need to systematically integrate contractor support into their planning and strategies.117

The historical record of DoD’s effort to use contractors to support stability operations is poor. DoD was unprepared to execute large-scale operational contract support in Iraq and Afghanistan, its personnel lacked the training to manage or work with contractors, and there was a lack of exposure to use of contractors in a soldier’s professional military

113 Among the reasons for the use of contractors during Operation United Assistance was that it enabled the Army to rapidly transition operations to USAID and NGOs. According to U.S. Africa Command’s directorate of logistics (ACJ4), “we needed to contract capabilities as much as possible to minimize the military footprint and transition contracts instead of organizations” (U.S. Africa Command, “Operation United Assistance: Logistics Partnership Success,” Africom.mil, January 12, 2015; see also Fluor, “Fluor Awarded New LOGCAP IV Task Order in Africa,” press release, April 10, 2012).


116 Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2015, p. 15.

education. In addition, the lack of sufficient capability and dedicated resources to oversee contractors resulted in poor performance, waste, and the failure to achieve mission goals.\textsuperscript{118} As a result, the poor use of contractors resulted in billions of dollars in waste, fraud, and abuse, which might have strengthened anti-American insurgents, and the misuse of funds which undermined military operations.\textsuperscript{119} In Afghanistan, for instance, poor contractor vetting and contract management and oversight allowed money to flow both to malign actors that gained positions within the Afghan government and to insurgent groups actively opposing the coalition. This tended to fuel grievances against the Afghan government and increase material aid to the insurgents.\textsuperscript{120} The use of private security contractors can be particularly problematic, as the use or misuse of deadly force can lead to tensions with the local government and population. This can arise from improper vetting, training, and oversight or the existence of rules of engagement that are different from those of coalition forces.\textsuperscript{121} In situations where contractors enjoy immunity from local law, the United States needs to establish its own legal framework for accountability and deploy sufficient investigative and prosecutorial capacity to enforce it. Although improvements were made in operational contract support as the result of operational experience, such as the introduction of the Army Operational Contract Support Course, DoD still faces significant challenges in effectively utilizing and managing contractors to support current contract operations and prepare for future operations.\textsuperscript{122} Underlying these problems is an inadequate number of trained oversight personnel who can ensure that contractors meet their requirements efficiently and effectively. Ensuring that there is an adequate number of properly

\textsuperscript{118} Schwartz and Church, 2013, pp. 4–5.

\textsuperscript{119} Schwartz and Church, 2013, pp. 8–9.


\textsuperscript{121} Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, \textit{At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan}, interim report to Congress, June 2009, pp. 60–77.

\textsuperscript{122} Schwartz and Church, 2013, pp. 9–14.
trained contract oversight personnel thus remains critical for the success of the use of contractors in future golden hour operations.123

**Basic Experience Retention**

As with experience retention generally, retention of COIN and stability operations experience will be a consistent problem during times when opportunities to acquire such experience directly are limited or nonexistent. In any given organization, the number of leaders with these experiences will inevitably decline. This decline will be somewhat more rapid in active component units than in the reserve component, and the experience base among NCOs will generally last longer in both the active component and reserve component, but the declines will affect all units as experienced personnel are promoted, move to other assignments, or leave the service. It is also likely that at least some of the requisite skills will atrophy in those leaders who still remain with their original units.

It is unclear at what rate COIN and stability operations skills degrade and how long operational experience remains relevant if these skills are not practiced, maintained through professional military education, or utilized during additional operational assignments. Part of the solution, however, would likely involve ensuring that soldiers with the desired skill set are provided the opportunity to practice in real-world environments during security cooperation or similar activities. The current security force assistance brigade concept could serve as a useful vehicle for preserving some of these skills. In addition, professional military education should contain enough instruction in these skills to familiarize new officers and NCOs with the skills necessary to conduct golden hour operations.124

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Conclusion

The Army typically defines its primary role in golden hour operations as being the provision of security; the other potential missions (the provision of essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief) are secondary and will be rapidly transitioned to others. The Army’s ability to provide security during the golden hour will be influenced by factors relevant to the country in which the intervention takes place—its size, quality of existing security services, and so on. But the Army’s own preparations for this mission—including its size, training, and capability to stand up local security forces (both military and police)—will also play an important role.

