Opportunities for All

Mutually Beneficial Opportunities for Syrians and Host Countries in Middle Eastern Labor Markets

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The Syrian Civil War has displaced 60 percent of its 23 million population, with 5.6 million Syrians living in neighboring Middle East countries as refugees. Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon host the largest numbers of Syrians. The addition of large numbers of people into these countries has placed a severe strain on their labor markets, public-sector services, and social cohesion. But this situation is not without opportunities for the Syrians to contribute to the economies of these host countries. The future prosperity and stability of the region rests on creating mutually beneficial economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host-country workers.

This RAND study, funded by the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD), builds on and complements existing work conducted by the governments of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon; the United Nations; and other donor governments in pursuing the goal of creation of jobs for Syrian refugees and citizens in host communities. Using in-depth interviews, focus groups, surveys of Syrian households, and surveys of firms, it conducts an analysis of existing skill sets of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (“supply”), the needs of private sector companies (“demand”), the steps needed to match the supply and demand, the changes needed to improve the overall economic climate, and strategies for improving social cohesion of refugees and host communities.

The study provides recommendations for its primary intended audience of the host-country governments, donor countries, and multilateral agencies in devising practical policies to help refugees find economic opportunities in host communities and to help host communities minimize disruption to local residents while assuring overall economic development. We also aim to make this report accessible to general readers who may be interested in the Syrian refugee situation in the Middle East and in possible solutions to provide Syrian refugees with livelihood opportunities.

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Summary

Background and Purpose

The Syrian Civil War has displaced 60 percent of its 23 million population, with 6.5 million Syrians displaced inside Syria, 5.6 million Syrians living in neighboring Middle East countries as refugees, about a million in Europe, and some 100,000 elsewhere in the world, primarily in North America (UNHCR, 2018b, 2018c; Connor, 2018). No other country in recent history has had such a large percentage of its population displaced.

Neighboring countries in the Middle East have felt the largest impact. Turkey hosts 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees; Lebanon hosts a million; Jordan hosts 660,000 registered refugees; Iraq hosts 250,000; and Egypt hosts 130,000. Actual numbers, including the unregistered, are even higher. The addition of such large numbers of new people into these countries has placed a severe strain on their labor markets; public-sector services such as education, health, and sanitation; and social cohesion (attitudes and relationships among Syrians and the host communities).

But this situation is not without opportunities for the Syrians to both support themselves through work and to contribute to the economies and societies of their host countries. The future prosperity and stability of the Middle East region and beyond rests on creating mutually beneficial economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host-country workers. This longer-term challenge requires investments in the host countries—particularly Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, which host the largest numbers of refugees and are the focus of this report—to help both their own citizens and the refugees meet their daily needs, legally contribute to their local and regional economies, and to infuse a sense of hope for their future opportunities.

This RAND study, funded by the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD), builds on and complements existing work conducted by the governments of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, multilateral agencies, and other donor governments in pursuing the creation of livelihood opportunities for Syrian refugees and citizens in host communities.

This study has drawn upon multiple methods: a context analysis that included a literature review and over 50 stakeholder interviews; 36 focus groups with Syrian, host-country, and other migrant workers in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon; 12 in-depth interviews with firms; a survey of Syrian households (600 per country) and firms (150 per country) in each of these three countries; and exchanges with an advisory council.

Using the qualitative and quantitative data we collected, this study contributes to the existing knowledge base with more expansive analyses than have been conducted before of existing skill sets of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (“supply”). It also addresses the needs of the labor market (“demand”); the steps needed to match the supply and
demand; steps needed to improve the overall economic climate; and strategies for preserving and improving social cohesion of refugees and host communities. In contrast to earlier studies, it also includes a comparison of three countries, as well as data about the perspectives of host country and other migrant workers, and the views of firms about the situation. The study provides recommendations for the host-country governments, donor countries, and multilateral agencies in devising actionable policies to help refugees find economic opportunities in host communities and to help host communities minimize disruption to local residents while ensuring overall economic development. It does so in the spirit of a win-win for all stakeholders, with consideration for how multiple parties may mutually benefit from new steps.

We first present a country-by-country overview of our findings before we present our policy recommendations.

**Turkey**

In 2018, 3.6 million Syrians were living in Turkey, and present in all 81 of Turkey’s provinces. The largest populations were in Istanbul (563,000) and in areas near the Syrian border. Our focus groups and household surveys were conducted in Istanbul and the Şanlıurfa and Adana provinces. The firm survey covered three manufacturing and three service industries located close to neighborhoods in which Syrians were concentrated.

**Employment and Opportunities for Jobs**

An estimated 750,000 to 950,000 Syrians were working in Turkey in 2018 (International Crisis Group, 2018). Among the households in our survey, the percentage of household members aged 18 and older who were working or willing to work was approximately 85 percent for men and 25 percent for women. The percentages of survey respondents willing to work but not working in our sample are 28 percent for men and 55 percent for women, and lower in Istanbul than in Şanlıurfa and Adana.

Our surveys found that although Syrians in Turkey worked across a wide spectrum of jobs, most were doing unskilled and semiskilled work. Performing manual labor, either skilled or unskilled, in textiles, construction, other manufacturing, and services was the most common type of work performed by survey respondents.

There was considerable mismatch between the sector of work and occupations of refugees in Turkey and what they did in Syria, according to our household survey data and the Syrians in our focus groups. Our interviews found that Syrians faced difficulty having education and professional certifications recognized in Turkey. In addition, not knowing the Turkish language was noted as a major employment challenge in both the firm and worker surveys.

One potential reason for the concentration of refugees in low-skilled work could be that Syrians in Turkey had lower levels of education than the population in Syria prior to the war. In our household survey, over half of the respondents had a primary-level education or less, with only 14 percent having postsecondary education. This could be in part because many with higher education moved on to European countries.

Tapping into social networks and visiting employers directly to inquire about work, according to our surveys and focus groups, were the most common means for finding employment. Few household or firm survey respondents reported using formal job-matching platforms.
Syrians were typically hired without work permits (that is, “informally”), were paid wages less than Turkey’s minimum wage, and worked for longer hours than permitted by law, according to our focus groups and surveys. Firms in the survey most commonly cited willingness to accept lower wages and benefits as advantages to hiring Syrians, while household survey respondents most commonly cited low wages as a major obstacle to employment. At the same time, a third of Turks also worked informally (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018a), with many paid below the minimum wage.

There were geographical mismatches between where the Syrians were concentrated and where job growth in Turkey was. Government policy prohibited Syrians from leaving their province of registration, yet Syrians have flocked to Istanbul, straining the city’s housing and public services. In the Syrian household survey, the percentage of survey respondents who were not working but were willing to work was relatively lower in Istanbul compared with the other provinces in our sample. Consistent with this finding, focus group participants viewed jobs as readily obtainable in Istanbul and hard to find in the east; not being legally allowed to move for work was a challenge.

**Policies and Programs**

A 2016 Turkish government regulation granted work permit eligibility to Syrians with Temporary Protection Status, though few such permits have actually been issued (around 16,000 in 2016). Our interviews and focus groups suggested that the legal framework has not enabled many Syrians to work formally with permits because employers had few incentives to hire Syrians legally: work permit costs could make hiring a Syrian more expensive than a Turk; procedures were not clear to firms or Syrians; Syrians could not legally work outside of their province of registration; and work permit requirements were not commonly enforced, especially for small- and mid-sized firms.

Programming to help Syrian refugees in Turkey for the first few years after their arrival focused mainly on humanitarian needs, with little attention on employment. Now, multiple stakeholders in the international aid community as well as business associations in our interviews recognized that assistance needed to move beyond humanitarian support to livelihood opportunities, and new approaches were needed. The international aid community has provided some assistance in vocational training (according to our surveys without much in language training); our interviews indicated that these programs have been mostly designed as humanitarian efforts and failed to create significant opportunities for Syrians to find jobs. Vocational training programs to date have not been well coordinated with job placement, market needs, or Syrians’ skills. Our interviews, focus groups, and surveys identified Turkish-language training as one of the most prominent needs. Syrians and Iraqis in our focus groups and household survey also reported little formal assistance with job matching.

**Perspectives on Employment Growth**

The integration of Syrians into Turkey’s labor market was taking place within a context of downward economic pressure. Annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth has slowed

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1 It is worth noting that “informality” has a different connotation when applied to Syrians versus nationals. In general, an informally employed Syrian is working without a work permit, while an informally employed national is working without being registered for social security. Despite potential confusion, we use “informal” for both types of workers, given the prevalence of this colloquial usage.
in recent years and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) fell between 2015 and 2017. Turkey’s unemployment rate climbed to 10.9 percent in 2017, with youth unemployment at 20.6 percent. Unemployment was higher in the southeastern regions where many Syrians resided.

Consistent with growing concerns about Turkey’s overall economic climate, few firms in our survey anticipated employment growth over the next 12 months. Respondents indicated a number of policies that could encourage overall employment growth: decreasing the cost of labor, lowering taxes, making it easier to get financing, making it easier to set up a business, and providing or subsidizing training for workers. However, most firm survey respondents did not believe that any policies would increase employment opportunities for Syrian workers. Firms cited low wages as the main reason to hire Syrians. Among those who did suggest policies that would help, language training was the most commonly cited example.

Syrians have been active entrepreneurs in Turkey, setting up over 10,000 registered businesses. Interviews indicated that factors of success for Syrian businesses include business skills brought from Syria, marketing to Syrian consumers inside Turkey, and preexisting trade relations with Middle Eastern countries. Yet, barriers remained to Syrian business growth: lack of Turkish networks, difficulties accessing financing and purchasing property in Turkey, unfamiliarity with how to access Turkish consumer markets, and lack of understanding of Turkish business law, to name a few.

Social Cohesion
Social cohesion between Turkish citizens and Syrians in Turkey has remained stable, despite resentment among the Turks at the presence of Syrians in the labor force and public services; one 2017 survey found that over half of Turkish respondents did not think that Syrians should be allowed to work (Erdoğan, 2018a). Many Turkish workers in our focus groups were pessimistic about their own employment opportunities and blamed some of this on competition with Syrians. Yet Turkish workers also expressed compassion for the Syrians and viewed them as hardworking. Turkish workers in these discussions disapproved of employers who hired Syrians informally, paid them low wages, and failed to provide social benefits.

Syrians reported mixed views (both positive and negative) of relations with Turks on the job; however, most Syrian survey respondents reported that workers and employers treated them with respect and did not regularly discriminate against them.

Opportunities and Gaps
Many Syrians were getting by in Turkey, but the focus groups and surveys indicated that most were working in low-wage, low-skill, and informal jobs and that high unemployment rates persisted in Şanlıurfa and Adana. There were a number of challenges to improving the quality and quantity of Syrian employment in Turkey. These included low educational attainment among the Syrians; lack of Turkish-language skills; slowing GDP growth and growing unemployment among Turkish workers (particularly among Turkish youth and in the southeast where Syrians are concentrated); a geographic mismatch between where Syrians were concentrated and the locations with greatest economic growth; a well-intentioned legal framework for Syrian employment that did not incentivize employers to apply for work permits for Syrians; and humanitarian livelihood and vocational training programs that did not meet the needs of the labor market. At the same time, a variety of factors provided opportunities: many Syrians were finding work; Syrian networks have increased trade with Arab countries; despite Turkish
resentment, social cohesion and stability remained; businesses viewed Syrians as a large consumer market; and Syrian entrepreneurs invested in businesses in Turkey.

**Jordan**

In the most recent Jordanian census, the number of Syrian refugees was estimated at around 1.3 million. About 20 percent resided in camps, and 80 percent lived outside of camps, mainly in urban areas (UNHCR, 2018a, 2018b). Most Syrians were registered in Amman Governorate and in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa. Our focus groups and household surveys were conducted on refugee populations in Amman, Zarqa, Mafraq, and the Zaatari refugee camp. Our firm surveys covered three manufacturing sectors (food and beverages, textiles, and chemicals, which is a strong sector in Jordan), construction, and two service sectors (trade and hotels and restaurants).

**Employment and Opportunities for Jobs**

Estimates of the number of Syrians currently working in Jordan range from 85,000 to over 330,000 (Razzaz, 2017, p. 29). In our survey sample, the percentage of household members aged 18 and older who were working or willing to work was 70 percent overall: 93 percent for men and 54 percent for women. The overall percentage of survey respondents who were willing to work but were not working was lowest in Zaatari at 44 percent, followed by Amman (52 percent), Zarqa (74 percent), and Mafraq (76 percent), though the percentage of survey respondents willing to work but not working was twice as high for women as for men.

Our surveys found that most respondents were working informally, and more were currently working in construction and food and beverage manufacturing compared to the share of those who worked in those sectors before leaving Syria. Given restrictions, survey respondents were concentrated in a smaller number of occupations compared to the range of occupations that respondents reported having in Syria. In our focus groups, Syrians likewise reported working in fields outside of which they had experience.

In contrast to Lebanon and Turkey, where the largest group of respondents had a primary-level education, over 39 percent of respondents across all three Jordanian governorates and 40 percent of respondents in the Zaatari refugee camp reported having an intermediate-level education. However, a larger share of survey respondents reported currently working in unskilled jobs (23 percent) compared to the share that reported working in those types of jobs in Syria (16 percent). Around 45 percent of employed survey respondents indicated that they currently worked in skilled manual labor jobs, which was very similar to the share who reported working in those types of jobs previously in Syria (42 percent).

Tapping into social networks was the most common means of searching for work for both unemployed and employed survey respondents, but those who were working were more likely to have visited an employer to inquire about work in person. Focus groups also suggested that friends, family, and connections were the way most Syrians, Jordanians, and Egyptians found employment.

Difficulty in getting work permits was cited as one of the top obstacles to finding work by Syrians residing in Mafraq and Zarqa. Firms echoed this view, citing the lack of information on rules about hiring and the Syrians’ lack of work permits as the main disadvantages of hiring them. Cost of work permits, restrictions on industries, and sponsor availability were key
issues reported in our focus groups as well. In-depth interviews with employers indicated they considered Syrians highly skilled, good employees who were willing to work for less; they also introduced healthy competition with Jordanians in the labor market. Willingness to work for less was cited by 47 percent of responding firms as a main advantage of hiring Syrians.

Policies and Programs
Jordan received pledges from the international community at the February 2016 London Conference for the Jordan Compact, which had provisions for support of Jordan’s economy as Jordan opened up its labor market to Syrian refugees. Our interviews indicated a number of challenges to fully taking advantage of the benefits of the Jordan Compact. One key provision of the Jordan Compact was to relax the Rules of Origin (ROO) on certain exports to Europe, for firms located in a specified list of economic zones, provided Syrians made up at least 15 percent of their workforce (rising to 25 percent over time). It proved challenging for firms to recruit Syrians because working in the eligible special economic zones could require relocation, and, to a lesser extent, many refugees worried about losing humanitarian benefits tied to their location, including subsidized shelter and housing. Furthermore, few companies that were eligible to benefit had the resources and know-how to promote their products in European markets. To address these concerns, the Project Management Unit within the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation monitored and reported on implementation of the Compact.

Jordan also took steps to make work permit regulations more flexible by temporarily removing the work permit fee, relaxing the requirement for employers to provide proof of social security for their employees when applying for the permit, and adjusting health certification requirements for Syrians (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017; Razzaz, 2017). But as mentioned above, work permits continued to be noted as a thorny issue in focus groups and surveys.

International organizations instituted various vocational and employment-related programs; for example, supporting work opportunities for Syrians and Jordanians on public work projects. However, overall, vocational and employment-related trainings remained a work in progress in Jordan. Slightly less than a third of Syrian respondents (32 percent) reported that they received any kind of training since they arrived in Jordan, though most survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they could get the training and education they needed to gain job-relevant skills. Firms frequently cited the need for assistance with job matching and training. Yet in our focus groups, Syrians did not view international assistance programs to be helpful to Syrians finding employment. Both Syrian and Jordanian focus group participants suggested the need for specific, need-based training, including psychological support and counseling.

Perspectives on Employment Growth
Annual percent growth in GDP was on a steep decline well before the Syrian crisis and has slowed since 2007–2008 due to the global economic downturn, regional unrest and insecurity, and domestic energy issues. Annual GDP growth continued at approximately 2–3 percent through 2017. Conflicts and instability in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt were particularly challenging for Jordan in terms of both trade and FDI, resulting in limited demand for Jordanian goods and complicating their movement as well as a broader economic downturn that has affected demand even from the wealthier Gulf states.

Consistent with this macroeconomic situation, the lack of available jobs was the most frequently cited obstacle to employment. And plans for employment growth among firms
were decidedly mixed. Manufacturing firms were more likely to anticipate an increase in employment—particularly among unskilled workers—than services firms. Many of the firms that anticipated an increase in employment indicated that Syrians would likely account for up to 25 percent of their hiring if there were no barriers.

To promote overall employment growth, firms in our survey most commonly recommended lowering taxes, decreasing the cost of labor by subsidizing wages and benefits, improving infrastructure, making it easier to set up a business and get financing, making employment regulations clearer and stabler, and assisting with job matching and training. Our in-depth interviews of firms and surveys indicated measures to facilitate the permitting process by increasing the number of occupations and sectors Syrians could work in and providing wage subsidies for Syrians to improve prospects for Syrians in particular.

Social Cohesion

Though the presence of the Syrians has not caused major unrest in Jordan, various reports indicate that the situation occasionally caused tension in local communities. Most Jorda- nian workers thought that Syrians, to at least some extent, took jobs from locals. Despite these feelings of resentment, Jordanian stakeholders in our discussions cited shared history and culture with Syrians, including extended familial ties, intermarriage, and open travel between the two countries, as the reason for lower incidents of problems between the two communities. There was genuine concern among Jordanians for the plight of Syrians and of their predicament.

Most Syrian survey respondents reported that Jordanian workers and employers treated them with respect and that they were not regularly discriminated against.

Opportunities and Gaps

Challenges remained to providing livelihood opportunities for Syrian refugees in Jordan. Among these were realizing the full potential of the Jordan Compact; improving the business environment in order to attract investment and increase demand for all types of labor; providing targeted training to workers; and easing restrictions on Syrians’ working by facilitating training permits and expanding the sectors in which they work. Syrians were finding work, and the fact that manufacturing firms, in particular, were anticipating employment growth (and those firms anticipating growth expect a quarter of this to come from Syrians) were encour-aging signs.

Lebanon

The government of Lebanon estimated that there were 1.5 million displaced Syrians in Lebanon, including both registered and unregistered refugees, out of a total population of about 6 million in the country (Government of Lebanon and the United Nations, 2017, p. 116). Of these, 36 percent were in the Bekaa Valley, 26.5 percent in Beirut, 25.5 percent in North Lebanon, and 12 percent in South Lebanon (UNHCR, 2018b). Our focus groups and household surveys were conducted on refugee populations in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, the Bekaa, North Lebanon, and South Lebanon. Our firm surveys covered food and beverage, other manufacturing within manufacturing sectors, construction, and three service sectors (trade, hotels and restaurants, and cleaning services, in which Syrians are allowed to work).
Employment and Opportunities for Jobs
Most Syrians in Lebanon worked informally. An estimated 384,000 people comprised the Syrian labor force in Lebanon, of whom an estimated 153,600 were employed (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). In our survey sample, the overall percentage of household members aged 18 and older who were working or willing to work was approximately 61 percent: 92 percent for men and 30 percent for women. The percentages of survey household members working or willing to work were lowest in the Bekaa at 53 percent (87 percent for men, 23 percent for women) and in the South at 60 percent (93 percent for men, 29 percent for women). For men, the percentages of survey respondents willing to work but not working were relatively low and less than 15 percent in most cases except for the North. For women, the percentage of survey respondents willing to work but not working ranged from 33 percent in the Bekaa (likely due to their involvement in agriculture) to 88 percent in Mount Lebanon.

Construction, agriculture, and environmental services (which mainly involved cleaning work) were the sectors open to Syrian refugees for work under Lebanese law. Previous studies noted a large portion of Syrians in Lebanon worked in these sectors both currently and before the war as well (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 70; Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017; Berthier, 2017). Our survey respondents were likewise more likely to be working in construction, wholesale and retail trade, and service-related jobs than they had previously in Syria. Many respondents also worked in agriculture, and a small share of respondents worked in hotels and restaurants and in manufacturing. In our focus groups, both Lebanese and Syrians reported working below their qualifications; Syrians occupied jobs Lebanese did not want. Syrians who worked in construction, mining, and mobile phone shops in Syria reported continuing working in these fields in Lebanon.

Around half or more of survey respondents had either a primary-level education or less, which is consistent with earlier studies. Our firm surveys showed Syrians were more likely to be doing unskilled and semiskilled jobs than the overall workforce but less likely to be doing unskilled work than other non-Lebanese workers.

As with Turkey and Jordan, among the unemployed, the most commonly cited action taken to find a job was to ask relatives and friends for information about employment opportunities; this suggests the prominence of networks and social groups as the main method to search for employment.

The most commonly cited reasons for not working as reported in our household surveys included not being able to obtain a work permit (21 percent), believing there is no work (13 percent), and not knowing how or where to look for work (13 percent). Echoing findings from the household survey, respondents in the firm survey most commonly cited the lack of a residency or work permit as a disadvantage to hiring Syrians. In our focus groups, obtaining a residence permit—more so than a work permit—remained of primary importance for Syrians for employment. These groups also revealed that wasta (favoritism or nepotism) remained a main barrier for securing employment, particularly among Lebanese. In-depth firm interviews showed Syrians were perceived as hard workers and skilled craftsmen who were willing to accept difficult workplace conditions for less pay. In a similar vein, the firm surveys showed that the advantages of hiring Syrian workers were as follows: they performed the tasks required and were willing to work longer hours and to accept lower wages and benefits than Lebanese workers.
Policies and Programs
The January 2017 Ministry of Labor decision 41/1 reserved various professions for Lebanese citizens but allowed Syrians to work in agriculture, construction, and the environment. Even before the war, Syrians working in Lebanon often did so informally, but Syrians working without a valid work permit were vulnerable to fines or arrest. To apply for the work permits, Syrians must provide various types of documentation, including a valid residence permit. Residence permits have represented a key challenge for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Several measures have sought to improve the residence permit situation or alleviate related issues in the future. However, as mentioned above, in our surveys and focus groups, the lack of permits emerged as a critical impediment for Syrians to find work.

Various international and local organizations have also implemented vocational training courses and job programs. Despite the numerous vocational training programs, officials from both the private and public sectors expressed concern that many of the efforts were not effective, since training was provided in sectors in which refugees cannot work or provided little avenue for employment because it was not based on an analysis of market needs.

Perspectives on Employment Growth
In 2006, GDP growth rose as high as 10 percent, but it fell back down to about 1–2 percent annually after the global economic downturn. Low economic growth and high government expenditures (which unfortunately, have not been focused on infrastructure investment) have conspired to increase the debt-to-GDP ratio to 157.3 percent (as of April 2018), which was the third highest ratio in the world. FDI in Lebanon grew substantially in the 2000s during a massive reconstruction phase but then declined after 2009.

Given the weak economy, plans for expanding employment were mixed among firms. Manufacturing firms (especially food and beverage manufacturing firms) were particularly likely to anticipate an increase in employment among highly skilled workers, while construction firms were particularly likely to anticipate a decrease in employment. Nearly all of the firms that anticipated an increase in employment indicated that Syrians would likely account for up to 25 percent of their hiring if there were no barriers.

To encourage overall employment growth, firms in our survey suggested lowering taxes, reducing red tape, easing labor regulations, decreasing the cost of labor (by subsidizing wages and benefits and decreasing social security fees), making it easier to get financing, and providing help connecting to customers and suppliers. To encourage employment opportunities for Syrians in particular, respondents focused on policies to clarify their legal status and to make it easier and less costly to get work permits. Many stakeholders we interviewed mentioned the need for large-scale public works projects fueled by foreign capital as necessary to revive the economy and create jobs for Lebanese and Syrians alike.

Social Cohesion
As the country that hosted the most refugees and displaced persons per capita in the world, Lebanon has made considerable efforts and sacrifices to accommodate the Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, the sectarian balance among Lebanese communities was fragile, and Lebanese views of Syrian refugees were affected by their own past experience with civil war as well as with the prior Palestinian refugee influx. Among those we interviewed, it was clear that many viewed the continued status quo as untenable. They emphasized the importance of recognizing that the country had a turbulent history with Syria, including an occupation and prolonged
military presence, and that these had caused deep-rooted effects on the Lebanese national psyche. This made it much more complex for Lebanese to accept a long-term presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Despite these sentiments, a 2017 UN survey found that over a third of surveyed Syrian refugee households in Lebanon characterized the refugee-host community relations in their area as positive, about half stated that they were neutral, and only 5 percent stated that they were negative or very negative, (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 16).

In our focus groups, Lebanese felt threatened by the large numbers of Syrians in Lebanon. Lebanese expressed hostility about Syrians, which was likely tied to the poor workplace conditions and tense relations on the job reported by Syrians. On a more positive note, most Syrian survey respondents reported that workers and employers treated them with respect and that they did not face regular discrimination.

Opportunities and Gaps
Lebanon presented a challenging environment to improve livelihood opportunities for Syrian refugees. Training programs were uncoordinated and not market driven; legal requirements for residency and work were complex; sectors in which Syrians could work were quite limited; reforms and increased government capacity emerged as prerequisites for foreign investment; and social stability, often fueled by misperceptions about refugees, remained tenuous. But the situation was not without hope. Manufacturing firms anticipated increasing employment, and Syrians were firmly in the plans of firms that did want to hire. And despite social tensions, most Syrians who were employed felt they were treated with respect and not regularly discriminated against.

The Employment Situation of Syrian Women
The circumstances of displacement have had a large impact on the employment of Syrian women. Our focus groups found that more Syrian women were working in the three host countries than in Syria before the war, although these numbers were still low and many who wanted jobs did not have them. The share of female household members aged 18 and above who were working or willing to work was 25 percent in our Turkey sample, 54 percent in our Jordan sample, and 30 percent in our Lebanon sample. We also found low rates of female employment among firms in our surveys. The share of survey respondents who were not working but were willing to work was 55 percent in our Turkey sample, 84 percent in our Jordan sample, and 58 percent in our Lebanon sample. Working was also viewed in our focus groups as newly empowering the women in some cases and as being more socially accepted, necessary, and respectable by both men and women alike. In most cases, comments were similar among both men and women about how to find a job, types of jobs available, working conditions, and aspirations. At the same time, Syrian women described several challenges particular to women: being paid less than Syrian men, lack of safe transportation to the workplace, childcare and household responsibilities serving as a barrier to work or causing exhaustion when work outside the home could be found, and sexual harassment in some cases. Women often expressed desire for jobs that would enable them to work from home.
Recommendations

Our findings from a review of the literature, stakeholder interviews, focus groups, and household and firm surveys allowed us to suggest recommendations to host governments, individual donor countries, and multilateral agencies to further develop mutually beneficial opportunities for Syrian refugees and the host countries. While there were many similar considerations across the three countries (see Tables S.1–S.3), their contexts were sufficiently different from each other to warrant country-specific recommendations.
### Table S.1
#### Recommendations for Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and risks of implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Expand Turkish-language training and capacity, in combination with what is expected in the Turkish workplace</strong></td>
<td><em>Rationale:</em> Lack of Turkish language is a main barrier to Syrian employment. Few Syrians have received Turkish-language training, and there is not enough Turkish-language training to meet demand. Amount/intensity of Turkish-language training is insufficient for many to get a job. Other barriers include lack of high-quality materials and trained teachers. In addition to language, the cultural differences between Syrians and Turks are a related barrier to finding jobs and retention. <em>Implementation considerations:</em>  - Prioritize Syrians in the labor force for spaces in Turkish as a Second Language (TSL) classes.  - Create improved TSL course materials.  - Train Turkish teachers in TSL.  - Expand availability and awareness of web-based and smartphone Turkish-language instruction applications.  - Coordinate with Turkey’s Ministry of National Education (MONE), teacher training universities, multilateral agencies.  - Invest in online course providers such as Duolingo, Rosetta, or other online course.  - Make language training part of a broader training and job placement package for Syrians, targeted at organized industrial zones in cities outside of Istanbul (such as Adana, Bursa, and Izmir).  - Supplement the language training with training on expectations of Turkish employers and typical characteristics of the Turkish workplace.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Individual donor countries  Multilateral agencies  Government of Turkey (MONE)</td>
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<td><strong>Expedite recognition of Syrian credentials and educational degrees in Turkey</strong></td>
<td><em>Rationale:</em> Many refugees lack documentation of their educational credentials; many such credentials are in Arabic; and Syrian educational institutions may be unfamiliar to Turkish employers. EU countries have experimented with programs (such as the European Qualifications Passport for Refugees) to create credential validation for refugees, with translation of languages, skills, and quality, in order to help employers understand the qualifications of refugee applicants. In addition, the ILO has developed similar approaches in Jordan. While the government of Turkey has a process to enable foreigners to validate their credentials, few Syrians have used the process. <em>Implementation considerations:</em>  - Adapt the Turkish certification validation process in combination with the European Qualifications Passport for Refugees to the situation of Syrians, Iraqis, and other refugees in Turkey.  - Consider establishing Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) guidelines as suggested by the ILO, to assess occupational skills obtained through informal training and on-the-job experience (ILO, 2015, 2018).</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Government of Turkey (MONE)  Individual donor countries (for financing)  Multilateral agencies</td>
</tr>
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| Conduct demand-driven, on-the-job training for both Syrians and Turks, linked to employment opportunities | **Rationale:** There is a geographic mismatch between where the Syrians are and labor market demand. Although Syrians are not allowed to obtain legal work outside of their province of registration, many Syrians leave their province of registration to move to Istanbul in search of work. However, stakeholder interviews suggested that Istanbul is becoming overburdened. At the same time, stakeholders noted that skill gaps often arise within cities outside of Istanbul, particularly in Organized Industrial Zones (OIZs). What is needed is a targeted set of programs to meet local employment demand, legal changes to allow Syrians moving for work, and relocation incentives and assistance. EU countries have incentivized refugees to move to regions where there is employment demand.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Work closely with a local chamber of industry, organized industrial zone manager, business association, or other job training and matching organization to identify the specific, current needs of manufacturing firms in OIZs located in cities outside of Istanbul, such as Adana, Bursa, or Izmir.  
• Consider relaxing geographic restrictions on travel and work for Syrians who are willing to relocate to the targeted areas for work, and work with business associations and local governments in those provinces to actively recruit Syrians as well as Turkish workers from other areas.  
• Coordinate with local government, business associations, MONE, UNDP, İŞKUR, GIZ, and Rizk to implement job-matching and on-the-job training programs for both Syrians and Turks focused on filling the identified skills gaps. | High       | Medium to High               | Individual donor countries  
Government of Turkey          
Multilateral agencies         |
| Provide safe transportation for women to places of employment                  | **Rationale:** According to the firm survey results, the share of female workers among Syrian employees is lower than the share of female workers in the overall workforce in Turkey. While there is a reason for this finding, one concern identified by respondents in the Syrian household survey was the lack of safe and reliable transportation for women to reach work.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Work with local transportation providers to develop safe, female-only transportation options for both Syrian and Turkish women to reach their places of employment.  
• Consider coordinating with large employers, particularly those that employ relatively high numbers of female workers, such as large textile factories. | Medium     | Low                          | Individual donor countries  
Multilateral agencies         |
Table S.1—Continued

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<th>Recommendation</th>
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| Build on İŞKUR and Rizk programs in job matching, and expand these in regions with the most Syrians | *Rationale:* İŞKUR is legally permitted to facilitate Syrian employment but may have limited capacity to do so at regional levels. Rizk is a Syrian employment-matching NGO with a track record of job matching for refugees in Istanbul and Gaziantep.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Pay for additional staff at İŞKUR and for opening Rizk offices in provinces with high concentrations of Syrians such as Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Bursa, Adana, and Mersin. | High | Medium | Government of Turkey  
Individual donor countries (for financing) |
| Facilitate work permits for Syrians under Temporary Protection Status AND/OR Create a temporary revision to the work permit regulations for Syrians that enables more to work legally | *Rationale:* Few work permits have been issued for Syrian workers. Stakeholder interviews suggest that employers have few incentives to hire Syrians legally due to lack of knowledge about the procedures for applying for a permit, the cost associated with the permit application, and the fact that with the work permit, hiring a Syrian can be more expensive than hiring a Turk. However, without a work permit, Syrians are at greater risk of low pay and dangerous work conditions.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Finance a consulting or legal firm to help employers to process work permit applications.  
• Cover the costs of the work permit application.  
• AND/OR Offer automatic temporary (two-year) work permits to Syrians under Temporary Protection Status. | Medium | Medium | Individual donor countries (for financing)  
Multilateral agencies  
Government of Turkey |
| Start a Syria desk at KOSGEB, Turkey’s small and medium-sized (SME) assistance agency | *Rationale:* Syrians have been active entrepreneurs in Turkey, but they face challenges that include lack of local knowledge, networks, and financing. The government SME assistance agency does not have particular help for Syrians.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Finance additional facilitation for Syrian entrepreneurs and staffing at KOSGEB. | Medium | Low | Government of Turkey  
Individual donor countries (for financing) |
| Conduct a joint venture with a large Turkish firm, hiring Turks and Syrians | *Rationale:* A joint venture may offer business opportunities that could also be combined with socially aware hiring.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Hire both Turkish and Syrian workers (up to the allowable 10% allotment), obtaining work permits for all workers and paying both Turkish and Syrian workers at least minimum wage. | Low | High | Foreign investment companies |
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<td><strong>Enhance the current Customs Union (CU) between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, including easing transport, visa, and other barriers under the current CU, moving forward on efforts to deepen the CU, and identifying ways to correct existing asymmetries</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Turkey currently has a CU with the EU. However, the current CU applies to only industrial goods, and has a number of challenges, including (1) there is asymmetry, in that if the EU negotiates a free trade agreement (FTA) with a third-party country, goods from that country can enter Turkey (via the CU), but Turkey does not automatically get access to export to the third-party country unless it negotiates a separate FTA; (2) agriculture and services are not covered; (3) road transport permits are limited; (4) it is difficult for Turkish businesspeople to get visas to do business in the EU. Negotiations to revise and deepen the CU have stalled. Deepening the CU to include services, and making it easier for Turkey to benefit from FTAs that the EU signs with third-party countries, could help to improve Turkey’s economic climate by encouraging exports and increase jobs for all.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>European Union Government of Turkey</td>
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| **Study developing a policy regarding minimum wages for Syrian refugees**      | **Rationale:** Syrians are reportedly working for much lower wages than Turks, often well below Turkey’s minimum wage. At the same time, many Turks work informally and are paid below the minimum wage. The focus groups suggest that Turkish workers in some cases feel that Syrian workers’ willingness to accept lower wages undercuts their own wages and employment opportunities; many Turkish workers also feel that such low wages for Syrians are exploitative. In contrast, in the firm survey, firms most commonly cited willingness to accept low wages as an advantage to hiring Syrians, and the most common recommendations by firms for increasing employment opportunities included lowering the cost of hiring workers (for example, by decreasing social security fees or subsidizing wages).  

**Implementation considerations:**  
• Study the effects of increasing enforcement of the minimum wage on Syrian and Turkish employment before developing the policy.  
• Examine the Turkish government’s capacity to increase enforcement of the minimum wage.  
• Examine potential alternatives such as an earned income tax credit, or wage or benefit subsidies, to encourage legal work among both Turks and Syrians. | Medium   | Medium                          | Government of Turkey Multilateral agencies |
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| Offer short vocational training courses on needed skills: air-conditioner maintenance, machine operation and maintenance, building maintenance and facility management (plumbing, carpentry, electricity), welding, cooking, customer relations, entrepreneurial skills, electrical work, information technology, security, hospitality, textiles, retooling jewelry making and wall-building skills | **Rationale:** Current training is not always market relevant or provided in a coordinated way. The resources currently used for training could be spent more effectively.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
- Offer these to both Jordanians and Syrian refugees (the stigma surrounding vocational education among Jordanians is going down; raising cultural capital in businesses such as beauty salons will further help Jordanian workers).  
- Especially for manufacturing, focus on training and placing semiskilled workers for both Jordanians and Syrians.  
- Skills acquired by Syrians can be used for reconstruction when safe to go back.  
- Crucial to coordinate with other trainers such as GIZ to reduce duplication.  
- Coordinate with private sector to make the courses market relevant.  
- Training provided outside of firms, say by an external agency, might decrease turnover (i.e., trainees will not join a firm to take offered training and move to another).  
- A geographic focus on a port city such as Aqaba (given export potential to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) could be helpful.  
- Assist ILO for certification of skills via exams (ambitious target of 80,000 for 2018).  
- Improve credentialing in fields such as construction, which will help Jordanians as well, by attracting them to the sector and expanding their employment.  
- Recognize the existing skills and backgrounds of the trainees in designing the program—many of the direct beneficiaries of training already have relevant skills for services or manufacturing work, while other do not, having either worked on farms their whole life, or in the case of women, having not participated in the labor force in Syria.  
- Assess the role that organized labor (e.g., General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions [GFJTU]) can play in providing training to both Syrian refugees and Jordanians.  
- Develop work placement after training (see recommendation below on matching employees to employers). | High | Medium | Individual donor countries |
| Identify promising training initiatives such as ReBootKamp (RBK; a computer coding course with a track record of placement success offered to both Jordanians and Syrians) and scale them up | **Rationale:** In addition to setting up training programs from scratch, proven models can be scaled up with additional investment; for instance, by supporting loan agreements in place.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
- RBK trains both Jordanians and Syrians.  
- RBK targets a higher end sector (information technology) and places Syrians as consultants, but scaling up can be done for any type of training. | High | Medium to High | Individual donor countries |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Improve skills assessment and certification of worker skills | **Rationale:** Skills that workers have are not always certified and therefore not recognized in the labor market, making it difficult for them to find jobs.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
- Set up another organization to do this or bolster existing efforts by organizations such as the ILO.  
- More likely to be useful for Syrians. | Medium | Medium | Individual donor countries |
| Improve matching of employees and employers | **Rationale:** Training to improve supply of workers and policies to stimulate demand for them are not likely to succeed without efficient matching of employers to employees, and this has been lacking.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
- Set up another matching agency or bolster existing ones such as recruitment agencies (for specialized skills) or GIZ’s initiative with the Ministry of Labor (for general labor).  
- Work with both Jordanians and Syrians.  
- Organize job fairs to bring employers and employees together. Even bringing job seekers together with employees who already have jobs will help as informal networks are important in finding jobs.  
- Matching at the informal level is harder than at the formal, higher-skill levels, since recruiting agencies do not operate much at the informal level. Therefore, matching could be aimed at formal firms ahead of informal firms. Educating firms about matching mechanisms available would be important.  
- Bolster the role of chambers of commerce in the matching process; employers use them sporadically.  
- Matching is especially important for Rules of Origin agreement (Jordan Compact)—eligible exporters.  
- There is also a need for an information broker on the availability of workers as well as policies to hire them, since these signals do not appear to be reaching employers. | High | Medium to High | Individual donor countries |
| Address the problem of employee turnover in firms by instituting and enforcing mechanisms such as two-sided notice | **Rationale:** Employee turnover, especially among Syrian workers, is often suggested as an impediment to hiring them; while policy stability is a more first-order issue, reducing this turnover with mechanisms such as two-sided notice is likely to increase certainty and therefore Syrians' employability.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
- Since all workers will benefit from this, should apply to Jordanians and Syrians  
- Policy certainty regarding Syrians would most likely help them to be hired, but this is likely to be politically difficult. | High | High | Government of Jordan (Multilateral agencies can provide capacity building) |
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<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Simplify and streamline the procedure of issuing work permits                  | Rationale: The requirement of work permits and the difficulty of obtaining them is an impediment for Syrians entering the labor market. Implementation considerations:  
  • More than any subsidy, there is a demand for stability of policy so that employers can hire with peace of mind.  
  • Continue to facilitate opening work permits in sectors such as services and restaurants and food preparation businesses (where there is need and Jordanians do not want to work).  
  • Allow GFJTU to issue permits beyond the currently agreed-upon one year (including allowing them to train Syrian workers on their rights), thereby making permits easier to get.  
  • Clarify and disseminate information about rules on hiring Syrians, for instance by issuing an easy to understand handbook that summarizes work permit and other regulations.  
  • Moreover, if the regulations are in the gazette and have legal status, legal aid staff, employers, workers, and others will have a formal way of accessing them. | High     | High                             | Government of Jordan (Multilateral agencies can provide capacity building) |
| Explore enforcing minimum wage laws and working conditions for Syrian workers and for Jordanian workers | Rationale: Employers paying lower wages to Syrian workers is a major source of local resentment and also opens these workers to potential exploitation. Implementation considerations:  
  • Weigh these benefits against the potential loss of demand for Syrian workers.  
  • Given the complexity of the issue, further investigation might be warranted.  
  • Enforce minimum working conditions laws, as poor working conditions, especially in industry, are likely to be a major deterrent, particularly to women who would otherwise be willing to work in textile and other factories.  
  • Examine mechanisms for provision of health insurance and social security for non-Jordanian workers. | High     | High                             | Government of Jordan (Multilateral agencies can provide capacity building in inspection and enforcement) |
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<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Reassess the assistance provided by multilateral agencies to Syrian refugees | **Rationale:** There is local resentment that refugees get this over and beyond (low) wages, which together gives the impression that they are better off than host-country workers.  
  **Implementation considerations:**  
  • Keep assistance focused on the most vulnerable, while enabling those who can work to do so.  
  • On the margin, it reduces the incentive for Syrian workers to find jobs.  
  • As the stay of the refugees lengthens, the situation moves from humanitarian to livelihood, and assistance can be viewed as complementary.  
  • Donor fatigue might have set in, which might make reduced assistance inevitable, in any case.  
  • Lessons learned from schemes such as EITC in the U.S. could be explored here (assistance complementary to wages instead of substituting) to give Syrian workers appropriate incentives. Communicate such an incentive-based policy appropriately with refugees. While this will apply to those who are able to work, those who are not able to work due to age, health, or similar considerations would continue to need assistance. | Medium | Medium | Multilateral agencies |
| Ease restrictions on the Rules of Origin agreement that is part of the Jordan Compact, such as allowing companies outside the special economic zones to participate, expanding the list of eligible products, and lowering the threshold percentage of Syrian employment | **Rationale:** Very few companies have met the eligibility criteria to participate in the Rules of Origin agreement of the Jordan Compact, decreasing the effectiveness of the program. | Medium | Medium | European Union, Government of Jordan |
| Improve environment for doing business for all | **Rationale:** The Jordanian economy was slowing down even before the refugees arrived; and addressing the structural impediments to economic growth would be needed to improve job prospects for all workers: Jordan came in at 103 out of 190 in the World Bank’s 2019 Ease of Doing Business rankings.  
  **Implementation considerations:**  
  • Improve “ease of firing” (with appropriate notice) as firms will not take risks and hire in the first place if it is difficult to retrench their workforce if their ideas do not bear fruit.  
  • Shorten duration for approvals and licenses, thereby reducing the cost of doing business.  
  • Improve secured lending laws and insolvency bylaws.  
  • Streamline registration procedures for companies, thereby making it easier to start a business.  
  • Encourage investment by all nationalities, else they will invest elsewhere. Ease passport restrictions for Syrian investors, and assess the high cost of this document against the period of validity. | High | Medium | Government of Jordan |
### Table S.2—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase capacity of government agencies</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> All the recommendations would need support from the government agencies and capacity building in appropriate areas would help.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Individual donor countries, in collaboration with the Government of Jordan, Multilateral agencies</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Implementation considerations:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Project Management Unit (PMU) in Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) is already trying to increase awareness of Jordan Compact through outreach and communication.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Leverage public, private, and multinational resources to provide technical assistance to companies to market their products and improve standards for European markets.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Invest in large-scale infrastructure projects</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> The Jordanian economy was slowing down even before the refugees arrived, and stimulating economic growth would be necessary to improve job prospects for all workers.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Individual donor countries, Multilateral agencies</td>
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<td><strong>Implementation considerations:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Builds capacity for Syrian workers to eventually rebuild Syria.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Addresses much-needed infrastructure development in health, education, transportation, and utilities across multiple sectors that have claimed to be burdened with the influx of refugees.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Increasing the capacity of government agencies as mentioned above (to disburse funding and monitor projects) would be particularly critical for this recommendation to work.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Improve transportation infrastructure and services to factories in the industrial zones, particularly targeting both Jordanian and Syrian women</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> One of the key barriers to link Syrian women to work opportunities in the zones is transportation to and from the zone.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Individual donor countries, Multilateral agencies</td>
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<td><strong>Implementation considerations:</strong></td>
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<td>• Transport could target Syrians in both camp and noncamp settings as well as Jordanians.</td>
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<td>• Transportation to large manufacturing firms could be targeted first to achieve efficiencies of scale.</td>
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### Table S.3
**Recommendations for Lebanon**

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<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Offer short vocational training courses on needed skills: security/alarms, mechanical and other technical skills, construction, English, cooking and other restaurant work** | **Rationale:**
Current training is not always market relevant or provided in a coordinated way.

**Implementation considerations:**
- Offer these to both Lebanese workers and Syrian refugees.
- Training to Syrians assumes the fields in which they would be allowed to work are expanded (see recommendation below).
- Identify firm needs for highly skilled workers and provide appropriate training and placement services.
- Firms say they have no incentive to train as employees leave after training, which is why governmental help would be required.
- At the same time, this needs private sector involvement; e.g., use fiberoptic firm to train in factory setting through internships; would also address the issue of some viewing training as an opportunity to socialize and get free meals.
- Training aimed at strengthening skills of Syrians would also be beneficial upon their eventual return and the rebuilding of Syria.
- Develop work placement after training (see recommendation below on matching employees to employers). | High      | Medium                            | Individual donor countries |
| **Decrease restrictions on sectors where Syrians can work** | **Rationale:**
Bakery, hospitality, and driving are some of the jobs Syrians can do, especially because there is a gap in supply by nationals (based on interviews and focus groups). | High      | High                              | Government of Lebanon |
| **Facilitate obtaining work permits** | **Rationale:**
Workers are either reluctant to search for jobs without permits or employers do not offer them jobs. Focus groups and surveys repeatedly point to difficulty of obtaining permits as a major impediment to finding a job. | High      | High                              | Government of Lebanon |

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Address the problem of employee turnover in firms by instituting and enforcing mechanisms such as two-sided notice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Employee turnover, especially among Syrian workers, is high; as mentioned above, this is a disincentive for firms to provide training; while policy stability is a more first-order issue, reducing this turnover with mechanisms such as two-sided notice is likely to increase certainty and therefore Syrians’ employability and training opportunities. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Should apply to all workers. • Policy certainty regarding Syrians would most likely help them to be hired, but this is likely to be politically difficult.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon (Multilateral agencies can provide capacity building)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase capacity of government agencies</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Foreign investment is unlikely to flow unless there is a suitable capacity for governance, procurement, etc. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Help in decentralized implementation of projects—develop capacity of municipal governments including their coordination and management across the multiple NGOs that are working in their geographical jurisdiction. • Seek complementary responses to those provided by the central government, such as local government responses, including public-private and people partnerships. • Help build an efficient monitoring system. • Ensure that development of human capital in government agencies includes local and municipal governments in socio-economically challenged areas of the country that have been historically neglected, and in whose jurisdictions Syrian refugees are likely concentrated.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Individual donor countries in collaboration with the Government of Lebanon Multilateral agencies, in collaboration with the Government of Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improve matching of employees and employers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Training to improve supply of workers and policies to stimulate demand for them are not likely to succeed without efficient matching of employers to employees, and this has been lacking. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Set up another matching agency or bolster existing ones such as recruitment agencies. • Matching at the informal level is harder than at the formal, higher-skill levels, since recruiting agencies do not operate much at the informal level.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium to High</td>
<td>Individual donor countries</td>
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<td>Recommendation</td>
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<td>Priority</td>
<td>Costs and Risks of Implementation</td>
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| Address the negative perceptions on assistance provided by multilateral agencies to Syrian refugees | **Rationale:** There is local resentment that refugees get this over and beyond (low) wages, which together makes them perceived as better off than host-country workers; some experts feel these are just negative perceptions with little basis in reality.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Highlight the economic contributions of the refugee response to address negative perceptions.  
• On the margin, assistance could reduce the incentive for Syrian workers to find jobs. Lessons learned from schemes such as EITC in the U.S. could be adopted here (assistance complementary to wages instead of substituting) to give Syrian workers appropriate incentives. Communicate such an incentive-based policy appropriately with refugees. While this will apply to those who are able to work, those who are not able to due to age, health, or similar considerations would continue to need assistance.  
• Donor fatigue might have set in, which might make reduced assistance inevitable, in any case. | Medium | Medium | Multilateral agencies |
| Address the gap between reality and perceptions regarding Syrian refugees | **Rationale:** The public is not always aware of the facts about refugees, leading to resentment.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Provide assistance to institutions like the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut to get the facts out and negate misperceptions.  
• Work through community-based organizations including religious bodies and respected members (including politicians) of each confessional community.  
• Identify and support champions across the Lebanese community, particularly high-profile and visible members, and communicate the new narrative through media (TV, newspapers) and film.  
• Highlight the good work done by Syrians through visual means (such as pictures of Syrians contributing to the society and the economy) to create a positive image. | Medium | Low | Government of Lebanon  
Individual donor countries  
Multilateral agencies |
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<th>Recommendation</th>
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<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve environment for doing business for all</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> The Lebanese economy was slowing down even before the refugees arrived, and addressing the structural impediments to economic growth would be needed to improve job prospects for all workers.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon, Individual donor countries, Multilateral agencies</td>
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<td><strong>Implementation considerations:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve access to finance, which is noted as a leading impediment by firms.</td>
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<td>• Reduce red tape, and thereby the cost of doing business.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Improve the electricity infrastructure.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Help with market expansion activities—where to sell? Set up a Lebanese Development Authority similar to Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA). Lebanon is well known for niche products such as furniture and food products, which could be marketed abroad.</td>
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<td>• Link SMEs to markets (say, by funding incubators like Berytech).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Invest in large-scale infrastructure projects</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> The Lebanese economy was slowing down even before the refugees arrived, and stimulating economic growth would be necessary to improve job prospects for all workers.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Individual donor countries, Multilateral agencies, including the international private sector</td>
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<td><strong>Implementation considerations:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Helps both Lebanese and Syrian workers.</td>
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<td>• Builds capacity for Syrian workers to eventually rebuild Syria.</td>
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<td>• Increasing the capacity of government agencies as mentioned above (to disburse funding and monitor projects) would be particularly critical for this recommendation to work.</td>
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<td>• Addresses much-needed infrastructure development in health, education, transportation, and utilities across multiple sectors that are claimed to have been burdened with the influx of refugees.</td>
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<td>• Provides the greatest opportunity to make much-needed infrastructure investment in the most vulnerable and traditionally neglected areas and regions, where Syrian refugees also happen to be concentrated.</td>
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</table>
We are grateful to the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) for funding this study. In particular, we deeply appreciate the guidance and advice provided by Mr. Ali Abdulla Al-Dabbagh, Mr. Samer Raymond Frangieh, and Mr. Youssef Elias Heneine.

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- Mr. Fahad Al-Sulaiti, Education Above All
- Mr. Mohamed Al Ghamdi, Qatar Charity
- Mrs. Subah Haioos, Silatech
- Mr. Andrew Harper, United Nations High Commission for Refugees
- Ms. Shaza Ghaleb Jondi, International Labour Organization
- Mr. Gideon Maltz, Tent Foundation
- Mr. Michael Moroz, United Nations Development Programme
- Mr. Jonathan Peters, United Nations Development Programme
- Dr. Mary Joy Pigozzi, Education Above All
- Mr. Jason Pronyk, United Nations Development Programme
- Mr. Matthew Reynolds, United Nations High Commission for Refugees
- Mr. Samuel Rizk, United Nations Development Programme

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Ipsos in Turkey and Lebanon, and Market Research Organization (MRO) in Jordan, provided excellent service in conducting focus groups and refugee and firm surveys in the respective countries.

At RAND, we benefited from the guidance and support of Mr. Michael Rich, CEO and president, and Mr. Charles Ries, vice president, International, for which we are thankful.
Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANOVA</td>
<td>analysis of variance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTEC</td>
<td>Business and Technology Education Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPI</td>
<td>Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing (device)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIP</td>
<td>Capital Investment Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Customs Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGMM</td>
<td>Directorate General for Migration Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITC</td>
<td>earned income tax credit</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>Employment Promotion Program</td>
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<td>ERF</td>
<td>Economic Research Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESSN</td>
<td>Emergency Social Safety Net</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>foreign direct investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>free trade agreement</td>
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<td>GBPTP</td>
<td>Greater Beirut Public Transportation Project</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFJTU</td>
<td>General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>Industrial Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>international nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIC</td>
<td>International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
İSKUR: Turkish employment agency
IT: Information technology
JIC: Jordan Investment Commission
JLMPS: Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey
KOSGEB: Small and Medium Industry Development Organization
LFPR: Labor force participation rate
LFS: Labor Force Survey
MONE: Ministry of National Education
MoPIC: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MRO: Market Research Organization
MSMEs: Micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises
NGO: Non-governmental organization
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIZs: Organized Industrial Zones
PMU: Project Management Unit
QFFD: Qatar Fund for Development
RBK: ReBootKamp
ROO: Rules of Origin
RPL: Recognition of Prior Learning
RSC: Refugee Studies Centre
SMEs: Small and medium-sized enterprises
TSL: Turkish as a Second Language
TVET: Technical and vocational education and training
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
WFP: World Food Programme
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Background and Purpose

The Syrian Civil War has displaced 60 percent of its 23 million population, with 6.5 million Syrians displaced inside Syria (UNHCR, 2018c), 5.6 million Syrians living in neighboring Middle East countries as refugees (UNHCR, 2018b), about a million in Europe, and some 100,000 elsewhere in the world, primary North America (Connor, 2018). No other country in recent history has had such a large percentage of its population displaced. Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon host most of these displaced Syrians.

Turkey is host to the greatest number of Syrian refugees: 3.5 million, or about 5 percent of its 80 million population. Although Lebanon (with 1 million registered refugees [down from 1.2 million in 2015], equal to 17 percent of its population) and Jordan (with 660,000 registered refugees, equal to 7 percent of its population) are hosts to smaller numbers of Syrian refugees, the numbers of refugees are substantially larger in relation to their populations. Indeed, Lebanon has the highest per capita number of both Syrian refugees and of refugees in the world.

The addition of such large numbers of new people into these countries has placed a severe strain on their labor markets, public-sector services (e.g., education, health, sanitation), and social cohesion (attitudes toward newcomers that lead to harmony among the various groups). But this situation is not without opportunities for the Syrians to contribute to the economies of these host countries.

The future prosperity and stability of the Middle East region rests on creating mutually beneficial economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and host-country workers. This longer-term challenge requires investments in the host countries, particularly Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, to help both their own citizens and the refugees meet their daily needs, legally contribute to the local economy and likely the regional economy through trade, and infuse a sense of hope for their future opportunities.

In February 2016, the United Nations, a group of donor countries, and the refugee host governments convened in London to map a way forward in addressing the Syrian refugee crisis. Turkey agreed to the “London Conference—Turkey Statement”; Jordan agreed to implement the “Jordan Compact”; and Lebanon presented a “Statement of Intent.” Following these efforts, there have been additional plans and programs led by the governments of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, as well as United Nations agencies.

This RAND study, funded by the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD), builds on and complements existing work conducted by the governments of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon; the United Nations; and other donor governments in pursuing the goal of creation of jobs for Syrian refugees and citizens in host communities.
We decided to focus on Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, given the sheer number of Syrian refugees they have accommodated. For instance, the numbers of Syrian refugees in Iraq (around 251,000) and Egypt (around 130,000) are considerably lower (3RP, 2018c, 2018d). We also expect our findings and the recommendations to address challenges relevant to other contexts.

Our research questions, broadly, are:

- What is the overall labor market situation for Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon?
  - What are the general skill levels of Syrians, their current and previous occupations, the training they have received and desire, their average earnings, and their perceptions of the workplace and the hurdles they face?
  - To what extent do firms hire and plan to hire Syrians, and what advantages and disadvantages of Syrian workers do they perceive?

- What are the host-country worker and firm perceptions of Syrians in the labor market?

- Are there mutually beneficial opportunities in the labor markets of these countries, such as existing gaps that could be filled by Syrian workers and ways in which they could add economic value to host countries?

- What policy and program improvements could be recommended to host-country governments, multilateral and nongovernment organizations, and donors to realize the gains from such opportunities?

To answer these questions, this study conducts an in-depth analysis of existing skill sets of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan (“supply”); the needs of private sector companies (“demand”); the steps needed to match the supply and demand; the steps needed to improve the overall economic climate; and strategies for social cohesion of refugees and host communities beyond purely economic opportunities. It provides recommendations for the host-country governments, donor countries, and multilateral agencies with the hope of devising practical policies to help refugees find economic opportunities in host communities and to help host communities minimize disruption to local residents while assuring overall economic development. It does so in the spirit of seeking win-win outcomes for stakeholders and turning the refugee situation into an opportunity for both the refugees and host countries. In summary, this RAND study aims to generate options on how to create opportunities for securing economic opportunities for Syrian refugees that will have long-lasting benefits for host countries and refugees alike.

In carrying out this study, RAND has conferred with governments and multilateral agencies to ensure that we are cognizant of and complementing ongoing initiatives. In turn, we hope our work will play a role in identifying policies and initiatives on the part of host countries, multilateral agencies, and foundations that will contribute to needed stability amid the turbulence of the Syrian refugee crisis.

This study has drawn upon multiple methods (described in detail in Chapter Two): a context analysis that included a literature review and stakeholder interviews; focus groups with Syrian, host-country, and other migrant workers in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon; surveys of both firms and Syrian households in each of these three countries; and workshops with an advisory council. Our mixed-methods approach, besides shedding light on the multiple facets of a very complex situation, helps us identify recurring themes and corroborative as well as conflicting findings across the methods, thereby allowing us to draw nuanced conclusions.
As we discuss in the context overviews, others have studied the Syrian refugee situation to varying degrees in these three countries. Our study has benefited considerably from the existing knowledge base and also extends it in significant and complementary ways. In particular, here is how our report adds value:

- While most of the existing reports examine only one country, we study three countries with large Syrian refugee populations that have similarities but also critical differences. We synthesize our findings in a cross-country context, allowing for the possibility that each country could learn from the other on the effectiveness of various refugee-related policies and regulations.
- While many studies have been based primarily on interviews with Syrians, we conducted focus groups of host-country and other expatriate workers, and we also did in-depth interviews of local firms. We can therefore identify similarities and differences in perceptions of the situation on the ground from different groups. This approach allows us to recommend interventions cognizant of group dynamics.
- Surveying both Syrian households and firms that are likely to hire them is another novel aspect of our study. This allows us to examine perceptions regarding employment of Syrians from both perspectives. From the Syrian workers, we gather information on barriers to finding work and workplace treatment, and from the potential employers, we gather advantages and disadvantages of hiring Syrians.
- Surveying firms on their prior, current, and anticipated future recruitment of Syrians, as we do, has not been commonly done. This allows us to document hiring practices, compare them across the three countries, and make our recommendations on training and removal of barriers more context specific.
- Our comprehensive mixed-methods approach is rare in the context of studying the refugee situation. By employing semistructured and in-depth interviews of stakeholders and firms; focus groups of host-country workers, Syrians, and other expatriates; and surveys of both Syrian households and firms, our methods can provide much-needed texture for a complicated situation.

