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Intolerance in Western Europe

Analysis of trends and associated factors: summary report

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Key findings

- Trends in intolerance, as expressed by respondents in large attitudinal surveys, have varied across Western European countries over the time period studied. Both within countries and across the region as a whole, trends have also differed with respect to different ethnic, national and religious groups.
- Opinions and attitudes among individual Western European countries have moved apart.
- Our analysis did not reveal any clearly discernible associations between intolerant attitudes and specific contextual trends at the national level.
- Existing empirical literature offers strong evidence of association between intolerant attitudes and various economic, demographic, socio-political and cultural factors.

SUMMARY ■ Intolerance of others on grounds of race, religion, nationality or ethnicity is an area of high public salience, with significant implications for policy, social outcomes and well-being. Intolerance (defined broadly for the purpose of this study as a lack of acceptance of or hostility towards others specifically on grounds of their minority status) in Western Europe, and in Europe more broadly, is widely perceived as having been on the rise in recent years. At the same time, there has also been a documented increase in support for and visibility of extremist and populist political parties,¹ and an apparent rise in manifestations of intolerant attitudes, both in national policy and more widely in the behaviour of individuals.

This study aimed to situate these observations and perceptions in the context of empirical evidence on high-level trends in intolerant attitudes in Western Europe. Through analysis of European datasets, a review of empirical literature, and assessments of trends in selected individual countries, we explored whether

intolerance has risen more in some countries than others, whether it has risen more against particular groups, if such attitudes are particularly prevalent among subgroups of the population and if there are clear patterns of association with trends in wider political, social, economic and cultural factors.

Trends in intolerance vary by country

Our analysis of pan-European survey data revealed no uniform trend in expressed intolerance between 1981 and 2008. Trends varied across countries, with attitudes among Western European

countries diverging over the time period studied. Both within countries and across the region as a whole, trends in expressed intolerance also differed with respect to different ethnic, national and religious groups.

The differing trends emerging from the data have developed against complex demographic, political, economic and policy backdrops, and our individual country assessments did not reveal any clearly discernible associations between intolerant attitudes and specific contextual trends at the national level. The absence of any apparent consistent trends highlights the importance of taking a more nuanced and targeted approach when discussing intolerance.

Factors associated with intolerance

Through an analysis of empirical literature we assessed the strength of evidence for the association of intolerance with selected economic, demographic, socio-political and cultural factors. This analysis revealed that:

- Evidence of association with intolerance is strong for some economic factors, such as macroeconomic prosperity, and much less so for others, such as unemployment rate.
- There is strong evidence of an association between intolerance and demographic factors such as age, education and socio-economic class, but somewhat less strong evidence for an association between intolerance and personal income.
- All socio-political factors examined in this study – citizenship regime, welfare state regime and political orientation – have been found to be associated with intolerant attitudes.
- Cultural factors such as levels of social trust and contact with minorities are generally found to be associated with reduced levels of intolerance; however, evidence for the role of minority group size is more mixed.

Policy considerations


Building on the findings from our analysis of European survey datasets, literature review and in-depth country assessments, we developed a series of policy considerations intended to stimulate further evidence-based debate and encourage policymakers and funders to make use of the available evidence when developing and implementing policies and programmes.

- Policymakers should not assume that policy and investment in this area would lack public support.
- The tendency to emphasise the financial crisis as a driver of increasing intolerance requires more careful consideration.
- Voting for populist and extremist parties does not appear to be strongly correlated with wider public attitudes – it is important to separate these analytically and empirically in order to understand the many facets of intolerance.
- With some notable exceptions, few evaluations of policy interventions are publicly available, especially at the national level.
- Young people represent a potentially important target for policy interventions as they are broadly the most tolerant, but are also most prone to taking on more radical views and may be particularly impressionable.
- Intergroup contact can serve as an important shaper of tolerance, particularly in conjunction with certain situational factors.
- Roma face the highest levels of expressed intolerance across all Western European countries, and represent a group that may benefit significantly from policy interventions aimed at reducing intolerance.

In addition to the policy considerations presented above, the research team have also identified several areas for future research. Figure 1 captures the relationship between the findings of this report, policy considerations and suggestions for research topics.

The rest of this report presents the methodology and detailed findings from which these considerations were developed, alongside some examples of interventions aimed at tackling various forms of intolerance. We end by suggesting areas which would benefit from further research. Please note that this document is intended as a summary of main findings. For the full discussion, please refer to the main report (see www.randeurope.org/intolerance).

Figure 1. Overview of main findings, policy considerations and areas for future research



INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

Intolerance of others based on their race, religion, nationality or ethnicity is an important issue that has become increasingly prominent in the public discourse (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012). This has significant implications for policy, social outcomes and well-being (European Network Against Racism, 2008). Governments, funders and practitioners face challenging decisions about where to focus scarce resources to facilitate and improve social cohesion and well-being in diverse societies.

This report summarises the findings of a research project commissioned by the Open Society Foundations (OSF) to begin to fill the gaps in our knowledge about trends and factors associated with intolerance in Western Europe. While there have been many papers published in this field, there has been relatively little empirical research mapping where and how levels of intolerance are changing and against which groups.² The project aims to begin to inform such questions as whether growing support for extremist parties or rising numbers of hate crimes are indicative of wider negative public attitudes towards migrants and those of other races, religions and ethnicities.

The OSF's mission is to help build vibrant and tolerant societies and strengthen respect for human rights, minorities and a diversity of opinion.³ The OSF commissioned RAND to conduct an independent study into whether and to what extent intolerant attitudes are expressed towards a selected number of minority groups. The various groups we considered in this study were selected on the basis of the strengths and limitations of existing survey datasets, and in consultation with the OSF.

Focus on high-level trends across countries

Intolerance is a broad concept and can mean many things. In this report, we conceptualise intolerance as a lack of acceptance of or hostility towards others specifically on grounds of their minority status. As such, intolerance of others may be expressed in many ways: for example, in laws and policies concerning who is allowed to enter a country and access citizenship, services and welfare provisions; at the individual level, for example by supporting certain political groups; through public opinion and views gathered in surveys and opinion research, or through targeted verbal or physical attacks on members of minority groups.

This project does not attempt to provide a detailed empirical analysis of all the many facets of intolerance and their manifestations. Our aim was to look at broader, high-level trends in expressed intolerance over time and across several countries, as traced through attitudinal questions in large, long-running cross-national surveys. For the purposes of this study, expressed intolerance refers to responses given in large European studies, such as the European Values Study (EVS), which indicate a lack of acceptance of or hostility towards others specifically on grounds of their minority status. For example, a statement from a survey respondent that he/she would not want a member of a minority group as a neighbour is understood as an instance of expressed intolerance.⁴ Focusing on attitudes expressed by representative samples of the populations of many countries is in no way to denigrate the importance of any of the other facets of intolerance. However, without such a broader mapping it is difficult to situate support for political parties and instances of racist speech or hate crime in their wider context.

The project therefore focuses on the following four research questions:

1. Are intolerant attitudes rising more in some countries or regions than in others?
2. Are intolerant attitudes against some groups rising more than against others?
3. Are such attitudes more prevalent amongst certain socio-economic and/or demographic groups than others?
4. If so, are there other socio-economic, political, historical/contextual factors that appear to be associated with these changes in expressed intolerance?

