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Countering Others’ Insurgencies

Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context

Stephen Watts, Jason H. Campbell, Patrick B. Johnston, Sameer Lalwani, Sarah H. Bana
Preface

This report documents the results of a project that assessed the reasons why counterinsurgents in the developing world so often adopt counter-insurgency strategies and practices at odds with U.S. preferences and how the United States can influence its potential partners’ choices in these conflicts.

The report is written for a general audience, although it is likely to be of particular interest to those in the foreign policy and defense communities, both civilian and military, concerned with counterinsurgency and security-sector assistance.

This research was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and foundations and other non-governmental organizations that support defense and national security analysis.

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With the United States exhausted by more than a decade of war and facing severe fiscal limitations, decisionmakers are striving to place American defense policy on a more sustainable footing. Central to this effort is a commitment to work through partner nations wherever possible, providing support to countries with which the United States shares interests or values while also ensuring that the primary responsibility for these nations’ security remains their own. Thus the document that currently guides U.S. defense policy states:

Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world . . . remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations. . . . Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives.1

This emphasis on partnership strategies is particularly central to U.S. efforts to manage the “security externalities” of fragile and conflict-affected states. Such states increase the risk of spillover conflicts throughout the region in which they occur, damage the economies of neighboring states, contribute to flourishing transnational crime networks, spread pandemic disease, and foster transnational terrorism.

When pursuing partnerships with regimes that are fighting insurgencies, however, the likelihood of success using such “small-footprint” approaches is inextricably bound with the local context and particularly the nature of the partner government. Too often the importance of local context is minimized in discussions of U.S. security strategy, particularly in relation to the problems of fragile states. Proponents of small-footprint and indirect approaches overwhelmingly cite as models the recent U.S. operations in the Philippines and Colombia—without providing any indication of the generalizability of these models.

This study seeks to understand the extent to which the “success stories” of U.S. partnerships such as those with the Philippines and Colombia can be generalized—or, phrased differently, to understand the conditions under which the small-footprint model is likely to succeed in bringing an end to an insurgency that both the United States and its partner seek to combat. It explores how local circumstances shape the “art of the possible” in such partnerships and how the United States can best maximize the potential and minimize the risks of these often uneasy alliances. More specifically, the study asks three central questions:

- Why do counterinsurgents adopt particular counterinsurgency strategies and practices?
- What are the likely consequences of these strategies, in terms of conflict outcomes and civilian casualties?
- When the United States finds a partner government’s counterinsurgency strategy and practices problematic, what can it do to influence its partner’s actions to improve the chances of a favorable outcome?

Research Findings

The answers to these questions provided in this report are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold
War (72 in all) to understand the manner in which they were fought and how they terminated. This broad overview frames more in-depth analyses of two important recent cases of U.S. partnerships, the Philippines and Pakistan, drawing on secondary literature, a wide variety of quantitative data sources, and interviews conducted with several dozen government officials, military officers, and civil society actors in the Philippines, Pakistan, and the United States.

The report finds that the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by regimes fighting rebellions are strongly shaped by the characteristics of these regimes—in particular, the degree to which they are politically inclusive and the extent of state capacity they possess. “Success stories” like the Philippines and Colombia have occurred in countries characterized by relatively inclusive politics and reasonable levels of state capacity. The governments of such countries typically adopt strategies that approximate the Western model of counterinsurgency, often (misleadingly) referred to as the “hearts-and-minds” approach. Unfortunately, only approximately one insurgency in eight occurs in such best-case countries. The majority of rebellions take place in worst-case conditions—that is, in countries that lack both inclusive politics and state capacity. Regimes in this latter category are prone to relying on blunt applications of military force to contain or suppress rebellion.

The quantitative analysis conducted in this study paints a stark picture of the different trajectories that conflicts follow in these best-case and worst-case environments. As shown in Figure S.1, only 13 percent of civil wars in the best-case environments fail to reach an outcome that the government finds acceptable (that is, either outright military victory or a negotiated settlement acceptable to both sides); the failure rate is nearly five times as high (60 percent) in the worst-case environments. Non-inclusive regimes are much more likely to suffer outright defeat than are more-inclusive ones. Weak regimes are much more likely to experience indeterminate ends to their conflicts, where insurgents retain their capabilities and de facto control over parts of the country.
Similarly, as shown in Figure S.2, whereas fewer than 10 percent of all politically inclusive regimes (high- and low-capacity combined) have resorted to indiscriminate violence as a tool of counterinsurgency, 39 percent of regimes that are less inclusive have used such tactics. In other words, the chances of wide-scale abuse by security forces are four times greater among less-favorable types of regimes than they are among the more-favorable types.

Case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan broadly support these quantitative findings. In both the Philippines and Pakistan, relatively more-democratic governments were more likely to adopt a classical counterinsurgency model that sought accommodation with the reconcilable opposition and used violence relatively discriminately. This tendency was particularly pronounced in regions where the governments possessed the necessary civil capacity to implement hearts-and-minds approaches. In contrast, during periods when these countries were ruled by more-autocratic governments and in regions where the state exercised little effective control, the governments were much
more likely to seek to contain and suppress insurgents through raw force.

The successes of U.S. operations in countries such as the Philippines appear to have more to do with the partner nation than they do with U.S. policies. This is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; to the contrary, the case study of the Philippines suggests that U.S. aid played a critical role in that country’s recent successes. But similar U.S. policies with less-promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. And as the quantitative analysis in this study reveals, the large majority of potential U.S. partner nations—including many that are central to ongoing U.S. counterterrorism efforts—are much less promising.

Of course, the fact that more than half of all insurgencies occur in countries governed by the least-favorable type of regime does not mean that more than half of all U.S. military interventions are likely to occur in such countries. Indeed, the historical record suggests that a disproportionate share of U.S. military interventions—somewhere in the vicinity of half—occur in best-case environments. This propensity might be explained by the fact that the odds of success are higher in such countries, or it may be that the United States shares many values
and interests with such states. It is sobering, however, to consider the number of least-favorable environments in which the United States has intervened and the levels of success it has experienced. Roughly half of U.S. interventions have been in these worst-case environments, and the record of U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq is hardly promising.

**Policy Implications**

Counterinsurgency is perhaps the most context-dependent activity in which militaries engage. Consequently, no universal set of policy prescriptions is possible. A few broad rules of thumb can nonetheless be discerned.

First, where U.S. and partner-nation interests fundamentally diverge, there is little hope of a productive partnership to combat an insurgency. The amount of U.S. leverage and information is too small for conditionality to be used effectively to overcome the divergence.

Second, conditionality can reasonably be used to enforce “red-lines,” where the United States would be willing to walk away from a partner if the partner crossed certain thresholds of acceptable behavior, or to press for a limited number of important but narrowly scoped reforms, or to take advantage of specific moments in time when more wide-ranging political change is possible. In most cases, however, it is extremely unlikely that conditionality can be used to press for more-fundamental transformations of partner nations in accordance with U.S.-preferred models of counterinsurgency.

Third, given the duration of most contemporary insurgencies and the length of time it typically takes to build state capacity or institutionalize mechanisms of political inclusion, the United States should enter into partnerships with the expectation that they will be long-term and will have relatively low odds of success in the short-to-medium term. Decisionmakers should carefully weigh their ability to make such long-term commitments, particularly where potential partner nations are problematic. With the memories of the September 11, 2001, attacks fading and public attention no longer monopolized by the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, decisionmakers should expect more critical scrutiny of such light-footprint engagements.

Beyond these broad rules of thumb, a number of specific mechanisms may be useful to manage partnerships with difficult partner regimes. Such mechanisms include the following:

- The United States can help partner regimes credibly commit to political compromises with reconcilable elements of the armed opposition through a variety of instruments, potentially including large-scale commitments of foreign aid and, in some contexts, international peace operations.

- Progress toward greater democracy is normally heavily contested, usually occurring only when incumbents are unable to resist demands for greater political inclusion. Periods of prolonged military stalemate in a civil war may provide such openings. In these cases, political reforms are less about alleviating popular grievances and winning the general population’s hearts and minds in order to defeat insurgents. Rather, they are about providing a framework in which reconcilable opposition leaders come to believe they can participate with minimal fears of persecution or marginalization. These processes typically do not look like Western conceptions of “democracy,” at least for many years, often two decades or more. But they can provide—and often have provided—a means for ending violent conflicts. Such fragile political systems require support in their initiation phase, and they require buttressing to prevent collapse. The United States and other international partner nations can help in both of these phases.

- The United States should make the principle of civilian oversight and other accountability mechanisms central to its security-sector assistance. As a general rule, the United States should also stress quality over quantity in developing partners’ security forces. This finding highlights the importance of imparting the necessary doctrine, leadership, discipline, and (where appropriate) technology to manageable numbers of partner-nation forces and then sustaining these qualitative improvements. Wherever possible,
partner-nation units receiving such assistance should be closely paired with U.S. forces to ensure that the United States has visibility into how its assistance is being used.

- Security forces that do not include members of the same ethnic or religious affiliation as the population in which they are operating are at particularly high risk of abusive behavior. The United States, therefore, should work with partner regimes to improve the representativeness of their security services. Unfortunately, incorporating personnel from disaffected populations during the course of intensive fighting risks subversion within these forces. The ideal time to integrate personnel from different communities, therefore, is before fighting erupts or, if that is not possible, as early within a conflict as possible.

- Unfortunately, all of the above prescriptions are long-term and uncertain. Moreover, they are all substantially more difficult to implement during ongoing fighting than in peacetime. These challenges suggest that security-sector reform efforts should be a central element of U.S. “phase-zero,” or peacetime, engagement strategy, not a peripheral concern or an issue to which significant resources are devoted only after a crisis erupts.
The authors are grateful to Nadia Schadlow of the Smith Richardson Foundation for her support throughout this study. The study relied on dozens of interviews with officials, military officers, and analysts from Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United States. To guarantee their anonymity, we cannot thank them by name, but we are greatly indebted to them for their insights. Special thanks are owed to COL (Ret.) Joseph Felter for his support and subject-matter expertise on both the United States and the Philippines. We thank Helge Holtermann and Benjamin Valentino for sharing their quantitative data with us. Emma Cutrufello provided valuable research assistance on security issues, and Katherine Pfrommer was extraordinarily helpful in providing quantitative and database support. Natalie Ziegler and Joy Merck provided expert assistance in formatting the draft document and preparing it for publication. Janet DeLand edited the final document and smoothed its many rough edges. We are grateful to Ambassador James Dobbins for his thoughtful suggestions and guidance in the early stages of the study. Finally, we thank Daniel Byman, Paul Miller, and Eric Peltz for their insightful reviews of the manuscript. The final report was much improved by their suggestions. The authors, of course, accept full responsibility for any remaining errors.
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJK</td>
<td>Azad Jammu and Kashmir</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHCD</td>
<td>clear-hold-consolidate-develop</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Philippines</td>
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<td>DSO</td>
<td>Development Support Operations</td>
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<td>EPPA</td>
<td>Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FC</td>
<td>Frontier Corps</td>
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<td>FM</td>
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<td>GoP</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
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<tr>
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<td>JI</td>
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<td>Joint Special Operations Group</td>
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<td>JSOTF-P</td>
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<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

With the United States exhausted by more than a decade of war and facing severe fiscal limitations, decisionmakers are striving to place American defense policy on a more sustainable footing. Central to this effort is a commitment to work through partner nations wherever possible, providing support to countries with which the United States shares interests or values while also ensuring that the primary responsibility for these nations’ security remains their own. Thus the document that currently guides U.S. defense policy states:

Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world . . . remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations. . . . Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives.¹

This emphasis on partnership strategies is particularly central to U.S. efforts to manage the “security externalities” of fragile and conflict-

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, January 2012, p. 3. Such a turn in U.S. defense policy is nothing new. In fact, the United States adopted a remarkably similar policy as it sought to extricate itself from the Vietnam War. In the speech in which he announced the “Vietnamization” of the Vietnam War, President Nixon proclaimed a core principle of what would become known as the Nixon Doctrine: “We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested . . . but we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense” (Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” November 3, 1969, P-691101).
affected states. Such states increase the risk of spillover conflicts throughout the region in which they occur, damage the economies of neighboring states, contribute to flourishing transnational crime networks, spread pandemic disease, and foster transnational terrorism. Yet U.S. interests in such states are seldom substantial enough to warrant large-scale interventions.

In many ways, this guidance encapsulates what has become the dominant sentiment within the U.S. defense community. Many of the best-known thinkers in this community have advocated “small-footprint” approaches to stabilizing fragile states over the past several years, and such thinking has become dominant within the Department of Defense.2

Such an approach has many advantages. Small investments in a country’s stability may prevent a crisis and thus the potential need for much more costly crisis-response measures. In addition, U.S. commitment to small-footprint approaches may send an important signal to irresponsible partner nations that might be tempted to escalate a latent conflict or fail to offer opponents reasonable concessions in anticipation of unlimited American support. Even if a conflict erupts, a commitment to small-footprint approaches helps to ensure that internal crises do not become “Americanized”—that is, the partner government is more likely to realize that it cannot “free ride” on an open-ended U.S. commitment, the armed opposition is less able to frame the conflict as one between local patriots and a foreign invader, and American

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military personnel, diplomats, and aid workers are more likely adapt to local circumstances rather than attempting to re-create a partner nation in the image of the United States.

The likelihood of success using the small-footprint, or indirect, approach in such circumstances is inextricably bound with the local context and particularly the nature of the partner government. Where the partner government is hopelessly corrupt, abusive toward its own population, or incompetent and ineffective, or where the partner government is pursuing goals that diverge significantly from those of the United States, the small-footprint approach can become deeply problematic. Generally speaking, the United States faces two risks when working with and through partner governments fighting counterinsurgencies and similar conflicts. First, there is the risk that the partner government will be ineffective, thus potentially embroiling the United States in a perpetual conflict. Second, there is the risk that the partner government will be abusive, potentially subjecting the United States to blowback from the populations that have been abused. Working with even highly problematic partners may be the appropriate policy choice, depending on the U.S. interests at stake and the goals of the U.S. partnership. But in such cases the United States should enter into these partnerships with eyes wide open to the likelihood of success and the potential risks.

Too often, the importance of local context is minimized in discussions of U.S. security strategy, particularly in relation to the problems of fragile states. Proponents of small-footprint and indirect approaches, for instance, overwhelmingly cite as models the recent U.S. operations in the Philippines and Colombia, without ever providing any indica-

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tion of the generalizability of these models. In fact, as this report will demonstrate, the conditions in the Philippines and Colombia were particularly favorable for small-footprint operations. The large majority of potential partner nations present considerably greater challenges to the United States’ renewed faith in indirect approaches.

This study examines U.S. partnerships with governments fighting counterinsurgencies—or, more specifically, the conditions under which the small-footprint model is likely to succeed in bringing an acceptable end to an insurgency that both the United States and its partner seek to combat. For the purposes of this analysis, an insurgency is essentially synonymous with a civil war and is defined as

an armed conflict that pits the government and national army of an internationally recognized state against one or more armed opposition groups able to mount effective resistance against the state; the violence must be significant, causing more than a thousand deaths in relatively continual fighting that takes place within the country’s boundaries; and the rebels must recruit mostly locally, controlling some part of the country’s territory.

The study seeks to understand how local circumstances shape the “art of the possible” in such contexts and how the United States can best maximize the potential and minimize the risks of these often uneasy alliances. More specifically, the study asks three central questions:

• Why do counterinsurgents adopt particular counterinsurgency strategies and practices?

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• What are the likely consequences of these strategies, in terms of conflict outcomes and civilian casualties?
• When the United States finds a partner government’s counterinsurgency strategy and practices problematic, what can it do to influence the partner’s actions to improve the chances of a favorable outcome?

The report’s answers to these questions are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. In Chapter Two, the policy and academic literature on counterinsurgency is reviewed to determine core principles of counterinsurgency and key areas in which counterinsurgency practice differs among those who practice it. From this discussion, a typology of counterinsurgent regimes is derived to suggest how the characteristics of potential U.S. partner nations shape the strategic choices available to them. In Chapter Three, simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all) to understand the manner in which these wars have been fought and the likely outcomes of wars fought by different types of counterinsurgent regimes.

This broad overview frames more in-depth analyses of two important recent U.S. partnerships, those with the Philippines and Pakistan (Chapters Four and Five, respectively). On the basis of the quantitative analysis, the Philippines was selected to represent a U.S. partnership in a promising environment. Pakistan was selected to represent a much more challenging environment for the small-footprint approach. These case studies combine insights from secondary literature, a wide variety of quantitative data sources, and interviews conducted with several dozen government officials, military officers, and civil society actors in the Philippines, Pakistan, and the United States.

In Chapter Six, the implications of the quantitative analysis and case studies for U.S. partnership strategies are discussed. Two broad partnership strategies are outlined, along with a number of specific mechanisms for managing difficult partnerships. The chapter concludes with a summary of the implications of the research findings for U.S. foreign and security policy.
The report makes three central arguments, all of which represent potentially important contributions to our understanding of counterinsurgency and U.S. partnership strategies.

First, although there are certain universal (or near-universal) principles that can be extracted from Western counterinsurgency doctrine, not every counterinsurgent is equally capable of implementing these principles. Understanding context—and in particular, the characteristics of the counterinsurgent regime—is critically important to understanding the wide variety of counterinsurgency strategies and practices that can be observed throughout the world.

Second, the “success stories” of U.S. light-footprint interventions (especially in Colombia and the Philippines) represent relatively promising types of partner nations. Unfortunately, only about one in eight counterinsurgencies in the post–Cold War period has been fought by a regime that scores as highly on critical characteristics as do Colombia and the Philippines. The vast majority of regimes fighting insurgencies have much less-favorable characteristics, and consequently, their chances of pursuing a counterinsurgency strategy compatible with U.S. preferences are much lower. We should not generalize from U.S. experiences in Colombia and the Philippines and assume that similar indirect approaches will work elsewhere; in fact, the odds are against such successes.

Finally, except in rare circumstances, the United States is unlikely to be able to exert sufficient leverage on partner nations to induce the regimes to undertake transformational reforms. Recognizing the limits of its influence, the United States should avoid committing to certain partner nations altogether. Where U.S. security interests are such that it cannot afford to remain disengaged, there are options the United States can pursue to induce more modest changes in its partners’ counterinsurgency practices. These alternative approaches are all problematic, but in the conditions that characterize a substantial portion of potential U.S. partners, they are the best that can realistically be adopted.
This study examines the strategies and practices that regimes adopt when fighting insurgencies. Other studies have examined the strategies and practices that counterinsurgents supposedly should adopt, and still others have focused on how external powers can help to provide them the capabilities with which to conduct counterinsurgency. Surprisingly, few studies have systematically examined how regimes actually do practice counterinsurgency.  Fewer still have assessed whether the capabilities the United States or other outside actors provide to these regimes are used in support of counterinsurgency models that are likely to produce the strategic effects desired by the regimes’ sponsors.

The existing policy literature is focused overwhelmingly on the experience of the United States and other Western nations. The ends and means of counterinsurgency are frequently taken as a given, leading quickly to a narrow focus on operations and tactics. Such a focus is understandable: Over the past decade, the United States has faced the urgent task of dealing with its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States plans for the drawdown of its military presence in Afghanistan and contemplates a wider range of light-footprint “shaping” activities throughout the world, however, it is important for the defense community to broaden its perspective.

In this chapter, we first briefly review the current state of thinking on counterinsurgency within the U.S. defense community and the limitations of that view. Next, we examine counterinsurgency strategy from a broader perspective, seeking to understand the many different approaches that countries adopt when fighting internal wars. We then propose possible explanations for the implementation by many developing countries of counterinsurgency strategies and practices that are at odds with those preferred by the United States. The chapter concludes with a typology of counterinsurgent regimes, illustrating the wide range of potential partner nations with which the United States must negotiate and the need for the United States to adapt its policies to each type of regime. The historical record of counterinsurgency practiced by each of these types of regimes is reviewed in Chapter Three.

**Current American Counterinsurgency Thought**

The current official U.S. doctrine on counterinsurgency represents an enormous evolution from the thinking that predominated a decade ago. That thinking provided critical insights for Americans deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan (OEF-A), but its evolution was deeply shaped by the requirements of the war in Iraq. As a result, U.S. doctrine has faced significant limitations in Afghanistan and even more in other theaters where the U.S. footprint is a small fraction of the massive presence it maintained in OIF and the later years of OEF-A. In particular, official

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4 These limitations have been broadly recognized and have spurred U.S. practitioners to begin expanding and adapting policy guidance for these conflicts. In January 2009, the *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* was published, incorporating the insights of nine government
American thinking has been limited by a failure to grapple sufficiently with the strategic dimension of counterinsurgency and by its focus on the Western experience of expeditionary counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency is often conflated with a particular way of war—exemplified, for example, by the “hearts-and-minds” approach so often advocated in the Western counterinsurgency community. Yet by itself, counterinsurgency is simply a type of military operation, and it is conducted differently by different countries.5

When we shift our view from the most frequently discussed counterinsurgency campaigns—the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, more distantly, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the British experience in Malaya—to a broader range of contingencies, the variation in counterinsurgency approaches becomes evident. Substantial variation can be seen even in recent U.S. interventions, including in Iraq (where the United States dedicated substantial resources) and in Yemen and Somalia (where it did not). If we broaden our focus to the experience of other countries, we see practices ranging from scorched-earth tactics, to forcible efforts to alter the ethnic balance of a rebellious region, to relatively hands-off approaches designed only to contain an insurgency, to population-centric policies more reminiscent of the hearts-and-minds approach ostensibly favored by countries like the United States and the United Kingdom.

Unfortunately, most of the policy literature on counterinsurgency offers little insight into how developing countries have fought their own insurgencies. It generally suffers from a bias toward Western or other external interventions, largely to the neglect of indigenous incumbents

5 See, for instance, Hammes, 2012, p. 49, and remarks by Eliot Cohen, “To COIN or Not?” transcript from a roundtable discussion co-sponsored by Foreign Policy and the RAND Corporation, March 18, 2013.
(that is, regimes fighting insurgencies within their own countries). Such regimes constitute roughly 81 percent of the post-1945 counter-insurgencies and 97 percent of those since 1990, yet the literature typically focuses on counterinsurgency conducted by foreign militaries.6 An examination of the policy-oriented Journal of Strategic Studies illustrates this point. Between the early 1990s and the writing of this report, the journal published 82 articles on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism; 93 percent of them contained case studies, but only 26 percent contained case studies of non-Western domestic incumbents. A similar pattern is found in International Security, where only 21 percent (nine articles) of the 43 articles since 1996 that mention counterinsurgency and deal with the subject of state response to violent non-state actors include a domestic-incumbent case study, while 65 percent (28 articles) focus on campaigns by foreign interveners. Excluding Israel and the Soviet Union/Russia, that figure falls to 12 percent (ten articles). The result is a limited understanding of the way much of the world strategizes for and fights insurgencies.

Perhaps the greatest departure between the classic-counterinsurgency literature and the recent track record of insurgencies in the developing world is the former’s focus on institution-building and attaining a monopoly on violence. Political elites equipped with limited resources engage in cost-benefit analysis to determine what they consider to be an acceptable outcome. This calculus often results in policies aimed more at mitigating the harm caused by an insurgency than at achieving a decisive defeat. As Paul Staniland contends, “Informal bargains, collusive state-insurgent relationships, and shared sovereignty are often less costly and more enduring than trying to build strong states, an endeavor that integrally involves coercion, extraction, and centralization.”7 If the reach of the national government is weak, it is not uncommon to find local officials colluding with insurgent elements


to keep violence levels down or to mutually profit from illicit economies. If the insurgency is confined to a region deemed by national elites to be of secondary importance, it may be largely ignored.\(^8\)

Relatively little of counterinsurgency, in other words, is actually practiced the way U.S. military doctrine prescribes. As the United States shifts to a global strategy that emphasizes security partnerships and small-footprint approaches, it will increasingly need to adapt its policies to the realities of counterinsurgency as practiced by partners throughout the developing world.

**Varieties of Counterinsurgency**

Soldiers who have actually had to fight in counterinsurgencies often claim that all insurgencies are unique; no lessons can be universally applied, because the circumstances of each conflict are so different.\(^9\) Although it is certainly true that counterinsurgency is highly context-dependent, a number of patterns emerge in the ways that different countries choose to fight counterinsurgencies and the likely consequences of such choices. This section examines the range of counterinsurgency strategies that different countries adopt, and the following section explores why regimes adopt particular counterinsurgency strategies and practices.

Three principles of counterinsurgency characterize the predominant Western approach:

- The counterinsurgent regime should seek accommodation—including opportunities for participation in the governance of the country—with the *reconcilable* armed opposition.
- The counterinsurgent regime should use violence discriminately (i.e., should avoid harming the general civilian population) when

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targeting the *irreconcilable* opposition, or “hard core,” of the insurgency.

- The counterinsurgent regime should provide public goods (including both security and various social services such as education and health care) to disaffected populations in order to ensure their loyalty and prevent their support of insurgent groups.

These three principles have been articulated with remarkable consistency from the early “classics” of the Western counterinsurgency canon such as those of David Galula and Sir Robert Thompson through to the recent U.S. field manual on counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.¹⁰

As discussed in detail below, there is reason to believe that two core principles of Western counterinsurgency doctrine—the need to accommodate the reconcilable opposition and the need to use violence discriminately against irreconcilable armed groups—are applicable to the large majority of counterinsurgencies. Many counterinsurgent regimes stray from these principles, and some have been successful while adopting harsher approaches, but the past several decades of experience suggest that regimes following those two principles are more likely to terminate their internal wars on satisfactory terms.

The third principle—the requirement to provide public goods to the general population—has much less universal applicability. Indeed, Western counterinsurgency thinking has in many ways been hampered by a focus on a state-building model overly influenced by the European experience.

**Bounded Accommodation**

The need to bring the reconcilable opposition into the political process has long been recognized, but its importance has increased in recent decades as the dynamics of insurgencies have changed.

Insurgencies endure much longer than they once did: The average duration of civil wars in the period immediately after World War

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II was only approximately two years, but by the post–Cold War era, their duration had risen to about 15 years. This trend is rooted in a number of factors that appear unlikely to change, including the increasing availability of small arms and light weapons, the widespread adoption of guerrilla tactics, the ready availability of rebel funding through the trafficking of contraband, and the general unwillingness of major powers to make large and indefinite commitments to allies in the developing world. This steady upward trend in the duration of insurgencies suggests that it is increasingly difficult to end these conflicts through outright military victory.

These conflicts are also extremely damaging to the countries in which they are fought—so much so that they have been described as “development in reverse.” Consequently, leaders with a stake in the post-conflict future of their country may well decide that offering at least portions of the armed opposition the opportunity to share in power is superior to a long and damaging fight to the finish.

Moreover, insurgencies have extremely damaging consequences beyond the borders of the country originally affected: They generally increase the risk of spillover conflicts throughout the region in which they occur, damage the economies of neighboring states, contribute to flourishing transnational crime networks, spread pandemic disease, and foster transnational terrorism. Unless outside powers are willing


14 Collier et al., 2003, Ch. 2.
to intervene decisively in these conflicts (a rare occurrence\textsuperscript{15}), the international community has a vested interest in ensuring some form of negotiated settlement and working to enforce it on the warring parties.

Given these trends, it is not surprising that a growing proportion of internal conflicts end in negotiated settlements, cease-fires, or stalemates. Whereas the vast majority of civil wars in the decades after World War II ended in military victory for one side or the other, now only a minority do.\textsuperscript{16} Regimes that find it difficult to accommodate the reconcilable opposition are therefore increasingly likely to consign themselves to lengthy, costly wars. They eventually find themselves either facing outright defeat, yielding concessions in the end, or co-existing indefinitely with an insurgency that exercises de facto control over parts of the country.

Determining which segments of the opposition are reconcilable is, of course, rarely a straightforward matter. Groups with limited, clearly defined political objectives seldom need to resort to insurgency in the first place against governments that are willing to accommodate the reconcilable opposition. In most cases, reaching accommodation with insurgents is instead achieved through an iterated process of fighting and talking. As the costs of continued fighting become clear, the outlines of an acceptable compromise begin to emerge—at least for those warring parties whose minimum acceptable outcomes are compatible with one another’s. In many conflicts, however, portions of the opposition have minimum acceptable outcomes that will never coincide with the government’s. Any accommodation with these parties is inevitably tactical—a pause before renewed hostilities.\textsuperscript{17} Thus,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Stephen Watts, Caroline Baxter, Molly Dunigan, and Christopher Rizzi, \textit{The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions}, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2012.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Toft, 2010, Ch. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{17} These distinctions between different types of insurgents parallel those in Stephen Stedman’s typology of “spoilers,” in which he divides parties that can undermine peace processes into three groups: what he terms \textit{limited}, \textit{greedy}, and \textit{total}. The reconcilable opposition corresponds to the first two of these groups, while the irreconcilable opposition corresponds to the last. See Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” \textit{International Security}, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 1997, pp. 5–53.
\end{itemize}
while accommodation with a significant portion of the armed opposition is increasingly necessary to end insurgencies, accommodation cannot be open-ended. We therefore refer to this principle as *bounded accommodation*—reconciliation with those portions of the opposition that can be accommodated without sacrificing the core interests of the government. For the remainder of the insurgency, the irreconcilable opposition, the counterinsurgent’s only realistic alternative is the continued use of force. Even when confronting the hard core of insurgents, however, violence must be used discriminately.

**Discriminate Violence**

There is strong support for the notion that government use of force usually must be discriminate to be successful. If the government employs violence only against those who oppose it while leaving unharmed those who are neutral, the population has considerable incentive to avoid opposing the government. On the other hand, if neutrality is no guarantee of safety (that is, if violence is indiscriminate), the population is much more likely to seek safety or payment from rebels. There is significant evidence to suggest that, much like the need to accommodate the reconcilable opposition, the imperative to use force discriminately is a counterinsurgency principle with broad applicability.

**Provision of Public Goods**

While there is a consensus of opinion on the first two elements of classical Western counterinsurgency doctrine, there is no such consensus on the need for the state to provide public goods to its population as

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part of a counterinsurgency strategy. Given the slow pace at which state-building usually progresses and the myriad ways in which many regimes abuse their capacity, efforts to improve the state’s ability to deliver public goods among discontented populations may in fact undermine counterinsurgency goals.

This claim challenges much recent orthodoxy on counterinsurgency and “good practice” for fragile states. The U.S. Army’s doctrine for stabilizing fragile states, for instance, charges the Army with helping the host nation provide health care and education and assert control over the illicit economy.\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, in a recent guide to repairing fragile states, the World Bank asserted that “[a] long-term focus on state capacity . . . is critical in all fragile state contexts if these countries are ever to find a durable exit from crisis.”\textsuperscript{21} Some research has also supported the contention that provision of public goods is key to counterinsurgent victory, but others have reached different conclusions.\textsuperscript{22}

As a long-term goal, state-building efforts are entirely reasonable. But durable improvements in state capacity typically require decades.\textsuperscript{23} In the meantime, efforts to expand state control may be counterproductive, at least in those countries with little history of a powerful state. In many countries, the state has historically exercised little authority in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} U.S. Department of the Army, \textit{Stability,} Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05, August 2012, p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{21} The World Bank, \textit{Fragile States: Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies,} Washington, D.C., 2005, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{22} See especially, Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010, 2013, for research in favor of this view. For a contrasting perspective, see Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” \textit{Journal of Political Economy,} Vol. 119, No. 4, August 2011, pp. 766–819. Note that Paul’s work examines specific practices rather than regimes’ ability to implement those practices. It may well be that highly capable states are more likely to succeed in counterinsurgency campaigns if they provide public goods, while efforts by extremely weak states to provide public goods may have the opposite effect. The importance of understanding the character of the counterinsurgent regime is a theme to which this report frequently returns.
\end{itemize}
Peripheral regions remote from the major cities.\textsuperscript{24} Attempting to rapidly build state capacity in such regions risks alienating populations who have traditionally mistrusted the state—often with good reason.

As long as control over resources is divided equitably between the regime and the armed opposition, the record of civil-war termination suggests that insurgencies can be brought to a satisfactory end without extending the state’s reach. Indeed, many peace deals are predicated on informal understandings and a tacit acknowledgment by state leaders that the regime will exercise little effective control in remote regions. In Mali, for instance, the formal democratization and decentralization that underlay the peace that the country enjoyed from the latter 1990s until recently was accompanied with a more informal acceptance of the fact that the central state would exercise less control over even illegal activities in the north of the country.

Nevertheless, it is important to be clear about the limitations of such peace deals. They often prove less durable than more formal arrangements, in part because they typically provide few institutionalized conflict-resolution mechanisms between the warring communities.\textsuperscript{25} They accept the continued existence of spaces with little formal governance in which terrorist organizations and transnational criminal networks may flourish.\textsuperscript{26} And they often provide a poor framework for long-term development, which is usually thought to require the rule of law and expectations of durable stability. Informal understandings are


clearly second-best alternatives to more institutionalized frameworks, but in many cases, they may be the best realistic alternative available.

A Typology of Counterinsurgency Models

Counterinsurgent regimes’ strategies and practices can be understood in terms of the three principles discussed above: the political accommodation of the reconcilable armed opposition, the discriminate use of violence, and the provision of public goods to disaffected communities. As Figure 2.1 suggests, a variety of counterinsurgency models can exist within these three dimensions.

More specifically, we can discern four different models or “ideal types” of strategies of particular interest:

27 Other strategies besides these four are, of course, feasible. As the remainder of this chapter and Chapter Three reveal, however, these four appear to be particularly common in practice.
1. **Classic counterinsurgency.** The classic Western approach to counterinsurgency emphasizes the three principles outlined above. It is not purely a hearts-and-minds approach in that it recognizes the importance of the well-targeted use of force, but it places stronger emphasis on an inclusive, capable, and accountable government than do the other strategies. This strategy is most often associated with the United Kingdom and the United States and, to a lesser degree, France—highly capable Western democracies.

2. **Strong-state repression.** On the opposite corner of the front side of the diagram in Figure 2.1 lies strong-state repression, a strategy associated with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Russia in Chechnya, and—at the lower end of the conflict spectrum—Egypt’s repression of Islamists in the 1990s. In this approach, the regime is unable or unwilling to offer accommodations to any part of the opposition, relying instead on broad, often indiscriminate use of force and terror to suppress organized dissent. Frequently, however, such regimes offer substantial services to the general population, in part in an effort to “buy off” discontent.

3. **Informal accommodation.** At the back of the three-dimensional space in Figure 2.1, we find strategies in which central governments are unable or unwilling to provide public goods to discontented populations—typically those in rural or peripheral regions, far away from the cities over which the regime maintains stronger control. Although the state does not provide substantial services in these regions, however, this does not mean that the regime cannot reach an accommodation with the armed opposition. Weak states are often able to reach peace agreements with insurgents. Such deals—which we term informal accommodation—usually are tacit understandings. Members of the armed opposition may be offered a variety of “participation rights” in the government, ranging from leadership positions to guarantees of participation in the security services or civil bureaucracy. Perhaps even more important, informal accommodation normally entails tacit agreement on
the armed opposition’s control over territory and various illicit or semi-licit economic activities such as smuggling, unlicensed resource extraction (e.g., narcotics trafficking, illicit timber sales, or trade in “conflict diamonds”) or the steering of foreign aid to the insurgents’ supporters. As noted above, the Bamako government adopted such an approach in 1996 to bring peace to northern Mali.