**Organization of This Report**

Following this introduction in Chapter One, we discuss our approach and methodology in Chapter Two, relegating details to appendices. Chapters Three through Five give context overviews of circumstances related to refugee employment and the overall economic climate in Turkey through a review of the literature and semistructured interviews with local experts, analysis of the findings from focus group discussions and interviews with employers, and findings from Syrian households and firms, respectively. Chapters Six through Eight do the same for Jordan, and Chapters Nine through Eleven for Lebanon. In Chapter Twelve, we provide a brief treatment of lessons learned from countries other than the three we have examined, and in Chapter Thirteen, we synthesize the main findings within each of the three countries we have studied, and across them. We provide a set of recommendations to improve both refugee and host-country worker economic opportunities in Chapter Fourteen. We conclude in Chapter Fifteen with suggestions for future directions.
The socioeconomic and political aspects of the Syrian refugee crisis, including related to employment in host countries, are so complex that they require a multimethod approach to analyze and address the challenges posed. Therefore, we followed a mixed-methods approach in this study, employing qualitative and quantitative approaches to understand the various facets of the crisis and develop recommendations to address it. Qualitative methods included: a context analysis (based on a literature review and stakeholder interviews), focus groups, semistructured interviews with firms, and workshops with the project’s advisory council. Quantitative methods included a household survey of Syrian refugees and survey of host-country firms.

All interview and focus group protocols, survey instruments, and research procedures were reviewed and approved by the RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee. RAND oversaw Market Research Organization (MRO) in Jordan and Ipsos in Lebanon and Turkey to recruit participants and conduct the focus groups and in-depth interviews of firms, as well as to conduct the surveys of Syrian households and local firms. We had several discussions with the management, focus group moderators, interviewers, and survey enumerators to set expectations on standards and arrive at a common understanding on the best practices to follow on information elicitation in focus groups, data collection, cleaning, and verification.

Qualitative Methods

Context Analysis: Literature Review and Stakeholder Interviews

The context analysis, based on both a literature review and semistructured stakeholder interviews, included a review and evaluation of available data sources and reports (such as those from the governments, universities, and the United Nations [UN]); identification of relevant programs, policies, and investment initiatives; assessment of the latest developments toward creating jobs for Syrians and their host communities; and a review of each country’s recent policies and programs related to refugee employment. This coalesced in a broad overview of the policy landscape and context. Therefore, our aim in these chapters was partly to provide context, but also to synthesize and provide findings from the existing literature and data and from our stakeholder interviews. While many of the same themes are subsequently echoed in the focus group and survey findings, we believe that the synthesis presents context and complementary evidence.

The literature review considered key issues across the countries. These included: geographic distribution of refugees within each country; educational qualifications of refugees and of host-country nationals; sectoral and occupational distribution of refugees and host-country nationals;
unemployment rates by education level and geography; sectoral contributions to GDP; overall economic climate; key barriers to growth and entrepreneurship; policies and laws that facilitate or hinder refugee employment, including perceived impacts of recent changes; and major themes in media surrounding refugees, including social cohesion.

Following review and approval by the RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee, we conducted 23 stakeholder interviews in Istanbul, Ankara, and Şanlıurfa in Turkey; 16 in Beirut, Lebanon; and 15 in Amman, Jordan. These 54 interviews aimed to outline the broad policy landscape from those working closely on the topic of labor market integration, aid, diplomacy, and research.

Guided by our research questions, interview protocols (included in Appendix A) covered issues central to the labor markets: opportunities (skills matching, key sectors, and growing employment demand); the legal framework and government policies and programs; programs, initiatives, and interventions; collaboration and coordination among stakeholders; perceptions of Syrians and willingness to employ Syrians; and visions for the future. Stakeholders included in the interviews included government officials, multilateral agencies, donor country embassies, think tanks, industry associations, private sector representatives, firm owners, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Notes from the stakeholder interviews were drawn on to develop additional questions within the literature review, as well as in the development of the protocols for focus groups and semistructured interviews with firms.

**Focus Groups of Affected Segments of the Population**

We conducted focus groups among segments of the population impacted by the influx of Syrian refugees into the Turkish, Jordanian, and Lebanese labor markets—namely working-age Syrian refugees in the labor market (both men and women), working-age host-country workers in the labor market (both men and women), and migrant (non-Syrian, expatriate, male) workers.

The focus group protocols were developed based on the context analysis and experience from previous research conducted by the RAND team. As with the interview protocols, they were designed to provide answers to the research questions listed in Chapter One (understanding the overall labor market situation from the supply and demand perspectives, and identifying perceptions of host-country workers and firms, mutually beneficial opportunities, and recommendations to further them). The focus group protocols were developed to elicit each group’s understandings of the particular social, circumstantial, cultural, and structural factors affecting their ability to find and maintain sufficient and decent work (see Appendix B). Specific topics included: strategies to seek and obtain employment, knowledge of employment opportunities, work permit– and residence permit–related issues, social cohesion among Syrians and host-country citizens in the workplace, working conditions, assistance provided by other refugees and aid agencies in obtaining employment, the role of credentials, childcare, transportation, experiences with any current training programs under way, and aspirations and outlook on the future.

Thirty-six total focus groups (consisting of six to ten participants) were conducted in Turkey (13 focus groups), Jordan (12), and Lebanon (11). The distribution of each focus group is described in Appendix C. Focus groups consisted of participants from key geographic regions where Syrians have settled and were limited to working-age adults (ages 18–50). Focus groups were additionally stratified by gender based on the cultural norms (e.g., host-country participants were stratified by gender in Turkey and Jordan only; Syrian participants were stratified by gender in all countries).
Participants were recruited from existing representative databases owned by survey partners until a purposive sample of each type of participant (Syrian working-age adult, host-country working-age adult, and migrant worker) was reached. Participants were offered compensation for their time. Participants gave verbal consent prior to the start of the focus group. RAND team members attended six of the above-mentioned 36 focus groups to pilot test the focus group protocols, to provide feedback to focus group moderators, and to ensure quality. All focus groups were conducted in Arabic or Turkish as appropriate, recorded, transcribed verbatim, and translated into English.

Semistructured Interviews with Host-Country Firm Owners
In line with the aims of the focus groups, we conducted 12 semistructured interviews among small, midsized, and large firm owners that employ Syrians and migrant workers (four in each country). We developed an interview protocol based on the findings of the context analysis, which included preliminary discussions with business representatives, and based on existing knowledge of the challenges and opportunities that firms face in the current labor market.

Our survey partners recruited firms from existing databases of firms until at least one firm of each size was interviewed. The owners of a small service firm, a midsized food production firm, a large construction firm, and a large textile factor in Turkey participated in an interview. In Lebanon, we interviewed the owners of a small restaurant, a midsized services firm, a midsized production firm, and a large construction firm. Finally, in Jordan, we interviewed the owners of a small services firm, a midsized manufacturing firm, a large construction firm, and a large manufacturing firm. Firm owners were offered compensation for their time. Verbal consent was gathered prior to starting the interview. All interviews were conducted in Arabic or Turkish as appropriate, recorded, transcribed verbatim, and translated into English.

Analysis of Focus Groups and Semistructured Interviews
All transcriptions were uploaded into Dedoose (SocioCultural Research Consultants, 2017), a cloud-based qualitative analysis software program that facilitates team-based coding and subsequent data analysis. We employed an inductive and deductive approach to the development of a codebook in order to encompass key research questions covered within the focus group and interview protocols, as well as additional topics that emerged. The codebook denoted the domains of interest to this evaluation (e.g., barriers and facilitators to securing employment, types of jobs performed by Syrians, issues related to social cohesion, and workplace environment descriptions).

The qualitative data analysis team iterated the codebook and specified the proper application of codes. Four team members experienced in qualitative data analysis then coded the interviews. We established intercoder reliability (i.e., consistency and consensus in the application of codes) within the Dedoose platform (Cohen’s Kappa > 0.801) (Haney et al., 1998, pp. 38–43). The coding team met biweekly over the course of the analysis to resolve any discrepancies in the application of codes.

Upon completion of coding, three researchers reviewed the coded excerpts for key themes. Each researcher was assigned to review the coded excerpts from one country. We identified

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1. Cohen’s Kappa is a robust, acceptable measure of intercoder agreement. Cohen’s Kappa approaches 1 as agreement among coders increases (Haney et al., 1998). Cohen’s Kappa is calculated as $K = \frac{Pa - Pc}{1 - Pc}$, where $Pa =$ proportion of units on which the coders agree and $Pc =$ the proportion of units for which agreement is expected to occur by chance.
themes through well-established techniques, including repetition (e.g., if a theme was expressed more than multiple times), use of metaphor, and exceptional cases (Ryan and Bernard, 2003). We also focused on themes that were specific to particular groups and/or to particular geographic regions.

Together, these techniques gathered a range of perspectives from those impacted by the crisis. In addition, the qualitative findings provided in-depth, contextual data to complement the quantitative survey findings. The results of these analyses are described in Chapters Four, Seven, and Ten.

Advisory Council Workshops
This study relied on a council of distinguished external advisers to provide advice and facilitation for the study. The advisory council comprised a respected group of stakeholders and leaders engaged in the Syrian refugee response from multiple institutions: Education Above All, the International Labour Organization, the International Organization for Migration, Qatar Charity, Silatech, the Tent Foundation, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The group served as an advisory body and without legal standing. The study involved consultation with individuals in the advisory council for advice and facilitation and meetings with the advisory council as a group three times: at the initiation of the study for overall feedback on the study design and advice on the approach, which was completed in January 2017; after the delivery of the interim report for feedback and discussion of the draft recommendations in summer 2018; and in September 2018 to discuss ideas about report dissemination and impact.

Quantitative Methods
To complement the qualitative methods described above, and following review and approval by the RAND Human Subjects Protection Committee, we conducted surveys of Syrian refugees and firms that are likely to employ them. Given time and resource constraints, we did not aim for these surveys to be representative or lead to population-level estimates. Rather, our aim was to achieve a broad enough representation of refugees and firms which would allow us to make informed recommendations broadly relevant to multiple segments of the populations. Below, we provide an overview of the survey and sampling methods; further details can be found in Appendix D.

Household Survey and Sampling Methodology
In the household survey, we asked the respondents for information on the family background, education and training, sector and occupational details of those who are working, methods that those who are not working are using to find work as well as the method used by those who are employed to find their job, previous employment in Syria, obstacles to employment, and general employment perceptions in the host country. The household survey questionnaire used in Jordan is provided in Appendix E; the questionnaires for the other two countries are similar.

Even though we did not aim for a fully representative survey sample of Syrian refugees, the geographic areas selected for the survey were intended to broadly represent the population of Syrian refugees in each country. The selection of governorates for the household and firm surveys, as well as for the focus groups and in-depth interviews with firms, were aligned geo-
Methodology

graphically to the extent possible. RAND and its survey partners developed approaches that ensured that the broad representation desired was achieved and that also took into the account the unique circumstances in each country, such as geographic reach and distribution of the target population; resources available to the survey partner and other logistical considerations; the social, political, and cultural contexts, and absence of reliable sampling frames and related data on this population.

Time and resource constraints dictated that we would be able to survey up to 600 households in each country. This target sample was distributed across the selected governorates proportional to the population of Syrian refugees in those governorates, and in turn, within each governorate. Districts with the highest concentrations of Syrian refugees were then selected based on published statistics or common knowledge. In urban areas, districts were then divided into neighborhoods and streets, and systematic random sampling of dwellings (typically, apartment buildings), was then employed, followed by random walks with skip patterns within the buildings to recruit households to participate in the survey. Residences that were not known in the local neighborhoods to have Syrian refugee households were not included in the random walk. In Jordan, which is the only country with a significant camp-based Syrian refugee population, the survey team was able to employ systematic random sampling of Syrian refugee households inside the Zaatari camp, since Syrian refugees comprise the vast majority of camp residents.

Once a Syrian refugee household was successfully identified during the random walk, survey enumerators gathered basic information about the household composition in order to develop a roster of those within the household who are working, actively searching for work, or would search should the situation become conducive. In Jordan, multiple attempts were made to reach the randomly selected individual before dropping the household. In both Lebanon and Turkey, if a randomly selected person was not available at the time of the initial visit, that household was dropped and enumerators moved to the next household. Further details on the sampling methodology followed in each country are provided in Appendix D.

Despite these variations in sampling methodology, it is important to note that the criteria for eligibility for inclusion in the roster and the completion of the employment perceptions sections of the survey were consistent across each country to allow for cross-country comparisons to the extent possible.

The analysis of the household surveys mainly consists of examining summary statistics (such as education levels, economic participation, and worker perceptions) and cross-tabulations of these statistics (primarily by geography).

Firm Survey and Sampling Methodology

In the firm survey, we asked respondents for information on the size, age, employment and export markets of the firm, plans for growth, perceptions on hiring Syrians, and policies and incentives that would help the firm. The firm survey questionnaire used in Jordan is provided in Appendix F; the questionnaires for the other two countries are similar.

We surveyed firms in areas close to where refugee households were surveyed, since these firms are more likely to have exposure to Syrian refugees and to be those among which the Syrians search for jobs. The firms did not have to be owned by Syrians, though we did not exclude such firms. We selected a mix of manufacturing and service industries, targeting those that had substantial employment within each country, as well as those likely to hold substantial potential for employing refugees. In each country, we included construction, wholesale and
retail trade, and hotel and restaurant industries, each of which accounts for a large share of employment among the native population and, when including both informal and formal employment, among Syrian refugees. We also targeted several manufacturing sectors within each country; the specific selection varied depending on the manufacturing strengths of each country.

We surveyed small, medium, and large firms in order to capture a wide range of potential employers. Time and resource constraints dictated that we would be able to survey 100 small firms and 50 medium and large firms in each country. In each country, small firms accounted for a large share of employment; however, the broader literature on firm growth suggests that large firms tend to exhibit higher employment growth (Haltiwanger et al., 2013, pp. 347–361; Martin et al., 2017, pp. 354–386). We only targeted firms with at least one paid employee to avoid surveying household-based firms that are unlikely to hire any nonfamily members.

As we describe in more detail in Appendix D, we developed sampling quotas by region, industry, and firm size, based on the best available information on the distribution of employment. Given the potential importance of special economic zones for employment creation and the fact that the Rules of Origin (ROO) agreement that is part of the Jordan Compact specifically offers incentives to exporters in certain zones, we also targeted a number of manufacturing firms in such zones in Jordan and Turkey. The appendix also describes the methods used to identify specific firms to interview in each country.

The analysis of the firm surveys mainly consisted of examining summary statistics (such as share of firms employing Syrians, their skill levels, and employer perceptions) and cross-tabulations of these statistics (primarily by geography, firm size, and sector).

Methodological Limitations

It is important to note the limitations of the methodologies discussed above, which have implications for our findings. While our survey partners had an extensive list of individuals and firms who had participated in previous studies, from which they recruited participants for focus groups and in-depth interviews, this did not amount to random selection from a reliable sampling frame. Therefore, it is likely that certain types of individuals were overrepresented; for instance, the more outgoing and entrepreneurial of local workers and Syrian refugees would have been more likely to participate in prior studies and, therefore, the current study. Since focus groups elicit qualitative and subjective information on a variety of topics, a biased composition of participants could lead to overemphasis of certain types of opinions. We have tried to address this concern by using a diverse set of selection criteria for focus group participants based on geography, age, and gender. Moderators of focus groups were specifically instructed to ensure even the quieter group members participated in the discussion.

2 In keeping with International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) codes, this industry also includes repair of motor vehicles.

3 It is worth noting that “informality” has a different connotation when applied to Syrians versus nationals. In general, an informally employed Syrian is working without a work permit, while an informally employed national is working without being registered for social security. Despite potential confusion we use “informal” for both types of workers, given the prevalence of this colloquial usage on the ground.

4 Lebanon does have a few special economic zones, but they are focused on trade rather than manufacturing.
While the focus groups for Syrians in Turkey were conducted by Syrians, local moderators conducted those in Jordan and Lebanon. Despite their best efforts to make the Syrians feel comfortable, it is possible that focus group participants were not completely forthcoming in their responses.

There is much self-reported information in our qualitative and quantitative data collection, which is subject to the usual challenges, such as “social desirability bias” (tendency of respondents to answer questions in a way that would be viewed favorably by others). Our use of multiple methods and our ability to triangulate responses and identify recurring key themes mitigates this concern to some extent. In the same vein, when our surveys asked for sensitive information likely to elicit untruthful responses, we rephrased questions to make them less personal. For example, our firm survey asked the question: “Do you think other firms in this line of work use any of these ways to avoid barriers to hiring Syrians?”

The absence of a reliable sampling frame on which to base a robust sampling strategy is even more challenging for the surveys. Only Jordan has conducted a recent population census that includes refugee households, and Syrian refugees living outside of camps can be widely dispersed among the local host-country population. Employing standard random sampling methods is infeasible in this context, and aiming for it, say, by attempting a complete count, entails high costs, is impractical, and is unlikely to yield desired results. To address this issue, RAND and its survey partners developed sampling approaches that relied on systematic random sampling techniques to the greatest extent possible but also incorporated commonly known but unpublished sources of information on the locations of Syrian refugees. These methods have been outlined above and are discussed in greater detail in Appendix D. Given the lack of representativeness of the sample, it is not possible to arrive at population-level estimates. Moreover, time and resource considerations limited our sample size to 600 households per country, which did not give us enough statistical power in all cases to draw distinctions across specific groups. Response rates also varied widely; for instance, in Turkey, response rates ranged from a high of 63 percent in Şanlıurfa to 44 percent in Adana.

Our sampling strategy for firms had similar limitations. First, the availability of data to decide on the distribution of firms by industry, region, and firm size differed across the countries. Given time and resource limitations, we targeted a total of only 100 small firms and 50 mid-sized to large firms in each country, which again makes group-level distinctions hard to discern in some cases. The choice of industries was focused on those that had many Syrians working in them and on those we anticipated had the potential to hire them in the future. Second, identification of larger firms relied on official statistics that were not necessarily current, combined with more up-to-date lists compiled by our survey partners. While firms in the targeted industries were randomly selected from these lists, there is likely bias in the firms that made the list in the first place.

However, arriving at population-level unbiased estimates is not the aim of this study; our objectives are to identify hurdles Syrians face in seeking livelihood opportunities and gaps that exist between the supply of and demand for labor, and to provide recommendations to advance mutually beneficial solutions. We believe the qualitative and quantitative data we have collected allows us to realize these objectives despite the limitations listed above.
CHAPTER THREE
An Overview of the Situation in Turkey

Between 3.5 and 4 million Syrians resided in Turkey in 2018. This chapter describes the overall circumstances of Syrians in Turkey; Turkey’s economic climate and the impact of the Syrians; policies and programs of the government and international aid community; business considerations for hiring Syrians; and social cohesion. We synthesize information from a variety of sources, including existing literature, secondary data, and our interviews with stakeholders, which provide crucial interpretation of existing circumstances.

Syrian Circumstances in Turkey
Numbers, Locations, and Demographics
In 2018, over 3.5 million Syrians were registered in Turkey with Temporary Protection Status by the Turkish government (Republic of Turkey DGMM, n.d.); up to another 400,000 may be unregistered (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 1). The Syrian population in Turkey is very young; 38 percent are children under the age of 15 and another 33 percent are youth aged 15–29.1

Syrians have registered in all 81 of Turkey’s provinces, with the largest populations located in large cities or in areas near the Syrian border (see Figure 3.1). The vast majority live in cities or towns throughout Turkey, with only 6 percent housed in camps. Though Istanbul hosts the highest total number of Syrians, the southeastern provinces of Kilis, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, and Gaziantep have the most concentrated numbers of registered Syrians in comparison to the host populations. In these provinces, Syrians make up 49 percent, 22 percent, 19 percent, and 16 percent of the total populations, respectively.2

Yet existing data on the locations, education, and employment of Syrian refugees in Turkey are not adequately detailed, up to date, or publicly available (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 61; Grisgraber and Hollingsworth, 2016, p. 6). Most national-level data came during registration when Syrians entered Turkey; with the passing of time, many Syrians have left the provinces in which they registered to move elsewhere for work. Turkish government officials we interviewed estimate that Istanbul alone may have a million Syrians, even though only half as many are registered there. Recognizing this issue, the Turkish government, UNHCR, and the World Bank began

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1 Calculations based on age distributions listed at Republic of Turkey DGMM, “Temporary Protection”; numbers current as of March 22, 2018.

2 Calculations based on population figures listed at Republic of Turkey DGMM, “Temporary Protection”; numbers current as of June 28, 2018.
a verification and reregistration project to update records on Syrians in Turkey, with survey piloting under way in early 2018 (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 101; Sahin, 2017). While the government of Turkey has some additional data, most are not publicly available. Other assessments and sources of data have been small scale or local.

**Education and Skill Levels**

Existing data suggest that Syrians in Turkey have lower levels of education than the overall population in Syria in 2010, prior to the war. One study based on 2015 Turkish government data reported that 84 percent of Syrian refugees in Turkey aged 15 plus had primary school educations or lower, while just 16 percent had secondary educations or above (Cengiz and Tekguc, 2018, p. 46).\(^3\) Only 2.7 percent had some college and above, according to 2015 data (Cengiz and Tekguc, 2018, p. 46).\(^4\) Another study estimated that 20–30 percent of Syrians in Turkey were illiterate, with about another 10 percent not illiterate but never having attended school (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 16). In addition, among Syrian school-aged children in Turkey, over a third were not enrolled in school in 2018 (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 1). In contrast, the general population in Syria before the crisis had higher rates of education, with less than 20 percent illiterate (UNESCO Education, 2018; World Bank, 2018b; UNICEF, 2013).\(^5\) In 2010, 59.7 percent of those aged 15 plus had primary educations or less, and 4.6 percent had at least some tertiary education (World Bank, 2018a). One possible

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\(^3\) Meanwhile, these measures were 56 percent and 44 percent, respectively, for the 2015 Turkish population aged 15–64.

\(^4\) This figure is for those aged 15 plus.

\(^5\) UNESCO and World Bank data report the total adult literacy rate in Syria in 2004 as 80.84 percent. UNICEF reports the total adult literacy rate in Syria 2008–2012 at 84.1 percent.
reason Syrians in Turkey have lower education levels could be that many with higher education who moved to Turkey initially have moved on to western countries (Hoffmann and Samuk, 2016, p. 9).

**Type of Work Conducted by Syrian Refugees in Turkey**

Some Syrian refugees in Turkey have found ways to work and get by, despite impediments to formal employment. Recent estimates from the International Crisis Group indicate that 750,000 to 950,000 Syrians work informally (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 5). Erdoğan (2018a) estimates that the number is between 1.2 and 1.3 million, and that approximately 40 percent of employed Syrians work in regular jobs, while another 43 percent provide daily wage labor, and 6 percent do seasonal work. Rates of child labor are high (Pitel, 2017).

Turkish Labor and Social Security Administration statistics indicate that 13,290 work permits were granted to Syrians in 2016 (CSBG, n.d.). About 20,970 Syrians were reportedly granted permits in 2017 (Daily Sabah, 2018), and the number granted permits by mid-2018 was likely around 25,000 (Erdoğan, 2018b). While specific data are lacking, both surveys and interviews with stakeholders have indicated that Syrians in Turkey often work across the spectrum of high- to low-skill jobs, with most working in lower-skilled jobs in textile production, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, recycling, food service, and hairdressing (Hoffmann and Samuk, 2016, p. 17; International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 5; Erdoğan, 2017, p. 83; Kaya and Kirac, 2016, p. 28). Others work as teachers for other Syrians, or in shops, offices, and humanitarian aid jobs (Hoffmann and Samuk, 2016, p. 17; Erdoğan, 2017, p. 83). High-skilled Syrians have often also found work using their Arabic language skills for Turkish companies in Middle Eastern markets in tourism, health care, and trade, based on our interviews. Many Syrians do not work in their fields of education or experience for a number of reasons that include a lack of verification of their diplomas and credentials from Syria, work permits, Turkish-language skills, and professional networks in Turkey.

**Syrian Businesses in Turkey**

Syrians in Turkey have also been active entrepreneurs. Every year since 2013, more companies have been founded or cofounded by Syrians than by entrepreneurs of any other non-Turkish nationality.6 Syrian entrepreneurs have made positive contributions to the Turkish economy by creating jobs and reviving and increasing exports to the Middle East (Asik, 2017a; Kaymaz and Kadkoy, 2016, p. 6).

Estimates suggest that over 10,000 Syrian businesses operate in Turkey, including registered and unregistered ones (Ucak et al., 2017, p. 20). These businesses are often small cafés, restaurants, stores, and workshops, which typically have few employees (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 83). Our interviews with organizations that work with entrepreneurs indicated that factors of success for Syrian businesses include business skills brought from Syria, marketing to Syrian consumers inside Turkey, and preexisting trade relations with Middle Eastern countries.

Yet, our interviews also suggested that challenges to these Syrian businesses include: differing bookkeeping practices that can reduce Turkish trust in Syrian business partners, lack of Turkish networks, Syrian inability to purchase real estate because of Turkish law, inability to move collateral from Syria to Turkey for financing, difficulties opening bank accounts and

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6 In 2017, companies founded with Syrian foreign partners were second to companies founded with Turkish foreign partners (TOBB, n.d.).
accessing financing in Turkey, and not knowing how to access Turkish consumer markets. Challenges posed by the policies and environment include bureaucratic and visa issues, lack of guidance and information about laws and rules related to business establishment, and insufficient Turkish-language proficiency (Ucak, Holt, and Raman, 2017, p. 20).

**Turkey’s Economic Climate and Impact of the Syrians**

While a causal assessment of the impact of the arrival of refugees on the Turkish economy is beyond the scope of this report, it would be useful to quickly survey Turkey’s economic climate before and after the refugee crisis to understand the context in which the refugees arrived and are currently situated.

**Macroeconomic Situation**

Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown since 2002, with the exception of a downturn in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. After a slowdown in growth between 2011 and 2016, GDP grew by 7.4 percent in 2017 (Figure 3.2). However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently expressed concern about an “overheating” economy, based on a variety of indicators including an uptick in inflation (IMF, 2018b).

Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have not recovered to their pre-financial crisis levels, and there was a reduction in both FDI inflows and outflows between 2015 and 2017 (Figure 3.3). This reduction in investment is consistent with the views of several business association representatives we interviewed who indicated that there is some concern among the business community that recent political uncertainty (particularly following the 2017 failed
coup attempt), and the takeover or closure of thousands of businesses, has harmed investment (IMF, 2017b).

**Labor Market Indicators**

Despite continued GDP growth, Turkey’s unemployment rate climbed from 8.8 percent in 2011 to 10.9 percent in 2017 (Figure 3.4). This average masks substantial heterogeneity: youth unemployment in 2017 was 20.6 percent (OECD, 2018a), and unemployment is higher in the southeastern regions where many Syrians now reside (Kaymaz and Kadkoy, 2016, p. 4). Figure 3.4 also shows that the recent increase in unemployment coincides with the rapid influx in Syrian refugees; however, it also coincides with a number of other regional and political disruptions. In addition, the minimum wage was increased by 30 percent in 2016 (IMF, 2017b).

It is difficult to separate the impact of the refugee influx from the impacts of concurrent events. Nonetheless, several recent studies have attempted to do so, by comparing provinces that received more versus fewer refugees. Results are mixed, but generally suggest that provinces that received more Syrians showed declines in informal employment or informal sector wages among Turkish workers, and an increase in formal employment, relative to provinces that received fewer Syrians (Cengiz and Tekguc, 2017; Ceritoglu et al., 2017; Tumen, 2016; Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015). This is consistent with the fact that most Syrians are working without permits, and are therefore most likely to compete with informally employed Turks. There is also some evidence that the influx is associated with new businesses and start-up capital, as well as increased residential construction, but also with higher rents (Cengiz and Tekguc, 2017; Tumen, 2016).

**Business Environment**

As of 2015, over 95 percent of all enterprises in Turkey are small businesses, employing between 1 and 19 people. These enterprises account for nearly 40 percent of total employment. In con-

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7 The IMF reported that “4,000 companies and institutions with assets of close to US$4 billion have been shut, or taken over by the state.”
Contrast, while fewer than 1 percent of enterprises (about 5,000 out of nearly 2.7 million) employed 250 or more people, these large enterprises accounted for 27 percent of total employment (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2015).

The issue of informal work is not confined to Syrians within Turkey. Several representatives of multilateral organizations and research organizations whom we interviewed indicated that most firms—even small ones—are registered in Turkey. However, registered firms do not always formally register all of their employees (Korkmaz, 2017, p. 9), which means that these employees are not entitled to social protection and other benefits. The informal employment rate in Turkey is about 33 percent (Korkmaz, 2017, p. 8; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2018b).

It is worth noting that “informality” has a different connotation when applied to Syrians versus locals working in Turkey. In general, an informally employed Syrian is working without a work permit, while an informally employed Turk is working without being registered for social security. However, as our interviews indicated, both types of informal workers face difficulties in terms of low wages (often below the minimum wage), lack of access to social protection programs, and poor working conditions.

In fact, “practices of competitors in the informal sector” was named as one of the biggest obstacles faced by (registered) firms of all sizes in the World Bank Group’s Enterprise Survey conducted in Turkey in 2013 (see Table G.1 in Appendix G for a list of all obstacles). Nearly half of the firms with 100 or more employees, and 15–20 percent of small- and midsized firms, listed such competition as the biggest obstacle, ahead of political instability and access to finance (and, for large firms, ahead of taxes). In the same survey, 6 percent of large firms reported an inadequately educated workforce as the biggest obstacle to current operations. Although most firms did not consider this the biggest obstacle, fully 40 percent of large firms reported inadequate education as a moderate, major, or very severe obstacle to current operations, as did
ees stated that many Turks are reluctant to take low-skilled jobs in construction and manufacturing or work in industrial zones that do not have desirable amenities.

**Policies and Programs**

**Legal Framework for Syrian Employment and Entrepreneurship**

The government of Turkey has responded to the influx of Syrians by developing new institutions and laws to manage resulting issues. Prior to the influx, the government had already begun setting up the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) under the Ministry of Interior to handle overall migration and refugee policies; the DGMM was officially established in 2013, and the Directorate General of International Labor was established under the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in 2016 to manage policies related to foreigners working in Turkey. The 2013 *Law on Foreigners and International Protection* laid out protection types for foreigners fleeing conflict, including Temporary Protection Status, which is used for the Syrians (Erdoğan, 2015, p. 35; Republic of Turkey DGMM, 2014). A January 2016 regulation granted work permit eligibility to Syrians under Temporary Protection, though as noted above, few such permits have actually been issued in comparison with the number of Syrians estimated to be working (Korkmaz, 2017, pp. 7–8).

Most Syrians in Turkey (about 3.5 million of the estimated nearly 4 million) are under Turkey’s Temporary Protection Status, which permits them to remain in the country and to receive basic health, education, and social services (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 1). Although Turkey ratified the 1951 *Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, it maintained a geographical restriction: only those fleeing conflict in Europe can receive refugee status in Turkey (Development Workshop, 2016, p. 50.) Much smaller numbers of Syrians in Turkey have different types of legal status, such as Turkish citizenship, residence or work permits, or marriage to Turkish citizens (see Table G.2 in Appendix G). Temporary Protection Status allows Syrians to obtain work permits (for which their employers must apply) but restricts them to obtaining a work permit in their province of registration. It also permits access to banking and finance and business licenses, although many Syrians find barriers to opening accounts with banks and operating their businesses informally.

Turkish government officials interviewed described the government’s recent approach to the Syrians as “harmonization,” which is meant to indicate a mutual relationship between Turks and Syrians in Turkish society, as opposed to integration, which implies that only the Syrians must adapt. Interviewees indicated that jobs and education are key to harmonization. In early 2018, the Turkish government was collaborating with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the World Bank, and other international organizations on the Turkish harmonization strategy.

There are multiple ways that the legal framework either inhibits or does not facilitate legal, formal Syrian employment, as evidenced by the tiny proportion of Syrians working in Turkey with a work permit. As one donor country stakeholder noted, “Turkey has a legal framework, designed with good intentions, but it is not functioning.” A multilateral official explained why the work permits have such low uptake: “Incentives are completely off for both supply and demand.” See Table G.3 in Appendix G for a list of these incentives and disincentives; a few notable disincentives are discussed here. The Temporary Protection Status limits Syrians to work permits in the province of registration, a provision that according to our inter-
views is meant to reduce the numbers of Syrians moving to Istanbul, which is perceived as overburdened with fast population growth.

The costs associated with obtaining work permits make hiring Syrians formally more expensive than hiring Turks formally, whereas interviews with stakeholders from firms, organizations that work with Syrians, and multilateral organizations indicated that being able to hire Syrians informally and thus to pay them lower wages is a major factor in firms’ hiring decisions. Additionally, some professions are banned outright for foreigners, including various medical, legal, and maritime jobs, among others (Turkish Laborlaw website, 2017). Though the Turkish government instituted a program that allowed Syrian medical professionals and teachers to apply for special work permission, the program only allowed them to serve other Syrians (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 48)—unless, as our interviews suggested, they go through a lengthy and difficult process of having their Syrian credentials validated in Turkey.

Yet it is important to recognize that it is not only the legal framework for temporary protection that makes it challenging for Syrians to work legally. A substantial share of the economy as a whole is informal; one out of three workers in Turkey are employed informally. In fact, the Turkish government has largely turned a blind eye to Syrians working even when it is not in line with their legal framework. Turkish government officials acknowledged to us that while not all Syrians had work permits, the economy had managed to incorporate them.

**Government, International Community, and Business Employment-Related Programs**

Programming to help Syrian refugees in Turkey for the first few years after their arrival focused mainly on meeting humanitarian needs, with little attention to assisting in employment. Turkey reports having spent over $25 billion on the refugees, in comparison with about $500 million in support from the international community (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 38). Through 2015, the U.S. government was the largest donor country providing assistance in Turkey. After the 2015 EU-Turkey agreement in which the EU agreed to provide substantial financial assistance to Turkey in exchange for Turkey closing its borders to refugees on their way to Europe, large EU programs have also started. Now, multiple stakeholders in the international aid community as well as business associations in our interviews have recognized that new approaches emphasizing employment are needed.

The Turkish government employment service İŞKUR is responsible for providing job training and job matching, and Syrians can apply to İŞKUR. In addition, international organizations (such as UNDP, ILO, IOM, FAO, and the World Bank), foreign governments (including the United States, Germany, and Japan), and Turkish government entities (particularly the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, İŞKUR, and the Ministry of Education) have implemented vocational training programs targeting Syrians in Turkey (International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 15–16; Dogan, 2017; UNDP, 2017; ILO, 2016; IOM, 2017). These projects are often implemented through NGOs or local government agencies.

About $150 million for livelihoods and social cohesion was requested by the United Nations for 2018 (3RP, 2018a, p. 44), although budget requests for livelihoods activities have not received full funding in the past few years in Turkey. In 2017, $20 million was received for livelihoods with an $85 million gap in pursuit of the goal of $105 million for the sector (3RP, 2018b). In 2016, $11 million was received for livelihoods and social cohesion out of a requested $92 million (UNHCR, 2017, p. 26).

Internationally funded vocational programs have included training in agriculture, woodworking, textiles, electrical plumbing, installing solar energy, plastics, welding, other industrial
skills, accounting, data processing, information technology (IT) skills, first aid, entrepreneurship, and more (Jones, 2016; Karasapan, 2017; Toloken, 2016; UNDP, 2017; ILO, 2016). The Turkish government offers vocational training to Turks and migrants in Turkey, with over 3,000 courses on offer, according to data provided by the Turkish government. Official government estimates indicate that over 200,000 Syrians have taken certificate courses (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, 2018). Because of the proliferation of internationally managed vocational training, in 2016, Turkey’s Ministry of National Education mandated that all vocational training for Syrian refugees must be certified by the Vocational Qualification board.

In interviews for this study, stakeholders indicated that vocational training has not been as effective as desired, and there has been little rigorous assessment of the programs’ fidelity of implementation and impact. Stakeholder explanations for ineffectiveness of the vocational training included low quality of programs, not basing the training on an analysis of employer demands, few programmatic links with employment, attention to numbers trained instead of labor market outcomes, lack of oversight, little coordination across implementers and between implementers and employers, and paying participants for attending (thus encouraging some participants to attend multiple trainings only for the payments). In addition, UN officials noted that many of the vocational programs had not been conceptualized as helping job seekers obtain employment, but rather had been designed with a protection and social function, targeted toward the most vulnerable. “Training was more of a psychosocial activity,” a UN official said. A training provider said that most of their Syrian trainees attended training because of the cash incentive offered for attendance. One multilateral official summed it up: “Every agency is doing training, but it is not matching employer needs.”

Examples from the literature also support the conclusion that Syrian participants in these vocational programs often do not proceed to find related work. For example, İŞKUR provided a requested hairdressing training to Syrians, but many failed to find jobs afterward due to low demand (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 15). In another example, students of a textile training refused subsequent job offers because they had only participated in the program for the cash incentive (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 15).

With these challenges in mind, some donors and implementers have begun changing their approach, instead aiming to provide training that is market relevant and providing matching of employees to employers. However, such programs to date have been at a small scale. A Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey/Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey effort aims to result in 3,000 Syrians employed with work permits. UNHCR has facilitated formal employment of 1,500 Syrians since 2016. The U.S. State Department and ILO worked with chambers of commerce to identify and fill local employment gaps and work permit fees, with 3,000 Syrians hired by early 2018.

One training need that was widely noted during interviews was instruction in the Turkish language. While the aid community offers Turkish-language training, there are a number of barriers: the intensity and duration of the courses offered are not sufficient to provide the minimum language competency required to hold many jobs; there are not enough places for the Syrians who want it; Turkey is not used to teaching Turkish as a second language, has few teachers trained in this, and lacks high-quality instructional materials; Syrians do not want to put in the effort because they think that they are leaving; the UN targets the most vulnerable as opposed to the employable; and the intensive time required competes with the need to work.
Considerations of Businesses for Hiring Syrians

Our interviews suggested that the business community is also starting to recognize that the large number of Syrians in Turkey is no longer just a humanitarian issue but presents both challenges and opportunities for their integration into the Turkish workforce. They pointed to opportunities for Turkish business that included: the Syrian Arabic language skills that could help Turkish firms with tourism, trade, call centers, marketing with Arab countries, and retail; Syrians filling gaps in jobs that Turks do not want; Syrians with specialized skills in certain trades such as textiles; and growing interest in Turkey’s 4 million Syrians as a consumer market. Nevertheless, to date, the business associations we interviewed had not developed official positions with regard to Syrian employment. Some interviewees noted that large firms hire small numbers of Syrians because of a sense of social responsibility, while smaller firms hire Syrians as a source of cheap labor.

Several sectors, jobs, and skill areas represent potential opportunities for Syrians in Turkey. A recent analysis suggests that some needs of the manufacturing sector remain unmet, as job seekers lack manufacturing-specific skills or prefer to pursue jobs in the services sector (Asik, 2017b). The agriculture sector has also allegedly experienced issues such as a “shortage of intermediate staff and a decline in the labor force in general due to development of the industrial and services sectors” (Asik, 2017b).

At the same time, business representatives noted barriers to incorporating Syrians into the labor market. Businesses lack not only information about laws and procedures for work permits but also knowledge of where the Syrians are located and what their skills are. Perhaps more importantly, political uncertainty in Turkey impedes investment—and thus hiring—in general. With high unemployment among Turks, there is often a preference for hiring Turks when possible. And professional and cultural differences (such as the language barrier, lack of equivalency for Syrian educational and professional credentials, perceptions among firms that Syrians do not work hard, and a general lack of a culture of diversity in Turkish workplaces) give businesses a sense of added risk when hiring Syrians.

Social Cohesion

Turks overall have adopted an accommodating attitude toward Syrians. While there is some resentment of the Syrians, their presence has not been a major political issue; it has not caused large-scale social conflicts; and many Syrians are finding work (Hoffmann and Samuk, 2016, p. 20). However, despite general Turkish acceptance of the Syrians, several studies suggest that potential for future tensions is rising (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 1). Recent polling indicates high levels of resentment toward the Syrian presence in Turkey amid rising nationalist sentiment in the country (Hoffman, Werz, and Halpin, 2018; Tharoor, 2018). Communities with a large number of Syrians have expressed concerns that they do not receive sufficient government resources (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 1).

Misconceptions about the refugees exist too, including that most Syrians receive government financial support without working. In reality, financial support programs for Syrians are targeted: for example, the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) program is a collaboration between the EU, the Turkish government, the Turkish Red Crescent, and the World Food Programme; it is targeted at the “most vulnerable” and provides up to 1.3 million Syrians with 120
Turkish lira per person per month (European Commission, 2018), compared with a minimum wage of approximately 1,600 lira per month (Hurriyet Daily News, 2017).

Our interviews indicated that some Turks have resented provision of health care to Syrians (assuming that the Turkish government paid for the health care, while in fact, the EU paid). In addition, there is resentment that some Syrians were given provision to enter Turkish universities without taking exams (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 7). A notable negative social media reaction arose when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan suggested potential citizenship for Syrians in mid-2016 (Girit, 2016). However, more recent government statements regarding the refugees suggest a potential turnaround in approach, with Erdoğan announcing that Turkey aims for the refugees to ultimately return to Syria (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018).

As for Turkish views of Syrians working, one 2017 survey found that over half of Turkish respondents did not think that Syrians should be allowed to work (Erdoğan, 2018a). The study also stated that while Turks are increasingly worried about losing their jobs, their bigger concerns relate not to Syrians working but to Syrians founding new businesses (Erdoğan, 2018a). Along these lines, other studies also note that local Turkish businesses perceive unfair competition with Syrian enterprises (Korkmaz, 2017, p. 7).

Summary

The existing literature, and our stakeholder interviews, suggested that while many Syrians are getting by in Turkey (mainly through low-wage, low-skill, informal jobs), there are a number of challenges to improving the quality and quantity of Syrian employment in Turkey. These include low educational attainment among the Syrians and lack of Turkish-language skills; high unemployment among Turkish workers (particularly among Turkish youth and in the east where Syrians are concentrated); a geographic mismatch between where Syrians are concentrated and the locations with the most economic growth; a well-intentioned legal framework for Syrian employment that does not incentivize employers to apply for work permits for Syrians or facilitate Syrians’ relocation in order to alleviate the geographic mismatch; and livelihoods programs that do not meet the needs of the labor market. At the same time, a variety of factors provide opportunities: Syrians are filling jobs that Turks do not want; Syrian networks have increased trade with Arab countries; despite Turkish resentment, social cohesion and stability have remained; and Syrian entrepreneurs have invested in businesses in Turkey. In Chapters Four and Five, we explore many of these issues in greater depth through results from focus groups with Syrians and Turks, and from surveys of Syrian households and Turkish firms.
In this chapter, we describe findings from the thirteen focus groups conducted in Turkey with Syrian, Turkish, and Iraqi workers (both men and women) in Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, and Adana, as well as interviews with four firms (see Appendix C for detailed focus group distribution). We discuss focus group participant views related to employment opportunities, the Syrian experience of obtaining a job, employer considerations for hiring Syrians and migrants, perceptions of the legal framework for work permits, skills and training needs, social cohesion related to employment, work environment conditions for Syrians, and aspirations and solutions. Most of the issues were common to both men and women; we describe several issues particular to women alone. Highlights of our findings include the following items:

• Syrians worked for wages below minimum wage, for longer hours than permitted in Turkish law, typically for small and medium firms, and often without work permits.
• Syrians were often not working in their fields of experience.
• The Turkish language was a key need for obtaining employment.
• Syrians viewed jobs as readily obtainable in Istanbul and hard to find in the east; not being legally allowed to move for work was a key complaint.
• Many Turkish workers were pessimistic about their own employment opportunities and blamed some of this on competition with Syrians.
• Getting a work permit was not a barrier to informal, low-wage, low-skill jobs at small and medium firms, but it was a barrier to formal jobs, particularly at larger firms.
• Employers reported few incentives to hire Syrians legally and confusion with the legal framework.
• Turkish workers disapproved of employers hiring Syrians informally with very low wages and without social rights. While Turkish workers resented Syrians in the workforce, they also expressed compassion for them, viewed them as hardworking, and sometimes viewed them as exploited.
• Syrians wanted a legal framework to enable them to work with dignity and rights.
• Syrians and Iraqis reported little formal assistance with job matching, typically finding work through their networks or the Internet.
• As circumstances required more Syrian women to work, Syrian women and men increasingly viewed women working as necessary and respectable.
Employment Opportunities

Syrians in Turkey were working in multiple types of jobs, but mainly low-skill, low-wage jobs. As described by both Syrians and Turks in the focus groups, these jobs ranged from high- to low-skilled jobs: tourism, dentistry, tailoring, construction, restaurants, accounting, translation, teaching, supermarkets, athletics, shopping malls, agriculture, cleaning, textiles, mechanics, sewing, nongovernmental organization (NGO) work, day labor, human resources, and engineering. Yet by and large, the main description of opportunities for Syrians was in informal low-skill, low-wage jobs at small and medium firms, without work permits, without insurance, and for much less than Turkey’s minimum wage.

Many Syrians reported not using their professional skills or working in their occupations. Many of the Turkish workers also observed this about the Syrians. For example, one Syrian worked as a fireman in Syria, and now worked in Turkey as a tailor; another studied applied chemistry at university in Syria, and now worked as a mechanic in Turkey. When asked his aspirations for the future, a Syrian man in Istanbul said, “Being allowed to apply my proficiencies and do my work... Each one of us should work according to his/her knowledge, experience, and qualification.”

Views of Turkish workers about their job opportunities were mixed. While some felt that they could get a job easily if they left their current job, most were pessimistic about their opportunities. This pessimism was more pronounced in the focus groups in Şanlıurfa and Adana, which have higher unemployment rates among Turks than Istanbul. A Turkish man in Adana said, “Finding a job is nearly impossible. I once considered quitting my job but realized that I may never find another job; I try to bear it.” This remark indicates that improving the economic environment in general could help generate jobs for all.

The Experience of Obtaining a Job

Many Syrians and Iraqis obtained a job through their personal networks and the Internet—and rarely reported help from organizations. These networks were usually Syrian or Iraqi family and friends—and sometimes Turkish neighbors or friends. Some Syrians went door to door asking for work. Others used social media sources, such as recruitment websites, Facebook, bayt.com, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Kariyer.net. Several mentioned getting help from the Syrian employment agency Rizk, also interviewed for this study. When asked about other associations or NGOs, no others were mentioned as helpful in job searches. Yet while no Syrians mentioned the Turkish employment agency İŞKUR as a source of job information, several Turkish workers expressed resentment at their perception that İŞKUR favored Syrians to Turks. At the same time, Iraqi workers believed that Syrians had many more organizational resources than other migrant workers had for finding jobs and wanted additional resources.

Moving to Istanbul was a key strategy Syrians used to find a job. Syrians in Istanbul reported being able to find a job generally within a few weeks to two months, and many reported leaving east Turkey to find a job in Istanbul, after not finding work in the east. Most Syrians in Istanbul thought that it was easy to find a job, although not a job that fit their skill set or one of adequate pay. Syrians in the focus groups in Adana and Şanlıurfa thought that it was hard to get a job and several reported long periods without work, from months to several years. At the same time, some Turkish workers felt that Istanbul had become too overburdened from the
presence of such large numbers of Syrians. These comments, in combination with stakeholder interviews about the overburdening of Istanbul, point to considering Turkey’s midsized cities (not Turkey’s east and not Istanbul) as potential places where Syrians may be incentivized to move for jobs.

*Travel restrictions that come with Temporary Protection Status were a barrier to job matching.* According to Turkish law, Syrians under Temporary Protection Status were only permitted to live and obtain work permits in their province of registry, although this is not enforced more often than not. In interviews, stakeholders noted that at various times, the Turkish government enforced travel restrictions by prohibiting transportation ticket sales to Syrians in provinces. One Syrian man in Adana said that the travel restrictions created a situation like living in a “big prison.” A Syrian man in Şanlıurfa said about biggest barriers to finding a job, “The bigger problem is the travel permit. I can’t go anywhere.”

*Learning Turkish proved crucial for finding a job or getting a better job.* The need for Turkish-language skills to find work was one of the most common themes among Syrians, Turks, and employers. Many Syrians said that they had difficulty finding any work when they did not know Turkish; learning Turkish either enabled them to get their first job or enabled them to leave their current employment for a better job. This clearly highlights the need for language training.

*More Syrian women were seeking employment, and Syrian men and women were increasingly viewing women working as necessary and respectable.* Circumstances were requiring women who had not worked before to work and were changing Syrian perceptions of women in the workplace, as observed by both Syrian women and men. A Syrian woman in Şanlıurfa said, “In Syria we were not obliged to work; men used to take care of everything. Here, things have changed, and we feel the need to work to be able to survive and help our families.” A Syrian man in Adana said, “Women’s jobs are respectable here in Turkey, so if my wife wants to work it is fine for me. But if we are back in Syria, that would be impossible for me to allow it. . . . Women here work with pride, and they are respected.”

*Some Syrian women described barriers to getting a job that were particular to women.* Women often noted family responsibilities at home, making the long hours expected of Syrians by employers particularly difficult. Several said that employers did not want to hire them because they wore a headscarf. Others reported not wanting to work in a mixed-gender environment (or a husband who did not want that).

*Some Syrian men reported age discrimination.* Several said they were viewed as too old to get a job in Turkey. One Syrian man in Şanlıurfa explained, “I am 40 years and so I can’t find a job. We are destroyed. Nobody wants to hire us because we are old and don’t have experience.”

*Not having Syrian credentials and experience recognized could prevent working in their fields.* A Syrian woman in Istanbul said, “Most degree holders from Syria are not recognized in Turkey, and a lot of professional people with degrees are not able to find work.” On the other hand, a few Syrians mentioned that their certifications and experience from Syria helped them to get a job, while a few said lacking formal certification had not mattered.

*Legal issues and lack of insurance had prevented some from getting a job.* We discuss perceptions of Turkey’s legal framework for Syrians working below, and particular legal issues included not being able to travel under Temporary Protection Status, difficulties in finding a job that provided a work permit, not having health insurance, and fear of losing humanitarian assistance if they worked. Several mentioned that big companies will not hire Syrians without processing a work permit while small companies would. Even more than a work permit, some
Syrians in Istanbul reported that not having health insurance was a bigger impediment to employment, with employers requiring a Syrian to already have health insurance as a precondition for employment.

**Employer Considerations for Hiring Syrians and Migrants**

*Employers reported disincentives to hire Syrians.* First among the disincentives was ambiguity and lack of clarity about the legal framework to hire Syrians as well as the paperwork involved. Other disincentives included the inability to check the criminal backgrounds of Syrian candidates like they could check for Turks and more familiarity with hiring Turks, language barriers, and few reasons to legally hire Syrians when hiring Turks (which were more culturally familiar) was just as cost-effective. One large construction firm representative said that they would pay all employees the same, so there would be “no advantage” to hiring Syrians. Several said that if they were to hire Syrians, they wanted Turkish-language skills. One small food production firm representative had the misperception that Syrians come with their own work permits, rather than needing one from a firm. One Turkish construction manager in the focus groups noted a problem on the job: “Syrians cannot understand [us] at firm meetings.”

*At the same time, several incentives to hire Syrians stood out.* One textile firm representative reported that Syrians they hired had more continuity on the job than Turks. Several spoke of the advantage of Arabic skills to talk with Arabic-speaking customers in Turkey (such as other Syrians) or in other countries. A large textile firm representative said, “We had a need for Arabic language. When we heard that a Syrian, a native speaker, wanted a job, we had an automatic agreement. It’s a win-win situation.” A Syrian woman in Istanbul confirmed this: “Since our customers are Arabic, I have the upper hand over my coworkers.” Several employers also reported being unable to meet their hiring needs and not finding enough candidates with the right skills and work ethic—although none in our interviews connected this with the potential of hiring Syrians.

*Turkish workers disapproved of employers hiring Syrians for very low wages.* They believed that Syrians often fill jobs that Turks will not do, take jobs for well under the minimum wage, work longer hours than Turks would agree to, forego health or social security insurance, and are docile employees. A Turkish man in Istanbul summed up a common comment in the focus groups, “I think Syrians benefit these small and medium enterprises, not the bigger ones, because the bigger ones do not employ people without insurance, because they are not taking risks. But small and medium enterprises can do that.” There appears to be a need for studying the enforcement of a uniform minimum wage for all workers.

**Perceptions of the Legal Framework and Work Permits**

*Getting a work permit was not an impediment to employment in informal jobs at small and medium firms, but it was a barrier to formal jobs at larger firms.* Many Syrians felt that the Temporary Protection Status document was sufficient to get a job, albeit an informal job without a work permit. Syrians and Turks believed that the Turkish government turned a “blind eye” to Syrians working without permits. Syrians believed that there were few consequences to being
caught working without a work permit. A fine could be levied on the employer, but this would generally not mean that the worker would be punished or lose the job. During government inspections, an employer might tell Syrian workers to stay home.

*Many Syrians expressed the desire to have the rights, dignity, and protection that come with legal work.* A work permit in Turkey gave benefits: minimum wage, health insurance, social security, legal rights in an employment dispute, and the dignity of legal employment. Syrians believed that not having a work permit prohibited them from raising complaints about employment conditions, as they could be terminated easily and replaced.

*How to get a work permit seemed ambiguous for both Syrians and employers.* A representative of a medium food production firm summed it up: “We are familiar with the legislation for the Turkish employees, but . . . such issues as where and how long [Syrians] can be employed and how the problems may be settled . . . are not clear enough. . . . I may not choose them if we may have problems regarding working permits.” Some Syrian participants and one firm had the impression that Syrians themselves had to get the work permit, rather than a work permit being something that an employer processed for an employee.

*There were multiple additional barriers to obtaining a work permit.* Employers and Syrians described barriers as including: high cost, the insurance requirements that come with work permits, extensive paperwork, a hesitancy to invest in a work permit because it is uncertain how long a particular Syrian might stay in Turkey, particular residency status as a prerequisite to a work permit, and the 10 percent quota. These challenges point to the need to streamline the work permit process.

**Skills and Training**

*Turkish-language training was in demand.* The most resounding comment about training needs for Syrians, in all of the interviews and focus groups, was for Turkish language. Multiple Syrian participants reported that learning Turkish had enabled them to get a job or get a better job. A Syrian man in Istanbul said, “The most basic need is language.” Syrians tried to gain Turkish-language skills in multiple ways: taking courses; talking with Turkish neighbors or coworkers; watching YouTube or TV; surfing the Internet; watching the news; reading Turkish books; and listening to Turkish audiotapes. Several were frustrated with the lack of Turkish-language training available to them and the lack of spaces in courses. While there were some language-training programs for the Syrians, they were not enough for the need, according to Syrian participants. Several noted that Syrians in Europe received language training.

**Social Cohesion Related to Employment**

*Both Syrians and Turks reported work relationships that were sometimes positive and sometimes negative.* As one Syrian man in Istanbul described, “The society is split between three: some people are neutral toward our presence, some hate us and don’t want us to be here, and others love us and want us to stay and help us a lot.” Some Syrians also reported feeling grateful to Turkey for taking in the Syrians, and many Turks in the focus groups expressed compassion for the circumstances of the Syrians. On the other hand, several Syrians described “jealousy” from Turkish coworkers and instances of bullying or hostility.
The Iraqi migrant workers reported that sometimes Turks treated them badly when they believed that they were Syrians. An Iraqi man in Istanbul said, “Their relationship with us is not good, because they look at us as Syrian people.”

Sources of Turkish resentment toward Syrians were the perceptions that Syrians were taking Turkish jobs and were receiving better public services. A Turkish man in Adana said, “I am complaining that as an unemployed person, the Syrian works instead of me.” Several felt that the Turkish employment agency İŞKUR prioritized the Syrians over the Turks. Some Turks believed that most Syrians received salaries from the Turkish government or received preferential access when they went to public hospitals. Others resented Syrian access to Turkish universities without the same exam processes as the Turks. One Turkish man said, “The state provides Syrians to the fullest but deprives her own citizens of this opportunity.”

Work Environment Conditions

In terms of the work environment, while some Syrians described their jobs as stable and enjoyed their work, many of the comments about work conditions were about problems.

Syrians work for less than Turks and below minimum wage. Both Turks and Syrians recognized that Syrians often work for significantly less than Turks and without health and social security insurance. Syrians and Turks gave numerous examples of Syrians working for 30–60 percent of the wages of a Turk doing the same job. Wages described were often well below Turkey’s minimum wage of 1,600 TL per month, with most focus group participants citing wages between 600 TL to 1,000 TL per month (although examples were given of 300 TL per month). In some cases, the comparison wage for a Turk doing the same job was also below Turkey’s minimum wage. Iraqi migrants said that they worked for wages lower than the Turks but higher than the Syrians. These wages were often viewed as not enough to get by. This was especially so in Istanbul where the cost of living and rents were high. Some Syrians described inconsistent pay and uncompensated overtime. A Syrian woman in Şanlıurfa said, “If you do not like it, then you are free to go. You are easily and quickly replaceable.”

Poverty led Syrian children to work. The Turks in particular expressed concern about Syrian children working. A Turkish man in Adana said, “Sometimes I am sorry when I see them, a little child comes at a traffic light, gives water. . . . I object that children are employed.”

Both Turks and Syrians recognized the long hours that Syrians worked, longer than typical Turkish hours. Turks in the focus groups generally viewed the Syrians as hardworking, although several thought Syrians did not work hard. Syrian men described working 9–16 hour days, mainly 10–12 hours. Some described working also without breaks.

Syrian women raised several additional work challenges particular to women. Several mentioned sexual harassment. Syrian women reported being paid less than Syrian men, and several Syrian men said they thought employers preferred Syrian women because they were even cheaper than Syrian men. Several women also reported extreme fatigue because of both long hours expected of Syrians and family responsibilities.

Both Syrians and Turks believed that Syrians had few legal rights on the job and also experienced occupational safety hazards. These points were more often raised by Turks than Syrians. A Turkish man said, “A Syrian has no means of defense. They accept everything.” Two Syrians in different focus groups reported knowing a Syrian who had died on the job.
Both Syrians and Turks described dehumanizing work conditions for the Syrians. Syrian men in Şanlıurfa described themselves as “a robot” and “a work machine.” A Turkish woman in Adana said, “They work uninsured and their wages are so low. They work like slaves.” A Turkish man in Şanlıurfa described them as “exploited.”

Turkish workers described their own work conditions getting worse after the arrival of the Syrians. A Turkish man in Şanlıurfa said, “The working conditions are already bad, and they became even worse with their arrival.” Other Turkish workers complained of low pay, long hours, poor opportunities for advancement, and monotony.

Aspirations and Solutions

When asked about their aspirations for the future, answers from Turks, Syrians, and Iraqis were often similar. These included completing education, opening a business, using or developing professional skills, having a stable job and salary, getting married and having a family, having a home, and improving the economic climate in general.

Aspirations unique to the Syrians included learning Turkish, being able to work legally, having equal salaries to Turks according to their work, having stability, and working in their profession. Instability and uncertainty in particular about the future made it hard for some Syrians to plan their future, and Syrian men and women in multiple locations expressed a desire for stability. Syrians had varying aspirations for where they would live in the future: staying in Turkey, going to another country in Europe or the Gulf, or going back to Syria (and indeed, some of the Turks expressed a wish that the Syrians would go back to Syria), and eventually taking the knowledge gained in Turkey back to Syria to help Syria rebuild. Iraqis mainly wanted to remain in Turkey, as they viewed life in Iraq as without hope.

Syrians and Turks in focus groups suggested ideas for a range of solutions to the problems presented. These included recognizing Syrian certification and degrees, enabling Syrians to work in their professions, having additional Turkish-language training, having a legal framework for temporary work permission, facilitating Syrian work permit costs and bureaucracy for employers, allowing Syrians to legally move to a different location where work was available, sending Syrians to places other than big cities (suggested by several Turks), learning lessons from the way Germany integrated both Turks and Syrian refugees into the labor force (including language training and employment facilitation), protecting and enforcing decent work conditions on the job, getting other professional training to enable Syrians to adapt to the Turkish work environment, and creating jobs so that Syrian women could work at home.
This chapter describes the results from the analysis of surveys administered to Syrian refugee households and to firms in Turkey. The household survey results highlight findings pertaining to the supply of skills among Syrian refugees, their work experiences both in Turkey and in Syria, and their perceptions toward employment in Turkey. The firm survey results focus on findings pertaining to Syrian employment, as well as firms’ perceptions about Syrian workers and about policies that could encourage employment growth. Appendix D contains details on the sampling strategies used in each survey, as well as additional results.