Both the Army’s size and training will be determined largely by the needs to prepare for high-intensity operations against a near-peer competitor. The current operating environment and policy guidance has reduced the saliency of COIN and stability operations security skills for the Army as it returns to its traditional focus on high-end combat operations against peer or near-peer opponents. As time passes, personnel with direct experience with COIN and stability operations will leave the force and be promoted out of the lower echelons (battalion and below), which are primarily responsible for executing them. This highlights the need to retain knowledge about how to conduct these operations. In an era of constrained resources and an emphasis on different threats, it is unlikely that full-spectrum training that covers both traditional combat and COIN or stability operations will continue. This highlights the importance of professional military education in propagating the required skills and maintaining a basic knowledge of such operations.

Current doctrine does not explicitly endorse the concept of the golden hour, although elements of the doctrinal concept of consolidation of gains to appear to endorse it. This suggests that the Army could further develop its stability doctrine to cover the concept of the golden hour. In particular, the Army should highlight the potential importance of the concept and provide guidance as to what tasks should be prioritized, who should be responsible for them, and how
to integrate them into operational plans. Army doctrine could also place greater emphasis on the development of professional police forces with a law-and-order orientation, as well as how to integrate other U.S. government organizations, coalition partners, and civilian contractors into this effort. In addition, because the golden hour is a whole-of-government effort, the Army should support the development of inter-agency doctrine not only to support the development of host nation police forces but also to coordinate and organize the disparate lines of effort required to take advantage of the golden hour.

Rapidly standing up security forces in a postconflict operation will continue to be a challenge for the Army. Although the security force assistance brigade structure has the potential to provide important capabilities in this regard, it has yet to be fully developed. The first security force assistance brigade was stood up in late 2017, and personnel still needed to be recruited and trained for the remaining five. Although the Army has committed itself to the security force assistance brigade concept, maintaining the momentum to see it through to completion and then continuing to maintain it should not be taken as a given. Experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the challenge in filling such units with personnel of the proper skill, grade, experience, and temperament. Such individuals are also in high demand elsewhere, so it will require continued support by the Army’s leadership to ensure that the security force assistance brigade concept comes to fruition. In addition, the Army needs to ensure that service in security force assistance brigades or other training and mentoring positions is seen as career enhancing, and not a dead-end job, if it is to retain and develop personnel with the proper experience for this mission.

The Army’s ability to stand up properly trained civilian police forces remains rudimentary. Ideally, this task would not be conducted by military police but by civilian police. Given the lack of easily deployable civilian police in the United States, most missions will seek to rely

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127 SIGAR, 2017, p. 179.
on U.S. partners and on contractors to provide necessary civilian police capabilities. Past experience suggests, however, that partners may also be unable or unwilling to provide policing capabilities at the necessary scale. As a result, the Army may want to consider ways to mitigate the challenge of supporting law-and-order operations in a partner nation. Such efforts could include leveraging civilian military police skills that already exist within the guard and reserve, providing Regular Army military police with the opportunity to get on-the-job training with civilian police organizations, improving the United States’ ability to recruit and oversee civilian contractors with the requisite law-and-order policing skills, and increasing the emphasis on developing deployable police capabilities in partners through security cooperation.

Outside the security sphere, the Army has limited capacity to make significant contributions to golden hour operations with its organic capabilities. Both Army civil affairs and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel can play a role in such operations, but they lack the capacity (and skills) to be the lead actors. DoD-employed contractors, however, can provide significant on-demand capacity for the restoration essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. Proper utilization of such contractors, however, requires the ability to properly plan and supervise contractor operations and the ability to integrate the use of contractors into golden hour operational plans.