4. **Containment.** Finally, weak states that are unable or unwilling to accommodate the reconcilable opposition typically rely on containment strategies, depicted in the bottom left-hand corner of the back of Figure 2.1. Such strategies accept that some level of residual violence is the inevitable result of an inability to exercise effective control or to coopt the armed opposition. The counterinsurgent regime uses force—usually indiscriminately—to repress insurgent activity whenever it becomes too threatening to the regime. As long as the insurgents stay within certain (usually ill-defined) bounds, the regime typically accepts their presence and concomitant limits on its control over portions of its population and territory. Such containment strategies have been adopted at various points by the ruling regimes of countries such as Myanmar and Yemen.

Each of these approaches to counterinsurgency is potentially viable. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, for instance, was able to crush Kurdish and Shiite insurgencies through strong-state repression. Similarly, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, Pakistan has relied on containment strategies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for decades. However, there is substantial evidence that the strategies in the upper right-hand corners of Figure 2.1—classic counterinsurgency and informal accommodation—are most often successful in the current international environment, where small arms and light weapons abound, guerrilla tactics and illicit economies make insurgents extremely resilient, and major powers exhibit little willingness to commit to extensive interventions on behalf of client regimes.

The designation of these strategies as models or ideal types indicates that no country practices counterinsurgency in a “pure” form. Indeed, even the United Kingdom, perhaps the foremost proponent of
the classic counterinsurgency strategy, has never truly practiced counterinsurgency as its doctrine would suggest.\textsuperscript{28} Creating these conceptual “bins” is nonetheless useful for understanding in general terms the major differences counterinsurgency practiced by various regimes. Moreover, the historical record reveals that there are clear patterns in which types of regimes adopt these different approaches.

**Determinants of Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice**

Given the considerable evidence that suggests that accommodating the reconcilable opposition and applying violence discriminately maximize a regime’s chances of waging counterinsurgency successfully, why do all counterinsurgents not adopt this approach? The answer appears to be that not all regimes can apply these principles with equal success.

Both the policy and academic literatures suggest that two characteristics of a regime are particularly important in determining how it will prosecute counterinsurgency: its degree of political inclusion and the extent of its capacity.

These characteristics, as well as the extent of the regime’s military superiority, lie at the center of the analysis in this section and in Chapter Three. Here, we explain why different types of counterinsurgent regimes are likely to adopt different counterinsurgency strategies and practices and discuss the likely implications of these choices for achieving negotiated settlements with the armed opposition and using force discriminately. Chapter Three examines the record of the past two decades to determine the extent to which the characteristics of counterinsurgent regimes can explain outcomes in these wars. As will be seen, those characteristics shape the ability of the United States to positively influence regimes’ counterinsurgency practices.

**Political Inclusion**

The first critical characteristic of counterinsurgent regimes, political inclusiveness, is understood here as the extent to which organized

political actors are afforded opportunities to meaningfully influence the formulation and execution of public policies.\textsuperscript{29} Relatively few of the countries fighting insurgencies could be understood to be “democracies,” as the term is typically conceived. Especially in recent decades, however, a great many conflict-affected states have significant democratic characteristics and meaningful opportunities for opposition groups to participate in influencing politics.

A central lesson to be learned from both the policy and academic literatures is that non-democratic regimes find it difficult to accommodate elements of the armed opposition. There are at least two reasons why more-democratic regimes find it easier to accommodate the reconcilable opposition:

- **Breadth of coalitions.** Non-democratic regimes are often based on narrow coalitions that would be highly threatened by major concessions to the opposition, even if top leaders wanted to compromise.\textsuperscript{30}

- **Ability to make credible commitments.** Non-democratic regimes may be willing to make concessions, and there may be sufficient areas of mutual agreement between the regime and the armed opposition to make a peace deal possible. But the regime may find it difficult to convince the opposition of the credibility of its commitment to compromise due to a lack of institutionalized “hand-tying” mechanisms.\textsuperscript{31} The opposition, in other words, is likely to fear that any concessions made by the gov-

\textsuperscript{29} This concept is similar to Dahl’s concept of “polyarchy,” See Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972.


ernment under the threat of continued insurgency will be withdrawn as soon as the insurgents disband. The accountability mechanisms that might prevent a regime from reneging on its commitments—institutions such as a free press, courts to uphold agreements, guaranteed levels of representation or veto rights in legislatures, etc.—are typically much weaker in autocracies than in democracies.

If more-democratic regimes are in fact better able to accommodate the reconcilable opposition, we should see a number of patterns in the way wars terminate. More-democratic regimes should be better able to broker formal peace deals with the armed opposition. Consequently, unless their record of military victory is poorer than that of less-democratic regimes, they should also be more capable of securing a favorable outcome—that is, either a victory or a formally negotiated settlement that meets at least the minimum demands of all parties. If more-democratic regimes are in fact better able to accommodate the reconcilable opposition, we should see a number of patterns in the way wars terminate. More-democratic regimes should be better able to broker formal peace deals with the armed opposition. Consequently, unless their record of military victory is poorer than that of less-democratic regimes, they should also be more capable of securing a favorable outcome—that is, either a victory or a formally negotiated settlement that meets at least the minimum demands of all parties. Finally, they should be able to better sustain the peace in the post-conflict period due to the presence of institutions that promote transparency and accountability, such as a free press.


32 The existing literature has not reached a consensus about the effects of democracy on counterinsurgency outcomes. Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010, maintain that democracy is weakly associated with counterinsurgent victory, but updated work in Paul et al., 2013, finds no such relationship. Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki find a very complex relationship between democracy and victory. See Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-965-MCIA, 2010, pp. 186–187. Jason Lyall finds no relationship. See Jason Lyall, “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Re-assessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration,” *International Organization*, Vol. 64, Winter 2010b, pp. 167–192. It is important to note that the research in this report is focusing on the post–Cold War era, while these other studies examined much longer periods of time. There are many reasons to believe that the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency have shifted in recent decades, making it more necessary for regimes now to reach an accommodation with the reconcilable elements of the armed opposition. We have not examined previous eras (i.e., the Cold War era or earlier) to determine how this relationship has changed over time, although there remains much important research to be done on this topic.
There is also reason to believe that greater political inclusion restricts a regime’s ability to use violence indiscriminately. The relationship is greatly tempered, however, by the fact that counterinsurgency is typically a particularly brutal form of conflict—a fact that not even the best-intentioned regimes can escape.

Numerous examples exist of public opinion restraining democracies’ use of violence in expeditionary counterinsurgency.33 More-systematic studies of domestic counterinsurgency, however, have only recently begun to disentangle the ways in which democratic accountability may restrain the use of indiscriminate violence in such campaigns. Two mechanisms in particular stand out:

- **Transparency and public accountability.** Democracies have robust civil societies, including a free press and advocacy organizations, that can expose brutal and repressive practices carried out by the regime. They also have numerous channels through which citizens can express their preferences and hold government leaders accountable.

- **Executive constraints.** Democracies typically diffuse executive power and more effectively constrain executive autonomy than do autocracies, providing more opportunities for other sectors of the government to restrain abusive security services.34

Existing evidence suggests a generally positive relationship between democracy and the discriminate use of force. Democracies are much less likely to engage in genocide and similar campaigns.35

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Evidence about lesser forms of indiscriminate violence is more mixed. Although “consolidated democracies” are generally agreed to be the least likely form of government to conduct violent repression, what have alternatively been labeled “intermediate,” “hybrid,” or “illiberal” democracies may be as likely as autocracies to engage in such acts.³⁶

**State Capacity**

The second critical characteristic of the counterinsurgent is state capacity—what Samuel Huntington called the degree rather than the type of government.³⁷ Like political inclusiveness, state capacity is an important determinant of a regime’s ability to reach acceptable accommodations with armed opposition groups. In particular, state capacity can influence a regime’s ability to achieve negotiated outcomes in two ways:

- **Provision of public goods.** Both U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and academic studies suggest that governments gain the support of their populations through the widespread and effective provision of public goods such as public sanitation and health services, physical infrastructure (e.g., roads and bridges), and education.³⁸ If the government can provide few services that are

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desired by insurgents or the populations that support them, it has few “carrots” with which to pursue accommodation with the armed opposition. As a result, it will be more dependent on either accepting de facto insurgent control over portions of territory and population (as in the informal accommodation or containment strategies) or winning an outright military victory.

- **Support for coercive capabilities.** Unfortunately, weak state capacity also limits the state’s ability to coerce insurgents. If the state does not penetrate relatively deeply into the social life of ordinary people, it is difficult for the regime to acquire the information necessary to identify insurgents.39

State capacity may also influence a regime’s ability to use force discriminately. The propensity to engage in indiscriminate violence may be influenced by several mechanisms:

- **Sustainment and discipline.** Strong, capable states are more likely to be able to pay their forces regularly and provide them with necessary supplies and other material support, and they are more likely to be able to effectively monitor the performance of their agents in the field and discipline personnel who behave in abusive, predatory, or counterproductive ways.40

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40 Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 80, for instance, argues that “effective counterinsurgency requires government forces to distinguish active rebels from noncombatants without destroying the lives and living conditions of the latter. This is an extremely difficult political, military, and organizational problem even for well-equipped and well-paid modern militaries. . . . For less well-financed and bureaucratically competent states, the problem appears to be nearly insoluble. Such states either cannot prevent the abuse of local powers by field commanders or may even permit these abuses as a sort of tax farming to the military. That is, they ‘pay’ the soldiers with the opportunity to loot and pillage, a practice that tends to sustain rather than end insurgencies.” Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells argue that government forces have become almost indistinguishable from rebels in many conflicts, particularly in the post–Cold War era. See Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 3, August 2010, pp. 415–429. Perhaps the
ity over and discipline among counterinsurgent forces are often less a function of democracy than of state capacity; even well-intentioned democratic leaders may be unable to prevent indiscriminate violence if the state is unable to sustain its personnel and discipline abuses of authority.

- **Futility.** Weak regimes may rely excessively on “sticks” because they have too few “carrots” to offer disaffected populations. If the regime cannot effectively provide public services to its population, it may feel that it must resort to terror tactics to compel obedience, if not loyalty.\(^\text{41}\)

### Military Superiority

Counterinsurgency is, in the end, a form of warfare. The quality of governance provided by the regime is critical, but without the requisite military capabilities, governance is inadequate. Violent conflict emerges precisely because the parties to the conflict cannot find a mutually acceptable solution to their disagreements within existing political mechanisms. Even if the government improves the quality of its governance during the course of an insurgency, a political solution that does not sacrifice core government interests requires at a minimum a military stalemate, if not the clear superiority of the governing forces.\(^\text{42}\)

For this reason, many observers have argued that the military capabilities of a regime are a third determinant of counterinsurgency approaches and outcomes. We argue that military capabilities play an important role, but their effects can be understood only in terms of the regime for which they fight. Consequently, we examine the effects of military capabilities throughout this study and, in particular, their


ability to achieve outright military victory, but we do not believe that they by themselves will determine a regime’s ability to reach a negotiated settlement or its propensity to use violence discriminately.

**Measures and Predictions**

The examination of counterinsurgents’ characteristics and their consequences suggests four broad generalizations about their likely behavior:

- Regimes that are more politically inclusive and have higher degrees of state capacity are more likely to adopt the classical approach to counterinsurgency.
- Regimes that are more politically inclusive but possess only weak state capacity are more likely to adopt informal accommodation as their predominant strategy.
- Regimes that are less politically inclusive and have higher degrees of state capacity are more likely to engage in strong-state repression.
- Regimes that are less politically inclusive and possess weak state capacity are more likely to pursue containment strategies.

These generalizations are summarized in Table 2.1.

Predictions are not particularly helpful, however, without indicators of the key causal variables—we need to know how to characterize a particular regime before we can predict what its likely behavior will

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Characteristics</th>
<th>Predominant Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Inclusivity</td>
<td>State Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Fortunately, considerable efforts have been made to measure the key characteristics of counterinsurgent regimes by the academic and research communities. While all of the measures have been criticized, they provide a reasonable approximation of the underlying concepts. Moreover, from a more practical perspective, each of the measures can predict regime behavior, as demonstrated in Chapter Three.

The first key characteristic of counterinsurgent regimes, their degree of political inclusion, can be approximated with the Freedom House index of democracy, using the midpoint of the Freedom House scale as the basis for distinguishing between more- and less-inclusive regimes. This measure provides an acceptable approximation of the underlying concept, with full coverage of all the countries in our sample for all of the years under review.

We rely on two indications of the second critical determinant of counterinsurgency strategies and practices, state capacity. One may be called state reach, the ability of the state to exercise influence within society. States with poor state reach are characterized by “low state penetration and capacity; a rural, scattered settlement structure; and poor communications.” The other may be termed government effectiveness, a world governance indicator (WGI) defined by researchers at the World Bank as “the quality of public services, the quality of the...

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43 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*, Washington, D.C., 2013. As described in greater detail in Chapter Three and the Appendix, Freedom House scores were based on three different time periods: the average score of the country throughout all years of conflict, the average score in the final two years of conflict, and the average score from the five years prior to the conflict’s onset.

44 Holtermann, 2012, p. 63. This variable is constructed as an index of three different factors: road density, proportion of the population that is urban, and telephone density. Unfortunately, the data do not cover the entire period of the conflicts under review. Consequently, we were forced to use the entire post–Cold War period as the basis for each country’s state-reach score. Doing so clearly introduces some degree of distortion to the measure; countries in which conflicts terminated in the early post–Cold War period, for instance, are more likely to have a higher state-reach score than countries with conflicts that endured for much of the post–Cold War period because the former states would have had more years of peace (and thus opportunity to recover from wartime destruction) in the period being measured. Despite this limitation, the state-reach variable still does a creditable job of differentiating lower- and higher-capacity states. As with the rest of the quantitative analysis, details may be found in the Appendix. The authors are grateful to Helge Holtermann for sharing his data.
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.\textsuperscript{45}

Finally, military superiority in counterinsurgency has traditionally been measured in terms of force-to-force ratios or force-to-population ratios—that is, the ratio of government forces to insurgent forces or the ratio of government forces to the population (typically expressed in terms of government forces for each 1,000 inhabitants of a country).\textsuperscript{46} James T. Quinlivan argued that force-to-population ratios are the most appropriate rule of thumb for sizing forces in counterinsurgency:

A “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency campaign places the focus on the people, the military consequences of which are requirements for population control measures and local security of the population. Population control measures and local security both demand security force numbers proportional to the population.\textsuperscript{47}

Others have argued instead that force-to-force ratios are the more appropriate measure.\textsuperscript{48} Unfortunately, there is very little standardized

\textsuperscript{45} Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, \textit{Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996–2008}, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper 4978, June 2009, p. 6. As with the state-reach variable, the limited number of years for which data were available meant that we were forced to use available data for the entire post–Cold War period rather than data from only the period of conflict. Similarly, despite this limitation of the data, government effectiveness remains a useful—if rough—measure of the underlying concept.


\textsuperscript{48} FM 3-24 suggests the use of both measures.
data on police forces. Consequently, we have had to rely strictly on numbers of government military forces.49

The indicators discussed here are only crude approximations of the underlying concepts. However, by relying on multiple measures and examining a sizable number of cases, and by comparing the generalizations we observe in these data with the specific dynamics we observe in our case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan, we can have a substantial degree of confidence in the results.

Together, these variables can explain a great deal about why counterinsurgents adopt particular counterinsurgency strategies and practices. Table 2.2 provides a typology of counterinsurgent regimes based on the characteristics outlined in this discussion, and it offers predictions about the type of strategy each type of regime is most likely to adopt. Chapter Three reviews the record of recent insurgencies to determine the extent to which regime characteristics do, in fact, shape counterinsurgent behavior in the ways that the findings reviewed above would suggest. The case studies in Chapters Four and Five examine how differences in political inclusiveness and state capacity over time and between subregions can provide a more nuanced understanding of the variation in counterinsurgency policies within particular countries.

Table 2.2
A Typology of Counterinsurgent Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Characteristics</th>
<th>Predicted Dominant Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Inclusivity</td>
<td>State Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49 Data on government forces and country populations during the period of conflict are from The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset.
### Table 2.2—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Characteristics</th>
<th>Predicted Dominant Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Inclusivity</strong></td>
<td><strong>State Capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this chapter, we quantitatively assesses the extent of the relationship between regime characteristics and patterns of conflict termination and use of indiscriminate violence. More specifically, we use the simple statistical technique of cross-tabulation to assess the historical record of all the insurgencies that have taken place in the post–Cold War era—a total of 89 cases, of which 17 were ongoing as of 2008 (the last year in our dataset)—to examine the extent to which a regime’s political inclusivity, state capacity, and military superiority are associated with several key outcomes:

- Decisive war termination, including both government victories and negotiated settlements
- Durable peace
- Indiscriminate use of force by the regime (i.e., large-scale violence directed against non-combatants).

We use as transparent a method as possible so that readers can understand exactly how the results were derived, which cases were influential in driving those results, and how they relate to the case studies presented later in this report.

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1 More specifically, if any portion of an insurgency was fought after 1989 and before 2010, it was included in this analysis. The original dataset of insurgencies underlying this research was taken from Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, with data updated to 2010 from Watts et al., 2012. See the Appendix for the cases and coding notes.

2 More detailed notes on all of the concepts, data, and coding decisions underlying this quantitative analysis are given in the Appendix. The dataset on which the analysis relied and more detailed findings are available upon request from the authors.
This analysis is designed primarily to indicate the extent to which outcomes are associated with regime characteristics. It does not provide a direct test of the predominant counterinsurgency “models” adopted by each type of regime, described in Chapter Two. To the extent that patterns of conflict termination and discrimination in the use of force correspond to the various counterinsurgency models, however, the analysis also provides an indirect test of the hypotheses previously developed. More-inclusive regimes, for instance, are expected to adopt counterinsurgency models that emphasize accommodation of the armed opposition and discriminate uses of force. Insofar as political inclusion is associated with negotiated settlements and the avoidance of mass killings of non-combatants, it appears to be associated with the use of the classical counterinsurgency model. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan in Chapters Four and Five, respectively, examine the precise linkages between the characteristics of counterinsurgents, the counterinsurgency models they adopt, and the likely outcomes of their counterinsurgency campaigns.

The following two sections explain why regimes’ political inclusiveness, state capacity, and military superiority shape their ability to accommodate the reconcilable opposition and use violence discriminatorily, as well as the implications of these practices for favorable termination of insurgencies. A final section integrates the quantitative analysis with the typology of counterinsurgent regimes introduced in Chapter Two to help decisionmakers understand the counterinsurgency strategies and practices that potential partner nations are likely to adopt.

**Accommodation of the Reconcilable Opposition**

It is extremely difficult to assess the general record of governments’ success in negotiating with elements of armed opposition. Many deals exist informally. Some are made with individuals or small groups of insurgents—side deals so minor that there is often no historical record of them.
We can, however, learn a great deal about governments’ abilities to accommodate the reconcilable opposition by looking at processes of war termination. Wars can end in a number of ways: through military victory by the government; military victory by the insurgents; a military stalemate followed by a formal, comprehensive peace agreement between the warring parties that clearly delineates the terms of the post-conflict order; or a military stalemate followed by informal, tacit agreements. As Table 3.1 shows, in the post–Cold War era, 17 conflicts ended in victory for the government, 24 ended in victory for the insurgents, 17 ended with a military stalemate followed by a formal peace agreement accepted by both sides, and 14 ended in a military stalemate but without a formal settlement.3

From the U.S. perspective, either a victory by a partner government or a formal peace agreement that satisfies the regime’s core security interests is generally preferable. A cessation of hostilities (or reduction to an extremely low level of residual violence) can be adequate from the U.S. perspective, and in many circumstances it may be the best outcome that is realistically possible. But war termination without either outright military victory or a formal negotiated settlement risks the perpetuation of regions without any effective government control—regions that risk becoming safe havens for terrorists, transit routes for illegal traffickers, or other sources of regional instability.4 Such war termination also creates a greater risk that conflict will reignite.5

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3 Data on formal peace agreements were taken from Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, and were updated to 2008 by the authors of this report. See the Appendix for details of the coding procedures.

4 See, for instance, Rabasa et al., 2007.

Table 3.1
Conflict Outcomes in the Post–Cold War Era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Conflict Outcome</th>
<th>Number of Conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government victory</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military stalemate, formal peace agreement</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military stalemate, no formal peace agreement</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent victory</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We next examine how the characteristics of the counterinsurgent regime—specifically, its political inclusivity, its reach and effectiveness, and its military superiority—affect the chances of

- A formally negotiated settlement acceptable to both sides
- A decisive outcome that is acceptable from the standpoint of the government—either a military victory for the government or a military stalemate that leads to a formal peace agreement
- An indeterminate outcome—a military stalemate without a formal peace agreement
- A durable peace, defined here as a peace that lasts at least five years following the end of a civil war.

This discussion provides a baseline estimate for a regime’s likelihood of success in counterinsurgency following the core counterinsurgency principles discussed in Chapter Two.

**Political Inclusivity**

The record of all conflicts that have terminated in the post–Cold War era strongly supports the notion that more-democratic countries are much better able than less-democratic countries to accommodate armed opposition movements without sacrificing core interests. Conflicts that were ongoing as of 2008 were excluded from the analysis.
score in the upper half of the Freedom House democracy index over the course of a conflict, and less-democratic countries are those that score in the bottom half of this index.\textsuperscript{7} As can be seen from Figure 3.1, nearly half of the conflicts in more-democratic countries end in formally negotiated settlements, while less than one-quarter of those in less-democratic countries do.

Similarly, more-democratic countries are better able to achieve an acceptable decisive outcome—that is, an end to an internal war in which the government either wins an outright military victory or is able to reach a formally negotiated peace agreement with the armed

\textsuperscript{7} Specifically, an average value of 4.0 on both the Political Rights and Civil Liberties dimensions of the Freedom House index was used as the break point between more- and less-democratic countries. Data on negotiated settlements were taken from Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, updated to 2008 by the authors of this report. $\chi^2 = 2.7386$, and the relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1 level ($p = 0.098$). In this calculation, all cases in which a large military intervention occurred in the post-conflict period were dropped from the sample on the assumption that the prospect of such an intervention would heavily condition the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The relationship remains statistically significant at the 0.1 level if those cases are retained. Data on foreign interventions, including the distinction between large- and small-scale interventions, were taken from Watts et al., 2012.
opposition that guarantees each side’s core interests in the absence of military victory for either side. Figure 3.2 shows that 41 percent of conflicts in less-democratic countries end in an acceptable decisive outcome, whereas approximately two-thirds of conflicts in more-democratic states terminate with a favorable outcome. The odds of failure, in other words, are close to twice as great for less-democratic counterinsurgent regimes.

Finally, more-democratic countries appear better able to sustain peace in the aftermath of civil wars. As Figure 3.3 shows, 22 percent of more-democratic countries experience renewed conflict within five years of the termination of a civil war, whereas almost exactly twice as

Figure 3.2
Relationship Between Democracy and Acceptable Decisive Outcomes

![Bar chart showing the percentage of cases terminating in an acceptable outcome for more-democratic and less-democratic countries.]

8 $\chi^2 = 3.6409$, and the bivariate relationship is statistically significant at the 0.1 level ($p = 0.056$). If we are interested only in outright military victories, we find—perhaps surprisingly—that democracies are somewhat more likely to win, although the difference is not sufficient to achieve statistical significance. Relatively more-democratic states won approximately one-quarter of the time (six cases out of 23), whereas non-democracies won only approximately one-sixth of their counterinsurgencies (11 cases out of 65).
many—43 percent—of less-democratic countries experience a return to war within the same period.\(^9\)

These results should be sobering for those who recommend extensive use of small-footprint operations. The partner countries in the success stories of U.S. small-footprint interventions that have frequently been cited in recent years—the Philippines, Colombia, and El Salvador in the late Cold War era—all would be characterized as relatively more democratic, using the measures adopted in this analysis.\(^10\) When we look at all insurgencies that have taken place at least in part in the post–Cold War era, however, only 24 out of 89 (or 27 percent) coun-

\(^9\) \(\chi^2 = 2.8236\) and \(p = 0.093\). Cases in which a large foreign military force was deployed in the post-conflict period were excluded from this analysis on the assumption that the post-conflict trajectory of the country was too strongly influenced by the large-scale foreign intervention to yield accurate information about the relationship between the domestic regime and the conflict outcome. Data on foreign interventions, including the distinction between large- and small-scale interventions, were taken from Watts et al., 2012.

\(^{10}\) Colombia had an average Freedom House score of 3.2 during the course of its conflict; the Philippines had an average score of 3.5 throughout the period of its conflict with Muslim separatist groups; and El Salvador had an average score of 3.8.
tries would be characterized as relatively more democratic. The “success stories” of U.S. small-footprint operations, in other words, had levels of political inclusion experienced by only approximately one-quarter of all counterinsurgent regimes.

**State Capacity**

The data from the post–Cold War period also support the proposition that state capacity influences a counterinsurgent’s ability to achieve an acceptable outcome to a conflict. As discussed previously, this analysis uses two measures of state capacity: state reach, a measure of a state’s ability to penetrate social relations and exercise meaningful effects in the population’s day-to-day lives, and government effectiveness, a measure of the bureaucratic capacity of the state. Counterinsurgents with strong state capacity (as measured using either indicator) are more

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11 These 89 cases include ongoing conflicts that were dropped from the statistical analysis of outcomes.

12 The relationship between political inclusiveness and political accommodation is even stronger if we focus only on a counterinsurgent regime’s level of democracy at the tail end of a conflict. It may be that insurgents are less concerned about a regime’s democratic character at the start of a conflict than they are about its character toward the end, when it is attempting to negotiate an end to fighting. On the basis of a counterinsurgent regime’s average democracy score in the final two years of a conflict, more-democratic governments are more than three times as likely to achieve a formally negotiated settlement than less-democratic regimes, securing such settlements in 55 percent and 17 percent of cases, respectively ($\chi^2 = 9.2960$ and $p = 0.002$, an extremely strong statistical relationship). Similarly, governments that are more democratic toward the end of a conflict are much better able to achieve acceptable decisive outcomes (again, defined as either a military victory by the government or a military stalemate that is formally codified in a peace deal accepted by both sides). Approximately 70 percent of more-democratic governments are able to achieve such decisive results, whereas just over 40 percent of less-democratic governments ($\chi^2 = 4.3799$) can do so, and the relationship is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, with $p = 0.036$). Finally, a government that is more democratic in the final two years of a conflict is more likely to sustain a peace. Nearly half (48 percent) of less-democratic regimes experienced a return to conflict within five years of the end of a civil war, whereas only one-fifth (20 percent) of more-democratic regimes did ($\chi^2 = 4.2656$ and $p = 0.039$).

13 As in the analysis of political inclusiveness, the analysis of the effects of state capacity on conflict outcomes excluded all cases of conflict that were still ongoing as of 2008.

14 States with high state reach are those that score above the midpoint (0.5) of Heltermann’s state-reach index, while states with high government effectiveness are those with scores above
likely to achieve negotiated settlements to conflicts, and they are more likely to sustain peace. These relationships, however, are insufficient to be statistically significant. Nevertheless, counterinsurgents with strong state capacity are nearly twice as likely as weaker states to achieve an acceptable conflict outcome (i.e., either an outright military victory by the government or a formally negotiated peace deal in which both sides are able to secure their core interests). As shown in Figure 3.4, approximately three-quarters of regimes with high state reach achieve acceptable decisive outcomes, whereas only 41 percent of regimes with low state reach do so.\(^{15}\)

The World Bank’s measure of government effectiveness tells a very similar story. Regimes with high government effectiveness are able to secure an acceptable decisive outcome two-thirds of the time, whereas those with low government effectiveness are able to achieve similar outcomes little more than one-third of the time (Figure 3.5).\(^{16}\)

**Figure 3.4**

Relationship Between State Reach and Acceptable Decisive Outcomes

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the median for conflict-affected countries (those that experienced civil wars in the post–Cold War era).

\(^{15}\) \(\chi^2 = 6.2045\) and \(p = 0.013\).

\(^{16}\) \(\chi^2 = 4.8673\) and \(p = 0.027\).
Low-capacity states also appear substantially more likely to have conflicts terminate in an indeterminate outcome—that is, an end to large-scale conflict without either a military victory by either side or a formal peace deal. In fact, all 14 cases in which a war ended without a military victory and without a formal peace deal occurred in countries with low state reach (Figure 3.6).

Once again, the record of recent counterinsurgencies paints a stark picture. Counterinsurgent regimes with higher state capacity are able to achieve acceptable outcomes in two-thirds to three-quarters (depending on the precise measure used) of the conflicts in which they are involved. Those with lower state capacity achieve acceptable outcomes in 38 and 41 percent of the conflicts—little more than half the rate of success of stronger regimes. Just as with democracy, moreover, the oft-cited “success stories” of U.S. small-footprint interventions—Colombia, the Philippines, and El Salvador—score favorably on this dimension, whether one uses a measure of state reach or government

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17 $\chi^2 = 7.6469$ and $p = 0.006$. Interestingly, the relationship between government effectiveness and indeterminate outcomes is not nearly as strong, achieving nowhere near statistical significance.
effectiveness. Only 30 percent of all counterinsurgents in the post–Cold War era score above the midpoint of the state reach index, however, suggesting that the cases of Colombia, the Philippines, and El Salvador are far from typical. Much more common are countries like Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia, and Yemen—countries with much lower state capacity, where the United States has had generally much less-favorable experiences.

**Military Sufficiency**

Consistent with the findings in Chapter Two, data from the post–Cold War era suggest an ambiguous relationship between a government’s military capacity and conflict outcomes. High force-to-population ratios and high force-to-force ratios are associated with somewhat better odds of a government victory, but the difference between more and less militarily-capable governments is not sufficient to be statistically significant in nearly any of the specifications we examined.18

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18 We used two alternative break points for distinguishing between governments with high and low force-to-population ratios: a 10:1,000 ratio and a 5:1,000 ratio. (We used these low ratios rather than the doctrinally accepted 20:1,000 because, to the best of our knowledge, there are no systematic data on police forces for all of the countries in our sample. Thus, our calculations relied on only the military portion of a government’s security forces. Of
Similarly, governments with greater military capacity appear no more capable of accommodating the reconcilable opposition, and governments with higher force-to-population and force-to-force ratios appear no more likely to achieve negotiated solutions to a conflict, nor are they more likely to achieve a favorable decisive outcome. Finally, governments with higher force ratios do not appear significantly more capable of sustaining peace with the armed opposition—either in instances where neither side was victorious or in cases of terminated conflict—than governments with lower military capacity.

What are we to make of these results? There are at least three possible explanations for the fact that greater military capacities do not consistently yield improved counterinsurgency outcomes: (1) there may be no relationship between military capacity and counterinsurgency outcomes; (2) the relationship may be weak and not statistically significant; (3) the relationship may be reversed, with higher force ratios associated with worse outcomes.

The 88 cases in our sample, 41 had force-to-population ratios of 5:1,000 or greater, so this lower threshold is close to the median value. We also relied on two alternative specifications of force-to-force ratios. The first one used the doctrinally accepted ratio of 10 government forces for every insurgent. Again, however, our data include only military forces, so such a threshold is potentially artificially high. Consequently, we also used the median force-to-force ratio from all of the countries in our sample as a second break point between high- and low-capacity governments. Finally, we examined both the outcomes of all cases of insurgency that ended in the post–Cold War era and the outcomes of only those cases in which a large external intervention force did not deploy in the post-conflict period (on the assumption that the prospect of such an intervention force would strongly influence the outcome of a conflict). In all of these cases, the relationship operated in the expected direction: Governments with greater military capacity generally had somewhat better odds of winning. In only one specification (using force-to-force ratios with the break point between high- and low-capacity governments determined by the median value and with all cases for which we did not have relatively precise data on insurgent strength dropped from the sample), however, did the relationship achieve statistical significance.

Depending on the precise specification of the relationship used, the results can range from no relationship whatsoever (i.e., high- and low-capacity states have almost exactly the same odds of achieving a favorable decisive outcome) to a weak relationship (i.e., high-capacity states tend to achieve better outcomes, but the relationship is not sufficiently strong to be statistically significant at even the 0.1 level).

As with the other relationships in this analysis, higher force ratios typically lead to slightly better odds of favorable outcomes but not sufficiently improved odds for the relationship to be statistically significant. In some specifications, the relationship is actually reversed, and higher force ratios are associated with slightly worse outcomes—but again, these relationships achieve nowhere near statistical significance.
outcomes; (2) there may be a relationship, but our methods are inadequate to reveal it; or (3) there may be a relationship between military capabilities and counterinsurgency outcomes, but measures of simple numerical superiority (i.e., capacity) are inadequate to capture it.

The first possibility flies in the face of U.S. military doctrine and the writings of many of the most respected counterinsurgency theorists. The possibility should not be dismissed, however. As discussed in the Chapter Two, counterinsurgency warfare has changed profoundly in the past few decades due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, changes in funding streams, the spread of guerrilla tactics, and a radically altered international context, among other reasons. Whereas military victory was the norm in the decades following World War II, a minority of insurgencies terminate in victory today. It is possible that although they are still important, military means simply do not exercise the same degree of influence on conflict outcomes that they once did.

It is also possible that our methods are inadequate to capture the relationship between military capacity and conflict outcomes. In particular, it could be that especially dangerous insurgencies cause governments to build large security forces. In this case, our results could be biased by adverse selection: The countries with particularly difficult insurgencies would create large security forces, leading to an apparently inverse relationship between the size of the forces and success in battling insurgencies. Such biases may be particularly apparent when using force-to-population ratios. Our use of the force-to-force measure, however, should at least partially alleviate this concern. Insofar as the number of insurgents is an indication of the threat they pose to the government, force-to-force ratios automatically control for the possibility of adverse selection. Force-to-force ratios, however, also failed to reveal any consistent relationship between military superiority and the ability to secure favorable outcomes.

Finally, and perhaps most plausibly, the lack of a statistically significant relationship between military capacity and conflict outcomes could be driven by our measure of military superiority. Force ratios capture only the number of government forces. They say nothing about their equipment; their tactics, techniques and procedures; or their dis-
cipline and accountability. It may well be that a more holistic measure of military sufficiency—if one were available—would reveal a much stronger relationship with conflict outcomes. This “quality over quantity” argument is entirely plausible, and it also has significant implications for U.S. partnership policies—a point to which the discussion will return later in this report.