**Household Survey**

**Key Findings**

- The education level is low among survey respondents, with close to half across the three provinces having a primary-level education.
- Overall, the share of sampled household members working or willing to work is low, at just above 50 percent, but higher for males than females.
- The share of our sample of respondents not working but willing to work is around one-third overall and lower in Istanbul compared with the other two provinces.
- Tapping into social networks is the most common means for finding employment, though employed persons are more likely to have visited an employer directly to inquire about work.
- Performing manual labor jobs, either skilled or unskilled, in textiles manufacturing, construction, other manufacturing, and other services are the most common types of work being performed by respondents in Turkey.
- Low wages in existing jobs, inability to speak the Turkish-language, and lack of available work were the most frequently cited obstacles to finding employment.
- Survey respondents were evenly split between being concerned about getting in trouble by being caught working or losing their assistance, but most expressed difficulty paying for the work permit.
- Most agree that employers are willing to hire them, but that it is difficult to find an employer to sponsor a work permit.
- Most survey respondents reported that workers and employers treat them with respect, and that they do not face discrimination.
Opportunities for All

Education Level Is Generally Low, Though a Sizable Share of Respondents Have Postsecondary Education

Over half of survey respondents have a primary-level education or less while a third possess an intermediate-or secondary-level education (see Figure 5.1). A sizable share of survey respondents across all three provinces (14 percent) possessed a postsecondary degree. In Şanlıurfa, around 20 percent of respondents possessed a postsecondary education. In general, survey respondents tended to have higher education levels than Lebanon but lower education levels than Jordan as measured by the share who possess an intermediate-level education or higher.

Survey respondents were asked about any training they received since arriving in the host country, and only 17 percent reported receiving training. Around 10 percent of respondents indicated that they received Turkish-language training since they arrived in Turkey. The most commonly cited trainings among those who reported receiving training since arriving in the host country include carpentry; woodworking and wood technologies; clothing design, sewing, and tailoring; and construction-related training. Of note is that while our interviews and focus groups emphasized Turkish-language training needs, this was not a main type of training taken.

Share of Household Members Working or Willing to Work and Share of Respondents Not Working Diverge Widely Between Males and Females

We calculated the share of household members 18 years and above who are either working or willing to work as a measure of participation in the labor force; it was 52 percent overall: 85 percent for males and 25 percent for females (see Figure 5.2). Males in Istanbul and Adana were generally more likely to be working or willing to work compared with Şanlıurfa, but there were few differences across provinces for females. Our data reveal that among our survey sample, women were more likely to be working or willing to work compared with labor force participation of women in Syria prior to the war. This finding is consistent with our focus group findings.1 Among both male and female survey respondents, the share of respondents who

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1 It is important to note that while labor force participation in Syria prior to the civil war (2010) was estimated to be 13.27 percent and roughly consistent with the share of females chosen to complete the employment perceptions survey,
reported not working was lower in Istanbul compared with the other provinces. Şanlıurfa had the highest rates of respondents not working compared with the other provinces, at 50 percent for males and 72 percent for females. High rates of women reporting that they are not working, particularly in Şanlıurfa and Adana, should be placed into context of our survey design and sampling. Of the 602 survey respondents in our sample, 93 were females. Of those, only 42 reported working. Our distribution of working females was 26 out of 37 in Istanbul, 14 out of 50 in Şanlıurfa, and only 2 out of 6 female survey respondents in Adana. The low rate of females in our sample was a function of low eligibility (working or willingness to work) in our target population and therefore representation in our sample.

studies have suggested that labor force participation is higher among refugee women due to the need for them to work to support the family. For a more detailed explanation, see Appendix D.

The percentage not working was calculated for the survey respondents. In the survey, we relied on the ILO definition of what it means to be working, which is defined as working even for one hour in the past seven days or being temporarily absent from work. The survey respondents who do not fit either of those two criteria are considered not working, which is equivalent to unemployed—they are not working, they are not actively searching for work, and they are not willing to work if they had the opportunity. In this case, we do not strictly impose the condition for unemployment that the respondent needs to be actively looking for work. Thus, rather than referring to our survey respondents who are not working as “unemployed,” we refer to them simply as “not working.” Given the circumstances of Syrian refugees, who as observed in our focus groups perceive many barriers to working, we opted for a less strict application of the criteria and also include in our sample those who state willingness to work if provided the opportunity.
Temporary Family Illness, Low Expectations About the Availability of Work, and Not Knowing Where to Look Among the Most Commonly Cited Reasons for Not Working

Survey respondents who were not working focused on barriers related to searching for and identifying work, including inability to find work, uncertainty about where to look for a job, and the belief that there is no suitable work (see Figure 5.3). Temporary family illness was also one of the key factors, illustrating how health-care challenges are interacting with labor force participation. The “Other” category includes an extensive list of other reasons. The entire list is available in the survey in Appendix D.

Both Those Working and Those Not Working Rely on Social Networks to Find Work, but Those Working Are More Likely to Visit Employers Directly

Among the respondents not working, the most commonly cited action taken was to ask relatives and friends for information about employment opportunities (Figure 5.4), suggesting the prominence of networks and social groups as the method to search for employment. This was consistent with the method used by those working to find work, which was noted as hearing about their current job from relatives or friends. It was more common for a working respondent to have visited a workplace in person, compared with a respondent who was not working. Conversely, it was much more common for a respondent who was not working to have registered with an employment agency to look for work, compared with the way in which working...
Figure 5.3
Reasons Given for Not Working

- Language barrier, does not speak the language/dialect at work sites: 6%
- Tired of looking: 10%
- Not knowing how or where to look for job: 11%
- Believing that there is no work: 11%
- Cannot find appropriate work: 16%
- Temporary family reasons or illness prevented search for work, otherwise would look: 16%
- Other: 29%

Percentage of respondents: 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. Responses are based on the 192 unemployed survey respondents who responded that they had neither worked nor were on temporary break (questions D3 and D4 in the survey). A chi-square goodness of fit reveals significant differences at the 1 percent level in responses across categories compared to an even distribution of responses across categories.

Figure 5.4
Actions Taken to Find Work for Not Working and Working Respondents

- None: 7% (Not working), 17% (Working)
- Register with a government employment agency, private employment agency, the UN, or an NGO: 14% (Not working), 17% (Working)
- Other: 18% (Not working), 18% (Working)
- Ask relatives and friends to make a recommendation to an employer: 33% (Not working), 35% (Working)
- Visit workplace in person: 11% (Not working), 38% (Working)
- Ask relatives and friends for information: 69% (Not working), 66% (Working)

Percentage of respondents: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Responses are based on the 192 survey respondents who responded that they had neither worked nor were on temporary break and 410 employed respondents who responded that they are working or on temporary break to the questions in the survey (questions D3 and D4). A chi-square goodness of fit reveals significant differences at the 1 percent level in responses across categories compared to an even distribution of responses across categories.

respondents had typically acquired their jobs: around 17 percent of survey respondents not working chose to register with a government employment agency, private employment agency, UN agency, or NGO, compared with 4 percent of those already working. This is consistent with focus group discussions in which participants noted not receiving much formal job-matching assistance.
NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on survey data. Responses are based on the 410 employed survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in questions D3 and D4 of the survey, and the 405 survey respondents who reported that they previously worked in Syria. A Pearson chi-square test reveals that there are statistically significant differences in the overall distribution of respondents between the types of sectors, occupations, and employment status worked in the host country and those worked in Syria.
Survey Results: Turkey

Survey Respondents Are More Likely to Work in Textiles and Construction, in Unskilled Work, and in Temporary Positions Compared with Their Situation in Syria

Currently working respondents were asked what sector they work in, and the findings are provided in Figure 5.5. Survey respondents, whether they currently work or not, were also asked about their previous employment in Syria. It is important to note that we are examining an aggregate picture across all respondents who report being employed rather than a dyadic match of sectors worked for each respondent. We find that more respondents are currently working in textile manufacturing (28 percent) and construction (18 percent), compared to the percentage who worked in those sectors before leaving Syria. While the refugees are adapting to conditions and availability of jobs, the mismatch might suggest opportunities for sectors that need workers. Similarly, many focus group participants noted that they were not working in their field of expertise in Syria and wanted to use their previous skills.

Largely because Syrians are restricted to work in certain occupations and because most Syrians are working informally, there is greater heterogeneity in the types of occupations that our respondents reported having in Syria compared to their current jobs. This is reflected in the “Other” category, which spans a long list of jobs with small cell sizes given the size of our sample. The survey results indicate that a larger share of survey respondents report currently working in unskilled jobs (40 percent) compared to the share that reported working in those jobs in Syria. The percentage of survey respondents reporting that they work in skilled jobs is similar to the percentage who reported working on those jobs in Syria.

In general, and not surprisingly, there has been a shift among respondents from stable, permanent paid work to less stable, temporary, and casual work. Around 56 percent of respondents held permanent paid work prior to leaving Syria, whereas 48 percent hold those types of jobs in Turkey. A much larger share are currently in temporary or fixed-term positions (24 percent compared with 10 percent), and a much higher share report being in casual type of work (11 percent versus 1 percent). There is currently a lower share of business owners and self-employed persons than there was prior to leaving Syria.

Perceived Obstacles to Finding Work

Survey respondents were asked to choose from a list of the three biggest obstacles to finding a job or starting a business in Turkey (see Table 5.1). While there were some common concerns across provinces, there were also a few differences. Low wages were commonly reported across all three provinces at close to 50 percent of respondents in Istanbul and Şanlıurfa and around 60 percent in Adana. This is not surprising given our earlier focus group findings that many Syrians are working below Turkey’s minimum wage. On the other hand, not speaking Turkish was cited as more of a barrier in Istanbul (43 percent) compared with Şanlıurfa (32 percent) and Adana (34 percent). Not enough jobs were cited by over a third of respondents in Şanlıurfa and around one-quarter of respondents in Istanbul (along with one-quarter citing difficulty getting a work permit). Other factors not listed but deemed important include difficulty getting a work permit (also in Adana), difficulty getting legal residency (more so in Istanbul), and poor working conditions (cited across all three provinces). Lack of information about availability of work is much more of an issue in Şanlıurfa and Adana, which suggests a need for better matching mechanisms. A combination of legal and institutional factors (residency, work permits) as well as macroeconomic conditions (availability of jobs, low wages) all play a role in inhibiting employment, though to different degrees of emphasis from the Syrian refugee perspective.
Table 5.1
Top Obstacles to Syrians Finding Work in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
<th>Şanlıurfa</th>
<th>Adana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low wages in available jobs (45%)</td>
<td>Low wages in available jobs (46%)</td>
<td>Low wages in available jobs (60%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not speaking Turkish language or dialect, communication issues (43%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (35%)</td>
<td>Not speaking Turkish language or dialect, communication issues (34%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit; Not enough jobs available (tie at 24%)</td>
<td>Not speaking Turkish language or dialect, communication issues (32%)</td>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs (28%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Survey respondents were asked to choose the top three obstacles. Percentages were calculated based on dividing the number of survey respondents who chose that obstacle by the total number of respondents by province. Results are based on 274 households in Istanbul, 235 in Şanlıurfa, and 93 in Adana.

Figure 5.6
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
<th>Şanlıurfa</th>
<th>Adana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Many Syrians are afraid they will get into trouble with the government or police if they work</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many Syrians do not look for work because they worry about losing assistance</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are organizations in Turkey that support Syrians to find work</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many Syrians cannot pay the work permit and/or residency fees</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td>11% 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is difficult to find employers willing to sponsor a Syrian to obtain a work permit</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employers in Turkey are willing to hire Syrians</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined, as were the responses disagree and strongly disagree. Results are based on 602 survey respondents.
Survey Results: Turkey

Perceptions Toward Employment in the Host Country

Around 40 percent of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement they thought they would get into trouble with the government or the police if they worked, another 40 percent disagreed, and the remainder neither agreed nor disagreed (see Figure 5.6). Roughly half of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that not searching for work was tied to losing assistance while over a third agreed or strongly agreed that the fear of losing assistance acts as a hindrance. The vast majority of respondents agreed that most Syrians cannot pay the work permit and residency fees. While 58 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that employers in Turkey are willing to hire Syrians, 65 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that it is difficult to find employers willing to sponsor a Syrian to obtain a work permit. Similar to perceptions in the other host countries, employers are willing to hire but perhaps only if they can do so without being subject to labor laws and regulations.

In terms of perceptions toward the work environment and relations with employers and fellow workers, around 60 percent of survey respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that they have been regularly discriminated against by employers or fellow employees (see Figure 5.7). Over 60 percent also agreed or strongly agreed with the statement

Figure 5.7
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception</th>
<th>Agree or strongly agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Disagree or strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by a fellow worker</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by an employer</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I am mistreated at work, I would feel comfortable going to the public authorities</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Turkish coworkers treat me with respect in the workplace</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can get training and education that I need to gain skills and relevant jobs</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian women worry about being harassed in the workplace in Turkey</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no reliable and safe transportation for women to be able to reach work</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians fear they experiencing physical harm in the workplace in Turkey</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined, as were the responses disagree and strongly disagree. Results are based on 602 survey respondents.
that their Turkish coworkers treat them with respect. This is in line with focus group findings that Syrians report both positive and negative relationships with Turkish coworkers. Close to half would feel comfortable complaining to the authorities if they were being mistreated in the workplace. Despite overall positive statements, half of survey respondents indicated that Syrian women fear harassment in the workplace, and over half expressed fear about being harmed in the workplace. Approximately 40 percent of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that there is no reliable and safe transportation for women to be able to reach work.

**Firm Survey**

**Key Findings**

- Out of the 157 firms included in the survey, about 15 percent had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, and another 15 percent had previously recruited (successfully or unsuccessfully) Syrian workers.
- Firms in Istanbul and Şanlıurfa were more likely to have recruited Syrians than firms in Adana.
- Syrians were more likely to be doing unskilled and semiskilled jobs than other workers.
- Consistent with growing concerns about Turkey’s overall economic climate, few firms anticipated employment growth over the next 12 months.
- **Firms’ perceived advantages and disadvantages of hiring Syrians.**
  - The most commonly perceived advantages to hiring Syrian workers had to do with Syrians’ willingness to accept lower wages and benefits than Turkish workers.
  - The most commonly cited disadvantage to hiring Syrian workers was the language barrier.
- Respondents indicated a number of policies to encourage overall employment growth.
  - These included decreasing the cost of labor (by decreasing social security fees, subsidizing wages and benefits, and reducing the paperwork involved in hiring), lowering taxes, making it easier to get financing, making it easier to set up a business, and providing or subsidizing training for workers.
  - However, most respondents did not believe that any policies would increase employment opportunities for Syrian workers. Among those who did suggest policies that would help, language training was the most commonly cited.

**Nearly 30 Percent of Firms in the Sample Had Ever Recruited Syrian Workers**

About 15 percent of the firms in the sample (21 out of 157) had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, and another 15 percent (22 firms) had previously tried to recruit Syrian workers, either successfully or unsuccessfully (Figure 5.8). Among the 22 firms that had previously tried to recruit Syrians, 17 indicated that they had hired Syrians but that those workers were no longer employed at the firm at the time of the survey, while 2 indicated that they were unable to find qualified Syrians.³

³ The remaining three firms gave answers that made it difficult to confirm whether they had in fact successfully recruited Syrians in the past.
The share of firms that had ever recruited (had on board at the time of the survey, or had previously tried to recruit) Syrians differed significantly by province; over 45 percent of firms in Şanlıurfa had recruited Syrians, compared with approximately 30 percent in Istanbul and only 6 percent in Adana. This is consistent with the fact that the ratio of registered Syrians to the overall population in Şanlıurfa is nearly 20 percent, compared to about 9 percent in Adana (authors’ calculations based on Republic of Turkey DGMM, 2018). Although the ratio of registered Syrians to the total population is actually lower in Istanbul (about 4 percent) (authors’ calculations based on Republic of Turkey DGMM, 2018), our interviews suggested that many Syrians who are registered elsewhere have migrated to Istanbul to pursue employment opportunities, and the Syrian household survey also showed that employment rates were higher in Istanbul than in Şanlıurfa or Adana. In addition, within Istanbul, the firm survey was targeted at areas close to where Syrians were concentrated.

Both small and midsized/large firms and firms in each of the industries included in the sample had recruited Syrians. While there is suggestive evidence that recruiting Syrians is particularly common in textile, garment, and apparel manufacturing, the differences across industry and firm size are not statistically significant at conventional levels.

In general, up to 10 percent of a Turkish firm’s workers can legally be Syrian.\(^4\) This constraint may have affected small firms but did not appear to be binding for larger firms. The number of Syrian workers ranged from one to eight and did not scale up with firm size among the 21 firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey.

An important concern with self-reported employment numbers is that respondents may be reluctant to report any Syrian workers if they are hired without work permits and might therefore get into legal trouble. Hence, we asked all respondents if they believed that other firms in their line of work hired Syrians. Although fewer than 30 percent of respondents indicated

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\(^4\) There are certain exceptions to this general rule. Firms with fewer than ten employees and those without any Turkish employees can employ at most one Syrian.
that their own firms had recruited Syrians, over 50 percent believed that other firms in their line of work had done so, and that other firms hired Syrians without work permits in order to avoid barriers to hiring.

Female Employment Is Low Among All Workers and Among Syrian Workers
Almost half of all firms had at least one female worker of any nationality. The average share of female workers among the firms with female workers was 28 percent, while the average share across all 157 firms was only 12 percent. This may partly reflect the fact that the labor force participation rate (LFPR) for women in Turkey was less than half the LFPR for men in 2017 (ILO, 2017a, 2017b), but it may also be due to the sampling design. Indeed, this share differed significantly by industry and firm size; midsized and large firms had higher shares of female employees than small firms, and firms in the textile/garment/apparel manufacturing, food manufacturing, and hotels and restaurants industries had the highest shares of female employees among the industries in the sample.5

5 An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test rejects that the share of female workers is equal across firm size and across industry at the 1 percent level of statistical significance, but fails to reject that the share of female workers is equal across provinces.
In the Syrian household survey, 85 percent of men, but only 25 percent of women, were working or willing to work. In keeping with that finding, among the 21 firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, nearly 60 percent (12 firms) had at least one female worker of any nationality, but only 24 percent (five firms) had at least one female Syrian worker. In the focus groups, Syrian women frequently mentioned that they worked in textiles; consistent with this finding, four of the five firms that had female Syrian workers were in textile, garment, and apparel manufacturing.

**Syrians Are Working in Semiskilled and Unskilled Jobs**

The survey elicited information about the number of all workers in highly skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled jobs and about the number of Syrian workers in each job type (the latter number being from the 21 firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey). The average share of highly skilled jobs is 30 percent among all firms and 18 percent among firms that had Syrians workers; however, none of the Syrian workers were in highly skilled positions (Figure 5.9).

This may be partly because of the level of education among Syrians in Turkey; the survey of Syrian households found that 55 percent of respondents had primary education or below. However, 14 percent of respondents did have postsecondary education, and the distribution of jobs may also reflect the inability of Syrians to obtain jobs in line with their education or skills; a common theme in the Syrian worker focus groups was that participants had taken jobs that did not make use of their skills.

**Firms Use Similar Channels to Hire Syrians and Other Workers**

Among firms that had recruited semiskilled or unskilled workers of any nationality over the previous 12 months or that had ever recruited Syrians, the top three hiring channels were the same: asking current employees for recommendations, receiving direct applications, and going

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6 For highly skilled and unskilled jobs, two-sided t-tests reject that the share of Syrian workers is equal to the share of all workers in firms that hire Syrians at the 1 percent level; for semiskilled jobs, a t-test rejects the equality at the 5 percent level.
through intermediaries (Appendix D). Indeed, Syrian workers in the focus groups and in the household survey most commonly reported getting a job through networking with family and friends and through visiting a workplace in person.

Firms were more likely to use formal recruiting channels when attempting to fill highly skilled positions. Among those that had recruited workers for highly skilled jobs, asking current employees for recommendations was also the top hiring channel; however, the next most common channels were working with government organizations or private employment agencies.7

Nearly 60 percent of the firms that recruited for highly skilled jobs indicated that they faced difficulties in doing so, compared with 37 percent for semiskilled jobs and 15 percent for unskilled jobs. Given the unemployment rate of over 10 percent, such difficulties may reflect a mismatch between firms and job seekers in terms of skills or expectations about working conditions. In fact, the difficulties most commonly cited by firms were similar across job types: not enough applicants, lack of skills and experience (and, for semiskilled and highly skilled positions, lack of education), and requests for higher salaries than the firm was willing to offer. For semiskilled and unskilled positions, lack of willingness to do the required tasks was also noted.

7 Twenty-one firms had recruited highly skilled workers, 70 had recruited semiskilled workers, and 52 had recruited unskilled workers over the previous 12 months. Forty-three firms had ever recruited Syrian workers.
The Most Commonly Identified Disadvantage to Hiring Syrians Was Language

The survey asked respondents about their perceptions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of hiring Syrian workers. Approximately 80 percent of respondents perceived no advantages to hiring Syrians (Figure 5.10). Among those who did perceive some advantages, the most commonly cited reasons were their willingness to accept lower wages and benefits than Turkish workers. In fact, respondents in the Syrian household survey noted the low wages in available jobs as the top obstacle to finding work. This discrepancy in wages was also noted as a source of tension in the focus groups. Turkish workers consistently noted that Syrians were paid substantially lower wages and viewed this as unfair treatment of the Syrians as well as creating unfair competition for Turkish workers.

These perceptions were similar across firm size, province, and industry. A few firms—largely in Istanbul and Şanlıurfa—did indicate that it was easier to find Syrian applicants, did note that Syrians were willing to perform the required tasks or to work in a particular location, or did indicate that Syrians exhibited greater motivation or productivity.

The most commonly cited disadvantage of hiring Syrians by firms of all sizes, provinces, and industries was the language barrier, and this mirrors the fact that not speaking Turkish was one of the major obstacles to employment noted in the Syrian worker focus groups and in the household survey. Lack of motivation and productivity were also commonly cited, as were difficulties in finding Syrians with the right qualifications, education, skills, and experience, or finding those who were willing to perform the required tasks. A number of firms noted that Syrians were more likely to leave the firm. Cultural barriers were also cited in several instances.

Only 5 percent of small firms and 10 percent of midsize and large firms cited lack of residency or work permit when asked about overall disadvantages to hiring Syrians. When asked specifically about perceived difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians, only 12 percent

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8 Among the 21 firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, median tenure among Syrian employees was reported to be 7–12 months, while median tenure among Turkish employees was reported to be one to two years.
of small firms, but over 40 percent of midsized and large firms perceived any difficulties in doing so. This difference is consistent with the focus group findings: both Turkish and Syrian workers indicated that small firms would hire Syrians without permits, while large firms would not hire Syrians without permits. In interviews, industry association representatives noted that large firms wanted to ensure that they were operating legally for reputational and other reasons, while small firms may have been less concerned about this.

Among those firms that did report perceived difficulties with obtaining work permits for Syrians, the most commonly identified difficulties included the length of time taken for the permit application, the lack of information about how to apply, and the fact that the employee might not have a residency permit. The concern about lack of information about the permit process was also noted during the in-depth interviews with firms, as well as interviews with industry association representatives.

**The Most Common Suggestions for Employment Growth Included Lowering the Cost of Labor for All Workers and Providing Language Training for Syrians**

The survey asked about plans for future growth and perceptions about policies that could encourage such growth. Fewer than 10 percent of respondents anticipated an increase in the number of jobs over the next 12 months. This finding is not consistent with the current rate of GDP growth in Turkey, but is in keeping with the concerns about the overall state of Turkey’s economy, which were expressed during interviews and during the in-depth interviews with firms. Among the firms that did anticipate increasing their employment, only one indicated that they would hire Syrians even if there were no barriers to doing so.

Respondents indicated a number of policies the government could use to promote overall employment opportunities. Most commonly cited policies included decreasing the cost of labor (decreasing social security fees, subsidizing wages and benefits, and reducing the paperwork involved in hiring), lowering taxes, making it easier to get financing, making it easier to set up a business, and providing or subsidizing training for workers (the top five are shown in Figure 5.11).

However, when asked about policies that could increase employment opportunities for Syrians, 50 percent of respondents indicated that nothing would do so. Among those who did suggest potential policies, language training was most commonly cited; similarly, language training was the most common request of Syrians in the focus groups. Despite the lack of overall concern about work permits, other common suggestions included making the legal status of Syrians clearer and making work permits free and easier to get. A number of firms did also suggest other types of training and job matching, as well as decreasing social security fees or subsidizing wages for Syrians.

**Summary**

Despite the fact that most firms in the sample did not perceive any advantages to hiring Syrians, about 30 percent had recruited Syrians at some point, and most appeared to be motivated by the ability to pay Syrians lower wages or benefits. This is consistent with the fact that a

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9 Eighty small firms and 41 midsized and large firms responded to the question about perceived difficulties in obtaining work permits after excluding those that responded “don’t know” or refused to answer. A Pearson chi-square test rejects that the distribution of firms perceiving any difficulties in obtaining a work permit is equal across firm size at the 1 percent significance level.
majority of Syrian households in the sample agreed that employers were willing to hire Syrians, but also that it was difficult to find an employer to sponsor a Syrian to obtain a work permit. The finding that large firms were more likely than small firms to perceive difficulties in obtaining a work permit is also consistent with the focus groups, which suggested that large firms were more likely than small firms to hire Syrians formally.

The most critical barrier to hiring Syrians in Turkey—a theme echoed throughout the household and firm surveys as well as in the focus groups—was the language barrier. In fact, while half of firms in the sample did not perceive that anything could be done to improve employment opportunities for Syrians, those that did indicate policies that would be helpful were most likely to note language training.

Both surveys indicated substantial differences in employment for Syrians across the three provinces that were included in the sample. In the household survey, the percentage of Syrians in Istanbul who were willing to work but were not working was substantially lower than in the other provinces. The interview findings (see Chapter Three) indicated that many Syrians have migrated to Istanbul from the southeastern provinces, where unemployment rates are high, and that the high inflows of Syrians—as well as Turks—into Istanbul has strained the city’s infrastructure and resources.

Firms in the sample were most likely to report difficulties in hiring highly skilled and semi-skilled workers. The firm survey indicated that Syrians were generally working in unskilled and semiskilled jobs. The relatively low level of education among the Syrian population in
Turkey means that they may require substantial training to be able to work in more highly skilled jobs; in general, although many training programs are available, it is not clear that these programs are effective or tailored to employer needs.

Reflecting concerns about the overall state of the economy, firms in the sample were not optimistic about growth prospects in the immediate future, while respondents in the Syrian household survey commonly named lack of available jobs as a barrier to employment. Nonetheless, in the firm survey, respondents did indicate a number of policies that could improve employment opportunities for all—including reducing the cost of doing business, making it easier to start a firm, and improving access to finance.
In the most recent Jordanian census, the number of Syrian refugees was estimated at around double the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR (1.3 million, as opposed to 660,000). This chapter provides basic information on the demographics, education, and employment status of Syrian refugees. It also describes Jordan’s economic climate, policies and programs of the government and international aid community, business considerations for hiring Syrians, and social cohesion.

Syrian Refugee Circumstances in Jordan

Numbers, Locations, and Demographics
According to UNHCR, about 660,000 Syrians are registered as refugees in Jordan as of March 2018; most of them had arrived by the end of 2013 (UNHCR, 2018b; Jordan INGO Forum, 2018, p. 3). In addition, some refugees remain unregistered (Culbertson et al., 2016, p. 4). Accordingly, the Government of Jordan estimates that the actual number of Syrians in the country may be closer to 1.3 million (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, pp. 20, 93). Of the registered Syrians, just over half are under age 18, and most come from rural areas of Syria (UNHCR, 2018b; Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 5). About 140,000 (20 percent) reside in camps, with nearly 520,000 (80 percent) living outside of camps, mainly in urban areas (UNHCR, 2018a, 2018b). Most Syrians are registered in Amman Governorate (over 186,000) and in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, and Zarqa—each of which host more than 100,000 refugees (see Figure 6.1).

Education and Skill Levels
The educational attainment of Syrians in Jordan is generally less than that of both Jordanians and other migrant workers (Razzaz, 2017, p. 6). According to a 2015 ILO report (based on a household survey conducted in 2014 in Amman, Irbid, and Mafrq), over half of Syrian refugees in Jordan over age 15 had not completed basic education, and only about 15 percent had completed secondary school (Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 5). Additionally, approximately 40 percent of school-age Syrian children in Jordan are not attending school (Jordan INGO Forum, 2018).

Nevertheless, Syrians in Jordan reportedly have skill sets that are not necessarily apparent from their formal education levels (Razzaz, 2017, p. 6). Though comprehensive data on these skill sets are lacking (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 76), information about the refugees’ prior occupations provides related insights. Before coming to Jordan, many Syrians living
opportunities for all

outside of the camps had worked as craft and trade workers, including tile work, plastering, and other semiskilled trades in construction (Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 5). Others had worked in services and sales; plant and machine operation and assembly; and skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishing jobs (Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 5).

Types of Work Conducted by Syrian Refugees in Jordan

Estimates of the number of Syrians currently working in Jordan range from 85,000 to over 330,000 (Razzaz, 2017, p. 29), with a 2017 UNDP study stating that 125,000 are employed (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 75). Many work informally, with the construction and wholesale and trade sectors displaying particularly high rates of informality (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 48; ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, p. 32). Similar to Turkey and Lebanon, “informality” has a somewhat different connotation when applied to Syrians versus locals working in Jordan. In general, an informally employed Syrian is working without a work permit, which is distinct from an informally employed Jordanian who is typically working without a work contract or registration for social security. In this report, we employ the same definition here as explained in Razzaz (2017). As mentioned in the cases of Turkey and Lebanon, both types of informal workers face difficulties in terms of low wages (often below the minimum wage), lack of access to social protection programs, and poor working conditions. Reports indicate that Syrians in Jordan are often employed as craft and trade workers (mainly in construction), in services and sales (such as accommodation and food service), or in agriculture (Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 5; Razzaz, 2017, p. 30). According to an expert on the Jordanian economy

Figure 6.1
Distribution of Registered Syrian Refugees in Jordan by Governorate

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: UNHCR Jordan as of December 2017.

RAND RR2653-6.1
whom we interviewed, specialized construction skills are in particularly high demand in Jordan, and Syrian refugees with these skills are hired to work informally in both small (e.g., residences) and large construction jobs. In general, Syrian workers have the reputation of being both hard-working and willing to work for lower wages than Jordanian workers. Additionally, Syrian business ownership in Jordan is low, despite potential entrepreneurial capabilities among the refugees (Jordan INGO Forum, 2018, p. 10; Razzaz, 2017, p. 13).

Jordan has also made progress in formalizing Syrians’ work, although according to labor market experts interviewed, Syrian participation in the labor market remains confined to certain sectors (primarily construction and agriculture) and to a certain class of occupations within those sectors (low- to entry-level middle-skill jobs). According to a recent report by the Jordan INGO Forum, over 46,000 formal work permits were issued to Syrians in 2017, and about 40,000 Syrians held valid permits in the beginning of 2018 (Jordan INGO Forum, 2017, p. 9). This is well below the target of 80,000 work permits by the end of 2018, and behind the targeted 200,000 work permits within five years of the implementation of the Jordan Compact. Since employers typically sponsor work permits, recent studies have found that employer reluctance to issue them may be because the businesses are unregistered, or employers do not want to commit to stable employment; or because of the perceived time, effort, and cost to register workers. Employers may also be subject to meeting quotas for non-Jordanian workers if they formally register. Moreover, employers may not be fully aware of recent changes to regulations, despite reducing overall barriers to obtaining work permits including lowering costs (Buffoni, Kattaa, and El Khalil, 2017; Razzaz, 2018).

The Jordan Department of Statistics and the Economic Research Forum (ERF) collaborated to field the Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS), a first wave in 2010 and a second wave in 2016. In the second wave, a refresher sample of 3,000 households was added from areas with high concentrations of non-Jordanian households, based on the 2015 census. Recently published studies have examined these data and generated new insights that shed light on the dynamics of Syrian refugee influx into Jordan and the effect on the labor market. The key finding is that Jordanians living in areas with a high concentration of Syrian refugees have not experienced adverse labor market outcomes compared with Jordanians living in areas with lower concentrations of Syrians. Non-Jordanian, non-Syrian workers, however, have experienced worse labor market outcomes in areas with high influx of Syrians (Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba, 2018; Wahba, 2018). Several explanations for these findings are worth noting. The studies found that Syrian refugees typically compete for work with other migrant workers, particularly Arabic speaking migrants from Egypt and other countries in the region. Moreover, the presence of Syrian refugees in Jordan generated demand for goods and services from the refugees, as well as from the NGOs and other organizations that came to Jordan to offer both humanitarian and livelihood support. Finally, employment effects in Jordan were more directly affected by the closure of export channels due to several ongoing crises, including the one in Syria, that in turn tempered economic activity and job growth countrywide (Fallah, Krafft, and Wahba, 2018; Wahba, 2018).

These types of studies are possible because of efforts by the Jordan Department of Statistics, working with partners, to collect data on the Syrian population. Further examination of these labor market dynamics over time will be possible because the Department of Statistics has included Syrians in its quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS) (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2018d). In conversations with representatives of the private sector in Jordan, there is general concern that under current economic conditions, including the implementation of the Jordan
Compact, it is difficult to imagine where many permit holders would find employment. Per Jordan’s 2016 Statistical Yearbook (2016 being the most recent year for which specific data are available), the highest number of permits held by Syrians in that year were for the agriculture sector (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2016b, p. 56). This was followed by the trade, restaurants, and hotels sectors; then manufacturing; then construction. Syrians also held permits to work in social and personal services; other services; transport, storage, and communications; electricity, gas, and water; financing and businesses; and mining and quarrying (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2016b, p. 56). Over 90 percent of the Syrians who hold work permits in Jordan are male (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2018a, p. 4). According to the ILO, LFPR of women in Syria in 2010 (just prior to the war) was low at 13.27 percent (ILO, 2017a).

Recognizing some of the potential barriers to work permit issuance, organizations such as the ILO, the German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), the World Bank, and the World Food Programme in Jordan have pursued various approaches to increasing formal employment of Syrian refugees in agriculture and construction. In addition to pursuing changes to the law to reduce work permit fees, efforts were under way as of early 2018 to allow more flexible permits to be issued that are not tied to specific employers, shortening the time to reapply for a work permit, and allowing movement between permitted sectors. Additionally, Syrian refugees were able to obtain certification for education and training credentials obtained in Syria for broader recognition in the Jordanian labor market, although gaining certification was not a requirement for obtaining a work permit. The ILO has been assuming the costs of certification. The number of Syrians applying for credential certification remains relatively low, with only 6,000 credentials being certified since the beginning of the program; but as of early 2018, efforts were under way to further promote certification options for Syrians.

**Syrian Businesses in Jordan**

Syrian business owners and entrepreneurs that we interviewed have found Jordan to be a generally welcoming place when relocating their business from Syria; however, several key constraints exist. Syrian businesses have had to rely on local Jordanian demand, which is insufficient to promote business growth. These businesses face the same barriers related to transportation routes as Jordanian businesses. However, a key barrier that is unique to Syrian business owners is the difficulty to travel abroad and market their products.

One of the key objectives of the Jordan Investment Board, established in 2014, was to facilitate the acquisition of temporary Jordanian travel documents for foreign business owners, particularly Syrians, to allow them to travel and market their products. Practically, this has had limited effect, as the incentive to acquire a Jordanian travel document is low, given the high cost (according to sources, approximately $40,000) and the limited three-year viability of the document.

**Jordan’s Economic Climate and Impact of the Refugees**

As with Turkey, it is useful to quickly survey Jordan’s economic climate before and after the refugee crisis to understand the context in which the refugees arrived and are currently situated.
Macroeconomic Situation

Amid preexisting and current nonrefugee factors affecting Jordan’s economy, it is difficult to isolate the economic impact of the Syrian refugee influx. As seen in Figure 6.2, annual percent growth in GDP was on a steep decline well before the Syrian crisis and has slowed since 2007–2008 due to the global economic downturn, regional unrest and insecurity, and domestic energy issues (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 93). Annual GDP growth continued at approximately 2–3 percent through 2017. Export growth has declined since 2010, as political events in the region, namely the Syrian crisis, the closing of the border with Iraq, and the decline in Gulf demand, have generally caused exports to trend downward. It remains to be seen whether a slight uptick seen in 2017 constitutes a positive trend. Inflation remained relatively low, turning into deflation recently, mirroring the shrinking of the economy.

Particularly challenging for Jordan in terms of both trade and FDI have been conflicts and instability in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt (resulting in limited demand for Jordanian goods and complicating their movement) as well as a broader economic downturn that has affected demand even from the wealthier Gulf states. Figure 6.3 shows FDI peaking at $3.5 billion in 2006 and then declining rapidly as the global economy crashed. There was a slight increase beginning in 2012, though that has tapered off somewhat in the last couple of years. The region remains a volatile place, and despite relative peace and security in Jordan, investors appear to be wary of committing substantial resources.
About 1.4 million Jordanians worked in 2016 (Razzaz, 2017, p. 7), with the LFPR for those aged 15 plus at around 39 percent (a low rate due to a low female LFPR). The unemployment rate in Jordan has also remained consistently high over the last two decades at above 12 percent (Figure 6.4). Unemployment is especially high among women, youth, and those with university education (IMF, 2017c, p. 6; Razzaz, 2017, p. 25).

Despite a relatively high unemployment rate among Jordanians, there are up to 1.4 million non-Jordanians who may be working in the country (Razzaz, 2017, p. 7), with Egyptians comprising about two-thirds of migrant workers (Razzaz, 2017, p. 6). Construction and agriculture—sectors in which many Syrians in Jordan work—each account for under 5 percent of Jordan’s GDP (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2018b). Conversely, over 400,000 Jordanians, mainly with high education levels, work abroad in Gulf countries (Razzaz, 2017, p. 24). According to a 2017 ILO study, Jordanians in Jordan often work in different occupations and sectors than either Syrians or migrant workers, with over one-third working as managers, professionals, and clerks (Razzaz, 2017, p. 31). The two largest sectors employing Jordanians are the public and education sectors, and the main area of competition between Jordanians and other groups is

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1 “Labor force participation rate, total (percentage of total population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate),” World Bank Data website; “Labor force participation rate, female (percentage of female population ages 15+) (modeled ILO estimate),” World Bank Data website.

2 The high unemployment rate among the educated indicates that better education alone cannot be a solution; demand for labor might be a more fundamental challenge.
services and sales jobs (Razzaz, 2017, p. 31). Additionally, “[a]lthough fewer Jordanians compete with non-Jordanians in crafts and trades, elementary occupations or agriculture, those Jordanians who do work in those occupations tend to be among the poorest” (Razzaz, 2017, p. 31).

Informal work is also common overall in Jordan. Citing the 2010 JLMPS, Jordan’s National Employment Strategy states: “26 percent of employed wage workers have no contract and no social security coverage” (Jordan, National Employment Strategy, 2014, p. 62). This was the extent of informal labor in the private sector before the Syrian crisis (UNDP, Jordan Economic and Social Council, and AECID, 2013, p. 32).

A combination of low-quality training, a mismatch of the training to labor market needs, and high reservation wages, particularly among young people, all contribute to a stubbornly high unemployment rate among Jordanians (see Figure 6.4). However, the unemployment rate began declining in 2002, and in general, continued that decline even during the global economic downturn, although staying above 12 percent. A portion of the minor decline may be attributed to more people exiting the labor force because they had given up looking for work. Unemployment started rising after 2015, and whether or not this can be attributed to the large influx of Syrian refugees into the labor market is unclear. Some studies suggest that Syrian refugees compete with Jordanians for low-skill jobs (Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 7).

**Business Environment**

According to the 2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey for Jordan, the top three obstacles cited by business owners were access to finance, tax rates, and political instability (see Appendix Table G.4) (World Bank Group, 2013a). Jordan ranked 65 out of 137 on the World Economic
Forum’s *Global Competitiveness Index*, though it was designated ninetieth in labor market efficiency (World Economic Forum, 2018). Additionally, Jordan came in at 103 out of 190 in the World Bank’s 2018 *Ease of Doing Business* rankings (World Bank, 2017a).

**Policies and Programs**

**Legal Framework for Syrian Refugee Employment and Entrepreneurship**

At the February 2016 London Conference, Jordan received pledges from the international community to support the Jordan Compact (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, p. 7). The Compact aims to spur overall job growth in Jordan and create 200,000 jobs for Syrians, mostly by issuing work permits and formalizing existing jobs held by Syrians (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, p. 7; IMF, 2017c, p. 22). Jordan and the EU also arrived at a trade agreement to ease the rules of origin for exports to Europe for Jordanian companies that employ a workforce of at least 15 percent Syrians (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, p. 7). Nonetheless, Jordan maintains a significant trade deficit with the EU. On average, Jordan exports €160–170 million but imports €3.5 billion. On the other hand, Jordanian exports to the United States under the free trade agreement (FTA) amounts to over $1 billion, most of which are textiles. While this has led to a large growth of jobs in the garment industry in Jordan, these jobs have been primarily filled by migrant workers.

Jordan also took steps to make work permit regulations more flexible (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, pp. 8–10), easing some of the restrictions that stem in part from the country’s Labour Law (Razzaz, 2017, p. 35). These measures included temporarily removing the work permit fee, relaxing the requirement for employers to provide proof of social security for their employees when applying for the permit, and adjusting health certification requirements for Syrians (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, pp. 8–9), and other actions (Razzaz, 2017, p. 38). Additional new rules allow refugees who hold work permits to leave the camps for up to a month at a time (Sarrado and Dunmore, 2017). Also, non-employer-specific permits have been allowed in the agricultural and construction sectors (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, p. 11; ILO, 2017c). Further, social security registration is not required for anyone working in agriculture (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, p. 11). The General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU) assists Syrian refugee workers in obtaining work permits through the Ministry of Labor. While the union’s primary stakeholder are its affiliated members, the union’s leadership asserted that the Federation views its mission as the protection and advocacy for all workers regardless of their national origin. Working closely with other partners, the union was able to secure health insurance for workers through a private provider, though paying for social security benefits (also done through employers) remains unresolved. Currently, there is no national policy in place to secure social security benefits for Syrians.

Though Syrian refugees with these permits have gained the legal right to work, foreign workers in Jordan—Syrian and otherwise—are still barred overall from certain jobs or are subject to quotas (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 94). Restricted occupations include: “administrative and accounting professions, clerical professions, telecommunication jobs, jobs in sales, most technical professions, including mechanical and car repair, engineering, education and some professions in hospitality” (ILO, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017, p. 20). Finally, constraints on movement and limited access to finance—among other restrictions—inhibit
Syrian workers and entrepreneurs (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, pp. 35–36, 94). The incentives and disincentives to work from both the employer and employee perspective are summarized in Appendix Table G.3.

International organizations (such as UNDP, ILO, and the World Bank), foreign governments (such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Korea), and the Jordanian government have funded and/or implemented programs to assist Syrian refugees in Jordan (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 95; UNESCO, n.d.). These have included various vocational and employment-related efforts; for example, supporting work opportunities for Syrians and Jordanians on public work projects (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 95). In addition, UNHCR and ILO founded employment offices in the Zaatari and Azraq camps to assist refugees in finding formal employment (UNHCR, 2018d, p. 3). UNHCR and ILO have also used various methods to provide information to refugees about work permit access and other topics (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, pp. 60, 95). Further, UNDP instituted a Skills Exchange Program between
Syrians and Jordanians (UNDP in Jordan, 2017) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) provided entrepreneurial and handicraft skills training to Syrian and Jordanian women (UNESCO, 2017). UNESCO is also implementing the “Technical and Vocational Education and Training for Syrian and Jordanian Youth in Jordan” program to provide access to education that leads to a Business and Technology Education Council (BTEC) Level 3 diploma (UNESCO, n.d.).

The Employment Promotion Program (EPP) led by GIZ and its partners includes both a trade for employment component stemming from the discussion of the constraints around meeting the conditions set forth by the ROO agreement in the Jordan Compact and another component that provides support for micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). The trade for employment component has three arms including public-private dialogue; trade facilitation; and employment and recruitment—all of which aim to help Jordanian companies meet the requirements of the Compact. The latter, in particular, is relevant to meeting the ROO requirements around hiring Syrians. The second component targeting MSMEs has a particular focus on promoting women-run enterprises by supporting microfinance and digitalization. GIZ has been working closely with the Ministry of Labor to address labor market issues that pertain to all workers in Jordan—both host country and refugees.

However, overall, vocational and employment-related trainings remain a work in progress in Jordan. The 3RP 2017 Progress Report noted that Jordan had made little advancement toward its overall targets set at the 2016 London Conference in the category of Livelihoods and Social Cohesion: 580 out of a targeted 11,989 Syrians had participated in applied skills and technical trainings, and only 47 individuals had taken part in employment readiness and employability courses, though the eventual target is 14,746 (3RP, 2017, p. 39).

Social Cohesion

Though the presence of the Syrians has not caused major unrest in Jordan, various reports indicate that the situation occasionally causes tension in local communities. Social cohesion in relation to the refugee influx is impacted by Jordan’s past experience with refugee crises, perceived job competition with Syrians amid high unemployment levels, apparent potential for wage decreases and increased rents, and refugee demands on services and resources (World Bank, 2016, p. 4; Culbertson et al., 2016, pp. 5–6; Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 112). In interviews, Jordanian stakeholders cite shared history and culture with Syrians, including extended familial ties, intermarriage, and open travel between the two countries as the reason for lower incidents of problems between the two communities. There is genuine concern for the plight of Syrians and of their predicament among Jordanians. Nonetheless, tensions do exist, particularly in the northern governorates with high concentrations of refugees, and strains on health, education, water, and general municipal services frustrate local populations, who often express concern that aid prioritizes Syrians over Jordanians (Carrion, 2015, pp. 4, 6; Seeley, 2015, p. 20). Additionally, perceptions of the refugees’ effect on general culture and public order has also caused resentment among the host population (Carrion, 2015, p. 6; Amman: CARE International in Jordan, 2015, p. 8).

As for the Jordanians’ views of working Syrians in Jordan, according to the 2015 ILO report, 95 percent of Jordanian workers think that Syrians, to at least some extent, take jobs from locals, and about two-thirds are also concerned that Syrians seem to be opening up busi-
nesses that hire only Syrians (Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 111) Nevertheless, other Jordanians do not think that Syrians and Jordanians are competing for the same types of employment, with Syrians more willing to accept jobs and salaries that Jordanians would deem unacceptable (Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 110) Additionally, over 70 percent of Jordanian workers surveyed considered Syrians to be hardworking (Stave and Hillesund, 2015, p. 111). Employment practices suggest that some firms are willing to hire Syrians, particularly skilled ones (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 95), “reportedly using a variety of approaches for circumventing quotas and sectoral restrictions placed on Syrian refugees” (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 48).

**Summary**

In summary, while there are many programs that have been put in place by the Government of Jordan and multilateral institutions to move from the provision of humanitarian assistance to enhancing livelihood opportunities, a few gaps appear to remain. Realizing the full potential of the Jordan Compact, improving the business environment in order to attract investment and increase demand for all types of labor, providing targeted training to workers, and easing the restrictions for Syrians to work are a few of the areas we explore in greater detail in Chapters Seven and Eight, through results from focus groups with Syrians and Jordanians and from surveys of Syrian households and of Jordanian firms.
We conducted 13 focus groups with Jordanians and Syrians in Amman, Mafraq, and Zarqa; with Syrian men and women in the Zaatari camp; and with Egyptian migrant workers in Amman (see Appendix C for detailed listing of focus groups). In addition, we conducted in-depth interviews with four firms. The aim of these discussions was to understand better the current employment conditions faced by Syrian refugees as well as other migrant groups and host-country nationals. Specifically, we asked about available jobs, how workers seek employment, and what barriers and challenges they face in securing jobs. The focus groups and interviews also covered topics related to working conditions, social cohesion, refugee aspirations, and ideas for solutions to improve the conditions and employment outcomes for Syrian refugees as well as host-country nationals. Highlights of our findings from the focus groups in Jordan include the following items:

- Syrian and Egyptian employment in Jordan was concentrated in a limited set of fields; many Syrians were working outside fields in which they had previous experience.
- Jordanians found it difficult to find jobs and viewed wages as too low.
- All groups reported that finding jobs took a long time, and job options were limited.
- Work permits were a significant barrier to Syrians obtaining employment; cost, restrictions on industries, and sponsor availability are also key issues.
- Friends, family, and connections were the way most Syrians, Jordanians, and Egyptians found employment.
- International assistance programs were not viewed as helpful in finding employment.
- Transportation to work was a challenge for Syrians, as costs were too high.
- Women faced additional barriers to employment: childcare and long working hours.
- Employers considered Syrians skillful, good employees and willing to work for less; they also introduced healthy competition with Jordanians in the labor market.
- Uncertain legal status related to residence permits and hassle around work permits discouraged employers from hiring Syrians.
- Relations on the job between Jordanians and Syrians were good in general, but Jordanian resentment about Syrian employment was strong.
- Syrians and Egyptian migrants were subject to not receiving full wages and overtime pay.
- Jordanians', Syrians', and Egyptians' greatest aspirations were steady employment and a living wage, safety, and security.
- Solutions for Syrians seeking work in Jordan should include focus on reforming the work permit system.
Employment Opportunities

Syrian and Egyptian employment in Jordan was concentrated in a limited set of fields. Syrian and Jordanian focus group participants noted that these included construction-related jobs (e.g., tiling, plastering, painting, general day laborers), agriculture, tailoring, and home-based/small businesses selling pastries or other food items, for both men and women. Much of this employment appeared to be seasonal, ad hoc, or “freelance,” where workers were paid a daily rate rather than a permanent position with salary. This was also true for Egyptian migrant workers. For women, cleaning jobs were common. Other jobs mentioned included store clerk, cell phone and air-conditioner repair, factory worker, concierge, and barber. Many women reported looking for work, as they had not been able to find suitable positions.

Highly skilled Syrians were working outside their chosen fields of previous experience. Several Syrian participants noted that this was particularly the case for those in high-skill professions (e.g., medicine, accounting) or former government employees because of Jordanian government restrictions on Syrian employment in these fields. Those Syrians trained as low-or middle-skilled craftsmen reported being able to navigate employment more easily than higher skilled workers, perhaps because there were more temporary, lower paid jobs available in the trades. Many complained about the low availability of consistent jobs. Host-country nationals and employers alike mentioned that Syrians’ reputation for having strong customer service orientation and excellent interpersonal skills made them assets to any employer, especially ones involving sales, restaurant, and hospitality industries. These experiences suggest the need for expanding the set of occupations for which Syrians are eligible, especially to those where there is a demand and the Syrians have the requisite skills.

Syrian entrepreneurship is hampered. A few Syrian participants suggested that Syrians who came to Jordan with their own businesses or established one after arriving were often successfully employed. However, the major restrictions on foreign-owned business significantly hampered potential. In particular, concerns about security and legal status (e.g., property ownership) impacted Syrian entrepreneurship. As one Syrian participant noted, “The Syrian is afraid to open a business here in Jordan. . . . The security forces do not really support the presence of Syrians here and they do not treat them in a polite manner.” Other Syrians reported opening their businesses under the name of a Jordanian partner.

Jordanians described a difficult economic environment and were not positive about their job prospects. Many Jordanians were also not working in the fields for which they trained because jobs were not available, and it took significant time to find suitable employment. They reported that wages were too low, and they often needed more than one job to make ends meet. A few participants blamed the presence of Syrian refugees as a reason the situation had become more difficult, in particular for getting construction and skilled trade jobs because Syrians were willing to work for lower wages. A few Jordanians observed that Syrians were willing to take entry-level jobs that Jordanian youth were not willing to take.

The Experience of Obtaining a Job

Friend and family connections were the way most Syrians found employment, while some reported using social media and pickup points. Many reported connecting with employment opportunities through someone they knew already. This was true for many Egyptian migrants work-
Focus Groups in Jordan

ers as well. At the same time, there were differing opinions about the importance of wasṭa or favoritism shown because of influential connections with employers. Jordanian participants and some Syrian participants felt wasṭa had been a barrier to opportunities in their experience. Others said it was not an issue, and they had been hired without such influence or connections. Other means of finding employment mentioned included newspaper ads and websites like Open Souk, Akhṭawūt, and Facebook. A few mentioned going door to door to ask about jobs as well as gathering at central meeting places where employers come to find workers, especially for construction-related jobs; Egyptian migrants also reported getting day-labor work opportunities in this way. Several employers we interviewed noted this was the way Syrians had been hired by their firm. These experiences highlight the need for services to more efficiently match employees to employers.

Many Syrians had strong and long-standing connections in Jordan. Crossing back and forth between Syria and Jordan for jobs and business dealings has long been common. As one participant put it, “Most of us Syrians have lived in Jordan longer than in Syria. We used to come here and work since we come from rural areas in Syria and there were no job opportunities.”

International assistance programs were not viewed as helpful in finding employment. Many Syrian participants reported mixed success with UN agencies or other international employment programs; most said these programs were not helpful for getting a job in their personal experience. A few mentioned success through NGOs such as Mercy Corps and the CARE Foundation. They noted in particular the provision of sewing machines to Syrian refugees and training on how to use the equipment, which some said had been helpful.

Job prospects in general were viewed as limited. Syrians, Jordanians, and Egyptians whom we spoke to alike were frustrated and pessimistic about their future job prospects. They reported that wages were too low, especially for the long hours demanded of them, and jobs were not stable. For Syrian women, the barriers to securing employment also included finding suitable childcare and working hours that would allow mothers to be home when children are home from school. This underscores the need for improving business and economic conditions to create jobs for all groups.

There is new cultural acceptability for women working outside the home given Syrians’ circumstances. There were mixed views on women working in general, but most Syrian men and women said the unusual and dire financial circumstances they were facing increased cultural acceptability of female employment. One Syrian man noted, “Back in Syria the woman was mostly a housewife, but as soon as they came to Jordan some were forced to work. Personally, I do not have a problem with the women in my family working.” Jordanians also held mixed views about women working, with many preferring that women work from home or in jobs that do not require long hours or commutes.

Employer Considerations for Hiring Syrians and Migrants

Employers considered Syrians highly skilled, good employees and willing to work for lower wages than Jordanians or other migrant groups. Jordanian employers interviewed noted several advantages to hiring Syrians. Most often cited was Syrians’ willingness to work for lower wages compared to Jordanians while producing better-quality work products. As one medium-sized firm owner said, “Any Syrian pay compared to a Jordanian’s pay would be less by 20–30 percent. So we witnessed that the workers would accept any wage and would produce or deliver the
same as a Jordanian worker.” Firm representatives also noted that the presence of Syrians in the workplace had created more competition with other migrant groups such as Egyptians, leading to increased productivity. Egyptian migrants corroborated this, noting that Syrians undercut their wages and take “the easy jobs.” Employers described Syrians’ technical skills, particularly in construction and manufacturing, as attractive.

*Concerns about work permit costs discouraged employers from hiring.* Employers also noted some challenges in hiring Syrian refugees. Some said they were too costly to hire because of the need to obtain a work permit—although most Syrians noted that they were the ones who paid the government fee from their wages; perhaps the administrative difficulties to obtain the permit was on the minds of employers. One employer observed that Syrian willingness to accept lower wages was threatening to Jordanian workers and created tension. There appears to be a need for streamlining the work permit process as well as studying the establishment of a uniform minimum wage for all workers.

*Employers were concerned about stability of Syrian employees.* More frequently mentioned as a reason to not hire Syrians was the uncertainty of the Syrians’ legal status in Jordan and the expectation that they would not be long-term employees. A large manufacturing firm representative noted, “Every now and then a new law is implemented; you are allowed to hire, then you are not allowed to hire, [and] you have to let them go. You know this creates a difficult situation because you could lose employees at any time. A Jordanian would be less costly.” Egyptian migrants believed that Jordanian employers preferred them because “the Egyptian chose to leave his country in order to provide for his family—unlike the Syrian worker” and the Egyptians were less likely to leave the job.

**Perceptions of the Legal Framework and Work Permits**

*Work permit limitations were main employment barrier for Syrians.* By far, the issue of work permits for Syrian refugees was mentioned most frequently as a significant barrier to employment by Syrians and employers, and specifically the restrictions on permits for certain industries and job types and as the expense of obtaining a permit. Participants reported that permits were available only for construction and agriculture jobs, although they heard rumors that permits have been or would be issued for other sectors as well. They reported that the cost of the permits was 57 JD, down from an earlier cost of 400 JD, due to assistance from the UN. The financial burden of paying for the annual permit, as well as loss of other UN-provided financial aid, were also underscored as challenges by participants.

*There was confusion about consequences for work permit violations.* Some Syrians reported working without a work permit since they could not afford it; they left jobs when the Ministry of Labor came to inspect work permit documentation on the job site. Some feared that if they were caught working without permits, they would be sent back to refugee camps. There were varying accounts of the ramifications of working without a permit—some said Syrian refugees were given three chances; first, they would be warned and have to pay a fine; second, they have to sign a pledge that they would not work again without a permit; and third, they would be sent back to camp or Syria itself.

*Finding appropriate sponsors for work permits was a challenge.* A related challenge was finding a Jordanian sponsor who would assist in securing the permit and the sponsor expectations that were attached. One participant said, “[S]ome sponsors will not allow you to work with
anyone else even if there is no work with him—so you will end up without any work and money just because of the sponsor.”

Employers had mixed views about work permit challenges for Syrians. Some said they did not see work permits as big issue for Syrians to obtain and that the expense was not great: “I found out that their work permits are at low costs, perhaps it was the government aiding them in finding work.” Others said that work permits were an issue, and if the government removed these restrictions, they would be more likely to hire Syrians, particularly given their skills and work ethic.

Egyptian migrants also experienced difficulty with work permits. They had similar complaints about the work permit system, noting the permits were expensive and difficult to obtain. Some worked without them, but most had found sponsors through friends or family, even though they had not met those sponsors. They felt these “mediators” were often taking advantage and resented having to pay them. They also noted that the presence of Syrian workers had increased the work inspections performed by the Ministry of Labor, which was negatively affecting other migrant workers who might not have been caught otherwise.

Skills and Training

Syrian and Jordanian participants suggested specific, market-driven training. Many Syrians were viewed as already highly skilled in their fields; there would be no need for training if they were allowed to work in those fields. Language was not a barrier for Syrians living and working in Jordan, so language training was not needed either. Others suggested vocational training would be useful in the occupations where Syrians have been allowed to work in Jordan, such as tailoring and trades like plumbing and electricity. Some noted the usefulness of similar training courses that were provided by the CARE Foundation and the Jordan River Foundation. Others said refresher courses in their fields of specialty would be useful since many have been away from their trades for several years due to the war. And one participant noted that psychological support or counseling would be more useful than professional skills training. Others requested courses in résumé building, interview skills, and English language. It appears there is a necessity for specific, need-based training of Syrians.

Social Cohesion Related to Employment

Participants painted a mixed view of social relationships between Syrians, Egyptians, and Jordanians in the workplace and labor market. Notably, many Jordanian and Syrian participants described positive individual interactions with coworkers and bosses, observing mutual respect and equal treatment for the most part, and that relations had improved over time as people became accustomed to working with one another.

Syrians, Jordanians, and Egyptians reported tensions related to Syrian employment. Even though many reported positive relationships between Syrians and Jordanians, many Syrians perceived that Jordanians were resentful of Syrians’ skills, job performance, and willingness to accept lower wages. Jordanian participants corroborated this resentment, noting with dismay

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1 Work permits obtained by the GFJTU cost substantially lower than those obtained directly by employees.
that Syrians have lowered wages and made employment more difficult for them when they were already struggling in a tight labor market. Egyptian participants also resented Syrian workers who they perceived as taking jobs and undercutting wages.