Finally, given the inherent weakness in the Army’s capacity to deploy, plan, and monitor many of the civilian skill sets required for the golden hour, the Army should consider supporting efforts to build such a deployable capability elsewhere in the government. This requirement is all the more urgent because earlier efforts to build such a capability have largely withered. The Army should consider supporting the rebuilding of deployable capacity and expertise within both the Department of State and USAID to execute such operations. But

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experience suggests that Army planning should continue to assume that these efforts would fall short of the need for such capacity in any large operation and particularly so in the early weeks and months.

employees in the Office of Public Safety devoted to supporting programs that provided technical advice, training, and equipment to foreign civilian and paramilitary police organizations. Under the auspices of the Office of Public Safety, public safety officers were deployed overseas who averaged 14 years of police or equivalent experience. See Keller, 2010, p. 5.
Postconflict stabilization takes place in a wide range of circumstances, from the occupation and governing of a defeated adversary to helping oversee the implementation of a peace agreement among warring factions. The United States may be acting largely alone, as part of a coalition, or within an established alliance structure. Although it is impossible to prescribe a formula for such operations that fits all cases, some basic conclusions emerge from this study regarding the existence of a golden hour and its implications for the conduct of these missions.

Experience indicated that actions taken during the early weeks and months of a postconflict stability operation set the mission on a trajectory from which, if trending downward, recovery is difficult.

Establishing a positive trajectory early in any operation requires both planning and preparation beyond that needed to overcome initial resistance. All of America’s post–Cold War interventions required more ground forces to stabilize the subject society than were needed to affect entry. For ground forces, at least, stabilization has thus proved more demanding in terms of capacity than the conventional combat, if any, that preceded it.

Because one’s adversaries have been driven from power and dispersed does not mean that they have disappeared, nor that they are incapable of reconstitution. Stability operations that begin on the basis of formal acceptance of the new order, either through a peace agreement among contending parties or an explicit capitulation by the former adversary, seem to have an improved prospect of success. Thus,
the basis on which the conflict is terminated can have an important impact on what comes after.

Postconflict stabilization is a government-wide enterprise, but collaboration between civil and military actors in the field becomes progressively more difficult as the security environment deteriorates.

Below, we have divided our recommendations into those involving multiple agencies and those directed principally at the Army.

Whole-of-Government Recommendations

Two interrelated factors shape a postconflict environment: the attitudes of neighboring states and the design of the new political order. In articulating its intentions for shaping the peace, the United States should aim both for inclusiveness within the society in question and for maximum international support, with particular attention to those states with easy access to and influence over that society. Although it is likely that the Department of State and the White House will take the lead in establishing these objectives and conducting the requisite diplomacy, military leaders will be consulted and should consider how such decisions will affect their mission. Political and military planning should not occur in separate silos but should be integrated from the start. This will require greater cross-agency sharing than is usual in typical war planning.

The United States must be prepared to act quickly when it seeks to consolidate gains in a postconflict country. When U.S. forces first arrive in a postconflict context, they have the opportunity to reassure potential allies and to both deter and co-opt potential enemies. If they fail to do so, armed opposition networks have the opportunity to solidify; these potential spoilers, while relatively susceptible to co-option and vulnerable to disruption in their nascence, typically become disproportionately more difficult to win over or defeat if they are allowed to reach maturity.

U.S. officials should recognize that patterns of collaboration and formulas for inclusion established early on will become progressively more difficult to change. Broadly inclusive governance within an oth-
erwise divided society can create inefficiencies and promote deadlock. Consideration should be given to mechanisms that permit flexibility and evolution while preserving the necessary buy-in of all the critical actors.

Establishing security is absolutely critical in the earliest phases of such operations. Although security is not simply a military task, military forces will typically be called on to provide public order and security in cases where they intervene. Security is a prerequisite for many nonmilitary tools—including humanitarian and development assistance—to have the intended effects. The United States is understandably reluctant to expend the massive resources necessary to secure large countries from border to border. But decisionmakers should take care that the attempt to find innovative ways to succeed in stabilization at lower cost does not ultimately become self-defeating. The United States attempted to maintain an extremely small footprint in Afghanistan, and hoped to do so in Iraq, only to find that the limitations of such an approach contributed to the metastasizing of insurgency.

