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Intolerance in Western Europe
Analysis of trends and associated factors

Jennifer Rubin, Jirka Taylor, Alexandra Pollitt, Joachim Krapels, Mafalda Pardal
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The research described in this report was supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.
RAND Europe was commissioned by the Open Society European Policy Institute to conduct a study exploring the empirical evidence on high-level trends in intolerance in Western Europe. The primary focus was on expressed intolerance of others on the grounds of race, religion or ethnicity. Our research approach comprised a literature review, analysis of European attitudinal data, and assessments of contextual trends in eight countries.

This report sets out the study’s rationale, methodology and findings, from which we develop a set of policy considerations to encourage evidence-based discussion and decision-making among programme funders and policymakers.

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Executive summary

Intolerance of others on grounds of race, religion, nationality or ethnicity is an area of high public salience, with significant implications for policy, social outcomes and well-being. Intolerance (defined broadly for the purpose of this study as a lack of acceptance of or hostility towards others specifically on grounds of their minority status) in Western Europe, and in Europe more broadly, is widely perceived as having been on the rise in recent years. At the same time, there has also been a documented increase in support for and visibility of extremist and populist political parties, and an apparent rise in manifestations of intolerant attitudes, both in national policy and more widely in the behaviour of individuals.

This study aimed to situate these observations and perceptions in the context of empirical evidence on high-level trends in intolerant attitudes in Western Europe. Through analysis of European datasets, a review of empirical literature and assessments of trends in selected individual countries, we explored whether intolerance has risen more in some countries than others, whether it has risen more against particular groups, if such attitudes are particularly prevalent among subgroups of the population and if there are clear patterns of association with trends in wider political, social, economic and cultural factors.

Trends in intolerance vary by country

Our analysis of pan-European survey data revealed no uniform trend in expressed intolerance between 1981 and 2008. In this report ‘expressed intolerance’ refers to responses given in large European studies, such as the European Values Survey, which indicate a lack of acceptance of, or hostility towards others specifically on grounds of their minority status. Trends varied across countries, with attitudes among Western European countries diverging over the time period studied. Both within countries and across the region as a whole, trends in expressed intolerance also differed with respect to different ethnic, national and religious groups.

The differing trends emerging from the data have developed against complex demographic, political, economic and policy backdrops, and our individual country assessments did not reveal any clearly discernible associations between intolerant attitudes and specific contextual trends at the national level. The absence of any apparent consistent trends highlights the importance of taking a more nuanced and targeted approach when discussing intolerance.
Factors associated with intolerance

Through an analysis of empirical literature we assessed the strength of evidence for the association of intolerance with selected economic, demographic, socio-political and cultural factors. This analysis revealed that:

- Evidence of association with intolerance is strong for some economic factors, such as macroeconomic prosperity, and much less so for others, such as unemployment rate.
- There is strong evidence of an association between intolerance and demographic factors such as age, education and socio-economic class, but somewhat less strong evidence for an association between intolerance and personal income.
- All socio-political factors examined in this study – citizenship regime, welfare state regime and political orientation – have been found to be associated with intolerant attitudes.
- Cultural factors such as levels of social trust and contact with minorities are generally found to be associated with reduced levels of intolerance; however, evidence for the role of minority group size is more mixed.

Policy considerations

Building on the findings from our analysis of European survey datasets, literature review and in-depth country assessments, we developed a series of policy considerations intended to stimulate further evidence-based debate and encourage policymakers and funders to make use of the available evidence when developing and implementing policies and programmes.

- Policymakers should not assume that policy and investment in this area would lack public support.
- The tendency to emphasise the financial crisis as a driver of increasing intolerance requires more careful consideration.
- Extremist voting does not appear to be strongly correlated with wider public attitudes – it is important to separate these analytically and empirically in order to understand the many facets of intolerance.
- With some notable exceptions, few evaluations of policy interventions are publicly available, especially at the national level.
- Young people represent a potentially important target for policy interventions as they are broadly the most tolerant, but are also most prone to taking on more radical views and may be particularly impressionable.
- Intergroup contact can serve as an important shaper of tolerance, particularly in conjunction with certain situational factors.
- Roma face the highest levels of expressed intolerance across all Western European countries, and represent a group that may benefit significantly from policy interventions aimed at reducing intolerance.
The rest of this report presents the methodology and detailed findings from which these considerations were developed, alongside some examples of interventions aimed at tackling various forms of intolerance. We end by suggesting areas that would benefit from further research.

Figure 0-1 below captures the relationship between the findings of this report, policy considerations and suggestions for research topics.
### Policy Considerations

- Policymakers should not assume that policy and investment in this area would lack public support.
- The tendency to emphasise the financial crisis as a driver of increasing intolerance requires more careful consideration.
- Voting for populist and extremist parties does not appear to be strongly correlated with wider public attitudes — it is important to separate these analytically and empirically in order to understand the many facets of intolerance.
- With some notable exceptions, few evaluations of policy interventions are publicly available, especially at the national level.
- Young people represent a potentially important target for policy interventions as they are broadly the most tolerant, but are also most prone to taking on more radical views and may be particularly impressionable.
- Intergroup contact can serve as an important shaper of tolerance, particularly in conjunction with certain situational factors.
- Roma face the highest levels of expressed intolerance across all Western European countries, and represent a group that may benefit significantly from policy interventions aimed at reducing intolerance.

### Areas for Future Research

- Relationship between state and individual attitudes
- Implications of convergence/divergence of attitudinal data
- Causality and strength of relationship between individual factors and intolerance
- Intolerance of intolerance
- Other indicators of intolerance
- Addressing intolerance of Roma in Western Europe
- Intolerance in Eastern Europe
- Intolerance between minority groups

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**Figure 0-1. Relationship between the findings of this report, policy considerations and suggestions for research topics**
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESEDA</td>
<td>Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Foreigners Rights Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECAR</td>
<td>European Cities against Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECRI</td>
<td>European Commission against Racism and Intolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Social Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVS</td>
<td>European Values Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National (National Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Fundamental Rights Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALDE</td>
<td>Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité (Equal Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord (Northern League)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF</td>
<td>Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn List)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX</td>
<td>Migrant Integration Policy Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>Nazionaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSF</td>
<td>Open Society Foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNCF</td>
<td>Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français (French Railways)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the Open Society Foundations for funding this research project and for facilitating the presentation of its findings at various platforms engaging stakeholders in the field of intolerance, discrimination and anti-discrimination policy.

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1.1 Introduction

Intolerance of others based on their race, religion, nationality or ethnicity is an important issue that has become increasingly prominent in public discourse (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2012a; Human Rights Watch, 2012). This has significant implications for policy, social outcomes and well-being (European Network Against Racism, 2008a). While there have been many papers published in this field, expressing a plethora of views and theories, there has been relatively little empirical research that maps and compares where and how levels of intolerance are changing and against which groups. With strong feelings surrounding intolerance, a weak evidence base to inform decisions, and budgets across many related areas under strain, governments, funders and practitioners face challenging decisions about where to focus scarce resources to facilitate and improve social cohesion and well-being in diverse societies.

This report presents the findings of a research project commissioned by the Open Society Foundations to begin to fill gaps in knowledge about trends in expressed intolerance, and trends and factors considered to be associated with the phenomenon in Western Europe.

Our working definition of expressed intolerance is presented in Box 1 below and further discussed in section 1.2.2 and Appendix B.

**Box 1. Working definition of expressed intolerance**

Expressed intolerance refers to situations where respondents in large European attitudinal studies gave answers that may be understood as expressions of intolerance. For example, a statement from a survey respondent that he/she would not want a member of a minority group as a neighbour is understood as an instance of expressed intolerance.

As will be discussed in greater detail below, the research project focuses on intolerance to begin to inform such debates as whether growing support for extremists or rising numbers of hate crimes are indicative of wider negative public attitudes towards migrants and those of other races, religions and ethnicities, or whether these are more isolated phenomena.

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1 As discussed in greater detail later in the report, of 3,301 articles identified in the literature review in the early stages of the project, only 177 were judged to be relevant to the research questions and to have a sufficient empirical basis.
Open Society Foundations describes its mission as helping to build vibrant and tolerant societies and strengthen respect for human rights, minorities and a diversity of opinion. RAND Europe’s role has been to conduct research on whether and to what extent intolerant attitudes are expressed towards the groups included in this study. However, the empirical evidence, as well as strong moral/philosophical arguments, point to the importance of seeking to avoid the challenges (in terms of safety, quality of life, and a wide range of other outcomes) for individuals and communities that are associated with ethnic and other kinds of conflict and with discrimination of particular groups purely on grounds of group membership. The various groups we considered in this study were selected on the basis of the strengths and limitations of existing survey datasets, and in consultation with Open Society Foundations.

1.1.1 Conceptualisation of intolerance and research questions

Intolerance is a broad concept. In this report, we conceptualise intolerance as a lack of acceptance of or hostility towards others specifically on grounds of their minority status. Intolerance of others may be expressed in many ways. For example, intolerance can arguably be instantiated in laws and policies concerning who is allowed to enter a country and access citizenship, services and welfare provisions (see, for example Fox, Morosanu and Szilassy, 2012). At the individual level, intolerance may be expressed through, for example, supporting political groups whose agendas focus on or include a lack of acceptance of certain minorities and their ways of living. Intolerance may also be expressed through views gathered in surveys and opinion research – the focus of this research – or through explicit verbal or physical attacks on members of minority groups. This list is not exhaustive, and these various forms of intolerance are not necessarily linked. For example, some research suggests (perhaps counter-intuitively) there may be an inverse relationship between support for far-right parties and levels of population-wide intolerance (Mudde, 2012).

This project did not attempt to provide a detailed empirical analysis of all or even several of the many facets of intolerance and their manifestations. Instead, the focus is on mapping expressed views about different ethnic, national, religious and racial groups. More specifically, the focus is on expressed intolerance as traced through attitudinal questions in large, long-running cross-national surveys.

Focusing on attitudes expressed by representative samples of the populations of many countries is in no way to denigrate the importance of any of the other facets of intolerance. Showing support for parties that are hostile to diversity or perpetrating attacks on minority groups are phenomena that merit serious and systematic attention (indeed, there are studies of many of these facets of intolerance; see, for example Koopmans, 1996; Lubbers, 2012).  

Adapted from OSF’s mission statement, available from http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/mission-values [last accessed 2 April 2013].

These may include sexual orientation, religious practices, clothing and dietary preferences, such as halal, kosher, etc.

The relationship between the existence of extremist political parties and levels of intolerance is further explored in Section 3.1.2.

This approach is discussed in greater detail in Section 1.2.
Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2004; Goodwin, 2011; Iganski, 2011; Mudde, 2012). However, without a broader mapping of trends over time and a comparative overview across several countries it is difficult to situate support for political parties and instances of racist speech or hate crime in their wider context. These more extreme behavioural manifestations of intolerance elicit fear and generate pressing questions about whether some groups of people, countries or regions as a whole are becoming more intolerant, and whether attitudes towards minorities have worsened in recent decades.\(^6\)

The aim of this study is to look at these broader, high-level trends. While the report focuses on intolerance on grounds of race, religion, nationality and ethnic origin as the main variables, in places, we also indicate the ways attitudes towards groups of people within these categories appear to relate to other forms of intolerance, such as homophobia, and whether trends in these forms of intolerance appear to be moving with or diverging from each other.\(^7\)

The report focuses on the following four research questions:

1. Are intolerant attitudes rising more in some countries or regions than in others?
2. Are intolerant attitudes against some groups rising more than those against others?
3. Are such attitudes more prevalent amongst certain socio-economic and/or demographic groups than others?
4. If so, are there other socio-economic, political, historical/contextual factors that appear to be associated with these changes in expressed intolerance?

The report is structured as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the context of a perceived rise in intolerance, addresses relevant definitional and theoretical issues and discusses available datasets and scientific literature. Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the main European survey datasets with respect to the study questions. Chapter 3 builds on this analysis and presents more in-depth findings on themes and factors associated with trends in expressed intolerance in Western Europe. Chapter 4 includes a set of eight country assessments, which explore in greater depth trends uncovered by the analysis of survey datasets Chapter 5 offers conclusions and policy considerations for policymakers and other stakeholders along with a set of suggestions of areas for future research.

1.1.2 Perceived rising intolerance
Levels of intolerance in Western Europe (and in Europe more broadly) are widely perceived to have been rising.\(^8\) This perception is expressed in numerous reports from the

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\(^6\) It should also be added that intolerance may be triggered by a perception of intolerance on part of other individuals, groups or institutions. In other words, the fact that an actor is seen as expressing negative attitudes or behaviours may turn that very actor into a target of someone else’s intolerance. Regrettably, while this phenomenon is undoubtedly worthy of more research, it falls outside of the scope of this report.

\(^7\) Convergence/divergence of attitudes is an issue raised by researchers interested in trends and changes in people’s values. See, for example, Halpern (2010).

\(^8\) For a selection of examples of assertions that intolerance is rising, from both European and non-European authors, see Kotkin (2010), National Public Radio (2010) or Bartlett (2011). It is also important to note that this perception is not necessarily a new phenomenon. See, for instance, Goldmann (1991).
fields of human rights and countering racism. For instance, the most recent report by the Council of Europe on its activities stated that “racism and intolerance are on the rise in Europe today and the resulting tension sometimes leads to racist violence” (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2012a). Similarly, Human Rights Watch’s 2012 World Report included an essay on what they termed a European human rights crisis, marked by, among other phenomena, what they deemed a xenophobic debate on the place of migrants and minorities in Europe and a rise of populist extremist political parties (Ward, 2012). Such statements have been picked up and elaborated by major European media (see, for instance, Beaumont, 2012; Le Figaro, 2012; Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 2012). In addition, the perception of rising intolerance is reinforced by high profile relevant events and the coverage they attract, such as the mass shooting in Norway in July 2011 (Reuters, 2012).

1.1.3 Apparent rise in support for extremist and populist political parties in many countries

At the same time that there is a perceived rise in European intolerance, there has also been a documented increase in support for and visibility of extremist and populist political parties (Golder, 2003; Rydgren, 2007; Goodwin, 2011). In several Western European countries, such parties have been able to play a significant role in their respective national political processes, either by becoming members of the ruling coalition (such as the Swiss People Party in Switzerland or the Northern League under Berlusconi governments in Italy), or by lending their support to the government (such as the Danish People’s Party or the Dutch Freedom Party under the Rutte-Verhagen government, see Berkowitz and Kreijger, 2010).

In other countries, extremist and populist parties have managed to achieve historic electoral successes. Among the most recent examples, in the French 2012 presidential election the National Front won the biggest share of the popular vote in its history (Ministere de l’Interieure, 2012). In the 2010 Swedish general election and in the 2012 Greek parliamentary election, extremist groups (Sweden Democrats and Golden Dawn, respectively) cleared the threshold to gain seats in their national parliaments for the first time (Greek Ministry of Interior, 2012; Swedish Election Authority, 2010). In the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election, the True Finns won almost a fifth of the popular vote to become the third largest party in the national parliament (Finnish Ministry of Justice, 2011).

However, two important qualifications need to be added to the account of extremist parties’ electoral successes. First, the apparent increase in the popularity of at least some extremist and populist political parties needs to be placed in the context of the European financial and economic crisis. Parties such as the True Finns and the Dutch Freedom Party may have been able to attract voters through their vocal opposition to mechanisms such as the European Stability Mechanism or the European Monetary Union (EMU) in general, rather than exclusively through their rhetoric of intolerance (Sundberg, 2012). In fact, it has been suggested that Marine Le Pen’s success for the French National Front in the latest

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9 It should be added, though, that this success is not much higher than the party’s previous results. In fact, the National Front has never received less than 10 per cent of the popular vote in any presidential election since 1988.
elections came about as a result of her decision to tone down the party’s far-right rhetoric and run more on a nationalistic, anti-EU platform (Samuel, 2012).

Second, several instances of notable electoral success of far-right parties have either failed to repeat themselves or have been confined to elections to the European Parliament (EP). For instance, in 2009 the British National Party won two EP seats with over 6 per cent of the popular vote, yet a year later it received less than 2 per cent in the general election and lost almost all council wards it was defending in the local elections (Lowles, 2010). A sizeable decrease in the aftermath of a notable success can be seen also in the performance of the Dutch Freedom Party, which lost 5.4 percentage points over the same period (Kiesraad, 2012).

1.1.4 Apparent rise in intolerant policies and behaviours

Accompanying increased support for some extremist parties is an apparent rise in manifestations of intolerance at the level of both policy and wider behaviour. A high-profile example of a policy intervention perceived as intolerant is the decision in 2010 by the French government to deport over 8,000 Bulgarian and Romanian nationals to their countries of origin, a step described by Viviane Reding, EU Justice Commissioner as a “disgrace” (BBC News, 2010a). Another example, considered to be a manifestation of intolerance by observers including the Pew Forum (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2011) is legislation banning the wearing of Islamic veils in public, passed between 2010 and 2012 in France, the Netherlands and Belgium.10

At the behavioural level, the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) reported in 2010 that available data suggested an upward trend in recorded racist crime between 2000 and 2008 in EU Member States (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010a).11 Similarly, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) observed a “general rise in racist violence” (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2010) – although some of this rise could be driven by increased reporting and recording of racially-motivated crimes. A rise in extremism, particularly by far-right groups, has also consistently been noted as a cause for concern by successive reports by the European Cities against Racism (ECAR) (Iganski, 2011). As with policy interventions, several notable events have been viewed as signals of an apparent rise in intolerant behaviours. In 2000, clashes between Moroccan immigrant workers and Spanish neighbours erupted in the agricultural community of El Ejido in Almeria. In a separate incident, a settlement of seasonal migrant workers came under attack in 2010 in Rosarno

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10 The degree to which the ban is enforced may vary. For an account of police discretion vis-à-vis the measure in France, see Erlanger (2012).

11 Each reporting country has its own definition of what constitutes a racist crime. This encompasses a range of incidents and crimes, which variously cover racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and related crimes such as incitement to racial hatred and violence. According to FRA, there were 12 EUMS which published sufficient criminal justice data on racist crime to be able to undertake an analysis of trends. These were Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Austria, Poland, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland). However, drawing conclusions about these trends is rather risky as, for instance, results can be influenced by changes in data collection practices. Also, high levels of reported racist crime are not necessarily only a negative indicator as they may suggest that the country in question is responding seriously to the problem.
in Calabria. In 2008, a Roma settlement near Naples came under attack, prompting a declaration of a state of emergency in three Italian regions with large Roma settlement camps (Baussano, 2012).

1.2 Research approach and scope

In order to address the four main questions outlined above, this research drew on three distinct data collection exercises: a literature review, an analysis of survey datasets and a series of in-depth country assessments. All three data collection exercises and their relationship with one another are presented in Figure 1-1 and discussed in greater detail below.

![Figure 1-1. Process map of the research project](image)

In terms of regional scope, the report looks at trends in expressed intolerance in countries that were EU member states before the 2004 enlargement. This focus was determined in agreement with the Open Society Foundations. Furthermore, in order to provide a more in-depth perspective to begin to assess possible patterns and linkages between intolerant attitudes and wider contextual factors, the research team conducted country assessments on patterns of expressed intolerance in the following member states: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. These countries were selected on the basis of trends and patterns identified in the analysis of attitudinal data that comprised the first part of the study, and in order to align with OSI’s activities and priorities. The selected group enabled the research team to consider factors that may be associated with intolerance in various different environments – with countries varying by size, degree of heterogeneity, economic performance, demographic structure, political systems and policy traditions.
1.2.1 **Literature review**

At the outset of the project, the research team conducted a literature review in order to map existing evidence on factors that might be associated with intolerant attitudes and their expressions. These were expected to fall into varying categories, such as behavioural, demographic or contextual and were intended to provide theoretical background and a reference point for the survey data findings. In addition, results of the literature review were used to formulate more detailed questions for the individual country assessments.

The search for literature in relevant databases clearly revealed the relative lack of empirical evidence on the subject of intolerance and factors associated with it. Of 3,301 articles identified in EBSCO Host and IDEAS (two of the key databases for relevant literature) in the early stages of the project, only 177 were judged to be relevant to the research questions and to have a sufficient empirical basis. Of these, far fewer have taken a cross-national comparative approach. Of the remaining articles, 77 focused on a single country, and those which were relevant were included when conducting out country assessments. This finding highlights a significant gap and suggests a need for more empirical research to provide a cross-national evidence base on how levels and types of intolerance in Europe may be changing, and on factors associated with expressed intolerance.

Characteristics of the reviewed studies are discussed in Appendix A, the research team did not undertake a formal assessment of their quality. Much of the reviewed literature draws on similar datasets that are used in this report. While bearing in mind some limitations of these datasets (discussed in greater detail in Appendix B) as well as the fact that some studies did not provide details of their data cleaning, we have confidence in the methodology behind the data and therefore felt that findings about trends and levels of intolerance were sufficiently valid and reliable.

Findings from the review on relevant factors associated with intolerance are presented in Chapter 3. The methodology of the literature review is described in greater detail in Appendix A.

1.2.2 **Analysis of survey datasets**

This research is primarily based on analysis of attitudinal data from three main cross-national surveys: the European Values Study (as part of the World Values Survey), the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer. Their main characteristics are summarised in Table 1-1 and are discussed, along with their strengths and limitations, in greater detail in Appendix B. We have also consulted and drawn from data collected by the German Marshall Fund and the Pew Research Center.

| Table 1-1. Main characteristics of survey datasets used in the research project |
|---|---|---|---|
| **EVS** | 1981–2008 | From 16 countries (1981 waves) to 47 countries (2008 wave) | Representative multi-stage or stratified random samples; net sample size 1,500 (2008 wave) |
| **Countries** | Life, family, work, religion, politics, society |

12 Exceptions were Northern Cyprus and Northern Ireland (500 interviews each), Iceland (808), Cyprus (1000), Ireland (1013), Norway (1090), Finland (1134), Sweden (1187), Switzerland (1272) France (random sample: 1501, two additional quota samples: 1570), Germany (disproportional sample East: 1004, West: 1071).
A discussion of findings from the survey data analysis is presented in Chapter 2. The primary indicators used are from longitudinal data from the European Value Study which, unless specified otherwise, capture trends in the proportion of respondents who indicated they would not want a member of the following minorities as a neighbour: people of different race, Muslims, immigrants, Jews, and ‘Gypsies’. For details of these indicators, challenges of interpreting findings from this and other survey questions drawn upon as indicative of intolerance please see Appendix B.

### 1.2.3 Country assessments

The third data collection exercise undertaken by the project team consisted of eight country assessments. The assessments were designed to explore in greater depth trends uncovered by the analysis of survey datasets and to provide answers to questions emerging from the literature review. As explained in Section 1.2, the selected countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) were chosen on the basis of trends and patterns identified in the analysis of attitudinal data that comprised the earlier part of the study, as well as to align with OSI’s activities and priorities.

The country assessments sought to provide an overview of the following aspects of country contexts in which to situate the attitudinal data: historical, economic, demographic, political, policy, behavioural and media. Findings from the cases studies are incorporated in the presentation of factors associated with intolerance in Section 3.1.

Three comments on data sources for the country assessments should be made. First, statistical data on migration flows were drawn from the Eurostat and OECD databases. Eurostat data are primarily available for stocks and flows of people of foreign nationality (i.e. other than that of the declaring country), while the OECD data are predominantly available for foreign-born individuals. However, this difference is unlikely to affect the findings of this project as both indicators have followed very similar trends in recent decades.

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13 Or 800 for countries with fewer than 2 million inhabitants.