*Jordanian and Egyptian participants perceived an unfair advantage for Syrians.* They believed Syrians received more aid in the form of housing and food assistance, while they did not receive such assistance and struggled to make ends meet with low wages. There was confusion and perhaps misperceptions about the type and amount of aid Syrian refugees received; some Jordanian participants thought Syrians had almost all of their expenses covered and questioned why they needed to work at all. As one Jordanian put it, “The income of Syrians is higher than the income of Jordanians—and this is a problem. In addition to the fact that the organizations are helping them and paying for their rent while working in several jobs leading to a higher income.”

**Work Environment Conditions**

*Syrians and Egyptians often were not paid in full and worked long hours.* Syrian participants mentioned low wages and long working hours as the most problematic challenges, as well as the lack of recourse for employees if they lacked work permits. Some reported experiences with employers not paying the full amount that they had been promised. One Syrian man said, “the employer will sometimes take 80 to 90 percent of the amount and will give you a tiny bit with the excuse that you cannot go and complain—this is a huge problem as he might complain about you and you might get deported back to the camp or even to Syria.” Egyptian migrant workers also complained about this happening occasionally. Many Syrian and Jordanian participants noted that Syrians were paid lower wages than Jordanians for the same work, which several Jordanians termed “exploitative.” Some Jordanians sympathized with the Syrians on this issue, and noted the particular vulnerability of Syrian women to this. Working hours were reported as typically ten-plus hours a day, and sometimes employers extended the work day with no additional pay.

*Transportation costs were very high relative to wages.* One Syrian woman living in the Zaatari camp said, “The transportation to exit the camp is limited and you have to pay 1.5 JD to get to the door, and this also applies when you come back to the camp, as you have to pay another 1.5 JD and since I get 5 JD when I work that day, I will only have 2 JD remaining for me.” Several Syrians said they would be unwilling to travel more than an hour to a job because of the transportation cost and the added time to the work day. Improved and affordable transportation emerged as a great need for Syrians, especially for women.

**Aspirations and Solutions**

*Syrians’, Jordanians’, and Egyptians’ greatest aspirations were steady employment, a living wage, safety, and security.* The participants shared these common aspirations for the future. For the Syrians, many added that they wished to return home to Syria and rebuild their country eventually; as one said, echoing many others’ statements about this, “I would love to go back to my country and help in rebuilding it, so that I can live there with my family and have a stable life. Our houses were lost, and we need to start all over again.” Jordanians were eager to live
in a society that provides equal opportunity and an end to corruption, and several said they wished to leave Jordan to pursue their fortunes abroad.

*Work permit reform was the most desired change for improving the lives of refugees and migrants.* The most often cited solution among Syrians was to address the issues with work permits and to allow Syrians to work in a broader set of fields and specializations. They felt this would go a long way in addressing the employment problems faced by the refugee community. A few Syrians suggested opening factories in the camps that would provide employment and useful products for the Jordanian market. They also suggested that providing transportation for workers and childcare options for families would facilitate Syrian participation and productivity in the labor market.

*Employers suggested introducing a minimum wage along with work permit and other reforms to address employment challenges.* The firm representatives also provided a number of recommendations for resolving the employment challenges. One suggested implementing a minimum wage so that Jordanian workers were not undercut and could compete more fairly with Syrian workers. This could reduce host-country resentment toward Syrians and create a more even playing field, he felt. Others suggested overhauling the work permit system to include reducing the cost of work permits, simplifying the process for obtaining one, and issuing permits without industry/field restrictions. Employers wanted the flexibility to hire the most qualified candidates and welcomed a larger pool from which to choose that including Syrians. However, it was critical to make Syrians’ legal status clear and stable so that they would not lose employees due to work permit policy changes. Employers also said they would welcome tax breaks for employing Syrians.
This chapter describes the results from the analysis of surveys administered to Syrian refugee households and to firms in Jordan. The household survey results highlight findings pertaining to the supply of skills among Syrian refugees, their work experiences both in Jordan and in Syria, and their perceptions toward employment in Jordan. The firm survey results focus on findings pertaining to Syrian employment, as well as firms’ perceptions about Syrian workers and about policies that could encourage employment growth. Appendix D contains details on the sampling strategies used in each survey, as well as additional results.

Household Survey

Key Findings

- Education levels among survey respondents are not high, but generally higher than respondents in Turkey and Lebanon.
- LFPRs are much higher for males than females, consistent with regional labor market indicators.
- Rates of not working for both males and females were high across all the geographic areas sampled, but lower in Zaatari camp, suggesting greater employment opportunities.
- Tapping into social networks is the most common means of searching for work for both not working and working survey respondents, but those who are working are more likely to have visited an employer to inquire about work in person.
- Compared to their situation in Syria, survey respondents are more likely to be working in less stable manual labor jobs and concentrated in fewer sectors.
- Lack of available jobs was the most frequently cited obstacle to employment, in line with the current macroeconomic conditions in Jordan.
- Survey respondents agreed that employers in Jordan are willing to hire them, but that it is difficult to find an employer willing to sponsor them to get a work permit.
- Most survey respondents reported that Jordanian workers and employers treat them with respect and that they are not regularly discriminated against.

Of the randomly selected household members to participate in the employment perceptions portion of the survey, 66.5 percent were male and 33.5 percent were female. Setting aside the 100 households from Zaatari, 440 households were sampled from urban areas and 60 households from rural areas (10 from the outskirts of Amman, 30 from Zarqa, and 20 from Mafraq). Thus,
a substantial share of households in Zarqa and Mafraq resided in what could be considered rural areas with less than 5,000 residents in the localities sampled.

**Education Levels Among Survey Respondents Is Generally Higher Than in Other Host Countries**

In contrast to Lebanon and Turkey, where the largest group of respondents have a primary-level education, over 39 percent of respondents across all three Jordanian governorates and 40 percent of respondents in Zaatari report having an intermediate-level education (Figure 8.1). In general, education levels are higher in Amman and Zaatari with higher rates of secondary education compared with Zarqa and Mafraq, which have higher rates of primary-level education. One possible explanation is that Syrian refugees in Jordan may have come from communities and locations in Syria with traditionally higher education levels.

Close to a third (32 percent) of respondents reported that they received any kind of training since they arrived in Jordan. Among those who reported receiving training since arriving in the host country, the most commonly cited training included beauty, hairdressing, and salon services (close to 10 percent of respondents); computer programming and information technology network installation and support (6 percent of respondents); clothing design, sewing and tailoring, and working with textiles (5 percent of respondents); and around 4 percent in each of construction, construction technology, and other construction-related trades; hospitality services and tourism, including food preparation (cooking, baking); and health-related trades (nursing assistant, physiotherapy, assistant pharmacist). Around 3 percent of respondents indicated that they received language training since they arrived in Jordan, most commonly in English.

**Share of Household Members Working or Willing to Work and Share of Respondents Not Working Diverge Widely Between Males and Females**

Two key labor market indicators are the share of household members working or willing to work and the share of respondents not working. These indicators essentially capture the LFPR and unemployment, but we only include individuals age 18 and above (rather than 15 and above). This indicator is captured at the household level because we rostered individuals who met the eligibility criteria of working, or if not working, they are willing to work. We also gathered the total number of household members 18 years and above. The share of household members 18 years and above who were working or willing to work was 70 percent overall: 93 percent for males and 54 percent for females (Figure 8.2). The percentage of survey
Survey Results: Jordan

Respondents participating in the labor force was higher than that reported in Syria prior to the war.\(^1\)

The overall share of survey respondents who report not working was lowest in Zaatari, at 44 percent, followed by Amman (52 percent), Zarqa (74 percent), and Ma'afraq (76 percent). It is important to note the especially low rates of employment among females, with the percentage not working almost twice as high as that of males; however, we should interpret these numbers with caution given the small numbers of female survey respondents in our sample.\(^2\)

For example, out of the 201 females in our sample, only 32 reported working. In governorates such as Zarqa and Ma'afraq, our sample consisted of 35 females in Zarqa, of whom only one reported working, and in Ma'afraq, none of the 21 females in our sample reported that they were working.

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\(^1\) It is important to note that while LFPRs in Syria prior to the civil war (2010) was estimated to be 13.27 percent and roughly consistent with the share of females chosen to complete the employment perceptions survey, studies have suggested that LFPRs are higher among refugee women due to the need for them to work to support the family.

\(^2\) The percentage not working females was calculated for the survey respondents. In the survey, we relied on the ILO definition of what it means to be working, which is defined as working even for one hour in the past seven days, or being temporarily absent from work. The survey respondents who do not fit either of those two criteria are considered not working, which is equivalent to unemployed—they are not working, they are not actively searching for work, and they are not willing to work if they had the opportunity. In this case, we do not strictly impose the condition for unemployment that the respondent needs to be actively looking for work. Thus, rather than referring to our survey respondents who are not working as “unemployed,” we refer to them simply as “not working.” Given the circumstances of Syrian refugees, who, as observed in our focus groups, perceive many barriers to working, we opted for a less strict application of the criteria and also include in our sample those who state willingness to work if provided the opportunity.
The lower rates of not working for males and females in Zaatari suggests that opportunities for work (for those who want to work) are more readily available compared with the three governorates. Local economies have emerged in Zaatari, and certain barriers that might exist in the other governorates, such as transportation and work permit requirements that act as barriers to work, may be less of an issue in Zaatari. Out of the 100 respondents sampled in Zaatari, 56 reported working (43 males and 13 females). Males were predominately working in construction (14 respondents), wholesale and retail trade (9 respondents), and food and beverage manufacturing (9 respondents), among other sectors; while females worked in education (5 respondents), cleaning services (4 respondents), health care or social work (3 respondents), and services to a household (1 respondent).

**Believing There Is No Work Is the Most Commonly Cited Reason for Not Working**

Among those not working, the most commonly cited reasons included believing there is no work (35 percent), cannot find appropriate work (10 percent), temporary family reasons or illness (10 percent), and cannot obtain a work permit (8 percent) (see Figure 8.3). For the first two constraints mentioned, a case could be made for developing mechanisms to better match job seekers to job opportunities. The perception that there is a lack of jobs is also tied to the downturn that the Jordanian economy has experienced. The “other” category incorporated an extensive list of other reasons that were selected relatively infrequently, as well as a catchall “other” category. The entire list is available in the survey in Appendix D.
Figure 8.3
Reasons Given for Not Working

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Believing that there is no work</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary family reasons or illness</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot find appropriate work</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot obtain a work permit</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not like work conditions</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not qualified for work</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not knowing how or where to look</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tired of looking</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depend on seasonal work</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Responses are based on the 335 unemployed survey respondents who responded that they had neither worked nor were on temporary break (questions D3 and D4 in the survey).

Job Seekers Primarily Rely on Social Networks for Employment Opportunities

Among both working and not working respondents, the most commonly cited action taken was to ask relatives and friends for information about employment opportunities (Figure 8.4), suggesting that the prominence of networks and social groups was the method used to search for employment. A more common approach among working respondents was visiting the workplace in person to inquire about work; close to 60 percent of respondents indicated they took this action compared with just 33 percent of not working respondents. Beyond matching, approaches to actively convene workers and employers seems to be important, given the prominence of this method of finding work among working respondents. This might especially be helpful for job seekers who have limited transportation or who have other travel barriers in going to and inquiring about work opportunities.

Survey Respondents Are More Likely to Work in Specific Sectors, in Manual Labor Jobs, and in More Casual Work Compared with Their Situation in Syria

Survey respondents were asked about their sector of work, occupation, and employment status now and before they left Syria (Figure 8.5). It is important to note that we are examining an aggregate picture across all respondents who report being employed rather than a dyadic match of sectors worked for each respondent. We find that more respondents are currently working in construction and food and beverage manufacturing at 35 percent and 13 percent, respectively, compared to the share of those who worked in those sectors before leaving Syria.
Largely because Syrians are restricted from working in certain occupations, survey respondents are concentrated in a smaller number of occupations compared to the range of occupations that respondents reported having in Syria. The survey results indicate that a larger share of survey respondents report currently working in unskilled jobs (23 percent) compared to the share that reported working in those types of jobs in Syria (16 percent). Around 45 percent of employed survey respondents indicated that they currently work in skilled manual labor jobs which is very similar to the share who reported working in those types of jobs previously in Syria (42 percent).

Just over half of survey respondents (52 percent) held permanent paid work prior to leaving Syria, compared with 48 percent currently. A larger share are now in casual-based work (40 percent compared with 13 percent) and temporary or fixed-term positions (7 percent compared with 2 percent) compared with their previous work in Syria. Interestingly, 20 percent reported being a business owner or employer prior to leaving Syria compared with none reporting that occupation currently.

Lack of Jobs Most Commonly and Consistently Cited as Obstacles to Employment
Survey respondents were asked to choose from a list of the three biggest obstacles to finding a job or starting a business in Jordan (Table 8.1). While there were some common concerns...
Figure 8.5
Sector of Work, Occupation, and Employment Status in Jordan Compared with Syria

Panel A: Current and previous sector of work

Panel B: Current and previous occupation

Panel C: Current and previous employment status

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Current sector of work responses are based on the 265 employed survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in D3 and D4 of the survey. Previous sector of work responses are based on the 339 respondents who indicated that they had previous work in Syria. Current occupation responses are based on 264 (one refusal) currently employed survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in D3 and D4 of the survey, and 339 survey respondents previously employed in Syria. Current employment status responses are based on the 265 currently employed survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in D3 and D4 of the survey, and 339 survey respondents previously employed in Syria. A Pearson chi-square test reveals that there are statistically significant differences in the overall distribution of respondents between the types of sectors, occupations, and employment status worked in the host country and those worked in Syria.

RAND RR2653-8.5
across provinces, there were also a few differences. Lack of jobs was commonly reported across all governorates at close to half or more than half of survey respondents reporting this as an obstacle. Other factors such as poor working conditions, difficulty getting a work permit, and low wages were also frequently cited. Obtaining a work permit in Zaatari is not an issue; however, in nearby Mafraq, as well as Zarqa and Amman, a third or more of survey respondents reported difficulty getting a work permit. Around 46 percent of respondents in Amman and 44 percent of respondents in Mafraq reported low wages in available jobs as an obstacle, and 37 percent reported poor working conditions as an obstacle in Amman.

**Respondents Report Generally Positive Perceptions Toward Host-Country Nationals, but Getting Work Continues to Be a Challenge**

Survey respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their employment experiences in the host country, and they noted several key obstacles to employment (Figure 8.6). A vast majority were concerned that they would get into trouble with the government or the police if they were caught working. Close to half of respondents (43 percent) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that Syrians do not search for work because of fear of losing assistance, and more than half agreed that most Syrians cannot pay the work permit and residency fees. While three-quarters of respondents felt that employers in Jordan were willing to hire Syrians, most indicated that it is difficult to find employers willing to sponsor a Syrian to obtain a work permit. While employers may be willing to hire Syrians, they may not want to formally hire them because they could be subject to labor laws. Just over a third (37 percent) of respondents agreed with the statement that there are organizations in Jordan that help Syrians to find work.

In terms of perceptions toward the work environment and relations with employers and fellow host-country workers, most survey respondents expressed positive views toward their employers and fellow Jordanian workers (Figure 8.7). Close to 75 percent of survey respondents indicated that their Jordanian coworkers treat them with respect, and over 60 percent did not feel discriminated against. Around 25 percent of respondents indicated they would feel comfortable complaining to the authorities if they were being mistreated in the workplace, while 41 percent would not feel comfortable. Around 40 percent of survey respondents agreed or
Figure 8.6
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (1)

Many Syrians are afraid they will get into trouble with the government or police if they work
Many Syrians do not look for work because they worry about losing assistance
There are organizations in Jordan that support Syrians to find work
Many Syrians cannot pay the work permit and/or residency fees
It is difficult to find employers willing to sponsor a Syrian to obtain a work permit
Employers in Jordan are willing to hire Syrians

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined, as were the responses disagree and strongly disagree. Results are based on a range of respondents depending on the question, from 584 to 596 respondents.

Figure 8.7
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (2)

I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by a fellow worker
I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by an employer
If I am mistreated at work, I would feel comfortable going to the public authorities
My Jordanian coworkers treat me with respect in the workplace
I can get training and education that I need to gain skills relevant for jobs
Syrian women worry about being harassed in the workplace in Jordan
There is no reliable and safe transportation for women to be able to reach work
Syrians fear experiencing physical harm in the workplace in Jordan

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined, as were the responses disagree and strongly disagree. Results are based on a range of responses, from 465 to 593 respondents.
strongly agreed with the statement that there is no reliable and safe transportation for women to reach work, and 42 percent worry about harassment in the workplace. Surprisingly, given the low numbers of reported training, most survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they could get the training and education they needed to gain job-relevant skills.

Firm Survey

Key Findings
- Out of the 150 firms included in the survey, about 25 percent had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, and another 20 percent had previously recruited (either successfully or unsuccessfully) Syrian workers.
- Other non-Jordanian, non-Syrian workers also made up a substantial share of the workforce.
- Midsized and large firms were more likely to have recruited Syrians than small firms.
- Syrians were concentrated in semiskilled jobs.
- Manufacturing firms were more likely to anticipate growth over the next 12 months than services firms.
- Firms’ perceived advantages and disadvantages of hiring Syrians.
  - The most commonly perceived advantages to hiring Syrian workers were a mix of Syrians’ willingness to accept lower wages and benefits than Jordanian workers as well as the perceptions that they were more productive and less likely to leave the firm.
  - The most commonly cited disadvantages revolved around regulatory and social issues.
- Respondents indicated a number of policies to encourage overall employment growth.
  - These included lowering taxes, decreasing the cost of labor through means such as subsidies, improving infrastructure, making it easier to set up a business and get financing, making employment regulations clearer/stabler, and assisting with job matching and training.
  - Measures to facilitate the work permit process, to make Syrians’ legal status clearer, and to allow Syrians to work in more occupations were the most commonly cited policies as having the potential to increase employment opportunities for Syrians.

About 45 Percent of Firms in the Sample Had Ever Recruited Syrian Workers
About 25 percent of the firms in the sample (36 out of 150) had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, and another 22 percent (33 firms) had previously tried to recruit Syrian workers—either successfully or unsuccessfully (Figure 8.8). Among the 33 firms that had previously tried to recruit Syrians, 13 indicated that they had hired Syrians but that those workers were no longer employed at the firm at the time of the survey. Five indicated that they were unable to find qualified Syrians, and three that their job offers were not accepted.3

The share of firms that had ever recruited (had on board at the time of the survey or had previously tried to recruit) Syrians differed significantly by firm size; about 35 percent of small firms had ever recruited Syrians, while 70 percent of midsized/large firms had done so. Among firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, all but one had ten or fewer

3 Among the remaining 12 respondents, 2 indicated that they did not know, and 10 gave answers that made it difficult to confirm whether they had in fact managed to hire any Syrians in the past.
Syrians on board. Syrian workers accounted for an average share of 17 percent of the workforce among firms with Syrians at the time of the survey, and an average share of about 4 percent across all 150 firms (including those that had no Syrian workers).

About 25 percent of firms also had non-Jordanian, non-Syrian workers. These workers accounted for an average share of 29 percent of the workforce among these firms and an average share of about 7 percent across all 150 firms.

An important concern with self-reported employment numbers is that respondents may be reluctant to report any Syrian workers if they are hired without work permits and might therefore get into legal trouble. We therefore asked all respondents if they believed that other firms in their line of work hired Syrians. Although only 45 percent of respondents indicated that their own firms had recruited Syrians, nearly 75 percent believed that other firms in their line of work had done so, and nearly 50 percent believed that others hired Syrians without work permits.

Female Employment Is Low Among All Workers and Among Syrian Workers
About 30 percent of firms in the sample had at least one female worker of any nationality. The average share of female workers among the firms with female workers was 34 percent, while the average share across all 150 firms was only 10 percent. This may partly reflect the fact that the LFPR for women in Jordan was only 14 percent in 2017, compared with 64 percent for men (ILO, 2017a, 2017b); but this may also be due to the sampling design. Indeed, this share differed significantly by governorate, firm size, and industry; midsized and large firms had higher shares of female employees than small firms, and firms in the textile/apparel and chemical/pharmaceutical manufacturing industries had female employment shares close to 30 percent. In keeping with these findings, the sample in Mafraq included only five firms—

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4 In the sample of 150 firms, 15 percent had Syrian workers at the time of the survey but no other non-Jordanian workers; 16 percent had other non-Jordanian workers but no Syrian workers; and 9 percent had both.
all of which were large manufacturing firms—and the share of female workers in this governorate was higher than the share in other governorates.5

In the Syrian worker focus groups, men and women generally noted that the concept of working women had become more culturally acceptable given the circumstances; nonetheless, Syrian women noted additional barriers to work, including long working hours and the need for childcare. The Syrian household survey showed that the percentage of men working or willing to work was over 90 percent, compared with about 55 percent for women. In the firm survey, while nearly ten of the 36 firms with Syrian workers at the time of the survey had at least one female worker of any nationality, only three firms (two of which were large manufacturing firms) had at least one female Syrian worker.6

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5 ANOVA tests reject that the share of female workers is equal across firm size, industry, and governorate at the 1 percent level of significance.

6 One large textile/garment/apparel manufacturing firm in Mafraq had 16 female Syrian workers; one large chemical manufacturing firm in Amman had one female Syrian worker; and one small firm in the hotels and restaurants industry in Zarqa had one female Syrian worker.
Survey Results: Jordan

Syrians Are Concentrated in Semiskilled Jobs

The survey elicited information about the number of all workers in highly skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled jobs; and, among the 36 firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, the survey elicited information about the number of Syrian workers in each job type. In contrast with non-Jordanian, non-Syrian workers, who are largely found in unskilled jobs, the average share of Syrians in semiskilled jobs is higher than that of the overall workforce, while the share in highly skilled jobs is lower (Figure 8.9).7

This may be partly because of the level of education among Syrians in Jordan; the survey of Syrian households found that 36 percent of respondents had primary education or below, 58 percent had intermediate or secondary education, and 7 percent had postsecondary education. In addition, Syrian focus groups suggested that unskilled and semiskilled Syrians were more easily able to find jobs in their occupations than highly skilled Syrians due to restrictions on Syrian employment in certain occupations.

Firms Use Similar Channels to Hire Syrians and Other Workers

Among firms that had recruited semiskilled or unskilled workers of any nationality over the previous 12 months or that had ever recruited Syrians, the top five hiring channels were the same: receiving direct applications, going through an intermediary, asking current employees for recommendations, and placing job advertisements on information boards or online (Appendix D). These findings mirror those from the focus groups and the Syrian household survey, which indicated the importance of networking with family and friends and of visiting workplaces in person in order to find work. Hiring channels for highly skilled workers were similar but also included asking other firm owners to identify highly skilled workers.8

Respondents were most likely to indicate that they had experienced difficulties in filling semiskilled positions, but even among those who had tried to do so, only 10 percent indicated

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7 Two-sided t-tests reject that the share of Syrian workers in highly skilled (semiskilled) jobs is equal to the share of all workers in firms that hire Syrians in highly skilled (semiskilled) jobs at the 1 percent (5 percent) level, but fail to reject that shares are different for unskilled jobs.

8 Twenty firms had recruited highly skilled workers, 78 had recruited semiskilled workers, and 73 had recruited unskilled workers over the previous 12 months. Sixty-nine firms had ever recruited Syrian workers.
that it was difficult. Among those respondents who did indicate difficulties, these most commonly included lack of experience and skills (Appendix D).

The Most Commonly Identified Disadvantages to Hiring Syrians Concerned Regulatory and Social Issues

About 20 percent of firms did not perceive any advantages to hiring Syrians, and about 30 percent of firms did not perceive any disadvantages to hiring them.\(^9\) Among those that did perceive advantages, respondents most commonly noted Syrians’ willingness to work longer hours for lower wages and to perform the types of tasks required. However, a number of firms noted positive characteristics of the Syrian workers, notably their higher levels of productivity and their unlikelihood of leaving the firm.\(^{10}\) These findings are consistent with in-depth interview findings, which indicated that employers perceive Syrians as highly skilled and good employees who are willing to work for less pay.

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\(^9\) About half of the firms that perceived no advantages also perceived no disadvantages.

\(^{10}\) Among the 36 firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, median tenure was reported to be one to two years among both Syrian and Jordanian workers.
Also consistent with the focus groups and in-depth interviews, respondents most often cited regulatory issues (lack of information on rules for hiring, problems with authorities, and concerns about residency or work permits) as disadvantages to hiring Syrians. In addition, a number of respondents mentioned public pressure (Figure 8.10). Difficulty in getting a work permit and legal barriers to working were also commonly cited by respondents in the Syrian household survey as obstacles to finding work; however, those respondents also commonly noted lack of available jobs and low wages in available jobs.

When asked specifically about perceived difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians, 64 percent of small firms and 47 percent of midsized and large firms perceived any difficulties in doing so. The most commonly cited difficulties included a mix of concerns about the application process (lack of information about how to apply, complicated procedures, length of time, or likelihood of denial), as well as restrictions on occupations for which permits were given.

Manufacturing Firms Were More Likely to Anticipate Employment Growth Than Services Firms

The survey asked about plans for future growth and perceptions about policies that could encourage such growth. While some firms anticipated increases in employment and others anticipated decreases, in all industries, manufacturing firms were more likely to anticipate an increase in employment—particularly among unskilled workers—than services firms (Figure 8.11).

Some of the firms that anticipated increases in employment—2 out of 9 for highly skilled workers, 5 out of 16 for semiskilled workers, and only 1 out of 21 for unskilled workers—indicated that they would find it difficult to fill the new positions. Several firms anticipating

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11 Seventy-six small firms and 45 midsized/large firms responded to the question about perceived difficulties in obtaining work permits, after excluding those that responded “don’t know” or refused to answer. A Pearson chi-square test rejects that the distribution of firms perceiving any difficulties in obtaining a work permit is equal across firm sizes at the 10 percent significance level.
employment growth—2 out of 9 for highly skilled workers, 7 out of 16 for semiskilled workers, and 12 out of 21 for unskilled workers—also indicated that Syrians would likely account for up to 25 percent of their hiring if there were no barriers.

The Most Common Suggestions for Employment Growth Included Lowering the Cost of Doing Business and Improving Infrastructure

Respondents indicated a number of policies the government could use to promote overall employment opportunities. Most commonly cited policies included lowering taxes, decreasing the cost of labor (subsidizing wages and benefits and decreasing social security fees), improving infrastructure, making it easier to set up a business and get financing, making employment regulations clearer/stabluer, and assisting with job matching and training (the top five are shown in Figure 8.12).

With respect to policies that could increase employment opportunities for Syrians, about 20 percent of firms indicated that nothing could be done to increase such opportunities. However, in keeping with findings from the in-depth interviews, others indicated measures to facilitate the permitting process, including making work permit applications easier and less costly.

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12 Pearson chi-square tests fail to reject that the anticipated share of new hires that would be Syrian is equal across firms anticipating versus firms not anticipating hiring difficulties.
and allowing permits to be transferable across employers. The fact that a number of firms indicated that permits could be made less costly, even though permit costs are relatively low (Razzaz, 2018), may reflect a broader lack of information about the permitting process. Other suggested measures to increase employment opportunities for Syrians included making their legal status clearer (providing identification cards, making it clear they could stay for the long run), and increasing their ability to work throughout the country and in more occupations/sectors. Providing wage subsidies for Syrians was also suggested by several firms.

**Summary**

About 75 percent of respondents in the Syrian household survey indicated that firms were willing to hire Syrians, and, consistent with this finding, nearly 50 percent of the firms in the sample had recruited Syrians at some point. Many firms perceived the key advantages to hiring Syrians to be their willingness to work longer hours for lower wages; however, a number of firms also viewed Syrians as more productive. In fact, among the firms in the sample, Syrians were concentrated in semiskilled work, even though their overall education levels remain low compared with the local population (see Chapter Six).

Nonetheless, the percentage of household survey members not working in our sample—for both men and women, but particularly for women—was high. The overall economic downturn in Jordan likely plays an important role: Syrian survey respondents most commonly cited “believing there is no work” as an obstacle to work. Only about 5 percent of firm survey
respondents anticipated growth in highly skilled employment, 10 percent in semiskilled employment, and 15 percent in unskilled employment over the next 12 months. However, manufacturing firms were more likely to anticipate growth, particularly in semiskilled and unskilled employment. Firms in the sample most commonly identified lowering the cost of doing business, investing in infrastructure, and making it easier to start a business as the top policies that could improve employment opportunities for all.

Among the firms that anticipated growth, those aiming to hire semiskilled workers were most likely to anticipate difficulties in filling positions. In general, both firms and workers reported that informal hiring channels, rather than formal job-matching platforms, were used for recruiting workers of all skill levels.

A number of the firms that did anticipate growth over the next 12 months indicated that they would hire some Syrian workers if there were no barriers to doing so. Even though the respondents in both surveys noted that hiring Syrians without work permits is common, they also listed challenges with work permit and legal restrictions on work as important barriers to Syrian employment.

Effect of Rules of Origin Agreement of the Jordan Compact on Firm Decisions

We designed the firm sample in Jordan to include 15 large manufacturing firms in the special zones covered by the ROO agreement, which was part of the Jordan Compact. For firms located in these zones, the agreement relaxes the ROO on certain exports to Europe—including a number of goods produced by the chemical, textile, garment, and apparel industries—provided Syrians made up at least 15 percent of the firm’s workforce (rising to 25 percent over time). We provide a perspective on the ROO agreement based on our firm surveys.

Ten out of these 15 firms sold some of their products outside of Jordan. However, the ROO agreement did not appear to play a major role in the firms’ decisions. Of the ten exporters in the industrial zones, only three listed Europe as an export destination. Two of these firms had experienced increases in exports over the past five years, but neither attributed the increase to the European market.

We also asked the 15 firms if the ROO agreement affected their decisions to export or to hire Syrians. Six firms (three exporters and three nonexporters) indicated that the agreement did not affect exporting or hiring behavior, and three (two exporters and one nonexporter) were not familiar with the agreement. Four exporters indicated that the agreement did affect exporting decisions, and one exporter and one nonexporter indicated that the agreement did affect their decisions about hiring Syrians. However, none of the five exporting firms that reported that the agreement affected their decisions included Europe among their export markets. Of the two firms located in industrial zones with Europe as an export market, one noted that the agreement did not affect exporting or hiring, while the other reported not being familiar with the agreement.
CHAPTER NINE
An Overview of the Situation in Lebanon

According to UNHCR, the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is estimated to be close to 1 million, while the Lebanese government puts the number closer to 1.5 million. Lebanon is the country with the highest number of refugees per capita when including Palestinian and other refugees, adding to an already complex political and social context in the country. This chapter provides basic information on the demographics, education, and employment status of Syrian refugees. It also describes Lebanon’s economic climate; policies and programs of the government and international aid community; and social cohesion.¹

Syrian Refugee Circumstances in Lebanon

Numbers, Locations, and Demographics

The government of Lebanon estimates that there are 1.5 million displaced Syrians, including both registered and unregistered refugees, out of a total population of about 6 million in the country (Government of Lebanon and the United Nations, 2017, p. 116) (see Figure 9.1). Though the government suspended new registrations in May 2015, UNHCR currently reports 991,917 registered Syrians in Lebanon (UNHCR, 2018b). Of these, 357,315 (36 percent) are in the Bekaa Valley, 262,462 (26.5 percent) in Beirut, 253,147 (25.5 percent) in North Lebanon, and 118,993 (12 percent) in South Lebanon (UNHCR, 2018b). Unofficial informal tent settlements are common, but there are no official camps for Syrian refugees in Lebanon (Culbertson et al., 2016, p. 4). Most live in vulnerable host communities under conditions of poverty (Culbertson et al., 2016, pp. xi, 4–5; UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 2). About 55 percent of registered refugees are under age 18, and of these, 52.6 percent are female, and 47.5 percent are male (UNHCR, 2018b). Counting all refugees, including the estimated 450,000 Palestinians, Lebanon is estimated to have the highest number of refugees per capita in the world (Berti, 2017).

¹ Since we collected data for our study, there have been several new developments, particularly around the issue of return of the Syrian refugees to Syria. Many of the recommendations we provide are focused on developing skills that would allow Syrians to earn livelihoods in Lebanon, but also to facilitate their reintegration back into the Syrian labor market in the event of return. For more details about specific policy frameworks for considering this issue, refer to recent studies such as Ziad El-Sayegh, Lebanon and the Return of the Syria Displaced, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, May 2018.
Education and Skill Levels

Though comprehensive education and skills data are unavailable, various surveys indicate that Syrian refugees in Lebanon generally have low educational levels. According to an ILO study conducted in 2013 of 400 households and 2,004 individuals in four regions (Akkar, Tripoli, the Bekaa, and southern Lebanon), about one-third of the Syrians in Lebanon were illiterate or had not attended school, 40 percent had primary education, and 3 percent had reached university (International Labour Organization, Regional Office for the Arab States, 2014, p. 8). In
addition, as of October 2017, nearly 60 percent of registered school-aged Syrian refugee children in Lebanon were not enrolled in public school.2

**Types of Work Conducted by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon**

Most Syrians in Lebanon work informally. Similar to Turkey and Jordan, “informality” has a somewhat different connotation when applied to Syrians versus locals working in Lebanon. In general, an informally employed Syrian is working without a work permit, while an informally employed Lebanese is typically working without a work contract or registration for social security (Ajliuni and Kawar, 2015). However, as mentioned in the cases of Turkey and Jordan, both types of informal workers face difficulties in terms of low wages (often below the minimum wage), lack of access to social protection programs, and poor working conditions. An estimated 384,000 people comprise the Syrian labor force in Lebanon, of whom an estimated 153,600 are employed (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). Underemployment is high, with many working for less than 15 days a month and/or on a temporary basis (Government of Lebanon and the United Nations, 2017, p. 103; Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017), and with many households dependent on unsustainable income sources (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 72). In particular, VASyR-2017: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon found that WFP assistance served as the primary income source for 28 percent of refugee households, with borrowing and credit as the primary income source for 16 percent (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 2).

As mentioned previously, a large portion of Syrians in Lebanon work in construction and agriculture as well as in environmental services, which mainly involves cleaning work—sectors in which many Syrians had worked in Lebanon before the war as well (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 71; Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017; Berthier, 2017). Estimates of the number of Syrians working in Lebanon before 2011 range widely—from a couple of hundred thousand to over a million workers (Gonzalez et al., 2008; El Sayegh, 2017). One of our interviewees in Lebanon suggested that around 1 million Syrian workers would travel back and forth between Syria and Lebanon to work in the agricultural and construction sectors, though data to verify these numbers are not readily available. Nonetheless, the composition of the Syrian migrants has changed substantially with more families crossing the border and staying longer.

As of 2016, estimates indicated that 85 percent of hired agricultural workers in Lebanon were Syrian, with the remaining 15 percent comprised of Lebanese and other groups such as Palestinians (Government of Lebanon and the United Nations, 2017, p. 74).3 Of employed Syrian men in Lebanon aged 15–64 surveyed by VASyR-2017, 33 percent were working in construction, 22 percent in agriculture, 16 percent in services, 8 percent in manufacturing, and 7 percent in professional and irregular work (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 70). Most of the employed women surveyed worked in agriculture (55 percent), while 24 percent worked in services and 8 percent in professional services (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 70). Child labor has also been an issue, with about 4.8 percent of surveyed Syrian refugee children aged 5 to 17 reportedly working (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 19). Of working

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2 “280,000 Syrian refugees still out of school in Lebanon—and many work to feed their families.” Theirworld website.
3 Citing FAO 2016 Agricultural Labour study preliminary result.
children, 22 percent worked in agriculture, another 22 percent in services, 11 percent in professional services, and 8 percent in manufacturing (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 70). Finally, there is some evidence that small numbers of Syrians have founded their own businesses in Lebanon, which are often enterprises that provide local food services (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 23).

**Lebanon’s Economic Climate and Impact of the Refugees**

**Macroeconomic Situation**

Among the many challenges that Lebanon faces in creating economic opportunities for both host-country workers and refugees alike is the often-volatile intersection of economics, demography, and politics (Gohlke-Rouhayem et al., 2016, p. 7). Lebanon’s small local market, current export challenges, high cost of production, and recurrent episodes of political conflict and strife present significant challenges (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 35). Directly after the end of the Lebanese Civil War and the signing of the Taif Agreement (the National Reconciliation Accord) in 1989, the Lebanese economy experienced significant growth in the early 1990s followed by stabilization during the mid-1990s and 2000s (Gonzalez et al., 2008). Substantial infrastructure investments were also made throughout the country, but particularly evident in the complete rehabilitation of the largely destroyed downtown area of Beirut.

Beginning in 2006, GDP growth rose as high as 10 percent (averaging around 7–9 percent) before falling back down to about 1–2 percent annually after the global economic downturn (Figure 9.2) (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015, p. 10). Moreover, political uncertainty further limited economic growth in the country. Exports declined as the security situation in the region deteriorated and trade routes and export markets closed. In particular, the crisis in Syria (a key trading partner of Lebanon) decreased Lebanese outputs and incomes (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015, p. 3). Lebanese exports are estimated to have dropped by half—from about $5 billion to $2.4 billion—between 2010 and 2015 due to the closure in 2014 of Syria’s southern border with Jordan. This, in turn closed the land route that Lebanon had used to ship goods to the Arabian Peninsula (Berthier, 2017). Production costs rose as Lebanon could no longer import cheap raw materials from Syria and had to seek alternative sources. Lebanese value-added processing of Syrian agricultural goods also declined. Tourism declined as fear of violence arose, and also because travel to both Lebanon and Syria together represented a significant share of the travel market prior to 2011 (Berthier, 2017). The decline in oil prices among Gulf countries has also further tempered both demand for and consumption of Lebanese goods and services (Berthier, 2017).

Given this experience, officials from UN agencies with whom we spoke reiterated the need to expand markets for Lebanese firms and to provide technical assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in particular. They argued for a strong focus on demand-side efforts to grow businesses and expand the Lebanese economy. Officials argued that access to European markets is difficult, and that new agreements should come with no strings attached (which is one of the factors that limits the reach of the ROO agreement of the Jordan Compact), in order to help increase demand for Lebanese exports and promote more robust growth.

Low economic growth and high government expenditures (which unfortunately, have not been focused on infrastructure investment) have conspired to increase the debt-to-GDP ratio to 157.3 percent (as of April 2018), which is the third highest ratio in the world (IMF,
FDI in Lebanon grew substantially in the 2000s during the massive reconstruction phase, but then declined after 2009 (Figure 9.3). During the period of growth, but preceding the current crisis, Lebanon reestablished itself in the region as a tourist destination. Real estate and banking and finance also experienced growth. The influx of refugees into the country has strained Lebanese infrastructure, but this has also triggered planned investment in infrastructure, including expansion of water and sanitation systems in areas that have been historically neglected by the central government (Berthier, 2017).

Labor Market Indicators
The delicate confessional balance among ethnoreligious groups that serves as the basis of the political system and the complications inherent in the system have resulted in Lebanon not conducting a national census since 1932. This also means that Lebanon does not compile regular statistics on labor market indicators through labor force surveys, though some are conducted periodically such as in 1970 and 1997 (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015, p. 3). It is therefore difficult to consistently examine trends over time. As suggestive as the above figures are that the Lebanese economy was slowing down before the large influx of refugees, it is hard to pinpoint if Lebanon’s economic problems preceded the Syrian crisis, were exacerbated by the crisis, or resulted from the crisis.

Coinciding with rapid economic expansion in the mid-2000s, the unemployment rate in Lebanon experienced a steady decline (Figure 9.4). Unemployment rates in 2017 were slightly
higher for women compared with men (7.5 percent vs. 5.9 percent), and more than twice as high for both female and male youth aged 15–24 compared with the national average 15 plus (World Bank, 2018c; Gonzalez et al., 2008). Surveys of Lebanese youth also reveal that many are not very active in the labor market, and, because the labor market has been unable to absorb young and educated labor, many aspire to emigrate (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015, p. 12).

The overall decrease in unemployment masks changes occurring in the composition of employment. Studies have found that overall demand for low-skilled work in low-productivity sectors has grown more quickly than demand for work in more productive fields. These jobs are also generally characterized by lower wages and poorer working conditions (Ajluni and Kawar, 2015, pp. 3–4). An ILO report found that close to half of employed persons in Lebanon lack formal work contracts or social protection, and among those working informally, more than half receive less than the minimum wage. The expansion of the informal sector raises concerns about the potential for competition between Lebanese and Syrian workers for jobs, particularly given the scale of the refugee presence in the country (IMF, 2017a, p. 6).

**Business Environment**

Close to half or more of small (58 percent), medium (66 percent), and large (39 percent) firms surveyed in the 2013 World Bank Economic Survey cited political instability as one of the biggest obstacles faced to doing business (see Appendix Table G.6). Unreliable electricity and corruption followed as key obstacles. In interviews in Lebanon, concerns with corruption, mismanagement, and overall lack of capacity in government repeatedly emerged as central
themes. Officials from both the private and public sector expressed concerns. Though there was widespread recognition of the need to reform, the exact mechanism was not clear. One indication of the reluctance to invest in the country, according to one official, is the large and in many cases well-resourced Lebanese diaspora limiting its investments to summer homes rather than business ventures.

The Lebanese government’s Capital Investment Plan (CIP), a plan to strengthen Lebanese infrastructure in various sectors around the country, provides a framework for implementing the recommendations provided in the report. A recent assessment of the plan provides both opportunities and challenges to implementation (Harake and Kostopoulous, 2018).

Policies and Programs

Legal Framework for Syrian Refugee Employment and Entrepreneurship

Lebanon has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the 1967 Protocol (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). Foreigners’ legal rights to work in Lebanon stem from the 1964 Decree no. 17561, which stipulates that non-Lebanese must seek work permits from the Ministry of Labor (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). The January 2017 Ministry of Labor decision 41/1 reserves various professions for Lebanese citizens but allows Syrians to work in agriculture, construction, and the environment. In these fields, Syrians have certain exemptions from Lebanon’s Labour Law and can seek work permits more easily than can other foreigners, for example, with a lower fee (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). Decision 41/1 also notes that foreigners can work in expert or technical jobs that the National
Employment Office has confirmed cannot be filled by a Lebanese national (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). Additionally, with some limitations, Syrians can serve as partners in a business or as employers, and they can also legally own shops if they hold work permits (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017).

However, even before the war, Syrians working in Lebanon often did so informally (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). At the end of 2015, only 2,150 Syrians held formal work permits (Government of Lebanon and the United Nations, 2017, p. 103n). Yet, Syrians working without a valid work permit are vulnerable to fines or arrest (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). To apply for the work permits, Syrians must provide various documentation, including a valid residence permit (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017). Residence permits have represented a key challenge for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, of whom only about 20 percent hold such permits according to a 2017 report (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 41). Cited reasons for this situation include cost and uncertainty about requirements (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 41). In 2015, Lebanon issued new residency renewal requirements that included a $200 fee plus documentation that is often difficult for Syrians to secure, such as certified documentation of a housing commitment in the form of a lease agreement or real estate deed, valid ID or passport, and entry slip and return card (Janmyr, 2016). Additionally, Lebanon's government suspended new UNHCR registrations in 2015, thus complicating residency issues, because holding a UNHCR registration certificate was one of two key ways that Syrians could pursue renewal of their residency (Janmyr and Mourad, 2018, p. 19). Also, though this requirement was removed following the London Conference, “Syrian refugees were initially asked to sign a pledge ‘not to work’ as part of their residency permit process” (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 41). Additionally, a system that allowed Syrians to renew their residency through sponsorship, usually by an employer, has led to exploitation of refugees and other issues (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017; Oxfam Briefing Paper, 2017, p. 6).

Several measures have either sought to improve the residence permit situation or might alleviate related issues in the future. In February 2017, for some UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees, Lebanon waived the fee to acquire legal residency (NRC, 2018, p. 22). In February 2018, Lebanon’s State Council annulled the 2015 Directorate of General Security decision that had “blocked many Syrian citizens from entering Lebanon and prevented others from obtaining or renewing legal residence permits” (Saghieh and Frangieh, 2018). This new decision provides the opportunity for less restrictive entry and residency requirements, but its future effects are still uncertain.

**Government, International Community, and Business Employment-Related Programs**

According to interviewees in Lebanon, one of the biggest challenges to managing the refugee crisis has been the absence of a single government entity responsible for coordinating issues related to Syrian refugees. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education each focused on certain aspects of Syrian refugees relevant to their mission, but there was no single coordinating government entity to oversee and manage the government response to the influx of refugees. Currently, the Ministry of State for Displaced Affairs is working to fulfill this role. Previously, the portfolio was managed through the Ministry of Social Affairs. Adding to the uncertainty was the ensuing political crisis that lasted for two years (May 2014–October 2016) after the country’s president stepped down without a replacement. Thus, the overall government response to the influx of refugees was deemed slow and inadequate (El Sayegh, 2017). Moreover, according to some interviewees, lack of coordination at the central
level has also trickled down to an uncoordinated response at the decentralized, municipal level. Many municipal governments in areas where Syrian refugees have settled are not adequately prepared to efficiently utilize funds they have been allocated or to coordinate the activities of refugee support agencies operating in their jurisdiction.

Lebanese experts argue that, thus far, approaches to address the refugee situation have been based on consumption-based assistance. Basic necessities such as food and shelter are subsidized to increase consumption and spending in the host country, and there has been some infrastructure spending in local communities where Syrians are living. The intent is to reduce tensions rising among host-country nationals, though the effect is likely to be temporary. It is estimated roughly that Syrian refugees added $1.5 billion to the Lebanese economy in 2016, though it has also been argued that increased consumption may also be to blame for widening the trade deficit (Berthier, 2017).

Employment Placement and Assistance Programs

Employment-related programming in Lebanon caters to both refugees and host communities (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, pp. 49, 51). Major activities have included the provision of technical support to enterprises in Lebanon, particularly small businesses (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 52). Innovation Lab trainings conducted by 3RP partners provide Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian youth with funding and advising services to foster income-generating ideas (3RP, 2018a, p. 20). Other programs also aim to further innovation and entrepreneurship; for example, one local program provides small business training and microfinancing to help students establish their enterprises (Dziadosz, 2016). Even though such programs benefit participants, they do not make a large-scale impact (Dziadosz, 2016). For 2018, UN agencies, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), and NGOs have appealed for $1.93 billion, and have received about $350 million as of October 31, 2017.

Vocational and Technical Training

Various international and local organizations have also implemented vocational training courses and job programs (Dziadosz, 2016). For example, the International Rescue Committee has run three-month trainings in fields such as food processing and tailoring (Dziadosz, 2016). The 3RP plan for 2018–2019 notes that food security partners are running initiatives including farmer’s markets and digital skills trainings in Lebanon (3RP, 2018a, p. 13). It also states that 3RP partners are currently conducting an initiative to support and increase participation in technical and vocational education (3RP, 2018a, p. 17). The effort aims to better link youth job goals with labor market demand and involves consultation with relevant UN agencies, Lebanese government agencies, civil society, and private sector entities (3RP, 2018a, pp. 17–18). The 2017–2020 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan states that the livelihoods sector will work to better match the skills taught in educational programs with the qualifications required in the labor market, and to this end the sector “will undertake programs that will target 20,000 people in 2017, with 4,000 of them being placed into jobs within a year. Beneficiaries will be periodically tracked, monitored and their acquired skills adequately profiled” (Government of Lebanon and the United Nations, 2017, p. 107n). GIZ has also been developing a vocational program as part of the regional Qudra project, in partnership with the Ministry of Education, to provide training in nursing, construction trades, and hospitality.

Despite the numerous vocational training programs, officials from both the private and public sectors expressed concern that many of the efforts were not effective. They contend that
some of the training provided is in sectors in which refugees cannot work or provide little avenue for employment because they are not based on an analysis of market needs. In general, restrictions of Syrians to three occupational areas limits the ability of organizations to provide technical and vocational education and training (TVET) in certain fields, thus limiting the overall potential for TVET to have an impact on employment in Lebanon (Dziadosz, 2016).

**Aid for Infrastructure Development and Concessional Financing**

NGOs have worked with municipalities to provide programs to employ Syrian refugees in infrastructure-upgrading projects (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 49). Several UN and other development agencies committed to implement infrastructure projects that would provide employment opportunities as part of the London commitments, but efforts to move forward with these programs are stalled. Plans to fund a €22 million project to improve water, roads, and agricultural land coupled with the Lebanese government’s proposed five-year, multibillion-dollar infrastructure improvement plan have not resulted in any implementation (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 49).

The World Bank and Islamic Development Bank have also been formulating concessional lending programs for infrastructure projects in Lebanon. In turn, the Lebanese government, after the London Conference, proposed a Priority Development Investment Program for Concessional Financing for implementation at the national and municipal levels. The program was to be implemented from 2017 to 2021 and would include infrastructure investments in road and transport ($1.1 billion), school rehabilitation ($100 million), environmental cleanup ($155 million), water ($340 million), and electricity ($1.5 billion) (UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 97). In February 2017, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved a Roads and Employment Project for Lebanon with an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan of $200 million (including a “concessional portion of US$45.4 million from the Concessional Financing Facility made on a grant basis”) with a loan maturity of 32.5 years with a seven-year grace period. The objective of the project is to improve transportation infrastructure and create short-term jobs for Lebanese and Syrians (World Bank, 2017b). More recently (March 15, 2018), the World Bank approved a $295 million funding package to reform the transportation sector in Lebanon as part of the Greater Beirut Public Transport Project (GBPTP) (Hamdan, 2018), and the Paris Conference raised $11 billion in development aid (Ganley and Mroue, 2018).

The lower education level among refugees raises questions about the efficacy of solutions targeting expansion of opportunities in formal sector work and whether they will bring about a meaningful change in their employment. Many stakeholders argued that the most viable near-term approach to generate economic opportunities for Lebanese and Syrian workers is to invest heavily in infrastructure to create jobs, which would also address Lebanon’s aging and weak infrastructure. Since the war, Lebanon continues to be in need of investments in rehabilitating and building new schools and hospitals as well as expanding and improving water and sanitation, electricity, and transportation infrastructure. Moreover, investment targeting the most socioeconomically disadvantaged and historically neglected areas also coincide to some extent with the presence of large concentrations of Syrian refugees (Yassin, 2017). Targeting investment in sectors such as construction, where Syrians have historically worked, may be more likely to raise employment prospects. However, interviewees representing various organizations acknowledged that rampant corruption has made international donors and the private sector reluctant to invest in Lebanon. In fact, political reform and substantial steps toward greater
transparency and accountability measures are a precondition to the Lebanese government’s receiving funding. While many of those we interviewed expressed the opinion that Lebanon was providing a “public good” by housing a disproportionate share of refugees within its borders, and the international community should in return generously invest in infrastructure and other sectors, the situation is considerably complicated by potential investors insisting on fiscal and other reforms before such investment can flow in.4

Social Cohesion

As the country that hosts the most refugees and displaced persons per capita (European Council, 2016), Lebanon has made considerable efforts and sacrifices to accommodate the Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, the sectarian balance among Lebanese communities is fragile (Culbertson et al., 2016, p. 6), and Lebanese views of Syrian refugees are affected by their own past experience with civil war as well as with the prior Palestinian refugee influx (Dziadosz, 2016). Lebanese officials reportedly note that integrating the mainly Sunni Syrians into the economy could disrupt the country’s power-sharing system among Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites (Dziadosz, 2016). Moreover, Lebanese nationals have expressed concern about competition with Syrians in the job market and with Syrian-founded businesses, as well as about the potential for increased unemployment in the country (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017; UNDP, ILO, and WFP, 2017, p. 97). Some politicians in Lebanon have used the refugee influx as a scapegoat for the country’s economic, infrastructure, and social decline, thus focusing further negative attention on their presence (Berthier, 2017). Host communities have protested in municipalities throughout the country, conveying their grievances about Syrians working and about Syrians’ shop ownership (Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon, 2017).

These incidents aside, however, VASyR-2017 found that over 33 percent of surveyed Syrian refugee households in Lebanon characterized the refugee-host community relations in their area as positive; about 50 percent stated that they were neutral; and only 4 percent stated that they were negative, with 1 percent saying they were very negative (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP, 2017, p. 16).

Among key informants we spoke with, it was clear that many viewed the continued status quo as untenable. They emphasized the importance of recognizing that the country has had a turbulent history with Syria, including an occupation and prolonged military presence, and that there are deep-rooted effects on the Lebanese national psyche. This makes it much more complex for Lebanese to accept a long-term presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. This is further exacerbated by the delicate confessional balance and the concern that integrating Syrians, even if only being referred to in terms of the labor market, will alter this balance and set off renewed hostilities among the Lebanese. In fact, the terms “refugees” and “social cohesion” are being replaced in public reporting and discourse by, respectively, “displaced persons” and “social stability,” and political leaders prefer to emphasize “eventual return” over the term “integration” because the latter implies a longer-term presence (Janmyr, 2016, pp. 58–78).

4 After our interview of stakeholders, at the April 2018 donors conference in Paris, international donors pledged around $11 billion in loans and grants, but also called for the money to be well spent (WTOP website). And in a conference in Brussels during the same month, aid to the tune of $4.4 billion was mobilized to help Syrians inside Syria and the neighboring host communities (European Council website).
These careful choices of terms reflect the fragile political and social balance in Lebanon and overall tenuousness surrounding the Syrian refugee presence in the country.

While social tension related to the refugee presence is high, key informants clearly stated that much of that is shaped by politicians exploiting the situation and the media. In particular, a perception has been created among Lebanese that Syrian refugees are better off because they receive subsidies and other supports from the government and international organizations. They then supplement those with work, which they can accept at a lower wage and directly compete with Lebanese. This perception exists, despite the fact that many Syrian refugees choose not to formally register for fear of being deported under Lebanese illegal residence laws and thus do not receive subsidies and consequently live in very poor and fragile conditions that require them to work to subsist (Berti, 2017).

There has been a push by certain institutions, such as the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, to counter the narrative and disseminate more facts. Representatives of multilateral institutions with whom we spoke argued that NGOs and religious institutions are an effective mechanism to channel the message. They have been working with these institutions to correct misperceptions and communicate a more positive message to the community. However, they also stated that more champions among the Lebanese are needed through media, television, and high-profile members of the community who can communicate to the Lebanese across religious and sectarian lines and the socioeconomic spectrum.

**Summary**

In summary, while multilateral agencies have been providing humanitarian assistance and concessional financing, and they and other organizations have implemented job training and vocational programs, Lebanon presents a challenging environment to improve livelihood opportunities for Syrian refugees. Training programs are uncoordinated and not market driven; legal requirements for residency and work are complex and sectors in which Syrians can work are quite limited; reforms and increased government capacity emerge as prerequisites for foreign investment; and social stability, often fueled by misperceptions about refugees, remains tenuous. In Chapters Ten and Eleven, we explore many of these issues in greater depth through results from focus groups with Syrians and Lebanese, and from surveys of Syrian households and Lebanese firms.

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5 See also El Behairy, 2016.
We conducted 11 focus groups among Syrians, Lebanese, and Egyptian workers in Beirut/Mount Lebanon, Tripoli, South Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley (see Appendix C for sampling of focus groups). In addition, four Lebanese firm owners participated in in-depth interviews. Focus groups were conducted to understand perceptions of the employment and training available, facilitators and barriers to securing employment, cross-cultural perceptions, workplace descriptions, and aspirations and hopes for the future. Highlights include:

- Lebanese, Syrians, and Egyptian migrants perceived the economic and social situation in Lebanon as deteriorating.
- Syrians and Lebanese reported working below their qualifications; Syrians occupied jobs Lebanese did not want. Syrians who worked in construction, mining, and mobile phone shops in Syria reported continuing working in these fields in Lebanon.
- Educational backgrounds among Syrians in Lebanon varied greatly.
- Reliance on networks was the primary means of securing employment.
- Wasta (favoritism or nepotism) remained a main barrier for securing employment, particularly among Lebanese.
- Syrians were perceived as hard workers and skilled craftsmen who were willing to accept difficult workplace conditions for less pay.
- Obtaining a residence permit, more so than a work permit, remained of primary importance for Syrians for employment.
- Lebanese felt threatened by the large numbers of Syrians in Lebanon. Lebanese expressed hostility about Syrians, which is likely tied to the poor workplace conditions and tense relations on the job reported by Syrians.
- Most Syrian women reported being either housewives or farmers in Syria; in Lebanon, many reported work as seamstresses, cooks, factory workers, and farmers.
- Although women faced difficult workplace circumstances and challenges securing child-care, they reported a sense of independence and empowerment through working.
- Many Syrians expressed aspirations of returning to Syria; until then, they aspired to find full-time employment with the help of formal skills-matching organizations.
- Lebanese expressed interest in investing in large-scale public works projects.

Employment Opportunities

*Syrians mainly worked in low-wage, low-to-medium-skill jobs.* All of the Syrian participants worked in informal jobs as construction workers, miners, electricians, mobile shop workers, cleaners,
clothing manufacturers, informal daycare providers, seamstresses/tailors, carpenters, barbers, or farmers. Syrians reported that many jobs were only part time, provided a minimal salary, or required long work hours.

Many Syrians worked in jobs that did not match their skills and experience and in jobs that Lebanese do not want. Syrians were concerned with finding any employment, as opposed to finding an ideal match for their skills. For instance, a Syrian man in the Bekaa Valley said, “When we find a job, we take it, even if [it is] not our profession. We need the money, so we will take any jobs in order to survive.” For example, a Syrian man in South Lebanon who used to work in IT could only find occasional opportunities to perform small tasks in electronics in Beirut. Syrians have a long history of migrant labor in Lebanon in construction and agriculture, which Lebanese participants in South Lebanon labeled as “stereotypical Syrian jobs.”

One Lebanese man said, “The Lebanese public created these vacancies for Syrian employees because the Lebanese are too proud to work labor jobs. . . . Even before the Syrian war, the Lebanese used to hire Syrian labor in construction work, as the Lebanese people do not accept working in such physically demanding jobs for low pay rates.” These experiences suggest the need for making better use of Syrian skills. At the same time, a growing perception among the Lebanese that Syrians hold higher-skilled or technical jobs that Lebanese might want is a source of resentment.

More Syrian women were working outside the home, and some expressed new independence because of their work. While few women worked outside of the home in Syria, Syrian women participants found employment in clothing manufacturing, sales, daycare, education, food production, and farming. Nearly three-quarters of the women noted that this was their first employment outside the home and a necessity for their families to pay rent, school fees, and living expenses. Syrian women also reported feeling a sense of pride from working. “Women feel like they are valued, like they are an active member of society,” explained a Syrian woman in Beirut. Another echoed, “Women are capable of earning their own money and being financially independent [in Lebanon]. In Syria, we didn’t have this privilege of being exposed to the world. I don’t have to wait for my husband to give me money to buy food and other things I need. Women can depend on themselves. Women feel empowered after coming to Lebanon, having to work, and being independent.” Women also said living in Beirut had more work opportunities than in rural areas. Nevertheless, a Syrian man in Tripoli admitted that “It is hard for the man to see his wife working, especially when they have kids.” Circumstances have led to reevaluation of Syrian cultural norms of women in the workplace.

Lebanese participants viewed the Lebanese economy as deteriorating; Lebanese reported difficulties in finding a job and securing an adequate salary. Participants attributed poor opportunities to political corruption and the large numbers of Syrians. One Lebanese in Tripoli remarked that the “economic situation in Lebanon has been mediocre since 1990. The refugee crisis made it even more mediocre.” Workers of all skill levels expressed limited opportunities, although it was particularly felt among those with an advanced degree. A Lebanese woman in Beirut said, “I graduated from a Lebanese university, and my dad paid a lot of money for me to finish my degree, but now I work at a shop, and my degree is useless.” Lower- and middle-skilled workers reported working multiple jobs to make ends meet and thought that more jobs were now occupied by Syrians. Lebanese said it was hard to find work in their chosen fields, and it was growing increasingly difficult to make ends meet. This underscores the need for improving economic conditions to create jobs for all.
The Experience of Obtaining a Job

Jobs were difficult to obtain. Securing employment in Lebanon took some Syrian participants up to six months, which for some meant missing rent payments and having to move out of formal housing into informal tented settlements. Most Syrian participants in the Bekaa Valley reported long-term unemployment, particularly in the construction and agricultural sectors. While most Syrians, Lebanese, and Egyptian migrants had secured some employment, many (including Lebanese) were required to relocate for their jobs, had to take on a second job, or were unable to secure full-time work.