To some extent, local security forces can be part of the solution, if the appropriate resources are dedicated to building these forces’ capacity and overseeing them so that they do not engage in widespread abuses. But building effective and sustainable partner capacity is typically a long-term proposition. Efforts should be made during the golden hour to begin forming (or re-forming) local security capacity, but U.S. decisionmakers should recognize that such initiatives are long-term commitments and should not sacrifice quality and sustainability in overly ambitious schemes. Once again, Afghanistan and Iraq serve as a warning of the self-defeating nature of many security force assistance shortcuts.

Law and order is an important component of providing stability and preventing the reemergence of domestic forces dissatisfied with or opposed to the new political structure. Over the past several decades, however, the U.S. government has found it challenging to deploy adequate civilian police capacity to rebuild or establish police forces in partner states, and it has often been unable to secure adequate capacity from other allies and partners. As a result, it has turned to military personnel whose training and skills are less suited to civil-order polic-
ing and police training. Given these challenges, the U.S. government should explore revitalizing Department of State or other interagency abilities to plan, monitor, and execute civilian police capacity-building operations. Because such operations tend to be personnel intensive, the focus should be on developing the necessary planning and management capabilities to organize and oversee contractors and other partners executing the law-and-order training mission. Experience suggests, however, that such civilian capacity will be slow to come online and even, given time, unable to meet the requirements of operations in larger societies, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Military authorities should assume, therefore, that these civilian assets might not be immediately available and might never entirely meet the requirements.

Since the United States will seldom be willing to commit the resources necessary to suppress broad-based armed opposition to the postconflict order, it must attempt to broker as broad as feasible a coalition of reconcilable political actors and give them a stake in the new political order. Again, such a process is neither a purely diplomatic nor a purely military endeavor. Diplomats will be responsible for helping broker the new political dispensation and manage tensions among coalition members. On the other hand, military forces will be necessary to reassure partners and deter potential spoilers. External forces can help to reassure parties within the political order that it is safe to make compromises and take risks in the interest of long-term gains. External forces can also make sure that the various parties do not find the threat of violence an attractive means of improving their bargaining position in the highly fragile political environment typical of golden hours.

Military and civilian actors must work out appropriate arrangements for CIMIC. Where there is no viable local partner government, the U.S. military will likely be called on to take over most essential functions. Where a reasonably effective and acceptable government exists, demands on the United States will be correspondingly lower, and a variety of civil-military coordination mechanisms (such as CMOCs and CIMIC) are appropriate. These arrangements—whether they involve local actors, partner countries, or partner multilateral organizations, in addition to the United States—must be worked out well in advance of when U.S. forces arrive in country. Such preparation will
encourage a unity of effort that historical experience shows is so critical to operational success. Once in the country, U.S. forces should be prepared to provide transportation and security to critical civilian personnel. The Army is also likely to be called on to provide civil affairs officers in substantial numbers to facilitate these requirements.

Where widespread violent resistance is anticipated, special arrangements for civil-military integration should be agreed on in advance and put in place from the beginning of the operation. Where such resistance is a distinct possibility, advance interagency planning should at least include arrangements for such integration, at least on a contingent basis.

If these core tasks are managed successfully, then the United States will typically have bought itself time to experiment with the full range of other tools for stabilization, including humanitarian, reconstruction, and development assistance.

Recommendations for the Army

The Army has many of the capabilities in highest demand for stabilization missions, including logistics capabilities, personnel who can train and advise foreign security forces (including at higher echelons and in defense institutions), and many of the enabler units and specializations in most demand for stabilization functions (civil affairs personnel, engineers, human intelligence officers, and so on). Consequently, the Army has a particular interest in being prepared for such contingencies.

The overwhelming focus of the Army today is on high-end conventional contingencies against near-peer competitors. Given evolving shifts in the United States’ geostrategic concerns and the Army’s diminished capabilities in this area after years of fighting in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, this focus on conventional combat is likely appropriate. But there are several relatively small investments the Army can make as a hedge against future irregular contingencies. The remainder of this chapter discusses some of these opportunities, grouped into three categories: concepts and doctrine; training, education, and leader development; and organization and personnel.
Concepts and Doctrine

The latest edition of the Army’s FM on operations, FM 3-0, continues to categorize stability operations as a third and equal type of operation alongside offensive and defensive operations.\(^1\) It also emphasizes the need to consolidate the gains won through conventional combat. Both of these points of emphasis are important markers of the continuing relevance of stabilization requirements. But Army doctrine could go further in stressing the importance of the early phases of stabilization to ensure that the Army is prepared for future such contingencies.