While the research looks primarily at intolerance on grounds of race, religion, nationality and ethnic origin, we also consider in places how these attitudes appear to relate to other forms of intolerance such as homophobia, and whether trends in different forms of intolerance appear to be converging or diverging from each other.⁵

Context of perceived rising intolerance

Levels of intolerance in Western Europe (and in Europe more broadly) are widely perceived as having been on the rise.⁶ This perception is expressed in numerous reports from the fields of human rights and countering racism. For instance, a 2012 report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance stated that “racism and intolerance are on the rise in Europe today and the resulting tension sometimes leads to racist violence” (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2012). Human Rights Watch's 2012 World

Report included an essay on what they termed a European human rights crisis, marked by a “xenophobic debate” on the place of migrants and minorities in Europe and a rise of populist extremist political parties (Ward, 2012). Such statements are picked up and elaborated by major European media (see, for instance, Beaumont, 2012; Le Figaro, 2012; Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 2012). The perception of rising intolerance is also reinforced by high-profile events such as the mass shooting in Norway in July 2011 (Reuters, 2012). At the same time, there has also been a documented increase in support for and visibility of extremist and populist political parties (Golder, 2003; Rydgren, 2007; Goodwin, 2011). In several Western European countries, these parties have been able to play a significant role in national political processes, either by becoming members of the ruling coalition (such as the Swiss People Party in Switzerland or the Northern League in Italy), or by lending their support to the government (such as the Danish People’s Party or the Dutch Freedom Party under the Rutte-Verhagen government; Berkowitz and Kreijger, 2010).

In other countries, extremist and populist parties have managed to achieve historic electoral successes. In the French 2012 presidential election the National Front won the biggest share of the popular vote in its history (Ministere de l’Interieure, 2012).⁷ In the 2010 Swedish general election, the Sweden Democrats, and in the 2012 Greek parliamentary election, the extremist group Golden Dawn, gained seats in their national parliaments for the first time (Greek Ministry of Interior, 2012; Swedish Election Authority, 2010). In the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election, the True Finns won almost one-fifth of the popular vote to become the third largest party in the national parliament (Finnish Ministry of Justice, 2011).

Accompanying increased support for some extremist parties is an apparent rise in manifestations of intolerance at the level of both policy and wider behaviour. In 2010 the French government deported over 8,000 Bulgarian and Romanian nationals to their countries of origin, a step described by Viviane Reding, European Union (EU) Justice Commissioner, as a ‘disgrace’ (BBC News, 2010a). Also considered an example of intolerance by many observers, between 2010 and 2012 France, the Netherlands, and Belgium passed bans on wearing Islamic veils in public (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2011).⁸

At the behavioural level, the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) reported in 2010 that available data suggested an upward trend in recorded racist crime between 2000 and 2008 in EU Member States with available data.⁹


Similarly, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) observed a ‘general rise in racist violence’ (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 2010). As with policy interventions, several notable events have been viewed as signals of an apparent rise in intolerant behaviours. In 2000, clashes between Moroccan immigrant workers and Spanish neighbours erupted in the agricultural community of El Ejido in Almeria. In a separate incident, a settlement of seasonal migrant workers came under attack in 2010 in Rosarno in Calabria. In 2008, a Roma settlement near Naples came under attack, prompting a declaration of a state of emergency in three Italian regions with large Roma settlement camps (Baussano, 2012).

Research approach and scope

To address the four questions outlined above, this research drew on three distinct data collection exercises – a literature review, an analysis of survey datasets and a series of in-depth country assessments. The three data collection exercises and how they relate to one another are presented in Figure 2 and discussed briefly overleaf.

A literature review provided theoretical background for and evidence with which to compare our survey data findings and helped frame more detailed questions for the country assessments. Our search of relevant databases revealed a clear lack of empirical evidence on the subject of intolerance. Of 3,301 articles identified, only 177 were judged to be relevant and to have a sufficiently empirical basis. Fewer took a cross-national approach, with 77 articles focused only on a single country. This finding highlights a significant gap and suggests a need for more empirical research to provide a cross-national evidence base. Characteristics of the reviewed studies are discussed in Appendix B to the main report; the research team did not undertake their quality assessment. Much of the reviewed literature draws on datasets similar to those that are used in this report. While bearing in mind some limitations of these datasets (discussed in greater detail in the main report) as well as the fact that some studies did not provide details of their data cleaning, we have confidence in the methodology behind the data and felt therefore able to rely on existing knowledge generated through their use. The analysis of survey datasets looked at trends in expressed intolerance in countries that were EU Member States before the 2004 enlargement. This focus was determined in agreement with the OSF. For this exercise we used attitudinal data from three main cross-national surveys: the EVS (as part of

Figure 2. Process map of the research project



the World Values Survey), the European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer.¹⁰

The research team also conducted more detailed country assessments in the following Member States: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. These countries were selected on the basis of trends and patterns identified in the analysis of attitudinal data, and to align with the OSF's activities and priorities. The country assessments sought to provide an overview of the following contexts: historical, economic, demographic, political, policy, behavioural and media. This allowed us to begin to assess possible patterns and linkages between intolerant attitudes and wider contextual factors in different environments.

INTOLERANT ATTITUDES: NATIONAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL TRENDS

The analysis of European datasets looked at trends in expressed intolerance in Western European countries. The aim was to address the first two research questions agreed with the OSF:

- 1) Are intolerant attitudes rising more in some countries or regions than in others?
- 2) Are intolerant attitudes against some groups rising more than against others?

No uniform trends in intolerance

Expressed intolerance varies across countries and over time

Our analysis of European survey data revealed no discernible uniform trends in levels of intolerance across countries and over time. In some countries, intolerance against most groups has risen over the past three decades, in others it has decreased. In some it decreased and then rebounded. This wide variation does not seem to be related to the absolute level of intolerance – observed trends varied both among countries with high levels and among countries with low levels of intolerance.

EVS data for 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008 (EVS, 2011) show that in roughly half of the countries studied, including Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, intolerance has been rising against many groups. In other countries, including Belgium, France and Spain, intolerance against most groups has been declining. Figure 3 demonstrates this variability for expressed intolerance against immigrants.

There is also variation in patterns of intolerance between countries over time. Between 1990 and 2008, intolerance declined steadily in two countries, France and Belgium, but in all other eleven countries,¹¹ intolerance increased against at least one group over the same period. In some countries, such as Portugal and Sweden, intolerance appeared to be in decline by 1999, but returned to earlier levels in 2008. Conversely, in other countries, such as Spain and the United Kingdom, intolerance against several groups rose in the 1990s, followed by a decline between 1999 and 2008.

Trends in expressed intolerance also vary towards different groups

There are notable differences between levels of intolerance expressed towards particular groups, as Figure 4 demonstrates. Since its inclusion in the EVS in 1999, self-reported intolerance towards 'Gypsies' (as they are termed in the surveys) has grown more than that towards any other minority group.¹² The only EU15 countries¹³ where intolerance against 'Gypsies' did not grow are Belgium, France, Germany,


Roma face the highest levels of expressed intolerance in all surveyed countries

Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom. Intolerance against this group has also been consistently higher (in absolute terms) than intolerance expressed towards other minority groups, even in countries where expressed intolerance towards 'Gypsies' has been declining.¹⁴

The second-highest levels of intolerance are mostly expressed against Muslims. After 'Gypsies', Muslims are also the group against whom expressed intolerance has most frequently been rising since 1990, with increased intolerance towards Muslims reported in seven of the 13 countries analysed.¹⁵


As for other minority groups, intolerant attitudes expressed against Jews have declined in a large majority of Western European countries, and in 2008 were the lowest across all studied groups on average.¹⁶ In a very slight majority of studied countries intolerant attitudes against people of different race and immigrants have also declined over the three time periods. The mixed picture in regard to attitudes to immigrants and immigration is also evident in a related EVS ques-

Figure 3. Trends in intolerance expressed against immigrants in Western European countries



Source: EVS. Proportion of respondents who indicated they would not want an immigrant as a neighbour.

Figure 4. Levels of expressed intolerance against individual minority groups in the 2008 EVS wave in Western European countries



Source: EVS 2008 wave. Proportion of respondents indicating they would not want a member of a given minority group as a neighbour.

tion. Between 1999 and 2008, the share of respondents who felt their country's immigration policy should either 'prohibit people from coming' or introduce 'strict limits' increased in eight of the EU15 countries.¹⁷

As a comparison, intolerance expressed against homosexuals has been declining in the long term, though there were increases between 1999 and 2008 in four countries. However, this decline started from a relatively high baseline and, even in 2008, levels of intolerance expressed against homosexuals were on average higher than for all minority groups except 'Gypsies' and Muslims.