Connections and referrals were key in securing employment for Syrians and Lebanese. Some Syrians drew on connections in Lebanon from prior to the war, while others connected to Syrians in Lebanon through family and friends, social media, and messaging apps. Firms drew on networks of their Syrian employees to find other Syrians to hire. A Syrian man in South Lebanon viewed printed job ads as futile, as “There is only a 1 percent chance that you might find a job, because people are scared of us. . . . If someone refers you, you would be more trustworthy in the eyes of the employer.”

Wasta remained a barrier to securing employment for Lebanese in particular. Wasta (favoritism or nepotism) was viewed, particularly by Lebanese, as pervasive. A Lebanese participant in South Lebanon explained, “Lebanon is the country famous for wasta, and the job market is not fair. . . . it is very hard to find a job, unless your parents were able to pull some strings through the people they know to get you hired for a decent well-paid job.”

Formal job-matching assistance was limited. Career guidance and job-matching assistance programs were desired among Syrians, Lebanese, and Egyptians and regions.

Syrians and Egyptians often find work informally. Both Syrians and Egyptians reported going door to door and leaving contact information should a vacancy open up. Additionally, Syrians waited in designated areas to be picked up and taken to work for a day. Syrians complained of a practice in which Lebanese “recruiters” take “half of the income earned.” A woman in the Bekaa Valley described, “[An agent] takes us with his car to work and brings us back. We know he takes money too, but we must work, and we want to live.” Syrian men reported instances of paying fraudulent job agencies for jobs that did not materialize.

Lack of mobility hindered securing employment. Syrians reported high transportation costs to work, sometimes up to half of their salary. In addition, Syrians described regions in Lebanon (e.g., in Dahye, Hamra, Borj Barajne, Dahr el Baydar) where their safety could be compromised during transportation, as routine checkpoints could lead to incarceration for those without a residence permit. Improved and affordable transportation would enhance livelihood opportunities for Syrians.

For Syrian women, lack of childcare, little experience, and conservative clothing norms hindered employment. Syrian women reported that employers were reluctant to allow women to check in on their children during the workday. A Syrian woman in the Bekaa Valley said, “If you have children, the employer might tell you that you can’t work there, as the work might run late.” Women seeking employment for the first time also faced difficulty. Some Syrian women also cited wearing a headscarf (and a general difference in style from the Lebanese) as a barrier, as some Lebanese prefer not to hire women wearing headscarves (although some Lebanese women also wear headscarves).

Syrians lacked English- and French-language skills. Lebanese often are trilingual (Arabic, French, and English), as Lebanese schools educate students in all three languages. Both Leba-
inese and Syrians noted that lacking English and French skills was a detriment to Syrian assimilation into both the labor market and in society more generally, as Syrians generally spoke only Arabic. This points to a need for language training.

*Age and poor health made finding and keeping a job more difficult among Syrian men.* Syrian men reported age, poor health, and disability as barriers to securing employment. This was exacerbated by a lack of health insurance. This signals the need to consider health-care policy in combination with employment policy.

**Employer Considerations for Hiring Syrians and Migrants**

*Employers viewed Syrian labor as crucial to the Lebanese labor market.* Lebanese employers of Syrians noted that Syrians have long had a presence in low-skill, low-wage jobs, such as in construction, production, agriculture, and other trades work, in Lebanon. The owner of a large construction firm said that he would be “afraid if the Syrian laborers were to return to Syria.” In his view, Syrians employees “are the workforce in Lebanon.”

*Syrians were viewed as hardworking and skillful.* There was consensus among employers that Syrians were willing to perform many tasks and work hard, were highly skilled, took low wages, and “are faster, produce more, and are more experienced at work.” They sometimes compared this with the Lebanese work ethic. As one Lebanese in the Bekaa Valley said, “The Lebanese person doesn’t work; he barely works for six hours.”

*Syrians received a higher salary than other migrants but did not require housing.* Employers noted that while Syrians worked for lower wages than the Lebanese, they received higher wages than Bangladeshi workers; firms attributed this to the Syrian need to support families and rent housing, while Bangladeshis typically were without their families in Lebanon and were provided housing by employers. Vis-à-vis Bangladeshi or Egyptian workers, employers in our focus groups viewed Syrians as possessing greater skills.

*There was little incentive for employers to process work permits for Syrians.* While some employers mentioned sponsoring Syrian residence permits (often making Syrians cover the cost), employers rarely described providing work permits within the industries open to Syrian labor. The owner of a medium-sized services firm admitted that Syrians could be listed on government paperwork as an employee in a role legally open to Syrians, while actually performing different tasks: “For example, you have an employee who . . . has gained a lot of experience in technical aspects of the work, but you must declare to the government that he is either working as a porter or cleaner, as those are the only two fields the government allows.” This highlights how employers circumvent restrictions on hiring Syrians and work permits.

**Perceptions of the Legal Framework and Work Permits**

*Syrians viewed residence permits as more important for employment and personal safety than work permits.* While Syrians reported not needing a work permit to obtain work, they emphasized the necessity for a residence permit. A pressing issue was keeping residence permits up-to-date, which required both finding a sponsor and paying US$200 per person (and US$200 to retroactively pay for each year spent without the permit). A Syrian man in Tripoli said, “When I go and search for a job and I don’t have [the residence permit], they will think a lot before
hiring us, and they sometimes don’t hire us because we don’t have papers.” Checkpoints limited mobility for those without up-to-date residence permits. A Syrian man in South Lebanon described, “People with expired papers face difficulties at checkpoints and in finding jobs, and if you don’t have legal papers, it would be a disaster—no work, no money, you can barely go out, etc. They would put you in prison for 20 days, and with all the beating and suffering that you go through there is also a chance that you would be deported. I know people who went through all of this.” This risk at checkpoints was also linked to employer reluctance to serve as a sponsor for Syrians; one employer of a medium-sized firm said security officers perform routine checks for residence permits (but not work permits).

**Syrians and Egyptians reported difficulty obtaining permits.** For Syrians who were able to find a sponsor and cover the cost, the work permit application process was daunting. A Syrian man in South Lebanon described the application process: “When you go to state offices they would treat us like animals saying all sort of bad words. We are coming to renew our papers and [to] be legally. We are even paying money for it, so why are you treating us this way?” Egyptian migrants also described Lebanese authorities as paying more attention to legal residency and no longer permitting Egyptian workers to enter on tourist visas.

**Inconsistent government policies exacerbated risks to employers and Syrians.** Lebanese participants in the Bekaa Valley emphasized the informality and lack of consistent government oversight in labor markets. One said, “The absence of the governmental rules causes all this chaos.” This lack of confidence in Lebanese government policy was cited by participants across geographic regions.

**Skills and Training**

**Syrians and Lebanese requested assistance with job placement more than training.** Syrians felt confident in their skill sets and ability to work, but needed more assistance finding employment opportunities. A Syrian man in South Lebanon remarked that job-matching assistance “would improve the situation on the security, psychological, financial, and physical levels. . . . There should be specific entities that organize the Syrian workforce in Lebanon and find them adequate jobs.” Lebanese with university degrees believed that formal assistance could mitigate *wasta*, while Syrians believed it could shorten the waiting periods in between jobs and make finding employment less ad hoc.

**Trade-offs were associated with training.** Both Syrians and firms noted participating in training could take time away from the job. Some found available training ineffective, while others emphasized that the most optimal training would be on-the-job training.

**Some specific training was desired by Syrians.** Syrian men and women were eager to improve their language skills in English and French, and men also wanted to sharpen their skills in mechanics and electronics. Syrian women preferred job training with Lebanese women as a means of lessening social tensions. This points to the need for specific and targeted training programs in line with labor market needs.

**Social Cohesion Related to Employment**

**Lebanese expressed concerns about demographic changes in Lebanon.** Lebanese participants expressed anxiety over the perception that Syrians were “going to outnumber us” or might someday
“demand to have Lebanese nationality.” This concern was also tied to collective anxieties about the demographic proportions of religious groups in Lebanon, as most Syrians are Sunni and their presence could change the current confessional balance of religions (Sunni, Shiite, and Christian) in Lebanon.

Economic and political instability compromised social cohesion. Lebanese participants attributed some resentment of Syrians to “economic stress” and “the result of financial problems.” This frustration, combined with political instability and suboptimal employment opportunities, carried over into interactions in the workplace and daily life for Syrians. Lebanese expressed security-related fears about Syrians, perceiving Syrians as dangerous.

Relationships between Lebanese and Syrians in the workplace were mixed. A Syrian man in South Lebanon remarked, “Working with Lebanese is good 70 percent of the time. The [bad relations with the] remainder 30 percent could ensue from either jealousy or better work.” Syrians and Lebanese alike noted that one-on-one relationships in the workplace were often amicable. A Syrian man in the Bekaa Valley recounted, “There are lots of people who are good and treat us well.” Yet many Lebanese expressed condescension and hostility toward Syrians. A Lebanese man in South Lebanon said, “I must honestly say they I do not treat the Syrian workers as I treat the Lebanese workers, I just can’t. It is a result of their behavior, they accept being humiliated and they don’t mind it.” Some viewed Syrians as not clean or tidy. Tensions also arose over issues relating to hierarchy; an owner of a services firm explained, “Sometimes there is some negativity between a Lebanese technician and a Syrian technician who is more experienced. The Syrian technician would have eight years of experience, while the Lebanese technician would be new; still he would not accept working under a Syrian.”

Lebanese held misperceptions about assistance Syrians received in Lebanon. Syrians across regions described currently receiving only assistance with education costs for their children, and how they have steadily lost food, aid, and other support. Yet some Lebanese believed that Syrians received a lot of support from the UN and did not pay rent. Some Lebanese viewed the Syrians as migrants, not refugees, noting that they crossed the border into Syria often. Some Lebanese believed that Lebanon was the only country that permitted Syrians to work. Such misperceptions may be reflective of inflammatory media reports on Syrians. There is a need to disseminate facts about the Syrian refugees to counter misperceptions.

Work Environment Conditions

Syrians faced long work hours, physical hazards, inconsistent pay, and lack of recourse. Syrians worked long hours and lacked recourse if they experienced adverse working conditions. Syrian men in Beirut reported physical abuse on the job. Several Syrians described delayed payment, reduced payment, or underpayment; one Syrian man in the Bekaa Valley said he worked for 60 days without pay. These problems were reportedly more common among those without a residence permit and a work permit.

Syrian women reported sexual harassment. A Syrian woman in the Bekaa Valley described the situation: “Because we are Syrians, Lebanese talk to you in a way that makes you feel cheap. . . . Then they asked us to do things, to sell our body. They tell you all Syrian women are doing this, so we quit. . . . We’re not here to do these things or to sell our bodies. We are working for ourselves and to be able to eat. We’re not cheap.”
Aspirations and Solutions

Lebanese and Syrians both longed for peace and stability, an end to corruption, and consistent employment opportunities. To Syrian participants, peace and stability meant basic rights in the workplace and safety for themselves and their families, while awaiting a safe return to Syria or finding secure employment and housing in Lebanon.

Syrians in particular described goals related to legal work, including work permits and formal job-matching assistance. Participants among all groups wanted to introduce fairness into the job market. Several Syrians wished for a skills-matching organization. Employers and Lebanese wanted clearer provision of work permits as a means of instituting taxation for Syrian employees and regulating the labor market.

Many Syrians aspired to return to Syria to rebuild it, while others aimed to stay in Lebanon. Many Lebanese feared that Syrians would stay in Lebanon for the long term. The Lebanese feared this because of the country’s experience with accepting Palestinian refugees who have remained for decades and because the largely Sunni Syrians could upset the sectarian balance in Lebanon; yet many Syrians aimed to return home. Others confronted prospects of “having nothing in Syria anymore.” Both Syrians and employers aimed to rebuild Syria and aspired to have Lebanese firms play a leading role in Syria’s reconstruction. Some Lebanese wanted to leave Lebanon. A Lebanese in Beirut said, “If we stay like this, I would let my kids travel and live abroad because there is no future here.”

Lebanese desired investment in large-scale public works projects such as improving the electrical grid, water infrastructure, waste management, and energy infrastructure. “Just by solving these problems, you can create so many job vacancies,” one Lebanese noted, “but here we are still focusing on government planning and organization.”
This chapter describes the results from the analysis of surveys administered to Syrian refugee households and to firms in Lebanon. The household survey results highlight findings pertaining to the supply of skills among Syrian refugees, their work experiences both in Lebanon and in Syria, and their perceptions toward employment in Lebanon. The firm survey results focus on findings pertaining to Syrian employment, as well as firms’ perceptions about Syrian workers and about policies that could encourage employment growth. Appendix D contains details on the sampling strategies used in each survey, as well as additional results.

**Household Survey**

**Key Findings**

- Education level is low among survey respondents with the largest group having a primary-level education.
- Overall, the share of household members working or willing to work was around 60 percent, but three times higher for males compared with females.
- The percentage of survey respondents not working is relatively low for males but high for females, except in the Bekaa, where a lower percentage of females not working, compared to other governorates, which may be accounted for by agricultural work.
- Tapping into social networks is the most common means for finding employment.
- Performing unskilled jobs in construction, wholesale and retail trade, agriculture, and other manufacturing are the most common types of work being performed, generally consistent with the types of work Syrians have typically done in Lebanon.
- Difficulty obtaining a work permit and a lack of legal residency are the two most frequently cited obstacles to employment.
- Most respondents fear getting in trouble and losing assistance if they are caught working.
- Most respondents agree that employers are willing to hire them, but that it is difficult to find an employer to sponsor a work permit.
- Most survey respondents reported that workers and employers treat them with respect, and that they do not face regular discrimination.

**Education Level Among Survey Respondents Is Low**

Around half or more of survey respondents had either a primary-level education or less (Figure 11.1), which is consistent with findings reviewed in the Lebanon country overview chapter.


**Lebanon Household Sample**

A total of 600 households were sampled across five governorates in line with the proportion of the population across these geographic locations.

- Beirut (30 households)
- Mount Lebanon (132 households)
- The Bekaa Valley (216 households)
- North (150 households)
- South (72 households)

Of the randomly selected household members to participate in the employment perceptions portion of the survey, 77 percent were male and 23 percent were female. The majority resided in regular homes (362), followed by an equal distribution across formal camps (119) and informal settlements (119). The majority of households were sampled from urban areas (343), but a sizable share of households were sampled from rural areas (257). All households in Beirut and most in Mount Lebanon (91 percent) and the North (55 percent) were in urban areas, whereas rural households constituted the majority in the Bekaa (62 percent) and the South (61 percent).

**Figure 11.1**

*Education Level of Survey Respondents*

![Education Level Bar Chart]

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Results are based on 600 respondents: 30 in Beirut, 216 in Bekaa, 132 in Mount Lebanon, 150 in the North, and 72 in the South. A Pearson chi-square test reveals that there are statistically significant differences at the 1 percent level in the distribution of education levels across governorates.

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In general, survey respondents in the more rural governorates of the Bekaa and the South have lower education levels than those in the more urban governorates of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the North. Survey respondents in the Bekaa and the South are largely involved in agriculture and have typically come from the more rural and agricultural areas of Syria, where emphasis is on working on the farm and where there are more limited schooling options.

Survey respondents were asked about any formal training they received since arriving in the host country, and just over a third (34 percent) of respondents indicated that they received any training since arriving in the host country. Among those, the most commonly cited training included construction-related training (15 percent of respondents), training in agriculture, horticulture, and livestock production (5 percent of respondents), hospitality services (4 percent of respondents), and auto mechanic repair, maintenance, and equipment operation (3 percent). Less than 1 percent of respondents indicated that they received language training since they arrived in Lebanon, most commonly in English.

Share of Household Members Working or Willing to Work and Share of Respondents Not Working Diverge Widely Between Males and Females

Across our sample of households, the overall share of household members aged 18 years and above either working or willing to work was approximately 61 percent: 92 percent for males and 30 percent for females (Figure 11.2). Again, low labor force participation among women is broadly consistent with the notion that female labor force participation in the region is low. For males, the share of survey respondents working or willing to work does not vary significantly by governorate, whereas it is higher for females in Beirut and the North compared with the other governorates. Rates of working or willingness to work were lowest in the Bekaa, at 53 percent (87 percent for males, 23 percent for females), and the South, at 60 percent (93 percent for males, 29 percent for females). We can speculate on a number of factors that could be playing a role. In general, there is a high reliance on UN and NGO aid in these communities, and work opportunities outside of agriculture may be very limited. So, while the share not working may be lower in the Bekaa for women who are willing to work in agriculture, limited opportunities outside of agriculture may be effectively keeping a significant share of women out of the labor force altogether. In fact, working in agriculture was common among focus group participants from the Bekaa.

Though high by normal standards, the rates of men not working were relatively low and less than 15 percent in most cases, except for the North governorate. However, these rates mask important differences between males and females. With the exception of the Bekaa, where the

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1 It is important to note that while women’s labor force participation rates in Syria prior to the civil war (2010) were estimated to be 13.27 percent and roughly consistent with the share of females chosen to complete the employment perceptions survey, studies have suggested that labor force participation rates are higher among refugee women due to the need for them to work to support the family. For a more detailed explanation, see Appendix D.

2 The percentage not working was calculated for the survey respondents. In the survey, we relied on the ILO definition of what it means to be working, which is defined as working even for one hour in the past seven days or being temporarily absent from work. The survey respondents who do not fit either of those two criteria are considered not working, which is equivalent to unemployed—they are not working, they are not actively searching for work, and they are not willing to work if they had the opportunity. In this case, we do not strictly impose the condition for unemployment that the respondent needs to be actively looking for work. Thus, rather than referring to our survey respondents who are not working as “unemployed,” we refer to simply as “not working.” Given the circumstances of Syrian refugees, who, as observed in our focus groups, perceive many barriers to working, we opted for a less strict application of the criteria and also include in our sample those who state willingness to work if provided the opportunity.
share of household members working or willing to work is low, among females who are participating, the rate not working is lower relative to the other governorates. This is likely due to their involvement in agriculture. It is important to put this finding in the context of the sample size. Out of the 139 females in the sample, 59 report being employed. Across the governorates, 3 out of 11 females in Beirut, 29 out of 43 females in the Bekaa, 3 out of 24 in Mount Lebanon, 17 out of 43 in the North, and 7 out of 18 women in the South reported working. Across the other governorates, while the share of household members working or willing to work are higher, women face a more difficult time finding employment with rates at 60 percent or greater. Although small sample sizes in general limit what we can draw in terms of conclusions, relative to other provinces, higher rates of working or willingness to work and higher rates of not working in Beirut suggests that female survey respondents in Beirut face greater barriers to employment.

**Difficulty Obtaining a Work Permit Is the Most Commonly Cited Reason for Not Working**

Among those not working, the most commonly cited reasons included not being able to obtain a work permit (21 percent), believing there is no work (13 percent), and not knowing how or where to look for work (13 percent) (Figure 11.3). The “Other” category allowed respondents to choose if the existing list did not encompass their choice and included an extensive list of other reasons that were selected relatively infrequently. In the focus groups, female participants mentioned transportation, safety, a husband’s pride, childcare, and more conservative practices that limited interaction in mixed gender environments. The entire list is available in the survey in Appendix D.
Job Seekers Primarily Rely on Social Networks for Employment Opportunities

Among those not working, the most commonly cited action taken was to ask relatives and friends for information about employment opportunities, suggesting the prominence of networks and social groups as the main method to search for employment (Figure 11.4). This was consistent with the method used by working respondents to find work, although over half of working respondents reported that they asked family or friends to provide a recommendation to an employer for a job. These findings are consistent with findings from the focus groups and in some cases were noted as a must in order to secure employment. It was more common for not-working respondents to have registered with a government employment agency, private employment agency, UN agency, or NGO.

Survey Respondents Work in Sectors Such as Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Agriculture, and Services and in Manual Labor Jobs

Survey respondents, whether they currently work or not, were also asked about their previous employment in Syria (Figure 11.5). It is important to note that we are examining an aggregate picture across all respondents who report working rather than a dyadic match of sectors worked for each respondent. Survey respondents are more likely to be working construction and wholesale and retail trade jobs, compared with their situation in Syria. Respondents also typically work in agriculture in Lebanon, and those are concentrated in certain provinces. Construction, agriculture, and environmental services are the sectors open to Syrian refugees for work. A small share of respondents work in other manufacturing and hotels and restaurants.

Largely because Syrians are restricted to work in certain occupations, survey respondents are concentrated in a small number of occupations compared to the range of occupations that respondents reported having in Syria. Close to half of the respondents currently working do so in unskilled jobs followed by more skilled positions. The rates between current work and
previous work in terms of current versus previous occupation are comparable between the Lebanon and Syria. While some mismatch is expected, it seems in Lebanon that the rate may be lower than in the other host countries. This could largely be due to the history of migrant labor from Syria working in Lebanon.

In terms of employment status, around half of working survey respondents report that they have permanent positions, though significant shares perform less stable work that is either task based, temporary, or casual. Rates of these types of employment arrangements, as expected, are higher than they were in Syria. This is consistent with what we found in focus groups where Syrian refugee women in Lebanon reported that their initiation into the labor market happened first in Lebanon.

**Difficulty Obtaining a Work Permit and Legal Residency, as Well as a Lack of Jobs, Are the Most Commonly Cited Obstacles to Employment**

Survey respondents were asked to choose from a list of the three biggest obstacles to finding a job or starting a business in Lebanon (Table 11.1). While there were some common concerns across provinces, there were also a few differences. Difficulty of getting a work permit and difficulty getting legal residency were commonly reported across all the governorates except for the Bekaa, where lack of jobs and low wages were the most common obstacles cited. Lack of legal residency affects mobility because Syrian refugees caught without appropriate documentation are immediately detained, effectively curtailing both searching for and commuting to work.
Figure 11.5
Sector of Work, Occupation, and Employment Status in Lebanon Compared with Syria

Panel A: Current and previous sector of work

Panel B: Current and previous occupation

Panel C: Current and previous employment status

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Responses to current sector of work, current occupation, and current employment status are based on the 464 employed survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in D3 and D4 of the survey. Previous sector of work, previous occupation, and previous employment status are based on the 388 respondents who indicated that they had previous work in Syria. A Pearson chi-square test reveals that there are statistically significant differences in the overall distribution of respondents between the types of sectors, occupations, and employment status worked in the host country and those worked in Syria.
Fear of Being Caught, Inability to Pay Work Permit Fees, and Difficulty Securing Sponsorship Were Commonly Held Perceptions Among Survey Respondents

Survey respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their employment experiences in the host country. Respondents held a number of perceptions that affected their employment experiences (Figure 11.6). The vast majority of respondents thought they could get into trouble with the government or the police if they worked, and most agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that Syrians do not search for work because of fear of losing assistance. Around 86 percent agreed that most Syrians cannot pay the work permit and residency fees, and concerns over having to pay fees retroactively was expressed in the focus groups. Much like the other host countries, survey respondents believe employers are willing to hire them, yet it is difficult to find employers to sponsor their work permit. This is consistent with the notion that employers may prefer to hire them informally in order to avoid having to abide by labor laws and regulations. Over half (56 percent) of respondents disagreed with the statement that there are organizations in Lebanon which support Syrians to find work.

In terms of perceptions toward the work environment and relations with employers and fellow host-country workers, in general, most survey respondents did not report being discriminated against by either their employer or coworkers (Figure 11.7). In fact, well over the majority (71 percent) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that their Lebanese coworkers treat them with respect. However, while just over 33 percent would feel comfortable complaining to the authorities if they were being mistreated in the workplace, close to 40 percent would not feel comfortable. There was significant concern about treatment of women in the workplace and fear of physical harm with 63 percent of survey respondents, indicating that Syrian women fear harassment in the workplace and 56 percent agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement that Syrians fear experiencing physical harm. More than half of survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that there is no reliable and safe transportation for women to be able to reach work.

### Table 11.1
Top Obstacles to Syrians Finding Work in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beirut</th>
<th>Bekaa</th>
<th>Mount Lebanon</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit (67%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (69%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit (61%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency (45%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency (63%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency (40%)</td>
<td>Low wages in available jobs (40%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency (54%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (41%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit (58%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No work experience (33%)</td>
<td>No work experience (36%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (37%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit (29%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (35%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Survey respondents were asked to choose the top three obstacles. Percentages were calculated based on dividing the number of survey respondents who chose that obstacle by the total number of respondents by province. Results are based on 30 survey respondents in Beirut, 216 in the Bekaa, 132 in Mount Lebanon, 150 in the North, and 72 in the South.
Figure 11.6
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (1)

Many Syrians are afraid they will get into trouble with the government or police if they work
Many Syrians do not look for work because they worry about losing assistance
There are organizations in Lebanon that support Syrians to find work
Many Syrians cannot pay the work permit and/or residency fees
It is difficult to find employers willing to sponsor a Syrian to obtain a work permit
Employers in Lebanon are willing to hire Syrians

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined, as were the responses disagree and strongly disagree. Results are based on a range of responses from 522 to 599 respondents.

Figure 11.7
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (2)

I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by a fellow worker
If I am mistreated at work, I would feel comfortable going to the public authorities
My Lebanese coworkers treat me with respect in the workplace
I can get training and education that I need to gain skills relevant for jobs
Syrian women worry about being harassed in the workplace in Lebanon
There is no reliable and safe transportation for women to be able to reach work
Syrians fear experiencing physical harm in the workplace in Lebanon

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined, as were the responses disagree and strongly disagree. Results are based on a range of responses from 522 to 599 respondents.
Firm Survey

Key Findings

• All 150 firms included in the sample had Syrian workers, and the average share of Syrian workers was 30 percent. This finding may be partly attributable to the fact the firm survey was targeted at locations close to where Syrians lived.
• About 40 percent of the firms also had non-Lebanese, non-Syrian workers, and the average share of these workers was 6 percent.
• Syrians were more likely to be doing unskilled and semiskilled jobs than the overall workforce but less likely to be doing unskilled work than other non-Lebanese workers.
• Among the firms that anticipated growth over the next 12 months, nearly all indicated that they would continue to hire some Syrians if there were no barriers to doing so.

• Advantages and disadvantages of hiring Syrians.
  – The most commonly perceived advantages to hiring Syrian workers were their willingness to perform the required tasks and to work longer hours for lower wages than Lebanese workers.
  – The most commonly cited disadvantage to hiring Syrian workers was the lack of a residency or work permit.

• Respondents indicated a number of policies to encourage overall employment growth.
  – These included lowering taxes, reducing red tape, easing labor regulations, decreasing the cost of labor (by subsidizing wages and benefits and decreasing social security fees), making it easier to get financing, and providing help connecting to customers and suppliers.
  – To encourage employment opportunities for Syrians in particular, respondents focused on policies to clarify their legal status and to make it easier and less costly to get work permits.

Lebanon Firm Sample

A total of 150 firms (100 small firms and 50 midsized and large firms) were surveyed in the following industries:

• Food and beverage manufacturing (16 firms)
• Other manufacturing (20 firms)
• Construction (28 firms)
• Wholesale and retail trade/repair of motor vehicles (63 firms)
• Hotels and restaurants (21 firms)
• Cleaning services (2 firms)

In keeping with the overall employment distribution across the targeted governorates, 22 surveys were conducted in Beirut, 17 in the Bekaa, 69 in Mount Lebanon, 27 in the North, and 15 in the South. All of the firms were privately owned, and the sample included a mix of established firms as well as firms that had been started within the past few years.
All Firms in the Sample Had Syrian Workers

All of the firms surveyed had Syrian workers at the time of the survey, and over 90 percent of respondents believed that other firms in their line of work also hired Syrians. This finding is consistent with the fact that Syrians account for somewhere between one-sixth and one-quarter of the total population of Lebanon and have historically played an important role in Lebanon’s workforce. In addition, the firm survey was targeted at locations close to where Syrians lived in order to align with the household survey and to provide information on employment opportunities that might be more readily available to Syrians. About 75 percent of respondents in the Syrian household survey believed that firms were willing to hire Syrians.

On average, Syrian workers made up about 30 percent of each firm’s workforce. The average share was higher among small firms than among midsized and large firms and was generally higher in service industries relative to manufacturing (Figure 11.8). About 40 percent of
firms also had non-Lebanese, non-Syrian workers. These workers accounted for a smaller share of the overall workforce (6 percent overall, or 15 percent when only including firms with at least one non-Lebanese, non-Syrian worker).

Since the “environment” sector is one of the few in which Syrians are legally permitted to work, we surveyed two large cleaning service firms. Between these two firms, the average share of workers who were Syrian was 15 percent of the total number of workers, while the average share of workers who were neither Lebanese nor Syrian was 52 percent of the total number of workers. In addition, we asked all firms how many of their Syrian workers were employed as cleaners, concierges, or porters. The average share employed as such was about 50 percent of the total number of Syrian workers.

Female Employment Is Low Among All Workers and Even Lower Among Syrians

About 70 percent of firms had at least one female worker of any nationality. The average share of female workers among the firms with female workers was 21 percent, while the average share across all 150 firms was only 15 percent. This may reflect the fact that the LFPR for women in Lebanon was 23 percent in 2017, compared with 71 percent for men (ILO, 2017a, 2017b). It may also reflect the sampling design, since mid-sized and large firms had higher shares of female employees than small firms. Consistent with the Syrian household survey, in which the percentage of male household members who were working or willing to work was three times as high as that of female household members who were working or willing to work, only 17 percent of firms had at least one female Syrian worker. The average share of female workers among Syrian workers was 43 percent among the firms that had female Syrian workers but was only 7 percent across all 150 firms.

Syrians Are Working in Semiskilled and Unskilled Jobs

The survey elicited information about the number of highly skilled, semiskilled and unskilled jobs, and about the number of Syrian workers in each job type. The average share of highly skilled jobs is 29 percent, but the average share of highly skilled jobs among Syrians is 7 percent (Figure 11.9). In contrast, Syrians are concentrated in unskilled jobs relative to the overall workforce. This mirrors evidence from focus groups which suggests that Syrians have historically filled unskilled jobs in the Lebanese labor market. It may also reflect the level of education among Syrians in Lebanon; the survey of Syrian households found that 69 percent of respondents had primary education or below, and only 5 percent had any postsecondary education.

However, Figure 11.9 also shows that non-Lebanese, non-Syrian workers are even less likely to be employed in jobs requiring any type of skills; the average share of unskilled jobs among this population is nearly 90 percent.

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3 An ANOVA test rejects that the share of female workers is equal across firm sizes at the 10 percent level of significance but fails to reject that the share of female workers is equal across governorates or industries.

4 A two-sided t-test rejects that the mean share of female workers is equal to the mean share of female Syrian workers across all 150 firms at the 1 percent level of significance. ANOVA tests fail to reject that the share of female Syrian workers is equal across governorates, firm sizes, or industries.

5 For highly skilled and unskilled jobs, two-sided t-tests reject that the share of Syrian workers is equal to the share of all workers at the 1 percent level. A t-test fails to reject that the shares are different for semiskilled jobs.
Survey Results: Lebanon

Firms Use Similar Channels to Hire Syrians and Other Workers

The top five hiring channels used to recruit Syrians and to recruit unskilled workers were the same: receiving direct applications, asking current employees for recommendations, going through intermediaries, placing job advertisements in newspapers, and placing job opening announcements on information boards (Appendix D). The importance of asking current employees for recommendations is consistent with findings from in-depth interviews with firms, as well as with the Syrian worker focus groups and the Syrian household survey, which indicated that networking with friends and family was the most important channel for finding work. The focus groups with Syrians also indicated that some intermediaries retained a large share of the workers’ pay.

Hiring channels for semiskilled and highly skilled workers were similar, but announcements were more commonly placed online rather than on information boards, and firms drew on a network of firm owners to identify highly skilled workers.

Skill Levels

In the survey, we described each skill level to the respondents as follows:

- **Highly skilled**: Workers in highly skilled jobs are professionals whose tasks require extensive theoretical, technical, or managerial knowledge (for example, engineer, accountant, manager)
- **Semiskilled**: Workers in semiskilled jobs are those whose tasks require some level of mechanical or technical knowledge or expertise in areas like administration or sales (for example, clerk, salesperson, machine operator, welder, skilled tradesman)
- **Unskilled**: Workers in unskilled jobs are those whose tasks involve no specialized knowledge (for example, laborer, dishwasher, cleaner, production worker who does not operate a machine)
Twenty-five percent of firms that recruited highly skilled workers over the previous 12 months indicated that they faced difficulties in doing so; only about 10 percent of firms that had tried to hire semiskilled or unskilled workers reported difficulties. The difficulties most commonly cited included lack of education, skills, or experience, not enough applicants, request for higher wages or benefits than the firm was willing to offer; and lack of willingness to perform the required tasks or work the required hours. Legal barriers to hiring semiskilled and unskilled workers were cited by a few firms.

The Most Commonly Identified Disadvantages to Hiring Syrians Were Problems with Permits or Authorities

The survey asked respondents about their perceptions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of hiring Syrian workers. The most commonly cited advantage—consistent across firms of different sizes, governorates, and industries—was Syrians’ willingness to perform the types of tasks required (Figure 11.10). Other perceived advantages had to do with Syrians’ willingness to accept undesirable working conditions—that is, their willingness to work longer hours and to accept lower wages and benefits than Lebanese workers—which focus groups suggested may be partly due to the historical role played by Syrians in the Lebanese labor market. However, a number of firms (in all governorates) indicated that it was easier to find applicants, and—again reflecting several comments from the in-depth interviews with firms—noted positive characteristics of the Syrian workers, notably their higher levels of productivity and motivation.

Echoing findings from the Syrian household survey in which two of the top obstacles to finding work were getting a work permit or legal residency, respondents in the firm survey most commonly cited the lack of a residency or work permit as a disadvantage to hiring Syrians. Evidence from the focus groups and in-depth interviews suggests that lack of a residency permit may be more critical than lack of a work permit, which is consistent with the fact that
many Lebanese also work informally. Other difficulties typically centered around the hiring/work permit process, problems with authorities, or resistance from other workers or the public.

The survey also asked respondents about specific difficulties they perceived in obtaining work permits to hire Syrians. About 50 percent of small firms and 65 percent of mid-sized and large firms did not perceive any difficulties, which is consistent with the findings from in-depth interviews. Among those that did perceive difficulties, the most commonly cited difficulties were that Syrians might not have a residency permit, that the firm would serve as a guarantor for the worker, and that there would be challenges with the permit process, cost, or length of validity.

The survey also sought to elicit methods that were commonly used to avoid legal restrictions on hiring Syrians—particularly relevant since every firm reported employing Syrian workers, despite the restrictions on Syrians working in sectors other than agriculture, construction, and environment. In order to mitigate the concern that respondents might be unwilling to discuss their own firm’s actions, we asked respondents what methods they believed other firms in their line of work used to avoid barriers to hiring Syrians. Eighty percent of respondents believed that others hired Syrians without work permits, and nearly 40 percent believed that others hired Syrians who had received work permits through previous employers. Methods that involved misreporting—namely, reporting that a worker was in a particular occupation but having them work in another occupation and reporting Syrians as local workers—were mentioned in in-depth interviews but were perceived to be less common than simply hiring workers without permits in the survey.

**Firms Anticipating Employment Growth Indicated that They Would Hire Syrians If There Were No Barriers to Doing So**

The survey asked about plans for future growth and perceptions about policies that could encourage such growth. While some firms anticipated increases in employment and others anticipated decreases, in all industries, manufacturing firms (especially food and beverage manufacturing firms) were particularly likely to anticipate an increase in employment among highly skilled workers, hotels and restaurants to anticipate an increase among semi-skilled workers, and construction firms to anticipate a decrease in all types of employment (Figure 11.11).

Very few of the firms that anticipated increases in employment indicated that they would find it difficult to fill the new positions. Nearly all of the firms that anticipated an increase in employment indicated that Syrians would likely account for up to 25 percent of their hiring if there were no barriers.

**The Most Common Suggestions to Encourage Syrian Employment Revolved Around Legal Status and Recognition**

Respondents indicated a number of policies the government could use to promote overall employment opportunities. The most commonly cited policies included lowering taxes, reducing red tape, easing labor regulations (by reducing hiring paperwork, making it easier to fire workers, and making employment laws clearer), decreasing the cost of labor (by subsidizing wages and benefits and decreasing social security fees), making it easier to get financing, and providing help connecting to customers (the top five are shown in Figure 11.12).

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6 Pearson chi-square tests reject that the share of firms indicating no difficulties is equal across firm sizes at the 10 percent level but fail to reject that it is equal across governorates or industries.
Figure 11.11
Anticipated Changes in Employment

Panel A: Increase by industry

Panel B: Decrease by industry

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on survey data. Figure shows the percent of firms that anticipated an increase or decrease in the number of highly skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled employees. The number of firms included 16 in food and beverage manufacturing, 19 in other manufacturing, 28 in construction, 63 in wholesale and retail trade, and 21 in hotels and restaurants. Cleaning services are not included because there are only two cleaning services firms in the sample. A Pearson chi-square test rejects that the share of firms anticipating an increase in highly skilled and semiskilled employment is equal across industries at the 5 percent level and that the share of firms anticipating a decrease in highly skilled employment is equal across industries at the 1 percent level. Other differences across industries are not significant at the 10 percent level.

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Figure 11.12
Most Commonly Identified Policies to Increase Employment Opportunities

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on responses of 150 firms. Multiple responses could be provided, unless the respondent indicated “none.” Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of firms that selected the given response by the total number of firms responding.

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With respect to policies that could increase employment opportunities for Syrians, the most commonly cited policies dealt with their legal recognition—namely, providing them with identification cards, making their legal status clearer, making it easier and less costly to get work permits, allowing work permits to be transferable across employers, allowing Syrians to work anywhere in the country, and facilitating recognition of Syrian credentials. Providing wage subsidies for Syrians in particular was also frequently suggested. A number of firms did also suggest job matching. The policies to facilitate legal recognition and to work anywhere in the country would address the concern expressed in the Syrian focus groups that travel to other regions of the country was challenging since those without residence permits could be incarcerated.

Summary
Among households included in the survey, most Syrian men were working—and all of the firms in the sample had at least one Syrian worker at the time of the survey, with Syrians making up (on average) 30 percent of the workforce among firms in the sample. The percentage of female survey household members working or willing to work was substantially lower than the percentage of male survey household members working or willing to work. This finding is consistent with the low share of women among Syrian workers observed in the firm survey. The surveys suggested that Syrians were working in a mix of unskilled and semiskilled jobs and in a variety of industries and were particularly concentrated in much the same types of jobs that they have traditionally worked in Lebanon—manual labor in construction, agriculture, and services.

About 10–15 percent of firms in the sample—particularly in manufacturing, as well as hotels and restaurants—anticipated employment growth over the next 12 months, and nearly all of these firms indicated that they would continue to hire some Syrian workers if there were no barriers to doing so. However, even though the respondents in both surveys noted that hiring Syrians without work permits is common, they also identified difficulties in getting a work permit or legal residency as the most important obstacle to Syrian employment. In fact, the most common policies noted by firms that would increase employment among Syrians involved facilitating their legal recognition and making it easier and less costly to get work permits.

Firms in the sample were most likely to report difficulties in hiring highly skilled workers. For the Syrian population in Lebanon as a whole, the relatively low level of education indicates that Syrians may require substantial training to be able to work in more highly skilled jobs.

The surveys also confirmed that the relatively low growth rate of the Lebanese economy in recent years plays a role in employment challenges for all workers. Believing there were not enough jobs available was a common barrier to finding work that was cited in the household survey. Firms in the sample most commonly identified lowering the cost of doing business, reducing red tape, and making it easier to get financing as the top policies that could improve employment opportunities for all.
Before we turn to providing recommendations based on data we collected as part of our study, we briefly discuss the lessons learned from Europe on livelihood provision for Syrian refugees and export-driven growth experience. An assessment of what has worked or not worked in other contexts can serve to strengthen or temper the recommendations we make.

Lessons Learned from Europe

A number of the challenges that we identified for Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey are echoed among refugees in Europe. Given some of these common challenges, we examine the lessons Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon can learn from the European experience. These lessons cannot simply be applied directly without taking the local context into account; for example, the unemployment rate in Germany is very low, which creates a different labor market dynamic than exists in countries with higher unemployment rates. Nonetheless, successful European practices could help guide policy development in the Middle East.

Europe offers a few lessons with respect to job training and placement. To begin with, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommends assessing and documenting the skills and qualifications that refugees already have (OECD, 2017, p. 37; see also OECD, 2016). For example, Germany has programs to assess informal qualifications and vocational skills (OECD, 2017, p. 53). In addition, there may be a benefit to providing a standardized résumé template that refugees can use. Norway, for example, has created a standardized “Qualification Passport” for refugees, documenting their “highest completed qualification, language proficiency and work experience” (OECD, 2017, p. 53).

As in Turkey, language is a major barrier to refugee employment in many OECD countries (Deloitte and Refugee Studies Centre [RSC] at the University of Oxford, 2017, pp. 4, 21; European Commission and OECD, 2016, p. 22). In Germany, according to a survey conducted by the OECD, the Association of German Chambers of Commerce, and the German Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (the OECD-DIHK-BMAS survey), about half of employers reported that good German language skills were necessary for low-skilled jobs, and more than 90 percent stated that good German language skills were necessary for medium-skilled jobs (OECD, 2017, pp. 12, 33). Surveyed employers also cited difficulties, including refugees’ and asylum seekers’ lack of job skills, differing work habits, and uncertain legal situation and thus unclear length of stay in Germany (OECD, 2017, p. 12). According to a Deloitte and University of Oxford RSC survey conducted in Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, refugees’ employment prospects are also limited by disincentives to work (Deloitte
and RSC at the University of Oxford, 2017, pp. 23–24). Further barriers include transportation problems, discrimination, lack of recognition of qualifications, and market access issues (OECD, 2017, p. 25). Germany offers intensive German language courses. Online courses are not a perfect substitute for in-person courses but can help to sustain language skills after taking a language course and can be used to target professionals who need specific types of language training (OECD, 2017, p. 41). For example, in Sweden, the most popular language of instruction on the online language learning app Duolingo is Swedish, and the app is used mainly by refugees in Sweden.

The German experience suggests that training be differentiated based on refugees’ existing skills and should also be of sufficient length to provide an impact (OECD, 2017, p. 54). Providing certification at the end of a course can help to increase completion rates (OECD, 2017, p. 41). In general, OECD evidence suggests that on-the-job training, including on-the-job vocational language training, is effective; also effective is getting refugees into jobs through internships or trainee positions or by subsidizing their employment (OECD, 2017, p. 41; Joyce, 2018). Additionally, training may require more than just language and skills assistance, as sharing general labor market information (for example, the importance of apprenticeships in Germany) and work habit norms is also important (OECD, 2017, p. 13). In fact, Germany’s 2016 integration law requires refugees who wish to stay permanently to take an integration course (Rietig and Müller, 2016).

Another set of lessons learned deals with policies toward labor market access and the geographic dispersal of refugees. In 2015, Germany made one government agency in charge of permission to stay in the country, as well as labor market access, thus streamlining the process for labor market integration (Rietig and Müller, 2016). The OECD recommends “[factoring] employment prospects into dispersal policies” (OECD, 2017, p. 37; see also OECD, 2016) and evidence from Sweden suggests that doing so can improve employment outcomes (OECD, 2017, p. 47). After refugees have been settled, the OECD also recommends allowing “job-related secondary moves” (OECD, 2017, p. 67). One of the key concerns with allowing such moves is that certain urban areas may be overwhelmed by a large influx of refugees who move there in search of jobs. Germany has sought a balance, allowing some mobility while attempting to avoid “overburdening of certain regions and cities” (Okyay, 2017, p. 7). In 2016, it “introduced the so-called 3 + 2 rule, granting safety from deportation to any asylum seeker who undergoes vocational training (usually for three years) and then works as a skilled professional after graduation (for at least two years)” (Rietig and Müller, 2016). “Recognized refugees” are assigned to German states; under the 2016 law, they cannot leave their assigned states within the first three years unless they find a job elsewhere (Okyay, 2017, p. 7). Moreover, the OECD recommends ensuring that refugees in rural areas have access to public transport (OECD, 2017, p. 47). Doing so can increase access to local jobs, thus potentially decreasing the flow of refugees out of rural areas.

Export-Driven Growth Experience

In the three countries we examined, there are calls to increase exports with the aim of spurring overall growth and increasing job opportunities for all. How has Europe fared on this front? In general, the success of policies to encourage export-driven growth has mixed results. While some countries have experienced success using policies such as export subsidies, tax prefer-
Lessons from Other Countries

ences for exports, and export processing zones, others have not, and there is no consensus on whether such policies are cost-effective (Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare, 2010; Belloc and Di Maio, 2011). However, a number of conditions have been identified as important for overall economic growth; in many cases, such conditions can also serve to encourage exports (Nataraj et al., 2012). These include:

- Excellent physical infrastructure, including roads, electricity, ports, and telecommunications: Infrastructure improvements are sometimes focused in special zones such as export processing zones, particularly when resources are limited. While infrastructure is generally provided by the government, public-private partnerships can make construction and maintenance more efficient.
- Simple, easy-to-follow regulations for businesses: These include policies such as “one-stop shops” for permits that make it easy for entrepreneurs to open new businesses, as well as policies that make it simple for firms to hire employees formally.
- Access to a well-educated workforce: In the long term, this requires improving the quality of the overall education system. In the shorter term, it may be possible to improve workforce skills to meet specific firm demands.
- Access to finance: New and growing firms often find it difficult to obtain access to both long- and short-term financing. Exporters may also benefit from access to short-term trade finance.

As discussed earlier, there is a need to improve the overall economic situation (rather than focus only on exports), especially in Jordan and Lebanon, and the above steps are likely to yield dividends for them.

This brief assessment influences recommendations we make on credentialing, language training, addressing the geographic mismatch between refugees and jobs, and policies to aid overall growth.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

A Synthesis Across the Three Countries

To set the stage for providing recommendations for the host-country governments, multilateral institutions, and donor countries, we first present a synthesis of the main themes from the literature review, stakeholder interviews, focus groups, in-depth firm interviews, household survey, and firm survey for each country based on our detailed discussions in the previous chapters. We then compare our findings across the three countries.

Turkey

- The Syrian refugees in Turkey were finding ways to get by, largely by working informally and well below Turkey’s minimum wage. They appeared to be concentrated in agriculture, construction, textiles, and low-end services.
- There were geographical mismatches between where the Syrians were concentrated and where job growth in Turkey was. Government policy prohibited Syrians from leaving their province of registration, yet despite the prohibitions, Syrians had flocked to Istanbul, straining the city’s housing and public services.
- Syrians had been active entrepreneurs in Turkey, setting up over 10,000 registered businesses, yet barriers remained to Syrian business growth.
- The government had been pragmatic in permitting informal employment by not enforcing work requirements strictly. However, the public discourse changed during 2018, and a discussion of the return of refugees to Syria started, in addition to the government’s policy of “harmonization.”
- Few Syrians were employed with work permits, as both employers and Syrians faced disincentives to enter into formal work arrangements.
- While many Turkish workers resented the presence of the Syrians in the labor force, social cohesion largely remained stable, with many Turks expressing compassion for the circumstances of the Syrians.
- Syrians faced difficulty having their education and professional certifications recognized in Turkey.
- Vocational training programs had not been well coordinated with job placement, market needs, or Syrians’ skills, although several efforts were under way to change this situation. Formal job placement would require coordination with a government employment agency and chambers of industry or commerce.
- The lack of Turkish-language skills was one of the most prominent barriers to refugee employment.
Jordan

- Structural problems were created in the Jordanian economy by the security situation and the closing of borders to trade. The ensuing economic slowdown was exacerbated by the arrival of refugees. It would therefore be crucial to pay attention to policies that could improve the overall economy and have the potential to create jobs for Jordanians and refugees alike.

- While there were misgivings about refugees competing for jobs, there was also an appreciation among Jordanians of the need to help those in crisis. In order to promote social cohesion, it would be important for programs to help Jordanian workers and not just the Syrian refugees.

- Syrian refugees were permitted to work in limited sectors and occupations and were shut out from setting up businesses where they would have a comparative advantage, such as food preparation. Overall there was a high degree of informal employment among the Syrians to circumvent the regulations that exist on paper.

- Syrians were viewed as hardworking which was seen as an opportunity by firms but also as a threat by Jordanian workers. However, interviewees noted that the Syrians would not take certain types of jobs, and the availability of assistance was attributed as a disincentive.

- It appeared that the ROO agreement that was signed as part of the Jordan Compact faced challenges to meet the high expectations placed on it. Very few firms qualified to participate in the program, primarily because it required appropriately qualified Syrian workers, who could not be found.

Lebanon

- As with Jordan, structural problems were created in the Lebanese economy by the security situation and the closing of borders to trade. The ensuing economic slowdown was exacerbated by the arrival of refugees. It would therefore be crucial to pay attention to policies that could improve the overall economy and have the potential to create jobs for Lebanese and refugees alike.

- There were deep suspicions about Syrian workers, and few pathways to formal employment. Most expected refugees to return to Syria when it became safe for them to do so. As a result, most refugee employment in Lebanon was informal.

- Public works and infrastructure projects (and in general, structural reforms to improve the economy) were seen as way to create jobs for both Lebanese and Syrians. Lebanese policymakers felt that the country was providing a global public good by hosting the highest per-capita level of Syrian refugees and that this should form the basis for an appeal for international financing of the above projects by donor countries. But the donor countries insisted on governance and fiscal reforms before such funds could be released.

- There was a large discrepancy between perceptions and the actual realities of the refugee situation. The media, in particular, was viewed as unreliable, creating a need for disseminating objective information.
A Comparison Across Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon

Employment and Opportunities for Jobs
Many Syrians were working and finding ways to get by. In our sample of Syrian households, most men were working (see Figure 13.1). While the percentage of women working in the sample was significantly lower, this difference was consistent with the fact that the labor force participation rate for women in Syria prior to the war was low (13.27 percent [ILO, 2017a]). At the same time, many who wanted to work were not working, especially in Jordan, and particularly among women.

As shown in Figure 13.2, many firms in our survey had either previously or currently recruited Syrians. The different proportions of firms in each country that had recruited Syrians were not inconsistent with the relative proportion of Syrians in comparison with host-country nationals. This was particularly the case in Lebanon, where all of the firms in our sample had hired Syrians, given the high proportion of Syrians to Lebanese there, and Lebanon’s history of employing Syrian workers even before the war.

While Syrians were performing a wide spectrum of jobs (high to low skilled), most Syrian work was either unskilled or semiskilled, per Figure 13.3, Jordan was an interesting standout: the concentration of Syrians in semiskilled jobs was higher than Syrians in semiskilled jobs in Turkey and Lebanon, and also higher than the concentration of Jordanians in semiskilled jobs. This was consistent with the higher education levels of Syrians in Jordan than in Turkey and Lebanon, as seen in Figure 13.5.

Many in our focus groups and surveys also reported not working in their fields of experience, working informally, and working for lower wages than host-country workers, per Figure 13.4. Not being able to use former professional and occupational skills was a strong theme.
in our focus groups. In our surveys, too, many were not working in the same sector, occupation, or employment status as in Syria.

Our household survey (see Figure 13.5) and secondary data indicated that Syrians in these three countries had relatively low educational attainment. In Turkey and Lebanon, over half of respondents had a primary education or less. Education levels of Syrians were higher in Jordan, as two-thirds of respondents in Jordan had an intermediate or secondary education. Yet Turkey had the highest proportion of Syrians with postsecondary education (14 percent). These rates
Figure 13.4
Sector of Work, Occupation, and Employment Status in Host Country Compared with Syria

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. Survey respondents are considered currently working in the same sector, occupation, and employment status if their work in the host country is similar in terms of sector, occupation, and employment status as in Syria. The numerator is the number of survey respondents working in the same sector/occupation/employment status in the host country as they did in Syria. The denominator includes survey respondents who are working in the same sector/occupation/employment status in the host country, survey respondents who work in different sector/occupation/employment status in the host country, and those who worked in Syria but do not work currently in the host country. Survey respondents who did not work in Syria were not included in the calculation. Survey respondents who worked in an “other” or “other services” field in Syria were not included in the calculation. Results are based on 307 survey respondents for sector, 347 survey respondents for occupation, and 401 survey respondents for employment status in Turkey; 312 survey respondents for sector, 339 survey respondents for occupation, and 339 survey respondents for employment status in Jordan; and 360 survey respondents for sector, 386 survey respondents for occupation, and 387 survey respondents for employment status in Lebanon.

Figure 13.5
Educational Attainment of Respondents

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. Results are based on 602 survey respondents in Turkey, 600 survey respondents in Jordan, and 600 survey respondents in Lebanon.
are lower than the educational attainment rates in Syria before the war. This may be because larger percentages of more educated Syrians moved on to Europe.

There were multiple barriers to Syrians getting work, according to our focus groups and surveys (see Table 13.1). Macroeconomic factors were important across all three countries, which were in general experiencing economic downturns, low growth, and low availability of jobs, including for host-country workers. Quality of work conditions were cited as barriers to jobs as well, particularly in terms of wages. Language barriers were important in Turkey. Difficulty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13.1</th>
<th>Top Obstacles to Syrians Finding Work in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey survey</strong></td>
<td><strong>Jordan survey</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low wages in available jobs 48%</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not speaking Turkish-language or dialect, communication issues 38%</td>
<td>Low wages in available jobs 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough jobs available 28%</td>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit 32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. Survey respondents were asked to choose the top three obstacles. Percentages were calculated based on dividing the number of survey respondents who chose that obstacle by the total number of respondents by country. Results are based on 602 survey respondents in Turkey, 600 survey respondents in Jordan, and 600 survey respondents in Lebanon.

The Employment Situation of Syrian Women

The circumstances of displacement have had a large impact on the employment of Syrian women. Our focus groups and surveys found that more Syrian women were working in the three host countries than in Syria before the war, although these numbers were still low. The share of female household members aged 18 and above who were working or willing to work was 25 percent in our Turkey sample, 54 percent in our Jordan sample, and 30 percent in our Lebanon sample. Yet, many could not find jobs (as in Figure 13.1). The share of survey respondents who were not working but were willing to work was 55 percent in our Turkey sample, 84 percent in our Jordan sample, and 58 percent in our Lebanon sample.

We also found low rates of female employment among firms in our surveys.

Working was also viewed in our focus groups as newly empowering to the women in some cases and as being more socially accepted, necessary, and respectable by both men and women alike. Comments about employment were similar among both men and women about how to find a job, types of jobs available, working conditions, and aspirations.

Syrian women in our focus groups and surveys (see Figure 13.6) described several challenges particular to women: being paid less than Syrian men, lack of safe transportation to the workplace, childcare and household responsibilities serving as barriers to work or causing exhaustion when work outside the home could be found, and sexual harassment in some cases. These concerns were more pronounced in Lebanon than in the other countries, in both our focus groups and surveys. Women often expressed desire for jobs that would enable them to work from home.
with getting a work permit or maintaining a residency permit was viewed as an obstacle to employment by Syrians and firms in all three countries, although in many cases, governments turned a blind eye to Syrians working without a work permit.

Syrians in Turkey have been active entrepreneurs, setting up over 10,000 businesses. Yet Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan, facing many impediments, have set up far fewer businesses.

**Policies and Programs**

There was little formal programmatic effort related to job matching for Syrians and employers, based on our context review and interviews. In our surveys in all three countries, the main way of finding work was through personal networks of family, friends, or acquaintances; few in our surveys reported awareness of job matching services (see Figure 13.7), although awareness of job-matching assistance was greater in Jordan (which also had the highest percentage of survey respondents who were not working but were willing to work, among those in our sample).

In all three countries, difficulty obtaining work permits or residency permits presented a major barrier to employment from the perspectives of Syrians and some firms, as discussed above. These barriers remained, despite government intentions in taking steps to provide a legal framework for Syrians working, as well as some additional steps to address known barriers. Reasons work permit legal frameworks were not functioning as intended included a lack of clarity about them among firms; costs; and bureaucracy in obtaining them. Many Syrians in our survey experienced difficulties obtaining employment with a work permit, including costs and being unable to find an employer willing to sponsor a Syrian (see Figure 13.8).

High rates of informal work made many Syrians in our focus groups and surveys feel that they had little recourse in cases of mistreatment on the job (see Figure 13.9). Syrians in all three countries reported a fear of getting in trouble with the law if they were caught working without a permit; half of respondents in Turkey and Lebanon expressed concern about potential

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**Figure 13.6**

**Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Turkey Survey</th>
<th>Jordan Survey</th>
<th>Lebanon Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian women worry about being harassed in the workplace</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no reliable and safe transportation for women to be able to reach work</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. Agreeing and strongly agreeing responses were combined. Results are based on 583 and 572 respondents in Turkey; 593 and 591 responses in Jordan; and 583 and 578 survey respondents in Lebanon.

RAND RR2653-13.6
physical harm at work, and only a quarter to half said that they would feel comfortable going to public authorities if mistreated.

The geography of employment was also a major policy issue. Many Syrians were not living where there was the most employment demand within each country. In Turkey, this was because of regulations that required that Syrians live and work in their province of registration; large numbers of Syrians were registered in Turkey’s southeastern provinces near Syria’s border and where unemployment was highest among both Turks and Syrians. In Jordan, special economic zones have had trouble recruiting Syrians because it would require Syrians to relocate. In Lebanon, the largest numbers of Syrians lived in the Bekaa, where the percentage of survey household members working or willing to work was lowest in our survey. By contrast, EU countries have incentivized refugees to live in particular regions with labor market demand.
Figure 13.9
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage Agreeing or Strongly Agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If I am mistreated at work, I would feel comfortable going to the public authorities</td>
<td>Turkey: 49%, Jordan: 25%, Lebanon: 36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrians fear experiencing physical harm in the workplace in Turkey</td>
<td>Turkey: 52%, Jordan: 21%, Lebanon: 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many Syrians are afraid they will get into trouble with the government or police if they work</td>
<td>Turkey: 39%, Jordan: 80%, Lebanon: 81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined. Results are based on 581, 590, and 587 respondents in Turkey; 577, 590, and 596 responses in Jordan; and 551, 595, and 577 survey respondents in Lebanon.

Figure 13.10
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents Agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Many Syrians do not look for work because they worry about losing assistance</td>
<td>Turkey: 33%, Jordan: 43%, Lebanon: 58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined. Results are based on 591 respondents in Turkey; 594 responses in Jordan; and 560 survey respondents in Lebanon.

To a lesser extent, some Syrians worried about losing humanitarian benefits that were often tied to their location (see Figure 13.10). An exploration of how assistance policies incentivized or disincentivized work would therefore be warranted.

In all three countries, vocational training was not designed with a cognizance of labor market demands. A small proportion of Syrians had received such training, although many Syrians reported that they could get the training that they needed, per Figure 13.11. Both Syrians and firms wanted need-specific training, such as Turkish-language training in Turkey, psychological support in Jordan, and trade-specific training in all three countries. Only 11 percent of household survey respondents in Turkey reported having received language
training, even though language training was reported as a major need by both Syrians and employers.

**Perspectives on Employment Growth**

The influx of Syrians into the three host countries has coincided with a time of slowing growth caused by regional economic downturns, regional political instability, and trade routes being cut off because of warfare. Unemployment was high in all three countries, among host-country workers and Syrians alike.