**Discriminate Use of Violence**

The second overarching principle of counterinsurgency is that the use of force must be discriminate; otherwise, ordinary citizens have nothing to gain by *not* supporting the insurgency. To better understand when regimes are likely to employ violence indiscriminately in the prosecution of a counterinsurgency, we examined the relationship between democracy, state capacity, and force sufficiency on the one hand and intentional mass killings of civilians by government forces on the other.

Data on deaths in war zones—especially data on civilian deaths in an insurgency environment—are notoriously elusive. Wary of unwarranted precision and of missing important cases of indiscriminate violence, most studies of this issue have relied on a dichotomous coding of mass killings (i.e., a simple yes-or-no categorization) with a low threshold, so that even relatively low levels of civilian deaths are enough to count as mass killings or indiscriminate violence. The problem with such an approach is that it typically finds that nearly all governments engage in some degree of indiscriminate violence during counterinsurgency.21 Unfortunately, this finding tells us what we already know:

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21 Chris Paul and his colleagues, for instance, find that in only five out of 85 cases did government forces avoid “excessive collateral damage, disproportionate use of force, or other illegitimate applications of force.” See Paul, Clarke, and Grill, 2010. Similarly, when we compare Ulfelder and Valentino’s list of “mass killings” by government forces with the list of recent civil wars, we find that governments engaged in mass killings (as defined by Ulfelder and Valentino) in more than two-thirds of all cases of civil war or insurgency. See Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino, *Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing*, Political Instability Task Force, February 2008, with data updated through 2010 by the authors of this report, and the list of civil wars taken from Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, updated in Watts et al., 2012.
Counterinsurgencies are “dirty wars.” It also fails to distinguish horrific campaigns of violence from much lower levels of abuse.

This report adopts a somewhat higher threshold: Intentionally killing 2,000 or more civilians per year throughout the course of an entire counterinsurgency is considered mass killing or truly indiscriminate violence. Lesser totals might still be deplorable, but they are considered lesser cases of repression rather than persistent, large-scale, indiscriminate violence. By this standard, there were 26 instances of mass killings in the 89 civil wars fought in the post–Cold War era, or approximately 29 percent of all the counterinsurgencies.

Based on this standard, data from the past two decades strongly support the contention that democratic accountability mechanisms are critical to preventing indiscriminate violence. The relationship between military sufficiency and the discriminate use of force is much more complex—a finding with implications that will be discussed in the case studies in Chapters Four and Five.

**Political Inclusivity**

A broad review of the historical record of the past two decades strongly supports the claim that democratic accountability is critically important to preventing abuses and atrocities by government forces. Only two relatively democratic countries (fewer than 10 percent of the total) engaged in mass killings of civilians during the course of counterinsurgency campaigns in this period. In contrast, less-democratic countries engaged in mass killings in more than one-third of all counterinsurgencies. Figure 3.7 shows the stark difference between the two types of regimes in their propensity to use indiscriminate violence. Demo-

---

22 We used the most comprehensive data on large-scale killings by government forces that we could find—Ulfelder and Valentino’s mass-killings database, developed as part of the CIA-funded Political Instability Task Force. We then matched these events to Doyle and Sambanis’ list of civil wars or insurgencies. We took the average of the high-end and low-end estimates of civilian deaths, then determined the average number of deaths per year of the conflict.

23 As before, relatively democratic is defined as scoring in the top half of Freedom House’s democracy index (i.e., an average combined score of 4 or less during the course of a conflict).

24 \( \chi^2 = 6.9282 \), and the results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level (\( p = 0.008 \)).
cratic accountability, of course, is only one form of accountability, and a majority of even authoritarian regimes managed to avoid such high levels of indiscriminate violence. The risks of supporting less-democratic regimes in their counterinsurgency campaigns, however, should be evident.

**State Capacity**

As discussed in Chapter Two, state capacity might influence a regime’s proclivity toward indiscriminate violence in two ways: Weak states may be more likely to use indiscriminate violence because they lack sufficient positive inducements to persuade discontented populations to side with them, or they may be more likely to engage in abuses because they lack sufficient oversight and control over their fielded forces. The state-reach variable is probably a better choice of measures to test the argument that weak regimes rely excessively on “sticks” because they have too few “carrots.” The government-effectiveness variable is probably more appropriate for assessing the extent to which more-capable governments are able sustain more-disciplined forces in the field.
The state-reach variable does not reveal any clear relationship between state reach and indiscriminate violence.\textsuperscript{25} Government effectiveness, however, does demonstrate a statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of state-perpetrated mass killings.\textsuperscript{26} As Figure 3.8 shows, regimes characterized by relatively high government effectiveness resorted to indiscriminate killings in less than one-fifth of the counterinsurgencies they fought, whereas weaker states engaged in such killings nearly twice as often.

**Military Sufficiency**

An examination of the relationship between force ratios and mass killings of civilians produces seemingly inconsistent results. Force-to-force ratios provide apparent support for the claim that less-capable regimes resort to indiscriminate violence in desperation, lacking the military

\textbf{Figure 3.8}

\textit{Relationship Between Government Effectiveness and Mass Killings of Civilians by Government Forces}

\[\chi^2 = 0.2026 \text{ and } p = 0.653 \text{ for the bivariate relationship including all cases. The lack of a clear relationship is not changed by dropping cases in which a large, external intervening force was present during the conflict or by dropping cases in which conflicts had not concluded.}\]

\[\chi^2 = 3.4599 \text{ and } p = 0.063.\]
means to implement more-precise counterinsurgency campaigns. As Figure 3.9 shows, governments with sufficient military forces (in this case, a ten-to-one ratio of government to rebel forces, as prescribed in U.S. military doctrine) appear half as likely to resort to indiscriminate violence in their prosecution of counterinsurgencies.

Force-to-population ratios exhibit the opposite tendency. As shown in Figure 3.10, governments with greater military capacity (indicated by a ratio of at least five military personnel to every 1,000

![Figure 3.9](image)

**Figure 3.9**

*Relationship Between Force-to-Force Ratio and Mass Killings of Civilians by Government Forces*


28 $\chi^2 = 3.8651$ and $p = 0.049$. If we instead use the median force-to-force ratio among all cases of conflict in our sample as the break point between more- and less-capable governments, the relationship remains much the same, although it is not quite as strong and narrowly misses achieving statistical significance.
inhabitants, with police forces excluded) appear substantially more likely to engage in indiscriminate violence.  

How can we explain these seemingly paradoxical results? One possibility is that the simple relationship between military forces and mass killings misapprehends the causal dynamics at work. It could be that large insurgencies cause governments to create larger security forces and to use violence indiscriminately. In this case, both large security sectors and mass killings are effects of powerful insurgencies, rather than the large security being the cause of the mass killings. Or it could be that a large security apparatus creates rebellion—either by tempting a regime to use those capabilities for repression or by having weapons and other coercive capabilities escape state control. The end result may be that larger security forces create a rebellion that the regime then attempts to crush through indiscriminate violence. In this case,

\[
\chi^2 = 3.0911 \text{ and } p = 0.079. \text{ If we use a } 10:1,000 \text{ force-to-population ratio as the break point between counterinsurgents with military sufficiency and those without, countries with low force-to-population ratios remain substantially less likely to use force indiscriminately, but the relationship does not achieve statistical significance.}
\]

\[30 \text{ See, for instance, Clapham, 2004, p. 91.}\]
the large security sector is the cause of both the large insurgency and
the mass killings.

Much is at stake in parsing these alternative explanations. If the
first explanation is true, the appropriate policy response may well be
to build stronger security sectors to weaken insurgents. If the second
explanation is correct, such a policy would pour oil on the fire.

Unfortunately, the simple quantitative techniques used here do
not allow us to determine which of these rival explanations is correct.
Even the most sophisticated statistical techniques would provide only
partial insight into this question.\(^{31}\) To establish the conditions under
which strong military capabilities are likely to yield more or less dis-
criminate use of violence, it is helpful to turn to case studies. First,
however, it will be useful to integrate these quantitative findings into
a framework for understanding different types of counterinsurgent
regimes and the strategies they are likely to adopt.

**Integrating Quantitative Findings on Counterinsurgent Strategies**

So far, the quantitative analysis has proceeded by examining each of
the relevant factors in isolation. If we return to the typology of coun-
terinsurgent regimes presented in Table 3.1, however, we can see how
these factors combine to influence the ways in which counterinsurg-
cy campaigns are conducted and terminate.

**Conflict Termination**

Table 3.2 shows the relationship between different types of counter-
insurgent regimes and the outcomes of the counterinsurgency cam-
paigns they conduct.\(^ {32}\) As described above, acceptable outcomes are
those in which the government either wins an outright military victory
or is able to achieve a formal negotiated solution to the conflict in the

\(^{31}\) Experimental methods provide the strongest identification strategies, but they are diffi-
cult to devise in such circumstances, and they provide results that are highly context-specific.

\(^{32}\) Cases in which conflicts had not terminated as of 2010 were not included in this table.
### Table 3.2

**Counterinsurgent Regimes and Conflict Outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Characteristics</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Acceptable Outcome % Without Acceptable Outcomes % of All Cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
absence of military victory for either side. Because neither measure of military sufficiency proved to have a statistically significant effect on conflict outcomes, this variable was not included in the typology of counterinsurgent regimes.

Grouping cases of insurgency in this way is revealing. Counterinsurgent regimes that are both relatively more politically inclusive and have higher levels of state capacity (as measured using the state-reach index) are almost exactly twice as likely to reach an acceptable outcome as regimes that are neither inclusive nor have reasonably high levels of state capacity. The most-effective regimes—those that are both relatively inclusive and have high levels of state capacity—achieved an acceptable outcome in counterinsurgencies in the post–Cold War era 87 percent of the time. The least-effective regimes—those that are neither politically inclusive nor have high levels of state capacity—secured acceptable outcomes to such conflicts 40 percent of the time, less than half the rate of the most-effective counterinsurgents. Expressed another way, regimes that are neither politically inclusive nor have high levels of state capacity are nearly five times as likely as inclusive, high-capacity regimes to fail to secure either a military victory or a formally negotiated peace deal that is acceptable to all parties.

Once again, it is important to recognize that the successful U.S. small-footprint operations cited in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and elsewhere—Colombia, El Salvador, and the Philippines—all occurred in countries with the best possible type of counterinsurgent regime. But the United States has also launched small-scale interventions in many less-promising environments—for example, in Somalia and Yemen—and it is anticipating a small-scale intervention in Afghanistan after 2014. Only 13 percent of the insurgencies in our sample were directed against the most-effective types of regimes. More than half (56 percent) of all cases of insurgency occurred in the least-promising environments, where regimes lacked both political inclusion

33 At the time of writing, between 8,000 and 12,000 foreign troops are anticipated to initially be in post-2014 Afghanistan. That number is expected to decline in subsequent years to levels closer to those of Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P) and similar missions, and even the initial number is still a small fraction of the 20:1,000 force-to-population ratio specified in FM 3-24 and similar documents.
and state capacity. The United States should therefore not expect that its successes in OEF-P and similar operations will necessarily be replicated elsewhere; indeed, the odds are often against such interventions leading to a decisive outcome.

Of course, just because more than half of all insurgencies occur in countries governed by the least-favorable type of regime, this does not mean that more than half of all U.S. military interventions are likely to occur in such countries. Indeed, the historical record suggests that a disproportionate share of U.S. military interventions—somewhere in the vicinity of half—occur in best-case environments. This propensity might be explained by the fact that the odds of success are higher in such countries, or the fact that the United States shares many values and interests with such states. It is sobering, however, to consider the number of least-favorable environments in which the United States has already intervened and the levels of success it has experienced. Roughly the other half of U.S. interventions have been in these worst-case environments, and the outcomes in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, and Yemen are hardly promising.

Figure 3.11 presents these differences in conflict outcomes graphically, breaking them into each of the four categories used for this analysis: government victory, military stalemate followed by a formally negotiated settlement, military stalemate without a formally negotiated settlement, and insurgent victory. As shown, high-capacity regimes historically do not experience indeterminate outcomes—that is, military stalemates unresolved by a formal settlement acceptable to all of the major warring parties. More-inclusive regimes are much more capable of achieving negotiated solutions to conflicts, thereby decreasing their risk of outright defeat.

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34 The proportion of cases in each type of country was calculated from the entire sample of insurgencies that have taken place in the post–Cold War era, whereas the proportion of cases ending in an acceptable outcome was calculated using only those cases in which the insurgency had actually ended by our data cutoff date.

35 For a list of U.S. interventions, see Watts et al., 2012. The precise proportion of interventions in each type of country depends on the time period examined and the exact definition of intervention being used.

36 Figure 3.11 includes all cases of wars that have terminated in the post-conflict era. If we drop from our sample cases in which large-scale external military interventions occurred in
More-inclusive regimes are not only better able to broker negotiated peace deals, they are also better able to sustain a peace once it is achieved. Of particular interest, among low-capacity regimes, those that are more inclusive demonstrate significantly better odds of remaining at peace for at least five years after an insurgency ends. Indeed, as Figure 3.12 reveals, they have a more than 50 percent greater chance of sustaining a peace than do less-inclusive regimes of similarly low capacity.

**Discriminate Use of Violence**

Table 3.3 shows the relationship between regime characteristics and mass killings of civilians by the government. Just as weak and non-inclusive regimes are less likely to terminate insurgencies on favorable
terms, they are also less likely to use violence discriminately.\textsuperscript{37} In only
two insurgencies—less than 9 percent of the total—did relatively more
politically inclusive regimes engage in the mass killings of civilians, and
both of those regimes were only marginally democratic. In contrast,
there were 24 cases of mass killings among less politically inclusive
regimes, with the worst type of counterinsurgent regimes (those exhib-
iting low inclusion and low state capacity) resorting to mass killings 39
percent of the time. The worst type of counterinsurgents (shown in the
bottom row of Table 3.3) were more than four times as likely to use
violence indiscriminately than more-inclusive regimes such as Colom-
bia and the Philippines in recent years, and they comprise well over
half of all regimes fighting insurgencies.

\textsuperscript{37} As in Table 3.1, military superiority is not shown as a variable in Table 3.2 because of the
ambiguous quantitative findings on the relationship between military capacity and mass
killings of civilians.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Characteristics</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>% with Mass Killings</th>
<th>% of All Cases</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Inclusivity</td>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
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<td>State Capacity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Using Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis to Reinforce One Another

This typology of counterinsurgent regimes and the quantitative analysis of counterinsurgency in the post–Cold War era not only provides a broad overview of counterinsurgency practice, it also informed our selection of cases for in-depth study.

Drawing on well-established social science methods, we chose cases that exhibit significant variation on the causal variables of interest. Specifically, the Philippines represents a case of a highly promising counterinsurgent, while Pakistan represents a much more challenging case. The Philippines ranks among the more inclusive counterinsurgent regimes for the post–Cold War era, and it possesses relatively greater state capacity, regardless of whether state capacity is approximated using state-reach or government-effectiveness measures. Pakistan, in contrast, has consistently ranked among the less inclusive counterinsurgent regimes in the post–Cold War era. Its degree of state capacity is more ambiguous; it ranks in the weaker group of counterinsurgent regimes, using the state-reach measure, but in the more-inclusive half, using the government-effectiveness measure.

Of course, there are many other differences between the two countries. Ideally, all of the other factors would be as similar as possible so that their effects would be “controlled” and only the differences in their extent of political inclusion and state capacity would be left to

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39 In the post–Cold War period, the Philippines have an average Freedom House score of 2.9 (approximately two points away from complete democracy), while Pakistan has an average score of 4.9 (two points higher than the Philippines and approximately two points lower than complete autocracy along Freedom House’s scale from 1 to 7). The Philippines’ Freedom House ratings during both of its insurgencies are among the 19 highest-rated (most democratic) of the 89 cases of insurgency in the post–Cold War era, while Pakistan’s ratings from its insurgencies are both within the top 49. The Philippines’ government-effectiveness rating places it among the top 25 cases, while Pakistan’s rating places it among the top 47. Similarly, the Philippines’ state-reach score ranks it among the top 14 cases, while Pakistan’s is among the top 39. Taken together, these statistics suggest that the Philippines typically has ranked in the quartile of cases with the most-favorable characteristics (and often much higher), whereas Pakistan has ranked roughly in the middle of all cases. Complete data are available from the authors upon request.
explain differences in outcomes. Such a perfectly controlled comparison is obviously impossible. Nevertheless, the Philippines and Pakistan are similar in enough respects to make the comparison valuable. Both countries have gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (adjusted for purchasing-power parity) that ranks them between the average of low-income and lower-middle-income states.40 Both countries have received similar levels of net official development assistance per capita in the post–Cold War period ($10.80 and $9.30 per person in Pakistan and the Philippines, respectively).41 Although precise data on fatalities in war zones are difficult to acquire, the numbers of people killed in the conflicts in Pakistan and the Philippines are also comparable, generally ranging in the hundreds for most years of the long-running conflicts in these countries and only occasionally reaching the low thousands.42 In short, the two countries are similar in many relevant respects, even though the regimes in power have been strikingly different.

It would be wrong, however, to think of the Philippines and Pakistan as only two cases. Perhaps even more revealing than the contrasts between them are the differences in counterinsurgency strategy and practice that can be observed over time and between regions within each of them. The case-study chapters that follow therefore examine how changes in political inclusiveness over time and differences in state reach from one subregion to another in each country have shaped these regimes’ policy choices.

The case studies also provide important insights into the effectiveness of U.S. assistance to counterinsurgent regimes. If the findings of our analyses are correct, counterinsurgency practices and outcomes are largely a reflection of the character of counterinsurgent regimes. U.S. assistance designed to improve the capabilities of partner nations’ secu-

40 All values and definitions were taken from The World Bank’s WDI, using post–Cold War data.

41 Again, figures and definitions are from the WDI dataset.

rity forces is thus unlikely to produce superior outcomes unless these capabilities are harnessed to an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy. The choice of counterinsurgency strategy, in turn, should—at least in part—reflect a potential partner regime’s inclusivity and civil capacity. American assistance, in other words, might play an important role in strengthening the counterinsurgency capabilities of a regime that is already predisposed to a classical counterinsurgency model, but it is unlikely to be able to induce a partner government to change its basic orientation toward counterinsurgency. Chapters Four and Five show that these predictions have generally been fulfilled in the Philippines and Pakistan. Chapter Six turns to the broader literature on counterinsurgency and development to suggest that the experiences of these two countries are generalizable, but also to explore ways in which the United States might adapt to its limited ability to influence events on the ground in such contexts.
CHAPTER FOUR
Counterinsurgency in the Philippines

Introduction

The Philippines is often viewed by Americans as an archetypal counterinsurgency success story and the quintessential model for how effective partnerships can improve partner nations’ conduct of counterinsurgency. In the post-9/11 Philippines, U.S. non-combat support, primarily through a light-footprint advise-and-assist role, has contributed to the severe degradation of terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and insurgent groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

This chapter examines counterinsurgency in the Philippines and how the United States has influenced its course. It analyzes Philippine approaches to counterinsurgency from the early Marcos period in the 1970s through the present, using the analytical framework in Chapter Two. It describes how key factors described in the analytical framework—political inclusivity, military superiority, and state capacity—have varied in the Philippines over time and vis-à-vis particular insurgent groups and, in turn, assesses the extent to which the presence or absence of these factors maps onto the discriminate use of force and the will and ability to successfully accommodate reconcilable groups or factions of groups.

It also examines how other case-specific contextual factors influenced these outcomes or, alternatively, influenced the presence or absence of the key explanatory variables. One such factor is the influence the United States has exerted over Philippine counterinsurgency practices, particularly in the post-9/11 era, in which it deployed a light-
footprint military intervention that has simultaneously increased Philippine counterinsurgency capabilities and mitigated the Southeast Asia terrorist threat to the United States.

This case study suggests the utility of looking to the post-2001 Philippines as a possible model for influencing future counterinsurgencies in partner nations. But given that counterinsurgencies do not typically happen in the first place unless host-nation conditions are extremely poor, this period in Philippine history provided a decidedly favorable environment for a small-footprint intervention. As a result, OEF-P should not be considered a default model for cost-effective, indirect approaches, but rather as one among numerous possibilities. The case study shows that practitioners should also heed the lessons of previous Philippine counterinsurgency experiences—less-favorable environments in which the government’s policies and practices were only partially consistent with overarching American preferences and in which the United States’ influence was relatively limited or constrained. On balance, the broader record of Philippine counterinsurgency suggests as many warnings as it does models for the future.

The first section of this chapter presents a historical overview of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in the Philippines. The next section analyzes the sources of the Philippine government’s strategies and practices. We then assess the ways in which the United States was able to influence Philippine counterinsurgency strategy. The chapter concludes with broader lessons that can be learned from the Philippine experience.

Background

Overview of the Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Environment

For most of its post-independence history, the Philippines has been a democracy, albeit a fragile one characterized by political patronage and coalitions dominated by relatively narrow, parochial interests. Widespread poverty has hamstrung human development, and armed conflict has persisted since before the country’s independence in 1946. Of
the numerous factors that shape the environment in which insurgent and counterinsurgent forces currently contend in the Philippines, two in particular stand out: extreme ecological and societal diversity and a history of intractable, low-intensity conflict.

Physical and Human Terrain

The Philippines is an archipelago of more than 7,000 islands and a variety of ethnic, tribal, and religious groups. Slightly larger than the state of Arizona, the Philippines has 300,000 square kilometers of territory and shares no land borders with other countries. It is the seventh most populated country in Asia and the twelfth most populated country in the world, with a population of more than 97 million.¹ The country is both urban and rural—49 percent of Filipinos live in urban areas, and 51 percent live in rural areas.

The human terrain of the Philippines is also defined by its diversity. Tagalog is the predominant ethnic group, encompassing over 28 percent of the population. The next-largest group is the Cebuanos, at 13 percent. Perhaps the most striking fact about Philippine ethnic demographics is its fragmentation, as more than one-fourth of the Philippine population does not belong to any of the country’s six largest ethnic groups.² Linguistically, Filipino and English are the Philippines’ official national languages, but eight other major dialects are also common.³ In terms of religion, recent census data show that 83 percent of Filipinos consider themselves Catholic, while a small minority (5 percent) of the population is Muslim.⁴


² Philippines National Statistics Office, Census 2000: Philippines, Population and Housing Characteristics, Manila: Republic of the Philippines, National Statistics Office, 2003. The next largest ethnic groups, by percentage share, are the Ilocanos (9 percent), the Bisaya/Binisaya (7.6 percent), the Hiligaynon Ilonggo (7.5 percent), and the Bikol (6 percent).

³ The official language of Filipino is based on Tagalog. The eight major dialects are Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilocano, Hiligaynon or Ilonggo, Bicol, Waray, Pampango, and Pangasinan (Philippines National Statistics Office, 2003).

⁴ The Philippines’ Muslim population is heavily concentrated in the southern part of the country, and this geographical concentration has played an important role in the country’s armed conflicts.
**Historical Background**

Conflict has played a persistent role in the Philippine Islands for centuries. Dating at least to the beginning of the Philippines’ encounter with Spain in 1521, irregular warfare has endured in the southern and other parts of the archipelago. After the United States took control of the Philippines in 1898, a nationalist resistance that had been active against Spain continued to violently resist U.S. rule. Following a bloody counterinsurgency campaign, the United States emerged victorious in 1902, but despite tamping down the Philippine nationalist resistance, it never fully quelled resistance throughout its new territorial holding; violent resistance from the Muslim Moro population in the southern Philippines was especially persistent.

In 1935, the Philippines was granted self-governing commonwealth status, with a plan put in place to transition the country to full independence in 1945. In the meantime, the Philippines became a key World War II location in the Pacific theater. In 1942, Japan occupied the islands, controlling the country until the United States, along with Filipino resistance forces, began to reclaim control in 1944 and regained control in 1945. Following Japan’s surrender, the Republic of the Philippines attained independence in July 1946. A democratic government was elected to coincide with national independence. Manuel Roxas was elected the country’s first president in 1946. Foreshadowing later periods on which we focus, the post-independence government was almost immediately threatened by armed insurgencies. Most threatening was the Hukbalahap, or “Huk,” a communist insurgency that began a rebellion against the Roxas government in 1946 and was not defeated until 1954.5

The United States played a significant role in the Philippines following the country’s independence. This role was not confined to helping the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) counter the Huk insurgency. The GRP, under President Roxas, passed a

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Military Bases Agreement in 1947 that gave the United States the right to establish military bases and other installations, which in turn meant that U.S. troops and materiel would have access to the Philippines. The GRP-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) followed in 1952 to guide the overall direction for U.S.-GRP security cooperation, including U.S. support to the Philippine government to counter internal threats such as insurgencies. The MDA remained in place after Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos—a close Cold War ally of the United States—declared martial law in 1972, and it remained an important mechanism for funneling U.S. aid to the regime until Marcos was deposed in 1986. Following Marcos’ deposition, the Philippines transitioned to democracy. However, U.S.-GRP relations were fragile, and when the U.S.-GRP basing agreement expired in 1991, the Philippine Congress voted for the closure of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base—two of the largest American military bases outside the continental United States. Following the closure of the bases, U.S.-Philippine security cooperation diminished dramatically before a Visiting Forces Agreement between the two countries was signed in May 1999. This agreement provided the domestic legal basis that facilitated the GRP’s enhanced security cooperation with the United States in the 2000s.

Insurgent and Terrorist Organizations

Today, the Philippines’ main internal threats are the New People’s Army (NPA), a communist insurgency that is active throughout the country; the MILF, an Islamist-separatist movement that is active in the south; and the ASG, a thuggish Salafi jihadist organization based in the southern provinces of Basilan and Sulu. The ASG has links to al Qaeda and JI but is equally well known for its high-profile criminal activities, including numerous kidnap-for-ransom operations targeting

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Westerners. None of the groups currently pose an existential threat to the GRP. They do, however, foment widespread instability, undermine foreign investment, participate in rampant human trafficking, and engage in subregional terrorism.

**New People’s Army (1969–)**

The NPA is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Since its foundation in 1969, it has sought to establish a communist state in the Philippines by waging a rural-based insurgency according to the Maoist doctrine of protracted people’s guerrilla war. The group has traditionally maintained a presence throughout the country, but it is primarily active in the regions of Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao.

The threat posed by the NPA has fluctuated over time, peaking in the late 1980s during the unpopular regime of President Marcos, when the NPA strength reached an estimated 25,000 armed guerrillas and a mass base of support significantly larger than that. In the post-Marcos era, the NPA has struggled to elicit the same degree of popular support, and a series of brutal interfactional clashes within the organization has weakened its organization internally and undermined its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the Philippine population. However, the threat posed by the NPA began to escalate once more following the collapse of peace talks in 2005, and there was a sharp rise in attacks carried out by the group.

Although the NPA has been able to maintain a steady operational tempo following the launching of a concerted counterinsurgency campaign targeting it in 2006, its capabilities have been steadily degraded, and its areas of operation have increasingly been curtailed. Nevertheless, although it is no longer capable of posing the threat it once did, and despite intelligence in early 2010 suggesting that the group was once again suffering from internal fractionalization, the NPA remains militarily powerful and has become a successful social and political actor through its control of political parties and organizations. While a resolution to the conflict remains elusive, NPA representatives met with government negotiators in Hong Kong in early December 2010, and peace talks resumed in Oslo in mid-February 2011. Although both
sides agreed to hold further talks, NPA violence continued, and disagreements in early November 2011 led to the peace talks being postponed. The NPA insurgency continued apace into 2012.

As of 2012, the NPA asserted that it had an active presence in 70 of the Philippines’ 81 provinces, yet its presence appears to be thin: A 2007 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) estimate claimed the NPA was highly active in only 2,121 of the Philippines’ 42,000 barangays, the country’s village-level administrative divisions. In February 2010, the AFP claimed that NPA influence had been further eroded, with the group controlling only 1,077 barangays. Still, the government considers the NPA its most serious threat, and indeed, the group is responsible for considerably more attacks annually than the MILF and the ASG combined.

_Moro National Liberation Front (1972–1996)_

The primary goal of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was the creation of an autonomous Muslim state in the southern Philippines. The MNLF sought the autonomy of Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago, in which there are 13 provinces. There is a long history of conflict between Christians and Muslims in the Philippines dating back to the mid-16th century, but the proximate trigger of the MNLF movement’s rebellion occurred in the 1950s, when the GRP encouraged Christian Filipinos to move to Mindanao. Christians became the majority in Mindanao by the late 1960s, leading not only to religious tensions but also to economic conflict over the area’s natural resources.

By the mid-1970s, the MNLF boasted more than 10,000 members and controlled large swaths of Mindanao and Sulu. With the country already under martial law, President Marcos responded to the MNLF’s advance with heavy doses of force, committing 80 percent of his available troops to the southern Philippines.

In 1976, the MNLF agreed to a 16-point accord with the GRP. Concurrent with this accord, a referendum on autonomy for the southern islands was held in 1977. But because the islands had a Christian

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majority, the referendum failed to garner a majority vote, the MNLF’s autonomy bid failed, and the organization splintered into several groups. In 1986, the MNLF and the GRP signed a truce in which the parties agreed to continue discussion of full autonomy for the Mindanao region, with a joint commission to be set up to develop the details of a proposal for full autonomy of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan, subject to democratic processes. Finally, in 1996, President Fidel Ramos agreed to a peace accord with MNLF leader Nur Misuari. The agreement created a four-province Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, of which Nur Misuari joined the political leadership.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (1977–)
The MILF is an Islamist militant group based and operating in the southern Philippine region of Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and North Cotabato. Salamat Hashim established the MILF in 1977 as a splinter faction of the MNLF with the aim of creating an independent Islamic state in Mindanao. However, MILF structure and policy direction were not specifically defined until 1984.

The Philippine government never really saw the MILF as anything more than a radical splinter of the MNLF, upon which it continued to focus both its military and diplomatic efforts. However, the MILF grew steadily, particularly through its control of the mosques in central Mindanao. The group was also a beneficiary of the 1996 peace accord between the government and the MNLF, as 5,000 to 6,000 MNLF combatants rejected the accord and joined the MILF, doubling its size. By 1999–2000, the MILF controlled vast swaths of central Mindanao, where it established Islamic-based governing structures.

Peace talks resumed in Malaysia in December 2009. While the MILF initially rejected a power-sharing offer in February 2010, it announced the following September that it would be prepared to accept an agreement in which a Muslim “substate” was created. The revision of the MILF’s objectives paved the way for the resumption of exploratory peace talks in February 2011, when the group presented the government with a proposal to create a semi-autonomous politi-
cal entity in Mindanao. The future of the peace process was called into question in October, following the MILF’s involvement in a clash between the military and the ASG that left 19 soldiers dead.

Currently, the MILF is one of the most powerful militant groups in Southeast Asia. It commands approximately 10,000 armed fighters and has well-established bases from which it exerts political control over local Muslim communities. Its principal areas of activity include the southern provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and North Cotabato. The group has extensive grassroots support, which means that the reservoir of potential fighters remains very large. Not everyone joins exclusively for religious or ethnic purposes; some join because of the poor economic conditions in Mindanao and a lack of other opportunities. Senior military officials have estimated that the MILF could easily mobilize an additional 8,000 to 10,000 fighters within a short period of time. In recent years, however, the group’s influence and threat to the GRP have declined somewhat. This decline is in part due to government operations and the resulting deterioration of the MILF’s conventional fighting strength, but it can also be linked to the death of radical leader Salamat Hashim in 2003 and his replacement by the more-moderate Ebrahim el-Haj Murad, who is more willing to accept a negotiated settlement on expanded autonomy.

Abu Sayyaf Group (1991–)
The ASG is a Sunni militant group based and operating in the southern Philippine region of Mindanao, particularly on the island province of Basilan and the nearby island of Jolo in Sulu province. While the ASG’s global jihadist outlook and its ultimate desire to establish an independent Islamic republic make it ideologically similar to al Qaeda and JI, the group is also known for its criminal activities, including a number of high-profile kidnappings for ransom involving Westerners. The ASG’s links to al Qaeda and JI and its targeting of Westerners helped ensure that the group would become a focus of U.S. counter-

8 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2012, p. 36.
9 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” June 7, 2013b, p. 3.
terrorism efforts after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Indeed, a series of joint U.S.-Philippine military and political actions have substantially degraded the ASG’s capabilities.

Although the ASG’s top leadership hierarchy has remained unclear since Khadafy Janjalani was killed in 2006, numerous other ASG commanders and subcommanders were subsequently killed or captured, including ASG spokesman Jainal Antel Sali, alias Abu Solaiman; Ismin Sahiron, the son of a top ASG commander; and other key operatives, including Jundam Jamalul and Borhan Mundus. The AFP claimed that 144 ASG rebels were killed, were captured, or surrendered in 2007, bringing the total number of ASG rebels to fewer than 400 (from a peak of between 1,000 and 1,200) for the first time in years.

The ASG has nonetheless demonstrated that it can still inflict significant casualties. In July 2007, ASG and MILF forces ambushed a group of AFP Marines searching for a kidnapped Italian priest on Basilan. Fourteen of the Marines were killed, ten of whom were beheaded. In August 2007, the ASG conducted an attack that killed 15 AFP Marines in Basilan province.10 For the foreseeable future, the group’s propensity for kidnap-for-ransom operations ensures that it will pose a threat to civilians, particularly foreign nationals.11 At the same time, it appears that the ASG is unlikely to pose more than a low-level threat to Philippine and U.S. security forces in the south.

Government Forces and Strategies

Armed Forces of the Philippines

The AFP, established in 1935, is an all-volunteer, tri-service organization comprising an Army, a Navy, and an Air Force. By constitutional mandate, the AFP is under civilian control, with the President of the Philippines as its Commander-in-Chief. All AFP branches are part of


11 Fund-raising through criminality appears to have enabled the group to replenish its depleted ranks by offering competitive wages to recruits, many of whom do not share the previous generation’s Salafi jihadist ideology. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience in the Southern Philippines,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 2010, pp. 17–19.
the Department of National Defense, which is headed by a Secretary of National Defense. The AFP is organized into Joint Service Area Commands, each of which is responsible for a particular region.\footnote{The commands are Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas, Western, East Mindanao, West Mindanao, and National Capital.}

Especially significant with respect to combating terrorism is the fact that the AFP has an established special operations capability within its Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as a Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG). The Philippines Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) consist of four units: the Special Forces Regiment (Airborne), the First Scout Ranger Regiment, the Light Reaction Battalion, and the Civil Affairs Group. The Special Forces Regiment was founded in 1962 and has approximately 1,200 personnel trained to conduct unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, and direct action raids. The First Scout Ranger Regiment was first organized in the late 1940s and today consists of approximately 1,800 personnel considered by some to be the most experienced unconventional fighters in the AFP. The Light Reaction Battalion consists of approximately 400 personnel taken from the Special Forces and Scout Ranger Regiments and is organized into three companies that are trained to conduct counterterrorist operations under the operational control of the JSOG. The Civil Affairs Group evolved from the Public Relations Office of the 1950s and consists of approximately 130 personnel trained in civil-military operations. Once a part of the Philippines Special Operations Command, the Civil Affairs Group now falls directly under the control and supervision of the Headquarters of the Philippines’ Army.\footnote{Stuart Farris, \textit{Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines}, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009, pp. 22–23.}

\textit{Government Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Strategies}

Throughout more than three decades of armed communist insurgency and Muslim separatism, the GRP’s responses have been a compromise between civilian and military interpretations of the armed threats and how best to respond to them. This tension between civilian and military
authorities is reflected in the mix of government and military responses to the threats, as seen in the “right- and left-hand approaches” to counterinsurgency since the 1950s. The balance between the right hand (primarily the use of military force) and the left hand (socioeconomic and political measures to address the root causes and win the hearts and minds of the people) has tilted in favor of one side or the other, depending on the overall political, economic, and social context, the strategic situation on the ground, and the personality and policy preferences of political and military leaders.