14 Data presented in the table pertain to Standard Eurobarometers.

15 Since 2004 also intermittently accession and candidate countries and occasionally EFTA countries.

16 With the exception of small countries such as Malta and Luxembourg.

17 We are mindful of the potentially offensive and pejorative connotations carried by the expression ‘Gypsies’ when referring to Roma/Romani people. This report uses the term solely in instances of reporting results of an analysis of European survey datasets on the basis that this is the language used in the surveys.
Second, the country assessments draw on the Migration and Integration Index (MIPEX) as a source of data on trends in migration and integration policies. It measures individual countries’ policies and their implementation and in so doing tracks whether all residents are guaranteed equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities. MIPEX is a scientifically robust peer-reviewed tool with a consistent track record and international recognition (Weisblatt, 2011). Since the scoring system of the first MIPEX edition differed from the subsequent two versions – in that it worked on a scale from 1 (worst) to 3 (best), rather than 0 (worst) to 100 (best) – MIPEX I scores were linearly converted to the latter scale to facilitate comparison. Consequently, higher MIPEX scores denote a greater extent to which all residents are legally entitled to equal rights and responsibilities as well as to any support that addresses their specific needs (Huddleston et al., 2011b).

Third, the country assessments follow the trends in electoral support for populist parties. For each country, the research team identified all political parties with notable support at the national level (ie not confined to a particular region), and selected the one with the position most aligned with extremism. Of course, in some countries there may be multiple populist political parties that enjoy nation-wide support, albeit perhaps to different degrees; however, for the sake of clarity, only one party per country is included. For Germany and Spain, no significant populist parties were identified.

1.2.4 Theoretical issues and strengths/limitations of data

There is some debate around the relationship between expressing intolerant attitudes and expressing intolerance through more concrete behaviours. Whilst meta-analyses of the empirical literature suggest a significant correlation between attitudes and behaviour more broadly (Kraus, 1995; Glasman and Albarracin, 2006), it is also acknowledged in the literature that the relationship between the two is complex and influenced by a number of moderating variables (see, for example, Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005). Also, trends in behavioural indicators can be used in assessments of interventions to reduce intolerance (Levy Paluck and Green, 2009); however, mechanisms of attitude change in relation to intolerance remain an underexplored area in need of further research.

Both self-reported attitudinal data and the use of behavioural proxies present a range of methodological challenges, a more detailed discussion of which is provided in Appendix C.

Challenges of conducting cross-national comparisons

The cross-national nature of this work is associated with additional theoretical and methodological issues. Cross-national explorations of intolerant attitudes are constrained by the fact that the socio-political and institutional contexts in which negative attitudes

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18 One example of this situation could be the existence of both the British National Party and the United Kingdom Independence Party in the United Kingdom.

19 In spite of the lack of clarity on the mechanisms of attitude change, there are at least three good reasons why it is important to know about public attitudes in addition to their potential use as progress indicators. First, they are at times reported in the media or expressed in everyday life and can help shape migrants’ and other minorities’ perceptions of how welcome or otherwise they are. Second, expressed attitudes may play a role in setting behavioural norms for the wider population. Finally, policymakers may be influenced by public opinion and shape policies accordingly.
may emerge vary across regions and countries. Heath et al. (2005) list three main issues that may induce measurement errors in cross-national surveys:

1. Translation: translating a questionnaire into a variety of languages carries the risk of translation errors.

2. Common concepts whose interpretation differs: even if concepts are accurately translated they may still refer to different phenomena in different contexts. Certainty on ‘functional equivalence’ of concepts is difficult to attain and may in some cases rely on trial-and-error.

3. No common concept to measure: not every concept exists in every country, and thus measurement of such context-specific concepts would be inherently problematic.

In light of these risks, cross-national consistency of method is an important step to ensure that the data collected are reliable and valid across countries. Appendix B includes a detailed overview of how the three major European datasets used in this study (EVS, ESS, Eurobarometer) approach this data quality concern.

While cross-national comparisons can be fraught with the above challenges, much of the present study also considers changes over time within countries, and re-measurement of the same concepts within a given context over time is less subject to large differences in meaning than those that may be found across countries and languages (Lynn, Japec and Lyberg, 2006). Overall, we feel that the datasets drawn upon are sensitive to the key challenges and provide data that are useful and informative on the areas under consideration.

Having introduced the focus of the study, our approach and some of the issues around definitions and data, the following chapter presents findings from the analysis of longitudinal European survey datasets.
CHAPTER 2  Analysis and findings – European survey datasets

This chapter addresses the first two research questions presented in Chapter 1:

1. Are intolerant attitudes rising more in some countries or regions than in others?
2. Are intolerant attitudes against some groups rising more than against others?

2.1 Trends in intolerance

2.1.1 Trends in expressed intolerance vary across countries and over time

There is wide variation in levels of expressed intolerance both across countries and over time in Western Europe over the past thirty years. Overall, according to responses to the European Values Study (EVS, 2011), in roughly half of the countries studied, including Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, intolerance has been rising against many groups. In the remaining countries, including Belgium, France and Spain, intolerance against most groups has been declining. This variation in trends appears to be irrespective of absolute values of intolerance expressed in individual countries. In other words, we cannot conclude, for example, that countries with comparatively high levels of intolerance were more likely to see decreases over time than countries with lower levels of intolerance, and vice versa. Figure 2-1 demonstrates this variability using the example of trends in expressed intolerance against immigrants.

Crucially, this variation among countries and over time was found in every time period covered by the EVS. As a result, we cannot conclude that expressed intolerance was uniformly rising, or declining, at any given point in time.

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20 For details of the survey questions drawn upon as indicative of intolerance please see Section 1.2.2 and Appendix B.
Generally, where data are available for the period 1981–1990, more countries reported intolerance rising than declining. In only two countries, France and Belgium, did intolerance against all groups decline steadily over the period from 1990 to 2008. In all other eleven countries, intolerance increased against at least one group over the same period.

This variation over time includes some countries in which intolerance appeared to be in decline and then returned to earlier levels. Portugal and Sweden are examples where decreases in intolerance observed in the 1999 wave appear to have been partially reversed by a rise in intolerance against all groups recorded in the 2008 wave of the survey data. Conversely, in a few countries, such as Spain and the United Kingdom, intolerance against several groups rose in the 1990s, followed by a decline between 1999 and 2008.

2.1.2 Trends in expressed intolerance also vary towards different groups

There are notable differences between levels of intolerance expressed towards particular groups, as Figure 2-2 demonstrates. Since its inclusion in the EVS in 1999, self-reported intolerance towards ‘Gypsies’ (as the people are termed in the surveys) has grown more than that towards any other minority group. The only EU15 countries where

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21 Data from the 1981 EVS wave are available for intolerance expressed against people of different race and immigrants for the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

22 Luxembourg and Greece are not included in this analysis because they were not included in the EVS prior to the 1999 wave.

23 Admittedly, the data on intolerance against ‘Gypsies’ is the weakest of all minority groups as this question appeared only in the 1999 and 2008 waves.
intolerance against ‘Gypsies’ did not grow are: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom. Not only has intolerance apparently risen against ‘Gypsies’ more than against other groups in many countries, but intolerance against this group has also been consistently higher (in absolute terms) than intolerance expressed towards other minority groups, including in countries where expressed intolerance towards ‘Gypsies’ has nonetheless been declining.25

Figure 2-2. Levels of expressed intolerance against individual minority groups in the 2008 EVS wave in Western European countries

The second group against whom expressed intolerance has most frequently been rising is Muslims. This trend of rising intolerance towards Muslims (since the question was first asked in 1990) is reported in seven of the 13 countries included in our analysis.26 Intolerance towards Muslims also tends to be higher in absolute terms than intolerance expressed against any other group with the exception of ‘Gypsies’.27

24 In contrast to analysis to questions related to other minority groups, Greece and Luxembourg are included in the analysis of attitudes towards ‘Gypsies’ since they have been included in both survey waves since this question was first introduced in 1999.

25 In the 2008 EVS wave, levels of self-reported intolerance against ‘Gypsies’ were on average almost 15 percentage points higher than those against Muslims – the second highest minority group in terms of expressed intolerance.

26 When looking only at the period between the last two survey waves, ie 1999 and 2008, the number of countries in which intolerance expressed against Muslims rises to nine out of fourteen due to the inclusion of Portugal and Sweden. That said, the levels of intolerance expressed against Muslims in those two countries in 2008 were still lower than in 1990.

27 The only two exceptions in the 2008 wave to this were Portugal (intolerance towards homosexuals was higher) and the United Kingdom (intolerance towards immigrants was higher).
As for other minority groups, intolerant attitudes expressed against Jews have declined in a large majority of Western European countries, and were in 2008 on average the lowest across all studied groups. Intolerant attitudes against people of different race and immigrants have also declined over the three time periods, albeit in only a very slight majority of studied countries. However, between 1999 and 2008 there were several instances of rising intolerance against these two groups – in five countries for people of different race and in seven countries for immigrants, as illustrated in Table 2-1.

Table 2-1. Degree and direction of change in levels of expressed intolerance per country and target group (EVS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AUT</th>
<th>BEL</th>
<th>DEN</th>
<th>FIN</th>
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<th>SPA</th>
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<td>-12.1</td>
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<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
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<td>-3.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>13.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990–2008</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-15.7</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-4.6</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
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<td>-4.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>-11.4</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>-8.5</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
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<td>-11.0</td>
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<td>1990–2008</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>-1.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999–2008</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999–2008</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-14.9</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table values represent differences in the proportion of respondents who indicated they would not want a member of a given group as a neighbour expressed in percentage points. Negative values (indicated in green) suggest falling levels of intolerance, positive values (indicated in red) suggest increasing levels of intolerance, grey colour denotes no change (defined as no more than half a percentage point) Lighter shades of a given colour indicate the change is less than three percentage points. Source: EVS waves 1990, 1999, 2008.

The mixed picture in regard to attitudes to immigrants and immigration is also evident in a related EVS question. Between 1999 and 2008, the share of respondents who felt their country’s immigration policy should either “prohibit people from coming” or introduce “strict limits” increased in eight of the EU15 countries. To complicate matters further, the countries that recorded an increase in this question are not necessarily those that recorded an increase in intolerant attitudes towards immigrants. In other words, respondents’ views on immigration policy seem unrelated to their views on having an immigrant neighbour.

As a comparison, intolerance expressed against homosexuals has been universally declining in the long term, even though there were increases between 1999 and 2008 in four countries. However, it should be noted that this decline started from a relatively high

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28 Two possible contributing factors are that Jews are present in Europe in lower numbers than other minorities and are less likely to be visibly identifiable. For a discussion of the visibility of Jews and other minority groups see, for instance (Nadeau, Niemi and Levine, 1993).

29 The other two remaining options were ‘let anyone come’ and ‘as long as jobs are available.’
baseline and, even in 2008, levels of intolerance expressed against homosexuals were on average higher than against all minority groups except ‘Gypsies’ and Muslims.

In addition to the variability in intolerance expressed towards different ethnic, racial and religious groups found within the survey responses, there are also differences in intolerance expressed towards different subgroups within these broader categories such as immigrants. This may reflect the fact that the EVS neighbour categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, people who are both immigrants and of a different race to the majority of the population may be subject to more intolerant attitudes than individuals who are members of only one of those groups. To illustrate, in the 2002 European Social Survey round (ESS, 2002) a larger proportion of respondents in every EU15 country thought that their country should allow “none or few” migrants of “different race/ethnic group from majority”, than thought that “none or few” migrants from the “same race/ethnic group as majority” should be allowed. On average, this difference amounted to twelve percentage points across the studied countries.

2.2 Convergence / divergence across Western European countries

In addition to looking at trends in expressed intolerance, data from the EVS allow us to examine whether opinions in individual Western European countries have diverged or converged over time. If there has been a convergence of opinions, the values recorded in opinion surveys should become more similar over time and, by extension, there should be less variation of opinions held by respondents. By contrast, a divergence of opinions would manifest itself in a greater variation of recorded values (Li and Bond, 2010). Therefore, trends in standard deviations, which are a measure of variance of observed values, are usable as an indicator of relative movements in opinions and attitudes. Regrettably, due to the binary nature of the intolerance questions used in the EVS, an analysis of convergence/divergence within individual countries is not meaningful, unless respondents are split into subgroups. However, it is possible to use individual country means as an indication (albeit rather crude) of whether opinions and attitudes in different Western European countries grew more aligned or more disparate between survey waves.

2.2.1 Opinions and attitudes among individual Western European countries have moved apart

Table 2.2. below presents an overview of trends in intolerance and attitude convergence depending on the target group. Generally, opinions and attitudes among Western European countries appear to have diverged. In other words, differences among countries in their levels of expressed intolerance have increased over the course of the EVS. This is an interesting observation, given that one might expect to see attitude and/or value convergence over time in the face of growing international flows of people and ideas.

Therefore, trends in standard deviations, which are a measure of variance of observed values, are usable as an indicator of relative movements in opinions and attitudes. Regrettably, due to the binary nature of the intolerance questions used in the EVS, an analysis of convergence/divergence within individual countries is not meaningful, unless respondents are split into subgroups. However, it is possible to look at individual country means, their standard deviations and how these evolved as a group over time.

The countries included in this analysis are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

As Halpern (2010) points out, this lack of value convergence across country is fairly unexpected. Since many aspects of modern life, particularly modes of economic production and consumption have been converging...
Evidence of increasing divergence in attitudes between countries appears to be in line with the finding presented in Section 2.1.1 that trends in expressed intolerance vary across countries and over time, as increases in intolerance in some countries occurred at the same time as decreases in others. An alternative explanation is that, in the case of long-term decreases in intolerance, countries with relatively high levels of expressed intolerance that have nevertheless seen a decline in such attitudes may have done so at a slower pace, and thus failed to catch up with their counterparts with lower baseline levels of intolerance. Of course, there are other possible interpretations as well. For example, this apparent finding of general divergence may mask the possibility that a few individual outliers in countries had a disproportionate effect on the observed trends.

There were two exceptions to the general diverging trend: intolerant attitudes towards Jews, which, while decreasing somewhat overall, have maintained a roughly consistent degree of variation among individual countries; and levels of intolerance expressed against immigrants. Of diverging attitudes, the biggest degree of divergence (both in percentage and absolute terms) has been recorded in intolerance expressed against people of different race. This means that attitudes to people of a different race vary more widely from country to country than attitudes towards people of different nationality or religion, with some on average, very accepting of different races and others much more intolerant.

As a comparison, attitudes towards homosexuals in Western Europe also bucked the observed trend and converged over the observed period. Interestingly, this has not been the case when respondents were asked whether homosexuality is justifiable. In this instance, while opinions have grown overwhelmingly more tolerant over time, they have diverged to a small extent.

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33 It is beyond the remit of this study to ascertain which has been the case.

34 This difference may be at least partially attributable to the different design of the two questions. While the one on intolerant attitudes was framed in a binary way, the one on the justifiability of homosexuality was presented as a 10-point scale.
This chapter addresses the third and fourth research questions set out in Chapter 1:

3. Are intolerant attitudes more prevalent amongst certain socio-economic and/or demographic groups than others?

4. If so, are there other socio-economic, political, historical/contextual factors that appear to be associated with these changes in expressed intolerance? Are intolerant attitudes therefore rising more in some countries or regions than in others?

Figure 3-1 summarises the results of the literature review conducted for this research to map available evidence on factors that may be associated with intolerance. Factors that were mentioned in studies included in the review can be organised into four major groups: 1) economic, 2) demographic, 3) socio-political, and 4) cultural. Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive; some factors may and do straddle the boundaries between them.
Figure 3-1. Overview of factors and the strength of available evidence

The factors are grouped according to the strength of available evidence. For factors in the green band, evidence available from included studies allows us to conclude fairly confidently that there exists an association between the factor and intolerance. Factors in the yellow band have generally been found to be associated with intolerance, but the literature review revealed instances in which this relationship was either not supported by findings, or was rejected, thus indicating that caution should be used when drawing conclusions about their association with intolerance. Finally, for factors in the red band, we did not consider that the literature review yielded sufficient evidence to be able to claim these are associated with intolerance. This is not to say that there is no association; rather that there was insufficient evidence to support or disprove that claim. In addition, for all but two of the factors in the green band, an indication of the direction of association is included. An upward arrow means that a higher amount or degree of a given factor is associated with higher levels of intolerance, a downward arrow suggests a higher level of a given factor is associated with lower levels of intolerance.

Five important qualifications need to be added to the discussion of these factors and their association with intolerance:

- First, the overview merely traces evidence of association, and as such does not imply causation in any direction. While some factors may be conceived as predictors of intolerance, this is not necessarily applicable to all the items listed below. For instance, rather than citizenship regimes shaping people’s (in)tolerant

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35 The direction of association is not indicated for citizenship and individual political orientation as these cannot be measured on a scale.
attitudes, it is possible that a citizenship regime of a given country is a reflection of existing levels of intolerance, or of policymakers’ reaction to perceived intolerance among the population.

- Second, the categorisation of factors into distinct bands depending on the quality of available evidence says nothing about the strength of their association with intolerance. In fact, it is quite likely that some will be more closely linked with intolerant attitudes and behaviours than others; however, the scope of the review and limited amount of evidence available does not allow the research team to comment on this aspect. More research would be needed to determine causality or strength of relationships.

- The third qualification is that some factors are likely to be related to or reinforced by others. For example, education is a strong determinant of socio-economic status, and therefore it is not surprising that both factors are listed in the same evidence category.

- Fourth, evidence on factors presented below may at times be associated only with a particular expression or target of intolerance. To illustrate, a few studies included in the review offered findings on factors associated with intolerance expressed particularly towards immigrants from poorer countries.

- Finally, it is important to note that findings presented in the figure above represent information from only one data collection exercise of this project. Their relationship with findings from other strands of this project is presented later in this chapter.

3.1 Factors considered to be associated with intolerance

This section includes a discussion of factors that were identified in the review of academic studies as potentially associated with changes in levels of intolerance. As demonstrated below, the same factors are also frequently mentioned in media discussions as possibly associated with trends in intolerance. The areas or factors are organised into the same four groups as presented in Figure 3-1 – economic, socio-political, demographic and cultural. For each factor we provide a brief summary of the main findings from that section. In the more detailed discussion of each factor, we first present a high-level statement of how the mechanisms of association might work. This is then discussed in relation to findings from available theoretical and empirical literature. Subsequently, we provide additional analysis based on data available from survey datasets and country assessments.

It should be noted that the discussion of economic factors is somewhat more extensive than that of the three other groups of factors. This is due to three main reasons. First, their discussion is most prevalent in the identified research literature. Second, the link between economic factors (particularly economic hardship) and intolerance and xenophobia is well established in popular conceptions compared with the other factors considered in this section. And third, economic factors are comparatively more dynamic and thus potentially subject to more frequent changes over time, allowing a deeper analysis of long-term trends.
3.1.1 Economic factors

**Brief summary of the relationship between economic factors and expressed intolerance**

- The association of individual employment status with intolerance is largely supported by available research literature. The evidence for a similar association of macroeconomic performance indicators such as GDP growth or overall unemployment rate is much less clear.

- Data from survey datasets and country assessments offer a very mixed picture. In some instances, such as in Denmark in the late 1990s, levels of expressed intolerance decreased over a period of satisfactory economic performance and thus the proposition that there is an association between economic factors and intolerance held. However, there are also cases, such as that of the United Kingdom in the late 1990s, in which levels of expressed intolerance towards immigrants rose despite favourable economic conditions such as low unemployment rate and strong economic growth.

- It appears to be helpful to distinguish intolerance expressed against immigration and intolerance expressed against immigrants, with the former being somewhat less pronounced when considered in relation to economic factors. This distinction may reflect a trend towards greater acknowledgement of demographic and economic realities that will necessitate future inflows of foreign labour to numerous Western European countries.

**Unemployment**

The possibility of an association between experiencing unemployment and being more likely to be intolerant has been expressed in research literature (Case, Greeley and Fuchs, 1989; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Semyonov and Glikman, 2009), media sources (Kissane, 2012; Maclean and Hornby, 2012) and official policy documentation (United Nations Office at Geneva, 2012). According to this hypothesis, unemployed people are presumed to harbour a more negative view of immigrants, whom they may perceive as taking jobs away from local populations. In a further nuance of this perception, some would argue that even when migrants do not directly take jobs from native workers, their willingness to accept poor working conditions and insecure employment drives down wages and working conditions for all (Aydemir and Borjas, 2011). This set of beliefs is thought to be particularly applicable to low-skilled workers, who tend to be most vulnerable to immigrant competition in the labour market. In this context, the current financial and economic crisis, coupled with a sluggish recovery and austerity measures adopted by European governments, has been expected to be associated with increasing levels of intolerance (Schmitz, 2012).

Available research confirms this proposition. Ervasti (2004) found that unemployment seems to increase the likelihood of having a negative opinion of immigration, although the only Western European country where the results of the study were statistically significant was Finland. Similarly, Card, Dustmann and Preston (2005) found that unemployed

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36 This may seem a somewhat paradoxical observation as people may often have a more positive attitude to having immigrants as neighbours than to overall levels of immigration to a given country. This is the case, for instance, in the United Kingdom (Blinder, 2012).
people were more resistant to immigration than those in paid work. Looking at voting behaviour as a proxy for intolerance, Lubbers, Gijsbert and Scheepers (2002) observed that unemployed people were more likely to vote for an extreme right-wing party.

Interestingly, people considered to be outside of the labour force (i.e., retired, disabled or looking after children) were found to be even more opposed to immigration than the unemployed (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005). Disabled and retired people are, however, also more likely to be older, and age appeared to be a stronger predictor of intolerance. The impact of employment status on negative attitudes may vary depending on the groups against which negative attitudes are directed. Gorodzeisky (2011) found that unemployed people are particularly intolerant of European ‘foreigners’ from poorer countries, but do not appear to be more intolerant of European ‘foreigners’ from wealthier countries. Also, a Europe-wide study by Strabac and Listhaug (2008a) did not find evidence that the unemployed and individuals with financial difficulties were more prejudiced against Muslims.

Macroeconomic performance
Related to the effect of employment situation is a hypothesis that a country’s economic performance may be associated with changes in individual levels of intolerance. This hypothesis particularly in the form that periods of economic decline are likely to be associated with rising intolerance has been put forward in research literature (Case, Greeley and Fuchs, 1989; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002; Semyonov, Rajman and Gorodzeisky, 2006), and is echoed by media and other sources (Pop, 2010; Euranet, 2012; Larive, 2012). Under this proposition, at times of economic downturn, people are presumed to take a more negative view of migrants and minorities. These groups are often seen as direct competitors in the labour market and as a burden on public finances and public services (especially on a country’s welfare system).

However, the available evidence related to this hypothesis is inconclusive, and at times even contradictory. Semyonov and Glikman (2009) found that a higher level of GDP is associated with lower perception of threat among that country’s population. This supports the proposition that economic prosperity is likely to decrease negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities. At the same time, the authors found that economic conditions have no impact on perceptions of social distance, suggesting that the effect of GDP is not uniform. Another study (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009) observed that real GDP growth was unrelated to attitude changes. A similar conclusion was reached by Card, Dustmann and Preston (2005), who found that the association between expressed attitudes and economic prosperity was weak. This, according to the authors, contradicted the common belief that adverse economic conditions are an important driver of hostility.

57 Lubbers et al. (2002) noted that housewives and retired people are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties than the service class.

58 The study measured respondents’ perceptions of threat posed by foreigners in the following domains: jobs, the economy, health and welfare, cultural life, crime, and overall life. See also Schneider (2008).

59 Social distance was constructed with two measured indicators: willingness to have an immigrant from a different race or ethnicity as a family member and willingness to have an immigrant from a different race or ethnicity as a boss.
towards immigration. In addition, they observed a weak association between unemployment rate and the prevalence of negative attitudes towards immigration. In light of their observation that individual employment status is positively associated with intolerance (as discussed above), this suggests that unemployment may be a stronger predictor of intolerance at the micro than the macro level.