Convergence / divergence across Western European countries

The data from the EVS also allows us to examine whether opinions in individual Western European countries have diverged or converged over time, by using trends in standard deviations as an indicator of relative movements in opinions and attitudes. If there has been a convergence of opinions, the values recorded in opinion surveys should become more similar over time and, by extension, there should be less variation of opinions held by respondents. By contrast, a divergence of opinions would manifest itself in a greater variation of recorded values (Li and Bond, 2010).¹⁸ In this way, it is possible to use individual country means as an indication (albeit rather crude) of whether opinions and attitudes in different Western European countries grew more aligned or more disparate between survey waves.

Opinions and attitudes among individual Western European countries have moved apart

Table 1 presents an overview of trends in intolerance and attitude convergence depending on the target group. Generally, opinions among individual Western European countries appear to have diverged over the course of the EVS. In other words, the differences between countries in their levels of expressed intolerance increased between 1981 and 2008. This is an interesting discovery, given a relatively widespread belief that attitudes and/or values might converge over time due to growing international flows of people and ideas.¹⁹

Table 1. Trends in intolerance and attitude convergence by target group

Target group	Trend in intolerance	Convergence trend
Different race	Stayed the same	Diverged
Muslims	Increased	Diverged
Immigrants	Increased	Stayed the same
Jews	Decreased	Stayed the same
'Gypsies'	Increased	Diverged
Homosexuals	Decreased	Converged

This finding matches the variability among countries described above in that increases in intolerance in some countries happened at the same time as decreases in others. Another possible explanation is that intolerance decreased more rapidly in countries with already relatively low levels of intolerance or rose faster in countries with already relatively high levels of intolerance.

The greatest divergence (both in percentage and absolute terms) is in intolerance expressed against people of different race. This means that attitudes to people of a different race vary more from country to country than intolerance by nationality, ethnicity or religion, with some countries being, on average, very accepting of different races and others much more intolerant.

There were two exceptions to the general diverging trend: intolerant attitudes towards Jews, which, while decreasing somewhat overall, have maintained a roughly consistent degree of variation among individual countries; and levels of intolerance expressed against immigrants. For comparison, attitudes towards homosexuals in Western Europe also bucked the observed trend and converged over the observed period.

Detailed assessment of selected individual countries and their contextual factors showed no clear discernible pattern to the variation in trends in intolerance

A more detailed assessment of eight Western European countries did not reveal consistent patterns and trends in expressed intolerance. In fact, we found wide variety in how intolerant attitudes, and support for extremist and populist political parties, have evolved against the backdrop of different economic, demographic and policy developments. A comparison of European-level surveys as well as national-level survey data also often yielded conflicting pictures. As a result, it was not possible to identify a clear relationship between

intolerant attitudes and any particular contextual factor(s) at the country level. This finding corresponds to some extent to the findings from the literature review, which in several instances found stronger evidence of an association with intolerance for individual-level factors (such as age and socio-economic status) than for macro-level factors (such as policy context or economic performance).

The in-depth country assessments for Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom can be found in the main report.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH INTOLERANCE

The literature review looked at the available evidence on contextual factors that might be associated with intolerance. The aim was to address the last two research questions agreed with the OSF:

- 3) Are intolerant attitudes more prevalent amongst certain socio-economic and/or demographic groups than others?
- 4) If so, are there other socio-economic, political, historical/contextual factors that appear to be associated with these changes in expressed intolerance?

Figure 5 presents the results of the review. The factors that were mentioned in studies are organised into four major groups: 1) economic, 2) demographic, 3) socio-political, and 4) cultural. Of course, these categories are not mutually exclusive; some factors may and do straddle the boundaries. The factors are grouped together according to the strength of available evidence from included studies. For those factors in the green column, the evidence allows us to conclude fairly confidently that an association exists with intolerance. Factors in the yellow group are generally supported by available evidence as well; however, the literature review revealed other instances where their relationship with intolerance was not supported, or was rejected, thus indicating that caution should be used when drawing conclusions. Finally, for factors highlighted in red, we felt that the literature review yielded insufficient evidence to claim these are associated with intolerance. We do not say that there is no association, only that evidence is lacking to support or challenge that claim. In addition, for factors in the green column that can be measured on a scale, an indication of the direction of association is included.²⁰ An upward arrow means that a higher amount or degree of a given factor is associated with higher levels of

there is strong evidence of association between intolerant attitudes and 11 various factors

Figure 5. Overview of factors and the strength of available evidence

	Strong evidence	Generally strong evidence with some contradictory findings	Mixed, inconclusive or no evidence of association
Economic factors (€)	Macroeconomic prosperity ↓	Individual employment status	GDP growth Unemployment rate
	Perception of economic threat ↑		
Demographic factors (👤)	Socio-economic Status / Social class ↓	Personal income	
	Age ↑		
	Education ↓		
Socio-political factors (🗳️)	Individual political orientation		
	Citizenship regime Size of welfare state ↓		
Cultural factors (🌐)	Outgroup contact ↓		Outgroup size
	Perception of ethnic threat ↑		
	Social trust ↓		

KEY ↑ Higher amount associated with higher levels of intolerance
 ↓ Lower amount associated with higher levels of intolerance

intolerance, a downward arrow suggests a higher level of a given factor is associated with lower levels of intolerance. Five important qualifications need to be added to the discussion of these factors:

1. The overview merely traces evidence of association, and as such does not imply causation in any direction
2. The categorisation of factors into columns depending on the quality of currently available evidence says nothing about the strength of their association with intolerance. In fact, it is quite likely that some factors where limited evidence exists at present may prove to be closely linked with intolerant attitudes and behaviours.
3. Some factors are likely to be related to or reinforced by others. For example, education is a strong determinant of socio-economic status.
4. The evidence on certain factors may be associated only with a particular form of intolerance. For example, some studies offered findings on factors associated with intolerance towards immigrants from poorer countries.
5. Finally, it is important to note that the findings presented in Figure 5 represent information from just one data collection exercise of this project.

Economic factors

Overall, there is strong evidence of association with intolerance for some economic factors, but much less so for others.

Individual employment status: a strong but not uniform association

The possibility of an association between unemployment and intolerance has been widely expressed in research literature (Case, Greeley and Fuchs, 1989; Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Semyonov and Glikman, 2009), the media (Kissane, 2012; Maclean and Hornby, 2012) and official policy documents (United Nations Office at Geneva, 2012). Unemployed people, particularly the low-skilled, are presumed to harbour a more negative view of immigrants, either because they are perceived to take jobs away from local populations or because their willingness to accept low-paid and insecure employment drives down working conditions for all. In this context, the current financial and economic crisis, coupled with government austerity measures, has been expected to be associated with increasing levels of intolerance.

Available research evidence tends to confirm this hypothesis. Ervasti (2004) found that unemployment seems to increase

the likelihood of having a negative stance towards immigration. Another study (Card, Dustmann and Preston, 2005) observed that unemployed people were more resistant to immigration than those in paid work. Unemployed people were also found to be more likely to vote for an extreme right-wing party (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002). However, the impact of employment status on negative attitudes may vary depending on which groups the negative attitudes are directed towards: Gorodzeisky (2011) found that unemployed people are particularly intolerant of European ‘foreigners’ from poorer countries, but not those from wealthier countries. A Europe-wide 2008 study observed that predictions about the unemployed being more prejudiced against Muslims were not confirmed (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008a).