Overall, a highly conventional military strategy predominated during martial law and dictatorship, because the military was a main partner of the civilian leader in the government, Ferdinand Marcos. The Marcos government depended on the military for political survival, giving the military a role in politics, a large budget, and significant bureaucratic clout. The military’s influence in the counterinsurgency strategy was also determined by the rise of the NPA and the MNLF soon after the imposition of martial law and the growth of these organizations during the rest of the Marcos era, as well as the growing opposition to his rule from the broader sociopolitical spectrum.14

After democracy was restored in 1986, the Philippine military continued to play a significant role in politics. It had distinct preferences concerning how internal security threats should be addressed, which involved relying heavily on coercion and conventional force. Unlike the Marcos regime, however, each civilian democratic administration that followed made negotiating with insurgencies a major part of its strategy. Each also attempted to incorporate non-kinetic operations into its internal security strategies. Yet more often than not, a lack of policy coherence—the military often did one thing while the civilian government said another—or a lack of GRP capacity to implement

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these strategies effectively in the face of military opposition stymied the success of their implementation.15

The Role of the United States

The role of the United States is inextricably intertwined in the Philippine counterinsurgency experience. During the Cold War, Washington was primarily interested in the Philippines for geopolitical reasons. In particular, the United States had a strong interest in continued use of its military bases there.16 As a result, the United States largely stayed out of Philippines internal affairs. Washington remained silent when Marcos declared martial law in 1972, even though many in the U.S. government were reportedly uncomfortable with his growing authoritarian bent.17 Despite the declaration of martial law, Marcos’ Philippines was a significant recipient of U.S. aid: From 1972 until 1983, the U.S. provided $2.5 billion in bilateral military and economic aid to the Marcos regime and about $5.5 billion through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank.18

Fourteen years after he first declared martial law, Marcos went into exile in Hawaii amid growing pressure that culminated in the People’s Power demonstrations of 1986. He departed Malacanang Palace aboard a U.S. helicopter on February 25, 1986, after U.S. officials personally informed him that he would receive no further U.S. assistance and prepared a formal announcement that U.S. policy was to support a “transition” to a popular government in the Philippines. Corazon Aquino succeeded Marcos and restored democratic rule—however imperfect—to the Philippines. In a sharp break with the policies of the Marcos era, Aquino attempted to negotiate with the NPA, but these talks foundered, in part due to U.S. opposition to negotiations with communists.

U.S.-Philippine military relations were largely severed in 1992, when Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base were closed. Philippine demands for U.S. withdrawal were not disconnected from the United States’ Cold War relationship with Marcos and the pressure on the democratic government to reduce the U.S. presence in the Philippines despite the major loss of revenue that was incurred.19 As U.S.-Philippine relations deteriorated, the United States dramatically decreased security assistance to the Philippines in the early 1990s, from about $350 million in 1991 to $5 million in 1993. The cut in U.S. military aid likely contributed to the degradation of Philippine counterinsurgency capabilities and the resurgence of the NPA and the MILF, as well as the emergence of the ASG, during the mid-1990s.

In response to the rise of militancy in the Philippines, the United States began preparations to resume military support, and in 1998, U.S. SOF deployed to the Philippines to help establish a counterterrorist unit to address the Islamist threats that were growing in the southern part of the country. The unit, called the Light Reaction Company, was modeled after a U.S. SOF Special Missions Unit.20

Kidnappings of Westerners by the ASG had already pushed the United States closer to the GRP before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Following those attacks, however, the Philippines became an important front in the U.S. Global War on Terrorism.21 The United States designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally in October 2003.22 U.S. military aid to the Philippines spiked from $3.8 million in 2001 to $56 million in 2002 and over $52 million in 2003 and 2004, before declining to around $35 million in 2005 and 2006—a figure still six


20 Interview with former commander, AFP Special Operations Command, Manila, Philippines, June 2013.


times higher than the U.S. aid received by any other southeast Asian country.\textsuperscript{23}

The United States intervened to support counterterrorism in the Philippines as part of OEF-P. Akin to traditional foreign-internal-defense strategies, the U.S. strategy in the Philippines later became known as “the indirect approach.”\textsuperscript{24} Compared with U.S. operations in other theaters, the operational method in OEF-P could aptly be described as “indirect,” because of its relatively light footprint (approximately 500–750 U.S. personnel operating under the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines [JSOTF-P]) and its focus on operating through indigenous security forces.

**Analysis of Philippine Counterinsurgency**

Using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Two and the empirical findings presented in Chapter Three, we analyzed three factors associated with Philippine counterinsurgency strategy and outcomes: political inclusivity, military superiority, and state capacity. Consistent with general patterns in counterinsurgency campaigns, changes in regime type from autocracy to democracy are associated with government adoption of counterinsurgency strategies that involve pursuing negotiations with at least certain parts of the opposition and an expressed desire to use force discriminately. These preferences have been evident in multiple elected administrations’ commitment to the minimal use of conventional firepower and avoidance of indiscriminate sweep operations and a greater emphasis on reintegration programs and other civil-military operations intended to win popular support vis-à-vis the insurgents they faced.

Democratic Philippines governments’ ability to implement such strategies have invariably been imperfect and susceptible to compromise by political factors or capacity gaps; in some instances, the regimes

\textsuperscript{23} Lum, 2012.

reverted back to conventional approaches favored by the military or other actors. Despite these inconsistencies, as of mid-2013, the GRP is close to achieving a peace agreement with the MILF and appears to have minimized the ASG threat and the foreign terrorist threat in its southern islands.

Table 4.1 summarizes changes in key variables in the Philippines. It disaggregates the case study by time period and insurgent group to describe how state capacity and political inclusiveness have shaped key counterinsurgency outcomes. The country underwent a significant change from lesser to greater political inclusivity with the ouster of the Marcos regime in 1986. Variation in state capacity is more complex. In general, the Philippines took significant strides toward greater

Table 4.1
Regime and Campaign Features of Philippine Counterinsurgency, 1972–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>State Capacity</th>
<th>Political Inclusion</th>
<th>Accommodate</th>
<th>Public Goods</th>
<th>Discriminate Violence</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA, 1972–1986</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Strong state repression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF, 1972–1986</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Containment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF, 1977–1986</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Containment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA, 1987–2000</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Informal accommodation/ containment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLF, 1987–1996</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Informal accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF, 1986–2000</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Containment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG, 1991–2000</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Containment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA, 2001–2013</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Classic counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF, 2001–2013</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Informal accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG, 2001–2013</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Classic counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Values represent the authors’ and outside experts’ judgments on relative levels of each category over time. They should be considered heuristic summaries of the variables rather than calculations based on precise data.
state capacity in the four decades covered in this study. These improvements, however, did not occur uniformly across the country. Typically, the core regions closer to Manila enjoyed substantially higher access to public goods than did the more peripheral regions of Mindanao and especially the Sulu Archipelago. As a result, the government was better able to employ strong-state counterinsurgency practices against the NPA, which operated in both the core regions and the periphery, than it was against the insurgencies that operated in the predominantly Muslim peripheral regions—the MNLF, the MILF, and the ASG.

The GRP counterinsurgency practices shown in Table 4.1 are divided into three broadly defined time periods. The first time period begins with the imposition of martial law by President Marcos from 1972 to 1981 and runs through the end of Marcos’ presidency in 1986. During this period, political inclusivity was low, as the imposition of martial law made Marcos a de facto dictator until he was forced from power. His investment in coercive capabilities to crush the NPA is consistent with strong-state repression, even though Philippine government capacity could be considered only moderate in Manila and some of the areas where the NPA operated. The GRP’s capacity was even lower in the Muslim south, where the MNLF and the MILF had established parallel state structures amid largely sympathetic co-ethnic populations, and the broad government strategy employed against these groups was consistent with containment.

The second time period, roughly spanning 1986 to 2000, can be viewed broadly as a transitional period. During this period, the country transitioned toward democracy. Policies and operational methods changed, but the government’s capacity to implement reforms was limited. The limitations stemmed in part from the civilian government’s weakness relative to the military, whose most senior officers from the Marcos period retained much of the political clout Marcos had conferred on them. Their disagreement with the civilian government’s policy preferences and the military’s reliance on old tactics from the Marcos period, which often involved conventional operations in which force was applied indiscriminately, played a key role in shaping the ultimate approach that was taken in countering insurgencies. In this period, the democratically elected regime made attempts to
forge a peace agreement with each major insurgent group. But only one such effort—the 1996 peace deal with the MNLF—succeeded. Despite the increased level of political inclusiveness, the government’s lack of capacity relative to the military often resulted in counterinsurgency approaches that most closely resembled containment. Such an approach was evident, for instance, after peace talks with the NPA and the MILF repeatedly broke down and intermittent large-scale military operations resumed. The government also was left to pursue a containment strategy against the ASG, which was never interested in a negotiated peace and was thus alternately ignored and dealt with through military operations that in many cases relied on the use of indiscriminate firepower.

The third broad period began in 2001 after Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded Joseph Estrada as President and significantly expanded the country’s relationship with the United States in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. U.S. assistance, both military and civil, increased dramatically during this period. Although the dramatic expansion in U.S. aid was inadequate to boost state capacity throughout the country in such a short period of time, it made a dramatic difference in the government’s capabilities in the small peripheral region of the Sulu Archipelago, where joint operations by the U.S. military and its Philippine partners gave the government an unprecedented reach. Democratic institutions were also increasingly consolidated in this period: Despite allegations of electoral graft in 2004 and 2010, a return to military rule appears increasingly unlikely. The government’s approach to counterinsurgency has followed relatively predictable patterns: Against the NPA, it undertook the closest approximation of the classic counterinsurgency model that it had taken to date. Against the MILF, it engaged in an ongoing peace process and worked to restrain the military from conducting operations that could compromise the process, an approach consistent with the informal-accommodation model described in Chapter Two. And against the ASG, it has worked with U.S. partners to combine civil-military operations with discriminate targeting of ASG members—an approach that again approximates the classic counterinsurgency model.
Although the GRP’s policies over these four decades do not perfectly align with the behavior that we might expect based on the framework presented in Chapter Two, the extent of congruence is remarkable. In only two of the ten subcases depicted in Table 4.1 do GRP policies clearly diverge from the behavior predicted by the framework: the government’s approach to the MILF from 1986 to 2000 and its approach to the ASG from 1991 to 2000. In both cases, the fledgling democratic regime implemented containment strategies more commonly used by weak autocratic regimes. As discussed in more detail below, these divergences from the behavior more typical of democratic regimes can be understood in terms of the country’s transition to democracy. In the early years after the end of the Marcos regime, democratic administrations were preoccupied with the critical tasks of the transition. They did not have the necessary high-level engagement or political capital to confront a military shaped by the Marcos era over a conflict in a peripheral region. As the new regime consolidated its authority, however, it was increasingly able to rely on more accommodative approaches to moderate insurgents. Where the regime had the necessary resources—specifically, against the insurgency that threatened core territories (the NPA) and where the United States provided extensive assistance focused on a relatively small peripheral region (the campaign against the ASG)—it adopted the classical counterinsurgency policies common to higher-capacity, more politically inclusive regimes.

These variations are explored in greater detail below.

**Political Inclusion, Accommodation, and Restraint**

*The Growth of Insurgency Under Martial Law, 1972–1986*

After being democratically elected in 1965, Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, in part because of threats posed by internal armed groups and in part because his reelection prospects were poor. Under martial law, Marcos subsequently greatly increased the size of the AFP, in terms of both budget and personnel. At the same time, his government showed little genuine interest in making concessions to reconcilable elements of the insurgencies it faced, which grew significantly during this period.
Under martial law, Marcos’ main weapon against insurgency was military force. The military budget was increased by 700 percent from 1972 to 1976; the number of Philippine Security Forces (PSF) was also increased from 60,000 to 157,000. Due to the partnership between the government and the AFP during the period of martial law, the AFP fully supported the government’s campaigns against the CPP-NPA and the MNLF. The AFP patterned its operations closely on the overall policy of the martial-law regime, which sought to eliminate its opposition through crackdowns and coercion rather than inducement or compromise. In practice, this meant that the Marcos regime implemented a heavy-handed counterinsurgency strategy, unleashing both the AFP and armed local militias that had little or no formal training.

Marcos’ gambit backfired: Civilian casualties skyrocketed, Filipino public opinion increasingly turned against the regime, and the insurgencies flourished. The NPA grew its base enough to shift from an almost exclusively rural movement to one that also drew from urban areas, particularly local universities whose students were prone to radical ideas. Overall, the CPP-NPA grew from a small group of about 1,100 in 1971 to an estimated 7,200–10,660 members by 1983. The Moro-based Muslim separatist movements also grew under martial law. The challenge from the MNLF became a serious threat to the Philippines in the 1970s. The fiercest fighting occurred between 1969 and 1976, when Marcos’ counterinsurgency campaign killed an estimated 60,000 people, wounded another 54,000, and displaced as many as 350,000.


The Marcos government was not completely opposed to negotiating with insurgents, but, consistent with the framework outlined in Chapter Two, it was neither willing nor able to credibly commit to a comprehensive peace accord. In 1977, the GRP entered into a temporary peace deal with the MNLF, the Tripoli Agreement. The terms of the agreement’s implementation, however, which consisted of the MNLF’s requirements for regional autonomy, were left open to a referendum that was to be held at a later time. Meanwhile, both the GRP and the MNLF violated its initial terms, and the MNLF splintered into multiple groups. The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) would not be formally created until 12 years had passed and a democratically elected administration was in place, and even then, the newly created entity still failed to end the Muslim separatist insurgency.28


After Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency in 1986, she immediately announced plans to negotiate with the insurgents and to offer concessions such as amnesties and reintegration packages. Peace talks with the NPA were accompanied by a short cease-fire from December 1986 to January 1987, when the talks collapsed due to the NPA’s lack of a serious commitment to peace, dissent from Marcos loyalists in the military, and a general lack of U.S. support for any settlement ceding substantive concessions to communists.29

Military operations also changed under Aquino, once again in line with the discussion in Chapters Two and Three. Particularly after the collapse of peace negotiations, the military’s counterinsurgency strategy against the NPA also shifted in a new direction, focusing on

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28 Marcos was actively supporting the resettlement of Christian Filipinos in Mindanao during his tenure as the MNLF peace process continued, with demographic changes undermining the chances of a successful comprehensive agreement. See, for example, Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, *The U.S. and the Southern Philippines’ Quagmire*, Murdoch, Western Australia: Asia Research Center, July 2007, p. 4.

conducting intelligence-driven operations that targeted the NPA’s local infrastructure. Under this strategy, the conventional-style search-and-destroy operations so common under Marcos received less emphasis. \textit{Lambat Bitag}, the GRP’s comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy launched in the post-Marcos era, emphasized the integration of civil-military operations, intelligence, and combat operations, and it focused on the military tactics of clear, hold, consolidate, and develop. This strategy was derived from a right-hand and left-hand approach, which sought to neutralize the insurgency by reducing the emphasis on force and instead focusing on development and popular support. The strategy was intended to include a variety of civilian government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). A key part of the strategy involved reeducating AFP personnel about human rights and the importance of popular support in counterinsurgency and internal-security operations.\textsuperscript{30}

More formally, this strategy focused on the clear-hold-consolidate-develop (CHCD) methodology. It was to be executed in stages, with the aim of dismantling insurgent political and military infrastructures in the countryside and establishing government control in contested areas to create opportunities for development. The strategy was designed to be relatively flexible, and its stages could be conducted sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the prevailing situation in an area.

The “clear” stage would involve combat, intelligence, and civil-military operations conducted to defeat the insurgent armed groups and to neutralize their political and military infrastructures. The aim was to gain possession or control of strategic areas or key terrain to allow holding forces to come in for the next stage or operation. The “hold” stage was intended to reestablish government control and authority and to preserve the initial gains of the clearing forces through occupation and control of the cleared areas. It was to signal the strength of local defense capabilities to defend the cleared areas from incursions and reentry of rebel groups. The “consolidate” stage involved the collabora-

tive participation of the AFP, police, civil government agencies, and the local population to strengthen government control. Consolidation was to include assisting local government units in the delivery of basic services to help them gain the population’s trust and confidence. The “develop” stage was intended to foster the implementation of the government’s socioeconomic and political reforms, including the delivery of basic services to address root causes of insurgency. The military and police were to focus on the clear and hold stages and were to assume supportive roles during the consolidate and develop stages. Other agencies were intended to support the military and police in the clear and hold stages but to take the lead role in the consolidate and develop stages.31

Aquino’s preferred military counterinsurgency strategy achieved only partial implementation and suffered de facto reversal by 1990.32 The preliminary results of the new strategy had looked promising, at least according to AFP intelligence estimates and metrics. These estimates suggested that NPA influence dropped from a peak of almost 8,500 NPA-influenced barangays in 1987 to fewer than 1,000 in 1993, and that NPA strength declined from just under 24,000 in 1987 to about 6,000 in 1995.33 But Aquino had less luck sustaining these gains than in achieving them in the first place. After AFP troops withdrew from an area, the NPA would typically return and reclaim control of its villages. In a strategy oriented around the principles of CHCD, the consolidate and develop aspects of Lambit Bitag were chronic shortcomings of the civilian agencies tasked with reconstruction and development.

GRP counterinsurgency operations rarely played out this way in practice. Resourcing for civilian government agencies to perform these

missions and their coordination with the AFP were limited. Multiple sources suggest that the AFP was holding up largely on its own against the NPA. In practice, the unsuccessful implementation of a whole-of-government approach exacerbated the already strained relations between the Aquino government and its civilian agencies and the AFP, over which Aquino had only tenuous control.34

The civilians in Aquino’s government were poorly coordinated and could not reach consensus on the appropriate measures to take against insurgents. Many in the Congress viewed the insurgencies as purely local phenomena, while others viewed them as a task for the military. Either way, support for Aquino’s desired strategy was limited, and implementation was often difficult.

With nowhere else to turn, Aquino, under intense pressure from the military and with promises of increased U.S. support, reversed course and launched a total-war policy against the NPA. Interestingly, however, although the NPA sought to take advantage of the uptick in AFP abuses, it was less able to do so under the democratically elected Aquino than it had been under Marcos’ martial law, with support less forthcoming from moderate elements of the population, perhaps because the democratic system afforded possible opportunities for reforms that would simply never happen if the NPA were to win.35

Negotiations between the Aquino government and the MNLF led to the creation of the ARMM on August 1, 1989. This agreement was hardly comprehensive, however: Of the 13 southern provinces and nine cities that participated in the referendum held on the basis of the Tripoli Accords, only four—Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi—opted to be part of the ARMM. Marcos’ legacy haunted the prospects for fuller implementation, as one of the reasons for the failure of the referendum to garner a majority vote was Marcos’ encour-

34 Interview with GRP official, Quezon City, Philippines, June 2013; interview with AFP officer, Makati, Philippines, June 2013; Devesa, 2005, p. 36.

agement of Christians to move into Mindanao at the same time thousands of Muslims were fleeing from government repression.

Ultimately, Aquino failed to reach a final negotiated settlement with any of the country’s three major internal threat groups, despite having engaged all of them in talks during her tenure. Aquino was weak vis-à-vis a variety of actors with divergent preferences concerning the peace processes, including powerful factions of the AFP, old interests from the Marcos administration, and in some cases, the United States. This weakness likely undermined insurgents’ confidence in her government’s ability to make good on its stated objectives of peace and reintegration. At the same time, rebel fragmentation in both the NPA and the southern Muslim separatists threatened to spoil any negotiated peace.

After Fidel Ramos came to power in 1992, he affirmed Aquino’s initial policy of national reconciliation and general amnesty for willing parties from the communist factions and the Muslim separatists. Ramos’ efforts culminated in the only successful and lasting peace agreement—the 1996 Final Mindanao Peace Agreement, brokered with the MNLF—during the four decades examined in this study. Ramos succeeded in reaching a deal that took a key part of the opposition off the battlefield.

In addition to the success of Ramos’ peace initiatives—at least compared with those of his predecessors—his strategy hinged partly on civil-military relations. A former Secretary of National Defense

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36 The NPA did not receive significant assistance from external sources during the Cold War, with the exception of support from China from 1969 to 1976. The group’s strength, and its entry into negotiations, varied more with changes in the regime it faced. “New People’s Army,” START Terrorist Organization Profiles database, University of Maryland, College Park, Md., undated.

37 One unanticipated byproduct of democratization and attempts at reconciliation—imperfect as they were—was that they triggered NPA fractionalization, pitting hard-line “reaffirmationists” against “rejectionists,” who opposed continuing the protracted war strategy. The bickering between the two factions escalated until a series of bloody internal purges of suspected traitors had riven the NPA, nearly leading to its collapse. See International Crisis Group, The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks, Crisis Group Asia Report No. 202, Islamabad/Brussels, February 2011, pp. 5–6.
who had lost favor with key elements of the AFP, Ramos had an acute understanding of the importance of both addressing root causes of the insurgencies and reconciling with the military. His policy objectives reflected these priorities. Ramos repealed R.A. No. 1700, also known as the Anti-Subversion Law, to open the door for former subversive organizations to pursue political and social goals through political means rather than armed struggle. To accommodate individual dissidents, the Balik-Baril program was created; it reintegrated rebels who surrendered their weapons to government authorities in exchange for an up-front cash payment and additional payments to be made in subsequent months that would enable all those who surrendered to take up a livelihood program of their choosing. With regard to the military, Ramos sought to accommodate the coup plotters of the 1980s by granting them unconditional amnesty.

Overall, Ramos’ conciliatory policies held promise for addressing the country’s insurgencies. For example, during his tenure, the number of communist-influenced villages declined to its lowest point.\(^\text{38}\) The reduction was sufficient, in fact, that the AFP’s role in combating insurgency was scaled back and eventually transferred, in 1996, to the Philippine National Police, along with the Department of the Interior and Local Government and local government units (LGUs). These agencies remained poorly coordinated, underresourced, and lacking in the training and doctrine for counterinsurgency that the AFP had enjoyed. In subsequent years, the GRP lost ground in its efforts against multiple insurgent groups, including the NPA, and in particular, the MILF. Ramos’ attempt to enact a whole-of-government approach to counterinsurgency never fully gained the population’s confidence. Despite the democratic handover from Aquino, the Ramos government’s bureaucracy was perceived by many as weak, uncommitted to reform, uncoordinated, corrupt, and financially strained, all of which limited its capacity to deliver on the promises of Lambat Bitag.\(^\text{39}\) Although the communist insurgency reached the lowest point of its history during the Ramos administration, the MILF and the ASG began to rise up

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\(^{38}\) Devesa, 2005, p. 5.

again during the latter part of his term, as shown in Figure 4.1, in large part because of the government’s failure to execute and sustain the consolidate and develop stages of the Lambat Bitag campaign strategy.\(^{40}\) Ultimately, the insurgents discovered many of the same opportunities they exploited during the Aquino administration, playing on the people’s grievances to increase their dissatisfaction with the government.\(^{41}\) This episode illustrates that the preferred policies of democratic regimes can be undermined by inadequate capability to implement them—a subject that will be further explored in the discussion of state capacity.

Ramos’ successor, Joseph Estrada, returned responsibility for internal security operations to the AFP in 1998. After some initial skirmishes, the military and the insurgent groups both escalated

Figure 4.1
Insurgent-Group Strength by Administration

![Graph showing insurgent-group strength by administration from 1968 to 2004.](Graph.png)


\(^{40}\) Pena, 2007, p. 57.

\(^{41}\) Pena, 2007, p. 57.
operations in a tit-for-tat fashion, and the hope of a negotiated settle-
ment was largely dashed in 2000 when Estrada declared a strategy of
all-out war against the MILF, which resulted not only in a renewal of
combat, but also in high levels of civilian displacement in Mindanao.

**Philippine Strategy Since 2001: Conciliation and Counterterrorism**

Estrada was ousted in 2001 and replaced by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. Although his ouster was dubbed “People Power 2,”
it came after the AFP withdrew its support, citing his corruption and
unpopularity as evidenced by popular protests in Manila, and shifted
to supporting Arroyo. Subsequent presidential elections in 2004 and
2010 were allegedly subject to irregularities, but whatever their flaws,
democratic processes are now institutionalized—an outcome that was
far from certain when Marcos went into exile in 1986. While not
impossible, a return to Marcos-style martial law appears increasingly
unlikely.

Since 2001, the GRP’s stated strategy for addressing its internal
security threats has been to pursue a negotiated solution with both the
MILF and the NPA through ongoing peace processes. As of July 2013,
a settlement with the MILF appeared increasingly likely, although the
government’s dialogue with the NPA has been less productive for a
variety of reasons.42

The ASG case is somewhat different. Like other Salafi jihadist
groups, the ASG rejects any negotiated compromise with the Catholic
government in its pursuit of an Islamic emirate in the Philippines.43 As
a result, the ASG remains the target of AFP counterterrorism opera-
tions in the southern Philippines that aim to cripple the group or defeat
it outright.

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42 These reasons include severe NPA fragmentation and internal disagreement over the
group’s objectives; economic rents NPA leaders were able to capture via “revolutionary taxes”
and front companies; and the GRP’s decision to make the NPA peace process a secondary

Studies Institute, September 2005, pp. 41–42.
Military Superiority

A second explanatory factor associated with Philippine counterinsurgency strategy and outcomes is military superiority, which reflects the balance—or imbalance—between government armed forces and the size and capabilities of the insurgents and terrorists. Change over time to the military balance can shape strategy and indeed did shape GRP strategy. Contrary to the hypothesis that governments tend to be more discriminating in their use of force when they enjoy significant military superiority, however, the Philippines experience suggests that quantitatively superior government forces might use either high or low levels of indiscriminate violence. The nature of the regime and the quality of the counterinsurgency forces it deploys account better for the variation over time in the Philippines.

The history of Philippines counterinsurgency since Marcos’ ouster maps onto this framework relatively well. Under Marcos, the country was under de facto authoritarian rule for 14 years. Marcos’ military was significantly larger than the rebel forces he faced, particularly after he invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the expansion of the both the AFP and pro-government paramilitary forces to fight armed dissident movements. Consistent with our framework, Marcos’ authoritarian regime did not bargain in good faith; rather, it knowingly implemented policies that would undermine the Moro Muslims’ demographic majority status in Mindanao and thus reduce the chances that an agreed-upon referendum would force the concessions sought by the MNLF. Moreover, the Marcos regime’s use of force became more and more indiscriminate as the military’s relative dominance eroded due to booms in rebel recruitment, particularly by the NPA from the late 1970s through the first half of the 1980s.

Quantitative Military Superiority and Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy

As Figures 4.2 and 4.3 indicate, the escalation in the number of PSF predated the NPA’s membership spike. The number of AFP personnel rose dramatically shortly after Marcos imposed martial law in 1972, rising from 62,000 in 1972 to 90,000 in 1974—an increase of almost one-third in just two years. Marcos continued to increase the
Figure 4.2  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PSF (thousands)</th>
<th>NPA (thousands)</th>
<th>PSF:NPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Esperon, 2006; Correlates of War Project, 2010.

Marcos not only increased the number of military personnel in his armed forces, he also increased spending on the military. From 1972 to 1974, Philippine military expenditures increased 142 percent, jumping from $119,320,000 to $289,035,000. Philippine military size of the military in subsequent years. By 1977, it grew to 155,000, where it remained fairly steady through 1982, at which time it declined to 113,000, where it would remain fairly steady for the remainder of Marcos’ tenure. Overall, in the 17 years from the beginning of Marcos’ reign in 1965 to the regime’s peak military strength in 1982, the number of military personnel more than tripled.

44 These statistics come from the Correlates of War project’s National Material Capabilities database (version 4.0). For more on the National Material Capabilities data, see Singer, 1987, pp. 115–132.
Figure 4.3
ASG Estimated Strength, 1993–2003


spending peaked in 1982 at $909,822,000—more than 14 times the $64,838,000 spent in 1965, Marcos’ first year in power.45

Marcos clearly sought military superiority over the internal-security threats his regime faced. But his military buildup did not repel the NPA, the armed wing of the CPP, which was the main threat. On the contrary, as Marcos invested more and more in his military, the NPA also grew (see Figure 4.2). According to many accounts, the Philippine government and armed forces’ repression of the communists was a potent tool for NPA mobilization and significantly contributed to its growth, which spiked from the mid-1970s through the late 1980s.46 Indeed, the communists had long described Marcos as their


best recruiter. For the period for which systematic estimates of NPA strength are available, 1978–2006, the most striking period of growth in NPA strength was during the Marcos era: During the period of the most significant PSF growth in the Marcos era for which data are available, 1978–1982, the estimated number of NPA members nearly tripled, increasing from 2,760 to 7,750. Estimated NPA membership increased to approximately 10,660 in 1983; 14,360 in 1984; 22,500 in 1985; and 24,430 in 1986. According to these data, the ratio of PSF to NPA personnel was highest in the late 1970s and early 1980s but declined steadily during this period and continued to decline until 1987.

Unclassified AFP annual estimates of ASG strength are shown in Figure 4.3 for 1993 to 2003. These estimates confirm the conventional wisdom that the ASG is the smallest of the three major Philippine threat groups. AFP intelligence suggests the group had only 120 members in 1993. This number increased steadily throughout the 1990s and peaked at 1,270 in 2000, before beginning to steadily decline in 2001 and 2002. The timing of the ASG’s decline coincides with the deployment of U.S. SOF to the southern Philippines, first to assist in establishing the Philippines’ premier counterterrorism unit, the Light Reaction Company, in 2000, and then as Joint Task Force 510 (JTF-510) and then as JSOTF-P from 2002 on.

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49 Esperon, 2006, p. 5.
50 These were the only years for which unclassified annual estimates of ASG strength were available. See Office of the Deputy Chief for Intelligence, J2, Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2004, Annex IA. Quoted in Romulo C. Supapo, U.S.-Philippine Security Relations: Its Implications for the Global War on Terrorism, Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, March 2004, pp. 7–8.
51 Lambert, Lewis, and Sewall, 2012, pp. 120–121.
The Importance of Quality

The discussion of military superiority raises an important point. One explanation for the steep decline in ASG strength in the early 2000s involves the quality of the modest number of U.S. troops deployed to the southern Philippines. Their training and doctrine, not to mention the high quality of the equipment, weapons, and technical assets they brought, were both sufficient and appropriate to support the PSF campaign against the ASG and facilitated a quick, significant degradation of the ASG organization. Moreover, the AFP has developed increasingly potent SOF capable of performing unconventional small-unit operations independently.

The relative quality of the PSF deployed to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations clearly correlates with partner-nation qualities the United States seeks. High-quality troops—that is, AFP troops who have undergone rigorous, specialized training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and whose operational approach is guided and disciplined by appropriate doctrine for such operations—are more likely to be able to build rapport with the local population and plan and execute intelligence-driven operations in a selective, discriminate fashion than are soldiers who lack these qualities.52

Table 4.2 contrasts the average number of deaths per conflict incident for AFP elite SOF units, such as Special Forces and Scout Rangers; for conventional, or regular, units, such as infantry; and for indigenous units, which serve as local militia, typically in areas where the AFP’s presence is insufficient to hold territory. The statistics show that of the three unit types, elite AFP units tend to suffer the fewest deaths per incident, on average, illustrating their force-protection capabilities, and also that these units inflict the most fatalities on insurgents (nearly two times the rate of conventional units) and the fewest civilian casualties. They thus have the most favorable loss-exchange ratio of the three unit types—a finding that holds when the data are disaggregated and analyzed for a variety of different threat conditions.

and other environmental factors. AFP elite units conduct operations against all threat groups, typically independent of U.S. advice or assistance against the GRP’s main adversary, the NPA. This trend supports the notion that quality might be as important as quantity, if not more important, in executing counterinsurgency operations efficiently and with maximum discrimination in the use of force.

Although troop quality—of both U.S. SOF advisors and their Philippine counterparts—certainly plays a role in PSF posture and effectiveness against unconventional threat groups, it is important not to divorce it from context. Thinking through a counterfactual scenario in which the U.S. intervention occurred in a different time period suggests that the post-9/11 U.S. intervention might have come at a propitious time for the United States to be able to cultivate counterinsurgency tactics within the AFP. The Philippine government was committed to maintaining democratic institutions (even while government corruption remained relatively high) and seeking political accommodation with those insurgent groups that could reconcile with the central government. Had the United States provided the same train-

53 Loss-exchange ratio is a measure of the fraction of conflict deaths experienced by government forces relative to deaths of rebels. This variable was coded by dividing the number of rebels killed by the sum of both government forces and rebels killed. A value of 0.5 indicates an equal number of government and rebel soldiers died as a result of operations in the unit of analysis. Values closer to 1 reflect cases where the government killed more insurgents than it lost in the incident; the opposite is the case as the loss-exchange fraction value moves from 0.5 toward zero. See Felter, 2008, pp. 31–32.
Counterinsurgency in the Philippines

ing in the Marcos era, it might have fed a very different operational strategy—one that proved counterproductive during that era.

State Capacity and Counterinsurgency

Geography, Terrain, and Logistics

Like the governments of many fledgling states in the developing world, the GRP has struggled to generate sufficient capabilities to effectively exercise governance throughout its territory. One result of the lack of government authority in certain parts of the country is that even when the GRP and a rebel group both appear to have a willingness to negotiate toward a conflict settlement, the GRP has had difficulty making a credible commitment to comply with and enforce such a settlement. Indeed, factional politics and intragovernment instability severely undermined peace processes with both the MNLF and the MILF, the latter of which is still unresolved. If democracy is a factor associated with governments that tend to be more willing to negotiate with moderate elements of insurgencies, it appears that democratic states must also have the capacity to implement a deal.

The Philippines has had limited capacity for several reasons. First, the country’s geography makes committing to the implementation of a peace agreement difficult for many of the same reasons it makes fighting insurgents difficult. This can result in an “equilibrium” of protracted, low-intensity insurgency.

What exactly are these geographic conditions? The Philippines is an archipelago of more than 7,000 islands, many of which have rugged or jungle terrain, which provides an abundance of safe havens where insurgents can recruit, stage operations, and avoid apprehension by government authorities. The terrain also makes it difficult for the government and insurgents to monitor each other and ensure transparency during and after a peace process. Indeed, the combination of geographic challenges and relative poverty in the Philippines means that—as is the case in most countries in the developing world—the logistics required for effective counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, or stability operations are difficult.