As with individual employment status, the effect of economic performance on intolerance appears to vary by group. According to Gorodzeisky (2011), higher GDP is associated with lower levels of intolerance of European foreigners from relatively poorer countries. However, the same study showed that a higher level of GDP is also associated with higher levels of intolerance of European foreigners from richer countries compared to in countries with lower domestic output. This would suggest that residents of comparatively wealthy European countries are more intolerant of people from European countries with similarly high GDP than of people from comparatively poorer European countries.

**Findings on economic factors from survey datasets and country assessments**

As with the research literature, an analysis of trends expressed in both pan-European and national survey data offers a somewhat mixed picture. Overall, a uniform trend does not appear to be discernible – developments in some Western European countries seem to support the arguments presented above, while trends in other countries do not. One country in which trends support the hypothesis, for instance, is Denmark, where expressed intolerance against immigrants in Denmark decreased while economic indicators improved since the early 1990s. Other instances of simultaneously declining intolerance and improving economic indicators include the Netherlands in the 1990s and Spain in the early 2000s. However, it is also possible to find examples of the converse: periods in which intolerance rose despite improving economic conditions. For instance, the level of expressed intolerance in the United Kingdom grew over the course of the 1990s, in spite of solid economic performance, especially in the second half of the decade. Similarly, Spain saw levels of expressed intolerance increase over the same period, although its economy performed satisfactorily, particularly towards the turn of the century. Even the hypothesised effect of the current economic crisis does not appear to be necessarily universally applicable. According to national surveys, negative attitudes towards immigration in Spain rose between 2008 and 2010 (Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martinez, 2009; 2010; 2011), yet British negative attitudes towards immigration over the same period declined, reversing some of the increases registered in the pre-crisis boom years (Park et al., 2012).

When assessing the economic dimension of intolerance, some evidence suggests that it may be necessary to distinguish attitudes towards immigrants from attitudes toward immigration. As Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) pointed out, views on one may support the other or there may be no discernible connection between the two.

The case of Finland offers an example of how distinct these two types of attitudes may be. Expressed intolerance of immigrants in the country rose consistently between 1990 and 2008. And yet, over the same period, the proportion of people who felt Finland should receive fewer foreign job seekers declined notably (Jaakkola, 2009). Available data do not provide an explanation of these trends, but one hypotheses could be that there has been a gradual acceptance of the need for immigration, given Finland’s projected demographic
trajectory. At the same time, this gradual acceptance did not prevent the Finnish population from developing more negative views of individual migrants.

The importance of distinguishing immigration from migrants is also illustrated by the behaviour of the Northern League in Italy. At the rhetorical level, the party has embodied an aggressive anti-immigration platform, as exemplified by its staunch opposition to the 1990 Martelli Law which made it possible for non-Europeans to seek asylum in the country. Yet, as part of the governing coalition the party agreed to the largest regularisation programme in Italian history, while maintaining its anti-immigrant stance. Thus the party could be said to have evolved from an anti-immigration stance to an anti-immigrant one. As such, it acknowledges the economic need for the immigration of foreign workers, but seeks to keep the process within rigid constraints (Finotella and Sciortino, 2009).

3.1.2 Demographic factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brief summary of the relationship between demographic factors and expressed intolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• There is strong evidence that age is a factor associated with intolerance. According to several studies included in the review, older people are more likely to express intolerant attitudes. This finding holds true even when analysing intolerance expressed against a particular minority group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The links between intolerance and education and between intolerance and socio-economic status are supported by equally strong evidence. Higher educational attainment has been found to be associated with lower levels of intolerance and lower social status was observed to be linked with increased intolerant attitudes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Findings specifically on personal income were not uniform across studies included in the review. The majority of studies found income is associated with levels of intolerance, but one study found income to be an insignificant factor in the Western European context.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age

The association between age and intolerance has been established by several studies included in this review. According to Vala and Costa-Lopes’s findings (2010) young people are more tolerant than old people. Similarly, Card et al. (2005) found that, when they controlled for levels of education, older people have stronger anti-immigrant views. Another study (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007) noted that individual-level odds of developing positive contact with members of ethnic minorities are lower among older people. Other studies arrived at similar conclusions even when analysing intolerant attitudes expressed towards a particular group. For example, in regard to attitudes specifically expressed towards European foreigners coming from poor countries, Gorodzeisky (2011) observed that older people are more likely to express this type of intolerance. With respect to Muslims, the odds of expressing anti-Muslim attitudes were

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40 The authors could not tell whether this is a difference associated with ageing or with differences across birth cohorts included in the study. A more detailed discussion of this issue and its potential implications for policy is presented in Section 5.2.
found to increase by around 12 per cent for each additional decade of age (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008a).

Education
The link between educational attainment and intolerant attitudes has been frequently observed in the research literature. According to available evidence, well-educated individuals tend to be more tolerant (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007), have more positive views on immigration (Herreros and Criado, 2009; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009) and are more positive about the effects of immigration on the economy and on quality of life (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005). Correspondingly, the less educated a person is, the more negative a stance he or she tends to hold about receiving immigrants in his or her country (Ervasti, 2004). In addition, less well educated people are more likely to vote for an extreme right-wing party (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002). Examining attitudes towards Muslims, Strabac and Listhaug (2008a) found that the odds of expressing anti-Muslim prejudice decreased by 20 per cent with each additional level of education.

The link between education and intolerance does not appear to be universally applicable, or at least not universally strong. For instance, in line with findings from other studies, Hello et al. (2002) argued that more highly educated individuals turn out to be less prejudiced against ethnic minorities than lower educated individuals. However, the authors observed that there are cross-national variations in the strength of the “educational effect”. These variations are predominantly attributable to cultural factors, such as a given country’s democratic tradition or religious heterogeneity, rather than to structural factors, such as a country’s ethnic composition or unemployment rate. A similar conclusion was drawn by Kunovich (2002), in that prejudice was more strongly correlated with education than with income. Moreover, the effect of education on prejudice was significantly weaker in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.

Socio-economic status (SES) and personal income
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given its well-established relationship with education (Winkleby et al., 1992; Evans et al., 1997), socio-economic status has also been identified as a factor associated with intolerance in a range of studies included in this review. Available evidence suggests that vulnerable and socio-economically weak populations are less tolerant (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007) and lower social status seems to be associated with increases in the perception of ethnic threat (Schneider, 2008). In addition, manual workers, the self-employed, and routine non-manual workers were found to be more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties in comparison with the service class (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002). These findings were echoed by O’Connell (2011) who found no increase in hostility on part of high skilled natives towards immigrants with a similar level of skills. With respect to attitudes towards Muslims, white collar workers and students appeared to be less prejudiced than blue collar workers (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008a).

41 Schneider (2008) mentions that some of the mechanisms in which this perception of threat can manifest itself are fear of economic competition and perceived threat to one’s own culture. These threats may be perceived both at the individual and group level, depending on how the threat perception is constructed by a given individual.
At the same time, the evidence available on the role of personal income, one component of SES, is not uniform across the studies included in the review. Herreros and Criado (2009) observed that lower income groups have more negative attitudes towards immigration than people with high income. Kunovich (2002) noted that the similarity across countries in the relationship between social class and prejudice is striking, with blue collar workers, those not in the labour force and those unemployed generally demonstrating the highest prejudice scores. In this analysis, the correlation between social class and prejudice was much stronger in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. However, this finding did not extend to personal income, which the author found to be a significant factor only in Eastern Europe, while having no significant effect on prejudice in Western Europe.

**Findings on demographic factors from survey datasets and country assessments**

Neither the analysis of survey datasets nor the country assessments led to new findings on demographic factors in addition to those presented above.

### 3.1.3 Socio-political factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brief summary of the relationship between socio-political factors and expressed intolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Findings from the literature review suggest there is a link between individual political orientation and expressed intolerance. Right-wing and conservative political preferences have been found to be more likely to be associated with a less tolerant stance towards migration, difference and diversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• This link is not fully borne out by trends in extreme right-wing voting and intolerance over the past decade. In several instances the two moved together as expected. However, opposite situations occurred as well – both in terms of rising far-right voting with no corresponding increase in intolerance and vice versa. However, it should be noted that the link between right-wing political orientation and intolerance established in the research literature is not confined to extremist views. Instead, it relates more broadly to an individual’s position along the lines of the basic right-left political dichotomy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A small number of studies included in this review also suggested that welfare and citizenship regimes are associated with intolerance. With respect to the former, comprehensive welfare regimes were found to be associated with lower levels of intolerance while, concerning the latter, citizens of countries with more restrictive citizenship regimes tended to express more intolerant attitudes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political orientation**

Individual political orientation has been frequently hypothesised to be related to levels of intolerance. This proposition has recently been linked to the apparent rise in the popularity of extremist, populist and xenophobic political parties as discussed in Section 1.1.3, and has appeared frequently both in the media (New York Times, 2009; Farago, 2012) and in publications of organisations active in the area of anti-discrimination (European Network Against Racism, 2008b; Council of Europe, 2011). According to the hypothesis, right-wing political preference (especially in its extreme form) is linked with higher levels of intolerance.
Evidence available from research literature supports this hypothesis. Vala and Costa-Lopes (2010) found that personal values are a good predictor of intolerance of difference and diversity. In this context, conservatism was associated with lower levels of tolerance. Following a similar theme, Hix and Noury (2007) analysed the stances vis-à-vis migration-related issues of Members of the European Parliament in light of their political affiliation. They found that the most pro-migration MEPs were from green and regionalist parties, followed by radical left-wing groups and socialists. Liberals were located in the middle of the spectrum while those holding anti-immigration positions were recruited primarily from anti-European, national conservative, Christian democratic and conservative political groups.

**Welfare system**

Welfare systems of Western European countries may play a role in the broader picture of trends and levels of intolerance. This possible link stems from the fact that minority groups may be portrayed and/or perceived as relying on or ‘draining’ welfare services, thus placing a perceived burden on a country’s finances. This possible link is picked up both by the media (Easton, 2011) and by organisations active in the area of migration (Hedetoft, 2006).

One study included in the literature review discussed a possible association between the size and character of a given country’s welfare state and intolerant attitudes. Crepaz and Damron (2009) found that natives’ concerns that immigrants depress wages and salaries were less pronounced in more comprehensive welfare regimes than in countries with more liberal systems. These results were obtained controlling for variables such as levels of social trust, individual political preferences, income, age, gender, and post-materialist attitudes.

**Citizenship regime**

Citizenship rules of a particular country may be related to levels of intolerance among the general population. Restrictive citizenship systems could be partially understood as an expression of hostile attitudes towards foreigners, and efforts to move existing policy in a more restrictionist direction may be attributable to underlying intolerant or xenophobic sentiments. This hypothesis has been recently put forward both in Europe (Christopoulos, 2012) and in North America (Preston, 2011).

While single studies are not necessarily a firm basis for drawing conclusions, one study included in this review analysed this hypothesis and confirmed its validity: the citizenship regime of a given country was found to be a factor associated with levels of intolerance by Weldon (2006). The author observed a strong relationship between laws governing the acquisition and expression of citizenship and individual tolerance judgments. In the study, natives in collectivist-ethnic countries, such as Germany or Austria, were found to be less tolerant than those in more inclusive regimes. Citizenship laws were also found to mediate the explanatory power of other key variables possibly associated with tolerance: in-group national identity, ideology, and satisfaction with democracy. According to this finding, the type of citizenship regime largely determines whether these individual-level factors affect

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42 Typically, in such a country, citizenship is inherently exclusive and is meant also as a reflection of ethnic identity, not just membership in a political community. According to Weldon (2006) the *jus sanguinis* citizenship principle embodies this relationship between nation and ethnicity.
tolerance. In collectivistic-ethnic regimes individual-level factors strongly predicted
tolerance, in civic regimes the observed relationship was weak.

**Findings on socio-political factors from survey datasets and country assessments**

Data available from survey datasets offer a rather complicated picture regarding the link
between intolerance and right-wing political orientation. Over the past decade, in some
instances observed rises in intolerant attitudes in the EVS were accompanied by increased
political support for far-right extremist and populist parties. This has been the case, for
instance, in Finland and the Netherlands. At the same time, some instances of increased
intolerance do not appear to have been concurrent with growing far-right electoral
support, as in Ireland or Italy. There have also been cases of increased far-right support
without a corresponding observed rise in expressed intolerance, for example in Denmark
and France. However, it should be noted that this analysis of extremist voting at the
backdrop of trends in expressed intolerance does not address exactly the same issue as the
findings from the literature review. Voting for extremist right-wing parties revolves largely
around extreme- and far-right political preferences. Reviewed literature, on the other hand,
works with a much broader range of political opinion, ie including moderate right-of-
centre positions.

On a related note, the ability of individuals to express their attitudes is to a large degree
determined by the existence (or the lack) of outlets to do so. For instance, membership of
and support for extreme movements and far-right parties could be a vehicle for expression
of intolerant attitudes and their existence varies considerably across Western Europe. To
illustrate, there is no discernible politically successful far-right political party in Spain.
Similarly, the United Kingdom has historically been marked by the absence of a politically
significant extreme right (Joppke, 2004). On the other hand, the French National Front
has earned over 10 per cent of the national vote in every presidential election since 1988
and its emergence elevated racial issues and rhetoric to the status of an important
component in inter-party competition in France (Schain, 1988).

Importantly, the effects of the existence or lack of outlets for intolerant behaviour are not
always clear. For instance, several studies found some empirical evidence for the
proposition that the xenophobic rhetoric of radical parties spills over into violence
(Mudde, 2005; Eatwell, 2000; Bjorgo and Witte, 1993; Altermatt and Kriesi, 1995).
Conversely, other studies have concluded that the success of radical right parties channels
frustrations of potential perpetrators in the direction away from violent behaviour
(Koopmans, 1996; Backes, 2003).

One reviewed study explored the association of welfare regimes with intolerance. An
analysis based on empirical data from the Swedish welfare model (Kumlin and Rothstein,
2005) arrived at conclusions in line with findings from the literature review. The authors
found that the design of welfare state policies may affect formation of social capital in that
contacts with universal welfare state institutions tend to increase social trust. Conversely,
social programmes organised on a means-testing basis tend to undermine it.

Data collected through the survey datasets and country assessments were not related to the
role of citizenship regimes and therefore do not allow any commentary in addition to the
findings presented above.
3.1.4 Cultural factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brief summary of the relationship between cultural factors and expressed intolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Relevant studies included in the review found social trust to be associated with levels of intolerance. Survey data, however, do not always match this finding. In fact, in both surveys which included questions on social trust countries with declining levels were split roughly equally between those where expressed intolerance rose and where it declined. The same split was applicable to countries where the level of social trust increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Available evidence on the role of out-group size as a factor is inconclusive. Several studies included in the review found it to be associated with levels of intolerance and several others found no such link. Evidence collected from survey datasets and country assessments is equally inconclusive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is strong evidence available on two other cultural factors: contact and perception of threat. Greater contact with members of minority groups was uniformly found to be associated with lower levels of intolerance. Greater perception of threat was consistently found to be associated with more intolerant attitudes. Evidence collected through country assessments and dataset analysis suggests that perception of cultural threat may be more significant than economic threat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trust

Only two studies identified in this review commented on the relationship between intolerance and social trust. However, the evidence these studies provided is consistent. One study (Vala and Costa-Lopes, 2010) found that higher levels of interpersonal trust lead to lower levels of intolerance or prejudice. The other study (Herreros and Criado, 2009) observed that social trust of individuals had a significant positive effect on attitudes towards immigration.43

Perception of threat

Several studies included in this review indicated that perception of threat (of both economic and cultural character) is indeed associated with intolerant attitudes. Sari (2007) observed that people tended to become more prejudiced as perceived threat increased. According to McLaren (2003), perceived threat is a strong predictor of willingness to expel migrants and treat them harshly. More specifically, this is applicable to perceptions of economic and cultural threats which were significantly associated with intolerance. By contrast, the association between threats perceived at the individual level and intolerance was weak and insignificant. This finding was echoed by Ramos et al. (2006) who found that the best predictor of opposition to immigration of people of ‘another race or ethnic group’ is perception of economic threat, with threat to cultural identity being an important predictor as well. Further, the results of this study indicated that the perception of threat derived to a large extent from racist beliefs and was not confined to situations of economic threat.

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43 It should be noted that issues around social trust have been discussed at length in the literature recently, following Putnam’s (2007) finding in the US that social trust may be lower in more diverse communities. This has led to a wide-ranging discussion of how this relationship might be affected by the context of the community and a range of other influencing factors, highlighting the complexity of the many interrelated issues that are involved.
fragility. The same study also found that the strength of egalitarian values in a given country constituted an obstacle to the construction of individuals’ threat perceptions.

**Out-group size**

Evidence on the role of out-group size (i.e., the size of a given minority group) is inconclusive. Schlueter and Wagner (2008) found that existence of a large regional immigrant population led to greater perception of group threat, which resulted in increased negative attitudes towards immigrants. Similarly, another study (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009) observed that attitudes towards immigration generally seemed to have become more restrictive in countries with high levels of immigration. Analysing attitudes towards a particular sub-group of immigrants, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009) found that the greater the size of the non-European population in a given country, the greater is the support for limiting the group members’ access to their social rights.

By contrast, several other studies arrived at the opposite conclusion. Sari (2007), noted that living in a context that may be threatening in terms of the size of minorities did not increase expressions of prejudice. Examining attitudes towards one particular group, Strabac and Listhaug (2008b) found that the size of the Muslim population in a given country did not seem to increase the level of anti-Muslim prejudice. Similarly, prejudices against Jews did not appear to be correlated with the size of the Jewish minority (Bergmann, 2008)

**Contact**

Evidence available from research literature offers ample support for the contact hypothesis, as formulated by Allport (1954). According to Semyonov et al. (2007), the greater amount of contact with different ethnic groups an individual has the more tolerant he or she becomes. Additionally, positive inter-ethnic contact was found to decrease prejudice and social distance (Semyonov and Glikman, 2009). Ervasti (2004) concluded that personally knowing immigrants was the best predictor of attitudes favourable towards receiving immigrants. Similarly, another study (McLaren, 2003) found that intimate contact with members of minority groups in the form of friendships could reduce levels of willingness to expel legal immigrants from the country.

Several studies analysed the effects of intergroup contact in relation to out-group size. Schlueter and Wagner (2008) noted that the existence of a larger migrant population increases intergroup contact, which in turn reduced perceived group threat, thereby diminishing anti-immigrant social distance. A similar observation was made by McLaren (2003) who found intergroup contact could mediate the effect of the environment and lead to lower levels of perceived threat in contexts of high immigration.

**Findings on cultural factors from survey datasets and country assessments**

Data available from the EVS are similarly inconclusive as to the role of out-group size. Western European countries which have seen the largest increases in the share of foreign born population do not share a clear pattern in intolerance expressed against immigrants. In some countries (Austria, Finland) intolerance levels rose, in some (Belgium, France, Spain) they decreased and in others (United Kingdom, Ireland) they remained roughly constant. By contrast, in Germany and the Netherlands, the two EU15 countries where
the stock of foreign-born population was more-or-less constant (rose by less than one percentage point between 2000 and 2009) (data from OECD, 2012)\textsuperscript{44} intolerance expressed against immigrants rose, albeit much less so in Germany than in the Netherlands.

Evidence from the survey datasets and the country assessments also lends support to the association between perception of threat and levels of intolerance. In fact, available data suggest that the perception of cultural threat may be even more important than the perception of economic threat. Consistently across Western European countries, a greater share of respondents felt that their country should admit none or few immigrants of different ethnic group than was the case for immigrants of the same race/ethnic group. Soderling (1997), writing in the Finnish context, observed that the most accepted groups of immigrants in Finland had the lowest unemployment rate and vice versa. This suggests that material well-being might not be at the core of immigration-related anxiety, which may be predominantly driven by questions of identity (Pyrhönen and Creutz-Kämppi, 2010). Similarly, with respect to the Netherlands, Sniderman et al. (2004) concluded that concerns about Dutch national identity and culture appeared to have a stronger impact on ethnicity-based attitudes and behaviours than economic concerns.

The connection of social trust to levels of expressed intolerance is not fully supported by evidence available from survey data. The EVS allows a longer-term consideration of the topic as it has included questions on social trust in all four iterations, spanning from 1981 to 2008. Its data suggest that social trust has increased over the duration of the survey in nine out of thirteen Western European countries.\textsuperscript{45} However, in all instances, the change in observed levels of social trust amounted to less than six percentage points between the first and last rounds of the survey (Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden are exceptions, as all saw sizable increases in social trust). When broken down by individual decades, the 1980s and 2000s saw predominantly increases in social trust, whereas the period between 1990 and 1999 was marked by a slight majority of decreases in social trust.

This is very roughly in line with findings on attitudinal trends, which found a slightly higher number of instances of rises in expressed intolerance between 1990 and 1999 than in other periods. However, a detailed look at recent trends in individual countries reveals inconsistencies between social trust and expressed intolerance, these are summarised in Table 3-1 below.

\textsuperscript{44} Data not available for Greece and Italy.

\textsuperscript{45} Out of the EU15 countries, Greece and Luxembourg were excluded from this analysis because data was not available for these two countries for at least three data points.
Table 3-1. Examples of inconsistent relationship between declining social trust and trends in intolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country with declining social trust</th>
<th>Based on data from</th>
<th>General trend in intolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>EVS</td>
<td>Increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>EVS</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>Decreased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>Increased</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to EVS data, social trust decreased between 1999 and 2008 in only Italy and Spain. In the same period expressed intolerance of most minority groups increased in Italy but decreased in Spain against all groups except Muslims. The remaining countries, where levels of social trust rose between the last two rounds of the EVS, were split equally between those with rising intolerance and declining intolerance.

The ESS offers a more detailed insight into trends in expressed social trust within the past decade, as this topic was included in every survey round between 2002 and 2010. Rather than offering a binary question asking whether people can be trusted (as in the EVS), the survey asks respondents to indicate their position on a scale ranging from 0 (“you can’t be too careful”) to 10 (“most people can be trusted”). The ESS data produce a slightly more mixed picture about the past decade. In contrast to the EVS, which identified two instances of declining social trust (Spain, Italy), the ESS revealed four different cases (Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal) among Western European countries where available data allowed meaningful comparisons. Out of these four, expressed intolerance generally decreased over the relevant decade in Denmark and France, while it rose in Portugal. In Ireland intolerance rose against three out of the six observed minority groups. As with the EVS, changes recorded in the ESS were relatively small, with the largest mean differential for any individual country being 0.31 on the 0–10 scale. Since the latest ESS wave was conducted in 2010, the survey also captures the period of the recent financial and economic crisis. The available data does not reveal any indication of any potential impact of the economic downturn – in the majority of countries, trends in social trust continued the same trajectory as before the onset of the crisis.

46 Data for Luxembourg and Greece were compromised by low sample sizes.

47 Out of the EU15 countries, this analysis of ESS data on social trust excluded Italy and Luxembourg. The reason why the two surveys identified different countries with declining social trust may be differences in their design (binary vs scale). For instance, the EVS recorded a sizable increase in Denmark, while the mean value observed in ESS declined. However, the proportion of ESS respondents who replied with a value of six and above actually increased over time.
CHAPTER 4  Analysis and findings – country assessments

This chapter provides an overview of each of the countries included in the in-depth assessments. Each country overview begins with a summary of key points. The sections then go on to discuss the political, economic, demographic and policy context of trends in expressed intolerance in a given country and end with an example of a policy intervention to reduce intolerance. The examples are selected to include a mix of interventions undertaken at both the national and local level and targeting a variety of groups. Where available, the findings of any evaluations of a given intervention are presented. Each country assessment contains two graphical representations of long-term trends. The first graph presents a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance based on EVS questions plotted against level of social trust and electoral support for the extremist or populist party identified according to the criteria presented in Section 1.2.4 (if applicable). The second graph shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators (GDP growth, unemployment rate, proportion of foreigners in total population).

