What factors contributed to the different levels of disorder witnessed in Marseille and Lille during the 2016 UEFA European Championship?

Case study

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This case study has been produced as part of an independent research project conducted for Qatar University by RAND Europe on ‘Connections between misuse of alcohol, antisocial, violent and destructive behaviour at major sporting events, and promising strategies to minimise the incidence of and harm from these behaviours’.

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank interviewees for sharing their views and professional insights with members of the research team. We would also like to express our gratitude to Professor Mariam Al Maadeed and Dr Suzanne Hammad of Qatar University, for their support during the research process. The views presented in this report are the authors’ and any remaining errors are also our own.

For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2792

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Key findings

- Serious violence broke out in the French city of Marseille between supporters of the national teams of Russia and England, local youths and the police during the 2016 UEFA European Championship.

- Matches involving the national teams of Russia, England and Wales were due to take place in the Lille area only days thereafter, and there was concern from police forces, fans and other stakeholders that similar, or even more serious disorder would occur. However, while there were several smaller clashes and instances of antisocial behaviour, large-scale problems were avoided.

- Evidence gathered in this case study points to a number of reasons why events played out differently in the two cities. In particular, the high-intensity, reactive policing tactics deployed in Marseille may have caused the situation to escalate. A generally lower-intensity policing approach aimed at facilitating positive behaviours was reportedly adopted in Lille.

- Different approaches to the sharing and utilisation of intelligence between foreign police forces about travelling supporters, as well as the role of foreign police officers in local security operations, may also have contributed to the contrasting outcomes.

- Other contributory factors include issues with UEFA’s security inside the Marseille stadium; the history of conflict between England fans and local youths in Marseille; and different regulatory frameworks regarding the sale and consumption of alcohol during the tournament.
1. Introduction

This case study is part of a research project that RAND Europe has been commissioned to undertake by Qatar University, examining violent and antisocial behaviours at football events, the factors associated with such behaviours, and strategies to prevent and reduce their occurrence.

Here we seek to examine a particularly high-profile instance of football-related violence and disorder that broke out in the southern French city of Marseille during the 2016 UEFA European Championship. Three days of clashes between supporters of the national teams of Russia and England, local youths and the police in the lead up to a match between the Russia and England teams resulted in dozens of serious injuries to fans and bystanders. Only four days after these events, matches involving Russia, England and Wales were due to take place in the Lille area, and there was concern that similar, or even more serious disorder would occur.¹ Several smaller clashes did occur between the rival groups in Lille, alongside antisocial behaviour such as chanting and public intoxication.² Overall, however, the scale of disorder fell short of what had been feared.³ This case study explores the factors that may have contributed to the different outcomes in crowd behaviour and public safety witnessed in Marseille and Lille. We begin with an overview of the events in Marseille and Lille, before examining a range of contributing factors identified in the evidence including differences in policing strategies, stadium security, contextual differences, and the application of different regulatory frameworks regarding the sale and consumption of alcohol. We then present some conclusions and key lessons for Qatar in preparing for the FIFA World Cup in 2020.

Our analysis is based on six interviews with the following types of key informants: 1) policing practitioners involved in the organisation and management of football matches (interviewees SP1 and SP2); 2) academic experts working on football-related violence and antisocial behaviour research (AE1, AE2, AE3); and 3) a representative of European fan associations (FO1). In addition, a review of French- and English-language grey literature and media coverage of the events was undertaken, as well as a review of French and English government websites for official statements and reports issued by police and other agencies. No academic research examining the policing strategies deployed during the Euro 2016 tournament has been identified by the research team. However, available evidence on the effectiveness of various tactics used at other football events is included. More information on research methods for this case study, and its limitations, is included at the end of this report.

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¹ Interviewee AE2; Morgan (2016).
² BBC News (2016h).
³ Interviewee AE1.
2. What happened in Marseille and Lille during Euro 2016?

Overview

The 15th UEFA European Championship, commonly referred to as Euro 2016, kicked off in France on 10 June 2016. National football teams from 24 European countries gathered to compete in ten host cities across the country. With them came tens of thousands of football fans who planned to watch matches either in the stadiums or at other sites in the host cities. In the lead up to the tournament, concerns were expressed about a range of potential risks, including the threat of terrorism, strikes by airline and railway workers, flooding in Paris, and football hooliganism and disorder, the latter of which is a recurring concern during football tournaments. It was also this last issue that would ultimately manifest itself most markedly and dominate press coverage over the month-long tournament. Violent confrontations between fans and locals, as well as antisocial behaviour such as offensive chanting, public intoxication and bottle throwing were reported in public spaces across several host cities including Paris, Nice and Lyon. French police clashed with fans and locals on several occasions, using tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds. However, the scale of the violence and disorder, as well as the intensity of the police response, arguably reached its peak over three days in Marseille, host city for the match between England and Russia.

The events in Marseille

Confrontations between England fans, local youths and the French police began two days before the England vs Russia match was scheduled to begin, on the night of 9 June in the Old Port area of Marseille. Groups of England fans had gathered to drink and socialise, some quietly but others singing nationalistic and racially charged chants. Around 70 local youths were reported to have approached the crowd and a violent confrontation broke out between the two groups, at least some of whom were intoxicated. Local police were reported to have arrived at the scene swiftly and they used tear gas, rubber bullets and dogs to disperse

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4 Transfer Markt (2016).
5 Jackson (2015).
6 Calder (2016).
7 Lichfield (2016).
8 Toronto Sun (2016).
9 Stevens (2016).
10 BBC News (2016c); Rumsby (2016).
11 BBC News (2016i).
12 BBC News (2016h).
13 Smith (2016).
14 Stott (2016); Weaver (2016a); BBC News (2016e).
15 BBC News (2016a).
the crowd; four officers received minor injuries and two people were arrested.