Macroeconomic factors: a mixed picture

A related hypothesis is that a country’s economic performance may be associated with changes in individual levels of intolerance (Case, Greeley and Fuchs, 1989; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002; Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky, 2006). At times of economic downturn, people are presumed to take a more negative view of migrants and minorities, seeing them as a burden on public finances and public services, and especially on a country’s welfare system.

There is strong evidence that perception of economic threat posed by minority groups and level of macroeconomic prosperity (in an absolute, static sense) are indeed associated with intolerant attitudes. By contrast, the evidence for dynamic macroeconomic factors such as a country’s overall unemployment rate and gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate is mixed. Semyonov and Glikman (2009) found that a higher level of GDP is associated with lower perception of threat among that country’s population. Another study (Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet, 2009) concluded that real GDP growth was unrelated to attitude changes, however, and a similar conclusion was reached by Card, Dustmann and Preston (2005), who found only a weak association between expressed attitudes and economic prosperity. Interestingly, the study also observed a weak association between unemployment rate and the prevalence of negative attitudes towards immigration, suggesting unemployment may be a stronger predictor of intolerance at the micro level than at the macro level.

No uniform pattern of association across countries

Data from survey datasets and country assessments reveal a very mixed picture. In some instances, such as in Denmark

in the late 1990s, levels of expressed intolerance decreased over a period of satisfactory economic performance, supporting the proposition that there is an association. Other similar examples include the Netherlands in the 1990s and Spain in the early 2000s. However, in other cases, such as the United Kingdom in the same period, levels of expressed intolerance towards immigrants rose despite low unemployment and strong economic growth. Spain also saw levels of expressed intolerance increase over the same period, even though its economy performed satisfactorily. This suggests that while a country’s overall wealth is associated with levels of intolerance, we cannot conclude that dynamic economic factors, such as the negative growth and rising unemployment associated with the recent financial crisis, will necessarily have a uniform effect on intolerance, at least in the short term.

Demographic factors

There is strong evidence of an association between intolerance and demographic factors such as age, education and socio-economic status. The evidence of an association between intolerance and personal income, while also generally strong, is not uniform.

Older people more likely to express intolerant attitudes

A strong association between age and intolerance is established by a number of studies reviewed. Vala and Costa-Lopes (2010) found young people are more tolerant than old. Card et al. (2005) found that, with controls for levels of education, older people have stronger anti-immigrant views. Another study (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007) noted that the odds of an individual developing positive contact with members of ethnic minorities are lower among older people, while Strabac (2008a) found that the odds of expressing anti-Muslim attitudes increased by around 12% for each decade of age.

Higher education levels associated with lower intolerance, but some national variation

The link between educational attainment and intolerant attitudes is frequently observed in the research literature. Available evidence suggests that well-educated individuals tend to be more tolerant (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007), have more positive views on immigration (Herros and Criado, 2009; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009) and are more positive about the effects of immigration on the economy and on quality of life (Card, Dustmann and

Preston, 2005). Correspondingly, the less educated a person is, the more negative a stance he or she tends to hold about receiving immigrants in his or her country (Ervasti, 2004). In addition, less well educated people are more likely to vote for an extreme right-wing party (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002). Strabac and Listhaug (2008a) found that the odds of expressing anti-Muslim prejudice decreased by 20% with each additional level of education.

Interestingly, the link between education and intolerance does not appear to be universally strong. Hello et al. (2002) observed cross-national variations in the strength of the 'educational effect.' These variations are predominantly attributable to cultural factors, such as that country's democratic tradition or religious heterogeneity, rather than structural factors, such as the country's ethnic composition or unemployment rate. Another study (Kunovich, 2002) found that the effect of education on prejudice was significantly weaker in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.

Socio-economic status is a strong factor in intolerance, but personal income less so

Unsurprisingly, given its well-established relation to education (Winkleby et al., 1992; Evans et al., 1997), socio-economic status is identified as a relevant factor for intolerance in a range of studies. Vulnerable and socio-economically weak populations appear less tolerant (Semyonov, Glikman and Krysan, 2007), and lower social status appears to be associated with increased perception of ethnic threat (Schneider, 2008). Manual workers, the self-employed and routine non-manual workers were found to be more likely to vote for extreme right wing parties (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002). Interestingly, Kunovich (2002) found the correlation between social class and prejudice was much stronger in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe.

At the same time, the evidence available on the role of personal income, one component of SES, was not uniform across the studies included in the review. Herreros and Criado (2009) observed that lower income groups have more negative attitudes towards immigration than people with high income. Kunovich (2002) found personal income to be a significant factor only in Eastern Europe, while having no significant effect on prejudice in Western Europe.

Socio-political factors

All the socio-political factors examined – citizenship regime, welfare state regime and political orientation – were found to be associated with intolerant attitudes.

Right-wing preferences linked to higher levels of intolerance

The evidence from the literature review suggests there is a link between individual political orientation and expressed intolerance. Right-wing and conservative political preferences have been found to be more likely to be associated with a less tolerant stance towards migration, difference and diversity. Vala and Costa-Lopes (2010) found that personal values are a good predictor of tolerance, and conservatism was associated with lower levels of intolerance. Hix and Noury's study of Members of the European Parliament (2007) found that those holding anti-immigration views were found mainly among anti-European, national conservative, Christian democratic and conservative political groups.

The data for individual countries show a complex picture, however, with the link between intolerance and political views not always clear. In some countries, for example Finland and the Netherlands, observed rises in intolerant attitudes have been accompanied by growing political support for far-right or populist parties. In other countries such as Ireland and Italy, increased intolerance has not translated into support for far-right parties. In addition, there have also been cases of increased far-right support without a corresponding observed rise in expressed intolerance, for example in Denmark and France. The ability of individuals to express intolerant attitudes at the ballot box and support for extreme movements and far-right parties varies considerably across Western Europe. For instance, Spain and the United Kingdom lack successful far-right parties (Joppke, 2004) while the French National Front has consistently taken over 10% of the national vote in presidential elections. However, the effects of having or lacking political outlets for intolerant views are unclear. Several studies found evidence that xenophobic rhetoric of radical parties spills over into violence (Mudde, 2005; Eatwell, 2000; Bjorgo and Witte, 1993; Altermatt and Kriesi, 1995). Other studies concluded that far-right parties channel the frustrations of the dissatisfied away from violent behaviour (Koopmans, 1996; Backes, 2003).

Comprehensive welfare regimes associated with lower levels of intolerance

Welfare systems may play a role in broader trends and levels of intolerance. One hypothesis is that minority groups may be perceived as a burden on welfare services (Easton, 2011; Hedetoft, 2006). However, Crepaz and Damron (2009) found that natives' concerns were less pronounced in countries with more comprehensive welfare regimes, controlling for variables such as income, age, gender, political preference

and levels of social trust. Kumlin's analysis of empirical data from the Swedish welfare model (2005) found that contacts with universal welfare state institutions tended to increase social trust. Conversely, social programmes organised on a means-testing basis tended to undermine it.

Restricted citizenship regimes associated with higher levels of intolerance

The citizenship rules of a particular country may be related to levels of intolerance among the general population. While single studies are not necessarily a firm basis for drawing conclusions, it is worth noting that Weldon (2006) found a strong relationship between laws governing acquisition and expression of citizenship and the tolerance judgements of individual citizens. Natives of collectivist-ethnic countries such as Germany or Austria were found to be less tolerant than those in more inclusive regimes. The same study also found that other key variables such as in-group national identity, ideology and satisfaction with democracy were strong predictors of tolerance in collectivist-ethnic regimes, but the observed relationship was weak in civic regimes.

Cultural factors

The studies examined in this review found that social trust, perception of threat and contact with minorities are generally associated with levels of intolerance. Survey data on social trust do not always match this finding, however. The evidence for the role of out-group size is inconclusive.