Overall, the following assessments did not reveal any consistent patterns and trends in expressed intolerance. In fact, there is wide variety in how intolerant attitudes (and support for extremist and populist political parties) have evolved against the backdrop of economic, demographic and policy developments. In addition, a comparison between European-level surveys and national-level survey data often yielded conflicting pictures. As a result, it was not possible to identify a clear relationship between intolerant attitudes and any particular contextual factor(s) at the country level. This finding corresponds, to some extent, with findings from the literature review, which in several instances found stronger evidence of an association with intolerance for individual-level factors (such as age and SES) than for macro-level factors (such as policy context or economic performance).

4.1.1 Denmark

Key points
- Patterns of expressed intolerance in Denmark vary significantly and are largely dependent on what group intolerance is expressed against. In the majority of cases, observable trends suggest there has been a long-term decline in levels of intolerance, particularly over the last decade. This finding is consistent with data on rising level of expressed social trust in Denmark, which is among the highest of all European
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countries. Data available from surveys conducted at the national level, however, offer a rather inconclusive picture.

- The Danish integration policy environment showed signs of reduced intolerance over the past decade. Notable developments include an establishment of a robust anti-discrimination body and a range of measures targeting labour market participation of workers of migrant origin. At the same time, Denmark continue to lag behind its European peers in areas such as access to nationality, which may be a reflection of relatively low support for multiculturalism in the country.

- The impact of the economic crisis in Denmark has not been as pronounced as in other countries. Yet the strongest Danish populist party achieved its best electoral result in its midst in 2009, building on previous gains registered in the 2000s. This is a noteworthy development in that trends in electoral support for populist parties in the country appear to be dissociated from those in expressed intolerance, which decreased against most groups in the 2000s.

Figure 4-1 below shows a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance plotted against level of social trust and electoral support for the Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party.

![Figure 4-1. Denmark – timeline 1](image)

Figure 4-2 shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators.

![Figure 4-2](image)
Available survey data reveal that patterns of expressed intolerance in Denmark vary significantly depending on the target group in question. Expressed intolerance in Denmark has risen against ‘Gypsies’ and is far higher than intolerance against all other ethnic, national or religious groups included in the 2008 round of the EVS. Levels of intolerance expressed against other groups, however, either decreased throughout the 1990s and 2000s (as was the case for Jews) or initially rose somewhat throughout the 1990s, followed by a trend reversal in the subsequent decade (applicable to people of different race, immigrants, Muslims). The decline in expressed intolerance against Muslims between 1999 and 2008 is particularly noteworthy as the period spans the controversy surrounding the publication of cartoons depicting Prophet Muhammad, which erupted in 2005 and re-emerged in 2008 with the uncovering of a plot by three Muslims in Denmark to kill one of the cartoonists (BBC News, 2008).

Data from surveys conducted at the national level, available only until 2001 (Andersen, 2002), largely confirm the somewhat variable trends in the 1990s. The perception of the threat posed by immigration to the Danish national character remained constant during that period. At the same time, though, national data show a sharp increase in the perception of migration as a policy problem that should be tackled. The slight drop in levels of expressed intolerance coincided with a steady increase in expressed social trust. The proportion of respondents who felt other people can be trusted reached 76 per cent in 2008, rendering Denmark the country with the highest levels of trust in Western Europe.

In demographic terms, Denmark has seen a relatively constant flow of immigration over the past decade and a half, with a slight acceleration after 2008. This trend is reflected in changes in the share of the entire population migrants represent. The proportion of foreign citizens residing in Denmark hovered at around 5 per cent of the population between 1998–2008 and subsequently rose to 6.2 per cent in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012). This is similar
to trends in the proportion of the population who are foreign-born; this is generally about a percentage point above the proportion of the population who are foreign citizens, and also appears to have picked up pace towards the end of the 2000s (OECD, 2012). Still, these increases are significantly lower than those seen in other Western European countries, such as Spain.

At the same time as tolerance was increasing towards the majority of surveyed groups, MIPEX policy indicators also showed an upward trend between 2004 and 2010. Areas showing the most notable score increases are labour market mobility, particularly in the form of numerous targeted measures introduced to increase foreigners’ work participation and skills, and anti-discrimination, albeit from a low base. Denmark has established a Board of Equal Treatment to deal with discrimination cases brought against the government, companies and private persons and address discriminatory practices, (Quraishy; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2012b). In addition, measures have been taken to provide judges with training on national and international legal instruments pertaining to racism and anti-discrimination. By contrast, Denmark’s MIPEX scores remain very low in comparative terms in the area of family reunion (second lowest among all participating countries) and access to nationality (one of the longest residency and highest language requirements). This may be at least partly reflective of the fact that, according to Mouritsen et al. (2009) no important group or political constituency is in favour of multiculturalism, understood as a comprehensive political programme aiming to accommodate cultural minority needs.

The current economic crisis caused a large drop in Danish economic output but a relatively solid recovery followed rapidly. In the aftermath of the crisis, the unemployment rate nearly doubled, although it still did not reach levels seen in the early 1990s. That said, it may well be that while the 1993 peak in unemployment was followed by rapid decrease, the current bout of high unemployment will turn out to be of a more prolonged nature.

The period of the recent global economic crisis also saw the biggest electoral success of the far-right Danish People’s Party, winning nearly 16 per cent of the popular vote in the 2009 European elections. Yet the DPP enjoyed electoral support well above 10 per cent even in the 2005 and 2007 parliamentary elections (ie before the start of the crisis). In fact, Danish populist parties (DPP or its predecessor, the Progress Party), have never won less than 5 per cent of the popular vote in any parliamentary or European election since 1988. Still, having risen at a time when intolerance was declining against most groups, electoral support of Danish populist parties appears to be somewhat dissociated from observed trends in expressed intolerance.

Below follows an overview of a Danish national policy intervention targeting young people. It corresponds with the findings on age as a factor associated with intolerance (see Section 3.1.2) in that young people are less likely to have developed intolerant attitudes.

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48 However, this step has not necessarily been followed by closer cooperation with anti-discrimination NGOs.

49 This echoes an observation made by Hedetoft (2003) several years earlier that, in the context of the Danish integration policy, culture is not a relative norm but an absolute yardstick of core values to be adopted by newcomers.

50 A more detailed discussion of the potential benefits of targeting young people is presented in Section 5.2.
As such, one of the effects of this policy intervention may be in preventing the formation of such attitudes.

**Example of a national-level policy to reduce intolerance – “A common and safe future – an Action Plan to prevent extremist views and radicalisation among young people”**

In 2009, the government of Denmark published “A common and safe future – an Action Plan to prevent extremist views and radicalisation among young people”. The Action Plan proposed to address some of the problems related to extremism in a coordinated and preventive manner, with a focus on young people. The underlying goal of the plan was “to maintain and further develop Denmark as a democratic society with freedom, responsibility, equality and opportunities for all” (Government of Denmark, 2009). The government further elaborated a comprehensive set of initiatives, divided into the following seven core areas:

1) Direct contact with the young people
2) Inclusion based on rights and obligations
3) Dialogue and information
4) Democratic cohesion
5) Efforts in vulnerable residential areas
6) Special initiatives in prisons
7) Knowledge, co-operation and partnerships

One of the initiatives outlined in the first core area was the setting up of tailor-made courses and teaching material on extremism. The rationale behind this particular intervention was to improve the skills of employees who have close contact with youngsters in order to facilitate the early identification of problematic behaviour among young people, as well as a more adequate planning of solutions (Government of Denmark, 2009). Lindekilde (2012) criticised the logic of change underlying this and other initiatives as they tend to be based on the assumption that “if the supply of information targeting young people is optimized and made ‘factual’, attitudes and behaviours can be changed” (p. 114). Furthermore, the information flow is likely to be one-way, from authorities to adolescents, not allowing for a two-way exchange of opinions (Lindekilde, 2012).

A mid-term external evaluation of the Action Plan pointed out a number of positive results deriving from the implementation of the Plan (Cowi Consulting, 2011). This preliminary evaluation, conducted in 2011 - two years after the implementation of the Action Plan, assessed 13 selected initiatives and proposed a self-assessment of the remaining initiatives. It focused on the relevance of the activities carried out at the time of the evaluation, the goal fulfilment in terms of the objectives set for each of the seven action areas, the cost effectiveness and sustainability of the activities, and its long-term effects. It also assessed the contribution of the various activities to the overall goal fulfilment as well as the mechanisms established to ensure an adequate coordination of those responsible for the execution of the Action Plan. In this area, the evaluation showed that, for instance, new interdisciplinary and coordinating cooperation structures have been set up and the competences of the agents involved have been developed. With regard to the interventions in particular, the preliminary results indicated a “high degree of goal fulfilment under the action areas ‘Efforts in vulnerable residential areas’ and ‘Democratic community’, whereas increased attention is required within ‘Special efforts in prisons’ and ‘Inclusion based on duties and rights’” (Cowi Consulting, 2011). Whilst the majority of the initiatives seem to have been launched (Cowi Consulting, 2011), the long-term effects of this policy are still to be assessed.

**Box 2. Example of a Danish policy to reduce intolerance**
4.1.2 Finland

**Key points**

- According to data collected through the EVS, levels of expressed intolerance in Finland have generally been on the rise over the past two decades, with a more pronounced increase during the 1990s. This has occurred simultaneously with rising levels of social trust, in relation to which Finland ranks among the highest in Western Europe. However, surveys conducted at the national level do not fully support the picture of a long-term increase in intolerance. This suggests (as argued in Section 3.1.1) that it might be necessary to conceptually separate intolerance expressed towards migrant individuals (which appears to have risen) and towards immigration as a phenomenon (which appears to have declined).

- The increase in immigrant population and the growing recognition of the need of foreign labour may have contributed to slight changes in Finnish migration and integration policy in the 2000s. In the area of anti-discrimination new legislative frameworks have been introduced and existing bodies, such as the Ombudsman for Minorities, have been strengthened.

- The effects of the recent financial and economic crisis on Finland, at least for now, appear to be relatively limited, particularly in comparison with other European countries or with the Finnish economic crisis of the early 1990s. Yet, in the context of the current crisis, the True Finns enjoyed the largest electoral support in recent history. In the 2009 European elections, the party won almost 10 per cent of the popular vote, a share it almost doubled in the 2011 parliamentary election, thus becoming the third strongest party in the country. However, the success of the True Finns needs to be understood in the context of the unpopularity of EU-wide measures designed to manage the ongoing euro crisis.

Figure 4-3 below shows a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance plotted against level of social trust and electoral support for the True Finns.
Figure 4-3. Finland – timeline 1

Figure 4-4 shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators.
According to EVS data, Finland has seen an increase in expressed intolerance against a majority of studied groups over the past two decades, the two exceptions being Jews and people of different race. The increase was larger between the 1990 and 1998 rounds, a period during which even intolerance expressed against Jews increased, than between the 1999 and 2008 rounds. As in other observed countries, levels of expressed intolerance are consistently highest in relation to ‘Gypsies’. This upward trend in expressed intolerance occurred against the backdrop of rising social trust – nearly 65 per cent of all respondents in 2008 felt other people can be trusted, ranking Finland among the highest in Western Europe on this measure.

However, data available from surveys conducted at the national level (Jaakkola, 2009) do not always support the picture of a steady increase in expressed intolerance. In these surveys, respondents’ attitudes towards foreigners looking for a job in Finland consistently grew more accepting across all survey rounds between 1993 and 2007. Similarly, negative attitudes towards Finland accepting refugees became less common, despite a small uptick between 2003 and 2007. The discrepancy between the results from the two sets of surveys suggests, as elaborated in Section 3.1.1, that it might be useful to separate intolerance expressed towards migrant individuals and towards immigration as a phenomenon. This is particularly applicable in Finland, given its demographic projections and likely future needs of foreign labour force, which are important themes within the Finnish immigration discourse (Pyrhönen and Creutz-Kämppi, 2010).

Against the backdrop of rising intolerance in the 2000s, in terms of policy developments, MIPEX scores for Finland increased slightly over the course of the three iterations. The
most notable positive change occurred in the domain of anti-discrimination, predominantly through the adoption of the 2004 Non-discrimination Act and through strengthening of the Finnish Ombudsman for Minorities. The situation of migrants has been addressed by the Immigration Act that entered into force in 2011. This legislation expanded the scope of measures in areas such as provision of information on rights and obligations, language training needs assessment and creation of personal integration plans. In addition, the Finnish government also adopted the first National Policy on Roma, which aims to improve the education of Roma, tailor employment services to their needs and improve their access to goods and services (Mäkilä and Selkälä, 2012).

Until 1990, Finland’s migrant population was very small, with foreign citizens accounting for only 0.4 per cent of the total in 1990 (Koivukangas, 2003). Since then, the country has been accepting migrants at an accelerating pace. Available data show that the proportion of foreign citizens residing in Finland rose by more than 50 per cent between 1998 and 2011 (Eurostat, 2012) and a similar increase can be observed in the proportion of foreign-born residents in Finland (OECD, 2012). Still, the proportion of foreign citizens in Finland remained slightly above 3 per cent, which is very low in comparative Western European terms and shows that Finland continues to be a relatively homogeneous country.

The current economic crisis resulted in a sharp economic contraction in Finland, accompanied by an increase in unemployment of roughly two percentage points compared to pre-recession levels. However, the current crisis does not appear to have had as lasting effects as the financial crisis of the early 1990s. The Finnish economy returned to growth in 2010, and the unemployment rate has never exceeded 10 per cent.51 By contrast, the unemployment rate in 1994 spiked to 16.6 per cent and took seven more years to decrease below 10 per cent.

Nevertheless, it is in the current economic climate that a populist party, the True Finns, enjoyed the largest electoral support in recent history. In the 2009 European elections, the party won almost 10 per cent of the popular vote, a share it almost doubled in the 2011 parliamentary election, thus becoming the third strongest party in the country. However, the success of the True Finns needs to be understood in the context of high unpopularity of EU-wide measures designed to manage the ongoing euro crisis, such as the European Financial Stability Facility, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, and their successor, the European Stability Mechanism, which are often perceived as making Finland bail out more profligate Eurozone members and which feature prominently on the True Finns’ political agenda. Still, it appears as though the popularity of the party has also induced other political parties to take up immigration-related themes, usually with the idea that Finland might have been too lenient in the design of her immigration policy.52

Below follows a discussion of an example of a Finnish intervention to reduce intolerance aiming to assist immigrant entrepreneurs. Conceivably, better economic and cultural integration of immigrants may lead to lower perceptions of threat, which have been found

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51 That said, Finland has likely entered a mild recession in 2012, even though growth is forecast to resume in 2013.

52 For instance, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Jutta Urpilainen, recently stated that you ‘either live by the Finnish tradition or you leave the country’ (Mäkilä and Selkälä, 2012).
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to be associated with intolerance (see Section 3.1.1). In addition, improving the labour market outcomes of immigrants might reduce their perception as a public burden (the relationship between welfare regimes and intolerance is discussed in Section 3.1.3).

Example of a local policy to reduce intolerance – “EnterpriseHelsinki”

EnterpriseHelsinki is a free business counselling service, run by the city’s Economic Development Unit, which has been supporting immigrant entrepreneurs since 1993 (EnterpriseHelsinki, 2013b). Similarly to other social entrepreneurship programmes across Europe, such as Barcelona Activa and Vienna’s Mingo (Cities of Migration, 2013a; Cities of Migration, 2013f), EnterpriseHelsinki aims to support start-up businesses, helping immigrants develop their business projects. The programme provides a range of entrepreneurship courses and workshops to introduce the newcomers to the Finnish business culture and legal standards. EnterpriseHelsinki also offers to develop a connection between the new small/mid-sized businesses and a number of experts, who are available to provide a hands-on guidance in Finnish, Swedish, English, Russian, Estonian, German and Arabic (EnterpriseHelsinki, 2013a). In 2010, the programme supported the establishment of 270 new firms, with 765 migrants having used the business counselling services (Cities of Migration, 2013d). In order to broaden its outreach, Enterprise Helsinki collaborated with other agencies, namely the Regional Business Services for Immigrants, and joined the EU project ‘Multicultural Business Services’ in 2011. The research team have not been able to identify an evaluation of this programme.

Box 3. Example of a Finnish intervention to reduce intolerance

4.1.3 France

Key points

- According to the large surveys analysed, over the two decades from 1990–2008, France appears to have experienced a decline in levels of expressed intolerance towards every group except for people with a criminal record. The trend of declining expressed intolerance, including towards ethnic minorities, those of other religions and those from other countries, is most evident between 1999 and 2008, and coincides with an increase in levels of expressed trust in others more generally. In that period, expressed negative attitudes dropped most markedly against ‘Gypsies’, who nevertheless remain the minority group against whom expressed intolerance is highest.

- At the same time, policy surrounding minorities and those of other religions and nationalities shows some signs of increased intolerance. MIPEX scores for France gradually declined, especially between 2004 and 2007 and in the area of long-term policy around granting of residence. Alongside this trend, and more aligned with declining expressed intolerance, there has been a notable strengthening in the policy framework against discrimination.

- In the period since 2008 France’s GDP declined (similarly to that of other EU countries). However, in its recent recovery France seems to have avoided a second dip. Some notable events indicative of challenges around racial, religious, national or ethnic intolerance have, however, occurred in the immediate aftermath of the recession. Recent incidents include, for example, the 2010 deportation of Romanian and Bulgarian illegal immigrants, the 2010 introduction of a ban on full-face veils and the strong showing of support for the Front National in the 2012 presidential election.
These events coincided with a gradual decline in a longitudinal index of tolerance, which decreased in four consecutive years since 2009.

Figure 4-5 below shows a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance plotted against level of social trust and electoral support for the National Front.

Figure 4-5. France – timeline 1

Figure 4-6 shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators.

Figure 4-6. France – timeline 2
Self-reported attitudinal survey data from French respondents show very similar patterns for all groups included as potential targets of intolerant attitudes (people of different race, Muslims, immigrants, Jews and ‘Gypsies’, in the survey’s words). Following an increase in the 1980s (data from that period are available only for people of different race and immigrants), levels of intolerance showed a long-term decrease after 1990, accelerating between 1999 and 2008. The most significant drop was observed in the proportion of respondents who would not want ‘Gypsies’ as their neighbours, even though the levels of intolerance expressed against ‘Gypsies’ remained by far the highest of all the groups included in the 2008 round of the EVS. The rapid decrease coincided with an increase in the number of respondents who felt other people can be trusted. However, even after the increase, the level of expressed social trust among French respondents (below 30 per cent) was still comparatively low in wider European terms.

In demographic terms, France has seen a steady inflow of immigrants over the past 15 years (Eurostat, 2012). However, this flow has not translated into a rapid increase in the proportion of the entire population migrants represent, although this proportion did grow in some other Western European countries. Between 1999 and 2011, the proportion of foreign citizens living in France rose less than half a percentage point, hovering most of the time slightly below 6 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of foreign-born population in France, generally slightly less than double that of foreign citizens, increased by roughly a percentage point and a half between 2000 and 2010 (OECD, 2012).

Against a backdrop of decreasing levels of intolerance in the 2000s, though, the policy context showed signs of deterioration. MIPEX scores for France declined over the course of all three of its iterations, with the most significant decrease occurring between 2004 and 2007. As a result, the 2010 MIPEX assessment found that France’s overall score was slightly lower than the average of all EU participating countries (Huddleston et al., 2011a). The trends in the development of immigration policies were not uniform across all monitored areas. The biggest deterioration occurred in the field of long-term residence, following the passage of the 2006 Code on entry and stay of foreigners and right of asylum (Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile, CESEDA). The new legislation introduced stricter conditions for the acquisition and renewal of long-term residency permits and led to harsher provisions on family reunion. On the other hand, there was a notable strengthening in the domain of anti-discrimination policy and structures, particularly in the form of the activities of the High Authority for the Struggle against Discrimination and for Equality (Haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité, HALDE). Set up at the end of 2004, the new body established itself as a strong, independent institution providing advice to the government and victims of discriminatory practices until its dissolution in May 2011 when its functions where subsumed by the office of the ombudsman (Défenseur des droits).

When it comes to the current financial and economic crisis, France has undergone a contraction in GDP similar to that of other countries; however, its economy seems to have avoided a double-dip recession, at least for now.53 The unemployment rate in the country

53 At an annualised rate, France is predicted to post positive economic growth in 2012, even though its economy likely shrunk in the last quarter of 2012. The forecast for 2013, albeit lowered compared to earlier estimates, remains slightly above zero.
remains high, but not much higher than its pre-recession levels.\textsuperscript{54} In fact, the current unemployment rate is actually lower than that of the late 1990s. According to a longitudinal index of tolerance, a national-level measure developed by Mayer et al. (2012), there has been an increase in expressed intolerance among French respondents since the beginning of the crisis. However, it needs to be added that the increase was limited to expressed intolerance towards Muslims and people of North African origins, whereas levels toward blacks and Jews remained roughly the same. Furthermore, the overall index showed increases in tolerance in both 2008 and 2009, a period already affected by the economic downturn, leading the authors to conclude that the economic explanation for the later increase in intolerance is insufficient. Instead, they suggest the underlying cause might be the overall societal context, marked by the co-occurrence of several notable events. For instance, in 2010 clashes with police broke out in Grenoble, followed by a speech by President Sarkozy in which he implied a link between immigration and crime. In addition, the onset of popular Arab revolutions and subsequent political uncertainty provoked fears of uncontrolled migration, particularly from northern Africa. As mentioned above, some notable policy events also occurred in this period: in 2010, the French government took the decision to deport Romanian and Bulgarian illegal immigrants, and in the same year France introduced a ban on wearing the Islamic veil.

In this context, the Front National achieved the strongest electoral result in its history in the 2012 presidential elections, receiving nearly 18 per cent of the popular vote (Ministere de l’Intérieur, 2012). However, it should be noted that the party has enjoyed a consistently high level of support over the past two decades and has never earned less than 10 per cent of the vote in any parliamentary or presidential election since 1992. In fact, the party’s other notable electoral result (Jean-Marie Le Pen’s appearance in the second round of the 2002 presidential elections, having edged out the Socialist Party’s Lionel Jospin) occurred during a period of low unemployment and some economic growth.

Below follows an example of a French intervention to reduce intolerance at the local level with the aim to improve cultural integration among members of minority groups. One possible outcome may be a reduction in the perception of cultural threat, which has been found to be associated with intolerance (see Section 3.1.4).

\textsuperscript{54} Data compared here are annual averages.
Example of a local-level intervention to reduce intolerance – “street mediators”

The ‘social mediation’ policy was first introduced at the end of the 1990s in French neighbourhoods with a significant foreign population and high levels of crime and violence. Rising fear of crime and a sense of insecurity, along with poor relationships between some communities and the police, led the government to intervene. In 1997, a number of local security interventions were thus funded by the Ministry of the Interior, within a framework of ‘contrats de sécurité’ (Body-Gendrot and Duprez, 2001).

An illustrative example of these interventions was the policy termed ‘local agents for social mediation’ (agents locaux de médiation sociale). One of the main goals of this policy was to bridge the gap between those in the community who were not well integrated culturally or in terms of employment, while seeking to reduce tensions and violence in those communities. The mechanism for doing so was to engage and train young people from the relevant communities, often representative of the ethnic minorities and nationalities, to play an active role as mediators in circumstances in which tensions might otherwise erupt into conflicts or violence (Mrad, 2004; Ocqueteau, 2004).