Views on prospects for additional hiring were mixed. In Turkey, few firms in our survey anticipated additional employment growth in the next year. Manufacturing firms surveyed in both Jordan and Lebanon anticipated additional employment growth (with particularly strong demand for unskilled workers in Jordan and skilled workers in Lebanon); services firms included in the surveys were less likely to anticipate growth. Firms indicated policies that could encourage overall employment growth (with priorities varying according to the country): decreasing the cost of labor, lowering taxes, making it easier to get financing, easing processes to set up a business, helping with training and job matching for workers, clarifying employment regulations, and helping to connect to customers and suppliers (the top five in each country are shown in Figure 13.12). Jordan and Lebanon were also in need of investment in strained and aging public infrastructures, which were further burdened by the rapid population increase from the Syrians. Some of these findings may not be surprising, but these points are important to call out since policies to increase the hiring of both host-community workers and Syrians must take place within the con-
Figure 13.12
Most Commonly Identified Policies to Increase Employment Opportunities for All Workers

Panel A: Turkey survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>% of Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decrease social security fees</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower taxes</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide wage subsidies</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make it easier to get financing/loans</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make it easier to set up a new business</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Jordan survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>% of Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower taxes</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide wage subsidies</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve infrastructure</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make it easier to set up a new business</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide benefit subsidies</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: Lebanon survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>% of Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower taxes</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide benefit subsidies</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce bureaucracy/paperwork in general</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce paperwork for hiring workers</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make it easier to get financing/loans</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on responses of all firms (157 in Turkey, 150 in Jordan, 150 in Lebanon). Multiple responses could be provided, unless the respondent indicated “none.” Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of firms that selected the given response by the total number of firms responding.

The text of robust economic growth. Two of the most commonly identified policies to increase employment opportunities for all—lower taxes and easier access to financing and loans—echoed findings from the World Bank Enterprise surveys in all three countries, in which firms consistently reported tax rates and access to finance among the five biggest obstacles that they faced.

Figure 13.13 shows the policies that firms in our survey suggested to increase hiring of Syrians. In Turkey, firms were pessimistic about hiring in general. Half thought nothing would increase job opportunities for Syrians. The remainder emphasized the importance of language and other training. While there were concerns about legal status, these were secondary to concerns about finding qualified applicants. Firms in Turkey did not include hiring Syrians in their planning. Yet while most employers in Turkey in our survey reported no advantages to hiring Syrians in comparison with Turks, 15 percent of them had Syrian workers at the time of
the survey, and another 15 percent had previously tried to recruit Syrian workers (either successfully or unsuccessfully). Among the few firms in the Turkey survey that anticipated increasing their employment, only one indicated that they would hire Syrians even if there were no barriers to doing so.

In contrast, a number of firms in both Jordan and Lebanon anticipated that up to 25 percent of new hires would be Syrians if there were no barriers to hiring. In Jordan and Lebanon, firms wanted clarification of Syrians’ legal status (including increasing the sectors they could work in) and help with work permits in order to hire more Syrians. In the firm surveys, employers reported that the main advantages to hiring Syrians were that they are willing to work for less and for longer hours. In the in-depth interviews, Syrians were viewed as hard workers and skilled craftsmen.
Sectors with Hiring Demand

The firm and household survey data indicated sectors and occupations where there was likely to be demand among firms and which match the capabilities of the Syrians. In general, firms that had difficulty hiring reported gaps in finding highly skilled and semiskilled workers. And Syrians were mainly finding work in semiskilled and low-skilled positions. Given these facts, semiskilled work might offer the greatest job growth prospect for Syrians.

Nearly 60 percent of the firms that had recruited highly skilled workers in Turkey reported difficulties in doing so, as did nearly 40 percent of the firms that had recruited semiskilled workers and about 15 percent of the firms that had recruited unskilled workers. In Jordan, about 10 percent of the firms that had recruited semiskilled workers reported difficulties in doing so; fewer than 5 percent that had recruited highly skilled or unskilled workers reported difficulties. In Lebanon, 25 percent of the firms that had recruited highly skilled workers reported difficulties doing so, compared with about 10 percent of those that had recruited semiskilled or unskilled workers.

Manufacturing firms were more likely to report anticipated employment growth than services firms. Fewer than 10 percent of firms in any sector in the Turkey survey anticipated employment growth in the near future. However, in Jordan, about 20–25 percent of manufacturing firms in the food and beverage, textile/garment/apparel, and chemical/pharmaceutical industries anticipated increasing the number of semiskilled positions, and 30–35 percent anticipated increasing the number of unskilled positions. In Lebanon, about 30 percent of firms in food and beverage manufacturing and 15–20 percent of firms in other manufacturing industries anticipated increasing the number of highly skilled and semiskilled positions. About 25 percent of firms in the hotels and restaurants industry also anticipated increasing the number of semiskilled positions in particular.

The firm surveys in all three countries also showed that Syrians were being hired to fill semiskilled and unskilled positions (recall Figure 13.3). The higher share of Syrians in semiskilled jobs in Jordan is consistent with the higher levels of education found among Syrians in the household survey in Jordan, relative to Turkey and Lebanon.

Given firms’ difficulties in filling skilled positions, the fact that Syrians are currently employed in unskilled and semiskilled jobs, and the Syrians’ level of education, one strategy that is applicable across all three countries is to develop a program to train workers for semiskilled positions with manufacturing firms in specific zones or regions.

In Turkey, one effective approach would be to train and match Syrians and Turks with semiskilled positions in manufacturing firms in organized industrial zones located in cities outside of Istanbul—such as Adana, Bursa, and Izmir—which are most likely to face difficulties in finding workers with the requisite skills. Such matching is more likely to be effective if done in partnership with a local chamber of industry, organized industrial zone manager, or business association, so that the specific, current needs of local firms can be identified and training provided to Turks and Syrians to meet those needs. In addition, coordinating with the Turkish government regarding geographic restrictions on travel and work could broaden the pool of Syrians who could benefit from such a program and alleviate stress on the provinces that have the highest numbers of Syrians.
In Jordan, a promising approach would be to collaborate with large manufacturing firms—particularly those in Jordan’s export-driven industries such as textiles/garments/apparel and chemicals/pharmaceuticals—to develop industry- and occupation-specific (and perhaps even firm-specific) training curricula for both Jordanians and Syrians, culminating in on-the-job training.

In Lebanon, a program conducted collaboratively with the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, targeted at identifying the specific needs of local firms in the manufacturing and hospitality industries, and training and matching Lebanese and Syrians with semiskilled jobs in those firms, could be valuable.

**Perspectives from Exporting Firms**

In all three countries, a number of firms included in the surveys were involved in exporting goods or services to other countries. For these firms, the survey elicited information about their export markets and their experiences over the previous five years. Here, we highlight some findings based on their responses. We caution that these findings are based on a small sample of firms and should therefore be considered suggestive.

Ten of the firms in Turkey, 15 in Jordan, and 19 in Lebanon were exporters. Across exporters in all three countries, export destinations varied, including the Middle East, Africa, Asia, Europe, and (in Jordan and Lebanon) North America. Although general trade patterns suggest that the war in Syria has reduced trading in the region, the exporters in our surveys did not consistently report declines in exports, and the reported changes in exports did not appear to exhibit a clear pattern with respect to export destination.

There is some evidence that exporters in Jordan and Turkey were more likely to have recruited Syrians than nonexporters. This is likely related to the fact that the exporting firms were more likely to be midsized or large, and to be in manufacturing, than the overall firms in the sample. As shown in Figures 5.8 and 8.8, manufacturing firms were more likely to have recruited Syrians in Turkey, and midsized and large firms in Jordan were more likely to have recruited Syrians than small firms. (In Lebanon, all of the firms, both exporters and nonexporters, had Syrian workers at the time of the survey.)

Finally, we note that firms in Turkey were more likely to identify export-related policies among the top three policies the government could use to increase employment opportunities: 29 out of 157 firms (including exporters as well as nonexporters) included incentivizing exporters or devaluing the currency among the top three. In contrast, only 11 out of 150 firms in Jordan and 3 out of 150 firms in Lebanon included incentivizing exporters or devaluing the currency among the top three policies.

**Social Cohesion**

All three countries have made considerable efforts and sacrifices to accommodate the Syrian refugees. In none of the three countries has there been significant social unrest because of the presence of such a large number of new people. While there was widespread resentment of the presence of the Syrians in the labor market and in public services, there was also compassion and genuine concern for their plight, particularly expressed by host-country workers in our
focus groups. While Syrians reported relationships on the job with host-country workers that were sometimes positive and sometimes negative, the majority of Syrians reported that they were treated with respect and did not face regular discrimination (see Figure 13.14).

At the same time, there were tensions among communities. This was particularly the case in Lebanon, which has a delicate sectarian balance, the highest proportion of Syrian refugees in comparison with host nationals, and a history of both former occupation by Syria and accommodation of Palestinian refugees for close to 70 years. Stability in these countries cannot be taken for granted; expanding employment of both refugees and host nationals and economic stability should be a high priority of all concerned stakeholders.

Opportunities and Gaps

Many Syrians in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan were getting by, but most were working in low-wage, low-skill, and informal jobs. There were a number of challenges to improving the quality and quantity of Syrian refugee employment in these countries: low educational attainment, slowing economic growth and high unemployment among host-country citizens, misaligned incentives in work permit legal frameworks, geographic mismatches between where the Syrians were and where the jobs were, limitations on the sectors in which Syrians could work, vocational training programs that did not meet the needs of the labor market, challenges to firm growth and the overall investment climates (and in Jordan’s case, disappointing results from the ROO agreement in the Jordan Compact), misperceptions about refugees, and low government capacity in some circumstances.

At the same time, there were a number of positive factors to build upon, and causes for hope. These included relative overall social stability and generosity by host communities; the fact that most Syrians felt respected at work and not regularly discriminated against; anticipated

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**Figure 13.14**
Perceptions Toward Statements Regarding Employment in Host Country (7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Turkey survey</th>
<th>Jordan survey</th>
<th>Lebanon survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by a fellow worker</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by an employer</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My coworkers treat me with respect in the workplace</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. Agree and strongly agree responses were combined. Results are based on 579, 577, and 566 respondents in Turkey; 465, 466, and 475 responses in Jordan; and 554, 562, and 522 survey respondents in Lebanon.
growth by a number of firms in Jordan and Lebanon (particularly in manufacturing), as well as plans to continue to hire Syrians; and the large size and continued growth of Turkey’s economy that had been able to absorb so many new people.

We offer a number of specific, actionable recommendations that provide opportunities to improve current employment circumstances and forge mutually beneficial outcomes in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Recommendations

The findings from our interviews, focus groups, and surveys, and their synthesis presented in the previous chapter, as well as the lessons learned from other countries, motivate a detailed set of recommendations that we provide for Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Some of these recommendations are specific and aimed at particular organizations, while others are broader, such as recommendations intended to aid the entire economy. Our unique, multimethods study aimed at finding mutually beneficial solutions has uncovered many interconnected facets of the complex refugee situation, which allows us to make nuanced recommendations. However, we do not claim that all our recommendations are brand new; some, such as the need for investment, have been made by other studies. But taken together, the recommendations we make are necessary to address the challenges that remain in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis.

While there are many similar considerations across the three countries, their contexts are sufficiently different from each other to warrant country-specific recommendations. We provide these recommendations in tabular format for clarity and to ensure readability (Tables 14.1 through 14.3). For each country we list the recommendation in brief and follow it up with more detailed notes on the rationale for recommending the policy and considerations for implementation. We assess the priority for implementing the recommendation as well as the costs and risks of implementation (both are categorized as low/medium/high). These assessments are necessarily subjective but grounded in our judgment derived from extensive expert interviews, knowledge of the literature, and situational awareness gained through the course of our study. Finally, we list the entities that are in the best position to implement the recommendation—a combination of the host-country government, multilateral institutions, and individual donor countries. Needless to say, recommendations implemented by entities other than the local governments are best done in collaboration with those governments and are likely to require their permission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expand Turkish-language training and capacity, in combination with what is expected in the Turkish workplace</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Lack of Turkish-language is a main barrier to Syrian employment. Few Syrians have received Turkish-language training, and there is not enough Turkish-language training to meet demand. Amount/intensity of Turkish-language training is insufficient for many to get a job. Other barriers include lack of high-quality materials and trained teachers. In addition to language, the cultural differences between Syrians and Turks are a related barrier to finding jobs and retention. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Prioritize Syrians in the labor force for spaces in Turkish as a Second Language (TSL) classes. • Create improved TSL course materials. • Train Turkish teachers in TSL. • Expand availability and awareness of web-based and smartphone Turkish-language instruction applications. • Coordinate with Turkey’s MONE, teacher training universities, multilateral agencies. • Invest in online course providers such as Duolingo, Rosetta, or other online course. • Make language training part of a broader training and job placement package for Syrians, targeted at organized industrial zones in cities outside of Istanbul (such as Adana, Bursa, and Izmir). • Supplement the language training with training on expectations of Turkish employers and typical characteristics of the Turkish workplace.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Individual donor countries Multi donor countries Government of Turkey (MONE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expedite recognition of Syrian credentials and educational degrees in Turkey</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Many refugees lack documentation of their educational credentials; many such credentials are in Arabic; and Syrian educational institutions may be unfamiliar to Turkish employers. EU countries have experimented with programs (such as the European Qualifications Passport for Refugees) to create credential validation for refugees, with translation of languages, skills, and quality, in order to help employers understand the qualifications of refugee applicants. In addition, the ILO has developed similar approaches in Jordan. While the government of Turkey has a process to enable foreigners to validate their credentials, few Syrians have used the process. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Adapt the Turkish certification validation process in combination with the European Qualifications Passport for Refugees to the situation of Syrians, Iraqis, and other refugees in Turkey. • Consider establishing Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) guidelines as suggested by the ILO, to assess occupational skills obtained through informal training and on-the-job experience (ILO, 2015, 2018).</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Government of Turkey (MONE) Individual donor countries Multi donor agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</td>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>Costs and Risks of Implementation</td>
<td>Suitable for Whom?</td>
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</table>
| **Conduct demand-driven, on-the-job training for both Syrians and Turks, linked to employment opportunities** | *Rationale:* There is a geographic mismatch between where the Syrians are and labor market demand. Although Syrians are not allowed to obtain legal work outside of their province of registration, many Syrians leave their province of registration to move to Istanbul in search of work. However, stakeholder interviews suggested that Istanbul is becoming overburdened. At the same time, stakeholders noted that skill gaps often arise within cities outside of Istanbul, particularly in Organized Industrial Zones (OIZs). What is needed is a targeted set of programs to meet local employment demand, legal changes to allow Syrians moving for work, and relocation incentives and assistance. EU countries have incentivized refugees to move to regions where there is employment demand.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Work closely with a local chamber of industry, OIZ manager, business association, or other job training and matching organization to identify the specific, current needs of manufacturing firms in OIZs located in cities outside of Istanbul, such as Adana, Bursa, or Izmir.  
• Consider relaxing geographic restrictions on travel and work for Syrians who are willing to relocate to the targeted areas for work, and work with business associations and local governments in those provinces to actively recruit Syrians as well as Turkish workers from other areas.  
• Coordinate with local government, business associations, MONE, UNDP, IŞKUR, GIZ, and Rizk to implement job-matching and on-the-job training programs for both Syrians and Turks focused on filling the identified skills gaps. | High     | Medium to High                    | Individual donor countries  
Government of Turkey  
Multilateral agencies                                                                 |
| **Provide safe transportation for women to places of employment**            | *Rationale:* According to the firm survey results, the share of female workers among Syrian employees is lower than the share of female workers in the overall workforce in Turkey. While there are a number of reasons for this finding, one concern identified by respondents in the Syrian household survey was the lack of safe and reliable transportation for women to reach work.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Work with local transportation providers to develop safe, female-only transportation options for both Syrian and Turkish women to reach their places of employment.  
• Consider coordinating with large employers, particularly those that employ relatively high numbers of female workers, such as large textile factories. | Medium   | Low                               | Individual donor countries  
Multilateral agencies                                                                 |

(continued)
Table 14.1—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Build on İŞKUR and Rizk programs in job matching, and expand these in regions with the most Syrians</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Government of Turkey, Individual donor countries (for financing)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Facilitate work permits for Syrians under Temporary Protection Status</strong></td>
<td><em>Rationale:</em> Few work permits have been issued for Syrian workers. Stakeholder interviews suggest that employers have few incentives to hire Syrians legally due to lack of knowledge about the procedures for applying for a permit, the cost associated with the permit application, and the fact that with the work permit, hiring a Syrian can be more expensive than hiring a Turk. However, without a work permit, Syrians are at greater risk of low pay and dangerous work conditions. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong>  • Finance a consulting or legal firm to help employers to process work permit applications.  • Cover the costs of the work permit application.  • AND/OR Offer automatic temporary (two-year) work permits to Syrians under Temporary Protection Status.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Individual donor countries (for financing), Multilateral agencies, Government of Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Start a Syria desk at KOSGEB, Turkey’s small and medium-sized (SME) assistance agency</strong></td>
<td><em>Rationale:</em> Syrians have been active entrepreneurs in Turkey, but they face challenges that include lack of local knowledge, networks, and financing. The government SME assistance agency does not have particular help for Syrians. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong>  • Finance additional facilitation for Syrian entrepreneurs and staffing at KOSGEB.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Government of Turkey, Individual donor countries (for financing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conduct a joint venture with a large Turkish firm, hiring Turks and Syrians</strong></td>
<td><em>Rationale:</em> A joint venture may offer business opportunities that could also be combined with socially aware hiring. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong>  • Hire both Turkish and Syrian workers (up to the allowable 10% allotment), obtaining work permits for all workers and paying both Turkish and Syrian workers at least minimum wage.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Foreign investment companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</td>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>Costs and Risks of Implementation</td>
<td>Suitable for Whom?</td>
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<td>Enhance the current Customs Union (CU) between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, including easing transport, visa, and other barriers under the current CU; moving forward on efforts to deepen the CU; and identifying ways to correct existing asymmetries</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Turkey currently has a CU with the EU. However, the current CU only applies to industrial goods, and has a number of challenges, including (1) there is asymmetry, in that if the EU negotiates a free trade agreement (FTA) with a third-party country, goods from that country can enter Turkey (via the CU), but Turkey does not automatically get access to export to the third-party country unless it negotiates a separate FTA; (2) agriculture and services are not covered; (3) road transport permits are limited; (4) it is difficult for Turkish business people to get visas to do business in the EU. Negotiations to revise and deepen the CU have stalled. Deepening the CU to include services, and making it easier for Turkey to benefit from FTAs that the EU signs with third-party countries, could help to improve Turkey’s economic climate by encouraging exports and increase jobs for all.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>EU, Government of Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study developing a policy regarding minimum wages for Syrian refugees</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Syrians are reportedly working for much lower wages than Turks, often well below Turkey’s minimum wage. At the same time, many Turks work informally and are paid below the minimum wage. The focus groups suggest that Turkish workers in some cases feel that Syrian workers’ willingness to accept lower wages undercuts their own wages and employment opportunities; many Turkish workers also feel that such low wages for Syrians are exploitative. In contrast, in the firm survey, firms most commonly cited willingness to accept low wages as an advantage to hiring Syrians, and the most common recommendations by firms for increasing employment opportunities included lowering the cost of hiring workers (for example, by decreasing social security fees or subsidizing wages). <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> - Study the effects of increasing enforcement of the minimum wage on Syrian and Turkish employment before developing the policy. - Examine the Turkish government’s capacity to increase enforcement of the minimum wage. - Examine potential alternatives such as an earned income tax credit, or wage or benefit subsidies, to encourage legal work among both Turks and Syrians.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Government of Turkey, Multilateral agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</td>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>Costs and Risks of Implementation</td>
<td>Suitable for Whom?</td>
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</table>
| **Offer short vocational training courses on needed skills:** air-conditioner maintenance, machine operation and maintenance, building maintenance and facility management (plumbing, carpentry, electricity), welding, cooking, customer relations, entrepreneurial skills, electrical work, IT, security, hospitality, textiles, retooling jewelry making and wall-building skills | **Rationale:**
Current training is not always market relevant or provided in a coordinated way. The resources currently used for training could be spent more effectively.

**Implementation considerations:**
- Offer these to both Jordanians and Syrian refugees (the stigma surrounding vocational education among Jordanians is going down; raising cultural capital in businesses such as beauty salons will further help Jordanian workers).
- Especially for manufacturing, focus on training and placing semi-skilled workers for both Jordanians and Syrians.
- Skills acquired by Syrians can be used for reconstruction when safe to go back.
- Crucial to coordinate with other trainers such as GIZ to reduce duplication.
- Coordinate with private sector to make the courses market relevant.
- Training provided outside of firms, say by an external agency, might decrease turnover (i.e., trainees will not join a firm to take offered training and move to another).
- A geographic focus on a port city such as Aqaba (given export potential to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) could be helpful.
- Assist ILO for certification of skills via exams (ambitious target of 80,000 for 2018).
- Improve credentialing in fields such as construction, which will help Jordanians as well, by attracting them to the sector and expanding their employment.
- Recognize the existing skills and backgrounds of the trainees in designing the program—many of the direct beneficiaries of training already have relevant skills for services or manufacturing work, while other do not, having either worked on farms their whole life, or in the case of women, having not participated in the labor force in Syria.
- Assess the role that organized labor (e.g., General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions [GFJTU]) can play in providing training to both Syrian refugees and Jordanians.
- Develop work placement after training (see recommendation below on matching employees to employers). | High | Medium | Individual donor countries |
| **Identify promising training initiatives** such as ReBootKamp (RBK; a computer coding course with a track record of placement success offered to both Jordanians and Syrians) and scale them up | **Rationale:**
In addition to setting up training programs from scratch, proven models can be scaled up with additional investment; for instance, by supporting loan agreements in place.

**Implementation considerations:**
- RBK trains both Jordanians and Syrians.
- RBK targets a higher end sector (information technology) and places Syrians as consultants, but scaling up can be done for any type of training. | High | Medium to High | Individual donor countries |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Improve skills assessment and certification of worker skills                  | **Rationale:** Skills that workers have are not always certified and therefore not recognized in the labor market, making it difficult for them to find jobs.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Set up another organization to do this or bolster existing efforts by organizations such as the ILO.  
• More likely to be useful for Syrians.                                                                                       | Medium   | Medium                            | Individual donor countries                       |
| Improve matching of employees and employers                                    | **Rationale:** Training to improve supply of workers and policies to stimulate demand for them are not likely to succeed without efficient matching of employers to employees, and this has been lacking.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Set up another matching agency or bolster existing ones such as recruitment agencies (for specialized skills) or GIZ’s initiative with the Ministry of Labor (for general labor).  
• Work with both Jordanians and Syrians.  
• Organize job fairs to bring employers and employees together. Even bringing job seekers together with employees who already have jobs will help as informal networks are important in finding jobs.  
• Matching at the informal level is harder than at the formal, higher-skill levels, since recruiting agencies do not operate much at the informal level. Therefore, matching could be aimed at formal firms ahead of informal firms. Educating firms about matching mechanisms available would be important.  
• Bolster the role of chambers of commerce in the matching process; employers use them sporadically.  
• Matching is especially important for Rules of Origin agreement (Jordan Compact)—eligible exporters.  
• There is also a need for an information broker on the availability of workers as well as policies to hire them, since these signals do not appear to be reaching employers.                                                                                     | High     | Medium to High                    | Individual donor countries                       |
| Address the problem of employee turnover in firms by instituting and enforcing mechanisms such as two-sided notice | **Rationale:** Employee turnover, especially among Syrian workers, is often suggested as an impediment to hiring them; while policy stability is a more first-order issue, reducing this turnover is likely to increase certainty and therefore their Syrians’ employability.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Since all workers will benefit from this, should apply to Jordanians and Syrians.  
• Policy certainty regarding Syrians would most likely help them to be hired, but this is likely to be politically difficult.                                                                                     | High     | High                              | Government of Jordan (Multilateral agencies can provide capacity building) |

(continued)
### Table 14.2—Continued

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simplify and streamline the procedure of issuing work permits</td>
<td>The requirement of work permits and the difficulty of obtaining them is an impediment for Syrians entering the labor market.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Government of Jordan (Multilateral agencies can provide capacity building)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>More than any subsidy, there is a demand for stability of policy so that employers can hire with peace of mind.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Continue to facilitate opening work permits in sectors such as services and restaurants and food preparation businesses (where there is need and Jordanians do not want to work).</td>
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<td>Allow GFJTU to issue permits beyond the currently agreed-upon one year (including allowing them to train Syrian workers on their rights), thereby making permits easier to get.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Clarify and disseminate information about rules on hiring Syrians, for instance by issuing an easy-to-understand handbook that summarizes work permit and other regulations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Moreover, if the regulations are in the gazette and have legal status, legal aid staff, employers, workers, and others will have a formal way of accessing them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explore enforcing minimum wage laws and working conditions for Syrian workers and for Jordanian workers</td>
<td>Employers paying lower wages to Syrian workers is a major source of local resentment and also opens these workers to potential exploitation.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Government of Jordan (Multilateral agencies can provide capacity building in inspection and enforcement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weigh these benefits against the potential loss of demand for Syrian workers.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Given the complexity of the issue, further investigation might be warranted.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enforce minimum working conditions laws, as poor working conditions, especially in industry, are likely to be a major deterrent, particularly to women, who would otherwise be willing to work in textile and other factories.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Examine mechanisms for provision of health insurance and social security for non-Jordanian workers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</td>
<td>Priority</td>
<td>Costs and Risks of Implementation</td>
<td>Suitable for Whom?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Reassess the assistance provided by multilateral agencies to Syrian refugees | **Rationale:** There is local resentment that refugees get this over and beyond (low) wages, which together gives the impression that they are better off than host-country workers.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Keep assistance focused on the most vulnerable, while enabling those who can work to do so.  
• On the margin, it reduces the incentive for Syrian workers to find jobs.  
• As the stay of the refugees lengthens, the situation moves from humanitarian to livelihood, and assistance can be viewed as complementary.  
• Donor fatigue might have set in, which might make reduced assistance inevitable, in any case.  
• Lessons learned from schemes such as EITC in the U.S. could be explored here (assistance complementary to wages instead of substituting) to give Syrian workers appropriate incentives. Communicate such an incentive-based policy appropriately with refugees. While this will apply to those who are able to work, those who are not able to work due to age, health, or similar considerations would continue to need assistance. | Medium | Medium | Multilateral agencies |
| Ease restrictions on the Rules of Origin agreement that is part of the Jordan Compact, such as allowing companies outside the special economic zones to participate, expanding the list of eligible products, and lowering the threshold percentage of Syrian employment | **Rationale:** Very few companies have met the eligibility criteria to participate in the Rules of Origin agreement of the Jordan Compact, decreasing the effectiveness of the program. | Medium | Medium | European Union, Government of Jordan |
| Improve environment for doing business for all | **Rationale:** The Jordanian economy was slowing down even before the refugees arrived; and addressing the structural impediments to economic growth would be needed to improve job prospects for all workers; Jordan came in at 103 out of 190 in the World Bank’s 2019 Ease of Doing Business rankings.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Improve “ease of firing” (with appropriate notice) as firms will not take risks and hire in the first place if it is difficult to retrench their workforce if their ideas do not bear fruit.  
• Shorten duration for approvals and licenses, thereby reducing the cost of doing business.  
• Improve secured lending laws and insolvency bylaws.  
• Streamline registration procedures for companies, thereby making it easier to start a business.  
• Encourage investment by all nationalities, or else they will invest elsewhere. Ease passport restrictions for Syrian investors, and assess the high cost of this document against the period of validity. | High | Medium | Government of Jordan |

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Increase capacity of government agencies | Rationale:  
All the recommendations would need support from the government agencies and capacity building in appropriate areas would help.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Project Management Unit (PMU) in the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) is already trying to increase awareness of Jordan Compact through outreach and communication.  
• Leverage public, private, and multinational resources to provide technical assistance to companies to market their products and improve standards for European markets. | Medium | Medium | Individual donor countries in collaboration with the Government of Jordan  
Multilateral agencies, in collaboration with the Government of Jordan |
| Invest in large-scale infrastructure projects | Rationale:  
The Jordanian economy was slowing down even before the refugees arrived, and stimulating economic growth would be necessary to improve job prospects for all workers.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Builds capacity for Syrian workers to eventually rebuild Syria.  
• Addresses much-needed infrastructure development in health, education, transportation, and utilities across multiple sectors that have claimed to be burdened with the influx of refugees.  
• Increasing the capacity of government agencies as mentioned above (to disburse funding and monitor projects) would be particularly critical for this recommendation to work. | High | High | Individual donor countries  
Multilateral agencies |
| Improve transportation infrastructure and services to factories in the industrial zones, particularly targeting both Jordanian and Syrian women | Rationale:  
One of the key barriers to link Syrian women to work opportunities in the zones is transportation to and from the zone.  
*Implementation considerations:*  
• Transport could target Syrians in both camp and noncamp settings as well as Jordanians.  
• Transportation to large manufacturing firms could be targeted first to achieve efficiencies of scale. | High | High | Individual donor countries  
Multilateral agencies |
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Offer short vocational training courses on needed skills: security/alarms, mechanical and other technical skills, construction, English, cooking and other restaurant work** | **Rationale:**
Current training is not always market relevant or provided in a coordinated way.  
**Implementation considerations:**
- Offer these to both Lebanese workers and Syrian refugees.  
- Training to Syrians assumes the fields in which they would be allowed to work are expanded (see recommendation below).  
- Identify firm needs for highly skilled workers and provide appropriate training and placement services.  
- Firms say they have no incentive to train as employees leave after training, which is why governmental help would be required.  
- At the same time, this needs private sector involvement; e.g., use fiberoptic firm to train in factory setting through internships; would also address the issue of some viewing training as an opportunity to socialize and get free meals.  
- Training aimed at strengthening skills of Syrians would also be beneficial upon their eventual return and the rebuilding of Syria.  
- Develop work placement after training (see recommendation below on matching employees to employers). | High | Medium | Individual donor countries |
| **Decrease restrictions on sectors where Syrians can work** | **Rationale:**
Bakery, hospitality, and driving are some of the jobs Syrians can do, especially because there is a gap in supply by nationals (based on interviews and focus groups). | High | High | Government of Lebanon |
| **Facilitate obtaining work permits** | **Rationale:**
Workers are either reluctant to search for jobs without permits or employers do not offer them jobs. Focus groups and surveys repeatedly point to difficulty of obtaining permits as a major impediment to finding a job. | High | High | Government of Lebanon |

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<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Notes (Rationale, Addressed Problem, Implementation Considerations)</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Costs and Risks of Implementation</th>
<th>Suitable for Whom?</th>
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<tr>
<td>Address the problem of employee turnover in firms by instituting and enforcing mechanisms such as two-sided notice</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Employee turnover, especially among Syrian workers, is high; as mentioned above this is a disincentive for firms to provide training; while policy stability is a more first-order issue, reducing this turnover with mechanisms such as two-sided notice is likely to increase certainty and therefore Syrians’ employability and training opportunities. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Should apply to all workers. • Policy certainty regarding Syrians would most likely help them to be hired, but this is likely to be politically difficult.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon (Multilateral agencies can provide capacity building)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase capacity of government agencies</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Foreign investment is unlikely to flow unless there is a suitable capacity for governance, procurement, etc. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Help in decentralized implementation of projects—develop capacity of municipal governments including their coordination and management across the multiple NGOs that are working in their geographical jurisdiction. • Seek complementary responses to those provided by the central government such as local government response, including public-private and people partnerships. • Help build an efficient monitoring system. • Ensure that development of human capital in government agencies includes local and municipal governments in socioeconomically challenged areas of the country which have been historically neglected, and in whose jurisdictions Syrian refugees are likely concentrated.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Individual donor countries in collaboration with the Government of Lebanon Multilateral agencies, in collaboration with the Government of Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve matching of employees and employers</td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> Training to improve supply of workers and policies to stimulate demand for them are not likely to succeed without efficient matching of employers to employees, and this has been lacking. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Set up another matching agency or bolster existing ones such as recruitment agencies. • Matching at the informal level is harder than at the formal, higher-skill levels, since recruiting agencies do not operate much at the informal level.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium to High</td>
<td>Individual donor countries</td>
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<td><strong>Address the negative perceptions on assistance provided by multilateral agencies to Syrian refugees</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> There is local resentment that refugees get this over and beyond (low) wages, which together makes them perceived as better off than host-country workers; some experts feel these are just negative perceptions with little basis in reality. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Highlight the economic contributions of the refugee response to address negative perceptions. • On the margin, assistance could reduce the incentive for Syrian workers to find jobs. Lessons learned from schemes such as EITC in the U.S. could be adopted here (assistance complementary to wages instead of substituting) to give Syrian workers appropriate incentives. Communicate such an incentive-based policy appropriately with refugees. While this will apply to those who are able to work, those who are not able to due to age, health, or similar considerations would continue to need assistance. • Donor fatigue might have set in, which might make reduced assistance inevitable, in any case.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Multilateral agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Address the gap between reality and perceptions regarding Syrian refugees</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale:</strong> The public is not always aware of the facts about refugees, leading to resentment. <strong>Implementation considerations:</strong> • Provide assistance to institutions like the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut to get the facts out and negate misperceptions. • Work through community-based organizations including religious bodies and respected members (including politicians) of each confessional community. • Identify and support champions across the Lebanese community, particularly high-profile and visible members and communicate the new narrative through media (TV, newspapers), and film. • Highlight the good work done by Syrians through visual means (such as pictures of Syrians contributing to the society and the economy) to create a positive image.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Government of Lebanon, Individual donor countries, Multilateral agencies</td>
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| **Improve environment for doing business for all** | **Rationale:**  
The Lebanese economy was slowing down even before the refugees arrived, and addressing the structural impediments to economic growth would be needed to improve job prospects for all workers.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Improve access to finance, which is noted as a leading impediment by firms.  
• Reduce red tape, and thereby the cost of doing business.  
• Improve the electricity infrastructure.  
• Help with market expansion activities—where to sell? Set up a Lebanese Development Agency (LDA) similar to Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA). Lebanon is well known for niche products such as furniture and food products, which could be marketed abroad.  
• Link SMEs to markets (say, by funding incubators like Berytech). | High     | Medium                           | Government of Lebanon  
Individual donor countries  
Multilateral agencies |
| **Invest in large-scale infrastructure projects** | **Rationale:**  
The Lebanese economy was slowing down even before the refugees arrived, and stimulating economic growth would be necessary to improve job prospects for all workers.  
**Implementation considerations:**  
• Helps both Lebanese and Syrian workers.  
• Builds capacity for Syrian workers to eventually rebuild Syria.  
• Increasing the capacity of government agencies as mentioned above (to disburse funding and monitor projects) would be particularly critical for this recommendation to work.  
• Addresses much-needed infrastructure development in health, education, transportation, and utilities across multiple sectors that are claimed to have been burdened with the influx of refugees.  
• Provides the greatest opportunity to make much-needed infrastructure investment in the most vulnerable and traditionally neglected areas and regions, where Syrian refugees also happen to be concentrated. | High     | High                             | Individual donor countries  
Multilateral agencies, including the international private sector |
In this report, we have explored the possibilities for creating mutually beneficial livelihood opportunities for the Syrian refugees and the host countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Enormous challenges remain. While many Syrians are getting by, most are working in low-wage, low-skill, and informal jobs, and there are high rates of unemployment among refugees. Many factors have conspired against Syrians finding opportunities for employment: low average educational attainment of Syrian refugees, complex legal frameworks for obtaining residency and work permits, lack of language skills in some instances, training programs that are mostly not market oriented, resentment among local workers, and environments that do not encourage Syrian entrepreneurship.

However, there are reasons for hope. Despite underlying resentment caused among the local populations by the arrival of refugees, there has been broad social stability and significant compassion toward the Syrians. An equilibrium, however informal and fragile, has been reached in many parts of these three countries where employers who have found Syrians to be hardworking and to be filling needs in the local labor market are providing them with livelihood opportunities. There is a strong feeling among policymakers that the host countries are providing a “public good” for the world by hosting the Syrian refugees, and the global donor and investment communities should invest in large-scale public projects such as infrastructure building that will help these economies and local workers and Syrians alike.

Based on these observations, we have recommended expanding training programs (including language training) but tailoring them to the needs of the market, coordinating across the various providers and making such training available to local workers as well, and improving matching of employers and employees. We have recommended enabling and incentivizing Syrians to move within a country to where the jobs are, streamlining work permit systems, and strengthening government capacity for disbursal of funds and governance, as well as exploring the creation of independent disbursal mechanisms to attract foreign investment which can create jobs for all. We also recommend decreasing restrictions in sectors where Syrians can work so they can further fill the needs of the labor market, and creating an environment that facilitates entrepreneurship for both the local and Syrian entrepreneurs.

We have built on many previous outstanding studies that have focused on improving the lives of Syrian refugees in the countries we have studied. We hope our comprehensive mixed-methods study based on in-depth interviews, focus groups, and surveys of Syrian households as well as firm surveys has further improved the collective understanding of the situation and exploration of potential solutions.

However, much work remains to be done. Understanding the complex trade-off between, on the one hand, decreasing resentment among local workers and exploitation of Syrian workers
by enforcing minimum wages for all, and, on the other hand, the possibility that the Syrians will not even be able to secure the jobs they currently have if minimum wages are higher, deserves further study. Similarly, the roles that assistance programs play in providing basic humanitarian support, especially for the young and the elderly, and creating local jobs through refugee response operations needs to be better understood. In particular, assistance programs potentially causing resentment among local workers through negative perceptions and disincentivizing Syrians to find work or take jobs at lower pay than the nationals needs further study. The specific capacity building needs of government agencies to improve governance and disbursement structures also need to be understood more. Further studies could also examine the potential for attracting investment and workers to the second-tier cities in each of the three countries so as to not strain the main cities’ resources and satisfy labor demand of second-tier cities. And looking to the future, a realistic assessment of Syrian reconstruction and the role countries in the region could play in it (including appropriately trained Syrian refugees) also deserves attention.
Key Stakeholders

Study Overview
Thank you very much for your time. Before we begin, here is some background about our study.

At the 2016 February London Supporting Syria and the Region Conference, and at the 2017 follow-up conference in Brussels, host countries and donor countries confirmed the need to create economic opportunities for Syrian refugees in the Middle East host countries, along with investment from donors in these countries.

As a follow-up action, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP) undertook an assessment of employment opportunities in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt last year.

Building upon these efforts, the RAND Corporation is conducting a study of labor markets and Syrian refugee employment opportunities in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan to offer policy recommendations that are beneficial to both Syrian refugees and the host countries. We will place a particular emphasis on understanding skills needs of employers, skills availability among refugees, general opportunities to improve business climates, and social cohesion.

The study is sponsored by the Qatar Fund for Development, and it is in close collaboration with the UNDP, the International Labour Organization (ILO), and other UN agencies.

In each of the countries in the study, the study team is conducting interviews with government officials, UN agencies, NGOs, donors, local businesses, Syrian businesses, trade associations, and leading employers of Syrians.

The interviews will support the other data collection activities as well as our analysis and recommendations. We will not quote any individual by name in the report, and of course, please feel free to decline to answer any questions. Do you have any questions before we begin?

Introduction
A. We would like to start by asking you about your organization and position.
   a. What is the role of your organization, particularly related to jobs and livelihoods for refugees?
   b. What are your roles, if any, in addressing jobs and livelihoods for refugees?

Module 1: Opportunities (Skills Matching/Key Sectors/Growing Employment Demand)
A. What types of work are Syrians finding in both the formal and informal sectors?
   a. What are the main sectors that Syrians are working in?
   b. What types of jobs?
c. What companies or types of businesses are hiring Syrians?
d. What evidence is there for this?

B. What impact is Syrian labor having on the host community labor market? What evidence is there for this? How has the host community reacted to this?

C. What types of businesses are Syrians starting? In which sectors?

D. What are the main sectors in which other migrant workers (who are not citizens) are working? [Mainly for Jordan and Lebanon.]
   a. Which areas are other migrant workers usually from?
   b. How do employers view the trade-offs among hiring nationals, Syrians, and other migrants?

E. What do you think are the main barriers to Syrians working in this country?
   a. Prompts: Legal status, discrimination, poor economy, skills mismatch, networks, high unemployment in host community, challenges in getting work permits (required documents, costs), lack of information, exploitative conditions, language, culture, infrastructure/transportation barriers, others?
   b. What different barriers do women and men face?
   c. What barriers are particular to youth?

F. What are the main sectors that could benefit from additional labor, if barriers were removed?
   a. Are there specific sectors in which certain stakeholders are particularly concerned about removing barriers to work? [Prompts: sectors where host-country citizens might feel their jobs or wages are particularly threatened]

G. In the sector(s) that you work in or are familiar with, what are the experiences of people with different skill levels in finding jobs?
   a. University-educated professionals
   b. University-educated youth
   c. Middle-skill workers
   d. Low-skill workers

H. What are the experiences of professionals with certain public-sector skills needed by Syrians as well, such as in medicine and education?

Module 2: Legal Framework and Government Policies and Programs

A. Can you provide an overview of government policy toward Syrians working, and how this is implemented in practice?
   a. How are these policies different than those that apply to immigrants from other countries?

B. How have government policies and laws evolved in the past few years toward Syrians working, in particular since the agreements at the 2016 London Conference and the 2017 Brussels Conference?
   a. What has been the impact of these changes?
   b. In particular, what has been the impact of concessional lending for infrastructure and other projects, as well as trade concessions on creating jobs for Syrians and host-country nationals? What potential is there for job creation from this?

C. What has been the public reaction to these changes?

D. Are there good examples of job policies and government programs (at the national, local level)?
   a. For Syrian refugees?
   b. For citizens?
E. What is the process for Syrians to obtain work permits and residency permits? How is this implemented in practice?
F. What are penalties for both employers and Syrian individuals for employment outside of government approved policies?

Module 3: Programs, Initiatives, Interventions
A. Can you provide an overview of livelihood programming by the aid community in this country for both refugees and citizens?
   a. Prompts: vocational training, language training, job-matching services
   b. How are these efforts coordinated for efficiency and effectiveness with each other and with the government?
B. What is working well and not working well? What is the evidence base?
C. Are there good examples of livelihoods programming from the assistance community? From the government?
D. What protections do Syrians have against exploitation in the informal economy? What initiatives are there to address this?
E. What programs and initiatives do you think are needed to fill any gaps in helping create jobs for Syrians?

Module 4: Collaboration and Coordination Among Stakeholders
A. If a company/business wanted to hire Syrians, what is the process? Where would they go for guidance or assistance?
B. Who are the main stakeholders that are/need to be involved to get Syrians into a work environment?
   a. How do these organizations/stakeholders communicate and coordinate with one another?
   b. How well do these organizations/stakeholders collaborate?
   c. Which organizations work particularly well together? Why?
   d. What are the gaps in coordination? What are the implications of that?
C. Who/which organization can make a big impact in helping Syrians in _____ earn a living?
   a. Do you have an example of a policy, program, or initiative taken by an organization/individual that made a positive impact?
   b. Do you have an example of a policy, program, or initiative taken by an organization/individual that limited opportunities for Syrians to earn a living?

Module 5: Perceptions of Syrians and Willingness to Employ Syrians
A. How have local perceptions of Syrians in the workforce evolved over the past few years, now that Syrians have been living and working in this country since 2011?
   a. Do these perceptions vary within the country? If so, across which dimensions (e.g., region, age, gender, educational level, employment status)?
B. In general, what are the local perceptions of Syrians in the workplace?
   a. In general, what do people say about their work ethic?
   b. What can Syrians do particularly well?
   c. What do Syrians need to better understand about the workplace here?
   d. Do these strengths and weaknesses differ across the formal and informal sector? How so?
      i. Across specific industries (add relevant industries)?
      ii. Are there differences among men and women?
e. Can you think of an example of when hiring a Syrian was beneficial for an employer?
   i. Or detrimental/problematic for an employer?
C. In general, how are businesses run by Syrians perceived?
   a. Do these businesses generally cater to the Syrian refugee community or to a broader customer base?
D. What job-related issues are straining host community relations? What job-related issues are helping host community relations?
E. How do language differences affect jobs and ability of Syrians to work or to start businesses? [Mainly for Turkey, but also Lebanon.]
F. What are some facilitators that help men/women/youth find work?
   a. What are some challenges men/women/youth face?
      i. Would training or other programs help overcome these challenges (that is, can these challenges be solved)?
G. In your own words, what motivates employers to hire Syrians? Why do employers hire Syrians?
   a. Prompts: Their skill sets? Work ethic? Low wages? Willingness to work? A moral motivation/a sense that it is the right thing to do? Recognition? Other incentives?
   b. What might prevent an employer from wanting to hire Syrians?
      i. Legal reasons?
      ii. Workplace cultural differences?
      iii. Language (if relevant)?
      iv. Gender-related issues?
      v. Other disincentives?

Closing: Vision for the Future
A. In your opinion, what do you think are needed steps to address the problems discussed?
   a. How could this be achieved?
B. Is there anyone else whom you think we should interview in order to better understand skills matching of Syrians into work environments?
C. Is there anything else that you would like to say, or anything else that we have not specifically asked you?

Business Owners
What is your job title/position in the firm?
Can you tell us about the firm?

- How many establishments/plants does this firm have?
- How long has the firm been operating?
- What products/services does the firm offer?
- Where are the products/services sold? Does the firm export any of them and where?

How many employees does the firm have? Prompt: If these are household businesses, ask them to focus on paid, nonfamily employees
Could you tell us about what types of jobs the firm's employees do? *Prompts: manual labor, unskilled work with machines, skilled work with machines, specialized professional work like engineering or programming, sales, management, administrative tasks*

Are there certain jobs/occupations for which you have particular trouble finding or retaining qualified employees?

- If so, what are the major reasons you have trouble filling positions? *Prompts: not enough applicants, applicants do not have the right skills, applicants want too much money/too many benefits, applicants not willing to work needed hours, applicants leave quickly*
- What steps, if any, has the firm taken to overcome these problems?

Have you ever reached out to the chamber of commerce, chamber of industry, or other organization to get assistance in finding employees? What about for other types of help? If so, can you describe your experience? If not, why not?

Does the firm currently hire any Syrian refugees?

If yes [firm does hire Syrian refugees]:

What types of jobs do these refugees do?

Are these jobs similar to/different from the jobs done by local workers?

What is the process of hiring Syrians?

- How do you hire these workers? I.e., what channels do you use?
- Have you tried to get work permits for your Syrian employees? How was that experience?
- Did you face any challenges in hiring Syrian refugees that were different from usual challenges in hiring employees? *Prompt only if needed: lack of residency or work permit, lack of skills, language or cultural barriers, need for additional training, concerns from other workers*
- What is your view of the refugees’ skills, work ethic, and ability to adapt to your workplace environment?
- Do you perceive any advantages to having Syrian refugees as employees? *Prompt only if needed: help fill vacant positions, willing to work for lower pay/fewer benefits, willing to work required hours, good work skills and motivation, moral imperative*
- Do you perceive any disadvantages in having Syrian refugees as employees? *Prompt only if needed: additional inspections, tensions between refugees and other workers, tensions between refugees and supervisors, language or cultural barriers, differences in expectations about working hours or conditions, lack of skills*
- How is the relationship between these workers and other employees?
- Have you faced challenges in retaining Syrian refugees that are different from usual challenges in retaining employees? *Prompt only if needed: high turnover, leaving without notice, poor fit between employee expectations and job conditions*
- Do you face any problems with government authorities for employing Syrian refugees?
- What kind of on-the-job training did you initially provide to refugees?
- Is it different from the kind of training you typically provide to your local employees?
- What kind of training do you think would be useful if the international aid community or government offered it to Syrians before working here?
If no [firm does not hire Syrian refugees]:
Have you ever considered hiring Syrian refugees? If yes, but you have not hired refugees, what are the major barriers to your doing so? [Prompts: refugees lack needed skills, legal barriers, time/cost to get work permit, potential fines and penalties, cultural barriers, language] If you have not even considered hiring them, why not? [Prompts could be same as above]
Are you aware of other firms like yours that hire Syrian refugees? What types of jobs do the refugees typically do for those firms?
[For the following questions on hiring Syrian refugees, some of these firms may not be allowed to hire them due to country-specific and sector-specific restrictions. Please add “if you were allowed to hire them” if this is the case.]
Do you perceive any advantages to hiring Syrian refugees? [Prompt only if needed: help fill vacant positions, willing to work for lower pay/fewer benefits, willing to work required hours, good work skills and motivation, moral imperative]
What are the disadvantages of hiring Syrians? [Prompt only if needed: Time/cost to get work permit, additional inspections, fines and penalties, potential cultural clashes among employees, lacking skills for the work]
Does the firm currently hire any other migrant workers?
If yes [the firm does hire other migrant workers]:
What types of jobs do these migrants do?
Are the jobs done by migrant workers similar to/different from the jobs done by local workers?
[If the firm also hires Syrian refugees] Are the jobs done by migrant workers similar to/different from the jobs done by Syrian refugees?
Are you aware of government policies or programs to help Syrians secure employment? If so, what is your opinion of these programs and policies as an employer? Do you think they are feasible or realistic? Do you think there is real government will/motivation to help both employers and Syrians?
Are there steps the government or other organizations could take to make you more likely to consider hiring Syrian refugees? [Prompts if needed: allow refugees to work in more occupations, clearer legal status of workers, language training, other training, free work permits, subsidized wages, not having to pay benefits, tax break, lower tariffs for exports, other incentives such as loans]
Are there any other thoughts that you would like to share?
Focus Group Protocols

Host-Country Workers

[To gather individually before the group discussion]

- What is your occupation/what kind of work do you do?
- What is your highest education level? Do you have any technical/professional credentials?
- For how long have you been working in this occupation? Overall?
- Are you working now? If so, do you work for yourself, for a household business, or for an employer?
- About how many people work in your business?
- What industry do you work in?

[Icebreaker] Let’s start by having each of you share a fact about yourself. This could be something that you are interested in, your favorite television series, your favorite dish, a game you enjoy, or something about your family. [Note to moderator: Please feel free to choose an icebreaker that you think is appropriate.]

Now I would like to ask you about an average day for you here.

- Where do you go?
- What do you do?
- How many hours a day do you work?
- Are most of your days fairly predictable?

How do you view job opportunities for citizens in this country? For yourself?

- Do you receive an income from multiple sources?
- How many people do you have to provide for? Do you have sufficient resources?

In general, how do you feel that society here perceives Syrians as workers?

- Assuming there were enough jobs for both citizens and Syrian refugees who want them, how accepting do you think society would be of Syrian refugees working in those jobs?
- Under what circumstances might citizens accept Syrian refugees getting jobs?
- Under what circumstances might citizens dislike Syrian refugees getting jobs?
What are your views about the presence of the Syrians in the labor market in this country?

- How long do you think that the Syrians will be working in this country?
- What are ways that Syrians in the workforce benefit this country?
- What are ways that Syrians in the workforce bring challenges?

How are your interactions with your coworkers who are Syrians?

- Can you describe specific interactions with Syrians at work?

If you work with any Syrians, what are your thoughts about their contributions to the workplace?

- Do they do specific types of jobs, or do they do the same kind of work as other employees or migrant workers?
- How are their skills?
- What benefits do they bring to the workplace?
- What are some of the challenges?
- Where do you think Syrians should work?

What do you think makes it easier or more difficult to work with Syrians here?

- Prompts: language, relations with coworkers, work outside of your occupation, different habits of workers on the job
- To better adapt to working here, what should the Syrians do?
- Could particular types of training help overcome challenges to working with Syrians?

What kinds of policies and programs are needed to help everyone find jobs in this country?

- What is one thing that could be done to help local workers?
- What is one thing that could be done to help Syrians in this country find a job? What could be done to help them adapt to the workplace?
- What is one thing that could be done to help other migrant workers?

Is wasta [favoritism or nepotism] a barrier or a facilitator to getting a job? How do you think we could prevent wasta in this country?

- What would you do differently if there is no wasta?

Do you think that job opportunities for yourselves and Syrians could change in the future? If so, how?

In your opinion, do you think most Syrians want to go home?


Are there any other thoughts that you would like to share on how to improve the situation for yourselves and for Syrians?

What do you wish for? How would you like your life to be in the future?

Are there any other thoughts that you would like to share?
Refugees

[To gather before start of group discussion]

- What kind of work did you do in Syria?
- What was your education level? Did you have any technical credentials/certificates?
- What was your occupation?
- What industry did you work in?
- What is your occupation here?

[Icebreaker] Let’s start by having each of you share a fact about yourself. This could be something that you are interested in, your favorite dish, a game you enjoy, or your family. [Note to moderator: Please feel free to choose an icebreaker that you think is appropriate.]

Now I would like to ask you about an average day for you here.

- Where do you go?
- What do you do?
- Are most of your days fairly predictable?

Can you tell us about your experience finding a job here?

- How did you figure out what part of this country to go to?
- How did you figure out companies to apply to?
- How did you get information about available jobs?
- How did you apply?
- How long did it take you to find a job in this country?
  - Is this work stable and continuous? Is it temporary?
  - If you have temporary work, are you looking for stable work? What makes it difficult to find stable work?
- Do you receive a financial support/an income from multiple sources?

What have been the biggest challenges to getting work here?

- *Prompts: legal status, work permit, transportation, certification, lack of information, lack of network, childcare, crossing checkpoints, lack of available jobs, cannot find work in your occupation, language issues, health issues*
- How have you managed these challenges?

(For women only) Are you working? [Note to moderator: As this could be sensitive, take time to build rapport and allow women to answer.]

- If you do work, how have you managed to get this work?
- If not, are you willing to work? Are you looking for work? If you are not willing to work or looking for work, tell us the reasons.
- As women in this country, what are your biggest challenges getting work and being on the job?
Who helped you most to find your job?

- Other Syrians? Other contacts?
- Did you get help from any program in finding your job? Prompts: United Nations, government, nongovernmental organization
- What did they do that was effective?
- What did they do that was not useful?
- What is the one thing that could be done to help Syrians in this country find a job?

To what extent are you able to use your professional skills here?

- Are you able to find work in your occupation?
- Do employers accept your professional qualifications or certificates?
- Do you feel like your employers and colleagues respect your skills?
- Do you think that Syrians in this country need any kind of education or training to adapt? If so, what kind?

How has your refugee status and work permit status affected your ability to work?

- Has legal residency or type of visa in this country affected your ability to work?
- Do you have a work permit, or do you know other Syrians with work permits?
- If you have a work permit, how did you get it?
- Were there any challenges getting a work permit?
- How does having or not having a work permit affect your ability to get work?
- Based on people you know, what happens if government authorities find Syrians working without the proper permits?
- Are you concerned about losing certain benefits/supports if you do work?

What have been the biggest challenges adapting to your new workplace in this country?

- Prompts: language, relations with coworkers, work outside of your occupation, different habits of workers on the job, competition with others, health-related issues, views that your stay in this country may be temporary, wasta
- How do you think we could prevent wasta in this country?
- What would you do differently if there is no wasta?

In general, how do you feel that society here in this country perceives Syrians as workers?

- How is your relationship with your coworkers who are citizens of this country?
- Please tell us about some specific interactions you have had with people in this country while working?

We know that this is an exceptionally difficult time for Syrians.

- What would be the ideal job/work situation for you and your family?
- How has being a refugee changed your views of work and jobs?
- How has this changed your perception of women working? Under what circumstances would it be acceptable for women to work? What would be the ideal conditions for women to work?
What do you wish for? How would you like your life to be in the future?
Are there any other thoughts that you would like to share?

**Migrant Workers**

[To gather individually before the group discussion]

- What is your occupation/what kind of work do you do?
- What is your highest education level? Do you have any technical/professional credentials?
- For how long have you been working in this occupation? Overall?
- How long have you been in this country?
- Are you working now? If so, do you work for yourself, for a household business, or for an employer?
- About how many people work in your business?
- What industry do you work in?
- Does your family join you here?
- Do you have a residency permit? [If applicable] Does this also apply to your family?
- Do you usually have the same job, or do you change jobs from season to season, or year to year?

[Icebreaker] Let's start by having each of you share a fact about yourself. This could be something that you are interested in, your favorite television series, your favorite dish, a game you enjoy, or something about your family. [Note to moderator: Please feel free to choose an icebreaker that you think is appropriate.]

Now I would like to ask you about an average day for you here.

- Where do you go?
- What do you do?
- How many hours a day do you work?
- Are most of your days fairly predictable?

What are your general interactions with people from this country?

- What is your housing situation like?
- Where can you go if you need assistance here?
- How are your day-to-day interactions while shopping, traveling around, attending religious services?
- Do you mostly feel comfortable in your interactions with people from this country?

Now I would like to hear more about your work.

- What do you do?
- How did you find this job?
- Are you paid/compensated for your work regularly? Are you paid fairly for your work?
- Do you have a work permit? If so, how did you obtain this work permit?
How are you treated by your coworkers and managers/boss?

How do you view job opportunities for people from your country? For yourself?

- Do you receive an income from multiple sources?
- Do you send your earnings back to your home country?

In general, how was your experience at getting a job in this country?

- Has getting a job for people from your country changed recently (for example, over the last five to ten years)?
- Do you find that there is more (or less) availability of jobs for everyone?
- Have you noticed any changes in the number of people from your country who have come here to work?
- Are you competing with other migrants for these jobs?

What are your views about the presence of the Syrians working in this country?

- How long do you think that the Syrians will be working in this country? In your opinion, do you think most Syrians want to go home?
- What are ways that Syrians in the workforce bring challenges?
- Do they bring any advantages?
- What did you think about the Syrians before the crisis started?

Do you have any coworkers who are Syrian?

- Can you describe specific interactions with Syrians at work?

If you work with any Syrians, what are your thoughts about their contributions to the workplace?

- Do they do specific types of jobs, or do they do the same kind of work as other employees or migrant workers?
- How are their skills?
- What benefits do they bring to the workplace?
- What are some of the challenges?
- Where do you think Syrians should work?

What do you think makes it easier or more difficult to work with people from this country?

- Prompts: language, relations with coworkers, work outside of your occupation, different habits of workers on the job
- Is there any particular training that would help you in your work or help you find a different, more desirable job?

What do you think makes it easier or more difficult to work with Syrians in this country?

- Prompts: language, relations with coworkers, work outside of your occupation, different habits of workers on the job, Syrians are willing to accept lower wages
• To better adapt to working here, what should the Syrians do?
• Could particular types of training help overcome challenges to working with Syrians?

What kinds of policies and programs are needed to help everyone find jobs in this country?

• What is something that could be done to help migrant workers like yourselves?
• What is something that could be done to help all workers?
• What do you think is the biggest barrier to finding a job here?

Do you think that job opportunities for you could change in the future? If so, how?
What do you wish for? How would you like your life to be in the future?
Are there any other thoughts that you would like to share?
This appendix provides further details on the qualitative methods used in the study, in particular the focus group distribution in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. We conducted focus groups according to the distribution below in Table C.1 Focus groups were stratified by location and included both men and women. Individual groups included a range of employment status, housing types, education, and age (18–50).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
<th>Şanlıurfa</th>
<th>Adana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants (1)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian men (4)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian women (2)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish mixed gender (1)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish men (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish women (2)</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Amman</th>
<th>Zarqa</th>
<th>Mafraq</th>
<th>Zaatari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants (1)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian men (4)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian women (2)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian men (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordanian women (2)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Beirut/ Mount Lebanon</th>
<th>Bekaa Valley</th>
<th>Tripoli</th>
<th>South Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants (1)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian men (4)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian women (2)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese mixed gender (4)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This appendix provides further details on the quantitative methods used in the study; that is, the survey and sampling strategies used for both households and firms. It is worth reiterating that given time and resource constraints, we did not aim for these surveys to be representative or lead to population-level estimates. Rather, our aim was to achieve a broad-enough representation of refugees and firms, which would allow us to make informed recommendations broadly relevant to multiple segments of the populations.

In addition, this appendix also provides additional results from the household and firm surveys.