As discussed in Chapter One, U.S. military doctrine does not emphasize golden hours. The JB on stabilization devotes approximately one page out of more than 200 to the early phases of stabilization efforts. Even then, the discussion is vague and occurs after more than 100 pages of other material.\(^2\) The Army doctrine publication on stabilization makes only a brief mention of the importance of initiative but otherwise says nothing about golden hours: “By acting quickly and mitigating sources of instability, military forces improve the security situation, retard deterioration of the institution and infrastructure, and create a space for civilian agencies, organizations, and the host nation to work.”\(^3\) More-technical Army publications, such as Stability Techniques, provide a more detailed discussion of sequencing.\(^4\) Given the strategic importance of golden hours, however, these issues of sequencing should not be confined to a manual on tactical procedures. The next round of updates to Army and joint doctrine on stability (the 3-07 series of publications) offers an opportunity to address this concern.

The Army should also provide concepts and doctrinal guidance on how to plan and conduct low-cost and small-footprint operations. Since the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, this phrase has captured the U.S. approach to stability operations.\(^5\) But without details on what

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\(^1\) FM 3-07, 2014.


\(^3\) Army Doctrine Publication 3-07, 2012, p. 10.

\(^4\) Army Techniques Publication 3-07.5, 2012.

\(^5\) DoD, 2012, p. 3.
low-cost and small-footprint operations can accomplish, what they cannot accomplish, and how they must adapt ways and ends to fit limited means, this phrase risks papering over major conceptual challenges. The experiences in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq illustrate the long-term costs of resting large hopes on small means.

Finally, the Army and the rest of the defense community should continue to refine doctrine (and associated professional military education) for civil-military coordination. Despite years of experience in operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, civil-military coordination remains a persistent challenge. In particular, more-detailed guidance is needed to determine under what circumstances civil-military arrangements should move from basic coordination to more-complex integration. To be adequately prepared for the latter case, the United States requires improved structures to help integrate civilian and military lines of effort.

**Training, Education, and Leader Development**

Although much of the doctrine necessary for success is in place, it must be updated and internalized, or it will not be followed after a period of disuse. The Army should therefore take several steps to encourage the continued relevance of its doctrine.

First, organizations within the Army’s generating force must continue to serve as proponents for stabilization and preserve and update doctrine to reflect lessons learned. Adversaries will continue to evolve with changes in technology and the geopolitical situation. If adequately resourced and empowered organizations do not exist within the Army to track these changes and make appropriate adjustments, the United States risks being ill prepared for the next time a golden hour arises. At various points in the past, the Army entities charged with preparations for stabilization—including the U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Army Irregular Warfare Center—have been either eliminated or at risk of elimination. It is important that
such organizations endure and contribute to preserving the skills and knowledge associated with stability operations.6

Second, the Army should undertake steps to ensure that stabilization and irregular warfare remain part of all leaders’ development. The Army has recently emphasized readiness for conventional warfighting. Again, such an emphasis is entirely reasonable given the current context. But emphasizing that conventional warfare is different from pursuing it to the exclusion of all other concerns. Both commissioned and noncommissioned officers with experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom will make up an ever-smaller proportion of Army personnel: Half of all Army officers leave active service after ten years, and fewer than one-third remain after 20 years. If the Army does not continue to make stabilization a part of leader development, its knowledge of how to conduct such operations will slowly atrophy. Once it is gone from the service, it is much more difficult to build it from scratch. The Army should ensure that at least some of its field and tabletop exercises contain some stabilization component, including requirements for civil-military coordination. It should also ensure that its schools make stabilization and irregular warfare a nontrivial part of leaders’ education and continue to publish articles on these missions in professional journals.