The role of the mediators has been shaped by the communities and situations in which they act. They are encouraged to intervene to attempt to resolve threatening behaviour and disputes before there is involvement from the police (Mrad, 2004). In order to do so the mediators establish strong links with local agencies of transport and health, riding on public transport, standing with ticket collectors and service providers, and use their mediation skills to mitigate potential conflicts or tensions. Whilst no formal evaluation of this policy has yet been conducted, some tangible outcomes have been nevertheless reported. For example, evidence suggests that through their engagement as ‘street mediators’ they are perceived as positive actors in the community, acting for the community rather than against it. Surveys conducted in those local areas suggest that the service providers and agencies drawing on the support of mediators feel safer and value the mediators’ contribution, as do the wider communities (Duclos and Gresy, 2008). And according to a spokesman for SNCF (the French national railway), there has been a reduction of at least one-third in the number of times that emergency cords are pulled on public transport in the areas where social mediators are active. Finally, there is also evidence that many of the young people trained and experienced in acting as mediators have been eventually hired by the local agencies and public services who have been benefiting from their work.

Box 4. Example of a French intervention to reduce tolerance

4.1.4 Germany

Key points

- EVS data suggest there has been a decline in levels of expressed intolerance in Germany since 1990. This decline was more pronounced between 1990 and 1999 than during the subsequent decade. One notable exception to this trend is intolerance expressed against Muslims, which has risen substantially. The sharp increase, especially in relation to other groups, sets Germany apart from the vast majority of other Western European countries. Data available from national-level surveys present a more ambiguous picture. On one hand the perception of conflict between Germans and foreigners declined, on the other respondents over time indicated an increased wish for foreigners to adapt better to their (ie presumably German) lifestyle.

An evaluation of the social utility of this and other mediation programmes has been conducted (Duclos and Gresy, 2008).
• The MIPEX scores for Germany remained roughly constant in the second half of the 2000s. That said, German migration and integration policy underwent a transformation in that it has been given a comprehensive form, reflecting the recognition of the need for a managed migration system. This is best embodied by the 2005 Immigration Act and subsequent national integration plans, which established integration as a cross-sectoral policy topic involving a variety of stakeholders.

• The impacts of the financial and economic crisis on Germany have been relatively limited, particularly in comparison with other countries, even though German economic recovery appears to have weakened of late. It may be also partly for this reason that populist and extremist political parties have not gained traction at the federal level and their electoral successes have been confined to regional and local elections. That said, intolerant extremism is present in Germany as demonstrated by the uncovering of the far-right terrorist cell in 2011.

Figure 4-7 below shows a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance plotted against level of social trust. No populist or extremist party has been successful at the national level in Germany.

![Figure 4-7. Germany – timeline 1](image)

Figure 4-8 shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators.
Data available from the EVS indicate that levels of expressed intolerance in Germany have generally decreased since 1990 (data for Germany are not available for the 1981 round of the survey). The observed decrease was more notable during the 1990s and appears to have slowed in the subsequent decade. The only exception to this trend is intolerance expressed against Muslims, which saw a dramatic increase in the 2000s. This increase was so pronounced that the level of expressed intolerance against Muslims recorded in 2008 was only a percentage point lower than that against ‘Gypsies’, who (as in all other Western European countries), are the target of the highest levels of intolerance. The difference between the two groups was the smallest of all observed countries, with the exception of Austria.

The general decrease in expressed intolerance was concurrent with a slight increase in expressed levels of social trust. However, less than 40 per cent of German respondents felt other people could be trusted, which puts Germany roughly in the middle of all observed countries – somewhat higher than the average value but nowhere near levels observed in the Nordic countries or the Netherlands.

Data obtained from studies conducted at the national level (Terwey and Baltzer, 2012) offer a rather mixed picture. On the one hand, the aforementioned decline in intolerance was confirmed in that there was a long-term decline in the share of respondents who agreed with the proposition that foreigners should be sent home when jobs are scarce and

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56 Respondents were asked to give a numerical response denoting their opinion of that proposition ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The average score over time decreased from 4.42 (SD = 2.15) in 1980 to 2.74 (SD = 1.85) in 2010, with a short uptick between 1996 and 2000. The decrease in observed standard deviations suggests that respondents’ views on this matter converged over time. The data were collected for all years in both old and new federal states and were weighted to reflect different sample sizes in the two regions.
who felt conflict existed in Germany between Germans and foreigners.\footnote{The share of respondents who felt there was a “very strong” or a “rather strong” conflict (the other options being “rather weak” and “none”) decreased from 70 per cent in 1990 to 63 per cent in 2010.} At the same time, the share of respondents who agreed that foreigners should make greater effort to adapt to the German lifestyle increased between 1990 and 2010,\footnote{Respondents were asked to give a numerical response denoting their opinion of that proposition ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The average score over time increased from 4.40 (SD = 1.87) in 1980 to 5.53 (SD = 1.57) in 2010. The decrease in observed standard deviations suggests that respondents’ views on this matter converged over time. The data were collected for all years in both old and new federal states and were weighted to reflect different sample sizes in the two regions.} as did the share of respondents who reported that they “feel foreign in their own country because of foreigners”.\footnote{Respondents were asked to give a numerical response denoting their opinion of that proposition ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The average score over time increased from 3.21 (SD = 2.12) in 1996 to 3.50 (SD = 2.14) in 2006. The data were collected for all years in both old and new federal states and were weighted to reflect different sample sizes in the two regions.} In regard to Islam, the proportion of respondents who approved of allowing religious classes for Muslim pupils in public schools increased from 35 per cent in 1996 to 44 per cent in 2002, only to decrease to 32 per cent in 2006. In this context, the period 2002–2006 spans several notable events that may have helped shape the public debate, including a series of honour killings, the release of Thilo Sarrazin’s book on migration Germany Is Abolishing Itself, and the debate on whether to outlaw the Islamic veil.

Immigration to Germany was growing fast in the early 1990s and the number of foreigners living in the country peaked in 1997. Since then, the share of foreign citizens in the total German population has remained roughly constant, with a slight decrease from 9 per cent in 1998 to 8.8 per cent in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012). In regard to the proportion of foreign-born residents, which is in Germany generally four percentage points higher than that of foreign citizens, their share in total population increased somewhat from 12.5 per cent in 2000 to 12.9 per cent in 2009 (OECD, 2012). Importantly, the immigrant population in Germany is very unevenly distributed across the country’s territory. The vast majority of foreigners reside in the former West of the republic. Out of the federal states, Berlin hosts almost half a million foreigners, nearly double the number in all the other former Eastern states combined. In total, the share of foreigners in the new states is less than 3 per cent (BAMF, 2012).

The context of migration and integration in Germany is rendered more complex by the fact a substantial part of the inward migration flows has historically been made up of ethnic German expatriates and their families from the territory of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. In response, the German government introduced the notion of ‘people with migration background.’ Within this group (which, according to the 2012 National Integration Plan, comprises 15 million people, ie almost one fifth of the population) more than half possess German citizenship (Oezcan, 2007).

Over the past two decades, Germany moved away from being a guest worker country (ie primarily concerned with managing an inflow of foreign workers, originally intended on a temporary basis) to one with a managed migration process. The official migration and
integration policy evolved correspondingly. A comprehensive codification of migration policy came in the form of the 2005 Immigration Act, which addressed areas such as regulation of entry and residence and employment of third country nationals. What is more, its enactment coincided with the introduction of the so-called ‘integration summits’, bringing together various relevant stakeholders with the aim to develop National Integration Plans. The Act managed to shift policy focus towards sustainable and structural integration, which it established as a cross-sectoral topic (Butterwege, 2005; Schneider, 2005). In the second half of the 2000s, MIPEX scores remained roughly constant, with increases and decreases outweighing each other. In 2007 and 2008, respectively, language and integration tests were introduced for family members as a precondition of long-term residence. At around the same time, in 2009, the nationality law was amended to place limits on citizenship withdrawals for fraud/deceit on national security grounds. Overall, according to MIPEX scores, Germany’s integration policy is deemed slightly above average in comparative EU terms (Huddleston et al., 2011a).

The recent financial and economic crisis has affected Germany to a relatively limited extent, particularly in comparison with other EU countries. Like in every other Western European country, economic output fell in 2008, but rebounded with a very strong growth rate the following year and economic growth has stayed relatively satisfactory. Perhaps even more importantly, the German unemployment rate throughout the crisis remained lower than in 2007 and decreased to 6 per cent in 2011. It may be partly for this reason that no trends in attitudes expressed in national surveys appear to be affected by the crisis. Indeed, where data were available, every trend reported above continued during the crisis in the same direction as it did in the first half of the 2000s.

At the political level, there are three populist right-wing parties in Germany – the National German Party (NPD), the German People’s Union (DVU), and the Republicans. None of these parties has been able to gain sufficient popularity at the national level and their successes have been limited to regional politics. The DVU held seats in the regional parliament in Brandenburg between 1999 and 2009 and the NPD has had members in the legislatures of Saxony (since 2004) and in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (since 2006). The electoral success of far-right parties has been largely confined to new federal states. This is consistent with findings of Decker et al. (2012) that the share of people with extreme

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60 Examples of policy developments in the 1990s include: tightening of rules regarding recognition of repatriates, restrictions on asylum procedures, formalisation of the right to naturalisation, and creation of an independent commission on immigration (Butterwege, 2005; Schneider, 2005)

61 However, Frost (2005) suggests the paradigm shift might not have manifested itself beyond the discursive level.

62 At annualised basis, Germany has avoided a second dip, even though the country recorded its first GDP contraction since 2009 in the last quarter of 2012. Growth forecasts for 2013 remain positive.

63 It is conceivable that this achievement might be at least partly attributable to the Kurzarbeit scheme, whereby employers cut numbers of hours per employee rather than numbers of employees. As a result, the overall total of people who were unemployed or employed less that they would like might not have been that dissimilar from other countries (OECD, 2010).

64 It should be added that Germany underwent a mild (in terms of output) recession in 2002–2003. This period coincided with rise in unemployment, which peaked at 11.3 per cent in 2005.
right-wing views had grown substantially over the previous six years in the new federal states, while declining, albeit from a higher base, in the West. At the same time, electoral support for extremist parties might not be an expression of wide acceptance of their platforms. In fact, Stoess (2010) argues that right-wing voting in Germany occurs mainly as a sign of political protest: only 40 per cent of NPD voters declared they had voted for the party out of personal agreement with the party’s policies. This observation is in line with the fact that the above mentioned far-right parties saw their membership base decline in the second half of the 2000s (Statista, 2013). The NPD has also been a subject to efforts to ban the party as anti-constitutional. The first attempt in the early 2000s was rejected by the Constitutional Court; a new effort is currently under way, following the uncovering of a far-right extremist terrorist cell responsible for a series of xenophobic and racist crimes, including a series of murders (Bleiker, 2013).

Below follows a discussion of a multifaceted German intervention to reduce intolerance. Activities undertaken within its framework relate to a range of factors identified to be associated with intolerance in Section 3.1, most notably individual employment status and out-group contact.

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65 The finding was based on a composite score derived from individuals’ opinions on a series of statements postulated to be associated with right-wing political ideology.
Example of a national-level intervention to reduce intolerance – “Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance – against extremism and violence”

In 2001, the German government, under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, introduced the new action programme “Youth for Tolerance and Democracy – against right-wing extremism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism”. It finances prevention-oriented interdisciplinary pilot initiatives in the fields of labour, leisure and education which, for the majority, employ a participatory, creative, or history-oriented pedagogic approach. Those trialling new and innovative methods, such as biographical learning, which otherwise would face difficulties to secure funding, are given priority. The projects’ sustainability is considered to be important, and is thus regularly evaluated and improved – so far quite successfully, as the majority of grantees continue their project work with their own resources after support has elapsed. Examples of initiatives include discussion fora, international youth camps, exhibitions, and work camps (Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2006; Jugendinstitut, 2002).

The aim of the initiative is to foster democratic behaviour, civil engagement, tolerance and cosmopolitanism. Focuses are thus social integration, intercultural and interreligious learning and identity formation. Youth are defined as the main target group – particularly students in vocational training, young active civil society participants, and young people exhibiting right-wing affiliations – but it also includes multipliers such as parents, teachers, social workers and civil servants (Sischka, Schwientrieng and Beyersmann, 2011).

The action programme consists of three project components: (i) ENTIMON, (€65 million in 2001–2006), (ii) CIVITAS (€52 million in 2001–2006) and (iii) XENOS (€75 million in 2001–2006). About 450 projects to strengthen civil society (eg encourage active citizenship along with community learning processes) have been sponsored (Jugendinstitut, 2002; Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2006).

“ENTIMON – Together against violence and right-wing extremism” covers projects fostering participatory community behaviour and strengthening of democratic behaviour through political education. It aims at enabling young people to form their own judgements about societal developments and to take over responsibility through creating room for dialogue and thereby enable person-centred learning, self-reflection and challenging of racist stereotypes. The overall goal is to facilitate integration of people with migrant backgrounds into German society, and to counteract violence and right-wing extremism (Jugendinstitut, 2002; Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2006).

“CIVITAS – Initiative against right-wing extremism in former Eastern Germany [Neue Bundesländer]” aims at developing a democratic and community-oriented, human rights inspired culture to counteract right-wing extremism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the former East. This is meant to be achieved through fostering the recognition, respect and protection of ethnic, cultural and social minorities. Local civil society initiatives, such as mobile advice teams and network centres, including victim counselling, constitute the main focus of work (Jugendinstitut, 2002; Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2006).

“XENOS – Living and working in diversity” sponsors practical initiatives against xenophobia and racism. They include training modules to nurture awareness or to educate on non-violent handling of conflicts. Projects financed through XENOS have a labour market focus: they either attempt to ease access for disadvantaged people directly, particularly their transition from education into work, through advising on job choices for instance, or indirectly, through changing attitudes both within the private and public sector, for example with the help of education on racism or right-wing extremism. Evaluations point towards some success with regard to strengthening employability (Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2010; Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2006).

The described action programme ended in 2006 and was followed by the initiative “Diversity is beneficial: Youth for diversity, tolerance in democracy” (2007–2012). The transfer into this new action programme was accompanied by a shift in focus as result of evaluations: local action plans to better reach people locally were introduced while the discrimination agenda was widened to
encompass any kind stemming from pluralisation of society (within XENOS, which was the only sub-programme extended from previous years). The experimental approach characterising the previous programme was continued. The programme was complemented by the initiative “competent. For democracy”, which finances interventions of mobile counselling teams who offer support in conflict situations stemming from xenophobia and right-wing extremism. Recent evaluations (Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2010) highlight that the new local action plans have been successful in developing locally integrated prevention strategies, facilitating common learning processes between German and migrant youth and adults. However, a lack of gender sensitivity is highlighted (Lawaertz-Stiftung and Univation, 2012).

Both programmes have been superseded in 2011 by the most recent government programme “Foster Tolerance – strengthen competency” which continues the same thematic focus, with a total of €24 million available until 2013 (Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2012).

A particular strength of the German initiatives against intolerance is the built-in component of evaluations from the outset: projects financed under the action programmes are regularly evaluated by third-party institutions, mainly universities (eg University of Bielefeld, Free University of Berlin) or research institutes (eg German Youth Institute, Institute for Social Work Frankfurt/Main) commissioned by the government to guarantee an academic monitoring (wissenschaftliche Begleitung), or occasionally in the form of activity reports by the public sector itself. Methods include workshops, semi-structured (expert) interviews, online surveys, qualitative document analysis, focus groups and participant observation (Heitmeyer et al., 2009; Becker et al., 2009).

Box 5. Example of a German intervention to reduce intolerance

4.1.5 Italy

**Key points**

- Data available from European studies show that there has been a long-term rise in expressed intolerance in Italy. This increase was most pronounced in the 1980s, continued more slowly in the next decade and stopped, with the exceptions of attitudes towards Muslims and ‘Gypsies’ between 1999 and 2008. This observed trend is in line with findings from surveys conducted at the national level and corresponds with a long-term decline in social trust reported by Italian respondents.

- Over the past twenty years, Italy has experienced a fast increase in the size of its migrant population, particularly in the 1990s. This development has repeatedly led to social tensions that have manifested in a series of incidents targeting members of minority groups. With respect to the Italian policy environment as captured by MIPEX scores, the past decade has seen a mix of both increases and their reversals.

- Italian recovery in the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis has been particularly weak and the Northern League earned strong support in elections held in its midst. However, this connection should not be overestimated since neither weak performance of the Italian economy nor strong support for the Northern League are phenomena confined to the most recent years. Interestingly, the Northern League’s performance in the government has not always been consistent with its anti-immigrant rhetoric, suggesting it may be necessary to conceptually differentiate between anti-immigrant and anti-immigration attitudes.

Figure 4-9 below shows a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance plotted against level of social trust and electoral support for the Northern League.
Figure 4-9. Italy – timeline 1

Figure 4-10 shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators.

Figure 4-10. Italy – timeline 2

Where available, EVS data for Italy show that the biggest increase in expressed intolerance occurred in the period between 1981 and 1990. In the 1990s, the upward trend
continued, albeit at a much slower pace.\textsuperscript{66} Between 1999 and 2008, the growth in expressed intolerance stopped, with the exception of attitudes towards two groups – Muslims and ‘Gypsies’. ‘Gypsies’, as in other Western European countries, are the target of by far the highest level of expressed intolerance. This long-term growth in expressed intolerance, even though less pronounced between 1999 and 2008, coincided with a decline in the levels of expressed social trust. In 2008, only slightly over 30 per cent of Italian respondents felt other people can be trusted, rendering Italian values low in comparative European terms.

Data collected via surveys at the national level, though regrettably covering a period only until 2002, confirm only some of the trends presented above (Bonifazi, 2006). The proportion of respondents who felt that there are too many foreigners living in Italy increased sharply in the late 1980s, followed by gradual decline over the next decade. Similarly, the proportion of Italian respondents who agreed with the statement that there is no place for immigrants in Italy rose over between 1987 and 1997, only to decrease over the following five years. One indicator that remained relatively constant across all survey waves was the proportion of respondents who thought that an increase in the number of immigrants leads to the spread of crime and terrorism.

Italy became a country of immigration in the late 1980s, with rapid growth in numbers entering the country from the early 1990s onwards. In fact, in 2007, there were nearly four times as many foreigners living regularly in Italy than in 1992 (Finotella and Sciortino, 2009). As a share of total population, the proportion of foreign citizens living in Italy increased from around 4 per cent in 1998 to over 7 per cent in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012).

The growing settlement of immigrants has gradually led to social tensions, especially in large cities and southern agricultural areas. To name a few incidents, a black labourer Jerry Essan Masslo was murdered in 1989 in a tomato-farming area near Naples. In 2008, following attacks against Roma settlements near Naples, a state of emergency was declared in three Italian regions. Other attacks took place in 2010 targeting seasonal migrant workers in a small Calabrese town. In 2011, a man with links to extreme right opened fire on street vendors of Senegalese origin in Florence, killing two.

Against the backdrop of rising migrant population in Italy, MIPEX scores show some improvement between its first and second editions in 2004 and 2007. However, some of the improvements achieved earlier in the 2000s were reversed under the Berlusconi IV government, which assumed office in 2008. For instance, the 125/2008 law changed the Italian Penal Code, making it possible to deport a foreigner or expel an EU citizen in cases where he/she was found guilty of a crime that could carry a sentence longer than two years. The 94/2009 law introduced further restrictions on the Italian migration and integration policy in the following ways: 1) it made it a crime to be an undocumented migrant; 2) it increased the time migrants and asylum-seekers may be held in detention for administrative purposes from two to six months; 3) it increased requirements and costs associated with residency and citizenship acquisition and family reunion; 4) it created an obligation to show a valid residency permit for all civil acts, such as birth registration; 5) it obliged money transfer agencies to report clients without a residency permit.

\textsuperscript{66} Levels of expressed intolerance against homosexuals even decreased during that period.
Italy’s economic performance in the aftermath of the current financial and economic crisis was weak in comparison with other European countries. The GDP contraction of 5.5 per cent in 2009 was not too dissimilar from other countries; however, the recovery has been slow and Italy’s GDP contracted for six consecutive quarters beginning in mid-2011. At the same time, it should be noted that the Italian economy underperformed even before the crisis, with very slow growth in the early 2000s. Similarly, despite the recent rise in unemployment, the overall rate is still within one percentage point of what it was during the recession of the early 1990s.

In the most recent European Parliament election, held in 2009 at the height of the economic crisis, the populist Northern League earned over 10 per cent of the popular vote. This is similar to levels of support in the early 1990s, which were followed by a decrease between 1999 and 2006. Despite its anti-immigrant rhetoric, the Northern League as a government coalition partner presided over the largest regularisation programme in Italian history, suggesting it may have evolved from an anti-immigration party to an anti-immigrant one (Finotella and Sciortino, 2009).

The box below presents a discussion of a local intervention to reduce intolerance, aiming to support the integration of immigrant businessmen. In doing so, the intervention is instrumental in building trust between local and immigrant communities, a factor found to be associated with intolerant attitudes (see Section 3.1.4).
Example of a local-level intervention to reduce intolerance – “Spinner Project – supporting the integration of small Chinese businesses in Bologna”

From 2000 to 2006, a local consortium of research and development groups (Consorzio Spinner) supported the integration of the growing Chinese community in Bologna, and assisted Chinese entrepreneurs with the regularisation of their business practices in compliance with the Italian labour laws (regarding, for instance, working hours or health and safety conditions) (Cities of Migration, 2013b). This EU-funded project67 hence aimed to support small ethnic businesses, particularly within the textile industry, enhancing the social and economic integration of these communities – the perception that Chinese-owned firms were not respecting EU or Italian labour standards tended to be understood as unfair competition by the local population, leading to divisions within the communities (Mitzman, 2006). The Chinese population in the Emilia Romagna region has been growing over the last decade or so, with a substantial presence in the textile and fashion industry – a strategic area of the region’s economy.68 However, the levels of integration and interaction with the Italian community remained rather low. In order to overcome this barrier, Spinner adopted a long-term intervention plan, training Chinese intercultural mediators to establish contact with different companies, offering to assist with the necessary documentation and regularisation process. Through the consortium’s activities, the Spinner team contacted 390 Chinese entrepreneurs, visited 187 firms, trained 167 Chinese entrepreneurs, and delivered 70 consulting services. Furthermore, Spinner published and distributed a “Handbook for the transition to the regular and formal system” – a bilingual manual (Chinese/Italian) with comprehensive guidelines regarding the business practices in Italy (fiscal and contract law, health and safety, banking, etc) (Eurofound, 2009). This was complemented by the broadcasting, on local stations, of radio programmes in Chinese, covering a range of aspects of working life in Italy.

The initiative yielded very positive results, improving both business practices and helping develop a stronger bond between the Italian and Chinese communities – trust building was a crucial element of this strategy (Eurofound, 2009). In 2006, the Spinner Project was selected as a ‘Best Practice’ initiative by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), and by the Dubai Municipality in receiving the 2006 Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment (DIABP). The DIABP is awarded based on the assessment of an independent committee of technical experts, which identifies ‘good’ and ‘best’ practices, using as key criteria the demonstration of “positive and tangible impact on improving the living environment of people, particularly the poor and disadvantaged” (Government of Dubai, 2008).

Box 6. Example of an Italian intervention to reduce intolerance

4.1.6 The Netherlands

Key points

- Data available from the EVS show a marked increase in intolerance between 1999 and 2008. This was a reversal of a previous downward trend, which offset any gains registered pre-1999. However, this trend is not fully supported by data collected through surveys conducted at the national level, which in several instances showed an opposing sequence of trends in intolerant attitudes. Also, the rise in intolerance

67 The Spinner project was funded both by the European Social Fund and by the Regione Emilia Romagna during a 30-month period (2001–2003). Due to the positive results of this initiative, the funding was extended to 2006.

68 According to Cities of Migration, between 2000 and 2005 the Chinese population in the Emilia Romagna region registered an annual average increase of 20 per cent. Furthermore, the Chinese Textile Community (CTC) had a similar growth in order to aid the booming industry.
observed in EVS is contrasted with patterns of rising social trust among Dutch respondents.