These challenges differ across the various insurgencies in the Philippines. The more-concentrated, territorial nature of the MILF and
especially the ASG in the southern Philippines, along with the geographical constraints imposed by the islands where they operate, can help government forces find insurgent camps and limits insurgents’ freedom of movement to elude apprehension when the military or police are able to conduct timely operations. At the same time, parallel, state-like structures built by the MNLF and the MILF make parts of the southern Philippines akin to denied or hostile areas, in which the AFP’s operational latitude is limited. Conversely, the more-dispersed nature of the NPA has allowed it to better withstand strong government offensives, although it has also made it more difficult for the group to firmly establish its primacy.

The GRP’s limited capacity must be understood in comparative perspective. Relative to all regimes battling insurgencies, which tend to have very low governance and overall state capacity, the Philippines has a reasonably competent governmental infrastructure that can provide some degree of public goods even in remote rural areas. Compared with most of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and many of the poorer countries of Asia, it scores considerably better on both indices of state capacity used in this study. The fact that it continues to struggle to implement government policies, especially in the remote regions of the country, is evidence of the challenges the classic counterinsurgency model faces in most conflict-affected countries of the developing world.

**The Threat of Institutional Weakness and Strained Civil-Military Relations to Civilian Control**

In addition to the geographical and logistical challenges involved in vanquishing an insurgency in the Philippines or cooperating with one, the institutional capabilities of the AFP dedicated to these efforts are modest. Relatively weak civilian oversight, along with embedded patronage networks, sometimes results in corruption and mismanagement, especially within the AFP officer corps. This weakness threat-

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54 Fearon and Laitin, 2003, pp. 75–76.
ens to undermine attempts to instill a culture of professionalism, obedience to civilian rule, and restraint from civilian abuses. Reports of AFP human rights abuses have decreased since the all-out war against the MILF in 2000 and particularly after the establishment of U.S. SOF JTFs in early 2002. Professionalism within the AFP officer corps remains uneven, however, and paramilitary units—though vastly improved in comparison with their predecessors under Marcos—remain, in many cases, beyond the central government’s control and are thus more prone to committing abuses at the behest of local bosses. Ultimately, the AFP’s limited capacity to conduct effective, sustained, and disciplined counterinsurgency operations means that those designing the policies and strategies to combat insurgents often struggle to ensure that they are implemented as planned.

**State Capacity and Civil Counterinsurgency**

Despite numerous post-Marcos strategic and doctrinal initiatives to broaden counterinsurgency efforts to include civil functions in a “holistic” approach, the AFP has in practice shouldered much of the burden of internal-security operations. Consequently, deviations from new counterinsurgency approaches have been relatively common, and the GRP’s response has thus often been to revert to old, conventional approaches that rely on heavy firepower and sweep operations, which have failed to eradicate the insurgencies and have sometimes undone progress made in addressing popular grievances.

Despite the incomplete reform of GRP counterinsurgency approaches during successive post-Marcos democratic governments, there is some correlative evidence linking development projects to counterinsurgency successes.

As Figure 4.4 illustrates, after the onset of AFP Development Support Operations (DSO) in 2004, which included development project delivery, there was an upward trend in the number of projects delivered and a downward trend in both the number of barangays assessed as affected by insurgents and the number of guerrilla fronts, the local organizational units of NPA insurgents. These trends were strongest in 2007 and 2008, when the AFP activated the National Development Support Command (NADESCOM) to institutionalize
Countering Others’ Insurgencies

Figure 4.4
Development Projects, Insurgent-Affected Barangays, and Guerrilla Fronts

Impact of DSO
(2001–2010)

Affected barangays
Projects
Recipient barangays

Social preparation
Institutionalization of DSO through activation of NADESCOM
2010 projects not delivered

SOURCE: Interview with former commander, AFP NADESCOM, 2013.
RAND RR513-4.4

its development efforts in counterinsurgency. The trends also reveal a minor reversal in 2010, when projects were not delivered. NADESCOM was dissolved in 2012, and there currently appears to be somewhat less enthusiasm for AFP-led development efforts, possibly as a result of personnel turnover in high-level Philippine defense positions, including the Secretary of National Defense and the AFP Chief of Staff in 2010.57 The longer-term implications of this suspension of AFP development programs are as yet unclear.

57 Interview with former NADESCOM commander, June 2013, Manila, Philippines.
There are also qualitative examples that illustrate what robust civil-military integration in counterinsurgency looks like when the GRP has the capacity and will to implement a classic counterinsurgency approach in a concerted, sustained way. The counterinsurgency effort in Bohol province, once an NPA stronghold, is one of the clearest illustrations of successful civil-military integration. In Bohol, development was assigned a significant role in the local campaign, and provincial counterinsurgency efforts were subsumed under the auspices of the Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office. The civil aspect of the Bohol campaign was multifaceted: Governance, environmental management, social welfare, peace and security, urban management, education, health, rural improvement, population management, sustainable livelihood, infrastructure, and economic management were components of the overarching effort against the NPA. Militarily, the AFP expanded the use of Special Operations teams in Bohol to collect village-level intelligence and conduct other small-unit operations. But military operations were just one component of a broader, multifaceted GRP approach to counterinsurgency in Bohol.

While perhaps an exceptional case—the GRP considered Bohol a high-priority province for operations against the NPA—Bohol indicates the potential of such an approach. Indeed, the war-torn province changed from among the poorest provinces in the Philippines in 1997 to one of the fastest-developing provinces by 2001. By the mid-2000s, Bohol was virtually free of insurgency.

Bohol is also notable for the fact that U.S. civil engagement has supported Philippine counterinsurgency objectives there. In response to reports of drug trafficking and NPA money-laundering operations, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell authorized additional aid to build

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60 Hastings and Mortela, 2008, pp. 68–69.
and support Philippine capacity to counter these activities, which was disbursed primarily by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The U.S. military did not play a significant role in Bohol’s post-2001 success, as the NPA insurgency in Bohol is domestic and thus beyond the scope of its purview, which is focused primarily on ASG and foreign elements in the south.

Analysis of U.S. Assistance

The U.S. military has played a significant role in the southern Philippines in OEF-P since 2001, when the U.S.-Philippines security relationship was reestablished after security cooperation between the two countries had diminished in the 1990s.

In the post-9/11 period, the Philippines became the Southeast Asian front line of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. During the 1990s, there was relatively little interest in the ASG or its links to foreign terrorist groups. But after the 9/11 attacks, the recognition that numerous key al Qaeda figures had used the Philippines for various fund-raising and operational purposes and that the Philippines served as one of its key potential staging grounds for expanding al Qaeda’s influence in Southeast Asia, made the Philippines a key interest of U.S. counterterrorism officials.

U.S. interest in Philippine counterinsurgency, however, was largely limited to the southern Philippines, and specifically to parts of Mindanao, such as Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu, where the al Qaeda–linked terrorist network was believed to be most active. The U.S. resurgence in the Philippines did not—and was not intended to—address the main insurgent threat to the GRP, the communist NPA. These restrictions on U.S. activities have limited the influence of the United

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63 Author interview with former U.S. government official, Manila, Philippines, June 24, 2013.
States’ advisory support, both in practical operational terms and in the eyes of some AFP officers who see themselves as confronting a very different—and for them, more vital—insurgent adversary.64

Indeed, the United States’ primary interest in the Philippines after 9/11 was to advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives, not to develop PSF capacity to combat insurgencies. The latter was a byproduct of Philippine domestic law, which prohibited the U.S. military from pursuing its initial plan—engaging in direct-action counterterrorism operations against particular individuals from select groups—and forced the United States to develop PSF capabilities in order to facilitate the degradation and destruction of militant networks in the region. The restrictions placed on U.S. forces by the Philippine government required a more-nuanced, integrated response involving a wide range of U.S. capabilities, from civilian aid and U.S.-supported civil-military operations to intelligence support from the United States’ technical platforms and logistics involving U.S. SOF aviation assets.65

The post-2001 U.S. military objective in the Philippines has remained largely constant: to degrade terrorist threats in the region. The U.S. objective and presence have resulted in high-quality intelligence and in increased oversight of the PSF in its areas of operation, reducing the incidence of indiscriminate violence due to shoddy information or a lack of oversight and accountability. U.S. influence on the PSF, however, is largely limited to those areas in the southern islands where JSOTF-P operates. Human rights abuses and other counterinsurgency practices that are undesirable from the United States’ standpoint continue to occur and remain a significant concern in other parts of the country. These bad counterinsurgency practices, however, should be considered in relative terms. Overall, the AFP has transitioned from brute-force approaches—a persistent characteristic of operations during


the period of martial law and a sporadic one of the fragile democratic governments of the 1990s—to the use of focused tactics that seek to minimize harm to the civilian population. This transformation is considered a key component of the success against militant groups in the past decade.66

**Capacity-Building and Enhanced Civilian Oversight**

U.S. partnership assistance has sought to influence GRP counterinsurgency practices by providing military and other assistance intended to, among other things, influence its political inclusivity, military superiority, and overall state capacity and thereby shape its response to the threats the United States cares about most. Over the past decade, this assistance has improved GRP and AFP capabilities, particularly through intelligence-sharing and tactical advice that has resulted in highly precise military operations. It has also improved assessments of local populations’ needs and support for the provision of goods and services that satisfy those needs.67 Equally important, U.S. assistance has demonstrated to the AFP the value of a classical counterinsurgency strategy that balances discriminate, targeted uses of force with non-kinetic approaches involving various types of assistance to the population or acceptable concessions to reconcilable insurgent elements.68

OEF-P has played an additional stabilizing role: It has helped tip the civil-military balance within Philippine power structures in favor of the civilian government, primarily by providing funding and other support in coordination with the GRP, which had long struggled to assert and consolidate its primacy over the military. Important for counterinsurgency, this occurred not only at the national level but also at the local level, where it relied on an indirect approach in which AFP units led operations but did so with critical support and oversight from U.S. advisors. As such, U.S. military assistance to the Philippines

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during OEF-P has resulted in dramatic changes not only in the tactical proficiency and operational capacity of the AFP and other PSF, but also in the AFP’s role in and level of local engagement.  

As a result of the American presence during OEF-P, Philippine civil-military engagement was influenced in two important ways. First, the U.S.-PSF military partnership enabled the AFP to reach local areas and their primary administrative bodies, LGUs, as well as civilian populations that previously were beyond the effective control of GRP national-level mechanisms. This occurred not only through the provision of logistics support for AFP operations, but also through intelligence support that helped the AFP to conduct timely, intelligence-driven operations. The AFP, with U.S. support, was thus able to engage in civil-military operations, support development efforts, and develop a robust messaging strategy intended to influence the population favorably toward the GRP. Second, the AFP’s extended reach and ability to provide basic security functions meant LGUs and private citizens were less likely to rely on local paramilitaries. The mutual reliance of LGUs and civilian populations, on the one hand, and the AFP and other GRP agencies, on the other hand, has since 2001 enhanced state capacity by enabling the GRP to provide better security and other services and to conduct tactical military operations in previously denied areas of Basilan, Sulu, and other locations in the southern Philippines where ASG and foreign militants operate.

The U.S. Role: Limitations and Risks

Despite their benefits, U.S. activities suffer from limitations of their own. First, U.S. and Philippine objectives are imperfectly aligned, which poses a risk to both GRP and U.S. interests. The United States’
primary interest is in counterterrorism—specifically, disrupting, degrading, and dismantling Salafi jihadist networks that operate in Southeast Asia and have used the Philippines as a hub or for sanctuary among the ASG or in MILF base camps.\textsuperscript{72} From the United States’ perspective, AFP counterinsurgency is a critical part of an indirect approach intended to advance U.S. counterterrorism objectives. The GRP-MILF peace process, however, has complicated the U.S. counterterrorism campaign. And from the GRP’s perspective, U.S. counterterrorism goals have complicated its efforts to reach an acceptable end-state with the MILF. When the United States raised the possibility of declaring the MILF a terrorist group because of its relationship with the ASG, the GRP objected strenuously and has repeatedly sought to limit military countermeasures against the MILF in its controlled territory for fear of jeopardizing a political resolution with the group.\textsuperscript{73} Yet GRP protection of the MILF has at times allowed ASG and JI operatives to use MILF camps as de facto safe-haven areas, resulting in tensions between U.S. objectives and GRP policies. Indeed, aggressive U.S.-backed AFP counterterrorist pursuit operations into MILF-controlled areas have risked compromising the ever-fragile peace process. This possibility remains a concern—tactical-level successes, such as capture/kill raids or airstrikes against senior terrorist leaders, could trigger MILF retaliation and escalation to war. Another possibility is that such tactical strikes in the south could radicalize the MILF (or other armed Muslim factions) and push it toward the ASG, which would strengthen the United States’ main enemy in the country and inadvertently make it a more credible spoiler of the MILF peace process, hurting both U.S. and GRP interests in the process.\textsuperscript{74}

Second, the U.S. and the GRP have divergent interests in another key area for counterinsurgency, the NPA. As with the MILF, the

\textsuperscript{72} Ressa, 2004.

\textsuperscript{73} Abuza, 2005, pp. 14–16.

GRP anticipates a negotiated solution to the NPA conflict. Unlike the MILF, however, the GRP views the NPA as its main threat, if not an existential one. The United States has shown little interest in providing military support to the GRP’s NPA counterinsurgency. Since 2001, the United States has significantly increased foreign-military funding and other economic assistance, which indirectly supports the GRP counterinsurgency against the NPA, but the lack of a direct advise/assist role and the provision of unique capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, leads some AFP officers to question the commitment of the United States to the mutual-defense agreement that formalized the post-2001 reinitiation of significantly deepened U.S.-Philippine security cooperation.

Third, intelligence- and information-sharing between the United States and the PSF has considerable transaction costs and limitations due to the fact that U.S. personnel cannot divulge sensitive sources or methods to their Philippine partners. These limitations could have a significant impact on the sustainability of the AFP’s improvements in the use of discriminate force against known militants. Filipinos are likely to struggle to target insurgents and terrorists efficiently and discriminately if U.S. intelligence support diminishes, which could hasten a return to old, less-discriminate practices.

Conclusions

The Philippines counterinsurgency environment has progressed in a way that is largely consistent with the framework advanced in this study. The Marcos regime declared martial law from 1972 to 1983 and

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75 Since 2001, U.S. military assistance (the combined amount under the foreign military financing [FMF], foreign military sales [FMS], international military education and training [IMET], and excess defense articles), for example, grew from $10.5 million to $42.8 million in 2007. Hall, 2010, p. 34.

76 Multiple interviews with AFP officers, Tarlac and Makati, Philippines, June 2013; multiple interviews with former JSOTF-P officers, April 2013; interview with former U.S. military attaché, Makati, Philippines, June 2013.

77 Interview with former JSOTF-P intelligence officer, Arlington, Va., May 2013.
adopted an increasingly repressive and indiscriminate strategy vis-à-vis the opposition, even undermining chances for a sustained peace with the MNLF separatists through its policies. Subsequent democratic regimes, starting with Corazon Aquino’s in 1986 and followed by Fidel Ramos’ in 1992, implemented policies that were more open to accommodating moderate or reconcilable elements of the opposition, while continuing military campaigns against opposition that was less willing to engage the government. These military campaigns were often aimed at pacification—an integrated civilian and military approach that would combine reconstruction and military operations—although they sometimes reverted to more-conventional, military-led campaigns that relied on heavy force against insurgent encampments. After 2001, however, the Arroyo and Aquino governments largely reconstituted earlier efforts to engage moderate insurgents, advance peace processes, and develop methods for more-discriminate targeting of insurgent and terrorist groups’ hard-line elements.

The democratically elected Estrada regime, starting in 1998 and ending in 2001, is the main outlier to this general pattern. With U.S. support to the Philippines during the 1990s significantly diminished, the Estrada regime was particularly weak, and at the same time, it was renowned for its corruption, siphoning off remaining available resources that could have been used to build governmental capacity to counter insurgents. With little remaining capacity in the civil sector and low-level violence between the AFP and insurgents ongoing, Estrada authorized the military to resume major combat operations that derailed the southern peace process and caused widespread harm to the civilian population.78 The resumption of significant U.S. support to the Arroyo regime after 2001 was a key turning point in the return to previous democratic regimes’ strategy of conciliation and a more balanced counterinsurgency approach.

The Philippines provided a hospitable environment for the United States to partner with to counter mutual threats, particularly during

the post-9/11 period, by which time the GRP had established consolidated, if imperfect, democratic institutions. Like other democratically elected governments that followed Marcos’ regime, the post-2001 Philippines has sought to negotiate an end to conflicts with groups it considers reconcilable. These efforts have met with only partial success: The MILF peace process holds significant promise for an agreement, while NPA negotiations have never developed to the same stage of maturity and are currently stalled.79

The Philippines has adapted the military side of its counterinsurgencies toward a greater focus on the population, making progress in minimizing civilian casualties and the incidence of indiscriminate violence.80 Oversight and headquarters-level control of certain units in certain locations remains limited, but U.S. military assistance and advisors have facilitated a more sustained population-centric approach than ever before by easing resource burdens and sharing operational methods and techniques for conducting a range of civil-military operations.

By injecting additional resources, oversight, and capabilities, the U.S. military also appears to have helped to stabilize civil-military relations—a chronic source of policy instability in the Philippines since the transition to democracy in 1986. It is entirely possible, however, that this stability will be fleeting, as there is no institutional mechanism in place to build or sustain the capacity to maintain smoother civil-military relations in the absence of the combination of qualities and resources the United States brings to the environment.

Finally, although the United States’ partnership with the GRP should be considered a success story, claims about that success should be qualified by questions concerning the long-term sustainability of the gains that have been made. Philippine capacity to counter insurgent and terrorist groups effectively and selectively is unquestionably greater now than it was during any part of the pre-9/11 period. It is unclear, however, whether the GRP will be able to deploy and sustain certain capabilities that have enhanced its capacity and contributed


to its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism successes over the past decade. The United States, acting indirectly in support of the GRP, has provided important intelligence support and logistics capabilities, such as intelligence obtained from technical sources and airborne ISR assets, robust helicopter support, and night-vision capabilities, all of which are critical enablers of timely collection and validation of intelligence and of precise military operations that minimize collateral damage and civilian harm.\textsuperscript{81} The Philippine government is unlikely to be able to harness and exploit these capabilities independently. Thus, a long-term U.S.-Philippine partnership and continued U.S. support to the GRP, albeit at a low level, are likely to be necessary to sustain success in the Philippines, unless the GRP manages an enduring resolution to its conflicts with the myriad groups and factions that contest its rule.

\textsuperscript{81} Lambert, Lewis, and Sewall, 2012, p. 127.
CHAPTER FIVE
Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

Introduction

Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has faced numerous challenges from violent non-state actors. The number and intensity of internal conflicts began to escalate following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, particularly in the northwest regions of the country. The United States began to take an active interest in Pakistan’s approach to counterinsurgency at that time and especially after the Taliban resurgence beginning in approximately 2006. In a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, U.S. officials expressed concern over Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban and their foreign and al Qaeda affiliates operating in the northwest and tribal areas. According to the estimate, increased activity by these groups threatened to erode gains made in Afghanistan and, more importantly, to destabilize a nuclear-armed Pakistan.¹ As a result, the United States adopted a more activist approach to influencing the Pakistan government’s counterinsurgency operations through military and economic assistance.

This chapter examines the drivers and trajectory of Pakistan’s various counterinsurgency campaigns since 2001. In contrast to the Philippines, Pakistan possesses a large, professional, and highly capable military but weak state capacity and civilian institutions. Despite frequent elections over the past decade, opportunities for meaningful

political participation remain limited.\(^2\) Whereas the Philippines offered an opportunity to examine a U.S. partnership under something close to best-case conditions, Pakistan represents a much more challenging case. This contrast between the two countries is useful for understanding both the limitations and the potential of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes.

The Pakistan case merits careful consideration for other reasons as well. Because the government of Pakistan has fought multiple insurgencies during this period, it offers the chance to explore many “mini-cases” under different subnational conditions. Comparing the different approaches that the government has taken at different points in time and against different insurgent groups provides us with considerable insight into the domestic determinants of counterinsurgency strategy and practices.

Regime characteristics—in particular, the extent of political inclusion and state capacity—have shaped Pakistan’s preferred strategies for countering insurgency. The nuances of case-study methods allow us to explore subtle variations in both domestic features and counterinsurgency approaches. By dividing Pakistan across distinct regions (Swat/Malakand, Balochistan) and various agencies within FATA and over different time periods (before and after civilian governments), we are able to analyze how different levels of inclusion, state capacity, and military superiority in eight subcases have impacted strategy and outcomes.

Across these eight subcases, we find that Pakistani governments have usually pursued containment strategies typical of less politically inclusive regimes with low state capacity. As the government has moved closer toward democracy in recent years, however, it has often (although not uniformly) adopted strategies characteristic of more-inclusive regimes, emphasizing greater efforts toward accommodation of the reconcilable opposition and more discriminate use of force. Yet even in this period, government strategy has varied by region, as some subcases reveal. In regions closer to the core of the Pakistani state that possess better institutions for higher levels of political inclusion

\(^2\) Pakistan’s democracy score on the seven-point Freedom House index has improved over the past five years, but it has still not reached the midpoint.
and state capacity (e.g., the Swat Valley), the government has adopted approaches resembling classic counterinsurgency strategies. In peripheral regions like FATA and Balochistan, in contrast, the state has been more prone to using force indiscriminately and denying even potentially reconcilable opposition movements the opportunity for meaningful political participation in state structures.

The U.S.-Pakistan security partnership is commonly regarded as a failure, particularly since the steady decline in relations that began in 2011. Our analysis suggests that a more-nuanced view is appropriate. The study clearly reveals the limits of U.S. leverage, even in countries to which it provides large amounts of assistance, but it also reveals specific circumstances under which the United States might positively engage. Finally, it suggests the potential for even partners with unfavorable characteristics to adopt elements of Western counterinsurgency best practices, at least under certain conditions. To be clear, the story of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is not an encouraging one. It does, however, hint at ways in which the United States might influence problematic partners’ counterinsurgency practices on the margins.

The first section below provides background detail on the Government of Pakistan (GoP), the insurgent groups it has fought since 2001, and the counterinsurgency campaigns in FATA, Swat/Malakand, and Balochistan during the pre- and post-2008 periods. The next section analyzes the influences of the three domestic structural variables—political inclusion, state capacity, and military superiority—across each of the eight subcases. The third section analyzes the role of the U.S. partnership assistance in shaping GoP strategy. Finally, the chapter concludes with some key findings supporting the broader claims of this report and some additional implications of the Pakistan case.

**Background**

The GoP has presided over an extremely diverse and contentious ethnic and political landscape carved out of British India in 1947. Throughout nearly all of its independence, Pakistan has been considered a weak and
non-democratic state, but it has possessed a very large and capable professional military. It has fought four major wars with its longtime rival, India, as well as a number of counterinsurgency campaigns. Today, its landscape is dotted with numerous militant organizations of ethno-national, sectarian, and religious extremist variants, some of which the GoP disregards, some which it directly fights, and some of which it tacitly relies on as an internal or external national security tool. The government has engaged in three major counterinsurgency campaigns against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) since 2001, its previously inchoate incarnations in FATA since 2002, the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in the Swat Valley and Malakand Division since 2007, and a range of Baloch nationalist insurgent organizations in Balochistan since 2005. At certain points in time, it has prosecuted all three counterinsurgency campaigns simultaneously, stretching the limits of an already weak state. Consequently, its approach to these insurgencies has varied, following preexisting patterns of varying geography, political topography, and state capacity across regions and even subregions.

**Context**

**Physical and Human Geography**

The physical and economic landscape of Pakistan has been very unevenly distributed, which has led some to describe it as an artificial construct. Pakistan is roughly the size of France and the United Kingdom combined and home to 180 million people. While the province of Punjab forms the bulk of Pakistan’s industrial base, population centers, political authority, and arterial road networks, the province of Sindh remains important as an agricultural center and home to Pakistan’s largest city and commercial capital, Karachi. The Northwest Frontier province, recently renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkwa (KP), has been increasingly integrated into the political, economic, and social fabric of Pakistan since the 1970s. However, the vast expanse of Balochistan province, which makes up 47 percent of Pakistan’s territory but only 4.5 percent of its population, largely exists apart from the other three provinces and is mainly valued for its natural-resource deposits and its newly developed Gwadar port. FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan (previously the
Federally Administered Northern Areas), and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) are also physically remote and sparsely populated territories.

This geography underpins very uneven political topography, particularly for the non-provincial territories where political authority is more closely akin to suzerainty than modern state governance. FATA remains outside the Pakistani constitution and is governed by federal political agents and tribal leaders under a set of draconian rules laid down by the British in 1901, and the GoP has deployed segmented and distinct approaches to different agencies even within FATA based on tribal composition. Gilgit-Baltistan was also governed directly by the federal government outside the constitution until 2009. AJK is a self-governing state under Pakistani control. Meanwhile, 95 percent of the territory of Balochistan (the rural areas where 52 to 75 percent of the population lives) is administered as “B areas,” where the provincial police have no jurisdiction and law and order is administered by tribal levies controlled by Baloch tribal leaders (Sardars).

The human terrain of Pakistan is equally complicated, with most major ethno-linguistic groups concentrated and generally dominant in the provinces named after them, creating an array of centrifugal forces contributing to tension, instability, and conflict. The dominant ethno-linguistic group of Punjabis makes up 45 percent of the population. The rest of the population is made up of 9 percent Saraikis (concentrated in southern Punjab and sometimes counted as Punjabis), 15 percent Pashtuns, 14 percent Sindhis, 7.5 percent Mohajirs (Urdu-speaking immigrants from Northern India, with the majority concentrated in urban Sindh), 3.5 percent Balochi, and 6 percent other. Along with English, the official language of Pakistan is Urdu, although only 8 percent of the people are native speakers. Nearly all groups have been involved in some violent internal challenge to the state or dominant groups, through either ethno-nationalist movements or Islamist militant movements. Prior to 1947, most of modern-day Pakistan constituted the frontiers of the British Raj, indirectly ruled and policed due to the harsh terrain and unruly tribes. Only Punjab province, which

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was both one of the richest provinces and one of the chief contributors to the British Indian Army, was directly governed.

While Islam is the official religion of Pakistan and over 96 percent of the population is Muslim (the majority Sunni and about 10 to 15 percent Shia), religious friction persists. Pockets of religious minorities of Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Ahmadis constitute the remainder, but their numbers have declined due to migration or conversion. Sectarian tensions have frequently escalated to violence and acts of terrorism, not only between Sunnis and Shias but also within the Sunni majority (for instance, between the Barelvi and Deobandi sects).

On paper, Pakistan is the most urbanized country on the South Asian subcontinent (excluding the Maldives), with 36 percent of the population living in cities. In daily life, however, kinship networks remain strong and have prevented the breakdown of old sociocultural structures. The country’s ethno-linguistic diversity, combined with the strength of kinship networks of collective solidarity, have left Pakistan a weak state beset by many strong societies.

**Government**

**Regime type and political inclusion.** Since its independence, Pakistan has vacillated between civilian-led and military-led governments. For the most part, however, the politics of the country have not been very democratic or politically inclusive, and the military has historically dominated politics even during periods of civilian rule. Even though an elected civilian regime took office in 2008, a number of scholars and practitioners do not consider Pakistan a democracy given

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5 Ahmadis are a sect that claims to be a branch of Islam, but a Pakistani constitutional amendment declared them a non-Muslim minority, and they are prohibited from identifying themselves as Muslims.


that the military retains substantial control, and civil liberties such as individual rights, freedom of expression, and rule of law have remained poor even as political rights improved.8

Greater checks and balances within the government of Pakistan have emerged since 2008, and the military has generally refrained from overt interventions in politics. The passage of the 18th amendment to the Constitution in 2010 reduced the powers of the executive and devolved greater powers to the legislature and provinces. The legislature has also grown more assertive on domestic politics and some aspects of security such as counterterrorism, although the military continues to dominate most aspects of national security. A strong and independent judiciary has emerged since 2007, with the Supreme Court expanding its oversight role and holding the military, the executive, and the legislature to account. Additionally, the media has become an important player on the political landscape and has grown substantially in terms of the number of outlets and journalists.

These steps toward greater democracy were capped by a major historical achievement in March 2013, when the democratically elected civilian government became the first to complete a five-year term and peacefully transition without military intervention to a newly elected civilian government, suggesting a more robust and sustained commitment to democratic governance by all institutions.9 Some charge that the military has refrained from intervening in domestic politics in large part as a choice, because it still controls national-security policy. While this is true to a large extent, its choice has been in part shaped by institutional developments that make interventions costlier, such as a stronger media, judiciary, and parliament, and these civilian institutions have begun to assert themselves in some national-security debates. Thus, while Pakistan as a whole cannot be considered to have

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8 Based on scores and subscores from Freedom House, 2013.

been democratic during the period covered in this study, it is important to pay close attention to subtle variations over time, between regions, and among different institutions and policy arenas. It seems difficult to deny the expansion of some political-inclusion mechanisms like coalition breadth, transparency, and executive constraints since civilians returned to power in 2008. Even as the central government has become increasingly democratic and provincial assemblies like that in KP more assertive, regions like Balochistan and FATA remain poorly integrated into these liberalizing trends. Moreover, in many areas of national security, the security and intelligence services remain a law unto themselves. These variations in the extent of democratic governance play crucial roles in explaining the multiplicity of counterinsurgency strategies the state has adopted over the past decade. Later in this chapter, we examine variation in the state’s approach to counterinsurgency through eight subcases divided by time (pre- and post-2008) and by the regions described above.

**State capacity.** Pakistan is considered by most scholars to be a relatively weak state (like all states in South Asia) because of its weak economy, level of development, political capacity, and quality of governance. In Table 2.2 of Chapter Two, Pakistan is identified as a country with low state reach—a categorization confirmed by one scholar who wrote that “the [Pakistani] state . . . does not necessarily affect many people’s lives very much.” Pakistan also exhibits very low government effectiveness (with a World Bank composite score at the very bottom of the third quartile, just above Nepal). Further indexes confirm this categorization. Pakistan is classified by the World Bank as a lower-middle-income country, and most economic data sources place it in the bottom quartile of countries for per-capita GDP (whether nominal or purchasing power parity) and in the bottom quartile of the

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12 The indexed measures of state capacity in Chapter Two identify the Philippines as possessing high state reach and moderate government effectiveness (safely located in the second quartile).
United Nations human-development index. The Failed States Index has ranked Pakistan between the 9th and 13th weakest states since 2006. Pakistan is one of the weakest countries in terms of extracting taxes, with a tax-to-GDP ratio of 9.2 percent, which ranks it 113th out of 122 countries and 23rd worst out of 176 countries in terms of the percentage of the population paying income taxes. Pakistan also ranks in the bottom quartile of countries in the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. Even though it has a powerful, capable, and professional military, Pakistan’s state capacity also suffers from this in some ways. In 2000, defense and debt servicing consumed three-quarters of Pakistan’s federal budget. Like levels of political inclusion, state capacity has varied tremendously in terms of reach and services among Pakistan’s different regions.

**Security capabilities.** Despite being a weak state, the Pakistani government commands a very powerful modern military with strong institutional underpinnings built by the British Indian Army from 1858 to 1947. Pakistan ranks twelfth in the global firepower index of conventional military power, just ahead of Israel, and is one of only nine countries in possession of nuclear weapons. It ranks eighth

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19 Global Firepower, “Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2013),” web site. The index is based on 42 measures.
in terms of active forces, with over 900,000 regular and paramilitary personnel. The forces that have been used for counterinsurgency are the Army, with 550,000 active-duty personnel, and the Frontier Corps (FC), estimated at between 65,000 and 80,000 personnel. Spending on the military has consistently outstripped domestic spending on health, education, and public welfare.

Pakistan has never lacked raw military superiority over insurgent groups in the past decade, but it has been constrained nevertheless. Its military power is primarily dedicated to countering its more-powerful Indian neighbor, which it sees as an existential threat.

Because Pakistan’s doctrine and forces are built and deployed around countering this perceived threat, the government has had to be selective about the degree of military power it deploys against insurgencies, ever mindful of preventing the military balance on its eastern border from falling too low to ensure defensibility in case of a crisis. It has been estimated that Pakistan needs to retain about half the number of brigades it has generally held on the border around Punjab and Kashmir to maintain conventional deterrence. Although some outside observers deride Pakistan’s continued focus on India, it is impossible to ignore the fact that India is spending seven times more on defense than Pakistan and accounts for more than 75 percent of all defense spending in South Asia.

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Insurgents
A vast array of insurgent, terrorist, and militant organizations based in Pakistan have challenged state forces, institutions, or authority at various points in time. In addition to these clear challengers to the state, there are a number of militant organizations that are either ostensibly neutral or even allied with the GoP. We focus primarily on the strongest insurgent organizations that have directly threatened the state and have been the targets of counterinsurgency campaigns over the past decade. These include the Taliban-affiliated TTP and TNSM, as well as Baloch nationalist insurgents.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. The TTP insurgency originated in 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban and al Qaeda from Afghanistan during the U.S.-led invasion, when a number of foreign fighters took refuge in Pakistan’s northwest. Alongside local militant commanders indigenous to the tribal regions, they began to violently assert their influence, challenging local political orders and attacking GoP security forces. In response to Pakistan military operations targeting al Qaeda after 2001 and more-robust operations beginning in 2004, some local tribal militants and commanders who hosted these foreign fighters fought alongside them against the state. At first the local commanders conducted operations just within FATA, but eventually their attacks spread across the country.