Third, and related to the first two, the Army should ensure that it can rapidly expand its capabilities for training soldiers for such missions. The appropriateness of programs of instruction and the realism of exercises depends on maintaining a cadre of experts. Many of these experts can be hired as contractors on an as-needed basis, but not all of them.

Finally, the Army should work to provide its leaders with the necessary experience when it is not actively engaged in COIN or similar missions where they can learn through ongoing operations. Many reserve civil affairs personnel, for instance, have valuable skill sets gained from their civilian work, but that experience is usually in the

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6 The Army Irregular Warfare Center ceased operations in 2014 but reportedly is being revived by the Army. Interview with Army personnel with responsibilities for stability operations, telephone, November 17, 2017.
United States. Helping to run utilities or local governments in the United States is very different from doing so in most developing countries. Providing opportunities for these personnel to deploy abroad in peacetime will give them valuable experience for the initial phases of stability operations. Similarly, military police might gain valuable skills by being allowed to shadow U.S. civilian police officers, participating in broadening assignments with state and federal law enforcement agencies, or supporting overseas security cooperation activities (e.g., those oriented toward counterdrug missions).

**Organization and Personnel**

The Army and DoD more broadly have several mechanisms through which they can have rapid access to the appropriate personnel for golden hours.

First, the Army has developed security force assistance brigades to train and advise foreign militaries. These units could potentially provide vital functions during the golden hour and beyond. The Army should give further thought to the organization of these units. As currently structured, they have very few civil affairs, military police, or other personnel who are essential for stabilization activities. The security force assistance brigades and similar units potentially offer an excellent opportunity for such personnel to gain vital experience in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Second, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness recently issued guidance that “establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures to identify and manage DoD personnel with skills, training, education, and experience related to” irregular warfare and security force assistance. If implemented appropriately, this guidance might help DoD rapidly identify the right personnel for golden hour tasks. All such guidance, however, must compete with the numerous other requirements, and it is easy for them to go unimplemented. The Army should provide sufficient high-level attention to ensure that the tasks contained in this guidance are implemented appropriately.

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7 Department of Defense Instruction 3000.11, 2016.
Third, the Army and DoD can take actions to gain ready access to the necessary manpower they need from outside the Regular Army, including through contracting mechanisms, the CEW, and potentially reservists with the requisite civilian skill sets. These mechanisms include integrating the use of contractors into the postconflict planning process so that appropriate contracts accessing the required capabilities can be ratified as rapidly as possible. It is also important that the Army continue to develop and strengthen its organic capabilities to evaluate and monitor the execution of contracts in a postconflict environment to ensure that these efforts contribute to the goal of rapidly stabilizing a partner or defeated state. Understanding potential golden hour needs would also be useful in ensuring that the CEW is shaped appropriately to provide the required skills. Incentives could be targeted to attract volunteers with the skills most relevant to golden hour operations.
References


CIA—See Central Intelligence Agency.


DoD—See U.S. Department of Defense.


FM—See Field Manual.


GAO—See Government Accountability Office.


Hollen, Patrick, Thomas Mundell, Dean Nilson, and Mark Sweeney, “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College, September 5, 2003.


JP—See Joint Publication.


SIGAR—See Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.


SWNCC—See State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.


UN—See United Nations.


USAID—See U.S. Agency for International Development.


———, “The Potsdam Conference, 1943,” webpage, undated-d.


This report analyzes the *golden hour*—the early phase of a postconflict stability operation—and the actions, organization, and capabilities necessary to seize it and set the conflict-affected country on a path to self-sustaining peace. The report combines a review of the literature in this field and a brief examination of key cases of U.S.-led stability operations. The authors find evidence that the early phases of postconflict operations are, in fact, critical for improving the odds of success and reducing the eventual costs of achieving an acceptable outcome. Both diplomatic and military actions to provide security in the postconflict country, as well as efforts to broker a broad-based coalition in support of the new political order, are essential. The United States must work to improve civil-military coordination in these early phases. There are also several relatively small investments the United States could make now, in a period of relative peace, to prepare for future contingencies so that it will be prepared to seize golden hours when they arise.