On the following afternoon, further conflict developed in the same area, between England fans who were drinking and chanting, and locals who were reported to have started throwing bottles at them. Police soon arrived wearing body armour, helmets and shields, and they again used tear gas on the crowd. According to multiple media reports, the situation escalated when between 150 and 300 Russia fans arrived at the location and violent confrontations broke out between Russia and England fans. The Russians, some carrying knives and metal bars, were described as ‘hyper-fast’ and ‘extreme and well-trained’ by the chief prosecutor of Marseille. A French researcher who specialises in radical fan behaviour and was on the scene at the time described the arrival of the Russian supporters as a ‘raid.’ Similarly, the head of the UK policing delegation described them as ‘highly organised and determined to carry out sustained violent attacks,’ adding that there was a ‘small minority’ of England fans who were also seeking to cause trouble. Indeed, some England fans were reported to have sought to engage in the conflict, while many others fled; a large group of England supporters locked themselves into a pub to escape up to 40 Russians who had pursued them. While French police were reported to have held back in the early stages of the disorder, as the situation deteriorated they moved into the crowds by the Port using tear gas, a water cannon and other escalatory tactics. Numerous fans were reported to have responded aggressively to the police intervention, and several were arrested for throwing bottles at officers before the fans ultimately dispersed, some with serious injuries.

The following afternoon, the day of the match, further violent and extensive clashes occurred between Russia and England supporters and local youths in the Port area. The police again responded to the disorder with tear gas and were reported to eventually ‘charge’ at the crowd; numerous fans were also seen throwing bottles at the police. Local residents and other bystanders sought cover as the clashes escalated. The riot police presence increased, and physical fights were reported to have spread to a number of streets around the Port. After several hours, the situation calmed; several England fans were arrested and multiple injuries

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16 BBC News (2016a); Weaver (2016a, 2016b); Stott (2016).
17 BBC News (2016a).
18 Wallace (2016).
19 Rof (2016); Boffey (2016); Gibson et al. (2016); BBC News (2016e).
20 Morgan (2016).
21 Rof (2016).
22 Boffey (2016).
23 Wallace (2016).
24 Wallace (2016).
25 Weaver (2016a).
26 BBC News (2016e).
27 PA Sport (2016).
28 Stott (2016).
29 Gibson et al. (2016).
30 BBC News (2016b).
were reported.31 Outside the stadium, ranks of police in riot gear gathered as fans moved into the venue for the 9pm kick-off; over 1,000 officers and an additional 500 stewards were reportedly stationed around the site, with a further 1,000 officers nearby at the fan zone.32 The crowds were described as mostly peaceful, although there were reports of minor skirmishes as well as fans ‘hanging off trees, swinging plastic chairs and throwing plastic cups.’33

Inside the stadium, a number of flares were set off by Russian fans during the match.34 Serious disorder broke out in the closing minutes of the game: rockets and other missiles were thrown onto the pitch, flags were torn down, and dozens of Russian fans broke through barricades separating the fan groups and stormed into the England fan section, violently attacking the supporters.35 A number of England fans engaged with the attackers, while thousands more sought to exit the stadium in panic, in what one witness described to the BBC as a ‘stampede.’36 In accordance with UEFA practice,37 there were no police officers on duty inside the stadium,38 although some stewards intervened to separate the groups.39

The violence was reported to have then moved outside the stadium, with chairs, bottles and flares thrown,40 and with police again using a water cannon and tear gas on fans.41 Crowds finally dispersed late in the evening. After three days of violence and disorder, at least 35 people were reported injured, some seriously.42

The events in Lille

Following the violence and disorder in Marseille, the concerns of many stakeholders turned to the next fixtures in the tournament. Matches involving Russia, England and Wales were due to take place in the Lille area43 only days later, and there was widespread anxiety that similar, or even more serious, disorder would occur, particularly given the few arrests or bans of Russia supporters for their involvement in the earlier violence.44 Interviewee AE2, a football policing researcher who had witnessed the events in Marseille while conducting research on fan and police behaviour, stated that ‘the disorder in Lille had the potential to be as, if not more, fearsome than what happened in Marseille.’ The head of the UK policing delegation for the tournament

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31 BBC News (2016b).
32 ABC News (2016).
33 Hayward (2016).
34 BBC News (2016, 2016f); Flood (2016).
35 ABC News (2016); BBC News (2016f); Flood (2016); PA Sport (2016).
36 BBC News (2016b).
37 Mollaret (2016).
38 BBC News (2016d); Flood (2016); RT (2016).
39 RT (2016).
40 RT (2016).
41 Flood (2016).
42 Rof (2016); Ouest France (2016a); BBC News (2016e, 2016f, 2016g).
43 The Russian national team played Slovakia in Villeneuve-d’Ascq, just outside Lille, on 15 June. England played Wales in Lens, a city 23 miles from Lille, on 16 June. Due to the proximity of Lille to Lens, and its greater capacity to accommodate large numbers of visitors, England and Wales fans were advised by British police to base themselves there (Interviewee SP2; BBC News 2016g).
44 Interviewee AE2, Morgan (2016).
was quoted in a media report as saying: ‘It’s realistic to expect that the Russia fans will seek to try to behave in a similar way.’\textsuperscript{45} UK Football Association chairman Greg Dyke also expressed ‘serious concerns around the security arrangements for the city in the next few days’, adding ‘these concerns are heightened with the knowledge that Russia will play in Lille on Wednesday afternoon.’\textsuperscript{46} Around 4,000 police officers and emergency services personnel were deployed in the city,\textsuperscript{47} alongside ‘spotters’ from UK and Russian police forces who assisted local police by interacting with fans from their own countries, and feeding back intelligence about the behaviour of the crowd to the command centre.\textsuperscript{48}