The nascent Pakistani Taliban eventually formed the basis for the TTP, which was officially declared in late 2007 to be an umbrella organization of 40 senior Taliban commanders and Islamist militant movements totaling 40,000 fighters. These diverse movements were united by a desire to fight a “defensive jihad” against the Pakistan Army’s incursions in the tribal regions. In July 2007, the Pakistani military’s

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siege and storming of Islamabad’s Red Mosque, where militants had holed themselves up, provided a major impetus to TTP cohesion and escalation of operations. The incident triggered a wave of attacks and suicide bombings beyond FATA against military targets and civilian population centers throughout the country. Baitullah Mehsud, a militant commander from the Mehsud tribal region in South Waziristan Agency (SWA), initially presided as the head of the TTP fighters. After his death in August 2009, he was succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud. Though the TTP is similar to the Afghan Taliban in its ethnic and ideological origins, its goals and targeting are different, with TTP violence focused on the GoP.\(^{26}\) Although the TTP is a religious movement with Islamist principles, given its Pashtun tribal base, some analysts and officials fear it has nationalist liberation elements and could potentially escalate to a separatist insurgency.\(^{27}\)

To whittle down the strength of the TTP, the GoP sought to distinguish between “good Taliban” and “bad Taliban.” Good Taliban were those who focused their attention on Afghanistan and ceased to directly participate in attacks on the GoP. The distinction between good and bad Taliban was not an intrinsic one but developed over time after deals struck with certain militant groups proved durable. The designation of good was applied to the Afghan Taliban Quetta Shura—a group that had not targeted the GoP and focused on Afghanistan. It eventually also came to include Mullah Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who opted for cease-fire deals that have appeared to remain durable since 2007 or 2008, as well as the Haqqani network, based within Gul Bahadur’s territory.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{28}\) Nazir and Gul Bahadur’s groups were considered GoP allies even though there was evidence they may have provided tacit support to bad Taliban elements. See Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, “The Taliban in North Waziristan,” in Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, eds., *Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 128–163; Mansur Khan
The Mehsud tribe came to form the core of the TTP, although it was allied with a number of militant outfits across FATA, foreign fighters, and even some Punjabi Taliban. Estimates of TTP force strength have been highly varied due to militant-organization defection, attrition, and the flow of militants between the Afghan and Pakistan theaters. However, in 2009, the Pakistani military estimated Mehsud fighters to number about 10,000, making total estimates of the TTP at 25,000 seem plausible, with upper-end estimates of 53,000 fighters. Over time, what made the TTP—and specifically the Mehsud component—so formidable and threatening was its ability to project power and violence outside of FATA and strike civilian and military targets in Pakistan’s core urban centers. This was done through suicide bombings (of which the Mehsud/TTP force was believed to be responsible for about 70 percent) and complex, high-risk attacks, including one on the Army’s headquarters. This successful conversion of a “defensive war into an offensive and proactive campaign” beginning in 2007 “represented a major escalation and a serious threat to the country’s centers of power.”

**Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi.** The TNSM is a militant group dedicated to implementing Sharia law in the region of KP formerly known as the Malakand Division, encompassing Swat, Dir, Malakand, Chitral, and parts of Buner and Shangla. Unlike the TTP, the TNSM (led by Mullah Sufi Muhammad) has long-standing roots in Pakistan dating back more than two decades and stemming from Pakistan’s major Islamist political party, Jamaat-e-Islami. The TNSM engaged in major confrontations with the state in 1994 in reaction to a Supreme Court decision overturning the validity of local tribal courts and incorporating the region into mainstream Pakistani law. Nominal

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30 The first quotation is from Gul, 2011, p. 40; the second is from Jerry Meyerle, *Unconventional Warfare and Counterinsurgency in Pakistan: A Brief History*, Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, November 2012, p. 30.
government concessions on sharia law were never fully implemented, and the region witnessed periodic political confrontations for the rest of the decade.

After Muhammad was jailed for leading a large militia to fight the United States in Afghanistan in 2001, his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah assumed leadership of the TNSM. Fazlullah managed to revive it in 2006 by running an illegal radio station promoting Islamist values and denouncing modernity, Pakistani President Musharraf, and the United States (earning him the nickname “Mullah Radio”). Under the leadership of a sympathetic provincial government run by a coalition of religious parties, the region of KP and the Swat Valley in particular was subject to increasing radicalization and became a haven for militant organizations as well as violent and overzealous enforcement of sharia, the intimidation of locals, and disruption of development measures like vaccinations and girls’ education. Fazlullah was given free rein to continue his radio propaganda in exchange for halting the TNSM’s intimidation campaign. After the July 2007 storming of the Red Mosque, however, the TNSM declared jihad against the GoP and began to attack security forces and government buildings, effectively taking control of the region by October 2007.

The TNSM, initially estimated at between 500 and 3,000 armed forces in 2007, grew to between 6,000 and 10,000 by 2009 by drawing in foreign fighters as well as generating local recruits. The group turned out to be surprisingly capable, motivated, and adept at guerrilla warfare, retreating to the mountains surrounding the Swat Valley during major Pakistan Army sweeps. Though religious in its aspirations and driven in response to GoP military actions, the TNSM managed to mobilize new recruits through a combination of appeals to local grievances and opportunities for payment, power, and score-settling, as well as some amount of forcible recruitment. While this mobilization and political violence coincided with the rise of Pakistani Taliban violence in FATA and shared similar motivations, the TNSM’s trajectory, agenda, and targets of violence remained distinct to the Malakand region.
Baloch nationalist groups. Ever since Pakistan’s independence from the British, the underdeveloped and indirectly governed province of Balochistan (specifically, the eastern regions encompassing parts of Kalat, Khuzdar, and Jhalwan) has witnessed a number of uprisings, including one large one from 1973 to 1977. These rebellions generally involved one or more militias of the three most powerful Baloch tribal groups—the Marri, Mengal, and Bugti—though they were plagued by disunity and vulnerable to GoP divide-and-rule tactics. Rebellion against the state stemmed from an initial belief that Balochistan was an independent territory and was later due to political exclusion and marginalization. Despite periodic flare-ups, the conflict did not seriously reemerge until 2004.

This most recent round of Baloch insurgency was a response to perceived encroachment and subjugation by the Pakistani center, including the construction of the Gwadar port and new Army cantonments, underpayment for resources extracted, and administrative restructuring under the Musharraf regime that would undercut the tribal levies system. Violence was a form of coercive bargaining to restore a degree of provincial autonomy and increase Balochistan’s resource share, and it was confined to tribal militias that mostly targeted infrastructure and some GoP security forces. For its part, the GoP saw this uprising as a threat to the modernization and development of Balochistan and sought to crush it.

Initial estimates of the size of Baloch forces in 2005–2006 ranged from 1,000 to 14,000, though the upper figure likely included all potential tribal militia members rather than actual hardened fighters. While the Baloch insurgents suffered significant losses in the early years of the insurgency, after the heavy-handed military response, the

number of insurgent fighters is believed to have grown to between 3,000 and 12,000, expanding across social classes. At the same time, the goals of the insurgency shifted from limited autonomy to separatism, with growing public support for an independent state, and its targets expanded to include civilians.\(^{32}\)

**Other militant organizations.** Though outside the scope of this study, the Pakistani militant landscape is replete with organizations with varying degrees of links to the state that operate for a variety of purposes, including ethnic nationalism (Muttahida Qaumi Movement, Sindu Desh Liberation Front), sectarianism (Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi), and low-intensity proxy war (Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Harkut-ul-Mujahideen). This militant milieu has unpredictable alignments and effects, with some groups threatening the state, others serving its interests, and some straddling the two roles. Nevertheless, their presence and overlap with some insurgent groups described earlier complicate any counterinsurgency strategy.\(^{33}\)

**Conflict Narrative**

Since 2001, the Pakistani government has focused on fighting three insurgencies: the TTP in FATA, the TNSM in the Swat Valley/Malakand, and nationalist/separatist militants in Balochistan. Drawing on numerous detailed accounts, we next provide brief accounts of the conflicts and the campaigns by the GoP and its security forces to counter them.


Counterinsurgency in Pakistan

FATA

After the fallout of 9/11 and U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, militants based in FATA who were formerly part of, allied with, or sympathetic to the Taliban began to assert their dominance over local power structures and administrative institutions. They also resisted GoP counterterrorism efforts coordinated with U.S. and NATO operations on the Afghan side of the border to round up these actors, and they harbored foreign fighters and al Qaeda operatives. In response, the GoP launched a number of large- and small-scale operations broadly grouped under the name Operation al Mizan. The scope of the campaign from 2002 to 2007 was narrow, with the threat viewed as one “to be contained, not defeated.” Military activity was “sporadic,” “not sustained over time,” and “incomplete, inconclusive, and at times, appeared insincere.” Following clearing operations, the Army was “reluctant to maintain a presence” or exert “any effort to control the area fully.”


37 Fair and Jones, 2009–2010, p. 76.

The government deployed as many as 80,000 forces during this period, but the number does not accurately reveal the level of effort. First, most major operations during this campaign seemed to involve only 10,000 or fewer troops. The real operations were led by Special Services Group (SSG) forces, while most of the troops remained in their bases rather than patrolling or even manning checkpoints.39 One analyst quotes a senior Pakistani officer’s description of this as “a policy of ‘sitzkrieg’—meaning, sitting in camps without any aggressive actions.”40 Most of the Army forces, including two divisions from Peshawar’s XI Corps, were not deployed but already garrisoned in the area,41 and 60 percent of the forces were paramilitary FC that were ill-equipped, poorly trained, and at times unwilling to fight the nascent Pakistani Taliban.42

When the Pakistani government did summon greater resolve and effort, it still relied on conventional kinetic tactics with high levels of collateral damage. About two dozen major operations were search-and-destroy missions.43 The GoP ended up using a heavier hand than it may have intended because the unwillingness or incapability of FC forces to directly confront militants led to an overreliance on airpower and artillery to substitute for the forces or bail them out.44 Meanwhile, despite plans to integrate security, development, and governance, the strategy was in fact quite narrow, without any systematic efforts to hold and

41 Fair and Jones, 2009–2010, pp. 36, 42.
build in areas following the military sweeps. Due to the economization of resources, “FATA was left to fester.”

The GoP’s conventional “enemy-centric” approach was observed and described by one counterinsurgency expert through a list of tactical shortfalls: (1) a near-exclusive focus on enemy targeting and high-value targets; (2) an overdependence on large-scale, multi-unit forces rather than small, lithe patrol units; (3) the frequent defensive deployment of forces to static garrisons, checkpoints, or asset tasks; (4) the absence of maneuver room and a shortage of resources for flexible responses to contingencies; (5) an overreliance on kinetic direct-action operations; and (6) the discounting of local knowledge and assets in planning operations.

Facing stiffer resistance than expected, lacking sufficiently capable deployed forces, and hamstrung by public opposition to these operations, the GoP was fought to a stalemate with much higher losses than it expected. As a result, the Army sought to sign ceasefire agreements with tribal groups and armed militants in order to gain a tactical pause, stem its losses, withdraw, and regroup. Major deals were signed in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2008, and a number of informal deals were believed to exist as well. The deals were intended to “[co-opt] influential tribal elders” on the condition that they “generally commit to provide stability in the area.” GoP officials believed they could manage militants, use them to stem foreign fighters believed to be the source of instability, and return the region to the pre-2001 system of indirect governance run by tribal elders and political agents, when FATA was believed to be “very peaceful.” While these deals yielded some tactical gains and turned some Taliban forces against foreign militants such

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as the Uzbek fighters in the area, militancy continued unabated. The Army nonetheless stuck with this approach.\(^{48}\)

Following the July 2007 Red Mosque incident that triggered a wave of suicide bombings throughout urban Pakistan, the GoP, the military, and the country as a whole began to reconsider their approach to counterinsurgency. In 2008, new operations were launched across FATA that were sustained with a higher operational tempo and were even more unrestrained in the use of force. Led by higher-quality Army units, they began to occupy (though not really build) territory in some places. Total manpower in FATA escalated to 90,000 troops in early 2008, 120,000 troops by early 2009, and more than 140,000 troops through 2010.\(^{49}\)

During this time, the Army as an institution also began to adapt in a number of ways, reducing security-force losses (see Table 5.1). Army Chief of Staff General Kayani created a special inquiry commission to investigate the Army’s counterinsurgency failures, triggering a series of reforms to boost training, morale, materiel, information col-

### Table 5.1
FATA and Malakand Conflict Deaths per Engagement, 2002–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Engagements</th>
<th>Security Forces</th>
<th>Militants</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Loss-Exchange Fraction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FATA, 2002–2006a</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA, 2007–2008</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA, 2009–2012</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakand, 2007–2008</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakand, 2009–2012</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Data from Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies.

\(^{a}\)Very rough estimates derived from various accounts and data sources.

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\(^{49}\) Rasool, 2008; Shuja Nawaz, 2009a; Shuja Nawaz, 2011.
lection, and synchronization and intelligence-sharing between units. Counterinsurgency began to be incorporated into the regular military’s curriculums at all levels, and U.S. and British SOF were brought in to help upgrade and train the FC, while professionalism and pay were increased.50

By 2009, the GoP also began to focus on destroying rather than weakening the base of the Pakistani Taliban. Prior to 2007, the insurgency consisted of a disparate set of militant groups and commanders with unclear organization or goals. As the Mehsud camp increasingly became the face of the TTP insurgency in FATA, organizing under a single banner with more clearly stated goals and demands and claiming credit for much of the suicide bombing throughout the country, the GoP began to more directly confront the group and its base. Government operations were initially launched primarily in SWA, but they were later pursued in other parts of FATA. In October 2009, the GoP launched a major offensive in a part of SWA to destroy the TTP and the Mehsud’s base of combat power, lines of communication, and command and control. The operation involved as many as 30,000 troops, mostly Army, as well as massive firepower and aerial bombing (with at least 150 targets hit in the first week). Victory was declared in December, and most of the forces remained to occupy SWA. Despite the greater persistence and intensity of military operations, many observers continued to doubt the extent of government efforts to introduce the governmental and economic programs characteristic of the build phase of classic counterinsurgency doctrine.51

Troops backed by airpower continued to conduct operations in Orakzai, Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber to pursue TTP remnants over the next three years, although they seemed to resume a pattern

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commonly derided as “whack-a-mole”—that is, the killing of individual insurgents without any indication of strategic effect. Most activities throughout FATA continued to be kinetic, narrowly focused on degrading insurgent combat power, heavily reliant on airpower, and with little attempt to hold areas or address internally displaced persons (IDPs). This unbalanced effort may explain why the military, outside of SWA, is continuing to fight the same fights in FATA, most recently in the Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency.52

Malakand Region and the Swat Valley53
Between 2006 and 2007, a revived TNSM became increasingly confrontational. After a deal to limit TNSM activities collapsed following the Red Mosque incident, the TNSM declared open war on the Pakistani state, attacked government buildings and police, and seized control of the Swat Valley and parts of Malakand.

In November 2007, the Army launched its first campaign, Operation Rah-e-Haq (Just Path), to take back control of Swat, deploying between 12,000 and 15,000 troops. Government forces nonetheless “appeared hesitant to take them on.”54 While the GoP con-


54 Gul, 2011, p. 118.
ducted a conventional sweep of the Swat Valley through mid-December and forcibly shut down jihadist radio stations and transmissions.\textsuperscript{55} Most TNSM forces simply retreated to the mountains, where the Army tried to shell them with artillery. These conventional operations and reliance on area weapons produced a moderate amount of collateral damage and won little public support. The GoP wound down this first phase of operations in early 2008 prior to the general elections and soon brokered a second peace deal through the newly elected provincial government.

When the deal collapsed, a second round of major operations was required, and the military was sent back in late July 2008, this time with a slightly larger force. The military repeated the same “blow up, patch up, blow up” cycle of clear-and-occupy operations relying on conventional tactics and artillery. Fearing excessive collateral damage, however, it failed to clear militants out of the towns and abandoned their checkpoints to retreat to the ridges of the valley. This excessive caution and premature declarations of victory resulted in a loss of control of the valley by late 2008. As border tensions with India mounted in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008, the Pakistani military nonetheless hesitated to commit larger numbers of troops for more-decisive action. Peace negotiations began again in February 2009, and another deal was signed in April.\textsuperscript{56}

Things took a decisive turn after the collapse of this third peace deal. An emboldened TNSM quickly broke the deal as it publicly derided the Pakistani Constitution and stormed into the neighboring province of Buner. The Pakistani government, the Army, and the broader public finally realized that they would have to dispense with previous economization efforts. In April 2009, the GoP launched a new operation titled Rah-e-Rast (Righteous Path) with a much larger


force of 52,000 high-quality troops to clear out an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 militants and adopted a new “presence-oriented strategy.”

Although this operation regained full control of the region, it proved costly for the military, with 985 casualties endured over two years. Following these “clearing” operations, the Army converted to a much more defensive and sustained posture of holding the territory to build it up and transfer it back to local control. These actions defied predictions of skeptical experts and observers and in two years substantially reduced insurgent incidents in the region (see Figure 5.1).

One of the more unconventional and unprecedented methods it used to reduce collateral damage was to rapidly evacuate 2 million to 2.5 million people from the area, providing temporary camps and allowances for about 25 percent of them so that they could more ably prosecute their operations and dislodge dug-in militants using overwhelming firepower. Though widely criticized early on as another desperate and poorly thought-out plan, this option had clearly been the subject of extensive deliberations, and it ultimately proved quite successful. About 90 percent of the residents of Swat were able to move back to their homes within a few months. One retired officer commented that many people in Swat were so desperate for GoP intervention, they “offered to migrate and vacate their homes . . . [they] have accepted their dislocation as a price for getting rid of militancy.”

This controlled evacuation, combined with more-discriminate use of force, rapid repatriation efforts, and compensation and reconstruction of homes damaged from operations, indicates that this Swat campaign


Following the repatriation of the population, the Army adapted its approach to emphasize population control and protection. Army forces maintained a sustained presence for years to prevent regrouping of TNSM cadres, coordinated with locals and village councils, developed and utilized informant networks to monitor and prevent militant infiltration, rebuilt a 3,700-strong professional police force, armed and coordinated about 30,000 lashkars in defense of the area, facilitated the efforts of reconstruction and development teams, manned


checkpoints and patrolled throughout the region, and even developed their own low-grade version of monitoring and regulating the population through colored lanyards and identification cards that had to be worn at all times.63 Despite what might have been seen as an intrusion in other areas, operations worked in Swat because most of the inhabitants wanted the Army to remain in place to provide security and “felt they were equally involved in the operations.”64

The Army also engaged in an unprecedented set of non-kinetic tactics during this holding phase, including information operations, reconstruction, and beginning to address some grievances over local justice systems. The GoP engaged in its own rebuilding of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools, and vocational centers, as well as in providing water, electricity, and sanitation services. All told, the GoP may have spent as much as much as 2 percent of its budget on rehabilitating IDPs and another 0.05 percent on reconstruction projects. The Army’s sustained presence long after offensive operations concluded (see Figure 5.2) and checkpoints also provided a safe environment for the revitalization of the cosmetic, agriculture, and tourism industries and the reestablishment of local marketplaces; the rebuilding of some physical and social infrastructure by NGOs; and the rebuilding and reopening of girls’ schools. One NGO leader described the continued Army presence as “a blessing.”65

In order to transfer security gains to local control, the GoP rebuilt the police force, almost doubling its size in Swat and KP and improving


64 McKelvey, 2011; interviews with Pakistan analysts confirm this, 2012, 2013.

Figure 5.2
Manpower and Operational Tempo in the Swat Valley/Malakand Region, 2007–2012

SOURCES: Data from Pakistan Institute for Peace studies data; numerous sources (for manpower).

pay, equipment, training, and recruitment while supporting local levies and peace jirga militias. Additionally, the democratically elected provincial government began to implement much-promised judicial reforms to improve the speed and equity of the justice system, which had been the rallying cry for the TNSM. It reduced the backlog of cases by about 87 percent by increasing the number of judges, establishing new circuit and mobile courts for easier access, imposing duration limits on cases, and embracing some alternative appellate courts run on the principles of Sharia and dispute-settlement mechanisms like reconciliation committees.66

Finally, the GoP also began the process of rehabilitating and reintegrating several thousand former TNSM members deemed reconcilable. “Socio-psychological” deradicalization was conducted in two Army-run centers, Mishal and Sabaoon, to reeducate these former militants and teach them basic vocational skills. More than 1,000 of them have thus far been reintegrated.67

As of the writing of this report, violence has been reduced substantially, and Swat is considered by many to be a victory. Despite having strongly criticized Pakistani counterinsurgency efforts previously, Ahmed Rashid wrote of these operations:

The war in Swat was the first, and so far the only, time the Pakistan Army successfully completed a counterinsurgency campaign according to the book: the militants were killed, captured, or driven out, the area was secured, the displaced population returned, their homes were rebuilt, and the civic administration was revived. The army had finally learned the principles of “clear, hold, build, and transfer” . . . and could carry them out when it had the will to do so.68

**Balochistan**

After nearly 30 years without major conflict, Baloch insurgents reemerged in late 2004.69 The rebellion was fueled by the construction of the Gwadar port and the establishment of new Army garrisons,
both believed to be preludes to ushering in major demographic changes that would further weaken the ethnic Baloch grip on the province, as well as by perceptions that the Baloch had been undercompensated for resources extracted from their territory. The insurgents began to attack infrastructure in the region, particularly around the Sui gas fields and pipelines in late 2004 and early 2005. President Musharraf, then head of the GoP military regime, believed the tribal groups had been blackmailing Pakistan for decades and threatened to strike them so hard “they won’t know what hit them.”

The GoP’s strategy combined efforts to harass, intimidate, and eliminate some nationalist and tribal leaders, while politically dividing and co-opting others. This consistently harsh response by the GoP has been attributed in part to suspicions that Indian intelligence agencies like the Research and Analysis Wing have been covertly supporting Baloch insurgents.

In 2005, the GoP deployed tens of thousands of troops supported by tanks and helicopter gunships. Operations involved indiscriminate bombing and shelling, with substantial loss of civilian life. This first round of highly firepower-intensive military operations culminated in the assassination of the Bugti and Marri tribal leaders (in late 2006 and 2007, respectively) and the arrest of the Mengal leader.

Though casualty estimates are hard to come by, the military appears to have relied heavily on the indiscriminate application of firepower between 2005 and 2007. The use of indiscriminate shelling caused as many as 84,000 IDPs to flee the area, including at least 85 percent of the town of Dera Bugti, without any government coordination, relief, or repatriation efforts. Unlike the efforts conducted

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during the Swat campaign, in fact, the GoP is believed to have taken steps to block NGO relief aid to Baloch IDPs.\footnote{Quotation from Wirsing, 2008, pp. 29–30; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2005–2006, documents 22 killed in Jabbar Pakal, another 43 in Dera Bugti, and 41 from the Jamhoori Watan Party, as well as 14 summary executions and 16 people missing, totaling 136; International Crisis Group, \textit{Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan}, Asia Briefing No. 69, Islamabad/Brussels, October 22, 2007, p. 6.}

By 2007, some GoP officials believed they had crushed the insurgency. These actions, however, appear to have further inflamed it and increased insurgent intensity and activity (see Figure 5.3). The GoP acknowledged in 2007 that insurgent activity and attacks had increased, likely attributable to a martyrdom effect.\footnote{Wirsing, 2008, pp. 39–40; International Crisis Group, 2006a.} Analysts assessed that the majority of Baloch activists previously in support of autonomy had been radicalized into the nationalist separatist camp.\footnote{Grare, 2013; Akbar, 2011, pp. 54–55.}

**Figure 5.3**

*The Balochistan Insurgency, 2004–2013*

\[\text{SOURCES: Data from Pakistan Institute for Peace studies and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System.}
\[\text{NOTE: Figures for 2013 through June and estimated/doubled.}
\]
The insurgency spread across the province, encompassing areas that had previously remained at peace, including southwest Balochistan and urban centers such as Quetta. It also spread beyond its rural and tribal roots, gaining the support of other sectors of society, including the middle class and student organizations. Ultimately, the uprising took a more radical turn, spawning organizations that were willing to target civilians and opposed to compromise with the government.75

Following the end of the military regime, the departure of Musharraf, and the emergence of a democratic government in early 2008, the GoP reduced the military footprint by about 7,000 soldiers as a confidence-building measure. Repressive operations nevertheless continued in a different guise, described as a “dirty war.” GoP force levels rose as high as 50,000, but these were predominantly poorly trained paramilitary and FC, as most Army troops appear to have been withdrawn. The GoP forces were backed by about 19,000 police assigned to urban “A areas” and about 13,500 levies assigned to the “B areas.”76

This dirty-war strategy, privately acknowledged by some in the Pakistani security establishment and reported to be waged by irregular assets and intelligence agents, is believed to have involved arbitrary arrests, abductions, enforced disappearances, and a “kill-and-dump” policy, with mutilated bodies discovered on the roadside. Details and actual figures on the strategy are difficult to ascertain, but by 2008, 5,000 Baloch had been arrested and the government officially acknowledged that at least 1,100 were missing, many suspected to have been the victims of extrajudicial killings.77 Additionally, within a 16-month span between 2011 and 2012, 300 corpses were recovered.78 The Baloch

Student Organization, a nationalist but non-violent political organization, had been extensively targeted, with one-third of all kill-and-dump victims believed to have been its members.Outside analysts and the Pakistan Supreme Court suspect the security and intelligence services were also making use of death squads to target nationalist political leaders. This policy is believed to have contributed to the breakdown of social order and to have unleashed a wave of ethnic violence across the province.

This form of counterinsurgency “on the cheap” results from a lack of state reach. Limited penetration of society yields poor information to target or apprehend insurgents involved in attacks. Meanwhile, weak and corrupt provincial government institutions are ineffective at channeling allocated resources for public goods and services to substitute for force or coercion.

Despite these repressive measures, sympathy for the movement has increased substantially since 2006. A Gallup survey in July 2012 found that 37 percent of the Baloch population favored independence outright—a position not quantified in previous years but thought by analysts to be much lower—while 67 percent supported greater autonomy, suggesting that state policies were increasing rather than depressing nationalist sentiments.

The GoP has made some attempts at negotiations or accommodations (in 2004, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2012), the more-frequent and sincere efforts occurring under civilian rule, but these have been undermined by continued repressive security measures. Early on, “genuine accommodation of the Baloch minority [did] not seem to com-

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mand the [military-led government’s] sincere and sustained interest.” 84 Later, efforts under the civilian regime failed to halt the dirty war, offer increased political autonomy, or provide real development rather than increased provincial resources siphoned off by the center’s handpicked elites. 85

**Analysis of Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency**

Even these abbreviated accounts of the counterinsurgency campaigns between 2001 and 2013 clearly reveal the relationship between Pakistan’s general level of political inclusion and state capacity and its selection of counterinsurgency strategies and practices. For most of this period, the government relied on heavy-handed but unsustained counterinsurgency operations approximating the containment model discussed in Chapter Two. A closer look at these operations, however, reveals important variation over time and between regions. As the regime became more democratic, it increasingly turned to a classical counterinsurgency model in the core region of Malakand and the Swat Valley. Due in part to low state penetration into the hinterlands of FATA and Balochistan, on the other hand, the regime continued to rely on other models in these regions.

The approaches adopted by the Islamabad government cannot, however, be fully explained by the regime’s degree of political inclusivity and state capacity, nor is military superiority a determining factor—in fact, the regime only selectively applied its tremendous military capabilities, depending on local contexts and threat perceptions. A closer examination of these cases reveals the importance of other, albeit secondary, factors, including ethnic representation within the security forces.

The accounts from the previous section suggests that the dominant GoP counterinsurgency strategy was containment—on average,

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more repressive and indiscriminate, involving few meaningful political accommodations to redress grievances, and offering even fewer public goods to stabilize the region. This approach appears to be consistent with our analytic framework and quantitative findings.

When making comparisons with other countries, general measures of political inclusion and state capacity are useful, but they capture only an average for what is often highly uneven political terrain. Moving away from this average treatment of Pakistan to its subnational variation, one finds further evidence for the expected consequences of these structural variables. As described earlier, some subregions of Pakistan were more politically inclusive and had greater state capacity than others (core regions), and this variation appeared to shape the GoP’s diverse counterinsurgency approaches, as Table 5.2 shows.

During the period of military rule, the government employed a containment strategy in the peripheral regions of Balochistan and FATA—an approach typical of less-inclusive regimes with weak state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2</th>
<th>Regime and Campaign Features of Pakistan Counterinsurgency, 2001–2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Superiority</strong></td>
<td><strong>State Capacity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan, 2004–2007</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan, 2008–2012</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swat, 2007–2008</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swat, 2009–2012</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA, 2002–2007</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Waziristan, 2008–2012</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Waziristan, 2008–2012</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of FATA, 2008–2012</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
capacity. After the transition to civilian rule and increasing (albeit highly imperfect) democratization from 2008 on, the pattern becomes more complicated. In the region of Malakand, where political inclusion and state capacity were higher than in the periphery, the state was eventually able to concentrate much higher levels of resources. Consequently, the government responded to the direct threat to the core regions of the country posed by the growing insurgency in the Swat Valley with a classic counterinsurgency campaign. In the more peripheral regions of FATA and Balochistan, the regime continued to use counterinsurgency models more in keeping with a low-capacity state.

Interestingly, the state also appeared to rely on more-autocratic approaches in the periphery despite its gradual transition toward higher levels of democracy. Specifically, it continued to employ containment strategies in Balochistan and much of FATA, as predicted in the discussion in Chapter Two. Only the Waziristans depart from these predictions and warrant further explanation. In SWA, the government eventually drew considerable resources from the center and undertook counterinsurgency operations most similar to the strong-state repression model because the tremendous violence inflicted from insurgents of this region on Pakistan’s core was no longer containable. In NWA, an overstretched government’s recognition of militant political neutrality led to informal accommodation typical of more-inclusive but low-capacity regimes. This variation is explained in greater detail below, including a discussion of factors outside of the analytic framework presented in Chapter Two that account for some of the Pakistan government’s observed behavior.

**Political Inclusion**

The case of Pakistan generally supports predictions of how political inclusivity and regime type shape counterinsurgency strategy. Given that Pakistan was a non-democracy for much of this period, we would expect that on average, it would rely on more-repressive, indiscriminate military operations with few meaningful measures of political accommodation and reconciliation—in other words, strong-state repression or containment policies, depending on the resources the government could muster. This prediction generally holds true for the campaigns in
Balochistan and most of the campaigns in FATA and Swat. The GoP struggled to make credible commitments, relied on a narrow political constituency, was less accountable to the broader public, and allowed little civilian input on national-security matters, generally resulting in the use of indiscriminate force with high civilian casualties and low prospects for reconciliation. The deals and cease-fires the military regime did make in FATA prior to the return of civilian rule in 2008 were merely tactical, shallow (involving a narrow subset of militants), and neither trusted by insurgents nor durable.

Indiscriminate force continued in Balochistan throughout the insurgency. After the 2008 elections, however, repressive tactics became less visible. The irrelevance of the Baloch constituency, “a small, politically weak, recalcitrant, and untrustworthy ethno-tribal minority,” allowed the GoP to continue with this approach. Even when the GoP did make attempts at political negotiations or reconciliation, its credibility was undermined by a shortage of dialogue and quick resorts to force. Eventually, even good-faith efforts routinely failed, because Baloch opposition leaders do not trust the government. Ethnic Baloch leaders have little role in central-government coalitions or bureaucracies, and the civilian government cannot credibly commit to greater Baloch autonomy when it cannot even withdraw federal security forces or hold them accountable for indiscriminate violence.

Civilian casualties in FATA were not particularly high in the early stages of the conflict, not because of any commitment to the indiscriminate use of force by the military government, but rather due to limited state capacity to support coercion and sustained operations. When the military did conduct major operations, it relied on large-unit actions, intensive firepower, and “indiscriminate and excessive force.” A number of missteps may have resulted from not involving civilians—both politicians and the civil bureaucracy—in decisionmaking processes with the potential to disrupt a military’s organizational

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86 Wirsing, 2008, p. 38.
87 Wirsing, 2008, pp. 38–39
pathologies, particularly in counterinsurgency. As the GoP escalated operations in FATA, it continued with the indiscriminate approach of continuous raids, resulting in higher civilian casualties. This pattern even persisted in the core region of Swat for some time. Only in early 2009 did the civilian government switch tactics to a population-oriented approach in Swat. Even then, it retained a generally enemy-centric approach to the peripheral regions of FATA and Balochistan (see Table 5.3).

Variation in Political Inclusion over Time

Pakistan’s gradual transition toward more-democratic politics following the 2008 elections led to significant changes in its counterinsurgency campaigns. The most obvious change in strategy took place in Swat, with the government transitioning from a containment strategy to a classic counterinsurgency strategy focused on securing the population, instituting reforms, and redressing grievances. Scholars and practitioners alike credit the civilian government for enabling this change in strategy by generating resolve, public support, and consensus, which bought time, legitimacy for a sustained military campaign, and the military’s eventual transition from an enemy-centric to a population-centric approach.

Though public perceptions of insurgent threat levels and appropriate government actions were shifting toward greater resolve, a narrower regime coalition might have remained uninterested in the long-term resolution of the conflict through both force and reforms and rehabilitation of insurgents. A less transparent and legitimate govern-


91 Based on survey data released by Pew Global Attitudes, Gallup, International Republican Institute, Terror Free Tomorrow, Gilani Research, and World Public Opinion.
Table 5.3
Estimates of Use of Indiscriminate Force in Different Counterinsurgency Theaters, 2009–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Malakand</th>
<th>FATA</th>
<th>Balochistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilians killed in offensive operations (2009–2012)</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians killed per 1,000 people</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size in area of operation</td>
<td>6.1 million</td>
<td>4 million</td>
<td>6.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive clashes/defensive clashes</td>
<td>0.707</td>
<td>1.832</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airpower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average sorties/month (during major operations)</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs dropped</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The elected KP provincial government, now far more accountable to the general public, took costly actions to accommodate the insurgent support base in May 2008 and April 2009. Even though these deals were insufficient and further military action was required, a GoP sensitive to its political constituency not only paid lip service to political accommodations on the core issues motivating the insurgency—economic disenfranchisement and the sluggish justice system—it also implemented judicial-sector reforms and established greater opportunities for education and vocational training.

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Some change in strategy after 2008 was also seen, though to a much lesser degree, in Balochistan and FATA. Attempts at accommodation to redress Baloch grievances increased under civilian rule, with four major attempts launched in the past few years, two of which involved concrete steps such as the passage of legislation, implementation of some political reforms, and redistribution of a greater share of economic resources. A fifth attempt may soon be launched by the newly elected Sharif government. Even in FATA, most informal deals with militant commanders in Waziristan (the informal accommodation model of Chapter Two) that repeatedly collapsed prior to 2008 proved more durable in keeping a relative lid on violence without major military operations after civilian rule returned, in part because there are more counterbalancing institutions to constrain the military’s freedom of action. And in the Mehsud tribal area still occupied by the military, some dim signs of a determination to build the region emerged in 2013. It seems no coincidence that this change corresponds with recent efforts by the legislature and the judiciary to more actively exercise oversight to hold the military accountable for its conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

**Variation in Political Inclusion Across Regions**

In addition to shifts in the level of democracy over time, different levels of accountability in political institutions and quality of governance at the provincial level may explain some of the uneven shifts to a classic


counterinsurgency model after 2008. The fact that the strategy shifted
to a more discriminate model in the Swat Valley but not in FATA
and Balochistan may have been the result of higher levels of political
enfranchisement and more direct accountability of the government in
KP. Even after the elections in 2008, FATA had no elected representa-
tives and was primarily controlled by the military with little input from
civilians. Moreover, government officials had greater confidence in the
efficacy of investments in public goods and institutional reforms in KP,
where the social and governance infrastructure existed to support and legitimimize them. By contrast, government officials saw little incentive
to invest effort or resources in FATA or Balochistan, where many perceived that “it wouldn’t take.” Though improved over the pre-2008 period, political inclusivity in Balochistan is still very low. For the most part, the now broader central government coalition remains aloof to its Baloch constituency, and the events in the province remain immune to transparency by the press, accountability by the judiciary, and civilian constraints on the security forces.