- From a policy perspective, the Netherlands has officially undergone a shift away from multiculturalism towards greater efforts at assimilation over the past two decades. Several notable events occurred during the period of this transition and may have played a role in the process. These include, among others, high-profile murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, and the so-called Scheffer debate. In its current form, Dutch integration policy is scored by MIPEX as above average in comparative European terms.

- Over the studied period, several populist political parties achieved large electoral gains, although these have generally failed to sustain themselves and were followed by significant losses or, in the case of LPF, eventual disintegration. This suggests that contextual factors may be more important for explaining the support for extremist parties than underlying intolerant sentiments.

Figure 4-11 below shows a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance plotted against level of social trust and electoral support for the Centre Democrats, Pim Fortuyn List and the Dutch Freedom Party.

![Figure 4-11. The Netherlands - timeline 1](image)

Figure 4-12 shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators.
Survey data show that intolerance expressed against all major ethnic, national or racial groups in the Netherlands followed the same pattern. Levels of intolerance decreased in the 1990s, followed by an increase during the subsequent decade. The reversal that occurred between 1999 and 2008 was large enough to offset all previous gains. As a result, the proportion of respondents who expressed negative attitudes in 2008 was higher than that in 1990. As in other Western European countries, ‘Gypsies’ are the target of the highest levels of expressed intolerance. Unlike in other Western European countries, though, the level of trust among survey respondents rose over the entire study period, even as levels of expressed intolerance were also on the rise between 1999 and 2008. Admittedly, the upward trend in levels of trust slowed notably during this period.

However, the rising trend in the 2000s observed in the EVS data is not fully supported by surveys conducted at the national level. For instance, Gijsberts and Lubbers (2009) found that while the proportion of Dutch respondents who had a positive view of Muslim contribution to Dutch society did decline between 1998 and 2004, it rose over the following four years almost to the level reported in 1998. Also, the proportion of Dutch respondents who thought that most foreigners in the Netherlands had already adapted to Dutch society or would do so soon rose between 2002 and 2006, reversing earlier declines between 1996 and 2002. These changes occurred concurrently with events such as the debate triggered by Paul Scheffer’s essay *The Multicultural Drama*, the emergence of Pim Fortuyn and his assassination by an environmental activist in 2002 and the assassination of film producer Theo van Gogh by an Islamist assailant in 2004.

From a demographic perspective, available data suggest the share of immigrants has remained relatively constant over the past decade and a half. The proportion of foreign citizens residing in the Netherlands stayed under 5 per cent of the entire population (Eurostat, 2012) and the proportion of foreign-born residents, generally somewhat above double that of foreign citizens, rose only slightly from 10.1 per cent in 2000 to 11.1 per cent in 2009 (OECD, 2012).
In policy terms, during the 1990s institutional integration of migrants progressed well, but Entzinger (2006) reports there was a perception that migrants were not integrating sufficiently in terms of their cultural orientation. In response, the official Dutch position shifted in the 1990s from multiculturalism to assimilation. Language tuition and other services were mainstreamed in a shift from support for group needs and identity to promoting individual identity (Vasta, 2007). In other words, institutional participation was no longer enough as an objective, but immigrants were also expected to behave in line with Dutch habits (Entzinger, 2006). More recently, according to MIPEX, the overall migration and integration policy background between 2004 and 2010 remained roughly constant, with the Netherlands achieving consistently above average scores in comparison with its EU peers. That said, there were several notable developments. For instance, the situation regarding access to nationality was changed markedly as the same test now applies for long-term residence and naturalisation. This means long-term residents do not need to sit the test again and integration classes now prepare candidates for citizenship (Huddleston et al., 2011a).

The Netherlands has weathered the current economic crisis with somewhat mixed results. The drop in output it experienced in 2009 was small in comparison with other Western European countries and, perhaps even more importantly, there has not been a very significant rise in unemployment in the aftermath of the crisis, as the overall rate has stayed below 6 per cent. At the same time, the recovery has been fairly weak and the country slid back into recession in 2012.

In this context, the populist Dutch Freedom Party won over 15 per cent of the popular vote in the 2010 general election and became the third biggest party in the country, in an apparent manifestation of sizable popular approval of its anti-immigrant rhetoric (Traynor, 2010). However, big electoral gains of populist and extremist parties in the Netherlands have historically failed to sustain themselves over the longer term. The best electoral result by a populist party ever, List Pim Fortuyn’s 17 per cent in the 2002 general election, was not repeated one year later when the party lost two-thirds of its support and disintegrated several years later. Similarly, the Freedom Party’s 2010 results were not replicated in the 2012 election, which saw it lose over 5 percentage points of its support and nearly 40 per cent of its seats in the Dutch parliament. This suggests that rather than reflecting broad intolerant sentiments, support for populist parties may be to some degree dependent on contextual factors and one-off events, such as Fortuyn’s assassination in LPF’s case or anxiety and frustration stemming from the financial crisis and proposed EU-level solutions in the case of PVV.

The box below presents an overview of an intervention to reduce intolerance implemented at the local level. Its activities aim to improve cultural exchange between immigrant neighbourhoods and their visitors. This is related to a few factors found to be associated with intolerance – namely out-group contact and reduction in perceived cultural threat (see Section 3.1.4).
**Example of a local-level intervention to reduce intolerance – “City Mondial – colourful neighbourhoods”**

City Mondial is a not-for-profit multicultural tourist information centre established in 2002 in The Hague. Financed by the local government, City Mondial is responsible for the execution of the city marketing policy. The organisation is focused on the promotion of the so-called ‘colourful neighbourhoods’: Transvaal, Stationsbuurt, China Town and Schilderwijk (City Mondial, 2013). These are neighbourhoods with a strong international composition (more than 80 per cent of the population are of non-Dutch ethnicity) and which struggle with problems concerning working and living conditions, integration and safety (Cities of Migration, 2013c). City Mondial helps develop the economic vitality of these neighbourhoods and aims to attract new tourists – the key target group is those visiting the city for a day or weekend who want to go beyond the classic tourist highlights. The organisation engages with local businesses and offers a range of programmes, such as walking tours of the city, introducing visitors and residents to the city’s diverse background and encouraging them to experience the culture of the different ethnic groups and more than 120 nationalities living in The Hague. By doing so, the organisation tries to put these ‘colourful neighbourhoods’ on the map, as an attractive environment to potential inhabitants, tourists and companies.

Whilst no evaluation of the programme has yet been conducted, the positive role played by City Mondial has been highlighted by the city’s Department of Urban Development, in the context of the proposal on the “City marketing vision” 2011–2015 (DenHaag.nl, 2013), which foresees the programme to continue. Furthermore, there are indications of an increase in the number of tourists visiting the ‘colourful neighbourhoods’, as well as in the number of participants in the organisation’s activities (Cities of Migration, 2013c).

**Box 7. Example of a Dutch intervention to reduce intolerance**

### 4.1.7 Spain

**Key points**

- Data from the EVS show that expressed intolerance generally increased in the 1980s, remained constant in the 1990s and then declined in the 2000s. An exception to this trend is intolerance against Muslims, which increased between 1999 and 2008. Spain belongs to a small group of countries where intolerance against ‘Gypsies’ declined, even though, as in all other countries, its absolute level remained higher than that of any other group. Surveys conducted at the national level do not, however, uniformly support the findings from the European level and present a more ambiguous picture of trends in intolerant attitudes.

- Spain has seen one of the most dramatic inflows of migrants of all European countries as a proportion of its total population, even though the rising trend has largely stopped with the coming of the economic crisis. In this context, Spanish migration and integration policy, as scored by MIPEX, has recorded increases across the board. At the same time, possibly in response to anxieties exacerbated by the economic crisis, Spain restricted access to its labour market for Romanian workers in 2011.

- The repercussions of the economic crisis in Spain have been severe, most clearly exemplified by an unemployment rate exceeding 20 per cent. Remarkably, this has not translated in an increased support for extremist and xenophobic political groups. If there has been any impact of the crisis in terms of changing patterns of electoral support, the main beneficiaries appear to have been regional separatists.
Figure 4-13 below shows a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance plotted against level of social trust. No populist or extremist party is successful at the national level in Spain.

![Figure 4-13. Spain – timeline 1](image)

Figure 4-14 shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators.

![Figure 4-14. Spain – timeline 2](image)

Data from surveys conducted at the European level show the following trends. Levels of expressed intolerance in Spain generally increased in the 1980s, stayed relatively constant in the 1990s and subsequently declined between 1999 and 2008. An exception to this rule
is attitudes towards Muslims, which grew more intolerant between 1999 and 2008, a period spanning the Atocha bombings in March 2004. In comparative terms, the proportion of respondents who expressed intolerant attitudes in Spain across all EVS rounds is low by Western European standards. Spain ranks among the few Western European countries where attitudes towards ‘Gypsies’ have improved over the lifetime of the EVS. Overall levels of expressed social trust remained relatively stable, with a slight increase in the 1990s followed by a very small decrease in the next decade.

Surveys conducted at the national level, however, do not always support the findings presented above. On one hand the proportion of respondents who felt that immigration was a positive phenomenon for Spain increased between 1995 and 2010. On the other, over the same time period, there was an increase in the proportion of respondents who felt there were too many foreigners currently in Spain (Cea D’Ancona and Valles Martinez, 2011; Centro de Investigaciones Sociolgicas, 2013a). In addition, the proportion of respondents who found immigration to be one of the three principal problems for Spain increased substantially over the 2000s, only to start decreasing towards the late 1990s levels at the beginning of the current economic crisis (Centro de Investigaciones Sociolgicas, 2013b).

Against the backdrop of rising tolerance, MIPEX policy indicators show increases in several areas between its second and third iterations in 2007 and 2010, respectively. This trend is to a large extent attributable to the enactment of the Immigration Law 2/2009, which had ramifications in numerous aspects of Spain’s integration policy. It enabled immediate labour market access to reunited families of migrants with the aim of increasing labour participation of spouses and adult children and discouraging illegal work. It gave former international students better eligibility for long-term residence by opening a possibility for former students trained for its labour market to settle in Spain. The law also strengthened the protection of political liberties for undocumented migrants. Yet, some areas in need of further work persist. For instance, in 2009, Spain set up the Council for the Promotion of Equal Treatment of All Persons without Discrimination on Grounds of Racial or Ethnic Origin to assist victims of discrimination and collect data on complaints. However, it has been said that the body is not independent and remains critically weak and little known by the public (Huddleston et al., 2011b). In a separate development, Spain reintroduced in 2011 transitional measures regulating the access of Romanian workers to the Spanish labour market.

In demographic terms, Spain has seen a massive rise in its immigrant population over the past decade and a half, even though the upward trend has almost levelled off with the coming of the economic crisis. The proportion of foreign citizens as a share of total population rose from under 2 per cent in 1998 to over 12 per cent in 2011 (Eurostat,

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69 There was a minor difference in the response options offered to respondents over time. In the 1990s, the options regarding the impact of immigration were ‘rather positive’, ‘rather negative’, and ‘neither positive nor negative’. In the 2000s, the options were ‘very positive’, ‘positive’, ‘negative’, ‘very negative’ and ‘neither positive nor negative’.

70 The wording of response options differed slightly over time. In the 1990s, the options regarding the opinion on the number of immigrants in Spain were ‘insufficient’, ‘quite a few but not too many’, and ‘excessive’. In the 2000s, the option ‘quite a few but not too many’ was split in two: ‘fair’ and ‘high’.
2012). Similarly, the share of foreign-born, as a rule of thumb about two percentage points higher than that of foreign nationals, almost tripled between 2000 and 2009 (OECD, 2012).

The current financial and economic crisis has hit Spain very hard. As in almost all European countries, Spanish output fell in 2009, and Spanish recovery has been very weak. The economy was still in recession in 2010 and is projected to slide back in 2012 and 2013. There has been a dramatic rise in the unemployment rate to over 20 per cent. While this combination of very high unemployment and decrease in output is not unprecedented in Spanish modern history – a similar occurrence took place in the early 1990s – the prolonged nature of the current economic problems is unique.

Historically, Spain has been characterised by the absence of a strong extremist, xenophobic or populist political party (Veugelers and Magnan, 2005; Swank and Betz, 2003; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2011). Remarkably, even the economic slump does not appear to have resulted in an uptick in support for such political groups. The economic downturn appears to have invigorated separatist tendencies in Spanish regions and produced a protest movement of the ‘indignados,’ but neither can be considered as associated with a rise in intolerance (Garcia de Blas, 2012). That said, there have been incidents of extremist violence in Spain, for instance a murder of a Dominican immigrant by members of a neo-Nazi group in Madrid in 1992 and a murder of a young student by a neo-Nazi activist in Madrid in November 2007.

Below follows a brief discussion of a national Spanish policy to improve the integration of the country’s Roma population. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, Roma are the target of the highest levels of expressed intolerance of all studied minority groups. Therefore, they are likely to benefit substantially from the existence of policies aimed at supporting their integration as it is related to cultural factors associated with intolerance, such as out-group contact and perception of cultural/ethnic threat (see Section 3.1.4).
Example of a national-level intervention to reduce intolerance – “Integrating Roma population”
The European Commission adopted in 2011 an EU Framework for national Roma integration strategies (European Commission, 2011b) with a view to improving the situation of Roma within the EU. The Framework was built upon four fundamental policy areas, addressing access to education, employment, healthcare and housing and is expected to contribute to substantial progress in the field by 2020. The EU has laid down the commitment to coordinate the national efforts and support inclusion policies with several EU funds, namely the Social and Structural Funds (European Commission, 2011b). Within this context, all member states have recently elaborated a set of policy measures to be implemented at the national level. Spain has been particularly engaged in the development of a national plan for Roma integration and some of the specific interventions put forward in its National Strategy (Government of Spain, 2012), especially with regards to education and access to employment, have been highlighted by the European Commission as good practice (European Commission, 2012). One such measure is the launch of new mediation programmes aimed at tackling early school leaving and absenteeism, intended to increase the academic success of Roma pupils. The specific objective is to reduce early school absenteeism in primary education to 15 per cent by 2015 and to 10 per cent by 2020. Furthermore, Spain has also issued an Action Plan for the development of Roma people (Government of Spain, 2010), setting out the allocated funding for the implementation of the various interventions. A follow up review and evaluation of the Plan is foreseen and was envisaged to take place by the end of 2012, this target, however, was not met.

Box 8. Example of a Spanish intervention to reduce intolerance

4.1.8 The United Kingdom

Key points

- In the majority of cases, levels of expressed intolerance decreased across all waves of EVS. The only exception to this trend is intolerance express toward people of different race and immigrants, both of which increased in the 1990s. ‘Gypsies’ are the target of the highest levels of expressed intolerance; however, the United Kingdom is among the few Western European countries where intolerance expressed against this group decreased. Data obtained at the national level lend only limited support to the trends observed at the European level.

- The policy environment showed signs of a gradual move towards greater restrictions on immigration over the past decade. The biggest reason for this was the adoption of the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act, which introduced greater obstacles to long-term residence and access to nationality through the concept of ‘earned citizenship’. The current coalition government decided not to go ahead with the scheme but nevertheless professed its commitment to impose strict limits on immigration flows.

- The current financial and economic crisis produced a drop in British economic output similar to that of other Western European countries. By contrast, however, British recovery has been particularly weak as the economy dipped repeatedly in the years immediately following the outbreak of the crisis and inflation has been high in comparative European terms. Notwithstanding some successes in European elections,

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71 The EU framework for Roma integration is incorporated within the EU’s 2020 strategy for a new growth path.
the economic hardship has failed to translate into significant political support for extremist and populist parties at the national level.

Figure 4-15 below shows a timeline of trends in self-reported intolerance plotted against level of social trust and electoral support for the British National Party.

![Figure 4-15. The United Kingdom – timeline 1](image)

Figure 4-16 shows the development of three selected survey questions (different race, Muslim, immigrant) against the backdrop of main economic and demographic indicators.

![Figure 4-16. The United Kingdom – timeline 2](image)
In the majority of cases, levels of expressed intolerance decreased across all waves of EVS. The only exception to this trend is intolerance expressed toward people of different race and immigrants, both of which increased in the 1990s. Subsequently, whereas expressed intolerance against people of different race decreased in the 2000s much below levels observed in 1990, attitudes against immigrants remained constant. As in all other countries, ‘Gypsies’ are the target of highest levels of expressed intolerance; however, the United Kingdom is among the few Western European countries where intolerance expressed against this group decreased between the two EVS waves that included this question (1999 and 2008). Levels of expressed trust decreased significantly during the 1990s, coinciding with the only observed increases in expressed intolerance. In the subsequent decade, levels of social trust recovered some of the lost ground and grew to slightly above 40 per cent, which nevertheless remains roughly average in the European context.

Data obtained at the national level lend only limited support to the trends observed at the European level. In line with rising levels of intolerance against immigrants recorded in the 1990s, the British Attitude Survey shows that the proportion of respondents with negative views of immigration grew steadily from 1995 onwards. In contrast with findings from the EVS, this growth did not level-off at the turn of the century and continued until 2008. Afterwards, the share of respondents who perceived immigration as a negative phenomenon decreased somewhat between 2008 and 2011 (Park et al., 2012). This represents a particularly useful finding not only because it provides data on a time period not covered by the EVS but also because it provides insight into what the trends in intolerance have been in a significantly deteriorated economic environment.

The policy environment, measured by MIPEX indicators, showed signs of gradual decline over the three iterations of the index. In particular, between the second and third editions of the index, the United Kingdom fell more points than any other included country. Still, even after the decrease British migration and integration policy scores remained slightly above average in comparative terms. The principal reason for this drop was the adoption of the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act, which introduced limits on long-term residence and access to nationality. Under the provisions envisaged in the Act, applicants for long-term residence could be delayed for several years as ‘probationary citizens.’ A points-based system of obtaining citizenship would be introduced in 2011, whereby non-EU residents would have to demonstrate they have ‘earned’ their citizenship. In the end, the coalition government formed in 2010 decided not to go ahead with the scheme, even though it declared its intention to introduce a cap on non-EU immigration. There have also been positive policy developments in the United Kingdom over the past decade, predominantly in the area of anti-discrimination. In 2006, the Equality Act created a single equality body, the Equality and Human Rights Commission. Anti-discrimination protections were further boosted by the 2010 Equality Act, which extended protections against discrimination and streamlined existing equality law.

Available data show that the United Kingdom has seen a steady rise in its immigrant population. The proportion of foreign citizens as a share of total population almost doubled from slightly below 4 per cent in 1998 to over 7 per cent in 2011 (Eurostat, 2012). The upward trend appears to have continued even after the outset of the economic crisis, though at a somewhat reduced pace. Similarly, the share of foreign-born residents,
generally roughly four percentage points above that of foreign citizens, grew from slightly below 8 per cent in 2000 to above 11 per cent in 2009 (OECD, 2012).

The current financial and economic crisis produced a drop in British economic output similar to that of other Western European countries. By contrast, however, British recovery has been particularly weak as the economy dipped repeatedly in the years immediately following the outbreak of the crisis. There has been a rise in unemployment of more than two percentage points compared to pre-crisis levels. The current overall unemployment rate is roughly in line with many other Western European countries; however, the impact of the crisis on British population has been aggravated by an inflation rate that is high in comparative European terms.

Historically, the United Kingdom has been marked by the absence of a politically significant extreme right (Joppke, 2004). This observation has been challenged by the surge in popularity of the British National Party, which managed to win over 6 per cent of the popular vote in the 2009 European elections and thus gained a seat at the European Parliament. However, it appears that BNP electoral results at the European level (the party also won almost 5 per cent of the vote in 2004) fail to spill over to British parliamentary elections. Indeed, in 2010 (ie one year after it won its first EP seat) the party saw its support reduced by more than two thirds and received less than 2 per cent of the vote.

The box below presents an overview of an intervention to reduce intolerance, initially undertaken at the local level and now rolled out nation-wide. It consists of a mentoring scheme for refugees with the aim to support their integration into the British society. This goal is related to cultural factors associated with intolerance such as out-group contact (see Section 3.1.4).
Example of an originally local-level intervention to reduce intolerance – “Time Together – a mentoring programme to help integrate refugees”

“Time Together” is a mentoring initiative set up by TimeBank in 2002, following a White Paper from the Government recommending the development of mentoring and befriending schemes. It aims to support refugees in the UK, by addressing a number of day-to-day challenges associated with integration. The programme has particularly focused on nine key dimensions, namely: English language, confidence, employment, education, isolation, UK culture, familiarity with the local area, volunteering, and access to services (Cities of Migration, 2013e)\(^\text{72}\). Time Together thus supports refugees on a range of practical issues, and is based on a one-on-one learning process between mentor and mentee. Both mentors and mentees undergo separate training, adjusted according to their roles in the programme, and become familiar with the concept of mentoring. Mentors and mentees are then matched taking into account their profiles, needs and expectations. The programme coordinator contributes to this process, supervising the matching stage and ensuring that the mentor-mentee pair is appropriate and committed to the initiative.

In 2005, after three years of running the programme, Time Together received funding from the Home Office and the HM Treasury Invest to Save Budget to implement the programme nationwide – 24 projects are now being implemented across the country (Cities of Migration, 2013e). A 2007 evaluation of the programme has further pointed out the positive impacts yielded by ‘Time Together’ in facilitating the integration of refugees\(^\text{73}\). In the course of the evaluation, 30 mentoring pairs from six different locations were selected and interviewed at the start of the programme, six months later and finally one year after joining the mentoring scheme. Furthermore, the evaluation team conducted two focus groups with other mentors and mentees. According to its findings, “in three-quarters of cases, mentors successfully enhanced integration in terms of offering practical help and advice relevant to everyday life, building confidence, and contributing to English language improvement” (Esterhuizen, 2007).

\(^{72}\) http://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/time-together-mentoring-for-daily-life/

\(^{73}\) http://www.timetogether.org.uk/TT_report_online.pdf
CHAPTER 5  Conclusions and implications

This chapter summarises the findings presented in the report in the form of eight concluding points. Based on these conclusions, the research team developed a set of seven policy considerations, which are intended to serve as a starting point for discussion about policy interventions. Finally, the chapter concludes by suggesting a list of areas that would benefit from further research to improve the existing evidence base on intolerance and ways of increasing tolerance and respect.

5.1 Conclusions

Trends in expressed intolerance vary across countries and over time
An analysis of European survey data revealed there are no discernible uniform trends in levels of intolerance that hold across countries and over time. In some countries, intolerance against most groups has risen over the past three decades, in others it has decreased. In some it has decreased and then rebounded. This wide variation does not seem to be related to the absolute level of intolerance – observed trends varied both among countries with high levels and among countries with low levels of intolerance.

Trends in expressed intolerance also vary towards different groups
Across all Western European countries and of all minority groups included in the study, the highest levels of intolerance (in absolute terms) are expressed against ‘Gypsies’. What is more, intolerance against ‘Gypsies’ has also been the most likely to have risen recently. The second highest levels of intolerance are mostly expressed against Muslims. This type of intolerance has also been the second most likely to have increased. Conversely, levels of intolerance expressed against Jews were on average the lowest of all groups.

Trends vary within individual countries and their specific political, demographic, economic and policy contexts, without a clear discernible pattern to this variation
A more detailed assessment of eight Western European countries did not reveal consistent patterns and trends in expressed intolerance. In fact, there is wide variety in how intolerant attitudes (and support for extremist and populist political parties) have evolved against the backdrop of economic, demographic and policy developments. In addition, a comparison between European-level surveys and national-level survey data often yielded conflicting pictures. As a result, it was not possible to identify a clear relationship between intolerant attitudes and any particular contextual factor(s) at the country level. This finding corresponds, to some extent, with findings from the literature review, which in several instances found stronger evidence of an association with intolerance for individual-level
factors (such as age and SES) than for macro-level factors (such as policy context or economic performance).