Social trust: study evidence suggests a link

Two studies commented on the relationship between social trust and intolerance. One study (Vala and Costa-Lopes, 2010) found that higher levels of interpersonal trust lead to lower levels of intolerance and prejudice, while Herreros and Criado (2009) observed that social trust had a significant positive effect on attitudes towards immigration. Evidence from survey data was less conclusive, however. Data from the EVS in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008 showed an increase in social trust in nine out of thirteen countries, but there were inconsistencies at country level between social trust and expressed intolerance. In two countries, Italy and Spain, social trust decreased between 1999 and 2008. Yet while expressed intolerance in Italy increased for most groups, in Spain it decreased against all groups except Muslims. For other countries, where social trust rose, there was an even split between those where intolerance rose and those where it declined.

Strong associations for contact and perception of threat

There is strong evidence available on two other cultural factors: contact and perception of threat.²¹ Greater contact with members of minority groups was uniformly found to be associated with lower levels of intolerance. Semyonov et al. (2007) showed that increased contact with different ethnic groups increases tolerance, while another study found that positive inter-ethnic contact decreases prejudice and social distance (Semyonov and Glikman, 2009). Ervasti (2004) concluded that personally knowing immigrants was the best predictor of attitudes towards receiving immigrants, while another study (McLaren, 2003) found that friendships with members of minority groups reduced willingness to expel legal immigrants.

Several studies indicated that greater perception of cultural or economic threat is associated with more intolerant attitudes. McLaren (2003) concluded that perceived threat is a strong predictor of willingness to expel migrants and treat them harshly, while Sari (2007) found that people became more prejudiced as perceived threat increased. Ramos et al. (2006) showed that perceptions of economic threat were the best predictors of opposition to immigration by people of 'another race or ethnic group', with threat to cultural identity being an important predictor as well. By contrast, the association of threats perceived at the individual level with intolerance was weak and non-significant. The same study also showed that perception of threat was not confined to situations of economic fragility, but derived from racist beliefs.

Evidence collected through country assessments and EVS data analysis supports these findings. The data also suggest that perception of cultural threat may be more significant than perception of economic threat. Across Western Europe, a greater share of respondents felt that their country should admit none or few immigrants of different ethnic group than was the case for immigrants of the same ethnic group. A study looking specifically at the Netherlands (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004) concluded that concerns about Dutch identity and culture had a stronger impact on attitudes and behaviours than economic concerns.

Evidence on significance of out-group size is inconclusive

The available evidence from studies, survey data and country assessments on the role of out-group size on intolerance is inconclusive. Several studies reached the conclusion that a large regional immigrant population increased intolerant attitudes (Schlueter and Wagner, 2008; Meuleman, Davidov and

Billiet, 2009; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009), for example support for excluding non-European migrants from social rights. However, several other studies reached the opposite conclusion: that size of minority population does not correlate with levels of prejudice, either for minorities generally (Sari, 2007; Herreros and Criado, 2009) or specific minority groups such as Muslims (Strabac and Listhaug, 2008b) or Jews (Bergmann, 2008). The survey data available from the

approximately half of surveyed respondents think not enough is being done in their country to fight all forms of discrimination

EVS were also inconclusive. Western countries that have seen the largest increases in the share of foreign-born population do not share a clear pattern in expressed intolerance towards immigrants. In some countries (Austria, Finland) intolerance rose, in some (Belgium, France, Spain) it decreased, and in others (United Kingdom, Ireland) it remained roughly constant. By contrast, in both those EU15 countries where the stock of foreign-born population rose by less than one percentage point between 2000 and 2009 (Germany and the Netherlands; data from OECD, 2012)²² intolerance expressed against immigrants rose, albeit much less so in the German case.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND EXAMPLE INTERVENTIONS

This section highlights a set of themes that build on findings from our research. These are intended as a starting point for discussion about possible policy interventions in this field. We highlight some examples of trialled interventions; however, it should be noted that these have not necessarily been evaluated. Other examples are described in the detailed country analyses outlined in the main report.

High-level policy considerations

Policy makers should not assume that policy and investment in this area would lack public support

Given the nuanced picture of trends in intolerance emerging from this study, and the decreasing trend in expressed intolerance in some countries, it is possible that policymakers considering measures to combat intolerance and assist integration of minority groups may meet less resistance than expected. One trend worthy of note is increasing recognition of the importance of teaching tolerance and respect.²³ Additionally, popular opinion appears to have moved in the direction of greater acceptance of immigration in some Western European countries. Evidence suggests this may have occurred in connection with the recognised need for migrant labour and skills (Pyrhönen and Creutz-Kämpfi, 2010; Finotella and Sciortino, 2009). For instance, the proportion of respondents who felt that their respective country should admit foreign workers without any limits or ‘as long as there are jobs available’ rose between the 1999 and 2008 EVS waves in seven EU15 countries. In line with this trend towards greater acceptance of immigration, there have been notable developments in the direction of less ‘restrictionist’ policies on migration and integration in some Western European countries, such as Denmark, Italy and Spain.²⁴ It is also the case that even extremist parties do not always act upon intolerant stances they often campaign on. In some instances, policies perceived as tolerant were passed by national governments that either included populist political parties or relied on their support. For example, regularisation waves in Italy that relied on (at least) tacit approval from the Northern League.²⁵ This theme is further supported by Eurobarometer data on the perceived sufficiency of existing policies. Several Special Eurobarometer surveys between 2006 and 2009 asked respondents whether they felt enough effort was being made in their country to combat all forms of discrimination. They found that approximately half of respondents in EU27 coun-

tries consider efforts to fight discrimination in their countries to be insufficient.²⁶

The tendency to emphasise the financial crisis as a driver of increasing intolerance requires more careful consideration

The current financial and economic crisis is often portrayed as associated with rising intolerance, particularly in light of the success of extremist political parties in some Western European countries. However, empirically there is evidence that the impact of the crisis on levels of intolerance is more varied than those portrayals suggest. Our literature review found insufficient evidence of a link between dynamic macroeconomic factors (such as GDP growth) and levels of intolerance. This may in part explain the greater variation in observed trends than the uniform nature of the economic downturn would suggest.²⁷ A theory posited in the literature is that the crisis might have translated into rising expressed intolerance via microeconomic factors such as individual employment status (as more people become unemployed), but analysis of survey data does not uniformly bear this out. In fact, as wider financial and economic factors have risen up the public's list of concerns, concern about areas that may be associated with self-reported intolerance, such as immigration, have if anything become less of a priority.²⁸ An analysis of Eurobarometer data from 2004 to 2012 shows that the perception of immigration as one of the most pressing policy problems has been declining.²⁹ When broken down individually, the extent of problematic perception of immigration fell in eight EU15 countries, rose in five and stayed the same in two. However, the observed increases were generally smaller than recorded decreases.

In addition, the literature review indicated that people's sense of being culturally threatened is more strongly associated with levels of expressed intolerance than their perception of economic threat. This primacy of cultural threat is another reason why the potential impact of economic factors may be less than is generally assumed.³⁰

Extremist voting does not appear to be strongly correlated with wider public attitudes – it is important to separate these analytically and empirically in order to understand the many facets of intolerance

A review of existing literature indicates that at an individual level, right-wing political orientation was associated with higher levels of expressed intolerance. However, an analysis of survey data indicates that in aggregate, at the country level,

intolerant attitudes do not always correlate with extremist voting. This finding is not limited to far-right voting patterns and is applicable to instances of rising electoral support on either side of the political spectrum. In some countries (e.g. Finland, Italy and the Netherlands) significant electoral support for extremist parties was indeed accompanied by rising levels of expressed intolerance. At the same time, in other countries (France, the United Kingdom and Denmark) the two indicators moved in opposite directions. It is therefore important to analyse instances of rising support for extremist parties in their respective contexts.³¹ In some cases, the popularity of intolerant political organisations and parties may be due to other factors, such as frustration at the perceived inability of mainstream political representatives to find an acceptable solution to the fiscal crisis in the Eurozone.³²

With some notable exceptions, few evaluations of policy interventions are publicly available, especially at the national level

Evaluations of policy interventions in the field of migration, integration and anti-discrimination are rarely publicly available. Some notable exceptions exist;³³ however, evaluations are seldom mandated by programme funders, highlighting the relative absence of an evaluation culture or a drive to identify best practices.³⁴

There are several underlying reasons for the relative paucity of evaluations.³⁵ Integration policies often cut across diverse portfolios and government departments. This overlap can be horizontal (involving multiple areas such as foreign affairs, justice and interior, employment, social affairs) and vertical (spanning communities, local, regional, national and supra-national bodies). As such, no single department or agency tends to be seen as accountable for integration and therefore responsible for funding and learning from evaluations. As a result of this complexity, designing appropriate objectives and performance indicators is a serious challenge. For interventions that aim to influence cultural and social phenomena such as religious or ethnic intolerance, the challenge is compounded by the fact that these domains do not have standard and widely accepted empirical indicators, such as employment rate or educational attainment in the field of economic integration.