An estimated 50,000 England, 20,000 Wales\textsuperscript{49} and 15,000 Russia fans began to arrive in the area.\textsuperscript{50} In the days leading up to the Wednesday matches, there had been a small number of scuffles between fans of various nationalities, but the atmosphere was described by many as relaxed and good-humoured.\textsuperscript{51} On match day, a small number of isolated and brief clashes occurred between Russia and England supporters,\textsuperscript{52} but news channel France24 reported that the main trouble during the day came from England and Wales fans, some of whom were intoxicated, chanting on the streets.\textsuperscript{53} In the early evening, a small group of Russian supporters reportedly charged at England fans, some of whom were standing on a parked car. Police on the scene pursued the participants, who scattered and clashed with each other, and threw bottles at police; the police used tear gas to disperse a larger group and the situation soon calmed.\textsuperscript{54} Later in the evening, groups of intoxicated England fans wandered the streets, singing;\textsuperscript{55} at around midnight, more revellers were reported to spill onto the street as reportedly around 350 bars closed.\textsuperscript{56} There is no evidence of violence occurring at this stage of the evening, but police used tear gas to disperse the crowds or steer them away from the city centre and towards designated fan zones.\textsuperscript{57} In total, 16 people were reported to have been treated for injuries.\textsuperscript{58}

Overall, however, the scale of disorder in Lille fell short of what many had predicted based on the experience in Marseille.\textsuperscript{59} What factors contributed to the different outcomes of these events? In the following sections, we gather together the views of experts on football fan behaviour and policing to explore this question.

\textsuperscript{45} Morgan (2016).
\textsuperscript{46} BBC News (2016f).
\textsuperscript{47} France 24 (2016).
\textsuperscript{48} Gibson (2016).
\textsuperscript{49} Fifield (2016).
\textsuperscript{50} Gibson (2016).
\textsuperscript{51} Fifield (2016).
\textsuperscript{52} Reuters (2016).
\textsuperscript{53} France 24 (2016).
\textsuperscript{54} Gibson et al. (2016).
\textsuperscript{55} Gibson et al. (2016).
\textsuperscript{56} Stott (2016).
\textsuperscript{57} Gibson et al. (2016).
\textsuperscript{58} BBC News (2016h); Gibson et al. (2016).
\textsuperscript{59} Interviewee AE1.
3. How did policing tactics impact on crowd behaviour in Marseille and Lille?

Discussions with all six interviewees on explanatory factors behind the differences in outcomes, as well as published commentary from policing practitioners and researchers, focused on a number of specific elements of the police's crowd disorder prevention and response activities. These elements, explored in the section, relate to the use of high intensity, reactive policing tactics compared to more facilitative approaches; the timing of the police intervention when instances of disorder and violence broke out; and the practice of information-sharing and other forms of cooperation with foreign police forces.

High-intensity and low-intensity policing

Discussions with all six interviewees on explanatory factors behind the differences in outcomes in Marseille and Lille, as well as published commentary from policing practitioners and researchers, centre above all on the impact of the Marseille police's use of high-intensity, reactive policing tactics. Features of this approach included the at-times indiscriminate use of force against the crowds, as well as the large numbers of officers in riot gear present before any disorder had emerged in the crowd. These have been described as escalatory tactics that inflamed the crowds’ behaviour. It is important to note that the research team has not been able to discuss policing tactics with the authorities in Marseille. However, in the immediate aftermath of the disorder, the police chief for the Marseille region rejected any suggestion that the tactics used contributed to the violence, stating:

I don't want anyone saying the security measures were inadequate. They were sufficient and proportionate to the risk. The police prevented very serious violence and damage by dispersing the most violent individuals.

Interviewees for this case study took a generally more critical view of police tactics and their impact on the disorder. Interviewee AE2, a football policing researcher, argued that the intensity of the policing response was at times disproportionate and caused disorder to increase, giving the example of the first evening’s clashes between England fans and locals. He stated:

…the French police used tear gas and rubber bullets on the first night of the three-day [disorder] as a result of, I would say, two to three English and locals having a fight. And they tear gassed them and rubber bulleted the crowd of about 100, and obviously that created serious disorder.

Interviewee FO1, a representative of a European fan organisation, also commented that the police’s use of tools including pepper spray and water cannons resulted in ‘a lot of fans [becoming] victims of these police actions who didn’t have anything to do with the violence.’ Interviewee AE1, a football policing researcher, reported that this kind of approach to managing crowds is likely to prove alienating and may erode the perception of legitimacy that police need to gain cooperation and compliance from the public. He commented that by creating an ‘inter-group dynamic of us and them… our research overwhelmingly
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shows that conflict begins to become possible and probable,’ adding:

...when fans are met with force from the outset, when they’re not communicated with, and when they’re all treated the same, as if they’re a threat to public order, then we see violence and conflict escalate.

In addition, one football policing researcher, quoted in a media report, argued that the wearing of riot gear even before conflict developed had a meaningful impact on the behaviour of both the crowd and the police officers, psychologically preparing them for conflict. He added that:

In most of Europe now, including Britain, the modern tactic is not to wear riot gear from the off but to begin by engaging with the crowd, resolving individual issues and arresting and taking away safely any individual who breaks the law.63

In Lille, according to several interviewees, authorities pursued a significantly different approach to dealing with the football fans.64 Interviewee SP2, a UK football policing practitioner, commented that ‘there was a very different, very noticeable difference in the policing styles within the cities.’ Interviewee AE1 reported that, particularly in relation to the England and Wales fans, the police largely sought to understand how the fans expressed themselves and respond to them in a way that would facilitate cooperation rather than conflict:

...we had an approach that was much more facilitative. It was about allowing England fans to get together, to be very drunk, to be very boisterous. But, to recognise that that wasn’t inherently linked to any threat of violence, it was simply them enjoying themselves. And actually, if you managed that, if you kept, for example, groups that might want to target England fans away, then England fans were largely compliant. ... They understood what England fans were doing in a very different way, and therefore actually sought to facilitate and support it, rather than prevent it.