Household Sampling

The first step in the strategy for sampling Syrian refugee households was to select the geographic areas that will broadly represent the population of Syrian refugees in the country. The selection of geographic areas, in these cases governorates or provinces, was based on a number of factors:

1. A review of documentation and data on the concentration of Syrian refugees across the country and the location of industry that could provide opportunities for employment for both Syrian refugees and host-country workers.
2. Achieving the goal of broadly including both urban and rural communities as well as camps and informal settlements (where relevant).
3. Close consultation with survey partners in each country to incorporate local knowledge and experience.

As mentioned previously, the selection of governorates (in the case of Jordan and Lebanon) and provinces (in the case of Turkey) for the household survey was aligned with that used in the focus groups and in-depth interviews with firms so that the data collected through qualitative methods could inform the interpretation of the survey data and vice versa.

The main challenge with conducting a survey of Syrian refugees is the absence of a reliable sampling frame on which to base a robust sampling strategy. Only Jordan has conducted a recent population census that includes refugee households, and Syrian refugees living outside of camps can be widely dispersed among the local host-country population. Employing standard random sampling methods is close to infeasible, and aiming for it, say by attempting a complete count entails high costs, is impractical and is unlikely to yield desired results. To
address this issue, RAND and its survey partners developed sampling approaches that rely on systematic random sampling techniques to the extent possible but also incorporate information on commonly known but unpublished sources of information on the locations of Syrian refugees.1 This is illustrated in the description below of sampling dwellings such as apartment buildings on a neighborhood street and incorporating information from neighborhood sources such as local businesses and community-based organizations on the likelihood of the presence or absence of refugees in those buildings.

Within each governorate, districts with high concentrations of Syrian refugees were selected based on published statistics or common knowledge. In urban areas, districts were then divided into neighborhoods and streets, and systematic random sampling of residential buildings (in most cases, apartment buildings), was employed to conduct random walks with skip patterns within the buildings to recruit households to participate in the survey. Residences that were not known in the local neighborhoods to house Syrian refugee households were not included in the random walk. In Jordan, which is the only country with a significant camp-based Syrian refugee population, employing systematic random sampling of Syrian refugee households in the Zaatari camp setting proved to be more feasible and straightforward since Syrian refugees comprise the vast majority of camp residents.

Once a Syrian refugee household was successfully identified during the random walk, survey enumerators gathered basic information about the household composition to develop a roster of those within the household who are working, actively searching for work, or seriously intending to work should the situation become conducive to doing so. Slightly varying methodology was employed in each country to include or drop households from the sample, although the criteria for eligibility both for inclusion in the roster and in the random selection to complete the employment perceptions sections of the survey were consistent across each country to allow for cross-country comparisons to the extent possible. The eligibility criteria for inclusion in the study were as follows: (1) respondent must be at least 18 years of age; (2) currently working; or (3) not working, but actively searching for work or seriously intending to work. For households included in the sample, basic information such as age, employment status, and education was gathered about each household member meeting the eligibility criteria and entered into a roster. A person was then randomly selected from the roster and administered the remainder of the household questionnaire.

Turkey
The total population of Syrian refugees in Turkey is estimated to be over 3.5 million—home to the largest number of refugees among all three host countries. In Turkey, as in Jordan, households were sampled from specific provinces across the country based on Syrian refugee migration and settlement patterns. Turkey is a much larger country both in terms of population and geographic area compared with Jordan and Lebanon, and so capturing broader representation of Syrians presented more of a challenge. Syrian refugees are particularly highly concentrated in cities that border Turkey and Syria or that are in close proximity to Syria. We selected two provinces in this region—Şanlıurfa, which is largely rural, and Adana, which has a larger urban area and is more economically dynamic. In addition, we selected Istanbul, the country’s commercial and business hub; many Syrians have migrated to the city, and Istanbul hosts the largest absolute

1 RAND partnered with Market Research Organization in Jordan and Ipsos in Lebanon and Turkey.
number of Syrian refugees. Based on these selections, Syrian refugees residing in a large metropolitan area as well as smaller cities and rural communities were captured as part of the survey.

Each province in Turkey selected for the study received a share of the target sample size (600 households) based on the distribution of Syrians across the provinces (Table D.1). RAND’s survey partner in Turkey—Ipso—was able to obtain official numbers of Syrian refugees (based on data from 2017) at the district level for each province, although no information was available at more detailed geographic units such as neighborhoods.

Ipso’s team selected districts with high concentrations of Syrian refugees based on officially published statistics by the Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). The districts were then divided into neighborhoods, and Ipso assigned a maximum of 15 interviews in each neighborhood within a district. The number of neighborhoods was calculated based on the sample size in each province, which was 6 neighborhoods in Adana, 19 in Istanbul, and 16 in Şanlıurfa. Ipso then distributed the number of neighborhoods in line with the Syrian population in the selected districts.

Prior to randomly selecting the neighborhoods, districts were selected among those with a high concentration of Syrians based on published statistics. In Adana, 3 districts from urban areas (out of 5) and 1 district from rural area (out of 11) which host the highest number of Syrians were selected. These districts represent approximately 89 percent of Syrian community in Adana. In Istanbul, where many districts host Syrians, a 4-percent threshold rule was applied wherein districts in which a minimum of 4 percent of residents were Syrian were eligible for selection. Accordingly, 13 districts were eligible in Istanbul; the number of selected districts among eligible ones was 7. There was an exception for one district from the Anatolian side of Istanbul: in order to increase the coverage, one additional district was manually selected for the sampling, for a total of 8 districts. Almost half of Syrian refugees (46 percent) reside in those districts. Since there are no rural areas in Istanbul, all selected districts were urban. In Şanlıurfa, five districts were randomly selected among eight eligible, based on the 4-percent threshold rule, with three of the selected districts being from rural areas. One in two Syrians (54 percent) in Şanlıurfa lives in these selected five districts. The districts in each province and the number of neighborhoods in each selected district in the sample are listed in Table D.2.

The starting point within each neighborhood or district was located on a map (i.e., street), and enumerators then systematically sampled dwellings (typically apartment buildings) on those streets. Since there are no official data on the number of Syrians at the neighborhood level, the information on the neighborhoods was gathered from local teams based on experience with pre-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table D.1</th>
<th>Distribution of Syrians by Province and Type of Dwelling in Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Province</strong></td>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>548,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>473,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>188,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,210,340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*SOURCE: Population data from the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM).*
previous studies. Again, random selection was made for the neighborhoods before starting the fieldwork. The streets within the selected neighborhoods were then selected by the supervisor during the course of the fieldwork. In each street, the first building on the left side was visited. A maximum of two interviews were conducted in each building. After visiting the first building, the next one was skipped, and the enumerator team visited the third building, and so on. When the left side of the street was completed, the walking route continued in the right side. If no Syrians lived in a building, it was not visited, just skipped. Interviewers incorporated information from local business owners and other neighborhood establishments, if available, about the apartment buildings in order to exclude buildings from the sampling frame if there were no confirmed Syrians residing in them. Once selected, enumerators conducted random walks with a skip pattern within the buildings. If a sampled household was not available during the time of the random walk, the enumerator moved to the next household. Information about the outcome of each attempt was recorded and kept in a disposition file in order to assess degree of nonresponse bias.

In Istanbul, a slightly different approach was applied. Due to the negative perceptions of local residents toward the Syrian community, Syrian interviewers faced some difficulty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/District</th>
<th>Number of Neighborhoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Istanbul</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adana</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Şanlıurfa</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
visiting households during the pilots. In order to prevent any potential risk, the supervisors gathered information about the Syrian households when they were in the selected streets, and sent the interviewers to these households. To be in line with other provinces in terms of sampling methodology, similar procedures were followed for the order of household visits.

For successfully reached households, information about each eligible member of the household was collected to complete the roster. A randomly selected individual from the roster (using an application available on the enumerator’s CAPI device) was asked to complete the more comprehensive employment perceptions sections of the survey. If a randomly selected individual was not available during the time of the visit, the household was dropped and the enumerator team moved to the next household. The reason for dropping the household was recorded. Enumerators attempted to collect data during various times of the day and during various times of the week. In order to increase the probability that randomly selected participants, particularly those who are working, are available at the time of the visit, enumerators began data collection later in the day and ended later in the evening. Households with completed interviews (roster and employee perceptions) received an incentive worth $10.00.

Response rates ranged from a high of 63 percent in Şanlıurfa and 52 percent in Istanbul, to 44 percent in Adana (Table D.3). Of the 467 noncompleted surveys, 170 cases were due to the household declining to participate in the study. An additional 98 households reported no members who met the eligibility criteria for inclusion in the roster. In an additional 107 households, the head of the household or another adult who could provide information for the roster was not available at the time of the visit. In 92 cases, the enumerators received no response from the household during the attempt (no one answered the door). In addition to these non-completes, we also considered dropped households when the household responded, but the randomly selected person meeting criteria not available, or when the household responded, but none of the members met the selection criteria. There were a total of 41 cases of this occurring, with 20 dropped households in Istanbul, 9 in Şanlıurfa, and 12 in Adana. These were accounted for in the response rate calculation. The total number of noncompleted surveys that we used in our calculation was 508 (467 + 41).

The enumerators also recorded their inquiries about the presence of Syrians in the location. These are not included in the response rate calculations for the purposes of comparability across the host countries. In total, there were an additional 168 unsuccessful attempts due to lack of access to building (63 cases), no Syrians in the apartment (39 cases), no Syrians in the building (43 cases), and no Syrians living on the street (23 cases). The total number of unsuccessful interviews, including all attempts, was 676. The final sample size achieved was 602 successfully completed household rosters and respondent interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table D.3</th>
<th>Response Rate by Province in Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Completed Surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Noncompleted surveys included: (1) Household declined to participate; (2) No eligible household members; (3) Head of household or adult not present; and (4) No response from confirmed Syrians in the house.
Figure D.1
Average Household Size (age 18 and above and all members) in Turkey

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on 274 households in Istanbul, 235 in Şanlıurfa, and 93 in Adana. RAND RR2653-d.1

Turkey Additional Results

Household Size

The average size of households in our sample was similar across provinces (Figure D.1), particularly the number of members aged 18 and above.

All household members meeting the eligibility criteria were rostered: they had to be between the ages of 18 and 55, either working, or if not working, willing to work if they were provided the opportunity, and adults who have arrived in the host country since 2011. Across our sample, the total number of rostered individuals was 894. Of those, there were 725 males (81 percent) and 169 females (19 percent).

Income Sources

Households were asked about their income sources and could indicate that they received income from multiple sources (Figure D.2). The vast majority of sample households in Istanbul report income from a salary or cash for work of household members, and around 29 percent report income in the form of benefits from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization. On the other hand, close to 50 percent of households in Şanlıurfa report receiving income from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization, and only 43 percent report receiving funds from salary or cash work. In Adana, the most commonly cited source of income is salary and cash work, and fewer households report receiving benefits from the government, the United Nations, or other nongovernmental organization. A higher share of households sampled in Adana report receiving funds from other sources such as a business owned by the household, personal savings, or other. In general, Syrian refugees in Istanbul relied more on earning a livelihood based on salaries or cash for work, while dependence on...
government and United Nations benefits was highest in Şanlıurfa. This is also where unemployment among host-country workers is highest.

**Hours Worked**

Among those working, around 89 percent of respondents reported working between 8–13 hours per day, and just over 91 percent reported working between five to seven days per week (Figure D.3). When asked whether they are working more or less or about equal to their desired amount of work, close to 81 percent of respondents indicated that they are working more than their desired hours and 56 percent are working more than their desired days per week.

**Wages**

The long working hours and week among employed survey respondents may be indicative of the need to do so in order to earn a livelihood, especially given the low wages that they earn. Median wages from the respondent’s primary employment was reported as 1,500 Turkish lira ($322) per month in Istanbul, 800 Turkish lira ($172) per month in Şanlıurfa, and 1,000 Turkish lira ($214) per month in Adana (see Figure D.4).

**Obstacles to Work**

The more complete table of most frequently cited obstacles of work is provided in Table D.4.
Figure D.3
Hours Worked vs. Desired Hours per Day and Days per Week in Turkey

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 410 survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in questions D3 and D4 of the survey.

Figure D.4
Monthly Wages by Province in Turkey

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 227 currently working respondents in Istanbul, 94 currently working respondents in Şanlıurfa, and 55 currently working respondents in Adana for a total of 376 currently working survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in questions D3 and D4 of the survey.
Table D.4
The Top Obstacles to Finding Work in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
<th>Şanlıurfa</th>
<th>Adana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low wages in available jobs</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not speaking Turkish language or dialect,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication issues</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough jobs available</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit</td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(21%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No work experience</td>
<td>(13%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information about availability of work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not allowed to work in my field</td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td>(22%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough jobs available</td>
<td></td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td>(21%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td>(21%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low wages in available jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not speaking Turkish language or dialect,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication issues</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough jobs available</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low wages in available jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not speaking Turkish language or dialect,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication issues</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough jobs available</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 274 households in Istanbul, 235 in Şanlıurfa, and 93 in Adana. Survey respondents were asked to choose the top three obstacles. Percentages were calculated based on dividing the number of survey respondents who chose that obstacle by the total number of respondents by province. The top seven most frequently chosen obstacle are listed in the table.

Figure D.5
Willingness to Move to Be Matched to Suitable Work in Turkey

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 274 households in Istanbul, 235 in Şanlıurfa, and 93 in Adana. Willingness to move to a rural area in another province was combined with willingness to move to an urban area in another province.
**Willingness to Move**

Survey respondents were asked if they would be willing to move if they could be matched to suitable work elsewhere (see Figure D.5). The vast majority of respondents in Istanbul (80 percent) indicated that they would not be willing to move, and 50 percent of respondents in Şanlıurfa and 52 percent in Adana indicated that they would not be willing to move. A greater share of respondents in Şanlıurfa (31 percent) compared with Adana (18 percent) and Istanbul (11 percent) indicated that they would be willing to move to anywhere to be matched to a suitable job.

**Jordan**

Based on the population census conducted in 2015, the Department of Statistics in Jordan reports that 1.26 million Syrians reside in Jordan, of which 725,073 reside in the four geographic areas selected for the study (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2016a). Each governorate included in the study received a share of the target sample size (600 households) based on the distribution of Syrian refugee population across the three governorates and the camp chosen for the study (Table D.5). RAND’s survey partner in Jordan, the Market Research Organization (MRO), compiled a list of districts and neighborhoods within those districts in each governorate, including districts in the Zaatari camp, with the population in each district and neighborhood. The Department of Statistics in Jordan publishes information on the distribution of Syrian residents at the governorate, district, subdistrict, and neighborhood levels. Districts were then selected and then neighborhoods within those districts based on three main factors: (1) indicators of a high share of Syrian refugees relative to the total population in the district and neighborhood (i.e., a high concentration of refugees); (2) inclusion of both urban and rural communities to ensure a broad representation of circumstances facing Syrian refugees in the governorate; and (3) logistical considerations given time and resources to conduct the data collection. The number of households in the sample assigned to each governorate or camp was then divided between the selected districts and neighborhoods roughly proportional to their size.

The availability of published statistics in Jordan on the types of communities that Syrians live in allowed us to incorporate additional selection criteria in the geographic sampling. Our

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate/Camp</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Sample Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>428,668</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>117,558</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>66,069</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaatari Camp</td>
<td>112,778</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>725,073</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2 The Jordanian Department of Statistics defines a locality as rural if the number of residents in that locality is 5,000 persons or fewer.
survey partner, MRO, examined the concentration of Syrian refugees in the districts of each governorate and excluded districts with low population density or concentration of Syrian refugees. Table D.6 provides information on the population of Syrian refugees by governorate when only districts with a high concentration of Syrian refugees are included. We find that, for example, in governorates such as Mafraq and Zarqa, a significant share of Syrian refugees (more than a third in both cases) live in rural districts. The final sampling distribution generally reflects this breakdown, though there is an oversampling of rural districts. The oversampling of rural districts is at least partially accounted for by the inclusion of rural districts in Amman, despite close to 100 percent of the districts in Amman with high concentrations of Syrians being urban.

Table D.6
Distribution of Syrians by Chosen Urban-Rural Districts in the Population and Final Sample in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate/Camp</th>
<th>Population of Syrian Refugees in Selected Districts with High Concentrations of Syrian Refugees</th>
<th>Final Sampling Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman (select districts)</td>
<td>200,708</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa (select districts)</td>
<td>41,986</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq (select districts)</td>
<td>24,342</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaatari Camp</td>
<td>112,778</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (select districts)</td>
<td>379,814</td>
<td>356,223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: *The number of households in the Zaatari camp are counted in the urban category for the total.

Within each neighborhood, the starting point was located on a map (i.e., street), and enumerators then systematically sampled dwellings on those streets. Interviewers incorporated information from local business owners and other neighborhood establishments about the likely presence or absence of Syrian refugees and excluded dwellings with no confirmed Syrians residing in them. This was done to ensure the survey could be conducted within the time line and budget parameters. Within the systematically selected dwellings (typically apartment buildings), enumerators conducted random walks with a skip pattern within each building. If a sampled household was not available during the time of the random walk, two additional attempts to reach the households were made. In order to assess degree of nonresponse bias, a disposition file was maintained to record each attempt to reach a household, whether it was successful or not. For successfully reached households, information about the household was collected to complete a roster. Only individuals who met the eligibility criteria were included in the roster. A randomly selected individual from the roster (using a Kish grid) was then asked to complete the more comprehensive employment perceptions sections of the survey. If a randomly selected individual was not available during the time of the visit, two additional attempts were made to reach them before the household was dropped from the sample. In order to increase the probability that randomly selected participants, particularly those who are working, would be available at the time of the visit, enumerators began data collection later in the day and ended later in the evening. Households with completed interviews (roster and employee perceptions) received an incentive (a phone card) worth JD 2.75 (about $4.00).

Table D.7 provides the response rates by governorate. Out of 863 attempts, 586 attempts resulted in a household response at the first attempt and rostering of household members and
successfully completed interviews. An additional 14 households were not available during the first attempt but were subsequently available at a future attempt and also resulted in household rostering and successful interviews. These attempts constituted the completed 600 surveys of our sample. In terms of the additional 263 unsuccessful results, 231 households were available during the initial visit but either did not have any household members who met the criteria for inclusion, or they declined to participate in the study. Out of the remaining 32 households, 22 were successfully reached at the first attempt and rostering commenced but did not result in a successfully completed interview because the randomly selected survey respondent declined to be included in the study. Finally, out of the ten remaining unsuccessful attempts, the household was not available initially, but after follow-up either the randomly selected person was not available or they declined to be included in the study.

Jordan Additional Results

Household Size

The average size of households in our sample varied somewhat across governorates and in particular, the total number of household members including children under the age of 18 (see Figure D.6). Households in Zarqa and Mafraq tended to be somewhat larger than households in Amman and Zaatari. There were relatively small differences across geographic areas in terms of the number of household members over the age of 18.

All household members meeting the eligibility criteria were rostered: they had to be between the ages of 18 and 55, either working or, if not working, willing to work if they were provided the opportunity, and had to have arrived in the host country since 2011. Across our sample, the total number of eligible household members was 974. Of those, there were 629 males (65 percent) and 345 females (35 percent).

Income Sources

Households were asked about their income sources (Figure D.7) and could indicate that they received income from multiple sources. The share of households in Amman, Zarqa, and Mafraq that reported receiving salary or cash for work was all just over 60 percent, while nearly 78 percent of households in Zaatari reported receiving salary or cash for work. Approximately 96 percent of households in Zaatari also reported receiving benefits from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization which is expected given the camp context. Less than half of households in Amman, Zarqa, or Mafraq reported receiving these types of benefits. Across all governorates, a significant share of households reported receiving funds from “other” sources, including up to 96 percent of households in Mafraq. In most cases, these are referred to as “coupons,” and these are either used to acquire food staples,
Figure D.6
Average Household Size (age 18 and above and all members) in Jordan

![Chart showing average household size by province in Jordan.]

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 370 households in Amman, 80 in Zarqa, 50 in Mafraq, and 100 in Zaatari.

Figure D.7
Household Income Sources in Jordan

![Chart showing percentage of households by income source in Jordan.]

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 367 households in Amman (one doesn’t know, two refused to answer), 80 in Zarqa, 50 in Mafraq, and 100 in Zaatari. Multiple responses were allowed so percentages exceed 100 percent and are based on the share of households in each province that selected that income source.
or, in some cases, are replaced with cash at a nearby supermarket or hypermarket at a portion of their value.

**Hours Worked**

Among those working, around 93 percent of respondents reported working between 5–12 hours per day (Figure D.8). Around 94 percent of employed respondents report working four to seven days per week with the remaining two to three days per week. When asked whether they were working more or less or about equal to their desired amount of work, around 48 percent of respondents indicated that they are working more than their desired hours per day while 42 reported that they are working about the number of days per week as they would like.

**Wages**

Syrian refugee survey respondents report relatively low wages. Median wages from the respondent’s primary employment was reported as 240 Jordanian dinars ($338) per month in Amman, 200 Jordanian dinars ($282) per month in Zarqa and Zaatari, and 210 Jordanian dinars ($296) in Mafraq (see Figure D.9).³

**Obstacles to Work**

The more complete table of most frequently cited obstacles of work is provided in Table D.8.

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³ The minimum wage for Jordanians was recently increased from JD 190 to JD 220 (Tabazah, 2018).
Figure D.9
Monthly Wages by Governorate in Jordan

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on 174 currently employed respondents in Amman, 21 in Zarqa, 11 in Mafraq, and 55 in Zaatari, for a total of 261 (out of 265) currently employed survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in D3 and D4 of the survey.

Table D.8
Top Obstacles to Finding Work in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle</th>
<th>Amman (%)</th>
<th>Zarqa (%)</th>
<th>Mafraq (%)</th>
<th>Zaatari (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not enough jobs available</td>
<td>(53%)</td>
<td>(51%)</td>
<td>(48%)</td>
<td>(78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low wages in available jobs</td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(46%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td>(37%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(44%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit</td>
<td>(33%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No work experience</td>
<td>(15%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(16%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not allowed to work in my field</td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(16%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor working conditions in available jobs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(34%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No suitable training opportunities</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(14%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on 370 survey respondents in Amman, 80 in Zarqa, 50 in Mafraq, and 100 in Zaatari. Survey respondents were asked to choose the top three obstacles. Percentages were calculated based on dividing the number of survey respondents who chose that obstacle by the total number of respondents by governorate. The top seven most frequently chosen obstacle are listed in the table.
Willingness to Move

Survey respondents were asked if they would be willing to move if they could be matched to suitable work elsewhere (Figure D.10). Over 54 percent of respondents in Amman, 48 percent of respondents in Zarqa, and 43 percent of respondents in Zaatari would not be willing to move from their location for work. On the other hand, around 32 percent of respondents in Mafraq would be willing to move anywhere in Jordan to find suitable work.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, households were sampled from governorates across the country rather than from specific governorates as was the case in Jordan and Turkey. There are eight governorates in Lebanon, two in the north (North Lebanon and Akkar), two in the south (South Lebanon and Nabatiyeh), two in the east (Baalbeck-Hermel and the Bekaa Valley), and two along the central coast (Beirut and Mount Lebanon). For the purposes of the sampling, a regional approach was taken, and households were drawn from each of the following areas: Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the Bekaa (including Baalbeck and Zahle), the North (including Tripoli and Akkar), and the South.

Government agencies in Lebanon do not formally collect information on the number of Syrians, and published statistics reported tend to vary widely as a result. UNHCR estimates that there are 1 million Syrian refugees, while the Lebanese government estimates close to 1.5 million. The distribution of Syrian residents is only available by governorate but not by district or neighborhood. RAND’s survey partner in Lebanon—IpsoS—has compiled estimates on the distribution of Syrian households by dwelling type, including regular dwelling (apartment, house), informal settlement, and camp setting. Each region in Lebanon
Table D.9
Distribution of Syrians by Governorate and Type of Dwelling in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th></th>
<th>Sample Achieved</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut and Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>268,788</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>358,384</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>248,878</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>119,461</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>995,512</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

received a share of the target sample size (600 households) based on the distribution of Syrians across the four geographic areas and dwelling type (Table D.9). Districts were then selected and then neighborhoods were selected within those districts based on knowledge of the districts and neighborhoods and likelihood of concentration of Syrian households. The sample assigned to each area was then divided proportionately to the selected districts and neighborhoods.

Similar to Jordan, within each neighborhood, the starting point within each neighborhood or district was located on a map (i.e., street), and enumerators then systematically sampled dwellings (typically apartment buildings) on those streets. Interviewers incorporated information from local business owners and other neighborhood establishments, if available, about the dwellings in order to leave out dwellings from the sampling frame with no confirmed Syrians residing in them. Once buildings were selected, enumerators conducted random walks within each building. If a sampled household was not available during the time of the random walk, the enumerator moved on to the next household. Information about the outcome of each attempt was recorded and kept in a separate disposition file in order to assess degree of nonresponse bias. For successfully reached households, information about each member of the household meeting the eligibility criteria was collected to complete the roster. A randomly selected individual from the roster (using an application available on the enumerator’s Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing [CAPI] device) was asked to complete the more comprehensive employment perceptions sections of the survey. If a randomly selected individual was not available during the time of the visit, the entire household was dropped, and the enumerator moved on to the next household. The reason for dropping the household was recorded. Enumerators attempted to collect data during various times of the day and during various times of the week. In order to increase the probability that randomly selected participants, particularly those who are working, would be available at the time of the visit, enumerators began data collection later in the day and ended later in the evening. Households with completed interviews (roster and employee perceptions) received an incentive (a phone card) worth $12.00.

Table D.10 provides the response rates by governorate. Out of the 115 unsuccessful attempts, 39 households declined to be interviewed. An additional 12 households were not available at the time of the initial visit, and in an additional 43 attempts, the randomly selected person from the roster was not available at the time of the visit. Out of the 43 attempts where the randomly selected person was not available, they were either at work (28 out of 43), not at work but not at home (12 out of 43), and in three cases, nothing was recorded on their status. For
the remaining 21 unsuccessful attempts, in 16 out of 21 cases, none of the household members met the selection criteria; in the remaining 5 cases, the randomly selected person refused to be interviewed.

**Lebanon Additional Results**

**Household Size**

The average size of households in our sample varied somewhat across provinces, particularly the total number of household members including children under the age of 18 (Figure D.11). Beirut stands out as having smaller average household size, and this is not surprising given the urban
setting. The size of households in the North was slightly larger than the remaining governorates which averaged around five individuals per household.

Roster information was collected from all household members meeting the following eligibility criteria: adults between the ages of 18 and 55, either working, or if not working, willing to work if they were provided the opportunity, and adults who have arrived in the host country since 2011. Across our sample, the total number of rostered individuals was 810. Of those, there were 618 males (76 percent) and 192 females (24 percent). The share of male and females in the household rosters varied somewhat by governorate with a higher proportion of females in Beirut (33 percent) compared with the other governorates at 20 percent in Mount Lebanon, 22 percent in the Bekaa, 27 percent in the North, and 25 percent in the South.

**Income Sources**

Households were asked about their income sources and could indicate that they received income from multiple sources. All households sampled in Beirut reported income from a salary or cash for work of household members, and only two households in Beirut reported income in the form of benefits from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization. In Mount Lebanon, 98 percent households reported income from a salary or cash for work of household members, while 8 percent reported income in the form of benefits from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization. In the Bekaa, over a third of households reported receiving income in the form of funds from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization. In the South, the vast majority of households reported income from salary or cash work, and 13 percent or nine households report benefits from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization. In contrast, in the North, 44 percent of households report receiving benefits from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization, and 51 percent reported receiving income from a business or entity and business owned by the household, or from savings, or from “other” sources. It is important to note that small sample sizes may be accounting for at least some the wide variation in the results shown in Figure D.12.

**Hours Worked**

Among those working, around 80 percent of respondents reported working between 7–12 hours per day (see Figure D.13). The range of days worked varies with around 67 percent working from five to seven days per week with 33 percent working less than four or fewer days a week. When asked whether they were working more or less or about equal to their desired amount of work, around 46 percent of respondents indicated that they are working more than their desired hours per day while 38 reported that they are working fewer days per week than desired.

**Wages**

Long working hours among employed survey respondents may be indicative of the need to do so in order to earn a livelihood, especially given the limited number of days per week that survey respondents reported working. This is also apparent in the relatively low wages that they earn.4 Median wages from the respondent’s primary employment was reported as 700,000 Lebanese pounds (LBP) ($462) per month in Beirut, 600,000 LBP ($396) per month in Mount Lebanon,

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4 As of 2008, the minimum wage in Lebanon was 500,000 LBP per month (Embassy of Lebanon, n.d.).
Figure D.12
Household Income Sources in Lebanon

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 30 households in Beirut, 215 in the Bekaa (one missing response), 131 in Mount Lebanon (one missing response), 149 in the North (one missing response), and 72 in the South. Multiple responses were allowed so percentages exceed 100 percent and are based on the share of households in each province that selected that income source.

Figure D.13
Hours Worked vs. Desired Hours per Day and Days per Week in Lebanon

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 464 currently employed survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in questions D3 and D4 of the survey.
Figure D.14
Median Monthly Wages by Governorate in Lebanon

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 22 currently employed respondents in Beirut, 99 in Mount Lebanon, 182 in the Bekaa, 101 in the North, and 56 in the South for a total of 460 currently employed survey respondents who responded that they are either working or temporarily absent in questions D3 and D4 of the survey.

Table D.11
Top Obstacles to Finding Work in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beirut</th>
<th>Bekaa</th>
<th>Mount Lebanon</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (62%)</td>
<td>No work experience (36%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit (61%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency (45%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency (63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low wages in available jobs (40%)</td>
<td>Low wages in available jobs (40%)</td>
<td>Low wages in available jobs (27%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (37%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit (29%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No work experience (33%)</td>
<td>No work experience (36%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (37%)</td>
<td>Difficult to get a work permit (29%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (35%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency</td>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency (54%)</td>
<td>No work experience (37%)</td>
<td>Not enough jobs available (21%)</td>
<td>Lack of information about availability of work (14%)</td>
<td>Not work experience (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not allowed to work in my field</td>
<td>Difficult to get legal residency (26%)</td>
<td>No work experience (21%)</td>
<td>Lack of information about availability of work (14%)</td>
<td>No work experience (24%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low wages in available jobs</td>
<td>Not allowed to work in my field (13%)</td>
<td>Poor working conditions (19%)</td>
<td>Low wages in available jobs (14%)</td>
<td>Mismatch in education (18%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mismatch in education (13%)</td>
<td>No suitable training opportunities (12%)</td>
<td>Discriminatory practices (18%)</td>
<td>Mismatch in education (11%)</td>
<td>Poor working conditions (17%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Survey respondents were asked to choose the top three obstacles. Percentages were calculated based on dividing the number of survey respondents who chose that obstacle by the total number of respondents by governorate. The top seven most frequently chosen obstacles are listed in the table. Results are based on 30 survey respondents in Beirut, 216 in the Bekaa, 132 in Mount Lebanon, 150 in the North, and 72 in the South.
500,000 LBP ($330) in the South, 400,000 LBP in the North ($264), and 300,000 LBP in the Bekaa ($198) (see Figure D.14).

**Obstacles to Work**

The more complete table of most frequently cited obstacles of work is provided in Table D.11.

**Willingness to Move**

Survey respondents were asked if they would be willing to move if they could be matched to suitable work elsewhere (see Figure D.15). The majority of respondents in Beirut (67 percent), Mount Lebanon (59 percent), the North (59 percent), and the South (61 percent) would not be willing to move from their location for work. However, 34 percent of respondents in the Bekaa, 32 percent of respondents in Mount Lebanon, 26 percent of respondents in the South, 22 percent of respondents in the North, and 20 percent of respondents in Beirut would be willing to move anywhere in Lebanon if they were matched to suitable work elsewhere in the country. Possible reasons why respondents may be expressing concerns about moving include wanting to remain close to connections and networks that they have formed, as well as possibly concerns about safety and security and its effect on mobility for those who lack a residency permit.

**Figure D.15**

Willingness to Move to Be Matched to Suitable Work in Lebanon

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on 30 survey respondents in Beirut, 216 in the Bekaa, 132 in Mount Lebanon, 150 in the North, and 72 in the South. Willingness to move to a rural area in another governorate was combined with willingness to move to an urban area in another governorate.

**Firm Sampling**

Our sampling strategy targeted firms in the same regions where refugee households were sampled, since these firms are more likely to have exposure to Syrian refugees and to be among those in which the Syrians search for jobs. For each country, we obtained information on the distribution of employment by industry, region, and firm size. The availability of data differed
Details on Survey and Sampling Methodology and Additional Survey Results

across the countries; in each case, we used the most recent and most disaggregated data we could obtain. We also consulted available sources of information on the industries Syrian refugees are currently working in, both formally and informally.

In each country, we included the construction, the wholesale and retail trade, and the hotel and restaurant industries, as each one accounts for a large share of employment among the native population, and evidence suggests that there are many Syrians working in these sectors. We also included several manufacturing industries; the specific selection was based on those industries already prevalent in each country.

Within each industry, we also targeted firms in each of three size categories, where we defined small firms as those with 1–19 employees; mid-sized firms as those with 20–99 employees; and large firms as those with 100 or more employees. In each country, we targeted a total of 100 small firms and 50 mid-sized to large firms.

Consistent with the definition of a firm, firm size was based on the total number of employees in all of the firm’s locations in the host country. In all three countries, most firms reported only one location. For firms with multiple locations, we aimed to interview a respondent who was knowledgeable about employment across locations, and the results presented here pertain to the firm as a whole (rather than a specific establishment of the firm). When data are presented by province or governorate, this refers to the province or governorate in which the survey was conducted, even if the firm has locations in multiple provinces or governorates.

We used different methods to identify specific firms to survey in each country. For larger firms, we used available lists of firms by industry, either from officially available statistics or lists compiled by our survey partners. Firms in the targeted industries were randomly selected from the list; the enumerator called to request an interview from an appropriate person, such as the human resources manager. If the number was no longer valid, someone appropriate could not be reached, or the potential respondent refused, the firm was dropped and the unsuccessful attempt was recorded. For smaller firms, the enumerators used a random walk with a skip pattern to identify firms. If a selected firm met the sampling criteria, the enumerator would attempt to interview a knowledgeable person (often the owner or manager). If the firm did not meet the sampling criteria, a knowledgeable person was not available, or the respondent refused, the firm was dropped and the unsuccessful attempt was recorded.

Turkey

In Turkey, we sampled firms in Adana, Istanbul, and Şanlıurfa, following the refugee sample. We identified the distribution of employment by province in 2016 and split the samples of small firms and of mid-sized and large firms across provinces according to the distribution of employment.

We also identified the distribution of employment by industry and firm size at a national level. Within each province, we split the sample across industries in accordance with the industrial distribution of employment at a national level. We did this split separately for small, mid-sized, and large firms, using the distribution of employment by industry and firm size.6

Given the importance of special economic zones (called Organized Industrial Zones [OIZs]) in manufacturing in Turkey, we set targets separately for large manufacturing firms

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5 In keeping with International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) codes, this industry also includes repair of motor vehicles.

6 After allocating the sample, we made some minor adjustments to address industry-size cells with no targeted firms.
inside and outside the zones. Given the small footprint of manufacturing, and of large firms in general in Adana and Şanlıurfa, we targeted all large manufacturing firms to be in OIZs in those provinces. In Istanbul, we split the sample of large manufacturing firms approximately evenly between OIZs and other areas.

Tables D.12 and D.13 show the number of successfully completed firm surveys and the nonresponse rates in Turkey.

**Table D.12**

Successfully Completed Firm Surveys in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
<th>Adana</th>
<th>Şanlıurfa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small firms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile, garment, and apparel manuf.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufacturing</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total small firms</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Midsized firms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile, garment, and apparel manuf.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufacturing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total midsized firms</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Large firms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile, garment, and apparel manuf.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufacturing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total large firms</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td>105</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:** Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Nearly all sampling targets in Turkey were met or exceeded. In the following instances, additional firms (beyond the original sampling targets) were included: in Istanbul, one additional small firm in other manufacturing and two additional firms in construction (one small, one midsized); in Şanlıurfa, one additional small firm in manufacturing, one additional midsized firm in hotels and restaurants (offsetting one fewer small firm in hotels and restaurants), and one additional large firm in services; in Adana, one additional small firm in hotels and restaurants and one additional midsized firm in food and beverage manufacturing.
Turkey Additional Results

The average share of female workers among firms in the sample was twice as high among midsized and large firms than among small firms, and was particularly high among food and beverage manufacturers as well as textile/garment/apparel manufacturers (Figure D.16). The share did not vary in a statistically significant manner across provinces.

Table D.14 lists the five most commonly identified recruiting channels for highly skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, as well as for Syrians (of all skill levels).

Table D.15 lists the five most commonly identified difficulties associated with hiring highly skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, among those firms that indicated any difficulties in hiring each type of worker.

Most firms anticipated no changes in employment over the next 12 months (Figure D.17). Approximately similar numbers anticipated increases as anticipated decreases in each type of employment.

### Table D.13

**Nonresponse in Turkey**

**Panel A: By province**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Completed Surveys</th>
<th>Noncompleted Surveys</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B: By firm size**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Completed Surveys</th>
<th>Noncompleted Surveys</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midsized</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel C: By industry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Completed Surveys</th>
<th>Noncompleted Surveys</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile/garment/apparel manufacturing</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufacturing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade/Repair of motor vehicles</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the above</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:** Authors’ calculations are based on survey data.
Figure D.16
Share of Female Employment in Turkey

Panel A: By province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Average percentage female employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şanlıurfa</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: By firm size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm Size</th>
<th>Average percentage female employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midsized/large</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: By industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Average percentage female employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile/garment/apparel</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufacturing</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade/motor vehicle repair</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on survey data. The average share of female workers is calculated by dividing the number of female workers by the total number of workers within each firm, and then taking the average across the 157 firms in the sample. An ANOVA test rejects that the share of female workers is equal across firm size and across industry at the 1 percent level of statistical significance but fails to reject that the share of female workers is equal across provinces.

Table D.14
Most Commonly Identified Recruiting Channels in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Skilled (Number of Firms = 21)</th>
<th>Semiskilled (Number of Firms = 70)</th>
<th>Unskilled (Number of Firms = 52)</th>
<th>Syrians (Number of Firms = 43)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ask current employees for recommendations</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive direct applications from applicants at workplace (factory, shop, facility)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go through intermediary</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask current employees for recommendations</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place job advertisements on the Internet, including Kariyer.net and LinkedIn</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with government agency or organization</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place job advertisements in newspapers</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Only firms that had tried to fill a position with a certain skill level over the past 12 months were asked about recruiting channels for that type of position (21 firms for highly skilled, 70 firms for semiskilled, 52 firms for unskilled). Only the 43 firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey or had previously recruited Syrians were asked about recruiting channels for Syrians. Multiple responses could be provided. Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of firms that selected the given response by the total number of responding firms.
Table D.15
Top Five Hiring Difficulties in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Highly Skilled (Number of Firms = 12)</th>
<th>Semiskilled (Number of Firms = 26)</th>
<th>Unskilled (Number of Firms = 8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not enough applicants</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary</td>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>experience</td>
<td>skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants lack the</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>Not enough applicants</td>
<td>Not enough applicants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessary experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants lack the</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary</td>
<td>Applicants are not willing to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessary skills</td>
<td></td>
<td>experience</td>
<td>do required tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants want</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>Applicants want higher salary</td>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher salary than firm</td>
<td></td>
<td>than firm can offer</td>
<td>experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can offer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants lack the</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>(Tie) Applicants lack the necessary</td>
<td>Applicants want higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessary education</td>
<td></td>
<td>education/applicants are not</td>
<td>salary than firm can offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>willing to do the required tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Only firms that had indicated difficulty in trying to fill a position were asked about what difficulties they faced (12 firms for highly skilled, 26 firms for semiskilled, 8 firms for unskilled). Multiple responses could be provided. Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of firms that selected the given response by the total number of responding firms.

Figure D.17
Anticipated Changes in Employment by Province and Firm Size in Turkey

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Percent of firms that anticipated an increase, a decrease, or no change in the number of workers in highly skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled positions, excluding “do not know” responses. Number of firms responding is 152 for highly skilled positions, 153 for semiskilled positions, and 154 for unskilled positions.

Small firms were substantially more likely than midsized and large firms to perceive no difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians (Figure D.18). The share of firms perceiving no difficulties did not vary substantially by province or industry.

Table D.16 shows the top five perceived difficulties for obtaining a work permit for Syrians, among firms that identified specific perceived difficulties.
Figure D.18
Percent of Firms Indicating No Difficulty with Work Permits for Syrians in Turkey

Panel A: By province
Panel B: By firm size
Panel C: By industry

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Share of firms that indicated that they did not perceive any difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians as a share of total number of firms, excluding those that responded “do not know” or refused to answer (by province: 82 in Istanbul, 15 in Şanlıurfa, 24 in Adana; by firm size: 80 small, 41 midsized and large; by industry: 9 in food and beverage manufacturing, 10 in textile/garment/apparel manufacturing, 21 in other manufacturing, 18 in construction, 49 in wholesale and retail trade, and 14 in hotels and restaurants). A Pearson’s chi-squared test rejects that the distribution of firms perceiving no difficulties is equal across firm sizes at the 1 percent level, but fails to reject that it is different across provinces or industries at the 10 percent level.

Table D.16
Top Five Work Permit Difficulties in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permit applications take a long time</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees may not have required residency permit</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information about how to apply for permit</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permit only valid for a short period of time</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tie) Permits not given for particular occupations/ complicated procedures to apply for permit</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Only 28 firms that had indicated any perceived difficulty in obtaining a work permit are included.
Jordan
In Jordan, we sampled firms in Amman, Mafraq, and Zarqa, following the refugee sample. A key aim of the Jordan Compact is to offer exporting firms operating in certain manufacturing industries in special economic zones an incentive to hire Syrians, by relaxing the ROO requirements for certain exports. Therefore, we began by targeting five large firms in the textiles/garments/apparel manufacturing or chemicals/pharmaceuticals manufacturing industries in eligible zones in each governorate.

We identified the distribution of employment by industry, within each targeted governorate in 2016. For Amman and Zarqa, we split the sample of small firms, and the remaining sample of midsized and large firms (after removing the five large firms already selected) based on the governorate’s relative share of employment. Mafraq presents a different environment than the other two governorates, because it has a relatively small share of local employment but a large number of Syrians. Thus, in Mafraq we targeted five large firms in the textiles/garments/apparel manufacturing and chemicals/pharmaceuticals manufacturing industries in the King Hussein Bin Talal Development Zone-Mafraq (including Mafraq Industrial City). We did not target any midsized or small firms in this governorate.

Table D.17
Successfully Completed Firm Surveys in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Amman</th>
<th>Zarqa</th>
<th>Mafraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small firms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile/garment/apparel manufacturing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical/pharmaceutical manufacturing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total small firms</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midsized firms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile/garment/apparel manufacturing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical/pharmaceutical manufacturing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total midsized firms</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large firms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile/garment/apparel manufacturing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical/pharmaceutical manufacturing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total large firms</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td>107</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. All sampling targets in Jordan were met.
Table D.18  
Nonresponse in Jordan  

**Panel A: By governorate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Completed Surveys</th>
<th>Noncompleted Surveys</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B: By firm size**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Completed Surveys</th>
<th>Noncompleted Surveys</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midsized</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel C: By industry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Completed Surveys</th>
<th>Noncompleted Surveys</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile/garment/apparel manufacturing</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical/pharmaceutical manufacturing</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade/repair of motor vehicles</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:** Authors’ calculations are based on survey data.

We also identified the distribution of private sector employment by firm size in 2014 at a national level. We cross-cut this distribution with the distribution of employment by governorate to estimate the distribution of employment by industry and by firm size, within the Amman and Zarqa governorates. We then allocated the number of firms approximately in proportion to this distribution.

Tables D.17 and D.18 show the number of successfully completed firm surveys, and the nonresponse rates, in Jordan.

**Jordan Additional Results**
The share of female workers among firms in the sample varies significantly by governorate, firm size, and industry. Midsized and large firms had a higher share of female workers than small firms, and the highest average shares of female employment in the sample were found in textile/garment/apparel and chemical/pharmaceutical manufacturing firms (Figure D.19). The share of female workers was higher in Zarqa and Mafraq than in Amman; in Mafraq in particular, this is likely because all five firms in the sample were large manufacturers.

Table D.19 lists the five most commonly identified recruiting channels for highly skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, as well as for Syrians (of all skill levels).
Figure D.19
Share of Female Employment in Jordan

Panel A: By Governorate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Average % female employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: By firm size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm size</th>
<th>Average % female employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midsized/large</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: By industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Average % female employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile/apparel/manufacturing</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical/pharmaceutical manufacturing</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale/retail/motor vehicle repair</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. The average share of female workers is calculated by dividing the number of female workers by the total number of workers within each firm, and then taking the average across the 150 firms in the sample. An ANOVA test rejects that the share of female workers is equal across firm size and across industry at the 1 percent level of statistical significance, and at the 10 percent level across governorates.

Table D.20 lists the five most commonly identified difficulties associated with hiring highly skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, among those firms that indicated any difficulties in hiring each type of worker. The number of firms indicating difficulties in hiring highly skilled and unskilled workers was low, and fewer than five different responses were provided.

The main text showed anticipated changes in employment by industry; Figure D.20 shows anticipated changes by governorate and firm size.

Small firms were less likely than midsized and large firms to perceive no difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians (Figure D.21). The share of firms perceiving no difficulties also varied in a statistically significant manner by governorate, but not by industry.

Table D.21 shows the top five perceived difficulties for obtaining a work permit for Syrians, among firms that identified specific perceived difficulties.
Table D.19
Most Commonly Identified Recruiting Channels in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Highly Skilled (Number of Firms = 20)</th>
<th>Semiskilled (Number of Firms = 78)</th>
<th>Unskilled (Number of Firms = 73)</th>
<th>Syrians (Number of Firms = 69)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receive direct</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>applications from</td>
<td>applications from</td>
<td>applications from</td>
<td>applications from</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>applicants at</td>
<td>workplace (factory, shop, facility)</td>
<td>workplace (factory, shop, facility)</td>
<td>workplace (factory, shop, facility)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place job</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advertisements</td>
<td></td>
<td>Go through intermediary</td>
<td>Ask current employees for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on the Internet,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>recommendations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including LinkedIn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place announcement</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and advertisement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Go through intermediary</td>
<td>Place announcement and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on information board</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>advertisement on information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of public place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>board of public place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask current</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employees for</td>
<td></td>
<td>Place announcement and</td>
<td>Place announcement and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recommendations</td>
<td></td>
<td>advertisement on information</td>
<td>advertisement on information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>board of public place</td>
<td>board of public place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tie) Work with</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chamber of commerce</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ask current employees for</td>
<td>Place job advertisement on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or chamber of</td>
<td></td>
<td>recommendations</td>
<td>the Internet,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industry/go through</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>including LinkedIn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intermediary/ask</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other firm owners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or managers for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recommendations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Only firms that had tried to fill a position with a certain skill level over the past 12 months were asked about recruiting channels for that type of position (20 firms for highly skilled, 78 firms for semiskilled, 73 firms for unskilled). Only the 69 firms that had Syrian workers at the time of the survey or had previously recruited Syrians were asked about recruiting channels for Syrians. Multiple responses could be provided. Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of firms that selected the given response by the total number of responding firms.
Table D.20
Top Five Hiring Difficulties in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Skilled (Number of Firms = 2)</th>
<th>Semiskilled (Number of Firms = 13)</th>
<th>Unskilled (Number of Firms = 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary skills</td>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary experience</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary experience</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary skills</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough applicants</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tie) Applicants are not willing to work required hours/applicants want more benefits than firm can offer</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Only firms that had indicated difficulty in trying to fill a position were asked about what difficulties they faced (two firms for highly skilled, 13 firms for semiskilled, five firms for unskilled). Multiple responses could be provided. Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of firms that selected the given response by the total number of responding firms.

Figure D.20
Anticipated Changes in Employment by Governorate and Firm Size in Jordan

Panel A: Increase by governorate
Panel B: Decrease by governorate
Panel C: Increase by firm size
Panel D: Decrease by firm size

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Percent of firms that anticipated an increase or decrease in the number of highly skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled employees. Number of firms included by governorate: 101 Amman, 35 in Zarqa, 4 in Mafraq; by firm size: 95 small, 49 midsized/large. Pearson’s chi-squared tests reject that the share of firms indicating an increase in semiskilled and unskilled employment is equal across governorates at the 1 percent significance level; that the increase in highly skilled and semiskilled employment is equal across firm size at the 5 percent level; that the increase in unskilled employment is equal across firm size at the 1 percent level; and that the decrease in semiskilled employment is equal across firm size at the 1 percent level. Other differences across governorate and firm size are not significant at the 10 percent level.
Figure D.21
Percent of Firms Indicating No Difficulty with Work Permits for Syrians in Jordan

Panel A: By governorate

Panel B: By firm size

Panel C: By industry

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Share of firms that indicated that they did not perceive any difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians, as a share of total number of firms excluding those that responded “do not know” or refused to answer (by governorate: 82 in Amman, 35 in Zarqa, 4 in Mafraq; by firm size: 76 small, 45 midsized and large; by industry: 17 in food and beverage manufacturing, 14 in textile/garment/apparel manufacturing, 16 in chemical/pharmaceutical manufacturing, 21 in construction, 44 in wholesale and retail trade, 9 in hotels and restaurants). A Pearson’s chi-squared test rejects that the distribution of firms perceiving no difficulties is equal across governorates (firm sizes) at the 5 percent (10 percent) level but fails to reject that it is different across industries at the 10 percent level.

Table D.21
Top Five Work Permit Difficulties in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information about how to apply for permit</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complicated procedures to apply for permit</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits not given for particular occupations</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permit applications are often denied</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permit applications take a long time</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Only 70 firms that had indicated any perceived difficulty in obtaining a work permit are included.
In Lebanon, we sampled firms in Beirut, the Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, and South Lebanon governorates, following the refugee sample. We identified the distribution of employment by industry, within each targeted governorate in 2009.\(^7\)

Given the relatively small number of large firms, particularly outside of the Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates, we began by targeting three large manufacturing firms and three
large construction firms in each of these governorates. In addition, since one of the few industries in which Syrians are officially permitted to work is the “environment” industry, we targeted one large cleaning services provider in each of these two governorates.

We then split the sample of small firms and the remaining sample of midsized firms (after removing the large firms already selected) across governorates based on each governorate’s relative share of employment. Within each governorate, we split the sample across industries in accordance with the sectoral distribution of employment in that governorate. We did this split separately for small and midsized firms, by cross-cutting the employment distribution by governorate with the distribution of the number of registered firms by size.8

Tables D.22 and D.23 show the number of successfully completed firm surveys and the nonresponse rates in Lebanon.

---

8 After allocating the sample, we made some minor adjustments to address industry-size cells with no targeted firms.
Lebanon Additional Results
The average share of female workers is slightly higher among midsized and large firms than among small firms, but does not vary in a statistically significant manner by governorate or industry (Figure D.22).

Table D.24 lists the five most commonly identified recruiting channels for highly skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, as well as for Syrians (of all skill levels).

Table D.25 lists the five most commonly identified difficulties associated with hiring highly skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers, among those firms that indicated any difficulties in hiring each type of worker.

The main text showed anticipated changes in employment by industry; Figure D.23 shows anticipated changes by governorate and firm size.

Small firms were less likely than midsized and large firms to perceive no difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians (Figure D.24). The share of firms perceiving no difficulties did not vary substantially by governorate or industry.

Table D.26 shows the top five perceived difficulties for obtaining a work permit for Syrians, among firms that identified specific perceived difficulties.

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. The average share of female workers is calculated by dividing the number of female workers by the total number of workers within each firm and then taking the average across the 150 firms in the sample. An ANOVA test rejects that the share of female workers is equal across firm sizes but not across governorates or industries at the 10 percent level of statistical significance.
### Table D.24
Most Commonly Identified Recruiting Channels in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Skilled (Number of Firms = 28)</th>
<th>Semiskilled (Number of Firms = 56)</th>
<th>Unskilled (Number of Firms = 84)</th>
<th>Syrians (Number of Firms = 150)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receive direct applications from applicants at workplace (factory, shop, facility)</td>
<td>Receive direct applications from applicants at workplace (factory, shop, facility)</td>
<td>Ask current employees for recommendations</td>
<td>Receive direct applications from applicants at workplace (factory, shop, facility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place job advertisements on the Internet, including Kariyer, net and LinkedIn</td>
<td>Ask current employees for recommendations</td>
<td>Receive direct applications from applicants at workplace (factory, shop, facility)</td>
<td>Ask current employees for recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask other firm owners or managers for recommendations</td>
<td>Go through intermediary</td>
<td>Go through intermediary</td>
<td>Go through intermediary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go through intermediary</td>
<td>Place job advertisements in newspapers</td>
<td>Place job advertisements in newspapers</td>
<td>Place job advertisements in newspapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ask current employees for recommendations</td>
<td>Place job advertisements on the Internet, including Kariyer, net and LinkedIn</td>
<td>Place announcement and advertisement on information board of public place</td>
<td>Place announcement and advertisement on information board of public place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on survey data. Only firms that had tried to fill a position with a certain skill level over the past 12 months were asked about recruiting channels for that type of position (28 firms for highly skilled, 56 firms for semiskilled, 84 firms for unskilled). All 150 firms had Syrian workers at the time of the survey and were asked about recruiting channels for Syrians. Multiple responses could be provided. Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of firms that selected the given response by the total number of responding firms.

### Table D.25
Top Five Hiring Difficulties in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Skilled (Number of Firms = 7)</th>
<th>Semiskilled (Number of Firms = 6)</th>
<th>Unskilled (Number of Firms = 8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applicants want higher salary than firm can offer</td>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary experience</td>
<td>Applicants want higher salary than firm can offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary experience</td>
<td>Applicants want higher salary than firm can offer</td>
<td>Applicants are not willing to work required hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough applicants</td>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary skills</td>
<td>Legal barriers to hiring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicants are not willing to do required tasks</td>
<td>Applicants want more benefits (e.g., holidays, pension) than firm can offer</td>
<td>Applicants lack the necessary experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tie) Applicants lack the necessary education/applicants want more benefits than firm can offer/ Applicants lack the necessary skills</td>
<td>(Tie) Legal barriers to hiring/applicants lack the necessary education</td>
<td>Not enough applicants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on survey data. Only firms that had indicated difficulty in trying to fill a position were asked about what difficulties they faced (seven firms for highly skilled, six firms for semiskilled, eight firms for unskilled). Multiple responses could be provided. Percentages are calculated by dividing the number of firms that selected the given response by the total number of responding firms.
Figure D.23
Anticipated Changes in Employment by Governorate and Firm Size in Lebanon

Panel A: Increase by governorate
Panel B: Decrease by governorate
Panel C: Increase by firm size
Panel D: Decrease by firm size

NOTES: Authors' calculations are based on survey data. Percent of firms that anticipated an increase or decrease in the number of highly skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled employees. Number of firms included by governorate: 22 in Beirut, 16 in the Bekaa, 69 in Mount Lebanon, 27 in North Lebanon, 15 in South Lebanon; by firm size: 100 small, 49 midsized/large. Pearson's chi-squared tests reject that the share of firms indicating an increase in unskilled employment is equal across firm size at the 1 percent level; and that the share of firms indicating a decrease in unskilled employment is equal across governorates at the 5 percent level. Other differences across governorate and firm size are not significant at the 10 percent level.
Figure D.24
Percent of Firms Indicating No Difficulty with Work Permits for Syrians in Lebanon

Panel A: By governorate

Panel B: By firm size

Panel C: By industry

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Share of firms that indicated that they did not perceive any difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians as a share of total number of firms, excluding those that responded “do not know” or refused to answer (by governorate: 22 in Beirut, 16 in Bekaa, 68 in Mount Lebanon, 27 in North Lebanon, 15 in South Lebanon; by firm size: 99 small, 49 midsized and large; by industry: 16 in food and beverage manufacturing, 19 in other manufacturing, 28 in construction, 62 in wholesale and retail trade, 21 in hotels and restaurants, and 2 in cleaning services). A Pearson’s chi-squared test rejects that the distribution of firms perceiving no difficulties is equal across firm sizes at the 5 percent level but fails to reject that the distribution is equal across governorates or industries at the 10 percent level.

Table D.26
Top Five Work Permit Difficulties in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulty</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employees may not have required residency permit</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm required to serve as a “guarantor” for Syrian worker</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permit only valid for a short time</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fee for work permit is too high</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information about how to apply for permit</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Authors’ calculations are based on survey data. Only 68 firms that had indicated any perceived difficulty in obtaining a work permit are included.
The data collected in this questionnaire will be protected according to local laws and for research purposes only.
Section A. Introductory Data

Instructions to Enumerator: Conduct the survey during various times of the day and week to ensure representativity. Fill out questions A1–A15 for each residence that you randomly select to interview, whether the interview is conducted or not. Identify the head of household or a designee to complete the remainder of the questions. This person should be an adult, aged 18 years or older, and a member of the household defined as immediate family, close relative, or a dependent who shares in household resources and has knowledge of each household member.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Type of residence</td>
<td>1. Regular home/apartment&lt;br&gt;2. Temporary dwelling&lt;br&gt;3. Other informal settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Governorate</td>
<td>1. Amman&lt;br&gt;2. Zarqa&lt;br&gt;3. Mafraq&lt;br&gt;4. Mafraq (Zaatari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>____ ____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>Subdistrict</td>
<td>____ ____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>Locality</td>
<td>____ ____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6</td>
<td>Neighborhood</td>
<td>____ ____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7</td>
<td>Block</td>
<td>____ ____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A8</td>
<td>Address/street/gate number</td>
<td>____ ____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A9</td>
<td>Geographic type:</td>
<td>1. Urban&lt;br&gt;2. Rural&lt;br&gt;3. Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A10</td>
<td>Supervisor ID</td>
<td>___________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A11</td>
<td>Surveyor ID</td>
<td>___________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A12</td>
<td>Number of questionnaire</td>
<td>___________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A13</td>
<td>Interview result</td>
<td>1. Household responded, rostering commenced → B1a (roster).&lt;br&gt;2. Household responded, none of the household members meet selection criteria for rostering → Skip household&lt;br&gt;3. Household declined to be interviewed → Skip household&lt;br&gt;4. Household not available at the time of the walk → Repeat attempt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A14</td>
<td>Date of attempt to reach household</td>
<td><em><strong><strong>/</strong></strong></em>/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A14a</td>
<td>Time of attempt to reach household</td>
<td>Hours: _____ Minutes: ______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A15</td>
<td>Date of second attempt to reach household</td>
<td><em><strong><strong>/</strong></strong></em>/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A15a</td>
<td>Date of second attempt to reach household</td>
<td>Hours: _____ Minutes: ______</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Section B. Household Roster

Instructions to Enumerator: Gather this information from the head of household or the adult member of the house who meets the criteria listed above. Complete this roster for every member of the household ages 18–55, who is either currently working or, if they are not currently working, is seriously intending to work. Follow the criteria in B1e, B1f, and B1g to determine eligibility.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>7.</td>
<td>8.</td>
<td>9.</td>
<td>10.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B2 Name of household member responding to questions (must be 18 years or older) 
B2a ID of household member having answered the questions so far (if included in the roster) 
B3 Phone number of household member responding to questions 
B4 Total number of household members (all ages) 
B5 Total number of all household members who are 18 years and older 
B6 Date of interview: / /2018
B7 Time of interview: Hours: Minutes:
Instructions to Enumerator: Once all eligible members are recoded in the roster, do the random selection. If the selected respondent shows some reluctance, repeat to him/her the points mentioned in the introduction to build an atmosphere of trust.