The cross-cutting nature of policy interventions also means that even if clear indicators were agreed, attribution of impact is inherently difficult as the interventions take place in an environment that is subject to constant change, largely out

of the control of those implementing interventions. Consequently, where evaluations are performed, they are often more akin to activity reports than systematic assessments to inform evidence-based decisions. Embedding evaluation in the design and implementation of interventions would help to build the evidence base for current and future decisions and expenditure, and improve clarity and transparency about policy choices.

Perspectives on targeted interventions

Young people represent a potentially important target for policy interventions as they are broadly the most tolerant, but they are also most prone to taking on more radical views and may be particularly impressionable.

Young people represent a potentially important target for policy interventions. Our review of available research literature revealed that younger people were significantly less likely to self-report intolerant attitudes. This relationship was

confirmed by analysis of available survey datasets, with self-reported intolerance among young people consistently lower than that of their older counterparts.³⁶ While it is important to assess whether this is an age effect or a cohort effect, either could indicate potential benefits of working with young people. If it is an age effect, interventions could aim to capture and retain the tolerance of youth into later life. In the case of a cohort effect, policies could aim to ensure that new cohorts of young people start out with a tolerant, open attitude to others and prevent this cohort from internalising intolerant attitudes. This is particularly important because while young people are least likely to express intolerant attitudes, they are most likely to be susceptible to adopting extremist views (Edelstein, 2003; Erikson, 1968; Erikson, 1959; Heitmeyer, 1995). A general framework of action to moderate the likelihood of discriminatory and intolerant adolescent behaviour can build on a large body of literature highlighting the role played by psychosocial risk factors in the development of adolescent problem behaviour, and the need to effectively address those to the extent possible (Jessor, 1991). Moreover, survey data demonstrate that families and parents increasingly recognise the significance of interventions targeting

Example of a national-level intervention targeted at young people: 'Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance – Germany'

In 2001, the German Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, introduced the action programme "Youth for Tolerance and Democracy – against right-wing extremism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism", which financed prevention-oriented interdisciplinary pilot initiatives in the fields of labour, leisure and education. The aim of the initiative was to foster democratic behaviour, civil engagement, tolerance and cosmopolitanism. Youth were the main target group - particularly students in vocational training, young active civil society participants, and young people exhibiting right-wing affiliations – but the project also included multipliers such as parents, teachers, social workers and civil servants.

The programme consisted of three components, focusing on: (i) facilitating integration of people with migrant backgrounds by fostering community behaviour through political education; (ii) tackling right-wing extremism in the former East Germany, primarily through local civil society initiatives; and (iii) practical labour market initiatives against xenophobia and racism. About 450 projects to strengthen civil society, e.g. encourage active citizenship and community learning processes, were sponsored. A particular strength of the initiative was the built-in component of third-party evaluation from the outset. Methods included workshops, semi-structured (expert) interviews, online surveys, qualitative document analysis, focus groups and participant observation (Heitmeyer et al., 2009; Becker et al., 2009).

After its completion in 2006, the programme was followed by the initiative "Diversity is beneficial: Youth for diversity, tolerance in democracy". The evaluations of its predecessor led to a shift in focus for this new programme: local action plans to better reach people were introduced while the discrimination agenda was widened. The programme was complemented by the initiative "Competent for democracy – advisory networks for combating right-wing extremism", which financed mobile counselling teams to offer support in conflict situations stemming from xenophobia and right-wing extremism. Recent evaluations show that the new local action plans have been successful in developing locally integrated prevention strategies, facilitating common learning processes between German and migrant youth and adults. However, a lack of gender sensitivity is highlighted.

Both programmes were superseded in 2011 by the most recent government programme "Foster Tolerance – strengthen competency" (Bundesministerium fuer Familie, 2012).

an increasing share of people think it is important to teach children tolerance and respect for other people

young people. Indeed, the proportion of respondents in the EVS study who felt it was important to teach children tolerance and respect grew almost 30 percentage points between the start of the survey in 1981 and its last wave in 2008.

Intergroup contact can serve as an important shaper of tolerance, particularly in conjunction with certain situational factors

Intolerant attitudes and behaviours appear to stem from both situational and personal factors, and may be reinforced by a perception of group competition and threat (Esses et al., 2005; Yzerbyt and Corneille, 2005). A review of the literature identified an overall association between greater levels of intergroup contact and lower levels of prejudice. (Allport, 1954; Brown and Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew and Tropp,

2008).³⁷ In other words, according to Allport, getting to know people from another ethnic group appears to reduce intolerance. This is in line with findings based on the Eurobarometer data, which indicated that migration is more likely to be perceived as a problem at the national level, rather than at the individual.³⁸

Nevertheless, there are complex dynamics in this contact-prejudice relationship. Other studies have shown that when a minority group is perceived as too prominent, other group(s) may be more intolerant. Findings on the effects of intergroup contact also varied significantly. A meta-analysis of 515 studies across 38 countries (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), indicated that positive outcomes were more likely to result from contact between heterosexuals and homosexuals than from intergroup contact between racial and ethnic groups, or between young people and the elderly. Nevertheless, from a policy perspective, the available evidence suggests that it is worth exploring the varying potential of intergroup contact, and developing policies tailored to particular groups and circumstances.

Existing literature suggests a number of facilitators that may increase the likelihood that inter-group contact reduces intolerance (Allport, 1954). Firstly, a perception of equal group status tends to generate more positive intergroup attitudes. Contacts which involve members of different groups collaborating to pursue a common goal will usually be more positive. Finally, the effects of contact also tend to be greater when supported by law, custom or social institutions. For

Example of a local-level intervention to reduce intolerance – ‘Spinner Project – supporting the integration of small Chinese businesses in Bologna’

From 2000 to 2006, a local consortium of research and development groups (Consorzio Spinner) supported the integration of the growing Chinese community in Bologna, helping Chinese entrepreneurs to comply with Italian labour laws (Cities of Migration, 2013). The growing Chinese population in the Emilia Romagna region was becoming a substantial presence in the textile and fashion industry - a strategic area of the region's economy.³⁹ However, levels of integration and interaction with the Italian community remained low. The perception that Chinese-owned firms were not respecting EU or Italian labour standards tended to be considered unfair competition by the local population, leading to divisions within communities (Mitzman, 2006). This EU-funded project⁴⁰ aimed to enhance the social and economic integration of Chinese communities. Spinner adopted a long-term intervention plan, training Chinese intercultural mediators to establish contact with companies, offering to assist with the necessary documentation and regularisation process. The team contacted 390 Chinese entrepreneurs, visited 187 firms, trained 167 Chinese entrepreneurs, and delivered 70 consulting services. Spinner also published and distributed a ‘Handbook for the transition to the regular and formal system’ – a bilingual manual with comprehensive guidelines on business practices in Italy (Eurofound, 2009). This was complemented by local radio programmes in Chinese, covering a range of aspects of working life in Italy.