**Opinions and attitudes among Western European countries have moved apart**
In the majority of cases, opinions among individual Western European countries appear to have diverged over the course of the EVS. This finding is in line with the variability in intolerance trends presented above, and may simply be a result of the finding that intolerance has declined in some countries and simultaneously risen in others. Another possible explanation is that intolerance decreased more rapidly in countries with already relatively low levels of intolerance or, in the case of long-term increases, rose faster in countries with already relatively high levels of intolerance. Broken down by individual groups, the differences in attitudes between individual countries increased most with respect to intolerance expressed against people of different race. On the other hand, the distance between individual countries in terms of opinions of Jews and migrants has remained roughly constant.

**Evidence of association with intolerance is strong for some economic factors and much less so for others**
There is strong evidence that perception of economic threat and lack of macroeconomic prosperity (in an absolute, static sense) are associated with intolerant attitudes. A similarly strong evidence base exists for individual employment status as a factor; however, this evidence is not uniform. The evidence for dynamic macroeconomic factors, such as a country’s overall unemployment rate and GDP growth rate, is mixed. This suggests that while a country’s overall wealth is associated with levels of intolerance, we cannot conclude that dynamic factors, such as the negative growth and rising unemployment associated with the recent financial crisis, necessarily have a uniform effect on intolerance, at least in the short term. In addition, with respect to economic factors, it appears to be helpful and indeed necessary to distinguish between intolerance expressed against immigration and intolerance expressed against immigrants, with the former being somewhat less pronounced.

**There is strong evidence of an association between intolerance and demographic factors such as age, education and socio-economic class, but somewhat less strong an association between intolerance and personal income**
There is strong evidence that age is a factor associated with intolerance – in particular, that older people are more likely to express intolerant attitudes. The links between intolerance and education and between intolerance and socio-economic status are supported by equally strong evidence. Higher educational attainment has been found to be associated with lower levels of intolerance and lower social status was observed to be linked with increased intolerant attitudes. The evidence on personal income, while also generally strong, is not uniform. While according to the majority of studies reviewed income is associated with levels of intolerance, one study found income to be an insignificant factor in the Western European context.

**All socio-political factors examined in this study – citizenship regime, welfare state regime and political orientation – have been found to be associated with intolerant attitudes**
According to evidence from the literature review, there is a link between individual political orientation and expressed intolerance. Right-wing and conservative political
preferences have been found to be more likely to be associated with a less tolerant stance towards migration, difference and diversity. Available evidence, albeit based on a small number of studies, also suggests that welfare and citizenship regimes are associated with intolerance. Comprehensive welfare regimes were found to be associated with lower levels of intolerance while citizens of countries with more restrictive citizenship regimes tended to express more intolerant attitudes.

Cultural factors such as levels of social trust and contact with minorities are generally found to be associated with levels of intolerance; however, evidence for the role of out-group size is more mixed

According to available evidence from the literature review, lower levels of social trust are associated with intolerant attitudes. However, this finding is not fully borne out by survey data. There is also strong evidence available on out-group contact and perception of threat. Greater contact with members of minority groups was uniformly found to be associated with lower levels of intolerance. Based on similarly uniform findings, greater perception of threat was found to be associated with more intolerant attitudes. Evidence collected through country assessments and EVS data analysis supports these findings and suggests that perception of cultural threat may be more significant than perception of economic threat, which has also been found to be a factor associated with intolerant attitudes. On the other hand, available evidence on the association with the size of minority groups as a factor is inconclusive. Several studies included in the review found it to be associated with levels of intolerance whereas several others found no such link. In other words, it is impossible to conclude, for instance, whether large migrant populations are associated with higher levels of intolerance or not.

5.2 Emerging policy considerations

In this section we highlight a set of themes which build on findings from our research, and are intended to serve as a starting point for discussion about policy interventions and areas in need of future research in this field. These are organised into two groups. The first offers general high-level policy considerations while the second relates to the targeting of interventions.

5.2.1 High-level policy considerations

Policymakers should not assume that policy and investment in this area would lack public support

Given the nuanced picture of trends in intolerance emerging from this study, and the decreasing trend in expressed intolerance in some countries across the EU, policymakers may be wrong in assuming that policies which favour tolerance and integration will not be welcomed by the public. One trend worthy of note in this regard is the increasing recognition of the importance of teaching tolerance and respect.\(^74\) Against this backdrop, popular opinion appears to have moved in the direction of greater acceptance of

\(^74\) The proportion of respondents in the EVS study who felt it was important to teach children tolerance and respect grew almost 30 percentage points between the start of the survey in 1981 and its last wave in 2008. The proportion grew in every Western European country, with the exception of Germany, which was not included in the 1981 wave and where the share remained roughly constant at around 75 per cent.
immigration in some Western European countries. Evidence suggests this may have occurred in connection with the recognised need for migrant labour and skills (Pyrhönen and Creutz-Kämppi, 2010; Finotella and Sciortino, 2009). For instance, the proportion of respondents who felt that their respective country should admit foreign workers without any limits or ‘as long as there are jobs available’ rose between the 1999 and 2008 EVS waves in seven EU15 countries. This trend has not necessarily translated into greater tolerance towards those immigrants who arrive in receiving countries; in fact, in several instances these two attitudes have diverged notably. Nevertheless, it may represent an important foundation for greater support for official policies targeting intolerance, such as migration, integration and anti-discrimination measures. This means that even in instances where people’s attitudes towards immigrants do not necessarily grow more tolerant, the public may be receptive to facilitating the integration of migrants through official policies.

In line with this trend towards greater acceptance of immigration, there have been developments in the direction of less ‘restrictionist’ policies on migration and integration in some Western European countries, such as Denmark, Italy and Spain. As a consequence of these observed trends, it is possible that policymakers considering measures to combat intolerance and support integration of minority groups may meet less resistance than expected. In addition, in some instances, policies perceived as tolerant were passed by national governments that either included populist political parties or relied on their support, as was the case with regularisation waves in Italy that relied on (at least) tacit approval from the Northern League. Thus, extremist parties do not always act upon the intolerant stances on which they often campaign.

This is further supported by Eurobarometer data related to perceived sufficiency of existing anti-discrimination policies. Several Special Eurobarometer surveys focusing on discrimination asked respondents whether they felt enough effort was being made in their country to combat all forms of discrimination. Data are available for the period 2006–2009 and demonstrate that approximately half of respondents in EU27 countries consider efforts to fight discrimination in their countries to be insufficient. Over the three years covered by this question, the proportion of respondents who responded in the negative decreased in twelve EU15 countries and increased only in Austria and Greece. However, the change observed over time was not dramatic, as might be expected over such a short period of time, amounting on average to a drop of three percentage points.

75 For instance, the proportion of Finnish respondents who felt the country should receive more foreign workers increased between 1998 and 2007 (Jaakkola, 2009) while levels of expressed intolerance against immigrants rose between the 1999 and 2008 EVS waves.

76 MIPEX III noted that most countries’ scores recorded an increase, albeit very small, between 2007 and 2010, i.e. in the midst of the current economic crisis. Restrictive measures typically limit migrants’ opportunities to participate fully in society, for instance by denying them rights accorded to other residents such as labour market access.

77 It should be noted that the regularisation did not cover undocumented migrants.

78 SEB 263 (Jun/Jul 2006), SEB 296 (Feb/Mar 2008), SEB 317 (May/Jun 2009). Regrettably, this question was not repeated in the latest special edition covering discrimination – SEB 393 (Jun 2012).

79 The EU15 average is several percentage points lower than the EU27 one. Expressed as a sum of respondents who answered ‘no, not really’ or ‘no, definitely not.’
The tendency to emphasise the financial crisis as a driver of increasing intolerance requires more careful consideration

The current financial and economic crisis is often portrayed as associated with rising intolerance, particularly in light of the success of extremist political parties in some Western European countries. However, empirically there is evidence that the impact of the crisis on levels of intolerance is more varied than those portrayals suggest. Our literature review found insufficient evidence of a link between dynamic macroeconomic factors (such as GDP growth) and levels of intolerance, which may in part explain the greater variation in observed trends than the uniform nature of the economic downturn would suggest.80 A theory posited in the literature is that the crisis might have translated into rising expressed intolerance via microeconomic factors such as individual employment status (as more people become unemployed), but analysis of survey data does not uniformly bear this out. In fact, as wider financial and economic factors have risen up the public’s list of concerns, concern about areas that may be associated with self-reported intolerance, such as immigration, have if anything become less of a priority. As part of the Eurobarometer surveys, respondents have regularly been invited to name the two most important issues facing their country. An analysis of data from 2004 to 2012 shows that the perception of immigration as one of the most pressing policy problems has been declining.81 Taking all EU27 countries together (EU25 until 2006), the share of respondents who indicated immigration was among the two most important issues decreased from 13 per cent in 2004 to 8 per cent in 2012. When only EU15 countries were included, their unweighted average fell similarly from 14 per cent in 2004 to 9 per cent in 2012. When broken down individually, the extent of perceiving immigration as a problem fell in eight EU15 countries, rose in five and stayed the same in two. However, the observed increases were generally smaller than recorded decreases – the biggest increase (in France) amounted to four percentage points, while the biggest decline (in the United Kingdom) equalled 20 percentage points.

This observation may be partially attributable to the design of survey questions, which allow respondents to name a limited number of issues. In this context, the fact that a respondent does not mention immigration may simply mean that other issues have become more urgent rather than immigration ceasing to be seen as problematic. However, some survey data indicate that immigration may have become less of a concern even in absolute terms. For instance the British Attitudes Survey indicated that, despite the economic crisis, a smaller proportion of respondents had a negative opinion of immigration in 2011 than in 2008 (Park et al., 2012) with no conditional relationship connection to their opinions on other issues.

80 While the review indicated that static macroeconomic indicators such as overall national wealth are associated with levels of expressed intolerance, the economic crisis has not drastically altered Western European prosperity and would therefore not be expected to affect intolerance levels via this channel. The literature reviewed shows that affluent countries tend to be less intolerant than poorer ones and the crisis has not significantly decreased the wealth gap between Western Europe and other regions.

81 Where available, surveys conducted at the national level offer a similar picture. For example, the proportion of Spanish respondents who thought immigration is one of three principal problems facing the country declined almost 30 percentage points between 2007 and 2012 (Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, 2013b).
In addition, the literature review indicated that people’s sense of being culturally threatened is more strongly associated with levels of expressed intolerance than their perception of economic threat. This primacy of cultural threat is another reason why the potential impact of economic factors may be less than is generally assumed.82

The overall ambiguity in terms of potential impacts of the economic downturn is evident also in the policy domain. While there have been several instances of high-profile policies put in place that have been deemed intolerant of others on religious or ethnic grounds, such as the deportation of French Roma or full-face veil bans in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, it is unclear whether these represent a broad trend in the direction of greater policy restrictions. For instance, while MIPEX observed a slight overall lessening of restrictions between 2007 and 2010, Pew clearly identified a trend of rising restrictive policies with respect to ethnic and religious diversity.83

**Extremist voting does not appear to be strongly correlated with wider public attitudes – it is important to separate these analytically and empirically in order to understand the many facets of intolerance**

A review of existing literature indicates that at an individual level right-wing political orientation was associated with higher levels of expressed intolerance. However, an analysis of survey data indicates that in aggregate, at the country level, increased support for extremist or populist political parties does not always appear to be accompanied by an increase in expressed intolerance. That is, within several countries, the data show that intolerant attitudes do not correlate with extremist voting. This finding is not limited to far-right voting patterns and is applicable to instances of rising electoral support on either side of the political spectrum. In some countries (eg Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands) significant electoral support for extremist parties was indeed accompanied by rising levels of expressed intolerance. At the same time, in other countries (France, the United Kingdom, and Denmark) the two indicators moved in opposite directions. It is therefore important to analyse instances of rising support for extremist parties in their respective contexts.84 Support for extremist parties can rise for reasons other than increased levels of intolerance. At least in some cases, the popularity of intolerant political organisations and parties is likely to be due to factors not necessarily directly linked to immigrants and other minority groups, such as frustration at the perceived inability of mainstream political representatives to find an acceptable solution to the fiscal crisis in the Eurozone.85

82 This finding is also reflected in some survey data. For instance, in the 2002 ESS survey, a larger share of respondents from every surveyed European country were in favour of restrictionist policy in regard to immigration by people of different race/ethnic group from majority than by people of the same race/ethnic group.

83 It should be noted that the rise in restrictive policies observed by Pew is not uniform. For instance, in regard to the countries with the full-face veil ban, France’s measure of social hostility involving religion and Belgium’s government restriction score declined between 2007 and 2009 and France’s government restriction score declined between 2009 and 2010.

84 For an example of this type of work see Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2011).

85 For instance, a regression analysis of data available from the 2011 Finnish National Election Study indicated that people who expressed distrust in the EU and people who favour referendums for important national decisions were more likely to vote reluctantly for the True Finns rather than for someone else or abstain (Fieschi, Morris and Caballero, 2012).
With some notable exceptions, few evaluations of policy interventions are publicly available, especially at the national level

Evaluations of policy interventions in the field of migration, integration and anti-discrimination are rarely publicly available. Some notable exceptions exist, such as a study assessing the impact of the Racial Equality Directive in the area of employment (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010b) and regular evaluations of German national programmes in support of tolerance and diversity (Heitmeyer et al., 2009; Becker et al., 2009; Lawaert-Stiftung and Univation, 2012). Also, there are numerous smaller studies such as the evaluation of Time Together, a programme aiming to support refugee integration in the United Kingdom (Esterhuizen, 2007). However, evaluations are rarely mandated by funders of these types of programmes, highlighting the relative absence of an evaluation culture or a drive to identify best practices.86

There are likely to be several underlying reasons for the relative paucity of evaluations.87 Integration policies often cut across portfolios of several governmental departments. This overlap can be both horizontal (policies often involve multiple areas such as foreign affairs, justice and interior, employment, social affairs) and vertical (policies may span communities, local, regional, national and supranational bodies). As such, no one department or agency tends to be seen as accountable for immigration and integration and therefore responsible for funding and learning from evaluations, complicating the setting out of goals and objectives. As a result of this complexity, and the potential for conflicting goals and objectives for different relevant departments and agencies, designing appropriate performance indicators is a serious challenge. For interventions targeting expressed religious, ethnic and national intolerance, and thus aiming at influencing cultural and social phenomena, this challenge is compounded by the fact these domains do not have standard and widely accepted indicators, such as employment rate or educational attainment in the field of economic integration.

The cross-cutting nature of policy interventions means that even if clear indicators were agreed, attribution of impact is inherently difficult as the environment in which interventions are carried out is itself subject to constant change, and change which is likely to be largely out of the control of those implementing interventions. Consequently, evaluations that are performed often take the form of something more akin to activity reports than systematic assessments to inform policymakers’ options and decisions about future programmes or interventions. This kind of activity reporting is in contrast to official national and pan-European discourse around the need for more evidence-based policies, especially at a time when tight budgets must be carefully deployed to ensure value for money and effectiveness. In order to address this lacuna, those making decisions and policy in this area would benefit from considering evaluation an important component of policy interventions, embedded in their design and implementation. Doing so will help to build

86 A notable high-profile exception to this trend and an example of best practice is aforementioned the assessment of the impact of the Racial Equality Directive, which was built into the wording of the directive itself (Article 17). Another example of an evaluation that is currently under way and has been built in the design of the programme is the evaluation of the European Programme on Integration and Migration (EPIM).

87 For a discussion of some theoretical issues with policy evaluations in this field see, for instance, Ardittis and Laczko (2008) or Rinne (2012).
the evidence base for current and future decisions and expenditure and would improve clarity and transparency about the aims of and rationales behind policy choices.

5.2.2 Perspectives on targeted interventions

Young people represent a potentially important target for policy interventions as they are broadly the most tolerant, but are also most prone to taking on more radical views and may be particularly impressionable.

Young people represent a potentially important target for policy interventions. Indeed, a review of available research literature revealed a strong association between age and levels of expressed intolerance, whereby older people were significantly more likely to report intolerant attitudes. This relationship between age and expressed intolerance was confirmed in an analysis of available survey datasets, where the average level of self-reported intolerance among young people was consistently lower than that of their older counterparts. While it is important to assess whether this is an age effect or a cohort effect, either could indicate potential benefits of working with young people. If greater intolerance expressed by older people is an age effect, interventions could aim to capture the tolerance of youth and seek to ensure it is retained into later life. In the case of a cohort effect, policies could aim to ensure that new cohorts of young people start out with a tolerant, open attitude to others that can then be carried through as that cohort ages. Therefore, interventions targeting young people may help prevent this cohort from internalising intolerant attitudes. This is particularly important since, while being least likely to express intolerant attitudes, young people are most likely to be susceptible to adopting extremist views (Edelstein, 2003; Erikson, 1968; Erikson, 1959; Heitmeyer, 1995).

A large body of literature exists highlighting the role played by psychosocial risk factors in the development of adolescent problem behaviour, and the need to effectively address those to the extent possible (Jessor, 1991). In order to do so, a range of interventions have been designed, with positive results, in particular in relation to youth delinquency and the misuse of alcohol or drugs (Hawkins, Catalano and Miller, 1992). Whilst these prevention and support interventions seek to address a specific manifestation of risk behaviour in adolescence, such as alcohol and drug use or violent and anti-social behaviour, they may nevertheless be valuable instruments in informing the general framework of action to moderate the likelihood of discriminatory and intolerant adolescent behaviour. Moreover, survey data demonstrate that families and parents increasingly recognise the significance of interventions targeting young people. Indeed, the proportion of respondents in the EVS study who felt it was important to teach children tolerance and respect grew almost 30 percentage points between the start of the survey in 1981 and its last wave in 2008. The increase was most dramatic during the survey’s first decade, continued at a much slower pace during the 1990s and stalled in the 2000s. Broken down by individual countries, all saw an increase in the 1980s, eleven out of fourteen in the 1990s and only five out of fourteen in the past decade. However, while the growth appears to have stopped between 2000 and 2008, attitudes have not noticeably declined: the average unweighted share of

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88 An ANOVA of the 2008 EVS values for each country included in in-depth assessments indicated that differences in expressed levels of intolerance between various age groups were significantly different (p<.05) everywhere except for Finland and Spain.
respondents who agreed it was important to teach tolerance and respect declined by less than 0.2 percentage points and even in 2008 remained above 80 per cent.

**Intergroup contact can serve as an important shaper of tolerance, particularly in conjunction with certain situational factors**

Intolerant attitudes and behaviours appear to stem from both situational and personal factors, and may be reinforced by a perception of group competition and threat (Esses et al., 2005; Yzerbyt and Corneille, 2005). A review of the literature identified an overall association between greater levels of intergroup contact and lower levels of prejudice (Allport, 1954; Brown and Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008). In other words, according to Allport, getting to know people from another ethnic group appears to reduce intolerance towards that group. This is in line with findings based on the Eurobarometer data, which indicated that the migration is more likely to be perceived as a problem at the national level, rather than at the individual.

Nevertheless, there are complex dynamics in this contact-prejudice relationship. A number of studies have shown that a perception of intergroup competition or threat (which might arise from increased contact) may generate prejudice and intolerance toward minorities considered ‘out-groups’ (Esses et al., 2005). Put differently, when a minority group is perceived as too prominent, other group(s) may be more intolerant. Depending on the specific groups involved, findings on the effects of intergroup contact varied significantly in available research. Pettigrew and Tropp’s meta-analysis of 515 studies (2006), including responses from a total of 250,493 individuals in 38 countries, indicated that positive outcomes of intergroup contact were more likely to result from contact between heterosexuals and homosexuals, than from intergroup contact involving racial and ethnic groups, or between young people and the elderly. Contact between those with and without physical illness appeared to produce substantially smaller positive effects.

According to the existing literature, a number of facilitators may increase the likelihood that inter-group contact results in reduced intolerance (Allport, 1954). These facilitators provide valuable guidelines, which could be of use to policymakers in the design of future policy interventions. Firstly, a perception of equal group status tends to generate more positive intergroup attitudes. Additionally, when members of different groups are involved in doing something collaborative, sharing and pursuing a common goal, the results of that contact are usually more positive. Finally, the effects of contact tend to be greater when this contact is supported by law, custom or social institutions as these are likely to provide “norms of acceptance and guidelines for how members of different groups should interact

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89 We draw on the contact hypothesis, introduced and developed by Allport (particularly in his book, *The Nature of Prejudice*), which, in short, postulated that contact with members of a different gender, class, racial or ethnic group could help reduce prejudice towards that group. Allport’s ideas have been further developed in the past 50 years, having been described as “one of the most long-lived and successful ideas in the history of social psychology” (Brewer and Brown, 1988).

90 From 2009 onwards, Eurobarometer has broadened its question about the two biggest policy problems so that respondents were asked about issues they personally face, in addition to what their country faces. A comparison of the two questions shows that migration is generally perceived as a bigger problem for countries than for individuals. At the personal level, the extent to which immigration is viewed as an issue has decreased in a manner similar to that at the country level. However, since the baseline in 2009 was lower, the observed decrease was correspondingly less pronounced.
with each other” (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2005). For instance, Pettigrew and Tropp (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2005) alluded to the role played by authority sanction both in military as in religious contexts. The authors furthermore argued that the passage of civil rights legislation in America seemed to have boosted the establishment of wider anti-prejudicial norms. In Europe, the long-term impact of the Race Equality Directive, which entered into force in 2000, will be better understood pending the publication of the assessment of its impact in its core areas.

Although the presence of these situational factors seems to have a positive effect on contact between different groups, these are to be understood as influential facilitators and not as necessary conditions or as automatically entailing change (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2005). This means that intergroup contact may also be positive in the absence of these so-called facilitators. Nevertheless, from a policy perspective available evidence suggests that it is worth considering and exploring in greater detail the varying potential of intergroup contact, and developing policies tailored to features of the particular groups and circumstances. A closer examination of strategies to encourage intergroup relations would also be useful in order to develop a more complete understanding of the factors increasing and constraining intergroup competition and perceptions of both cultural and other perceived threats (Esses et al., 2005). Policymakers would thus benefit from systematic assessments of interventions in this field, which would then build the evidence base for the identification of best practices informing and helping improving future policy decisions.

Roma face the highest levels of expressed intolerance across all Western European countries, and represent a group that may benefit significantly from policy interventions aimed at reducing intolerance

While in Western European countries intolerant attitudes towards other minorities may have higher profile or attract greater interest, Roma face the highest levels of expressed intolerance of any minority group included in survey questions, and this holds true across all Western European countries. What is more, intolerance expressed against this minority group has grown in the vast majority of countries since it was included in the EVS set of questions in 1999.91 These high levels of self-reported intolerance against Roma are matched by reported experiences of discriminatory treatment on the part of Roma populations in Western Europe. In a pilot FRA survey (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2012),92 approximately half of Roma respondents reported that they had faced discrimination on the basis of their ethnic origin. The proportion in Western European countries ranged from slightly over 30 per cent in Spain to approximately 65 per cent in Italy, which was the highest of all included countries. In addition, the survey revealed generally low levels of awareness of the existence of anti-discrimination legislation. The proportion of respondents who knew about a law forbidding discrimination against ethnic

91 Intolerance against Roma grew in ten EU15 countries. Only intolerance against Muslims grew in an equally high number of instances over the same period of time.

92 The survey covered countries previously included in the 2009 EU-MIDIS survey focusing on Roma (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and added four Western European countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain) where no large scale comparative quantitative survey on the socio-economic situation of the Roma had been conducted before. The FRA plans to repeat the survey twice at the mid-term point and at the end of the Europe 2020 process.
minority people when applying for a job ranged from roughly 55 per cent in Italy (the highest of all included EU15 countries) to below 30 per cent in Greece (the lowest of EU15 countries).

