Crisis and conflict prevention strategies
An international comparison
Preface

In February 2012, RAND Europe was commissioned by the Delegation for Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defence (Délégation aux Affaires stratégiques du ministère de la Défense) to conduct a study on different approaches to conflict and crisis prevention at both the national and international level. The original report, La prévention des crises et des conflits: enjeux et rôle pour la défense, was completed in November 2012 and authored by Sophie-Charlotte Brune, Anne Kovacs, Anais Reding and Maryse Penny.

This report is a translated excerpt from the original report, focusing on conflict prevention approaches in four national cases: France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. It was translated and revised from the original French by Giacomo Persi Paoli, Tess Hellgren and Sophie-Charlotte Brune. While some national mechanisms and structures may have evolved since 2012, this report presents the evidence that was accurate as of the report’s initial completion date.

The translation of this report was undertaken in order to improve the accessibility and resonance of its findings across a broader range of audiences. This research should be of interest to officials in the four countries studied, particularly those engaged in conflict and crisis prevention. It should also be of interest to stakeholders at international institutions, security personnel engaged in conflict and peacekeeping operations and practitioners in the domain of conflict prevention.

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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFD</td>
<td>Agence française de développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCAO</td>
<td>Appui à la lutte contre la cocaïne en Afrique de l’ouest</td>
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<td>APB</td>
<td>Atrocities Prevention Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASACA</td>
<td>Appui à la sûreté de l’aviation civile en Afrique</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMVg</td>
<td>Bundesministerium der Verteidigung</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>BND</td>
<td>Bundesnachrichtendienst</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCJO</td>
<td>Capstone Concept for Joint Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Centre de crise (MAEE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMA</td>
<td>Chef d’état-major des armées</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICID</td>
<td>Comité interministériel de coopération internationale et du développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combat Joint Task Force,</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMM</td>
<td>Conflict Management and Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCO</td>
<td>Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Conflict and Stability Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>Délégation aux affaires stratégiques</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCP</td>
<td>Document cadre de partenariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCSD</td>
<td>Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense (MAEE)</td>
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DDR  Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID  Department for International Development
DGM  Direction générale de la mondialisation, du développement et des partenariats (MAEE)
DIA  Doctrine interarmées
DoD  Department of Defence
DoS  Department of State
DRM  Direction du renseignement militaire
EMA  Etat-major des armées
EMA-RI  Etat-major relations internationales
EUBAM  European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCOM  United States European Command
EULEX  European Union Rule of Law Mission
EUMM  European Union Monitoring Mission
EUPOL  European Union Police Mission
FMF  Foreign Military Financing
FMS  Foreign Military Sales
FSP  Fonds de solidarité prioritaire
GAS  Groupe d’anticipation stratégique
GIZ  Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GPOI  Global Peace Operations Initiative
GPPT  German Police Project Team
GSCF  Global Security Contingency Fund
ICAF  Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
IIW  Internal Instability Watchlist
IMS  Interagency Management System
INCAF  International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OCDE)
IORF  International Operational Response Framework
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
ISR  Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JDP  Joint Doctrine Publication
JFCs  Joint Forces Commands
KFOR  Kosovo Forces
LBDSN  Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale
Crise et stratégies de prévention des conflits :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyme</th>
<th>Signification</th>
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<tr>
<td>MAEE</td>
<td>Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPRO</td>
<td>Mass Atrocities Prevention and Response Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARO</td>
<td>Mass Atrocities Response Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorisation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIC</td>
<td>National Intelligence Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>Northern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODNI</td>
<td>Office of the Director of National Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTAN</td>
<td>Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Provincial Development Funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>PITF</td>
<td>Political Instability Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKSOI</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Presidential Security Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Report</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State/ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGDSN</td>
<td>Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>UE</td>
<td>Union européenne</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTAF</td>
<td>United States Central Command Air Forces</td>
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<td>ZIF</td>
<td>Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze</td>
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1. Introduction

Over the last two decades, increased awareness of the devastating multidimensional consequences of conflicts has brought the issue of crisis and conflict prevention to the top of the international community’s agenda. As international awareness of the multidimensional consequences has grown, so too has the understanding of the security-development nexus and the continuum between conflict prevention, management and resolution.

In this context, recognition of the essential role of states and good governance has sparked several ‘capacity building’ initiatives at the national, regional and international levels. France, along with other national and international actors has, therefore, sought to better address these issues and to adapt its conflict prevention response.

The 2008 French White Paper on Defence highlights the importance of a crisis and conflict prevention policy for French national security. It focuses on three main areas:

1. Adopting a preventive approach aimed at improving international security through diplomatic means and development assistance.
2. Containing, when necessary, crises through military means.
3. Supporting post-conflict stabilisation through economic, diplomatic and other means of cooperation.¹

Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, France and the broader international community have become increasingly aware of the destabilising effects of distant regional crises. This increased awareness has resulted in a new political drive in the fields of conflict prevention and management, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. However, the implementation of a crisis and conflict prevention policy remains difficult, facing two main challenges: (1) the convergence in the same areas of security, development and international assistance actors with different priorities and mandates and (2) the need to support stability and reconstruction through a combination of civilian and military efforts.

Experiences in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have further highlighted the challenges of determining a clear division of tasks, duties and responsibilities between civilian and military actors across the whole spectrum of crisis prevention, management, stabilisation and reconstruction. In this context, the effectiveness of a comprehensive policy largely relies on the capacity of all civil and military actors involved to cooperate closely at both the political and operational level.

¹ Mallet (2008, 67).
As demonstrated by the adoption of a French Strategy for Crisis Management in 2009[^1] France is in the process of revising its policy priorities and interdepartmental coordination in the field of crisis and conflict prevention. Considering that preventive action is often based on concerted multilateral efforts, the French government (specifically the Department of Defence) is interested in exploring how France’s closest allies seek to address these issues.

It is in this context that the Delegation for Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defence asked RAND Europe to conduct a study on different approaches to crisis and conflict prevention, focusing in particular on France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, in order to support the review of the White Paper on Defence.

Focusing on these four national cases, the following study offers an overview of different approaches to crisis and conflict prevention at the political-strategic, institutional and practical-operational levels. Our analysis includes consideration of the different instruments used for prevention, ranging from early warning mechanisms to civil and military rapid reaction. Findings are based on evidence gathered through a broad literature review and high-level interviews with representatives within the French, British, American and German policy spheres. This empirical work has allowed us to compare, in a structured manner, different ways of designing and implementing a prevention policy. Although a rigorous assessment of different state structures is often not possible due to their recent creation, this study aims to identify best practice in conflict prevention policy by analysing the challenges and benefits of different national approaches.

2. Concepts, definitions and methodology

The first half of the 1990s was a learning period in crisis management for Europe and the United States. The emergence of a multitude of ethnic conflicts and separatist claims previously contained by the bipolar Cold War rivalry led to the development of a new type of engagement.

Since the late 1990s, there have been two major trends in crisis and conflict management. First, despite the various military interventions in the 1990s, it has gradually become apparent that international efforts to maintain peace do not guarantee lasting stability; indeed, many intervention zones quickly fall back into crisis shortly after an initial resolution. Second, experiences show that conflict intervention requires the implementation of various instruments. Coordination between civilian and military actors, both at the national and international level, is crucial. Significant efforts are required to improve cooperation and coordination and to best use the resources invested.

Powered by the international community’s intervention fatigue in the late 1990s, these two trends have led to the gradual emergence of a political will to develop preventive action capabilities. A majority of Western governments have discussed integration of conflict prevention capabilities within governmental and multilateral structures with a view to mainstreaming these processes. As a result of these discussions, several European states, as well as the US, have sought to institutionalise early warning structures and inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms.

A decade after this shift in the Western approach to crises and conflicts, it is now appropriate to evaluate the structures created and to gauge the political interest and financial commitment given to crisis and conflict prevention.

2.1. International approaches to crisis and conflict prevention have shifted over the past two decades

The political tensions that characterised the Cold War had two main effects. First, they helped freeze certain conflicts. Second, they limited the scope of some UN peacekeeping operations under Chapter VI of the Charter (as in the cases of Congo and Cyprus).

The end of the Cold War unlocked these political stalemates, resulting in the proliferation of conflicts and an expanded role for international organisations like NATO and the United Nations (UN). The first UN
missions were based on the principle of peacekeeping, yet after the unsuccessful peace mission UNSOM I it became clear that a different approach was needed when crisis management involved a failed state.³

During the 1990s, interventions became more complex and relied increasingly on the use of force and yet they failed to deliver long-term conflict resolution and stability. Such inability to find external solutions to conflicts added to the rising costs of these missions and led to several changes in the approach of the UN and major contributing countries. These changes included:

- Increasing involvement of regional organisations in cooperating with the UN and offering guidance and local diplomatic mediation.
- Strengthening civil rather than military liability.
- Developing a new emphasis on prevention (rather than reaction) as well as on the ownership of these missions by local authorities and populations.

2.1.1. Conflict prevention policies have been moving towards a capacity-building approach

The long-term stabilisation of societies weakened by inter-ethnic rivalries or dominated by duelling regimes requires a full spectrum of interventions across the areas of economic reform, political governance, justice and security. Such a comprehensive approach – emphasising the links between security, political stability and economic development – requires an interdepartmental coordination within governments of donor countries that remains very difficult to actualise.

The four Western countries analysed in this study agree that building the capacity of weakened states is a critical component of crisis and conflict prevention policies. Rather than aiming to eliminate global conflict, Western conflict prevention should attempt to strengthen the structures of governance, justice and security in weak states. Fragile or unstable societies are thus to be empowered with the tools to deal constructively with the violent potential of future conflicts.

2.2. The conflict prevention literature focuses both on conceptual issues and an evaluation of institutional policies

As research evolves on peace missions, conflict resolution and crisis management, a research stream dedicated to the analysis of prevention has developed. Conflict prevention is analysed from a variety of perspectives:

- The majority of publications aim to provide conceptual clarification and define conflict prevention by identifying its unique attributes.⁴ Some of these contributions seek to go


⁴
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

beyond the debates that address the issues of definitions and highlight the need to consider the origins of a conflict and the need to differentiate responses depending on the relevance given at each stage of the crisis cycle.\(^5\)

- Selected sources focus on the analysis of secondary issues related to the crisis and conflict prevention policy in Europe and the United States on the basis of a neo-Marxist interpretation background.\(^6\)
- A number of contributions provide further analysis of issues related to the emergence of conflicts and their prevention, including the role of gender and ethnic distributions in the genesis of conflict.
- Further sources assess the degree of institutionalisation of prevention in a number of countries and international organisations.\(^7\)
- Other research contributions, often originating from international institutions such as the OECD and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), seek to develop evaluation methods that measure the effectiveness of various tools for crisis and conflict prevention.\(^8\)

The present study primarily offers an overview of various national prevention policies. The academic analysis informs certain aspects of this work, including the conceptual framework. The many facets considered within our research limited the depth of comparative analysis. Furthermore, the institutional structures analysed in the study have often only very recently been created and thus do not allow for a definitive assessment of their effectiveness.

2.3. Our research uses a cyclical model of conflict to consider both short- and long-term preventive measures and strategies

A conflict can be defined as a ‘contested incompatibility: two parties seek to acquire at the same time a rare commodity, which can be either material or immaterial’.\(^9\) Linear definitions of conflict traditionally include a violent aggravation phase, a crisis/conflict phase and a final appeasement phase. This study

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\(^4\) Miall (2000); Lund (1999); Lund (2002a, 2002b); Svanstroem & Weissmann (2005); Wallensteen (2002); Wallensteen & Moeller (2003); Ackermann (2003); Melander & Pigache (2007); Barnett et al. (2007).

\(^5\) Gardner (2002); Gurr & Harff (1996); Axt et al. (2006); Ackermann (2003, 341).

\(^6\) De Wilde (2006); Moolakkattu (2005).

\(^7\) Lund & Rasamoelina (2000); Leonhardt (2000); Dwan (2002); Goetschel & Schmeidl (2002); Brusset & Tiberghien (2002); Bjorkdahl (2002).

\(^8\) Landgraf (1999); Dwan (2002); Van de Goor & Huber (2002); Kennedy-Chouane (2011); OECD-DAC (2007).

rather draws upon a cyclical model of conflict (see Figure 2.1)\(^{10}\) and focuses particularly on the phases of conflict prevention and resolution (1) as well as peacekeeping and stabilisation (3).

**Figure 2.1: Policy instruments within a cyclical model of conflict**

1. **CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION:** Conflict initiation
2. **PEACE ENFORCEMENT:** Violent conflict
3. **PEACE-KEEPING & STABILISATION:** Conflict transformation
4. **PEACE-BUILDING:** Social change

In terms of conflict prevention, this study focuses on **short-term** and **long-term (or structural)** prevention. Short-term prevention refers to the political and economic tools available during conflict initiation and applied before a violent crisis is apparent. Long-term prevention refers to stabilisation and peacekeeping measures used in post-conflict situations. The current study seeks to analyse states’ political preferences and operational skills according to these two categories of action.

A key objective of this study is to **identify the necessary skills and political priorities** that states consider for preventive short- or long-term measures. Short-term preventive measures are divided into cooperative and coercive measures and are often used simultaneously. The goal of structural preventive measures lies more in the long term: not only to reduce violence, but to treat the underlying causes and context of conflicting order to help prevent the emergence of latent conflicts.\(^{11}\)

For a prevention strategy to be effective, both short- and long-term instruments of crisis and conflict prevention must be included. Our conceptual understanding of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy follows the analysis of Beyna et al., who specify that it includes the following elements:

- A definition of explicit operational objectives, including an analysis situating the conflict in its socio-political and economic context.
- An analysis of options for action in the short and long term.

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\(^{10}\) Miall et al. (2005). The Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflict uses a different classification system based on the distinction between political, economic and military measures: (1) early warning, early response; (2) preventive diplomacy; (3) economic measures; (4) coercive measures. See: Carnegie Commission (1994).

\(^{11}\) Stares (2009, 7–8).
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

- The integration of a range of options to act preventively.12

2.4. This study conducts a structured comparative analysis of the conflict prevention policies of four countries

The objective of this study is to conduct a structured comparative analysis of four national case studies: France, the UK, the US and Germany. These countries’ conflict prevention policies are on the conceptual, administrative/ministerial and practical/operational level. In particular, the study considers the following points:

- The differences between the French approach to prevention (in terms of definitions, concepts and doctrine) and those used in the UK, Germany and the United States.
- Administrative organisation of prevention activities, with particular focus on the role of the Ministry of Defence (MOD).
- Interdepartmental set ups, particularly in terms of budget, authority and coordination of human resources.
- Early warning and civilian-military rapid reaction instruments.
- Where relevant, the lessons learned from selected states in the field of crisis and conflict prevention.

At the conceptual level, each case study focuses on three key questions:

- What is the definition or understanding of the concept of ‘crises and conflicts prevention’ within each country?
- Can we identify similarities or significant differences between the selected countries?
- What is the role assigned to the MOD?

We will address these questions through a qualitative analysis of different definitions of crisis and conflict prevention and roles between multiple bodies in the countries concerned. We also compare, to the extent that the relevant documents are accessible, the different concepts and doctrines used by the national armed forces concerned.

At the administrative/ministerial level, the goal is to determine the organisation and existing mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination in the selected countries. We seek above all to define the distinction of roles and the differences in relative weight of civilian13 and military actors. The case studies also analyse different aspects such as the role of coordinating authorities, human resources and budgetary issues.

At the practical/operational level, the main goal is to identify prevention tools used by each country and identify, to the extent possible, what lessons have been learned from the prevention policies in force.

12 Beyna et al. (2001).
13 We are here referring to Ministries of Foreign Affairs, equivalents to the Ministry of Development as well as agencies working on prevention policy.
Particular attention is given to identify possible ongoing reforms and revisions of current policies, as well as the motivations that generate them.

The case studies are based on an analysis of contributions from different sources (academic, policy, research institutes) as well as on the results of interviews with government officials and academic experts. The analysis also draws upon key official documents such as White Papers, doctrines and military concepts. The country case studies were conducted primarily based on interviews with crisis and conflict prevention officials of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs in selected countries.

The next four chapters present and analyse the policies and instruments of prevention in each of our targeted countries. The final chapter of the report compares these national examples to identify common challenges, trends and best practices across national crisis and conflict prevention strategies.
Although conflict prevention has gained visibility in France, national conflict prevention policy remains less structured and coordinated than the policies of France’s major international partners. While conflict prevention has appeared in numerous reports and recommendations over the past decade, French conflict prevention remains limited by an ad hoc approach to crisis management, weak inter-ministerial coordination, a lack of available personnel and insufficient funding.\(^{14}\)

As there is currently no centralised national prevention strategy in France, existing efforts are scattered among various key stakeholders. Structural reforms aiming to improve the coherence of national conflict prevention efforts have not been successful. France appears to prefer working in a generally informal manner, relying on ad hoc management of emerging crises rather than using systematic tools such as checklists, early warning indicators, strategies, mutual funds, and coordination structures. Due to this lack of structure, French conflict prevention efforts are relatively fragmented.

3.1. The concept of conflict prevention appears throughout the French strategic framework

While conflict prevention does not have its own national strategy in France, it is highlighted in a number of official documents that articulate a multifaceted sense of the French position.

3.1.1. Conflict prevention features conspicuously in key strategic documents

Conflict prevention features explicitly in the White Papers of both the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes, MAEE) and the Ministry of Defence (Ministère de la Défense). The MAEE’s 2008 White Paper addresses the issue of conflict prevention through three policy objectives: building an environment that deters crises, acting upstream on the root causes of conflict, and intervening quickly if and when a conflict erupts.\(^ {15}\) This approach requires the involvement of security institutions as well as development policies. This White Paper also outlines proposals for the reform of external action, including improving the French response throughout the escalation of a crisis situation. This implies the need for an improvement in intelligence, early warning mechanisms and

\(^{14}\) Dussourd (2009).

\(^{15}\) Juppé & Schweitzer (2008, 73).
alignment of stakeholders. It also criticises the current partitioning of French conflict prevention efforts, advocating better interdepartmental coordination and coherence.

Conflict prevention is also featured in the 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security (Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale, LBDSN), where it is discussed as a major strategic priority that should be better addressed through policy. The LBDSN adopts a ‘holistic’ vision of prevention, emphasising the continuum between prevention and post-conflict measures. In this document, conflict prevention is discussed in three temporal positions:

- **Before the crisis**: improving the international system and addressing the origins of conflict.
- **During the crisis**: limiting the effects of a crisis by military means, if possible.
- **After the crisis**: supporting the process of stabilisation and reconciliation through economic, diplomatic and cooperative means.

This White Paper focuses on preventive diplomacy, advocating improved coordination between security and development efforts, particularly in the ‘greater’ Middle East. While emphasising that France must retain the capacity to intervene both before and during the ‘arc of crisis’, the document also recommends strengthening the work of regional security organisations.

### 3.1.2. Other policy documents emphasise different aspects of civil and military prevention

In addition to these strategic documents, the issue of prevention is incorporated into documents of both the MAEE and the Ministry of Defence, with varying emphasis on the need for civil versus military intervention.

**MAEE documents emphasise the ‘civil society’ dimension of preventive action**

**France’s position on fragile states and situations of fragility**

France has sought to make its position on fragile states heard on an international level, mainly through the OECD platform. In this context, in 2007 it published a paper entitled *Fragile states and situations of*
fragility: France’s policy paper. As made clear in this document and reiterated in our interviews, France does not envision the creation of a formal list of fragile states, but rather advocates using a grid assessing the fragility of a state along various socio-economic categories to allow for a better understanding of specific cases.

Security Sector Reform: The French approach

Published in August 2008 and co-sponsored by the MAEE and the Ministry of Defence, this guide aims to define a French approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR), which is considered an essential part of conflict prevention and resolution due to the significant links between security and development. As the document explains, ‘SSR aims to act on all the institutions involved in the field of security (military, police, gendarmerie, customs, justice, prison administration, etc.), but also on institutional powers (Parliament, independent authorities) that are associated with them’. SSR is a comprehensive process which must take into account the specificities of each country and which is essentially political in nature.

Development Cooperation: a French vision [Policy 2011]

This framework document presents the French strategy for development cooperation and aims to make it more understandable. The document advocates strengthening stability and developing preventive approaches in countries with fragile situations. As is the case with France’s position on fragile states and situations of fragility, this document notes that preventive approaches rely on state-building, civil society and economic integration.

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24 France coopération (2007, 2). It is stated, however, that both the World Bank and the African Development Bank hold a list of fragile states.
25 This grid is built around five fragility criteria: (I) Failure of the rule of law; (II) Powerless state; (III) Illegitimate or non-representative government; (IV) Failing economy; (V) Weakened society. In addition to these categories, it is also important to take into account the regional or international environment. Source: France coopération (2007, 3).
28 Its preparation was piloted by the General Directorate for Globalisation, Development and Partnerships of the French MAEE. It was supervised by a pilot committee including the MAEE, the Ministry for the Economy, Finance and Industry, the Ministry of the Interior, Overseas, Territorial Authorities and Immigration, and the French Agency for Development (AFD).
29 French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (2011, 51).
30 French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (2011, 51).
The Ministry of Defence focuses on strategic monitoring to enable early intervention

The concept of the use of force

The concept of the use of force, published in January 2010, reviews the armed forces guidelines included in the White Paper. The notion of prevention appears repeatedly in this document and helps ensure international stability as part of the ‘strategic triangle’ shown below, limiting the risk of conflict by acting earlier through intelligence capabilities and quick intervention military forces.\(^{31}\)

Figure 3.1: The strategic triangle

![Strategic Triangle Diagram]

Coping with a brutal worsening of the situation

Contributing to international stability by monitoring the troubled areas and preventing unrest within them

Major conflict

International stability

Wider protection

Ensuring the protection of citizens and national interests against actual and immediate threats and risks

SOURCE: Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations (2010, 18)

The doctrine of the use of force

The doctrine of the use of force, dated July 2011, formalises the operational strategy of the French armed forces. This doctrine recalls the ‘strategic triangle’ concept and the five strategic functions included in the LBDSN. As in The concept of the use of force, the impact of the maritime environment for anticipating and preventing crises is underlined. Conflict prevention is also mentioned in the context of a global approach involving engagement with international institutions.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{31}\) Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations (2010, 18).

\(^{32}\) Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations (2010, 115–17).
The doctrine of prediction and strategic planning

The interagency doctrine on forecasts and strategic planning from December 2011 describes the process of developing a strategic decision. This process of ‘forecasting and strategic planning’ is the tool of the Chief of the Defence Staff (Chef d’état-major des armées, CEMA) to:

- Identify crisis factors in the short or medium term (6–24 months).
- Present possible military responses (options, contributions) to the political authorities.
- Translate government directives and guidance into operational planning for the armed forces.33

This process consists of six major phases: strategic foresight/intelligence, strategic prediction, pre-decision work, operational planning, conduct of operations, and transition/disengagement.34 The doctrine focuses particularly on the first two phases.

3.2. A range of actors and mechanisms are involved in both the civil and military aspects of French prevention strategy

As noted in the introduction, French conflict prevention efforts are distributed among various stakeholders and policy frameworks. France is therefore active in many different spheres of prevention at both the national and multinational levels. It is necessary to distinguish France’s involvement in longer-term structural prevention from its actions to address specific situations of tension (‘hot’ prevention) as these two areas are governed differently.

The MAEE leads structural, long-term, preventive actions, including those that involve military cooperation. Once the armed forces are deployed in an emerging crisis, however, the Ministry of Defence becomes the leading authority. This includes the preventive deployment of pre-positioned forces or the establishment of short-term missions to show presence and an interest in the area.35

3.2.1. Key prevention actors encompass diverse areas including foreign affairs, defence, economy and development

Crisis and conflict prevention efforts are shared among key stakeholders, namely the MAEE (responsible for political and security affairs as well as development issues and partnerships), the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the French Development Agency and the General Secretariat of Defence and National Security.

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33 Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations, (2011), Doctrine Interarmées 5(A)_Anticipation et planification stratégique, 15.
34 Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations, (2011), Doctrine Interarmées 5(A)_Anticipation et planification stratégique, 17.
35 Bagayoko & Kovacs (2007).
The MAEE

Various actors within the MAEE play a critical role in the field of prevention. These organisations need to cooperate and coordinate in order to implement specific actions. Implementation is generally supported by embassies.

**Directorate General of Political Affairs and Security (Direction générale des affaires politiques et de la sécurité)**

Within this branch, various departments are involved in conflict prevention. The **Directorate for Security and Defence Co-operation (Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense, DCSD)** is responsible for structural cooperation with foreign countries in the field of defence and security. The DCSD provides training, expertise and advice, ensuring strategic guidance and overall management. The budget of the DCSD is €86m, 75 per cent of which is dedicated to sub-Saharan Africa.36

Among its various functions, the **Directorate for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament (Direction des affaires stratégiques, de sécurité et du désarmement)** is responsible for monitoring French defence policy and overseas operations of the French forces, including crisis management. It also discusses bilateral relations in security and defence with the main partners of France. In addition, it follows French policy with respect to NATO and the various multinational frameworks existing in Europe.