The initiative yielded very positive results, both improving business practices and helping develop trust and a stronger bond between the Italian and Chinese communities (Eurofound, 2009). In 2006, the Spinner Project was selected as a ‘Best Practice’ initiative by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), and received the 2006 Dubai International Award for Best Practices to Improve the Living Environment (Government of Dubai, 2008).

example, Pettigrew and Tropp (2005) alluded to the role played by authority sanction both in military and religious contexts. The authors furthermore argued that the passage of civil rights legislation in America seemed to have boosted the establishment of wider anti-prejudicial norms.

While these situational factors seem to have a positive effect on contact between different groups, they should not be seen as necessary conditions. Intergroup contact may also be positive in the absence of these so-called facilitators (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2005).

Roma face the highest levels of expressed intolerance across all Western European countries, and represent a group that may benefit significantly from policy interventions aimed at reducing intolerance

Roma face the highest levels of expressed intolerance of any minority group included in survey questions, and this holds true across all Western European countries. Intolerance expressed against this minority group has also grown in the majority of countries since 1999.⁴¹ These high levels of self-reported intolerance against Roma are matched by reported experiences of discriminatory treatment. In a pilot survey by the FRA (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2012),⁴² approximately half of Roma respondents reported that they had faced discrimination on the basis of their ethnic origin. In Western Europe this proportion ranged from around 30% in Spain to approximately 65% in Italy. The survey also revealed generally low levels of awareness among Roma respondents of the existence of anti-discrimination legislation.

getting to know people from another ethnic group appears to reduce intolerance

Despite continuous efforts on the part of international organisations to elevate the profile of the situation of European Roma populations (UNDP, 2003; Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005; EUMC, 2006; Fundamental Rights Agency, 2009), Roma in Western Europe have frequently been the target of intolerant policies. Examples include the French government's decision in 2010 to deport hundreds of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens, predominantly of Roma origins (BBC News, 2010b), and the decision of the Italian government in 2008 to declare a state of emergency for "Nomadic camps" (a synonym for Roma settlements) and legislate to introduce stricter control over the presence of Roma groups in Italy (Simoni, 2010).⁴³

In light of this context, there is strong potential for Roma populations to benefit from interventions to reduce intolerance. At the EU level, the integration of Roma is already firmly positioned within the Europe 2020 growth strategy and enjoys - at least in theory - political commitment of individual EU Member States. In April 2011, the European Union introduced the EU Framework for national Roma integration strategies (European Commission, 2011a). The framework is

Example of a national-level intervention to reduce intolerance – 'Integrating Roma population'

In 2011, the European Commission adopted an EU Framework for national Roma integration strategies (European Commission, 2011b) to improve the situation of Roma within the EU. The Framework was built upon four fundamental policy areas: access to education, employment, healthcare and housing.⁴⁴ The EU committed to coordinate national efforts and support inclusion policies through its Social and Structural Funds. Within this context, all Member States have elaborated a set of policy measures to be implemented at national level. Spain has been particularly engaged in development of a national plan for Roma integration and some of the specific interventions put forward in its National Strategy (Government of Spain, 2012), especially those on education and access to employment, have been highlighted by the European Commission as good practice (European Commission, 2012). One such measure is the launch of new mediation programmes aimed at tackling absenteeism and early school leaving among Roma pupils. The specific objective is to reduce early school absenteeism in primary education to 15% by 2015 and to 10% by 2020. Spain has also issued an Action Plan for the development of Roma people (Government of Spain, 2010), setting out the funding allocated to implement its various interventions. A follow-up review and evaluation of the Plan is planned, and was expected to take place by the end of 2012, however this target was not met.

now being followed up with national documents, which will be the main vehicle for policy implementation.

However, the survey findings show that a solid evidence base is needed to assess the success of national integration strategies and implementation policies (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2012), such as the Spanish example highlighted in the box on the previous page. Further research is also needed to improve our understanding of underlying mechanisms behind attitudinal and behavioural change.

Areas for further research

This section presents an overview of high-level areas and issues that would benefit from further research to improve the evidence base on intolerance and interventions to increase tolerance and respect. This could assist policymakers seeking to design interventions, practitioners implementing adopted programmes and governments and NGOs making funding decisions.

Relationship between state and individual attitudes

Both citizenship regime and welfare state policy have been found to be associated with intolerance. Further research might offer insight into underlying dynamics such as the direction of influence, and the potential role of the state in creating and reinforcing social norms of tolerance and respect.

Implications of divergence/convergence of attitudinal data

Opinions and attitudes among Western European countries have largely diverged since 1999, as shown by the EVS. Additional research might shed more light on the underlying factors behind this diversity, and the implications for policies to reduce intolerance.

Causality and strength of relationship between individual factors and intolerance

This study found strong evidence of an association between intolerant attitudes and a sub-set of factors identified in our review. However, the data collected did not allow us to comment on either the strength or the direction of those relationships. Further research is needed to address these questions.

Intolerance of intolerance

Given a trend towards increasing tolerance in some countries, intolerance may also be triggered by a perception of intoler-

ance on the part of others. For example, certain extremist or religious groups may face strong, overt criticism for their perceived intolerance and counter-protests organised. Better understanding this dynamic could inform efforts to reduce intolerance.

Other indicators of intolerance

A better understanding of how intolerant attitudes relate to other behavioural indicators not identified in existing findings may allow better monitoring and understanding of the phenomenon.

Addressing intolerance of Roma in Western Europe

As discussed, Roma are the target of the highest levels of expressed intolerance in all Western European countries. A comparative analysis of the situation in new and old Member States, combined with systematic assessment of interventions at local levels, may be particularly useful.

Intolerance in Eastern Europe

The geographic scope of this study was limited to Western European countries. An analysis of trends in intolerance in Eastern European countries might produce additional findings and lessons for relevant stakeholders.

Intolerance between minority groups

This study primarily focused on high-level attitudes and majority–minority relationships. Research on relationships between minority groups could provide greater understanding of intergroup dynamics and possible points of intervention.

Notes

¹ In this report we use a number of terms which we recognise may be perceived in a variety of ways. The terms populist and extremist are such examples, used in this report to denote political parties with intolerant policies and rhetoric integral to their activities. While we realise that these terms may not perfectly capture the intended meaning, they are used in the absence of a satisfactory alternative.

² As discussed in greater detail in the main report, of 3,301 articles identified in the literature review in the early stages of the project, only 177 were judged to be relevant to the research questions and to have a sufficient empirical basis.

³ Adapted from the OSF's mission statement, available from <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/mission-values> [last accessed 2 April 2013].

⁴ For a list of survey questions used in this study, please refer to Appendix B in the main report.

⁵ Convergence/divergence of attitudes is an issue raised by researchers interested in trends and changes in people's values. See, for example, Halpern (2010)

⁶ For a selection of examples from both European and non-European authors see Kotkin (2010); National Public Radio (2010); Bartlett and Birdwell (2011). This perception is not necessarily a new phenomenon. See, for instance, Goldmann (1991).

⁷ It should be added, though, that this success is not much higher than the party's previous results. In fact, the National Front has never received less than 10% of the popular vote in any presidential election since 1988.

⁸ The degree to which the ban is enforced may vary. For an account of police discretion vis-à-vis the measure in France, see Erlanger (2012)

⁹ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2010a). However, drawing conclusions about these trends is rather risky as, for instance, results can be influenced by changes in data collection practices. Also, high levels of reported racist crime are not necessarily only a negative indicator as they may suggest that the country in question is responding seriously to the problem.

¹⁰ More details on these surveys, along with a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses is presented in Appendix B to the main report.

¹¹ Luxembourg and Greece are not included in this analysis because they were not included in the EVS prior to the 1999 wave.