### B8 Status of household member responding to questions, in relationship to the head of household.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Head of household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Husband/wife</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Son/daughter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Father/mother</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Brother/sister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Father-/mother-in-law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Son-/daughter-in-law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Grandfather/-mother</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Niece/nephew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Grandniece/-nephew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Other relatives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Friend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Grandson/granddaughter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### B9 Interview result:

1. Meeting conducted
2. Not available at the time; phone number acquired ______________________
3. Meeting refused
4. Other (specify):________________________________________________________

### B10a First attempt to reach individual:

1. Meeting conducted
2. Unable to reach
3. Reached; meeting refused
4. Did not show up for agreed-upon time
5. Other (specify):_____________________________

#### B10b Date of first attempt: / /2018

#### B10c Time of first attempt: Hours Minutes

### B11a Second attempt to reach individual:

1. Meeting conducted
2. Unable to reach
3. Reached; meeting refused
4. Did not show up for agreed-upon time
5. Other (specify):_____________________________

#### B11b Date of second attempt: / /2018

#### B11c Time of second attempt: Hours Minutes

NOTE: If randomly selected person is interviewed on the same day as roster, use B6 and B7 to record date and time. If interviewed after first attempt, use B10b and B10c. If interviewed after the second attempt, use B11b and B11c.
Section C. Family Background

Instructions to Enumerator: This should be completed by the head of household or the adult member of the house who meets the criteria listed above.

If respondent is not illiterate, present a showcard of the options every time you have to read them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C1</th>
<th>What are all the sources of income coming into your household? SHOW CARD AND READ. SELECT ALL THAT APPLY.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Salary or cash for work of household members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Income from entity and business owned by household members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Benefits from the government, the United Nations, or a nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Personal savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Other (for example, coupons, other benefits, or subsidies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Do not know (DO NOT SHOW OR READ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Refused to answer (DO NOT SHOW OR READ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Section D. Background Information for Household Member**

Instructions to Enumerator: The randomly selected person (between the ages of 18 and 55) from B Household Roster will complete the remainder of the questionnaire.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>D1</strong></td>
<td>Name of chosen individual (for office use only) ________________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D2</strong></td>
<td>Respondent ID in roster ____________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **D3** | Did you work during the last seven days, even for one hour, as an employee or self-employed, or as an unpaid worker in a business or farm owned by the household, relatives, or other? [INCLUDES FARMING OR LIVESTOCK ACTIVITIES, EXCLUDES HOUSEHOLD CHORES]  
1. Yes → D5  
2. No → D4 |
| **D4** | Although you didn’t work last week, did NAME have any job or business from which he/she was temporarily absent or on a break?  
1. Yes  
2. No |
| **D5** | What is your primary language? DO NOT READ. SINGLE ANSWER  
1. Arabic  
2. Kurmanji Kurdish  
3. Sorani Kurdish  
4. Turkish  
5. Turkic or Turkman  
6. English  
7. French  
8. Other |
| **D6** | Other than your primary language, what other languages do you speak? DO NOT READ. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED  
1. Arabic  
2. Kurmanji Kurdish  
3. Sorani Kurdish  
4. Turkish  
5. Turkic or Turkman  
6. English  
7. French  
8. Other (specify) ____________________________ |
| **D7** | Where were you born? DO NOT READ. SINGLE ANSWER  
1. Syria  
2. Turkey  
3. Lebanon  
4. Jordan  
5. Other country; specify ____________________________ |
| **D8** | What is your marital status? SHOW CARD AND READ. SINGLE ANSWER  
1. Married  
2. Not currently married, never been married  
3. Not married, widowed  
4. Not married, divorced |
Section E. Education and Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E1</th>
<th>Can you read and write?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E2</th>
<th>Are you currently going to school, vocational training, college or university, or other educational institution in HOST COUNTRY?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes—full time → E3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes—part time → E3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No → E4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E3</th>
<th>What is the highest level of education/training you expect to complete?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Primary education graduate (completed grade 6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Intermediate education graduate (completed grade 9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. General high school graduate (completed grade 12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Vocational high school graduate (completed grade 12, vocational)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Technical institute programs (diploma)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Some college but did not complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bachelor graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Post-bachelor graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Other (specify) ____________________________________________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E4</th>
<th>What is the highest education level already attained?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Illiterate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No formal education (or some primary education) but reads and writes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Primary education graduate (completed grade 6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Intermediate education graduate (completed grade 9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. General high school graduate (completed grade 12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Vocational high school graduate (completed grade 12, vocational)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Technical institute programs (diploma)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Some college but did not complete</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Bachelor graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Post-bachelor graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Other (specify) ____________________________________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If code is 9 or 10 → E5

Any other code → E6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E5</th>
<th>What was your field of study in the university?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Commerce and economics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Medicine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pharmacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Literature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fine arts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Natural or physical sciences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Engineering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Architecture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Teaching for K–12 education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Other (specify) ____________________________________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E6  

NOTE TO ENUMERATOR: FOR EACH TYPE OF TRAINING, ASK ALL QUESTIONS BEFORE MOVING TO NEXT TRAINING

Did you receive any formal training or participate in any workshops in any of the following occupations before you arrived in Jordan? **SHOW CARD AND READ**

Since you arrived in Jordan, have you received training in any of these occupations? If you received training in Jordan, did you receive a certification? Do you think that the training that you received in Jordan better prepared you to find work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before arriving in Jordan</th>
<th>Since arriving in Jordan</th>
<th>Certification from received training</th>
<th>Prepared you to find a job?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prior training?</td>
<td>Received training?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrative and office support including word processing and data entry; bookkeeping, accounting, financial and business management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agriculture- and horticulture-related including vegetable, fruit growing, and livestock production</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Auto mechanic repair and maintenance; operation of heavy equipment including truck/forklift, CNC turning machine operator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Beauty, hairdressing, and salon services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Carpentry, woodworking, and wood technologies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Commercial driving and transportation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Customer service and sales; marketing, advertising, and public relations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Clothing design, sewing and tailoring, working with textiles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Computer programming; information technology network installation and support</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Construction, construction technology, and other construction-related trades</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Hospitality services and tourism including food preparation (cooking, baking) and waiting tables</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Handicrafts, ceramics, metalworks including jewelry making/fixing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Health-related trades (nursing assistant, physiotherapy, assistant pharmacist)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Mobile and other small device repair</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Welding and fitting</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Other (specify)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E7 | Have you received any additional language training since you arrived in Jordan?
1. Yes → E8
2. No → Skip E8

E8 | What languages did you receive training in, and how well do you think that prepared you to adjust to life in Jordan and find a job? DO NOT READ. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Check if received training</th>
<th>Prepared you to adjust and find a job?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Arabic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Turkish</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. English</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. French</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other specify</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE TO ENUMERATOR: IF RESPONDENT ANSWERED “WORKING (EMPLOYED/ SELF-EMPLOYED)” TO B1e OR YES TO D3 OR D4 (WORKING OR TEMPORARILY ABSENT FROM WORK), SKIP TO SECTION G. OTHERWISE, IF RESPONDENT IS NOT WORKING BUT SERIOUSLY INTENDING TO WORK, GO TO NEXT SECTION (SECTION F).
### Section F. Nonworking Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F1</th>
<th>How long has it been since you last worked for at least one hour as an employee or self-employed, or as an unpaid worker in a business or farm owned by the household or relatives?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. More than 7 days, but less than a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 1–3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 4–11 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. A year or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Never worked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F2</th>
<th>What is the main reason you are not working? DO NOT READ. SINGLE ANSWER.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. In school or university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Cannot obtain a work permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Waiting to go back to the previous employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Already found work that will start later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Already made arrangements for self-employment to start later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Attending a training to be better prepared for a potential job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Pregnant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Affected by natural disaster and sudden event (drought, flood, fire, other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Depend on seasonal work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Believing that there is no work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Tired of looking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Not knowing how or where to look for job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Cannot find appropriate work (in areas of relevance to one’s skills, capacities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Not qualified for work (lack of education and/or work experience)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Not yet started to seek work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. Temporary family reasons or illness prevented search for work, otherwise would look</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Did not like salary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. Does not like work conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. Did not like work location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Afraid will get into trouble with the government or police if working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. Lack of transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Language barrier, does not speak the language at work sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. Discrimination for being Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24. Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F3</th>
<th>What professions/occupations does the job you are looking for/seeking fall under? DO NOT READ. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Legislators/Senior managers/General managers/CEOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Natural sciences/Physicists/Chemists/Statisticians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Computers/Programmers/Analysts/Computer engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Engineering/Engineers/Architects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Life sciences/Biology, plant and animal/Medicine and diseases/Specialists in agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Health/Physicians/Dentists/Veterinarians/Pharmacists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Health/Nurses/Midwives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Education/Higher education/Secondary/Basic and before/Learning skills/Inspectors/Special education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Business/Accountants/Human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Judicial/Lawyers/Judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Social sciences/Economists/Sociology/Philosophy/History/Languages/Social work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Arts and creativity/ Writers/Artists/Journalists/Musicians/Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Clerics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Clerical employees/Office work/Secretary/Data processing/Data entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Customer services/Telephone operators/Reception, information/Cashiers/Ticketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. Workers in personal care/Childcare/In-home personal care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Sales and services/Workers in personal services/Hairstylists/Barbers/Beauticians/Dry cleaners/Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. Skilled manual labor/Builders/Carpenters/Painters/Smiths/Mechanics/Butchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. Drivers/Small vehicles drivers/Bus drivers/Drivers of trucks and lorries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Home and restaurant services/Housekeeps/Cooks/Waiters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. Unskilled manual labor/Street vendors/Shoe shining/Maids/Cleaners in offices, hotels, institutions/Hand washing and ironing workers/Car washers/Office boys/Porters/Doorman/ Guards/Garbage collectors/Sweepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Armed forces/Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. Other (specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## F4
Which of the following have you done to find work? **SHOW CARD AND READ. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED.**
1. Ask relatives and friends to inform about jobs
2. Asked relatives or friends to give a recommendation to an employer for a job
3. Registered with UN agency
4. Registered with government employment agency
5. Registered with an NGO
6. Visited career center at education/training institution
7. Attended job fairs
8. Registered at private employment office
9. Visited workplace (factory, shop, facility) in person and requested work or submitted an application
10. Sent application to employers
11. Respond to newspaper advertisements
12. Respond to job advertisements in the Internet
13. Put announcement and advertisement on information board of public place
14. Requested a loan in order to start a business
15. Sought land, buildings, equipment, or machinery to start a business
16. Applied for a permit or license to start a business
17. Participated in training to improve skills (language, computer, technical)
18. Participated in training for job interview preparation
19. Other (specify) ________________________________________________________
20. I have not taken any actions to look for work

## F5
Which of training do you think would be most helpful in finding a job? **SHOW CARD AND READ. SINGLE ANSWER.**
1. Completion of vocational training
2. Completion of secondary education
3. Completion of university
4. Apprenticeship with an employer
5. Entrepreneurship training to start own business
6. Computer and IT training
7. Language training
8. Professional training
9. Other (specify) ________________________________________________________
10. None (DO NOT READ)

## F6
Have you received any formal advice/help/assistance to look for work in Jordan?
1. Yes → Go to F7.
2. No → Go to Section H.

## F7
Which organization provided you with the advice/help/assistance? **SHOW CARD AND READ. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED.**
1. Government or international organization (e.g., UN) employment services
2. Private employment services
3. NGOs
4. Other (specify) ________________________________________________________
5. Do not know (DO NOT SHOW OR READ)

## F8
What type of advice/help/assistance did you receive? **SHOW CARD AND READ. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED.**
1. Advice on how to search for job
2. Information on vacancies
3. Guidance on education and training opportunities
4. Placement at education/training program
5. Training on how to start a new business
6. Other (specify) ________________________________________________________

**NOTE TO ENUMERATOR: MOVE ON TO SECTION H.**
Section G. Working Cases: MAIN ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G1</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|    | Now I’d like to ask you some questions about your current work. Many people engage in more than one activity. If NAME does more than one activity, let’s start with the one where NAME typically works the most hours in a week. NOTE: REFERS TO MAIN ACTIVITY, EVEN IF THE INDIVIDUAL IS TEMPORARILY AWAY FROM THAT ACTIVITY. | 1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing  
2. Mining  
3. Electricity, gas, sewage, and water supply  
4. Construction  
5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles  
6. Hotels and restaurants  
7. Transport, storage, and communications  
8. Finance/banking/insurance  
9. Real estate, renting, and related business activities  
10. Education  
11. Health care or social work  
12. Food and beverage manufacturing  
13. Textiles, garments, and apparel manufacturing  
14. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals manufacturing  
15. Other manufacturing  
16. Nongovernmental organizations to help refugees  
17. Cleaning services provider  
18. Services to a household (cook, housekeeper, nanny, driver, other household helper)  
19. Other services not included above; specify _______________  
20. Other (specify) ______________________________ |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G2</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|    | What category of professions/occupations does your current activity fall under? DO NOT READ. SINGLE ANSWER. | 1. Legislators/Senior managers/General managers/CEOs  
2. Natural sciences/Physicists/Chemists/Statisticians  
3. Computers/Programmers/Analysts/Computer engineers  
4. Engineering/Engineers/Architects  
5. Life sciences/Biology, Plant and Animal/Medicine and diseases/Specialists in agriculture  
6. Health/Physicians/Dentists/Veterinarians/Pharmacists  
7. Health/Nurses/Midwives  
8. Education/Higher education/Secondary/Basic and before/Learning skills/Inspectors/Special education  
9. Business/Accountants/Human resources  
10. Judicial/Lawyers/Judges  
11. Social sciences/Economists/Sociology/Philosophy/History/Languages/Social work  
12. Arts and creativity/Writers/Artists/Journalists/Musicians/Actors  
13. Clerics  
14. Clerical employees/Office work/Secretary/Data processing/Data entry  
15. Customer services/Telephone operators/Reception, information/Cashiers/Ticketing  
16. Workers in personal care/Childcare/In-home personal care  
17. Sales and services/Workers in personal services/Hairdressers/Beauticians/Dry cleaners/Sales  
18. Skilled manual labor/Builders/Carpenters/Painters/Smiths/Mechanics/Butchers  
19. Drivers/Small vehicles drivers/Bus drivers/Drivers of trucks and lorries  
20. Home and restaurant services/Housekeepers/Cooks/Waiters  
21. Unskilled manual labor/Street vendors/Shoe shining/Maids/Cleaners in offices, hotels, institutions/Hand washing and ironing workers/Car washers/Office boys/Porters/Doorman/Guards/Garbage collectors/Sweepers  
22. Armed forces/Security  
23. Other (specify) _______________ |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G3</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|    | How many persons including yourself are employed in this workplace (firm/organization)? | 1. 9 or fewer  
2. 10–19  
3. 20–49  
4. 50–99  
5. 100–249  
6. 250–499  
7. 500 or more  
8. Does not know |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G4</th>
<th>In this job/work activity, what is your employment status? SHOW CARD AND READ. DOUBLE-CHECK THE ANSWER WITH RESPONDENT. SINGLE ANSWER.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Permanent paid worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Temporary or fixed-term paid worker (for example, a two-month job you might not return to)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. For the season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Casual (for the day or a few days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Task-based (depends on finishing a particular task, no matter how long)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Business owner/employer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7. Self-employed</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. Unpaid worker in a family business</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. Unpaid worker in a different business or voluntary work (other than apprentice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Apprentice (paid or unpaid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Other (specify) _______________________________________________________________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G5</th>
<th>In terms of how well this job matches your skills, how does the skill level required to perform this job compare with your educational and training background and skill level? READ. SINGLE ANSWER.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Skill level required for this job far higher than my current skill level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Skill level required for this job is somewhat higher than my current skill level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Skill level required for this job is at my skill level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Skill level required for this job is lower than my current skill level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Skill level required for this job much lower than my current skill level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G6</th>
<th>How long have you held this job?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Less than 1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 1 to 5 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 6 to 11 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 1 to 2 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. 3 to 4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. 5 years or more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G7</th>
<th>How did you find this job, or what did you do to get this job? SHOW CARD AND READ. SELECT ALL THAT APPLY.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Heard about it through a relative or friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. A relative or friend gave a recommendation to an employer for a job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Registered with UN agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Registered with government employment agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Registered with an NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Visited career center at education/training institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Attended job fairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Registered at private employment office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Visited workplace (factory, shop, facility) in person and requested work or submitted an application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Sent application directly to employers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Reply to newspaper advertisements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Respond to job advertisements on the Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Put announcement and advertisement on information board of public place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Requested a loan in order to start a business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Sought land, buildings, equipment, or machinery to start a business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. Applied for a permit or license to start a business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Participated in training to improve skills (language, computer, technical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. Participated in training for job interview preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. Other (specify) _______________________________________________________________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G8</th>
<th>Did you receive any advice/help/assistance from an institution of any kind in Jordan to find this or other jobs?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yes—Go to G9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. No—Go to G11.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G9</th>
<th>Which institution provided you with the advice/help/assistance? SHOW CARD AND READ. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Government or international organization (e.g., UN) employment services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Private employment services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Other (specify) _______________________________________________________________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Do not know (DO NOT SHOW OR READ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10</td>
<td>What type of advice/help/assistance did you receive? SHOW CARD AND READ. MULTIPLE ANSWERS ALLOWED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Advice on how to search for job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Information on vacancies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Guidance on education and training opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Placement at education/training program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Training on how to start a new business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Other (specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G11</th>
<th>a) How many hours do you usually work in this activity per week? ____________________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) How many days do you usually work in this activity per week? ____________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G12</th>
<th>a) How many hours would you prefer to be working per day? ____________________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) How many days would you prefer to be working per week? ____________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G13</th>
<th>Taking into account wages, profits, tips, fees, and other payments, what is the typical income (in Jordanian dinars) that you earn per month at this work activity? WRITE IN NUMBERS AT THE CONVENIENT PLACE. ____________________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99. Refused to answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G14</th>
<th>How many total jobs do you have including the main we have just discussed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Write the number of jobs ________________________________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Section H. Previous Employment in Syria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H1</th>
<th>Thinking back to your life in Syria before you left, did you have work experience?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yes → Go to H2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H2</th>
<th>For how many years did you work?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>___________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE TO ENUMERATOR: RECORD INTEGERS ONLY. ROUND TO THE UPPER BOUND. (EXAMPLE: FOR 3 MONTHS, WRITE 1 (YEAR); FOR 2 YEARS AND A HALF, WRITE 3; ETC.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H3</th>
<th>What was the sector of your last main job (firm/organization) in Syria? RECORD THE SECTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DOUBLE-CHECK THE ANSWER WITH RESPONDENT, THEN CODE IT BELOW. SINGLE ANSWER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Electricity, gas, sewage, and water supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Hotels and restaurants</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7. Transport, storage, and communications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. Finance/banking/insurance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Real estate, renting, and related business activities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Education</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Health care or social work</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Food and beverage manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Textiles, garments, and apparel manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Other manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. Nongovernmental organizations to help refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Cleaning services provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. Services to a household (cook, housekeeper, nanny, driver, other household helper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. Other services not included above; specify ______________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. Other (specify) ______________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H4</th>
<th>What was your employment status of your last main job in Syria? SHOW CARD AND READ. DOUBLE-CHECK THE ANSWER WITH RESPONDENT. SINGLE ANSWER.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Permanent paid worker</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Temporary or fixed-term paid worker (for example, a two-month job you might not return to)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. For the season</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Casual (for the day or a few days)</td>
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<td>5. Task-based (depends on finishing a particular task, no matter how long)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. Business owner/employer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. Unpaid worker in a family business</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Unpaid worker in a different business or voluntary work (other than apprentice)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Apprentice (paid or unpaid)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Other (specify) ______________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Household Survey Instrument - Page 235

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H5</th>
<th>What category of professions/occupations did your last main job in Syria fall under? DO NOT READ. SINGLE ANSWER.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Legislators/Senior managers/General managers/CEOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Natural sciences/Physicists/Chemists/Statisticians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Computers/Programmers/Analysts/Computer engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Engineering/Engineers/Architects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Life sciences/Biology, plant and animal/Medicine and diseases/Specialists in agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Health/Physicians/Dentists/Veterinarians/Pharmacists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Health/Nurses/Midwives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Education/Higher education/Secondary/Basic and before/Learning skills/Inspectors/Special education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Business/Accountants/Human resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Judicial/Lawyers/Judges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Social sciences/Economists/Sociology/Philosophy/History/Languages/Social work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Arts and creativity/Writers/Artists/Journalists/Musicians/Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Clerics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Clerical employees/Office work/Secretary/Data processing/Data entry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Customer services/Telephone operators/Reception, information/Cashiers/Ticketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Workers in personal care/Childcare/In-home personal care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Sales and services/Workers in personal services/Hairstylists/Barbers/Beauticians/Dry cleaners/Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Skilled manual labor/Builders/Carpenters/Painters/Smiths/Mechanics/Butchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Drivers/Small vehicles drivers/Bus drivers/Drivers of trucks and lorries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Home and restaurant services/Housekeepers/Cooks/Waiters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Unskilled manual labor/Street vendors/Shoe shining/Maids/Cleaners in offices, hotels, institutions/Hand washing and ironing workers/Car washers/Office boys/Porters/Doorman/Guards/Garbage collectors/Sweepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Armed forces/Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Other (specify) __________________________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H6</th>
<th>Taking into account wages, profits, tips, fees, and other payments, how much did you earn per month at your last main job in Syria? (In Syrian pounds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99.</td>
<td>Refused to answer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>H7</th>
<th>In which year did this last job in Syria cease?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>______________________________________________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- **H5**: Household Survey Instrument
- **H6**: Taking into account wages, profits, tips, fees, and other payments, how much did you earn per month at your last main job in Syria? (In Syrian pounds)
- **H7**: In which year did this last job in Syria cease?
- **Syrian pounds**: The currency of Syria
- **Per month**: Indicates the frequency of the payment
- **Refused to answer**: Indicates the respondent refused to answer the question
- **Sweepers**: Indicates the occupation of a worker who cleans the streets and public places
- **Telephone operators**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in a telephone exchange
- **Value**: Indicates the numerical value of an item
- **Workers in personal care**: Indicates the occupation of a person who cares for the needs of others in their homes or residential facilities
- **X**: Indicates the placeholder for an unknown or unspecified value
- **Y**: Indicates the placeholder for an unknown or unspecified value
- **Street vendors**: Indicates the occupation of a person who sells goods or services on the street
- **Workers in personal services**: Indicates the occupation of a person who performs services for others in their homes or residential facilities
- **Armored forces**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in the military or security forces
- **Other (specify)**: Indicates the option for the respondent to provide additional information about their occupation
- **Clerical employees**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in an office or administrative setting
- **Customer services**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in a service-oriented role, such as a salesperson or customer service representative
- **Clerics**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in a clerical or administrative role
- **Clerical employees/Office work/Secretary/Data processing/Data entry**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in an office or administrative setting
- **Customer services/Telephone operators/Reception, information/Cashiers/Ticketing**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in a service-oriented role, such as a salesperson or customer service representative
- **Workers in personal care/Childcare/In-home personal care**: Indicates the occupation of a person who cares for the needs of others in their homes or residential facilities
- **Sales and services/Workers in personal services/Hairstylists/Barbers/Beauticians/Dry cleaners/Sales**: Indicates the occupation of a person who performs services for others in their homes or residential facilities
- **Skilled manual labor/Builders/Carpenters/Painters/Smiths/Mechanics/Butchers**: Indicates the occupation of a person who performs physical labor in a skilled trade
- **Drivers/Small vehicles drivers/Bus drivers/Drivers of trucks and lorries**: Indicates the occupation of a person who drives vehicles for transportation purposes
- **Home and restaurant services/Housekeepers/Cooks/Waiters**: Indicates the occupation of a person who performs services in a domestic or restaurant setting
- **Unskilled manual labor/Street vendors/Shoe shining/Maids/Cleaners in offices, hotels, institutions/Hand washing and ironing workers/Car washers/Office boys/Porters/Doorman/Guards/Garbage collectors/Sweepers**: Indicates the occupation of a person who performs physical labor in an unskilled trade
- **Armed forces/Security**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in the military or security forces
- **Other (specify)**: Indicates the option for the respondent to provide additional information about their occupation
- **Taking into account wages, profits, tips, fees, and other payments, how much did you earn per month at your last main job in Syria? (In Syrian pounds)**: Indicates the question about the respondent's earnings
- **Refused to answer**: Indicates the respondent refused to answer the question
- **In which year did this last job in Syria cease?**: Indicates the question about the end date of the respondent's employment
- **Value**: Indicates the numerical value of an item
- **X**: Indicates the placeholder for an unknown or unspecified value
- **Y**: Indicates the placeholder for an unknown or unspecified value
- **Street vendors**: Indicates the occupation of a person who sells goods or services on the street
- **Workers in personal services**: Indicates the occupation of a person who performs services for others in their homes or residential facilities
- **Armored forces**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in the military or security forces
- **Other (specify)**: Indicates the option for the respondent to provide additional information about their occupation
- **Clerical employees**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in an office or administrative setting
- **Customer services**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in a service-oriented role, such as a salesperson or customer service representative
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- **Armed forces/Security**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in the military or security forces
- **Other (specify)**: Indicates the option for the respondent to provide additional information about their occupation
- **Taking into account wages, profits, tips, fees, and other payments, how much did you earn per month at your last main job in Syria? (In Syrian pounds)**: Indicates the question about the respondent's earnings
- **Refused to answer**: Indicates the respondent refused to answer the question
- **In which year did this last job in Syria cease?**: Indicates the question about the end date of the respondent's employment
- **Value**: Indicates the numerical value of an item
- **X**: Indicates the placeholder for an unknown or unspecified value
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- **Street vendors**: Indicates the occupation of a person who sells goods or services on the street
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- **Armed forces/Security**: Indicates the occupation of a person who works in the military or security forces
- **Other (specify)**: Indicates the option for the respondent to provide additional information about their occupation
- **Taking into account wages, profits, tips, fees, and other payments, how much did you earn per month at your last main job in Syria? (In Syrian pounds)**: Indicates the question about the respondent's earnings
- **Refused to answer**: Indicates the respondent refused to answer the question
- **In which year did this last job in Syria cease?**: Indicates the question about the end date of the respondent's employment
## Section I. Barriers to Employment and Future Plans

### I1

What have you found to be the top three obstacles in finding a good job or starting your own business in Jordan? **READ. UP TO 3 ANSWERS.**

1. No suitable training opportunities
2. Mismatch between education requirements for a good job and the education that I received
3. Difficult to get legal residency
4. Difficult to get a work permit
5. Not allowed to work in my field
6. No work experience
7. Not enough jobs available
8. Considered too young or too old
9. Being male/female
10. Discriminatory practices (i.e., excluded because of culture, nationality, disability, religion, physical appearance, etc.)
11. Low wages in available jobs
12. Poor working conditions in available jobs
13. Lack of information about availability of work
14. Cannot open a bank account or secure financing
15. Undecided about what type of work to do
16. Lack of transportation
17. Problems at home
18. Not speaking the Jordanian dialect, communication issues
19. Other (specify) _____________________
20. No obstacles

### I2

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
(1–Strongly Agree 2–Agree 3–Neither Agree nor Disagree 4–Disagree 5–Strongly Disagree)  
**98–Do not know**

1. Employers in Jordan are willing to hire Syrians
2. It is difficult to find employers willing to sponsor a Syrian to obtain a work permit
3. Many Syrians cannot pay the work permit and/or residency fees
4. There are organizations in Jordan that support refugees to find work
5. Many Syrians do not look for work because they worry about losing assistance
6. Syrian women fear experiencing physical harm in the workplace in Jordan
7. There is no reliable and safe transportation for women to be able to reach work
8. Syrian women worry about being harassed in the workplace in Jordan

### I3

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?  
(1–Strongly Agree 2–Agree 3–Neither Agree nor Disagree 4–Disagree 5–Strongly Disagree)  
**98–Not Applicable**

1. I can get training and education that I need to gain skills relevant for jobs
2. My Jordanian coworkers treat me with respect in the workplace
3. If I am mistreated at work, I would feel comfortable going to the public authorities
4. I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by an employer
5. I (or other individuals in my household) have been regularly discriminated against or treated unfairly by a fellow worker

### I4

Would you be willing to move to live in another place in Jordan if you were legally permitted to change residency to another location and you could be matched to suitable work or a better job?  
**SHOW CARD AND READ. SINGLE ANSWER.**

1. I am not willing to move
2. I am only willing to move in the same province/governorate
3. I am willing to move to an urban area in another province/governorate
4. I am willing to move to a rural area in another province/governorate
5. I would be willing to move anywhere (urban or rural) in Jordan to find work

### I6

What is your most immediate plans and aspirations? **DO NOT READ. SINGLE ANSWER.**

1. Complete my education/training
2. Obtain training in a new profession where jobs may be available
3. Gain experience through continuing to work or finding other work
4. Get married, start a family
5. Return to Syria once it is safe
6. Immigrate to another country
7. Other (specify) _____________________
8. No plans
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Researcher's Name and Signature:</th>
<th>Researcher’s Code:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>/ / 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisor's Name and Signature:</th>
<th>Supervisor’s Code:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>/ / 2012</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Auditor's Name and Signature:</th>
<th>Auditor’s Code:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>/ / 2012</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Data Entry's Name and Signature: | Data Entry’s Code: | Date:      |
|----------------------------------|                   | / / 2012  |
Firm Survey

The data collected in this questionnaire will be protected according to local laws and used for research purposes only.

Section A. Introductory Data

Instructions to Enumerator: Fill out A1, A17, and A18 for each firm that you attempt to contact, even if you are not able to contact anyone at the firm or if they refuse to talk. Also, fill out as much information as possible for questions A2–A16 for each firm that you attempt to contact, whether you are able to contact someone there or not.

If the firm agrees to the interview, identify the appropriate respondent to complete the remainder of the questions. This person will likely be the owner or manager for a small firm, or the human resources manager for a midsized/large firm.

If the firm has more than one establishment/plant/location, it is important that we get information about all of their establishments/plants/locations in Jordan, not just the one establishment/plant/location where the survey is conducted. When contacting midsized or large firms, please confirm that the respondent is knowledgeable to answer questions about the whole firm. The geographic information (A2–A6), and the information in A9–A10 and A12–A13, can be based on the establishment/plant/location where the survey took place. However, the firm size (A11) should be based on the whole firm.
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firm Survey</strong></td>
<td><strong>Participant ID#</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>Number of questionnaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Name of geographic level 1, code (governorate)</td>
<td>1–Amman 2–Al-Zarqa 3–Al-Mafraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>Name of geographic level 2, code (city)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>Name of geographic level 3, code (neighborhood)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>Geographic type: urban—1, rural—2, industrial zone—3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6</td>
<td>Name of industrial zone <em>(if A5 = 3)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A8</td>
<td>Surveyor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| A9 | Sector: | 1. Food and beverage manufacturing  
2. Textile, garment, and apparel manufacturing  
3. Chemicals and pharmaceuticals manufacturing  
4. Construction  
5. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles  
6. Hotels and restaurants  
7. None of the above → *Exclude*  
*Instruction to Enumerator: If firm operates in multiple industries, select the main industry in which this establishment/plant/location operates.* |
| A10 | Does the firm have at least one PAID employee who is NOT a member of the family that owns the firm? | 1. Yes  
2. No → *Exclude* |
| A11 | Size | 1. Small (1–19 employees)  
2. Midsized (20–99 employees)  
3. Large (100+ employees)  
*Instruction to Enumerator: If the firm has multiple establishments/plants/locations, this should be the number of employees in all establishments/plants/locations in Jordan.* |
| A12 | Firm name |   |
| A13 | Address of firm |   |
| A14 | Name of respondent: |   |
| A15 | Phone number of respondent: |   |
| A16 | Job title of respondent | 1. Owner  
2. CEO/Director/Manager (not owner)  
3. Human Resources  
4. Other (specify) |   |
| A17 | Date and time of first attempt to contact firm | Time: HH:MM  
Date: DD / MM /2018 |
| A18 | Interview result: | 1. Phone number incorrect/not working  
2. Could not reach appropriate person to request interview  
3. Refused interview outright  
4. Refused interview—was given some contact information but could not finalize  
5. Conducted interview  
6. Other (specify) |
Section B. Basic Firm Information

Instructions to Enumerator: If respondent is not illiterate, present a showcard of the options every time you have to read them.

Enumerator reads: We would like to start by asking you some basic information about the firm. If the firm has more than one location, please consider all locations in Jordan, not just this location.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>Date and time interview conducted</td>
<td>Time: HH:MM DD/MM/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>What type of ownership/organization does this firm have? <strong>Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response. If firm is partly government-owned and partly private, select government-owned option.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Private sector business hiring at least one nonfamily member. May be owned by an individual, a family, or a group of partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Private sector business owned by shareholders → Skip B3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Organization is wholly or partly owned by government of Jordan → Skip B3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Organization is wholly or partly owned by government of another country → Skip B3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Local/national nongovernmental organization (NGO) → Skip B3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. International NGO → Skip B3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Other (specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>To the best of your knowledge, what is the citizenship of the firm’s owner? <strong>Instructions to Enumerator: Do not read. Allow multiple responses.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Jordan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Syria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Iran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. United Arab Emirates</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Qatar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Other (specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4</td>
<td>How long has this firm been operating? <strong>Instruction to Enumerator: Single response.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Less than 1 year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 1–2 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 3–5 years</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. 6–10 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. 11–25 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. More than 25 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5</td>
<td>Does the firm sell any of its products/services outside of the country?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. No → Skip B6–B9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Does not know → Skip B6–B9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6</td>
<td>Approximately what share of products/services are exported? <strong>Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. &lt;25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. 26–50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. 51–75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. &gt;75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Does not know (Enumerator: DO NOT READ/SHOW THIS OPTION.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### B7 What countries/regions does the firm mainly export to?

*Instruction to Enumerator: Allow multiple responses.*

1. Iran
2. Iraq
3. Lebanon
4. Qatar
5. Syria
6. Saudi Arabia
7. Turkey
8. United Arab Emirates
9. Rest of Middle East/North Africa region
10. Rest of Africa
11. Europe
12. North America
13. Asia (including China, India, Russia/former Soviet states)
14. Rest of world

### B8 Over the past five years, what has happened to the firm’s total revenue from exports?

*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response.*

1. It has increased
2. It has decreased
3. It has remained about the same → Skip B9
4. Does not know *(Enumerator: DO NOT READ / SHOW THIS OPTION.)* → Skip B9

### B9 Which countries/regions account for the change?

*Instruction to Enumerator: Multiple responses allowed among those selected from B7.*

1. Iran
2. Iraq
3. Lebanon
4. Qatar
5. Syria
6. Saudi Arabia
7. Turkey
8. United Arab Emirates
9. Rest of Middle East/North Africa region
10. Rest of Africa
11. Europe
12. North America
13. Asia (including China, India, Russia/former Soviet states)
14. Rest of world
Section C. Employment

Enumerator reads: We would now like to ask you about the firm’s employees and the positions it hires for. Some employees and some positions may be formal (registered), and others may be informal (unregistered). While we are not asking you to disclose specific information on the informal (unregistered) employees you may have, please keep in mind both formal (registered) and informal (unregistered) employees and positions when answering questions. Any information given to us about formal (registered) or informal (unregistered) employees will not be shared with any official or private entity. If the firm has more than one location, please consider all employees in Jordan, not just those in this location.

| C1 | How many persons are employed in this firm? Please include anyone who currently works in the firm, including the owner, full-time employees, part-time employees, and unpaid helpers/family workers. Also, please include any seasonal workers who have been employed by the firm during the past 12 months, even if they are not currently employed by the firm.
Please consider all employees of the firm who are located in Jordan.
If you do not know the exact number, please give us your best estimate. |
| C2 | Please tell us approximately how many of these employees are men and how many are women. |
| C3 | How many establishments/plants/locations does this firm have in Jordan? Instruction to Enumerator: Single response. |
1. One — Skip C3a and C3b |
2. Two |
3. Three |
4. Four |
5. Five to nine |
6. 10 or more |
| C3a | Please tell us how many employees are in this establishment/plant/location. |
| C3b | Now, please think about the firm’s other establishments/plants/locations in Jordan. Considering the three establishments/plants/locations with the highest employment, please tell us what province/governorate each one is located in, and how many employees are in each one. Do not include this establishment/plant/location. Governorate | Number of Employees |
| Location #1 | |
| Location #2 | |
| Location #3 | |
Now, please think about the kind of work the firm’s employees do. I would like to ask you about how many of the firm’s employees are production workers and how many are nonproduction workers.

Production workers are employees engaged in fabrication, assembly, material handling, warehousing and shipping, maintenance and repair, janitorial and guard services, and services related to these activities. Nonproduction workers may include managers, clerks, salespeople, engineers, or others not engaged in activities related to the production process.

Thinking about the persons employed at this firm (in all establishments/plants/locations in Jordan), approximately how many are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonproduction workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, I would like to ask you about the number of workers at the firm who are in highly skilled jobs, semiskilled jobs, and unskilled jobs.

Workers in highly skilled jobs are professionals whose tasks require extensive theoretical, technical, or managerial knowledge (for example, engineer, accountant, manager).

Workers in semiskilled jobs are those whose tasks require some level of mechanical or technical knowledge, or expertise in areas like administration or sales (for example, clerk, salesperson, machine operator, welder, skilled tradesman).

Workers in unskilled jobs are those whose tasks involve no specialized knowledge (for example, laborer, dishwasher, cleaner, production worker who does not operate a machine).

Thinking about the persons employed at this firm (in all establishments/plants/locations in Jordan), approximately how many are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Type</th>
<th>Number of Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers in highly skilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in semiskilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in unskilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, please consider the positions at the firm (in all establishments/plants/locations in Jordan) that are [job type].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Type</th>
<th>Number of Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers in highly skilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in semiskilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in unskilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Usually, how long does a [job type] worker stay with the firm? *Instruction to Enumerator: Single response.*

1. Less than 1 month
2. 1–3 months
3. 4–6 months
4. 7–12 months
5. 1–2 years
6. 3–4 years
7. 5 or more years

Approximately many of these [job type] positions have you tried to fill over the past 12 months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Type</th>
<th>Number of Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers in highly skilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in semiskilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in unskilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How many of the [job type] positions that you tried to fill, over the past 12 months, were you able to fill?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Type</th>
<th>Number of Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers in highly skilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in semiskilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in unskilled jobs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C9
What channels did you use to try to fill these [job type] positions over the past 12 months?
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Select all that apply.*
1. Work with government agency or organization
   *Enumerator: give example; e.g., municipal government*
2. Work with chamber of commerce/chamber of industry
3. Work with private employment agency including using website for job matching
4. Work with career center at education/training institution
5. Attend job fairs
6. Receive direct applications from applicants at workplace (factory, shop, facility)
7. Place job advertisements in newspapers
8. Place job advertisements on the Internet, including LinkedIn
9. Place announcement and advertisement on information board of public place
10. Ask current employees for recommendations
11. Ask other firm owners or managers for recommendations
12. Go through intermediary
13. Other (specify)

**Cycle through for all job types (highly skilled, semiskilled, unskilled) reported by the firm in C5. If C7 = 0 for a job type, skip C9 for that job type.**

### C10
Was it difficult to find qualified workers to fill these [job type] positions over the past 12 months?
1. Yes
2. No → Skip C11 and C12

**Cycle through for all job types (highly skilled, semiskilled, unskilled) reported by the firm in C5. If C7 = 0 for a job type, skip C10 for that job type.**

### C11
Why was it difficult to fill these [job type] positions over the past 12 months?
*Instruction to Enumerator: Do not read out options. Select all that apply.*
1. Not enough applicants
2. Applicants lack the necessary education
3. Applicants lack the necessary experience
4. Applicants lack the necessary skills
5. Applicants want higher salary than firm can offer
6. Applicants want more benefits (e.g., holidays, pension) than firm can offer
7. Applicants are not willing to work required hours
8. Applicants are not willing to do required tasks
9. Legal barriers to hiring
10. Area where the firm is located is not attractive to workers
11. Other (specify)

**Cycle through for all job types (highly skilled, semiskilled, unskilled) reported by the firm in C5. If C7 = 0 for a job type, skip C11 for that job type.**

### C12
What steps did the firm take to try to overcome these difficulties in filling these [job type] positions over the past 12 months?
*Instruction to Enumerator: Do not read out options. Select all that apply.*
1. None
2. Offered higher salaries
3. Offered more benefits
4. Offered different work schedules
5. Increased recruiting effort
6. Changed recruiting methods
7. Hired applicants without necessary skills/education and provided on-the-job training
8. Hired applicants without necessary skills/education and paid for off-the-job training
9. Other (specify)

**Cycle through for all job types (highly skilled, semiskilled, unskilled) reported by the firm in C5. If C7 = 0 for a job type, skip C12 for that job type.**
| C13 | **Firms in industrial zones only** For this question only, even if the firm has more than one location, please consider only this location. How willing do you think [job type] workers are to travel or move to this zone to work? Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response.  
1. Not at all willing  
2. Somewhat willing  
3. Very willing | **Cycle through for all job types (highly skilled, semiskilled, unskilled) reported by the firm in C5.** |
Section D. Growth Plans

Enumerator reads: I would now like to ask you about the firm’s anticipated plans for growth. If you do not know exactly what sort of growth is expected, please give us your best guess. For this set of questions, please continue to consider all of the firm’s locations in Jordan, not just this location.

| D1 | Over the next 12 months, during normal times (i.e., nonseasonal times), does the firm expect a change in its revenues from selling products/services? Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response. 
1. No, the firm anticipates that revenues will remain approximately the same as they are now
2. Yes, anticipate a decrease up to 10%
3. Yes, anticipate a decrease of 11–25%
4. Yes, anticipate a decrease of 26–50%
5. Yes, anticipate a decrease of more than 50%
6. Yes, anticipate an increase up to 10%
7. Yes, anticipate an increase of 11–25%
8. Yes, anticipate an increase of 26–50%
9. Yes, anticipate an increase of more than 50%
10. Does not know (Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION.) |
| D2 | Over the next 12 months, during normal times (i.e., nonseasonal times), does the firm expect a change in the number of [job type] jobs? Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response. 
1. No, the firm anticipates that the number of [job type] jobs will remain approximately the same as it is now/firm does not have any [job type] jobs and does not anticipate adding any → Skip D3 
2. Yes, anticipate a decrease up to 10% → Skip D3 
3. Yes, anticipate a decrease of 11–25% → Skip D3 
4. Yes, anticipate a decrease of 26–50% → Skip D3 
5. Yes, anticipate a decrease of more than 50% → Skip D3 
6. Yes, anticipate an increase up to 10% 
7. Yes, anticipate an increase of 11–25% 
8. Yes, anticipate an increase of 26–50% 
9. Yes, anticipate an increase of more than 50% 
10. The firm does not currently have any [job type] jobs but anticipates adding some [If this option is selected, specify number of [job type] jobs anticipated to be added] 
11. Does not know → Skip D3 (Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION.) |
| D3 | Do you anticipate difficulties in finding a sufficient number of [job type] workers to achieve this growth? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Does not know |

Cycle through all worker types (highly skilled, semiskilled, unskilled) even if the firm did not report any of those worker types in C5.

If the answer is 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 go to D3.
### Section E. Perceptions About Hiring Syrians

**Enumerator reads:** For the next set of questions, please continue to consider all locations in Jordan, not just this location.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| E1 | Does the firm currently have any employees who are Syrians, in any establishment/plant/location in Jordan?  
   1. Yes  
   2. No → *Skip E2–E9* |
| E2 | Approximately how many Syrian employees does the firm currently have, in all establishments/plants/locations in Jordan? If you do not know the exact number, please give us your best estimate. |
| E3 | Please tell us approximately how many of these Syrian employees are men, and how many are women.  
   Men  
   Women |
| E4 | Please tell us how many Syrians are employed in this establishment/plant/location. |
| E4a | Now, please think about the firm’s other establishments/plants/locations in Jordan. Considering the largest establishments/plants/locations that we talked about earlier, please tell us how many Syrian employees are in each location. Do not include this establishment/plant/location.  
   *Only ask E4a if firm reported more than one establishment in C3.*  
   How many Syrian employees are in the first location you reported, in [governorate reported for Location #1 in C3b], with [number of employees reported in Location #1 in C3b] total employees?  
   How many Syrian employees are in the second location you reported, in [governorate reported for Location #2 in C3b], with [number of employees reported in Location #2 in C3b] total employees?  
   How many Syrian employees are in the third location you reported, in [governorate reported for Location #3 in C3b], with [number of employees reported in Location #3 in C3b] total employees? |
| E5 | Thinking about all of the firm’s Syrian employees (in all establishments/plants/locations in Jordan), please tell us approximately how many of them are production workers, and how many are nonproduction workers.  
   Production workers  
   Nonproduction workers |
| E6 | Thinking about all of the firm’s Syrian employees (in all establishments/plants/locations in Jordan), please tell us approximately how many of these Syrian employees work in each of the following positions:  
   Highly skilled  
   Semiskilled  
   Unskilled |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| E7       | Usually, how long does a Syrian employee stay with the firm?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Single response.*  
1. Less than 1 month  
2. 1–3 months  
3. 4–6 months  
4. 7–12 months  
5. 1–2 years  
6. 3–4 years  
7. 5 or more years |
| E8       | Usually, how long does a Jordanian employee stay with the firm?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Single response.*  
1. Less than 1 month  
2. 1–3 months  
3. 4–6 months  
4. 7–12 months  
5. 1–2 years  
6. 3–4 years  
7. 5 or more years  
8. Firm does not employ any Jordanian employees |
| E9       | How does the firm typically recruit Syrians?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Select all that apply.*  
1. Work with government agency or organization  
   ([Enumerator: give example; e.g., municipal government])  
2. Work with chamber of commerce/chamber of industry  
3. Work with private employment agency including using website for job matching  
4. Work with career center at education/training institution  
5. Work with organizations that help Syrians to find jobs  
6. Attend job fairs  
7. Receive direct applications from applicants at workplace (factory, shop, facility)  
8. Place job advertisements in newspapers  
9. Place job advertisements on Internet, including LinkedIn  
10. Place announcement and advertisement on information board of public place  
11. Ask current employees for recommendations  
12. Ask other firm owners or managers for recommendations  
13. Go through intermediary  
14. Other (specify)  
*Instruction to Enumerator: For firms that said “yes” to E1 and were routed to E2–E9, skip E10–E12 and go to E13.* |
### E10 Has the firm ever tried to recruit Syrians?
1. Yes
2. No → Skip E11–E12
3. Does not know → Skip E11–E12

### E11 What methods did the firm use to recruit Syrians?
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Select all that apply.*

1. Worked with government agency or organization
   *[Enumerator: give example; e.g., municipal government]*
2. Worked with chamber of commerce/chamber of industry
3. Worked with private employment agency including using website for job matching
4. Worked with career center at education/training institution
5. Worked with organizations that help Syrians to find jobs
6. Attended job fairs
7. Received direct applications from applicants at workplace (factory, shop, facility)
8. Placed job advertisements in newspapers
9. Placed job advertisements on Internet, including LinkedIn
10. Placed announcement and advertisement on information board of public place
11. Asked current employees for recommendations
12. Asked other firm owners or managers for recommendations
13. Went through intermediary
14. Other (specify)
15. Does not know (*Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION.*)

### E12 Why does the firm no longer have any Syrians working here?
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response.*

1. Unable to find qualified Syrians
2. Offered jobs to qualified Syrians but they did not accept
3. Was able to hire Syrians but they are no longer working at the firm
4. Other (specify)
5. Does not know (*Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION.*)

### E13 What do you perceive as the difficulties in obtaining work permits for Syrians?
*Instruction to Enumerator: Do not read out or show options. Select all that apply.*

1. No difficulties
2. Lack of information about how to apply for permit
3. Complicated procedures to apply for permit
4. Permits not given for particular occupations
5. Permits not given for this sector
6. Employees may not have required residency permit
7. Permit applications are often denied
8. Permit applications take a long time
9. Permits may not be renewed
10. Permit only valid for short period of time
11. Firm may be at quota for number of Syrian workers
12. Fee for work permit is too high
13. Cost of wages with permit is too high
14. Cost of benefits with permit is too high
15. Firm required to serve as “guarantor” for Syrian worker
16. Other (specify)
17. Does not know
18. Refused to answer
| E14 | Is it common for other firms in this line of work to hire Syrians?  
1. Yes  
2. No  
3. Does not know |
|---|---|
| E15 | Do you think other firms in this line of work use any of these ways to avoid barriers to hiring Syrians?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Select all that apply.*  
1. Hiring Syrians without work permits (informally or unregistered)  
2. Saying a worker is in one occupation to get a work permit but having them work in another occupation  
3. Showing Syrians as local workers on paper  
4. Hiring Syrians who have received work permits through other employers  
5. Other (specify)  
6. Do not know (Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION. If selected, single response.)  
7. None of the above. I do not think firms in this line of work use any methods to avoid barriers (Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION. If selected, single response.) |
| E16 | Approximately how many workers from countries other than Jordan and Syria does this firm currently have in all establishments/plants/locations in Jordan? If you do not know the exact number, please give us your best estimate.  
*[If None, skip E17]* |
| E17 | Please tell us approximately how many of these non-Jordanian, non-Syrian employees work in each of the following positions:  
Highly skilled  
Semiskilled  
Unskilled |
| E18 | You said that the firm intends to increase the number of [job type] workers over the next 12 months. If you were allowed to hire as many Syrians as you wanted, about what percent of these workers do you anticipate would be Syrians?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response.*  
1. None  
2. 1–25%  
3. 26–50%  
4. 51–75%  
5. >75%  
*Only ask E18 if any answers to D2 indicated increases in employment.*  
*Cycle through all job types reported to increase in D2.* |
| E19 | What do you perceive as an advantage to hiring Syrians, relative to other workers?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Do not read out options. Select all that apply.*  
1. None  
2. Willing to work for lower wages  
3. Willing to work longer hours  
4. Willing to accept fewer benefits  
5. Willing to perform types of tasks required  
6. Willing to work in this location  
7. Easier to find applicants  
8. More motivated  
9. More productive  
10. Applicants have higher levels of education  
11. Applicants are more skilled  
12. Less likely to leave  
13. Socially responsible to hire Syrians  
14. Other (specify) |
|---|---|
| E20 | What do you perceive as a disadvantage to hiring Syrians, relative to other workers?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Do not read out options. Select all that apply.*  
1. None  
2. Lack of information on rules for hiring  
3. Problems with authorities  
4. Syrians not allowed to work in occupation/sector  
5. Quota for number of Syrian workers  
6. Language barrier  
7. Work permit  
   a. Syrians lack residency or work permit  
   b. Lack of information on work permit procedures  
   c. Work permit too expensive  
   d. Work permit takes too long to get  
   e. Work permit applications often denied  
   f. Work permits may not be renewed  
8. Social issues  
   a. Resistance from current workers  
   b. Tensions between Syrians and other staff  
   c. Public pressure  
   d. Cultural barriers  
9. Working conditions  
   a. Want wages higher than what firm offers  
   b. Want working hours different from what firm offers  
   c. Want more benefits than what firm offers  
10. Work habits  
   a. Less willing to perform types of tasks required  
   b. Less motivated  
   c. Less productive  
11. Recruiting/retention  
   a. Harder to find qualified applicants  
   b. More likely to leave  
12. Education/skills  
   a. Applicants have lower levels of education  
   b. Applicants are less skilled  
   c. Applicants have less experience  
   d. Unable to verify education/training  
13. Other (specify) |
| E21 | [Firms in industrial zones only] For this question only, even if the firm has more than one location, please consider only this location. Do you think Syrians are more or less likely to be willing to work in this zone than Jordanian workers?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response.*  
1. More willing  
2. Less willing  
3. About the same  
4. Does not know *(Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION.)* |
## Section F. Incentives

| F1 | What are the top three things the government can do to encourage/increase job opportunities for all workers in Jordan?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Select up to 3.*  
1. Reduce paperwork for hiring workers  
2. Make it easier to fire workers if needed  
3. Reduce bureaucracy/paperwork in general  
4. Make regulations/laws pertaining to employment clearer stabler  
5. Make regulations/laws pertaining to running a business clearer stabler  
6. Make it easier to set up a new business  
7. Provide wage subsidies  
8. Provide benefit subsidies  
9. Decrease social security fees  
10. Provide or subsidize off-the-job training for workers  
11. Help find workers with the right skills  
12. Lower taxes  
13. Improve infrastructure  
14. Make it easier to get financing/loans  
15. Incentivize exports  
16. Devalue the Jordanian dinar  
17. Help with marketing/connecting to customers  
18. Help to connect to suppliers  
19. Make it easier to find/buy/lease land  
20. Make it easier to get access to technology at lower cost  
21. Nothing the government could do would increase job opportunities (Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION. If this option is selected, must be a single response.) |
|---|---|
| F2 | [For firms in industrial zones only] The Jordan Compact makes it easier for certain firms to export to the European Union if they hire Syrians. Does this benefit affect your firm's decisions regarding exporting and/or hiring Syrians?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Single response.*  
1. Yes, affects firm's decisions about exporting  
2. Yes, affects firm's decisions about hiring Syrians  
3. Yes, affects firm's decisions about exporting and hiring Syrians  
4. No  
5. Not familiar with this benefit |
| F3 | What are the top three things the government can do to encourage/increase job opportunities for Syrians?  
*Instruction to Enumerator: Read out or show options. Select up to 3.*  
1. Make legal status of Syrians clearer  
2. Provide identification cards to Syrians  
3. Make it clear that Syrians will be allowed to stay for long term  
4. Allow Syrians to work in more occupations sectors  
5. Allow firms to have a greater share of Syrian workers  
6. Allow Syrians to work anywhere in the country  
7. Help match Syrians with certain skills with firms looking for those skills  
8. Provide trade concessions lower tariffs for exports for firms that hire Syrians  
9. Provide free work permits for Syrians  
10. Make it easier to get work permits for Syrians  
11. Allow work permits for Syrians to be transferable across employers  
12. Allow firms to pay Syrians less than minimum wage  
13. Provide wage subsidies for Syrians  
14. Allow firms not to pay benefits (such as social security or health care) for Syrians  
15. Provide benefit subsidies for Syrians  
16. Decrease social security fees for Syrians  
17. Provide language training to Syrians |
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Provide other training to Syrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Subsidize the cost of training for Syrians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Provide certificates to Syrians for having completed language training courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Provide certificates to Syrians for having completed vocational training courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Facilitate recognition of Syrian credentials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 23. | Nothing would increase job opportunities for Syrians  
* (Enumerator: DO NOT READ OR SHOW THIS OPTION. If this option is selected, must be a single response.) |
APPENDIX G

Details on Country Overviews

This appendix provides further details on the country overviews provided in Chapters Three, Six, and Nine.

Table G.1
Biggest Obstacle Faced by Firms in Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small (5–19 Employees)</th>
<th>Medium (20–99 Employees)</th>
<th>Large (100+ Employees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax rates (41%)</td>
<td>Tax rates (38%)</td>
<td>Practices of competitors in the informal sector (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices of competitors in the informal sector (17%)</td>
<td>Practices of competitors in the informal sector (19%)</td>
<td>Tax rates (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability (10%)</td>
<td>Political instability (15%)</td>
<td>Political instability (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to finance (9%)</td>
<td>Access to finance (9%)</td>
<td>Access to finance (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity (5%)</td>
<td>Transport (7%)</td>
<td>Inadequately educated workforce (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations are based on World Bank Group, 2013b. Note that this survey targets registered firms with five or more employees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of Syrians</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Freedom of Movement in Turkey</th>
<th>Eligibility to Work</th>
<th>Access to Banking Services or Finance</th>
<th>Ability to Start a Business</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered under Temporary Protection</td>
<td>3,561,707(^a)</td>
<td>No travel freedom; restriction to city of registration; with valid justification, DGMM may provide exceptional travel permit; in reality, many have left registration locations(^b)</td>
<td>Formal work allowed with a work permit for which Syrians under Temporary Protection can apply; many also work informally</td>
<td>Regulations allow this, but it depends on the bank, as some private banks may avoid opening accounts for Syrians</td>
<td>More than 7,000 Syrians under Temporary Protection received work permits to open their own firms; in practice, many also open businesses (usually small firms) without a permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence or work permit holder</td>
<td>~40,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Almost no problem</td>
<td>Almost no problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish citizen after 2011</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unregistered</td>
<td>Estimates range from 250,000 to 400,000(^c)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Republic of Turkey, DGMM, n.d.
\(^b\) Erdoğan, January 2017, p. 29.
\(^c\) International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 1.
### Table G.3
**Employer and Refugee Incentives and Disincentives for Applying for Work Permits**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer Incentives</th>
<th>Refugee Incentives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Following the law</td>
<td>• Health, social security, or other benefits may be secured with work permits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social responsibility</td>
<td>• Legality and dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In cases when a Syrian has a rare and needed skill set</td>
<td>• Anticipation or fear that work permits may see more enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Minimizes labor recruiting costs</td>
<td>• Vulnerable to exploitation without work permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can be viewed as a mechanism for contributing to the local economy, since Syrians spend their money in country whereas migrants send their remittances home</td>
<td>• Avoid deportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health, social security, or other benefits may be secured with work permits</td>
<td>• Better working conditions through workplace inspections and enforcement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table G.4
**Biggest Obstacle Faced by Firms in Jordan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small (5–19 Employees)</th>
<th>Medium (20–99 Employees)</th>
<th>Large (100+ Employees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to finance (37%)</td>
<td>Access to finance (19%)</td>
<td>Political instability (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax rates (25%)</td>
<td>Tax rates (18%)</td>
<td>Tax rates (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability (10%)</td>
<td>Political instability (10%)</td>
<td>Customs and trade regulations (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor regulations (4.3%)</td>
<td>Inadequately educated workforce (9%)</td>
<td>Labor regulations (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices of competitors in the informal sector (4.0%)</td>
<td>Labor regulations (9%)</td>
<td>Inadequately educated workforce (9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Razzaaz, 2017; International Labour Organization, Regional Office for Arab States, 2017.
Table G.5
Biggest Obstacles Faced by Firms in Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small (5–19 Employees)</th>
<th>Medium (20–99 Employees)</th>
<th>Large (100+ Employees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax rates</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to finance</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations are based on World Bank Group, 2013b. Note that this survey targets registered firms with five or more employees.
References


El-Behairy, Nouran, “Burden or Brothers: Media Representation of Refugees in the Middle East,” June 8, 2016. As of August 3, 2018: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/06/burden-or


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ILO—*See* International Labour Organization.

IMF—*See* International Monetary Fund.


Jordan INGO Forum—See Jordan International Non-Governmental Organization Forum.


OECD—See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.


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TOBB—See Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey.


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UNDP—See United Nations Development Programme.


UNHCR—See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.


The Syrian Civil War has displaced 60 percent of the country’s population. Six million refugees live in neighboring countries in the Middle East. Such a large refugee influx has been a severe strain to these countries’ labor markets, public services, and social cohesion. This RAND report examines the problems of and opportunities for the labor market for displaced Syrians in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. The authors used multiple methods: interviews with stakeholders, focus groups with Syrian and host country workers, in-depth interviews with firms, and surveys of firms and Syrian households. The existing skill sets of the Syrians are compared to the needs of each country’s labor market; and the steps needed to improve the overall economic climate and strategies for preserving and improving social cohesion of refugees and host communities are examined. Each country has its specific challenges. For example, in Turkey a key barrier for the refugees was the ability to speak the language. In Jordan and Lebanon, the existing economic slowdowns and lack of jobs were exacerbated by the arrival of the refugees. Working legally was a challenge in all countries. The authors conclude with recommendations tailored to each country. Some of these include offering language classes (in the case of Turkey); assessing geographic areas where jobs are needed and enabling migrants to move to these regions; improving each country’s worker certification process so that qualified migrants can get jobs within their area of expertise; investing in infrastructure projects and better training courses; and improving the business environment for all.