The **Directorate for the United Nations, International Organisations, Human Rights and Francophonie (Direction des Nations unies, des organisations internationales, des droits de l’homme et de la francophonie)** ensures consistency in the French position within international organisations. Its role is important when France takes action in a UN framework.

Under the coordination of the Director General, **Regional Directorates** follow the internal political, economic and social issues as well as the development strategies of the countries in their respective regions.37

**The Directorate General of Global Affairs, Development and Partnerships (Direction générale de la mondialisation, du développement et des partenariats, DGM)**

In conjunction with relevant authorities, this Directorate defines and implements French economic and social policy within international and intergovernmental organisations. It also participates in the development and implementation of international cooperation in the area of governance. Within the MAEE, the DGM is responsible for budgetary programs related to international cooperation and development.38

Within the DGM, the Global Economy and Development Strategies Directorate, which includes the sub-directorate for International Economic Affairs, the sub-directorate of Development Strategies and the Mission for Democratic Governance, is most concerned with prevention issues.

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36 France Diplomatie, ‘La Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense – Présentation’.
37 France Diplomatie, ‘La Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense – Présentation’.
38 France Diplomatie, ‘La direction générale de la mondialisation, du développement et des partenariats (DGM)’. 

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The sub-directorate of Development Strategies develops French strategies and ensures coordination with other actors of international cooperation. It is responsible for negotiating and monitoring partnership framework documents (see below) and ensuring the consistency of development programmes, with emergency and post-crisis reconstruction coordinated by the humanitarian crisis centre.

The Mission for Democratic Governance develops and implements programmes and projects related to strengthening the rule of law and civil rights, state reform and decentralisation, and support for financial governance. This Mission also designs and implements strategies and actions related to the reconstruction of states in crisis or post-crisis, in conjunction with the departments concerned.

**Directorate of the European Union**

Within the Directorate of the European Union, the Department of External Relations follows EU relations with other States and international organisations in connection with the DGM. It defines and coordinates actions foreseen in the field of foreign policy and security.

**The Crisis Centre**

The Crisis Centre (Centre de crise, CDC), operational since July 2008, is under the direct authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It coordinates departmental responses to all international crises involving French nationals or requiring humanitarian action.

The CDC is responsible for coordination with NGOs and industries. It aims to maintain good relations with foreign counterparts and the EU Situation Centre. The CDC is also responsible for the constant monitoring of events abroad and coordinating humanitarian policy. In this context, it is responsible for anticipating safety concerns and conducting risk assessments by synthesising available information and planning implementable actions. Finally, the CDC has a surveillance capacity, which will be discussed in more detail in the third part of this chapter.

**The Ministry of Defence**

Within the Ministry of Defence, various stakeholders are involved in crisis prevention. At the early stages of a crisis, it is the defence attachés that ensure cooperation, especially under the guidance of the DCSD. A distinction is thus made between structural cooperation, led by the DSCD, and operational cooperation, led by the general staff of the armies and the Centre for the Planning and Conduct of Operations (Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations, CPCO). In addition to preventive actions, the MoD supports prevention through the pre-positioning, either permanent or circumstantial, of military forces near crisis areas in order to ensure an initial response capability if required.

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40 Legifrance (2009).
41 Legifrance (2009).
42 Legifrance (2009).
43 As much in terms of political, criminal and terrorist risk assessment as in health, seismic, meteorological, industrial, environmental, etc. Source: French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (2009, 14).
In France, the Defence Chief of Staff (chef d'État-major des armées, CEMA) is responsible for the command of all military operations and acts as a ‘bridge’ between the president and the operational command. Within the staff of the armed forces, the CPCO ‘is at the heart of the crisis management process both upstream (strategic foresight, planning) and downstream (conduct)’. Planning includes anticipation, preparation of a summary of crisis risk assessments, and preparation of military options to be submitted to the CEMA. The conduct of operations follows this planning: when an operation is initiated, a crisis cell is created to ensure its conduct.

Among its tasks, the Strategic Affairs Delegation (Délégation aux affaires stratégiques, DAS) coordinates prospective studies in order to anticipate threats and understand potential conflicts. It also provides strategic and political analysis in the context of international crises to strengthen appreciation and anticipation of situations of tension.

The Directorate of Military Intelligence (Direction du renseignement militaire, DRM) is responsible for managing the research and use of military intelligence. The DRM supports strategic planning and conduct of operations.

The Strategic Foresight Group (Groupe d’anticipation stratégique, GAS), which includes representatives of the CCPO, DRM, DGSE and the DAS, is chaired by CEMA and meets every six months to set intelligence priorities, conduct initial planning and direct military cooperation.

The General Staff for International Relations (L’État-major relations internationales, EMA-RI) handles all matters relating to international military relations and the conduct of negotiations on conventional arms control.

Finally, pre-positioned forces are also part of France’s prevention mechanism. Such forces are present in the West Indies, Djibouti, United Arab Emirates, in the Indian Ocean, Gabon, Guyana, Réunion/Mayotte, New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Senegal. The readiness of these forces to be deployed quickly increases France’s credibility and supports ‘hot’ prevention.

The General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN)

The General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, SGDSN) replaced the General Secretariat of National Defence (Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, SGDN) following the Council of Ministers’ adoption of a decree on 23 December 2009. This

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45 French Ministry of Defence, ‘État-major des armées: Organisation’
46 There are 1,350 servicemen in the West Indies, 1,050 of whom are permanently based. The Armed Forces in the West Indies’ (FAA) system aims at allowing for the preservation of a French intervention capability to support state action in emergency situations. It is organised according to a ‘theatre of operations’ logic, consisting of the West Indies-Guyana, Pacific and Indian Ocean zones. The FAA represents the main maritime fulcrum of the West Indies-Guyana zone, notably. The West Indies’ Defence Base and its support group were created on 1 January 2011. Source: French Ministry of Defence, ‘Les forces armées aux Antilles’.
47 French Ministry of Defence, ‘Forces prépositionnées’.
decree includes the guidelines set out in the White Paper and in military planning law. This decree also creates a council for defence and national security, which deals with defence, internal security and external crises in order to improve the coherency and preparation of decisions and monitor their implementation. The Council is chaired by the Head of State.

The SGDSN also provides surveillance, warning, monitoring and forecasting of international crises and conflicts. Finally, SGDSN is responsible for coordinating interdepartmental discussions on strategic developments that may affect French and European interests and for proposing guidelines to strengthen national security. The SGDSN also develops a synthesis of early warning indicators related to crises that occur in fragile states.

The Ministry of the Interior

Within the Ministry of Interior, there is a Directorate for International Cooperation (Direction de la coopération internationale, DCI), which is shared between the police and the gendarmerie. Founded in September 2010, it has been fully operational since January 2011. In this context, police and gendarmerie have been working together in international police cooperation in order to fight against various threats (terrorism, drugs, etc.) requiring cooperation between countries.

DCI’s mission is to lead and coordinate the operational, technical and institutional cooperation of the police and the National Gendarmerie. As well as the Ministry of Defence, the DCSD is responsible for controlling structural cooperation while DCI manages operational cooperation.

The French Development Agency

The French Development Agency (Agence française de développement, AFD) is a public financial institution whose mission is to fight poverty, support economic growth and contribute to the promotion of global public goods in developing countries, emerging countries and overseas territories. It is controlled by and cooperates with a range of ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Industry and Employment, and the Ministry of the Interior, Overseas and Territorial Authorities and Immigration. AFD provides 30 per cent of French public aid and two-thirds of bilateral aid.

In the sharing of official responsibilities, the MAEE is responsible for dealing with regulatory functions while the AFD is responsible for economic and social development. AFD’s actions fall squarely within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the development priorities set in 2000 by

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48 The General Secretariat’s missions cover the whole spectrum of strategic defence and security issues, from military programming, deterrence policy and internal security planning to economic and energy security, fight against terrorism and crisis response planning. Source: French General Secretariat for Defence and National Security website.


50 French General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, ‘Veille et alerte’.


the United Nations to reduce world poverty by 2015. AFD implements the guidelines set out in the framework of the Inter-ministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (see below) chaired by the Prime Minister.53

If AFD operates mainly in the context of economic development projects, it also helps prevention efforts indirectly by considering the socio-political dimension of the countries in which it operates. In seeking to apply the ‘do no harm’ principle in foreign countries, additional work is conducted to develop a better understanding of the operational environment. For example, AFD financed the work of an outside consultant to Niger to study the causes of fragility and instability of this country, what aid is being given and what the results of aid are.54

3.2.2. Inter-ministerial coordination of relevant actors is a challenge

The coordination of these various actors, both within the same department and at the inter-ministerial level, remains difficult. One example is the Inter-ministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (Comité interministériel de la coopération internationale et du développement, CICID), created by decree in 1998 to define the priorities of French development aid policy and to establish a French doctrine for cooperation.55 It is chaired by the Prime Minister and is composed of 12 ministers most directly concerned with development issues. However, a report of the Court of Auditors on the French policy on development aid accused CICID of being a ‘ghost institution’, as it de facto never convened between 2006 and 2009.56 The body theoretically responsible for ensuring the consistency of French cooperation thus created a void in this area through inaction.

Another case was the creation of an interdepartmental task force in late 2009 within the MAEE to help implement interdepartmental strategy on civil-military management of external crises. This task force is under the dual authority of a political director and the director of the Crisis Centre. It is responsible for the operational coordination of the French engagement – in coordination with the strategic and political leadership of the MAEE – in various stages of crisis management: forecasting, planning, conduct of operations and feedback. Among its various functions, it must ensure the continuous monitoring of French contributions to civil and civil-military operations and ensure the consistency of the long-term French commitment to prevention.

The task force initially concentrated on Afghanistan. While its mandate establishes its involvement in the prevention phase, it has never really managed to implement this mandate and has struggled to assert its place in the prevention mechanism. According to one interviewee, however, the task force was successful

54 Interviews.
55 It defines the Priority Solidarity Zone, which gathers the focus countries for French cooperation; sets the direction with regard to the objectives and terms of international cooperation policy and bilateral and multilateral development aid; ensures the coherence of geographical and sectorial priorities of all cooperation components; monitors and evaluates conformity with set objectives and means for international cooperation and development aid policies and instruments; defines the priority sector interventions. Source: France Diplomatie (2004).
56 Fabre, Thierry (2011).
in identifying clusters of civilian expertise. Currently, the task force has only a marginal role in the French system and consequently in prevention efforts. Thus, inter-ministerial coordination seems to continue to be largely conducted through an ad hoc approach.

This overview of different actors in French prevention efforts demonstrates that many organisations are concerned with the prevention of crises and conflicts, whether by means of long-term structural measures or analysis and surveillance measures. It is therefore essential for effective coordination at a ministerial and inter-ministerial level to achieve a better overall operational coherence.

3.2.3. Pursuing conflict prevention at the multilateral level

France favours working in a multinational framework for several reasons, including the opportunity to share costs. The responsibility of leading the French contribution to multilateral efforts varies according to the context. For instance, when relating to UN agencies or the European Union, the MAEE is the responsible institution; when cooperation involves financial institutions like the World Bank, the Ministry of Finance takes the lead. As France promotes multilateral engagements, it often seeks to work at the European level, including obtaining European support for French cooperation work in Africa.

In terms of intellectual influence, France usually seeks to promote its ideas through the OECD. The DGM is an active actor of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and has recently focused its activity on supporting international dialogue on peacebuilding and state-building efforts. This dialogue brings together fragile or conflict-affected states, development partners and international organisations and has resulted in a ‘New Deal’ for engagement in fragile states, offering a development architecture and new ways of working. The driving concept is to use peacebuilding and state-building objectives to work in support of the realisation of the MDGs in fragile countries. The strategy prioritises locally led solutions that take into account the five goals of political legitimacy, security, justice, economic foundations and revenues and services.

3.3. French prevention efforts include both short- and long-term initiatives

The French engagement in crisis and conflict prevention includes long-term actions at the bilateral or multilateral level as well as efforts in intelligence, forecasting, early warning and rapid response.

Long-term prevention through state capacity building is a key priority for France, as emphasised in both official documents and stakeholder interviews for this study. France is also concerned with strengthening states and working towards the MDGs through the reform of security, economic and social developments. French prevention efforts also include military and homeland security training and the strengthening of regional organisations.

France conducts state capacity building projects through the DGM of MAEE. France’s action has a distinctive focus on aspects related to ‘justice’ and civil society and, consequently, emphasises the importance of Security Sector Reform. On the other hand, actions carried out in the economic and social

57 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding & State building website.
development field are not systematically related to a prevention strategy. However, an effort is made to take into account the broader context and to try to create synergies wherever possible.

### 3.3.1. Priority Solidarity Funds and partnership framework documents are important tools in further French engagement

France has since 1998 identified a ‘Priority Solidarity Zone’, defined ‘as one where public aid, delivered in a selective and focused manner, can produce a significant effect and contribute to the harmonious development of institutions, society and economy’. About 50 countries are included in this zone, mainly from the sub-Saharan region and in the Indian Ocean.\(^{58}\)

The Priority Solidarity Fund (Fonds de solidarité prioritaire, FSP) aims to finance, through donations only, the support provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Priority Solidarity Zone.\(^{59}\) The FSP is a partnership instrument with the United States along with other donors and civil society. Through the FSP it is possible to intervene at several levels of public structures in a targeted country, such as ministries, local authorities and public institutions. The FSP also promotes the implementation of co-financed projects with international organisations.\(^{60}\) Examples of FSP projects include:

- ‘Country projects’ (bilateral projects)
- ‘Interstate projects’ that can benefit a group determined states, often regrouped in an intergovernmental organisation
- ‘Mobilising programmes’ that support actions to address cross-cutting development issues.

FSP was also used to finance the Security Sector Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a tool designed for multiannual commitment; for example, €3.6 million were authorised for Afghanistan over three years.\(^{61}\)

In addition, the partnership framework documents (documents cadre de partenariat, DCP) have been used since 2005 to support the programming of French aid in the countries of the Priority Solidarity Zone. These documents are co-signed between France and the partner country. They define a five-year bilateral strategy involving all actors of French aid as well as the recipient country.

The DCP is developed on the basis of the development strategy of the recipient country, taking into account the division of tasks and duties between donors. It identifies focus areas (maximum three) among the sectors contributing to the MDGs. Through the development of the DCP, the authority and responsibility for the programme is transferred from the ambassador to the capital. The DCP is discussed with the authorities of the partner country to align priorities and objectives and requires an inter-ministerial validation before its signature. An annual meeting is then held to monitor its implementation.

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\(^{58}\) French Senate (2010).

\(^{59}\) France Diplomatie (2010).

\(^{60}\) France Diplomatie (2010).

\(^{61}\) Interviews, General Directorate for Globalisation, Democratic Governance Mission, 20 July 2012.
3.3.2. French prevention efforts aim to strengthen local security and justice structures

France advocates and supports the strengthening of regulatory functions as an instrument of prevention, encouraging the legitimacy of states in their ability to fulfil their public missions.

The French cooperation strategy for development calls for a particular focus on three regions with a high concentration of poverty, instability and security risks: the Sahel/Sahara region, the Middle East and Afghanistan. The choice of recipient countries for French aid therefore does not seem to be the result of any formal interdepartmental coordination in Paris, especially as France does not produce an official list of fragile states. Indeed, ambassadors seem to play a leading role in the implementation of cooperation programmes. Projects on democratic governance are divided between the governance pole and civil society pole and actions in these fields are carried out at international, regional and national levels.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

SSR responsibilities are divided between the DCSD, which plays a primary role, and the DGM with its specific focus on democratic governance. DCSD is responsible for military cooperation, law enforcement and civil security while DGM supports training in the justice sector.

DCSD also takes an innovative approach towards the structuring of the defence and security effort by adapting armed forces in relation to assessed threats (captured in Figure 3.2.). This approach was used for interventions in Guinea (six months ending in 2010) and in Côte d’Ivoire (one year from mid-2011). In Guinea, a dual approach was used: background work was conducted to support the reconstruction of the defence and security system while specific actions, such as training for nurses or demining operators, were organised to ‘calm’ the impatient. 62

62 Interviews, DCSD, 24 July 2012.
France also supports the SSR actions of the European Union conducted in the context of external and security policy, for example in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic. Moreover, the EU actively supports strengthening African capacities for peace and security.\(^\text{63}\)

### Actions in the field of justice

France leads legal cooperation at various levels and through coordination between various actors.\(^\text{64}\) In particular, at the international level, France supports the specialisation of judges (to strengthen the fight against organised crime, money laundering and corruption, piracy, etc.) as well as the establishment of networks of judges to deal with cross-border issues. Since 2009, for example, France has implemented €4 million of FSP for ‘justice and security in the Sahelian-Saharan Africa’ to support the fight against trafficking and terrorism in Mali, Mauritania and Niger. This is to promote the International Criminal Court (ICC) and international justice actions to fight against destabilisation caused by major trafficking (arms, drugs, migrants, etc.) through regional solutions. France also supports national legal training through bilateral FSP.

### Fight against trafficking and organised crime

France is also working to fight against organised crime by adopting regional approaches such as AFOREMA for organised crime, the Appui à la sûreté de l’aviation civile en Afrique (ASACA) for airport security or the Appui à la lutte contre la cocaïne en Afrique de l’ouest (ALCAO) against cocaine trafficking.\(^\text{65}\)

\(^{63}\) Araud (2010).

\(^{64}\) The Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, of Justice and the National Centre for Judicial Studies notably.

\(^{65}\) ‘Aujourd’hui en Guinée’ (2012). According to this article, the ALCAO programme has a budget of €1.6 million, financed by a Priority Solidarity Fund. Benin, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Togo all benefit from the latter.
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

These actions are accompanied by a special effort aimed at insecurity at sea, which requires actions to strengthen the state, improve sub-regional structures and encourage coordination between sub-regions. Such efforts are conducted through bilateral and regional cooperation.

Another route: strengthening of civil protection

An additional action proposed by the DCSD includes the development or improvement of civil protection capacity. This proposal would have the advantage of improving the relationship between the state and civil society, allowing the state to prioritise its activities according to public needs.66

3.3.3. Strengthening the response of regional and sub-regional organisations is an important priority

One of the key points of the LBDSN is the strengthening of regional and sub-regional organisations, in particular to develop crisis response capacity. This approach was reaffirmed by former President Nicolas Sarkozy in a speech in February 2008.67

With regard to Africa, France seeks to strengthen the capacity of the African Union and African sub-regional organisations, in particular to develop their ability to prevent the outbreak or extension of conflicts.68 This position relies on the African commitment to take over the management of regional security as part of the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) established in 2002. It also reflects French interests as, given personnel and resource constraints, France would benefit from having other countries able to intervene in case of crises in critical areas.

French support for African peacekeeping initiatives focuses on three main areas: education, training and support to operational engagement. Training is provided at 14 National Schools with Regional Vocation.69 The training includes technical and operational exercises performed by national forces with the support of pre-positioned French forces. As stated above, the Ministry of Defence, through the Services General Staffs (État-major des armées – EMA), is responsible for developing plans for operational cooperation while DCSD is responsible for the conduct of training.

3.3.4. Defence initiatives focus on analysis, anticipation and early warning

Strategic foresight

From the defence side, various actors are involved in strategic foresight. This allows possible developments and associated indicators to be explored as well as permitting an assessment of the feasibility of potential operational commitments. Pre-planned tasks are conducted by the GAS while the CCPO – in connection

66 Interviews, 24 July 2012.
67 Rogel (2011, 7).
68 In Africa, the forces on hold are split into four brigades, which also correspond to the sub-regional organisations: the Western brigade (corresponding to the CEDEAO), the IGAD brigade, the Central brigade (CEEAC) and the Southern brigade (SADC). Each one of them is made up of 5,000 servicemen.
69 The National Schools with Regional Vocation are created and supported by France (in particular by the DCSD’s predecessor, the DCMD); they aim at training African interns on health, demining, peacekeeping, stability, etc.
with EMA/ESMG and in collaboration with the DRM, the DAS and other non-defence organisations – is responsible for task planning. The DRM also provides intelligence of military interest. EMA’s International Relations division provides priorities for international military relations.70

The SGDSN is responsible for coordinating interdepartmental discussions on strategic developments that may affect the French (and European) interests in order to identify guidelines and means of action. In this context, SGDSN produces regular summaries of information and evaluation focusing on conflict situations, in particular those in which French forces are engaged. It also provides research on the evolution of international terrorism, the risk of crisis in fragile states, or emerging international security issues (resources, environment) and key points of strategic debate.71

Selection of fragile states

France refuses to create a formal list of fragile states and prefers to speak in terms of factors contributing to fragility. According to one of our interviewees, this decision is mainly based on diplomatic reasons, reflecting a desire not to offend any states. However, other multinational organisations to which France belongs, such as the World Bank, have established a list of so-called fragile states. Similarly, the OECD ‘New Deal’ for engagement in fragile states includes a fragility assessment and the development of a harmonised methodology that includes a ‘range of fragility’.72

Strategic monitoring and early warning

The SGDSN also provides a monitoring, forecasting and early warning system for international crises and conflicts. The monitoring and warning office was created for this purpose in 2003. It is responsible for:

- Detecting and transmitting real-time information on major events relating to defence and national security.
- Relaying, within the SGDSN and outside, alerts transmitted by operational centres of other departments.
- Ensuring continuous and systematic monitoring of open sources, focused on the entire field of SGDSN activities.73

The SGDSN also follows international crises and develops an early warning synthesis of the crises that appear in fragile states that are of interest for France.74

In addition, the Crisis Centre performs a first analysis and synthesis of both open sources and confidential information and has a daily news bulletin with a selection of news, which is broadcast each morning to ministry officials.

71 French General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, ‘Suivre les questions de sécurité internationale’.
72 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding & State building website.
73 French General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, ‘Veille et alerte’.
74 French General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, ‘Veille et alerte’.
3.3.5. Special instruments are available for rapid intervention on a case-by-case basis

The incapacity to develop institutionalised responses to crises results in a case-by-case approach implemented through ad hoc solutions such as SGDSN management of the crisis in the Sahel. French military tools can be used in various contexts, not necessarily for major operations, and military advisers or education/training groups can be deployed for specific missions. This was notably the case in the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria on the issue of the Bakassi Peninsula. The deployment of an operational training group was intended to demonstrate French presence and deter additional conflict. Moreover, naval presence can also be used to get closer to a crisis area and serve as a deterrent message; an example of this type of action would be the mission ‘Corymbe’ in the Gulf of Guinea. Supporting the creation of regional poles for stability (through African peacekeeping capabilities, and with the presence of stand-by/pre-positioned forces) also aims to increase rapid intervention capabilities.

3.4. Concluding remarks

In the case of emerging or erupting crises, overall French mobilisation is strong and, according to our interviewees, efficient. However, strategies and activities are difficult to harmonise and coordinate due to a quite informal approach to response management. Prevention activities conducted by France on various fronts remain dispersed and therefore do not appear to coalesce as a targeted and coordinated strategy. The lack of overall consistency and the weak institutionalisation of cooperation practices led to a sub-optimal use of resources and assets. Greater coherence requires the establishment of a strategic framework, information sharing and optimisation of resources and funding. All of these actions require stronger interdepartmental coordination and therefore relate to sensitive issues of conflicting institutional prerogatives and the architecture of the French public system.

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4. Conflict prevention policy in the UK

4.1. UK strategy has evolved from conflict management to conflict prevention

The United Kingdom has a long experience of crisis and conflict prevention. During the Cold War and the period of decolonisation, the British strategy was to manage crises and emerging conflicts at the local level in order to avoid their intensification. In parallel, the United Kingdom had a broader prevention strategy whose main goal was to avoid engaging in conflict with Russia.

At the end of the Cold War, the emergence of many low intensity conflicts prompted the United Kingdom to adopt a strategy of crisis and conflict management. Considering the costs resulting from this approach and the recurrence of conflicts, more attention was paid to the issue of prevention.

An interdepartmental review of British efforts in terms of crisis and conflict prevention was made in 2000. The conclusion of this review was that British efforts should have focused more on prevention rather than on reaction. The review also stressed the need to adopt an interdepartmental approach to prevention, combining efforts and resources of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and the Department for International Development. In practice, however, prevention remained mainly a Department for International Development (DFID) issue. At that time, investment in prevention was mainly aimed to middle-income and poor countries as DFID felt that the largest impact could be achieved in these areas.

Over the next decade, the UK has learned significant lessons in the field of crisis and conflict prevention, in particular about the importance of avoiding recurring conflicts in fragile states that often find

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80 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’. The 2012 strategy is not available for public consultation.
themselves in a vicious circle of violence and underdevelopment. As a result, the UK revised its investment priorities in order to focus on fragile and conflict-affected states and strengthened interdepartmental coordination – particularly between DFID and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) – to focus on the links between security and development.

Conflicts have a destructive effect on years of development efforts and on the overall security of a country or region. Development is favoured by trade and, therefore, by the free movement of goods and people, which requires a certain level of security. Similarly, an action for securing a region will have less chance of success if it is not accompanied by investment in development as underdevelopment is a major cause of insecurity.

Officials consulted for this study stated that the United Kingdom would welcome the development of a crisis and conflict prevention strategy at a higher level. This strategy would devote greater efforts not to fragile and conflict-affected states where an intervention is essential (which could be considered a response strategy), but it would focus instead on regional programmes that would allow a real ‘upstream prevention’. These interdepartmental programmes would seek the ‘secure development’ of a region and would be implemented and further developed by local countries. Officials noted that the UK has tried to implement this approach on several occasions, but the crises and conflicts of recent years – notably the Arab Spring and the instability in Somalia and Yemen – have prevented such implementation, requiring a higher level of investment.

4.2. The current approach to prevention is included in several interdepartmental strategies published from 2010 onwards

The current approach of the United Kingdom to prevention aims to strengthen the stability of fragile and conflict-affected countries and is based on strong interdepartmental coordination. This approach is not detailed in a single document; instead, it is articulated across several interdepartmental strategies published in 2010 and 2011.

4.2.1. Key international and national strategies address crisis prevention and response

The main UK strategy, *Building Stability Overseas*, was published in summer 2011. This is the only document common to the Ministries of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and the

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Department for International Development. It stresses the importance of stabilising fragile and conflict-affected states through an interdepartmental approach based on three pillars:

1. Early warning: improving our ability to anticipate instability and potential triggers for conflict.
2. Rapid crisis prevention and response: improving our ability to take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it spreading or escalating.
3. Investing in upstream prevention: helping to build strong, legitimate institutions and robust societies in fragile countries that are capable of managing tensions and shocks so there is a lower likelihood of instability and conflict. 90

The Building Stability Overseas strategy is aligned with the National Security Strategy published in 2010. 91 This strategy, whose implementation has been described in the Strategic Defence and Security Review, 92 affirmed its commitment to fight the sources of instability in fragile and conflict-affected states where the risk of violence is high, British interest is directly concerned and where prerequisites for impact are present. 93

4.2.2. UK prevention strategies include a new diplomatic role for defence

These strategies, which simply formalise British practice during the last decade, involve a new role for the armed forces. This new military function not only meets the traditional role of combat and protection, but also plays a diplomatic role 94 supporting the development of sovereign powers in fragile and conflict-affected states. Upon publication of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, Liam Fox, then Secretary of State for Defence, explained that:

The MOD has an important role to play in helping to build stability overseas as our strong reputation and global reach allows us to achieve preferred outcomes through influence and persuasion to protect national security interests.

Defence engagement is designed to improve our understanding and influence across the world. We will coordinate the MOD capabilities with cross-government activity to prevent threats from emerging. Our engagement in many areas helps build democratically accountable security services that may also contribute to International Peacekeeping missions. 95

The MOD recently studied in detail the contribution of hosts in the prevention effort. As of 2012, a new strategy that will complement the Building Stability Overseas Strategy was in development, and provides

92 Her Majesty’s Government (2010b).
93 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2010).
94 The military always had a diplomatic role, particularly noticeable through defence attachés being posted in embassies. While the associated costs were usually borne by the Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Office however, they are now taken care of by the Ministry of Defence, which is responsible for defence investments (interviews, London, May 2012).
95 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2011a).
details on both the direct and non-operational role of defence in the prevention effort. This strategy is called Defence Engagement Strategy and although it was completed in early May 2012, as of the original publication of this report it has yet to be signed by the Secretary of State for Defence. It will lead to the establishment of a new Board, which will be a joint representation of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, but not of the Department for International Development. Its main objective is to strengthen the knowledge of local culture (or situational awareness) by the military. One of our interviewees in the MOD said that the strategy does not introduce any real change, but it provides an opportunity to reinvest energy in a vision that the Army has found difficult to implement so far. However, the interlocutor has suggested that the current budgetary context did not favour the chances of success of this initiative.

The defence interest in conflict prevention is reflected particularly in the review of the doctrine Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3–40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution. This doctrine, which was published in November 2009, was due to be republished in late 2012 after an effort of reflection on how best to implement the Building Stability Overseas Strategy.

4.2.3. British strategies are informed by a particular understanding of prevention

These strategies represent the British vision as it has developed since the 2000s. Even before their publication, the terminology used in the field of prevention showed the first signs of an interdepartmental approach. Multiple terms have been used to refer to prevention, the most common being: conflict prevention, stabilisation or upstream prevention. These terms are not neutral and may refer to different stages of the prevention effort that are more or less suitable to different players. ‘Upstream prevention’ was recently introduced as a term by the Building Stability Overseas Strategy to facilitate a truly interdepartmental response prevention.

4.3. The United Kingdom has three main types of tool for crisis and conflict prevention

UK prevention mechanisms take place in three main areas:

1. An early warning mechanism
2. Rapid reaction instruments
3. Efforts to strengthen the regulatory functions.

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97 Interviews, London, May 2012. This strategy is not available for public consultation.

98 Interviews (by phone), July 2012.


100 Interviews, London, May 2012.

Officials who participated in our study noted that the selection of prevention tools follows a conflict assessment conducted in the country of intervention. These assessments are recommended before the United Kingdom makes any political commitment and, according to UK officials, are executed in most situations. These conflict assessments are usually conducted jointly.

### 4.3.1. An early warning mechanism is informed by regular updates

Traditionally, the early warning mechanism was under the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, which notably established a biannual review of countries at risk of instability. The *Building Stability Overseas Strategy* has strengthened this system, implementing a recommendation that was included in the review of conflict prevention efforts published in 2000. The new system, chaired by the *Building Stability Overseas Steering Group*, has three instruments that synthesise the information already collected by each department:

1. The Early Warning System develops an overview of countries at risk of political, economic and security instability in which violence could erupt in the coming year, and produces an Early Warning Report twice a year. The Steering Group decides on the basis of this report whether to add a topic to the agenda of the National Security Council.
2. The Early Warning System is supported by an observation list, the Watchlist, which covers the countries where the risk of conflict and insecurity are estimated to be high and the UK has significant interests. This list is reviewed annually.
3. Finally, each year the Steering Group publishes an Annual Horizon Scan for topics that emerge as relevant in the field of stability in foreign countries. This overview is intended to inform the Early Warning System.

As is the case with other departments, the main contribution of the MOD to this crisis and conflict prevention tool is the information it shares at ministerial level and its representation in the *Building Stability Overseas Steering Group*.

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102 Until recently, these assessments were known as *Strategic Conflict Assessment* and were initiated by the Department for International Development (see Goodhand et al. (2002)); they are now known as *Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability* and the result of an inter-ministerial effort.

103 Austin et al. (2004). The authors specify that this was the main conclusion of the *Spending Reviews 2000* (SR2000). Although there have certainly been some developments since then, especially considering the United Kingdom’s effort in terms of inter-ministerial cooperation over the last few years, it would be surprising to see that assessments have been conducted less jointly than in 2000.

104 Austin et al. (2004).

105 This system is relatively new, as the stability strategy for foreign countries was only published about a year ago. Therefore, while certain aspects of the strategy may already have been implemented, others are still in the development phase.

4.3.2. Rapid reaction instruments focus on civilian deployment

Rapid reaction responses of the United Kingdom are authorised by the National Security Council (see Section 4.4.1 for more details about this board). While all crisis and conflict prevention actors contribute to this instrument, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is the main contributor through its diplomatic and consular function. The Stabilisation Unit is the other major player (see Section 4.4.2 for more details on this unit). It includes a Civilian Stabilisation Group whose teams can be deployed urgently, providing critical support for the initial planning of the stabilisation effort. The Civilian Stabilisation Group consists of approximately 800 independent experts (Deployable Civilian Experts) and about 200 members of the Civil Service Stabilisation Framework. This pool of experts offers a combination of relevant expertise in a wide range of areas as required by stabilisation operations, covering topics including project management, communications, infrastructure, justice, disarmament, economics, law enforcement, institutional reform, agriculture, health and public finances. The main coordinating body of rapid reaction is currently the Permanent Joint Headquarters, followed by the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team of the Joint Forces Headquarters. While the former provides expertise in the planning phase, the latter allows for reconnaissance prior to military engagement.

MOD involvement in rapid reaction is focused on supporting civilian deployment rather than providing military engagement. MOD representatives interviewed for this study noted that the MOD is not convinced about the involvement of the military forces in rapid reaction responses, with the exception of humanitarian evacuation. The main points behind this argument are the symbolic political weight that a military involvement entails and its possible consequences, including the risk of initiating a chain of events that could complicate the withdrawal of armed forces. However, the MOD participates in the rapid reaction effort through its contribution of military teams to the civilian deployable stabilisation unit. These soldiers help with tasks of security in a non-operational environment. According to the

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Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

MOD officials consulted, this model is more suitable for defence forces than other roles within the rapid reaction effort.117

4.3.3. Efforts to strengthen local regulatory functions involve tactical, operational and strategic training

All departments contribute to strengthening the regulatory functions of foreign states based on their own expertise. The support of the MOD in strengthening core defence functions is, according to the officials we interviewed, the main contribution of the MOD to prevention. They noted that, in practice, defence strengthens expertise at the tactical and operational levels (e.g. the use of weapons or the training of soldiers). Strengthening of strategic-level expertise is carried out by the Security and Justice Stabilisation Unit (e.g. the ability of local security forces to disarm the militants or the ability of the justice system to conduct a fair and transparent trial). Examples of such contributions include the British Peace Support Team based in Nairobi, Kenya, and working throughout East Africa118 to develop the capacity of the reserve forces for UN missions in Liberia and Somalia, as well as for the AU missions.119 A similar centre exists in Pretoria (the British Peace Support Team in South Africa) as a result of a co-financing effort with South Africa.120 Finally, it is worth mentioning the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMAT) stationed in Sierra Leone since 2002.121 One of our respondents noted that this training model of reserve forces in Africa is considered to have a measurable impact, mainly because of a ‘train the trainer’ approach that provides significant effects for a limited investment.

In addition to these three main mechanisms, many other instruments may play supplementary roles in conflict prevention. Indeed, any engagement with a foreign country can contribute to the prevention of crises and conflicts.122 The training of foreign officers at Sandhurst (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst) or the Royal College of Defence Studies may also contribute to prevention as the military education institute directly contributes to strengthening sovereign functions of a third country, even if this activity is rarely recognised as a tool for prevention.123

4.4. The implementation of UK strategy for crisis and conflict prevention is still developing

The implementation of the UK prevention strategy remains difficult. Our partners in this research agreed on this point, and according to one of them: ‘Yes, we are ahead of the curve [conceptually and institutionally], but in terms of actually doing things … that will come with time.’ One of the major

118 UK Army (2012).
120 British High Commission Pretoria (n.d).
121 British Army (2012).
122 British Army (2012).
issues that the United Kingdom seeks to address is improving interdepartmental cooperation. The various policy documents published from 2010–2012 and described above provide new inter-ministerial structures that seek to solve this issue.

4.4.1. The National Security Council plays a leading role in directing UK prevention

The National Security Council leads the British effort to prevent crises and conflicts. The Council was formed in 2010, in parallel with the publication of the National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. The Council’s objective is to coordinate the government’s response to national security threats and to initiate any rapid response action (see Section 4.3.2). The Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes as permanent members the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Minister of the Interior, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State for International Development and the Department of Homeland Security. Depending on the context, the Council may appeal to the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, the chief of intelligence and other government officials. The Council holds monthly meetings to determine the government’s position on strategic issues of national security.

On a daily basis, the Council is assisted by the officials of the National Security Council who are responsible for filtering and preparing topics that deserve the attention of the Council, under the direction of the National Security Advisor, who is responsible for the coordination and implementation of the international security agenda of the government.

4.4.2. The Stabilisation Unit is a central actor in coordinating responses to crises and conflicts

The Building Stability Overseas Board took shape following the publication of the Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2010. Its main objective is to lead the Stabilisation Unit, the first institution created to strengthen interdepartmental efforts in the fields of prevention, conflict management and post-conflict

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125 We were communicated the structures mentioned here by our interviewees and we subsequently verified them once we had a copy of the relevant documents. They rest on: the National Security Strategy (2010), the Building Stability Overseas’ Strategy (2011), the Defence Engagement Strategy (to be published in 2012) and the conclusions of the Stabilisation Unit Review (SU Review) published in April 2012 with limited distribution.
127 British Prime Minister’s Office (2010).
128 British Prime Minister’s Office (2010).
129 British Prime Minister’s Office (2010).
130 British Prime Minister’s Office (2010).
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies: reconstruction. This unit depends on the Ministries of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and the Department for International Development. The Unit was, until 2007, known as the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit. It was created in 2004 to better coordinate the interdepartmental response of British actors to crises and conflicts. It adopted a new name in 2007 to better reflect the nature of its work, which often begins at the core moment of a crisis or conflict and not at the end. The Unit has recently been involved in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. A representative explained that the countries in which the Unit is active are determined on an ad hoc basis at the request of the Council of Ministers or on the basis of a consensus between the Ministries of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and DFID.

Since its inception in 2004, the Stabilisation Unit has struggled to position itself within the institutional framework. In particular, it has sought to clarify its position in the government, including its role at the strategic level (i.e. development of policies and strategies) and the operational and tactical level (i.e. implementation of policies and strategies). It also sought to identify the optimal balance between its role as advisor and trainer for the ministries involved and as a direct response unit to crises and conflicts.

In early 2012, the Stabilisation Unit Review was commissioned by the Building Stability Overseas Board with a view to clarifying the added value of the Unit for its departments and its main role of reference in the future. The Review concluded that the Stabilisation Unit was a real added value both at the operational and tactical level, and in its advisory role. It was highlighted that in case of a crisis, the Unit has a key role to play as a rapid response unit through its Civilian Stabilisation Group (see Section 4.3.2). A description of the functions of this unit have also been formalised in the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which stated that the Stabilisation Unit has the responsibility – and not the option – to coordinate the government’s response to crisis. Such response would take shape under the direction of the Stabilisation Response Team, following the deployment model of the Civilian Stabilisation Group.

134 Teuten (2007).
135 Teuten (2007).
145 British Department for International Development (2012).
This review has actually given a larger role to the Stabilisation Unit.\textsuperscript{146} Finally, it should be noted that the Stabilisation Unit is based within the Department for International Development, even if it is a joint unit. The \textit{Defence Engagement Strategy} mentioned above was still in development in May 2012 (see Section 4.2.3) and should also include a board of representatives of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.\textsuperscript{147} Like the Building Stability Overseas Board and the Stabilisation Unit, the Defence Engagement Board will be chaired by a ‘two-star’ representative.\textsuperscript{148} Given that this strategy was neither official nor public at the time of this study, little information is available about its activities.

\textbf{4.4.3. Prevention structures are expanding but will require an interdepartmental approach}

Developments of these new structures clearly show that the United Kingdom recognises the importance of an interdepartmental approach to crisis and conflict prevention. Before the wave of new strategies and reviews in 2010 and 2011, the Stabilisation Unit was the only truly interdepartmental structure dedicated to strengthening prevention.

As new structures are created or being set up, the optimal way of using them is yet to be determined, as noted by various interlocutors. Some officials have stressed that no selection criteria for National Security Council topics have yet been developed, so the members of this Council have very busy agendas. It was also noted that it may be inconsistent for the Stabilisation Unit, the Defence Engagement Board and the Building Stability Overseas Board to be directed by officials of the same rank (two stars). It would be more logical for the first two to have a subordinate rank to the head of the Building Stability Overseas Board that is responsible for the coordination of interdepartmental responses.

Officials who took part in our study were not all convinced that this new structure will suffice to solve the difficulties of implementing an interdepartmental approach. They noted, in particular, that the prevention of crises and conflicts has no political representation in itself, while it would allow those working in this field to overcome the reasons for their departments to meet interdepartmental motivations. They also noted that incentives (such as decorations and promotions) are also aligned with the interests of the various departments.

\textbf{4.5. The budget for crisis and conflict prevention increases slightly from year to year}

\textbf{4.5.1. The Government has developed a funding mechanism that requires a minimum of interdepartmental collaboration in terms of crisis and conflict prevention}

Each department involved in preventing crises and conflicts draws on its own budget. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth supports most costs related to the diplomatic function of

\textsuperscript{146} Interviews, London, May 2012.
\textsuperscript{147} Interviews, London, May 2012.
\textsuperscript{148} Interviews, London, May 2012.
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies: early warning mechanisms while DFID invests a portion of its own budget in the development of regulatory functions that contribute to its development programmes. The choice of countries in which to invest is a decision determined by experts who take into account countries’ context (including poverty levels and risk of violence) as well as the ability of the UK to help improve this situation.

Interdepartmental funding mechanisms have been developed to strengthen the efforts of the United Kingdom in terms of crisis and conflict prevention. On the one hand, there is the budget spent on peacekeeping that supports the UK participation to OSCE, UN, or EU peacekeeping operations. This budget now has 374 million GBP per year, and this rate should remain stable (and therefore lose slightly in real terms) by 2015.

On the other hand, in 2009 the United Kingdom established the Conflict Prevention Pool. This fund merges the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool, the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Stabilisation Aid Fund. The first two funds were established in 2001 by a review of the British prevention effort that stressed the importance of an interdepartmental approach. Fund assistance for stabilisation was established in 2009 to support the efforts of conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By merging the three funds, the government sought to strengthen inter-ministerial work. In order to release funds, the Conflict Prevention Pool requires the three departments to conduct joint analysis to identify shared priorities and to develop interdepartmental programmes for prevention and conflict management. This is also the budget that supports the Stabilisation Unit.

In 2011–2012, the Conflict Prevention Pool invested in five regional programmes: Afghanistan, South Asia (excluding Afghanistan), the Middle East, Africa, and Europe and its neighbours. These areas were designated by the Ministers of Defence, Development and Foreign Affairs. Other regions were excluded either because they have a limited need for investment, or because the United Kingdom foresees its intervention as having limited impact. Activities financed by this fund are varied and include SSR, rule of law, training of mediators and soldiers for peacekeeping and funding efforts to reach a political agreement. The fund also finances a thematic programme aimed at developing the capacity of UK allies – including the UN – to engage in upstream prevention. Finally, as stated earlier, the fund finances the

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149 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’. This strategy is not available for public consultation.
150 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
151 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
152 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
153 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
154 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
155 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
156 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
157 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
158 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
159 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
160 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’.
Stabilisation Unit and its associated deployment of civilians. In total, the fund had £180 million in 2011–2012, not including a contingency fund of £76m (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Distribution of the Conflict Prevention Pool in 2011/2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Investment (millions of pounds)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia (excluding Afghanistan)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and neighbours</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilisation Unit</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Funds allocated in the budget for the maintenance of peace in the event of exhaustion of the principal fund)</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>256</strong></td>
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The Building Stability Overseas Strategy has created a new programme within the Conflict Prevention Pool: the Early Action Facility. The objective of this fund is to finance evaluations that clarify, from the emergence of a crisis or conflict, the effort required and its modalities of implementation (e.g. bilateral, in partnership, or via financing). The budget of the Conflict Prevention Pool is being increased slightly from 2011 to 2015, from £256 to £309 million per year.

It is important to note that the Conflict Prevention Pool is used to fund obligations to the UN if the budget for peacekeeping is exceeded; the total amount of these interdepartmental funding mechanisms is more important than their individual budgets. Overall, the interdepartmental crisis and conflict prevention budget is expected to increase from 53 million pounds in the period between 2011-2012 and 2014-2015 (see Table 4.2 ). In this interval, one of the objectives of the United Kingdom is to extend the

161 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Conflict Pool’
share of the overall budget dedicated to overseas development assistance in fragile and conflict-affected countries so that it reaches 30 per cent in 2014–2015.  

Table 4.2: Evolution of the British interdepartmental crisis and conflict prevention budget between 2011 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget for peacekeeping</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There are also other funds related to the prevention of crises and conflicts that have been established in exceptional circumstances. For example, the cost of military operations in Afghanistan is not included in the two budgets outlined above, but has been funded by the Treasury Reserve separate fund. Similarly, in 2011 the Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and DFID created a fund of £110 million over four years to invest in the Middle East and North Africa. This fund was established following the Arab Spring to address what was perceived as an historic opportunity for the development of a stable, open and prosperous region.

4.6. British prevention efforts are subject to a minimum of legal constraints but are accompanied by multiple directives

Officials with whom we spoke explained that the British crisis and conflict prevention is not subject to legal constraints other than the mandates of the UN, international conventions and other instruments of this type – for example concerning military engagement (Oslo Guidelines), arms control and financial accountability.

Officials say, however, that the UK focuses on best practices developed internally. These best practices are controlled by the Development Policy Committee that meets regularly to identify the needs of government. It identifies these needs based on areas in which there is demand for capacity building or

166 Berman (2012).
169 Interview (by phone), July 2012.
areas that represent new strategic priorities of the government. For example, the UK has recently developed a set of best practices in the field of security and justice, one of its main areas of expertise as discussed in Section 4.7. These best practices are often used in conjunction with an assessment of the situation of human rights in countries in crisis or conflict to determine what kind of UK commitment (if any) would be most suitable. These assessments are often followed by an interdepartmental risk analysis of conflict and stability (Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability, cf. 1.3). This tool is an analytical method that helps determine the support that the UK would be able to offer in order to obtain a significant positive effect.

4.7. The UK balances both bilateral and multilateral engagements in prevention efforts

The Building Stability Overseas Strategy stresses the importance of multilateral engagement. Specifically, the strategy confirms that the United Kingdom will support the work of the UN, World Bank, NATO, the European Union, the missions of the Common Defence and Security policy and European Service external action. The UK also says it will seek to strengthen the capacity of regional institutions such as the OSCE and the African Union. This would particularly improve the UK’s ability to pursue a policy of conflict prevention, mediation, post-conflict political agreements and conflict evaluations. The strategy places particular emphasis on working with the United States and France and strengthening ties with China, Brazil, South Africa and the Gulf states. It also stresses the importance of intensifying relations with India and reinvigorating relations with the Commonwealth.

In practice, however, the United Kingdom has no preference for a bilateral or multilateral engagement framework. A DFID representative estimated that approximately 50 per cent of UK prevention commitments are carried out through multilateral frameworks. The choice of engagement framework (bilateral or multilateral) is based on conflict assessments (see Section 4.3) that help understand the needs

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170 Interview (by phone), July 2012.
173 The United Kingdom does not commit to countries allowing the death penalty, for instance.
179 Some of the officials we interviewed observed that multilateral engagements could become more relevant as current budgets are shrinking.
on the ground as well as on the actors who are already present or involved. In general, if the government believes that it has the necessary competencies and relationships to engage directly in a country, it will act bilaterally and explore multilateral options as appropriate.

The UK today tends to invest bilaterally when building core functions in the areas of stabilisation, security and justice, and SSR, as well as in former colonial territories. Multilateral engagement is instead preferred when one of its allies is more familiar with the territory or area in question. In these situations, the contribution of the United Kingdom is usually to finance an established programme.

4.8. Prevention activities are actively assessed, both within departments and through oversight mechanisms

4.8.1. The UK emphasis on evaluation is particularly strong in the area of prevention initiatives

The UK has always had a culture of accountability and evaluation. Traditionally, the culture of accountability focused on the quality/price ratio of the various services and public investment (e.g. value for money). This ratio was often studied by independent organisations (such as the British equivalent of the Court of Auditors, the National Audit Office) or by quasi-NGOs. Since the end of the first decade of the 21st century, with the recession and the coming to power of a centre-right government in the UK, fiscal responsibility and short- and long-term effects gradually replaced the traditional price/quality ratio approach. At the same time, monitoring and evaluation have grown in importance, within departments themselves as well as among organisations that have the responsibility of auditing public services. In the area of crisis prevention and conflict, this trend is especially observable: for the past decade, the government has been active in the monitoring and evaluation of prevention activities.

The evaluation of crisis and conflict prevention requires the development of a hypothetical scenario and ultimately the comparison with a real scenario, making prevention activities particularly difficult to assess. The Building Stability Abroad Board announced that work would be conducted with the United Kingdom’s international partners to provide quantitative and harmonised indicators of progress to develop a collective view. One of our interviewees suggested that there is a strong temptation for the

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government to implement activities according to their ability to be evaluated. This possibility arises especially for the Ministries of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, for which the assessment may be more difficult. Some officials underline a dual dynamic: in parallel to the impetus given to the development of tools and evaluation systems, it is also possible to observe a renewed interest in the lessons learned from these processes.

4.8.2. DFID has a stronger evaluation tradition than its counterparts

Traditionally, DFID has taken a departmental lead in evaluation practices. This focus is exemplified by the development of ‘Logframe’, an assessment instrument that any DFID-funded project must meet. This requirement results in the development of at least one evaluation strategy for every project, even if not all are executed. All finished projects are also being evaluated against the Logframe. The Department continues today to have the most systematic evaluation, compared with the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The MOD uses measures of effectiveness that officials describe as better suited for tactical and operational actions than for strategic and interdepartmental efforts. In 2012 the MOD was working to develop an assessment tool for military programmes. This project follows the publication of pre-doctrinal output on the subject in 2012. Improving evaluation capacity is also a priority of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. One of the leaders we interviewed explained that, so far, the training evaluation takes place primarily through the management training programme. He noted also that the Ministry does not seem to have addressed the issue of project evaluation or assessment at the strategic level.

Government officials explained that all the differences between departments in the practice of evaluation are related to the different nature of the work of these departments. For example, while DFID funded programmes and projects have a relatively clear mission, the actions of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office mainly consist of exerting influence, which is more difficult to measure.

4.8.3. Assessments are also held at ministerial level and by independent evaluators

The UK strategies developed in recent years have created new mechanisms for interdepartmental monitoring and evaluation. The Building Stability Overseas Board reports annually on the progress made

196 British Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2012). In particular, this doctrine was based on a RAND Europe study commissioned by the Stabilisation Unit in 2010, aiming at identifying the best practices in monitoring and evaluating stabilisation operations (see Van Stolk et al. (2011)), as well as on the work conducted within the framework of the Multinational Experimentation 6.
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies: in the field of crisis and conflict prevention\textsuperscript{198} and examines systematically the activities of the United Kingdom in the countries identified in the observation list (see Section 4.2.1).\textsuperscript{199} The Board seeks to determine whether the UK approach was realistic, interdepartmental, and if it fully exploited the skills of its international partners while being effective in the expenditure of national resources.\textsuperscript{200}

At the same time, the International Development Committee within the UK Parliament has itself created an independent commission to assess the impact of development assistance (Independent Commission for Aid Impact).\textsuperscript{201} This Committee is responsible for reviewing the expenses of the Conflict Prevention Pool attributed to overseas development assistance.\textsuperscript{202} The results of a first evaluation by the committee on budget expenditure 2011/2012 included will include the Building Stability Abroad Board’s development of an evaluation strategy for UK prevention efforts.\textsuperscript{203}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{198} Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, (2011).
\item \textsuperscript{199} Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, (2011).
\item \textsuperscript{200} Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence (2011).
\item \textsuperscript{201} Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2011).
\item \textsuperscript{202} Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2011).
\item \textsuperscript{203} Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, (2011).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
5. Conflict prevention policy in the US

The United States first developed an interest for preventive action in response to the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s. After a period of declining attention, the issue of prevention regained importance in the early 2000s following the military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US government is particularly focused on improving its civil and military capabilities to stabilise and rebuild post-conflict areas. Institutional structures currently in charge of prevention were established around the year 2008, while the armed forces faced obvious difficulties carrying out stabilisation in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

5.1. Conflict prevention strategy is evolving as a result of recent stabilisation engagements

5.1.1. Two strategic publications address the issue of US prevention strategy

As of 2012 there is not one unified document summarising US prevention strategy. The various US government agencies are mostly guided in their preventive action by two key documents: the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reviews American defence policy every four years, defining how the military must adapt to international threats faced by the United States. The QDR 2009–2010 also analyses the role of the US government in prevention as well as the involvement of the military in the field. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2010 (QDDR), the first of its kind, sets out in detail the contribution of civil society actors in prevention. The desire to conduct a prevention-focused review of American diplomatic and civil action following the QDR model is due to the fact that US civil action was seen as particularly weak during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These publications traditionally have the role of communication and information sharing, the drafting processes helping to increase information sharing within government and the published document having an informative role at public level. They represent the result of negotiations between different actors of the US government, military and civilians, as well as between the armed forces and other agencies, and finally, between the administration and Congress.

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204 USAID had developed a Fragile States Strategy but it was not adopted by the entire US government. Under the presidency of George W. Bush, the latter developed a Foreign Assistance Framework that ranked countries within distinct categories, attributing them specific development goals. As such, this effort did not constitute a clear strategy, however; it rather represented an organised list of objectives out of touch with the field reality. See Stares (2009, 13).
5.1.2. Following recent challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, updated crisis and conflict prevention strategy is articulated in the QDR and QDDR

Following the difficulties encountered by the US armed forces to manage the civil consequences of military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the president of the United States enacted the National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) in 2005. This directive includes crisis and conflict prevention among the official priorities of US foreign policy. It establishes that:

The United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.\(^\text{205}\) (Emphasis added)

The Quadrennial Defence Review prioritises security sector reforms

The QDR (2010) notes the need for a more decisive grip on the prevention policy by civilian agencies of the US government. The QDR restricts the role of defence along the following terms:

Civil affairs forces address these threats by serving as the vanguard of [the Department of Defence] DoD’s support to US government efforts to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.\(^\text{206}\)

According to a representative of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the leaders of the US Armed Forces work on the premise that the need for deployment of military personnel tends to be a testimony to the failure of US preventive civil action.\(^\text{207}\)

The Pentagon sees the military role in crisis and conflict prevention mainly in three areas:

- The support of the US government to civilian actors
- The effective conduct of counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations
- The support to security capacity building initiatives in favour of partners (for example, through bilateral defense cooperation).

Thus, from a strict ‘prevention’ perspective, the US armed forces’ priority is to support security sector reform. In this regard, the QDR focuses primarily on the need to achieve a faster and more efficient decision-making process that is still designed around a long-term approach typical of the Cold War era (see Section 5.3.4 below).\(^\text{208}\)

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\(^\text{205}\) The White House (2005).


\(^\text{207}\) Interviews, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 13 August 2012.

\(^\text{208}\) US Department of Defense (2010, 73).
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) recalls the Pentagon’s definition of the role of defence as:

- Stemming violence once it erupts
- Creating the conditions for local security
- Providing assistance in building military capability in third countries.209

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review raises new conceptual considerations and identifies civilian shortcomings during recent operations

US policy in the prevention of crises and conflicts nevertheless remains primarily civil in its design. It was recently updated by the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Report (QDDR), which is an attempt to rebalance the American diplomatic and development action towards a more preventive approach to avoid military engagements.210

The QDDR defines the missions of the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the prevention of crises and conflicts within fragile states in the following terms:

The mission of State and USAID with regard to crisis and conflict in fragile states is to reduce or eliminate short, medium, and long-term threats to American security [...]. That mission encompasses a spectrum of operations from prevention to recovery. Whereas temporary order and an end to violence can usually be established through the application of force, the civilian mission is one of preventing conflict, saving lives, and building sustainable peace by resolving underlying grievances at both the individual and community levels and helping to build government institutions that can provide basic but effective security and justice. Over the longer term, the core of the mission is to build a government’s ability to address challenges, resolve conflicts, promote development and provide for its people on its own.211 (Emphasis added)

The preferred tools for US conflict prevention policy are clearly instruments of short-term prevention, that is to say, conflict resolution and mediation-based approaches, as well as assistance in the construction of stable state law. The QDDR defines these preventive actions as:

classic tools of diplomacy: creative problem-solving, mediation, fact-finding, inspections, third-party monitoring, arbitration or judicial resolution of disputes threatening to lead to conflict, confidence building measures, early warning systems, sanctions, conditional aid, and many other techniques.212

The QDDR seeks above all to identify the lessons of American civil engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The chapter on prevention dedicates a section to the analysis of civilian issues and identifies six reforms as priorities:

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1. Institutionalise the political leadership of interdepartmental process in the field of prevention through the Department of State and USAID. The division of labour between these two departments is clear: the Department of State conducts operations in response to political and security crises and conflicts. USAID, in turn, directs the operations of humanitarian crises.213

2. Create a framework for personnel with prevention expertise in a new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and improve specialised training in the public service in terms of prevention.

3. Develop a specific planning process in conflict prevention and resolution and define standardised frameworks in the field of prevention both at national level and for international use.

4. Create a new basis for civil-military cooperation in the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

5. Better coordinate and integrate the various aspects of assistance to third countries in the security sector reform.

6. Improve the ability of the US government to anticipate crises and genocide.214

The QDDR announces a series of inter-institutional reforms necessary to pursue these goals along with a review of the US approach to security sector reforms. The scope of these reforms will be analysed in the following sections.

5.2. Competencies and interdepartmental coordination

Given the scope of a comprehensive preventive approach, the ministries in charge of prevention policy are numerous. As with the other country case studies, our analysis will focus on the Department of Defense and the Department of State and, to some extent, the USAID. Other US government departments involved, particularly with regard to security reforms, are the Department of the Interior, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce.

5.2.1. The CSO leads prevention efforts within the Department of State

The implementation of institutional reforms contained in the QDDR to improve the capacity of the Department of State to lead prevention actions is underway. The most important reforms are:

- The unification of all efforts and capacities dedicated to prevention under the supervision of an Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights.
- The creation of a Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) specifically dedicated to conflict and stabilisation efforts.215

The CSO is under the direct responsibility of the Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights and its primary functions include:216

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Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

- Providing prevention expertise to regional offices
- Strengthening the Civilian Response Corps (see Section 4.2.3.)
- Creating interdepartmental rapid response teams (surge teams) and working closely with the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) System (see Section 4.2.4.)
- Institutionalising operational and international frameworks for crisis response.
- Coordinating efforts to build civilian capacity among key allies and partners of the United States.

The CSO is currently moving towards adopting more short- and medium-term prevention policies, focusing on activities such as election observation and dispute resolution. The CSO Bureau is also trying to develop more systematic action plans for certain crisis scenarios, prioritising about six regions where contributions may have a medium-term impact.

Favouring the medium- and short-term, the CSO Bureau tries quickly to demonstrate its practical success in prevention to Congress and to government more widely. These proof of concept requests are part of the classic prevention dilemma where it is difficult to provide conclusive evidence that a crisis or violence would have erupted if preventive action had not taken place. Indeed, the main challenge for the CSO is the gradual erosion of political will to implement a policy of prevention and effective stabilisation.

CSO responsibilities range from conceptual framing to active implementation

The organisation of the CSO focuses on four responsibilities:

- Definition and coordination of policy and prevention programmes and stabilisation (Office of Policy and Programmes).
- Assessment, planning, and implementation and deployment (Office of Overseas Operations).
- Training, communication, networking (Office of Partnerships and Office of Learning and Training).
- Recruitment and support (Office of Civilian Response Corps and Deployment Support).

5.2.2. The Pentagon [Department of Defense, DoD]

The role of the armed forces in prevention traditionally consists of military preparedness and deterrence. Due to the recent heavy commitment of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon has played a leading role in stabilisation and reconstruction. In this contribution to structural prevention efforts, the armed forces are a secondary player compared with civilian actors (according to the 2010 QDR).

216 US Department of State, ‘Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations’.
217 Interview, Stares, Paul B., Council on Foreign Relations, 26 June 2012.
218 US Department of State, ‘Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations: Where we work’.
219 Interview, Stares, Paul B., Council on Foreign Relations, 26 June 2012.
220 US Department of State, ‘Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations: Who we are’.

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The military has an active role to play in stabilisation and reconstruction

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO, 2009) articulates the role of defence in reconstruction and stabilisation through an active contribution to reconstruction activities. Civil-military coordination plays an important role, even in the context of a civilian-led operation.

Military doctrine specifies a support rather than a lead-role for defence

The Joint Publication 3.0 Joint Operation defines the different types of joint military operations and includes conflict prevention activities in the category of peace operations. Prevention is treated more fully in the Joint Publication 3-07.3 Peace Operation that was revised in August 2012 but remained confidential. Conflict prevention is defined by Joint Publication 3.0 as covering ‘diplomatic and other actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an agreement before armed hostilities.’ This doctrine lists the instruments in different categories that are part of a preventive approach:

- Diplomatic initiatives
- Security Sector Reform
- Deployment of ‘intercession’ forces to prevent or contain a conflict
- Military investigation missions
- Consultations
- Warnings, inspections and monitoring of the situation.

Some sources note the growing willingness of the military to engage in the ‘zero phase’ of a conflict, a so-called ‘shaping operation’, to reduce the risk of a regional conflict phase. The joint doctrine nevertheless clearly defines the need for close collaboration between civilian and military actors, giving a prominent leadership position to the former. Thus ‘military forces used for conflict prevention should be focused on support to political and developmental efforts to ameliorate the causes of tension and unrest. Military activities will be tailored to meet political and development demands.’

Bilateral defence cooperation occurs in many forms

Bilateral defence cooperation is a key element of the military’s involvement in the field of prevention. Such cooperation includes:

- Bilateral and multilateral training exercises

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222 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011, V-4, 5).
223 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011, V-24).
224 Stares (2009, 12). See also: US Department of Defense (2009b). The 2005 DOD 3000.05 was replaced in September 2009 by the DOD 3000.05 Instruction.
225 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011, V-4, 5).
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

- Military equipment sales (foreign military sales, FMS) and military funding (foreign military financing, FMF)
- Officer exchange programmes
- Professional education and military exchange programmes
- Technical exchanges
- Efforts to assist foreign armed forces in the development of their skills and abilities.

QDR 2010 puts increasing emphasis on assistance to reforming security systems and stresses that:

within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic in the coming years will be security force assistance (SFA) missions: ‘hands on’ efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories.

5.2.3. The Civilian Response Corps provides civilian experts to conflict areas

The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) was created in 2004 and is composed of civilian experts to be sent to conflict/emergency areas to facilitate civil-military interaction. CRC was originally planned to include an active component of about 250 people deployable in 48 hours and for a period of up to six months, a component of about 2,000 people on alert and mobilised with a notice period of 30–45 days and a reserve including about 2,000 experts. The active component was to be composed of officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments involved in stabilisation and reconstruction. CRC was established in 2004 but was not funded until 2008; this was through the adoption of the ‘Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act’ by the US Congress.

CRC is currently composed of diplomats, development and public health experts, law enforcement professionals, engineers, economists, lawyers, public administrators, agronomists and others. CRC main duties include:

- Planning, conducting and managing operations
- Ensuring the security and legal structures within a state
- Supporting Diplomacy and governance
- Ensuring the protection of essential services
- Supporting economic recovery and reintegration
- Providing force protection.

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227 Notably through programmes such as the State Department funded International Military and Education Training (IMET), which was subsequently implemented by the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency. See: US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ‘International Military and Education Training’.

228 US Department of Defense (2010, 26).

229 Serafino (2012a, 15).


231 US Department of State, ‘Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations’.
The QDDR plans to reform the CRC to better support the CSO mission

The QDDR plans to expand the capacity of both the CRC’s active and stand-by units. Active unit capacities are currently under revision to be better adapted to the reorientation of the CSO (for example towards mediation missions). The monitoring unit will be expanded and enhanced through greater use of staff from other US agencies, improving professional incentives, and extending the possibility of participation in Peace Corps volunteers, former US government employees, personal services contractors and foreign service nationals. CRC reserve units will be replaced by an Expert Corps composed of external experts to the US government instead of a pool of about 2,000 reservists. Up to the end of 2012, funding for this expensive reform of CRC structure had not been granted by Congress.

5.2.4. Efforts are underway to improve interdepartmental and civil-military coordination

The Interagency Management System focuses on interdepartmental coordination

The Interagency Management System (IMS) was created in 2007 to support the implementation of the political goals of the Directive NSPD 44. The IMS was composed of three elements:

- A stabilisation and reconstruction team with regional expertise (the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group).
- A civilian planning cell responsible for civil-military coordination (the Integration Planning Cell).
- A team of advisors to assist heads of stabilisation and reconstruction missions in case of need for specialised civilian skills (the Advance Civilian Team).

IMS mechanisms aim to improve interdepartmental coordination at the administrative level, which previously posed particular problems. Although an innovative coordination instrument, IMS is currently the most widely used tool. Additional attempts to improve interdepartmental management and civil-military coordination are outlined in the QDDR.

The International Operational Response Framework addresses civil-military coordination

The QDDR announced the creation of the International Operational Response Framework (IORF). The IORF aims to develop a system for interdepartmental coordination focusing on:

- Representing civilian contributions
- Facilitating civil-military coordination

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233 Schnaubelt, Christopher (2009, 37).
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

- Promoting transparency and accountability of leadership structures and agency lines of responsibility which, when combined, will leverage and deliver the full range of US international disaster, crisis and conflict response resources.\(^{234}\)

The IORF and its associated procedures complement required military contingency planning processes.\(^{235}\) The IORF will build on applicable elements from the National Incident Management System utilised by the Federal Emergency Management Agency when responding to domestic disasters as well as other international mechanisms.\(^{236}\)

Civil-military coordination is also undergoing regulatory reforms

Civil-military coordination is currently regulated by the NSPD 44 of December 2005. Interdepartmental coordination on the field for regional Combat Commands (COCOMs) is conducted through the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, but in the past coordination has proved difficult in practice because the planning and management cultures and practices differ greatly between civil and military agencies.\(^{237}\)

The objectives of reforms regarding civil-military coordination are:

- To increase the number of civilians who understand its principles and implementation and have practical experience in cooperation with the Pentagon in Washington and in the field\(^{238}\)
- To further integrate the military in the new framework of international operational response by increasing cooperation with the Pentagon to develop a clear division of roles and responsibilities of deployed teams
- To identify connection points between military and civilian departments and increase the use of Join Taskforces of civilian and military experts to work in regional Joint Commands and COCOMs.

As of 2012, a commission authorised by Congress and composed of representatives of the Department of State, USAID and the Pentagon was reviewing the coordination between these three institutions to make recommendations for improvement.\(^{239}\)

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\(^{234}\) US Department of State & United States Agency for International Development (2010, 140).

\(^{235}\) US Department of State & United States Agency for International Development (2010, 141).

\(^{236}\) US Department of State & United States Agency for International Development (2010, 141).


\(^{238}\) US Department of State & United States Agency for International Development (2010, 142).

\(^{239}\) US Department of State & United States Agency for International Development (2010, 143).
5.3. Instruments of prevention and implementation range from analysis to force deployment

5.3.1. Analysis, forecasting and early warning tools are available for short- and long-term responses; medium-term instruments are lacking

The US government relies on both short- and long-term tools for sharing information and analysis

The US government has access to a wide range of information sources that are an integral part of its preventive measures. The most important are compiled by the Department of State, the National Intelligence Council, the Pentagon and USAID.

**Short-term analysis: the Presidential Daily Briefs**

The short-term analysis that most directly influences the decision-making process of the US government is based on daily dispatches from the intelligence community to the US president (Presidential Daily Briefs, PDB). A summary analysis of short-term issues (0–12 months) for all US intelligence services is delivered to the president daily by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which has played an overarching role since the attacks of 11 September, 2001.240

A strategic gap exists in US intelligence regarding the forecasting period between 12 and 18 months, which is not covered by any report from the American intelligence community.241 The main reason is the lack of departmental demand for this time window, which could be interpreted as a lack of political interest in prevention issues. In addition to the Presidential Daily Brief, each department relating directly or indirectly to prevention has its own information and warning system.

**The Department of State and the ‘Internal Instability Watchlist’ (IIW)**

In 2005, the Office of the Secretary of State/Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in cooperation with the National Intelligence Council (NIC) created a watch list to monitor the country at risk of lapsing into instability and conflict: the Internal Instability Watchlist (IIW).242 This list was originally reviewed every six months, but it is at present reviewed once a year.

The list failed to mobilise political and bureaucratic support and has not been integrated into a regular policy review process due to the lack of institutional authority of the Office S/CRS. This prioritisation list was originally considered an embryonic cell of the early warning mechanism for the prevention of crisis and conflicts, but this is no longer the case.243

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240 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence website.

241 Interview, Stares, Paul B., Council on Foreign Relations, 26 June 2012.

242 Within the NIC, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning (National Warning Staff within the Office of the Director for National Intelligence) was responsible for cooperation with the S/CRS.

243 Interview, Stares, Paul B., Council on Foreign Relations, 26 June 2012.
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

States are included in the IIW based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis from conventional information services. The IIW focuses on the analysis of the probability of five scenarios:

1. The emergence of an internal conflict
2. Humanitarian crisis
3. Violent political transition
4. State collapse
5. The emergence of ungoverned areas.

The analysis also takes into account the probability of potentially destabilising events that would trigger a crisis in the short- and medium-term, as well as the possible consequences and severity of such a crisis to national interests.

USAID

Since 2006, the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) has created two lists comparable to the IIW: the Fragility Alert List and Instability Alert List. The first establishes a ranking of 160 countries following criteria of states’ strength or weakness, the second analyses the probability of increasing political instability and the emergence of violence in these countries. The CMM also performs a synthesis of these lists.²⁴⁴

National Intelligence Council

Another attempt to implement an early warning system is based on reports compiled by the US National Warning Office, a unit within the NIC that was created during the Cold War. It synthesised selected elements of analysis coming from NIC regional and operational offices. This bureau was nevertheless closed in 2011 in an effort to streamline and better integrate the operational and analytical structures of the NIC. Each regional office is currently responsible for redacting a regional monitoring analysis.

National Warning Staff currently produces the ‘Atrocities Watchlist’ analysis, which is revised every four months and includes countries that are at risk of abusing human rights or conducting atrocities in the next 12 months. National Warning Staff also circulate periodically Special Warning Notices when the risk is considered particularly imminent. Some of these notes may have a relatively short time horizon (e.g. six months) while others can cover a period of up to two years.²⁴⁵

The NIC is also responsible for long-term analysis, including the Global Trends reports that currently consider the 2025–2030 horizon. These reports are compiled jointly by the Strategic Futures Group and the Long Range Analysis Unit within it.²⁴⁶

Academic sources of information and analysis

The US government also consults risk assessment from academic institutions such as the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) from George Mason University (Virginia).²⁴⁷ The PITF produces a range of

²⁴⁴ Stares (2009, 14).
²⁴⁵ Stares (2009, 15).
²⁴⁶ US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘Who we are’.
predictions for stability that remain accessible to the public in addition to confidential reports for the government. Although this analysis does not officially provide the basis for decision-making, it helps to inform governmental decisions.\footnote{Centre for Global Policy, ‘Political Instability Task Force’.} The list of unstable countries managed by both USAID and the United Kingdom are based on the methodology and indicators used by PITF for its reports. PITF distinguishes four types of possible conflict aggravations in unstable regimes: (1) ethnic wars, (2) revolutionary wars, (3) adverse regime change, (4) genocide and political assassinations.

For each type of conflict the PITF has developed a series of indicators.\footnote{Interview, Stares, Paul B., Council on Foreign Relations, 26 June 2012.} Variables taken into account for ethnic wars and revolutionary wars are:

- Number of rebel fighters or activists (on a scale of 0–4)
- Annual number of deaths in combat (0–4)
- Proportion of countries affected by the conflict (0–4).

Those taken into account for an unfavourable regime change are:

- Failure of state authority (on a scale of 1 to 4)
- Collapse of democratic institutions (1–4)
- Violence associated with the transition from one regime to the other (1–4)
- Type of regime change.

Those taken into account for genocide and political assassinations are:

- Number of deaths per year (range 0–5).

\textit{Military Intelligence}

The armed forces produce their own risk analysis and early warning, including through the Defense Intelligence Agency, which issues regular reports, and regular consultation with Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and Armed Forces Commanders in Chief. For reasons of confidentiality, it was difficult for the research team to obtain an overview as extensive as that of other intelligence products.

\textit{Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)}

Following an initiative of the Office S/CRS and USAID, a tool for analysis and forecasting of emerging conflicts was created in 2008. This Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) provides a framework for deliberation and interdepartmental analysis to develop appropriate responses to emerging crises.\footnote{US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, \textit{Conflict Prevention and Stabilization Operations: 2010 Year in Review}, January 2011, Washington, DC.} The ICAF mechanism uses alerts coming from the intelligence community to provide assistance to an interdepartmental team and understand the underlying issues contributing to lack of stability in a region or country. Applying the valuation methods of the social sciences, it also seeks to identify societal
and situational dynamics that increase the likelihood of violent conflict.251 A further object of the ICAF is to evaluate implementation of US government measures.252 This mechanism can be used for three types of analysis:

- **Planning a mission of conflict prevention**, which may include preparation of an embassy, mobilisation following a request for interdepartmental assistance from an embassy or a COMOC to protect US interests in an at-risk country, or the development of ‘Theater Security Cooperation Plans’. These plans are developed by the relevant geographic Commands and describe the security environment, identify objectives and list related activities that can contribute to achieving these objectives.253 The ICAF is therefore primarily intended for American delegations sent to support destabilised areas and for the Pentagon/COMOCs, which define and plan so-called ‘zero-phase missions’.254

- **Planning for unforeseen events**, for which the mechanism provides a substantive analysis of the context and factors that contribute to the worsening or mitigation of violence.

- **Planning to respond to an emerging crisis**, for which the mechanism provides a starting point for analysing possible responses.255

The ICAF mechanism, however, does not explicitly act as an instrument for early warning.256 It is a mechanism that helps identify measures to be implemented to prevent conflict. It works in close cooperation with local actors and is based on an accurate assessment of regional political, social and economic assets using analytical social science tools. From its inception in 2008 to March 2012, the ICAF mechanism was used 25 times.257

The different political actors in the United States have differing opinions on the usefulness of ICAF mechanism, with the Pentagon strongly in favour of its more regular use. Joint Doctrines, (JP 3-07, Appendix 2) as well as the US Army doctrine and USAID key strategic documents make explicit reference to the ICAF mechanism.258

The Department of State, on the other hand, remains firmly in favour of a ‘state approach’, as its internal structure is centred on bilateral rather than regional relations. Some want to see the mechanism used in areas where attacks are imminent, while others think it should be applied in locations where elections will be held, as elections are considered to be a potentially destabilising factor by the Department of State.259

251 US Department of State (2011, 3).
252 US Department of State (2011, 2).
253 Hager (2004, iii).
254 Stares (2009, 16).
256 US Department of State (2008, 2).
257 US Department of State (2012, 3).
258 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
259 Interviews, Department of State, 20 July 2012.
Nevertheless, the future of this mechanism developed by the Office S/CRS remains uncertain. Tensions have emerged between the CSO Office and regional offices of the Department of Foreign Affairs, as this mechanism competes with their own skills and has been complex and expensive to implement. Its use has gradually been reduced in recent years.

As of 2012, reform of the mechanism was in the planning phase. This should improve the participation of international organisations, other countries and especially local NGOs involved in prevention activities. However, even if the ICAF provides a solution for the choice of action, it does not offer the ability to perform or facilitate political decisions about countries where it would be desirable to intervene.

Current reports demonstrate a gap of analysis and intelligence for the medium-term (12–18 month)

According to some experts, even if the range of intelligence products is wide, it rarely leads to an early warning that results in truly preventive actions. One reason may be the lack of an effective analysis for the medium-term (12–18 months) mentioned above and seen as particularly important in developing preventive actions. The US has an excellent intelligence system for short-term analysis provided by the Daily Briefs to the US President; the strategic analysis of the long term made by the NIC is solid as well. These structures, however, are not specifically dedicated to the prevention of crises but include intelligence and warning for any kind of dangers, both conventional and arising from fragile states.

Forecasting and alert: Identification of country strategic priority criteria

Paul B. Stares (2009, 15) notes that the lists of weakened or fragile countries supposed to assist in the development of preventive mechanisms are flawed in their consistency: the IIW lists approximately 50 states while the combined lists by USAID mention about 30. Decision-making actors do not find these lists particularly useful to help focus attention on the most urgent cases. Regional experts also complain that the lists do not provide new analysis. These criticisms show that prioritising one country over another is a highly political choice that cannot be delegated to or resolved by a technical process. Lists should in no case replace the technical expertise of regional specialists and have never been developed for such an objective.

The strategic identification of countries in which the United States should become involved remains problematic. This eminently political decision remains unanswered, even in the United States, mainly because of two factors:

- The presence of an excessive number of alert reports distributed at the interdepartmental level without any order of priority and without the decision-making and planning processes necessary for early preventive action.
- Political attention focused primarily on current issues and immediate responsiveness.

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260 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
262 Interviews, Council on Foreign Relations, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
The Office S/CRS had invested significantly in distributing early warning analyses within the US government. In addition to a network specifically dedicated to this task, the Senior Officer chairs an interdepartmental working group called the Interagency Intelligence and Analysis Working Group. This initiative has suffered the same fate as most of the bureau’s political initiatives and has never really been implemented. Because of these shortcomings, the intelligence community is struggling to play a constructive role to inform and develop decision-making at the political level. This situation favours an ad hoc and improvised approach contrary to the logic of preventive action.

**The National Security Council and political decision-making: lack of an Interdepartmental Office of Strategic Planning**

According to experts, the main administrative weakness of the US government is the lack of a strategic planning structure that also addresses prevention issues. A planning structure exists within the National Security Council, but this Strategic Planning Unit remains atrophied because it is composed of only three or four members. This situation is the result of a historical choice, as the National Security Council (NSC) was removed from any ‘operational’ role following the Iran-Contra affair. A Policy Planning Unit also exists within the Department of State, but this unit is most often responsible for the implementation of special projects or used solely on ad hoc basis.

The NSC is currently seeking to parse in which areas the US government action for prevention is adequate and where it remains insufficient. The NSC is also seeking a more regular review of the IIW up from its current revision once a year. However, in the words of CSO participants in the process of inter-ministerial consultations, NSC action consists of a reactive approach to short-term crisis response rather than a truly preventive approach.

**Prioritisation of at-risk countries depends on a number of criteria**

As is the case for other countries (like Germany), the Department of State seeks to help US aid recipient states to develop their own early warning mechanisms through diplomatic training, civil-military cooperation or support and funding structures.

The CSO bureau nevertheless established an internal structure specifically dedicated to preventive action, which monitors regions to identify potential crises. A team based in Washington tracks developments in about 18 to 20 regions and a dozen of its members are deployed on a regular basis to maintain relationships with local actors (Africa Command – AFRICOM, Afghanistan, etc.). The decision to act or not to act occurs on the basis of CSO opinion or on the advice of the embassies.

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264 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
265 Interviews, Department of State, 20 July 2012.
266 US Department of State (2009).
268 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
The CSO provides assistance through a strategy of prioritisation. As of 2012 these priorities include:

1. Support and assist non-violent opposition in Syria to reach the unification
2. Support ethnic minorities in Burma
3. Develop a regional approach to reduce violent crime in the northern third of Central America
4. Help partners put in place mechanisms to prevent the eruption of violence in Kenya.\(^{269}\)

The strategy of engagement selection follows a number of criteria:\(^{270}\)

- Is OSC in a position of comparative advantage to meet an urgent assistance need?
- Does the engagement window over the next 12 months offer the opportunity of a strategic impact through concerted action with partners?
- Is the engagement relevant to the national security of the United States?
- Does the engagement include action on a number of important topics related to the United States, such as the prevention of genocide?
- Are there opportunities to implement sustainable efforts by local actors?

**Stages of CSO engagement**

CSO uses the following steps for its commitment:

1. **Assignment of authority for directing US efforts**: This role is normally filled by the regional office and the US Embassy or the Special Envoy. It operates as a centre of gravity for the US effort.
2. **Analysis of the situation**: On the basis of local data about emerging conflicts or crises, analysis is conducted in consultation with US partners. The main goal is to establish immediate priorities to prevent worsening of the conflict.
3. **Development of a strategy**: This analysis generally leads to the development of a single integrated strategy for the US government and two to three sets of priorities for all Americans involved in order to offer a clear and consistent direction for prevention efforts.
4. **Choice of programmes to be implemented**: This strategy is used as a basis for decisions about hiring personnel and implementing programmes. The US team will seek to build coalitions with local actors supporting programmes involved. These programmes promote policies that reduce violence and increase resilience of local communities.
5. **Periodic reviews**: Activities are subject to periodic review in order to increase the chances of success and to transfer of activities to stakeholders.

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\(^{269}\) US Department of State, ‘Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations: What we do’.

\(^{270}\) US Department of State, ‘Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations: What we do’.
5.3.2. The CSO civilian rapid reaction instrument involves programming capacity and deployable country teams

A central element of the CSO strategy is the creation of a civilian rapid reaction instrument that incorporates the capacity of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) and the CSO Deployable Civilian Surge Capacity.

This rapid reaction mechanism involves a programming capacity to develop interventions for a window of six to eighteen months in which tangible and observable results must be emphasised.

The mechanism also includes country teams composed of employees and experts from the CSO and, sometimes, the CRC. They can be deployed quickly to implement preventive activities on the basis of early warning in areas of strategic priority. These teams are designed to implement a preventive commitment of the US government in close cooperation with USAID and proactively support local projects or the development of local infrastructure to establish preventive structures.

This approach also aims to establish direct links with the local population and to allow a more direct understanding of local issues in advance of a possible worsening of conflict. These teams will be flexibly deployed to provide services such as:

1. Expertise in economic development and governmental/institutional reforms to help local authorities to find solutions to emerging conflicts, violence, extremism and other factors of instability.
2. Scientific and technological expertise to respond to natural or humanitarian disasters.
3. Expertise on community stabilisation at the local level, which will draw on the experiences made by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.
4. A capacity for specialists’ rapid analysis of the factors, risks and options to be considered by the US interdepartmental mechanism to prevent mass atrocities and genocide.

The establishment of this rapid reaction mechanism is accompanied by the attempt to solve another major issue: the need to convince the US embassy staff to embrace an approach based on the principles of prevention. As of 2012 the QDDR affirms that an area of priority is the reorganisation of local embassies and USAID missions so that they operate effectively in a changing environment and are prepared for crisis and conflict prevention. The QDDR also mentions the need for embassies to develop the ability to manage country teams and to ensure interoperability with the military if necessary.

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272 Interviews, Department of State, 20 July 2012.
273 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
5.3.3. The prevention of genocide and mass atrocities is a new US policy priority

The Atrocity Prevention Board provides a new structure for the prevention of genocide

In August 2011, the Presidential Security Directive 10 (PSD-10) declared the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide to be a ‘national security priority and moral responsibility’ of the United States. PSD-10 also decided to create an Atrocities Prevention Board (APB) involving strong interdepartmental participation.²⁷⁷

This new structure was created 23 April, 2012 and includes representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice and Homeland Security; the General Staff of the Army; USAID; the US mission to the United Nations; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Office of the Vice-President. All representatives are Assistant Secretary level or higher. The PDB meets once a month to discuss the development and implementation of the genocide prevention policy and its evolving response. Emergency meetings are possible if required. The management of the PDB is provided by a senior adviser of the President – the NSS Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights – and therefore linked directly to the White House.²⁷⁸

PDB is considered a support structure that can be effective in comparison with other prevention structures because it has the clear support of President Barack Obama. After a trial period of six months the President intends to adopt a presidential Executive Order to consolidate the structure of the PDB, its functions and priorities and objectives, which will increase the chances of this structure surviving a change of political leadership in the White House.²⁷⁹

Prevention of mass atrocities is now incorporated in military doctrine

Prevention of mass atrocities has been integrated into the current military doctrine. Join Doctrine JP 3-07 for Stability Operations, revised in August 2011, postulates that:

1. Genocide is not the inevitable result of ‘ancient hatreds’ or irrational leaders; rather it requires planning and is carried out systematically. The emphasis of USG efforts to counter genocide lies in prevention and detection of early warning signs.
2. Department of State (DoS) leads efforts to detect and prevent genocide around the globe. Preventing or halting genocide, however, may require the employment of a joint force to deter or halt ongoing atrocities. Any such intervention will require a significant component of stability operations. Additionally, when operating in fragile states, joint forces may be critical to detecting early warning signs, preventing or deterring genocide.
3. Military intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) assets and the JIPOE process can help identify early warning indicators and describe important contextual factors, such as the nature of

²⁷⁸ The White House (2012).
²⁷⁹ Stares (2012).
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

belligerents and the status of the civilian population, connections between leaders and followers, and the means of violence.

4. Development of security institutions, including vetting and training of security and intelligence personnel, should include some emphasis on preventing and countering mass atrocities and genocide. Engagement with key leaders is particularly important in this area.

5. Joint Forces Commands (JFCs) should ensure Rules of Engagement (ROE) specifies guidance to units or individuals that encounter genocide or other mass atrocities, as well as human rights violations that could lead to such atrocities.  

JP 3.07-7 Peace Operations (classified), published in August 2012 in its revised version, specifies the role of the military in the prevention of mass atrocities. While an analysis of this document is currently impossible, publications by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) of the US Army (attached to the US Army War College) and the Harvard Kennedy School of Harvard University have formed a foundation for military consideration in this area. These sources therefore adequately reflect the content of the doctrine according to the official statements of the Pentagon.

Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO)

Civil action in the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities passes through three stages:

1. **Engagement phase** – The first phase involves the routine monitoring of an area or country and the prediction of incidents. It also includes engagement through dialogue with partners in situations where mass atrocities seem not imminent but possible in the future.

2. **Targeted prevention phase** – The second phase, called ‘targeted prevention’, may include mitigation of incitement to violent activities by strengthening social resilience through economic development, effective and legitimate governance, and protection of minorities.

3. **Phase of ‘crisis management’** – The third phase of ‘crisis management’ is initiated when indicators suggest the imminence of atrocities. The decision on the adoption of additional measures is then delegated to political leaders.

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280 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2011, III-14, 15).


282 Sewall et al. (2010).


Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) help protect vulnerable populations

Generic objectives in terms of military Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) are presented in the manual developed in 2010 by the Harvard Kennedy School entitled Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook.287 Such objectives include:

- Ensuring the safety of people exposed or vulnerable to atrocities
- Identifying, capturing and holding the leaders of the authors of mass atrocities
- Ensuring humanitarian assistance where it may be necessary
- Facilitating the transition to a proper civilian entity promoting good governance and stable security.

All these actions do not need to be present simultaneously for a MARO mission to be initiated. Often, such a mission will be part of a broader stabilisation effort and will not include one of the responsibilities outlined.288 The implementation of a MARO operation may require a Combat Joint Task Force (CJTF) to restore security in a large area, to protect vulnerable populations and/or to stop perpetrators of mass atrocities.289

The measures being considered by the White House to develop the role of the military in preventing atrocities cover the following points:290

- Ongoing review of doctrines and planning capabilities for MARO by the Pentagon.
- Refinement of Pentagon planning processes and instruments to improve its rapid response capabilities.
- The integration of MARO priorities in planning and programming, as well as in regional Combatant Commands activities.
- The integration of MARO objectives and skills in military training.
- The organisation of regular exercises incorporating MARO scenarios to test operational concepts.

5.3.4. Reform of the security sector is a priority for both the Pentagon and the Department of State

US strategy for the reform of the security sector and justice is under review

The QDDR envisaged a significant review of the US strategy in the field of security sector reform.291 The recommended steps are the following:

287 Sewall et al. (2010).
288 Sewall et al. (2010).
289 US Army War College (2012, 115).
290 The White House (2012).
Crisis and conflict prevention strategies:

- A comprehensive approach to security sector reform, including the establishment of strong links between the police, prosecutors, courts, prisons and oversight mechanisms.
- Strengthening focus on the development of effective and democratic legal systems, as well as on the capacity to demobilise and reintegrate armed combatants and to provide direct support to local security and justice institutions in their efforts to restore and maintain law and justice.
- Strengthen the involvement of a third country government (concept of local ownership).
- Establish a stronger links between security sector reform, development and democratisation initiatives.
- Develop a common strategic framework as well as operational guidelines.

A US government review of its various instruments of assistance to security sector reform (SSR) is currently underway under the auspices of the National Security Council. This procedure should review administrative and financial responsibilities.

A shift of competencies is underway from the Department of State to the Pentagon

Competencies of the DoS

The State Department has traditionally managed several efforts to support SSR, including the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, which aims to train and educate military and foreign police, and the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, which supports peacekeepers and the police. This initiative is funded by the Global Security Contingency Fund created in December 2011 by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The primary role of the Department of State in SSR is to facilitate the development of strategies with the Pentagon and the Department of Justice. Its role may also include facilitating interdepartmental exchange with partners to improve the use of resources dedicated to SSR. The Department of State also facilitates SSR by sending qualified personnel from CRC. The CSO Bureau does not have a primary role in SSR, although it may be required to finance minor initiatives such as the dispatch of experts, coordination of training efforts and provision of minimum material assistance for administrative or civil aspects of security sector assistance.

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293 Department of Defense (2010, 74–5).
294 Stares (2009, 12).
295 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
296 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
297 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
**Shifting competencies**

While for fiscal year 2002 about 94 per cent of all SSR assistance programmes managed by different agencies were funded by the Department of State, in 2008 about 50 per cent were funded by the Pentagon. The National Security Council has currently added institutional responsibility for the civilian aspects of SSR to the agenda of interagency decision-making processes. This decision aims to resolve the division of responsibilities for extending Pentagon competencies from missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Pentagon maintains a leading role in the management of military training and technical assistance.

**The QDR and Pentagon’s competencies in the field of SSR**

The Pentagon’s approach to SSR is evolving. Looking ahead, decision-making needs to become shorter and effective because its structures still are concentrated on a long-term approach. Additional internal adjustments focus primarily on the following points:

- The revision of doctrines, training and coaching of the US military and civilian personnel engaged in activities of SSR. The Security Cooperation Agency is in charge of an internal review of its training facilities.
- Ensure adequate ongoing funding through programmes such as the Commander’s Emergency Response Programme, the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.

The Global Security Contingency Fund, created in 2011, has already contributed to an acceleration of financing SSR activities (see Section 4.4 below).

**The Global Peace Operations Initiative supports capacity building efforts**

The ‘Global Peace Operations Initiative’ (GPOI) of the US government was created in 2005 as a contribution to the government’s commitments in relation to the G8 Action Plan to increase global capacity for peace operations and therefore the military and police available to UN missions and to facilitate the preparation, logistical support and deployment of military units. The first phase of the programme (2005–2009) was accomplished with a budget amounting to $577 million. The PGI programme is funded by the budget of Peace Operations managed by the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the Department of State.

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298 Stares (2009, 12); Adams (2009, 7–8).
299 Interviews, Department of State, 20 July 2012.
301 US Department of Defense (2010, 75).
302 Shapiro (2011).
The main objective of the first phase of the initiative (2005–2009) was the education and training of 75,000 blue helmets (prioritising Africa) by US forces and to help build capacity regional authorities to carry out peace operations. This goal was surpassed with a total of 87,000 soldiers from 78 countries trained by PGI funds. Of this total, more than 77,000 soldiers were of African origin and driven by the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme (ACOTA).306

The second phase is currently underway (2010–2014) and is devoted to assist third countries to develop local peacekeeping forces sustainably. It also aims to enhance the capacity of regional organisations to train, plan, deploy, manage peacekeeping troops and obtain and incorporate feedback.307

The PGI initiative is evaluated regularly by the Department of State, which focuses on the following questions:308

- Have units/individuals been sent on a mission after their training to participate in peacekeeping missions?
- If the unit/individual has been deployed, was it effective?
- If the unit/individual has not been deployed, did it at least contribute to peacekeeping missions?
- Can the unit adequately train its own personnel?

The PGI programme is implemented by the Department of State in close cooperation with the Pentagon. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs manages the Peacekeeping Operations budget by which PGI is financed. The Office is also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the programme. The Pentagon and its specialised agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the General Staff of the Armed Forces and regional COCOMs help develop regional programmatic plans and implement them. The defence division is thus responsible for the implementation of about 50 per cent of the programmes and activities of the PGI.309

5.3.5. Evaluation mechanisms for prevention efforts are lacking

There is no mechanism for the overall implementation review of US policy for the prevention of crises and conflicts. A number of programmes, such as the activities of the CSO or PGI, nevertheless undergo internal evaluation processes.

The lack of an evaluation culture is due to the absence of a coherent prevention policy and a preference for short-term crisis response, rather than to an inability to assess the impact of measures implemented.

5.3.6. Rapid Deployment Forces and pre-positioned forces provide additional military support

Special forces and rapid deployment forces can respond quickly to emerging conflicts

Rapid deployment forces are capable of swift mobilisation and consist of elite military units such as special forces, marines or paratroopers. They normally receive more intensive training than the rest of the armed forces to prepare for their mission. Following the commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of special forces has increased dramatically in the United States, today reaching a joint force of about 63,000 soldiers.\(^{310}\)

In the United States, the 82nd Airborne Division of the Army, based in Fort Bragg (North Carolina), and the 75th Ranger Regiment are the best examples of rapid deployment forces. These two units are ready to deploy combat troops within 18 hours of an executive notification. Both have the necessary know-how to force entry into a territory and to guarantee access to land for additional troops.

XVIII Airborne Corps

Since the end of the Cold War, the 82nd Airborne Division of the Army has performed a number of engagements for humanitarian purposes, such as Haiti (Operation Unified Response, 2010). However, it has not been deployed as a preventive stabilising force. The 82nd Division has made intercession missions, such as the 1992 Unified Task Force Mission (UNITAF) in Somalia, which was deployed under Resolution 794 of the Security Council to create a safe environment for the conduct of operations aid in southern Somalia. Other tasks of the 82nd division since 1990 consisted primarily of intercessory missions in the framework of interstate attacks such as the one between Iraq and Kuwait in 1994 (US Central Command Air Forces, USCENTAF). The 82nd Division was also deployed in Afghanistan in 2002 (Operation Enduring Freedom), and in Iraq in 2005 (Operation Iraqi Freedom).

Pre-positioned forces address various spheres of responsibility

Pre-positioned forces are divided into six Commands that have assigned ‘zones of responsibility’ and whose responsibilities are redefined every two years by the Unified Command Plan:\(^{311}\)

2. US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) – South America.
3. US Pacific Command (PACOM) – Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 325,000 military and civilian personnel stationed.\(^{312}\)
4. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) – Africa, 2,000 personnel (civilian and military).
5. US Central Command (CENTCOM) – Central Asia, which has a very fluid pre-positioning structure with minimal troops (about 900) permanently present.
6. US European Command (EUCOM) – Europe and Russia, 78,000 soldiers.\(^{313}\)

\(^{310}\) Feickert (2012).


\(^{312}\) United States Pacific Command (UPSACOM), ‘UPSACOM Facts’.

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These Commands are responsible for the development of the security engagement plans (Theatre Security Cooperation Plans) previously discussed.

5.4. A range of funding sources are available for prevention activities

The 1207 budget line has been transferred by the Pentagon to DoS and USAID

Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) was created in 2004 in response to requests from the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The original funding was exclusively reserved for tasks requiring considerable interdepartmental coordination. NDAA funds are transferred annually to the Department of State and USAID to support action in regions where a lack of intervention could lead to a US military operation. Under Section 1207, the Secretary of Defense was authorised to ‘provide services to, and transfer defense articles and funds to the Secretary of State for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country.’ The Congress insisted on the introduction of a threshold of $100 million. This budget line was created due to Congressional reluctance to pass on funding for State Department-led prevention and stabilisation initiatives. Congress has long been sceptical about the idea of providing funds for the prevention and reconstruction where US strategic interests are not immediately visible. Congress has also frequently expressed doubts about the ability of the Department of State to make effective use of the funds. In the past, this assumption has often played in favour of the Pentagon in terms of funding.

From 2006 to 2010, section 1207 of the NDAA was used to finance projects worth $435.2 million in 28 countries. The Prevention Unit within the Office of S/CRS insisted that these funds should be used exclusively for the countries listed on the IIW. In 2007, the Pentagon transferred a total of $99.7 million to the Department of State to fund projects for prevention and stabilisation in seven countries and regions (Colombia, Haiti, Nepal, Somalia, Yemen, and South East Asia trans-Sahara). In 2008, the Pentagon transferred $100 million for activities in Afghanistan, Colombia, Congo, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan. In 2009, $143.3 million funded activities in Georgia, Bangladesh, Colombia, Congo, Kenya, Lebanon, Morocco, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Uganda. In 2010, these funds returned a total of $92.2 million for activities in the Congo, Ecuador, Guatemala, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Somalia, East Timor and Yemen. However, section 1207 expired on 30 September, 2010.

313 United States European Command (EUCOM), ‘Fact Sheets’.
314 The 2006 NDAA was established (P.L. 109–163). This aptitude was transferred in the 2008 NDAA to Section 1210 (P.L. 110-181) and Section 1207 again for the 2009 Duncan Hunter NDAA (P.L. 110-417). Such transfer was accepted by the Congress for the last time during the 2010 fiscal year (P.L. 111-84). Source: Serafino (2011, 1).
315 Serafino (2011, i, 7).
316 Perito (2008, 2).
317 Stares (2009, 30).
318 Stares (2009, 30).
The Global Security Contingency Fund is dedicated to the reform of the security sector

The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) was established in 2011 on the initiative of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The aim of the fund is to improve the response of the Pentagon and the Department of State in situations where their missions overlap. For the fiscal year 2012, the government asked for $50 million with a request for an additional $450 million if necessary. This credit line was dedicated to the financing of SSR and to provide assistance to stabilisation. It is under the budget of DoS, but the Secretary of State must consult the Pentagon before using these funds.

Due to the fund’s interdepartmental nature and the fact that the GSCF finances a wide range of activities related to structural prevention, GSCF can be considered a successor to the 1207 budget line. This method of financing is considered by some representatives of civil society as part of the ‘militarisation’ of development assistance. These civil society organisations require independent funding for DoS stabilisation activities.

Reforms of the security sector are also funded in part by budget line 1206 under the National Defense Authorization Act, Title 22 of the State-Justice Trade Funding Bill for units funded by the Department of State (through which PGI is funded), and Division 10 of 1207 Department of Defense programme.

The Complex Crises Fund finances rapid response

With the Complex Crises Fund, Congress awarded the CSO a new budget line (which nevertheless remains below that of the S/CRS). Together with the creation of the GSCF, Congress decided in 2010 to replace the funds Sections 1206 and 1207 of NDAA by an independent rapid reaction fund for USAID and DoS called the Complex Crises Fund. The maximum amount is $50 million per year, below the $100 million requested by the Pentagon, the Department of State and USAID. This assignment is not permanent and must be renewed annually.

Additional prevention funding comes from CSO and the Office of Transition Initiatives

In addition to these funding sources, prevention is financed by budget lines such as the financing of CSO, which covers the CSO Office and Civilian Response Corps, and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI-USAID). The OTI was created in 1994 to ensure continuity between natural disaster assistance programmes and longer-term development programmes. OTI is relatively small, averaging between $40

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319 Glenn & Kaminski (2011).
322 Serafino (2011b).
323 Interviews, Pentagon, OSD, Washington DC, 13 August 2012.
324 Interviews, Department of State, 17 July 2012.
325 Serafino (2011b, 4).
and $60 million per year. Its team consists of about 50 employees.\textsuperscript{326} OTI activities have gradually shifted to accompany the process of stabilising fragile states. As of 2012, the OTI was working in Kyrgyzstan, Cote d’Ivoire and Haiti.\textsuperscript{327} Table 5.1 provides an overview of different sources of funding for prevention-related initiatives.

Table 5.1: Main sources of funding for prevention-related initiatives by the Pentagon, the Department of State and USAID agency (USD millions or billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Budget Line</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Humanitarian and civic</td>
<td>75m</td>
<td>86m</td>
<td>72m</td>
<td>91m</td>
<td>84m</td>
<td>84m</td>
<td>84m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>International security assistance</td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>2.5b</td>
<td>2.5b</td>
<td>2.3b</td>
<td>2.5b</td>
<td>5.4b</td>
<td>1.15b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programme funding foreign military</td>
<td>3.4b</td>
<td>3.5b</td>
<td>3.7b</td>
<td>4b</td>
<td>4.2b</td>
<td>4.2b</td>
<td>4.2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education and workout military international</td>
<td>69m</td>
<td>70m</td>
<td>70m</td>
<td>85m</td>
<td>85m</td>
<td>85m</td>
<td>82m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintaining peace operations</td>
<td>237m</td>
<td>170m</td>
<td>213m</td>
<td>228m</td>
<td>220m</td>
<td>225m</td>
<td>192m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Security Contingency Fund</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiative for civil stabilisation / Stability Operations conflict</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59m</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71m</td>
<td>44m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Complex Crises Fund</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34m</td>
<td>38.5m</td>
<td>23m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>USAID Development assistance</td>
<td>1.15b</td>
<td>0.77b</td>
<td>0.77b</td>
<td>2.08b</td>
<td>2.08b</td>
<td>2.2b</td>
<td>2.04b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI)</td>
<td>31m</td>
<td>29m</td>
<td>314m</td>
<td>97m</td>
<td>37m</td>
<td>43m</td>
<td>28.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiative for civil stabilisation / Stability Operations conflict</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16m</td>
<td>23m</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.5. Concluding remarks

US forces have had to conduct civilian reconstruction in the context of stabilisation and counter-insurgency interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A decade after the beginning of US commitment to conflict prevention, civil-military coordination has significantly improved as a result of practice and mutual adaptation. In supporting prevention and stabilisation efforts, the Pentagon still seems inclined to play a secondary role to civil authorities. US forces see their primary role as supporting security sector reforms and ensuring a secure environment for crisis management. Such rebalancing of competencies is also possible thanks to the efforts of successive governments to strengthen civilian capacities for prevention and stabilisation.

In an effort to strengthen civilian capabilities for conflict prevention and stabilisation, the US government is in the process of gradually establishing dedicated institutional structures as complete as those created by the British government. The CSO office prioritises short-term prevention while its predecessor, the Office S/CRS, focused on stabilisation due to requirements of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The

\textsuperscript{326} Lawson (2009).

\textsuperscript{327} USAID website.

United States has a powerful instrument of civilian rapid reaction. Nevertheless, it is still too early for an assessment of CSO initiatives, which only began in November 2011. Although these structures have the advantage of specialised personnel and are therefore highly skilled in prevention, the placement of these efforts outside the process of interagency coordination is likely to reduce significantly their power within the US bureaucratic structure. The challenge of political decisions about targeted or non-engagement also remains unresolved, and the mobilisation of entire prevention structures remains problematic. The success of new structures will most probably depend on the degree of their consideration by the National Security Council in its own efforts to coordinate prevention policy.

One particularly notable development is the *Atrocity Prevention Board* (APB) for the prevention of genocide. Designed by Hillary Clinton with the support of President Barack Obama, the APB’s proximity to decision-making power and leadership give this institution the potential to become an effective structure. To increase effectiveness, the APB’s responsibilities could also be expanded to crisis prevention more generally. However, the political likelihood of such a development remains relatively low at the completion of our initial research and the very survival of this structure remains uncertain at the threshold of a change of government in late 2012.
This chapter presents German crisis and conflict prevention policy in three parts. It defines the political and historical contexts for current policy and outlines Germany prevention strategy (Section 5.1), presents major policy instruments (Section 5.2) and describes institutional actors and interdepartmental coordination efforts (Section 5.3).

6.1. German conflict prevention strategy is captured in a number of targeted documents

6.1.1. Following the Kosovo crisis, the government developed a new Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention

During the Kosovo crisis of 1998 to 1999, the new government coalition between the German Green Party and the Social Democratic Party was in its first months in office and was soon led to transgress two ‘taboos’ of postwar German foreign and defence policy:

- Bonn accepted the need for participation of the Bundeswehr in NATO raids, thus involving German soldiers for the first time since the Second World War in major armed conflict.
- The government allowed this participation in the absence of a UN mandate, i.e. without clear legitimacy under international law.

This turn in post-Second World War German Foreign and Security policy happened to be engineered by two distinctly anti-militarist German parties. The shift sat uncomfortably with their electorate, so that the coalition government decided in 1999 to reform the German political crisis prevention and conflicts to compensate for the military bent on crisis management.

The new government drafted a ‘general concept of the federal government for civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building’, which was adopted in 2000 as the basis for more ambitious subsequent reform. The ‘general concept’ sets out the principle of civilian conflict prevention based on:

‘An extended concept of security, which encompasses political, economic, ecological and social stability. This stability is based on the respect of human rights, social justice, the rule of law, participatory decision-making, protection of natural resources [...] and the use of peaceful means to resolve conflicts’.329

It is on the basis of this document and due to the initiatives of various parliamentary members of the Green Party that an Action Plan embodying the concept of civil conflict prevention was to be developed under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the participation of various ministries, academic advisors and representatives of civil society over the next four years.\footnote{Stengel & Weller (2010, 96–7).} The Action Plan ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding’, adopted in 2004, is the result of this work and reflects the political antimilitarist imprint of both parties.\footnote{German Federal Government (2004).} Today it remains the key conceptual keystone for the German crisis and conflict prevention policy.

The adoption of the Action Plan happened relatively late compared with the increasingly prominent German international engagement in crisis management since the early 1990s. This adoption was a political act to address the increasing perception at national and international level that military rather than civilian responses were on the rise in order to deal with international crises and conflicts. It is part and parcel of the current generalisation of prevention in governments across Western Europe and the US since the beginning of the new millennium [prevention mainstreaming].

### 6.1.2. Three key documents define German conflict prevention policy

German crisis and conflict prevention policy is defined by three key documents. These apply to all ministries and government agencies involved in the formulation or implementation of policies for crisis prevention and/or certain of its many facets:

- The coalition treaties that pursue a comprehensive and interconnected approach along the policy line defined by the government of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and the Greens in 1998. The Coalition treaty of October 1998, signed between the SPD and the Greens, underlines the government’s ambition to develop and implement instruments for crisis prevention and develop for this purpose better infrastructure for interdepartmental coordination.\footnote{German Socio-Democratic Party & the Green Party (1998, 43, 46).} The treaty already committed to improving the German contributions for police training and training civilian personnel delegated to international missions (to support civilian efforts during missions of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction).\footnote{German Socio-Democratic Party & the Green Party (1998, 46).}

- The ‘General Concept of the German Government for civil crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peace’ of 2000 defines nine basic principles for the German political crisis and conflict prevention policy and forms the basis for the Action Plan of 2004.\footnote{German Federal Government (2004).}

- The action plan ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding’ was developed from 2000 onwards and adopted in 2004.\footnote{German Socio-Democratic Party & the Green Party (1998, 43, 46).}
The Action Plan reviews instruments for crisis prevention and conflict used by Germany and aims to improve interdepartmental coordination and interoperability with international organisations through 163 measures, in order to obtain a comprehensive and coherent approach, taking into account multiple sources of conflict and socio-economic sources of conflict aggravation. However, the problem of prioritisation among these actions persists until today.

The first part of the Action Plan is conceptual and describes the origins of conflict from a German point of view, and the policy adopted in civil crisis prevention. A second section provides an overview of German involvement in multilateral organisations, a third establishes a list of instruments recommended and used by the government. A final section describes the new institutions created to improve interdepartmental coordination.

From a total of 163 measures to improve policy German prevention, we will retain only the actions proposed to reform the security sector and will make a brief review of their implementation (see Section 5.3.5). Further evaluation of these measures is beyond the scope of this study. In addition, as indicated by some officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 163 measures required by the Action Plan do not represent innovations in most cases, but only a reformulation of policies and actions already pursued in advance by the German government.336

The implementation of the Action Plan is reviewed biannually. Three progress reports have been published since 2004 (in 2006,337 2008,338 and 2010).339 The fourth report is expected in 2012. However, in the last round of coalitional negotiations, the review of the implementation of the action plan was not mentioned anymore.340 We will base our analysis in part on the progress identified by these reports as we discuss each policy instrument in turn.

6.1.3. The Action Plan for Civilian Crisis Prevention adopts a global approach

In line with the General concept, the Action Plan ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding’ is based on a maximalist approach to crisis and conflict prevention. It includes both conflict resolution and peacebuilding.341 The general concept stresses that:

‘Crisis Prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building must be designed together. This applies to both the procedural and structural causes of conflict, as well as to instruments for inter and intra-state crises and conflicts (especially for fragile states)’.342

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341 German Federal Government (2004, 1).
The Action Plan focuses on the destabilising effect of fragile states that is associated with a gradual dissolution of clear phases within conflicts observed since the 1990s. Three initial phases of conflict are identified: the crisis phase, before the emergence of violence, the war phase, during which the systematic use of physical violence becomes the norm, the phase of peace, after stopping violence. The Action Plan recognises that the transition from one phase to another is now becoming increasingly fluid and a large majority of countries, initially considered to have been appeased, quickly relapsed into violence (Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Northern Ireland).

This situation is partly due to the emergence of 'new wars', with often vulnerable to rudimentary state structures. These new wars are characterised by the dominance of warlords, militias, rebels, criminal bands and terrorists, mercenaries and private security companies. For these actors, the fact of keeping alive a conflict or civil war provides an important long-term economic benefit (drugs, smuggling, concealment of weapons, kidnapping, trafficking of women and children, slavery, capturing natural resources such as oil, diamonds, precious woods or Coltan).343

To address this transformation of the nature of conflict, the Action Plan envisages first and foremost the need for a comprehensive approach [comprehensive approach – Vernetzte Sicherheit] promoting multilateral and national civilian instruments to strengthen socio-economic situations as well as the regulatory capacities of fragile states. The Action Plan thus focuses on the need to develop civilian capabilities in fragile states to peacefully handle their conflicts, themselves considered to be a social fact that every society must face.344 Conflicts become a problem once the state cannot guarantee their mediation and peaceful resolution any more. Any crisis or violent conflict is thus conceived by the Action Plan as having its principal origin with partial or total failure of the State.345

The Action Plan and its conceptual approach favours instruments of structural prevention, such as political and socio-economic stability as well as the strengthening of regulatory functions of fragile states.

6.1.4. Defence plays a role within long-term stabilisation efforts

By giving preference to long-term prevention instruments, the Action Plan marginalises the military. It explicitly attributes to military actions a rank subordinated to civil actions and stresses that ‘crisis prevention should be primarily civilian in nature and preferably be implemented as long as possible before the violent aggravation of conflict’.346 However, the Action Plan still grants the military a crucial role in the stabilisation phase to ensure a secure environment so that civilians can advance efforts to resolve conflict and reconstruction.347

The 2006 White Paper on Defence, however, offers somewhat reversed reading priorities compared with the approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs articulated in the Action Plan:

343 German Federal Government (2004, 7–8).
344 German Federal Government (2004, 1, 5).
345 German Federal Government (2004, 1).
347 German Federal Government (2004, 1).
The term “Civilian Crisis Prevention” is not to be understood as a delimitation towards military crisis prevention, but rather includes it. It includes the handling of conflicts before the outbreak of violence, crisis management, and also post-conflict rehabilitation (nation building). It is only through sustainable consolidation of peace and stability and the establishment of ownership on the part of those concerned that the renewed outbreak of conflicts can be prevented.348

For some, the emphasis in the Action Plan on the activities of stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction indicates a change of preferences for Germany.349 But the structural design of the prevention policy that emerges from the Action Plan has remained in fact in the traditional German approach since the end of the Second World War, namely to promote humanitarian and socio-economic development. This approach has since 2004 been complemented by a more specific intent to promote and further strengthen regulatory functions, such as reforms of the security sector.

6.1.5. The Action Plan includes guidance on security sector reforms

German support for reforms of the security sector is based on the training, advice and equipment assistance for military and police. It relies primarily on the guidelines issued by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) (DAC) for the reform of security and governance structures adopted at ministerial level on 16 April 2004.350

However, the Action Plan also contains guidelines for the government’s reforms of the security sector. It seeks to promote the rapid development of local security forces (police and military) to counteract the emergence of wars as an economic model, but equally stresses the importance of democratic control of these forces by parliaments, the executive and the judiciary. An Interdepartmental Working Group for the reform of the security sector was created within the Steering Committee composed of representatives of the Chancellery, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Defence and Development. The working group was tasked by the Steering Committee to develop a framework concept for the German reform of the security sector and contributions aimed at improving the efficiency, coherence and interdepartmental coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, Interior and Development.351 This concept was adopted in October 2006 and is based on three definitions of ‘security’:352

- Security as the absence of endogenous or exogenous threats to territorial integrity, state sovereignty and political and economic order.
- Safety through effective state monopoly to ensure order and the protection of the political, social and economic system against internal enemies.

348 German Federal Ministry of Defence (2006a, 23).
350 OECD DAC (2007).
351 German Federal Government (2004, 26).
• Human security as complementary to the traditional state-centred concept of security; as such, this concept takes into account the immediate living conditions and puts the safety needs of individuals as a priority.

The concept describes the actors of the security sector as well as their goals and approach to support the reform of this sector and highlights the importance of a coherent and coordinated inter-ministerial approach. The subcommittee remains the body in charge of interdepartmental coordination in the field of security sector reform.353

We will examine in more detail the ambitions of the Action Plan in the field and its implementation in the part 6.3.5.

6.1.6. Concluding remarks

The conceptualisation of German prevention policy relies on a logic that identifies fragile states as a key factor hindering sustainable appeasement: strengthening the rule of law is considered to be the key element of successful stabilisation (see Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Conceptualisation of the underlying problem thinning conflict

| Fragile states | War economy favoured | Solution: strengthening sovereign functions |

This effort requires work to resolve underlying ethnic and economic conflict, democratisation and the long-term development and reform of the judiciary as well as the security sector as far as defence is concerned.

6.2. Responsibilities for prevention are shared by multiple actors with complementary roles

In line with the driving idea of an ‘overall approach’ or ‘interconnected’ security, German prevention efforts involve cross-cutting policy in which all departments are involved according to their skills and responsibilities. The participation of the Ministries of Economy, Justice and the Environment can be requested on a case-by-case basis. However, prevention efforts primarily involve the more traditional actors in development and prevention policies such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Development and the Interior. Our analysis focuses primarily on the role of these latter actors.

6.2.1. A range of ministries share responsibility for crisis and conflict prevention

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs focuses on ad hoc rapid response

Within the German government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) and in particular the Department of the United Nations (VN-02) is responsible for interdepartmental coordination and project management of crisis and conflict prevention. Its responsibilities include decisions regarding intervention as well as final determination of the actions and financial resources devoted to preventive or rapid response action. While this is the norm, there are two exceptions. The current engagement in Afghanistan is subject to independent management by a cell reporting directly to the Minister and headed by a senior official (Secretary of State) with direct monitoring from the Chancellery. The current commitment at the European level also has a separate budget line and is managed by the E02 Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to crisis and conflict prevention is characterised by a lack of general strategy and instead focuses on ad hoc rapid response activity. A regional focus suggested by current events can then lead to interdepartmental consultation through a task force chaired by the VN-02 office. With the exception of concentrated provision of training and equipment for the African continent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not define in advance key areas in which a possible intervention is seen as a priority. Intervention decisions are made according to the availability of funds and public attention generated by the media at any given time.

The Ministry of Development and Development Agency supports structural prevention efforts

Many activities of the Ministry of Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) are related to structural prevention. These areas include the reduction of poverty, supporting education, health, democratic governance, support for the rule of law, human rights, strengthening civil society, economic development, rural development and migration issues. The role of the BMZ in the context of conflict resolution is led by its Agency for Technical Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), which provides:

- Technical advisors who assist local governments in the implementation of structural and institutional reforms.
- Financial support for local projects.
- Ongoing formal training.

The Ministry of the Interior supports police involved in security sector reforms

The Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium für Inneres) is responsible for the administration of police assistance in support of security sector reforms. The German government explicitly supports police training and provides assistance for equipment once a commitment to the training programme is

354 German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Konfliktbearbeitung: Gewaltfreie Lösungen entwickeln'.

79
undertaken by both parties. The ministry, however, must overcome a number of problems to mobilise German police for a mission:

- The department must above all consider the Länder (the 16 federal subdivisions of Germany): two thirds of the contributions of German police personnel in international missions is provided directly by the Länder. At the same time, the Länder must continue to contribute to the annual numbers of the federal police, thus putting an extra strain on the already small pool of police officers.
- The department is struggling to mobilise volunteers with adequate professional profiles. It is difficult to find police with international experience and language and intercultural skills for missions abroad. In addition, professional or financial incentives are still lacking.

**Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr are particularly involved in crisis management and stabilisation interventions**

The Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, BMV) and the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) are primarily responsible for crisis management (separation of the parties in conflict, peacekeeping) and stabilisation efforts (guaranteeing post-conflict security to facilitate civilian stabilisation efforts and training of armed forces regarding security reforms). Germany has no rapid response troops regardless of existing structures within NATO (NATO Response Force, NRF) and the EU (Battlegroups).

The actions of the Bundeswehr in prevention are primarily described by the 2006 White Paper on Defence. The Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr are committed to prevention and resolution of long-term conflict in accordance with international law and German constitutional law, if necessary by peacekeeping missions. The White Paper states that the policy of German security and defence is based on a comprehensive concept of security, a so-called 'networked' (vernetzter Ansatz) approach. This approach is characterised by an integration of policy, military, economic, humanitarian and development prevention instruments, as well as police and intelligence instruments in the field. The White Paper considers that the Action Plan is a key part of building such a network approach. German security and defence policy is characterised by a strong preference for multilateral action.

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356 The provision of police for missions beyond national borders is granted through a financial line called ‘Königstein’ (Königsteiner Schlüssel). This line is renegotiated each year and sets the police involvement in Bun by Land on the basis of joint funding. For a specific financial year, the key is defined as a function of the amount of taxed income two years prior to that year as well as a function of the level of population in the Länder for that same year. See: German Joint Science Conference (2012).
359 German Federal Ministry of Defence (2006a, 6, 21).
360 German Federal Ministry of Defence (2006a, 123).
361 German Federal Ministry of Defence (2006a, 23).
the 2011 Defence Guidelines emphasise that in the short- to medium-term, top German military priorities are conflict prevention and management at the international level, including the fight against terrorism. Supporting partners or alliances and protecting German citizens are secondary priorities in the White Paper.362

New concepts and doctrine are currently under development in the context of recent reforms to the Bundeswehr. These reforms, in progress since 2010, have led to the abolition of military service and introduced the professionalisation of the armed forces.

Unlike France, the United States or the United Kingdom, and largely for historical reasons, the Bundeswehr does not have exhaustive doctrines that formulate the principles of defence policy at the political-strategic level in order to derive principles and practices for the three services at the operational and tactical levels.363 However, ongoing efforts to professionalise it have led to attempts to adopt a more articulated doctrinaire approach and documents are currently under development.

According to an internal paper of the Ministry of Defence, crisis management in the broadest sense of the term is divided into four phases, captured in Table 6.1. Operational prevention (short-term) takes place only in the first two phases of crisis management, through the early identification of an emerging crisis in the attempt to prevent it from worsening.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Phase of conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early identification of an emerging crisis</td>
<td>Underlying conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis prevention</td>
<td>Open conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis mitigation</td>
<td>Crisis or armed altercation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conflict stabilisation</td>
<td>Open conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to departmental design, a number of prevention efforts fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. These are captured in Table 6.2.

**Early identification of an emerging crisis**: In order to contribute upstream to identify emerging crises, the armed forces and the Ministry use partnerships and bilateral and multilateral cooperation activities, as well as dialogues between the General Staffs of partner nations. These formal relationships play a continuous role throughout the different phases of a conflict. The Military Intelligence Service and the geo-information service of the Bundeswehr (the latter providing, among other things, geographic and weather and climate information) contribute to early warning efforts

**Crisis prevention**: The role of the Ministry of Defence in crisis prevention can be summarised into six tools:

- **Arms control**: Under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Bundeswehr ensures German government commitments in the field of arms control.

362 German Federal Ministry of Defence (2006a, 6).
363 Rassaerts (2011, 1).
• **Partnerships and cooperation**: Bilateral cooperation and integration into international structures enhance the exchange of experiences and support measures for crisis prevention.

• **Information sharing**: Intelligence services and the geo-information service of the *Bundeswehr* enable the sharing of key information.

• **Consulting, training support and military equipment**: Military and some military advisers (including infantry and military police) assist in the establishment and training of the security forces of a country and help establish security.

• **Imposition of UN sanctions**: Military presence, the demonstration of military force, the implementation of a blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces contribute to the implementation of UN sanctions.

• **Evacuation missions**: The *Bundeswehr* supports the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to carry out rescue operations and the evacuation of German nationals living in areas of crisis.

**Crisis mitigation** is based on civil-military cooperation and humanitarian aid. It involves support for a stable and secure environment, joint demonstration of political power, military intelligence, communication, operational information and evacuation of nationals.

**Post-conflict stabilisation** includes disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) as well as arms control, security and maintenance of public order (if the police is not present or able to act, the military fulfils these tasks). In addition, the *Bundeswehr* remains committed to the area of security sector reform by providing advice and assistance to military training, supporting civil-military cooperation and humanitarian aid, and ensuring the safety of air navigation.
Table 6.2: Summary of the types of instruments used by the German Ministry of Defence to address the conflict cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Early identification of an emerging crisis</td>
<td>- Partnerships and bilateral and multilateral cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Military intelligence services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Crisis prevention</td>
<td>- Arms control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mediation through partnerships and bilateral cooperation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Information services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Council support for training and military equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Imposition of UN sanctions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Missions evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Crisis mitigation</td>
<td>- Civil-military cooperation and humanitarian aid</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Support transport</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The interposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Contributing to a stable and secure environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The joint demonstration of political power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Military intelligence, communication and operative information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The evacuation of nationals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Post-conflict stabilisation</td>
<td>- Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and arms control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Securing and maintaining public order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The reforms of the security sector in the work of advice and assistance to military training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Civil-military cooperation and humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ensuring the safety of air navigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2.2. Recruitment and training initiatives are underway to support prevention personnel

The Centre for International Peace (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF) was created in 2002. The ZIF works under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was founded in response to the government’s inability to meet Germany’s political commitment to the OSCE to provide 10 per cent of civilian personnel to contribute to international missions. The ZIF is primarily responsible for the selection, recruitment and assignment of delegated positions in international organisations, but it also provides training for civilian experts and military police.

The ZIF offers a recruitment pool of deployable civilian experts

The ZIF offers a recruitment pool for civilian personnel and officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, the Interior and Justice for national posts seconded to the UN and the European Union. An equally important function is to support the training of civilian management and integration of training courses with the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Justice to standardise curriculum, knowledge
At its inception in 2002, the pool had only 400 staff members from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Today, the pool comprises about 1,360 civilian experts, with 220 to 230 constantly deployed in an operational capacity.

The selection process begins with the issuance of a call for contributions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ZIF then proposes candidates from its pool to the AA.

**A joint platform harmonises training for the Ministries of Development, Defence and the Interior**

The ZIF also serves as a training facility for civilians, police and military sent on a mission. The ZIF recently created a training platform in cooperation with the Ministries for Development, Defence and the Interior to harmonise and synchronise training. This platform includes fields such as intercultural skills and mentoring. The harmonisation effort applies primarily to the development of common curricula and concepts. The actors involved are the three police schools of the Ministry of Interior (Lbeck, Wertheim, and Brühl Führungsakademie), the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Development.

**6.2.3. Efforts to improve interdepartmental management have been mixed, with more success in enhancing civil-military cooperation than inter-ministerial coordination**

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is carried out without any special mechanism within the German government. Representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consulted for this study stressed that problems in civil-military cooperation are no longer as pronounced as in the late 1990s, following a mutual learning process that has taken place over the last 10–15 years. There are two main factors that contributed to this process: (1) a less central role attributed to CIMIC doctrine, accompanied by stronger civil-military cooperation fostered by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, and (2) more inter-ministerial and civil-military entities.

According to representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Bundeswehr has had a steep learning curve concerning the implementation of the CIMIC doctrine since its engagement in Kosovo. While the military initially insisted that it should assume full responsibility for CIMIC missions and their civilian components, the Bundeswehr has gradually come to reduce its involvement in such missions. With the exception of Afghanistan, ‘CIMIC’ missions have been almost completely discontinued. The Bundeswehr now limits its role to guaranteeing the security of missions and protection of local civilians, while contributing selectively to reconstruction efforts as determined by the defence budget.

CIMIC activities are still primarily used as an aid for building the confidence of the local population in order to facilitate the acceptance of the Armed Forces and to extract information. For example, some operations still take place within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

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mission in Afghanistan, while no CIMIC operation remains relevant in the context of the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) mission in Kosovo.365

Interdepartmental training programmes organised by the ZIF and the *Führungsakademie* (with the participation of specialists from all departments and non-governmental organisations) have also improved civil-military relations as it has been possible to establish mutual acculturation. To improve cooperation, joint training curricula have been promoted steadily under the alternating control of the Ministry of Defence and GIZ.366

**New institutional structures are in place to enhance interdepartmental coordination**

The adoption of the Action Plan ‘Civil Crisis Prevention’ is accompanied by the creation of a series of institutions whose purpose was to improve cooperation and interdepartmental coordination. As a first step, each ministry has selected leaders among units or departments representative for prevention.

The Action Plan establishes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main coordinator of various departmental activities in the field of prevention. This responsibility is shown in the creation of a High Representative with the rank of Ambassador for Civil Crisis Prevention within the Ministry. The main additional structures created by the action plan are:

- **The Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee** – The Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee [*Ressortkreis Zivile Krisenprävention*] was established in 2004 and brings together various crisis prevention representatives. The Committee is chaired by the High Representative for Prevention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Committee’s main task is to ensure and coordinate the implementation of the Action Plan. It is primarily an information and coordination structure, not a commanding body at the political or operational level. By the end of 2012, the Committee had not yet set a concrete policy strategy in the field of prevention. While the need to strengthen policy is often mentioned, links with management levels still need to be developed. The Committee meets every six weeks to monitor the implementation of the Action Plan and to ensure a better exchange of information, particularly with regard to early warning.367

- **Advisory Committee** – To improve the integration of civilian actors in German prevention policy, the Advisory Committee for Civilian Crisis Prevention has also been established to support interdepartmental processes by providing expertise in the field of prevention. The Advisory Committee consists of 19 representatives from civil society, non-governmental organisations, industry, religious entities, political foundations and academic experts. The Advisory Committee meets twice a year.368

367 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Nationale Strukturen’.
368 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Nationale Strukturen’.
Structures for improving interdepartmental coordination were met with mixed responses within government

**Inter-ministerial concept for the management of fragile states**

German action on crisis and conflict prevention at a civil-military and interdepartmental level is guided by the ‘Interdepartmental guidelines for fragile states’ [Leitlinien Fragile Staatlichkeit], adopted in April 2012. These apply mainly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the four departments analysed here.

**Steering Committee and High Representative**

The Steering Committee for the Prevention of Crises does not currently hold a hierarchical level high enough to have real political impact. In the current state, the Ressortkreis zivile Krisenprävention can only give impulses without real political consequence.369

The Ministry of Defence also criticises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for having prevented the proper functioning of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee by not replacing the High Representative and by decreasing institutional and political support through a severe reduction of its participation in the meetings.

The role of High Representative has been diminished significantly since 2010. While the first High Representative for crisis and conflict prevention strongly marked and defined its role, the second representative has reduced its commitment due to other tasks that were entrusted to him with the launch of the Partnership for Transformation (to financially support the current democratic transition of Maghreb countries). The position has not been refilled since the second High Representative failed to fulfil its duties.370

**Regional Working Groups/Taskforces**

Since the publication of the Action Plan in 2004, the AA has created two taskforces that aim to improve interdepartmental coordination and promote a more comprehensive and interdependent approach to address a conflict fully. These working groups take a ‘network’ approach and focus on specific geographic regions. The first working group on Sudan was created mainly in response to pressure on the Parliamentary Sub-Committee. In March-April 2012, a second working group on the South Sahel was created.371 Each ministry participates in such taskforces by sending its regional specialists. Depending on the subject to be addressed, other ministries may be asked to participate under specific circumstances.372

A frequent criticism of this tool is its lack of visibility outside of the MFA, even within the political community in question (ZIF). Internally, especially from the point of view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the instrument is often considered to be a duplication of frequent and routine interdepartmental meetings. Its added value is not obvious to officials. Some officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Crisis and conflict prevention strategies: actually believe that these new instruments provide no added value.373 Other officials believe that a lack of coordination and transparency still characterises many actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notwithstanding the creation of new formats such as coordination and cooperation taskforces.

6.2.4. The monitoring and evaluation of prevention programmes needs to improve

There is a strong need to improve the evaluation culture around the German commitment to crisis prevention. Current evaluation efforts are being managed individually by departments and practices vary significantly. Evaluation is nevertheless a growing point of interest within the government. Current thinking favours inter-ministerial methods of monitoring and evaluation that require an assessment around the time of completion of a project or action.

The German government participates in several collective evaluation processes involving a large number of donor agencies. These include the evaluation of conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives taking place in southern Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.374 Since 2006, an evaluation effort has been ongoing in northeast Afghanistan, where the government is working with the Free University of Berlin [Freie Universität Berlin] to assess the impact of governmental actions.375 The main purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether cooperation in the field of development policy managed to improve the legitimacy of the Afghan government, perceived levels of safety and acceptance of the peace mission.376

6.3. Conflict prevention instruments are numerous but suffer from a lack of coordination

Germany’s bilateral commitment to structural prevention is marked by the actions of the Ministries of Development and Foreign Affairs. In this section we only discuss instruments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt, AA), although the Ministry of Development also plays an important role in the structural prevention of crises. Between 2008 and 2009, the Ministry of Development dispensed 54 per cent of multilateral and bilateral funds for Official Development Assistance (ODA), which includes preventive measures.377 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the next largest provider of ODA, contributed only 7 per cent of the funds for the same period. The Ministries of Defence and the Interior followed in tenth and eleventh position respectively, each contributing no more than 0.1 per cent of ODA funds.378 It

374 German Federal Government (2010, 74).
376 German Federal Government (2010, 74-5).
377 This percentage corresponds to $5.2 billion, of which $3.2 billion were spent bilaterally and $2.1 billion multilaterally. Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘Mittelherkunft der bi- und multilateralen ODA (2008–2009)’, internal document.
follows that the contributions of these two departments are confined to their core business of providing training and military support in defence crisis management missions.\textsuperscript{379}

6.3.1. The Action Plan identifies concrete instruments for preventing violence and mediating conflict

The Action Plan identifies major categories of strategic action to pursue a comprehensive approach to ensure effective structural prevention:

- Development of international law.
- Development of law-enforcement mechanisms (among others through the International Criminal Court).
- Disarmament and arms control.
- Promotion of human rights.
- Strengthening the instruments of sanctions.
- Policy development.

In a narrower sense, the concrete instruments are:

- Instruments for the Prevention of Violence:\textsuperscript{380}
  - Measures to reform the political system.
  - Measures to strengthen trust between parties in conflict (confidence-building measures).
  - Measures to develop the structures of the rule of law and the sovereign functions of the state and civil society.

- Strategies for civil mediation in conflicts:\textsuperscript{381}
  - Measures to strengthen the communication between conflicting parties.
  - Mediation.

- Strategies for peace:
  - Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants (DDR).
  - Return of refugees and reconstruction of economic structures.
  - Support for democratisation and the establishment of a rule of law.
  - Reconciliation.

\textsuperscript{379} German Federal Government (2004, 91).
\textsuperscript{380} German Federal Government (2004, 6).
\textsuperscript{381} German Federal Government (2004, 7).
6.3.2. Systems of early warning and conflict identification suffer from a lack of coordinated analysis

The Action Plan recognises that the risk of worsening conflict is often known well in advance, but the mobilisation of preventive instruments is often made only after the eruption of violence has mobilised media attention and, through this, public opinion.\textsuperscript{382} It therefore underlines explicitly the need for early warning structures.

Early warning is negotiated by various structures within each department as well as at an inter-ministerial level, depending on the type of crisis. The most common tools to manage prevention in a crisis management context are:

- Management of diplomatic emergencies by the Crisis Response Centre of the AA.
- Organisation of internal security meetings at the inter-ministerial level.
- Routine meetings with the secret services in the Chancellery.

Since the adoption of the Action Plan, the quantity of information provided by the intelligence services has increased and cooperation between different intelligence services has intensified.\textsuperscript{383}

A number of governmental warning mechanisms exist, including the Crisis Response Centre

In the event of civil crisis or natural disasters abroad, the Crisis Response Centre has a warning function and can trigger a meeting of the federal Crises Cabinet (Krisenstab).\textsuperscript{384} Although not immediately applicable to prevention efforts, warning systems are also present in the National Centre for Situational Analysis on Safety in Airspace (Nationales Lage- und Führungszentrum 'Sicherheit im Luftraum') and the Counter-Terrorism Centre (Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum).

With regard to early warning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (especially the VN-02 Department) identifies emerging crises in close cooperation with its regional divisions. It also works in close coordination with embassies to establish a list of potential conflict areas and emerging crises where intervention may become necessary in the short and medium term.

Coordinated response is challenged by departments’ diverse approaches to identifying and analysing conflict

Indicators of crises used by the Department of Development are strongly based on the ODA criteria according to the OECD model. By contrast, indicators used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focus on changing power relations within societies.

Although these approaches are in fact complementary, the lack of shared analysis and criteria makes coordinated consideration of upstream emerging crises difficult. Although interdepartmental guidelines

\textsuperscript{382} German Federal Government (2004, 1, 5).
\textsuperscript{383} German Federal Ministry of Defence (2006b, 25).
\textsuperscript{384} German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Das Krisenreaktionszentrum’.

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on the management of fragile states have already led to a more regular flow and wider dissemination of analysis among departments, the problem of a plurality of analysis systems is still present.  

Identification of impending crises thus remains a major problem for the German government. The Ministry of Defence has submitted a proposal for coordination of intelligence and information circulated by the intelligence services (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) to certify assessment approaches. This proposal is aimed at establishing a ranking or rating of information disclosed by the BND, with each department assigning a severity score to the impending crises described. Using a threshold of negative ratings, an emergency meeting is convened to analyse the situation more accurately before referring the case to the government. However, this proposal has not been achieved due to lack of political support and institutional reluctance in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes a more reactive than proactive approach in ‘preventive’ actions  

The prioritisation, funding and implementation of projects are decided by the VN-02 Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The criteria considered are:  

- Willingness to act in the crisis region.  
- Availability of funds (as well as prioritisation of areas in which to intervene if necessary).  
- Relevance of the region or the crisis in the media/national political discourse.  
- Relational/historical responsibilities.  
- International law considerations and responsibility to protect (R2P).  

Preventive considerations are rarely present in the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its so-called preventive actions remain mainly reactive in nature. Most activities are therefore confined to peacekeeping, stabilisation activities, reconstruction and development.  

In selecting methods of prevention, regional divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs establish a list of possible, necessary and feasible actions based on their regional expertise. On this basis, the VN-02 division scans the database of NGOs’ proposals for services deemed necessary and for which no offer has yet been submitted. The department then plays a project management role.  

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6.3.3. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence support democratisation and election observation missions

In the area of preventive action (operational and structural), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established an elaborate system of bilateral grants to governments and non-governmental organisations in the sector. Beyond bilateral financial assistance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also provides funding and support for the activities of international organisations (such as the UN Democratisation Fund) and initiatives of the OSCE, Council of Europe and the European Union (including through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights).\(^\text{391}\) The Ministry is also active in observing elections and supporting democratisation. In these categories, it is particularly active in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

The Ministry of Defence actively supports democratisation in countries experiencing transition and post-conflict reconstruction. The department only supports the democratisation work already underway through the German bilateral development policy. Currently, the Middle East is particularly supported in the field of democracy assistance through the 'Partnership for transformation'.\(^\text{392}\) The goals of democratisation assistance are, among others, the support of state institutions, electoral assistance (material assistance, training of assistants and local election observers, public education) and election observation (election observer delegation under international observation missions of the European Union and the OSCE).\(^\text{393}\)

6.3.4. The German government provides grants to support thematic prevention aims

Since 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided financial support to international organisations and non-governmental organisations to subsidise measures of prevention, peacekeeping and conflict resolution.\(^\text{394}\) Its political crisis prevention policy includes free donations to UN trust funds such as the Peacebuilding Fund. Particular interest is currently given to projects related to strengthening the rule of law through training, promoting gender equality and women in conflict resolution, and reintegrating child soldiers and ex-combatants. However, the Ministry states that financial support for such projects is not mandatory and that the allocation of funds is based on the quality of the projects and the funds placed at its disposal.\(^\text{395}\) The Foreign Ministry also supports non-governmental organisations in the implementation of the Action Plan on Civil Crisis Prevention, including the ZIVIK fund that finances projects worth €250,000.\(^\text{396}\)

\(^{391}\) German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Massnahmen der Krisenprävention und Konfliktbewältigung’ (note 50).

\(^{392}\) German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Massnahmen der Krisenprävention und Konfliktbewältigung’ (note 50).

\(^{393}\) German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Massnahmen der Krisenprävention und Konfliktbewältigung’.

\(^{394}\) German Federal Foreign Office (2011).

\(^{395}\) German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Massnahmen der Krisenprävention und Konfliktbewältigung’.

\(^{396}\) German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Massnahmen der Krisenprävention und Konfliktbewältigung’.
The German government also contributes to the development of structures for crisis prevention in areas considered unstable by supporting relevant regional organisations. For example, it funded the creation of an early warning mechanism for the African Union.397

6.3.5. Security sector reform focuses on supporting local military and police

In the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR), the Action Plan includes measures to be implemented in four main areas:398

- **Democratic control:** The Action Plan recommends improving government actions to support democratic reforms for the security sector, particularly through integration of appropriate measures within development projects (for example administrative reforms, democartisation, demobilisation and reintegration). Ethics training for democratic control must also be promoted more clearly when the delegation of military and police advisors provides training support to local military personnel.

- **Local capacity for crisis management:** In the context of military training, the emphasis is on the development of local military capabilities, which contribute to the prevention and management of crises. In this case, military equipment will be provided to regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa so that they can gradually build up the capacity to perform peacekeeping operations themselves.

- **Support activities for police training** as well as assistance in training of border guards and customs.

- **Budget transparency** in terms of improving income and expenditure transparency in the field of security sector reforms.

A variety of SSR actions have been implemented since 2004

Supporting the rule of law and police training is a central element of the bilateral financial support for projects on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior.399 Among other missions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds initial and continuous training for judges and lawyers, advises police and contributes to building and strengthening an independent judiciary. It also supports democratic control of the security forces, advises legislators, provides support for the reconciliation process and provides financial assistance for the development of an active civil society.400

After adoption of the Action Plan, the government has offered support primarily through its development policy. Projects related to legislative reform, justice and prison services have been funded. Bilateral aid recipient countries were, among others, Chile (Prison Service) and Paraguay (judicial reform). Other projects have focused on establishing early warning capabilities for ministries and regional governments

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397 German Federal Government (2010, 57).
399 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Polizeiaufbau’.
400 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Polizeiaufbau’.
and supporting efforts by civil society and Parliament to exercise democratic control of the security sector (e.g. in Indonesia and Bolivia).

The military has contributed to SSR by providing training, equipment and strategic advice. During the last decade, military contributions in the field of SSR focused on the following activities:

- **Support to military training** in the processes of democratisation in Eastern Europe, the new members of NATO and bilateral partnerships (from 77 in 2004 to 87 in 2010). Military training takes place on the basis of bilateral agreements with the Bundeswehr. Since the process of democratisation and integration into NATO have stabilised, the Ministry of Defence has established training support as a clear priority, helping build capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations and crisis management in regional and multinational organisations. The Bundeswehr has also been involved in the basic training of the Afghan police (checks, patrols, how to behave during an arrest) to compensate for problems related to deploying German police in a war zone. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr regularly contributes to this task by sending members of the military police (Feldjäger) to support the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) mission.

- **Deploying military advisers** in order to support the construction and reorganisation of departments and their staff and to develop the organisation and logistical structures of the armed forces. This kind of activity is particularly designed to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of the African Union.

- **Bilateral and multilateral relations** to enhance or supplement the activities of German cooperation in international forums, including the establishment of military contacts at the institutional, general staff level.

- **Bilateral cooperation** for military dialogue and exercises, combined training curriculum, or meetings of expert groups. In 2005, a total of 450 measures were endorsed with 23 states of southeast Europe and the former Soviet republics. Bilateral cooperation with the new members of NATO was completed in 2006. Bilateral cooperation programmes currently exist with Egypt, Argentina, Australia, Chile, China, Pakistan, South Africa, Tunisia and Vietnam. For these states, about 80 initiatives were carried out in 2005.

- **Support for equipment** is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by the Ministry of Defence. The quadriannual programmes are adopted by the Bundestag. For the period 2005–2008, assistance focused on improving local infrastructure and civil training of army members in beneficiary countries. Since 2007, the primary purpose of this assistance has been to strengthen the capabilities of states and regional organisations to contribute effectively to peace missions conducted alone or through participation in

401 German Federal Ministry of Defence (2006b, 58–9).
international missions. Strengthening national, regional or sub-regional crisis prevention and peacekeeping capacities has thus become a priority. For the period 2008–2012, these efforts have been particularly active in Africa (Botswana, Djibouti, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, South Africa). Beyond the African continent, equipment support was also conducted in Afghanistan and Yemen. Aid to Yemen, Namibia and Tanzania focused on the construction of military hospitals. In Afghanistan, it focused on the construction of a school of mechanics and drivers as well as a school of logistics. As of December 2012, experts were still currently present in Senegal, Nigeria, Djibouti, Tunisia and Mauritania to attend the completion of projects. For the period 2009–2012, €30 million was made available for these activities (2005–2008: €19.35 million).

The German government has demonstrated a commitment to supporting police forces abroad

The German government is also committed to the training of police forces, primarily through sending advisers and police experts in the context of peacekeeping and international police missions and through bilateral cooperation in training and equipment. In the period 2004–2006, such support primarily took the form of training for police and border guards. For this period, the department sent experts and police to Afghanistan, to some prospective candidates for the European Union, to the states of south-west Europe and to Central Asia. Since September 2006, an advisory mission has been established for Lebanon and the concept of ‘border guard’ has been developed and implemented in the north.

In addition to its involvement in crisis zones, the Ministry of Interior is also pursuing an ‘anticipation strategy’ to combat crime and sees upstream capacity building in fragile states as a preventive measure for Germany’s national safety. In 2006, the Ministry of the Interior implemented bilateral aid programmes totalling €16.9 million.

In 2010, Germany provided a total of 270 police officers for about 12 international police missions including four UN missions (United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), United Nation Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)) and seven EU missions (European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Georgia, EUPOL Afghanistan, EU BAM Moldova/Ukraine, European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS Palestine, EUPM in BiH and European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Palestine). One third of this total was funded by the Bund, the remainder by the Länder. In 2012, Germany participated with about 340 police officers in eleven police missions of the UN and the European Union, and the team of German police in

408 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Polizeiaufbau’.
409 German Federal Government (2010, 29).
410 German Federal Government (2010, 22).
As of December 2012, almost two thirds of the German police deployed in international missions are stationed in Afghanistan. In 2002, the German government pledged to be the lead nation responsible for the training of the Afghan police.

### 6.4. Funding for conflict prevention is shared by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development

In Germany, funding for crisis prevention activities is provided by three main channels:

- **The budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a credit line specifically dedicated to ‘supporting international action in the field of crisis prevention, the maintenance of peace and conflict resolution’. It includes a ‘special fund for crises’.
- Different budget lines that are part of the budget of the Ministry of Defence in direct or indirect relation to prevention.
- Various budget lines that are part of the budget of the Ministry of Development. Discussions concerning the creation of an instrument for interdepartmental funding were not successful as of December 2012.

#### 6.4.1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides both short- and long-term funding

This budget line was created in 2001 and supports a number of activities related to the prevention of crises:

- Mandatory contributions to international organisations.
- Free contributions or those linked to specific tasks for thematic or regional funds.
- Project financing.
- Contributions in kind or personnel to peacekeeping missions of the UN and the EU.
- Support to international action in the fields of crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding undertaken by state or non-state actors, including the IFA-Zivik funds with which the Ministry of Finance finances projects of up to €250,000.
- Sending staff delegated to international organisations such as the UN or the OSCE and the EU, as well as material SSR contributions (which are related either to the expertise or technical equipment for building police and military capabilities).

This budget line is the main source of funding specifically dedicated to prevention activities in the short and long term. It is managed by the VN 02 Ministry of Foreign Affairs unit. These amounts include funding support for German military engagements in crisis zones or for civilian post-conflict engagement during the conflict resolution phase. They also include measures of post-conflict stabilisation for missions.

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411 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Polizeiaufbau’.
413 German Federal Government (2010, 69).
in which Germany is not militarily engaged. German financial contributions relate primarily to Africa and the Near and Middle East.\textsuperscript{414}

The Crisis Fund of an annual amount of €25 million is a rapid response instrument that is to allow the government to act quickly and appropriately in the case of the emergence of a conflict. It should facilitate rapid contributions to peacekeeping or stabilisation with a prompt start at the multilateral level as well as swift action limited in time [Quick impact].\textsuperscript{415}

Table 6.3: Funding crisis prevention and conflict by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in millions of euros)\textsuperscript{416}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crisis prevention, peacekeeping and conflict resolution</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>120*</td>
<td>94,2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy assistance, equipment and promotion of human rights</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training partnership</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>2,5</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 partnership for reform of the security sector in Africa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAE contributions to stabilising Afghanistan and Europe Southeast</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>115,7</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*An additional €30 million were allocated to the new ‘Transformation partnerships’ programme to support the transition process in the Middle East.

The budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specially dedicated to the prevention of crises and conflicts has seen a significant increase between 2007 and 2010 (see Figure 6.2). It has recently undergone a relative decline from a peak of €130 million to about €95 million forecasted for fiscal year 2013. This decrease was primarily due to a realignment of budget lines in favour of the ‘Partnership for Transformation’ which is a fund dedicated in 2011 to the transformation process in the Middle East and which is financed annually with €30 million.

\textsuperscript{414} Ibid. (p68).
\textsuperscript{415} German Federal Government (2008, 85).
\textsuperscript{416} German Federal Ministry for Finances, “Bundesaushalt 2009–2012”, “Haushaltsentwurf 2013”.
The general evolution of the various budget lines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in prevention is marked by the privileged funding of stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan (see Figure 6.3) and by a strong difference between the funding specifically dedicated to prevention and the funding of assistance to training and equipment. However, this difference is not surprising given the dominant responsibility of the military and the police in this field.

6.4.2. The Ministry of Defence is a relatively minor funder

Given its limited involvement, the Ministry of Defence has no dedicated budget line reserved exclusively for prevention. It finances only a relatively small portion of said prevention activities. In 2010, for example, contributions from several generic budget lines (personnel cost, dedicated to various crisis management operations, lines, etc.) mainly funded:
The structural prevention of crises in Afghanistan (ISAF), Bosnia (EUFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) (€10 million).

- CIMIC personnel costs (€2.6 million).
- Material donations for medical and social institutions (€251,510).
- Assistance following natural disasters (€4.77 million).417

Nevertheless, reforms of the security sector have their own funding (see Table 6.3). The latest CIMIC activities currently underway in Afghanistan are funded by a separate budget line that we include here only for offering a comparison to dedicated funding to Afghanistan with generic prevention activities. Beyond this example, however, we do not take into account the financing of crisis management operations, bilateral military relations or the financing of intelligence instruments in relation to early warning.

The interlocutors of the German Ministry of Defence noted that, apart from a budget line based on donations (see Table 6.4) and money dedicated to crisis management interventions, the Department has no additional resources dedicated directly or indirectly to the prevention of crises.

From 2007 to 2008, the Ministry of Defence funded a section entitled ‘structural crisis prevention’ [Strukturelle Krisenvorsorge], that was approximately worth €4 million per year. From 2009 this line was removed. Training foreign armed forces peaked between 2007 and 2009 and had since declined in funding to approximately €3 million p.a. (see Table 6.4). Specific contributions to reconstruction in Afghanistan are much higher than generic funds dedicated to global prevention.

Table 6.4: Key budget lines of the Ministry of Defence related to prevention (in millions or thousands of euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financing training of foreign militaries</td>
<td>3m</td>
<td>4.7m</td>
<td>4.7m</td>
<td>3.7m</td>
<td>3.7m</td>
<td>3.2m</td>
<td>3m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions for reconstruction, Faizabad, Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.4m</td>
<td>52m</td>
<td>40m</td>
<td>40m</td>
<td>40m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil preventive activities funded on the basis of donations (€ thousands)</td>
<td>259,000</td>
<td>182,000</td>
<td>595,000</td>
<td>297,000</td>
<td>267,000</td>
<td>144,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 2006 to 2008 the Ministry of Defence has also funded projects selected by the Steering Committee for the prevention of crises for a total of approximately €10 million. These measures have been developed in partnership with other departments involved in the prevention effort (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, Development and Environment). Approximately €5 million were used to fund projects.

in Afghanistan, in the provinces of Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan. The remaining funding was used for projects in the Caucasus, Mali and Cambodia, for example.418

Some of these projects were part of the interdepartmental cooperation implemented under the Provincial Development Funds (PDF). Funding civilians through PDF projects was mainly carried out in the logic of CIMIC doctrine (see below), that is to say, the legitimising of a civil commitment for military forces power.419 In 2010, the costs for these PDF were divided as follows among the departments involved in the prevention department of foreign affairs (1 million), Defence (1 million) and Development (0.5 million). These projects include measures such as development assistance in the agricultural domain, the guarantee of access to drinking water, education, infrastructure, as well as assistance in the fields of transport and energy.420

6.4.3. The Ministry of Development focuses on funding initiatives that contribute to structural prevention

Expenditure of the Department of Development on crisis prevention is not dedicated specifically to focused preventive efforts but rather to political and economic development that we have considered as part of structural prevention for the purposes of this study.

Table 6.5: Expenditure of the Ministry of Development related to crisis prevention and conflict (23 Einzelplan 2007–2013, in millions and billions of euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of social structures</td>
<td>31m</td>
<td>33.5m</td>
<td>39.5m</td>
<td>41.5m</td>
<td>41.5m</td>
<td>42m</td>
<td>42m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development assistance for emergency or transitional</td>
<td>91.5m</td>
<td>91.5m</td>
<td>129m</td>
<td>129m</td>
<td>129m</td>
<td>129m</td>
<td>49m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral financial cooperation</td>
<td>1.2b</td>
<td>1.4b</td>
<td>1.5b</td>
<td>1.6b</td>
<td>1.7b</td>
<td>1.9b</td>
<td>1.6b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral technical cooperation</td>
<td>700m</td>
<td>730m</td>
<td>780m</td>
<td>864m</td>
<td>864m</td>
<td>1.1b</td>
<td>1.1b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional financial cooperation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>126m</td>
<td>120m</td>
<td>120m</td>
<td>80m</td>
<td>80m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Due to the incapacity to further differentiate data, the Ministry of Development has nominally the largest budget compared with funding from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. We considered five budget lines, namely:

- The promotion of social structures.
- Development assistance for emergency or transition.
- Bilateral financial cooperation.
- Bilateral technical cooperation.
- Regional financial cooperation.

We observe the following trends:

- Expenses for the promotion of local social structures have increased steadily since 2007, though without increases as important as in other sectors.
- Aid for emergency or transition also increased steadily since 2007.
- Expenses for bilateral financial cooperation have evolved €1.2 billion in 2007 to almost 2 billion by 2012. Bilateral technical cooperation also marked a significant increase from €700 million in 2007 to just over €1 billion in 2012.
- Regional financial cooperation has, however, decreased for the period 2009 to 2012, falling from €126 million to €80 million during this period.

6.5. Concluding remarks

This chapter has discussed recent reforms in German conflict and crisis prevention presented on the backdrop of Germany’s post-Second World War political context. Considering the post-war trends in German foreign and defence policy, it is not surprising that attempts to improve the policies and structures of conflict and crisis prevention are highly concentrated on structural prevention to the detriment of an approach privileging military means. The Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention from 2004 clearly accentuates the importance of stabilising countries through economic and social development, as well as through reforms of the security sector.

German strategy focuses particularly on supporting SSR and providing equipment and training. The implementation of the civilian aspects of prevention policy, however, is marked by a lack of coherent strategy and political leadership. Looking ahead, a clearer political commitment on behalf of the Chancellery is necessary to avoid various institutional actors losing themselves in interdepartmental rivalries and thus hindering the implementation of the Action Plan. Besides the Chancellery, a chief responsibility accrues to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has been responsible for the management of interdepartmental coordination since 2004. A change in party-political leadership of the Foreign Ministry resulted in a relative loss of interest in crisis prevention. The lack in leadership has, in turn, favoured individual units’ protectionism over their areas of authority rather than a more active coordination. Interdepartmental coordination mechanisms created since 2004, such as the Steering Committee, have been emptied of their political force due to a lack of engagement on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Affairs. Reform attempts to allocate more power to the Committee by linking it directly to the Minister or the Chancellery have been unsuccessful.

Further, the continuing lack of harmonised crisis indicators renders existing early warning mechanisms more of a political ambition than a reality.

In the words of an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, truly preventive action occurs only within 1 to 2 per cent of all cases of intervention that use the funds and structures dedicated to preventive goals.
This study undertook a comparison of approaches to crisis and conflict prevention for four countries (France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany). We sought to identify similarities and differences in the policy approaches of these countries at three different levels:

- First, we compared each government’s conceptual and strategic approach to prevention through an analysis of key documents dedicated to prevention and stabilisation.
- Second, we analysed comparatively the capacity of governments to develop mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination in order to effectively implement such an approach.
- Third, we looked at the type of civilian and military instruments available to governments to take preventive action, paying particular attention to early warning mechanisms and rapid reaction instruments.

The analysis was performed with a particular consideration of the role envisaged by each country for defence and the armed forces.

7.1. While varying in their specific strategic positions, all four countries tend towards long-term, civilian-led prevention activities

7.1.1. National policies balance short- and long-term goals, with a preference towards stabilisation interventions

All states examined in this study have many instruments at their disposal for both short- and long-term prevention. However, over the last decade all countries under review made similar choices to prioritise security through a long-term stabilisation approach. For the UK and the US in particular, this lesson is a clear result of common commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The German strategic approach similarly denotes a preference for structural over short-term prevention, following German involvement in the NATO bombing in Kosovo in 1999. The French approach shares Germany’s focus on longer-term structural prevention, while also including a more readily deployable apparatus for preventive deployments of pre-positioned forces in specific situations of tension (‘hot’ prevention).

All four countries emphasise the importance of an effective interdepartmental approach. They also support strengthened international cooperation through multilateral organisations such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU to achieve a comprehensive approach to both upstream and downstream crisis prevention.
In Germany, the 2004 *Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding* action plan particularly highlights the goal of a comprehensive approach to crisis prevention. As of 2012, the implementation of the action plan remained incomplete, however. Diplomatic action is confined to funding short-term missions and projects. The transition between short-term activities and long-term commitment remains difficult. There are currently no military doctrines specifically in relation to prevention.

UK crisis and conflict prevention is detailed in three key documents published between 2010 and 2011. The *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, adopted in 2011, is the only joint strategic document of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Development. It focuses on the importance of stabilising fragile states and stresses the importance of concerted international action. The National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security Review highlight the growing role of the military in the reform of the security sector. Once published, the Defence Strategy commitments currently in development will complement the UK’s doctrinal base on this topic.

In the United States, the *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Development Agency and the *Quadrennial Defence Review* released by the Pentagon, both adopted in 2010, devote a significant part of their analysis to the crisis and conflict prevention policy of the US government. The QDR recognises the vital role of preventive action while enhancing the perception of the military that preventive action is primarily a civil prerogative, and that the responsible bodies should be strengthened adequately. According to the QDR, the primary role of defence is in the area of security sector reform. Military doctrine also incorporates the goals of prevention and articulates the military role in the prevention of mass atrocities. The QDDR is a comprehensive overview of the various facets of US preventive action, considering the role of diplomacy and development in the full range of short- and long-term prevention.

### 7.1.2. There is a clear preference for civil over military prevention activities

Taking into account prevention positions across all Ministries of Defence and national strategic documents, it is possible to identify a clear trend. Defence officials in all four countries favour a strengthening of civil over military preventive activities in order to avoid military mobilisation, loss of lives and often expensive and long-running commitments. All strategic defence documents also emphasise the leading role of civilian actors across the spectrum of preventive activities and long-term stabilisation efforts.

All defence ministries concerned also consider the triple role of defence in prevention:

1. Before a crisis erupts, defence can contribute to intelligence and early warning.
2. After a crisis, i.e. at the end of an intervention, the role of defence is to guarantee a secure environment for the implementation of civilian and inter-ministerial instruments at the political, economic and social level.
3. Before or after a crisis, strengthening the capacities of a sovereign country is a focal point for any successful structural/long-term effort in prevention. For defence, this means first and foremost delivering training for local forces.
The French, British, American and German strategies are in agreement on the fact that strengthening core functions of a fragile state, and the relationship between society and the state, are key enablers to allow a state to manage societal disputes in the long term.

Strategic attitudes towards military involvement vary

A noteworthy distinction exists between the countries analysed in terms of the level of military involvement in overall strategic positioning and hence defence policy. While France, the United Kingdom and the United States have pre-positioned forces, Germany has none. These forces are used very differently from country to country. According to the White Paper on National Defence, France seems more willing to engage in preventive actions than its British and American counterparts. In order to show its presence in a geographical area of strategic interest, the French military favours short-term preventive action, including deployment of pre-positioned forces and establishment of short-term missions. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, is not overly inclined to use its strength in preventive deployments, mainly because of the symbolism and heavy political weight that a military mobilisation carries. While our American interlocutors were not explicit about this issue, it is possible to observe significant preventive deployment activity within US military engagements since the end of the Cold War. British and American pre-positioned forces are also used for intelligence gathering and analysis as well as for training security forces.

7.1.3. The level of personnel and funding dedicated to prevention varies across countries under review

Before evaluating various national policy approaches, it is necessary to ascertain the extent to which political will is actually backed by the hiring of qualified personnel and the necessary financial resources.

Only the UK and US have clear personnel structures dedicated to prevention efforts

The UK is undoubtedly the most advanced country in the development of national structures designed to enable and sustain prevention efforts. The British Stabilisation Unit includes a body of experts dedicated exclusively to the management of the British prevention policy. To a certain extent, the UK model has been emulated by the United States Government, which created the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).

France and Germany, however, do not have structures specifically dedicated to prevention within their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. In France, prevention is managed by three services within the MAEE (Directorate General of Political Affairs, Department of Globalisation, and Directorate for European Union), while the Division for UN Affairs within the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs administers a variety of issues related to the United Nations in addition to prevention efforts.

The United Kingdom, the United States and Germany have also established rapid reaction structures such as the US Civilian Response Corps (3,250 civilian experts), the UK Civilian Stabilisation Group (about

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800 civilian experts) or the German experts trained by the Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF) (1,360 civilian experts). This type of civilian rapid response structure is currently lacking in France. An institutional unit composed of prevention experts and enhanced by a rapid reaction component enables the monitoring of unstable areas and the possibility of rapid deployment in response to immediate needs of an impending crisis.

The UK appears to have the highest level of funds dedicated specifically to prevention activities

We evaluated the funds dedicated exclusively to the prevention and stabilisation which have been allocated to the British, American and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs (See Figure 7.1). It should be noted that all states concerned also indirectly contribute to preventive efforts through many other budget lines that were not considered in this study. We therefore focused on spending for prevention by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and excluded bilateral cooperation budgets of the Ministries of Defence, as well as the budgets of the Ministries of Development.

**Figure 7.1: Comparison of UK, US and German funds specifically dedicated to prevention and stabilisation (in euros)**

![Chart showing comparison of UK, US, and German funds for prevention and stabilisation]

Source: Official national budgets, United Kingdom, USA, Germany (2011–2013)

This summarised budget comparison reveals that the UK has an instrument specifically dedicated to prevention, which is supported by the highest expenditure among the states considered, highlighting the UK’s political commitment to prevention. It should be noted that, unlike the budget lines in other countries, the UK fund includes a contingency fund for peacekeeping missions to be used if the primary fund is exhausted. In 2011/2012 these funds for peacekeeping operations were about 76 million GBP, or about €95 million.
It should be noted that a broader consideration of prevention-related funds (i.e. taking account of all funds for peacekeeping missions or security sector reforms) would undoubtedly make the United States the strongest funder of prevention.

7.1.4. A comprehensive prevention approach faces bureaucratic challenges to inter-ministerial coordination

Following institutional reforms to facilitate development of a comprehensive and interministerial prevention approach, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emerges as the key leader of prevention and stabilisation efforts in all four countries reviewed. All countries analysed also created dedicated interdepartmental coordination structures to facilitate a comprehensive approach to prevention. The success of these structures is generally mixed, with most institutions struggling to establish their authority within their respective national bureaucratic machinery.

An exception to this overall trend is the UK Stabilisation Unit, which has received the political support needed to consolidate its role. The American CSO, created at the end of 2011, might benefit from such support in the future; however, the experiences of its institutional predecessor, the S/CRS, are not encouraging. These new structures often face challenges in implementing interdepartmental coordination. Generally these are due to a lack of political leadership that undermines their authority in the face of established divisions of labour across ministries.

The structures created in France, Germany and the United States have, without exception, been undermined by interdepartmental rivalries since shortly after their launch. The French government created a ministerial task force in late 2009 within the MAE as part of the implementation of an interdepartmental strategy for civil-military management of external crises. This task force is very similar to the Steering Committee for Crisis Prevention [Ressortkreis Zivile Krisenprävention] of the German government, established in 2004 and chaired by the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) through a High Representative at Ambassador level. Both entities suffer from a lack of influence within government. The French task force never managed to assert its place in the French system and therefore currently does not have a major role in governmental prevention efforts. In Germany, the post of High Representative has not been reappointed by the AA since 2010, thus depriving the German Steering Committee of its political leadership.

The United Kingdom created the Stabilisation Unit in 2004, attached to the Building Stability Overseas Strategy Board (BSOS). Since 2012, the Stabilisation Unit has been officially responsible for the coordination of various interdepartmental contributions to prevention and stabilisation missions. Its track record appears positive overall.

The United States created a series of institutional structures for prevention and stabilisation: an entire directorate within the Department of State was created in 2004 under the name of S/CRS Office. It was restructured and renamed to CSO in 2011. The difficulties faced by these structures in establishing their position in the American administration should not minimise the fact that the S/CRS at the time employed about 50 employees compared with 12 in the equivalent French structure. In addition, the Civilian Response Corps, which lies at the heart of the American civil rapid reaction mechanism, is the largest national organisation of its kind. In light of the past experiences of the S/CRS office,
interdepartmental coordination work conducted by the CSO office will remain one of the biggest challenges for this structure.

Exceptions to bureaucratic rivalry are the special unit formed within the German government, which is responsible for stabilisation in Afghanistan (not prevention in the strict sense of the term), within the Chancellery and the Atrocities Prevention Board recently established by the United States Government, which reports directly to the White House. It thus appears that preventive action benefits from proximity to power due to the possibility of rapid decision-making and effective mobilisation of rapid response structures.

A clear distinction emerges between stated policies, often advocating the implementation of an interdepartmental and global strategy, and a political reality in which a lack of political leadership systematically undermines any attempts at interdepartmental coordination.

7.1.5. Prevention instruments and lessons learned

This section compares the three main instruments of short- and long-term prevention that we have identified in France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. Table 7.1 delivers a comparative overview of the instruments analysed in this study.

Early warning mechanisms suffer from a lack of interdepartmental coordination and political weight

The lack of political leadership in the field of crisis and conflict prevention is reflected very clearly in the lack of unified early warning systems within the administrations of France, Germany and, to some extent, the United States.

France

The French Government does not believe that France should develop its own formal list of fragile states. Nevertheless, the government defines geographic regions of strategic priority, as do the United Kingdom and the United States. While its institutional authority remains weak, the SGDSN provides mission watch, warning, monitoring and forecasting of international crises and conflicts. Beyond such collection and dissemination of information, political decisions about which preventive actions should be pursued remain largely ad hoc.

UK

Among the cases studied, the United Kingdom is perhaps the only country where early warning structures are consistent to the point of deserving to be called ‘mechanisms’. Three instruments are available to the Building Stability Overseas Strategy Board:

1. The early warning mechanism develops an overview of countries at risk of political and economic instability; this watch cell produces an Early Warning Report twice a year. On the basis of this report, a political decision is made whether or not to add it as a priority on the agenda of the National Security Council.

2. A watch list reviewed annually examines more remote countries considered unstable and representing an important UK strategic interest.
3. Each year, the Steering Group of the BSOS publishes the analysis and an Annual Horizon Scan that informs the early warning mechanism.

The United Kingdom is also the only state studied that has successfully developed a range of intelligence products specifically dedicated to prevention and covering all necessary time horizons. The UK is also the only state to have created an effective hierarchical chain of early warning instruments specifically dedicated to the prevention of crises and directly related to decision-making.

**United States**

United States effective early warning structures remain close to the President and aggregate conventional threats with the dangers arising from fragile states. The Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs), which summarise information from all US services, are provided on a daily basis to the President of the United States. PDBs nevertheless remain focused on the short term and therefore do not promote preventive action themselves. This institutional and political fault reduces the chances of acting truly preventively, interdepartmentally and systematically. Other existing instruments remain confined to the institutional actors directly concerned. Interdepartmental or ‘interagency’ coordination is as much a problem in the US government as it can be in the German federal government.

It should also be noted that the CSO, dedicated to prevention and comparable to the UK Stabilisation Unit, has begun to articulate a strategy to scale its commitments and set geographical priorities.

**Germany**

In Germany, early warning to take preventive action is primarily managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the department VN-02 UN), which identifies emerging crises in close cooperation with its embassies and with regional divisions of the Department. This monitoring system is split into similar mechanisms within the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Defence, each using its own indicators to classify the degree of destabilisation or weakening. As with the diversity of US information sources, this multiplication of warning systems denotes a lack of political leadership within the German prevention response. The selection of countries with which the German government chooses to engage, as well as the financing and implementation of prevention engagement, is largely determined by the Bureau VN-02 Auswärtiges Amt. A definition of regional priorities is present, but it seems fluid. It remains uncertain whether this strategic vagueness reflects the German government’s difficulty in formulating strategic priorities rooted in its historical legacy or whether it corresponds to a lack of political will/ability to define regions of strategic and economic interest for the German government.

**Civil and military rapid reaction instruments vary in their form and sustainability**

The United Kingdom, the United States and Germany have developed civil rapid reaction instruments as well as funds for the rapid financing of preventive activities accompanying civilian deployments if necessary. The United Kingdom and the United States also have rapid military deployment capabilities that Germany possesses only indirectly through its contributions to EU Battlegroups or NATO Response Forces. France maintains military rapid deployment capabilities but does not seem to have developed mechanisms for civilian rapid response.
The United Kingdom has developed several rapid reaction instruments, notably the Civilian Stabilisation Group. This entity is directed by the Stabilisation Unit and consists of approximately 800 deployable civilian experts and about 200 members of the Civil Service Stabilisation Framework. Their skills include project management, communication, infrastructure reconstruction, justice, disarmament, economics, law enforcement, institutional reform, agriculture, health and public finance.

The United Kingdom also has military rapid response capabilities, but the extent to which military forces should be involved in prevention (with the exception of humanitarian aid/evacuation) is still a controversial issue.

In the United States, CSO’s rapid reaction instruments include dedicated prevention teams who are deployable at short notice and focused on specific countries (Country Teams) in conjunction with the Civilian Response Corps. Added to this dual expertise, the high mobility of the CSO – who regularly travels to liaise with stakeholders and communities in at-risk countries – can compensate for embassies’ lack of expertise in prevention. Fieldwork is actually favoured by the CSO, which has used its embassies as pivots for action. Nevertheless, the transition to a more sustained effort seems to remain problematic.

The VN-02 Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages the IFA-Zivik programme that provides access to rapid project funding of up to €250,000. The priority for the German government is to fund projects led by NGOs, bilateral grants or contributions to trust funds managed by international organisations. The German government particularly supports the creation of local structures for early warning. Germany has also developed a pool of civilian experts through the Centre for International Peace Operations [Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, ZIF] by which the government trains and dispatches its top experts to international missions. Unlike entities such as the American CSO, however, the Office VN-02 is not a structure dedicated to prevention and does not consistently monitor fragile regions or countries of strategic interest. Germany seems to share US challenges regarding the transition of rapid response activities to more sustained development commitments.

Efforts aimed at reforming the security sector are shared between the DCSD, which plays a major role, and the mission for the democratic governance of the DGM. DCSD is responsible for military cooperation and police and civil security, while the mission for democratic governance is concerned with justice training. The activities of the DCSD do not always seem to respond to a broader SSR strategy. The French approach to SSR thus remains ad hoc.

The UK also contributes to prevention efforts by strengthening regulatory functions. A British peace support team is based in Nairobi, Kenya, working throughout East Africa, and seeks to develop the
capacity of the reserve forces for UN missions in Liberia and Somalia as well as African Union missions. Similar teams are located in Pretoria (British Peace Support Team in South Africa) and Sierra Leone (International Military Assistance Training Team).

United States
While for the Fiscal Year 2002 about 94 per cent of all assistance programmes to SSR were funded by the Department of State, in 2008 about 50 per cent were funded by the Pentagon. The primary role of the Department of State in SSR is to facilitate the development of SSR deployment strategies with the Pentagon and the Department of Justice. The Department of State has traditionally managed several efforts to help reform the security sector. These efforts include the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, which aims to train and educate military and foreign police, and the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, created in December 2011 and now funded by the Global Security Contingency Fund.

Germany
On the issue of Security Sector Reform, an Interdepartmental Working Group was created within the Steering Committee composed of representatives of the Chancellery, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Defence and Development. The working group was tasked by the Steering Committee to develop a framework concept for SSR aimed at improving efficiency, coherence and interdepartmental coordination between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, Interior and Development. This concept was adopted in October 2006. In addition to training tasks, it stresses the importance of effective democratic control of security structures and improved fiscal transparency. The contribution of German forces to SSR includes aid for military training, deployment of advisors, institutionalisation of military contacts, military dialogue, and support equipment (quadrennial programmes adopted by the Bundestag).

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422 Stares (2009, 12); Adams (2009, 7–8).
### Table 7.1: Comparison of different instruments to prevent countries scrutinised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments of short-term prevention</th>
<th>Instruments of long-term prevention</th>
<th>Evaluation of preventive action mechanism</th>
<th>Special instruments</th>
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<td><strong>Rapid reaction instruments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil</td>
<td>military</td>
<td>Security Sector Reforms</td>
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<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Financial</td>
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<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>DCSD, DGM</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>(Priority Solidarity Fund)</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>Civilian Stabilisation Group</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Forces / preventive deployment</td>
<td>Forces pre-positioned</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Fund for Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung – BMVg (FueS))</td>
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</table>


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