¹² Admittedly, the data on intolerance against 'Gypsies' is the weakest of all observed groups as this question appeared only in the 1999 and 2008 waves.

¹³ In contrast to other minority groups, Greece and Luxembourg are included in the analysis of attitudes towards 'Gypsies' as they have been included in both survey waves since this question was first introduced in 1999.

¹⁴ In the 2008 EVS wave, levels of self-reported intolerance against 'Gypsies' were on average almost 15 percentage points higher than the second highest, those against Muslims.

¹⁵ When looking only at the period between the last two survey waves, i.e. 1999 and 2008, the number of countries in which intolerance expressed against Muslims rises to nine out of fourteen due to the inclusion of Portugal and Sweden. That said, the levels of intolerance expressed against Muslims in those two countries in 2008 were still lower than in 1990.

¹⁶ Two possible contributing factors are that Jews are present in Europe in lower numbers than other minorities and are less likely to be visibly identifiable.

¹⁷ The other two remaining options were 'let anyone come' and 'as long as jobs are available.'

¹⁸ Regrettably, due to the binary nature of the intolerance questions used in the EVS, an analysis of convergence/divergence *within* individual countries is not meaningful, unless respondents are split into subgroups.

¹⁹ As Halpern (2010) points out, this lack of value convergence across countries is fairly unexpected. Since many aspects of modern life, particularly modes of economic production and consumption have been converging around the world, the presumption has been that the same would happen with people's values. However, results from cross-national surveys indicate that has not been the case (at least so far).

²⁰ The direction of association is not indicated for citizenship and individual political orientation as these cannot be measured on a scale.

²¹ This refers to a situation when an individual feels threatened by members of minority groups. This threat can take numerous forms, for instance economic (e.g. fear of job competition) or cultural (e.g. fear of losing own's culture).

²² Data not available for Greece and Italy.

²³ The proportion of respondents in the EVS study who felt it was important to teach children tolerance and respect grew almost 30 percentage points between the start of the survey in 1981 and its last wave in 2008.

²⁴ MIPEX III noted that most countries' scores recorded an increase, albeit very small, between 2007 and 2010, i.e. in the midst of the current economic crisis. Restrictive measures typically limit migrants' opportunities to participate fully in society, for instance by denying them rights accorded to other residents such as labour market access.

²⁵ It should be noted that the regularisation did not cover undocumented migrants.

²⁶ The EU15 average is several percentage points lower than the EU27 one. Expressed as a sum of respondents who answered 'no, not really' or 'no, definitely not.'

²⁷ While the review indicated that static macroeconomic indicators such as overall national wealth are associated with levels of expressed intolerance, the economic crisis has not drastically altered Western European prosperity and would therefore not be expected to affect intolerance levels via this channel. The literature reviewed shows that affluent countries tend to be less intolerant than poorer ones and the crisis has not significantly decreased the wealth gap between Western Europe and other regions.

²⁸ This observation may be partially attributable to the design of survey questions, which allows respondents to name a limited number of issues. In this context, the fact that a respondent does not mention immigration may simply mean that other issues have become more urgent rather than immigration ceasing to be seen as problematic. However, some survey data indicate that immigration may have become less of a concern even in absolute terms. For instance, despite the economic crisis, the British Attitudes Survey indicated that a smaller proportion of respondents had a negative opinion of immigration in 2011 than in 2008 (Park et al., 2012) with no connection to their opinions on other issues.

²⁹ Where available, surveys conducted at the national level offer a similar picture. For example, the proportion of Spanish respondents who thought immigration is one of three principal problems facing the country declined almost 30 percentage points between 2007 and 2012 (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2013).

³⁰ This finding is also reflected in some survey data. For instance, in the 2002 ESS survey, a larger share of respondents from every surveyed European country were in favour of restrictionist policy in regard to immigration by people of different race/ethnic group from majority than by people of the same race/ethnic group.

³¹ For an example of this type of work see Ford, Goodwin and Cutts (2011).

³² For instance, a regression analysis of data available from the 2011 Finnish National Election Study indicated that people who expressed distrust in the EU and people who favour referendums for important national decisions were more likely to vote reluctantly for the True Finns rather than for someone else or abstain (Fieschi, Morris and Caballero, 2012).

³³ For instance, a study assessing the impact of the Racial Equality Directive in the area of employment (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2010b) and regular evaluations of German national programmes in support of tolerance and diversity (Heitmeyer et al., 2009; Becker et al., 2009; Lawaertz-Stiftung and Univation, 2012). Also, there are numerous smaller studies such as the evaluation of Time Together, a programme aiming to support refugee integration in the United Kingdom (Esterhuizen and Murphy, 2007).

³⁴ A notable high-profile exception to this trend and an example of best practice is the aforementioned assessment of the impact of the Racial Equality Directive, which was built into the wording of the directive itself (Article 17). Another example of an evaluation that is currently under way and has been built in the design of the programme is the evaluation of the European Programme on Integration and Migration (EPIM).

³⁵ For a discussion of some theoretical issues with policy evaluations in this field see, for instance, Ardittis and Laczko (2008) or Rinne (2012).

³⁶ An analysis of variance in the 2008 EVS values for each country, as part of the in-depth assessments, indicated that differences in expressed levels of intolerance between various age groups were significantly different ($p < 0.05$) everywhere except for Finland and Spain.

³⁷ We draw on the contact hypothesis, introduced and developed by Allport (particularly in his book, *The Nature of Prejudice*), which, in short, postulated that contact with members of a different gender, class, racial or ethnic group could help reduce prejudice towards that group. Allport's ideas have been further developed in the past 50 years, having been described as "one of the most long-lived and successful ideas in the history of social psychology" (Brewer and Brown, 1988).

³⁸ From 2009 onwards, Eurobarometer has broadened its question about the two biggest policy problems so that respondents were asked about issues they personally face, in addition to what their country faces. A comparison of the two questions shows that migration is generally perceived as a bigger problem for countries than for individuals. At the personal level, the extent to which immigration is viewed as an issue has decreased in a manner similar to that at the country level. However, since the baseline in 2009 was lower, the observed decrease was correspondingly less pronounced.

³⁹ According to Cities of Migration, between 2000 and 2005 the Chinese population in the Emilia Romagna region registered an annual average increase of 20%. Furthermore, the Chinese Textile Community had a similar growth in order to aid the booming industry.

⁴⁰ The Spinner project was funded both by the European Social Fund and by the Regione Emilia Romagna during a 30-month period (2001-2003). Due to the positive results of this initiative, the funding was extended to 2006.

⁴¹ Intolerance against Roma grew in ten EU15 countries. Only intolerance against Muslims grew in an equally high number of instances over the same period of time.

⁴² The survey covered countries previously included in the 2009 EU-MIDIS (Minorities and Discrimination Survey) focusing on Roma (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and added four Western European countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain) where no large-scale comparative quantitative survey on the socio-economic situation of the Roma had been conducted before. The FRA plans to repeat the survey twice at the mid-term point and at the end of the Europe 2020 process.

⁴³ The highest administrative court struck down accompanying legislative provisions on the basis of their unconstitutionality. However, this does not appear to have put an end to official discriminatory practices as evidenced, for instance, by the forceful eviction of the Tor de' Cenci settlement near Rome in September 2012 (Gazetta del Sud, 2012)

⁴⁴ The EU framework for Roma integration is incorporated within the EU's 2020 strategy for a new growth path.

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About this report

This study, commissioned by the Open Society Foundations, aimed to situate the widely-shared perception of rising intolerance in Western Europe in the context of empirical evidence on high-level trends in intolerant attitudes in Western Europe. Through analysis of European datasets, a review of empirical literature, and assessments of trends in selected individual countries, we explored whether intolerance has risen more in some countries than others, whether it has risen more against particular groups, if such attitudes are particularly prevalent among subgroups of the population and if there are clear patterns of association with trends in wider political, social, economic and cultural factors.

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