The Pakistani government’s approach to NWA provides another
departure from its typical policy of containment, albeit of a different
kind. In NWA, short-term cease-fires graduated to informal accommoda-
tions as the government came to believe that militant groups in the
region did not directly threaten the Pakistani state or core, at least for
the time being. Given their geographic location on the border, Wazir
tribes were a key political constituency cultivated since the Afghan
jihad of the 1980s, represented well in the military, and potentially
useful as leverage in a future Afghanistan political settlement. Larger
military engagements that other counterinsurgency models demanded
might overstretch a military already committed to Swat and SWA,
brake this “live-and-let-live” bargain, and invite even greater violence
on the mainland than that suffered between 2007 and 2010. For all
of these reasons, informal accommodation appeared to offer the best
approach.

96 Interview with former U.S. official, June 2013; International Crisis Group, 2006b, pp. 3,
9, 27.
State Capacity

Pakistan’s weak state capacity throughout the past decade has led it to generally pursue less-resource-intensive strategies, particularly containment and, on occasion, informal accommodation, both of which are more prone to indecisive outcomes and conflict resumption. Even when the GoP attempted to complement military operations with development in FATA and Balochistan, it produced very little return on the ground due to scarce resources, a lack of focus, and weak institutions for implementation.98

In six of the eight cases in our Pakistan case study, the GoP pursued a strategy consistent with the predictions of a weak state (see Table 5.1 above). Scarcity led to selective strategies that would mitigate but not eliminate insurgency. As long as violence remained below a certain threshold and did not threaten survival, the state could tolerate it. This approach is consistent with the rationale expressed in Pakistani Army doctrinal writings. In the 2002 Pakistan Army Green Book, one author writes:

The type of aggression encountered in [low-intensity conflict] is not as blatant as that in war. Subversion, sabotage, assassination and guerilla operations . . . may pose a threat to national interests, but the threat to national survival may be neither imminent nor obvious. . . . The inevitable ambiguity of the proper employment of force demands that weight be given to other considerations. Limited national interests, the presumption against intervention, and lack of feasibility help explain apparent tolerance of some undesirable situations. On the other hand, non-involvement accepts the piecemeal degradation of security interests and tolerates unnecessary human suffering, both of which might be prevented or alleviated by a more active, if necessarily selective, approach.99

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In two cases, the state did not adopt a counterinsurgency model typical of low-capacity counterinsurgents: the second round of campaigns in Swat and SWA. In both cases, the GoP’s threat perceptions were heightened, although for different reasons in each case. The existential threat in SWA stemmed from the TTP core that had initiated a rash of suicide bombings across the country. By contrast, the heightened threat in the Swat Valley derived from the nature of the territory threatened—what Pakistani officials termed “settled areas” rather than tribal or unsettled areas.

In the case of SWA, the increased and direct threat to the Pakistani mainland forced the GoP to mobilize its scarce resources for a more-comprehensive and decisive campaign following the strong-state repression model. Between 2007 and 2009, the insurgents in FATA, and specifically the TTP insurgents based primarily in the Mehsud region of SWA, were able to project violence outside the tribal areas and into urban centers of Pakistan, including Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad, yielding more lethal attacks in denser areas and much higher levels of civilian casualties than in previous years. The TTP also became an existential threat to Pakistan, deliberately targeting not only military outposts in FATA but military bases, barracks, command and intelligence headquarters, and even places of worship frequented by military personnel throughout core Pakistan, particularly in Punjab. This direct threat to the Pakistani mainland led the GoP to embark on a strong but repressive counterinsurgency campaign in the eastern part of SWA to dismantle the Mehsud command center. Though SWA state capacity was weak prior to 2009, the acute threat compelled Pakistan to make investments in rapidly developing it, beginning with a large and sustained military presence following two months of major ground operations to extend state reach and collect better information for intelligence-driven operations. Military occupation continues today with the Army’s 9th and the 40th infantry divisions remaining in place to hold the area and consolidate their grip through some limited public goods such as the construction of roads and basic infrastructure. The treatment of the civilian population, however, has generally been con-
sidered harsh, with little attempt to repatriate and accommodate tribesmen, 90 percent of whom remain IDPs.  

The post-2009 counterinsurgency campaign in Swat also diverges from what we would expect in a low-capacity state, but a closer examination validates the broader theory. Swat and KP province had much higher levels of integration and state reach (measured in GDP per capita, human development, infrastructure, or representative provincial government), consistent with what was earlier described as the unevenness and subnational variation of state capacity in Pakistan. By 2009, the Swat Valley–based TNSM insurgents, not satisfied with previous deals, had escalated their reach, ambitions, and blatant challenge of federal authority in settled areas. While the TNSM’s proximity to Islamabad was not unimportant, of greater concern was its breakout into other parts of KP that could threaten core lines of communication or urban populations that were more closely tied into the national economy and government. TNSM escalation was ultimately met with a more resource-intensive classical counterinsurgency strategy, in part because in this settled area, the GoP had more to lose and greater state capacity and institutional legitimacy upon which to draw for counterinsurgency than it ever had in the traditionally indirectly governed tribal areas.  

The campaign in KP and Swat was more comprehensive because the insurgency threatened more-valuable real estate, which in turn justified greater resource allocations from the center. Moreover, existing state capacity and expectations were higher, and physical and social infrastructure needed only to be rebuilt rather than built from scratch. Preexisting social infrastructure enabled better penetration of society for information and effective coercion. Physical infrastructure allowed easier sustainment, resupply, and monitoring of security operations. Resources, existing and allocated, enabled a greater and wider variety

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101 The distinctiveness of the settled area and its impact on counterinsurgency was described in numerous conversations with retired Pakistani military officials, including an interview (December 2009) and a private briefing (April 2011).
of public goods and services, and the state’s prior presence and legitimacy made these viable substitutes for futile, excess violence.

FATA’s and Balochistan’s historically weak capacity and isolation had acquired a path-dependence due to increasingly prohibitive costs of development and a set of vested interests in the semiautonomous nature of these ungoverned spaces.\textsuperscript{102} Despite its failure to curtail the Baloch insurgency with negotiation offers, the central government appears content with containment, “confident it can digest the current amount of violence that is taking place.”\textsuperscript{103} With the exceptions of NWA and SWA, explained above, this was true for much of FATA as well.

Military Superiority

While military superiority and manpower has been a focal point for the counterinsurgency literature, this case study of Pakistan’s recent counterinsurgency campaigns finds mixed outcomes. Only one case found a correlation between military superiority (and quality) and the type of strategy adopted.

Military superiority is no guarantor of classic counterinsurgency approaches. In the Swat Valley, a more than threefold increase in troop levels resulted in an almost prototypical classic counterinsurgency strategy involving restraint, population protection, public goods, accommodation, and a decisive outcome. But when Pakistan’s enormous military capabilities were deployed to the tribal regions of Balochistan from 2005 to 2007 and in SWA in 2009–2010, none of these processes or outcomes resulted. Though perhaps obvious, the utility of military superiority is constrained by what a state or military chooses to actually do with the forces deployed. The case of NWA is most telling. The Pakistan military is believed to have deployed 40,000 troops in the agency since 2010, but it has generally avoided military engagements—both major offensives and defensive encounters.


\textsuperscript{103}Malik Siraj Akbar, “The Ifs and Buts of Negotiating with Insurgents in Balochistan,” \textit{The Baloch Hal}, August 1, 2013.
Meanwhile, higher force quality might be associated with improved fighting effectiveness, but it does not appear to be related to a particular model of counterinsurgency. The deployment of high-quality forces (more regular military from the eastern border and SSG forces) only seems to correlate with more-sustained operations, not with a particular model of counterinsurgency. In Swat, higher-quality forces were used for a more classic counterinsurgency approach, while in SWA, they were used for a more repressive, conventional campaign. Elsewhere, higher proportions of FC have been effectively utilized in support of a “second-best” strategy of informal accommodation, as appears to be the case in NWA at present.104

It is possible that certain governance and institutional contexts condition the effects of military superiority on strategy. In areas with high political inclusiveness and state capacity, like Swat, military superiority may enable a more classical counterinsurgency strategy, whereas in regions where these conditions are absent, military superiority may have indeterminate effects (as in FATA) or even harmful effects (as in Balochistan).

Perhaps more important than either the quantity or quality of security forces is their composition—that is, the extent to which they are representative of all the important subpopulations within a country, in terms of both overall numbers and representation in the officer corps and general staff. Particularly in a state like Pakistan, in which the military has played a dominant role, the composition and representativeness of the military appears to exert a major influence on counterinsurgency strategy toward different subnational groups.

In Pakistan, Pashtuns emerged as a powerful ethnic constituency in the 1970s. They have been highly represented—perhaps overrepresented—in the GoP security forces, with a greater share in the military (15 to 20 percent) than their population share (14 percent), an artifact dating back to the recruitment policies of the British Indian

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104 FC are estimated to constitute between 50 and 75 percent of the 40,000 troops in NWA given the number of regular army divisions based there (Nawaz and Khan, 2013, and interviews with Pakistani analysts, August 2013). On NWA strategy, see Syed Talat Hussain, “Profiling Our North Waziristan Policy,” Express Tribune, October 29, 2012.
Army. Moreover, they comprise nearly all of the FC. By contrast, the Baloch are very poorly represented in both forces.\textsuperscript{105} They comprise 1 percent or less of the military, and even in the FC wings specifically tasked to the province of Balochistan (a force of some 30,000 to 50,000), ethnic Baloch are believed to constitute only 5 percent.\textsuperscript{106}

Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani state was far more sensitive to punitive measures against Pashtuns, because of ethnic and tribal ties and concern that excessive force against them might threaten the cohesion of a military of which they constitute a high proportion. In the early years of the Taliban insurgency in FATA, the Pakistani military faced a strategic risk due to problems of defection, desertion, refusals to fight, and court-martials among some of its Pashtun officers and soldiers who refused to conduct military operations against their kin. Fears arose that continued operations “could split the army, which was clearly unhappy at the prospect of fighting their own people.”\textsuperscript{107} With Pashtuns in its ranks, the GoP also believed it had a better grasp of Pashtun tribal motives and behavior and a method of managing the insurgency without risking blowback. This may help to explain the GoP’s persistence in pursuing peace deals over pure coercion, which numerous observers described as appeasement.\textsuperscript{108}


\textsuperscript{106}Author interview with Pakistan analyst, May 2013.


By contrast, the Pakistani state seemed unconcerned at the harsh measures taken against the Baloch insurgency from 2005 onward. If President Musharraf had had Baloch advisors or generals cautioning that indiscriminate force could fan the flames of a nationalist insurgency or affect army morale and cohesion, the way he had from Pashtun advisors on FATA, the government might have exercised a more cautious and comprehensive approach early on in its counterinsurgency operations in Balochistan.\footnote{Interviews with Pakistani political and national security analysts, May 2013.}

### Analysis of U.S. Assistance

Although the United States engaged in a strategic partnership with Pakistan throughout the period under review in this study, the partnership was primarily motivated by the United States’ need to obtain Pakistani cooperation on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. The United States did not make serious efforts to influence GoP counterinsurgency until 2007.\footnote{Daniel S. Markey, \textit{Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt}, Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 36, August 2008, p. 117. Funding to bolster the FC did not begin until 2007. See Markey, 2008, p. 21. The Pakistan counterinsurgency fund was not initiated until 2009. See Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, \textit{Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance}, Congressional Research Service, R41856, October 4, 2012, p. 20.} Even then, however, U.S. assistance was unable to significantly influence Pakistani strategy directly, nor was it able to induce reforms in the regime features most determinative of counterinsurgency strategy. It was able to provide real but tactical contributions to the GoP’s military superiority, some of which proved helpful. Efforts to foster state capacity and political inclusion began only much later in the partnership, but these efforts encountered significant resistance and often hostility.

The U.S. security partnership with Pakistan had three goals: (1) buying logistics support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan; (2) securing counterterrorism cooperation against al Qaeda and some Afghan militant remnants in Pakistan; and (3) bolstering Pakistani
capabilities and incentives to combat militant threats on its own soil. The United States did not consistently prioritize any of these goals, however, and at times the goals even worked at cross-purposes. From 2001 to 2005, the United States primarily focused on buying support for its Afghan and al Qaeda missions, particularly access to bases, over-flight rights, border coordination, and the capture of al Qaeda operatives who fled to Pakistan. For much of the period through 2005, Pakistan’s indifference to Afghan Taliban regroupings was ignored and security assistance was not intended to be transformative or to influence Pakistan’s approach to its own internal security. The types and destination of assistance reflected this emphasis, as the majority of the funds reimbursed Pakistan’s military for operations in support of U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan, and most assistance was provided as direct budgetary support to the GoP.111

Beginning in roughly 2005, U.S. goals shifted to focus on the threats within Pakistan, and consequently, assistance expanded to bolster and better enable Pakistani military operations against al Qaeda, foreign militants, and tribes providing support to them (the nascent Pakistani Taliban). But not until 2009 did the United States try to leverage this aid to press for the adoption of sound counterinsurgency capabilities and tactics, sustained operations, and the expansion of targets. Additionally, it was only around this time that U.S. economic assistance sought to promote structural reforms—specifically, supporting projects to bolster economic development and employment, providing services to enhance perceptions of state legitimacy, and encouraging civilian governance.

While assistance led to some improvements in GoP military capabilities, particularly tactical and operational ones, it seems to have had little success in fostering improvements to state capacity or political inclusion. Upgrading military superiority was, for the most part, straightforward and undoubtedly in the GoP’s interest, allowing military assistance to translate into real gains. Assistance to alter

regime structures, however, targeted more complex and contested institutions—a much more challenging goal. Moreover, continued U.S. reliance on Pakistan for logistics and other support made it difficult for U.S. policymakers to compel the GoP to do anything it did not perceive to be unequivocally in its own interest.\textsuperscript{112}

Effects of U.S. Military Assistance

U.S. military assistance to Pakistan sought to augment Pakistan’s ability to combat foreign and al Qaeda militants amid a nascent Pakistani Taliban insurgency. In addition to helping finance Pakistan deployments and operations through coalition support funds, military assistance provided tactical inputs such as equipment, intelligence support, and training. U.S. assistance, however, did relatively little to induce Pakistan to adopt U.S. models of counterinsurgency, nor did it ensure a close alignment of Pakistani actions with U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. As a general rule, military assistance could not induce the GoP to take actions it did not want to take. Where both countries were committed to a campaign of mutual interest (as occurred in 2009), however, U.S. military assistance improved GoP capabilities, rendering its military campaigns more tactically successful—even if they were in service of what the United States considered to be a problematic strategy.

Equipment

Equipment from the United States was perhaps the most coveted form of military assistance, from the Pakistani perspective. While a number of conventional weapons systems were sold to the GoP for leverage or access, U.S. provision and sales of lift capability, airpower, ground mobility, ordinance disposal, and night vision equipment made the Pakistan military a more competent force for fighting a counterinsurgency campaign. Beginning in 2007, deliveries of 26 combat and transport helicopters seemed to correspond with the increasing aggressiveness and operational tempo of Pakistani counterinsurgency opera-

These assets proved critical for a number of close-air-support missions and the SSG deployments in mountainous terrain to retake the Swat Valley in May 2009. Other equipment also enabled Pakistan to step up its operational tempo. The sales of F-16s and joint direct-attack munitions, largely seen as a quid pro quo for Pakistani cooperation rather than a counterinsurgency tool, were in fact heavily relied upon by GoP operations in FATA and Swat between 2008 and 2012, though perhaps to the disappointment of some advisors. The continually requested night vision equipment, initially subject to strict accounting measures that hampered its effectiveness, eventually improved tactical capabilities and enabled round-the-clock air operations and ground patrols. Additionally, with improvised-explosive-device attacks becoming the leading cause of Pakistani casualties by 2010 and triggering security-force overreactions, 20 U.S.-provided explosive-ordinance-disposal vehicles proved valuable for route clearance.

**Intelligence**

As early as 2004 and perhaps earlier, a small SOF presence in Waziristan was deployed to provide support to the Pakistani military, but without mutual interests in operations in FATA, GoP commanders made a deliberate choice to underutilize these assets. Once the GoP internalized counterinsurgency operations in Swat and FATA as its own and committed to serious campaigns in 2009, however, the United States deployed ISR units to support the 11th Corps prior to and during its operations in SWA and Bajaur, as well as intelligence fusion cells embedded with the SSG and FC. Much of this support was politically

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feasible as long as it was kept largely secret from the broader public, though this eventually proved untenable as relations deteriorated.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{Training}

For years, the FC was continually criticized for deficiencies such as unskilled personnel, poor training, inconsistent leadership, lack of mobility, outdated weapons, shortage of equipment, a proclivity for desertion, and compromised loyalties.\textsuperscript{117} In 2007, the United States stepped up efforts to improve and expand these forces through financial assistance for new infrastructure, equipment (including 450 vehicles), and a train-the-trainers program to improve fighting capacity and morale specifically for counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{118}

As part of an advise-and-assist mission, U.S. SOF began training Pakistani trainers in October 2008. The impact of this training, which a few thousand FC underwent, appears to have been positive, although it is difficult to estimate with certainty.\textsuperscript{119} Alongside the training, pay for the FC was quadrupled, and better officers were introduced by a more determined leader, Maj. Gen. Tariq Khan, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of the training from these other factors.\textsuperscript{120} U.S. officials involved in the training program argued that it had an immediate effect on the skills, discipline, cohesion, and morale of the FC and that competition by battalion commanders to have their units trained offered evidence of its success.\textsuperscript{121} A former official not involved in the

\textsuperscript{116}Interview with former U.S. official, June 2013; Asad Hashim, “Pakistan and the U.S.: A Too-Close Embrace?” \textit{Al Jazeera}, June 3, 2011.


\textsuperscript{119}Estimate based on rate of training described in various accounts, including interviews and Jeremy Page, “Britain to Train Pakistan’s Frontier Corps Troops in Baluchistan,” \textit{The Times}, October 9, 2009.


\textsuperscript{121}Interview with former U.S. advisor to the FC, April 2013.
training but able to observe the FC noticed a significant change in its forces’ quality and confidence between 2007 and 2010. Another account claims the training produced immediate returns, with a 400-man commando unit developed within the FC responsible for killing or capturing 60 militants, including five high-ranking commanders, within months of the training program. At the very least, FC survival rates improved substantially after the onset of the training, but the training ended abruptly in May 2011.

Pakistani officials and analysts agreed that there were some improvements in FC skill sets, but they contended that these gains were a result of training on newly provided U.S. equipment rather than in basic skills. Organizational tensions between the FC and the regular Army and suspicions that U.S. SOF were used as a cover to spy on Pakistan, particularly following the Raymond Davis episode, may have led some to discount the training’s effectiveness. Nevertheless, FC training and investment seemed to expand the pool of capable counterinsurgency forces just as the need arose by 2009.

Effects of U.S. Civil Assistance
Economic assistance provided to the GoP from the beginning of the U.S. partnership in 2001 until 2008 essentially aimed to buy cooperation. Assistance was primarily focused on sustaining the government, with an initial $1 billion in debt forgiveness, deferral of debt payments, and direct budget support, largely in the form of cash transfers without any conditions or accountability measures. Most funds prior to 2008 were intended to reward Pakistan but lacked any transformative goals, with very little (about 9 percent of all assistance) dedicated to develop-

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122 Interview with former U.S. official, June 2013.
124 Survival rates were calculated using Pakistan Institute for Peace data; see the Appendix for more details.
125 Raymond Davis is an American who was arrested in Pakistan in 2011 after shooting two men at a crowded traffic stop. He was part of a covert, CIA.-led team collecting intelligence and conducting surveillance on militant groups deep inside the country.
126 Interviews with American and Pakistani military officials and analysts, summer 2013.
ment. Effectively, this assistance substituted for state capacity rather than engaging in the lengthy process of building it.127

By 2008, however, U.S. assistance was more directly targeted at transforming the Pakistani economy and governance. This change began with a $750 million package for development in FATA. It was soon followed by the 2009 Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, titled the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA), also referred to as the Kelly-Lugar bill, which offered to triple the level of non-military assistance to $1.5 billion per year for five years by overhauling spending on social, economic, and political development projects. The goals of this effort were threefold: (1) to generate a diplomatic and political victory by signaling a sustained commitment to the people of Pakistan, (2) to rebalance the U.S. partnership from one that was predominantly military-centric to one that bolstered civilians, and (3) to provide a meaningful level of assistance to improve Pakistani development and governance for continued stability. Though well-intentioned, this civil-assistance overhaul faced numerous challenges.

First, assistance to improve state capacity suffered from significant implementation problems. The first major civil-assistance effort, the 2008 Livelihood Development Program for FATA, revealed the difficulties of development in conflict-affected areas. An audit of this program found massive shortfalls between targets and actual results on the ground and highly inefficient use of funds, with very high overhead and operating costs, due to security issues, a lack of local expertise, and some contractor fraud. Subsequent efforts reinforced a belief that civil assistance did not work well in highly insecure environments, nor did it easily complement anemic counterinsurgency operations.128 Implementation problems persisted under the EPPA. In the first year, less


than $180 million was disbursed. Despite improvements, a $400–$500 million shortfall persisted in subsequent years. Concern for adverse selection of development partners and limited knowledge of the local partner landscape led to an overreliance on foreign contractors, with between 30 and 50 percent (though some alleged 90 percent) of the assistance making its way back to the pockets of U.S. firms. When disbursement rates remained slow in an effort to minimize waste, fraud, and abuse, Pakistani disappointment with a perceived pattern of U.S. overpromising and underdelivering further undermined U.S. diplomatic objectives. Ultimately, conflicting priorities—the diplomatic goal of disbursing a “flood of cash” quickly to secure Pakistani support and the development goal of spending this money through accountable Pakistani channels to generate sustainable capacity—proved to be a problem.

Second, the conditions attached to the EPPA to bolster civilian power—motivated in part by U.S. domestic politics—backfired and resulted in a “diplomatic disaster” that further strained relations and generated resentment. The explicit conditioning of this assistance on domestic politics within Pakistan, specifically on civil-military relations, was seen by some as attempted micromanagement of Pakistani politics and an infringement of Pakistan’s sovereignty. These conditions generated a firestorm of controversy and significant resentment from the military, some civilian leaders, and even the general public. At the time of its passage, only 15 percent of the Pakistani public supported the Kerry-Lugar bill, while 60 percent believed it would not improve development and 70 percent believed it would not make a difference in the lives of ordinary Pakistanis. While the United States quickly diluted many of its conditions and routinely waived them out of strategic necessity, by the spring of 2013, perceptions of U.S. aid had


Third, much of the civil assistance to Pakistan suffered from contradictions between the U.S. aims of fostering both long-term development and diplomatic gains, with the end result that it yielded neither in the short term. Initially, assistance had a very narrow focus and a short time horizon to maximize diplomatic impact, but it was not designed to have lasting development effects. For the tripling of assistance to have its intended symbolic effect, it needed to be implemented quickly. Most of the funds were allocated to quick-impact projects of questionable value in order to influence public opinion and the Pakistan elite’s strategic calculations regarding U.S. policy. During this time, civil assistance was routinely criticized for not investing in any capacity-building projects that might have made a gradual but meaningful impact on development and state legitimacy in the long run. The result was a slowdown in actual disbursements and the accumulation of unmet expectations that may have worsened Pakistani public perceptions of the United States. Though U.S. development officials have worked to correct some of these problems and refocus some stabilization efforts to specifically complement Pakistani military operations and improve government legitimacy, these remain on a small scale. A long-term relationship and tremendous patience are necessary to realize a return on these investments.\footnote{Interviews with development officials, July/August 2013; Birdsall, Elhai, and Kinder, 2011.}

Finally, the United States missed opportunities to provide the GoP with long-sought alternatives to aid, such as support for foreign investment and access to protected U.S. markets (most notably...
the U.S. textile market). The GoP had long pursued trade access—recognizing some of the inflationary risks and limited downstream effects of direct aid—to spur economic growth and job creation and create more stakeholders in U.S.-Pakistan relations.\textsuperscript{134}

Though bolstering political inclusion and state capacity were daunting tasks, assistance to complement specific counterinsurgency efforts proved effective. U.S. humanitarian and stabilization aid consistently remained popular among Pakistanis. Such aid not only cushioned the impact of natural disasters, it also helped to ameliorate the civilian impact of military operations that produced millions of IDPs, such as those in Swat. By spring 2013, about one-third of the EPPA’s disbursed $3.2 billion had been spent on emergency relief. These funds tended to be dispersed quickly to address immediate needs and encountered few bureaucratic obstacles.\textsuperscript{135} Moreover, the Swat experience later revealed that more-robust and sustained military operations could produce fertile ground for development and governance assistance to be effective. Assistance provided after major combat operations in Swat seemed to have a greater economic impact than aid deployed to conflict-affected regions, and it was often matched by local entrepreneurs, confident in the future, making capital investments. Recently, U.S. efforts in more-stable parts of the northwest to facilitate the provision of some public goods on a local level have seemed to be positively influencing local attitudes and confidence in government.\textsuperscript{136}


U.S. Efforts to Influence Pakistan and Their Consequences

Critics of the U.S.-Pakistani partnership point to its failures and seek to explain why the United States did not get more out of it, in terms of both support for its Afghan policy and reforms within Pakistan itself. The simplest explanation is one of interests and leverage. Pakistan disagreed with U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and held a different theory of stability in NWA, while the United States did not have the leverage to compel, nor did it offer sufficient funds to buy, a shift in Pakistani interests, behavior, and cooperation.

First, the U.S. and Pakistan simply had different and strongly held strategic interests. For obvious reasons, Pakistan placed its domestic stability above U.S. goals in Afghanistan. It feared another costly and bloody escalation of violence, such as the one that devastated urban Pakistan between 2007 and 2009. Instead of large-scale operations aimed at a decisive outcome, the GoP adopted a counterinsurgency strategy of informal accommodation in NWA involving peace agreements (and perhaps bribes) that appeared to be keeping a lid on violence. Additionally, some of the militant organizations in NWA and SWA were useful allies of the government, balancing or managing other, more-threatening groups. Moreover, many of these groups were reliable assets for ensuring Pakistani influence in any future Afghan settlement. GoP officials objected to what they saw as the disempowerment and exclusion of Afghan Pashtuns, and they fundamentally disagreed about the political reconcilability of Taliban actors on both sides of the Afghan border. They believed most Taliban groups representing aggrieved Pashtuns would cease to threaten the Afghan and Pakistani states following a U.S./NATO withdrawal and greater inclusion of Pashtuns in the Afghan government, particularly the security forces. Because of these disagreements, Pakistan was unwilling


139 Interviews and discussions with numerous retired Pakistani officials and analysts.
to easily accede to U.S. demands—such as abandoning cease-fires and engaging in military operations in NWA that would be harmful to its internal security and foreign-policy interests—for the sake of the alliance. 140

Second, the United States did not have the leverage to compel this cooperation. Even though the United States occasionally tried to use coercive diplomacy through public criticisms or demands,141 U.S. dependence on Pakistan for its logistical tail and supply lines undermined its leverage and made it incapable of credibly threatening the cutoff of support to influence Pakistani strategic behavior. Some analysts even suggest that whatever leverage the United States did possess remained unexercised.142

In part, this leverage problem was caused by a lack of information. Through 2007, the United States possessed poor information on Pakistan’s strategic calculations and actions, in part due to its attention and assets being focused on Iraq. It believed that during this period, the GoP was “clearly committed to this challenge [the war in Iraq] and willing to use all resources”—an assessment that was optimistic in the extreme.143 Even during the turnaround in Pakistani policy from 2008 through early 2011, U.S. officials may not have been able to discern Pakistan’s selective approach to counterinsurgency. Many continued to praise Pakistan for “very significant strides,” and “unprecedented cooperation [and] coordination,” and they even displayed high expectations.


141 These included numerous public-pressure campaigns by leading U.S. officials, including threats to lead independent incursions into Pakistan in 2007, after elected civilian leaders contemplated negotiations in the spring of 2008 and 2009, surrounding visits by U.S. officials in fall 2009, after the failed Times Square bombing in May 2010, or through Adm. Mullen’s September 2011 testimony linking Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence to the Haqqani network.


for new offensives in NWA. Ultimately, ambiguity and uncertainty over Pakistani strategic calculations mitigated what little leverage the United States did possess.

Third, large amounts of money intended to buy Pakistani cooperation were never sufficient to fully shift Pakistani interests and behavior. The GoP saw coalition support funds, the bulk of the funds transferred early on and 40 percent of the overall funding, as something it was owed. Additionally, while Pakistan received one of the largest shares of U.S. aid, the amount was not particularly large on a per-capita basis (given Pakistan’s extremely large population), nor did Pakistani government officials perceive it as adequate to offset the high material, human, and opportunity costs that had been suffered since Pakistan allied with the United States in 2001. Given what was perceived as inadequate compensation for the losses the GoP believed it had suffered between 2007 and 2010, the Pakistani government was much more reticent to fully align its strategy with U.S. interests in Afghanistan and embark on future operations such as an invasion of NWA.

A fundamental shift in GoP strategy was too much to expect, despite the substantial amount of assistance the United States provided. While the United States struggled to influence GoP strategic behavior, it was better positioned to improve certain military capabilities and enable some successful tactical operations with injections

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of material and economic support. These injections of tactical assistance would have an impact on Pakistani counterinsurgency practices, however, only when the government was already motivated to fight and shared the same threat perceptions of certain militant groups. This confluence of threat perceptions existed in Swat and SWA, but it has been absent in other parts of FATA and in Balochistan, which has been utterly neglected by U.S. policy.

Conclusion

The case study of Pakistan offers further support for the theory and empirical analysis presented in Chapters Two and Three. There is broad support for the contention that political inclusion and state capacity influence a state’s general choices of counterinsurgency strategy in terms of the level of discriminate violence, provision of public goods, and openness to reconciliation. At a more nuanced level, when counterinsurgency campaigns are broken down over time and space, the predictions still hold: Regions with higher levels of political inclusion, institutional integration, and state capacity prior to conflict are more likely to exhibit counterinsurgency campaigns that look like the classic counterinsurgency model. Subnational conditions, in other words, may explain much of the variation in counterinsurgency approaches that cannot be explained by the properties of the state at the macro level.

Since these subnational conditions are also important determinants of conflict onset, counterinsurgency will take place more frequently in these weak areas, leading states to more frequently adopt strategies of containment or informal accommodation. The type of competitive state-building the classic counterinsurgency model envisions assumes that a state can impose its writ on these “ungoverned” spaces. Generating the local architecture and tools necessary to implement this approach in a sustained manner may be infeasible, however, due to local resistance and excessive costs, as has been the case for the Pakistani government in FATA. In these areas, governments may have to settle for second-best strategies like informal accommodation and
may need to foster a gradual, decades-long approach to integration and state-building.

The Pakistani case offers no support for the claim that a country’s ex ante possession of military superiority dictates the manner of its application or the type of counterinsurgency campaign the state conducts. States in a high-threat environment with other internal or external concerns may choose to economize their force deployment and hold most in reserve for other purposes. Pakistan’s overall military superiority has never seriously changed since 2001, but Pakistan has employed different types of strategies depending on local contexts (what was threatened) and threat perceptions (who was threatening). The government chose not to deploy its military superiority in the early FATA and Swat campaigns but did so in Balochistan, because it judged the insurgency there to be more threatening to the state at the time. Likewise, how a state utilizes its military capabilities may vary. The government used its military superiority for strong-state repression in Balochistan, classic counterinsurgency operations in Swat, and containment in FATA—even after learning the lessons of population security in Swat. Ethnic representation in the security forces, however, can have some impact on a state’s use of force, its willingness to make accommodations, and its ability to adapt. In the case of the GoP encounters with Pashtun-based militant groups, there is some evidence that empathy, information, and concerns for cohesion motivated the security forces that have a significant Pashtun presence to sign peace deals, minimize their use of force, and eventually—when compelled to take action—adapt a population-centric counterinsurgency model. In contrast, in Balochistan, the GoP felt unencumbered and routinely defaulted to punitive measures, with little concern for the moral or strategic consequences of indiscriminate force or half-hearted accommodation efforts.

While political inclusion and state capacity seem to have been quite important in shaping counterinsurgency strategy in Pakistan, these features have been very difficult for third parties like the United States to manipulate through assistance policies, particularly in a near-to-medium time frame. Overtly tinkering with GoP domestic politics has proved to be not only difficult but also counterproductive for relations with Pakistan. The United States found it easier to bolster
military superiority and enhance certain capabilities, with no certainty that these would be employed for counterinsurgency practices consistent with U.S. interests or values. U.S. material support for Pakistan worked best in areas of greatest mutual interest—particularly in Swat and, to a lesser extent, in SWA. There is always a risk, however, that some military assistance—particularly equipment and forces trained—might be redeployed for purposes other than the one that motivated U.S. support. In the case of Pakistan, U.S. military assistance could easily be used to prosecute highly repressive counterinsurgency operations in Balochistan, where the United States has both limited interest and little influence.

The GoP’s employment of second-best strategies like informal accommodation in parts of FATA (most notably in NWA) both mitigated some conflict and sidelined some insurgent combat power. As a result, Pakistan was able to concentrate its military superiority for decisive actions in Swat and later in SWA for operations that are still ongoing. Though harmful to U.S. interests in Afghanistan, the GoP’s choice of informal accommodation in NWA may have been in its best interest in its attempt to ensure some stability and avoid the fallout of previous operations while consolidating its hold over territories in which it had retaken control.

Finally, very little could be done by the United States to change Pakistan’s overall cost-benefit calculus in NWA and its strategy toward the region, at least in the near-to-medium term. For a time, the GoP’s counterinsurgency goals and priorities were thought to overlap with U.S. policy goals in Afghanistan, with failures to act ascribed to a deficit of capability. The U.S. failure to change the GoP’s strategy of informal accommodation in NWA to a more confrontational approach, however, was due to different strategic interests and divergent theories of “victory.”147 Neither substantial aid nor intensive engagement has proved adequate to change the fundamentals of the U.S.-Pakistani partnership.

CHAPTER SIX
Managing Troubled Partnerships

Successful light-footprint U.S. operations such as OEF-P in the Philippines and Plan Colombia have led many in the American defense community to argue that the United States will be able to protect its security interests in conflict-affected countries throughout the world through low-cost, indirect approaches. This report suggests that while such operations can indeed have positive effects, their prospects for success depend critically on the local context and especially on the characteristics of the counterinsurgent regime.

Success stories of U.S.-counterinsurgent partnerships have occurred in countries characterized by relatively inclusive politics and reasonable levels of state capacity. The governments of such countries typically adopt approaches to counterinsurgency that approximate the Western model, often (misleadingly) referred to as the hearts-and-minds approach. Unfortunately, only approximately one insurgency in eight occurs in such best-case countries. The majority of rebellions take place in worst-case conditions—that is, in countries that lack both inclusive politics and state capacity. Regimes in this latter category overwhelmingly rely on blunt applications of military force to contain or suppress rebellion.