Despite continuous efforts on the part of international organisations to elevate the profile of the situation of European Roma populations (UNDP, 2003; Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005; EUMC, 2006; Fundamental Rights Agency, 2009), Roma in Western Europe have been the target of numerous instances of intolerant policies. Examples include the French government’s decision in 2010 to deport hundreds of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, predominantly of Roma origins (BBC News, 2010b). Further, in 2008, the Italian government declared a state of emergency in relation to a crisis within “Nomadic camps” (used as a synonym for Roma settlements) and introduced legislation aiming to introduce stricter control over the presence of Roma groups in Italy (Simoni, 2010).93

In light of this context, there is strong potential for Roma populations to benefit from interventions to reduce intolerance expressed against this minority group. At the EU-level, there already exists a robust framework for interventions of this kind. In April 2011, the European Union introduced the EU Framework for national Roma integration strategies (European Commission, 2011a). The framework is now being followed up with national documents, which will be the main vehicle for policy implementation. As a result, the integration of Roma is firmly positioned within the Europe 2020 growth strategy and enjoys, at least in theory, political commitment of individual EU member states.

Still, success of national strategies and integration policies will be dependent on the availability of a solid evidence base. Further research is needed to gain better understanding of underlying mechanisms behind attitudinal and behavioural change, and to improve the ability to assess the efficiency and measure progress of policy implementation (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2012).

5.3 Areas for further research

This section presents an overview of areas and issues that would benefit from further research to improve the existing evidence base on intolerance and ways of increasing tolerance and respect. This would be of great use to a wide range of stakeholders: policymakers seeking to design interventions to reduce intolerance, practitioners in their efforts to implement adopted programmes and funders and NGOs in their decisions around how to best apply limited resources.

The suggestions below were generated in two ways. One set of areas for further research reflect the limitations of the scope of this study and as such raise issues that were not able to be addressed in the course of the research. They could shed further light on intolerant attitudes. The other set of areas for further research represent suggestions stemming from this study’s findings and conclusions. Given the challenges posed by the lack of empirical

93 The highest administrative court struck down accompanying legislative provisions on the basis of their unconstitutionality. However, this does not appear to have put an end official discriminatory practices as evidenced, for instance, by the forceful eviction of the Tor de’ Cenci settlement near Rome in September 2012 (Gazetta del Sud, 2012)
research in this area, underlying every topic listed below is the need to support the capability and capacity in empirical research in the area of combatting intolerance.

**Relationship between state and individual attitudes**
As discussed in the section on socio-political factors, policies concerning a country’s citizenship regime and welfare state have been found to be associated with intolerance. Further research might offer greater insight into the dynamics behind this relationship such as the direction of influence and the strength and mediators of the relationship. Related questions revolve around a potential role of the state in ‘legitimising’ or potentially generating intolerant attitudes and behaviours through the implementation of restrictive policies, and conversely the role governments can play in creating and reinforcing social norms of tolerance and respect.

**Implications of divergence/convergence of attitudinal data**
This study found that opinions and attitudes among Western European countries have largely diverged over the course of the EVS. Additional research might shed more light on the implications of this development for policies and interventions to reduce intolerance. Does greater diversity of opinion afford a greater window of opportunity to the extent that it sets a precedent for thinking differently and provides role models to learn from? Further, given the complexity of the issues at stake and the lack of clear patterns emerging with respect to some of the factors identified in our review, can we learn from a greater focus on systematically assessing factors from a broader range of possible areas (including some that may not yet have been studied) that may contribute to declining intolerance in some countries or against some groups and rising intolerance for others?

**Causality and strength of relationship between individual factors and intolerance**
This study found strong evidence of an association between intolerant attitudes and a subset of factors identified in our review. However, the data collected did not allow us to comment on either the strength or the direction of those relationships. Further research is needed to address these questions.

**Intolerance of intolerance**
Particularly given a trend towards increasing tolerance in some countries and a widespread view that tolerance and respect of others is important, intolerance may also be triggered by a perception of intolerance on the part of others, whether they are individuals, groups or institutions perceived as themselves being intolerant. In other words, being seen as expressing negative attitudes or behaviours towards certain groups may generate intolerance in return, of that intolerance. For example in some areas intolerant extremist groups face strong, overt criticism for their intolerance and counter-protests may be organised around their public gatherings. Similarly, when intolerance towards homosexuality has been declining and there are growing calls for gender equality, religious groups whose values run counter to these trends may also generate intolerance of their less tolerant values. Better understanding this dynamic could be informative for efforts to reduce intolerance.

**Other indicators of intolerance**
This study has examined intolerant attitudes expressed as part of longitudinal European surveys. As noted, developing a better understanding of how these attitudes relate to other
behavioural indicators of intolerance may be beneficial for better monitoring and understanding of the phenomenon.

**Addressing intolerance of Roma in Western Europe**

As discussed in the survey data findings and policy considerations, Roma are the target of the highest levels of expressed intolerance in all Western European countries. What is more, intolerance expressed against this group is also most likely to have risen over the time period explored in this study. Therefore, Roma stand to benefit substantially from further research that would inform policy interventions to reduce intolerance and improve social outcomes for this group. A comparative analysis of the situation in new and old member states, as well as a systematic assessment of where there may have been effective interventions and reductions in levels of intolerance, even if at local levels, may be particularly useful.

**Intolerance in Eastern Europe**

The geographic scope of this study was limited to Western European countries. An analysis of trends in intolerance in Eastern European countries might produce additional findings and lessons for relevant stakeholders. While the region is generally not as diverse as Western Europe, it has seen manifestations of intolerant attitudes and behaviours, especially in relation to its sizeable Roma populations.

**Intolerance between groups**

This study addressed primarily high-level intolerant attitudes, focusing on majority-minority relationships. Further research on relationships between minority groups, or even between minority and majority groups (and this relates back to intolerance of intolerance dynamics) could also lead to greater understanding of inter-group dynamics and where there may be useful points of intervention.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Literature review methodology

Databases and search terms
The literature review searched the following databases: EBSCO, IDEAS, Sociological Abstracts and Google Scholar. Search terms used are summarised in the tables below, organised by the database searched. There were multiple iterations of the searches in each of the databases to ensure a sufficiently broad scope while obtaining a manageable number of hits. Searches were limited to articles published in English between 2000 and 2012. As explained in Section 1.2.1, only studies on religious, ethnic, racial and sexual intolerance involving a cross-national analysis were selected for inclusion in the review.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A-1. EBSCO search terms</th>
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<tr>
<td>(marginalis* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR homosexual* OR gay OR lesbian OR islamophob* OR muslim OR semiti* OR race OR racial* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (increas* OR decreas* OR change OR growth OR rising OR reduce)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (compar*)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (character* OR socio* OR econ*)</td>
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<td>(discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (behav*)</td>
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<td>(discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (factor OR determinant OR associat* OR correlat*)</td>
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<td>(discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (policy OR legislat* OR initiative)</td>
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<th>Table A-2. IDEAS search terms</th>
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<td>(tolerance OR intolerance OR discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (increas* OR decreas* OR change OR growth OR rising OR reduce)</td>
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Table A-3. Sociological Abstracts search terms

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<tr>
<td>(tolerance OR intolerance OR discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (character* OR socio* OR econ*)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(tolerance OR intolerance OR discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (driver* OR factor OR determinant OR associat* OR correlat*)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(tolerance OR intolerance OR discriminat* OR exclusion) AND (Europe*) AND (migrant* OR immigrant* OR xenophob* OR homophob* OR gay OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*) AND (policy OR legislat* OR initiative)</td>
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<th>Search Terms</th>
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<tr>
<td>(tolerance OR intolerance) OR (discriminat* OR exclusion) OR prejudice*) AND KW=europe*) AND(KW=((migrant* OR immigrant*) OR (xenophob* OR homophob*) OR (homosexual* OR gay OR populis* OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*)))) AND (KW=((increas* OR decreas* OR change) OR (growth OR rising OR reduce)</td>
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<td>(tolerance OR intolerance) OR (discriminat* OR exclusion) OR prejudice*) AND KW=europe*) AND(KW=((migrant* OR immigrant*) OR (xenophob* OR homophob*) OR (homosexual* OR gay OR populis* OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*)))) AND (KW=compar*)</td>
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<td>(tolerance OR intolerance) OR (discriminat* OR exclusion) OR prejudice*) AND KW=europe*) AND(KW=((migrant* OR immigrant*) OR (xenophob* OR homophob*) OR (homosexual* OR gay OR populis* OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*)))) AND (KW=(character* OR socio* OR econ*))</td>
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<td>(tolerance OR intolerance) OR (discriminat* OR exclusion) OR prejudice*) AND KW=europe*) AND(KW=((migrant* OR immigrant*) OR (xenophob* OR homophob*) OR (homosexual* OR gay OR populis* OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*)))) AND (KW=(behav* OR attitude*))</td>
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<tr>
<td>(tolerance OR intolerance) OR (discriminat* OR exclusion) OR prejudice*) AND KW=europe*) AND(KW=((migrant* OR immigrant*) OR (xenophob* OR homophob*) OR (homosexual* OR gay OR populis* OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*)))) AND (KW=((driver* OR factor) OR (determinant OR associat*) OR correlat*))</td>
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<tr>
<td>(tolerance OR intolerance) OR (discriminat* OR exclusion) OR prejudice*) AND KW=europe*) AND(KW=((migrant* OR immigrant*) OR (xenophob* OR homophob*) OR (homosexual* OR gay OR populis* OR rac* OR ethnic* OR nation* OR religio* OR gyp*)))) AND (KW=(policy OR legislat* OR initiative)</td>
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Table A-4. Google Scholar Search terms

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<tr>
<td>All of: intolerance discrimination Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>One of: increase OR decrease OR change OR growth OR rising OR reduce</td>
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The diagram below describes the literature selection process. Initially, 3301 articles were considered relevant by looking at their titles only. After reviewing their abstracts, 177 were still considered relevant. Of these, 65 satisfied the selection criteria in that they related to racial, ethnic, sexual or religious intolerance and included a cross-national comparison. Full texts of these articles were reviewed and duplicates removed, resulting in 46 articles included in the review presented in Chapter 3. Review of included articles was conducted by several members of the research team to ensure inter-rater reliability. That is why the removal of duplicates was done only at the last stage of the process.
Below follows a brief discussion of main characteristics of studies included in the review. As discussed in the introduction section, the research team did not undertake their quality assessment. Much of the reviewed literature draws on similar datasets that are used in this report. While bearing in mind some limitations of these datasets as well as the fact that some studies did not provide details of their data cleaning, we have confidence in the methodology behind the data and therefore felt that findings about trends and levels of intolerance were sufficiently valid and reliable.

**Method**

The majority of articles reviewed applied a quantitative method consisting of statistical analysis. This is not surprising given the aim of the study to provide an overview of the development of intolerance over time and across Western Europe, as quantitative methods are the common tool for the analysis of the large datasets that are required to provide these overviews. Of the articles applying a quantitative method a large share make use of a multi-level model of analysis. The benefit of using a multi-level model lies in the capacity to combine several levels of analysis. Usually this means variables at the individual, or micro level are combined with variables at the collective (or macro) level in order to provide a comprehensive explanation of a particular phenomenon. Most common among the multi-level models within the articles reviewed is the Hierarchical Linear Model, which in essence is an extension of a linear regression model through the addition of different levels of analysis.

A few articles make use of qualitative methods, ranging from examinations of law and policy (Brearley, 2001; De Schutter and Ringelheim, 2008; Mahnig and Wimmer, 2000), to the study of political parties in the European Parliament (Williams, 2010). Generally, these studies consist of a review of relevant literature and do not report any primary data. An exception is the comparative study of six local social service providers in six European countries (Cambridge and Ernst, 2006).
Level of analysis

Through the widespread use of multi-level models, many studies combine analysis of variables at the micro and the macro levels. In these studies individual characteristics, such as age, gender and educational level and collective characteristics, such as GDP and unemployment rates are taken into account. However, even though the data used in these studies were collected from individuals, the quantitative studies are not concerned with the views of particular individuals. In this respect it may be argued that despite the inclusion of individual-level variables, most of these studies are conducted at a macro, rather than a micro level of analysis.

Commonly, ‘real’ micro level analyses that take individual viewpoints into account are found in qualitative studies. The qualitative studies reviewed, however, are based on an analysis of law and policy, and do not report individual viewpoints. Like most of the quantitative studies, the level of analysis is largely macro.

An exception to the micro and macro levels is again the study by Cambridge and Ernst (2006) which, through the analysis of organisations, was conducted at the meso-level.

Data

The number of datasets that can be used for comparative studies at the European level is limited, so many studies make use of the same data. Frequently used are the European Social Survey (ESS), the European Values Study (EVS), the Eurobarometer (EB), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and less frequently the Pew Global Attitude Survey (Pew) and the Religious and Moral Pluralism Survey. The datasets cover (slightly) different subjects and can therefore be used for a range of studies without an immediate risk of duplication. All datasets consist of relatively large country samples (around 1,000–2,000 individuals per country) that aim to provide a representative reflection of the population. The longest running of these datasets are the EVS and EB, which originated in the late 1970s and 1980s respectively, which makes them suitable, especially the EVS, for longitudinal analysis. Furthermore, several studies reviewed make use of more specific and tailored national surveys, some in combination with the Europe-wide datasets, in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of a particular country or countries (Bleich, 2009; Drakopoulos, Theodossiou and Dodd, 2008; Pehrson and Green, 2010; Weiss, 2003; Pettigrew et al., 2008).

Geographical range

More than half (29/46) of the articles reviewed include 10 or more countries in the analysis, while another 7 studies have a coverage of between 5 and 10 countries. Central among the studies is the focus on Western European countries which are often accompanied by Eastern European countries or the US.

Several of the qualitative studies are similarly aimed at a European level analysis either through an examination of EU law and policy, or by a comparison of a selection of Western European countries. As the total number of these studies is small, there is not much variety among them in terms of countries covered.

Temporal range

The vast majority of studies rely on data collected either during the late 1990s or the early 2000s. The ESS of 2002, which contained a specific module on immigration, is frequently used. Only a few studies make use of the opportunities for longitudinal analysis provided
by the EVS and the EB. The focus is on the most recent data and therefore contemporary levels of intolerance within Europe.
Appendix B: Characteristics of surveys

This appendix presents detailed information on the European datasets used in the survey analysis and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. It particularly addresses two methodological issues along with steps taken to address these – the limited number of available data points for each survey set and risks to cross-national consistency.

Limited number of available data points
As outlined in Table 1-1, this project assessed observable trends in the time periods from 1980-2008 in the European Values Study (EVS) dataset (EVS, 2011) and 2002-2010 in the European Social Survey (ESS) dataset (ESS, 2002; 2004; 2006; 2008; 2010). The EVS dataset consisted of four waves (1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008) and the ESS one of five (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010), even though only the first 2002 wave was relevant for the majority of questions analysed in this project. Therefore, it is important to bear in mind that drawing trend analyses from a limited number of data points carries some risks. The main risk is that the overall trend line may mask significant fluctuations between the sampled time points. Indeed it is possible that large variations in data between sampled time periods could even imply the opposite trend to that appearing in the sampled time periods. We dealt with this issue by complementing findings from one dataset with data from other sources and by cross-validating these to the extent possible.

Cross-national consistency
Cross-national consistency of method is an important step to ensure that the data collected is reliable and valid across countries. The European Social Survey and Eurobarometer make explicit efforts to collect data according to similar methods across countries. The ESS has from the outset taken a range of measures to ensure consistency of method and comparability of data (Billiet, 2007; Billiet et al., 2007; Lynn et al., 2007). After the initial implementation the methods have also been reviewed several times and studies have been conducted to uncover possible patterns of non-response that may have introduced a bias in the data (Stoop et al., 2010). In the case of the Eurobarometer too, efforts have been made to standardize data collection across the member countries of the EU (GESIS, 2012), even though the piloting phase of the study in particular was not considered very rigorous and suffered from changes in question wording (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; O’Shea, Bryson and Jowell, 2002).

By contrast, the World Values Survey allows far more variety, as apart from the format and content of the questionnaire “no explicit standards are set with regards to any other aspect of the survey implementation” (Lynn, 2003). As a result participating countries differ substantially in sample-size, sample method, data collection method et cetera. The big
advantage of the EVS however, is that it has been conducted for a large number of
countries, and has been repeated several times over the last decades. It is the only survey
that allows longitudinal investigations of values and value change. The ESS and the EB,
given their different setup and organisation, both lack this element of systematic repetition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of questions utilised in this study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Question</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? [Muslims]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? [People of different race]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? [Immigrants/foreign workers]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? [Homosexuals]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? [Jews]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? [Gypsies]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five! [Tolerance and respect for other people]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How about people from less developed countries coming here to work? Which one of the following do you think the government should do?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with people?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>live here?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurobarometer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you say enough effort is being made in (OUR COUNTRY) to fight all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>forms of discrimination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the moment? (MAX. 2 ANSWERS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moment? (MAX. 2 ANSWERS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Methodological challenges associated with attitudinal and behavioural data

As explained in Section 1.2.4, this research builds primarily on self-reported attitudinal data as measures of trends in intolerance. In place it complements these by information on behavioural proxies presumed to be associated with intolerance. Below follows a discussion of the main challenges stemming from the use of these two types of data.

Challenges of using self-reported attitudinal data
The most significant risk to the quality of data on expressed attitudes for the purposes of this study stems from the possibility of a response bias, the existence of which needs to be taken into account when interpreting survey results. Among the response errors of interest to this study are:

1. Non-attitudes, or weak/soft attitudes
2. Acquiescence bias (yea-saying and nay-saying)
3. Social-desirability bias

Non-attitudes refer to a relatively simple phenomenon, when a respondent does not hold an attitude on the topic of inquiry. This has potentially great consequences when respondents are reluctant to admit the lack of attitude and respond either way (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Compensating for non-, or weak attitudes can distort survey

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94 Response bias refers to any bias that can arise in survey data as a result of respondents’ answers that deviate, intentionally or unintentionally, from the ‘real’. In psychology and particularly social-psychology much work has been done to uncover the types of response biases that can arise when questionnaires are administered (for a detailed review see Podsakoff et al., 2003; Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski, 2000). However, much of this work relates to surveys intended to measure personality traits or other psychological dispositions and is not directly relevant to the type of survey data with which this project is concerned.

95 That is not to say that there is no room for other issues. The most common problems are generally divided into two categories: measurement errors and non-measurement errors (for details see Groves, 1987; Groves, 2004; Heath, Fisher and Smith, 2005; Roberts, 2007). Non-measurement errors relate to problems of coverage, non-response and sampling. Measurement errors are more intricate than non-measurement errors and are subdivided by Groves (1987) into four categories relating to: 1) the interviewer, 2) the respondent, 3) the questionnaire, 4) the mode of interview. This report is based on large sets of secondary data and thus there is little we can still do to mitigate the impact of any possible measurement error, with the exception of possible response biases.
data as the frequency of attitudes observed is a (gross) over-representation of the actual prevalence.

Acquiescence bias results from a tendency in a respondent to agree or disagree with statements irrespective of their content (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In a way not dissimilar from non-attitudes it can distort survey data by recording attitudes that do not in fact ‘exist’, but are merely elicited by the questionnaire. When this strategy is applied, consciously or unconsciously to improve the picture of oneself, the measurement error transforms into SD.

Social desirability has been much discussed, again largely within the social-psychological literature (De Maio, 1984; Paulhus, 1984; Paulhus, 2002). Paulhus (1984; 1991) differentiates between two types of SD, (1) impression management, which stems from an respondent’s active efforts to present a favourable self-image, and (2) self-deception, which results from unconscious acts by respondents through which they present a more favourable image of themselves, possibly spurred by high levels of optimism or self-esteem.

The SD bias is not generally assumed to be a homogeneous trait that occurs in certain individuals regardless of the topic of interest. Given the sensitive nature of the subject, research on sexuality, discrimination, or violent behaviours is more likely to encounter the bias than surveys on more neutral topics (Bradburn, Sudman and Wansink, 2004; Fowler Jr, 1995). Questions surrounding homophobia, racism, discrimination and xenophobia are particularly likely to be sensitive as some respondents wish to present a picture of themselves that is ‘socially desirable’. Krysan et al. (1994) for example found that answers to a postal survey contained more negative opinions and attitudes on affirmative action and ‘racial integration’ than answers in face-to-face interviews.

Thus, the interpretation of attitudinal data requires care, especially when sensitive topics are involved. To deal with SD biases, a strand of publications in the psychological literature aims to address the issue of ‘asking sensitive questions’ (see for example Tourangeau and Smith, 1996; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007). Also, the SD bias declines as the respondent’s perceived sense of anonymity increases (Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski, 2000; Roberts, 2007).

Nevertheless, distilling ‘correct’ attitudes is not the only problem that surrounds social research. Hakim (2003c) points to another problem surrounding attitudinal research:

Hofstede (1980; 1991) was the first to make the distinction between choice and approval, between personal goals and public beliefs, between what is desired by the survey respondent for their own life and what is considered desirable in society in general. Building on his work, I have shown that the strong link between attitudes and behaviour only occurs in the case of personal preferences and goals; there is only a weak link between public morality attitudes and behaviour (Hakim, 1996; 2000; 2002; 2003a; 2003b).

Therefore, as Hakim argues, even if one taps correctly into people’s attitudes, this may still reveal only little about their actual actions. It is necessary to actually uncover personal preferences in order to have any indication of behaviour, as agreement or disagreement with public morality may only be weakly linked to behaviour. Unfortunately, most large cross-national datasets do not focus on preference data. Rather they seek to map the prevalence of certain values and norms, but will have to be used as they are often the only available source of data.
Additional challenges with the use of attitudinal data include the question of whether or not respondents understand the questions in the same way and/or mean the same thing when responding. This is of particular concern in the context of multi-national studies, which require collecting data in different cultural contexts and in multiple languages.

**Challenges of using behavioural proxies**

In response to the complexities of observing attitudes directly via self-reported measures, the project team used as a secondary data source behaviours or patterns of behaviours as proxies of those attitudes. This approach thus understands behaviours as representative substitutes of particular attitudes. For example, this study considers voting for an extremist party a potential proxy of intolerant attitudes. Nevertheless, the use of behavioural proxies for mapping attitudes entails a number of theoretical issues. De Houwer (2011) noted that this indirect observation may be exposed to more sources of bias, primarily because it implies a priori assumptions regarding the relation between attitudes and behaviour. In reality, however, observed behaviour might be driven by a very different set of underlying motivations than those stemming from the attitudes the observed behaviour is supposed to represent.

One way of reducing the risks associated with the attitude-behaviour dichotomy is to consider several behavioural proxies for each of the attitudes being measured (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; DeHouver, 2011; Manstead, 1996). Manstead (1996) used an interesting example to illustrate this: “if a subject refuses to work alongside a black person, live next door to a black person, allow his or her children to invite black friends home, and so on, a consistent pattern of discriminatory behavioural accumulates.” The aggregation of different indicators of behaviour thus tends to add validity and reliability to the conclusions being drawn. At the same time, aggregating multiple behavioural indicators increases somewhat the risk that some of them will not be correlated with the attitudes these indicators are intended to uncover.

Furthermore, a certain degree of compatibility between attitudes and behaviour should be observed. Accordingly, if the attitude being measured is a general one, ie not tied to a particular action, object, context or time, the behavioural proxies should be, to the extent possible, general as well (Manstead, 1996). Empirical evidence has shown that using a very specific behaviour when trying to map a rather general attitude is not a sufficient guarantee of correlation between the two and may lead to incorrect conclusions (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Davidson and Jaccard, 1979; Manstead, 1996).

In short, there are a number of difficulties arising from the use of behavioural proxies but these can to some extent be mitigated by the consideration of the aforementioned principles of aggregation and compatibility. This project adheres to both these principles in that it looks at multiple behaviours (extremist voting, incidence of racist crime, participation in extremist organisations and their activities) to uncover one underlying set of intolerant attitudes and in that the observed behaviours are at the same general level as the corresponding attitude.