Contemporaneous press coverage of policing tactics, highlighted above, also records police action taken against individuals or groups of troublemakers, rather than wider, indiscriminate use of force against fans, and steering large groups of intoxicated fans towards fan zones, albeit with the use of tear gas. In addition, while riot police were visible, plain clothes officers were seen stopping and searching Russia fans, looking for weapons or other evidence of plans to cause disorder.65

The relative paucity of rigorous research on the impact of policing tactics on violent and antisocial behaviour amongst football crowds has been established by a review of the evidence produced as part of this study66 and has been noted elsewhere.67 However, a small number of studies were identified and explored in greater detail in the RAND Europe review that assessed low-intensity policing tactics at the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany,68 and the 2004 European Championship in Portugal.69 These studies appear to support the argument that low-intensity policing approaches aimed at fostering dialogue and positive relations

63 Morgan (2016).
64 Interviewees SP2, AE1.
65 BBC News (2016g).
66 Taylor et al. (2018). This review only included journal articles published after 2005.
69 Schreiber & Stott (2012); Stott et al. (2007); Stott et al. (2008).
between the police, other authorities and fans, and de-escalating conflict situations, are effective in successfully maintaining public safety as well as enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the police. In addition, a 1998 study on the effect of interactions between England supporters and the Italian police at the 1990 FIFA World Cup, the findings of which were primarily based on participant (fan) observations, explored how an ‘us vs them’ dynamic may emerge amongst fans. It is suggested that:

...where police treat all fans as if they were potentially dangerous and treat all forms of collective self-assertion (singing, chanting, marching, etc.) as actual danger, then many supporters may experience what they perceive as legitimate rights to be denied (such as the right to gather in boisterous support of one’s team) and/or may experience what they perceive as illegitimate forms of external constraint (like being forced to leave particular areas and not to leave others). In either case, resistance to police action can be construed by participants as a reassertion of rights rather than [conflict].

The authors acknowledge a number of limitations to their study, in particular that it lacks the perspective of the police but rather focuses exclusively on fans, who may be motivated to justify their behaviour. In relation to the effect of police wearing riot gear from the outset, no published research has been identified in the context of football crowds, although several policing guidelines and strategy papers advise police forces to have riot gear available to be used only if the need arises.

This approach of scaling up tactics as the situation requires it was also considered by interviewee SP2, a policing practitioner, who agreed that in the first instance officers should seek to employ low-intensity tactic such as engaging with supporters and encouraging positive behaviours. He added, however, that authorities must also be prepared to utilise a variety of tactics to maintain public safety:

You’ve got to recognise, on other occasions, it may be that we would advise the host to contain people, disperse people, make early tactical arrests to try and take out troublemakers. We will always try to stop the troublemakers getting there, so the UK strategy for dealing with football-related issues is three-pronged. We say that we will seek to exclude ‘risk’ supporters, influence those supporters in the middle who usually, through too much alcohol, may engage in antisocial behaviour. And then we will empower the majority of genuine supporters and we will shift the style, depending on the actual nature of the supporter and the circumstances, rather than going with a predetermined idea that one tactic will, kind of, work over all others.

One football policing researcher, noting that this type of approach has been used in managing football fans in countries such as Germany and Sweden, has argued in the media that positive police interactions with fans before incidents occur can give officers confidence that if issues do occur, they can go

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71 See, for example, Police Executive Research Forum (2011).
72 The Council of the European Union Resolution of 4 December 2006 defines a ‘risk’ supporter as: ‘A person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or antisocial behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event.’ A ‘non-risk’ supporter is defined as: ‘A person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing no risk to the cause of or contribution to violence or disorder, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event’ (Council of the European Union 2006).
back into the crowd to intervene without being seen as antagonistic or illegitimate.73

**Timing of police intervention and arrests**

Linked with the commentary on the use of high-intensity policing tactics were observations from a number of stakeholders on the reportedly slow reaction of police in Marseille when disorder emerged, and the limited number of immediate arrests. Several media accounts were critical of the timing of the police interventions. According to one report:

...riot police, out in huge numbers, seemed content to corral the various factions to areas where they could control them and rarely intervened even when large groups were chasing each other around the town in the early hours.74

Similarly, a British newspaper commented:

Worse though was the apparent unwillingness of officers to intervene to prevent attacks on supporters taking place, particularly when Russian hooligans turned up on Saturday. Their approach is understood to have exasperated UK police on the ground in France who had hoped to convince their counterparts that there was another way.75

Criticisms of this approach also came from fans and researchers observing the policing tactics. Fan association representative FO1 noted that:

...the English fans’ embassy published a press statement that criticised the actions of the French police, mainly in that they didn’t intervene at a time when it was necessary and when it was possible. This was the time when the Russian hooligans, who... easily could have been identified before they started attacking in small groups the English fans, and the police didn’t intervene at these stages, despite the fact that the preparation of the Russian hooligans were quite obvious.

One British expert characterised the approach thus: ‘We move from zero policing, from no intervention, to riot policing, and that is clearly accentuating the problem rather than dealing with it.’ Interviewee SP2 suggested that the policing tactics were at least in part driven by the framework under which the officers were operating, telling us that the view of the local authorities was:

...that they couldn’t do anything until a crime had been committed, which then drives them into a purely reactive model. And once this disorder occurs, it’s very difficult then to de-escalate it and bring it down, so we would always go for prevention... and early de-escalation, rather than reacting to something once it’s happened.

The lack of immediate arrests by the police, particularly of violent Russia supporters, also received some criticism from French press. French newspaper *Le Monde* noted that 15 people had been arrested over the latter two days of the disorder, of whom 10 were placed into custody; the paper described this response as ‘a judicial balance sheet that may seem weak for those who experience the violence of the brawls’.76 A French expert on football fan behaviour characterised police not arresting participants in the Friday’s clashes as a ‘mistake’, given the much more serious violence that erupted the following day.77

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73 Weaver (2016a).
74 ABC News (2016).
75 Rumsby (2016).
76 ‘Un bilan judiciaire qui peut paraître faible pour ceux qui ont vécu la violence des rixes.’ (Rof 2016).
77 Goldbaum (2016).
From the perspective of the local authorities, the mayor of Marseille reportedly stated that the local authorities had been ‘completely overwhelmed’ and ‘intervened when they had to intervene’,78 while the police chief defended their response by saying that ‘at the height of the events, we prioritised the protection of the public, not arrests.’79

Rigorous evidence on the impact of well-timed policing intervention in the footballing context is limited. However, Dutch football policing researcher Otto Adang, in his systematic observations of around 60 football matches and 77 protest events in the Netherlands, found that early and targeted intervention is key to de-escalation, a cornerstone of successful low-intensity policing:

> When violence does occur, it is vitally important to act in a timely fashion rather than waiting for situations to escalate and get out of hand and to do this in a focused and targeted way, aimed specifically at those individuals transgressing limits.80

Adang’s findings would therefore support the views of the interviewees on this point. However, further research could attempt to test the hypothesis and provide greater insight into the psychological impact of the timing of police intervention in cases of large-scale violence and disorder, and its link to crowd behaviour.

**Police intelligence and liaison**

The sharing of intelligence about football fans between national police forces was also highlighted as a potential factor contributing to the different outcomes in Marseille and Lille. Interviewee AE1 reported:

> Sometimes what we see is that some countries, or even forces within countries, are more, for whatever reason, hostile to accepting help or support from other forces. But… where you have support and cooperation between forces, it allows you to develop more appropriate and balanced methods of policing them, because you have a better understanding of what they’re doing.

The review of evidence on interventions to prevent and respond to violent and antisocial behaviour at football events produced as part of this research study81 found little rigorous academic research on the use of intelligence in football policing. Several interviewees and other authority figures expressed the view that the use of intelligence (or lack thereof) by the police in Marseille and Lille impacted upon the operations of the respective forces. However, the evidence on the extent of international intelligence sharing in advance of the Euro 2016, particularly in relation to Russia supporters, is somewhat mixed. Although the research team was not able to interview representatives from the French authorities about the sharing of intelligence on ‘risk’ fans, a number of government representatives have been publically critical about the information they received from Russia. The French Sports Minister asserted that there had been a ‘regrettable absence of cooperation’ from the Russian authorities about their supporters,82 while authorities in Marseille were reported to have complained that Russian authorities had failed to confiscate the passports of known...
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Troublemakers among the cohort of Russian supporters. One police source was reported to have said:

The Russians gave us a list of 30 to 40 supporters to prepare for Euro 2016. That’s twenty times less than the number of supporters reported by the Swiss.

The local chief of police compared the cooperation from the Russian authorities unfavourably to that of the English:

There were no English hooligans. They were all retained in their country which... deserves to be highlighted. On the Russian side, all those reported to us were intercepted....

According to interviewee SP2, the French authorities were given advice by Russian police that supporters were travelling to France with the intention of causing violence and disorder, stating: ‘we [within UK football policing] thought that the Russian police gave excellent intelligence about that group; the Welsh Football Association was reported to have made the same claim.

In SP2’s view, while in the UK this kind of information about a ‘risk’ group would typically lead to pre-emptive intervention such as detaining them and searching for weapons, the position of the relevant authorities was that these tactics could only be used once an offence had been committed. The research team has not been able to confirm accounts of the approach to intelligence sharing with the French or Russian authorities.

Interviewee SP2 further added that, in relation to England and Wales fans, Marseille police were generally not receptive to the inputs of UK police ‘spotters’ – officers trained to spot trouble-makers who were on the scene in Marseille, engaging with fans, and feeding back intelligence to the command centre – and on occasion the spotters were even moved away from the scenes of disorder before action was taken against the fans by the local police. However, the research team was again unable to confirm this account with the French police forces.

Interviewee AE2 stressed the importance of gathering and using intelligence about individuals at football events in order to produce a differentiated (i.e. responding differently according to the type of perpetrator and the behaviour they are demonstrating) and effective policing approach. In particular, he expressed the view that many fans who become involved in disorder:

...aren’t there to have a fight, and they don’t necessarily have any history whatsoever. So therefore, how you police those people should be completely different to how you police somebody who is a known hooligan who has got a history of violent convictions.

According to SP2, the authorities in the Lille area opted for a more engaged approach with foreign police forces. Additional UK police officers were sent to Lille, reportedly following a request from the French authorities.

There were already more UK officers in the Lille area as the spotters deployed for both England and Wales fans, who had come to Lille for different matches on successive days.

83 Morgan (2016).
84 ‘Les Russes nous ont donné une liste de 30 à 40 supporteurs pour préparer l’Euro 2016. C’est vingt fois moins que le nombre de supporteurs signalés par les Suisses!’ (Rof 2016).
85 ‘Il n’y avait pas de hooligans anglais. Ils ont tous été retenus dans leur pays, ce qui, sur 3 000 personnes, mérite d’être souligné. Côté Russes, tous ceux qui nous ont été signalés ont été interceptés.’ (Rof 2016).
86 Morgan (2016).
87 BBC News (2016f).
had been combined. SP2 reported that the regional préfet was receptive to the advice and intelligence shared by British police, and integrated them into the operation, for example by allowing a senior UK officer into the control room to act as a point of contact with the local police. He detailed one instance that he felt was particularly illustrative of the effectiveness of this collaboration between the forces in Lille:

...there was a group of England fans more antisocial than intent on any disorder, but [were] in a confrontation with the French police who were seeking to move them and were all in riot gear. The local authority said that if they didn't move, they were going to use water cannon on them. We deployed a joint team of English and Welsh spotters, because it was a mix of fans, they deployed in just their bibs with no riot gear, walked to the supporters, engaged with them, spoke to them. They explained what was going to happen and gradually moved them and dispersed the crowd without the need for higher-end tactics. So, that was a really good example, both of the engagement and the willingness of the host country to work with us, but also, where officers were used in that dialogue role, that we actually got a much better result.

This analysis was supported by SP1, another UK security practitioner. He favourably compared the approach of the Lille authorities to those in Marseille, describing the role of foreign police officers as having a significant impact on crowd behaviour in Lille:

When you look at the way that the Welsh police had dealt with issues in Lille, that was a completely different matter [to the tactics deployed in Marseille]. Because the Welsh police decided to use more of a dialogue approach, and they de-escalated and de-conflicted a lot of their issues before it got anywhere near the sorts of things that happened in Marseille.

The French media also highlighted an incident on a train travelling from Lille to the nearby city of Calais, in which a violent fight broke out between around 15 England and Wales supporters. A British spotter was on board the train and alerted the local police, who arrested a number of people when the train arrived at the station.

Interviewee AE3, a football policing researcher, reported that the role of 'spotters' and liaison officers is demanding and requires significant skills and training:

You need officers on the ground... who are skilled and trained in communication, who can understand that fan group and liaise with them in a way that takes into account their cultural nuances. It’s a very, very sophisticated challenge.

Interviewee SP2 shared this view, stating that:

Part of the skill of being the officers who go overseas is that they can adapt to what they find rather than just trying to mandate for the host what they should do. And the other thing, a point about the staff we send, they are extremely experienced in what they do, so they can act as dialogue officers, but they will also gather evidence by cameras or video, they will gather intelligence from supporters, they will act as tactical advisors to local commanders, if they’re allowed to and will also do the family liaison. So the officers we send are extremely experienced and can switch between liaison roles, evidence-gathering, intelligence management and giving advice to local police.
SP2 also noted that part of the responsibility of foreign police forces is to communicate to fans that the attitude of local authorities towards disorder may be not be what they might anticipate in their own countries:

‘[There are] different rules in different countries and we continually try and tell supporters that, when you go abroad, you need to understand what the rules are and play by the local rules, not assume that you’ll be treated as you would in your host country.’

In addition, SP2 highlighted other activities that foreign police forces may undertake, in order to assist authorities in the host country. In advance of a tournament, the relevant police unit would set out policies governing their activities at the event and is typically the initial point of liaison with the host country. The unit also arranges to meet with the policing authorities in the host cities to open lines of communication and establish a working relationship. He added:

‘If it’s a country with no trouble, not many fans, then that level of engagement isn’t necessary, so I would say it’s really incumbent on both the host, but also visiting countries, to work out whether there’s a risk.

And then you scale your level of engagement based on the need, so if there are not many fans going and no risk, it’s no point speaking for two years. If there is a high risk, then it would be necessary to start that engagement early.

According to SP2, other tasks that foreign policing delegations may perform at football tournaments include:

• Requiring that citizens who are subject to banning orders forbidding them to attend football matches surrender their passports in advance of an international tournament.

• Posting police officers at airports and major seaports, monitoring travellers and, if there is reason to believe they are travelling with the intention of causing trouble, pursuing court action for an order preventing them from leaving the country.

• Providing officers as part of a mobile delegation that travels with and offers protection to their national team.

• Reviewing footage from social media and television coverage in the event of disorder, in order to investigate the behaviour of their own nationals.'
4. What other factors contributed to the events in Marseille and Lille?

In addition to the impact of various policing tactics on the events in the two cities, a number of other factors were identified in the available evidence. These factors relate to UEFA’s security operation inside the stadiums; contextual factors around the history of football-related violence in Marseille; and policies and practices regarding the sale and consumption of alcohol during the tournament.

Security inside the Marseille stadium

UEFA’s security operation inside Marseille’s Stade Vélodrome received heavy criticism from fans, government officers, and policing practitioners and researchers. In particular, the segregation between the seating areas for Russia and England supporters, and the apparently ineffectual searches of ticket-holders entering the stadium with flares and other prohibited items, both responsibilities of the event organisers, were highlighted as critical factors contributing to the violent disorder that broke out inside the stadium. A BBC correspondent who was at the match stated that the stampede ‘appears to have been triggered by an explosion’, before asking ‘how did such a device make it inside, and where was [the] segregation?’91 Tarpaulin (i.e. sheets of flexible material typically made of polyurethane) was used to demarcate the different country supporter areas, and this was torn down by Russia supporters who crossed into the England fan area.92 One steward lamented that ‘we only had our arms and a rope’ to separate fans.93 The Russian Sports Minister complained in the press: ‘For such meetings to be organized properly, you must separate the supporters…. There was no fence, nothing’,94 while the then British Home Secretary stated that ‘the French and UEFA will rightly be asking themselves searching questions about how the segregation of fans within the Vélodrome stadium broke down’.95 For their part, UEFA acknowledged ‘separation problems’ between the fans, which they promised to address for the rest of the tournament.96

In relation to the searches conducted on ticket-holders entering the stadium, the police chief for the Marseille region stated in an interview that:

> There was a flaw. These searches are the responsibility of the organizer. The police are present to avoid incidents during searches. Even if there are only two smoke bombs, there are two too many.97

A French researcher on football fan behaviour argued that the stewards lacked the proper training and preparation for their responsibilities in conducting the searches, which he described as ‘ineffective’. He stated:

> The instructions were not clear, the stewards were completely overwhelmed, they were not trained…. We must also stop the policy of [using volunteers] to save money – we need

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91 Flood (2016).
92 Flood (2016).
93 Gibson (2016).
94 Rof (2016).
95 Morgan (2016).
96 Rof (2016).
97 ‘Il y a eu une faille. Ces fouilles relèvent de l’organisateur. Les policiers, eux, sont présents pour éviter les incidents pendant les fouilles. Même si ce ne sont que deux fumigènes, ce sont deux de trop.’ (Mollaret 2016).
What factors contributed to the different levels of disorder witnessed in Marseille and Lille during the 2016 UEFA European Championship?

Finally, the absence of police within the stadium also received some critical attention from fans and other stakeholders. In responding to these criticisms, the local police chief described their delegation of security responsibilities inside the stadium to UEFA as a ‘normal mode of operation’, adding:

Realize what it would mean to have police officers come into the stands. This means that the organizer is overwhelmed and does not control the situation anymore. There we were after the final whistle, and the stewards managed the event.99

Notwithstanding this position, the regional préfet announced before the matches in the Lille area that police would be present in the stands of the stadiums and able to intervene quickly if there were clashes between supporters, and that security processes outside the stadiums would be reinforced by police officers.100 However, the impact of the police presence in and around the stadiums on fan behaviour is unclear from the available evidence.

History of violence

Several interviewees commented on the history of violence and conflict between England fans and local youths in Marseille during football tournaments as an important factor in how the events during Euro 2016 played out. Interviewee AE1 reported:

The historic conflict that’s existed, we can go back as far as [the FIFA World Cup in] France in 1998 to see it, similar problems have occurred during those tournaments.

A former UK police officer with expertise in football policing was quoted in the media as saying:

To be honest, I don’t envy the French police. When Marseille was drawn for this game, everyone took a big breath. You have the English fans, the Russians and the Marseille ultra fans there.

Given the potential for clashes between the visiting fans and local youths, UEFA was also criticised in the media for scheduling the match at 9pm on a Saturday, a time when large numbers of people, including those intent on causing trouble, were likely to be free to come to the city centre.101 By comparison, it was reported that Lille had historically experienced much less discord between locals and football fans from England during previous events.102

The role of alcohol

Different approaches to managing the sale and consumption of alcohol in Marseille and Lille have also been raised by some interviewees and covered in the identified literature. One British football policing researcher suggested that the alcohol-induced violence and antisocial behaviour in Marseille demonstrated the need to intensively manage street drinking, and the sale of alcohol in cans and glass bottles, which became missiles launched at the police,

people able to handle these situations. We did not go far from a disaster.98


99 ‘C’est un mode de fonctionnement normal. Rendez-vous compte de ce que cela voudrait dire des policiers qui rentrent dans une tribune. Cela veut dire que l’organisateur est débordé et qu’il ne maîtrise plus la situation. Là, on était après le coup de sifflet final et les stewards ont géré l’événement.’ (Mollaret 2016).

100 Gibson (2016); Maurice (2016).

101 University of Leicester (2016); Rumsby (2016).

102 Fifield (2016).
other fans and bystanders. Interviewee SP2 stated that the British policing delegation had ‘made representations about restricting the sale of bottles and cans and licensing times, which weren’t accepted in Marseille’. In a media interview, the local police chief defended their approach to managing alcohol, stating that:

We banned the sale of take-away alcohol near the stadium and the fan zone. For the city centre, we had asked ourselves the question. This option was ultimately not retained. It’s also difficult to implement. Someone who wants to drink always gets to get alcohol by some other means. It was easier to implement around the stadium where there are fewer shops and stores. This is one of the measures that must be used with care. I’m not sure it would have avoided anything on Saturday.

A French researcher on radical fan behaviour was also quoted as saying that the alcohol ban would not have impacted on the behaviour of Russian supporters involved in the Marseille violence:

We are dealing with a new generation of hooligans since the late 1990s, from the countries of the East, Russia and Poland mainly: they are people who do sports fighting, who train daily. They do not take drugs, not alcohol, they have an ascetic lifestyle to dedicate themselves to these clashes.

However, following the events in Marseille, the French Minister of the Interior asked all préfets to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol on the day before and day of Euro matches in their region. In Lille, a public drinking ban was put in place over four days around the matches, with shops selling alcohol in central Lille and the stadium forced to close. However, it was reported that other shops continued to sell alcohol, which was drunk openly on the streets. Lille authorities also banned the sale of alcohol in bottles and cans across the city; the regional préfet was reported as saying that the objective was to prevent these containers being used as projectiles and that the authorities were determined to ‘learn the lessons of elsewhere’. It is not known how effective this ban was on public safety, and the fidelity with which it was implemented and enforced is also unclear.

It was also reported that the order for bars to close early resulted in a large influx of fans being moved out onto the streets at around the same time, potentially giving the Lille police an additional public safety challenge to manage. The evidence on the role of alcohol, and efforts to control its sale and consumption, in relation to the different outcomes in violence in the two cities is therefore mixed. This topic is explored in greater depth, and in relation to evidence from numerous other football events, in another case study for this research project, entitled Alcohol and international football tournaments.

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103 University of Leicester (2016).
104 ‘Nous avons interdit la vente d’alcool à emporter près du stade et de la fan zone. Pour le centre-ville, nous nous étions posé la question. Cette option n’a finalement pas été retenue. C’est aussi difficile à mettre en œuvre. Quelqu’un qui veut boire arrive toujours à se procurer de l’alcool par un autre moyen. C’était plus facile à mettre en œuvre autour du stade où il y a quelques débits et commerces. Cela fait partie des mesures qu’il faut utiliser avec précaution. Je ne suis pas sûr que cela aurait évité quoi que ce soit samedi.’ (Mollaret 2016).
105 ‘Nous avons affaire à une nouvelle génération de hooligans depuis la fin des années 1990, venues des pays de l’Est, Russie et Pologne principalement : ce sont des gens qui font des sports de combat, qui s’entraînent quotidiennement. Ils ne prennent pas de drogue, pas d’alcool, ils ont un mode de vie asociaque pour se déider à ces affrontements.’ (Rof 2016).
106 Rof (2016).
107 BBC News (2016g).
108 Gibson (2016).
109 Interviewee SP2.
110 Stott (2016).
5. Conclusions and key lessons for Qatar

Rigorous evaluations of policing tactics deployed during Euro 2016 have not yet been published, and evidence about the effectiveness of football policing strategies more broadly is lacking. However, the emerging evidence gathered in this case study suggests that different approaches to policing in Marseille and Lille played a significant role in how football fans behaved in the two cities. We may, therefore, present some potential lessons that can be drawn for Qatar in the run-up to the FIFA World Cup in 2022.

Firstly, anecdotal evidence from Euro 2016 indicates that high-intensity, reactive policing tactics such as the widespread use of force, and the deployment of heavily armed riot police from the outset, may produce an aggressive response from those caught up in disorder, and cause the situation to deteriorate. By contrast, establishing mutually respectful relations with fans and facilitating positive behaviours through dialogue may afford police officers a perception of legitimacy and produce more cooperation from the crowd. However, authorities must also be prepared to utilise a variety of tactics, including scaling up their response to violence and disorder, to maintain public safety. The timing of police intervention is critical, with the evidence suggesting that prevention and early de-escalation are key to ensuring that violence does not spread.

Secondly, evidence suggests that the sharing and utilisation of intelligence from foreign police forces about their supporters may assist authorities in identifying troublemakers and being prepared for any disorder. Furthermore, giving foreign police a role in security operations during the tournament, for example by liaising with supporters from their own countries, providing advice on preventing or managing disorder, and feeding back intelligence about the behaviour and movement of crowds in real time, can also support the public safety activities of local authorities. In addition, foreign police officers may be able to advise the country’s supporters on what to expect from the host country in terms of cultural and behavioural norms, as well as how local authorities may respond to their actions. In the context of Qatar, interviewee SP2 commented:

> There may well be some significant cultural differences in Qatar that supporters need to be aware of and that is when it’s important that visiting authorities... [are] able to communicate what the standards are, so they actually know the rules that are going to be applied.

Thirdly, this event demonstrates the importance of effective security operations inside match stadiums, including proper searches of ticket holders for prohibited items; adequate segregation of fans inside stadiums; and well-trained and supported stewards. Perhaps of less direct relevance to Qatar are the contextual factors around the history of football-related violence in Marseille, given the lack of such a history in Qatar. Furthermore, as alcohol is not widely available in Qatar, policies and practices regarding the sale and consumption of alcohol during the World Cup in 2022 may have a different impact than they did during Euro 2016.

Finally, the relative lack of rigorous research on the strategies deployed in both Marseille and Lille, and in football policing more broadly, demonstrates the potential value of future research activity on these topics in Qatar. Such research activities could not only provide a valuable contribution to the evidence base in the run-up to the 2022 World Cup, but also shed light on the safety of football events in Qatar specifically as well as international football events in the region more generally.
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What factors contributed to the different levels of disorder witnessed in Marseille and Lille during the 2016 UEFA European Championship?


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About this case study and the research project for Qatar University

Qatar has hosted a number of international sporting events and will host the World Athletics Championship in 2019 and the 2022 FIFA World Cup. In preparing for these events, there is an opportunity to learn from research into the prevalence, nature and causes of violence and disorder at other sporting events that have drawn together spectators from a range of countries with diverse cultural and religious characteristics, and to draw on promising practices to prevent and respond to these harms.

Qatar University commissioned RAND Europe to research the current available evidence on these topics to identify insights that may be relevant for Qatar’s preparations.

Project aims

The goals of this project were to understand:

1. What has been the nature (types of behaviour, types of perpetrators, victims, location, etc.) and prevalence of antisocial, violent and destructive behaviours among populations watching and attending major sporting events, in particular international football matches?
2. What factors are associated with these behaviours (e.g. alcohol misuse, ethnicity and nationalism, group dynamics) and what is the nature of the association?
3. What approaches have been taken to prevent and respond to these behaviours?
4. To what extent have these approaches proved effective?
5. What specific recommendations follow from the findings that could be used in Qatar in planning for the World Cup in 2022, and where are the opportunities for further research?

Project methods and approach

The project drew mainly on the identification and critical assessment of international literature and media reports, as well as interviews with a wide range of stakeholders in Qatar and internationally.

Full details of the methodology for the research can be found in the final evaluation report available at https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/violent-and-antisocial-behaviour-at-football-events.html

About this case study

A total of six case studies were undertaken to investigate a range of issues relating to safety and security at international sporting events.

This case study drew on four main data collection methods. Firstly, six telephone interviews were undertaken with the following types of key informants: 1) policing practitioners involved in the organisation and management of football matches (interviewees SP1 and SP2); 2) academic experts working on football-related violence and antisocial behaviour research (AE1, AE2, AE3); and 3) a representative of fan associations (FO1).

The interviews were semi-structured and took between 45 and 60 minutes; in several instances the interviews were subsequently followed up by email for clarifications and further questions. The research team developed broad interview protocols tailored to each group of key informant, which served as the basis for each interview. In addition to questions included in the protocol, this approach allowed the team to discuss unanticipated topics that interviewees considered relevant. With the permission of interviewees, all telephone interviews were recorded and then transcribed.
Secondly, English-language media sources were searched (using the search terms “Euro 2016” AND Marseille’ and “Euro 2016 AND Lille”) in order to cast a wide net and maximise the number of relevant results. We also conducted a review of English-language academic and grey literature using the same search terms. In addition, we conducted a search (in French) of four major French newspapers: Le Monde, Ouest France, Libération and Le Figaro (using the following terms: ‘Marseille OR Lille AND violence AND police’, ‘Marseille OR Lille AND violence AND fans’, ‘Marseille OR Lille AND Euro AND police’, ‘Marseille OR Lille AND Euro AND fans’; and ‘Euro AND violence’).

Thirdly, we reviewed official French government websites for reports and statements relating to the events in Marseille and Lille. These were: the website of the North prefecture (http://www.nord.gouv.fr); the website of the Bouches-du-Rhône prefecture (http://www.bouches-du-rhone.gouv.fr); the website of the Interior Ministry (https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/); and the website of the national police (https://www.police-nationale.interieur.gouv.fr/).

Finally, the case study was informed by an earlier review of the evidence on interventions to prevent and respond to violent and antisocial behaviour, conducted as part of this research project. In addition, targeted searches for English-language research on the effectiveness of specific policing tactics raised by interviewees and other sources were conducted using the Web of Science and Google Scholar academic databases.

Data collected using the data collection processes described above were triangulated by the research team. Interviews were analysed using standard qualitative methods in order to identify salient themes, which were subsequently matched with information collected from the literature review. This process in turn informed the development of the case study’s structure.

This case study is subject to several limitations. Firstly, existing academic literature on the policing strategies deployed during Euro 2016 remains limited or inconclusive. Secondly, the case study was unable to draw on any official data pertaining to indicators of interest, such as numbers of violent incidents, arrests or injuries, or police strategies and information-sharing practices. While media reports have been incorporated into the case study, these may not present complete or up-to-date information. Fourthly, only English- and French-language sources were reviewed; Russian sources may provide a different perspective on the events. Finally, we were unable to secure interviews with the French or Russian authorities, who may have offered alternative insights on fan behaviour and local police decision making.
Project results and reports
Details of the other case studies and wider project results are available at https://www.rand.org/rand europerecherche/research/projects/violent-and-antisocial-behaviour-at-football-events.html. These are of interest not only to those responsible for preparing for upcoming events in Qatar, but to anyone involved in the safety and management of international sports tournaments.

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