The quantitative analysis presented in Chapter Three paints a stark picture of the different trajectories that conflicts follow in these best-case and worst-case environments. Whereas only 13 percent of civil wars in the best-case environments fail to reach an outcome that the government finds acceptable (that is, either outright military victory or a negotiated settlement acceptable to both sides), the failure rate
is nearly five times as high (60 percent) in the worst-case environments. Similarly, whereas fewer than 10 percent of all politically inclusive regimes have resorted to indiscriminate violence as a tool of counterinsurgency, 39 percent of regimes that are not politically inclusive and do not possess reasonable levels of state capacity have used such tactics. In other words, the chances of wide-scale abuse by security forces are four times greater among the worst-case regimes than they are among the more-favorable regimes.

The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan in Chapters Four and Five broadly support these quantitative findings. The focus on specific countries also provides an understanding of how various factors operate over time and across different subregions, helping to explain the microdynamics of conflict in these countries. In both the Philippines and Pakistan, more-democratic governments were more likely to adopt a classical counterinsurgency model that sought accommodation with the reconcilable opposition and used violence relatively discriminately. This tendency was particularly pronounced in regions where the governments possessed the necessary civil capacity to implement hearts-and-minds approaches. In contrast, during periods when these countries were ruled by more-autocratic regimes and in regions where the state exercised little effective control, governments were much more likely to seek to contain and suppress insurgents through raw force.

The successes of U.S. policies in the Philippines and Colombia, in other words, were critically contingent on the character of the partner regime. This conclusion is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; to the contrary, the case study of the Philippines suggests that U.S. aid played a critical role in recent successes there. But similar U.S. policies with less-promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. And as our quantitative analysis revealed, the majority of potential U.S. partner nations—including many that are central to ongoing U.S. counterterrorism efforts—are much less-promising partners.
Approaches to Managing Troubled Partnerships

These results should be sobering for those proponents of indirect or light-footprint approaches who suggest applying them in less-promising environments than those of the Philippines and Colombia. What, then, should U.S. policymakers do with this information if they are not simply to throw up their hands in exasperation?

One possibility is to be highly cautious in the choice of partner nations, partnering only with those that have favorable characteristics. Unfortunately, such an approach provides little guidance about what the United States should do in cases where it has important security interests at stake in a counterinsurgency being fought by a less-promising potential partner nation. Counterinsurgent regimes may be unattractive, but not infrequently, the insurgents they are fighting are even worse.

A second option would be to force liberalizing reforms on its partners, as the United States attempted to do in El Salvador in the 1980s. Such an approach has been the traditional hearts-and-minds prescription for counterinsurgency. Certainly, the United States should work with its partners to implement a variety of reforms. Evidence from the past several decades, however, suggests that it is unrealistic to expect most partner regimes to institute major changes unless they are forced to by looming military defeat or prolonged stalemate.

A third alternative is to look for small wins—that is, lesser reforms and informal practices that might serve as the basis for achieving at least minimally acceptable outcomes. Even among the worst types of counterinsurgent regimes, a significant number have managed to achieve satisfactory outcomes—often through a negotiated settlement with insurgents—and to do so without the use of indiscriminate violence. These outcomes suggest that the United States and its allies

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should explore alternatives to the traditional approaches that constitute the canon of Western counterinsurgency theory.

**Selectivity and Avoiding “Bad” Counterinsurgents**
The sobering statistics presented in Chapter Three and the lessons that can be gleaned from the case studies should encourage decisionmakers to reflect long and hard before committing to a counterinsurgent regime that lacks reasonable levels of political inclusivity or state reach. Regimes that score low in both of these dimensions are unlikely to bring a counterinsurgency to an acceptable end, and they run a high risk of resorting to indiscriminate violence while pursuing their indecisive campaigns. In many or most such cases, the United States would be well served to heed Daniel Byman’s advice and “act more like a third party to a conflict rather than an open and strong ally of government forces.”2 In others, the United States might insist on the partner regime implementing key reforms before it provides military assistance. This was the approach the United States recently adopted in Mali, for instance, where it insisted that the country’s military coup be rolled back and democratic elections take place before it would provide aid.

Such an approach is similar to the development community’s recent embrace of the principle of selectivity—that is, awarding aid only to those countries that are judged likely to use the assistance effectively.3 Selectivity focuses aid on reinforcing success rather than steering it to countries that may be most in need of assistance but are unlikely to make productive use of it. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, created under the administration of President George W. Bush, was created as a mechanism to execute such an assistance strategy.

Exercising selectivity is critically important in the national-security field as well as in development assistance, but there will inevitably be cases in which compelling national-security interests are at stake and U.S. decisionmakers do not believe they can afford to run the risk of having even a problematic partner government defeated by even

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2 Byman, 2006, p. 82.

more problematic insurgents. Here is where the analogy to the development community breaks down. Aid agencies are much more capable of abandoning a partner government that routinely underperforms than are defense authorities—at least when the partner represents a critical national-security interest. In such cases, the United States may be left with little choice but to attempt to work with the partner nation. How, then, should it manage such difficult partnerships?

**Conditionality and Making Partners into “Good” Counterinsurgents**

As the previous chapters have indicated, the traditional hearts-and-minds approach fits poorly with the characteristics of most regimes waging counterinsurgency. The large majority of them are autocratic regimes with weak state institutions, poorly outfitted to offer broad political participation rights and public goods. The Western response has often been to attempt to make partner regimes into better governments—more inclusive, more capable, and less abusive. As discussed below, although this approach is attractive, it has a discouraging record of success. In particular circumstances and for particular purposes, however, it may be appropriate.

**The Leverage Dilemma**

Many of the classic works in the counterinsurgency literature note a long litany of failed efforts to impose reform on unwilling partner governments, most obviously in South Vietnam.4 Similarly, the development community has generally become skeptical of aid conditionality.5 Two problems in particular have frequently confounded donor efforts to effectively condition their assistance: (1) the inability to credibly threaten to withdraw assistance, and (2) the inadequate ability to monitor the use of aid and the implementation of reforms.

In theory, the United States should have considerable leverage while supporting a partner regime threatened by insurgency. Particu-

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4 See especially Blaufarb, 1977.
larly if the partner regime would be at high risk of defeat without U.S. assistance, threats to withdraw that assistance should be highly persuasive. The problem is that U.S. credibility and the reputations of key U.S. actors become intertwined with the fate of the partner regime. Withdrawing U.S. support for a partner might lead to the partner’s defeat, which would be seen as a blow to the United States’ global reputation for supporting its allies and would impose domestic political costs on those decisionmakers who had initially supported the partner regime. In fact, several observers have posited what might be called the “leverage dilemma”: the greater the U.S. commitment to a partner regime, the less leverage it has over the partner. South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan are cited as the paradigmatic examples.

Stated in such linear terms, the leverage dilemma is almost certainly wrong: Taken to its extreme, it implies that the United States would have maximum leverage when it supplied no assistance whatsoever to the partner regime. Nonetheless, studies of development assistance do suggest that a donor’s ability to exercise leverage over an aid recipient is significantly weakened if the recipient is critical to the donor’s national interests.

Sierra Leone provides a useful example of the potential and limits of conditionality. In 2007, the incumbent Sierra Leonean People’s Party (SLPP) lost largely free and fair elections. The SLPP had given every

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7 See, for instance, Shafer, 1988. For a more recent example, see Hammes, 2012.

indication of its intent to subvert these elections and maintain itself in office despite its intense unpopularity after years of official corruption. The regime was utterly dependent, however, on international (and especially British) financial and military support. When the United Kingdom suspended budgetary support pending the ruling party’s acceptance of the results of the presidential poll, the SLPP had little choice but to accept its defeat. Here is an instance in which conditionality yielded an unambiguous success: The alternation of executive power in Sierra Leone was a milestone achievement in the country’s post-conflict evolution, and it almost certainly would not have happened in the absence of donor conditionality. What is much less clear is whether the United Kingdom would have been able or willing to make similar threats had its intervention in Sierra Leone been motivated by critical security interests rather than purely humanitarian concerns.

Seldom is conditionality such an all-or-nothing proposition, however. Conditionality is often applied to specific programs, so in theory, the United States should be able to fine-tune its conditionality, prodding a recalcitrant partner forward by threatening to withdraw specific aid programs if the partner does not make satisfactory progress toward reform. Such an approach would not place the regime’s survival at risk but would threaten to deny specific programs or funds that the partner regime finds useful.

Yet such fine-tuning of conditionality is extremely difficult in practice, particularly in conflict environments. In general, external actors are at an acute information disadvantage when seeking to influence the politics of foreign countries, especially countries in which formal institutions are weak and politics is even more informal and personality-driven than in developed countries. As a result, aid intended to influence political structures in recipient countries is often manipulated by local actors to serve purposes opposite from the ones intended.

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challenges donor nations face in monitoring the effects of their aid are even more pronounced in conflict environments, where their personnel often operate under severe mobility restrictions. This dynamic was observed in both of the case studies in this report and can be seen even in heavy-footprint theaters such as Afghanistan, where the United States possessed many more transportation assets and capabilities for personnel protection than is the case in light-footprint interventions.

**Potential for Changing Key Characteristics of Partner Nations**

Turning to the key characteristics of counterinsurgent regimes that are the focus of this study, we find a number of reasons to doubt the ability of most partner regimes to implement wide-ranging reforms in the course of fighting.

In aggregate, the countries in our sample experienced very little change in their degree of political inclusion during the course of conflict. On average, their Freedom House democracy scores changed by only 0.10 point on the seven-point scale from the first year of the war to the last. Fewer than 9 percent of cases experienced large positive change in their democracy scores—that is, a change of two or more points—during the course of fighting. In general, then, it is unrealistic to expect significant liberalization as a part of a counterinsurgency strategy. As a peacemaking and peace-building strategy, however, greater political participation may be much more realistic. Many regimes become more inclusive and participatory as a part of the war termination process. In such cases, efforts to improve political participation are much less about winning hearts and minds by redressing grievances than they are about providing a framework that reconcilable opposition leaders will feel offers them realistic opportunities for political participation and influence over the allocation of state services.

Building the state capacity of partner nations is even more daunting, at least within a time frame that is relevant to counterinsurgents.  

Lant Pritchett and his colleagues estimated how long it would take the worst-rated countries of the world to reach a level of state effectiveness equivalent to that of middle-ranked developing countries—countries such as Algeria, Tanzania, and Guatemala—on a variety of governance indicators. The results are sobering. If the 20 worst-rated countries continued to reform at their current pace, most of them would never reach the current quality of governance of middle-ranked developing countries, because their recent performance has been negative. Even if the worst-ranked countries experienced a miraculous change and started to reform as rapidly as the 20 fastest-reforming countries in the world, most would still require approximately 15 years to reach the middle tier of developing-country state effectiveness, and some would require three decades. If the bar were raised so that the goal were to become as effective as the 75th percentile of developing countries, most of the 20 worst-rated countries would require approximately 25 years to reach the goal, even if they consistently implemented reforms as rapidly as the top 20 fastest-reforming countries in the world.11

The results are somewhat more encouraging if we look more narrowly at building the military capabilities of partner nations. U.S. advisors from among conventional forces, SOF, and contractors have experienced considerable success in improving partner nations’ tactical capabilities in the short term. The case studies in this report provide evidence of such improvements in the Philippines and Pakistan, and similar gains have been observed among the troop-contributing countries to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and elsewhere.12

Even here, however, there are important limits to the degree of change that can be effected. While tactical skills such as marksmanship can be imparted relatively easily, operational-level skills are much more challenging. Developing-country militaries frequently struggle with logistics and sustainment, intelligence fusion and analysis, and

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other capabilities for which large, complex organizations are required. As our case study of the Philippines suggested, improvements in these fields made as a result of U.S. assistance can quickly be reversed if the United States does not continue to provide critical inputs.

More problematic are efforts to improve leadership and personnel systems. Many militaries in developing countries are built around patronage networks, where the military functions to provide important resources and/or employment to regime loyalists. Moreover, regimes frequently structure their militaries to minimize the risk of coups rather than to maximize the military effectiveness of the organization. Consequently, the quality of leadership is often highly degraded, and foreign military advisors have considerable difficulty changing these patterns.13

Organizational and political cultures also play a role. Many developing-country security forces have been constructed as servants of the regime, not the population. Alternatively, many militaries refuse to accept the principle of civilian oversight, believing that they should be given a free hand in dealing with security threats—a dynamic that has repeatedly troubled both Pakistan and the Philippines. Whether the security forces are heavily politicized in the service of a specific regime or refuse to accept legitimate civilian oversight, the outcome is often much the same. In either case, the notion that the security forces should serve the population—including by using violence discriminately, offering protection to vulnerable populations, and providing civil assistance in humanitarian crises or disasters—is typically alien. Such attitudes inhibit the adoption of key counterinsurgency principles.14


For these and similar reasons, tactical-level gains are often realized among partner-nation forces, but durable operational- and strategic-level improvements prove elusive. Widespread partnering between U.S. advisors and partner forces can help to alleviate these problems, as the case study of the Philippines suggests. But a major overhaul of an unprofessional force is typically a long-term, resource-intensive commitment.

**Policy Implications**

Is it possible to make “bad” counterinsurgents better? The evidence assembled here and in our case studies suggests that it is extremely difficult to transform partner nations during the course of a conflict. Change typically comes slowly, and attempting to use external aid to leverage reform efforts has a poor overall record of success. Despite these findings, the literature on development assistance and international diplomacy suggests at least three ways in which conditionality policies are appropriate and, indeed, critical components of an overall partnership strategy.

First, aid conditionality is necessary to “sterilize” the negative effects of foreign assistance. Many observers warn that foreign assistance provides regimes with an independent source of income and patronage, making them less reliant on—and thus less responsive to—their own populations.15 In this sense, foreign aid is potentially much like oil or other natural-resource rents that have been shown to have highly corrosive effects on developing countries’ governance. Unlike oil, however, aid is typically administered with a number of conditions intended to limit the ability of recipient regimes to divert these resources for private gain.16 Even if conditionality cannot be used to reform the recipient regime as a whole, it may at least be used to reduce the negative effects of the rents that can be derived from aid.

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Second, it should be possible to establish credible redlines for partner-regime behavior—that is, specified behaviors that would automatically result in the termination of foreign assistance. As discussed above, sponsoring states have difficulty convincing counterinsurgent regimes of the credibility of their threats to terminate aid and potentially permit the defeat of the partner. If the counterinsurgent regime’s behavior is so egregious as to be counterproductive, however, a sponsoring state such as the United States has no incentive to continue providing aid. Under such conditions, the threat to terminate aid should be entirely credible. The British government’s threat to terminate assistance to Sierra Leone had the SLPP abrogated the results of the 2007 elections is a perfect example.

While possible in theory, terminating assistance to a regime that has long received it is more difficult in practice. The central problem is that actors in the sponsoring state become personally invested in the success of the partner nation and the policies adopted toward it, making it difficult for them to even recognize failed policies, much less be willing to abandon them. High-level decisionmakers are very reluctant to cut their losses and withdraw even after overwhelming evidence of their strategy’s failure has accrued, because of personal incentives to gamble on even low-probability efforts to rescue a failing intervention.17 At lower levels of the decisionmaking hierarchy, it can be similarly difficult to turn off aid spigots due to vested bureaucratic interests in the perpetuation of assistance programs or simply due to bureaucratic inertia.18

How, then, can U.S. decisionmakers establish credible redlines in practice? There is no mechanism that can guarantee success. Incorporating explicit and robust discussions of redlines into preintervention planning, however, is a reasonable step in this direction. When such redlines have been incorporated into planning documents and are

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18 On related incentives operating in the development assistance community, see van de Walle, 2005, especially Chaps. 3 and 4.
repeatedly assessed through regularly collected metrics, the burden of proof for extending support to a regime that violates those redlines is clearly shifted to those who advocate in its favor.19

Finally, under certain circumstances, conditionality can and should be used to create incentives for the implementation of specific, often narrowly focused aid programs. The final section of this chapter explores such circumstances. In these cases, conditionality is a tool used either in extreme situations (when redlines are at risk of being broken) or as an exception in certain narrowly defined circumstances.

Policy Prescriptions for Managing Troubled Partnerships

The research presented here has indicated that the United States can easily partner with relatively inclusive, higher-capacity regimes such as those in the Philippines and Colombia. Particularly where those regimes lack needed military capabilities, the United States can offer critical assistance. With regimes that are inclusive but lack capacity, the United States still has substantial options—albeit at reduced odds of success. In such cases, the United States should strongly consider whether informal accommodation would meet minimal U.S. security goals.

The more-challenging circumstances are those in which the regime is not inclusive, especially when it lacks both political inclusion and state capacity. The odds of success are not favorable in such situations, and the risks of abusive behavior by the regimes are substantial. If the United States still believes it must partner with such regimes

19 The recently released Presidential Decision Directive on Security Sector Assistance issues similar guidance for routine security assistance: “[The Department of] State will report on the development of a set of notional triggers to prompt the United States Government to consider initiating, restructuring, pausing, terminating, or reinstating SSA programming for use by policymakers and planners. Circumstances warranting such an interagency review may include . . . SSA partners that are pursuing activities counter to U.S. policy, security interests or United States Government SSA goals; partner change of government or other landmark changes in political circumstances; or programs that fail to meet short-term aims (in 2–3 years).” See “Implementation of Security Sector Assistance (SSA) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD),” Washington, D.C.: The White House, undated, pp. 5–6.
despite the challenges, there are a number of rules of thumb that can be used to guide policy.

**General Principles**

Counterinsurgency is perhaps the most context-dependent activity in which militaries engage. Consequently, no universal set of policy prescriptions is possible. At least three principles, however, can be discerned from the case studies in this report and the broader literature on counterinsurgency and development to guide U.S. partnerships with problematic partners.

**Alignment of interests.** Where U.S. and partner-nation interests fundamentally diverge, there is little hope of a productive partnership to combat an insurgency within the partner nation. The United States’ leverage and information are insufficient to effectively use conditionality to overcome such gulfs. Examples of fundamental divergences in interests include cases in which the partner nation does not perceive an insurgent group as a threat (and may even regard it as a partner for fighting proxy conflicts, as has sometimes been the case in Pakistan) and cases in which the United States demands the elimination of ungoverned spaces over which the partner nation lacks the resources to assert effective control. Less fundamental differences in goals can be managed, as the Philippines case demonstrated. Even so, such relationships entail risk—particularly the risk that the partner nation will use military capabilities developed with U.S. assistance for purposes that the United States opposes. In such cases, it is important that the United States make clear and stand by its redlines.

**Pushing on open doors.** Conditionality can reasonably be used to enforce redlines, to press for a limited number of important but narrowly scoped reforms, or to take advantage of specific moments in time when more wide-ranging political change is possible. In most cases, U.S. efforts to reform the partner nation should focus on finding areas of agreement, potentially helping to convene the networks of actors in the partner nation that can implement changes, and then providing the necessary resources and technical expertise. U.S. support to AFP operations in the Sulu Archipelago, as described in Chapter Four, is one such example of a narrowly targeted, intensive collaboration.
U.S. assistance helped to transform the GRP strategy from containment to classic counterinsurgency by providing resources and know-how, but it was successful largely because the governments in power at the time were predisposed to such policies. This approach accords with concepts such as good-enough governance and problem-driven adaptation, which are currently popular in the development community. At the same time, U.S. decisionmakers should be attentive to opportunities to press for and support more-extensive change, particularly in political inclusivity. While state capacity takes decades to improve dramatically, political inclusivity can change much more rapidly. Cases of rapid change in political inclusivity are rare; fewer than one-tenth of all regimes fighting insurgencies experienced large shifts toward greater political inclusivity (defined here as two or more points on the Freedom House scale). They do, however, occur, often in response to prolonged periods of military stalemate in which the regime is looking for a way out. In such circumstances, the United States might play a significant role in bolstering local actors who are pressing for greater political inclusivity.

**Long duration.** Given the lengthy duration of most contemporary insurgencies and the length of time it takes to build state capacity or institutionalize mechanisms of political inclusion, the United States should enter into problematic partnerships with the expectation that they will be long-term relationships, typically with low odds of success in the short-to-medium term. This point was highlighted by the divergent results of long-term U.S. counternarcotics assistance in Pakistan and counterinsurgency aid focused on immediate results. Similarly, the more-successful recent U.S. light-footprint interventions—those in the Philippines and Colombia—have already lasted more than a

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dozen years, and the Philippines case study in this report highlighted the critical role the United States is likely to play in sustaining AFP capabilities for years to come. Decisionmakers should carefully weigh their ability to make such long-term commitments, particularly where partner nations are problematic. With the memories of the 9/11 attacks fading and public attention no longer monopolized by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, decisionmakers should expect more critical scrutiny of these light-footprint engagements. The example of El Salvador in the 1980s is instructive: The U.S. Congress became increasingly critical of U.S. support to the Salvadoran regime, drastically cutting the Reagan administration’s requests for aid to its ally despite the fact that the communist insurgency had battled the regime to a draw. Had the Cold War not ended, the level at which the United States could have maintained its support is unclear. Particularly where potential U.S. partners prove abusive or use violence indiscriminately, sustaining partnerships long enough to see significant changes in partner counterinsurgency behavior may be untenable.

**Bounded Accommodation**

Because only a minority of conflicts now end in outright military victory and the proportion decided by defeat on the battlefield has been steadily declining since World War II, the need to reach political accommodation with at least that portion of the opposition that can be accommodated without compromising core interests of the counterinsurgent appears to be increasing. Unfortunately, such accommodation is difficult for regimes characterized by low levels of political inclusion.

What can the United States do to facilitate such bounded accommodation? Depending on the precise circumstances, a number of instruments are available.

**Bolstering the credibility of regime commitments.** Democracies sometimes seek to implement accommodative solutions to insurgencies but lack the resources necessary to follow through on all of their promises. In such cases, foreign assistance can be critical in helping the counterinsurgent regime make good on its commitments, as the case of the Philippines illustrated. In other cases, even autocratic governments are willing to cut deals that would give rebels important
political rights and resources. Autocracies, however, find it difficult to credibly commit to such deals—that is, to convince insurgents that they will stand by the terms of the agreement even after the rebels disband. The United States and other external actors can play a critical role in making such commitments more credible. Peacekeeping operations are the best-known mechanism in such circumstances. 21 If the United States has been an active participant in a counterinsurgency, it may be unable to play the role of a peacekeeper, but other countries may well be able to do so. There is also a wide variety of mechanisms besides peacekeeping by which external powers can help to make regime commitments credible. In Mozambique, for instance, the international community committed to providing substantial development assistance, of which the rebels were guaranteed a proportionate share, but only if the parties to the conflict adhered to the terms of the agreed peace deal. 22 Although this arrangement has had its critics, peace has endured for two decades in Mozambique.

Promoting local solutions. Counterinsurgency theorists have long advocated more-inclusive, participatory politics at the local level as a key element of counterinsurgency. 23 Despite support for decentralization in much of the development community, there is little evidence that it reduces conflict or improves the quality of governance as a general rule. 24 In appropriate circumstances, however, it may be an important part of efforts to promote the inclusion of the reconcilable opposition. 25 USAID and other development agencies can play an important


25 Identifying the precise circumstances in which local governance is likely to exert positive effects is a complicated exercise. One such attempt is Kristin M. Bakke and Erik Wibbels,
role in improving the capacity of local governments to offer meaningful services to the local population, as the case study of the Philippines suggests. Such assistance, however, must be carefully tailored to local realities. Even within Mindanao, for instance, the appropriate sequencing of assistance varied from one locality to the next.

**Seizing rare opportunities for more-dramatic change.** Progress toward greater democracy is normally heavily contested, occurring only when incumbents are unable to resist demands for greater political inclusion. A prolonged military stalemate in a civil war may provide such an opening. In this situation, political reforms are less about alleviating popular grievances and winning the general population’s hearts and minds in order to defeat insurgents. Rather, they are about providing a framework in which reconcilable opposition leaders come to believe they can participate with minimal fear of persecution or marginalization. Such processes typically do not look like Western conceptions of democracy—they may go on for at least many years, often two decades or more. But they can provide a means for ending violent conflicts, and they have often done so. Such fragile political systems require support in their initiation phase, and they require subsequent buttressing if they are not to collapse. The United States and other international partner nations can help in both of these phases.

**Regulated Violence**

Accepting that the United States usually has only limited influence in light-footprint partnerships and that success is a long-term prospect implies an important corollary: The United States must undertake pol-

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27 As pointed out in Chapter Four, for example, there were many limitations on the Philippines’ democratic transition. Democratically elected administrations did not consistently adopt the counterinsurgency practices expected of more politically inclusive regimes for nearly two decades after the country’s initial democratic transition.
icies to mitigate the risk that its partners will use violence indiscriminately or otherwise engage in large-scale abuses while receiving U.S. military aid. Clearly such a policy is in line with American values, but it is also in line with U.S. interests. As discussed in Chapter Two, the discriminate use of violence is an important predictor of counterinsurgent success. It is also often necessary in order for the United States and other Western democracies to sustain their assistance to a counterinsurgent regime and sometimes to developing-nation partners more generally. The example of increasing Congressional opposition to aid for El Salvador in the 1980s has already been mentioned. Even more starkly, French popular reaction against the French government’s support of the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide was a significant factor in France’s retrenchment from its military commitments in sub-Saharan Africa.28

How can the United States mitigate the risk of abuses by partner nations’ security forces? The communication of clear and credible redlines, as discussed above, is probably the most important thing that the United States can do. Beyond such threats to terminate aid, the United States can also undertake a number of actions in the course of its security assistance.

**Improving civil-military relations.** As the case of the Philippines shows, even relatively promising regimes can have their counterinsurgency strategies undone by poor civil-military relations. Strong democratic oversight is typically associated with more-professional, higher-quality militaries, while many autocratic regimes suffer from problems of leadership and capability traceable to a heavy reliance on patronage networks, the need to prevent coups, and similar pathologies.29 Militaries also often prove unwilling to accommodate even the reconcilable opposition, insisting on outright military defeat of rebels,


no matter how distant a prospect such a victory might be. Although the United States is committed to the principle of civilian oversight and incorporates this commitment into much of its security assistance, senior U.S. defense officials have recognized that the United States can and should do a better job of reinforcing it. Military capacity-building in the absence of appropriate civil-military relations often has consequences the opposite of those intended, as both the Marcos-era Philippines and many examples from Pakistan have demonstrated.

**Quality over quantity.** There have been frequent debates over the relative priority of the quantity and quality of security services in a counterinsurgency context, with force ratios that measure the quantitative adequacy of security forces having recently come under considerable criticism. Both the quantitative evidence and the case studies in this report suggest the primacy of quality, at least in the vast majority of cases. In both the Marcos-era Philippines and Pakistani operations in FATA and Balochistan, larger numbers of troops were more frequently associated with more indiscriminate violence and ultimately counterproductive outcomes. This finding highlights the importance of imparting the necessary doctrine, leadership, discipline, and (where appropriate) technology to manageable numbers of partner-nation forces and then sustaining these qualitative improvements. Wherever possible, partner-nation units receiving such assistance should be closely paired with U.S. forces to ensure that the United States has visibility into how its assistance is being used. In both Pakistan and the Philippines, partner units with the necessary capabilities for counterinsurgency—often elite SOF—were more likely to engage in carefully targeted operations than were other units. At the same time, the Pakistan case suggests that even with such qualitative improvements, abuses are common without robust democratic oversight.

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31 See, for instance, Gen. Carter Ham, testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 7, 2013.

Managing Troubled Partnerships

Intercommunal integration. As Pakistani operations in Balochistan in particular demonstrated, security forces that do not include members of the same ethnic or religious affiliation as the population in which they are operating are at particularly high risk of abusive behavior. The United States, therefore, should work with partner regimes to improve the representativeness of their security services. Incorporating personnel from disaffected populations during the course of intensive fighting, however, risks subversion within the government’s security forces, as witnessed in the recent “green-on-blue” violence in Afghanistan. The ideal time to integrate personnel from different communities, therefore, is before fighting erupts, when there is still opportunity to develop unit cohesion and esprit de corps within the security services. This point, in turn, leads to our final recommendation: an emphasis on “phase-zero” reform activities.

Phase zero. Unfortunately, all of the prescriptions offered in this section are long-term propositions. Moreover, they are all substantially more difficult to implement during ongoing fighting than in peacetime. Consequently, when the United States partners with more autocratic regimes, it is accepting a high level of risk that its assistance will be abused by partner-nation forces. These warnings suggest that security-sector reform efforts such as those discussed above should be a central element of U.S. phase-zero, or peacetime, engagement strategy, not a peripheral concern or an issue to which significant resources are devoted only once a crisis erupts. Although the United States is committed to such reforms in principle, in practice its procedures for identifying and mitigating the risks are still nascent. Building capability


34 See also Herbst, 2004.

without building effective oversight and disciplining mechanisms risks failure at the strategic level, even if partner forces become much more effective at operational and tactical levels.
Dependent Variables

Acceptable Decisive Outcome
An acceptable decisive outcome is one in which the government either wins an outright military victory or is able to negotiate a formal peace agreement following a military stalemate. Our coding of military victory was derived from a version of the dataset in Connable and Libicki (2010), updated with data from Watts et al. (2012). Coding of negotiated settlements was derived from the data in Doyle and Sambanis (2006), updated through 2008 primarily using histories from the Europa World Plus online database, supplemented with additional source material where necessary (e.g., Watts et al., 2012).

Mass Killings
Our indicator of indiscriminate violence was derived from data on intentional government killings of civilians assembled by Ulfelder and Valentino (2008).

Ulfelder and Valentino’s instances of mass killings do not match up perfectly with the civil-wars list defined by Doyle and Sambanis that we used for our sample of cases. Consequently, we had to choose

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1 Data from Ulfelder and Valentino were updated through 2010 through email correspondence with the authors. Specifically, two new cases of mass killings were added: Sri Lanka (from January 15, 2009, to May 19, 2009), with between 3,000 and 20,000 intentional civilian deaths, and Côte d’Ivoire (from December 1, 2010, to April 11, 2011), with between 1,500 and 3,000 deaths.
between Ulfelder and Valentino’s year ranges for mass killings and Doyle and Sambanis’ civil-war lengths to calculate an average value for mass killings per year. We chose Ulfelder and Valentino’s year ranges because mass killings associated with a civil war could have taken place prior to the start date coded using Doyle and Sambanis’ procedures. We then matched the civil wars in Doyle and Sambanis and the mass-killing incidents in Ulfelder and Valentino based on approximate year and event type. In cases where a mass-killings record spanned multiple civil wars, we assumed that the mass killings were even across the civil wars. As discussed in Chapter Two, Ulfelder and Valentino also rely on a lower threshold of violence to code a case as an instance of mass killings. We selected as our break point an average of 2,000 or more intentional killings of civilians for each year of the civil war, with the number of such killings determined by the average of Ulfelder and Valentino’s high-end and low-end estimates. Ulfelder and Valentino’s data were collected for the period from 1945 to 2006; if a civil war was either ongoing or continued after 2006, we used 2006 as the latest year in the mass-killings calculation.\(^2\) In cases where a mass-killings incident was not reported for a country during the period of a civil war (as determined using start and end dates from Doyle and Sambanis’ dataset), the civil war was coded as a case of no indiscriminate violence by government forces.

### Independent Variables

**Government Effectiveness**

The government effectiveness variable from the World Bank’s WGI provided one of our two indicators of state capacity. According to the WGI source document, “Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the

\(^2\) The exception is Sri Lanka, 2003–2009, for which we had updated data.
government’s commitment to such policies.”

The indicator is reported by country for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002–2011. Unfortunately, with so many years of missing data, we had to use the average of the existing years of data to score each country’s government effectiveness rather than using only those years in which the country was affected by insurgency. The break point between high and low government effectiveness was the median value from all cases in our sample.

State Reach

Our second indicator of state capacity is Holtermann’s state-reach variable. Data for this variable are available from 1989 to 2006 and are on a scale of 0 to 1. As with government effectiveness, because of missing data, we had to use each country’s average values for all years from 1989 to 2006 rather than using only those years in which the country was affected by insurgency. Countries with average state-reach scores greater than or equal to the index’s midpoint of 0.5 are considered to have high state reach, and countries with average state-reach scores lower than 0.5 are considered to have low state reach.

Freedom House Scores

We derived our indicator of political inclusion from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World dataset. Freedom House reports two scores per year: The first is a political rights score, on a scale of 1 through 7, with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least free. The second is a civil liberties score, also on a scale of 1 through 7, with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least free. We took the average of these two scores for each year, then averaged a country’s combined score for all the years of a conflict. If a Freedom House score was not reported for a country year, that year did not influence the average. We selected as

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4 Holtermann, 2012.

5 Some past Freedom in the World reports cover unconventional date ranges, particularly in the 1980s. In these cases, we used the year most closely associated with the year covered. For example, Freedom House data for the period from August 2, 1982, to November 1983 were used to calculate a country’s score for 1983.
our break point the midpoint of the Freedom House scale; thus, if the average Freedom House score over the course of a civil war was less than or equal to 4, the country was considered to possess high political inclusivity; if the average Freedom House score was greater than 4, the country was considered to possess low political inclusivity.

**Force-to-Force Ratios**

Force-to-force ratios were calculated as the ratio of government to insurgent forces. For data on insurgent forces, we used the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Non-State Actors dataset, Version 3.3. We calculated the number of rebels per year using the dataset’s best estimate. If there were multiple insurgent groups in a given country corresponding to the same civil war in the Doyle and Sambanis dataset, we used the sum of all insurgent groups. Since the PRIO dataset uses conflict years as its unit of analysis, whereas our study examines conflicts as a whole, we used the average number of insurgents over the length of the conflict. Data on government forces were derived from the World Bank’s WDI. This variable is entitled Armed Forces Personnel, Total and consists of active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. The original source of the data is the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ *The Military Balance*. The indicator begins in 1989. If the indicator was not available for a certain country year, it was omitted from the average. To determine the extent of government military superiority, we took the ratio of the government troop estimate over this period of time to the rebel estimate, with a 10:1 ratio used as the break point between countries scoring high and low.

**Force-to-Population Ratios**

Force-to-population ratios were calculated as the ratio of a country’s government military forces to its inhabitants. As with force-to-force

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ratios, data on government forces were derived from the World Bank’s WDI. This variable is entitled Armed Forces Personnel, Total and consists of active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. The original source of the data is the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ *The Military Balance*. The indicator begins in 1989. If the indicator was not available for a certain country year, it was omitted from the average. Data on countries’ total populations were also found in the WDI. Using this ratio, we created two binary variables based on two different break points: average force-to-population ratios of 5:1,000 and 10:1,000. We used both break points in separate cross-tabulations of the relationship between military superiority and the outcomes of interest.
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This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. “small-footprint” partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report’s findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as “success stories” all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Only one insurgency in eight occurred in such best-case countries; the sizable majority have taken place in worst-case conditions. In these worst-case environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to suppress or contain rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships.